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The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date,
therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.
(Effectivity is immediately upon ratification)

Gonzales v. COMELEC

Nature of power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto: not inherent
power of Congress but of the people; constituent power of Congress

Tolentino v. COMELEC

The condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same convention
must be submitted in a “single election” or plebiscite.

Imbong v. COMELEC

Competence of Congress acting as Constituent Assembly: Authority to call constitutional

convention as Constituent Assembly in enacting implementing details.

Santiago v. COMELEC

Right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative would remain entombed in a cold niche until Congress provides for its
implementation. Section 2 of Article XVII is not self-executing.

Lambino v. COMELEC

Essence of people's initiative: (1) people must author; (2) they must sign the proposal; (3)
proposal is embodied in petition


Bacani vs NACOCO

• The mere fact that the Government happens to be a major stockholder of a corporation does
not make it a public corporation.
• Distinction between constituent and ministrant functions.


• Distinction between constituent and ministrant functions – obsolete.

• Government has to provide for general welfare.

Gov. of the Phil. Islands vs. Monte de Piedad


• Doctrine of Parens Patriae (state as guardian of the people)

• Transfer of sovereignty; effect on laws:
- abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the substituted sovereign
(political law).
- great body of municipal law regarding private and domestic rights continue in force until
abrogated or changed by new ruler.

Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh

• Continuity of Law: Law, once established, continues until changed by some competent
legislative power (not changed by mere change of sovereignty)
• All acts and proceedings of the 3 gov. depts. of a de facto government are good and valid.
• Kinds of De facto government:
(1) de facto proper – government obtained by force or voice of the majority
(2) paramount force – by military forces who invade the territory
(3) independent government – established by inhabitants through insurrection
• Republic of the Philippines (during Japanese occupation) was a de facto government.

People vs Gozo

• Principle of Auto-limitation: Extent of Philippine sovereignty over American bases –

Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory.

Laurel vs Misa

• Nature of Allegiance to sovereign: Absolute and permanent

• Effect of enemy occupation: sovereignty of the government – not transferred to occupier

Ruffy v Chief of Staff

• The rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded
or held in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil
inhabitants of the occupied territory and not for the enemies in arms.


The Holy See v Rosario, Jr.

• Pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is

granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any
real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission

Sanders v Veridiano

• Mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the laws of public officers and doctrine of
state immunity
• Doctrine of state immunity applicable also to other states.

Republic v Sandoval

• State cannot be held liable for the deaths that followed the incident; liability should fall on the
public officers who committed acts beyond their authority
• 3 instances when suit is proper:
1. when sued by its name
2. when unincorporated government agency is sued
3. when the suit is against a government employee but liability belongs to the government

Festejo v Fernando

• Officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable and maybe sued as any other
citizen and held answerable for whatever injury

Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals

Not all government entities whether corporate or not are immune from suits. Immunity from
suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.

Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Judge Firme

The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of
the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. It has already been
remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such
entities to be sued, the state merely gives the claimants the right to show the defendant was
not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was inflicted or that the case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimants cannot recover.

Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez

Municipal funds in possession of municipal and provincial treasurers are public funds exempt
from execution. Municipal funds are held in trust for the people intended and used for the
accomplishments of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created and that to
subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat
and in some instance destroy said purposes.

Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals

When a municipality fails or refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final
money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in
order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and
the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds.

USA vs Guinto

- A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.

Veterans Manpower vs CA

- The state is deemed to have given tacitly its consent to be sued when it enters into a
contract. However, it does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions.

The Merritt vs Gov’t of the Phil

- By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives remedy to enforce a pre-
existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense.

Amigable vs. Cuenca

The government, when it takes away a property from a private land owner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit. This doctrine cannot be used in perpetrating
injustice to a citizen.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

- When the state files an action, it divests itself of the sovereign character and shed its
immunity form suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant.

Fundamental Principles and State Policies

Section 1

Villavicencio v. Lukban:

Held: Mayor’s act unconstitutional. It was not authorized by any law or ordinance. “Our
government is a government of laws and not of men.”

Section 2

Kuroda v. Jalandoni:

think Japanese Lieutenat-General charged before the military commission.

Held: The Philippines can adopt the rules and regulations laid down on the Hague and
Geneva Conventions notwithstanding that it is not a signatory thereto. It embodied generally
accepted principles of international law binding upon all states.

Agustin v. Edu:

think triangular reflectorized early warning devices.

Held: Legislative enactment is not necessary in order to authorize the issuance of LOI
prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized early warning devices. This is also an
illustration of generally accepted principles of international law (Pacta sunt servanda).

Ichong v. Hernandez:

think Retail Trade Nationalization Law which is against the principle of Pacta sunt
servanda.Held: the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is not unconstitutional because it was
passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through the
medium of a treaty.

Gonzales v. Hechanova:

think rice importation. Statute vs. Treaty.

Held: Municipal law was upheld over international law on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers under the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court. In this case, the
contracts adverted to are NOT treaties.

