on case – taiwan

case o/v
Aff solves – ending sales have been the 1 big demand from China for over 60 years,
ending sales finally ends the high tentins and solve.
Chase 19’ explains that right now, Beijing is distrustful of Tsai and this would create an
unpredictable scenario. The PLA is already arming right now because of these high
tensions. This causes a cross straightt war more likely. The 2020 elections specifically
make escalation likely – Beijing continues their one china policy and pressures the
Chinese to get ready for war. They are literally arming their military up to intimidate
Taiwan. Our Glaser 15’ evidence says that right now there is a high risk of war because
Beijing is modernizing their nuclear forces.
Our
at: prolif good
 2AC – Prolif bad
Prolif kills heg and sparks conflict
Gene Gerzhoy and Nicholas Miller, 4-6-2016, "Donald Trump thinks more countries should have
nuclear weapons. Here’s what the research says.," Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-
nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/?utm_term=.90726a277c68
Would nuclear proliferation be good for U.S. interests?

What about Trump’s second proposition: that proliferation by our allies would be good for U.S. interests? This argument is based on the idea
that nuclear-armed allies could help contain U.S. adversaries and enable the United States to save money. As Trump told Cooper, “I would
rather see Japan having some form of defense, and maybe even offense, against North Korea.” And as he suggested, the United States can’t
afford to protect Japan and South Korea — and therefore, “they have to pay us or we have to let them protect themselves.”

Reducing military commitments and letting allies build their own nuclear weapons might save money for the
United States. But international relations scholarship suggests that allied proliferation would have broader negative
repercussions. Among these would be declining U.S. influence. When nations gain their own military
capabilities, they rely less on their allies and become less subject to their sway. And that can undermine
a senior partner’s ability to hold its junior allies back from risky military actions.
In other words, allowing or encouraging proliferation would worsen the “American weakness” that Trump decries.

Recent nonproliferation research underscores this proposition. Mark Bell shows that nuclear
allies are likely to become more
independent of their patrons and in some cases can develop more assertive foreign policies. And Francis
Gavin and Matthew Kroenig show that the fear of declining influence was one reason why most American administrations vigorously opposed
the spread of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear allies can also become security risks. Vipin Narang demonstrates that when weaker states gain nuclear
weapons, they often seek to coerce their senior partners into intervening on their behalf by threatening
to use nuclear weapons. That’s what Israel did at the height of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. That’s what
South Africa did during its 1988 confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. And that’s what Pakistan did
in the midst of its 1990 military crisis with India.

Instead of relieving the United States of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having more
nuclear allies could increase
the risk that the United States would get involved in conflicts that might turn nuclear.

Furthermore, were South Korea or Japan to begin developing nuclear weapons, their rivals might be
tempted to launch preventive military strikes, which research suggests has been frequently considered
in the past. The road to nuclear acquisition is often rocky and increases the likelihood of militarized
conflict. For example, Soviet worries that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons helped trigger
the Berlin Crisis.

And if Japan or South Korea actually acquired nuclear weapons, we could possibly see a nuclear arms
race in Asia. Japan’s neighbors, including South Korea, would fear resurgent Japanese militarism. North
Korea would expand its nuclear capabilities. China would continue to expand its own nuclear arsenal.
Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before?

Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common historically. But that’s largely because of determined U.S. efforts to stop them.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and
enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Research suggests the NPT has been instrumental in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, in
part by coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea
would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S. allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia,
Germany and Iran — to question the treaty’s viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals.

Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been
used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate. It’s
true that there has been no war between
major powers since 1945. But that may be due to other factors. The quantitative evidence linking
nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is limited at best.

Further, theoretical and historical evidence suggests that nuclear accidents and miscalculations are
likely. More countries with nuclear weapons would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear
mistakes.
So what’s the takeaway?

A look at history shows us that nuclear proliferation is anything but inevitable. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful,
even when the United States was weaker than it is today.

Without firm U.S. opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like
sanctions — the world would probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research suggests that
nuclear proliferation would reduce U.S. world influence, undermine global stability and increase the risk
of nuclear war.

Prolif doesn’t improve the squo, rogue states are emboldened

John Mueller, 10-15-2018, "Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter," John Mueller is an adjunct professor of
political science, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at Ohio State University, and a Senior Fellow at
the Cato Institute. Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-
weapons-dont-matter

Great powers are one thing, some might say, but rogue states or terrorist groups are another. If they go
nuclear, it’s game over — which is why any further proliferation must be prevented by all possible
measures, up to and including war.

That logic might seem plausible at first, but it breaks down on close examination. Not only has the world already survived the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by some of the craziest mass murderers in history (Stalin and Mao), but proliferation has slowed down rather than sped up
over time. Dozens of technologically sophisticated countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so. This is
because nuclear weapons turn out to be difficult and expensive to acquire and strategically provocative to possess.

They have not even proved to enhance status much, as many expected they would. Pakistan and Russia
may garner more attention today than they would without nukes, but would Japan’s prestige be
increased if it became nuclear? Did China’s status improve when it went nuclear — or when its economy
grew? And would anybody really care (or even notice) if the current British or French nuclear arsenal
was doubled or halved?
Alarmists have misjudged not only the pace of proliferation but also its effects. Proliferation
is incredibly dangerous and
necessary to prevent, we are told, because going nuclear would supposedly empower rogue states and
lead them to dominate their region. The details of how this domination would happen are rarely discussed, but the general idea
seems to be that once a country has nuclear weapons, it can use them to threaten others and get its way,
with nonnuclear countries deferring or paying ransom to the local bully out of fear.

Under Trump, prolif raises the risk of miscalc

ACA, 2-15-2018, "The New U.S. Nuclear Strategy is Flawed and Dangerous. Here’s Why.," The Arms
Control Association is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public
understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Arms Control Association,
https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2018-02/new-us-nuclear-strategy-flawed-dangerous-heres-
why.

The 2018 NPR says that the first use of nuclear weapons will only be considered under “extreme
circumstances” to defend the “vital interests” of the United States and its allies (p. 21). The 2010 NPR
used identical language. Unlike the previous administration, however, the Trump administration defines
extreme circumstances more broadly to include “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” against “U.S.,
allied or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their
command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”
The document does not explicitly define “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” but at various points says it could include chemical and
biological attacks, large-scale conventional aggression, and cyberattacks. The review references the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-
nuclear attacks over 30 times.

The 2010 NPR, on the other hand, described “a narrow range of contingencies” in which nuclear weapons may play a role in deterring "a
conventional or CBW attack.” There was no reference to cyberattacks or attacks on nuclear command, control, and communications capabilities
anywhere in the 2010 document.

“This opens questions,” writes former Pentagon official Rebecca Hersman, “about whether the United
States would consider using” nuclear “weapons more readily than it might have in the past or in
response to attacks that are less than fully catastrophic.”
In addition, the 2010 NPR stated that the United States “will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and
partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.”

Indeed, by the end of his second term of office President Obama believed that goal had effectively been achieved. As then Vice President Joe
Biden put it in remarks delivered in January 2017: “given our non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of today’s threats, it’s hard to envision a
plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary. Or make sense. President Obama and I
are confident we can deter and defend ourselves and our allies against non-nuclear threats through other means.”

In contrast, the new NPR explicitly rejects the idea of “sole purpose” (p. 20). The review extols ambiguity and proposes two new low-yield
nuclear capabilities to “expand the range of credible U.S. options for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack” (p. 55).

The Trump NPR diverges from the Obama NPR on declaratory policy in still other ways.

The 2010 review updated and strengthened the U.S. pledge of nonuse against non-nuclear-weapon states that are in good standing with their
nuclear nonproliferation obligations, even in the unlikely event that one of those states attacks the United States or its allies with chemical or
biological weapons. This revised negative security assurance expanded the security benefits for non-nuclear-weapon states of good faith
membership in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

The 2018 NPR reiterates this pledge but undermines the value of this assurance by retaining “the right to make any adjustment in the assurance
that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of non-nuclear strategic attack technologies and U.S. capabilities to counter that
threat” (p. 21).
It is notable that President
Trump argued in his 2018 State of the Union address that “we must modernize and rebuild
our nuclear arsenal, hopefully never having to use it, but making it so strong and powerful that it will
deter any acts of aggression by any other nation or anyone else.”

This approach represents a clear shift away from past U.S. strategy and practice that aims to reduce the
role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military and foreign policy. The 2010 NPR stated that the “fundamental role” of nuclear
weapons is to deter nuclear attack against the United States or its allies, not “any act of aggression.”

The proposed changes in the 2018 NPR on the role of nuclear weapons are real. And they are dangerous.

Threatening nuclear retaliation to counter new kinds of “asymmetric” attacks would lower the threshold
for nuclear use, increase the risks of miscalculation, and make it easier for other countries to justify
excessive roles for nuclear weapons in their policies. Such threats are also unlikely to be proportional
and therefore would be difficult to make credible. For example, though a kinetic or nonkinetic attack on U.S. nuclear
command and control capabilities, which support both nuclear and non-nuclear missions, could have major repercussions, such an attack is
unlikely to result in any human casualties.

Given the overall conventional superiority of the U.S.-led alliance system, it is in the U.S. interest to raise, not lower, the bar for nuclear use. A
more prudent approach to countering potential non-nuclear attacks on U.S. infrastructure and command and control capabilities would include
strengthening the resilience of these systems against cyberattack and ensuring the availability of credible symmetric and asymmetric
conventional response options.
at: circumvention
 AT: 2AC General
Interpretation – USFG means all government sales so there will be no way that there
will be a circumvention.

All of the negative’s circumvention offense assumes a normal president and a normal
Congress. Congress will go to extreme lengths to reign in Trump arms sales and will
find a way no matter what
Dana Stroul 19’ (senior fellow in The Washington Institute’s Geduld Program on Arab Politics and a
former senior staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.) “The Face-Off Over Gulf Arms
Sales: ‘Emergency’ or False Alarm?” June 10, 2019 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/the-face-off-over-gulf-arms-sales-emergency-or-false-alarm

The longer-term implications are more worrisome. The next major national security legislation coming
up for congressional debate is the annual National Defense Authorization Act. If members of Congress
are denied the standard options for expressing concern and dissent, they will likely look to more
impactful and longer-lasting options such as amendments to the NDAA. For example, they could try to
limit future arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE specifically. One could also imagine an attempt to
raise the bar even higher for future presidents to use the emergency AECA provision, potentially
hampering the White House in a credible emergency situation down the road. Indeed, by invoking the
emergency exception, the White House may have opened a Pandora’s box of foreign and economic
policy specters that reach beyond the current Gulf arms deals and Iran threats. With the precedent set,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE may now expect such expeditious treatment for all defense sales given their
place on the frontline against Iran. Meanwhile, Congress will likely retaliate against the executive
branch’s circumvention of the standard review process by slowing down the approval of future arms
sales to these two governments, further deteriorating their already frayed relations with Washington.
Other countries may seek preferential treatment as well, citing non-Iran emergencies such as threats
from Russia or China. At a time when many foreign officials already view the United States as unreliable,
further perceptions of unequal treatment among partners is unlikely to help.

Congress can pass legislation to ban all sales to particular countries—that overcomes
circumvention provisions
Joe Gould, 10-24-2018, "US House bill would close door on Saudi arms sales", Defense News,
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/10/24/us-house-bill-would-close-door-on-saudi-arms-
sales/ <staff reporter at defense news>, ke

A bipartisan group of 21 House lawmakers have introduced a bill to immediately stop all military sales
and aid to Saudi Arabia’s government. The bill, led by Rep. Jim McGovern, D-Mass., came as President Donald Trump said the killing of a Saudi journalist was a
botched operation and his administration has taken its first steps in punishing the Saudis by deciding to revoke the visas of the suspects. Halting arms sales could have repercussions for the

Trump, who initially touted Saudi leaders’ claims of

U.S. defense industry, which considers Saudi Arabia a lucrative overseas market.

innocence as “credible” and opposed cutting arms sales, has played up $110 billion in prospective deals
with the kingdom, which he spearheaded last year. Among other sales, the action leaves vulnerable Lockheed Martin Corp.’s potential $15 billion sale
to Saudi Arabia of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. The deal, started under the Obama administration and approved by

Congress, remains under negotiation, according to U.S. officials. On Lockheed’s earning’s call Tuesday, Chief Financial Officer Bruce Turner
 Calls in the U.S.
said the THAAD order was the “largest order that we’ve been waiting,” but it “has not taken place yet,” and he was “not sure when that will take place.”

Congress to punish Riyadh for journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s apparent death at the hands of Saudi
government operatives are growing louder. American lawmakers are considering three avenues in
response , including sanctions, stopping U.S. arms sales and cutting aid to Saudi-led military operations
in Yemen. Notable co-sponsors of McGovern’s House bill include House Armed Services Committee members, Walter Jones, R-N.C.; Ro Khanna, D-Calif.; Jackie Speier, D-Calif., and Tulsi
Gabbard, D-Hawaii. The libertarian leaning Reps. Justin Amash, of Michigan, and Thomas Massie, were the only other Republican co-sponsors. “Under both Democratic and Republican
Administrations, I’ve called for a serious review of our arms sales to the Saudi government,” McGovern, ranking member of the House Rules Committee, said in a statement. “With the murder

it’s time for the United States to halt all weapons sales and military aid to Saudi Arabia. Our
of Jamal Khashoggi,

democratic values are on the line here – and we need to step up as a country and do the right thing.”

Congress can pass joint resolutions of disapproval on any arms sale at any time
Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2019, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process”,
https://crsreports.congress.gov RL31675 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31675.pdf

Although Congress has more than one legislative option it can use to block or modify an arms sale, one
option explicitly set out in law for blocking a proposed arms sale is the use of a joint resolution of
disapproval as provided for in Section 36(b) of the AECA. Under that law, the formal notification is legally
required to be submitted to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Speaker of
the House. The Speaker has routinely referred these notifications to the House Foreign Affairs Committee as the committee of jurisdiction. As a courtesy, the
Defense Department has submitted a copy of the statutory notification to the House Foreign Affairs Committee when that notification is submitted to the Speaker
of the House. Under this option, after receiving a statutory Section 36(b) notification from the executive branch, opponents of the arms sale would introduce joint
resolutions in the House and Senate drafted so as to forbid by law the sale of the items specified in the formal sale notification(s) submitted to Congress. If no
Member introduces such a measure, the AECA’s provisions expediting congressional action, discussed below, do not take effect. The
next step would
be committee hearings in both houses on the arms sale proposal. If a majority of either the House or the
Senate committee supported the joint resolution of disapproval, they would report it to their respective
chamber in accordance with its rules. Following this, efforts would be made to seek floor consideration
of the resolution
 AT Compliance – Courts
Violations would be litigated---he would comply
Date 18, [Senior White House Correspondent, HuffPost, Trump’s Claims Of Vast Power Could Be
Heading Toward A Supreme Court Showdown, June 5th, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-
power-supreme-court-showdown_us_5b16e958e4b09578259c7adc]

Thus far, Trump does not appear ready to directly challenge the power of the judiciary over him ― or at least his
most talkative lawyer, former prosecutor Rudolph Giuliani, does not. When discussing
a hypothetical subpoena by Mueller demanding
that Trump appear before a grand jury, Giuliani said he would seek to quash it in court rather than just ignore it.

Mueller would surely go to court to enforce an ignored subpoena, Giuliani said in a recent interview with HuffPost. And the special counsel
could have the president held in contempt if Trump’s lawyers lost that dispute. “We want to avoid the argument that the president is operating
above the law,” Giuliani said. Multiple legal scholars contend that Trump and his team are already arguing that he is above the law. In a 20-page
letter sent to Mueller in January, Trump’s lawyers claimed that the president, as head of the executive branch, has the authority to end any
investigation undertaken within that branch as well as to render them moot using his pardon power. Trump has personally expanded on that
message in a number of Twitter statements in recent days. “The appointment of the Special Counsel is totally UNCONSTITUTIONAL!” Trump
wrote Monday, shortly after tweeting, “I have the absolute right to PARDON myself.” What’s more, given Trump’s demonstrated willingness to
ignore established guidelines of behavior in public office, critics worry that he might easily trigger a constitutional crisis if courts started to rule
against him. Early last year, Trump said he had recently learned that conflict-of-interest laws did not apply to the president. Since then, he has
continued to profit from his hotels and resorts, even from business clearly driven by his presidential position ― despite promises during the
campaign that he would separate himself from his private company. What happens when Trump similarly realizes that nothing in the
Constitution specifically requires him to accept a Supreme Court ruling he doesn’t like and that the high court’s authority largely flows from a
215-year-old precedent? “I don’t know what he would do,” said one former longtime Trump aide, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “I
just don’t know.” The White House did not respond to HuffPost’s queries about the matter. It was 1803 when Chief Justice John Marshall wrote
the opinion giving the court the power it has today in the case of Marbury v. Madison. The Supreme Court ruled that James Madison, the
secretary of state, acted illegally but that the law passed by Congress to remedy such situations was unconstitutional. In the process, the court
established that it has the power to declare an act of another branch of government unconstitutional ― a precedent that the executive and
legislative branches have honored ever since.

Turberville has been relieved to see the Trump administration honoring adverse court rulings so far, but she said
those decisions have all concerned his policies, such as banning visitors from predominantly Muslim nations. Trump could behave very
differently, she said, if the ruling were to involve him personally ― upholding a subpoena requiring him to turn over business records, for
example.

President Richard Nixon complied with a Supreme Court ruling requiring him to turn over secretly recorded tapes of his White House
conversations ― and ended up resigning just two weeks later. “The federal courts don’t have an army. They don’t have a police force to enforce
their rulings,” Turberville said. Instead, she said, judges rely on people of good faith ― including officials in the other branches of government
― to honor established norms.

“It is in the realm of possibility, hopefully not probability, that this president would seek to upend that. And then it would fall to Congress,” she
said. “The only way to head off a constitutional crisis of this nature [would be] for Congress to impeach him.”

Tribe agreed that Congress

could not tolerate such behavior by the president. “Even the Republicans in
Congress who sit still as Trump gradually violates one constitutional norm after another may well rise up
against outright defiance of a Supreme Court order,” he said.

Norm Eisen,the top ethics lawyer in President Barack Obama’s White House and now a senior fellow at the
Brookings Institution, said that while he’s not as confident as he would like to be that Trump would honor a court order, he does not
believe that Giuliani is ready to take on two centuries of Supreme Court precedent.

“I don’t think he’s ready to re-litigate Marbury,” Eisen said.

For his part, Giuliani told HuffPost that he’s not.

The lawyer said Trump could not be prosecuted for any crime while he remained president, even in an extreme hypothetical case such as if he
had shot James Comey last year rather than just firing the FBI director. But had that actually happened, Trump would immediately have been
impeached, Giuliani said ― and then added the country was lucky not to have had any truly violent presidents to test that theory. “Although,
what if Aaron Burr had become president?” Giuliani joked. (Burr was Thomas Jefferson’s vice president in 1804 when he challenged Alexander
Hamilton to a duel and killed him.)

While Giuliani said that Trump has broad powers under the Constitution, he said the courts do as well. “I think ultimately we all agree
that the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution,” Giuliani said.

He’ll comply – courts work with other actors and the travel ban proves
Goldsmith 17, [professor at Harvard Law School and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is a
former assistant attorney general in the George W. Bush administration, Will Donald Trump Destroy the
Presidency?, October, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-
destroy-the-presidency/537921/

Thus far, however, Trump

has been almost entirely blocked from violating laws or the Constitution. The courts,
the press, the bureaucracy, civil society, and even Congress have together robustly enforced the rule of
law.
Trump’s initial executive order on immigration—a temporary ban on entry for people from seven Muslim-majority countries that were not
obvious sources of terrorist activity inside the United States—was widely seen as his first step toward authoritarianism. Issued seven days into
his presidency, the ban was sloppily written, barely vetted inside the executive branch, legally overbroad, and incompetently rolled out. The
administration gave the people subject to the ban’s edicts no notice, which led to bedlam at airports. Many observers believed the immigration
order indulged the “symbolic politics of bashing Islam over any actual security interest,” as Benjamin Wittes of the Brookings Institution put it at
the time. A crucial moment occurred during the week after Trump issued the order. Civil-society groups such as the ACLU quickly filed habeas
corpus petitions asking federal courts to enjoin the order in various ways, which they did. For several days, it was unclear whether border
agents were complying with the injunctions, and rumors that Trump or his Department of Homeland Security had ordered them not to filled
the news. When a federal district-court judge in Seattle named James Robart halted the entire immigration order nationwide in the middle of
the afternoon on Friday, February 3, Twitter and the cable shows were aquiver for several hours with the possibility that Trump would defy the
court. “What would happen if the administration were to simply ignore this court order and continue to deny people entry?,” MSNBC national
correspondent Joy Reid asked her guests on All In. Washington State Attorney General Bob Ferguson, who had brought the case against Trump,
treated the question as a live possibility. “I don’t want to be overly dramatic, Joy,” he said, “but you would have a constitutional crisis.”

The hardest question in American constitutional law was suddenly raised: Why does a president, who
controls what Alexander Hamilton described as “the sword of the community,” abide by a judicial decision he
abhors?

Trump wouldn’t have been the first president to flout a court order. Six weeks into the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln
defied a ruling by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney that the president lacked the authority to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, and Franklin Roosevelt threatened to ignore the Supreme Court in a World War II case involving Nazi
saboteurs. But during the next few decades, judicial authority solidified. Though many worried that Nixon would disobey the Supreme Court in
1974 when it ordered him to turn over his incriminating tapes to a special prosecutor, Nixon famously acquiesced. Would Trump?

We can imagine that he didn’t want to. We can imagine him ranting deliriously after Robart issued his decision. But at 10:05 p.m., the White
House put out a statement declaring that the Justice Department would seek to stay the “outrageous order,” which meant that the executive
branch would pursue review in higher courts. And 10 hours later, at 8:12 a.m., the incensed chief executive tweeted the first of many attacks
against Robart. “The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be
overturned!,” Trump wrote. He would appeal, rather than defy, Robart’s injunction.

We don’t know why Trump acquiesced. Perhaps his staff convinced him that ignoring
the ruling would spark resignations in
the White House and the Justice Department, as well as congressional reprisal, which would jeopardize
his two-week-old presidency. Whatever the reason, the most powerful man in the world complied with the edict
of a little-known federal trial judge on an issue at the top of his agenda. The Constitution held.
 AT: Congress Fails
Congressional action checks circumvention
Catie Edmondson 6/20/19 (Catie Edmondson is a reporter in the Washington bureau of The New
York Times, covering Congress. “Senate Votes to Block Trump’s Arms Sales to Gulf Nations in Bipartisan
Rebuke” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/us/politics/saudi-arms-sales.html.)

WASHINGTON — The Senate voted to block the sale of billions of dollars of munitions to Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates on Thursday, in a sharp and bipartisan rebuke of the Trump administration’s
attempt to circumvent Congress to allow the exports by declaring an emergency over Iran. In three
back-to-back votes, Republicans joined Democrats to register their growing anger with the
administration’s use of emergency power to cut lawmakers out of national security decisions, as well as
the White House’s unflagging support for the Saudis despite congressional pressure to punish Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman after the killing in October of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi. A United Nations
report released Wednesday made the most authoritative case to date that responsibility for the killing and its cover-up lies at the highest levels
No other foreign policy issue has created as large a rift between President Trump and
of the Saudi royal court.
Congress, and the vote to block the arms sales deepens the divide. It is the second time in just a few
months that members of Mr. Trump’s party have publicly opposed his foreign policy, with both the
House and Senate approving bipartisan legislation this spring to cut off military assistance to Saudi
Arabia’s war in Yemen using the 1973 War Powers Act, only to see it vetoed. While the Democrat-controlled House
is also expected to block the sales, Mr. Trump has pledged to veto the legislation, and it is unlikely that either chamber could muster enough
support to override the president’s veto. Seven
Republicans — not nearly enough to override a veto — broke from
their party to disapprove of the sales to Saudi Arabia: Senator Susan Collins of Maine, Senator Lindsey
Graham of South Carolina, Senator Mike Lee of Utah, Senator Jerry Moran of Kansas, Senator Lisa
Murkowski of Alaska, Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky and Senator Todd Young of Indiana. “This vote is a vote
for the powers of this institution to be able to continue to have a say on one of the most critical elements of U.S. foreign policy and national
security,” said Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee and lead sponsor of the
resolutions of disapproval. “To
not let that be undermined by some false emergency and to preserve that
institutional right, regardless of who sits in the White House.” The White House announced the sales
late last month, and invoked an emergency provision in the Arms Export Control Act to allow American
companies to sell $8.1 billion worth of munitions in 22 pending transfers to the three Arab nations. Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are waging an air war in Yemen that has come under sharp criticism from Congress and human rights
organizations. Members of Congress from both parties have been holding up arms sales from American companies to Persian Gulf nations and
trying to end American military support for the Saudi-led coalition that is fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen, which has resulted in what the United
Nations calls the world’s worst man-made humanitarian disaster. By declaring an emergency over Iran, the administration
was able to override those holds. “If we let this emergency declaration go without protest, without a vote, I don’t know that we’re
ever getting the power to oversee arms sales back as a body,” said Senator Christopher S. Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut, and one of the
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had pushed hard for the emergency designation,
authors of the resolution.
over the objections of career Foreign Service officers and legislators, arguing that the sales would
support allies like Saudi Arabia to counter Iran and its partner Arab militias — though some of the
munitions would take years to produce and deliver. In the weeks after the declaration was announced, lawmakers have
scrutinized the role that a former Raytheon lobbyist played in the decision. In our video, a former State Department official sent to advise the
Saudi-led coalition says he saw firsthand how it failed to avoid civilian casualties in Yemen — and how the U.S. chose to look the other way.
Some Senate Republicans endorsed the administration’s position on Thursday, arguing that rejecting the
arms sales would be overly blunt with unintended consequences as tensions with Iran escalate. The
question the Senate will consider, Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the majority leader, said, “is
whether we’ll lash out at an imperfect partner and undercut our own efforts to build cooperation, check
Iran and achieve other important goals, or whether we’ll keep our imperfect partners close and use our
influence.” But the administration’s argument ultimately fell flat even for some of the president’s closest allies, like Mr. Graham, who co-
sponsored the legislation with Mr. Menendez. “The reason I’m voting with Senator Paul and others today is to send a signal to Saudi Arabia
that if you act the way you’re acting, there is no space for a strategic relationship,” he said. “There is no amount of oil you can produce that will
get me and others to give you a pass on chopping somebody up in a consulate.”The original legislation Mr. Menendez and
Mr. Graham introduced would have forced senators to vote on 22 separate resolutions of disapproval,
one vote for each arms sale. But a deal struck with Mr. McConnell grouped the resolutions into three
votes — and also ensured that the Foreign Relations Committee will take up a bill sponsored by Mr. Menendez that would curtail the ability
of the president to use emergency authority to sell arms. The vote came the same day that Britain announced it would
temporarily suspend approval of any new licenses to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, after an unexpected
court ruling that ministers had acted unlawfully in allowing the sale of weapons when there was a clear
possibility they might be used in violation of international humanitarian law in Yemen.

Even if Trump tries to change the Munitions List, Congress will block him
Committee on Foreign Relations 16 [United States Senate on Foreign Relations, A Committee in
the Senate that creates and changes US Foreign Policy, "MENENDEZ ANNOUNCES HOLD ON TRUMP
ADMIN’S PROPOSED MOVE TO WEAKEN REGULATORY CONTROL OVER U.S. GUNS SALES ABROAD,”
Ranking Members’ Press, February 26, 2019,
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-announces-hold-on-trump-admins-
proposed-move-to-weaken-regulatory-control-over-us-guns-sales-abroad]

WASHINGTON– Senator Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressing his concern about a proposal to
drastically weaken firearms export regulations, and announcing he will not allow the proposed rules to
move forward unless the State Department fully addresses the dangerous and far-reaching implications
of this proposal prior to its taking effect. In a move designed to stifle Congressional oversight and
weaken controls over exports of guns from the United States, the Trump Administration announced last
month that it will formally seek to transfer control of the export of semi-automatic pistols, assault-style
rifles, sniper rifles and ammunition from the United States Munition List (USML) under the authority of
the Department of State to the less-stringent controls of the Department of Commerce. As part of the
move, the Administration also seeks to transfer the control of the technical information and blueprints
for nearly undetectable 3D Guns from State to Commerce, where lax regulations will facilitate printing
of 3D guns worldwide. “[Firearms] are easily modified, diverted, and proliferated, and are the primary means of injury, death, and
destruction in civil and military conflicts throughout the world. As such, they should be subject to more, not less, rigorous export controls and
oversight,” wrote Menendez. As the top Senate Democrat with oversight on U.S. firearms exports and weapons sales, Menendez
announced he would refuse to consent to formal congressional notification of the proposed transfer
until the Trump administration is more forthcoming in responding to his questions and concerns.
Specifically, Menendez listed his concerns that all Congressional oversight and right of disapproval over
firearms sales to countries of concern would be eliminated, despite Congress tightening such oversight
under law; and that Commerce has admitted that it will not control or prevent the global internet
publication of 3D printing of nearly-undetectable guns by terrorist groups, a real danger to American
embassies, military bases, and passenger air carriers abroad. Despite the new statutory requirements on
the President and Secretary of Commerce to control emerging technologies like 3D printing, the
Administration is seeking in effect to eliminate meaningful control over 3D gun printing. “By proceeding with
the transfer of firearms, including 3D printing technical information, to Commerce, the Administration is acting recklessly and endangering
innocent lives. It should go without saying that we collectively need to understand the threat and have a plan to address this issue before
making the regulatory change,” added the Senator, specifically raising concerns about the capability to 3D-print lethal
weaponry that cannot easily be detected by metal detectors at airports, schools, or government
facilities. Earlier this month, Senator Menendez also led a group of his colleagues in introducing the
Stopping the Traffic in Overseas Proliferation of Ghost Guns Act, legislation that would statutorily
prohibit this transfer, and therefore maintain the strict controls over firearms and 3D printed “ghost
gun” information that currently exist on the United States Munitions List. As a champion for major gun safety
reforms, Sen. Menendez was an outspoken opponent of the Trump Administration’s action last year allowing a Texas company to publish the
downloadable designs for 3D printable firearms, which was later blocked by a federal court, and has taken a series of additional actions to
prevent the proliferation of untraceable, undetectable 3D printed guns. He called on Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to intervene and reverse
his department’s decision and spoke out about his decision at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The text of the letter
announcing the hold can be found here and below: Dear Secretary Pompeo: On February 4, 2019, I received a congressional notification from
the Department for a proposal to transfer responsibility for the export control of firearms and ammunition from the United States Munitions
list (USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL). I write to inform you that I am placing a hold on the congressional notification, pursuant to the
authority of Section 38(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). I am deeply concerned about this proposed transfer. As you no doubt are
aware, firearms and ammunition – especially those derived from military models and widely used by military and security services – are
uniquely dangerous. They are easily modified, diverted, and proliferated, and are the primary means of injury, death, and destruction in civil
and military conflicts throughout the world. As such, they should be subject to more, not less, rigorous export controls and oversight. Combat
rifles, including those commonly known as “sniper rifles,” should not be removed from the USML, nor should rifles of any type that are U.S.
military-standard 5.56 (and especially .50 caliber). Semi-automatic firearms should also not be removed, and neither should related equipment,
ammunition, or associated manufacturing equipment, technology, or technical data. Consequently, my hold will remain in place until such time
as the issues identified below are sufficiently addressed. 1) Removal of Firearms Exports from Congressional Information and Review The AECA
enables congressional review of exports of lethal weapons to ensure that they comport with U.S. foreign policy interests. Congress took action
in 2002 to ensure that the sale and export of these weapons would receive stringent oversight, including by amending the AECA to set a lower
reporting threshold (from $14 million to $1 million) specifically for firearms on the USML. Moving such firearms from the USML to the CCL
would directly contradict congressional intent and effectively eliminate congressional oversight and potential disapproval of exports of these
weapons. Congressional oversight must be retained. 2) Proliferation of 3D Gun Printing Technical Information There is a serious risk that this
transfer will open the floodgates of information for the 3D printing of nearly-undetectable firearms and components by foreign persons and
terrorists that intend to harm U.S. citizens and interests. The
Department of Commerce claims that it cannot, by its own
regulations, prevent the publication, including on the Internet for global consumption, of technical
information and blueprint files that would enable this 3D production, if such information has once been
published, even illegally. This is outrageous and simply unacceptable given the dangers it poses to U.S.
citizens and interests. Moreover, it may also be at variance with recent law. Section 1758 of the Export
Control Reform Act of 2018 authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to control “emerging and
foundational technologies” that (A) are essential to the national security of the United States; and (B)
are not critical technologies described in clauses (i) through (v) of section 721(a)(6)(A) of the Defense
Production Act of 1950. 3D printing has been identified by this Administration as an emerging
technology of concern, and the Department of Commerce itself used 3D printing as an example of
“emerging technology” in its November 19, 2018 Federal Register notice seeking public comment on
what constitutes emerging technologies pursuant to this new statutory charge. Then-Secretary of Defense Mattis
twice mentioned the challenges of 3D printing in congressional testimony, and Director of National Intelligence Coats, in his 2018 Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, stated that, “[a]dvances in manufacturing, particularly the development of 3D printing,
almost certainly will become even more accessible to a variety of state and non-state actors and be used in ways contrary to our interests.” It
would seem axiomatic that the capability to 3D-print lethal weaponry that cannot easily or reliably be detected by metal detectors at airports,
schools, governmental or other facilities (including the U.S. Capitol and the Department of State) would qualify as an emerging technology in
need of regulatory control. Yet, the Commerce Department has told my staff that the interagency process to identify emerging and
foundational technologies to be controlled has not been completed, and is unlikely to be completed for months. By
proceeding with
the transfer of firearms, including 3D printing technical information, to Commerce, the Administration is
acting recklessly and endangering innocent lives. It should go without saying that we collectively need to
understand the threat and have a plan to address this issue before making the regulatory change.
Moreover, the Department of Commerce would seem to have adequate additional regulatory authority
to control 3D gun printing information, at least temporarily. Commerce can control any item for foreign
policy reasons under the miscellaneous category of 0Y521, according to a final rule issued by Commerce
in 2012. Preventing foreign terrorists and thugs from acquiring the means to print undetectable guns to
use against U.S. citizens is a sufficient foreign policy justification to control this technology from public
release. Ultimately, the specific provision of the Export Administration Regulations is cited as preventing Commerce from controlling the
publication of 3D Printed guns in the longer term needs to be rewritten to permit this control. Until that occurs, or until Commerce determines
that such technical information can and will be controlled, this technical information cannot and should not be transferred from USML to the
CCL. I look forward to your prompt response to my concerns.
 AT: Free Transfers
Trump only cares about arms sales – free transfers don’t get jobs.
Jonathan Caverley, 4-6-2018, "America's Arms Sales Policy: Security Abroad, Not Jobs at Home," War
on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-
jobs-at-home/ Caverly is an undergrad teaching assistant at Rutgers University.

