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G.R. No.

150025 July 23, 2008 To avert the implementation of the writ of execution, the petitioners ejectment proceedings because of strong reasons of equity applicable
filed a Notice of Appeal. The MTC issued a subpoena dated June 5, to the case – the demolition of the petitioner’s house unless the
2000 setting the hearing on the petitioners’ Motion for proceedings would be suspended. The CA ruled that the petitioners’
SPS. NARCISO BARNACHEA and JULITA BARNACHEA (now
Reconsideration and the respondents’ Motion for Issuance of Writ of reliance on Amagan was inappropriate because the said case only
heirs of deceased Julita Barnachea), Petitioners,
Execution on June 19, 2000. The petitioners subsequently filed a applies to unlawful detainer actions while the petitioners’ ejectment
vs.
Compliance that prayed, among others, that the pending resolution suit is an action for forcible entry. To the CA, the initial tolerance on
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OSCAR C. HERRERA, JR.,
on the incident and the Notice of Appeal be deemed to have been the part of the private respondents did not convert the nature of their
Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 20, Malolos, Bulacan, HON.,
filed ex abundanti cautela. The respondents, for their part, filed a ejectment suit from forcible entry into unlawful detainer, following the
HORACIO T. VIOLA, Presiding Judge, MTC Pulilan, Bulacan,
Manifestation and Motion praying, among others, that the petitioner’s reasoning this Court applied in Munoz v. Court of Appeals.5
and SPS. AVELINO and PRISCILLA IGNACIO, Respondents.
Motion for Reconsideration of the May 5, 2000 Order be denied for
being moot and academic.
ASSIGMENT OF ERRORS
DECISION
On July 21, 2000, the MTC issued an order declaring the petitioners’
The petitioners impute the following error to the CA:
BRION, J.: Motion for Reconsideration abandoned because of the Notice of
Appeal they previously filed. Thereafter, the MTC forwarded the entire
record of Civil Case No. 818 to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 [T]he Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the said
Before us is the Petition for Review by Certiorari filed by the spouses
(RTC Branch 20), Malolos, Bulacan. On August 24, 2000, petitioners ejectment proceeding was not a suit for illegal detainer but one of
Narciso and Julita Barnachea1 (petitioners) against the spouses
submitted their Appeal Memorandum to the RTC Branch 20 which forcible entry, thus, denied application to the exceptional rule on
Avelino and Priscilla Ignacio (respondents), rooted in the ejectment
affirmed the MTC decision on September 20, 2000. suspension of ejectment proceedings, at any stage thereof, until the
complaint the respondents filed against the petitioners before the
action on ownership is finally settled.6
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pulilan, Bulacan. The petition prays
that we nullify the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its On October 5, 2000, the petitioner Julita's sister, Leticia, representing
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration, and that we herself to be the sole owner of EP No. A-050545 (TCT No. T-188-EP), From this general assignment of error, the petitioners submitted in
suspend the ejectment proceedings in light of a pending action for filed a Petition for Quieting of Title with the Regional Trial Court, their memorandum the following specific issues for our resolution:
quieting of title involving the disputed property. Branch 19 (RTC Branch 19), Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case
No. 694-M-2000. On October 9, 2000, prior to their receipt of the RTC 1) whether or not the ejectment case filed by the
BACKGROUND FACTS Branch 20’s September 20, 2000 decision, the petitioners filed an respondents against petitioners with the MTC of Pulilan is for
Urgent Motion for the Suspension of Proceedings (referred to for unlawful detainer or for forcible entry;
purposes of this decision as the urgent motion).
The respondents filed their complaint for ejectment against the
petitioners before the MTC on October 20, 1998. The subject matter 2) whether the MTC of Pulilan had validly acquired and
of the complaint were lots titled in respondent Avelino Ignacio’s name RTC Branch 20 denied on October 17, 2000 the petitioners’ urgent exercised jurisdiction over the ejectment case considering
(Subdivision Lot 16 covered by TCT No. 86821, and Subdivision Lot motion and their subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. The that the complaint was filed beyond one year from the
17 covered by TCT No. 86822), which lots are adjacent to the petitioners brought the denials to the CA via a petition for certiorari demand to vacate the subject premises; and
property that the petitioners own and occupy. These properties were under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the issue of "whether the
originally part of a piece of land owned by a certain Luis Santos and pendency of an action involving the issue of ownership is sufficient
basis for [the] suspension of an ejectment proceeding between the 3) whether or not the ejectment proceedings should be
subsequently inherited by his daughter Purificacion Santos Imperial.
same parties and relating to the same subject matter". suspended at any stage until the action on ownership of the
The land was subdivided and transferred to tenant-farmers Santiago
disputed portion of the subject property is finally settled.
Isidro (EP No. A-050545 with TCT No. T-188-EP) and Procopio de
Guzman (EP No. 445440 with TCT No. T-185-EP). The property that THE CA’S DECISION
the petitioners own and occupy was derived from the land transferred
to Santiago Isidro. Respondent Ignacio’s properties were derived, on
The CA denied the petition and the petitioners' subsequent motion for
the other hand, from the land originally transferred to Procopio de OUR RULING
reconsideration, essentially on the grounds that (1) the issue in an
Guzman.
ejectment suit is limited to the physical possession of real property
and is separate and distinct from the issue of ownership and We find the petition without merit.
The complaint was dismissed on December 8, 1999, but was revived possession de jure that either party may set forth in his or her
on April 5, 2000. The petitioners received summons on April 13, 2000 pleading; (2) the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over
and, instead of filing a new Answer, filed on April 18, 2000 a Motion the same property or for annulment of deed of sale does not divest 1. Nature of the Action before the MTC.
for Extension of Time to File Answer which the MTC denied on May 5, the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer
2000. The petitioners responded to this denial by filing a motion for case before it, and that ejectment actions generally cannot be The best indicator of what the plaintiff in an ejectment case intends
reconsideration on May 23, 2000. Meanwhile, the respondents filed a suspended pending the resolution of a case for quieting of title with respect to the nature of his or her complaint can be found in the
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution dated May 24, 2000, between the same parties over the same subject property; and (3) complaint itself. In this case, the complaint states:7
which the petitioners received on May 26, 2000. the case does not fall under the exception provided by the case of
Amagan v. Marayag4, where the Court allowed the suspension of
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"That plaintiffs are the registered owners in fee simple of several Under these standards, we do not hesitate to declare the Court of we touch the jurisdictional aspect of the case at all, it is only for
residential lots identified as lots 16 and 17 covered by Certificate of Appeals in error when it held that the present case involves forcible purposes of fully responding to the parties’ arguments.
Title Nos. 86821 and 86822 issued in the name of the spouses by the entry rather than unlawful detainer. A plain reading of the complaint
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, with a total aggregate area of 254 shows the respondents’ positions that the petitioners were in prior
The petitioners’ jurisdictional argument cannot succeed as the
square meters situated at Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan. Copy of the said possession of the disputed property; that the respondents allowed
respondents’ ejectment complaint was filed within the one-year
titles are hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" and "A-1" them to occupy the disputed property by tolerance; that the
period for bringing an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry
respondents eventually made a demand that the petitioners vacate
that Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires. Section 1
the property (on August 26, 1998, which demand the petitioners
"That in a portion of the lots 16 and 17, a portion of the house of the specifically states:
received on August 31, 1998); and that the petitioners refused to
defendants was erected and built thus usurping the said portion and
vacate the property in light of the defenses they presented.
this was made known to the defendants when the plaintiffs caused
Separately from the complaint, the respondents characterized the Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.
the relocation of the subject lots, however, considering that the latter
action they filed against the petitioners in the MTC as an unlawful
were not yet in need of that portion, they allowed the former to stay
detainer when they stated in their memorandum that "as alleged in Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
on the portion by tolerance;
the complaint, what was filed by the respondents [was] an ejectment deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
suit for unlawful detainer."12 intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
"That last July 1998, when the plaintiffs were in the process of
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building
fencing the boundary of their lots, to their surprise, they were not
A critical point for us in arriving at our conclusion is the complete is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
allowed by the defendants to extend the fence up to the portions they
absence of any allegation of force, intimidation, strategy or stealth in to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
illegally occupied;
the complaint with respect to the petitioners’ possession of the the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
respondents’ property. While admittedly no express contract existed vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
"That despite the advice given to them by several Geodetic Engineers between the parties regarding the petitioners’ possession, the such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
commissioned by both the plaintiffs and the herein defendants, for absence does not signify an illegality in the entry nor an entry by action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
them to give way and allow the plaintiffs to fence their lot, same force, intimidation, strategy or stealth that would characterize the persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
proved futile as they stubbornly refused to surrender possession of entry as forcible. It has been held that a person who occupies land of person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
the subject portion; another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract possession, together with damages and costs.
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are similar will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for On the basis of this provision, the petitioners argue that the
because they are both summary actions where the issue is purely ejectment is the proper remedy. The status of the defendant is respondents’ cause of action – whether for forcible entry or for
physical possession.8 Other than these commonalities, however, they analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose terms has expired but unlawful detainer – had prescribed when the ejectment complaint was
possess dissimilarities that are clear, distinct, and well established in whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner.13 filed on April 5, 2000. They point out that the last demand letter (the
law.9 reckoning date for unlawful detainer15) was dated Aug. 26, 1998 and
To be sure, we are aware of the Munoz v. Court of Appeals14 ruling was received by the petitioners on August 31, 1998; the complaint
that the CA relied upon to reach the conclusion that the present case was only filed on April 5, 2000 or more than 1 year after August 31,
In forcible entry, (1) the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
involves forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. What the CA apparently 1998. On the other hand, if the action had been for forcible entry, the
physical possession of the property until he was deprived of
misread in Munoz was the allegation of stealth in the complaint; prescriptive period commenced on the discovery of the usurpation
possession by the defendant; (2) the defendant secures possession of
anchored on this finding, the Court concluded that the defendant’s and the computation period would have commenced either during the
the disputed property from the plaintiff by means of force,
possession was illegal from the beginning so that there could be no relocation survey of the lots or in July 1998 when the respondents
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; hence, his possession is
possession by tolerance. The allegation of stealth, of course, is not were prevented from fencing the disputed property.
unlawful from the beginning; (3) the law does not require a previous
demand by the plaintiff for the defendant to vacate the premises; and present in the present case. On the contrary, tolerance was alleged in
(4) the action can be brought only within one-year from the date the the ejectment complaint itself. Thus, there is no reason for the Munoz The one-year period within which to commence an ejectment
defendant actually and illegally entered the property.10 ruling to apply to the present case; there is no basis nor occasion to proceeding is a prescriptive period as well as a jurisdictional
conclude that the respondents filed a forcible entry case. requirement. Hence, Article 1155 of the Civil Code on the manner of
reckoning the prescriptive period must necessarily come into play.
In marked contrast, unlawful detainer is attended by the following
2. The Jurisdictional Issue – Under this Article, the filing of a complaint in court interrupts the
features: (1) prior possession of the property by the plaintiff is not
Was the Ejectment Complaint running of prescription of actions. As an action for unlawful detainer,
necessary; (2) possession of the property by the defendant at the
Seasonably Filed? the one-year prescription period started running after August 31,
start is legal but the possession becomes illegal by reason of the
1998 – the date of receipt of the respondents’ demand letter. The
termination of his right to possession based on his or her contract or
period ran for almost two months until it was interrupted on October
other arrangement with the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff is required by We point out at the outset that what the petitioners directly appealed
20, 1998 when the respondents filed their ejectment complaint. This
law to make a demand as a jurisdictional requirement; and (4) the to this Court is the appellate court’s affirmation of the RTC’s refusal to
complaint, however, was dismissed on December 8, 1999. Upon this
one-year period to bring the complaint is counted from the date of suspend the ejectment proceedings based on the quieting of title case
dismissal, the prescriptive period again began to run for about four
the plaintiff’s last demand on the defendant.11 the petitioners cited. Hence, we are not reviewing the merits of the
months when another interruption intervened – the revival of the
main ejectment case, particularly the question of the MTC’s
complaint on April 5, 2000. Evidently, under these undisputed facts,
jurisdiction, as these aspects of the case were not appealed to us. If
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the period when the prescriptive period effectively ran does not add title case in their Comment since Leticia claimed to be the sole owner G.R. No. 176282 August 22, 2008
up to the one-year prescriptive period that would jurisdictionally bar of TCT No. T-188-EP in her action to quiet title. The respondents also VICTORIA FERNANDO, petitioner,
the ejectment case. pointed to the document entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana ng Lupa vs.
sa Labas ng Hukuman na May Pagtalikod sa Bahagi" executed on May SPS. REGINALDO LIM and ASUNCION LIM, respondents.
27, 1995, showing that Julita had relinquished her share over TCT No.
3. Suspension of the Ejectment
T-188-EP in favor of her sister Leticia. A desperation argument the DECISION
Proceedings until Resolution
petitioners advanced in their Memorandum is that the Kasulatan was AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
of the Ownership Issue.
only executed "pursuant to the agrarian reform policy proscribing the
parceling of the awarded landholding into smaller units to preserve its
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
The issue in an unlawful detainer case is limited to physical viability".19 In other words, the petitioners are disavowing, for
of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 31, 2006 Decision1 of the
possession. When a claim of ownership is used as a basis for de facto purposes of this case, the representation they made in completing
Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the ejectment of Victoria
possession or to assert a better possessory right, the court hearing their submission before the agrarian reform authorities. We cannot of
Fernando (petitioner) from the property of Spouses Reginaldo and
the case may provisionally rule on the issue of ownership. As a rule, course recognize this line of argument as justification for the
Asuncion Lim; and the January 15, 2007 CA Resolution2 which denied
however, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same suspension of the ejectment proceedings as the petitioners are bound
the motion for reconsideration.
property does not justify the suspension of the ejectment by their representations before the agrarian reform authorities and
proceedings. Only in rare cases has this Court allowed a suspension cannot simply turn their back on these representations as their
of the ejectment proceedings and one of these is in the case of convenience requires. No less decisive against the petitioners’ The relevant facts are of record.
Amagan v. Marayag16 that the petitioners cite. To quote from Amagan argument for suspension is the decision itself of RTC Branch 19 that
– the respondents attached to their Comment. This decision shows that Lim Kieh Tong and Sons, Inc. (LKTSI) was the owner of a parcel of
Civil Case No. 694-M-2000, instead of being a case for quieting of land with an area of 400 sq. meters, known as Lot 1 of the
[i]ndisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have title, is in fact a mere boundary dispute.20 consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-320, located at Blumentritt
resulted in the demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and registered in its name under Transfer
thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require Second. In Amagan, the MCTC decision involved the demolition of the Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 125241.3
suspension of the ejectment proceedings. xxx [L]ike Vda. de Legaspi, petitioners’ house – a result that this Court found to be "permanent,
the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible unjust and probably irreparable"; in the present case, only a portion On the property are improvements registered in the name of LKTSI
entry, and most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a of the petitioners’ house is apparently affected as the petitioners under Tax Declaration No. 00198.4 Among these improvements is Unit
demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create "confusion, occupy the lot adjoining the disputed property. Significantly, the 1682 which, as of March 5, 2004, was being occupied by petitioner
disturbance, inconvenience and expenses" mentioned in the said height, width and breadth of the portion of the house that would be for a gross monthly rental of P10,412.00 plus withholding tax
exceptional case.1awphi1 affected by the execution of the RTC Branch 20 decision does not of P520.60 or a total ofP10,932.60.5
appear anywhere in the records, thus, unavoidably inviting suspicion
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the that the potential damage to the petitioners is not substantial. More
important than the fact of omission is its implication; the omission When it was about to be dissolved, LKTSI executed on April 1, 2004 a
respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by
constitutes a missing link in the chain of equitable reasons for Deed of Assignment of Real Property,6 transferring by way of
physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to
suspension that the petitioners wish to establish. Thus, the equitable liquidating dividends all its rights and interests in the property
have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership
consideration that drove us to rule as we did in Amagan does not covered by TCT No. 125241 to its stockholder, respondent Reginaldo
only of the land, not of the house) Needlessly, the litigants as well as
obtain in the present case. Lim.
the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a
stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of
enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.17 In the absence of a concrete showing of compelling equitable reasons Spouses Reginaldo and Asuncion Lim (respondents) subdivided the
at least comparable and under circumstances analogous to Amagan, assigned property and registered their title to the larger portion under
we cannot override the established rule that a pending civil action for TCT No. 263331, and to the smaller portion -- which covers Unit 1682
However, we do not find these same circumstances present in this
ownership shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. -- under TCT No. 264835.7 They also registered in their names the
case for the reasons we shall discuss in detail below.
Additionally, to allow a suspension on the basis of the reasons the improvements on the assigned property under Tax Declaration No.
petitioners presented in this case would create the dangerous 00182.8
First. In Amagan, the party refusing to vacate the disputed premises precedent of allowing an ejectment suit to be suspended by an action
(or the deforciant in the action for unlawful detainer) was the same filed in another court by parties who are not involved or affected by In a letter dated April 29, 2004, respondents, through counsel,
party seeking to quiet his title. In the present case, the petitioners the ejectment suit. informed petitioner that they were the new owners of Unit 1682 and
are not parties to the civil action (for quieting of title) whose result
that they were not renewing her lease, thus:
they seek to await; the plaintiff in the quieting of title case is Leticia,
the petitioner Julita’s sister. No proof whatsoever was offered to show WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition
that petitioner Julita is asserting her own title to the property; there for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. We are writing you in behalf of our client, Mr. Reginaldo Lim,
is only the allegation that Leticia was appointed as the representative to formally inform you that he is now the new owner of the
of Julita and the other heirs of Isidro in their various recourses at law SO ORDERED. property you are presently leasing. Please find attached a
to vindicate their landowners’ rights.18 The respondents in fact copy of his title to the said property.
actively disputed petitioner Julita’s identification with the quieting of
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Our client decided not to renew or extend any lease Petitioner further argued that respondents had no cause of action for Finally, petitioner questioned the MeTC's imposition of a P25,000.00
agreement you may have entered with the previous owner. ejectment because they did not serve on her a valid demand to pay monthly rent for lack of factual and legal basis.23
We understand that your lease of the property is on a rent and vacate, or resort to barangay conciliation.14Petitioner was
month-to-month basis. Hence, your lease contract ends on never remiss in her obligations under the monthly lease contract; and
In a Decision dated December 16, 2005, the RTC affirmed the MeTC
April 30, 2004 and will no longer be renewed. Any stay in under the Rent Control Law, expiration of contract is not a valid
Decision with modification, thus:
the premises beyond the said date should not be construed ground for ejectment. 15
as a renewal of your monthly lease, but merely by tolerance
of our client. At any rate, you are hereby given notice to WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 7, 2005 of the
After the parties submitted their position papers, the MeTC rendered
vacate the premises of 1682 Blumentritt St., Sta. Cruz, Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 20 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
a Decision16 dated June 7, 2005, in favor of respondents, thus:
Manila within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter.
Your failure to do so will compel us to institute an ejectment 1. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] and all persons
suit against you to enforce our clients' rights, and charge WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
claiming right under her to vacate the subject premises and
you with attorney's fees and all attendant damages that will rendered in favor of the plaintiff [respondents] and against
peacefully surrender possession of the property located at
be incurred by our client, including lost business the defendant [petitioners]:
1682 Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila to herein plaintiffs
opportunities and income. [respondents];
1. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] and all persons
We trust that you will see yourself clear on this matter and surrender claiming right under her to vacate the subject premises and
2. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay a reasonable
peacefully the possession of the leased premises to our client.9 peacefully surrender possession of the property located at
monthly rental of P15,000.00 to plaintiffs [respondents]
1682 Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila;
computed from the time the instant action was filed up to
As their demand went unheeded, respondents filed with the the time the subject premises is completely vacated and
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila (MeTC) a Complaint10 for 2. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay a reasonable surrendered to plaintiffs;
Ejectment with Prayer for Issuance of Injunction against petitioner, monthly rental of P25,000.00 to plaintiffs [respondents]
praying that the latter be ordered to vacate Unit 1682 and to pay computed from the time the instant action was filed up to
3. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay plaintiffs
reasonable monthly rent ofP25,000.00 and attorney's fees. the time the subject premises is completely vacated and
[respondents the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
surrendered to plaintiffs [respondents];
In her Answer,11 petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC in 4. Without cost. SO ORDERED.24
view of an issue of title over Unit 1682 that she raised in a 3. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] to pay plaintiff the
complaint12 she filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to annul the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
April 1, 2004 deed of assignment for violation of Sec. 6 of Presidential Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in
Decree No. 1517 (P.D. No. 1517), which states: its Order25 dated January 20, 2006.
4. Without Costs. SO ORDERED. 17