Section 6

Aglipay vs. Ruiz

-There is no violation of the principle of the separation of church and state. The issuance and
sale of the stamps in question may be said to be linked with an event of a religious
character, but the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic Church, was not the
aim and purpose of the government. The idea behind the issuance of the postage stamps
was to attract tourists to our country and not primarily the religious event.

Section 10

Almeda vs. CA

-There exists a tenant’s right of redemption in sugar and coconut lands. Pursuant to
Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, it recognizes share tenancy in sugar lands which is
in consonance with the State’s promotion of social justice wherein it may “regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably
diffuse property…ownership and profits.”

Ondoy .vs. Ignacio

-The principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, not equality. The
Court recognized the right of the petitioner to the claim of compensation because her son
was shown to have died while “in the actual performance of his work.” To strengthen the
constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, The Court made mention that
“as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to
secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the stricter

Salonga vs. Farrales

-The plea of social justice of the plaintiff cannot be considered because it was shown that no
contract, either to sell or of sale, was ever perfected between him and the defendant. It must
be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property
owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice

consecrated in our Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give
them to another who is not entitled thereto.

Section 16


The immediate response to the demands of necessities of protecting vital public interests
gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies of the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16. As a constitutionally guaranteed
right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but the
consonance with the declared policy of the state to protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.

Section 19


BOI committed grave abuse of discretion because it repudiates the independent policy of
government to run its affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with
the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of national resources, the State full control
over the development and utilization of contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investment in accordance to national
goals and priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood.

Section 21


Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private
lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Private
rights must yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored
justification, as in the case of the policed power, that the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.

Section 25


Local Autonomy under 1987 Constitution simply means the decentralization and does not
make the local governments sovereign within the State or an imperium imperio.


Decentralization of administration is merely delegation of administrative powers to the LGUs

in order to broaden the base of governmental power. Decentralization of power is the
abdication by the national government powers.

Section 30

Legspi vs CSC

The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is self-executing without

the need for any ancillary act of legislation.

Valmonte vs de Villa

The constitutional right to information is limited on matters of public concern and is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. However, although citizens are
afforded the right to information, the Constitution does not accord them the right to compel
the custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their
desire to acquire information of public concern.

Aquino-sarmiento vs morato

When a committee or board is created as public in its very existence and character such
MTRCB, there can be no valid claim to privacy.


Sanidad v. COMELEC

On whether the case is justiciable

Political questions are associated with the wisdom of the legality of a particular act. Where
the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter
is definitely justiciable or non-political. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended,
the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

On whether the President may propose Constitutional amendments

If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly
to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but an adjunct, although peculiar, to its
gross legislative power.

(Note that at the time Prez. Marcos had legislative powers and there was no legislative
department at the time)

Daza v. Singson

Where the legality or validity of the act is in question and not the wisdom of the act, the Court
may take jurisdiction and decide on the acts’ validity. Even in political questions the Court
may take jurisdiction under the expanded judicial power extended to it by Art 8 Sec. 1 of the

(“Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of Government.”)

Delegation of Powers

Garcia v. Exec. Secretary

The Congress is may authorize the President to fix tariff rates and duties subject to such
limitations and restrictions that they may impose. This is expressly provided for in Art 6, Sec
28 par 2 of the Constitution.

Araneta v. Dinglasan

The delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President may be limited by

Congress subject to restrictions it may provide. Congress may withdraw the delegated power
at any time. In this case, the emergency power was withdrawn at the time Congress became
able to exercise its legislative duties again.

In Re: Manzano

The committee performs administrative function* which under Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution prohibits members of the SC and other courts established by law to be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. To quote CJ
Fernando in Garcia vs. Macaraig, he said that “while the doctrine of separation of powers is
a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrine application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required
to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character.”

• Administrative functions are those which involves the regulation and control the conduct
and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislative or such as are devolved upon
the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

The Electoral Commission is an independent, impartial, and non-partisan tribunal. The sole
power to determine contests regarding the elections, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly has been transferred in totality to the Electoral
Commission. Its power is clear, complete, and exclusive.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all three branches of government

specifically in the case of the legislative. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced and not what the law shall be since the
ascertainment of the latter subject is within the prerogative and determination of the
legislature. Delegation of legislative power is permitted and valid provided that is passes the
two accepted tests- completeness test and the sufficient standard test. The reason for such
delegation is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Casibang vs. Aquino

While under the 1973 Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assemble as well as elective provincial and city officials (par 2, Sec. 2, Art. XII-C, 1973
Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal
elective positions. The issue still remains a justiciable question and not a political question*.
Hence, the courts have the jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case.

Political questions, in its ordinary parlance, refers to the question of policy. It refers to those
questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity to, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been vested to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with the issues dependent upon the
wisdom, and not the legality of a particular measure.

Rodriguez v. Gella

Act No. 671 was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation of the delegation of
emergency powers. It is presumed that the National Assembly intended it to be for a limited
period. Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546, which was anchored to the said Act are
declared null and void and the respondents are ordered to desist from appropriating,
releasing and allotting expending funds set aside therein.

People v. Vera

Act No. 4221 is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative power. The powers of the
government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs:
the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of the departments of the government
derives its authority from the Constitution.