Announcing an impressive, if overstated, $110 billion worth of arms deals with Saudi Arabia last year, President Donald Trumpmade
clear the primary motivation for the agreements: “job, jobs, jobs.” The administration is now poised to expand this
effort in what officials have described as a “whole of government” push, easing export regulation and oversight to increase arms sales
around the world. This “Arms Transfer Initiative” fits neatly into Trump’s broader efforts to create manufacturing jobs in the United States. In
this spirit, the administration has already reversed Obama-era human rights-related restrictions on arms sales
to Saudi, Bahrain, and Nigeria.

The initiative has yet to be released, but its parameters seem clear. Regulations of arms sales will be reduced. There will be “more public
advocacy for foreign partners to buy American.” According to the Trump administration, military and diplomatic officials have been
“underutilized by previous presidents;” as one senior administration official put it, “We
want to see those guys, the commercial
and military attachés, unfettered to be salesmen for this stuff, to be promoters.” This would, according to the
official, represent a “180-degree shift” in America’s current “arms-length approach to foreign weapons sales.” Another unnamed administration
official said the new approach will conform to the “America First” policy of “better aligning our national security and foreign policy
objectives as well as economic imperatives for American jobs.”

Trump’s only interested in sales for profit – no motive to circumvent.

Hartung 18 [William D. Hartung, 4-19-2018, "Trump’s arms sales policy puts contractors above
common sense," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/384014-trumps-arms-sales-policy-
puts-contractors-above-common-sense]

In a move that poses grave risks to U.S. security, the

Trump administration’s newly released conventional arms
transfer policy will put jobs and the interests of arms manufacturers ahead of safety, security, and human
rights in its decisions on who the United States should arm.

This bias should come as no surprise given President Trump’s penchant for promoting U.S. weapons
sales and touting the jobs that they create. From calling foreign leaders to urge them to speed up
purchases of U.S. combat aircraft to using a White House meeting with the Saudi crown prince to brag about
which states would gain jobs from specific sales to Riyadh, President Trump seems to be obsessed with the alleged
economic benefits of the weapons trade.

Given its numerous mentions of creating jobs, making life easier for weapons contractors, and bolstering
the U.S. defense industrial base, one might think the Trump administration’s new directive is a statement of
economic policy rather than a carefully crafted expression of national security concerns.
 AT: CCL
CCL spurs a massive fight and gets blocked by Congress
McShane 19 [Jim McShane, Consultant, Trade Compliance for Export Solutions -- a full-service
consulting firm specializing in ITAR and EAR regulations. (“Will firearms (finally) change under Export
Control Reform?” https://www.exportsolutionsinc.com/resources/blog/firearms-export-control-
reform/]

On May 24, 2018, the Departments of State and Commerce published proposed revisions to U.S. Munitions List
(USML) Categories I, II, and III in the Federal Register. These three categories would be the last USML categories to be revised under the
Export Control Reform Initiative – a process that began more than nine years ago and that we first blogged about here. Public
Comments
to the proposed revisions were solicited and required to be submitted within 45 days. From that point forward, once
the final language of the revisions were accepted and approved, the President would notify Congress and the Final Rule
outlining the changes would be published. So what has happened since then? Rumors have abounded. Some in the trade
community believed the end of 2018 was a target date for publication. Others thought the announcement would be made in January 2019.
Some even believed the administration might implement the changes to coincide with the Shot Show – one of the firearm industry’s largest
trade shows (which occurred this year from January 22-25). None of these things occurred. In the meantime, Congress is
not waiting to be notified by the President on the Final Rule. There have been two legislative initiatives
to stop the transition of items from the USML to the CCL: “Stopping the Traffic in Overseas Proliferation of Ghost Guns
Act” (no H.R. number assigned yet) Specifically, this legislation would: Prohibit the transfer of small arms/light
weapons, and the technical manufacturing information related to them (including 3D printed guns), to the
Department of Commerce; Maintain the statutory restriction on publishing 3D printed gun information,
including over the internet; Prohibit the ability of the State Department to suspend the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) without 30-day prior notice to Congress. “Prevent Crime and Terrorism Act of
2018” (H.R.4765) This bill would amend the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit the President from removing any of the following items under
USML Categories I, II, or III (firearms, armament, ammunition) in order to transfer them to the Commerce Control List: Significant Military
Equipment or their components, parts, or accessories; Flame throwers designed or modified for military application; or Devices for launching or
delivering ordnance. More recently, a senior Senator has blocked the proposed Final Rule, citing that the transition of these designated items
would deny Congress oversight on export transactions meeting certain levels and increase the risk of military-grade weapons falling into the
hands of terrorists. The proposal to block the proposed Final Rule is not legally binding, but it will establish
another area of confrontation between the President and Congress if the President decides to proceed with the
publication of the Final Rule and the notification to Congress. At this point, the date for the transition of items currently
classified as ITAR controlled is mere guesswork. That said, increased Congressional activities over the
past few weeks would indicate action is either not far off, or will be delayed for some time.

Congress has substantial control and eliminates executive discretion

ABA 13 [voluntary bar association of lawyers and law students. “Proposals to Relax Export Controls for
Significant Military Equipment” https://bit.ly/2X2o4J6]

While the Administration has authority to determine what constitutes a defense article, the Congress
clearly intended for “significant military equipment” that has “substantial military utility” to be subject
to the special controls of the AECA.12 Semi-automatic rifles that can fire up to 60 rounds per minute clearly have substantial
military utility. It is therefore inconsistent with the AECA to transfer such items from the USML where they will no longer be subject to the
special controls of that statute. Contrary
to the Administration’s assertion in these proposed rulemakings,
Congress has established constraints on the Executive Branch that go beyond AECA’s notice requirements.
Indeed, Congress did not intend to give the President unfettered discretion in determining which items
should be placed on the USML, but rather made clear that certain defense articles considered to be
“significant military equipment” must be more closely controlled. ITAR has long identified SME as those defense
articles “for which special export controls are warranted because of their capacity for substantial military utility or capability,” 22 C.F.R. §
120.19(a) (1984), 22 C.F.R. § 120.7(a) (1997), and has clearly distinguished those items on the USML. Congress, in its 1996 revisions to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq., and AECA, amended AECA to include a definition for SME, which had previously only
been defined in ITAR. See Pub. L. No. 104-164, § 144, 110 Stat. 1421, 1434 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2794(9)). Congress’s
definition,
however, merelycopied the definition of SME from ITAR—SME are defense articles “for which special
export controls are warranted because of the capacity of such articles for substantial military utility or
capability” and “identified on the [USML].” 22 U.S.C. § 2794(9)(A)–(B) (see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-519, pt. 1, at 10 (1996))
(stating that “Section 144 amends the Arms Export Control Act to provide a definition of significant military equipment as defined in the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)”).
conditionality
 2AC -- Conditionality
Conditionality Bad 2ac:
Interp: NEG gets one conditional advocacy
Not reciprocal:
Not reciprocal- we cant run multiple plans to find the best example of the resolution
Advocacy:
If they can kick, then neg would just read a lot of bad counterplans that isn’t
developed.
Real Life
In real life, no policymaker can make 50 of similar bills in one day. To make debate the
most efficient and educational, we need conditionality to balance the debate
 1AR – Conditionality
Extend not reciprocal:
conditionality creates a no-risk issue for the neg, since the neg can just kick the
counterplan as soon as I generate any offense on it. Since I can’t kick out of affirming,
generic neg disads and turns will always be effective and the risk balance in the round
is skewed. A reciprocal risk balance is key to fairness because strategy is constrained
by potential risks. If one side has more no-risk issues than the other, this places that
side at an unfair advantage.
Extend advocacy:
conditionality justifies irresponsible neg argumentation because negs can run multiple
counterplans that contradict or bad arguments that they don’t plan on going for in the
NR. Because the neg can just kick out of these arguments, they never receive the
deterrent effect generated by good responses to bad arguments. Conditionality harms
education because debaters learn by seeing how others respond to their positions, but
conditionality encourages negs to ignore those arguments because they have no
impacts on individual rounds.
Extend model real life:
The point of debate is to each policymaking skill – if they neg can read 50 different
counterplans it makes them believe that in real life – the fastest side wins. This is a
bad mindset because there will never be good reasoning and warrants because people
will just read a lot of reasons why they are better.
 2AR – conditionality
Conditionality is a voter –
1. conditionality encouranges irresponsible neg argumentation because negs can
run multiple counterplans that contradict or bad arguments that they don’t
plan on going for in the NR. Because the neg can just kick out of these
arguments, they never receive the deterrent effect generated by good
responses to bad arguments. Conditionality harms education because debaters
learn by seeing how others respond to their positions, but conditionality
encourages negs to ignore those arguments because they have no impacts on
individual rounds.
2. Destroys education -- if they neg can read 50 different counterplans it makes
them believe that in real life – the fastest side wins. This is a bad mindset
because there will never be good reasoning and warrants because people will
just read a lot of reasons why they are better.
consultation cp
 2AC – consultation cp
Interpretation: The neg may only run consultation counterplans that are not
dependent on external agents.

Violation: The neg has runs a consultations cp in which they consult an external agent.

Standards:
1. Unpredictability – there are around 200 countries and hundreds of government
branches, this allows for thousands of CP’s under the neg and this will be very
hard to predict, a team could just run a random consult CP that is
unpredictable.
2. Moving Target – On top of the hundreds of Consult CP’s that exist they would
become nearly impossible to beat because they could say the country will say
yes which means that even if we prep out the hundreds of perms, we would
still have to debate if the country and say yes or no.
3. Education – There will be less education because it will remove clash, 1. The aff
either has to prep blocks to all of the thousands of Consult CP which take a long
time to prep for or 2. We can prep a generic block to Consult CP but that
destroys clash because we won’t have any country specific perms.
 1AR – consultation cp
No reason to vote for the CP – abuses the aff.
1. Extend Predictability -- there are an infinite amount of agents the neg. can
choose for his/her consult PCC. Because there are essentially an infinite
amount of agents, I can never truly know which one my opponent will choose,
and thus, consult PCC’s are unpredictable. Predictability is key to fairness,
because if I don’t know neg. advocacy, I have no way to prepare for it, whereas
my opponent will be super prepped out for it, creating an unfair situation
2. Moving target – there are hundreds of affs they can run, on top of that they can
run hundreds of variations of countries says yes or countries say no.
3. Education -- There will be less education because it will remove clash, 1. The aff
either has to prep blocks to all of the thousands of Consult CP which take a long
time to prep for or 2. We can prep a generic block to Consult CP but that
destroys clash because we won’t have any country specific perms.
conditions cp
 2AC – AT conditions
Interpretation: The neg may only run a CP that has no additional conditions.

Violation: The neg has added a condition to their CP.

Standards:
1. Predictability: There are an infinite number of antecedents that could be added on to a
plan which makes prep impossible for the AFF because I can never truly know which one my
opponent will choose, and thus, condition CP are unpredictable. This destroys fair debate
because it grants one side a much larger advantage for winning before coming in the round.
2. Underlimiting: Allowing the neg to put any conditions on their CP is under limiting
the neg. This is bad as it gives them access to an absurd number of ways to avoid any
potential harms that come as a result of running the CP without conditions. In order to
be fair in this any given debate round we must not under limit the neg because it only
gives them access to aff arguments, which is unfair.
off - taiwan
da
 2020 – TRUMP WINS
NUQ -- Trump loses because economic slowdown
Ben White 6/24, POLITICO Pro's chief economic correspondent and author of the “Morning Money”
column covering the nexus of finance and public policy, 6-24-2019, "How Trump could have terrible
economic timing," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/24/trump-economy-2020-
employment-growth-1376710

In just one week, the

current economic expansion will turn 10 years old and officially become the longest in
American history, an occasion likely to elicit bragging from the White House.

But it will also highlight a major risk for President Donald Trump.

Signs of a slowdown are mounting with weaker job growth, reduced manufacturing activity and a
nervous Federal Reserve hinting at slashing interest rates — suggesting that Trump could suffer from
terrible economic timing.

All recent presidents other than Bill Clinton experienced slowdowns in their first terms, but most sought reelection as the
economy was improving. No president since Calvin Coolidge in 1924 has held on to the White House during an
election year marred by recession.

Trump may avoid running for reelection in an official recession, especially if he gets his much desired rate cuts from the Fed. But there is a
good chance he’ll be seeking a second term with the economy slowing and unemployment rising,
especially if he continues to engage in bruising trade battles.

Voters tend to lock in their assessment of a president’s performance on the economy a few months
before Election Day, meaning Trump’s strongest argument for four more years may not wind up being all
that strong.

“The economy has been a tailwind for him, but by Election Day next year it will at best no longer be
blowing,” said Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics who maintains a model gauging how economic trends influence voting
outcomes. “And there is a reasonable probability that he will be facing an economic headwind for reelection with
growth slowing to the point that unemployment is starting to rise next year, though a lot depends on what he does
with the trade wars and what the Fed does in response.”

Economic numbers in the second quarter of an election year — in this case April through June of next year — tend to
exert the biggest impact on election outcomes, Zandi notes. That’s when voters focus on the race and their
own economic situation and before they get distracted by summer vacations.

That means Trump’s

strongest economic performance — a growth rate close to 3 percent in 2018, boosted by a big tax cut —
might have come too soon for electoral purposes.
Trump in fact might be better off with a shallow recession right now — generally defined as a pair of quarters with shrinking gross domestic
product — with growth picking up again next year heading into the election.

“If there is going to be a recession, it’s probably good to get it over early,” said Karlyn Bowman, polling analyst at the American Enterprise
Institute. “His marks on handling the economy and jobs are just about the only positive marks he has.”

A near-term recession still does not seem likely. Economic forecasters see a slide back into growth between 1 and 2 percent
as the impact from the tax cut fades, economies outside the U.S. struggle and trade tensions linger.
The Fed is predicting 2.1 percent growth this year and 2.0 percent next year, with the unemployment rate rising slightly next year to 3.7 percent
from 3.6 percent.

The rate of job growth has already slowed to an average of 151,000 over the past three months, down from an average of
238,000 earlier in the year. That’s enough to keep the unemployment rate from rising but not by much.

Readings on manufacturing activity in the Philadelphia and New York regions this month registered sharp declines just
as Trump was threatening tariffs on Mexico. And in its announcement on interest rates last week, the Fed said
“indicators of business fixed investment have been soft.”
The administration’s main argument that growth will pick up again is based on the belief that the tax cuts, which lowered corporate rates and
incentivized investment, would produce a sustained boom in business spending. That could still materialize — but it hasn’t yet.

The White House is strongly sticking to that argument, dismissing predictions of a sharp slowdown and continuing to promise that job gains will
pick up again and growth will stay at a 3 percent pace, providing a solid backdrop for the reelection campaign.

“We should expect a bounce back. The labor market fundamentals are very strong and haven’t changed very much,” Kevin Hassett, the
outgoing chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, said in a recent interview. “The last two years we grew at a healthy clip
because we became an attractive tax climate and we deregulated aggressively. It feels like those fundamentals are still in place.”

Right now, the

economy remains Trump’s strongest issue, though his high ratings on the subject have not
lifted his overall approval rating. And his numbers on the economy are already showing some signs of
slipping.

A Fox News poll last week found that 57

percent of voters feel optimistic about the economy, down from 66
percent when Trump took office and 63 percent in February. The survey found that 48 percent of voters believe Trump’s
policies “help people with more money,” 31 percent said they help everyone and just 5 percent said they help “people like me.”

A Quinnipiac survey last month found that 39 percent approve of Trump’s trade policies while 53 percent
disapprove.

In critical swings states that carried Trump to the White House in 2016 — Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio and Iowa —
voters disapprove of the president’s handling of trade by 56 percent to 41 percent.

NUQ -- Swing voters key to 2020---He’s alienated them with attacks on

Congresswomen and poor character
Ronald Brownstein 7/19, senior editor at The Atlantic, 7-19-2019, "Trump’s Base Isn’t Enough,"
Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/07/trump-base-2020/594325/

Buried beneath the blustery bravado of Donald Trump’s openly racist attacks on four Democratic
congresswomen of color were clear signs of electoral anxiety.
Trump insists he is producing great results for the country, especially on the economy. And yet, at the price of provoking great backlash, he
moved in an unprecedented manner this week to portray four nonwhite Democratic representatives as fundamentally un-American, not only
ideologically, but also racially and ethnically.

In so doing, Trump
has telegraphed that, ahead of 2020, he hopes to focus at least as much on the jagged
divide of “Who is a real American?” as on the traditional question incumbent presidents seeking reelection highlight during
generally good economic times: “Are you better off than you were four years ago?”
That choice may reflect the convergence of inclination and calculation. Trump’s instinct is to center his
politics on cultural and racial conflicts that pit Americans uneasy about the nation’s changing identity
against those who welcome or accept it. But Trump also faces clear evidence that he may be unable to
build a winning coalition with just the voters satisfied with his performance in office. That’s evident even with
an economy that’s booming, at least according to measures such as the low unemployment rate and the soaring stock market.

The latest such evidence comes in a new study released today by Navigator Research, a consortium of Democratic research and advocacy
groups. The
report, provided exclusively to The Atlantic, examines a group that many analysts in both parties believe
could prove to be the key bloc of 2020 swing voters: Americans who say they approve of Trump’s
management of the economy but still disapprove of his overall performance as president. And it shows
Trump facing significant headwinds among that potentially critical group, partly because of the divisive
language and behavior he’s taken to new heights, or lows, since last weekend—tweeting about the
congresswomen and encouraging his supporters to attack them as well.

“The main takeaway from this analysis is that while some Americans might be giving Trump positive marks for his economic performance,
they are
strongly held back by three things: the values that they have, the views they have on other
noneconomic issues, and some very real concerns about Trump’s character and temperament,” says Bryan
Bennett, an adviser to Navigator Research.

This conflicted group looms so large over 2020 because about half (or even slightly more) of voters express
support for Trump’s management of the economy, but only 40 to 45 percent of them give him positive
marks on his overall performance. That difference could be the tipping point between a coalition that
places Trump close to the comfort zone for presidents seeking reelection—support from about half of
Americans—and one that leaves him trying to secure a second term with positive marks from a much
smaller circle. The only presidents since 1952 who sought reelection with approval ratings below 50 percent—Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter,
and George H. W. Bush—all lost.

The conflicted voters, if they break for Trump, bring him “in range” to win, says the GOP pollster Gene Ulm: “He’s incredibly close. Can I predict
that he’s going to win Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania? No, I can’t do that. But he is within spitting distance of that 47 [or so] mark he needs
to win when you look at these chunks of people.”

These voters consistently register as a substantial group. Since April, polls from CNN, Quinnipiac University, and ABC/The
Washington Post have found that between 16 percent and 19 percent of Americans who approve of Trump’s
handling of the economy still disapprove of his overall job performance. That’s a very high disparity by historical
standards: The NBC/Wall Street Journal poll has found that Trump’s approval rating among Americans who say they are
satisfied with the economy is running 16 to 20 percentage points lower relative to the approval ratings
of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
The Navigator research, based on the cumulative results of all six national surveys the group has conducted since the 2018 election, defines this
group slightly more narrowly: Its results put about 10 percent of Trump’s voters, or 6 percent of all voters, in this camp. (The reason: Navigator,
compared with most public polls, records a slightly lower approval rating for Trump, both overall and on the economy.)

The added value of the Navigator research is that, by gathering results across several surveys, it provides a polling sample large enough to look
more deeply than the public surveys themselves have done at the attitudes and characteristics of these divided voters. In other words, the
results present a sharper picture.

Nearly two-thirds of the conflicted voters are men, compared with just under half of the overall electorate. Compared with all voters, they are
also more suburban (60 percent), slightly wealthier (70 percent earn $50,000 or more), better educated (45 percent have college degrees), and
somewhat younger (56 percent are under 50 years old). Fully one-third of them, more than might be expected, are
nonwhite.

Less surprisingly, these voters are loosely rooted in their political views. A much higher share of them than the electorate
overall identifies as independents or moderates (about 45 percent in each case). In 2016, these voters reported preferring Hillary Clinton over
Trump by a seven-point margin, though fully 30 percent said they voted for a third-party contender—much higher than the population overall.
But in 2018, these same voters broke sharply against Trump: They backed Democratic candidates in House elections by a resounding 20
percentage-point margin.

In Navigator’s polling, the economy emerges clearly as Trump’s greatest advantage. Though Democratic strategists such
as the pollster Stanley Greenberg and the super PAC Priorities USA believe they can dent Trump’s edge by arguing that the economy still isn’t
delivering for many families, for now these conflicted voters give the president a crushing 55 percentage-point edge over congressional
Democrats when asked which side they trust more to handle the issue. That’s an imposing lead on the concern that most academic models
from political scientists and economists consider the biggest factor in deciding presidential elections.

But on every other front, Trump faces headwinds. In the surveys, these voters prefer congressional
Democrats over Trump to handle taxes (by nine points), immigration (by 10 points), and health care (by
34 points).

The conflicted voters also return negative verdicts on key measures of Trump’s character. Three-fourths of
them say he is looking out for himself, not the country, compared with about three-fifths of the electorate overall, Navigator found. It recorded
a similar disparity when it asked whether he is bringing more corruption to Washington or reducing it. “There are a lot of character things, but
you also see policy [resistance],” says Bennett, the associate director of polling and analytics at the Hub Project, a liberal advocacy organization.
“That does speak to the fact [that] these voters do have a nuanced view of Trump: They are willing to give him credit, but they are holding back
from giving him full approval because of questions about other policies and his character.”

Navigator didn’t track other measurements of Trump’s personal behavior, but results from Quinnipiac University’s national poll in March trace
some of voters’ doubts confronting Trump. Among voters who said they approved of his economic performance, fully
one-third still
said he is not honest; about one-fifth said he does not have good leadership skills or care about average
Americans; and 44 percent said they do not consider him a good role model for children.
 2020 – TRUMP LOSSES
TL (2 min)
Trump wins now — he has the Electoral College.
Cohn 19- Nate Cohn is a journalist and writer at the Upshot in the New York Times. At the Upshot he
mostly covers polls and politics. He has also appeared on CNN, MSNBC, NPR, and CSPAN. “Trump’s
Electoral College Edge Could Grow in 2020, Rewarding Polarizing Campaign” 07/19/19
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/upshot/trump-electoral-college-edge-.html 07/23/19 DR

President Trump’s approval ratings are under water in national polls. His position for re-election, on the
other hand, might not be quite so bleak.

His advantage in the Electoral College, relative to the national popular vote, may be even larger than it
was in 2016, according to an Upshot analysis of election results and polling data.

That persistent edge leaves him closer to re-election than one would think based on national polls, and
it might blunt any electoral cost of actions like his recent tweets attacking four minority
congresswomen.

For now, the mostly white working-class Rust Belt states, decisive in the 2016 election, remain at the
center of the electoral map, based on our estimates. The Democrats have few obviously promising
alternative paths to win without these battleground states. The president’s approval ratings remain
higher in the Sun Belt battlegrounds than in the Rust Belt, despite Democratic hopes of a breakthrough.

There are signs that some of these voters have soured on his presidency, based on recent polling. There
is also reason to think that white working-class voters who supported Mr. Trump were relatively likely to
stay home in last November’s midterm elections.

A strategy rooted in racial polarization could at once energize parts of the president’s base and rebuild
support among wavering white working-class voters. Many of these voters backed Mr. Trump in the first
place in part because of his views on hot-button issues, including on immigration and race.

Alone, the president’s relative advantage in the Electoral College does not necessarily make him a
favorite to win. His approval rating is well beneath 50 percent in states worth more than 270 electoral
votes, including in the Northern battleground states that decided the 2016 election.

And just because racial polarization could work to the president’s advantage in general doesn’t mean
that his particular tactics will prove effective. The president’s campaign rally on Wednesday night
seemed, for a time, to go too far even for him: on Thursday he disavowed the “send her back” chants
that supporters directed toward a congresswoman who immigrated to the United States as a refugee.
(By Friday, he was declining to condemn the chants.)

But Mr. Trump’s approval rating has been stable even after seemingly big missteps. And if it improves by
a modest amount — not unusual for incumbents with a strong economy — he could have a distinct
chance to win re-election while losing the popular vote by more than he did in 2016, when he lost it by
2.1 percentage points.
The president’s relative advantage in the Electoral College could grow even further in a high-turnout
election, which could pad Democratic margins nationwide while doing little to help them in the
Northern battleground states.

It is even possible that Mr. Trump could win while losing the national vote by as much as five percentage
points.

The state of the Electoral College, 2018

The best available evidence on the president’s standing by state comes from the large 2018 election
surveys. Their quality is generally high, and unlike most surveys, they have been adjusted to match
actual election results, ironing out many potential biases of pre-election polls. Although these surveys
are nearly nine months old, the stability of the president’s overall approval ratings means, for our
purposes, that they remain a decent measure of the distribution of his support.

Taken together, the president’s approval rating among midterm voters stood at about 45.5 percent,
excluding the voters who did not express an opinion (for comparability, measures of the president’s
approval will exclude voters without an opinion).

By state, the president’s approval rating was beneath 50 percent in states worth 310 electoral votes: the
states carried by Hillary Clinton, along with Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Iowa, Arizona and North
Carolina. This is not exactly good news for the president, but not as bad as it typically would be given an
approval rating of 45.5 percent. John McCain, for instance, lost states worth 365 electoral votes in 2008
while winning 45.7 percent of the vote.

The most important measure of the president’s strength in the Electoral College, relative to the national
vote, is the difference between the national vote and the “tipping-point state” — the state most likely to
push a candidate over the Electoral College threshold.

Wisconsin was the tipping-point state in 2016, and it seems to hold that distinction now, at least based
on the president’s approval rating among 2018 midterm voters.

Over all, the president’s approval rating was 47.1 percent in Wisconsin, above his 45.5 percent
nationwide. This implies that the president’s advantage in the Electoral College, at least by his approval
rating, is fairly similar to what it was in 2016.

Trump’s future hardline foreign policies are vital to deter China and prevent nuclear
war with North Korea.
Blackwill 19 — Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, former Belfer Lecturer in
International Security at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2019
(“Trump Deserves More Credit for His Foreign Policies,” Foreign Policy, May 7th, Available Online at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/07/trump-deserves-more-credit-for-his-foreign-policies/, Accessed
07-24-2019)

To its credit, the Trump administration has adopted a much more clear-eyed approach to China that
breaks with many of the errors of the past. The president’s confrontational trade policy could lead to
concessions from the Chinese government that his immediate predecessors sought but could not get
through traditional diplomatic means. And on Oct. 4, 2018, Vice President Mike Pence delivered the
toughest speech on U.S.-China relations by a U.S. administration since former U.S. President Richard
Nixon opened up the relationship. “China now spends as much on its military as the rest of Asia
combined, and Beijing has prioritized capabilities to erode America’s military advantages on land, at sea,
in the air, and in space,” Pence said. “China wants nothing less than to push the United States of
America from the Western Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies.”
Although his withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and constant confrontations with U.S. allies
have weakened his administration’s China policy, Trump’s political push to address the increasing
dangers of Chinese power is more important—because his successor can remedy these mistakes.
Without the president’s initiative, Washington might well have continued sleepwalking as Beijing drew
large parts of Asia into its orbit and away from the United States

Trump should also be given credit for his policies toward North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Afghanistan,
India, and Venezuela, among others.

Regarding North Korea, Trump’s strategy to this point has calmed the situation and reinvigorated the
negotiating track through the first meetings at the highest level in the history of the relationship. He has
addressed, at least temporarily, what matters most to vital U.S. national interests: the suspension of
North Korea’s nuclear and intercontinental missile tests, which represent direct threats to the U.S.
mainland. At a minimum, he has delayed the moment when a U.S. president would have to either stand
by while North Korea progressively expanded its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities or
attack its nuclear and missile sites, which could lead to a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula and
beyond.

Concessions to China leave Trump susceptible to Dem attacks.

Landler and Swanson 5/10 — Mark Landler, London bureau chief of The New York Times, member
of the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a B.S. in International Affairs from Georgetown University,
with Ana Swanson, Trade and International Economics Reporter at The New York Times, holds a B.A. in
cultural anthropology from Northwestern University and M.A. in international relations with a focus in
China and international economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,
2019 (“Trump Sees a China Trade Deal Through a New Prism: The 2020 Election,” The New York Times,
May 10th, Available Online at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/us/politics/trump-china-trade-
2020-election.html, Accessed 07-24-2019)

When President Trump had finished mocking the field of Democratic presidential candidates at a rally in
Florida this week (“Sleepy Joe,” “Crazy Bernie” and “Boot-edge-edge”), he pivoted abruptly to his
intensifying trade war with China. The segue was no accident: Mr. Trump is determined to present
himself as tougher on the Chinese than any of his potential challengers in 2020.

“Representing us against President Xi of China,” a sarcastic Mr. Trump said of Pete Buttigieg, the young
mayor of South Bend, Ind. “That’d be great.” Taking aim at former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.
earlier in the day, he said that China had pulled back from a trade deal because it wanted to wait him
out and negotiate with a President Biden or “one of the very weak Democrats, and thereby continue to
rip off the United States.”

Election-year politics have crept into Mr. Trump’s trade policy.

For months, the prospect of a landmark trade agreement with China has tantalized Mr. Trump. But now,
according to analysts and several former aides, his political calculus seems to have flipped. His recent
statements suggest he now believes that demonstrating his toughness with the Chinese and walking
away from a deal might well put him in a better position politically than signing one.

Imposing new tariffs on China is likely to hurt American farmers, rattle the stock market and possibly
damage the economy. But signing an agreement could expose Mr. Trump to attacks by Democrats,
particularly if it is perceived as weak. A hard line, on the other hand, would allow the president to cater
to his political base while heading off any Democratic attempts to outflank him as the great protector of
American workers.

“The days of being soft on China are over,” said Stephen K. Bannon, the former White House chief
strategist for Mr. Trump, who shaped the economic message of his 2016 campaign and has warned
repeatedly about the dangers posed by China. “Politics now drives the economics.”

Bashing China is a well-worn election-year tactic for both Democrats and Republicans. But Mr. Trump
has upended the usual practice by pursuing actions against China that are every bit as aggressive as his
campaign messaging. His protectionist instincts defy mainstream Republican orthodoxy and align him
more with progressives like Senators Bernie Sanders, independent of Vermont, and Elizabeth Warren,
Democrat of Massachusetts.

Mr. Sanders has vowed to label China a currency manipulator — something Mr. Trump had promised to
do during his campaign but was talked out of by advisers. And he has criticized Mr. Biden for voting for
permanent normal trade relations with China and for saying, during a recent campaign stop in Iowa:
“China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man.”

“It’s wrong to pretend that China isn’t one of our major economic competitors,” Mr. Sanders said in a
tweet. “When we are in the White House, we will win that competition by fixing our trade policies.”

Several of Mr. Trump’s current and former aides — including Mr. Bannon and Peter Navarro, his trade
adviser — have long argued that being tough with China and never accepting a deal is the right course.
They were countered by more mainstream figures like Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Larry
Kudlow, the president’s chief economic adviser, who warned Mr. Trump that a prolonged trade war
would buffet both the economy and financial markets.

In recent weeks, however, Mr. Trump’s campaign advisers have also started to echo the no-compromise
approach, according to a former official. That, combined with Mr. Biden’s potential political weakness
on China, has shifted Mr. Trump’s thinking away from those who urged a deal.

Democrats will pounce.

Landler and Swanson 5/10 — Mark Landler, London bureau chief of The New York Times, member
of the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a B.S. in International Affairs from Georgetown University,
with Ana Swanson, Trade and International Economics Reporter at The New York Times, holds a B.A. in
cultural anthropology from Northwestern University and M.A. in international relations with a focus in
China and international economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,
2019 (“Trump Sees a China Trade Deal Through a New Prism: The 2020 Election,” The New York Times,
May 10th, Available Online at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/us/politics/trump-china-trade-
2020-election.html, Accessed 07-24-2019)

It is not clear whether Mr. Trump has reverted from the eager deal maker to the anti-China hawkishness
of the 2016 campaign. The risks of an all-out trade war are considerable. Political analysts said voters
were likely to judge the president’s actions by how they affected their economic fortunes, not by
whether he looked tougher than the Democrats. To some extent, that is true even of Mr. Trump’s
supporters.

“They have been willing to give him the benefit of the doubt because he is addressing the issue,” said
David Winston, a strategist who advises Republicans. “Their attitude is, ‘We’re with you in wanting to do
this, but ultimately, it’s got to produce a positive impact for the country.’”

Yet there are also political risks for Mr. Trump in agreeing to a deal, particularly if he ends up with an
agreement that has the same lack of teeth as those of his predecessors. Democratic candidates would
most likely pounce on that as evidence that Mr. Trump’s blustering style does not produce results.

“A weak deal, including one that does not stop cybertheft by China, will be another proof point for
Democrats to say that at the end of the day, Trump just doesn’t get the job done,” said Geoff Garin, a
veteran Democratic pollster.

Mr. Garin said his firm had conducted research for Democrats that showed undecided and independent
voters were troubled by the decline in the income of farmers because of Chinese retaliation for Mr.
Trump’s tariffs.

“The China trade situation is particularly important because it ties his impulsive and erratic nature to
real-world consequence for Americans, in terms of leaving many workers and farmers worse off than
before,” he said.

TL (4 min)
Trump wins now — he has the Electoral College.
Cohn 19- Nate Cohn is a journalist and writer at the Upshot in the New York Times. At the Upshot he
mostly covers polls and politics. He has also appeared on CNN, MSNBC, NPR, and CSPAN. “Trump’s
Electoral College Edge Could Grow in 2020, Rewarding Polarizing Campaign” 07/19/19
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/upshot/trump-electoral-college-edge-.html 07/23/19 DR

President Trump’s approval ratings are under water in national polls. His position for re-election, on the
other hand, might not be quite so bleak.