Sec. 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within She then filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
Petitioner appealed to the RTC, Branch 20, Manila emphasizing that
the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the Rules of Court in the August 31, 2006 Decision assailed herein. The
she actually owns Unit 1682 because it was she who rebuilt it after it
land for ten years or more who have built their homes on CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification:
was destroyed by fire,18 petitioner argued that respondents had no
the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands interest in or title to Unit 1682; hence, they could not validly compel
by contract, continuously for the last ten years shall not be her to vacate the property. Neither could they claim title to the land WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the instant
dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of on which Unit 1682 stands because the April 1, 2004 deed of petition is perforce denied. Accordingly, we affirm with
first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time assignment was of no effect, for it was in violation of Sec. 6, P.D. No. modification the assailed decision dated 16 December
and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be 1517.19 She reiterated that such issue of title affecting Unit 1682 2005 of the respondent court, in that the award of attorney's
determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land could only be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria cognizable by the fees in the amount of P20,000.00 is hereby deleted. SO
Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree. RTC.20 ORDERED.26

She pointed out that the MeTC could not decide the complaint for Moreover, in the event that the complaint for ejectment be found Her motion for reconsideration27 having been denied by the CA in its
ejectment without determining whether the assignment of Unit 1682 proper, petitioner invoked the protection against ejectment provided Resolution28 dated January 15, 2007, petitioner filed the present
to respondents impinged on her preemptive rights under P.D. No. under existing rent control laws. She argued that, contrary to the Petition, with application for temporary restraining order and writ of
1517; that the MeTC would also have to determine whether ruling of the MeTC, said laws were applicable to her because she had preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the assailed CA
respondents could legally eject her despite the express prohibition been using Unit 1682 not just as her business office but also as a decision and resolution.
against her dispossession under said law; and that, therefore, as the dwelling place.21 Moreover, her lease on the property started more
issues of possession and title could not be adjudicated separately, the than thirty (30) years ago; hence, the P7,500.00 threshold rent set
case should have been brought before the RTC, not the MeTC.13 In a Resolution29 dated February 28, 2007, the Court issued a
by the Rent Control Law could not prejudice her.22 Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the CA, RTC, MeTC and
respondents or their agents and assigns from implementing or
enforcing the August 31, 2006 Decision and January 15, 2007
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Resolution of the CA. Petitioner posted a cash bond in the amount 1. Whether the pending action for annulment of transfer of 10. Whether which rights in the instant case must be
of P100,000.00.30 title on ground of violation of P.D. 1517 (granting right of a priori protected - physical or material right of possession
first refusal to the lessee and prohibiting dispossession of or substantial issue of ownership which subsumes the issue
the property) filed by the petitioner against private of possession pursuant to the existing and applicable
Respondents filed a Motion to Lift the TRO or to Require Petitioners to
respondents and previous lessor LKTSI constitutes litis provision of law, 47
Make the Required Monthly Deposit,31 to which petitioner filed a
pendentia or at the very least poses legal questions
Consolidated Comment.32 In its Resolution33 of July 9, 2007, the Court
warranting the suspension of the proceedings of this
denied respondents' motion to lift the TRO, but granted their prayer in arrant disregard of the July 9, 2007 Resolution of the Court,
ejectment suit.
that petitioner be required to pay P10,932.60 monthly rental from the forbidding new issues from being raised by the parties in their
date of receipt by petitioner of the MeTC decision, in accordance with respective memoranda.48 This is a standard prohibition inserted into
Section 19,34 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. 2. Whether the court where the prior pending action every Court order for submission of memoranda, the purpose of
involving the issue of whether the lessee can be which is to forestall surprise by one party upon the other, who would
dispossessed has exclusive and original jurisdiction to the have no opportunity to counter whatever new point of law, theory,
In separate Certifications35 dated August 22, 2007, the MeTC and RTC
exclusion of other courts where the action for dispossession issue or argument may be belatedly raised.49
reported that petitioner did not make any rental deposit, although she
via ejectment suit is filed after.
posted a supersedeas bond in the amount ofP100,000.00. Hence,
respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion36 dated September 12, Consequently, the Court will not resolve such new issues, except
2007 to lift the TRO for failure of petitioner to comply with the Court's 3. Whether the trial court a quo has jurisdiction over the when they are related to the issues raised in the Petition, which may
Resolution of July 9, 2007. The Court, in a Resolution37 dated October complaint. actually be condensed, thus:
15, 2007, required petitioner to comment.
4. Whether there is a lease relationship between the parties First, whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC for sustaining the
In her January 28, 2008 Comment38 to the September 12, 2007 that can entitle the lessor to file an ejectment case. jurisdiction of the MeTC over the ejectment complaint; and
Manifestation and Motion, petitioner explained that she already
complied with the July 9, 2007 Resolution of the Court by filing a
5. Whether there is a proper demand for purposes of Second, whether the CA erred in affirming with modification the
supersedeas bond for P100,000.00, and that she had filed with the
ejectment suit. judgments of the RTC and MeTC ordering the ejectment of petitioner.
RTC an urgent motion for computation of back rentals but the same
had remained unresolved, thus preventing her from making the
required monthly deposit. 6. Whether the appellate court and the trial court a quo Third, whether the temporary restraining order issued by the Court
could make an award for payment of monthly rental in such should be lifted as prayed for by respondents.
amount more than if not other than the last agreed monthly
Earlier, on January 23, 2008, respondents filed a Reiterative Motion
rentals between petitioner and LKTSI.46
to Lift the Temporary Restraining Order39 for failure of petitioner to On the issue of jurisdiction
comply with the July 9, 2007 and October 15, 2007 Resolutions of the
Court. On March 12, 2008, the Court issued a Resolution40 noting To the foregoing set of issues, however, petitioner, in her
The allegations in a complaint50 and the character of the relief
both the respondents' Reiterative Motion and petitioner's Comment, Memorandum, added several more, to wit:
sought51 determine the nature of the action and the court with
and requiring petitioner to deposit to the RTC the unpaid monthly jurisdiction over it. The defenses set up in an answer are not
rentals in the amount of P10,932.60 as directed in the Court's July 9, 1. Whether private respondents committed forum-shopping; determinative.52
2007 Resolution and to submit proof of compliance within ten (10)
days from notice; otherwise, the temporary restraining order would
be lifted. xxx A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer
if it recites that: a) initially, possession of the property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; b)
In a Manifestation and Compliance41 dated March 9, 2008, petitioner 7. Whether on account of the foregoing issues, the
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
explained that her January 28, 2008 Comment was in compliance application for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction may
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; c)
with both the July 9, 2007 and October 15, 2007 Resolutions of the be granted as prayed for in the petition.
thereafter, defendant remained in possession of the property and
Court. deprived plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and d) within one year
8. Whether ejectment proceedings which are summary in from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, plaintiff
Based on court records, copy of the Resolution was mailed to nature can take precedence over an annulment action based instituted the complaint for ejectment.53
petitioner on March 18, 2008,42 and she received the same on April upon a violation of specific and express provision of law (PD
28. 2008.43 Yet, as per Certification issued on May 12, 2008 by the 1517).
The complaint for ejectment which respondents filed against
RTC, petitioner had not made any rental deposit.44 Hence, petitioner alleges:
respondents filed another Manifestation45 for the lifting of the TRO. 9. Whether the ejectment proceeding can be suspended
when it comes to direct conflict with an existing and
3. Plaintiffs [respondents] are the absolute and registered
The Court now resolves the main issues in the Petition, viz.: applicable law; and
owners of the land located at No. 1682 Blumentritt St., Sta.
Cruz, Manila, including improvements therein xxx.
5|P a g e
xxx would not be renewed when it expired; and that respondents also It is important to bear in mind that in Solanda, it was conclusively
served a written demand dated April 29, 2004 on petitioner to vacate found that the property in dispute was not within the coverage of P.D.
Unit 1682, but the latter refused to do so. By these allegations, the No. 1517 as defined under Proclamation No. 196760 and certified to by
5. xxx The first unit, designated as 1682 Blumentritt St.,
complaint clearly drew up a case for unlawful detainer. It was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Sta. Cruz, Manila xxx is presently being occupied by herein
therefore correctly filed with the MeTC which has jurisdiction over
defendant [petitioner].
ejectment cases.55
But then, there have been two rare cases in which the Court allowed
the suspension of an action for unlawful detainer to make way for an
6. Defendant's [petitioner's] lease of Unit 1682 xxx with LKT,
Petitioner, however, has raised an issue of title, to question the action for annulment of title.
[sic]
as with the others, was on a month-to-month basis. The
jurisdiction of the MeTC. She claims that respondents have no right to
property was transferred to plaintiffs [respondents] on April
institute the action for unlawful detainer because they did not validly
2, 2004. Plaintiffs [respondents] have no plans to have the In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño,61 the Court suspended the
acquire the property in view of the prohibition under P.D. No. 1517
premises leased as they acquired the property for some enforcement of a writ of demolition rendered in an ejectment case
against her dispossession or the transfer of the property without first
other urgent business purpose in mind. Thus, plaintiffs until after a case for annulment of title involving the property to be
offering it for sale to her. She insists that such issue of title prevents
[respondents] talked to and appealed to the occupants of demolished was decided. The Court ratiocinated:
the MeTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case; it should have
the building to voluntarily vacate the premises and
deferred to the jurisdiction of the RTC where there is a pending case
peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs
for annulment of the title of respondents. x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal
[respondents].
detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry,
and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises
As a rule, the nature of a complaint for unlawful detainer and the
7. However, defendant [petitioner] did not cooperate and is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
jurisdiction of a court over it are not altered by the mere claim of the
instead stubbornly remained on the subject premises. proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less
defendant of title to the property subject matter of the ejectment
productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
case.56 Even a pending action involving title to the property which the
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and
xxx defendant may have instituted in another court will not abate or
expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal
suspend the summary proceedings for unlawful detainer.57 The
possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought
9. Thus, plaintiffs [respondents], through their counsel, underlying reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from
to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be
formally wrote to defendant Victoria Fernando [petitioner], trifling with the summary nature of the case by the simple expedient
filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the
informing the latter that her lease of the aforegmentioned of asserting ownership over the disputed property.58
unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in
premises, which is on a month-to-month basis, ended on the more substantive case involving legal possession or