Tobias v. Abalos

The creation of a new congressional district is but a natural consequence of a municipality’s

conversion into a city. The Constitution provides that “a city should have a population of at
least 250,000” and is entitled to at least 1 representative.

Mariano Jr. v. Comelec

As decided in Tobias v. Abalos, the Constitution provides that the compositions of the House
should not be more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The natural result
in the creation of a new legislative from a special law whose purpose is to convert a
municipality into a city is sanctioned by the Constitution.

Montejo v. Comelec

The Comelec has no power to reapportion districts but only to make minor adjustments.

Republic Act No. 7941 “An act providing for the election of the party-list representatives
through the party-list system and appropriating funds therefrom.

Section 13

Zandueta vs. De la Costa

When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a
judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to
preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition of another
Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to
be entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his
new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased
in the discharge of the functions thereof.

Section 14

Puyat vs. De Guzman

No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case
wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office,or before any administrative body.

Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his
term of office.

He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called
to act on account of his office.

Section 16

Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.

Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

Avelino vs. Cuenco

The constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president should not be
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.

When the constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, it
does not mean all of its members. Majority of all the members constitute the House. Hence,
12 senators who unanimously voted constitute a majority of 23 senators (10 walked out, 1
out of the country).


The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior as conferred upon by the
Constitution. Also, Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension.


Sandiganbayan has the authority to suspend a district representative in violation of the Anti-
Graft Law as it is being imposed on the representative NOT as a member of the House.


The Court may not go beyond the the recitals of the legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journal are clear and explicit. To inquire the
veracity of journals, when they are clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and
spirit of the laws, to invade the coordinate and independent department of the government
and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.


Enrolled bill doctrine- the term “urea formaldehyde” is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by the Congress and approved by the President.

Section 18

* Daza vs Singson
- The sense of the Constitution is that the membership in the COA must always reflect political
alignments and must adjust to changes. Nowhere, however, in the Constitution require that the party
must be a registered party.

* Coseteng vs Mitra
- Endorsement of other representatives (in COA) cannot be counted in favor of a representative if
they do not belong to the latter's party.

* Guingona vs Gonzales
- Full complement of 12 seats in COA is not mandatory
Rounding out 0.5 to 1 is unconstitutional as it would deprive other parties of seats in COA.

Sec. 21:

* Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

- Investigation was not in aid of legislation where it merely aims at determining whether a law is
violated. To allow such investigation is to violate separation of powers.

* Arnault vs Nazareno

- Power of Investigation includes power to punish a contumacious witness for contempt. Experience
has shown that mere requests for information are frequently unavailing.
- “In aid of legislation” - not difficult to satisfy. Necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action is
determined by the sum total of information to be gathered as a result of investigation, and not by a
fraction of such information elicited from single question. It is sufficient that the question is germane
to the subject matter of inquiry. There is no need for it to be directly related or connected to possible

* Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability

- Exception to legislative inquiry: Executive Privilege (which is extended to all close advisors of the
- It is wrong for Senate to punish one for contempt where executive privilege is properly invoked.
- Senate's mistakes in the case at bar: (1) invitations to Neri did not include possible statute; (2)
contempt order lacks required # of votes; (3) Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive
privilege and instead dismissed Neri's explanation; (4) rules of procedure on inquiries in aid of
legislation – not duly published.

Sec. 21 and 22:

* Senate vs Ermita
- When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes, it is not imperative.
- The “oversight function” of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
- Appearance of department heads in question hour is discretionary.
- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE – privilege based on doctrine of separation of powers, exempting
executive from disclosure requirements where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of
highly important executive responsibilities. It covers “categories of information” not of persons.

Sec. 24:

* Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

- The phrase “originate exclusively” does not refer to the appropriations law but to the appropriations
bill. It is sufficient that the House of Rep. initiated the passage of the bill.

* Alvarez vs Guingona
- A bill of local application, such as one asking for the conversion of a municipality into a city, is
deemed to have originated from the House provided that the bill of the House was filed prior to the
filing of the bill in the Senate even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own version.
- The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill does not contravene
the constitutional requirement as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.

Sec. 25:

* Garcia vs Mata
- RIDER – a provision not related to the appropriation act (is prohibited)

* Demetria vs Alba
- transfer of appropriations – prohibited

* PHILCONSA vs Enriquez
- The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive.
- Case at bar: Congressmen are allowed to determine the necessity of realignment, but House
Speaker or Senate Pres. will have to approve the realignment before items are realigned.
- Case at bar: Chief of Staff may not be give authority to realign appropriations.