His advantage in the Electoral College, relative to the national popular vote, may be even larger than it
was in 2016, according to an Upshot analysis of election results and polling data.

That persistent edge leaves him closer to re-election than one would think based on national polls, and
it might blunt any electoral cost of actions like his recent tweets attacking four minority
congresswomen.
For now, the mostly white working-class Rust Belt states, decisive in the 2016 election, remain at the
center of the electoral map, based on our estimates. The Democrats have few obviously promising
alternative paths to win without these battleground states. The president’s approval ratings remain
higher in the Sun Belt battlegrounds than in the Rust Belt, despite Democratic hopes of a breakthrough.

There are signs that some of these voters have soured on his presidency, based on recent polling. There
is also reason to think that white working-class voters who supported Mr. Trump were relatively likely to
stay home in last November’s midterm elections.

A strategy rooted in racial polarization could at once energize parts of the president’s base and rebuild
support among wavering white working-class voters. Many of these voters backed Mr. Trump in the first
place in part because of his views on hot-button issues, including on immigration and race.

Alone, the president’s relative advantage in the Electoral College does not necessarily make him a
favorite to win. His approval rating is well beneath 50 percent in states worth more than 270 electoral
votes, including in the Northern battleground states that decided the 2016 election.

And just because racial polarization could work to the president’s advantage in general doesn’t mean
that his particular tactics will prove effective. The president’s campaign rally on Wednesday night
seemed, for a time, to go too far even for him: on Thursday he disavowed the “send her back” chants
that supporters directed toward a congresswoman who immigrated to the United States as a refugee.
(By Friday, he was declining to condemn the chants.)

But Mr. Trump’s approval rating has been stable even after seemingly big missteps. And if it improves by
a modest amount — not unusual for incumbents with a strong economy — he could have a distinct
chance to win re-election while losing the popular vote by more than he did in 2016, when he lost it by
2.1 percentage points.

The president’s relative advantage in the Electoral College could grow even further in a high-turnout
election, which could pad Democratic margins nationwide while doing little to help them in the
Northern battleground states.

It is even possible that Mr. Trump could win while losing the national vote by as much as five percentage
points.

The state of the Electoral College, 2018

The best available evidence on the president’s standing by state comes from the large 2018 election
surveys. Their quality is generally high, and unlike most surveys, they have been adjusted to match
actual election results, ironing out many potential biases of pre-election polls. Although these surveys
are nearly nine months old, the stability of the president’s overall approval ratings means, for our
purposes, that they remain a decent measure of the distribution of his support.

Taken together, the president’s approval rating among midterm voters stood at about 45.5 percent,
excluding the voters who did not express an opinion (for comparability, measures of the president’s
approval will exclude voters without an opinion).

By state, the president’s approval rating was beneath 50 percent in states worth 310 electoral votes: the
states carried by Hillary Clinton, along with Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Iowa, Arizona and North
Carolina. This is not exactly good news for the president, but not as bad as it typically would be given an
approval rating of 45.5 percent. John McCain, for instance, lost states worth 365 electoral votes in 2008
while winning 45.7 percent of the vote.

The most important measure of the president’s strength in the Electoral College, relative to the national
vote, is the difference between the national vote and the “tipping-point state” — the state most likely to
push a candidate over the Electoral College threshold.

Wisconsin was the tipping-point state in 2016, and it seems to hold that distinction now, at least based
on the president’s approval rating among 2018 midterm voters.

Over all, the president’s approval rating was 47.1 percent in Wisconsin, above his 45.5 percent
nationwide. This implies that the president’s advantage in the Electoral College, at least by his approval
rating, is fairly similar to what it was in 2016.

Trump’s future hardline foreign policies are vital to deter China and prevent nuclear
war with North Korea.
Blackwill 19 — Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, former Belfer Lecturer in
International Security at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2019
(“Trump Deserves More Credit for His Foreign Policies,” Foreign Policy, May 7th, Available Online at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/07/trump-deserves-more-credit-for-his-foreign-policies/, Accessed
07-24-2019)

To its credit, the Trump administration has adopted a much more clear-eyed approach to China that
breaks with many of the errors of the past. The president’s confrontational trade policy could lead to
concessions from the Chinese government that his immediate predecessors sought but could not get
through traditional diplomatic means. And on Oct. 4, 2018, Vice President Mike Pence delivered the
toughest speech on U.S.-China relations by a U.S. administration since former U.S. President Richard
Nixon opened up the relationship. “China now spends as much on its military as the rest of Asia
combined, and Beijing has prioritized capabilities to erode America’s military advantages on land, at sea,
in the air, and in space,” Pence said. “China wants nothing less than to push the United States of
America from the Western Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies.”
Although his withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and constant confrontations with U.S. allies
have weakened his administration’s China policy, Trump’s political push to address the increasing
dangers of Chinese power is more important—because his successor can remedy these mistakes.
Without the president’s initiative, Washington might well have continued sleepwalking as Beijing drew
large parts of Asia into its orbit and away from the United States

Trump should also be given credit for his policies toward North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Afghanistan,
India, and Venezuela, among others.

Regarding North Korea, Trump’s strategy to this point has calmed the situation and reinvigorated the
negotiating track through the first meetings at the highest level in the history of the relationship. He has
addressed, at least temporarily, what matters most to vital U.S. national interests: the suspension of
North Korea’s nuclear and intercontinental missile tests, which represent direct threats to the U.S.
mainland. At a minimum, he has delayed the moment when a U.S. president would have to either stand
by while North Korea progressively expanded its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities or
attack its nuclear and missile sites, which could lead to a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula and
beyond.

Concessions to China leave Trump susceptible to Dem attacks.

Landler and Swanson 5/10 — Mark Landler, London bureau chief of The New York Times, member
of the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a B.S. in International Affairs from Georgetown University,
with Ana Swanson, Trade and International Economics Reporter at The New York Times, holds a B.A. in
cultural anthropology from Northwestern University and M.A. in international relations with a focus in
China and international economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,
2019 (“Trump Sees a China Trade Deal Through a New Prism: The 2020 Election,” The New York Times,
May 10th, Available Online at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/us/politics/trump-china-trade-
2020-election.html, Accessed 07-24-2019)

When President Trump had finished mocking the field of Democratic presidential candidates at a rally in
Florida this week (“Sleepy Joe,” “Crazy Bernie” and “Boot-edge-edge”), he pivoted abruptly to his
intensifying trade war with China. The segue was no accident: Mr. Trump is determined to present
himself as tougher on the Chinese than any of his potential challengers in 2020.

“Representing us against President Xi of China,” a sarcastic Mr. Trump said of Pete Buttigieg, the young
mayor of South Bend, Ind. “That’d be great.” Taking aim at former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.
earlier in the day, he said that China had pulled back from a trade deal because it wanted to wait him
out and negotiate with a President Biden or “one of the very weak Democrats, and thereby continue to
rip off the United States.”

Election-year politics have crept into Mr. Trump’s trade policy.

For months, the prospect of a landmark trade agreement with China has tantalized Mr. Trump. But now,
according to analysts and several former aides, his political calculus seems to have flipped. His recent
statements suggest he now believes that demonstrating his toughness with the Chinese and walking
away from a deal might well put him in a better position politically than signing one.

Imposing new tariffs on China is likely to hurt American farmers, rattle the stock market and possibly
damage the economy. But signing an agreement could expose Mr. Trump to attacks by Democrats,
particularly if it is perceived as weak. A hard line, on the other hand, would allow the president to cater
to his political base while heading off any Democratic attempts to outflank him as the great protector of
American workers.

“The days of being soft on China are over,” said Stephen K. Bannon, the former White House chief
strategist for Mr. Trump, who shaped the economic message of his 2016 campaign and has warned
repeatedly about the dangers posed by China. “Politics now drives the economics.”

Bashing China is a well-worn election-year tactic for both Democrats and Republicans. But Mr. Trump
has upended the usual practice by pursuing actions against China that are every bit as aggressive as his
campaign messaging. His protectionist instincts defy mainstream Republican orthodoxy and align him
more with progressives like Senators Bernie Sanders, independent of Vermont, and Elizabeth Warren,
Democrat of Massachusetts.

Mr. Sanders has vowed to label China a currency manipulator — something Mr. Trump had promised to
do during his campaign but was talked out of by advisers. And he has criticized Mr. Biden for voting for
permanent normal trade relations with China and for saying, during a recent campaign stop in Iowa:
“China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man.”

“It’s wrong to pretend that China isn’t one of our major economic competitors,” Mr. Sanders said in a
tweet. “When we are in the White House, we will win that competition by fixing our trade policies.”

Several of Mr. Trump’s current and former aides — including Mr. Bannon and Peter Navarro, his trade
adviser — have long argued that being tough with China and never accepting a deal is the right course.
They were countered by more mainstream figures like Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Larry
Kudlow, the president’s chief economic adviser, who warned Mr. Trump that a prolonged trade war
would buffet both the economy and financial markets.

In recent weeks, however, Mr. Trump’s campaign advisers have also started to echo the no-compromise
approach, according to a former official. That, combined with Mr. Biden’s potential political weakness
on China, has shifted Mr. Trump’s thinking away from those who urged a deal.

Democrats will pounce.

Landler and Swanson 5/10 — Mark Landler, London bureau chief of The New York Times, member
of the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a B.S. in International Affairs from Georgetown University,
with Ana Swanson, Trade and International Economics Reporter at The New York Times, holds a B.A. in
cultural anthropology from Northwestern University and M.A. in international relations with a focus in
China and international economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,
2019 (“Trump Sees a China Trade Deal Through a New Prism: The 2020 Election,” The New York Times,
May 10th, Available Online at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/us/politics/trump-china-trade-
2020-election.html, Accessed 07-24-2019)

It is not clear whether Mr. Trump has reverted from the eager deal maker to the anti-China hawkishness
of the 2016 campaign. The risks of an all-out trade war are considerable. Political analysts said voters
were likely to judge the president’s actions by how they affected their economic fortunes, not by
whether he looked tougher than the Democrats. To some extent, that is true even of Mr. Trump’s
supporters.

“They have been willing to give him the benefit of the doubt because he is addressing the issue,” said
David Winston, a strategist who advises Republicans. “Their attitude is, ‘We’re with you in wanting to do
this, but ultimately, it’s got to produce a positive impact for the country.’”

Yet there are also political risks for Mr. Trump in agreeing to a deal, particularly if he ends up with an
agreement that has the same lack of teeth as those of his predecessors. Democratic candidates would
most likely pounce on that as evidence that Mr. Trump’s blustering style does not produce results.
“A weak deal, including one that does not stop cybertheft by China, will be another proof point for
Democrats to say that at the end of the day, Trump just doesn’t get the job done,” said Geoff Garin, a
veteran Democratic pollster.

Mr. Garin said his firm had conducted research for Democrats that showed undecided and independent
voters were troubled by the decline in the income of farmers because of Chinese retaliation for Mr.
Trump’s tariffs.

“The China trade situation is particularly important because it ties his impulsive and erratic nature to
real-world consequence for Americans, in terms of leaving many workers and farmers worse off than
before,” he said.

The plan’s strengthening of arms export controls forfeits Trump’s key election
promise.
Da Silva 18 — Chantal Da Silva, 2018 (“TRUMP WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR U.S. FIRMS TO SELL
WEAPONS TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS,” Newsweek, January 8th, Available Online at
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-looks-loosen-restrictions-arms-sales-boost-business-overseas-
773852, Accessed 07-22-2019)

The Trump administration is looking to loosen restrictions on U.S. arms sales as part of a new "Buy
American" plan focused on drumming up billions of dollars more in business overseas for the country's
weapons industry.

President Donald Trump is expected to announce an effort to ease export rules on U.S.-made arms
purchases from foreign countries, Reuters reports, citing U.S. officials.

The move seeks to ease controls exports of military equipment "from fighter jets and drones to
warships and artillery," officials familiar with the plan said.

It is part of a 2016 presidential election campaign promise to create more jobs in the U.S. by increasing
sales of goods and services abroad and bring down the U.S. trade deficit from a six-year high of $50
billion.

Trump is good for the economy – regulation and tax cuts

Henderson 18. David R. Henderson, emeritus professor of economics at the Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California, is a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He was a
senior economist at President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1982 to 1984. He is editor of
The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics and the author of The Joy of Freedom: An Economist’s Odyssey,
[“He’s Good and Bad on Foreign Affairs, Good and Bad on the Economy”, 1-19-18, Law & Liberty,
Accessed 7-27-19, URL: https://www.lawliberty.org/liberty-forum/hes-bad-on-foreign-affairs-but-good-
on-the-economy/] RN

On the economy, Trump’s biggest triumphs for liberty are in the area of regulation and taxes. On
regulation, Wayne Crews of the Competitive Enterprise Institute finds that in Trump’s first nine months,
he issued 58 percent fewer “significant rules” than Obama had issued in the corresponding nine-month
period of 2016. A significant rule is defined as one that has an impact of $100 million or more. To really
understand the significance of those regulatory changes one must, of course, examine the details of
each. But one example of a regulatory change in process will give a flavor of some of Trump’s
deregulatory moves. In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a rule asserting the EPA’s
jurisdiction over even ponds, swamps, and potholes on farmers’ lands. In response to a lawsuit, the Sixth
Circuit Federal Appeals Court stayed the regulation in October 2016, and Trump has reopened the
process to modify the rule.

Here’s how Christopher DeMuth, a distinguished fellow with the Hudson Institute and former president
of the American Enterprise Institute, has evaluated Trump’s regulatory policies in a recent Wall Street
Journal op-ed:

With some exceptions (such as business as usual on ethanol), and putting aside a few heavy-handed
tweets (such as raising the idea of revoking broadcast licenses from purveyors of “fake news”), President
Trump has proved to be a full-spectrum deregulator. His administration has been punctilious about the
institutional prerogatives of Congress and the courts. Today there is a serious prospect of restoring the
constitutional status quo ante and reversing what seemed to be an inexorable regulatory expansion.

Professor Weiner, in his brief segment on Trump’s executive actions on regulation, seems to agree with
DeMuth.

On taxes, the United States had one of the highest corporate income tax rates in the developed world,
and, with the new tax law, that rate has fallen from 35 percent to 21 percent, putting the U.S. rate
somewhere in the middle of existing corporate tax rates. Besides letting corporations (which, by the
way, are owned by actual people) keep more of their income, the tax cut will attract capital from around
the world. With more capital, labor productivity will be higher and, therefore, so will the real wages of
U.S. workers.

Moreover, the tax bill moves the United States to a territorial corporate income tax system whereby
corporations are taxed in the jurisdiction in which they earned their income. Most countries have such a
system; the United States was unusual in taxing U.S. corporations based on their worldwide income.

On the individual income side, the tax law cut marginal tax rates somewhat, making up for much of the
revenue loss by restricting to $10,000 the amount of state and local taxes that individuals could itemize
on their tax returns. This huge change, combined with an increase in the standard deduction to $24,000
for married couples filing jointly, will cause millions of taxpayers in high-tax states to feel the full bite of
their local and state taxes rather than being implicitly subsidized by taxpayers in low-tax states. Why is
this good news for the country? Because taxpayers in low-tax states should not be forced to pay for
California’s, New York’s, and New Jersey’s high rates of taxation. Moreover, there is one unintended side
benefit: there will be more pressure on the high tax states to cut taxes.

Trump’s foreign policy is more successful than past administrations

Means 18. Grady Means is a Stanford University-trained economist, a writer, and former corporate
strategy consultant who served in the White House as an assistant to Vice President Nelson Rockefeller,
[“In defense of Trump’s foreign policy”, 7-24-18, San Francisco Chronicle, Accessed 7-27-19, URL:
https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Pax-Trumpus-13101115.php?psid=eryg5] RN
The conduct of foreign policy is often thought of as the primary responsibility of a U.S. president.
Because of its existential importance to the security of our country, the disturbing Delphic utterances of
President Trump in Helsinki and thereafter have sent spasms through the Western foreign policy and
intelligence communities.

I am not an apologist for the president — I didn’t vote for him (or Hillary Clinton). I didn’t and still don’t
think he has a firm grasp of history and global issues, and so I have no dog in this fight — but the
American system, “of the people,” as some like to say, presumes some level of fair-mindedness, and I
think a little perspective and reflection is in order here for the good of the country.

In that vein, from my perspective, the concrete results of the president’s policies have not been all that
bad. As opposed to his immediate predecessors, he has not gotten us into a huge catastrophe in Iraq (in
fact, he has not gotten us into any big shooting war). He has not gone on an embarrassing global
apology tour to autocratic Muslim countries who treat women like dirt. He has not telegraphed our
moves in Afghanistan and Iraq, emboldening our enemy and leading to loss of American lives.

And, for the moment, he has stopped nuclear and missile expansion in North Korea as opposed to
Presidents Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, who all claimed to have stopped North Korea’s
nuclear program. Not to “conflate,” but he is way ahead of his more articulate predecessors on many
counts — the ones that actually count.

So what is Trump’s foreign policy? It appears to have something to do with positioning and making
deals, although we would need to use IBM’s Watson computer running a million variations of game
theory to fully understand his logic and approach. But that does not make it wrong. It just makes it
confusing.

Let’s take his “relationships” with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
What must they think?

My guess is that they are totally baffled. On the one hand, he meets Putin in Helsinki and Xi at Mar-a-
Lago, strokes their egos in public, calls them “good guys” whom he respects, and tells the world that we
can do business with them. Then he dramatically expands the defense budget (aimed at China and
Russia), takes the advice of the command leadership to streamline military response and effectiveness,
moves a good portion of the Pacific fleet to the coast of China and North Korea, and directly challenges
China over the islands in the South China Sea.

He TWICE draws a red line on chemical weapons in Syria and enforces it (as opposed to his feckless
predecessor) with cruise missile attacks, and then attacks and kills Syrian and Russian forces committing
genocide. He provides lethal weapons to Ukraine to fight Russians, creates a better balance between the
Shite and Sunni forces in the Middle East, re-strengthens our alliance with Israel, starts a mini trade
skirmish with China to force a needed discussion on intellectual property theft that his predecessors
were afraid to have, refocuses foreign policy on Asia and firms up the alliance with Japan.

Then he expands our energy resources and strengthens our alliance with Saudi Arabia to give the United
States a decisive say in global energy supply and pricing and creates an existential threat to Russia and
Iran, kicks NATO and EU leadership (which each led his predecessors around by the nose) in the rear for
their historically cynical and mercantilist policies, expands NATO funding and strengthens it significantly.
He puts our cyberwarfare systems on an offensive footing, and, most importantly, strengthens the most
crucial factor of U.S. foreign policy — the U.S. economy, and secures the dollar as the unrivaled reserve
currency in the world, a powerful weapon that underpins all trade and major deals worldwide.

I have no idea what the guy is thinking.

I often have no idea what he is saying, but, objectively, I feel a lot safer today than I did under his past
several predecessors. I cannot mind read the guy and have no interest in writing “Trump Agonistes,” in
the vein of Gary Wills’ book about Nixon. But, to paraphrase Teddy Roosevelt, “Speak incoherently and
carry a big stick,” seems to be working for him. President Richard Nixon was described by his aide John
Ehrlichman as the “mad monk,” combining foreign policy strategy with unpredictable execution. Well,
Trump has certainly nailed that one.

In global hot spots, North Korea has actually stopped making headlines with nuclear tests and missile
launches (although that may change any day), and Iran is falling apart from within due to American
sanctions and the awful economic policies of the regime, and in spite of the quisling, mercantilist, cynical
(I repeat myself) policies of the European Union.

The Magnitsky Act sanctions, which bar individuals complicit in human rights abuses from traveling to or
owning assets in the West, are still in place (and expanding) on Putin’s cronies, and that really annoys
and threatens the Russian leadership.

America lives in a tough neighborhood. Many of the largest and most dangerous countries are run by
hoodlums: They would all laugh at the conversations and social theories espoused in cocktail parties in
New York and Nantucket, Mass., San Francisco and Hollywood.

I do believe that peace comes from strength. So, maybe, just maybe, we have a president who actually
understands our enemies and speaks their language at an instinctive and visceral level. His political
vocabulary is very different: It is not pretty; It is not “diplomatic.” From a conventional perspective, it is
“cringe-worthy.” But that does not necessarily make it wrong in defending America’s interests.
 Alliance – General
Decades of research prove credibility is false, but maintaining an insolvent Taiwan
commitment hurts US allied perception
Beinart 18 (Peter Beinart, contributing editor at The Atlantic and a professor of journalism and political science at the City University of
New York, citing Dartmouth College political scientists Daryl Press and Jennifer Lin, September 16, 2018. “America Needs an Entirely New
Foreign Policy for the Trump Age.” https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shield-of-the-republic-a-democratic-foreign-policy-for-
the-trump-age/570010/)

There are two primary arguments against the Democratic foreign policy outlined above. The first involves credibility. If the United
States abandons Taiwan, the argument goes, it will undermine the credibility of its commitment to South
Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. Similarly, if America won’t fight Russia in Ukraine, neither Moscow nor Riga will believe
America’s promises to fight Russia in Latvia. During the Vietnam War, this logic was dubbed the “domino theory”: If the United
States didn’t defend Vietnam, its credibility would collapse and other anti-communist “dominoes” would soon fall. But the theory is
wrong. Decades of academic research show that, in the words of the Dartmouth College political
scientists Daryl Press and Jennifer Lind, “there’s little evidence that supports the view that countries’
record for keeping commitments determines their credibility.” The Soviets and West Germans did not
conclude that because America would not defend South Vietnam it would not defend West Berlin, because
they understood that America cared more about West Berlin than it cared about South Vietnam, and had a greater capacity to defend it.
Similarly, when predicting whether the United States will defend Japan, neither Beijing nor Tokyo will look at whether America defends Taiwan.
They will look at whether it is in America’s interests, and within America’s power, to defend Japan. Far
from bolstering a country’s
credibility, insolvent commitments drain its finances, overstretch its military, and undermine its
reputation for sound judgment. As Kennan put it, “There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and
courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives.”

Perceptions of US credibility don’t spill over and are counterproductive

Walt 2015 (Stephen M. Walt, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, January 6, 2015.
“The Credibility Addiction.” http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:UUohn0SMU10J:foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/the-
credibility-addiction-us-iraq-afghanistan-unwinnable-war/+&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
Unfortunately, this obsession with credibility was misplaced. For one thing, a state’s “reputation” for being
tough or reliable didn’t work the way most foreign-policy elites thought it did. American leaders kept worrying
that other states would question the United States’ resolve and capability if it ever abandoned an
unimportant ally, or lost some minor scrap in the developing world. But as careful research by Ted Hopf,
Jonathan Mercer, and Daryl Press has shown, states do not judge the credibility of commitments in one place by
looking at how a country acted somewhere far away, especially when the two situations are quite
different. In fact, when the United States did lose, or when it chose to cut its losses and liquidate some unpromising position, dominos
barely fell and its core strategic relations remained unaffected. In other words, how the United States responds
to a challenge in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa tells you nothing about how it would or should
respond somewhere else, and other states understood this all along. When trying to figure out what the United
States is going to do, other states do not start by asking what the United States did in some conflict on the other
side of the world. Instead, they ask whether it is in America’s interest to act in the situation at hand. And
guess what? This implies that U.S. commitments are most credible when the American interest is
obvious to all. I mean, nobody really doubts that the United States would fight like a tiger to defend its own soil, right? Exaggerated
worries about U.S. credibility had a number of unfortunate consequences. They encouraged American leaders to act in places that didn’t
matter, in order to convince others that it would also act in places that did. Squandering resources on marginal conflicts undermined
confidence in U.S. protection, however, because it consumed resources that could have been committed elsewhere and it sometimes made a
war-weary American public even less interested in far-flung foreign adventures. Ironically, misguided
efforts to bolster U.S.
credibility may have weakened it instead. The credibility obsession also made it easier for U.S. allies to
free-ride (something they were already inclined to do), because they could always get Uncle Sucker to take on more
burdens by complaining that they had doubts about American resolve. I don’t blame them for trying this ploy, but I
do blame American officials for falling for it so often. In fact, had allies been a bit less confident that the United States
was going to protect them no matter what, these states might have been willing to spend more on their
own defense and been more attentive to Washington’s wishes. If the goal is retaining U.S. influence and
leverage, what really matters is whether other states have confidence in America’s judgment. If they
believe that the United States is good at weighing threats soberly and rationally, and if they are convinced that Washington can
set clear priorities and stick to them, then U.S. allies can calibrate their actions with ours and will be
more inclined to follow the U.S. lead. If allies and adversaries believe the United States understands
what is going on in key regions and has a clear sense of its own interests, then they will know that the
United States won’t be buffaloed into unwise actions by self-serving allied whining, or provoked into
overreactions by enemies eager to drag us into another costly quagmire. By contrast, if American leaders
panic at every sign of danger and treat minor problems as mortal threats, then other states will be less inclined to
trust Washington’s views on these matters and be more inclined to follow their own counsel. When Washington goes to war on the
basis of cooked intelligence, worst-case assumptions, and unsurpassed hubris, then other countries will be warier the next time we try to get
them to line up alongside us. If the United States keeps throwing soldiers’ lives and billions of dollars into unwinnable conflicts, confidence
in our political system’s ability to make rational decisions will decline even more. If foreign powers
believe U.S. policy is driven more by domestic politics than by strategic imperatives, they’ll view us with
barely veiled contempt and meddle even more in our porous political system. If foreign leaders pay close attention
to the bluster and balderdash that pass for strategic debate in official Washington, they’ll have reason to wonder if the self-appointed Leader of
the Free World really knows what it is doing. And of course, when they see a lengthy series of costly screw-ups (Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen,
Somalia, Libya, Ukraine, etc.), they will be more inclined to think for themselves than to trust Washington’s guidance. What I’m suggesting, in
short, is that successful
diplomacy depends less on endlessly reaffirming our “will” or “resolve,” and more
on building confidence in the analytical capacity of the American foreign-policy community and the
judgment of top U.S. officials. And that’s not surprising, either. Diplomacy is mostly about persuasion; it is ultimately about convincing
others to do what we want. They are more likely to accept our recommendations when we can tell a truly convincing story, i.e., one that has
the merit of being true. And that means that credibility isn’t the key to a successful foreign policy, especially when it
becomes a reflexive tendency to respond to any and all challenges with threats, bluster, and the use of force. If America still wants other states
to follow our lead, what really matters is judgment: analyzing issues intelligently, setting clear and sensible priorities, and being
willing to rethink a course of action in response to events. New York Yankees pitcher Lefty Gomez famously said that it was better to be “lucky
than good.” He was probably right, but it’s even better to be lucky andsmart. And both matter more than being mindlessly predictable. Or, to
paraphrase Walt Whitman, a “foolish credibility is the hobgoblin of small minds.”

Credibility thesis is wrong - lacks empirical support

Lanoszka 2015 (Alexander, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow @ MIT, "The Alliance Politics of Nuclear
Statecraft," http://www.alexlanoszka.com/AlexanderLanoszkaIntro.pdf)
To be sure, some scholars even dismiss the notion that policy-makers can manipulate perceptions of credibility. Jonathan Mercer writes that
states can never develop a reputation for resolve among their allies. Whatever action they implement
that advances the security interests of another is explained away as rooted in self-interest rather than
on ‘being a good ally.’13 In his study of crisis diplomacy between adversaries, Daryl Press builds on this skepticism. He argues that
balances of interest and power shape perceptions of credibility rather than past actions. It is therefore
pointless to pursue policy on the grounds of appearing credible to others.14 Not everyone agrees with such
assessments of credibility. Gregory Miller demonstrates how actions can a↵ect credibility and, by extension, the behavior of allies. However, he
relies on evidence drawn exclusively from before the First World War.15 It is unclear whether and how credibility matters among allies in the
nuclear age. And yet pundits and analysts commonly assume that the United States to this day needs to appear resolved and
credible to its allies, whether in Central Europe or the East China Sea. In light of the critical literature just mentioned, the validity of these
intuitively appealing arguments is not self-evident. We lack an empirical study that assesses such claims.
2AC Credibility DA –
Trump thumps any NATO stability
Burns & Lute 4/2 (Nicholas Burns is a Former Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Douglas Lute is
the former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council), “NATO’s Biggest
Problem is Trump”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/natos-biggest-
problem-is-president-trump/2019/04/02/6991bc9c-5570-11e9-9136-
f8e636f1f6df_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0280c8651966
As NATO marks its 70th anniversary this week, this unique, often unwieldy, 29-member alliance is confronting one of the most difficult sets of
challenges in its history. NATO
is still the world’s strongest military alliance. But its single greatest danger is
the absence of strong, principled American presidential leadership for the first time in its history.
Starting with NATO’s founding father, President Harry S. Truman, each of our presidents has considered
NATO a vital American interest. President Trump has taken a dramatically different path. As former
U.S. ambassadors to NATO, we interviewed alliance leaders past and present for a new Harvard Belfer
Center report: “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis.” Nearly all viewed Trump as NATO’s most urgent
and difficult problem. Never before has NATO had a U.S. leader who didn’t appear to believe deeply in
NATO itself. During his first two years in office, Trump has questioned NATO’s core commitment
embedded in Article 5 of the alliance’s founding treaty — that an attack on one of the allies will be
considered an attack on all. He has been weak and reactive in defending NATO against its most
aggressive adversary, Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump has also been a consistent critic of
European democratic leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, while publicly supporting
anti-democratic populists such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Trump is the first president
to call the European Union a “foe,” rather than a partner, of the United States. Fortunately, the vast majority of
Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress disagree with Trump on NATO’s value to the United States. They should vote to approve the
bills working their way through committees that would reaffirm the United States’ commitment to Article 5 and to require congressional
approval should Trump try to diminish our commitment to NATO — or to pull the United States out altogether. Congress would be acting in
unison with the public’s strong support for NATO, according to a 2018 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Critics who agree with
Trump present three main arguments for why he is right to question NATO. First, they say NATO’s core job was finished with the end of the
Cold War. That ignores, however, Russia’s campaign to destabilize NATO members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. It also ignores Putin’s
attacks on the U.S. and European elections in 2016-2018, designed to weaken our democracies from within. Containing Russian power until
Putin’s Soviet-trained generation passes from the scene remains a core NATO aim. And, as our report shows, there are new challenges beyond
Russia confronting the alliance. Second, Trump has claimed the allies are “taking advantage of us.” Low European
defense spending is indeed a problem for NATO’s future. Germany, in particular, must do much more. But NATO allies have produced real
growth in defense spending for four consecutive years, starting with Putin’s annexation of Crimea — a collective increase of $87 billion. On this
issue, Trump would be smart to continue to push but while doing so strive to transform himself from chief critic into the unifying leader NATO
desperately needs. A third criticism is that NATO no longer contributes significantly to U.S. security in the world. Consider the facts: Canada and
the European allies came to our defense on 9/11 and invoked the Article 5 mutual-defense clause of the treaty. They viewed Osama bin Laden’s
attack on the United States as an attack on them as well. NATO allies went into Afghanistan with us where they and partner nations have
suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths. Most of those countries remain on the ground with our soldiers to this day. NATO allies have also
fought with us in the successful campaign to defeat the Islamic State caliphate in Syria and Iraq. They conduct counterterror operations with us
in Africa. The European allies have assumed full responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia and the bulk of the burden in Kosovo. U.S. air and
naval bases in allied countries also bring the United States a continent closer to contain Russia in Eastern Europe and confront terrorist threats
in the Middle East and South Asia. This is a decisive advantage for the United States. The reality is that NATO is a net plus for the United States
in political, economic and military terms. In the decade ahead, the United States will fight two battles with authoritarian powers China and
Russia. The first is a battle of ideas that will center on Moscow’s and Beijing’s growing confidence in the superiority of their own systems. We
will need the full weight of our democratic allies in NATO to repudiate the authoritarian model in this intensifying global debate just as
Presidents John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan did in the past. NATO allies will also be critical in a battle of technology, as the West competes
with a more assertive China in artificial intelligence, quantum computing and biotechnology. The United States has a better chance to maintain
its qualitative military edge over China if we enlist the scientific and productive capacity of all our allies in Europe as well as in the Indo-Pacific.
NATO remains the great power differential between the United States and Russia and China, which have no real allies of their own. Trump
should reflect on a last reality that all his predecessors understood. The United States would be far stronger inside NATO as it faces these
challenges than it would be alone. NATO is not just yesterday’s story but is indispensable if Americans want to reach for the elusive goal we
have been chasing since World War II: a secure United States alongside a united, democratic and peaceful Europe as its closest global partner.
 Alliance – Japan
US military presence and alliance treaty with Japan maintain security guarantees
USNI, 2019
(USNI – United States Naval Institute “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report Preparedness, Partnerships, and
Promoting a Networked Region,” Department of Defense, June 1 2019,
https://news.usni.org/2019/05/31/the-department-of-defenses-new-indo-pacific-strategy, accessed
7/9/19, GDI – JBII)

POSTURE: JAPAN

U.S. forces in Japan are an essential component of our posture in the region. To
meet shared threats, advance common
interests, and fulfill our obligations under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security – a
key enabler for maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region – the Department remains steadfast in
its commitment to deploy our most capable and advanced forces to Japan. The Government of Japan contributes
financially to the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through a Special Measures Agreement. This strategic contribution directly supports the
operational readiness of U.S. forces in Japan.

No threshold for your impact – Japan will only rearm if the US revokes the whole
umbrella
De Oliveira 2019 (Henrique Altemani, professor @ Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
focusing on Brazil-Asia relations, “Japan: A Nuclear State?, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional,
volume 62, number 1, 5-23-2019, SciELO, http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201900107, accessed 7-
14-2019, GDI-ATN)

The central pillar of the Japanese nuclear policy is its dependence on extended nuclear deterrence by
the U.S., with recognition of its role both in terms of regional security, and the maintenance of the
Japan-U.S. Alliance as a way to augment its deterrence credibility. The Japanese nuclear policy is still
complemented by the strategy of latent deterrence, or rather, “the maintenance of the ability to
develop quickly a nuclear deterrent” (Hoey 2016, 485).

Even though mainly for pacific purposes, as it is a dual technology, Japan allocated considerable
resources to master the complete nuclear cycle, which would make it possible to affirm that “Japan has
the technology to make a nuclear weapon fairly quickly” (Oros 2017, 40). Nonetheless, the prohibitively high economic,
political, and diplomatic costs have dissuaded the production of nuclear weapons, but are still “leaving the door open for this path should there
be drastic changes in the security environment or deterioration of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment’’ (Roehrig 2017, 97). Therefore,
it can be presumed that in principle, Japan has not, and will not, pursue real access to nuclear
weapons, unless the U.S.’ commitment to keep the country under its nuclear umbrella ceases to exist.