April 30, 2004 and will no longer be renewed. Defendant Respondents cite Solanda Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.59 It ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry
[petitioner] was also informed that if she ever continued to involves an action for ejectment filed by the vendee of a parcel of that as a matter of public policy the right to physical
stay in the premises beyond April 30, 2004, it should not be land against the vendor's lessees on the property. In turn, the lessees possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the
construed as a renewal of whatever lease agreement filed an action for annulment of the sale of the property between the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party
defendant [petitioner] previously had with LKT. vendor and vendee on the ground that the sale violated their might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the
[lessees'] preemptive rights over the property as guaranteed under premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to
10. Defendant, who duly received the letter, was given P.D. No. 1517. The Court held that the action for ejectment may recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and
fifteen (15) days to peacefully surrender possession of the proceed independently of the action for annulment, citing the without resorting to the courts. (Emphasis supplied)
subject premises, particularly 1682 Blumentritt, St., Sta. following reason:
Cruz, Manila, to herein plaintiffs. A copy of said letter dated More in point is Dulay v. Tabago,62 in which the Court sustained the
April 29, 2004 is hereto attached and made an integral part xxx the consistent case law is that ejectment suits deal only RTC in suspending the eviction of Spouses Tabago from the property
hereof as "Annex C". with the issue of physical possession. The pendency of an of Spouses Dulay in view of the issuance of Presidential Decree No.
action for the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of 2016, which placed the disputed property under the coverage of P.D.
11. However, despite oral and written demands to vacate the disputed property may not be successfully pleaded in No. 1517 and prohibited the eviction of the tenants therein. As there
subject premises, defendant failed and refused, and still fails abatement of an action for ejectment. Private respondent's was no dispute over the status of Spouses Tabago as tenants on the
and refuses, without justifiable reason, to vacate the said alleged right of possession is conditioned on his right to property since 1959, or over the status of the property as an urban
subject premises and to peacefully surrender possession acquire ownership over the land. His right of the possession land reform area, the Court therein held:
thereof to plaintiffs, to the damage and prejudice of the is, at best, only inchoate. In any event, the private
latter.54 respondent's expectation of being granted the
Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 2016, which was promulgated to forestall
preemptive right to purchase the property neither
violations of P.D. No. 1517, provides that "No tenant or
establishes his right to possess nor justifies the
In essence, the complaint recites that when respondents acquired occupant family, residing for ten years or more, reckoned
dismissal of the ejectment case against
Unit 1682 from LKTSI, petitioner was still in possession of the from the date of issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1517
him. [Emphasis added.]
property by virtue of a month-to-month lease contract with LKTSI; [June 11, 1978] otherwise known as the Urban Land Reform
that said lease contract was set to expire on April 30, 2005; that Law, in land proclaimed as Areas of Priority
respondents verbally informed petitioner that her lease contract Development . . . shall be evicted from the land or otherwise
6|P a g e
dispossessed" (emphasis added). Considering that surrendered by the stockholder or transfer of assets to said right of first refusal in the sale of said property. Petitioner, therefore,
respondents have been occupants of the lot in question since stockholder because said transaction is not treated as a sale.73 cannot invoke P.D. No. 1517 in abatement of the complaint for
1959 and in view of the subsequent classification of the said unlawful detainer.
land as an APD, petitioners' action for ejectment cannot
Preliminarily, therefore, the Court agrees with the view of the MeTC
prosper.
that the April 1, 2004 assignment of Unit 1682 is not covered by the Another matter raised by petitioner relating to the jurisdiction of the
prohibition under P.D. No. 1517. It should be emphasized that such MeTC is the personality of respondents to give notice to vacate and to
To be entitled to the beneficence of P.D. No. 1517, a party must interim ruling is without prejudice to how the complaint for annulment file an ejectment case. The Court need not belabor the point for it is
provide prima facie evidence of the following facts: a) that the of the April 1, 2004 deed of assignment is resolved by the RTC. well-settled that, as vendees of the property, respondents were
property being leased falls within an Area for Priority Development placed in the shoes of the original lessor LKTSI and vested with the
and Urban Land Reform Zone;63 b) that the party is a tenant on said right to evict petitioner as the lessee from the premises.80 Whether
In addition to the foregoing reason, the Court also finds no prima
property as defined under Section 3 (f)64 of P.D. No. 1517;65 c) that the transfer of the property to respondents was valid is of no
facie evidence that petitioner qualifies as a tenant under P.D. No.
the party built a house on said property;66 and d) that the party has moment, for all that is to be resolved in the ejectment case is
1517.
been residing on the property continuously for the last ten (10) years whether the latter are entitled to the material possession of the
or more, reckoned from 1968.67 property.81
Respondents presented a Land Transaction Certificate issued by the
HLURB, stating that Unit 1682 is outside any Area for Priority
The question is, did petitioner establish the foregoing requisites as to All told, the Court sustains the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC
Development.74 However, Proclamation No. 1967 identifies in
avail herself of the "suspensive" effect of P.D. No. 1517 as in Sps. that the MeTC correctly exercised jurisdiction over the complaint for
Appendix "J"75 thereof 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila that fall within
Dulay and Vda. de Legaspi ? unlawful detainer.
the coverage of P.D. No. 1517. In the West Sector (Manila), one
identified site is "8. Sta. Clara to Blumentritt." Thus, it would appear
It is noted that the MeTC rejected the claim of petitioner to that Unit 1682, which is located in Blumentritt Street, Sta. Cruz, On the issue of the correctness of the judgment of eviction
preferential rights over the property, but petitioner objected on the Manila, is within the scope of P.D. No. 1517,76 the HLURB Certification
ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction to resolve such subject to the contrary notwithstanding.
Petitioner poses no serious challenge to the concurrent findings of the
matter.
MeTC, RTC and CA that her right to possession of Unit 1682 has
Moreover, petitioner had a month-to-month lease contract with LKTSI expired; that her continued possession thereof unlawfully deprives
Petitioner's objection was frivolous. Under Section 3368 of Batas on Unit 1682, which expired on April 30, 2004. Thus, up to that time, respondents of the enjoyment of the property; and that, therefore,
Pambansa Blg. 129, the MeTC is conditionally vested with authority to petitioner was a rightful occupant of the property as defined under she must now peacefully surrender possession thereof to
resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in the case, Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 1517. respondents. Her remaining defense is that, under the rent control
the determination of which is necessary for a complete adjudication of laws, respondents cannot eject her because she has been religiously
the issue of possession.69 In the present case, the MeTC's foray into paying her rent.
However, other than her bare claim that she owns the structure on
the issue of whether under P.D. No. 1517, petitioner has preferential
Unit 1682 because she allegedly rebuilt it after it was burned down,
rights to the purchase and occupation of Unit 1682 as against
petitioner offered no concrete evidence of when the original structure Republic Act No. 9161,82 otherwise known as the "Rental Reform Act
respondents' rights was necessary to resolve the issue of material
was burned down and when she rebuilt it. She presented no detail on of 2002," was the rent control law in force at the time the complaint
possession.
how she spent for the construction of the structure, or proof that for unlawful detainer was filed. Sec. 7(e) thereof allows for judicial
LKTSI allowed her to claim ownership thereof. On the other hand, it ejectment of a lessee on the ground of expiration of the period of the
The provisional ruling of the MeTC on said issue is that P.D. No. was respondents who presented Tax Declaration No. 00182 which lease contract. As already discussed, the month-to-month lease
1517 does not apply to the case because there was no sale between indicates that they are the registered owners of the improvements, contract of petitioner expired on April 30, 2004 and was not renewed
LKTSI and respondents but a mere distribution of liquidating including Unit 1682, on the land covered by TCT No. 264835. by respondents; hence, the latter acted well within their rights to file
dividends on account of the dissolution of LKTSI.70 a complaint for unlawful detainer.83
Furthermore, except for her empty allegation -- which respondents
The share of each stockholder in the remaining assets of the dispute --77 that she has been occupying Unit 1682 for more than Petitioner has also questioned the award of reasonable rent
corporation upon liquidation, after the payment of all corporate debts thirty (30) years, petitioner presented no concrete evidence of the of P15,000.00. Trial courts are authorized to fix the reasonable value
and liabilities, is what is known as liquidating dividend.71 In its exact period of her occupation, even when she could have easily for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the
interpretation of recent tax laws, the Bureau of Internal Revenue produced receipts of past rental payments similar to the receipt78 she termination of the lease contract; and they are not bound by the
viewed the distribution of liquidating dividends not as a sale of asset easily presented for her March 2004 rental payment. Such stipulated rental in the contract of lease, since it is equally settled
by the liquidating corporation to its stockholder but as a sale of unexplained omission prevents an adjudication on whether that upon termination or expiration of said contract, the rental
shares by the stockholder to the corporation or the surrender petitioner's period of occupation qualifies her to exercise the right of stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for the use
of the stockholder's interest in the corporation, in place of first refusal under P.D. No. 1517.79 and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change
which said stockholder receives property or money from the or rise in values.84 As to what amount would constitute a reasonable
corporation about to be dissolved.72 Thus, on the part of the rent of Unit 1682, the same is a question of fact on which the
Therefore, unlike in Sps. Dulay or Guardacasa de Legaspi, there is
stockholder, any gain or loss is subject to tax, while on the part of the determination of the CA binds the Court, unless the latter finds
no prima facie showing in this case that petitioner is protected under
liquidating corporation, no tax is imposed on its receipt of the shares reason to reverse it.85 In the present case, the CA reduced the award
P.D. No. 1517 from dispossession of Unit 1682, or that she has the
of reasonable rent from P25,000.00 to P15,000.00 based on the
7|P a g e
finding that such amount represents the reasonable amount of lost the registered owners of a parcel of land and a duplex apartment It may also be pointed out that the certification to file action
opportunity income respondents would have derived from the building constructed thereon located at No. 16 Meriales Street, (Exhibit E) issued by the Barangay is for Land Dispute not for
conversion of Unit 1682 into a San Miguel Food shop.86 Petitioner has Marulas, Valenzuela, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. ejectment. (Emphasis ours) In the handwritten transcripts of the
not adduced evidence in refutation of the factual findings of the CA. 218979. Apparently, said title was issued pursuant to a Deed of proceedings in the barangay, it appears that this case is merely
Absolute Sale executed on September 11, 1975 in favor of an off-shoot of a misunderstanding between plaintiff Aurora
respondent Arturo Refugia, but the purchase price of P20,000.00 was Refugia and her in-laws. It was admitted by Aurora that she
Considering that no error has been committed by the CA in its August
reportedly advanced by his father, herein petitioner Mamerto Refugia. offered to pay the a mount of P20,000.00 but that the
31, 2006 Decision and January 15, 2007 Resolution, the Court affirms
Thereafter, respondent Arturo Refugia obtained a housing loan from defendants refused to accept the same. Then and there plaintiff
the same.
the Social Security System, using the land as collateral to secure Aurora said that she would prefer to sell the unit to another and
payment thereof. In 1976, after the construction of the duplex that out of the proceeds of the sale, she will pay the defendants.
On the issue of whether the temporary restraining order should be apartment building, herein petitioners immediately began to occupy These circumstances lead the Court to conclude that it is not true
lifted one door while respondents stayed in the other unit. that plaintiffs' daughter is in need of the premises.