Sec. 26:

* Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

- Imposition of tax is sufficiently related to the regulation of video industry where the title is
comprehensive enough to include such subject (taxation) related to the general purpose (creation of
Videogram Board)

* Phil. Judges Assoc. vs Prado

- Repeal/Withdrawal of franking privilege is germane to the object of the title, which is to create
postal service system. Hence, the same is embraced in the title/

* Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance [Sec. 26 (1)]

- Withdrawing tax exemptions granted before is embraced in the subject of the title which is to widen
the tax base

* Tan vs Del Rosario

- 3 purposes of Sec. 3(1), Art. VI:
(a) to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation
(b) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions which might be
(c) to fairly apprise the people of the subjects of legislation

* Tobias vs Abalos
- Provision providing for a separate legislative district is germane to the subject of the bill creating
the City of Mandaluyong

* Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance [Sec. 26 (2)]

- IF it is only the printing that is being dispensed by presidential certification, the time saved would be
so negligible as to be of any use in ensuring immediate enactment. (Printing and Readings on
separate days – both dispensable by pres. certification)
- Where no Senators controverted the reality of the factual basis of certification, growing budget
deficit may be considered as basis for presidential certification. Senators, in responding to the call of
the Pres. by voting on the bill, manifested their belief in the urgent need for certification of the bill.

Sec. 27:

* Tolentino vs Sec. of Finance

- It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision not
found in either House Bill or Senate Bill. (Amendment in the nature of substitution is warranted as
long as amendment is germane to the subject matter of the bill)
- to disregard the enrolled bill is to disregard the respect due the other 2 departments.

* Gonzales vs Macaraig
- Pressident can veto an item
- Doctrine of inappropriate provisions – a provision that is constitutionally inappropriate may be
singled out for veto if it is not an appropriation or revenue item. An inappropriate provision in an
appropriations bill is an item in iself.

* Bengzon vs Drilon
- President's power to veto an item does not grant authority to veto part of an item (or provisions).
- President cannot veto a law or repeal a law.

* PHILCONSA vs Enriquez
- Provisions that are germane to the specific appropriations cannot be vetoed.
- Requirement of Congressional approval for release of funds for modernization of AFP can be
incorporated in separate bill and hence inappropriate. It was properly vetoed.
- Executive Impoundment – refusal of the President to spend funds already allocated by Congress
for a specific purpose (the duty to implement the law includes the duty to desist from implementing it
when implementation would prejudice public interest). The Court, however, did not rule on this issue,
and rather declared the provision concerning benefits of CAFGUs as an inappropriate provision.

Sec. 28:

* Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pilipinas vs Tan

- a tax is considered uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where
the subject may be found.

* Province of Abra vs Judge Hernando

* Abra Valley College vs Aquino

- Where a lot is not used exclusively for educational purpose, it may be taxed if the use is not
incidental to the attainment of main purpose.

* Tan vs Del Rosario

- Uniformity of taxation means:
(a) standards that are used are substantial and not arbitrary
(b) categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose
(c) law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions
(d) classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class

Sec. 29:

* Pascual vs Sec. of Public Works

- Appropriation for a road owned by a private individual is invalid because it is not for a public
purpose. Subsequent donation did not validate the law because validity of a statute depends upon
the power of Congress at the time of its approval and not upon subsequent events.

* Aglipay vs Ruiz
- Appropriation for special stamp issue is valid as it is not specifically made to benefit a religious
denomination but for a public purpose. The benefit acquired by the Church is incidental only.

* Guingona vs Carague
- The Automatic Reappropriation Law for servicing foreign debts is valid because the amount is fixed
by the parameters of the law itself which requires the simple act of looking into the books of
Treasure (the amount is determinable).
- Budgetary process:
(a) budget preparation
(b) legislative authorization
(c) budget execution
(d) budget accountability

* Osmena vs Orbos
- Increase of petroleum prices to resolve the Terminal Fund Balance deficit is valid as it was a valid
exercise of police power.

* PHILCONSA vs Enriquez
- Pork barrel provisions in the annual budget allowing members of Congress to perform executive
function of spending money appropriated are not in violation of separation of powers because
Congress itself had specified the uses of the fund and the power given was merely recommendatory
to the President who could approve or disapprove the recommendation.

Sec. 30:

* First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs CA

- B.P. Blg. 129 granting exclusive appellate jurisdiction to CA over the decisions of quasi-judicial
bodies is not superseded by Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 providing that decisions of BOI are
appealable to SC because advice and concurrence of SC was not sought.

* Diaz vs CA
- Sec. 10 of EO No. 170 stating “a party adversely affected by a decision of ERB may file a petition
with SC” was superseded by the Constitution stating that jurisdiction of SC cannot be made to
increase without its advice and concurrence.

Sec. 32:

* Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC

- Initiative is entirely the work of electorate; the process of law-making by the people themselves
- Referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or
enacted by a legislative body.
- Case at bar: COMELEC erred in implementing a Resolution when respondents filed petition for
Initiative and not Referendum.


Sec. 1:

* Marcos vs Manglapus
- The President has “residual powers.” The President is more than the sum of specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution.
- What is not part of the legislative and judicial departments is deemed part of the executive.
- The 1987 Constitution provided for a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly
those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power.

* Soliven vs Makasiar
- The privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties free from any
hindrance or distraction considering that being the Chief Executive demands undivided attention.
- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office. There is nothing which prohibits the President to waive this privilege.