Won’t proliferate – public support lacking

Strong, Staff writer for the Taiwan News, 2018
(Matthew, “U.S. academics oppose nuclear weapons for Taiwan,” Taiwan News, 2018/01/18,
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3344193, accessed 7/14/19, GDI – JBII)
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) – Developing nuclear weapons of its own will bring Taiwan no benefits and might
even disrupt its relations with the United States, American academics said Wednesday.

The Global Taiwan Institute hosted a public seminar in Washington D.C. titled “Taiwan’s Role in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific,” during which the North Korean nuclear crisis was mentioned.

At the event, Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said that a nuclear
weapons program for the island would conflict with the local consensus and harm relations with the
U.S., and therefore not be of much use to the island.

Referring to a covert nuclear program in the 1970s and 1980s, Glaser reminded the seminar that it had
been aborted due to pressure from Washington, the Central News Agency reported.

Miles Maochun Yu of the United States Naval Academy agreed with Glaser’s opposition to a nuclear
program, but he nevertheless said Taiwan should learn from Japan and tell the world it had the
technology and the capability to develop nuclear arms, even if it did not want to take that final step.

National Identity—public opinion and moral responsibility prevent Japan proliferation

Mochizuki, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School
of International Affairs at George Washington University, 2017
(Mike, “Three reasons why Japan will likely continue to reject nuclear weapons,” The Washington Post,
2017/11/06, https://beta.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/06/japan-is-likely-to-
retain-its-non-nuclear-principles-heres-why/?outputType=amp, accessed 7/4/19, GDI – JBII)

1) Staying non-nuclear is part of Japan’s national identity

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are a clear part of Japan’s national identity, not simply a policy
preference. Repeated polls indicate overwhelming popular support for the three principles in Japan. A
2014 Asahi newspaper poll revealed that support for the principles had risen to 82 percent, compared
with 78 percent in a 1988 poll. Despite growing concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program and China’s military power during
this period, Japanese support for remaining non-nuclear actually increased.

Even after the provocative North Korean missile launches over Japan in August and September, a Fuji
News Network poll showed that nearly 80 percent of the Japanese population remained opposed to
Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state. And nearly 69 percent opposed having the United States bring nuclear weapons into
Japan.

The legacy of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings leave many Japanese convinced that their
country has a moral responsibility to promote global nuclear disarmament — as well as to forgo nuclear weapons of
its own. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant disaster has reinforced this view.

Powerful political and economic entities prevent Japanese proliferation.

Mochizuki, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School
of International Affairs at George Washington University, 2017
(Mike, “Three reasons why Japan will likely continue to reject nuclear weapons,” The Washington Post,
2017/11/06, https://beta.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/06/japan-is-likely-to-
retain-its-non-nuclear-principles-heres-why/?outputType=amp, accessed 7/4/19, GDI – JBII)
Powerful players in Japanese politics can block nuclear acquisition

In addition to public opposition to nuclear weapons, Japan has significant “veto players” — crucial political or economic actors
that are likely to block efforts to develop nuclear weapons.
Japan has a robust nuclear energy industry. But public acceptance of nuclear energy in the 1950s resulted from a fundamental political bargain:
nuclear energy, but no nuclear weapons.

As security scholar Jacques Hymans argues, the development of nuclear energy in Japan boosted the
number of Japanese government agencies and private-sector actors that are committed to the peaceful
use of nuclear power — and can serve as a formidable opposition to any political move toward acquiring
nuclear weapons. These veto players include powerful economic ministries, regulatory commissions,
industrial groups and prefectural governments.

The international nonproliferation regime and public opposition to nuclear weapons give these veto
players leverage in Japan’s policy process. The International Atomic Energy Agency has closely
monitored Japan’s reprocessing programs, for instance. Japan’s nuclear energy program is also tied to
bilateral agreements and multilateral bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group that embody
nonproliferation principles.

Japan won’t go nuclear unless attacked – public opinion, military strategy

Smith Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations and Haas, President, Council on
Foreign Relations, 2019

(Sheila and Richard “Japan Rearmed” CFR April 3, 2019 https://www.cfr.org/event/japan-rearmed-

sheila-smith accessed 7/12 GDI-TM)

I think the other thing that people are unaware of—and I discuss this in the book—is Japanese political
leaders have never been sky about acknowledging the hedge. They understand that their nuclear
capability may at some point need to be turned into a different weapons program. And you get very
prominent people, like Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, you know, who is the least likely to advocate the
nuclear option as any political leader in Japan, right? But asked at a press conference he said: Of course.
We have the capability to do it. We choose not to. And so I think what people don’t understand is, yes,
the public sensitivity is very high for very obviously reasons, right? I start out the book by referencing
the nuclear of nuclear force in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I think that, more than Article 9, more than
anything else, is the real cause of the restraint in Japan about the nuclear option.

HAASS: Is that less intense with Millennials in Japan than it is with their grandparents?

SMITH: Well, here—that’s a good question. I’m not sure I can answer it for you. But if force is used
against Japan, then you may have a much more emotional and much more charged debate. What you’ve
had in the past over nuclear options has been a very expert-driven, rational, quiet conversation about
would this option help us or not.

The last piece of that question is many people think the Japanese government has never considered it
seriously, and that’s not true. So there have been formal policy reviews on the nuclear option inside the
Japanese government. They happened when China detonated a thermonuclear bomb in the ’60s. They
happened when Japan was reviewing its participation in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It
happened again as the Cold War ended. So it’s not as if the Japanese haven’t had a thought process on
these. The military strategic answer to the question is not whether we can do it. Japan is a large, skinny
set of islands. There’s no strategic depth.

In other words, if you’re a nuclear planner you like lots of strategic depth if you want to have nuclear
weapons. If you want to have ICBMs, you want them on a big continent, right? (Laughs.) If you want
aircraft carrying nuclear—you know, our triad, right? The only thing that makes sense for Japan by that
very narrow calculus is to put them on submarines and have that kind of option. None of the military
planners that have looked at these issues think that that’s a viable option for Japan, or one that will
enhance Japanese security. They think it would detract. It would make Japan a target rather than make
Japan stronger. So there’s different layers of assessment about the nuclear option, not all of it having to
do with public opinion.

Japan won’t prolif as long as they have the US nuclear umbrella

Paal 19 (Douglas H. Paal, distinguished fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
former vice chairman of JPMorgan Chase International, “America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia”, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, January 31, 2019,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/31/america-s-future-in-dynamic-asia-pub-78222, //RDT)

Looking ahead, the

sense of rivalry and historical animosity that suffuses Sino-Japanese relations will not
dissipate anytime soon. The relationship will remain volatile. From the United States’ perspective, this reality is a
source of alliance continuity as Japan will long need an outside balancing force against its much larger
neighbor. This dynamic has helped Tokyo refrain from exploiting its latent capacity to become a nuclear-
weapon state in exchange for the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, another layer of the ties that
bind the two partners together.
 Alliance – Taiwan
Taiwan has no capability or motive to go nuclear – long timeframe for impact
Ding et al 12 (Arthur S. Ding is a Research Fellow of the Institute of International Relations, National
Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. Peter R. Lavoy is Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. James J. Wirtz is Dean of the
School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and Director
of the Global Center for Security Cooperation, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Over the Horizon
Proliferation Threats. Palo Alto, CA, USA: Stanford Security Studies, 2012. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 15 July
2015. Copyright © 2012. Stanford Security Studies.)
Practical Obstacles Several factors contribute to the absence of a nuclear debate in Taiwan. The foremost
involves capability. Although Taiwan is often described as having the requisite technology to develop nuclear weapons, the country
lacks the industrial capability and associated military infrastructure to field a credible nuclear arsenal.
Taipei faces practical obstacles. For instance, the island lacks fissile materials. Taiwan’s heavy water nuclear reactor that can enrich
plutonium, which was located at the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research, has been dismantled. The Institute for Nuclear Energy Research
itself has been downgraded to become a division of the civilian Atomic Energy Council of the executive branch, and its mission has been
redirected toward commercial energy production. Experienced research staff also have left or retired. Waste fuel rods stored at Taipower
Company, which are under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguard system, also are not available for use in a weapons program. 13
Even if Taiwan managed to assemble a bomb, it lacks test facilities needed for systems integration or a
full-scale test. Taiwan has no place to test a nuclear weapon, and it is impossible to test clandestinely. Simulated tests using super
computers are possible; however, Taiwan has no relevant database to gauge designs tested in this way. Many
observers have described these obstacles. Chien Chung, a nuclear chemistry expert teaching at Taiwan’s National Tsing Hua
University, notes that although many research facilities exist on the island, today’s researchers lack practical
experience when it comes to designing and manufacturing nuclear weapons. He noted that it would take
several billion U.S. dollars to “re-build the nuclear weapons program” given its complete disarray. 14 Another observer who is
familiar with Taiwan’s nuclear program also suggested that it would take eight to ten years to rebuild basic scientific
and industrial capacity before any nuclear development program could be undertaken. 15 Political Obstacles
Any effort to start a nuclear program also would encounter domestic political opposition. There is a
strong antinuclear movement in Taiwan that keeps close contact with the global antinuclear movement. This opposition is also
reflected in the DPP’s nuclear-free homeland Taiwan program, which was endorsed in May 2003 with a pledge not to develop nuclear weapons.
16 Combined with highly competitive media, which closely watch sensational stories, it would probably be
impossible to rebuild the nuclear weapons program secretly. Most Taiwanese believe that reviving the nuclear option
is highly risky, with the likely costs far outweighing any potential gains. U.S. policy on weapons of mass
destruction also is likely to deter any effort to launch a nuclear program on the island. U.S. nonproliferation and
counterproliferation policy, combined with Taiwan’s security dependence on Washington, would dissuade potential nuclear advocates. They
know that it is counterproductive for Taiwan to advocate a nuclear option, especially in the context of an improving U.S.-China relationship. 17
Taipei also understands that a nuclear program would tarnish its international image, which would hurt
ongoing efforts to gain international support and sympathy.

The plan strengthens alliance relationships

Glaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the
Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger
Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?”
International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

A third potential security danger is that accommodation by the United States could undermine its allies’
assessments of the credibility of the United States to come to their aid if attacked by China. More
specifically, critics believe that ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan could lead the Japanese to doubt
America’s commitment to defend Japan, which would undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance and in turn
reduce U.S. security. Tucker and Glaser argue, “A U.S. decision to abandon Taiwan—leading to
unification of an unwilling Taiwan with China— would be particularly alarming to Japan. . . . If Japan
begins to doubt U.S. reliability, that could deal a fatal blow to the U.S.-Japan alliance.”97 Although a
decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan would certainly send political shock
waves across the region, these concerns are overstated. There are similarities between the U.S.
commitments to Taiwan and Japan, but also clear differences. U.S. security interests in Japan are much
greater; as a result, the alliance involves much stronger political commitments and the deep integration
of U.S. and Japanese military capabilities.

In addition, the United States has a clear rationale for ending its commitment to Taiwan that does not
apply to Japan: the U.S. commitment to Taiwan strains the U.S.-China relationship and increases the
probability of war in ways that the U.S. commitment to Japan does not. Japan should appreciate these
differences and therefore recognize that the ending of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would not
indicate a coming diminution of the U.S. commitment to Japan. U.S. leaders could work to make sure
that their Japanese counterparts fully appreciate these differences.

In addition, the United States could take other actions that would starkly distinguish its policies toward
Japan from its policies toward Taiwan, which should help to offset doubts that accommodation on
Taiwan might create. Most obviously, the United States could increase the size and improve the quality
of the forces it commits to Japan’s protection. Other policies could include further deepening U.S.-Japan
joint military planning and continuing high-level discussions of the requirements for extending
deterrence to Japan. Growth in Chinese conventional and nuclear forces has increased the importance
of these interactions; ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would make them still more valuable.98

Finally, as China’s power continues to grow, Japan’s need for U.S. security guarantees will also grow.
Doubts about U.S. reliability are therefore likely to convince Japan to work harder to strengthen the
U.S.-Japan alliance, not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China.99

The commitment to Taiwan weakens alliances – plan boosts them

Goldstein, 15 - associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the US Naval War College
(NWC). He was also the founding director of the NWC's China Maritime Studies Institute (Lyle, Meeting
China Halfway, p. 71)

Two plausible objections may be discussed briefly at this point, though each is dealt with more
comprehensively in chapter 12, the book’s conclusion. A first objection concerns the oft-made argument
that any concession to Beijing represents “appeasement” that will only invite greater aggression. For
those making this argument, Taiwan is the “ultimate prize” for Beijing, and thus would raise China’s
confidence to unacceptably high levels. A related argument concerning the fate of US alliances in the
Asia-Pacific region is made that any kind of reunification between the Mainland and Taiwan would signal
a “death blow” to the US-Japan Alliance, and other allies would also be dubious of the US commitment
to the region’s security. However, both arguments turn out to be specious—having been built on crude
and simplistic assumptions. A clear view of history shows plainly that Beijing approaches the Taiwan
issue quite differently than other issues, and so the expectation that China, following unification, would
immediately seek to apply its hubris to other issues only stretches the imagination. The “Munich”
appeasement argument also seems to be ignorant of geography, neglecting the fact that Taiwan’s
defense is not feasible over the long term. White quite correctly concludes: “America can no longer
defend Taiwan from China, and a policy towards Taiwan that presumes that it can is unsustainable.”68
Even putting military capabilities aside, as Nathan and Scobell relate, “Beijing is convinced that it enjoys
an asymmetry of motivation over the United States with respect to Taiwan.”69 Moreover, a Washington
policy premised on Munich-type fears also ignores the fact that Mainland China has reasonable
expectations for its security. As for the US alliance structure, this book is advocating major changes in
that structure, in the hope that it would evolve toward something lighter and more defensive. Credibility
is logically questioned when commitments exceed genuine US national interests. If US commitments in
the Asia-Pacific region are constrained to cover only the clearest threats to US national security (thus
excluding Taiwan, in addition to various rocks and reefs along China’s maritime periphery), those
alliance relationships will actually be strengthened. Thus, it is well known that many South Koreans,
Japanese, and others in the region have been reasonably concerned that their states, quite against their
will, might be pulled by treaty commitments into the vortex of a Taiwan scenario. Having alleviated
such alliance strains, chiefly caused by unreasonable war-fighting requirements, these alliances will
actually benefit from enhanced and increasingly stable Taiwan–Mainland integration.

Trump thumps Taiwan assurance

Gries & Wang 2/15/19 (Peter Gries studies the political psychology of international affairs, with a
focus on China and the United States and Tao Wang is a China Strategist), “Will China Seize Taiwan?”,
Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-02-15/will-china-seize-taiwan
“China must be, and will be reunified,” Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in a speech in January. Xi spoke of “peaceful reunification” with
Taiwan, but he warned, “We do not forsake the use of force.” Ever since Hong Kong and Macau rejoined Mainland China in 1997 and 1999,
respectively, Chinese expectations that Taiwan would follow suit have grown. When, a decade ago, the Beijing Olympics and the global financial
crisis boosted China’s confidence on the world stage, those expectations redoubled. But “peaceful reunification” has proved elusive. After
Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen, of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to the presidency in 2016, many Mainland Chinese
lost patience with the idea. Some Chinese nationalists now argue that China has only a brief window of opportunity to seize Taiwan. Talk of
“forceful reunification” is ascendant. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. SIGN UP China has already begun to tighten the noose.
It has forced Taiwan out of international bodies, such as the World Health Organization; required airlines to replace “Taiwan” with descriptions
such as “Taiwan, Province of China”; and induced five more countries to sever relations with Taipei. Beijing seems to believe that the United
States will sit by as it squeezes Taiwan. Taipei, meanwhile, has convinced itself that China has no plans to invade. And U.S. President Donald
Trump seems to think he can rock the boat without consequences. All are wrong—and their wishful thinking is raising the odds of conflict.
“CHINA DREAM” IN BEIJING Now that Xi has consolidated power, he seeks a legacy befitting the great emperors of old: the reunification of the
Middle Kingdom. “The only thing that will make him the greatest leader in the Chinese Communist Party’s history is to take Taiwan back,” Shen
Dingli, a foreign relations scholar at Fudan University, told Quartz in 2018. “If he were to achieve China’s reunification, who will say he is second
to Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping?" There are signs that Xi believes the world will sit by if China invades Taiwan.
Xi, whose “China Dream” promises to make China great again, likely agrees. “Fight a war, win a war,” is one of his signature slogans. In 2017, he
presided over a military parade with a replica of Taiwan’s presidential palace visible in the distance. Chinese soldiers had constructed it to train
for an invasion of Taiwan. That same year, China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, circumnavigated Taiwan twice. “The PLA is likely preparing
for a contingency to unify Taiwan with China by force,” the U.S. Defense Department told Congress in 2018. There are signs that Xi believes the
world will sit by if China invades Taiwan. “Xi has told people that he was impressed by Putin’s seizure of Crimea,” a Beijing insider told the
reporter Evan Osnos in 2015. “[Putin] got a large piece of land and resources” and met little resistance from the West. Many among China’s
elite have embraced military action. “The possibility for peaceful reunification is gradually dissipating,” Wang Zaixi, a former deputy director of
the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, declared in 2017. “There will very likely be military conflict,” retired Chinese General Wang Hongguang told the
People’s Daily in December. Many ordinary Chinese agree. “If we want to take our island back, we have to use force.” reads a Weibo post from
last November. Both Chinese academics and journalists argue that this sentiment is widespread. “Mainland Chinese public opinion became
impatient with Taiwan a long time ago,” former director of the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s Institute of Taiwan Studies Zhou Zhihuai
wrote in 2017. “Mainland Chinese will be very happy to see the PLA take action to punish a ‘pro-independence Taiwan’,” a Global Times
editorial claimed in 2018. WISHFUL THINKING IN TAIPEI Despite this increased militancy across the Strait, Taipei has convinced itself that China
will not attack. Many in the ruling Democratic Progressive Party have persuaded themselves that China is too sensible to take military action.
“The mainland Chinese leader today is a rational decision maker,” Tsai claimed in 2017: Xi would not provoke a war likely to drag in Japan and
the United States. Others in the DPP depict China as too weak. “China has too many domestic problems” to capture Taiwan, professor Fan Shih-
Ping wrotein 2017. Taiwan’s major opposition party, the Kuomintang, takes a rosy view of Beijing that rejects the idea that China might invade.
“There is no problem,” former president Ma Ying-jeou declared last year. “Nowadays Beijing’s top strategy is peaceful rise,” the journalist
Huang Nian wrote in April. “Forceful reunification would derail it.” This complacency has led Taiwan to neglect its armed forces. Taiwan’s
military suffers from a desperate shortage of officers—nearly half of all lieutenant positions are unfilled. In 2018, Taiwan made matters worse.
Just as talk of “forceful reunification” was rising in Mainland China, the government ended compulsory military enlistment—but allowed felons
to serve. Morale has plummeted. The United States has recommended that Taiwan consider restoring conscription. “The shift to a voluntary
military was a mistake,” U.S. officials concluded. In an April 2018 poll, more than 40 percent of Taiwanese said they had “no confidence at all”
that their military could defend Taiwan; but 65 percent had convinced themselves that the PRC would not take military action against the
island; and only six percent believed that an attack was “very likely.” “AMERICA FIRST” IN WASHINGTON The withering of Taiwan’s armed
forces has increased Taiwan’s military reliance on the United States—just when many in Beijing are questioning the U.S. commitment to
Taiwan. Trump’s “America first” doctrine has convinced many Chinese that the United States is now too isolationist to come to Taiwan’s
defense. “America will absolutely sacrifice Taiwan,” the Global Times insisted in 2017. “On the premise of America First … the United States is
not likely to send troops to fight for Taiwan.” For decades, a U.S. policy of “dual deterrence” has helped prevent conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Washington has warned Beijing not to attack Taiwan unprovoked, but reassured Chinese leaders that
the United States would not support Taiwanese independence. It has told Taipei, in turn, that the United States
would come to its defense—as long as it did not provoke Beijing by declaring independence. Making the policy work has meant treading a fine
line, but for decades, dual deterrence has allowed Taiwan to enjoy de facto independence and helped prevent a war with China. Trump has
upset that delicate balance. In December 2016, Tsai called Trump to congratulate him on his victory. The incoming Trump administration then
began to talk of “revisiting” the One China policy, under which the United States recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal
government of China, but maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan. Beijing was outraged. Xi refused to talk to Trump until he recommitted the
United States to the One China policy. In February, Trump capitulated. In a phone call with Xi, he affirmed that the United States would
continue to support the “One China” policy. “Trump lost his first fight with Xi,” the Beijing scholar Shi Yinhong bragged to the New York Times.
“He will be looked at as a paper tiger.” Last year, however, the pendulum swung back toward confrontation. In February, Congress passed the
Taiwan Travel Act, encouraging (but not requiring) high-level U.S. officials to visit Taiwan, and high-level Taiwanese officials to visit the United
States. In the fall, Trump started a trade war with China, generating anxiety among Chinese nationalists. They now believe Trump is using
Taiwan as part of a new Cold War against China, creating a sense of urgency for reunification. A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY China could well
move to take Taiwan before 2020, when some Chinese fear that Taiwan’s presidential election will close Beijing’s window of opportunity for
military action. Many Mainland Chinese nationalists were disappointed, rather than relieved, by the pro-independence DPP’s poor showing in
last November’s local Taiwanese elections. This counterintuitive reaction reveals an alarming calculus: should a weakened Tsai and the DPP lose
the presidency in 2020 to a more pro-China candidate, the opportunity for “forceful reunification” would be lost. “What a pity,” one Weibo user
from Beijing wrote about the DPP’s losses. “We could be further away from the day of reunification.” It is the hated DPP that gives Chinese
nationalists a pretext to take Taiwan back now. That disappointment has fed a sense of urgency among many Chinese nationalists. “I request
that Mainland China issue a timetable for reunification,” one outraged Weibo user wrote in November. “Whether peaceful or forceful, please
don’t drag this out again and again.” The 2020 U.S. presidential election also looms in the minds of Chinese nationalists. Trump looks less likely
to win reelection after Democratic victories in the 2018 midterms, and many Chinese worry that a Trump loss would make forceful reunification
harder. Trumpis seen as a businessman and isolationist willing to bargain Taiwan away. “America will
sell Taiwan out in the blink of an eye,” a People’s Daily editorial claimed last year. (Few Chinese recognize the possibility that
Trump might respond forcefully to an attack on Taiwan to rally support at home.) A Trump successor, “forceful reunification” advocates fear,
may not be so willing to cut a deal. Some in Beijing even think China can retake Taiwan without violence. China may “break the enemy’s
resistance without fighting,” Wang Zaixi told the Global Times in 2017. Just as the Communist Party seized Beijing in 1949 without shooting a
single bullet, he argued, China could capture Taiwan peacefully by surrounding the island, imposing economic sanctions, and cutting off its oil
supply. “No need to shed blood,” he concluded. The idea that China can force reunification without fighting is delusional and dangerous.
Tightening the military or economic noose around Taiwan would likely provoke a reaction from the United States. Given popular nationalist
pressures, Beijing would then feel compelled to respond. Things could get out of control fast. All sides need to wake up to the dangers of
backing into a conflict that few want.

No chance for Taiwan prolif

NTI 15 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, international arms control and non-proliferation organization,
“Taiwan”, 2015, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/taiwan/)

Taiwan possesses much of the technological expertise necessary to develop nuclear weapons, but would face significant
obstacles in doing so—namely, U.S. opposition, international pressure, and the threat of a pre-emptive strike
by China. Recent assessments indicate that it would take Taiwan between one and eight years to
develop a complete nuclear warhead, and most likely much longer to design one light enough to be carried
by any of Taiwan's current land-attack missiles. Regardless, most analysts agree that under the current political
situation, Taiwan is very unlikely to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. [38]

No impact to Taiwan prolif

Sapolsky 14 (Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor Emeritus and the Former Director of The MIT Security
Studies Program. Christine M. Leah is a Stanton Fellow at the MIT Security Studies Program. 4-14-2014
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/let-asia-go-nuclear-10259)

Tailored proliferation would not likely be destabilizing. Asia is not the Middle East. Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and even Taiwan are strong democracies. They have stable political regimes. Government
leaders are accountable to democratic institutions. Civilian control of the military is strong. And they
don’t have a history of lobbing missiles at each other—they are much more risk-averse than Egypt, Syria or Iran.
America’s allies would be responsible nuclear weapon states. A number of Asian nations have at one time or another
considered going nuclear, Australia for example, with tacit U.S. Defense Department encouragement in the 1960s. They chose what for them
was the cheaper alternative of living under the US nuclear umbrella. Free nuclear guarantees provided by the United States, coupled with the
US Navy patrolling offshore, have allowed our allies to grow prosperous without having to invest much in their own defense. Confident that the
United States protects them, our allies have even begun to squabble with China over strings of uninhabited islands in the hope that there is oil
out there. It is time to give them a dose of fiscal and military reality. And the way to do that is to stop standing between them and their nuclear-
armed neighbors. It will not be long before they realize the value of having their own nuclear weapons. The waters of the Pacific
under those arrangements will stay calm, and we will save a fortune.

Nuclearization has no regional impact – empirics

Panda 14 (Rajaram Panda, Former Senior Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, The Korean Journal o f Defense Analysis Vol.
26, No. 4, December 2014,407^425. “Should Japan go Nuclear?” http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.proxy-
remote.galib.uga.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=498d6c76-aa45-45ed-b76b-cc4632695f35%40sessionmgr4005&vid=1&hid=4102)
The question that arises now: Would the United States allow, tolerate or encourage Japan and South Korea to go nuclear?
Most likely, the United States would feel highly uncomfortable if Japan and South Korea were to choose the nuclear path. But we know for sure
that the United States treated the prospect of China becoming a nuclear power as almost unthinkable. Yet
China and other countries have become nuclear powers without making the world a more dangerous
place. In South Asia, possession of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan has deterred both of them from going to a major war, though
occasional border skirmishes do take place without real fear of escalation on a nuclear scale. Should possession of nuclear
weapons by Japan and South Korea be worrisome to regional and world security? Developments during the
post-World War II period have proved otherwise. Nuclear weapons have encouraged cautious behavior by their possessors and
deterred any of them from threatening others’ vital interests. Besides China, North Korea’s nuclear program could precipitate
decisions both in Japan and South Korea to revisit their nuclear option. By implication, such a decision would mean
the abrogation of their security alliance relationship with the United States, which would also mean reordering the security dynamics in East
Asia, where all countries would claim to be equal in terms of sovereignty, territorial integrity and pride.

No prolif impact
Mueller 17 (John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University & Senior Fellow at
the Cato Institute & Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies
at Ohio State University "76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism"
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/cato-
handbook-for-policymakers-8th-edition-76_0.pdf)
Except for their effects on agonies, obsessions, rhetoric, posturing, and spending, the consequences of
nuclear proliferation have been largely benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them
simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, nuclear powers have
found the weapons to be a notable waste of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have quietly
kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. If
the recent efforts to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons have been successful, those efforts have
done Iran a favor.

There has never been a militarily compelling reason to use nuclear weapons, particularly because it has
not been possible to identify suitable targets—or targets that couldn’t be attacked as effectively by
conventional munitions. Conceivably, conditions exist under which nuclear weapons could serve a
deterrent function, but there is little reason to suspect that they have been necessary to deter war thus
far, even during the Cold War. The main Cold War contestants have never believed that a repetition of
World War II, whether embellished by nuclear weapons or not, is remotely in their interests.

Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be crucial status symbols. How much more status would
Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain
or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or much less if they had none? Did China need
nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth or its Olympics?

Those considerations help explain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of
nuclear proliferation. Most famously, in the 1960s, President John Kennedy anticipated that in another
decade “fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons.” Yet, of the dozens of
technologically capable countries that have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, very few have done
so. Insofar as most leaders of most countries (even rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons,
they have come to appreciate several drawbacks of doing so: nuclear weapons are dangerous, costly,
and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as the University of Southern California’s Jacques Hymans has
demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult for administratively dysfunctional
countries to obtain—it took decades for North Korea and Pakistan to do so. In consequence, alarmist
predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points
of no return have proved faulty.

Although proliferation has so far had little consequence, that is not because the only countries to get
nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. Large, important countries that acquired the bomb were run
at the time by unchallenged—perhaps certifiably deranged—monsters. Consider Joseph Stalin, who, in
1949, was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao
Zedong, who, in 1964, had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that resulted in an artificial
famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished.

Some also fear that a country might use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” its area. That argument was
used with dramatic urgency before 2003 when Saddam Hussein supposedly posed great danger, and it
has been frequently applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination is to be carried out is never made
clear. The notion, apparently, is this: should an atomic rogue state rattle the occasional rocket, other
countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would bow to its demands. Far more likely, threatened states
would make common cause with each other and with other concerned countries (including nuclear
ones) against the threatening neighbor. That is how countries coalesced into an alliance of
convenience to oppose Iraq’s region-threatening invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Yet another concern has been that the weapons will go off, by accident or miscalculation, devastating
the planet in the process: the weapons exist in the thousands, sooner or later one or more of them will
inevitably go off. But those prognostications have now failed to deliver for 70 years. That time period
suggests something more than luck is operating. Moreover, the notion that if one nuclear weapon goes
off in one place, the world will necessarily be plunged into thermonuclear cataclysm should remain in
the domain of Hollywood scriptwriters.

No arms racing impact

Brendan Green 18. Assistant Professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati. “Primacy and
Proliferation: Why Security Commitments Don’t Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons” in A. T. Thrall
and B. H. Friedman eds. US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century. Routledge. 48-9.

Despite the popularity of the nuclear domino theory among policymakers, the academic literature has
turned against it. The reason is obvious: several decades of pessimistic proliferation forecasts based on
falling dominoes were proved embarrassingly wrong by history. Moeed Yusuf notes that if all the "first
tier" suspects for nuclear acquisition identified in such reports had become weapons states there would
be nineteen nuclear powers today (Yusuf 2009: 61). Instead, as noted above, the number of technically
capable nuclear states has grown, while the number of weapons states has remained small. Moreover,
there was relatively little variation in the number of states in the "exploration" or "pursuit" phases of
nuclear programs during the Cold War, despite instances of proliferation that ought to have caused
domino behavior. After the Cold War, there has been a striking decline in nuclear interest, as more
states abandon their programs and fewer states initiate new ones (Miller 2014a: 10-11).¶ The judgment
of scholars has been scathing. Yusuf concludes that "an evident shortcoming of historical predictions
was their inability to accurately estimate the pace of developments ... the majority of [potential nuclear
dominoes] never even came close to crossing the threshold. In fact, most did not even initiate a
weapons program" (Yusuf 2009: 61). John Mueller suggests that projections of falling nuclear dominoes
"have shown a want of prescience that approaches the monumental-even the pathological ... [fear of a
nuclear tipping point] continues to flourish despite the fact that it has thus far proven to be almost
entirely wrong" (Mueller 2009: 89). Francis Gavin finds no "compelling evidence that a nuclear
proliferation chain reaction will ever occur" (Gavin 2009: 18). A two-volume study led by William Potter
and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova cites a "consensus among the case study authors ... that nuclear weapons
spread is neither imminent nor likely to involve a process in which one country's pursuit of nuclear
weapons leads to a 'chain reaction' involving other states" (Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2010: 337-338).¶
Research also suggests that even where security concerns matter for proliferation, their influence is
more diffuse and complex than is generally believed. Thus, even where proliferation causes security
fears, it may not beget more proliferation. Phillip Bleek's statistical analysis suggests that nuclear
acquisition by regional competitors has only a modest effect on state exploration of nuclear programs
and no impact on whether they pursue or acquire an arsenal. In contrast, a state's history of
conventional military disputes with its rivals strongly impacts all three phases of nuclear development
(Bleek 2010: 177). Bleek interprets these results to mean, in part, that states seek nuclear weapons for a
particular sort of security-deterring attack, not because of security competition in general. That
conclusion is consistent with other recent studies (Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013: 173-195). Thus, Bleek
concludes that his "findings strongly contradict the conventional 'reactive proliferation' wisdom that
underpins widespread predictions . . . of proliferation cascades, dominoes, tipping points, and the like"
(Bleek 2010: 179).¶ The causes of nuclear weapons proliferation reviewed above offer a reason to reject
nuclear dominoes and tipping points. As Potter and Mukhatzhanova summarize, "a fixation on security
drivers ... is apt to result in the neglect of important domestic economic and political constraints and to
exaggerate the propensity of states to proliferate," even given proliferation elsewhere (Potter and
Mukhatzhanova 2010: 338). Hymans' focus on individual psychology, for instance, implies that:¶
Leaders' preferences are actually not highly contingent on what other states decide. Therefore,
proliferation tomorrow will probably remain as rare as proliferation today, with no single instance of
proliferation causing a cascade of new nuclear weapons states. Hymans 2006: 225-226¶ Likewise,
Solingen's "emphasis on political economic factors" suggests that one state's nuclear decisions will not
directly drive another's. In the same vein, Hymans' other work implies major bureaucratic constraints
on reactive proliferation. States are not likely to shuck off multiple nuclear veto players with ease,
even if their international environment seems more dangerous. Finally, if NPT scholarship is correct, the
treaty is likely to provide at least a modest barrier to reactive proliferation. States that absorb its norms,
a la Rublee, will be less inclined to proliferate or at least more constrained in their decision-making.
States that perceive the treaty as a grand bargain, as posited by Coe and Vaynman, are likely to stick to
the agreement so long as the great powers appear to be sanctioning the rule-breaking states.¶ Overall,
the political science literature undermines primacy's claims about nuclear dominoes, and the probability
that a little insecurity will spawn spirals of proliferation. American alliance commitments, in so far as this
research is correct, are correspondingly diminished in their usefulness as an anti-proliferation measure.

