Wikileaks > Cablegate > Climate Change

The following pages contain climate change and UNFCCC COP15 related excerpts from the US Embassy documents released on Wikileaks Monday November 29, 2010. None of these texts contain information that can in any way endanger anyone's life. Texts obviously differing from the official spin or otherwise interesting are marked with yellow. Please respect the Wikileaks guidelines for using these texts: Include the reference ID (or link to the document at wikileaks.org) including messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING1247.

Table of Contents
20th of April 2007: Merkel pledge climate change effort, gets pragmatic US backing.....................4 7th of November 2007: American eyes on Greenland......6 26th October 2007, Paris: Trying to impress the French 8 29th of January 2008: Merkel “aggressive” on climate change...............................................10 6th of June 2008: Denmark & USA meet on Greenland....11 2nd of September 2008: Pulling strings to avoid Iranian scientist in IPCC....................................12 8th of May 2009, Beijing: China positive about COP15. 15 26th of May 2009, Moscow: An ice cold Russian........16 19th of June 2009: Briefing after hacking attack.....17 26th of June 2009: EU & US security talks............19 22nd of September 2009, Berlin: US evaluating German environmental policy.................................23 28th October 2009, Stockholm: Pragmatic Swedish ambitions............................................24 3rd of November 2009, Paris: The French are ambitious and have doubts about USA............................27 5th of November 2009, Berlin: Germany proposes US-EU team play............................................28 30th of November 2009: Preparing for Nobel Peace Prize .....................................................30 4th of December 2009, The Hague: “Roadmap, please” (the Dutch predicting everything).........................32 9th of December 2009: UK and France wants Tobin tax linked with climate change efforts...................34 15th of December 2009, London: Commonwealth keen on legally binding treaty...............................36 22nd of December 2009, London: Briefing..............38 23rd of December 2009, Brasilia: Disappointment – but not that much........................................40 31st of December 2009: EU Energy Commissioner is “lame duck”................................................41 4th of January 2010, Brussels: President of Europe says it like it is........................................42 10th of Janurary 2010: No snow in Afghanistan........44 21st of January, The Vatican: Pope backs Accord......45
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26th of January 2010, Riyadh: Saudis governed by petroleum ministry...................................47 28th of January 2010, The Hague: Dutch afterthoughts. 48 2nd of February 2010: Ethiopia wants monitoring of climate change mitigation funds......................52 5th of February 2010, Copenhagen: Evaluation of COP-15 .....................................................53 9th of February 2010: Cooperation with Brazil........58 9th of February, La Paz: Morales derailing Accord....59 11th of February 2010, Riyadh: Saudis worried about oil income...............................................62 12th of February 2010: Saudi schizophrenia...........63 17th of February 2010: Tactical discussion with the European Union.......................................68 17th of February 2010: Climate strategy agreed with Europe...............................................71 26th of February 2010: Guantanamo and Copenhagen in the same sentence........................................75

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20th of April 2007: Merkel pledge climate change effort, gets pragmatic US backing
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN WASHINGTON: GOALS FOR EUROPE, GOALS AT HOME Reference ID: #07BERLIN802 Classified By: DCM John Koenig. Summary: [...] Achieving her [Merkel's] goals for the EU - in the trans-Atlantic context these are focused on climate change and the Transatlantic Economic Initiative - will reinforce her position at home and in the EU, and serve as a springboard to success on the larger G-8 stage. A success for Merkel is also a success for the U.S. Even after the German EU Presidency, we will want the Atlanticist Merkel to remain a dominant force within the EU. In Berlin, a successful summit will strengthen her and other trans-Atlanticists against those who favor a policy of vocal, public antagonism. […] 3. […] she has vigorously pursued the Transatlantic Economic Initiative within the EU to remove regulatory barriers, and has pushed for agreement on the new EU climate change and energy initiatives. She has not succeeded in all her undertakings -- prospects for a new EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia remain distant, for example. […] 4. (C) […Merkel] is focused on our political cooperation in key areas - climate change and energy security as well as the Transatlantic Economic Initiative. We recognize that in these and other areas, European goals are not exactly aligned with our own. Nonetheless, success in these areas, the former a key concern of European publics and the latter important to sustaining European growth, after a long period in which trans-Atlantic relations were dominated by negative headlines and exchanges focused on other regions, would prove Merkel's particular competence at succeeding in Europe's key external relationship. After success in Washington, Merkel can count on maintaining her position in Europe against any incoming French President and UK Prime Minister-inwaiting Brown. Success in Washington will also strengthen
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her hand in the follow-on summits with Russia, Canada, and Japan and sets the stage for success in G-8 summit deliberations on climate change. 5. (C) At home, a Summit success may enable Merkel to end the SPD's ability to use loud, public "principled" criticism of the U.S. as a winning tactic. Gerhard Schroeder won the 2002 election with his public attacks on U.S. Iraq policy, but if Merkel brings home meaningful agreements -- especially on issues with domestic resonance such as climate change and trans-Atlantic economic cooperation -- she will have shown the German public that her policy of constructive engagement with the U.S. brings real benefits on issues of concern to it. Foreign policy, especially trans-Atlantic relations, is one of the few areas where the SPD still enjoys greater public support than does the CDU/CSU. Success in Washington may undercut the SPD on that theme, as the CDU/CSU has already undercut it on many domestic social themes.