* Estrada vs Desierto
- A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit (immunity is only during the tenure)

- Even a sitting President is not immune from suit for non-official acts or from wrongdoing. (Public
office is a public trust. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other

Sec. 13:

* Doromal vs Sandiganbayan
- Sec Sec. 13, Art. VII is applicable in a case where the accused has not signed any document of
any bid of the family corporation of which he is a member, submitted to any government department.
- Case at bar: Petitioner has at least an indirect interest with the transaction with DECS and NMYC.

* Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary

- EO No. 284 is unconstitutional insofar it allows a member of the Cabinet to hold not more than two
positions in the government. (Respondent's contention that Sec. 7, Art. IX-B is an exception would
defeat the obvious legislative intent which is to prohibit cabinet members from holding multiple

* Aytona vs Castillo
- As a rule, once an appointment is issued, it cannot be reconsidered where the appointee has
qualified. Exception: ad interim appointments issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive
(midnight appointments – made for buying votes).

* In re Valenzuela and Vallarta

- Sec. 15 (President shall not make appointments within 2 months prior to the next Presidential
election) is applicable to the members of the Judiciary.
- This sort of appointment is made for partisan considerations.

Sec. 16:

* Binamira vs Garrucho
- Appointment or designation involves exercise of discretion which cannot be delegated. Even if it be
assumed that the power could be exercised by Minister of Tourism, it could be recalled by the
- Designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security
of tenure.

* Sarmiento vs Mison
- 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
(a) heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution
(b) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law
(c) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
(d) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
- Case at bar: Confirmation of COA is not needed in appointment of Commissioner of Bureau of
Customs because a bureau head is not among those within the first group of appointments where
consent of COA is required.

* Bautista vs Salonga

- Confirmation of COA is not needed in appointment of Chairman of Commission of Human Rights

because such appointment is not vested in the President in the Constitution. The President appoints
Chairman of CHR pursuant to EO 163 (CHR Chairman is thus within the 3rd group of officers)

* Quintos-Deles vs Commission of Appointments

- The appointment of Sectoral Representatives requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives may be filled by appointment by the
President by express provision of Sec.7, Article XVIII of the Constitution (hence, sectoral
representatives are within the 1st group of officers)
- Exceptions to those officers within the 1st group: (1) Ombudsman and his deputies, and (2)
members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts.

* Calderon vs Carale
- Confirmation by COA is required only for presidential appointees that are within the 1st group of
officers as mentioned in Sarmiento vs Mison.
- Congress may not expand the list of appointments needing confirmation.
- Case at bar: RA 6715, which requires the COA confirmation in appointments of NLRC Chairman
and Commissioners, transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII. The appointments of NLRC Chairman and
Commissioners do not need COA confirmation because they fall under the 3rd group of officers.

* Tarrosa vs Singson
- affirmed the ruling in Calderon vs Carale
- Case at bar: Appointment of Central Bank Governor does not need COA confirmation.

* Flores vs Drilon
- A law which limits the President to only one appointee is an encroachment to the prerogative of the
President because appointment involves discretion to choose who to appoint.

* Luego vs Civil Service Commission

- CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was
better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.
- The permanent appointment made by the appointing authority may not be reversed by CSC and
call it temporary.

* Pobre vs Mendieta
- The vacancy in the position of Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission cannot be
filled by the Senior Associate Commissioner by operation of law (or by succession) because it will
deprive the President of the power to appoint the Chairman.

Sec. 17

* Drilon vs Lim
- Distinction between power and control:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. if they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide
to do it by himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor merely sees to it that rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify
or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to
conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner except to see to it that the
rules are followed.

(Note) Power of control pertains to power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a
subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute his judgment to that of the
former [Mondano vs Silvosa]

* Villena vs Secretary of the Interior

- Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (alter ego principle) -acts of the Secretaries of Executive
Departments, when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business or unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive
- Case at bar: Secretary of the Interior is invested with the authority to order the investigation of the
charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.

* Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs Pano

- Department heads are President's “men of confidence.” His is the power to appoint them; his, too,
is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Normally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then
is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries.
- Case at bar: The President, through his Executive Secretary, may undo an act of the Director of

* City of Iligan vs Director of Lands

- The President has the power to grant portions of public domain to any government entity like the
City of Iligan because he has control over the Director of Lands, who has direct executive control in
the lease, sale or any form of concession or disposition of the land of public domain.

* Gascon vs Arroyo
- Case at bar: Executive Secretary has the power and authority to enter into the Agreement to
Arbitrate with the ABS CBN as he acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it.

* Kilusan Bayan vs Dominguez

- An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

* Angangco vs Castillo
- The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, but not with regard to those officers or
employees who belong to the classified service for as to them the inherent power cannot be

* NAMARCO vs Arca
- Executive power of control extends to government-owned corporations.

Sec. 18:

* Guazon vs De Villa
- The President has the power to ordain saturation drives. There is nothing in the Constitution which
denies the authority of the Chief Exec. to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising
lawlessness, and alarming communist activities.