No impact to nuclear proliferation—more nuclear states produce peace

Suzuki 15 – (June 2015, Akisato, Researcher, Institute for International Conflict Resolution and
Reconstruction, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, MA in Violence, Terrorism and
Security at Queen's University, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and
interstate conflict by Random Forests,” Research and Politics, SagePub)
Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the estimation of conditional variable importance and partial
dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second, Random
Forests can
examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341), which is desirable because, as already noted, some theories expect
non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict; and finally, it can cope with
potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted
before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction

effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world product). The specific capabilities of Random

Forests are therefore essential. The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative importance
score.7 Thus, the nuclear year counter is not important in explaining the dispute–state ratio. This suggests that the optimist theory is supported. The remaining
regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important.
Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for
interstate conflict. Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower
dispute–state ratio, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the
relationship is
empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the
optimist theory is supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases
the dispute–state ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), the
number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approximately from 44 to 35. This is a
substantively significant decline. Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that
new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus, the pessimist theory finds no support from either
the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot. Finally, as for the control variables, the number of
democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the dispute–state ratio, but if the number of democratic

states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute–state ratio. Their
substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the
effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states
decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37.
Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a
systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per
system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly
sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution. Discussion and
concluding remarks The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between
nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average
decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new

nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear
weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or
expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis

should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results
indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system. This conclusion, however, raises questions

about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell
and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find
that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is

possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended
nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects
overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics
cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-
level empirics deserve attention.
 Alliance – SoKo
No prolif – technical and political hurdles
Holmes, former US Navy surface warfare officer, 12 (James, “Japan: Joining the Nuclear
Weapons Club? It Could.,” http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/japan-joining-the-nuclear-weapons-club-it-
could/)
Despite Japan's renown for high-tech wizardry and long experience operating nuclear power plants, it
would take Tokyo far longer than a year to deploy a working nuclear arsenal. We're talking many years.
As J. C. Wylie defines it, strategy is a plan for using available resources and assets to accomplish some goal. Strategy goes no farther than those implements can
carry it — and strategists cannot simply conjure them into being. Toshi and I see a variety of impediments to a Japanese breakout. Let's catalogue just a few.
Consider the politics. It is certainly true that nuclear weapons are no longer the third rail of Japanese
politics — a topic officials and pundits dare not touch lest it strike them (politically) dead. But Japan's
painful past experience as a target of atomic warfare, its ardent sponsorship of nonproliferation
accords, and the fury with which pacifist-leaning citizens and Japan's Asian neighbors would greet
evidence of a bombmaking program add up to a forbidding political barrier. That barrier is hardly unbreachable, but it
would demand quite a feat of political persuasion on Tokyo's part. As the learned strategist Mike Tyson points out, "everyone has a strategy 'til they get punched in
the mouth." Memo to nuclear-weapons advocates: duck! Nor are the strategic, operational, and technical challenges less daunting. A nuclear triad — land- and sea-
based missiles combined with weapons delivered by manned bombers — holds little promise in light of Japan's lack of geographic depth and the vulnerability of
surface ships and aircraft to enemy action. That means fielding an undersea deterrent would be Tokyo's best nuclear option. But doing so would be far from easy.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operates an impressive fleet of diesel submarines but has no experience with naval nuclear propulsion. And that leaves aside
the difficulty of developing sea-launched ballistic missiles and their nuclear payloads. Such engineering challenges are far from insoluble for Japan's scientific-
technical complex but cannot be conquered overnight. A force of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile subs, or SSBNs, thus looks like a remote prospect for Japan. As an
interim solution, the JMSDF might construct cruise missiles resembling the U.S. Navy's old TLAM-Ns, or nuclear-tipped Tomahawks. JMSDF boats could fire such
missiles through torpedo tubes, the easiest method. Or, shipyards could backfit Japanese subs with vertical launchers — much as the U.S. Navy installed Tomahawk
launchers in its fast attack boats starting in the late Cold War. The problem of constructing nuclear weapons small enough to fit on a missile would remain — but
nuclear-armed diesel boats would represent a viable course of action should Japan decide to join the nuclear-weapons club. Years
down the road, then
— not overnight — a modest Japanese nuclear deterrent might put out to sea. Will Tokyo proceed down
that road? I doubt It. But the prospect no longer appears unthinkable.

South Korea won’t develop nukes – trade ties, energy shortages, NPT, and economics
Hayes and Moon 14 (Executive Director, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, PhD in IR from Yale, Professor of History
at Northwestern; professor of political science at Yonsei University and Ambassador for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, the Republic of Korea. He served as Dean of Yonsei's Graduate School of International Studies and as Chairman of the
Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, a cabinet-level post. Peter and Chung-in, "Should South Korea Go
Nuclear?", 7/28/14, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/should-south-korea-go-nuclear/~~#axzz3AKArVDLT, Nautilus Institute)
The ROK would face very high costs were it to move in this direction because it is deeply embedded in multilateral
and bilateral treaty commitments and nuclear energy supply trading networks. South Korea is a member of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and therefore cannot receive, manufacture or get any assistance to produce nuclear
explosive devices or weapons under Article 2. It is also obliged to comply with the safeguard regulations of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Seoul would have to emulate Pyongyang and leave the NPT and the IAEA. But unlike North Korea which had almost
no external nuclear ties or market relations to lose, South Korea
is highly involved in global markets with Koreans serving as UN
Secretary General and World Bank president. Pulling out of the NPT and the IAEA might lead to UN action, possibly UN Security
Council sanctions as were imposed on the DPRK, as well as national sanctions. It would certainly end South Korea’s reactor
exports and likely also supply of uranium, enrichment services, and other materials and dual use
technology needed for South Korea’s nuclear fuel cycle from the Nuclear Supply Group such as the United States, Australia,
Russia, and France. Within a few years, South Korea would face an even larger power shortfall than Japan had to deal with after
shutting down all its nuclear plants in 2011. Also, Washington would likely reject not only Seoul’s request to reprocess or pyro-process spent
nuclear fuel, but also its desire to enrich uranium, even for research. IAEA
alarm bells will sound loudly the moment such
proliferation activity commences, not least due to the Agency’s experience with South Korea’s enrichment research and
development.
South Korea can’t and wont proliferate – political, economic, and security costs
outweigh
Peter Hayes 15, Professor, Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Australia and
Director, Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California, and Chung-in Moon, professor of political science at
Yonsei University and Ambassador for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, the Republic of Korea. “The War that Must Never be Fought, Chapter 13: Korea: Will South
Korea’s Non-Nuclear Strategy Defeat North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout?”,
https://books.google.com/books?id=-yVpCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT241
Far from reinforcing South Korea's already overwhelming offensive military capabilities-including in almost
every dimension where North Korea has tried to develop "asymmetric" capabilities-South Korean nuclear weapons would
undermine conventional deterrence and even reduce South Korea's ability to use its conventional forces in response to a
North Korean attack. Above all, we see its feasibility as very low because of severe political, legal, and
institutional obstacles. There is no doubt that South Korea has the technological and financial capability to develop nuclear weapons.
But it has never been easy, and won't be so at any time soon, for South Korea to arm itself with nuclear weapons, let alone with a submarine or
bomber-based nuclear retaliatory capacity that is immune from preemption-the basis of stable nuclear deterrence. It
would take South
Korea years to develop and deploy even a minimum deterrent. Until then, it would not possess a
credible second-strike capability. Initially, a South Korean nuclear force would be vastly inferior to current
US nuclear capabilities. It also lacks the space-based and high-altitude reconnaissance and other intelligence systems
needed to accurately hit mobile military or leadership targets. While it develops its own nuclear weapons force-and
assuming that doing so leads to rupture of the US-ROK alliance-South Korea would be vulnerable to a preemptive first
strike by Russia or China, who would certainly target it. Seoul would lack a countervailing ability to strike back after
suffering a nuclear attack. This may not be of concern in peacetime But in wartime, these two nuclear-weapons states would be obliged to treat
a South Korean nuclear force as a potential threat (as they may do already and likely already do so with regard to North Korea's nascent nuclear
force). Where would South Korea test and deploy the weapons under such circumstances? Inwhose backyard? The late American political
scientist Kenneth Waltz argued that nuclear proliferation may lead to strategic stability based on the threat of mutual nuclear annihi ation.QQ]
But John on-fat Wong argued decades ago that two small states armed with nuclear weapons in a military standoff are engaged in an unstable
relationship that is best described as "mutual probable destruction" because of their incentive to use their nuclear weapons first rather than
lose them.Q1] That is, given the time it would take each side to strike, an independent South Korean force facing off against the North Korean
nuclear force would be characterized by escalation imperatives that would make the peninsula highly unstable, with potentially catastrophic
consequences. Far from reinforcing South Korea's already overwhelming offensive military capabilities-including in almost every dimension
where North Korea has developed offsetting "asymmetric" capabilities-South Korean nuclear weapons would undermine deterrence based on
conventional forces, and even reduce South Korea's ability to use its conventional forces in response to a North Korean attack (see below). Put
in more theoretical terms, both Koreas would be faced with a nuclear-armed adversary with a mutual incentive to strike first. Each would
therefore remain in a state of constant nuclear alert in case the other side intended to attack immediately (in contrast to general deterrence.
where nuclear weapons cast a long shadow that makes commanders very cautious but there is no immediate intention to attack and therefore
no reason to stay on constant high alert).Q.21 This state of constant fear of an immediate threat of preemptive nuclear attack would push both
Koreas to invest heavi y in improved surveillance and intelligence capabilities needed to pinpoint nuclear targets for successful preemption,
especially given the potential for deception as to location and deployment of nuclear weapons. It would be difficult for either Korea to achieve
sufficient confidence that such intelligence were reliable enough to launch a preemptive strike as soon as either gained more than a few
warheads and dispersed them-which North Korea has likely done already.Indeed, for South Korea, going it alone without US support,and
possibly losing the United States altogether as senior ally, implies reduced confidence in its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
information, which is provided today mostly by US extra-peninsular assets, implying that the South's ability to identify targets to attack
preemptively may be lacking. However, it is also possible that in a crisis, intelligence that suggests a pending attack combined with partial but
reliable data as to locations of a substantia lfraction of the other's nuclear forces could lead either Korea to mount a damage-limiting
preemptive strike.[;li] The complications that an independent South Korean nuclear weapons capability would cause for US Forces Korea and
Combined Forces Command would be enormous. Put simply, no US commander-in-chief is going to put American forces in harm's way in Korea
if South Korea wields nuclear weapons outside of US political and military command-and-control. Since its creation in 1978, Combined Forces
Command has been headed by an American and combines the US and ROK military leadership in South Korea to face North Korea. However,
nuclear weapons remained under the sole command of the American general who also commanded us Forces Korea: nuclear command,
control, and communications were never shared with ROK m111tary counterparts when US nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea
(from 1958to 1991). In the European context, only one state in alliance with the United States-the United Kingdom with its "special
relationship"-developed its own nuclear forces. Except for a few naval and aerial tactical nuclear weapons, all UK strategic and aerial nuclear
weapons were dedicated to NATO and, ultimately, were commanded by NATO's American military head.Q2] (French nuclear weapons were
kept outside of NATO's integrated command after the force de frappe was created in 1966.) Given the stakes in Korea, 1t is incredible that the
United States would violate the principles of unified command when it comes to nuclear weapons and accept a unilateral capacity by South
Korea to start a nuclear war. Indeed, in the case of the United Kingdom, NATO commanders assumed that once released from direct US control
in wartime, allied forces armed with nuclear weapons would rapidly lose communication with nuclear commanders, creating a risk of loss of
control that would deter Soviet aggressors .Q§] This is not a precedent that the United States will want to repeat in Korea. To the extent that
both Koreas became fully armed with operational nuclear forces targeting each other across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), independent South
Korean nuclear weapons would not only create a more volatile standoff than the Korean Peninsula already has. They would contribute to a rigid
and permanent (until it failed) state of psychologicalwarfare and nuclear threats even more ferocious than that seen over much (but not all) of
the last six decades. Of course, it is possible that both sides would recognize the immense danger in escalation/de-escalation strategies
involving nuclear threat, as did India and Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil crisis. But the opposite also seems just as possible given the nature of the
Korean conflict which, unlike the India-Pakistan conflict, involves intense dimensions of a civil war as well as ideological collisions. In short, a
nuclear-armed South Korea would ensure the continuing division and antagonism between the two Koreas and would undermine inter-Korean
trust politik, peace politik, or anything other than mutual destruction politik for the indefinite future. This nuclear standoff would be made even
more volatile because one or both Koreas armed with nuclear weapons may believe that nuclear weapons provide a threshold below which
covert or even overt conventional military provocations may be undertaken, because the aggressor Korea believes that the victim Korea would
see the risk of escalation to nuclear war arising from retaliation as too great This is the obvious lesson learned from the North's attack on the
ROK warship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.QZJ The same lesson has been learned by India facing Pakistani-originated
violence in Kashmir and MumbaiQfil South Korea would face very high costs were it to move to nuclear armament
because it is deeply embedded in a network of multilateral and bilateral treaty commitments and
nuclear energy-supply trading networks. South Korea is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
therefore cannot receive, manufacture, or get any assistance to produce nuclear explosive devices or weapons
under Article 2. It is also obliged to comply with the safeguard regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ,
whose alarm bells will ring loudly the moment that South Korea starts a nuclear weapons program. It
cannot emulate Israel, which has refused to sign the NPT and is believed to be one of the states with a clandestine nuclear
weapons program. Seoul would have to emulate Pyongyang if it pursues nuclear weapons sovereignty. Like the North in 1994, the South
would have to leave the NPT using the pretext of emergency. But unlike North Korea, which had almost no external nuclear ties or
market relations to lose, South Korea is highly involved in global markets. The ROK's global reputation is
exemplified by South Koreans serving as UN secretary-general and World Bank president. To say the least, it
would undermine South Korea's claim to global middle power leadership as embodied in its hosting of such
events as the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit Pulling out of the NPT and the IAEA might lead to UN action, possibly UN
Security Council sanctions as were imposed on North Korea, as well as national sanctions. It would certainly end South
Korea's profitable reactor exports, never mind the loss of supply of uranium, enrichment services, and
other materials and dual-use technology needed for South Korea's nuclear fuel cycle from the members
of the Nuclear Supply Group such as the United States, Australia, Russia,and France. South Korea would face an even
larger energy shortfall than Japan had to deal with after shutting down all its nuclear plants in 2011. Also at risk would
be the 1974 bilateral nuclear energy cooperation accord with the United States. The United States would be obliged
by domestic law to cut off all ties in nuclear cooperation and demand restitution of uranium stock, including spent fuel. Bilateral relations could
turn frigid fast, as in the 1970s when Seoul secretly pursued a nuclear weapons program.[11] Even if Seoul promised not to use nuclear
weapons-re lated capabilities for anything but peaceful purposes, it would undercut its own attempt to rewrite the bilateral 123 nuclear
agreement (Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act) that needs to be renewed after March 2016. Should the South start to acquire nuclear
weapons, Washington would likely reject out of hand not only Seoul's request to reprocess or pyre-process spent nuclear fuel, but alsoits desire
to enrich uranium, even for research. An independent South Korean quest for nuclear weapons will not only justify North Korea's nuclear status
and diminish the opposition from China and Russia to the North's nuclear armament, but could also trigger a nuclear domino effect in
Northeast Asia. South Korea would have to take into account hostile Japan and China armed with nuclear weapons in its defense planning. It
should be noted that some ultra-rightists in Japan relish the prospect that Seoul might make such a move so that they can justify Japanese
nuclear weapons. Generalized
nuclear armament would be a nightmare for South Korean security. In sum,
South Korea would face significant-possibly highly significant-political, economic, and security costs if it
were to develop and deploy its own nuclear weapons.

South Korea won’t get nukes because of NoKo – nuclear taboo and international costs
– it will conventionally rearm
Keck 14 (Zachary Keck, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has
interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, May 31, 2014. “N. Korea Won’t Cause a Nuclear Domino in Asia
(But China Might).” http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/n-korea-wont-cause-a-nuclear-domino-in-asia-but-china-might/)
On Thursday the Wall Street Journal published excerpts from an interview it conducted with South Korean President Park Geun-hye. One article
from the interview discusses the dire consequences President Park foresees if North Korea goes through with a fourth nuclear weapons test.
“North Korea would effectively be crossing the Rubicon if they were to conduct another nuclear test,” WSJ quotes Park as saying. President
Park has also suggested that the six-party talks over North Korea’s nuclear program could end for good if Pyongyang goes through with its
threat to conduct a new kind of nuclear test. The article goes on to say that President Park also claimed that a
fourth nuclear test
by North Korea could spark a nuclear arms race in the region, where non-nuclear weapon states decide
to acquire a nuclear deterrent in response to Pyongyang’s growing atomic capabilities. “It would be difficult for us to prevent a
nuclear domino from occurring in this area,” were North Korea to conduct another test, Park is quoted as saying. Park is hardly the first to
worry that a new state acquiring a nuclear weapon will have a nuclear domino effect among its neighbors. Indeed, this has been a constant
concern in the United States since the dawn of the nuclear era. This concern continues today with many in Washington claiming that Iran
acquiring a nuclear arsenal would spark a nuclear arms race in the already volatile Middle East. Nor is Park wrong to emphasize that North
Korea conducting another test could be especially problematic for its neighbors. While many attribute North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests
entirely to domestic politics, Pyongyang’s interest in continuing with tests is almost certainly due to its desire acquire a nuclear deterrent. The
only way to be certain that a state has achieved this status is by conducting actual tests, which is why every nuclear state (very possibly
including Israel) has carried out tests. The next few North Korean nuclear tests will be particularly important because many believe that it is on
the verge of being able to build a nuclear warhead small enough to be placed on top of a missile. This will give it the operational nuclear
deterrent that it has heretofore lacked. While North Korea will initially still lack the capability to reach the U.S. with a nuclear-tipped
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), it will only be a matter of time before it can achieve this too. As we saw in the Cold War when the
Soviet Union acquired the capability to reach the continental United States with nuclear missiles, North Korea’s ability to target the U.S.
homeland will complicate extended deterrence. Still, Park’s warnings about North Korea’s growing capabilities creating
a nuclear domino effect in Asia is merely bluster. This view is premised on the argument that states
acquire nuclear weapons to deter rival nuclear armed states. This was true in the early nuclear era when
non-nuclear states had no reason to believe that their nuclear-armed rivals would not use nuclear
weapons against them. As the nuclear era progressed, however, it became clear that nuclear weapons would not be used
in the same manner as other military capabilities would. In the words of many, a taboo against the first use of
nuclear weapons took root. This taboo is especially strong when it comes to using nuclear weapons
against a non-nuclear state. North Korea would be particularly unlikely to break this taboo by launching
a nuclear attack against South Korea or Japan. To begin with, it will have an extremely small nuclear arsenal
given its financial constraints. Moreover, it will also have little in the way of early warning capabilities. This is important
because attacking Seoul or Tokyo with nuclear weapons would almost certainly invite a retaliatory nuclear strike from the U.S. And, given the
small size of its nuclear arsenal and its inability to detect incoming U.S. nuclear missiles, its entire nuclear arsenal would be wiped out in a U.S.
first strike. At that point, it
would be defenseless against a conventional attack aimed at overthrowing the regime, which
Washington would have every reason to carry out should Pyongyang break the nuclear taboo. South
Korea and Japan understand all this and therefore would not endure the enormous costs (especially to
their international reputations, alliances with the U.S., and relations with China) inherent in acquiring a
nuclear weapon. An isolated state like North Korea can endure massive international sanctions. Nations with economies highly integrated
in the global economy — such as South Korea and Japan — cannot afford to be cut off from the outside world.
That’s why South Korea is investing in conventional capabilities that would allow it to deal with North
Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Although North Korea is unlikely to precipitate a nuclear arms race in Asia,
China’s growing military capabilities and assertive diplomatic posture very well might. Indeed, just as history has
demonstrated that states don’t need nuclear arsenals to deter rivals from attacking them with nuclear weapons, it has also demonstrated that
nuclear weapons are extremely effective in deterring conventional military attacks. Thus, states
that face rivals with
overwhelming conventional military power have a strong incentive to acquire nuclear weapons to negate
their rivals’ conventional superiority. This is especially true if a state fears that its conventionally superior rival covets its territory. A nuclear
arsenal cannot always deter low level skirmishes from nuclear and non-nuclear powers. But nuclear weapons are extremely effective at
deterring states from challenging core interests, first and foremost territory. This is deeply troubling given present trends in the Asia-Pacific.
Most notably, China’s economic rise is allowing it to amass a conventional military force that Japan, especially with its declining population, will
eventually be incapable of matching. China also claims the Senkaku Islands that Japan administers and there’s been evidence that it may
ultimately covet the Ryukyu Islands as well. Thus, if
current trends in the Sino-Japanese conventional balance
continue, going nuclear will be an increasingly attractive option for Tokyo, particularly if it loses faith in America’s
willingness or ability to defend it.
 Industrial Base
US defense industrial base already failing- tons of alt causes
Peter Navarro, 10-4-2018, Navarro is assistant to the president for trade and manufacturing policy and
director of the National Trade Council, “America’s Military-Industrial Base Is at Risk”, The New York
Times, 5-28-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/opinion/america-military-industrial-
base.html, MJD

President Trump’s maxim that “economic security is national security” comes with an important corollary: A strong manufacturing
base is critical to both economic prosperity and national defense. Policies advanced by the administration under this
banner include corporate tax cuts and a wave of deregulation to stimulate investment and spur innovation; steel and aluminum tariffs to
bolster core industries; a stout defense against China’s brazen theft and forced transfers of American intellectual property and technologies; a
significant increase in the military budget; expansion of Buy American rules for government procurement; and tough steps on trade to level the
playing field for American workers, businesses and farmers. To
this long list of measures to improve America’s economic
and national security, we should now add the actions recommended in a new Department of Defense
report. This yearlong effort, carried out at the president’s order, constitutes the first governmentwide assessment
of America’s manufacturing and military industrial base. It identifies almost 300 vulnerabilities, ranging
from dependencies on foreign manufacturers to looming labor shortages. For example, the report
highlights several “single points of failure” involving the reliance on a single source of critical
equipment or material, including propeller shafts for our ships, gun turrets for our tanks, fuel for our
rockets and space-based infrared detectors for missile defense. A military-grade impregnated carbon product used in
72 different chemical, biological and nuclear filtration systems has only a single Defense Department-qualified source, and this current sourcing
arrangement can’t keep pace with demand. Or consider wrought aluminum plate — an essential component in armoring ground combat
vehicles, constructing Navy ships and building military aircraft. According
to the report, budget uncertainties,
unpredictable demand from the Defense Department and the effects of foreign competition raise the
risk of potential “production bottlenecks during a future surge in D.O.D. requirements” for the material.
More broadly, “sharp peaks” followed by “significant breaks or valleys in production” have taken a heavy toll on the shipbuilding industry, a
sector critical to constructing and maintaining our aircraft carriers, submarines and surface ships. A core threat to the American
industrial base comes from China. According to the report, “China represents a significant and growing risk to the supply of
materials deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security,” including a “growing number of both widely used and specialized metals,
alloys and other materials, including rare earths and permanent magnets.” The
American military is also heavily dependent
on foreign suppliers in such critical areas as printed circuit boards, machine tools, materials for
propulsion systems and even nuclear warheads. As the report notes: “Because the supply chain is globalized and complex, it
is challenging to ensure that finished assemblies, subsystems, and systems” for nuclear warheads utilize “trusted, discrete components due to
diminishing U.S.-based microelectronic and electronic manufacturing capability.” Even the lowly, but increasingly high-tech,
tent is at risk. With much of the American textile industry moving offshore, the United States no longer has the capability to manufacture
high-tenacity polyester fiber. A similar problem exists for rechargeable batteries, which are vital parts across myriad applications. One of
the biggest vulnerabilities identified in the report is a shortage of skilled labor for critical jobs. America
is simply not generating enough workers in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics fields
to fill jobs in sectors such as electronic controls, nuclear engineering and space. Nor are we training
enough machinists, welders and other skilled trade workers to build and maintain our ships, combat
vehicles and aircraft. To address these vulnerabilities, the Trump administration will immediately begin implementing the report’s
“blueprint for action.” It will rapidly expand the use of already available Defense Department funds to close identified supply-chain gaps.
Starting fast out of the gate, the president will sign determinations authorizing the use of funds, set aside in Title III of the Defense Production
Act, to expand manufacturing capabilities in such areas as lithium seawater batteries (critical for anti-submarine warfare) and cutting-edge fuel
cells (for the Navy’s future unmanned, underwater vehicles). The Pentagon’s National Defense Stockpile Program, created in 1939 to secure
adequate supplies of foreign-produced and limited-source strategic and critical materials, will likewise shift into high gear to help build up
reserves in key areas. The broader goal, as the report makes clear, is to “diversify away from complete dependency on sources of supply in
politically unstable countries who may cut off U.S. access.” An essential Pentagon mission will be to further modernize the “organic industrial
base” to ensure American leadership in advanced manufacturing across industrial sectors. This government-owned and -operated network of
depots, shipyards and arsenals sustains some 440,000 vehicles, 780 strategic missiles, 278 combat ships and almost 14,000 aircraft. As part of
the governmentwide effort, the president is also directing the secretary of labor to more precisely target occupations for current and future
growth (e.g., systems engineers, high-skilled tool operators), expand worker training and education programs, and ensure appropriate
incentives to recruit and retain workers. The secretary of energy is similarly charged with more aggressively addressing risks to the nation’s
manufacturing and industrial base within the energy and nuclear sectors, using funding that will become available in 2019. America has elected
a president in the mold of William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan — presidents best remembered for short but profound
maxims that directed their boldest strategies and biggest successes. McKinley’s campaign slogan “Patriotism, protection and prosperity” led to
strong tariffs and sound money policies that realigned the Republican Party and catalyzed strong economic growth. Roosevelt’s “Speak softly
and carry a big stick” helped transform the Navy into a military force capable of projecting power around the world. And Reagan’s “Peace
through strength” inspired an unprecedented rebuilding of the military that brought the Soviet Union to its knees. History will judge whether
Donald Trump’s “Economic security is national security” joins the ranks of great presidential maxims. The recommendations made in the
Defense Department’s report will surely be a part of that discussion.

US will continue to dominate international arms trade and maintain military

dominance globally, despite the AFF
Jason Lemon, 12-10-2018, Lemon is a Newsweek staff writer, “U.S. arms sales are nearly six times
higher than those of Russia, Washington's closest competitor”, Newsweek, 5-28-2019,
https://www.newsweek.com/us-arms-sales-nearly-six-times-higher-closest-competitor-russia-1252079,
MJD

The United States continues to dominate the international arms trade, dwarfing its nearest competitor,
Russia, by $184.9 billion. In 2017, Russian weapons manufacturers sold about $37.7 billion worth of arms, compared to $222.6 billion
in sales by American producers, according to an annual report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released
Monday. The amount of weapons sales from U.S. companies is just shy of six times higher than those of Russia. But sales from Russia rose 8.5
percent more than those of the U.S., which reached 2 percent. The United Kingdom also formerly held the number-two spot for weapons sales,
but Russia has now taken second place in the global ranking. Overall,
Russian sales accounted for 9.5 percent of the total
from the world’s top 100 producers, and the U.S. sales accounted for a massive 57 percent. Siemon
Wezeman, a senior researcher with SIPRI’s Arms and Military Expenditure Program, explained to Radio Free Europe that Russian companies
“have experienced significant growth in their arms sales since 2011. “This is in line with Russia’s increased spending on arms procurement to
modernize its armed forces,” Wezeman added. Arms
sales were just shy of $400 billion last year globally, meaning
that the U.S. accounted for well over half of the total from the world’s top producing countries. However,
the report did not include data from China, because researchers considered the information unreliable. A previous report by SIPRI suggested
that while China’s weapons sales had increased, they only accounted for about 5.7 percent of the world’s arms exports between 2013 and
2017. Following the U.S., Russia and the U.K. in the ranking, France takes the fourth spot with 5.3 percent of global sales. Trans-European
companies account for 3.7 percent, followed by Italy at 2.6 percent and Japan at 2.2 percent. Beyond
being the undisputed world
leader for weapons sales, the U.S. also spends significantly more on its military than any other nation,
according to a previous report by SIPRI. Last year, Washington spent $610 billion on the military, nearly three times
more than China, which spent the second highest amount at $228 billion. In fact, U.S. military spending
is larger than the combined total of the next seven biggest military spenders, which equaled $578
billion in 2017. All other countries in the world combined, besides the U.S. and the next top seven,
spend just $551 billion. The new SIPRI report came as U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia faced renewed scrutiny by senators who are
outraged by the Trump administration's continued support for Riyadh despite the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen and the murder of
journalist Jamal Khashoggi. A bipartisan block of lawmakers is attempting to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led conflict with Yemen, citing
human rights concerns and national interests. President Donald Trump has insisted that Saudi Arabia is a "great ally," and pointed to a multi-
billion-dollar arms deal that he argues will benefit the U.S. economy. Republican and Democratic lawmakers have pushed back, noting that the
kingdom's human rights abuses should concern Washington. “I think selling arms should have to deal solely with our national security, not jobs,
not money, nothing,” Republican Senator Rand Paul from Kentucky said Sunday on NBC News's Meet the Press. “I think our involvement in this
terrible war [in Yemen] is one of the things that engenders more terrorism.”
Strategic and security benefits from arms trading is minimal and the costs far
outweigh
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD
U.S. arms sales policy is out of control. Since 2002, the United States has sold more than $197 billion worth of major conventional weapons and
related military support to 167 countries. In just his first year in office, President Donald Trump inked arms deals at a record pace, generating
hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of potential sales. Though the president trumpets each deal as a victory for the United States, an analysis
of American arms sales since 2002 reveals that the arms trade is a risky business. The United States has repeatedly sold weapons to
nations engaged in deadly conflicts, and to those with horrendous human rights records, under conditions in which it has been impossible to
predict where the weapons would end up or how they would be used. On repeated occasions, American troops have fought opponents armed
with American weapons. Advocates argue that arms sales bolster American security by enhancing the military
capabilities of allies, providing leverage over the behavior and policies of client nations, and boosting the
American economy while strengthening the defense industrial base. We argue that the economic
benefits of arms sales are dubious and that their strategic utility is far more uncertain and limited
than most realize. Arms sales also create a host of negative, unintended consequences for the United
States, for those buying the weapons, and for the regions into which American weapons flow. Washington’s historical faith in
arms sales is seriously misplaced. The United States should revise its arms sales policy to improve the
risk assessment process, to ban sales to countries where the risk of negative consequences is too high,
and to limit sales to cases in which they will directly enhance American security. Few tools have been used in
pursuit of so many foreign policy objectives as arms sales. The United States has sold weapons to its NATO allies to ensure their ability to
defend Western Europe; to friendly governments around the world facing insurgencies and organized crime; to allies in the Pacific (buffering
them against China’s rising military power); and to both Israel and many of its Arab neighbors in efforts to maintain regional stability and
influence over Middle Eastern affairs. The United States has used arms sales, as well as the threat of denying arms, in efforts to influence
human rights policies, to help end conflicts, to gain access to military bases, and to encourage fair elections. Since 9/11, the new central focus
of U.S. weapons sales has been to bolster the global war on terror.36
Despite their many uses, arms sales impact foreign
affairs through two basic mechanisms. The first involves using arms sales to shift the balance of power
and capabilities between the recipient and its neighbors, thereby helping allies win wars or deter
adversaries, promote local and regional stability, or buttress friendly governments against insurgencies
and other internal challenges.37 During the Cold War, American arms sales became part of a broader strategy to deter the Soviet
Union from invading Western Europe. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States sold weapons to Afghanistan and Iraq to bolster their
ability to defeat the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Islamic State. By selling advanced weaponry to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, the
United States hoped to balance rising Chinese power and promote regional stability. Although
the specific objectives differ, at
root the causal mechanism is the same: using arms sales to shift the balance of power in a direction
more favorable to American interests.38 The second mechanism involves using arms sales to generate
leverage over the conduct of other nations. As the producer of the world’s most advanced and sought-after weaponry, the
United States can dictate, at least to some degree, the conditions under which it will agree to sell certain weapons.39 As Andrew Shapiro puts
it, “When a country acquires an advanced U.S. defense system, they are not simply buying a product to enhance their security, they are also
seeking a relationship with the United States… .
This engagement helps build bilateral ties and creates strong
incentives for recipient countries to maintain good relations with the United States.”40 American influence is
thought to be most potent in cases where the United States provides a nation with a large share of its military capabilities. In the wake of U.S.
pressure to halt Israeli defense exports to China, for example, an Israeli official acknowledged, “If the United States, which provides Israel with
$2 billion in annual military aid, demands that we will not sell anything to China — then we won’t. If the Americans decide we should not be
selling arms to other countries as well — Israel will have no choice but to comply.”41 The United States has used arms sales to try to encourage
states to vote with the United States at the UN, to support or adopt pro-Western and pro-U.S. foreign policies, to convince Egypt and Israel to
accept peace accords, and to gain access to military bases in places such as Greece, Turkey, Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and the Philippines. After
the Cold War, the United States also sought to tie arms transfers to human rights and democratization efforts in client states.42 Arms sales
remain attractive to presidents for three main reasons. First, arms sales are less risky than sending American troops, providing explicit security
guarantees to other nations, or initiating direct military intervention, even long distance.43 In
cases where allies or partners are
likely to engage in conflicts with their neighbors, providing weapons rather than stationing troops
abroad can lessen the risk of American entrapment in crises or conflicts. Taiwan is an example of this sort of arms-
for-troops substitution. On the other hand, in instances where the United States has an interest in conflicts already underway, arms sales can
be used in attempts to achieve military objectives without putting American soldiers (or at least putting fewer of them) in harm’s way. This
tactic has been a central element of the American war on terror, with sales (and outright transfers) of weapons to Afghanistan and Iraq to
support the fight against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIS, as well as to Saudi Arabia for its war in Yemen.44 In both situations the reduction of
military risk, in particular the risk of American casualties, also helps reduce the political risk. Presidents who would otherwise abstain from
supporting a nation if it entailed sending American troops can sell arms to that country without the political fallout that sending America troops
abroad would incur. Second, arms sales are an extremely flexible tool of statecraft. In contrast to the blunt nature of military intervention, or
the long-term commitment and convoluted politics that treaties involve, arms sales can take any form from small to large and can take place on
a one-time or ongoing basis; they can be ramped up or down and started or stopped relatively quickly, depending on the circumstances. Selling
arms to one nation, moreover, does not prohibit the United States from selling arms to any other nation. And thanks to their capacity and
prestige, American weapons serve as useful bargaining chips in all sorts of negotiations between the United States and recipient nations.45
Finally, arms sales represent a very low-cost and low-friction policy tool for the White House.46 Unlike military intervention or stationing troops
abroad, arms sales are not dependent on defense budgets or on a laborious congressional process. And since most arms deals receive little
publicity, presidents don’t have to worry about generating support from the public. As a result, the president can strike an arms deal
unilaterally and at any time. Moreover, since most political leaders view arms sales as an economic benefit to the United States, the president
tends to receive far more encouragement than pushback on the vast majority of arms deals. Inevitably,
the fact that arms sales
are low cost and easy to implement means that presidents reach for them frequently, even if they are
not necessarily the best tool for the job.