The Court finds respondents' September 12, 2007 Manifestation and It appears, however, that things did not turn out well between On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in its
Motion, January 23, 2008 Reiterative Motion to Lift the Temporary petitioners and private respondents, especially between petitioner aforementioned decision, affirmed with modification the judgment of
Restraining Order and May 13, 2008 Manifestation to be well-taken. It Feliza Refugia and her daughter-in-law, Aurora, such that in February the lower court by declaring herein petitioners and private
notes petitioner's January 28, 2008 Comment and March 9, 2008 of 1993, petitioners were told by private respondents to vacate the respondents co-owners of the lot and the two-door apartment. Their
Manifestation and Compliance, and finds unsatisfactory the unit that they were occupying because, according to private motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondents
explanation put forth therein why she failed to deposit to the RTC respondents, the family of one of their children who is married duly filed a petition for review before respondent Court of Appeals.
unpaid monthly rentals in the amount of P10,932.60 from date of needed a place of their own. Petitioners refused to leave, claiming
receipt of the MeTC Decision. It should be emphasized that while that they own the unit they are occupying by reason of the fact that it
On December 9, 1994, said respondent court rendered its questioned
petitioner may have questioned before the RTC the computation of was actually Mamerto Refugia who bought the lot on which the duplex
judgment which reversed and set aside the aforestated decisions of
back rentals, the same cannot muddle the July 9, 2007 and March 12, apartment stood. Because of this, the matter was brought before
the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, and
2008 Resolution of the Court which are rather explicit in the amount the barangay court of conciliation. No amicable settlement having
thereafter ordered petitioners and their privies to vacate the subject
of unpaid monthly rentals she is required to pay. The Court further been reached between the parties, private respondents instituted an
premises and to surrender possession thereof to private respondents.
notes that petitioner utterly failed to show proof of compliance with action for ejectment on October 20, 1993 in the Metropolitan Trial
In so ruling, respondent court declared that the Regional Trial Court,
the foregoing resolutions. Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81.
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over an ejectment case,
had no authority to resolve the issue of ownership and to declare
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining On March 4, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the herein petitioners as co-owners because its power is limited only to a
order issued by the court isLIFTED and SET ASIDE. complaint for ejectment based on its finding that herein petitioners determination of the issue of possession, that petitioners' bare
are the lawful occupants of the premises. Thus, it held that: allegation of ownership cannot prevail over the transfer certificate of
title and deed of sale in favor of private respondents; and that
G.R. No. 118284 July 5, 1996
petitioners have been occupying the subject premises by mere
Like in any other ejectment suit, the pivotal issue is whether the
tolerance.
defendants are unlawfully with(h)olding possession of the
SPOUSES MAMERTO REFUGIA and FELIZA PAYAD-REFUGIA,
premises in question. The question that perturbs the mind of the
RODOLFO REFUGIA, and CANDELARIA REFUGIA,petitioners,
Court which is not fully explained by plaintiffs is whether the stay Hence, this petition wherein petitioners aver that respondent Court of
vs.
of the defendants in the premises was indeed by plaintiffs' Appeals erred: (a) in giving due course to respondents' appeal
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ARTURO REFUGIA and
tolerance alone. From the evidence on hand the Court is more despite the fact that it was filed beyond the fifteen (15) day
AURORA TIMBANG-REFUGIA, respondents.
disposed to believe the position of the defendants that it was reglementary period to appeal; (b) in disregarding jurisprudence that
Mamerto who bought the lot where the duplex apartment was factual findings of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal;
REGALADO, J.:p constructed by plaintiff Arturo Refugia. As stated earlier, the (c) in holding that petitioners' claim of co-ownership of the subject
amount of P20,000.00 was withdrawn on September 11, 1975, premises is a mere allegation unsupported by any concrete evidence;
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of respondent Court the date the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits F and F-1) was (d) in ruling that the issue of ownership, as raised by petitioners, is
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34647 promulgated on December 9, 1994 executed. The consideration of the sale is for P20,000.00. The foreign to the issue of possession in an ejectment case; and (e) in
which reversed and set aside the judgment 2 dated April 29, 1994 of fact that a two-door apartment was indeed constructed likewise reversing the decisions of both lower courts and ordering petitioners'
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Case No. regenerates the claim of defendants that they shall be co-owners eviction from the disputed premises.
4347-V-94 affirming with some modifications the decision 3 rendered of the lot and shall dwell in one of the doors of said apartment. If
by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81, in Civil Case the averment of plaintiffs that they exclusively own the property
Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that private respondents
No. 6089 on March 4, 1994. is not to be trusted — what have motivated them to construct a
received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court on May 4,
two-door apartment instead of a single and a larger house?
1994 and thus they had until May 19, 1994 within which to file a
These facts are small tributaries that lead us to the bigger lake of
The records en bloc of the aforesaid cases show that private petition for review before the Court of Appeals. However, private
truth, that is, the stay of the defendants in the premises is not on
respondent-spouses Arturo Refugia and Aurora Timbang-Refugia are respondents filed instead a Motion for Reconsideration which was
the basis of mere tolerance.
denied by the Regional Trial Court in its Order dated June 21, 1994.
8|P a g e
Petitioners argue that since the motion for reconsideration is a with the Court of Appeals. The period for filing a petition for The main issue in this case demands the determination of whether
prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure and that review is fifteen days. If a motion for reconsideration is filed the Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the
the filing thereof did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the
period, the petition for review which was filed by private respondents the remaining period within which to file a petition for issue of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer where the issue
only on July 21, 1994 was already way beyond the 15-day review. Hence, it may necessary to file a motion with the Court of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the question of
reglementary period and should not have been given due course by of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review. ownership. In the affirmative, it becomes necessary to delineate the
respondent court. (Emphasis supplied). extent and legal effect of such adjudication.

In the case of Jakihaca vs. Aquino, et al., 4


this Court categorically It is not disputed that private respondents received a copy of the Under Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
ruled that: decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela on May 4, 1994, amended, the jurisdiction of the then municipal and city courts over
and that their motion for reconsideration was filed with said court on actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer was defined as
the fifteenth day of the reglementary period to appeal, that is, May follows:
The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed
19, 1994. In such a case, the rule is that the aggrieved party has only
before the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial
one day from receipt of the order denying the motion for
Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. — . . . In forcible
reconsideration within which to file a petition for review before the
Summary procedures have no application to cases before entry and detainer proceedings, the municipal judge or judge
Court of Appeals. 6 In the case at bar, private respondents received a
the Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the respondents of the city court shall have original jurisdiction, but the said
copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 6,
appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the municipal judge or city judge may receive evidence upon the
1994, and, without moving for extension of time, were able to file
Regional Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the
their petition for review only on July 21, 1994; hence their appeal
latter court. property, solely for the purpose of determining the character
was not seasonably perfected. Strictly speaking, therefore, the appeal
and extent of possession and damages for detention. In
should not have been given due course, following the pronouncement
forcible entry proceedings, he may grant preliminary
It is thus settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a in the case of Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al. 7 to the effect that the
injunctions, in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal within the
Court, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts
jurisdiction over decisions of the inferior courts in ejectment cases. reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
of dispossession against the plaintiff. (As amended by Republic
Accordingly, this argument of petitioners has to be rejected.
Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828).
This rule, however, has been relaxed in the latter case of Tijam, et
There is nonetheless appreciable merit in their contention that the al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al. 8 where it was held that a party, after
The law was subsequently amended by Republic Act No.
petition for review was belatedly filed in the Court of Appeals. This is voluntarily submitting a cause, is estopped from attacking the
5967 13 which vested in the city courts special jurisdiction to resolve
because in case of a judgment or final order of the Regional Trial jurisdiction of the court simply because it thereafter obtained an
the issue of ownership in conjunction with the issue of possession
Court rendered in an appeal from the judgment or final order of an adverse decision on the merits. The Court explained therein that the
whenever the question of ownership is brought in issue by the
inferior court, the former may be appealed to the Court of Appeals "party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
pleadings, thus:
through a petition for review within fifteen days from receipt of said order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
judgment or final order. If a motion for reconsideration is filed, the the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for
losing party has only the remaining period within which to file that reasons of public policy." It will be noted that the jurisdictional issue Sec. 3. Besides the civil cases over which the City Courts have
petition for review. The filing, therefore, of a motion for involved in the instant case was raised only for the first time in the jurisdiction under Section eighty-eight of Republic Act
reconsideration has the effect of only suspending the period to present petition for review on certiorari. The lack or absence of Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, as amended, it shall
appeal. This rule has been clarified in the case appellate jurisdiction was never questioned by petitioners either in likewise have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
of Lacsamana, et. al. vs.The Honorable Second Special Cases Division their Comment 9 submitted with respondent court or in their Motion to Instance over the following: xxx xxx xxx
of the Intermediate Appellate Court, et. al., 5 as follows: Dismiss Appeal 10 which was grounded solely on the fact that the
petition for review filed before said court was not verified. (c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is
3) APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF brought in issue in the pleadings. The issue of ownership shall
APPEALS Despite several opportunities to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the therein be resolved in conjunction with the issue of possession.
Court of Appeals, petitioners did not challenge its appellate
The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an jurisdiction and did so only after an adverse decision was rendered This special jurisdiction of city courts was differentiated from the
appeal from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial against them. To be more precise, they raised the issue of power ordinary accorded the inferior courts to receive evidence of
court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, jurisdiction, for the nullification of the decision of the Court of title only for the purpose of determining the character or extent of the
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for Appeals, when the case was already on appeal before this Court. They possession in dispute. This Court had the occasion to apply and
review in accordance with Section 22 of BP No. 129 and are now barred from doing so under the doctrine of estoppel by interpret the aforequoted statutory provision in Pelaez vs. Reyes, et
Section 22 (b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court through a laches. 11 Additionally, having participated actively in the proceedings al. 14 which raised the issue of whether a decision of a city court in an
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of before the appellate court, petitioners can no longer question its ejectment case involving the question of ownership was appealable to
the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The authority. 12 the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals, in this wise:
reason for extending the period for the filing of a record on
appeal is also applicable to the filing of a petition for review
9|P a g e
In the light of these provisions, petitioner insists that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts, which was promulgated pursuant to Section 36 of
respondents should have appealed to the Court of First Instance. the inferior courts. Specifically, the new law modified the power of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The old Rule, which took effect on August
Specifically, his contention is that the inclusion of the issue of inferior courts to resolve the issue of ownership in forcible entry and 1, 1983, stated that:
ownership in the pleadings did not change the character of the unlawful detainer cases, subject, however, to the qualification that a
proceeding as an action of unlawful detainer over which city and resolution thereof shall not be for the purpose of determining the
Sec. 1. Scope — This Rule shall govern the procedure in the
municipal courts have original exclusive jurisdiction. He claims issue of possession, to wit:
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
that his contention is supported by the very provision of Section
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
3, just quoted, to the effect that when ownership is brought in
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
issue in the pleadings in an ejection case before the city courts,
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil A. Civil Cases
said courts are to resolve the issue of ownership only "in
Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and (1) Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, except where
conjunction with the issue of possession." In other words, he
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise. xxx xxx xxx the question of ownership is involved, or where the damages or
posits that since the action is one of unlawful detainer, the main
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed
issue to be settled by the city court remains to be possession,
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) at the time of the filing of
and that to resolve the issue of ownership "in conjunction with (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
the complaint.
the issue of possession" is not the same as resolving it in a unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the
judicial litigation where it is the sole issue. defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding This Rule was revised pursuant to a resolution of the Court En
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved Banc which took effect on November 15, 1991, and the aforequoted
We are not impressed. Regardless of the juridical value of the
only to determine the issue of possession. provision now reads as follows:
significance petitioner is trying to thus draw from the rather
peculiar language of the statute, We are of the considered
opinion that the evident import of Section 3 above is to precisely Subsequently, this Court promulgated its Interim Rules and Sec. 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure
grant to the city courts concurrent original jurisdiction with the Guidelines in the implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in
courts of first instance over the cases enumerated therein, which Section 10 of which provides: Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial
include "ejection cases where the question of ownership is Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
brought in issue in the pleading." To sustain petitioner's 10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. — Metropolitan trial courts,
contention about the meaning of the last phrase of paragraph (c) A. Civil Cases
municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts, without
of said section regarding the resolution of the issue of ownership (1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective
distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and detainer even if
"in conjunction with the issue of possession" is to disregard the of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be
the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and the
very language of the main part of the section which denotes recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall
question of possession could not be resolved without deciding the
unmistakably a conferment upon the city courts of concurrent not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
issue of ownership, but the question of ownership shall be
jurisdiction with the courts of first instance over ejection cases in resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
which ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. It is to Us Under the original Rule, ejectment cases were covered by the
quite clear that the fact that the issue of ownership is to be summary rules only where the unpaid rentals do not exceed
resolved "in conjunction with the issue of possession" simply These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296
P20,000.00 and no question of ownership is involved. As presently
means that both the issues of possession and ownership are to which merely allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon the
formulated, however, all ejectment cases are now unqualifiedly
be resolved by the city courts. And the jurisdiction is concurrent question of title solely for the purpose of determining
covered by the summary procedure, which necessarily implies that
with the Courts of First Instance precisely because usually the extent and character of possession and damages for detention,
even if there is a need to resolve the issued of ownership, such fact
questions of title are supposed to be resolved by superior courts. which thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court to the effect
will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over these cases.
In other words, this grant of special jurisdiction to city courts is that if it appears during the trial that the principal issue relates to the
to be distinguished from the power ordinarily accorded to ownership of the property in dispute and any question of possession
municipal courts to receive evidence of title only for the purpose which may be involved necessarily depends upon the result of the Subsequently, Republic Act No. 7691, entitled "An Act Expanding the
of determining the extent of the possession in dispute. inquiry into the title, then the jurisdiction of the municipal or city Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
courts is lost and the action should be dismissed. With the enactment and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the 'Judiciary Reorganization
It being clear, therefore, that in the main ejection case, . . . , the over an ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be Act of 1980'", was passed and took effect on April 15, 1994. 15 The
issue of ownership is involved as shown by the pleadings therein resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the jurisdiction of the inferior courts over forcible entry and unlawful
filed by the parties, and that under Section 3 of Republic Act express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved detainer cases as defined under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was
5967, said city court exercised original jurisdiction over the same only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. In other retained. In addition, they now exercise limited original jurisdiction
concurrently with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, words, the fact that the issues of ownership and possession de over civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or
the appeal of respondents was rightly made by them to the Court facto are intricately interwoven will not cause the dismissal of the any interest therein depending on the assessed value and location of
of Appeals (Emphasis ours.) case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds. the property.