* Ruffy vs Chief of Staff

- Courts martial are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the Congress for the
President as Commander in chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein and utilize under his order those of his authorized military

* Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34

- Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions the accused be entitled to a trial. The
trial contemplated by the due process clause is trial by judicial process. Military Commissions are not
courts within the Philippine judicial system. Judicial power is vested only in the courts. Military
commissions pertain to the executive department and are instrumentalities of the President as
commander-in-chief to aid him in enforcing discipline in the armed forces.

* Quilona vs General Court Martial

* Gudani vs Senga
- The President has constitutional authority to prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying
before a legislative inquiry, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence, a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same
time, the Court also holds that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance befoe it of a
military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel
such attendance. Any military officer whom the Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders
have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Sec. 19:

* Torres vs Gonzales
- A judicial pronouncement is not necessary in determining whether the conditions in the pardon are
violated. The determination of whether there is a violations of the conditions rests exclusively in the
sound judgment of the President.

* Monsanto vs Factoran
- Pardon implies guilt. While it relieves the party pardoned from all punitive consequences of his
criminal act, it relieves him from nothing more. It does not, therefore, restore a convicted felon to
public office forfeited by reason of conviction.

* People vs Salle, Jr.

- Pardon may be granted only by final judgment. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending
appeal, executive clemency may not yet be granted. Before an appellant may be granted pardon, he
must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal.

* Garcia vs COA
- President's grant of executive clemency to a person dismissed from his office pursuant to an
administrative case (but where the latter has been acquitted in a criminal case based on the same
facts alleged in the criminal case) entitles the latter to automatic reinstatement and backwages.

* Sabello vs DECS
- Pardon (in a criminal case) frees the individual from all the penalties and disabilities and restores
him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon may restore a person's eligibility to public office, it
does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office.
- [Compare with Garcia vs COA]

* Llamas vs Orbos
- In granting the power of executive clemency, the Constitution does not distinguish between criminal
and administrative cases.

Sec. 18:

* Constantino, Jr. vs Cuisia

- The debt-relief contracts, providing for buy-back and bond-conversion schemes, entered into
pursuant to Financing Program are not beyond the powers granted to the President under Sec. 20,
Art. VII. The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, is that loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. Accordingly, the
contention that buy-back and bond-conversion schemes are neither “loans” nor “guarantees,” and
hence beyond the President’s power to execute, are without merit.

Sec. 21:

* Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading (1961)

- The concurrence of the House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of
treaties which are however distinct and different from executive agreements which may be validly
entered without such concurrence.

* Pimentel, Jr. vs Exec. Sec.

- The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to concurrence of the Senate. The role of the
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent or concurrence to the ratification. Hence, it
is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. This discretion to ratify lies within the President's
competence alone.
- 4 steps in treaty-making process:
(a) negotiation
(b) signing of the treaty (simply a means of authenticating the instrument and a symbol of
good faith)
(c) ratification (formal act by which a statute confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty)
(d) exchange of instruments of ratification
- In the case at bar, the treaty was merely signed.


Sec. 1:
* Santiago vs Bautista
- The courts may not exercise judicial power when there is no applicable law.
- Case at bar: An award of honors to a student by a board of teachers may not be reversed by a
court where the awards are governed by no applicable law.

Daza v Singson

- Even if the issue presented was political in nature, the Court is still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question.

- That where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to
the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."

Mantruste Systems v Court of Appeals

- There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative

agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of
discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

- Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the Asset Privatization Trust
(administrative body), nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the
implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of
assets transferred to it.

Malaga v Penachos, Jr.

- It was previously declared the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or

restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge
these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. On
issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be
prevented by any law (in this case, P.D. No. 605) from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts.

PACU v Secretary of Education

- Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.

(Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit
of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.)

- Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein
however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues
"reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to
avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.

Mariano, Jr. v COMELEC

- Considering that those contingencies mentioned by the petitioners may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue (city of Makati is involved). Worse, they raise this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Macasiano v National Housing Authority

-It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case.

J. Joya v PCGG

- The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper
party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first
two (2) requisites.

- Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done
by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a

Legaspi v Civil Service Commission

- It becomes apparent that when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

-"Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every


Dumlao v COMELEC

- For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. One petitioner does not join other
petitioners in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join the former in his. They,
respectively, contest completely different statutory provisions.

- For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case.

Bugnay Const. and Dev’t. Corp. v Laron

- The doctrine holds that only when the act complained of directly involves an illegal
disbursement of public funds raised by taxation will the taxpayer's suit be allowed. The
essence of a taxpayer's right to institute such an action hinges on the existence of that
requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.

- It is not enough that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest.

Kilosbayan v Guingona, Jr.

- A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise
of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.

- In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed
to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity
of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or

PHILCONSA v Enriquez

- The Senators have legal standing to question the validity of the veto. When a veto was
made in excess of the authority of the President, it impermissibily intrudes into the domain of
the Legislature. A member of Congress can question an act of the Executive which injures
Congress as an institution.

Tatad v Garcia, Jr.

-The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations
allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts
are involved (just like in Bugnay case since no public money was involved).

Oposa v Factoran, Jr.

- CLASS SUIT: The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the

- Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.

- Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors` assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

Lozada v COMELEC

- As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged
that tax money is being illegally spent. It is only when an act complained of, which may
include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public money
that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.
- The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is
that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution. When the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared
in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally
does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.

Kilosbayan v Morato

- The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, seven (7)
members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the
suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any
subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been charges in the membership of the Court,
with the retirement of Justice Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion

and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the
ruling as to petitioners' standing.


Bengzon v Lim

- What is fiscal autonomy? It contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize
their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the
power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding
the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and play plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside

- The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based


Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v Court of Appeals,

- Reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no
business at all.

- The Court with its new membership is not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a
party's case when, after its re-examination, the same calls for a rectification.


Drilon v Lim

- The Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

- In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality
upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the
questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or
both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined
after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of
those who participated in its discussion.

Larranaga v Court of Appeals


(Transfer the venue of the preliminary investigation from Cebu City to Manila because of the
extensive coverage of the proceedings by the Cebu media which allegedly influenced the
people's perception of petitioner's character and guilt.)

- The Court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances
can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. It was previously held that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage in publicity.
- In the case at bar, nothing in the records shows that the tone and content of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of
the DOJ Panel.

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v Court of Appeals

- It is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases paced under its
appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of
expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.

Aruelo v Court of Appeals

- Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.

Javellana v DILG

(Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-
81 does not violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution. Neither the statute nor the
circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the
practice of law.)

- The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe
rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their
public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it.


Maceda v Vasquez

- In the absence of any administrative action taken against a person by the Court with regard
to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

- Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to the Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.

Raquiza v Judge Castaneda, Jr.


- The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented against him
should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent
belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after
due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more so when as in
this case the charges are penal in nature.

('Misconduct' also implies 'a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. It results
that even if respondent were not correct in his legal conclusions, his judicial actuations
cannot be regarded as grave misconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears.)


Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue

- The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant
of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give
substance to equality among the three branches of Government.”


De La Llana v Alba

-Judiciary Act does not violate judicial security of tenure. This Court is empowered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." Thus, it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it
was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.

People v Gacott, Jr.

- To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or
cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative
matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the
Court en banc.

- Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower
courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the
need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the
judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one
year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in


In Re: Manzano

- As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As
public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the landable purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.


Nicos Industrial Corp v Court of Appeals

- The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion
to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending
on its evaluation of a case.

- As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the
merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the
facts and the law on which it is based.

Mendoza v CFI

- What is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear why either
party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any regid
formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and
distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is
necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of
being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs."

- The provision has been held to refer only to decisions of the merits and not to orders of the
trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar. (content of the resolution:
incident in the prosecution of petitioner)

Borromeo v Court of Appeals

- The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its
cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is
patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision
appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the
case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules.
The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.

- When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states
that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision
is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.

- Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice.

Komatsu Industries (Phils.) Inc v Court of Appeals

- It has long been settled that this Court has discretion to decide whether a "minute
resolution" should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case and that a
minute Resolution of dismissal of a Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an
adjudication on the merits of the controversy or subject matter of the Petition. It has been
stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to a Petition for Review is "not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Court's
denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'

Prudential Bank v Castro

- The Constitutional mandate that "no . . . motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be . . . denied without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable in
administrative cases. And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial
and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which
was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis.

-(certification issue) The requirement of a certification refers to decisions to judicial cases

and not to administrative cases. Besides, since the decision was a per curiam decision, a
formal certification is not required.

Oil and Natural Gas Commission v Court of Appeals

- The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not
preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

SECTION 14 (not 16)

Valdez v Court of Appeals

- The (lower) court statement in the decision that a party has proven his case while the other
has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the Constitution and the rules to be
clearly and distinctly stated.
- This Court has said again and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the
factual findings of the lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive.



Aruelo v. CA

The rule of the Commission should prevail if the proceeding is before a Commission. But if
the proceeding is before a court, the Rules of Court prevails. (Sec. 6)

Cua v. Comelec

The 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution. (Sec.7)

Vital-Gozon v. CA

Execution of the Civil Service Commission's decision should have been ordered and effected
by the Commission itself, when de la Fuente filed a motion therefor. It declined to do so,
however, on the alleged ground, as de la Fuente claims he was told, that it "had no coercive
powers unlike a court to enforce its final decisions/resolutions." That proposition,
communicated to de la Fuente, of the Commission's supposed lack of coercive power to
enforce its final judgments, is incorrect. It is inconsistent with previous acts of the
Commission of actually directing execution of its decisions and resolutions, which this Court
has sanctioned in several cases; and it is not in truth a correct assessment of its powers
under the Constitution and the relevant laws

Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer

While it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with
the COMELEC's award of contracts, the same being purely administrative and civil in nature,
nevertheless, herein petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegations of its

"The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other
functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the
right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of
the number of location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of
other election officials . . . The decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be
subject to review by the Supreme Court."

Mateo v. CA

The hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled corporations are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.
SC Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95. Final resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the
old rule or the present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases
involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.