Strategic and hegemonic benefits would be far greater if we limited foreign arms sales
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD
What role should arms sales play in American foreign policy? Though major deals — like Trump’s $110 billion agreement with Saudi Arabia
announced in 2017 or the decision to sell arms to Ukraine — provoke brief periods of discussion, there is no real debate in Washington about
the wisdom of exporting vast quantities of weapons around the globe to allies and nonallies alike. Congress, which has the authority to cancel
arms deals, has not impeded a deal since the passage of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act created the framework for doing so. Since 9/11 the
pace of sales has increased. From 2002 to 2016, the United States sold roughly $197 billion worth of weapons and related military support to
167 countries.1 In just his first year Donald Trump cut a deal worth as much as $110 billion to Saudi Arabia alone and notified Congress of 157
sales worth more than $84 billion to 42 other nations.2 Despite losing market share over the past two decades because of increasing
competition, the
United States still enjoyed the largest share of the global arms trade between 2012 and
2016 at 33 percent.3 The current consensus in favor of arms sales rests on three planks. First, advocates argue that arms
sales enhance American security by bolstering the military capabilities of allies, enabling them to deter
and contain their adversaries, and helping promote stability in critical areas like the Middle East and
Southeast Asia. Second, they argue that arms sales help the United States exert influence over the
behavior and foreign policies of client nations. Finally, advocates argue that arms sales provide a boon to
the U.S. economy and fiscal benefits in the form of lower unit costs to the Pentagon, while helping
ensure the health of the American defense industrial base.4 We argue, however, that Washington’s
faith in the wisdom of foreign arms sales is seriously misplaced. The benefits tend to be oversold, and
the downsides are often simply ignored. The defense industry and its champions, in particular, have long exaggerated the
economic boon of arms sales.5 And even if they were greater, economic benefits alone are not worth subverting strategic considerations. More
importantly, the strategic deficits of arms sales are severe enough to overwhelm even the most optimistic
economic argument. It is the strategic case for and against arms sales that we consider in this analysis. Arms sales create a
host of negative, unintended consequences that warrant a much more cautious and limited approach,
even in support of an expansive grand strategy like primacy or liberal hegemony. From the perspective of those
who would prefer a more restrained American foreign policy, the prospective benefits of engaging in the arms trade are even smaller. Even
in cases where the United States wants a nation to arm itself, there is rarely a need for the weapons to
come from the United States. Moreover, the United States would generate significant diplomatic
flexibility and moral authority by refraining from selling arms. Given these outsized risks and nebulous
rewards, the United States should greatly reduce international arms sales.

Arms sales diminish the US’s ability to promote peace and regional stability
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD
The Uncertain and Limited Benefits of Arms Sales Attempts to manage the balance of power and generate influence around the world are
heavily contingent on a number of factors, most of which lie outside American control. Upon closer review, most of the benefits of arms sales
are less certain and less compelling than advocates claim. Managing
the Balance of Power: The Illusion of Control. The
hidden assumption underlying the balance of power strategy is that the United States will be able to
predict accurately what the impact of its arms sales will be. If the goal is deterrence, for example, the assumption is that
an arms sale will be sufficient to deter the adversary without spawning an arms race. If the goal is to promote stability, the assumption is that
an arms sale will in fact reduce tensions and inhibit conflict rather than inflame tensions and help initiate conflict. These
assumptions,
in turn, depend on both the recipient nation and that nation’s neighbors and adversaries acting in ways
that don’t make things worse. As it turns out, these are often poor assumptions. Although arms sales
certainly enhance the military capability of the recipient nation, the fundamental problem is that
arms sales often initiate a long chain of responses that the United States generally cannot control. The
United States, after all, is not the only country with interests in regional balances, especially where the survival and security of local actors is at
stake.
The United States is neither the only major power with a keen interest in critical regions like Asia
and the Middle East, nor the only source of weapons and other forms of assistance. Nor can it dictate
the perceptions, interests, or actions of the other nations involved in a given region. For example, though a
nation receiving arms from the United States may enjoy enhanced defensive capabilities, it is also likely to enjoy enhanced offensive
capabilities. With these, a nation’s calculations about the potential benefits of war, intervention abroad, or even the use of force against its
own population may shift decisively. Saudi Arabia’s recent behavior illustrates this dynamic. Though the Saudis explain their arms purchases as
necessary for defense against Iranian pressure, Saudi Arabia has also spent the past two years embroiled in a military intervention in Yemen.
Likewise, arms sales can heighten regional security dilemmas . Neighbors of nations buying major conventional weapons
will also worry about what this enhanced military capability will mean. This raises the chances that they too will seek to arm themselves further,
or take other steps to shift the balance of power back in their favor, or, in the extreme case, to launch a preventive war before they are
attacked. Given these dynamics, the consequences of arms sales to manage regional balances of power are far
less predictable and often much less positive than advocates assume.54 This unpredictability characterizes even
straightforward-seeming efforts to manage the balance of power. The most basic claim of arms sales advocates is that U.S.
arms sales to friendly governments and allies should make them better able to deter adversaries. The
best available evidence, however, suggests a more complicated reality. In a study of arms sales from
1950 to 1995, major-power arms sales to existing allies had no effect on the chance that the recipient
would be the target of a military attack. Worse, recipients of U.S. arms that were not treaty allies
were significantly more likely to become targets.55 Nor is there much evidence that arms sales can help
the United States promote peace and regional stability by calibrating the local balance of power. On this
score, in fact, the evidence suggests that the default assumption should be the opposite. Most scholarly
work concludes that arms sales exacerbate instability and increase the likelihood of conflict .56 One study,
for example, found that during the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet arms sales to hostile dyads (e.g., India/Pakistan, Iran/Iraq, Ethiopia/Somalia)
“contributed to hostile political relations and imbalanced military relationships” and were “profoundly destabilizing.”57

Arms sales create blow back against the United States and often intensify regional
conflicts
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD

Arms Sales Have Many Potential Negative Consequences Though arms sales are of marginal value to national security
and the pursuit of national interests, their negative consequences are varied and often severe. Arms sales
can spawn unwanted outcomes on three levels: blowback against the United States and entanglement in conflicts;
regional consequences in the buyer’s neighborhood, such as the dispersion of weapons and increased
instability; and consequences for the buyer itself, such as increased levels of corruption, human rights
abuses, and civil conflict. Effects on the United States. Though the goal of arms sales is to promote American
security and U.S. interests abroad, at least two possible outcomes can cause serious consequences for
the United States. The first of these — blowback — occurs when a former ally turns into an adversary
and uses the weapons against the United States. The second — entanglement — is a process whereby
an arms sales relationship draws the United States into a greater level of unwanted intervention.
Blowback. The fact that the United States has sold weapons to almost every nation on earth, combined with frequent military intervention,
means that blowback is an inescapable outcome of U.S. arms sales policy. American troops and their allies have faced American-made weapons
in almost every military engagement since the end of the Cold War, including in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria.
And even where the United States has not yet engaged in combat, American arms sales have bolstered the military capabilities of adversaries
once counted as friendly. Blowback can occur in at least three ways. First, a previously friendly regime becomes
unfriendly. For example, the United States sold billions of dollars in weapons to the Shah of Iran during the 1970s in the hopes that Iran
would provide a stabilizing influence on the Middle East. The sales included everything from fighter jets for air campaigns to surface-to-air
missiles to shoot down enemy fighters.70 After the 1979 revolution, however, Iran used those weapons in its war with Iraq and enabled the
new Iranian regime to exert its influence in the region. Panama, the recipient of decades of American military assistance, as well as host to a
major military base and 9,000 U.S. troops, was a similar case. In 1989, Gen. Manuel Noriega — himself a CIA asset for more than 20 years —
took power and threatened U.S. citizens, prompting a U.S. invasion that featured American troops facing American weapons.71 Blowback
also occurs when the United States sells weapons to nations (or transfers them to nonstate actors) that,
though not allies, simply did not register as potential adversaries at the time of the sale. The United States, for
example, sold surface-to-air missiles, towed guns, tanks, and armored personnel carriers to Somalia during the 1980s. Few officials would have
imagined that the United States would find itself intervening in Somalia in 1992, or that the United States and its allies would provide billions in
weapons and dual-use equipment to Iraq in an effort to balance against Iran, only to wind up confronting Iraq on the battlefield to reverse its
annexation of Kuwait.72 And
finally, blowback can occur when U.S. weapons are sold or stolen from the
government that bought them and wind up on the battlefield in the hands of the adversary. For example, the
Reagan administration covertly provided Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen, who were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s;
they in turn sold them off eventually to Iran and North Korea, among others. More recently, the Islamic State managed to capture from the
Iraqi government a stunning number of Humvees and tanks the United States had sold to Iraq to rebuild its military capabilities after the 2003
invasion, as well as enough small arms and ammunition to supply three divisions of a conventional army.73 These examples of
blowback demonstrate how difficult it can be to forecast the long-term outcomes of arms sales and
how obvious it is that selling weapons carries a number of risks. Predicting what exactly will happen is
hard, but predicting that arms sales to clients with red flags are likely to end badly is quite easy. Iraq was
a fragile state ravaged by a decade’s worth of American intervention and rife with terrorism and civil
conflict; to transfer such large quantities of weapons to its military and police force under such
conditions was to invite disaster. Entanglement. Arms sales raise the risk of entanglement in two ways.
First, they can represent early steps down the slippery slope to unwise military intervention. Consider a case
like the Syrian civil war or the many cases during the Cold War in which the United States wanted to support rebels and freedom fighters
against oppressive governments.74 In the majority of those cases, American leaders were wary of intervening directly. Instead, the United
States tended to rely on money, training, and arms sales. But by taking concrete steps like arms sales to support rebel groups, Washington’s
psychological investment in the outcome tends to rise, as do the political stakes for the president, who will be judged on whether his efforts at
support are successful or not. As we saw in the Syrian civil war, for example, Barack Obama’s early efforts to arm Syrian rebels were roundly
criticized as feckless, increasing pressure on him to intervene more seriously.75 History does not provide much guidance about how serious the
risk of this form of entanglement might be. During the Cold War, presidents from Nixon onward viewed arms sales as a substitute for sending
American troops to do battle with communist forces around the world. The result was an astonishing amount of weaponry transferred or sold
to Third World nations, many of which were engaged in active conflicts both external and internal. The risk of superpower conflict made it
dangerous to intervene directly; accordingly, the Cold War-era risk of entanglement from arms sales was low.76 Today, however, the United
States does not face nearly as many constraints on its behavior, as its track record of near-constant military intervention since the end of the
Cold War indicates. As a result, the
risk of arms sales helping trigger future military intervention is real, even if it
cannot be measured precisely. The second way in which arms sales might entangle the United States is
by creating new disputes or exacerbating existing tensions. U.S. arms sales to Kurdish units fighting in Syria against the
Islamic State, for example, have ignited tensions between the United States and its NATO ally Turkey, which sees the Kurds as a serious threat
to Turkish sovereignty and stability.77 Meanwhile, ongoing arms sales to NATO nations and to other allies like South Korea and Taiwan have
exacerbated tensions with Russia, China, and North Korea, raising the risk of escalation and the possibility that the United States might wind up
involved in a direct conflict.78 Regional
Effects. Arms sales do not just affect the recipient nation; they also affect
the local balance of power, often causing ripple effects throughout the region. Though advocates of
arms sales trumpet their stabilizing influence, as we have noted above, arms sales often lead to
greater tension, less stability, and more conflict. Because of this — and the complementary problem of weapons dispersion
— the regional impact of arms sales is less predictable and more problematic than advocates acknowledge.

Non-UQ---Defense Industry Declining

US defense industrial base already failing- tons of alt causes
Peter Navarro, 10-4-2018, Navarro is assistant to the president for trade and manufacturing policy and
director of the National Trade Council, “America’s Military-Industrial Base Is at Risk”, The New York
Times, 5-28-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/opinion/america-military-industrial-
base.html, MJD

President Trump’s maxim that “economic security is national security” comes with an important corollary : A strong manufacturing
base is critical to both economic prosperity and national defense. Policies advanced by the administration under this
banner include corporate tax cuts and a wave of deregulation to stimulate investment and spur innovation; steel and aluminum tariffs to
bolster core industries; a stout defense against China’s brazen theft and forced transfers of American intellectual property and technologies; a
significant increase in the military budget; expansion of Buy American rules for government procurement; and tough steps on trade to level the
playing field for American workers, businesses and farmers. To
this long list of measures to improve America’s economic
and national security, we should now add the actions recommended in a new Department of Defense
report. This yearlong effort, carried out at the president’s order, constitutes the first governmentwide assessment
of America’s manufacturing and military industrial base. It identifies almost 300 vulnerabilities, ranging
from dependencies on foreign manufacturers to looming labor shortages. For example, the report
highlights several “single points of failure” involving the reliance on a single source of critical
equipment or material, including propeller shafts for our ships, gun turrets for our tanks, fuel for our
rockets and space-based infrared detectors for missile defense. A military-grade impregnated carbon product used in
72 different chemical, biological and nuclear filtration systems has only a single Defense Department-qualified source, and this current sourcing
arrangement can’t keep pace with demand. Or consider wrought aluminum plate — an essential component in armoring ground combat
vehicles, constructing Navy ships and building military aircraft. According
to the report, budget uncertainties,
unpredictable demand from the Defense Department and the effects of foreign competition raise the
risk of potential “production bottlenecks during a future surge in D.O.D. requirements” for the material.
More broadly, “sharp peaks” followed by “significant breaks or valleys in production” have taken a heavy toll on the shipbuilding industry, a
sector critical to constructing and maintaining our aircraft carriers, submarines and surface ships. A core threat to the American
industrial base comes from China. According to the report, “China represents a significant and growing risk to the supply of
materials deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security,” including a “growing number of both widely used and specialized metals,
alloys and other materials, including rare earths and permanent magnets.” The
American military is also heavily dependent
on foreign suppliers in such critical areas as printed circuit boards, machine tools, materials for
propulsion systems and even nuclear warheads. As the report notes: “Because the supply chain is globalized and complex, it
is challenging to ensure that finished assemblies, subsystems, and systems” for nuclear warheads utilize “trusted, discrete components due to
diminishing U.S.-based microelectronic and electronic manufacturing capability.” Even the lowly, but increasingly high-tech,
tent is at risk. With much of the American textile industry moving offshore, the United States no longer has the capability to manufacture
high-tenacity polyester fiber. A similar problem exists for rechargeable batteries, which are vital parts across myriad applications. One of
the biggest vulnerabilities identified in the report is a shortage of skilled labor for critical jobs. America
is simply not generating enough workers in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics fields
to fill jobs in sectors such as electronic controls, nuclear engineering and space. Nor are we training
enough machinists, welders and other skilled trade workers to build and maintain our ships, combat
vehicles and aircraft. To address these vulnerabilities, the Trump administration will immediately begin implementing the report’s
“blueprint for action.” It will rapidly expand the use of already available Defense Department funds to close identified supply-chain gaps.
Starting fast out of the gate, the president will sign determinations authorizing the use of funds, set aside in Title III of the Defense Production
Act, to expand manufacturing capabilities in such areas as lithium seawater batteries (critical for anti-submarine warfare) and cutting-edge fuel
cells (for the Navy’s future unmanned, underwater vehicles). The Pentagon’s National Defense Stockpile Program, created in 1939 to secure
adequate supplies of foreign-produced and limited-source strategic and critical materials, will likewise shift into high gear to help build up
reserves in key areas. The broader goal, as the report makes clear, is to “diversify away from complete dependency on sources of supply in
politically unstable countries who may cut off U.S. access.” An essential Pentagon mission will be to further modernize the “organic industrial
base” to ensure American leadership in advanced manufacturing across industrial sectors. This government-owned and -operated network of
depots, shipyards and arsenals sustains some 440,000 vehicles, 780 strategic missiles, 278 combat ships and almost 14,000 aircraft. As part of
the governmentwide effort, the president is also directing the secretary of labor to more precisely target occupations for current and future
growth (e.g., systems engineers, high-skilled tool operators), expand worker training and education programs, and ensure appropriate
incentives to recruit and retain workers. The secretary of energy is similarly charged with more aggressively addressing risks to the nation’s
manufacturing and industrial base within the energy and nuclear sectors, using funding that will become available in 2019. America has elected
a president in the mold of William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan — presidents best remembered for short but profound
maxims that directed their boldest strategies and biggest successes. McKinley’s campaign slogan “Patriotism, protection and prosperity” led to
strong tariffs and sound money policies that realigned the Republican Party and catalyzed strong economic growth. Roosevelt’s “Speak softly
and carry a big stick” helped transform the Navy into a military force capable of projecting power around the world. And Reagan’s “Peace
through strength” inspired an unprecedented rebuilding of the military that brought the Soviet Union to its knees. History will judge whether
Donald Trump’s “Economic security is national security” joins the ranks of great presidential maxims. The recommendations made in the
Defense Department’s report will surely be a part of that discussion.

US will continue to dominate international arms trade and maintain military

dominance globally, despite the AFF
Jason Lemon, 12-10-2018, Lemon is a Newsweek staff writer, “U.S. arms sales are nearly six times
higher than those of Russia, Washington's closest competitor”, Newsweek, 5-28-2019,
https://www.newsweek.com/us-arms-sales-nearly-six-times-higher-closest-competitor-russia-1252079,
MJD
The United States continues to dominate the international arms trade, dwarfing its nearest competitor,
Russia, by $184.9 billion. In 2017, Russian weapons manufacturers sold about $37.7 billion worth of arms, compared to $222.6 billion
in sales by American producers, according to an annual report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released
Monday. The amount of weapons sales from U.S. companies is just shy of six times higher than those of Russia. But sales from Russia rose 8.5
percent more than those of the U.S., which reached 2 percent. The United Kingdom also formerly held the number-two spot for weapons sales,
but Russia has now taken second place in the global ranking. Overall,
Russian sales accounted for 9.5 percent of the total
from the world’s top 100 producers, and the U.S. sales accounted for a massive 57 percent. Siemon
Wezeman, a senior researcher with SIPRI’s Arms and Military Expenditure Program, explained to Radio Free Europe that Russian companies
“have experienced significant growth in their arms sales since 2011. “This is in line with Russia’s increased spending on arms procurement to
modernize its armed forces,” Wezeman added. Arms
sales were just shy of $400 billion last year globally, meaning
that the U.S. accounted for well over half of the total from the world’s top producing countries. However,
the report did not include data from China, because researchers considered the information unreliable. A previous report by SIPRI suggested
that while China’s weapons sales had increased, they only accounted for about 5.7 percent of the world’s arms exports between 2013 and
2017. Following the U.S., Russia and the U.K. in the ranking, France takes the fourth spot with 5.3 percent of global sales. Trans-European
companies account for 3.7 percent, followed by Italy at 2.6 percent and Japan at 2.2 percent. Beyond
being the undisputed world
leader for weapons sales, the U.S. also spends significantly more on its military than any other nation,
according to a previous report by SIPRI. Last year, Washington spent $610 billion on the military, nearly three times
more than China, which spent the second highest amount at $228 billion. In fact, U.S. military spending
is larger than the combined total of the next seven biggest military spenders, which equaled $578
billion in 2017. All other countries in the world combined, besides the U.S. and the next top seven,
spend just $551 billion. The new SIPRI report came as U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia faced renewed scrutiny by senators who are
outraged by the Trump administration's continued support for Riyadh despite the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen and the murder of
journalist Jamal Khashoggi. A bipartisan block of lawmakers is attempting to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led conflict with Yemen, citing
human rights concerns and national interests. President Donald Trump has insisted that Saudi Arabia is a "great ally," and pointed to a multi-
billion-dollar arms deal that he argues will benefit the U.S. economy. Republican and Democratic lawmakers have pushed back, noting that the
kingdom's human rights abuses should concern Washington. “I think selling arms should have to deal solely with our national security, not jobs,
not money, nothing,” Republican Senator Rand Paul from Kentucky said Sunday on NBC News's Meet the Press. “I think our involvement in this
terrible war [in Yemen] is one of the things that engenders more terrorism.”

Link Turn---Generic
Strategic and security benefits from arms trading is minimal and the costs far
outweigh
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD
U.S. arms sales policy is out of control. Since 2002, the United States has sold more than $197 billion worth of major conventional weapons and
related military support to 167 countries. In just his first year in office, President Donald Trump inked arms deals at a record pace, generating
hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of potential sales. Though the president trumpets each deal as a victory for the United States, an analysis
of American arms sales since 2002 reveals that the arms trade is a risky business. The United States has repeatedly sold weapons to
nations engaged in deadly conflicts, and to those with horrendous human rights records, under conditions in which it has been impossible to
predict where the weapons would end up or how they would be used. On repeated occasions, American troops have fought opponents armed
with American weapons. Advocatesargue that arms sales bolster American security by enhancing the military
capabilities of allies, providing leverage over the behavior and policies of client nations, and boosting the
American economy while strengthening the defense industrial base. We argue that the economic
benefits of arms sales are dubious and that their strategic utility is far more uncertain and limited
than most realize. Arms sales also create a host of negative, unintended consequences for the United
States, for those buying the weapons, and for the regions into which American weapons flow. Washington’s historical faith in
arms sales is seriously misplaced. The United States should revise its arms sales policy to improve the
risk assessment process, to ban sales to countries where the risk of negative consequences is too high,
and to limit sales to cases in which they will directly enhance American security. Few tools have been used in
pursuit of so many foreign policy objectives as arms sales. The United States has sold weapons to its NATO allies to ensure their ability to
defend Western Europe; to friendly governments around the world facing insurgencies and organized crime; to allies in the Pacific (buffering
them against China’s rising military power); and to both Israel and many of its Arab neighbors in efforts to maintain regional stability and
influence over Middle Eastern affairs. The United States has used arms sales, as well as the threat of denying arms, in efforts to influence
human rights policies, to help end conflicts, to gain access to military bases, and to encourage fair elections. Since 9/11, the new central focus
of U.S. weapons sales has been to bolster the global war on terror.36
Despite their many uses, arms sales impact foreign
affairs through two basic mechanisms. The first involves using arms sales to shift the balance of power
and capabilities between the recipient and its neighbors, thereby helping allies win wars or deter
adversaries, promote local and regional stability, or buttress friendly governments against insurgencies
and other internal challenges.37 During the Cold War, American arms sales became part of a broader strategy to deter the Soviet
Union from invading Western Europe. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States sold weapons to Afghanistan and Iraq to bolster their
ability to defeat the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Islamic State. By selling advanced weaponry to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, the
United States hoped to balance rising Chinese power and promote regional stability. Although
the specific objectives differ, at
root the causal mechanism is the same: using arms sales to shift the balance of power in a direction
more favorable to American interests.38 The second mechanism involves using arms sales to generate
leverage over the conduct of other nations. As the producer of the world’s most advanced and sought-after weaponry, the
United States can dictate, at least to some degree, the conditions under which it will agree to sell certain weapons.39 As Andrew Shapiro puts
it, “When a country acquires an advanced U.S. defense system, they are not simply buying a product to enhance their security, they are also
seeking a relationship with the United States… .
This engagement helps build bilateral ties and creates strong
incentives for recipient countries to maintain good relations with the United States.”40 American influence is
thought to be most potent in cases where the United States provides a nation with a large share of its military capabilities. In the wake of U.S.
pressure to halt Israeli defense exports to China, for example, an Israeli official acknowledged, “If the United States, which provides Israel with
$2 billion in annual military aid, demands that we will not sell anything to China — then we won’t. If the Americans decide we should not be
selling arms to other countries as well — Israel will have no choice but to comply.”41 The United States has used arms sales to try to encourage
states to vote with the United States at the UN, to support or adopt pro-Western and pro-U.S. foreign policies, to convince Egypt and Israel to
accept peace accords, and to gain access to military bases in places such as Greece, Turkey, Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and the Philippines. After
the Cold War, the United States also sought to tie arms transfers to human rights and democratization efforts in client states.42 Arms sales
remain attractive to presidents for three main reasons. First, arms sales are less risky than sending American troops, providing explicit security
guarantees to other nations, or initiating direct military intervention, even long distance.43 In
cases where allies or partners are
likely to engage in conflicts with their neighbors, providing weapons rather than stationing troops
abroad can lessen the risk of American entrapment in crises or conflicts. Taiwan is an example of this sort of arms-
for-troops substitution. On the other hand, in instances where the United States has an interest in conflicts already underway, arms sales can
be used in attempts to achieve military objectives without putting American soldiers (or at least putting fewer of them) in harm’s way. This
tactic has been a central element of the American war on terror, with sales (and outright transfers) of weapons to Afghanistan and Iraq to
support the fight against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and ISIS, as well as to Saudi Arabia for its war in Yemen.44 In both situations the reduction of
military risk, in particular the risk of American casualties, also helps reduce the political risk. Presidents who would otherwise abstain from
supporting a nation if it entailed sending American troops can sell arms to that country without the political fallout that sending America troops
abroad would incur. Second, arms sales are an extremely flexible tool of statecraft. In contrast to the blunt nature of military intervention, or
the long-term commitment and convoluted politics that treaties involve, arms sales can take any form from small to large and can take place on
a one-time or ongoing basis; they can be ramped up or down and started or stopped relatively quickly, depending on the circumstances. Selling
arms to one nation, moreover, does not prohibit the United States from selling arms to any other nation. And thanks to their capacity and
prestige, American weapons serve as useful bargaining chips in all sorts of negotiations between the United States and recipient nations.45
Finally, arms sales represent a very low-cost and low-friction policy tool for the White House.46 Unlike military intervention or stationing troops
abroad, arms sales are not dependent on defense budgets or on a laborious congressional process. And since most arms deals receive little
publicity, presidents don’t have to worry about generating support from the public. As a result, the president can strike an arms deal
unilaterally and at any time. Moreover, since most political leaders view arms sales as an economic benefit to the United States, the president
tends to receive far more encouragement than pushback on the vast majority of arms deals. Inevitably,
the fact that arms sales
are low cost and easy to implement means that presidents reach for them frequently, even if they are
not necessarily the best tool for the job.
Strategic and hegemonic benefits would be far greater if we limited foreign arms sales
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD
What role should arms sales play in American foreign policy? Though major deals — like Trump’s $110 billion agreement with Saudi Arabia
announced in 2017 or the decision to sell arms to Ukraine — provoke brief periods of discussion, there is no real debate in Washington about
the wisdom of exporting vast quantities of weapons around the globe to allies and nonallies alike. Congress, which has the authority to cancel
arms deals, has not impeded a deal since the passage of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act created the framework for doing so. Since 9/11 the
pace of sales has increased. From 2002 to 2016, the United States sold roughly $197 billion worth of weapons and related military support to
167 countries.1 In just his first year Donald Trump cut a deal worth as much as $110 billion to Saudi Arabia alone and notified Congress of 157
sales worth more than $84 billion to 42 other nations.2 Despite losing market share over the past two decades because of increasing
competition, the
United States still enjoyed the largest share of the global arms trade between 2012 and
2016 at 33 percent.3 The current consensus in favor of arms sales rests on three planks. First, advocates argue that arms
sales enhance American security by bolstering the military capabilities of allies, enabling them to deter
and contain their adversaries, and helping promote stability in critical areas like the Middle East and
Southeast Asia. Second, they argue that arms sales help the United States exert influence over the
behavior and foreign policies of client nations. Finally, advocates argue that arms sales provide a boon to
the U.S. economy and fiscal benefits in the form of lower unit costs to the Pentagon, while helping
ensure the health of the American defense industrial base.4 We argue, however, that Washington’s
faith in the wisdom of foreign arms sales is seriously misplaced. The benefits tend to be oversold, and
the downsides are often simply ignored. The defense industry and its champions, in particular, have long exaggerated the
economic boon of arms sales.5 And even if they were greater, economic benefits alone are not worth subverting strategic considerations. More
importantly, the strategic deficits of arms sales are severe enough to overwhelm even the most optimistic
economic argument. It is the strategic case for and against arms sales that we consider in this analysis. Arms sales create a
host of negative, unintended consequences that warrant a much more cautious and limited approach,
even in support of an expansive grand strategy like primacy or liberal hegemony. From the perspective of those
who would prefer a more restrained American foreign policy, the prospective benefits of engaging in the arms trade are even smaller. Even
in cases where the United States wants a nation to arm itself, there is rarely a need for the weapons to
come from the United States. Moreover, the United States would generate significant diplomatic
flexibility and moral authority by refraining from selling arms. Given these outsized risks and nebulous
rewards, the United States should greatly reduce international arms sales.

Arms sales diminish the US’s ability to promote peace and regional stability
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD
The Uncertain and Limited Benefits of Arms Sales Attempts to manage the balance of power and generate influence around the world are
heavily contingent on a number of factors, most of which lie outside American control. Upon closer review, most of the benefits of arms sales
are less certain and less compelling than advocates claim. Managing
the Balance of Power: The Illusion of Control. The
hidden assumption underlying the balance of power strategy is that the United States will be able to
predict accurately what the impact of its arms sales will be. If the goal is deterrence, for example, the assumption is that
an arms sale will be sufficient to deter the adversary without spawning an arms race. If the goal is to promote stability, the assumption is that
an arms sale will in fact reduce tensions and inhibit conflict rather than inflame tensions and help initiate conflict. These
assumptions,
in turn, depend on both the recipient nation and that nation’s neighbors and adversaries acting in ways
that don’t make things worse. As it turns out, these are often poor assumptions. Although arms sales
certainly enhance the military capability of the recipient nation, the fundamental problem is that
arms sales often initiate a long chain of responses that the United States generally cannot control. The
United States, after all, is not the only country with interests in regional balances, especially where the survival and security of local actors is at
stake.
The United States is neither the only major power with a keen interest in critical regions like Asia
and the Middle East, nor the only source of weapons and other forms of assistance. Nor can it dictate
the perceptions, interests, or actions of the other nations involved in a given region. For example, though a
nation receiving arms from the United States may enjoy enhanced defensive capabilities, it is also likely to enjoy enhanced offensive
capabilities. With these, a nation’s calculations about the potential benefits of war, intervention abroad, or even the use of force against its
own population may shift decisively. Saudi Arabia’s recent behavior illustrates this dynamic. Though the Saudis explain their arms purchases as
necessary for defense against Iranian pressure, Saudi Arabia has also spent the past two years embroiled in a military intervention in Yemen.
Likewise, arms sales can heighten regional security dilemmas . Neighbors of nations buying major conventional weapons
will also worry about what this enhanced military capability will mean. This raises the chances that they too will seek to arm themselves further,
or take other steps to shift the balance of power back in their favor, or, in the extreme case, to launch a preventive war before they are
attacked. Given these dynamics, the consequences of arms sales to manage regional balances of power are far
less predictable and often much less positive than advocates assume.54 This unpredictability characterizes even
straightforward-seeming efforts to manage the balance of power. The most basic claim of arms sales advocates is that U.S.
arms sales to friendly governments and allies should make them better able to deter adversaries. The
best available evidence, however, suggests a more complicated reality. In a study of arms sales from
1950 to 1995, major-power arms sales to existing allies had no effect on the chance that the recipient
would be the target of a military attack. Worse, recipients of U.S. arms that were not treaty allies
were significantly more likely to become targets.55 Nor is there much evidence that arms sales can help
the United States promote peace and regional stability by calibrating the local balance of power. On this
score, in fact, the evidence suggests that the default assumption should be the opposite. Most scholarly
work concludes that arms sales exacerbate instability and increase the likelihood of conflict .56 One study,
for example, found that during the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet arms sales to hostile dyads (e.g., India/Pakistan, Iran/Iraq, Ethiopia/Somalia)
“contributed to hostile political relations and imbalanced military relationships” and were “profoundly destabilizing.”57

Arms sales create blow back against the United States and often intensify regional
conflicts
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD

Arms Sales Have Many Potential Negative Consequences Though

arms sales are of marginal value to national security
and the pursuit of national interests, their negative consequences are varied and often severe. Arms sales
can spawn unwanted outcomes on three levels: blowback against the United States and entanglement in conflicts;
regional consequences in the buyer’s neighborhood, such as the dispersion of weapons and increased
instability; and consequences for the buyer itself, such as increased levels of corruption, human rights
abuses, and civil conflict. Effects on the United States. Though the goal of arms sales is to promote American
security and U.S. interests abroad, at least two possible outcomes can cause serious consequences for
the United States. The first of these — blowback — occurs when a former ally turns into an adversary
and uses the weapons against the United States. The second — entanglement — is a process whereby
an arms sales relationship draws the United States into a greater level of unwanted intervention.
Blowback. The fact that the United States has sold weapons to almost every nation on earth, combined with frequent military intervention,
means that blowback is an inescapable outcome of U.S. arms sales policy. American troops and their allies have faced American-made weapons
in almost every military engagement since the end of the Cold War, including in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria.
And even where the United States has not yet engaged in combat, American arms sales have bolstered the military capabilities of adversaries
once counted as friendly. Blowback can occur in at least three ways. First, a previously friendly regime becomes
unfriendly. For example, the United States sold billions of dollars in weapons to the Shah of Iran during the 1970s in the hopes that Iran
would provide a stabilizing influence on the Middle East. The sales included everything from fighter jets for air campaigns to surface-to-air
missiles to shoot down enemy fighters.70 After the 1979 revolution, however, Iran used those weapons in its war with Iraq and enabled the
new Iranian regime to exert its influence in the region. Panama, the recipient of decades of American military assistance, as well as host to a
major military base and 9,000 U.S. troops, was a similar case. In 1989, Gen. Manuel Noriega — himself a CIA asset for more than 20 years —
took power and threatened U.S. citizens, prompting a U.S. invasion that featured American troops facing American weapons.71 Blowback
also occurs when the United States sells weapons to nations (or transfers them to nonstate actors) that,
though not allies, simply did not register as potential adversaries at the time of the sale. The United States, for
example, sold surface-to-air missiles, towed guns, tanks, and armored personnel carriers to Somalia during the 1980s. Few officials would have
imagined that the United States would find itself intervening in Somalia in 1992, or that the United States and its allies would provide billions in
weapons and dual-use equipment to Iraq in an effort to balance against Iran, only to wind up confronting Iraq on the battlefield to reverse its
annexation of Kuwait.72 And
finally, blowback can occur when U.S. weapons are sold or stolen from the
government that bought them and wind up on the battlefield in the hands of the adversary. For example, the
Reagan administration covertly provided Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen, who were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s;
they in turn sold them off eventually to Iran and North Korea, among others. More recently, the Islamic State managed to capture from the
Iraqi government a stunning number of Humvees and tanks the United States had sold to Iraq to rebuild its military capabilities after the 2003
invasion, as well as enough small arms and ammunition to supply three divisions of a conventional army.73 These
examples of
blowback demonstrate how difficult it can be to forecast the long-term outcomes of arms sales and
how obvious it is that selling weapons carries a number of risks. Predicting what exactly will happen is
hard, but predicting that arms sales to clients with red flags are likely to end badly is quite easy. Iraq was
a fragile state ravaged by a decade’s worth of American intervention and rife with terrorism and civil
conflict; to transfer such large quantities of weapons to its military and police force under such
conditions was to invite disaster. Entanglement. Arms sales raise the risk of entanglement in two ways.
First, they can represent early steps down the slippery slope to unwise military intervention. Consider a case
like the Syrian civil war or the many cases during the Cold War in which the United States wanted to support rebels and freedom fighters
against oppressive governments.74 In the majority of those cases, American leaders were wary of intervening directly. Instead, the United
States tended to rely on money, training, and arms sales. But by taking concrete steps like arms sales to support rebel groups, Washington’s
psychological investment in the outcome tends to rise, as do the political stakes for the president, who will be judged on whether his efforts at
support are successful or not. As we saw in the Syrian civil war, for example, Barack Obama’s early efforts to arm Syrian rebels were roundly
criticized as feckless, increasing pressure on him to intervene more seriously.75 History does not provide much guidance about how serious the
risk of this form of entanglement might be. During the Cold War, presidents from Nixon onward viewed arms sales as a substitute for sending
American troops to do battle with communist forces around the world. The result was an astonishing amount of weaponry transferred or sold
to Third World nations, many of which were engaged in active conflicts both external and internal. The risk of superpower conflict made it
dangerous to intervene directly; accordingly, the Cold War-era risk of entanglement from arms sales was low.76 Today, however, the United
States does not face nearly as many constraints on its behavior, as its track record of near-constant military intervention since the end of the
Cold War indicates. As a result, the
risk of arms sales helping trigger future military intervention is real, even if it
cannot be measured precisely. The second way in which arms sales might entangle the United States is
by creating new disputes or exacerbating existing tensions. U.S. arms sales to Kurdish units fighting in Syria against the
Islamic State, for example, have ignited tensions between the United States and its NATO ally Turkey, which sees the Kurds as a serious threat
to Turkish sovereignty and stability.77 Meanwhile, ongoing arms sales to NATO nations and to other allies like South Korea and Taiwan have
exacerbated tensions with Russia, China, and North Korea, raising the risk of escalation and the possibility that the United States might wind up
involved in a direct conflict.78 Regional
Effects. Arms sales do not just affect the recipient nation; they also affect
the local balance of power, often causing ripple effects throughout the region. Though advocates of
arms sales trumpet their stabilizing influence, as we have noted above, arms sales often lead to
greater tension, less stability, and more conflict. Because of this — and the complementary problem of weapons dispersion
— the regional impact of arms sales is less predictable and more problematic than advocates acknowledge.