However, on August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the The intendment of the law was reinforced by the revision of the Parenthetically, it might be argued that since inferior courts are
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was approved and it redefined former Rule on Summary Procedures involving special cases before anyway vested with jurisdiction over real actions, then it can very
10 | P a g e
well resolve the issue of ownership raised in the ejectment case, jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the nature ownership, 21 or where the issue of ownership is the principal question
under the conditions stated in Section 32(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. of possession. It cannot, however, resolve the issue of ownership, to be resolved, 22 the action is not one for forcible entry but one for
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. It must not be that is, by declaring who among the parties is the true and lawful title to real property.
overlooked, however, that proceedings in ejectment cases are owner of the subject property, because the resolution of said issue
summary in nature, whereas actions for recovery of ownership would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in
3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership
require a full-blown trial on the merits. The difference in the the summary action for unlawful detainer. With this as a premise and
where the relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently
procedure in special civil actions, like ejectment, and in ordinary civil taking into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas
established in the ejectment case, 23 unless it is sufficiently
actions, such as accion reinvindicatoria, inveigh against the Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested that inferior courts are now
established that there has been a subsequent change in or
consolidation of said cases or the joinder of the different causes of conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or
termination of that relationship between the parties. This is because
action involved. It could also be violative under certain circumstances ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.
under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant is not
of the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action since Section 6 of
permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
Rule 2 requires inter alia due observance of the rules on jurisdiction
Withal, it will be observed, that the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
and joinder of parties, and that said causes of action arise out of the
129 has spawned seemingly conflicting jurisprudence on the proper
same contract, transaction or relation between the parties.
interpretation and application thereof. Thus, in several cases decided
4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful
by the Court after the effectivity of this law, regardless of whether the
detainer, is that a party who can prove prior possession can recover
As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now stands, complaint for ejectment was filed with the inferior court prior thereto
such possession even against the owner himself. Regardless of the
even where the defendant raises the question of ownership in his or otherwise, it was held that the jurisdiction of the inferior court is
actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without lost and the ejectment case should be dismissed where the issue of
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time,
deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, possession cannot be resolved without determining the issue of
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless ownership. 18 In all of these cases, the Court declared that inferior
he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right through
have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of ownership courts may only admit evidence and proof of ownership but they
an accion publiciana oraccion reivindicatoria. 24 Corollarily, if prior
albeit only to determine the issue of cannot adjudicate on the question of ownership. Conversely, in also
possession may be ascertained in some other way, then the inferior
possession. 16 not a few instances, the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to resolve
court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the issue of ownership.
the issue of ownership in order to determine the issue of possession
was upheld by this Court. 19 Apparently, it could have been some
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that prior to the
imprecision in language or a misperception of the statutory text which 5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of inferior
generated the ostensible doctrinal variance. question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior
courts was confined to receiving evidence of ownership in order to
court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as
determine only the nature and extent of possession, by reason of
to who among the contending parties is the real owner. 25 In the
which such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became apparent that After due deliberation, we find and so hold that by virtue of the
same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on
the issue of possession was intricately interwoven with that of express mandate set forth in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of
ownership. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the 129, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve the question of
title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a
premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This
of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete
is because, and it must be so understood, that any such
determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on adjudication of the issue of possession. Certain guidelines, however,
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is
Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of must be observed in the implementation of this legislative
to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor
the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the issue of prescription, viz.:
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to
land. 26 Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly
adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has been thus
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
conferred on the inferior courts.
possession, and that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession
case the issue of ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this of determining the issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the or building.
particular issue concerns and applies only to forcible entry and legal provision under consideration applies only where the inferior
unlawful detainer cases where the issue of possession is intimately court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a
The interpretative rules we have herein adopted are not without
intertwined with the issue of ownership. It finds no proper application resolution of the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution
justification. It is our considered opinion that they are more in
where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in issue, or of the question of ownership.
keeping with the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and
where the principal and main issue raised in the allegations of the
unlawful detainer which have purposely been made summary in
complaint as well as the relief prayed for make out not a case for
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint nature so that there may be a peaceful, speedy and expeditious
ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.
that what the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from
possession. 20 Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby insuring
In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 17 this Court, as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the the maintenance of peace and order in the community, as, otherwise,
in making a distinction between the reception of evidence and the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of
resolution of the issue of ownership, held that the inferior court may possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of long waiting and decide, as a measure of self-protection, to take the
look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. 27And
11 | P a g e
since the law discourages continued wrangling over possession of Furthermore, the allegation of petitioners that there was a verbal Notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and the
property for they involve perturbation of social disorder which must agreement to subdivide the property between them and private Metropolitan Trial Court for the matter, to qualifiedly resolve the issue
be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details of respondents is self-serving and evidentiarily baseless at this stage. In of ownership raised in the present ejectment suit, but their findings
procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly addition, their theory of an "implied trust" was not raised in issue in thereon being devoid of basis in fact and in law, respondent Court of
and carefully be avoided. 28 the trial court and cannot therefore be raised for the first time in the Appeals was fully justified in decreeing a reversal of their judgments.
present petition. 31 At most, it was merely alluded to in petitioners'
Rejoinder filed with the Court of Appeals, but petitioners never
As a matter of judicial experience, there have been cases where WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
bothered to expound on or substantiate the same. Consequently, it
persons who have failed to adduce any legal ground for their toto.
cannot now be raised as an assignment of error in the present
continued stay on property belonging to another have nonetheless
petition.
managed to stave off eviction for several years through the improper
use of procedural technicalities. 29 Conformably, if we were to allow G.R. No. 156402 February 13, 2006
the dismissal of an ejectment case for the reason that the question of In sum, and as held by respondent court, the Regional Trial Court SPS. ALFREDO MENDOZA and ROSARIO F.
ownership is incidentally involved in determining the question of "overstepped its bounds" in ruling that petitioners and private MENDOZA, Petitioners,
possession, we are in effect providing the defendants in ejectment respondents are co-owners of the property, which issue should be vs.
cases with the opportunity to prolong their occupancy of premises, finally determined in the separate action for specific performance MARIA CORONEL, represented by JUANITO
over which they have ceased to have any valid possessory right, reportedly pending between the parties. At this juncture, however, CORONEL, Respondent.
during the time that an action for recovery of ownership, which the evidence conduces to a finding that private respondents are in
involves a more tedious and lengthy court proceeding, is actually possession of the premises in the concept of and consequent to their PUNO, J.:
pending in court. being owners thereof. Even on such prima facie showing, therefore,
private respondents can maintain the ejectment case involved.
On appeal are the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) May 30, 2002 Decision1 in
It is indeed ironic that a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case which CA-G.R. SP No. 67157 and November 12, 2002 Resolution,2 reversing
is intended to be disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes While it may be argued that petitioners were able to prove prior the September 17, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
proved to be the most cumbersome and difficult to decide. It is thus possession, such, however, is not the issue involved in this action for Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 458-M-2001. The RTC of Malolos
about time that this situation be remedied if only to contribute to the unlawful detainer. An action for unlawful detainer is different from a ruled that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
solution of the worsening problem of court congestion, by refusing to forcible entry case in that the former involves an act of unlawfully before which respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners,
edify these cases by giving them a full-blown treatment in all the withholding the possession of the land or building against or from a had no jurisdiction to decide the case for failure of respondent to
courts in the judicial structure, and thereby save the courts the landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the expiration or implead her co-owners of the disputed property, the latter being
expenditure of precious time and energy which could otherwise be termination of the detainer's right to hold possession by virtue of a indispensable parties to the ejectment suit.
devoted to more significant and vital litigations. 30 contract, express or implied, 32 and neither is prior physical
possession of the property by the plaintiff necessary; 33 whereas in
The facts are as follows:
the latter, the main issue is one of priority of possession. 34
With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to the merits of
the present case. Petitioners claim to be co-owners of the subject
Respondent Maria Coronel is one of the co-owners of Lots 3250 and
premises on the basis of an alleged verbal agreement between the In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show that they were legally
3251 located at Sagrada Familia, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioners,
parties to subdivide the property, as well as the payment made by entitled to continue occupying the unit in question. On the
spouses Alfredo and Rosario Mendoza, occupied said lots upon
petitioner Mamerto Refugia for the purchase of the lot in the amount considerations hereinbefore detailed, we agree with the position of
tolerance of respondent and her co-owners without paying any rent.
of P20,000.00. On the other hand, private respondents' property respondent Court of Appeals that petitioners would in effect be
When respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, the
rights are supported by sufficient documents and muniments of occupying the premises by mere tolerance. A person who occupies
latter refused. Thus, on December 27, 2000, respondent filed a case
ownership, namely, the deed of absolute sale, transfer certificate of the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without
before the MTC of Hagonoy, Bulacan for unlawful detainer against
title, and building permit in their names, the regularity in the issuance any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
petitioners. The MTC ruled in favor of respondent, ordering petitioners
of which was never controverted nor put in issue by petitioners. promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a
to vacate the disputed lots. The dispositive portion of its May 29,
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
2001 Decision reads as follows:
him. 35 The status of petitioners is analogous to that of a lessee or
The Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court are not in
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
accord on whether to treat the P20,000.00 as a loan or as payment
continued by tolerance of the owner. 36 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
for petitioners' share in the subject premises, while respondent Court
ordering the defendants and all those claiming rights under them:
of Appeals believes that the same is actually a loan. It bears
significant notice that petitioners never refuted nor denied, in any of It has further been held that such tolerance must be present right
their pleadings filed in this case from the court of origin and all the from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a (1) to vacate the subject premises (lots 3250 and 3251) and to
way up to this Court, the allegation that private respondents gave cause of action as one of unlawful detainer. 37 Here, it cannot be surrender possession of the same to plaintiff[;]
P5,000.00 as partial payment for the loan. No countervailing gainsaid that petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance of private (2) to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in the
explanation was advanced by petitioners why such payment was respondents from the very beginning. At any rate, it has likewise not amount of P10,000.00 and to pay a monthly rental ofP500 from
made to and accepted by them as such. been denied by herein petitioners that one of their sons also owns a receipt of this decision until they shall have vacated the subject
residential house where they can live. premises; and
(3) to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.4
12 | P a g e
Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan which ruled in In the past, a co-owner could not even maintain an action in G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004
their favor. It annulled and set aside the appealed decision for want ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. . . COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner,
of jurisdiction of the MTC. It held that the co-owners of the subject lot vs.
should have been impleaded as indispensable parties. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents.
While Article 487 of the Civil Code now provides that "any one of the
co-owners may bring an action in ejectment," former Chief Justice
DECISION
On appeal to the CA, respondent was successful as the appellate Moran also stressed that all of them are necessary and proper
CARPIO, J.:
court reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC and revived the parties . . .
decision of the MTC dated May 29, 2001. Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. The Case
We reiterate the Arcelona ruling that the controlling law is Article
487 of the Civil Code which categorically states:
Hence, this appeal.5 Before us is a petition for review1 of the 21 June 2000 Decision2 and
14 December 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)
No. 43129. The Court of Appeals set aside the 11 November 1996
Petitioners assign the following errors:
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
Article 487 is a departure from the rule laid down in the case 81,4 affirming the 15 December 1995 decision5 of the Metropolitan
I. The lower court erred in ruling that a co-owner can bring of Palarca v. Baguisi 7 which held that an action for ejectment must Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31.6
an action in ejectment without impleading his co-owners, be brought by all the co-owners. As explained by Tolentino, the law
relying on an "Errata for pages 38-39 of Volume 280 SCRA," now allows a co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, which covers
which appears to alter the original tenor of the ruling in all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including forcible
Arcelona vs. CA that co-owners are indispensable parties. entry and unlawful detainer, without the necessity of joining all the
other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.8
II. The lower court erred in not taking into account that the The Antecedents
complaint was filed by an attorney-in-fact authorized by only
one of the co-owners to file the ejectment suit. We also reject petitioners’ second and third assignment of errors.
In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo ("Pajuyo") paid P400 to a
Petitioners claim that Juanito Coronel, attorney-in-fact of Maria
certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in
Coronel, one of the co-owners of the lots in dispute is not authorized
III. The lower court erred in allowing the petition for review Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made
to file the ejectment suit. They insist that he should have obtained
despite the fact that the certification against forum-shopping of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house
the authority and consent of all the co-owners. But since Article 487
was executed by an attorney-in-fact, in violation of the from 1979 to 7 December 1985.
of the Civil Code authorizes any one of the co-owners to bring an
requirement that parties must personally sign the same.
action for ejectment and the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all, without the other co-owners actually giving consent to On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra
The main issue in the case at bar is whether any of the co-owners the suit, it follows that an attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff co-owner ("Guevarra") executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner
may bring an action in ejectment. does not need authority from all the co-owners. He needs authority of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided
only from the co-owner instituting the ejectment suit. Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house.
Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on
The CA is correct in overruling the RTC. The latter court held that
Pajuyo’s demand.
in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,6 we held that a co-owner cannot We likewise hold that the execution of the certification against forum
maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co- shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the case at bar is not a violation
owners, the latter being indispensable parties. of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same. In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the
The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra
the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff co-owner, refused.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA pointed out that the RTC
relied on the uncorrected Arcelona decision. The RTC overlooked the pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, is a party to the ejectment
fact that the decision has been corrected by an "ERRATA for pages suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court9 includes the Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan
38-39" appearing on the second leaf of volume 280 of the SCRA. representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 ("MTC").
Thus, the CA held: authorized to institute the proceedings.