Section 2


Civil service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original or
legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not
those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.
NHC is not covered by civil service so its employees undoubtedly have the right to form
unions or employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now

explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private

De los Santos v. Mallare

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly
technical. These positions mentioned are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at
pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. Thus,
the city engineer cannot be removed without just cause.

Salazar v. Mathay

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence
because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures.

Corpus v. Cuaderno

Highly technical employees cannot be removed by reason of lack or loss of confidence by

the one making the appointment.

Luego v. Civil Service Commission

The CSC has no authority to disapprove or revoke a permanent appointment on the ground
that another person is better qualified than the appointee. The CSC is not empowered to
determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its
authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. Approval is more appropriately called an attestation,
that is, of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named.

Province of Camarines Sur v. CA

Lack of civil service eligibility makes an appointment temporary; thus, the appointment is
revocable at any time (without a fixed and definite term) or dependent upon the pleasure of
the appointing power. Obtaining the civil service legibility later on does not ipso facto convert
a temporary appointment into a permanent one.

SSS Employees Association v. CA

The right of government employees to organize does not include the right to strike.

Section 7

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by tlaw and the
primary function of their office, Cabinet members, their deputies, and assistants may only do
so when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.

Flores v. Drilon

The proviso which states, “Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman

and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority”, violates the constitutional prohibition
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

Section 8

Quimson v. Ozaeta

The employment of a person as an agent collector is not itself unlawful because there is no
incompatibility between aid appointment and his employment as Deputy Provincial Treasurer
and Municipal Treasurer. There is no legal objection to government official occupying two
government offices and performing functions to both as long as there is no incompatibility.
The Constitutional prohibition refers to double appointments and performance of functions of
more than one office.


Section 1

Cayetano v. Monsod

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Brillantes v. Yorac

The President has no authority to make designation of a Comelec Chairman in an Acting

Capacity. The choice of temporary Chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes
under the discretion of the Comelec. It cannot be exercised by the President. A designation
As Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will.
No cause need be established to justify its revocation.

Lindo v. Comelec

Comelec’s statement that fake and spurious ballots may have been introduced to increase
the votes of protestant cannot be made a basis for denying the execution pending appeal.

Section 3

Sarmiento vs. Comelec

Pursuant to Section 16 of R.A. 7166, it provides:

"All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at
the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers
concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election
protest by the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the
evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears

meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to continue or when an
appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari."

Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro

All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the

COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion
for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, Section 7, "may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari."

Section 4

National Press Club vs. Comelec

The Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by
media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite.

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs GMA

It is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C,
Section 4 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit. In the first place, what
the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, Section 4 of the
Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of information of their franchises or
permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print
space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is
different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners to contend that
the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may have force if the
object of the power were the same.

Adiong vs. COMELEC

The posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the
candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals
and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the number of decals and stickers
is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his
right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on
his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment
of his liberties.

Sanidad vs. COMELEC

Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited
to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.




The Auditor-General has no madate to disapprove expenditures which in his opinion are
excessive and extravagant. His authority is limited to the auditing in expenditures of funds
and properties. such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law
appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether a contract entered made by the proper
officer has been entered in conformity with the said appropriation law; whether the goods
and services covered by the said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance
thereof, as attested by the proper officer; and whether payment therefore has been
authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements
have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in
audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. No discretion to disapprove said
payment on the ground that contract was unwise or unreasonable.


To determine whether an expenditure of a government agency or instrumentality is irregular,

unnecessary, excessive, extravagant and unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by
the opinion of the legal counsel of a particular agency. Legal counsel can only offer legal


A compromise agreement between a municipal corporation (Cebu City) and the parents of
victim (Spouses dela Cerna) was constitutional. The participation of the city in an amicable
settlement and eventual execution of a compromise is indubitable within the power and
authority of a municipal corporation. Notably, the compromise agreement was submitted to
its legislative council, which approved it conformably with its established rules and


COA has the regulatory power to ensure that government funds and properties are fully
protected and conserved and that irregular unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant
expenditures or uses of funds owned by, or pertaining to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies of instrumentalities are prevented.


Discretion exercised by COA in the denial of the appeal (on the decision of a Regional
Auditor) is within its power. Also, conclusions of a Board of Directors of a government-
owned and controlled corporation in safeguarding the proper use of the government’s and
people’s property cannot prevail over the constitutional mandate on COA.

Supreme Courts power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to
administrative cases (rape case vs. auditing examiner-respondent) involving the discipline of
its personnel.


PHIL AIRLINES VS COA (more on section 2)

COA has the exclusive authority, subject to limitations, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore. COA can adopt as
its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of repromulgation,
already existing rules and regulations. It may also expand the coverage thereof to agencies
or instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction. COA can advised PAL to desist from bidding
the its fuel upon expiration of contracts


COA, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by government
offices and corporations, upheld the legality of bidding although there is only one offeror (2
were disqualified- bid below floor price and technical reasons) since the COA Circular does
not speak of accepted bids but of offerors, without distinction as to whether they were
disqualified. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight
than the interpretation by the agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.