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2003 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 155 E/31

and contrary to the Seveso Directive and Spanish legislation setting the minimum safety distance at
2 000 metres  is planning to build a storage and regasification plant for LNG in a place where  within
a radius of 2000 metres  there is a population of more than 40 000 and the point of manoeuvre
envisaged for the tankers which will supply the plant with methane is barely 500 metres from the Ferrol
naval base with its arsenals and warships?

Is the Commission also aware that the regasification plant has not been the subject of an environmental
impact assessment in accordance with Directives 85/337/EEC (1) and 97/11/EC (2), merely of a decision on
the environmental effects issued by the Galician regional government, which has a 10 % holding in the
firm involved?

Has the Commission contacted the Spanish Government to request detailed information on this matter?
What information has the Spanish Government supplied?

(1) OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40.

(2) OJ L 73, 14.3.1997, p. 5.

(2003/C 155 E/034) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2555/02

by Rosa Miguélez Ramos (PSE) to the Commission

(13 September 2002)

Subject: Safety hazards relating to the regasification plant planned for the Ferrol estuary

A number of citizens’ organisations submitted a complaint (2001/5221 SG (2001) a/13049) to the

Commission on 5 November 2001 alleging several instances of failure on the part of the Kingdom of
Spain to comply with Community legislation in its handling and granting of the necessary permits for
constructing a natural liquid gas regasification plant in the Ferrol estuary (La Coruña district).

The Spanish government’s authorisation for the project was published in the Official State Bulletin on
24 July 2002, with the condition that authorisation was dependent on all security requirements being met
subsequently. The Ferrol town council has recently reassessed authorisation for the plant as being of
potential danger to the population in its planned location.

The project has understandably caused alarm in the area, given the inherently dangerous nature of the
plant’s projected activities, and in view of the fact that the development company has not fulfilled the
requirements of the Seveso Directive, in particular as regards maintaining minimum distances from
residential centres and observing safety rules relating to the handling and docking of the plant’s methane
carriers. Another cause for concern has been the lack of any environmental impact study in accordance
with Directives 85/337/EEC (1) and 97/11/EC (2).

Is the Commission aware that the Reganosa development company’s proposed plant does not comply with
European and international safety rules for regasification plants and related ports?

(1) OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, p. 40.

(2) OJ L 73, 14.3.1997, p. 5.

Joint answer
to Written Questions P-2541/02 and E-2555/02
given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(15 October 2002)

The Commission is aware of the situation reported by the Honourable Member.

Following parliamentary questions E-1310/01 by Mrs McKenna, E-1359/01 by Mrs Gonzalez Alvarez and
E-1379/01 by the Honourable Member (1), the Commission decided to open an own-initiative case,
registered as number 2001/2141.
C 155 E/32 Official Journal of the European Union EN 3.7.2003

During its examination of the dossier, the Commission has twice contacted the Spanish authorities to
check that Council Directives 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain
public and private projects on the environment (2) and 96/82/EC of 16 December 1996 on the control of
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (3) (Seveso) are being properly applied in this

The Commission is currently examining the latest reply from the Spanish authorities.

This dossier will be discussed with the Spanish authorities in October during the bilateral meeting being
held to review certain complaints and infringements relating to the environment.

As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will take the necessary steps to ensure that Community law is
observed in the case in hand.

(1) OJ C 350 E, 11.12.2001.

(2) OJ L 175, 5.7.1985, amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997  OJ L 73, 14.3.1997.
(3) OJ L 10, 14.1.1997.

(2003/C 155 E/035) WRITTEN QUESTION E-2563/02

by Anna Karamanou (PSE) to the Council

(16 September 2002)

Subject: Women in black  7th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre

According to the organisation ‘Women in Black’, the government of the Bosnian Serb Entity prevented a
delegation from the organisation from travelling to Srebrenica to attend the ceremony to mark the 7th
anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre on 11 July 2002 and to pay tribute to the memory of the victims.
Moreover, despite the fact that the Stabilisation Force, SFOR, had granted authorisation and promised to
escort the buses, it did not keep its word, so that women belonging to 16 peace organisations in Serbia
and Montenegro were unable to attend the commemoration.

What measures will the Council take to compel the governments of present-day Yugoslavia and the
Bosnian-Serb Entity (Republika Srpska) and SFOR to respect the right of the women to attend similar
events in the future and not to obstruct the free movement of individuals for reasons of political
expediency? In addition, what action will the Commission take to put an end to the attempts of chauvinist
elements in the Bosnian Serb Entity to undermine peaceful coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina?


(3 March 2003)

UNMIBH and OHR confirm that on 11th July 2002, the Republica Srpska (RS) police prevented
representatives of the Serbian NGO ‘Women in black’ from traveling to Srebrenica/Potocari to attend a
ceremony to mark the 7th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre on 11 July 2002. The Republica Srpska
police also blocked the entry into the RS of a television crew from Federation TV, which was travelling to
Srebrenica/Potocari to prepare a live broadcast of the commemoration service.

UNMIBH subsequently confirmed that ‘Women in Black’ had failed to meet the deadline for accreditation
and had therefore been prevented from travelling to Srebrenica/Potocari. The FTV crew also lacked valid
accreditation. UNMIBH and SFOR assess the conduct of the RS Ministry of Interior and the 1500 police
officers, who participated in the security operation, to have been correct.

These were reportedly the only two exceptions. Otherwise, all participating organizations and other 150
media representatives, who had followed proper registration or accreditation procedures, were able to take
part or cover the events in Srebrenica/Potocari without any restrictions.