In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right
Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners’ appeal is DENIED. The Court of of possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is
the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." It was subsequently Appeals’ May 30, 2002 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 67157 and within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for
held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment November 12, 2002 Resolution, reversing the September 17, 2001 socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to
without joining all the other co-owners. Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him.
No. 458-M-2001 and reviving the May 29, 2001 Decision of the Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.
Municipal Trial Court of Hagonoy, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 1308, are
The foregoing statement was deleted and replaced with the following: AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

13 | P a g e
On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of On 27 February 1997, the Court of Appeals ordered Pajuyo to The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Pajuyo. The dispositive portion of the MTC decision reads: comment on Guevara’s petition for review. On 11 April 1997, Pajuyo
filed his Comment.
The Court of Appeals declared that Pajuyo and Guevarra are
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby squatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the contested lot
rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the On 21 June 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing which the government owned.
latter to: the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Perez, the person from whom Pajuyo acquired his rights, was also a
A) vacate the house and lot occupied by the defendant or WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of squatter. Perez had no right or title over the lot because it is public
any other person or persons claiming any right under him; the court a quo in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943 land. The assignment of rights between Perez and Pajuyo, and
B) pay unto plaintiff the sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS isREVERSED and SET ASIDE; and it is hereby declared the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra, did not have any legal
(P300.00) monthly as reasonable compensation for the use that the ejectment case filed against defendant-appellant is effect. Pajuyo and Guevarra are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The
of the premises starting from the last demand; without factual and legal basis. SO ORDERED.11 court will leave them where they are.
C) pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and by way of
attorney’s fees; and
Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Pajuyo The Court of Appeals reversed the MTC and RTC rulings, which held
D) pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.7
pointed out that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright that the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra created a legal tie
Guevarra’s petition for review because it was filed out of time. akin to that of a landlord and tenant relationship. The Court of
Aggrieved, Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon Moreover, it was Guevarra’s counsel and not Guevarra who signed the Appeals ruled that the Kasunduan is not a lease contract but
City, Branch 81 ("RTC"). certification against forum-shopping. a commodatum because the agreement is not for a price certain.

On 11 November 1996, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. The On 14 December 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution Since Pajuyo admitted that he resurfaced only in 1994 to claim the
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: denying Pajuyo’s motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion property, the appellate court held that Guevarra has a better right
of the resolution reads: over the property under Proclamation No. 137. President Corazon C.
Aquino ("President Aquino") issued Proclamation No. 137 on 7
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds no
September 1987. At that time, Guevarra was in physical possession
reversible error in the decision appealed from, being in WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for
of the property. Under Article VI of the Code of Policies Beneficiary
accord with the law and evidence presented, and the same is reconsideration is hereby DENIED. No costs. SO
Selection and Disposition of Homelots and Structures in the National
hereby affirmed en toto. SO ORDERED.8 ORDERED.12
Housing Project ("the Code"), the actual occupant or caretaker of the
lot shall have first priority as beneficiary of the project. The Court of
Guevarra received the RTC decision on 29 November 1996. Guevarra The Ruling of the MTC Appeals concluded that Guevarra is first in the hierarchy of priority.
had only until 14 December 1996 to file his appeal with the Court of
Appeals. Instead of filing his appeal with the Court of Appeals,
The MTC ruled that the subject of the agreement between Pajuyo and In denying Pajuyo’s motion for reconsideration, the appellate court
Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court a "Motion for Extension of
Guevarra is the house and not the lot. Pajuyo is the owner of the debunked Pajuyo’s claim that Guevarra filed his motion for extension
Time to File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42" ("motion for
house, and he allowed Guevarra to use the house only by tolerance. beyond the period to appeal.
extension"). Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure questions
Thus, Guevarra’s refusal to vacate the house on Pajuyo’s demand
of law. The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme Court received the motion
made Guevarra’s continued possession of the house illegal.
for extension on 13 December 1996 or one day before the right to The Court of Appeals pointed out that Guevarra’s motion for
appeal expired. extension filed before the Supreme Court was stamped "13 December
The Ruling of the RTC 1996 at 4:09 PM" by the Supreme Court’s Receiving Clerk. The Court
of Appeals concluded that the motion for extension bore a date,
On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed his petition for review with the
The RTC upheld the Kasunduan, which established the landlord and contrary to Pajuyo’s claim that the motion for extension was undated.
Supreme Court.
tenant relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra. The terms of Guevarra filed the motion for extension on time on 13 December
the Kasunduan bound Guevarra to return possession of the house on 1996 since he filed the motion one day before the expiration of the
On 8 January 1997, the First Division of the Supreme Court issued a reglementary period on 14 December 1996. Thus, the motion for
demand.
Resolution9 referring the motion for extension to the Court of Appeals extension properly complied with the condition imposed by the Court
which has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The case presented of Appeals in its 28 January 1997 Resolution. The Court of Appeals
no special and important matter for the Supreme Court to take The RTC rejected Guevarra’s claim of a better right under explained that the thirty-day extension to file the petition for review
cognizance of at the first instance. Proclamation No. 137, the Revised National Government Center was deemed granted because of such compliance.
Housing Project Code of Policies and other pertinent laws. In an
ejectment suit, the RTC has no power to decide Guevarra’s rights
On 28 January 1997, the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals rejected Pajuyo’s argument that the appellate
under these laws. The RTC declared that in an ejectment case, the
issued a Resolution10 granting the motion for extension conditioned on court should have dismissed the petition for review because it was
only issue for resolution is material or physical possession, not
the timeliness of the filing of the motion. Guevarra’s counsel and not Guevarra who signed the certification
ownership.
against forum-shopping. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Pajuyo