Arms sales create, sustain and prolong episodes of conflict and violence and in no way
foster regional stability
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD

Instability, Violence, and Conflict. First, arms sales can make conflict more likely.79 This may occur
because recipients of new weapons feel more confident about launching attacks or because changes in
the local balance of power can fuel tensions and promote preventive strikes by others. A study of arms sales
from 1950 to 1995, for example, found that although arms sales appeared to have some restraining effect on major-
power allies, they had the opposite effect in other cases, and concluded that “increased arms transfers from
major powers make states significantly more likely to be militarized dispute initiators.”80 Another study
focused on sub-Saharan Africa from 1967 to 1997 found that “arms transfers are significant and positive predictors of increased probability of
war.”81 Recent history provides supporting evidence for these findings: since
2011, Saudi Arabia, the leading buyer of
American weapons, has intervened to varying degrees in Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, and Qatar. Second, arms
sales can also prolong and intensify ongoing conflicts and erode rather than promote regional
stability. Few governments, and fewer insurgencies, have large enough weapons stocks to fight for long without resupply.82 The
tendency of external powers to arm the side they support, however understandable strategically, has
the inevitable result of allowing the conflict to continue at a higher level of intensity than would
otherwise be the case. As one study of arms sales to Africa notes, “Weapons imports are essential additives in this recipe for armed
conflict and carnage.”83 Third, this dynamic appears to be particularly troublesome with respect to internal
conflicts. Jennifer Erickson, for example, found that recipients of major conventional weapons are 70 percent more
likely to engage in internal conflicts than other states. Though halting arms sales alone is not a panacea
for peace and stability, arms embargoes can help lessen the destructiveness of combat in both civil
and interstate wars simply by restricting access to the means of violence.84 Finally, because of their
effects on both interstate and internal conflict, arms sales can also erode rather than promote
regional stability. As noted in the previous section, where the United States seeks to manage regional balances
of power, arms sales often create tension, whether because the American role in the region threatens
others or because American clients feel emboldened. The Middle East, for example, has seesawed between violence and
tense standoffs for the past many decades, at first because of Cold War competition and more recently because of the American war on terror.
The notion that increased U.S. arms sales since 9/11 made the Middle East more stable is far-fetched to
say the least. Similarly, though many argue that American security commitments to countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea have
produced greater stability, there is a strong case to be made that the opposite is now true. American support of South Korea has
driven North Korea to develop nuclear weapons; the presence of U.S. missile defense systems in South
Korea has aggravated China, and American support of Taiwan produces continual tension between the
two powers.85
US military assistance rarely increases security- more often does the opposite
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD

Dispersion. The United States uses a number of procedures to try to ensure that the weapons it sells
actually go to authorized customers and to monitor the end use of the weapons so that they do not
wind up being used for nefarious purposes. The Department of State even compiles a list of banned countries, brokers, and
customers. But most of these tools have proved ineffectual.86 Programs like Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry aim to shed
light on the service life of American weapons sold abroad through end-use monitoring.87 While the description of U.S. end-use
monitoring (“pre-license, post-license/pre-shipment, and post-shipment”) sounds comprehensive, it’s
actually anything but. In fiscal year 2016, the agency in charge of approving and monitoring arms sales, the Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls (DDTC), authorized 38,398 export-license applications — down more than 50 percent from 2012 after the government shifted
some weapons to the Department of Commerce’s purview.88To oversee more than 35,000 export licenses annually, the DDTC has a full-time
staff of only 171 people. The
Blue Lantern program is executed by embassy staff in recipient countries but
administered back in Washington by only nine State Department employees and three contractors.89
Twelve people can’t possibly track everything that happens to billions of dollars’ worth of advanced
weaponry transferred to dozens of countries abroad each year. Nor is the process designed to correct
problems. On one hand, end-use violations can result in individuals and companies being prevented from making future purchases. On the
other hand, there is no evidence that end-use monitoring has changed the pattern of American arms sales
in any way. The United States in truth has little or no control over what happens to the weapons it sells
to other nations. The result is that year after year weapons of all kinds end up falling into the hands of unreliable, risky, or just plain bad
actors, at which point they’re used in ways neither the United States nor its customers intended. American weapons have frequently wound up
being used against Americans in combat. And even more often, local and regional actors, including criminal gangs, have employed them in their
own conflicts. In civil wars, regime collapse, or other extreme cases, factions steal weapons and use them for their own purposes, as ISIS did in
Iraq.90 Iraq, as previously noted, provides an excellent case study in the inability of the United States to prevent dispersion. As part of U.S.
efforts to rebuild Iraq’s military and security capabilities after the 2003 invasion, the United States sent Iraq roughly $2.5 billion worth of
American weapons through 2014, including everything from small arms to “armored personnel carriers, military helicopters, transport aircraft,
anti-tank missiles, tanks, artillery and drones.” 91 Despite the presence of thousands of U.S. troops in-country and the very close relationship
between those troops and their Iraqi counterparts, many of those weapons went missing. Between 2003 and 2008 alone, 360,000 out of 1
million small arms disappeared, along with 2,300 Humvees. A sizable chunk of this weaponry would later end up in the hands of ISIS. The Iraqi
army, trained and equipped by the American military, dissolved when faced by ISIS and left their weapons behind for the terrorist group to pick
up and use for conquering and holding territory. A UN Security Council report found that in
June 2014 alone “ISIS seized
sufficient Iraqi government stocks from the provinces of Anbar and Salah al-Din to arm and equip more
than three Iraqi conventional army divisions.”92 Data collected by Conflict Armament Research in July and August of 2014
showed that 20 percent of ISIS’s ammunition was manufactured in the United States — likely seized from Iraqi
military stocks.93 In short, dispersion enabled the spread of ISIS and dramatically raised the costs and
dangers of confronting the group on the battlefield. Regime Effects. Finally, arms sales can also have deleterious effects on
recipient nations — promoting government oppression, instability, and military coups. As part of the war on drugs, America inadvertently
enabled the practice of forced disappearances. In the cases of Colombia, the Philippines, and Mexico, American
weapons feed a
dangerous cycle of corruption and oppression involving the police, the military, and political leaders.94
Though the United States provides weapons to Mexico ostensibly for counternarcotics operations, the arms transferred to the country often
end up being used by police to oppress citizens, reinforcing the “climate of generalized violence in the country [that] carries with it grave
consequences for the rule of law.”95 Similarly, in Colombia and the Philippines the United States has supplied arms in an effort to support
governments against external threats or internal factions and to combat drug trafficking, but with mixed results. A study of military aid to
Colombia found that “in environments such as Colombia, international military assistance can strengthen armed nonstate actors, who rival the
government over the use of violence.”96
Recent research reveals that American assistance programs, like foreign
military officer training, can increase the likelihood of military coups. U.S. training programs frequently bought by
other nations, most notably International Military Education and Training (IMET), gave formal training to the leaders of the 2009 Honduran
coup, the 2012 Mali coup, and the 2013 Egyptian coup.97 In
these cases, the training that was supposed to stabilize the
country provided military leaders with the tools to overthrow the government they were meant to
support.

No Link---Generic
Arms sales have no effect on national security
Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s
Defense and Foreign Policy Department. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason
University’s, Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Caroline completed a Master’s in International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Risky Business:
The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Cato Institute, 5-28-2019,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, MJD
To develop our argument we begin in section one with a quantitative analysis of U.S. arms sales since 9/11 in order to illustrate the dangerous
track record of recent sales. We then provide a brief history of U.S. arms sales policy to provide a context for the current process in section two.
Section three outlines the advocates’ case for arms sales and section four outlines the case against. We conclude with a brief discussion of the
current politics of the arms trade and a series of policy recommendations. Under the right circumstances, we agree that arms sales can be a
useful tool of foreign policy. More often, however, we
argue that the benefits of U.S. arms sales are too uncertain and
too limited to outweigh the negative consequences they often produce. Though presidents like them because they
are relatively easy to use, in most cases arms sales are not the best way to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. The strategic case for radically
reducing arms sales rests on four related arguments. First, arms sales do little to enhance American security. Second, the
nonsecurity benefits are far more limited and uncertain than arms sales advocates acknowledge. Third, the negative and unwanted
consequences of arms sales are more common and more dangerous than most realize. Finally, the
United States would enjoy significant diplomatic benefits from halting arms sales. Arms Sales Provide
Little Direct Benefit to U.S. National Security At the strategic level, the United States inhabits such an
extremely favorable security environment in the post-Cold War world that most arms sales do little or
nothing to improve its security. Thanks to its geography, friendly (and weak) neighbors, large and dynamic economy, and secure
nuclear arsenal, the United States faces very few significant threats. There is no Soviet Union bent upon dominating Europe and destroying the
United States. China, despite its rapid rise, cannot (and has no reason to) challenge the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the United States.
Arms sales — to allies or others — are unnecessary to deter major, direct threats to U.S. national
security in the current era.47 Nor are arms sales necessary to protect the United States from “falling dominoes,” or the consequences
of conflicts elsewhere. The United States enjoys what Eric Nordlinger called “strategic immunity.”48 Simply
put, most of what happens in the rest of the world is irrelevant to U.S. national security. The United States
has spent decades helping South Korea keep North Korea in check, for example, but division of territory on the Korean peninsula does not
affect America’s security.
Likewise, civil wars in the Middle East and Russia’s annexation of Crimea might be
significant for many reasons, but those events do not threaten the ability of the United States to defend
itself. As a result, a decision to sell weapons to Ukraine, Taiwan, or South Korea could significantly affect
those nations’ security; doing so is not an act of ensuring U.S. national security.
cp
 CONDITIONS CP
Perm the plan and the counterplan
Perm do the cp then the plan
Perm do the plan then do the cp
Perm everything that isn't mutually exclusive

No Solvency --- Trump gutted congressional oversight for small arms—he will
circumvent the CP to sell arms
Tom O'Connor, Staff writer at Newsweek, 19 [Tom O'Connor, 5-24-2019, Newsweek, "Donald Trump will
sell weapons to Saudi Arabia whether Congress likes it or not," https://www.newsweek.com/trump-sell-
saudi-weapons-congress-1435849, accessed 7-8-2019, //EJA]

WASHINGTON — American gun manufacturers and their allies have pressed the federal government for
years to change the way it regulates small-arms exports in an effort to ease restrictions, boost gun sales
abroad and lower costs at home. The Trump administration appears to be on the brink of delivering.

Officials from the State and Commerce Departments — the two entities tasked with regulating arms
sales internationally — privately told Congress this week that they intend to finalize rules next week that
would shuffle which agency oversees most consumer gun exports, relaxing export regulations and
oversight, according to congressional aides familiar with the plans. Once Congress receives formal
notification of the rule change, lawmakers will have 30 days to decide whether to intervene or let the
new rules take effect.

Under the changes, many American gun and ammunition manufacturers that sell primarily to consumers
would no longer be required to register with the State Department, which currently licenses
international arms sales, or to pay the department an annual fee. Instead, those sales would be licensed
by the Commerce Department, which has a simpler process and does not charge a fee.

The changes are almost certain to provoke resistance from some Democratic lawmakers, who fear that
lighter regulation will lead to a proliferation of American guns, including AR-15s and similar
semiautomatic rifles frequently used in mass shootings, around the world and exacerbate illegal arms
trafficking. Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, has such strong concerns that he plans to place a hold on the new rule — a step that his
staff believes could effectively bar it being carried out for a period of time to allow for negotiations over
his objections.

But blocking the changes permanently would be exceedingly difficult. It would require an act of
Congress and, therefore, the overwhelming support of congressional Republicans, who generally back
changes that will lessen regulations on businesses, especially gun manufacturers.

Though many liberal lawmakers now oppose the plan, the push to streamline government controls on
American arms exports began under President Barack Obama to promote export opportunities for
American companies and refocus regulatory attention on sales that could pose national security risks.
The rule to move commercial gun export licenses to the Commerce Department was nearly complete
when a gunman opened fire at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., in late 2012, killing
26 people, most of them children. Though the proposal was not related to domestic gun control, Mr.
Obama’s administration delayed the rule-making process and never reopened it.

Mr. Trump’s campaign to pare back federal regulations across the government revived the issue. He
formally proposed a rule change virtually identical to Mr. Obama’s last May and has subsequently
incorporated public comments. The meeting between administration and congressional officials this
week was meant to draw that process to a close.

Among the items being transferred to the Commerce Department’s jurisdiction are semiautomatic and
single-shot firearms, as well as a range of parts and components. The State Department will continue to
license sales of items that serve “a critical military advantage or perform an inherently military
function,” including automatic weapons.

In moving jurisdiction of certain sales from the State Department to the Commerce Department,
Congress will lose an oversight lever that it covets and has relied on in high-profile cases in the past.
Under the Arms Export Control Act, the State Department is required to submit information on any
commercial arms sale worth $1 million or more to congressional review. The Commerce Department has
no such requirement.
 RELATIONS CP
Perm do both the plan and the counterplan
Perm do the cp then the plan
Perm do the plan then the cp
Perm do everything that isn't mutually exclusive.

China wont bargain over Taiwan --- even over concessions they want. They believe it’s
a sovereignty issue.
China also wont work with US --- It also uses the nationalism warrant
Kim ‘17
(Patricia, International Security Program research fellow at the Belfer Center and a Ph.D. candidate in the
Department of Politics at Princeton University, “History Shows Beijing Won’t Budge an Inch on Taiwan,” pg
online @ http://sports.yahoo.com/news/history-shows-beijing-won-t-152611565.html //ghs-ef)

Much has been made of President-elect Donald Trump’s phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and his statement in a recent interview that he does not
understand “why we have to be bound by a One China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things,” Some have criticized Trump for unnecessarily shaking up a
delicate understanding on Taiwan that has underpinned decades of U.S.-China relations. Others have expressed a range of cautious optimism for Taiwan’s sake, to outright praise for Trump for
refusing to “kowtow” to the Chinese. And some, including the student leaders of the 2014 Sunflower Movement that began in opposition to a Beijing-pushed trade deal, have decried the use

the real issue is this: Trump’s gambit won’t work, because Beijing doesn’t
of Taiwan as a “tool to score political points.” But

believe it owes Washington anything for recognizing Taiwan as a part of China. Trump is not the first
president to try to use Taiwan as leverage with Beijing. Richard Nixon, while negotiating the opening of relations with China
from 1971 to 1972 , tried to link American concessions on Taiwan to Chinese cooperation in Vietnam. Around

Nixon and Henry

this time, thousands of U.S. troops were deployed in Taiwan as part of the United States’ mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (ROC).

Kissinger knew one of Beijing’s greatest priorities was obtaining American recognition of Taiwan as a part of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and getting U.S. troops off the island. Thus, they decided to link the withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan to China’s pledge to help the United States
achieve an “honorable exit” from the Vietnam War. The two American leaders suggested to their Chinese counterparts that they should pressure their ally, North Vietnam, to sign a peace
agreement with the United States if they wanted a quick exit of U.S. troops from Taiwan. But Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai categorically rejected the quid pro quo. Zhou insisted that because
Taiwan was a rightful part of China, Beijing had no reason to reward the United States for leaving the island. In fact, Zhou said, making such a demand was as ridiculous as China taking
exception to the United States’ sovereignty over Hawaii or Long Island. While the bargain failed, rapprochement proceeded with a general understanding that the United States would
gradually withdraw its troops from Taiwan. Beijing, however, continued to support North Vietnam’s war efforts and provided significant amounts of military assistance to its ally between 1971
and 1973. Ronald Reagan also tried to strike a bargain with Beijing that involved Taiwan when he first arrived in office. Reagan had campaigned on the platform that the Carter administration
had conceded too much to the Chinese while normalizing relations with the PRC in 1979, and suggested he would re-establish official relations with the ROC if he were elected. After assuming
office with this tough stance, the Reagan administration was immediately obliged to confront the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, and especially with the question of whether it would proceed
to sell FX fighter jets as had been discussed during the previous administration. Beijing objected not only to the potential sale of the FX, but also to all arms sales to Taiwan as an infringement
upon Chinese sovereignty. With the knowledge that Beijing coveted advanced American-made, dual-use technology and weapons, the Reagan administration decided to offer an implicit
bargain to their Chinese counterparts. Beijing was told it would be granted the status of a “friendly, non-aligned state,” making it eligible to purchase American arms if it acquiesced to the

Even though the reward was very appealing to the Chinese side, they immediately
United States’ arms sales to Taiwan.

rejected the bargain, because accepting the deal would not only undercut China’s sovereignty, but also
damage the Chinese leadership’s standing among their citizens. Furthermore, the Chinese refused to move forward with any other
aspects of the bilateral relationship until the issue of Taiwan arms sales was resolved. Finally, after months of negotiations, the two sides agreed to the Aug. 17, 1982, communiqué, which
resolved the bilateral impasse with the United States’ declaration that it would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan in light of China’s declaration that it would strive for a peaceful solution

to the Taiwan question.China simply will not engage in bargains that call into question its sovereignty over
Taiwan. Trump’s attempt to use the One China policy as a bargaining chip rests on the false assumption
that Beijing sees the policy as something to be negotiated. This is perhaps one of the few times the
routinely hyperbolic Global Times can be taken literally when it states that the notion of “One China”
cannot be “bought or sold.” China has stood by this principle consistently, even in the face of enticing
deals. Nixon and Reagan attempted their bargains when China was both weaker in the global arena
and less vulnerable to domestic criticism. Today, the PRC is a global power that is recognized by the vast majority of states as the official government
of China, many of which see Beijing as a critical trade partner they cannot afford to antagonize. At the same time, Chinese leaders are much more
vulnerable at home due to the rise of officially encouraged nationalism, a slowing economy, and mounting societal grievances.
As a result, Chinese leaders know they cannot afford to look weak in front of their own citizens. All of
this makes Taiwan a genuine red-line issue that cannot be manipulated to elicit Chinese cooperation
in other areas.
 DEC CP
PERM DO BOTH
PERM DO PLAN THEN CP
PERM DO CP THEN PLAN

CP can’t solve – China strikes first

Farley 2014 - Robert Farley is a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International
Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at
Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. (Robert, “This Is How
World War III Would Begin (As in a U.S.-China War),” The National Interest, 2014,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-world-war-iii-would-begin-us-china-war-97697)

Whatever the trigger, the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack against Chinese fleet, air,
and land-based installations. Although the US military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-
access assets before they can target US planes, bases, and ships, it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario in
which the United States decides to pay the political costs associated with climbing the ladder of
escalation. Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the
U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have to wait for Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United States will almost
certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military
combat before it can begin engaging Chinese forces. If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will
not allow the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first strike, or properly prepare
to receive a first blow. At the same time, a “bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing crisis will steadily
escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on the part of the US military that indicate
to Beijing that Washington is genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups, shifting
deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need
to decide whether to push forward or back down. On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions (the US
effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. This will begin the
economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt
global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in industrial production.
 MORE ARMS
Perm the plan and the counterplan
Perm do the cp then the plan
Perm do the plan then do the cp

CP fails – China already provoked and CP pushes china into war.

Ward 19’ Alex Ward@Alexwardvoxalex.Ward@Vox, 7-9-2019, "China isn’t pleased with Trump’s
Taiwan arms sales authorization," Vox, https://www.vox.com/2019/7/9/20686016/taiwan-arms-sales-
missile-tank

On Monday, the State Department announced that the US could sell $2.2 billion in weapons, including
108 Abrams tanks and around 250 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, to the small island nation and staunch
US ally. That paves the way for America to officially deliver those weapons at some point down the line. But the authorization on its own has
added to longstanding tensions between Taiwan and China. They are still considered one country by both governments and by much of the
world. Butin practice, they have been totally separate since 1949, when China’s Kuomintang (Nationalist
Party) leaders fled to the island of Taiwan and started a government there. Since then, relations
between China and Taiwan have been very poor, with periods of low-level conflict and even moments
when it looked like there would be a full-blown war. The US doesn’t officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation — it
only recognizes China — but this big-ticket arms sale proposal highlights how Washington has long treated Taiwan as a separate, independent
country in everything but name. Which means the decision could increase the China-Taiwan animosity. The
Chinese government
has already requested that the US cancel the authorization, while Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen — who noted in
March that her country requested the weapons — tweeted her appreciation for the Trump administration’s decision.
 FIRST STRIKE CP
Perm do both
Perm do the CP then the plan
Perm do the plant then the CP

CP can’t solve – China strikes first

Farley 2014 - Robert Farley is a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International
Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at
Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. (Robert, “This Is How
World War III Would Begin (As in a U.S.-China War),” The National Interest, 2014,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-world-war-iii-would-begin-us-china-war-97697)

Whatever the trigger, the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack against Chinese fleet, air,
and land-based installations. Although the US military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-
access assets before they can target US planes, bases, and ships, it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario in
which the United States decides to pay the political costs associated with climbing the ladder of
escalation. Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the
U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have to wait for Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United States will almost
certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military
combat before it can begin engaging Chinese forces. If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will
not allow the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first strike, or properly prepare
to receive a first blow. At the same time, a “bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing crisis will steadily
escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on the part of the US military that indicate
to Beijing that Washington is genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups, shifting
deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need
to decide whether to push forward or back down. On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions (the US
effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. This will begin the
economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt
global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in industrial production.

Even if China lost they can quickly rebuild

Farley, 17 - Robert Farley is a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International
Commerce (“A War Between the U.S. and China Would Be World War III (And Might Be Hard to Shut
Off)” 2/2, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/war-between-the-us-china-would-be-world-war-iii-
might-be-19287?page=show

China will not find it difficult to reconstruct war losses. Even if the United States effectively annihilates
the PLAN and the PLAAF, we can expect that the Chinese shipbuilding and aviation industries will replace
most losses within the decade, probably with substantial assistance from Russia. Indeed, significant
Chinese war losses could reinvigorate both the Russian shipbuilding and aviation industries. Moreover,
the war will, by necessity, “modernize” the PLA and PLAAF by destroying legacy capability. A new fleet
of ships and planes will replace the legacy force.

War losses to trained personnel will hurt, but the experience gained in combat will produce a new,
highly trained and effective corps of personnel. This will lead to better, more realistic training for the
next generations of PLA soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Win or lose, the Chinese military will likely be more
lethal a decade after the war.

The United States may have a harder time replacing losses, and not only because US warships and
aircraft cost more than their Chinese counterparts. The production lines for the F-15 and F-16 are near
the end, and the US no longer produces F-22. Moreover, US shipbuilding has declined to the point that
replacing significant war losses could take a very long time. This might prove particularly problematic if
the war demonstrated severe problems with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Given US intention to arm the
USAF, USN, and USMC with F-35 variants over the next decade, proof of inadequacy would wreck force
planning for the foreseeable future.

The United States will have to face the “was it worth it?” question. In victory or defeat, the US will suffer
substantial military and economic damage. Even if the US wins, it will not “solve” the problem of China;
even in the unlikely event that the CCP collapses, a successor regime will still dispute China’s littoral.
 CONSULT JAPAN
1. Perm
Perm do both
Perm do the CP - normal means
perm do the counterplan but still do the aff regardless of the outcome
perm consult japans but secretly do the aff

2. Theory
1. Consult CP bad
2. Moots the 1AC – that’s bad for:
a. Fairness – steals the entirety of the aff and shifts it to negative offense
with net benefits as advantages
b. Education – it turns into debating yourself and they get no unique offense,
it removes clash without authentic offcase competition, leads to less
depth in debates
3. Unpredictability – there are a litany of actors that the neg can choose to consult –
it’s impossible to prep for all the possible CPs and that’s amplified by a limited
specific literature base
4. Plan plus – consult CPs justify plan plus CPs if the actor is guaranteed to say yes
5. Reading the consult CP as a DA solves all their offense.

3. Solvency
Japan says no — they’re friends with Taiwan
Hoppens., Ph.D – studies Sino-Japanese relations, 18 (Robert, "Contemporary Japan-Taiwan Relations
in Historical Context", Asia Dialogue, 7-13-2018,
https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/07/13/contemporary-japan-taiwan-relations-in-historical-
context/))SEAMUS
President Tsai got her start in politics as a protégé of Lee Teng-hui, went on to join the DPP and served as chair of the Mainland Affairs Council
under Chen Shui-bian. Tsai has also cultivated contacts in Japan and with the Abe family in particular. As a presidential
candidate in October 2015, Tsai embarked on a “Japan-Taiwan friendship” mission during which she toured the Abe
family’s home prefecture of Yamaguchi with Kishi Nobuo and met surreptitiously with Prime Minister Abe himself. Since
Tsai’s election in January 2016, the two sides have made a series of moves to upgrade the relationship. For example,
the ambiguous titles of the offices that handle their unofficial relations were changed to include the names of both Japan and Taiwan. The
Tsai administration’s commitment to increase defence spending and cooperation has revived interest in
a Japanese Taiwan Relations Act (JTRA), an idea first broached under the Chen Shui-bian administration. Taiwan’s
democratization, therefore, transformed the narrow, interparty relationship of the cold war into one
between vibrant democracies characterized by popular mutual affinity. Democratization also freed local
Taiwanese to express historical narratives and concepts of national identity that stress Taiwan’s separation from
China and promote generally positive views of Japan that gratify the historical views and nationalist sentiments
of Japan’s conservative rulers. This makes for amicable Japan-Taiwan relations but also poses a challenge to stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Nationalist sentiment in Taiwan can put pressure on leaders to be more assertive in advocating independence. Among Japanese
conservatives, there has long been sympathy for Taiwanese independence as a way to recover a more
positive interpretation of Japan’s modern history. There is little support in Taiwan or Japan for reunification, and for both
sides strengthening relations is a way to stand up to a rising China. All of this is provocative to a PRC leadership committed to reunification and
subject to its own nationalist pressures. While there is little support for an outright declaration of independence, there is a danger of nationalist
forces in Taiwan and Japan reinforcing each other to provoke the PRC and upset stability in the Taiwan Strait.
 CONSULT NATO
1. Perm
Perm do both
Perm do the CP - normal means

perm do the counterplan but still do the aff regardless of the outcome

perm consult NATO but secretly do the aff

NATO is on a path of inefficient, incremental growth – broadening its agenda will only
destroy sustainability
Deni, PhD, 03-18-19 (John R., Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Security
Studies at the U.S. Army War College’s (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Journal of Transatlantic Studies, p. 158)//EF

Over the last 30 years, NATO’s evolving mission growth has exhibited two of the most commonly cited
typologies of organizational change—adaptive learning and incremental growth.35 The former is
rational, empirically driven, and usually efficient—organizations change by carefully studying and
modifying ends, ways, and means. The latter may be rational but it is typically not efficient—new tasks
are simply added on to old ones, without any critical appraisal of purpose or goals. With specific regard to the post-
Cold War period, or roughly 1990 until 2014, both of these typologies were evident. In some cases during the 1990–2014 time period,

the alliance engaged in a well-informed, almost methodical shift away from collective defense and
toward crisis management and cooperative security. For example, NATO developed the Membership
Action Plan (MAP) to build norms, establish guidelines, and manage the admission of new member
states from Eastern Europe.36 In a similar way, the alliance developed a robust force generation system
to manage the challenge of providing continuous force rotations for operations in Afghanistan during an
era of shrinking resources.37 In other instances during the 1990–2014 time period, it seems clear that
NATO’s post-Cold War shift toward crisis management and cooperative security was characterized by
incremental growth, with member states pushing tasks onto the alliance’s plate without a knowledge-
mediated approach. For example, the addition of energy security to the alliance’s agenda made little
sense at a time when there was (and still is) significant divergence among the member states over
what role NATO should play in this issue area, or when there was little understanding of what
capabilities or capacity NATO could actually bring to the table.38 In contrast to the post-Cold War 1990–
2014 time period, since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 NATO appears to have whole-heartedly
resorted to incremental growth. It has done so by recommitting itself to collective defense while also
maintaining or even augmenting its work in crisis management and cooperative security. Notably, there has been
no significant strategic-level reassessment of NATO’s mission set and no new Strategic Concept published since the last was released in 2010. The alliance’s embrace
of an all-of-the-above approach is largely a function of the unique principal–agent dynamic at work within NATO and among its member states, and the complex
array of member state interests. As
noted briefly earlier in this article, in contrast to an international organization
like the United Nations, NATO’s potential for action independent of the interests of its largest member
states is extraordinarily limited. Certainly, there are instances when NATO’s international secretariat or its Secretary General show signs of
autonomy. However, the alliance organization’s ability to exploit its limited autonomy and truly counteract

the desires of its member states is limited by several factors. First, the Secretary General’s position is not
a permanent one but rather a rotating one—most NATO Secretary Generals serve a single 4-year term—
and the nominees are subject to the unanimous approval of all member states. This prevents the
development of an entrenched leader capable of making decisions against the wishes of most member
states. In contrast, UN Secretary Generals are nominated by a minimum of 9 members of the UN Security Council, including no vetoes by the five permanent
members, and then subject to a majority vote of the General Assembly. UN Secretary Generals normally hold two consecutive 5-year terms. Second, while it is true
that the NATO International Staff consists of many permanent civil servants, it also is comprised of staf members temporarily assigned there by individual allied
governments. This limits the autonomy that the International Staff might otherwise develop since temporarily assigned employees usually fail to develop strong
biases toward the institution they work for, or biases that would displace their loyalties to their permanent employer back home.39 Moreover, the International
Military Staf (IMS) is comprised almost entirely of military officials on temporary assignments. The same holds true with regard to the Allied Command Operations
based in Mons, Belgium and the Allied Command Transformation based in Norfolk, Virginia. At the same time, the array of sometimes disparate interests among the
various alliance member states drives much of NATO’s all-of-the-above approach. NATO
exists for several reasons, such as the fact
that the alliance is a community of (mostly) liberal democracies that share similar values. What is
arguably more critical though is the fact that the alliance continues to exist because it provides more
benefits than costs to its members—in short, it meets their security needs, at least in part, in an
efficient and effective way relative to other options.40 Among other ways of meeting these needs, the alliance satisfies the demands
of its member states by engaging in issue areas of interest to those member states. For instance, Spain wants security in the Mediterranean Sea and stability in
northwest Africa. Italy desires the same as well as capacity-building in Africa. Meanwhile, Germany wants a framework for the further development of its political
and economic power that reassures its neighbors as well as itself. France wants increased intelligence sharing to mitigate the challenge of returning foreign fighters.
Poland wants reassurance against domination from the East (Russia) and possibly from the West (Germany). Farther east, the Baltic States want protection against
an existential enemy. The United States wants political legitimacy and military burden sharing for operations near and far. The
point is, NATO’s
member states often have different security interests, threat perceptions, and strategic objectives, and
yet they all look to NATO as a primary means of fulfilling their interests and meeting their objectives.
Accordingly, the alliance responds by pursuing a broadening agenda. Arguably, this tendency on the
part of the alliance to pursue a broadening agenda to satisfy the sometimes disparate interests of its
member states has only gotten worse with enlargement. Since 1997, the alliance has steadily grown, and it seems that trend will
continue albeit at a slower rate. In July 2018, the alliance decided to begin accession talks with Macedonia, and it is possible Kosovo may follow. Less likely but still
possible is membership for Sweden or Finland, as addressed by Anna Wieslander elsewhere in this special issue. As membership grows,
definitions of ‘why NATO matters’ may grow as well, and with it NATO’s agenda. 39 See, for example, Weiss [48], and
Jordan [49]. 40 For an examination of how this applies to the USA, see Brands and Feaver [50]. 170 Journal of Transatlantic Studies (2019) 17:157–173 The

primary challenge confronting the alliance today is that it lacks the capability and the capacity to fulfill
all of the various missions and activities that member states wish to saddle it with. European defense
budgets, on average, steadily declined through most of the post-Cold War period, and trends have only
reversed since 2014. Despite the turnaround, that acquisition accounts are struggling to keep pace with
demand, many military units remain whole on paper only, and readiness continues to be underfunded.
Additionally, even though spending increases have been broad based, they have also been uneven. The most signifcant increases have come from those countries
with relatively small military forces, while the ‘big four’ European NATO members—France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, which together account for roughly two-
thirds of European NATO military spending—have been increasing at a slower pace. Until
these countries pick up their defense
spending pace, and until all of the European allies are able to acquire the equipment, manpower, and
training necessary to fulfill their agreed upon defense plans, the alliance will continue to struggle in its
effort to achieve ‘all of the above
2. Theory
6. Consult CP bad
7. Moots the 1AC – that’s bad for:
a. Fairness – steals the entirety of the aff and shifts it to negative offense
with net benefits as advantages
b. Education – it turns into debating yourself and they get no unique offense,
it removes clash without authentic offcase competition, leads to less
depth in debates
8. Unpredictability – there are a litany of actors that the neg can choose to consult –
it’s impossible to prep for all the possible CPs and that’s amplified by a limited
specific literature base
9. Plan plus – consult CPs justify plan plus CPs if the actor is guaranteed to say yes
10. Reading the consult CP as a DA solves all their offense.
 CONSULT CONGRESS
Perm the plan and the counterplan
Perm do the cp then the plan
Perm do the plan then the cp
perm do the counterplan but still do the aff regardless of the outcome
perm consult Congress but secretly do the aff

No Solvency --- Trump gutted congressional oversight for small arms—he will
circumvent the CP to sell arms
Tom O'Connor, Staff writer at Newsweek, 19 [Tom O'Connor, 5-24-2019, Newsweek, "Donald Trump will
sell weapons to Saudi Arabia whether Congress likes it or not," https://www.newsweek.com/trump-sell-
saudi-weapons-congress-1435849, accessed 7-8-2019, //EJA]

WASHINGTON — American gun manufacturers and their allies have pressed the federal government for
years to change the way it regulates small-arms exports in an effort to ease restrictions, boost gun sales
abroad and lower costs at home. The Trump administration appears to be on the brink of delivering.