14 | P a g e
did not raise this issue in his Comment. The Court of Appeals held Procedural Issues disputed property and the application of Guevarra as beneficiary of
that Pajuyo could not now seek the dismissal of the case after he had Proclamation No. 137.
extensively argued on the merits of the case. This technicality, the
Pajuyo insists that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed
appellate court opined, was clearly an afterthought.
outright Guevarra’s petition for review because the RTC decision had The Court of Appeals has the power to grant an extension of time to
already become final and executory when the appellate court acted file a petition for review. In Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases
The Issues on Guevarra’s motion for extension to file the petition. Pajuyo points Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court,18 we declared that
out that Guevarra had only one day before the expiry of his period to the Court of Appeals could grant extension of time in appeals by
appeal the RTC decision. Instead of filing the petition for review with petition for review. In Liboro v. Court of Appeals,19 we clarified
Pajuyo raises the following issues for resolution:
the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with this Court an undated that the prohibition against granting an extension of time applies only
motion for extension of 30 days to file a petition for review. This in a case where ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere notice of
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS Court merely referred the motion to the Court of Appeals. Pajuyo appeal. The prohibition does not apply in a petition for review where
AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF believes that the filing of the motion for extension with this Court did the pleading needs verification. A petition for review, unlike an
JURISDICTION: not toll the running of the period to perfect the appeal. Hence, when ordinary appeal, requires preparation and research to present a
the Court of Appeals received the motion, the period to appeal had persuasive position.20 The drafting of the petition for review entails
1) in GRANTING, instead of denying, Private Respondent’s already expired. more time and effort than filing a notice of appeal.21 Hence, the Court
Motion for an Extension of thirty days to file petition for of Appeals may allow an extension of time to file a petition for review.
review at the time when there was no more period to extend We are not persuaded.
as the decision of the Regional Trial Court had already In the more recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
become final and executory. Court of Appeals,22 we held that Liboro’sclarification
Decisions of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate
of Lacsamana is consistent with the Revised Internal Rules of the
jurisdiction are appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for
2) in giving due course, instead of dismissing, private Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91. They all allow
review in cases involving questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
respondent’s Petition for Review even though the an extension of time for filing petitions for review with the Court of
and law.14 Decisions of the regional trial courts involving pure
certification against forum-shopping was signed only by Appeals. The extension, however, should be limited to only fifteen
questions of law are appealable directly to this Court by petition for
counsel instead of by petitioner himself. days save in exceptionally meritorious cases where the Court of
review.15 These modes of appeal are now embodied in Section 2, Rule
Appeals may grant a longer period.
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
3) in ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered into by
the parties was in fact a commodatum, instead of a Contract A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law.
Guevarra believed that his appeal of the RTC decision involved only
of Lease as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court and in Finality of judgment becomes a fact on the lapse of the reglementary
questions of law. Guevarra thus filed his motion for extension to file
holding that "the ejectment case filed against defendant- period to appeal if no appeal is perfected.23 The RTC decision could
petition for review before this Court on 14 December 1996. On 3
appellant is without legal and factual basis". not have gained finality because the Court of Appeals granted the 30-
January 1997, Guevarra then filed his petition for review with this
day extension to Guevarra.
Court. A perusal of Guevarra’s petition for review gives the
4) in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional impression that the issues he raised were pure questions of law.
Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943 and in holding that There is a question of law when the doubt or difference is on what the The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
the parties are in pari delicto being both squatters, law is on a certain state of facts.16 There is a question of fact when it approved Guevarra’s motion for extension. The Court of Appeals
therefore, illegal occupants of the contested parcel of land. the doubt or difference is on the truth or falsity of the facts alleged.17 gave due course to the motion for extension because it complied with
the condition set by the appellate court in its resolution dated 28
January 1997. The resolution stated that the Court of Appeals would
5) in deciding the unlawful detainer case based on the so- In his petition for review before this Court, Guevarra no longer
only give due course to the motion for extension if filed on time. The
called Code of Policies of the National Government Center disputed the facts. Guevarra’s petition for review raised these
motion for extension met this condition.
Housing Project instead of deciding the same under questions: (1) Do ejectment cases pertain only to possession of a
the Kasunduan voluntarily executed by the parties, the structure, and not the lot on which the structure stands? (2) Does a
terms and conditions of which are the laws between suit by a squatter against a fellow squatter constitute a valid case for The material dates to consider in determining the timeliness of the
themselves.13 ejectment? (3) Should a Presidential Proclamation governing the lot filing of the motion for extension are (1) the date of receipt of the
on which a squatter’s structure stands be considered in an ejectment judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition, and (2)
suit filed by the owner of the structure? the date of filing of the motion for extension.24 It is the date of the
filing of the motion or pleading, and not the date of execution, that
determines the timeliness of the filing of that motion or pleading.
These questions call for the evaluation of the rights of the parties
The Ruling of the Court Thus, even if the motion for extension bears no date, the date of
under the law on ejectment and the Presidential Proclamation. At first
filing stamped on it is the reckoning point for determining the
glance, the questions Guevarra raised appeared purely legal.
timeliness of its filing.
The procedural issues Pajuyo is raising are baseless. However, we However, some factual questions still have to be resolved because
find merit in the substantive issues Pajuyo is submitting for they have a bearing on the legal questions raised in the petition for
resolution. review. These factual matters refer to the metes and bounds of the Guevarra had until 14 December 1996 to file an appeal from the RTC
decision. Guevarra filed his motion for extension before this Court on
15 | P a g e
13 December 1996, the date stamped by this Court’s Receiving Clerk Settled is the rule that the defendant’s claim of ownership of the In Pitargue v. Sorilla, 43 the government owned the land in dispute.
on the motion for extension. Clearly, Guevarra filed the motion for disputed property will not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction The government did not authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant
extension exactly one day before the lapse of the reglementary period over the ejectment case.32 Even if the pleadings raise the issue of in the case of forcible entry case to occupy the land. The plaintiff had
to appeal. ownership, the court may pass on such issue to determine only the prior possession and had already introduced improvements on the
question of possession, especially if the ownership is inseparably public land. The plaintiff had a pending application for the land with
linked with the possession.33The adjudication on the issue of the Bureau of Lands when the defendant ousted him from possession.
Assuming that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed Guevarra’s
ownership is only provisional and will not bar an action between the The plaintiff filed the action of forcible entry against the defendant.
appeal on technical grounds, Pajuyo did not ask the appellate court to
same parties involving title to the land.34 This doctrine is a necessary The government was not a party in the case of forcible entry.
deny the motion for extension and dismiss the petition for review at
consequence of the nature of the two summary actions of ejectment,
the earliest opportunity. Instead, Pajuyo vigorously discussed the
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, where the only issue for
merits of the case. It was only when the Court of Appeals ruled in The defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the courts to settle the
adjudication is the physical or material possession over the real
Guevarra’s favor that Pajuyo raised the procedural issues against issue of possession because while the application of the plaintiff was
property.35
Guevarra’s petition for review. still pending, title remained with the government, and the Bureau of
Public Lands had jurisdiction over the case. We disagreed with the
In this case, what Guevarra raised before the courts was that he and defendant. We ruled that courts have jurisdiction to entertain
A party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute for resolution,
Pajuyo are not the owners of the contested property and that they ejectment suits even before the resolution of the application. The
receives an adverse decision on the merits, is estopped from
are mere squatters. Will the defense that the parties to the ejectment plaintiff, by priority of his application and of his entry, acquired prior
attacking the jurisdiction of the court.25 Estoppel sets in not because
case are not the owners of the disputed lot allow the courts to physical possession over the public land applied for as against other
the judgment of the court is a valid and conclusive adjudication, but
renounce their jurisdiction over the case? The Court of Appeals private claimants. That prior physical possession enjoys legal
because the practice of attacking the court’s jurisdiction after
believed so and held that it would just leave the parties where they protection against other private claimants because only a court can
voluntarily submitting to it is against public policy.26
are since they are in pari delicto. take away such physical possession in an ejectment case.

In his Comment before the Court of Appeals, Pajuyo also failed to


We do not agree with the Court of Appeals. While the Court did not brand the plaintiff and the defendant
discuss Guevarra’s failure to sign the certification against forum
in Pitargue44 as squatters, strictly speaking, their entry into the
shopping. Instead, Pajuyo harped on Guevarra’s counsel signing the
disputed land was illegal. Both the plaintiff and defendant entered the
verification, claiming that the counsel’s verification is insufficient since Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at
public land without the owner’s permission. Title to the land remained
it is based only on "mere information." issue in an action for recovery of possession. The parties cannot
with the government because it had not awarded to anyone
present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession
ownership of the contested public land. Both the plaintiff and the
except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to
A party’s failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is defendant were in effect squatting on government property. Yet, we
resolve the issue of physical possession.36 The same is true when the
different from the party’s failure to sign personally the verification. upheld the courts’ jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even
defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence
The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by the party, if the plaintiff and the defendant in the ejectment case did not have
of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to
and not by counsel.27 The certification of counsel renders the petition any title over the contested land.
withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.
defective.28
Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic
proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical possession of the
formal and not a jurisdictional requisite.29 It is intended simply to policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful
premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to
possession de jure.37 It does not even matter if a party’s title to the
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the
property is questionable,38 or when both parties intruded into public
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.30 The party party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to
land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved
need not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any obtain what he claims is his.45 The party deprived of possession must
by the proper government agency.39 Regardless of the actual
person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the not take the law into his own hands.46 Ejectment proceedings are
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
pleading may sign the verification.31 summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or
recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social
terror.40 Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue on the certificate disturbances.47
Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.
against forum shopping was merely an afterthought. Pajuyo did not
call the Court of Appeals’ attention to this defect at the early stage of We further explained in Pitargue the greater interest that is at stake
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
the proceedings. Pajuyo raised this procedural issue too late in the in actions for recovery of possession. We made the following
possession even against the owner himself.41 Whatever may be the
proceedings. pronouncements in Pitargue:
character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
Absence of Title over the Disputed Property will not Divest until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.42 To repeat, the The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without
the Courts of Jurisdiction to Resolve the Issue of Possession only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving
to physical possession. these public lands before final award is made by the Lands
Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting
16 | P a g e
claimants? It is one of utmost importance, as there are public have been intended to include the power to prevent or of the action in mind, by no stretch of the imagination can
lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially settle disorders or breaches of the peace among rival conclusion be arrived at that the use of the remedy in the courts
in newly opened regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as it settlers or claimants prior to the final award. As to this, of justice would constitute an interference with the alienation,
requires the determination of the respective authorities and therefore, the corresponding branches of the Government must disposition, and control of public lands. To limit ourselves to the
functions of two coordinate branches of the Government in continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within the limits of case at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in any
connection with public land conflicts. their respective functions. The vesting of the Lands way interfere with the manner of the alienation or disposition of
Department with authority to administer, dispose, and the land contested? On the contrary, it would facilitate
alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood adjudication, for the question of priority of possession having
Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil
as depriving the other branches of the Government of the been decided in a final manner by the courts, said question need
Code, either in the old, which was in force in this country before
exercise of the respective functions or powers thereon, no longer waste the time of the land officers making the
the American occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory
such as the authority to stop disorders and quell adjudication or award. (Emphasis ours)
action, the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the
breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the
physical possession of real property, irrespective of the question
part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory
as to who has the title thereto. Under the Spanish Civil Code we The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases
actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or
had the accion interdictal, a summary proceeding which could be
indirectly, alienation and disposition.
brought within one year from dispossession (Roman Catholic
The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari
Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as
delicto to this case.
October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the Code of Civil Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in
Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we American courts to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction to
implanted the common law action of forcible entry (section 80 of determine the rights of claimants to public lands, and that until Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code48 embody the principle
Act No. 190), the object of which has been stated by this Court the disposition of the land has passed from the control of the of pari delicto. We explained the principle of pari delicto in these
to be "to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal Federal Government, the courts will not interfere with the words:
disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C. J. 1093-
remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would 1094.) We have no quarrel with this principle. The determination The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo
create that some advantage must accrue to those of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands is malo non eritur actio’ and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio
persons who, believing themselves entitled to the different from the determination of who has the actual physical defedentis.’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal
possession of property, resort to force to gain possession possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them.49
rather than to some appropriate action in the court to preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the
assert their claims." (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to
Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So before the enactment of the first the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there
Public Land Act (Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never are exceptions to its application. One of these exceptions is where the
already available in the courts of the country. So the question to be "prejudicial interference" with the disposition or alienation of application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established
be resolved is, Did the Legislature intend, when it vested the public lands. On the other hand, if courts were deprived of public policy.50
power and authority to alienate and dispose of the public lands in jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, that
the Lands Department, to exclude the courts from entertaining threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace In Drilon v. Gaurana,51 we reiterated the basic policy behind the
the possessory action of forcible entry between rival claimants or committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. We held
occupants of any land before award thereof to any of the parties? state of lawlessness would probably be produced between that:
Did Congress intend that the lands applied for, or all public lands applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might,
for that matter, be removed from the jurisdiction of the judicial not right or justice, would rule.
Branch of the Government, so that any troubles arising It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible
therefrom, or any breaches of the peace or disorders caused by entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition
It must be borne in mind that the action that would be used to of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
rival claimants, could be inquired into only by the Lands
solve conflicts of possession between rivals or conflicting possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence
Department to the exclusion of the courts? The answer to this
applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of
question seems to us evident. The Lands Department does not
entry. This action, both in England and the United States and in the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal
have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the
our jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedy whereby disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the
means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain
one in peaceful and quiet possession may recover the possession remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would
breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon
of which he has been deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or create that some advantage must accrue to those persons
conflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to
terror; its ultimate object being to prevent breach of the peace who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of
disposition and alienation, and while it may decide
and criminal disorder. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to
conflicts of possession in order to make proper award,
59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis of the remedy is mere possession as some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims.
the settlement of conflicts of possession which is
a fact, of physical possession, not a legal possession. (Mediran vs. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions
recognized in the court herein has another ultimate
Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752.) The title or right to possession is never of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel
purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and
in issue in an action of forcible entry; as a matter of fact, evidence the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law
occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of
thereof is expressly banned, except to prove the nature of the alone to obtain what he claims is his.52
the peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not
possession. (Second 4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) With this nature
17 | P a g e
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of Second. The Court of Appeals should not have given credence to Ako, si COL[I]TO PAJUYO, may-ari ng bahay at lote sa Bo. Payatas,
ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out Guevarra’s unsubstantiated claim that he is the beneficiary of Quezon City, ay nagbibigay pahintulot kay G. Eddie Guevarra, na
relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra merely alleged that in the survey the pansamantalang manirahan sa nasabing bahay at lote ng "walang
mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter project administrator conducted, he and not Pajuyo appeared as the bayad." Kaugnay nito, kailangang panatilihin nila ang kalinisan at
from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, actual occupant of the lot. kaayusan ng bahay at lote.
emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them
where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted
There is no proof that Guevarra actually availed of the benefits of Sa sandaling kailangan na namin ang bahay at lote, sila’y kusang
squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost.
Proclamation No. 137. Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to occupy the aalis ng walang reklamo.
disputed property in 1985. President Aquino signed Proclamation No.
Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what 137 into law on 11 March 1986. Pajuyo made his earliest demand for
Based on the Kasunduan, Pajuyo permitted Guevarra to reside in the
ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to Guevarra to vacate the property in September 1994.
house and lot free of rent, but Guevarra was under obligation to
prevent.53 Even the owner who has title over the disputed property
maintain the premises in good condition. Guevarra promised to
cannot take the law into his own hands to regain possession of his
During the time that Guevarra temporarily held the property up to the vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s demand but Guevarra broke his
property. The owner must go to court.
time that Proclamation No. 137 allegedly segregated the disputed lot, promise and refused to heed Pajuyo’s demand to vacate.
Guevarra never applied as beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Even
Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the when Guevarra already knew that Pajuyo was reclaiming possession
These facts make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer
ejectment suit are squatters. The determination of priority and of the property, Guevarra did not take any step to comply with the
involves the withholding by a person from another of the possession
superiority of possession is a serious and urgent matter that cannot requirements of Proclamation No. 137.
of real property to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or
be left to the squatters to decide. To do so would make squatters
termination of the former’s right to hold possession under a
receive better treatment under the law. The law restrains property
Third. Even assuming that the disputed lot is within the coverage of contract, express or implied.59
owners from taking the law into their own hands. However, the
Proclamation No. 137 and Guevarra has a pending application over
principle of pari delicto as applied by the Court of Appeals would give
the lot, courts should still assume jurisdiction and resolve the issue of
squatters free rein to dispossess fellow squatters or violently retake Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his property by
possession. However, the jurisdiction of the courts would be limited to
possession of properties usurped from them. Courts should not leave tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by
the issue of physical possession only.
squatters to their own devices in cases involving recovery of an implied promise that he will vacate on demand, failing which, an
possession. action for unlawful detainer will lie.60 The defendant’s refusal to
In Pitargue,55 we ruled that courts have jurisdiction over possessory comply with the demand makes his continued possession of the
actions involving public land to determine the issue of physical property unlawful.61 The status of the defendant in such a case is
Possession is the only Issue for Resolution in an Ejectment
possession. The determination of the respective rights of rival similar to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired
Case
claimants to public land is, however, distinct from the determination but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner.62
of who has the actual physical possession or who has a better right of
The case for review before the Court of Appeals was a simple case of physical possession.56 The administrative disposition and alienation of
This principle should apply with greater force in cases where a
ejectment. The Court of Appeals refused to rule on the issue of public lands should be threshed out in the proper government
contract embodies the permission or tolerance to use the property.
physical possession. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that the agency.57
The Kasunduan expressly articulated Pajuyo’s forbearance. Pajuyo did
pivotal issue in this case is who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has the
not require Guevarra to pay any rent but only to maintain the house
"priority right as beneficiary of the contested land under Proclamation
The Court of Appeals’ determination of Pajuyo and Guevarra’s rights and lot in good condition. Guevarra expressly vowed in
No. 137."54 According to the Court of Appeals, Guevarra enjoys
under Proclamation No. 137 was premature. Pajuyo and Guevarra the Kasunduan that he would vacate the property on demand.
preferential right under Proclamation No. 137 because Article VI of
were at most merely potential beneficiaries of the law. Courts should Guevarra’s refusal to comply with Pajuyo’s demand to vacate made
the Code declares that the actual occupant or caretaker is the one
not preempt the decision of the administrative agency mandated by Guevarra’s continued possession of the property unlawful.
qualified to apply for socialized housing.
law to determine the qualifications of applicants for the acquisition of
public lands. Instead, courts should expeditiously resolve the issue of
We do not subscribe to the Court of Appeals’ theory that
The ruling of the Court of Appeals has no factual and legal basis. physical possession in ejectment cases to prevent disorder and
the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.
breaches of peace.58
First. Guevarra did not present evidence to show that the contested
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another
lot is part of a relocation site under Proclamation No. 137. Pajuyo is Entitled to Physical Possession of the Disputed
something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a
Proclamation No. 137 laid down the metes and bounds of the land Property
certain time and return it.63 An essential feature of commodatum is
that it declared open for disposition to bona fide residents.
that it is gratuitous. Another feature ofcommodatum is that the use of
Guevarra does not dispute Pajuyo’s prior possession of the lot and the thing belonging to another is for a certain period.64 Thus, the
The records do not show that the contested lot is within the land ownership of the house built on it. Guevarra expressly admitted the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after
specified by Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra had the burden to prove existence and due execution of the Kasunduan. expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use
that the disputed lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No. 137. The Kasunduan reads: for which thecommodatum is constituted.65 If the bailor should have
He failed to do so. urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary

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use.66 If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can Pajuyo did not profit from his arrangement with Guevarra because a ruling would discourage squatters from seeking the aid of the courts
demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual Guevarra stayed in the property without paying any rent. There is in settling the issue of physical possession. Stripping both the plaintiff
relation is called a precarium.67 Under the Civil Code, precarium is a also no proof that Pajuyo is a professional squatter who rents out and the defendant of possession just because they are squatters
kind of commodatum.68 usurped properties to other squatters. Moreover, it is for the proper would have the same dangerous implications as the application of the
government agency to decide who between Pajuyo and Guevarra principle of pari delicto. Squatters would then rather settle the issue
qualifies for socialized housing. The only issue that we are addressing of physical possession among themselves than seek relief from the
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo
is physical possession. courts if the plaintiff and defendant in the ejectment case would both
to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While theKasunduan did
stand to lose possession of the disputed property. This would subvert
not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the
the policy underlying actions for recovery of possession.
property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in
the Kasunduan a contract different from a commodatum. The effects ejectment.73 This is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and
of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum. unlawful detainer.74 In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of Since Pajuyo has in his favor priority in time in holding the property,
Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as physical possession of his land or building by means of force, he is entitled to remain on the property until a person who has title or
one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Thus, he must allege and a better right lawfully ejects him. Guevarra is certainly not that
withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the prove prior possession.75 But in unlawful detainer, the defendant person. The ruling in this case, however, does not preclude Pajuyo
lease.69 The tenant’s withholding of the property would then be unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of and Guevarra from introducing evidence and presenting arguments
unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence. his right to possess under any contract, express or implied. In such a before the proper administrative agency to establish any right to
case, prior physical possession is not required.76 which they may be entitled under the law.81
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is
one of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to Pajuyo’s withdrawal of his permission to Guevarra terminated In no way should our ruling in this case be interpreted to condone
turn over possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The the Kasunduan. Guevarra’s transient right to possess the property squatting. The ruling on the issue of physical possession does not
obligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to ended as well. Moreover, it was Pajuyo who was in actual possession affect title to the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive
contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of commission, administration of the property because Guevarra had to seek Pajuyo’s permission to adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership.82 The owner can
and commodatum.70 These contracts certainly involve the obligation temporarily hold the property and Guevarra had to follow the still go to court to recover lawfully the property from the person who
to deliver or return the thing received.71 conditions set by Pajuyo in theKasunduan. Control over the property holds the property without legal title. Our ruling here does not
still rested with Pajuyo and this is evidence of actual possession. diminish the power of government agencies, including local
governments, to condemn, abate, remove or demolish illegal or
Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the sole ground that
unauthorized structures in accordance with existing laws.
like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter. Squatters, Guevarra pointed out, Pajuyo’s absence did not affect his actual possession of the disputed
cannot enter into a contract involving the land they illegally occupy. property. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
Guevarra insists that the contract is void. has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is Attorney’s Fees and Rentals
deemed in possession.77 One may acquire possession not only by
physical occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
Guevarra should know that there must be honor even between The MTC and RTC failed to justify the award of P3,000 attorney’s fees
action of one’s will.78Actual or physical occupation is not always
squatters. Guevarra freely entered into the Kasunduan. Guevarra to Pajuyo. Attorney’s fees as part of damages are awarded only in the
necessary.79
cannot now impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it. instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.83 Thus, the
The Kasunduan binds Guevarra. award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the
Ruling on Possession Does not Bind Title to the Land in Dispute rule.84 Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in
a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the
The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between
right to litigate.85 We therefore delete the attorney’s fees awarded to
Pajuyo and Guevarra has a right to physical possession of the We are aware of our pronouncement in cases where we declared that
Pajuyo.
contested property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of "squatters and intruders who clandestinely enter into titled
Guevarra’s recognition of Pajuyo’s better right of physical possession. government property cannot, by such act, acquire any legal right to
Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad faith. The absence of a contract said property."80 We made this declaration because the person who We sustain the P300 monthly rentals the MTC and RTC assessed
would not yield a different result, as there would still be an implied had title or who had the right to legal possession over the disputed against Guevarra. Guevarra did not dispute this factual finding of the
promise to vacate. property was a party in the ejectment suit and that party instituted two courts. We find the amount reasonable compensation to Pajuyo.
the case against squatters or usurpers. The P300 monthly rental is counted from the last demand to vacate,
which was on 16 February 1995.
Guevarra contends that there is "a pernicious evil that is sought to be
avoided, and that is allowing an absentee squatter who (sic) makes In this case, the owner of the land, which is the government, is not a
(sic) a profit out of his illegal act."72 Guevarra bases his argument on party to the ejectment case. This case is between squatters. Had the WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision dated 21 June
the preferential right given to the actual occupant or caretaker under government participated in this case, the courts could have evicted 2000 and Resolution dated 14 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals
Proclamation No. 137 on socialized housing. the contending squatters, Pajuyo and Guevarra. in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 11
November 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81
in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943, affirming the Decision dated 15
We are not convinced. Since the party that has title or a better right over the property is not
December 1995 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
impleaded in this case, we cannot evict on our own the parties. Such
Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 12432,
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is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The award of attorney’s fees occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968 and that the SO ORDERED.11
is deleted. No costs. SO ORDERED. issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner was
tainted with irregularities.7
Hence the present petition raising the sole issue:
G.R. No. 169793 September 15, 2006
On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered
[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
judgment, which reads:
VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner, THAT THE PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION
vs. PUBLICIANA AND NOT UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS
NIEVES AMIGO, respondent. WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence, a DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff FILED BY PETITIONER.12
VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION and against the defendant
DECISION NIEVES AMIGOE (sic) as follows:
The petition lacks merit.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the


In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of
parcels of land described in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
possession of real property are:
This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decision of the
1
T-256650 and T-256651 he is now occupying and surrender
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857, ordering the remand of it to the plaintiff;
Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, 1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may
Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings. be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful
b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) as attorney's fees, and
recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has
The antecedent facts are as follows: not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in
c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to] the proper inferior court;
Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. P500.00 per month from February, 2001 until the portion of
2121-B-1, consisting of 100 square meters and covered by TCT No. the land occupied by him is surrendered to the plaintiff.
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of
T-256650; and Lot No. 2121-B-2 consisting of 607 square meters the real right of possession, which should be brought in the
with TCT No. T-256651, located at District 1, National Hi-way, COSTS against the defendant. proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has
Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a lasted for more than one year; and
single 707 square meter track of land owned by Rogelio Valiente who
sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on January 18, 1982. On March SO ORDERED.8
21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the 3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which
death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20,
an Affidavit of Waiver2 on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.13
ruled as follows:
property in favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano
Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision of the land Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that
into two lots3 and the issuance of titles in his name on July 18, 1996.4 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of the
case on the ground that as the Municipal Court had no
possession of the property in this case is the length of time of
jurisdiction over the case, this Court acquired no appellate
Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible
jurisdiction thereof. Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
possession of a portion of the property sometime in 1985 without the entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of the
permission of the then owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Said occupation possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
by respondent continued even after TCT Nos. T-256650 and T- SO ORDERED.9 strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
256651 were issue to petitioner. against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review10 under Rule 42 of the withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals which promulgated the possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter dated5
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
Febuary 1, 2001 demanding that the respondent vacate the subject assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. The
dispositive portion thereof reads: other person. These remedies afford the person deprived of the
property. As evidenced by the registry return receipt, the demand possession to file at any time within one year after such unlawful
letter was delivered by registered mail to the respondent on February deprivation or withholding of possession, an action in the proper
12, 2001. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter, respondent WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
still refused to vacate the subject property. Thereafter, on March 2, REMANDED to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
2001, petitioner filed a complaint6 for ejectment, damages with Isabela for further proceedings. claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
injunction and prayer for restraining order with the Municipal Trial with damages and costs.14 Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted
Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as CV-01-030. In his for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the
No costs.
Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and inferior court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the
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dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper action to be We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are the lower court, without prejudice to the admission
filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper indeed the owners of the subject lot and were unlawfully of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in
Regional Trial Court. deprived of their right of possession, they should present the interest of justice.19
their claim before the regional trial court in an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for
find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in Appeals dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the
unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the
holding that the proper action in this case is accion publiciana; and in remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of
owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be
ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED.
wrested from another who had been in physical or material
Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
possession of the same for more than one year by resorting
to a summary action for ejectment.18 No costs.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that: SO ORDERED.
at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. was in 1985 but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen
The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the years after, when petitioner filed his ejectment case. The
ones to be consulted.15 On its face, the complaint must show enough respondent should have filed an accion publiciana case which
ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol is under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
testimony.16
However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.
From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner
became the owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:
waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint
for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to
the respondent demanding that the latter vacate the premises SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without
remained unheeded. While it is true that the demand letter was trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken from
received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby making an order of the lower court dismissing the case without
the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm
year from last demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance
equally true that petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over
1995 and has been since that time deprived possession of a portion the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has
thereof. From the date of the petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up to jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits
his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of
elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion proceedings.
interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the
lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court
Regional Trial Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the
title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of case in accordance with the preceding section, without
one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
withholding of possession of the realty.17 additional evidence in the interest of justice.

Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If
another person was occupying his property way back in 1977 but the the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court
said owner only filed the complaint for ejectment in 1995, the proper without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC
action would be one for accion publicianaand not one under the on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has
summary procedure on ejectment. As explained by the Court: original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall
no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide
the case on the basis of the evidence presented in

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