Officials from the State and Commerce Departments — the two entities tasked with regulating arms
sales internationally — privately told Congress this week that they intend to finalize rules next week that
would shuffle which agency oversees most consumer gun exports, relaxing export regulations and
oversight, according to congressional aides familiar with the plans. Once Congress receives formal
notification of the rule change, lawmakers will have 30 days to decide whether to intervene or let the
new rules take effect.

Under the changes, many American gun and ammunition manufacturers that sell primarily to consumers
would no longer be required to register with the State Department, which currently licenses
international arms sales, or to pay the department an annual fee. Instead, those sales would be licensed
by the Commerce Department, which has a simpler process and does not charge a fee.

The changes are almost certain to provoke resistance from some Democratic lawmakers, who fear that
lighter regulation will lead to a proliferation of American guns, including AR-15s and similar
semiautomatic rifles frequently used in mass shootings, around the world and exacerbate illegal arms
trafficking. Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, has such strong concerns that he plans to place a hold on the new rule — a step that his
staff believes could effectively bar it being carried out for a period of time to allow for negotiations over
his objections.

But blocking the changes permanently would be exceedingly difficult. It would require an act of
Congress and, therefore, the overwhelming support of congressional Republicans, who generally back
changes that will lessen regulations on businesses, especially gun manufacturers.

Though many liberal lawmakers now oppose the plan, the push to streamline government controls on
American arms exports began under President Barack Obama to promote export opportunities for
American companies and refocus regulatory attention on sales that could pose national security risks.
The rule to move commercial gun export licenses to the Commerce Department was nearly complete
when a gunman opened fire at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., in late 2012, killing
26 people, most of them children. Though the proposal was not related to domestic gun control, Mr.
Obama’s administration delayed the rule-making process and never reopened it.

Mr. Trump’s campaign to pare back federal regulations across the government revived the issue. He
formally proposed a rule change virtually identical to Mr. Obama’s last May and has subsequently
incorporated public comments. The meeting between administration and congressional officials this
week was meant to draw that process to a close.

Among the items being transferred to the Commerce Department’s jurisdiction are semiautomatic and
single-shot firearms, as well as a range of parts and components. The State Department will continue to
license sales of items that serve “a critical military advantage or perform an inherently military
function,” including automatic weapons.

In moving jurisdiction of certain sales from the State Department to the Commerce Department,
Congress will lose an oversight lever that it covets and has relied on in high-profile cases in the past.
Under the Arms Export Control Act, the State Department is required to submit information on any
commercial arms sale worth $1 million or more to congressional review. The Commerce Department has
no such requirement.

1. Consult CP bad
2. Moots the 1AC – that’s bad for:
a. Fairness – steals the entirety of the aff and shifts it to negative offense
with net benefits as advantages
b. Education – it turns into debating yourself and they get no unique offense,
it removes clash without authentic offcase competition, leads to less
depth in debates
3. Unpredictability – there are a litany of actors that the neg can choose to consult –
it’s impossible to prep for all the possible CPs and that’s amplified by a limited
specific literature base
4. Plan plus – consult CPs justify plan plus CPs if the actor is guaranteed to say yes
5. Reading the consult CP as a DA solves all their offense.
 QPQ – Generic CP
Perm the CP and the Plan
Perm do the cp then the plan
Perm do the plan then the CP

THE CP FAILS - China wont bargain over Taiwan --- even over concessions they want.
They believe it’s a sovereignty issue.
Kim ‘17
(Patricia, International Security Program research fellow at the Belfer Center and a Ph.D. candidate in the
Department of Politics at Princeton University, “History Shows Beijing Won’t Budge an Inch on Taiwan,” pg
online @ http://sports.yahoo.com/news/history-shows-beijing-won-t-152611565.html //ghs-ef)

Much has been made of President-elect Donald Trump’s phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and his statement in a recent interview that he does not
understand “why we have to be bound by a One China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things,” Some have criticized Trump for unnecessarily shaking up a
delicate understanding on Taiwan that has underpinned decades of U.S.-China relations. Others have expressed a range of cautious optimism for Taiwan’s sake, to outright praise for Trump for
refusing to “kowtow” to the Chinese. And some, including the student leaders of the 2014 Sunflower Movement that began in opposition to a Beijing-pushed trade deal, have decried the use

the real issue is this: Trump’s gambit won’t work, because Beijing doesn’t
of Taiwan as a “tool to score political points.” But

believe it owes Washington anything for recognizing Taiwan as a part of China. Trump is not the first
president to try to use Taiwan as leverage with Beijing. Richard Nixon, while negotiating the opening of relations with China
from 1971 to 1972 , tried to link American concessions on Taiwan to Chinese cooperation in Vietnam. Around

Nixon and Henry

this time, thousands of U.S. troops were deployed in Taiwan as part of the United States’ mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (ROC).

Kissinger knew one of Beijing’s greatest priorities was obtaining American recognition of Taiwan as a part of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and getting U.S. troops off the island. Thus, they decided to link the withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan to China’s pledge to help the United States
achieve an “honorable exit” from the Vietnam War. The two American leaders suggested to their Chinese counterparts that they should pressure their ally, North Vietnam, to sign a peace
agreement with the United States if they wanted a quick exit of U.S. troops from Taiwan. But Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai categorically rejected the quid pro quo. Zhou insisted that because
Taiwan was a rightful part of China, Beijing had no reason to reward the United States for leaving the island. In fact, Zhou said, making such a demand was as ridiculous as China taking
exception to the United States’ sovereignty over Hawaii or Long Island. While the bargain failed, rapprochement proceeded with a general understanding that the United States would
gradually withdraw its troops from Taiwan. Beijing, however, continued to support North Vietnam’s war efforts and provided significant amounts of military assistance to its ally between 1971
and 1973. Ronald Reagan also tried to strike a bargain with Beijing that involved Taiwan when he first arrived in office. Reagan had campaigned on the platform that the Carter administration
had conceded too much to the Chinese while normalizing relations with the PRC in 1979, and suggested he would re-establish official relations with the ROC if he were elected. After assuming
office with this tough stance, the Reagan administration was immediately obliged to confront the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, and especially with the question of whether it would proceed
to sell FX fighter jets as had been discussed during the previous administration. Beijing objected not only to the potential sale of the FX, but also to all arms sales to Taiwan as an infringement
upon Chinese sovereignty. With the knowledge that Beijing coveted advanced American-made, dual-use technology and weapons, the Reagan administration decided to offer an implicit
bargain to their Chinese counterparts. Beijing was told it would be granted the status of a “friendly, non-aligned state,” making it eligible to purchase American arms if it acquiesced to the

Even though the reward was very appealing to the Chinese side, they immediately
United States’ arms sales to Taiwan.

rejected the bargain, because accepting the deal would not only undercut China’s sovereignty, but also
damage the Chinese leadership’s standing among their citizens. Furthermore, the Chinese refused to move forward with any other
aspects of the bilateral relationship until the issue of Taiwan arms sales was resolved. Finally, after months of negotiations, the two sides agreed to the Aug. 17, 1982, communiqué, which
resolved the bilateral impasse with the United States’ declaration that it would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan in light of China’s declaration that it would strive for a peaceful solution

to the Taiwan question.China simply will not engage in bargains that call into question its sovereignty over
Taiwan. Trump’s attempt to use the One China policy as a bargaining chip rests on the false assumption
that Beijing sees the policy as something to be negotiated. This is perhaps one of the few times the
routinely hyperbolic Global Times can be taken literally when it states that the notion of “One China”
cannot be “bought or sold.” China has stood by this principle consistently, even in the face of enticing
deals. Nixon and Reagan attempted their bargains when China was both weaker in the global arena
and less vulnerable to domestic criticism. Today, the PRC is a global power that is recognized by the vast majority of states as the official government
of China, many of which see Beijing as a critical trade partner they cannot afford to antagonize. At the same time, Chinese leaders are much more

vulnerable at home due to the rise of officially encouraged nationalism, a slowing economy, and mounting societal grievances.
As a result, Chinese leaders know they cannot afford to look weak in front of their own citizens. All of
this makes Taiwan a genuine red-line issue that cannot be manipulated to elicit Chinese cooperation
in other areas.

Taiwan knows China wont honor their commitment --- means Taiwan rejects the
counterplan and starts a war over the strait to maintain separate status

Kastner 16 (Scott L. Kastner - Professor in the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park. <MKIM> “Is
the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point?”. Winter 2016. 7/10/19.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/294137881_Is_the_Taiwan_Strait_Still_a_Flash_Point_Rethinking_the_Prospects_for_Armed_Confl
ict_between_China_and_Taiwan)

Finally, commitment problems would likely complicate the search for a peaceful accommodation even if a
future Taiwan government comes to recognize that China’s redline has moved to the left of the status quo and is,
in principle, willing to bargain away some of its sovereignty to preserve the peace.98 The problem here is that the
issue being bargained over, Taiwan’s sovereign status, affects Taiwan’s future bargaining power : to
the degree that a Taiwan government bargains away some of Taiwan’s sovereign status today, Taiwan’s
future bargaining power with Beijing will be further diminished. Perhaps most importantly, even a loose unification
bargain would almost certainly reduce even further Taiwan’s confidence that the United States would intervene in a future cross-strait
conflict—because in the aftermath of a unification agreement U.S. involvement would represent intervention in a civil, rather than an
international, conflict. Thus, any
bargain involving a reduction in Taiwan’s sovereignty should independently
reduce Beijing’s expected costs of war, thus pushing China’s redline, R, even further to the left. The
credibility of Beijing’s commitment to such a bargain would therefore be suspect, because once the
commitment was implemented, Beijing would have incentives to demand an even more favorable bargain (and
Taiwan would not be in a position where it could refuse). This situation thus represents a dynamic
commitment problem, where the good being bargained over (in this case, Taiwan’s sovereignty) has implications
for future bargaining power of the parties involved.99 Absent a mechanism that obliges Beijing to
honor the agreement, Taiwan could reject the bargain even if it recognizes that this could lead to war.
In short, a shifting balance of power in the PRC’s favor has the potential to create renewed instability in
cross-strait relations, if it comes to overwhelm the effects of other, more stabilizing, trends. How worried should analysts be about this
sort of a dynamic emerging in the Taiwan Strait?
 QPQ – Econ CP
Perm do both
Perm do the plan then the cp
Perm do the cp then the plan

Economic pressure fails

Harrison 10 - founder of Credit Writedowns and a former career diplomat, investment banker and
technology executive with over twenty years of business experience (Ed, “Can external pressure
precipitate change in a command economy like China?,”
https://www.creditwritedowns.com/2010/03/can-external-pressure-precipitate-change-in-a-command-
economy-like-china.html)

So, here’s my question again: How effective is external pressure in precipitating regime change or
economic policy moves?

We see that most Americans believe it was very effective in bringing down the Soviets. Most believe it
was effective in ending Apartheid in South Africa. It has not been so successful in Cuba or North Korea.
But could external pressure work in Iran or even in China?

My general take is no; politicians, especially in command economies, are relatively unconcerned with
external pressure. I used to be a foreign policy specialist. And, despite my role, I was keenly aware of the
primacy of domestic issues over foreign ones in a politician’s decision-making. What the ruling elite in
command economies care about is social unrest that stems from a lack of civil liberties and economic
progress. Even in the United States, this is true. Do you think American politicians will yield to Brazilian
threats to retaliate for American cotton subsidies? Of course not.

Threats don’t work. The only thing that can work is inflicting economic pain and creating social unrest.
Yes, autarky hasn’t brought the North Koreans or Cubans to heel; nor did it topple Saddam Hussein.
However, implicitly, this is the power that some American political historians ascribe to the policies
against South Africa and the Soviets. They assert that it was the economic pain that caused those
governments to eventually yield.

So, as Americans look to threaten to punish China for China’s protectionist exchange rate policy, we
should all understand that these threats will have no effect. The Chinese will not do anything because of
threats. More likely, they will dig in their heels. The Telegraph’s Liam Halligan has it right when he says:

When it comes to China, the West needs to face the truth. The more America calls for China to revalue
the longer Beijing will take to do it. Chinese politicians are as unlikely to buckle in the face of Western
pressure as their Western counterparts would be given a tongue-lashing from Beijing.

China’s government is petrified of social unrest. Given the importance of the export sector for continued
high growth and jobs, this again makes it impossible to Beijing to be seen yielding to pain imposed by
the West.
 EUM CP
Perm do both
Perm do the plan then the cp
Perm do the plan then the cp

Perm solves – Golden Sentry and Blue Lantern do not account for state-sanction,
military use of purchased arms. Only the affirmative solves for that disad to the
counterplan.
Thrall and Dorminey 2018 (A. Trevor and Caroline, “Risky Business: The Role of Arms
Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy” via The CATO Institute 13 March 2018
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#full
A. Trevor Thrall is an associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George
Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Caroline Dorminey is a policy analyst at
the Cato Institute.)

The United States should reorient its arms sales policy to ensure that sales provide strategic
benefits and to avoid producing negative unintended consequences. At a practical level, this
means reducing arms sales dramatically, especially to nations with high risk factors for negative
outcomes. Officials should look for other ways to conduct foreign policy in situations where
arms sales have been common tactics — such as when the United States negotiates access to
military bases or seeks cooperation in the war on terror. The arms sales process should also be
revised in order to ensure that all sales receive more thorough scrutiny than has been the case
to date. To implement this new vision for arms sales we recommend the following steps:

1. Issue an Updated Presidential Policy Directive on Arms Sales — Most importantly, the
president should issue a new Presidential Policy Directive reorienting U.S. arms sales policy
so that the new default policy is “no sale.” The only circumstances in which the United
States should sell or transfer arms to another country are when three conditions are met:
(1) there is a direct threat to American national security; (2) there is no other way to
confront that threat other than arming another country; and (3) the United States is the
only potential supplier of the necessary weapons.

The reasoning behind this recommendation is threefold: first, as noted, the United States
enjoys such a high level of strategic immunity that there is currently no direct security
rationale for arms sales to any nation. Second, even if one believes that the United States
has an interest in helping other nations defend themselves against internal enemies (e.g.,
Iraq, Afghanistan) or external ones (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, NATO countries), there are
other ways the United States can help instead of supplying weapons. Finally, by halting the
sales of weapons the United States will decrease the risk of entanglement in conflicts that
do not directly involve American security. It will also improve the diplomatic flexibility of the
United States to play the role of honest broker and to exert moral leverage on dueling
parties.
2. Immediately Stop Selling Weapons to Risky Nations — The first step in implementing a new
approach should be to stop selling weapons to the countries most likely to misuse weapons or to
lose control of them. Based on the risk assessment described here, we recommend that the
United States immediately halt the sale of weapons to any nation that scored in the
“highest risk” category for any risk factor, or which is actively engaged in conflict. Taking
this action would immediately add 71 nations to the list of embargoed nations until further
notice. This simple and commonsense step would mitigate some of the worst negative
consequences and stop the United States from enabling conflicts abroad.
3. Improve and Respond to End-Use Monitoring — The United States should significantly
expand its tracking of the use and misuse of American weapons. The current system of end-
use monitoring does not collect enough data on how weapons are used once they are transferred.
This is largely because the system is designed to monitor and prevent instances of dispersion and
corruption and is not necessarily focused on the use of force by the client military and
government. Rather than focusing on tracking abuse down to a single military unit, end-use
monitoring should hold countries accountable for the actions of their militaries as a whole. End-
use monitoring should take into account the bigger picture of a country’s strategic
environment and should assess weapons sales based on a proposed customer’s history,
actions, and participation in ongoing conflicts. End-use monitoring should be tracked and
reported annually, and the results should be made public to enforce oversight and give
Congress the information needed to make better-informed decisions.
4. Amend the AECA to Require Congressional Approval for All Arms Sales — Finally, we
recommend that the AECA be amended to require congressional approval for all arms
sales. The current law is designed to make arms sales easy by making it difficult for
Congress to block them. Blocking a sale requires a majority vote in both houses of Congress,
with such votes typically cropping up inconveniently in the middle of other, more-pressing
issues on the legislative agenda. Congress has exerted little or no influence over arms sales
and has allowed the executive branch near-complete autonomy. Requiring a congressional
vote to approve arms sales, on the other hand, would subject arms deals to much more
intense scrutiny than has traditionally been the case, and blocking misguided arms sales
would be much easier. Requiring a separate piece of legislation to approve each arms deal,
not simply requiring a resolution against, would encourage deliberations about the strategic
benefits of any proposed deal.
topicality
 Substantial
We meet- even one recent arm sale is worth billions of dollars, making Taiwan a top
ten arms sale importer from the US.
Mike Stone 19’ , 6-6-2019, "Exclusive: U.S. pursues sale of over $2 billion in weapons to Taiwan,
sources say, angering China," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-exclusive/exclusive-
us-preparing-to-sell-over-2-billion-in-weapons-to-taiwan-testing-china-sources-idUSKCN1T62CA

The United States is pursuing the sale of more than $2 billion worth of tanks and weapons to Taiwan,
four people familiar with the negotiations said, sparking anger from Beijing which is already involved in
an escalating trade war with Washington.

Counter interpretation - A substantial reduction must be greater than 2.7% of total

arms sales
Portela, 10 - Dr Clara PORTELA holds a PhD from the European University Institute in Florence and an
MA from the Free University of Berlin. She is currently a full-time faculty member in Political Science at
the University of Valencia (Spain), having previously served as an Assistant Professor at Singapore
Management University (Singapore). (Clara, European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and
why Do They Work?, p. 105, google books) CFSP = Common Foreign and Security Policy for the EU
A number of member states Belgium, Germany and Italy supplemented these EU actions with national measures, such as the suspension of grants, loans and aid (Kreutz 2004). The EU measures, most of which are diplomatic
sanctions, ceased to be valid in October 1990 (Wacker 2004), while the arms embargo remained in place. The fact that the arms embargo was never for- malised in a CFSP instrument has significant implications. Firstly, the
measures were adopted on an indefinite basis, unlike most CFSP regimes currently in force, which contain an expiry date, or 'exit-clause'. Secondly, no common list of goods covered by the embargo was agreed, as is routine
practice with current CFSP arms embargoes; thus, individual member states remain responsible for interpreting the embargo. Given that the embargo was interpreted as excluding the supply of equipment under agreements that

a US study published in 1998

were already con- cluded, European arms sales under those contracts continued. Some items with military applications, such as early warning systems, were also supplied. However,

estimated that European arms sales to China were not substantial, making up only 2.7 per cent of China's imports of
military equipment (cited in Wacker 2004:2). In 2003, EU member states refused applications for 44 export licences for military equipment to China, and granted 159. However, the volume of
sales remains "relatively small' according to experts' estimates (Austin 2005:9).
We Meet –12 countries account for more than 2.7% of US arms sales including
Taiwan, based on the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database

Counter Standards
Balanced Limits - We create fairer limits, we should have breadth to the year to
encourage creativity and innovation so that the debate topic doesn't become stale
and we seize learning by semester 2. However we only allow affirmatives that at least
reduce by 2.7 percent which prevents a explosion of the topic.
Fair Ground - our interp = fair ground because itll be enough to it can trigger DA's like
hege turns and case turns with alliance DA's. There is no traditional DA that would not
function with our interpretation. And specifically, Taiwan aff is considered core of
topic with dozens of premade neg postiotns to the aff. There is no reduction in their
ground.
Voter
Default to reasonability -
good is good enough- Don’t vote on T if you believe we are reasonably topical to
prevent the neg from createing a race to the bottom on limiting definition to destroy
the topic.
Education- Taiwan affs are heart of the topic – it’s the number one result on Google
and the best authors all discuss it- their interp would destroy key discussions
 Reduce
We meet – Reduce means decrease – excludes the possibility or result of increasing
Friedman, 99 – Senior Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CUNA MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee. 98-5033 UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 169 F.3d 737; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1832; 99-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,245; 83 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 799 February 9, 1999, Decided, lexis)

B. CUNA's position has another fatal flaw. Section 808 is captioned "Policy Dividends Deduction," and §
808(c) states:

(1) In general

Except as limited by paragraph (2), the deduction for policyholder dividends for any taxable year shall be
an amount equal to the policyholder dividends [**15] paid or accrued during the taxable year.

(2) Reduction in case of mutual companies

In the case of a mutual life insurance company, the deduction for policyholder dividends for any taxable
year shall be reduced by the amount determined under section 809.

"The amount determined" under § 809, by which the policyholder dividend deduction is to be
"reduced," is the "excess" specified in § 809(c)(1). Like the word "excess," the word "reduced" is a
common, unambiguous, non-technical term that is given its ordinary meaning. See San Joaquin Fruit &
Inv. Co., 297 U.S. at 499. "Reduce" means "to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number." Webster's
Third International Dictionary 1905. Under CUNA's interpretation of "excess" in § 809(c), however, the
result of the "amount determination" under § 809 would be not to reduce the policyholder dividends
deduction, but to increase it. This would directly contradict the explicit instruction in § 808(c)(2) that the
deduction "be reduced." The word "reduce" cannot be interpreted, as CUNA would treat it, to mean
"increase."

Counter Interpretation -- Reduce means to decrease the quantity of

Ingram, 88 – law student (Cindi M. Ingram, Plaintiff's Right to Recover from Non-Settling Tortfeasor
When Settlement with Joint Tortfeasor Exceeds the Jury Award, 53 Mo. L. Rev. (1988) Available at:
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/8

In answering this question, the Hampton court turned to various principles for guidance. The court
looked first to the "plain meaning" of the statute.6 " Interpretation of a statute involves ascertaining the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the statute. Consideration of the "plain meaning" of the
words used in the statute is a basic principle of statutory construction in determining legislative
intent.6 7 The Hampton court discussed the "plain meaning" of the words "reduce" and "claim" in
reaching its construction of the statute. The court referred to the dictionary definition of "reduce" as
meaning "to diminish in size, amount, extent or number; to make small or to lower, bring down or to
change the denomination of a quantity." 68 The court then judicially defined "claim" as "the amount of
damages as determined by an impartial fact finder - the jury."'
We meet – we substantially reduce, we are not increasing sells and preventing future
sells, the aff is topical under this interpretation.

Counter Standards
Balanced Limits - We create fairer limits, we should have breadth to the year to
encourage creativity and innovation so that the debate topic doesn't become stale
and we seize learning by semester 2. However we only allow affirmatives that reduce
which prevents a explosion of the topic.
Fair Ground - our interp = fair ground because itll be enough to it can trigger DA's like
hege turns and case turns with alliance DA's. There is no traditional DA that would not
function with our interpretation. And specifically, Taiwan aff is considered core of
topic with dozens of premade neg positions to the aff. There is no reduction in their
ground.

Voter
Default to reasonability -
good is good enough- Don’t vote on T if you believe we are reasonably topical to
prevent the neg from createing a race to the bottom on limiting definition to destroy
the topic.
Education- Taiwan affs are heart of the topic – it’s the number one result on Google
and the best authors all discuss it- their interp would destroy key discussions.
 Permanent
w/m –
1. We don’t resume arms on a later date
2. We won’t return to a baseline.
3. The current arms will not be renewed.
voter – Default to reasonability
good is good enough- Don’t vote on T if you believe we are reasonably topical to
prevent the neg from createing a race to the bottom on limiting definition to destroy
the topic.
Education- Taiwan affs are heart of the topic – it’s the number one result on Google
and the best authors all discuss it- their interp would destroy key discussions.
Sales
Body Politics
kritik
Set Col
Security
 Militarism
Framework -- Policymakers must take national interest above all other interests---it’s
the only ethical option
William F. Felice 2008, Professor of international political economy, international law, international
organization, and human rights at New York University, “Moral Responsibility in a Time of War”, Social
Justice/Global Options, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768499

Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, attempts to distinguish between right and wrong behavior.
Ethical theories have been
applied to war and violence with "just war" theories influencing policymakers. However, the intellectual
framework used by the overwhelming majority of the world's foreign policy decision-makers is an
"amoral" calculation of what action best serves the "national interest." The first-rate foreign policy
expert will give absolute priority to the interests of his or her nation, which often means neglecting and
opposing the material interests of those outside this partial community. Through this lens, policy
options pose few moral dilemmas, as these decisions are merely practical solutions to real-world
problems. Some who call themselves "political realists" share such a view of the separation of ethics from
politics.
To a classical political realist, history demonstrates that states must focus on power and wealth to survive in the international system. Morality
has a limited role to play in this anarchical, dangerous world. Since the time of Thucydides in ancient Greece, states have consistently chosen
power over negotiated diplomatic agreements, with the "logic of fear and escalation" always pushing out the "logic of moderation and peaceful
diplomacy." This overriding priority of "national security" means that ethics plays an extremely circumscribed role in the deliberations of states.
Many realists argue that in international politics "only the weak resort to

moral argument" (Smith, 1986: 6-7).

Many powerful officials in the U.S. government have stated strongly that, in their view, moral
considerations have no place in politics. For example, Dean Acheson, former secretary of state under President Harry Truman,
was asked by President Kennedy in 1962 to serve on the Executive Committee to advise the president on an appropriate response to the Cuban
missile crisis. Acheson later wrote that during these discussions, when the lives of millions of people were in danger, "those involved...will
remember the irrelevance of the supposed moral considerations brought out in the discussions...moral talk did not bear on the problem"
(Acheson, 1971; Coady, 1993: 373). Realist counsel has traditionally excluded morality from foreign policy and instead
focused solely on the "national interest." Yet, this does not mean that no ethics apply to statecraft. Rather, a difference is accepted in the
morals that apply to individuals versus those that apply to the state. An individual can base his or her conduct on principles such as honesty and
nonviolence. In contrast, the state must protect its position of "power" in the international system. This means that the state should not engage
in ideological crusades for democracy and freedom that could dilute its power. Yet key "realist" virtues enhance the state's power position and
thus must be embraced. These ethical norms are said to include prudence, humility, study, responsibility, and patriotism. Such an approach
allows leaders to conduct a responsible and tough defense of the national interest, but still show respect for others. The claim made for the
cosmopolitan significance of this realist approach has been named "ethical realism." "Ethical realism," according to Lieven and Hulsman (2006:
62-83), "is therefore of universal and eternal value for the conduct of international affairs, and especially useful as a guiding philosophy for the
United States and its war on terror."

As a representative of the community overall, the government official has a primary obligation to the national
interest, and, in particular, the security and integrity of the state. The ethics of "humility" and "prudence" can help to
protect the security of the state. However, the necessities of national existence cannot be sorted out through an
ethical lens of right and wrong conduct. Effective statecraft demands that officials act to protect the whole, even if individual and
collective moral principles are sacrificed. The government official must protect the interests of the community
above all else. As a result, according to international relations theorist Hans Morgenthau (1979: 13),
there is a "difference in the moral principles that apply to the private citizen in his relations with other
private citizens and to the public figure in dealing with other public figures." Many of these "political realists"
and/or "ethical realists" seem to embrace Machiavelli’s division of morality between the public and private worlds.
Perm do both---the alternative challenging militarism and the aff removing weaponry
that are in high risk countries are not mutually exclusive---we both challenge the
foundational principle of militarism by advocating for a world with disarmament
which is a first step to confront U.S. hegemony and militaristic logic
The aff is valuable even if it never leads to any broader critique of militarism
Margarita H. Petrova 18, Assistant Professor of International Relations and International Peace and
Security at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, October 2018, “Weapons prohibitions
through immanent critique: NGOs as emancipatory and (de)securitising actors in security governance,”
Review of International Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 619-653

At the discursive level, NGOs have started their critique with the core IHL principle – balancing
humanitarian costs and military interests that all too often privilege the military side of the equation. In
the process, they have gradually tried to extricate themselves from the IHL framework, but so far have
not managed to pose a radical challenge to military practices, let alone to the acceptability of war.
However, in those cases where they have focused their attention, NGOs have tipped the scales towards
the humanitarian side by elevating the importance of civilian protection and diminishing the military
and political value of specific weapons. That does not mean that civilian suffering on the whole has
lessened or that wars are less likely to occur, only that NGO campaigning has curbed particular uses of
force and the suffering they inflict upon civilians. In a world of ‘moral limit and possibility’, 24 this
contribution should not be easily discarded.

No link---The affirmative challenges the legitimacy and intervention that the Neg
questions--- the 1AC is a prior demand to address dominate discourse of masculinity
that has normalized interventionism--- disarmament is key to confront gender-based
violence and prevent conflict
Sara E. Davies 19 and Jacqui True, an Australian Research Council Future Fellow and an associate
professor in international relations at Griffith University; a Professor of International Relations and
Director of Monash University's Centre for Gender, Peace and Security, February 2019, “The Oxford
Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security,” DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190638276.001.0001

Shift 2: Challenging, Transforming, and Eliminating Violent Militarized Power Relations and Militarization

Militarism as a way of thought and the militarization of societies, such that perceived threats are likely
to be met with weaponry rather than words, is a root cause of conflict and violent conflict (WILPF
2015:1). This is because militarism and cultures of militarized masculinities create and sustain political
decision-making whereby resorting to the use of force becomes a normalized mode for dispute
resolution (Global Study 2015: 207). As the UN Advisory Group of Experts explained, while militarized
responses can be effective in the immediate context of halting violence, they tend to address symptoms
rather than root causes. "The very nature of such responses, with their emphasis on short term security,
can sometimes reduce support and detract attention from achieving sustainable peace" (UN Advisory
Group 2015: 46).
Challenging militarism is therefore a key strategy to prevent conflict and sustain peace. None of the
eight Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security call for dis-armament. This is
notwithstanding the reality that conflict prevention cannot take place without disarmament and the
references to disarmament in the Charter of the United Nations (including the obligation of the Security
Council to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security "with the
least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources").4

The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) makes it mandatory for arms exporting states to assess the risk that
their weapons will be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious
acts of violence against women and children and to deny authoriza-tion of any sales that present such
a risk.5 It was only due to the interventions of WILPF, which galvanized other local and international
NGOs to advocate for the gendered impact of weaponry, that such language was included.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (the CEDAW Committee) has
followed up on this ATT provision in General Recommendation 3o on women in conflict prevention,
conflict, and post-conflict. After referring to the direct and indirect impact of the proliferation of
conventional weapons on women as victims of conflict-related gender-based violence, as victims of
domestic violence, and also as protestors or actors in resistance movements,6 the Committee
recommends state parties address the gendered impact of international transfers of arms, especially
small and il-licit arms including through the ratification and implementation of the ATT.7 However,
while the references to gender-based violence and violence against women and children represent an
important step forward in the recognition of the gendered impact of the proliferation and use of arms,
we are still confronted by the overall objective of the ATT, which is to prevent and eradicate the illicit
trade in conventional arms and not to prevent and eradicate the transfer of arms per se (on this point
see chapter 54 in this volume).

Given its founding principle as a peace organization—to save "succeeding generations from the scourge
of war"—the United Nations, led by the new Secretary-General, should more robustly and visibly
promote disarmament as a central strategy to prevent conflict. In his first public pronouncement on the
need to prioritize prevention, the Secretary-General called for a "surge in diplomacy for peace" as a
means of preventive action. Though recognizing that "war is never inevitable. It is always a matter of
choice: the choice to exclude, to discriminate, to marginalize, to resort to violence the Secretary-General
has, to date, been disappointingly silent on the need for disarmament (Guterres 2017). It is critical that
the Secretary-General take firm unequivocal steps to reframe the ongoing "prevention" debate; beyond
elaboration of early warning measures and increased public and private mediation, the Secretary-
General must—and must be seen to—advocate ro-bustly for a world without weapons. Disarmament
must be a key element of his platform to prevent conflict if the universal calls for conflict prevention
are to make real headway in the world today.
Orientalism
Afropess
Cap
Ballriauard