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7th of November 2007: American eyes on Greenland
Subject: SHAPING GREENLAND'S FUTURE Reference ID: #07COPENHAGEN1010 This cable contains sensitive but unclassified and proprietary business information. High Stakes for the U.S. in Greenland 4. With the planet's fastest moving glaciers, Greenland is an iconic adventure destination for hardy Congressional delegations and down-encased journalists looking for visual proof of climate change. Its gleaming icebergs will be the backdrop for a May 2008 ministerial hosted by Denmark on Arctic issues. But Greenland holds strategic value for the United States beyond its starring role in the global narrative of climate change. [...] A U.S. Air Force base at Thule, 500 miles north of the Arctic Circle, hosts important radar that alerts us to incoming missiles over the Pole. American investors are poised to commit $5 billion this year to develop hydropower and smelting facilities there. Exploration and development of Greenland's energy resources are just now beginning in earnest, with enormous potential for American industry. 5. [...] we have reassured sometimes skeptical Greenlanders of our good will and interest in partnership. Although part of the Danish kingdom and traditionally oriented toward Europe, Greenland nevertheless has a growing appreciation for the logic of geography and its own potential as part of North America. Our [efforts] have reinforced Greenlandic desires for a closer relationship with the United States, just as Greenland assumes ever-greater charge of its international relations and edges closer to full independence. Our intensified outreach to the Greenlanders will encourage them to resist any false choice between the United States and Europe. It will also strengthen our relationship with Greenland vis-a-vis the Chinese, who have shown increasing interest in Greenland's natural resources. [...]
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11. A recent study of hydrocarbon potential, led by the U.S. Geological Survey, concluded the continental shelf off northeast Greenland alone could harbor oil and gas reserves to rival Alaska's North Slope. The USGS will complete additional studies on similarly promising areas in northern and western Greenland next year. After a thousand-year interval of cooling, average temperatures in Greenland have in this century climbed to the level they were during the first Viking settlements of 986 AD. Whether because of man-made climate change or a massive, cyclical shift in weather patterns, Greenland's carbon riches are more easily accessible now than ever. 12. Meanwhile, the resource possibilities in Greenland are not limited to oil and gas. The Greenland government has issued 68 mineral exploration licenses to international companies, and expects at least five significant new mines to open in the next five years, harvesting everything from diamonds and rubies to molybdenum and zinc.

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26th October 2007, Paris: Trying to impress the French
Subject: PRESIDENT SARKOZY’S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE U.S.: POLICY COORDINATION WITH A SELF-CONSCIOUSLY INDEPENDENT FRANCE Reference ID: #07PARIS4357 Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton [...] 3. [...Sarkozy] stated publicly that he would not be a “vassal” of the U.S. He will also continue to highlight differences on selected issues such as the environment, GMOs [...] 16. [...] high priority issues which Sarkozy will also want to discuss include his top issue, climate change, along with Iran, Kosovo, Burma, Darfur, counterterrorism and climate change. [...] 22. (SBU) Environment/Climate Change: Climate Change: On his election day, Sarkozy called for a greater U.S leadership role on climate issues. He will want to come out of his meeting with the President able to say that he again pushed the President to lead. The Embassy, backed closely by Washington agencies, has impressed on not only Sarkozy and his staff, but also officials across France that the U.S. has been leading and continues to lead in the fight against climate change. We’ve impressed on them -- and Sarkozy should be told again -- that the U.S. has spent $37 billion in the past six years -- more than any other country -- for climate science and energy research. We’ve developed new international partnerships, part of a real strategy of international engagement to reduce carbon emissions. We’ve shown the French that even with considerably greater economic and population growth than in Europe, we’re doing a better job at reducing both energy intensity and carbon emissions. After the President’s Major Economies Meeting (MEM) in late September in Washington, French officials offered to host the next meeting while expressing some disappointment with both the lack of agreement on a post-Kyoto emissions
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goal and U.S. reluctance regarding market-based cap and trade measures. Areas of potential conflict include concerns that a failure for a broad adoption of similar carbon reduction schemes will put European industry at a competitive disadvantage and the possible French advocacy of a European imposed carbon tax on imported goods. Despite extensive U.S.-French collaboration in developing next generation climate-friendly technologies, the French also criticize what they see as U.S. over-reliance on yet-to-be-developed technologies (carbon capture and storage, second generation bio-fuels, and advanced nuclear) to address emissions. France is skeptical that China and India and other major emerging economies will take steps to reduce emissions unless the U.S. moves first. This is an opportunity to convince Sarkozy that we take this issue seriously and have a concrete plan to make real progress.

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29th of January 2008: Merkel “aggressive” on climate change
Subject: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN KOENIG CLIMATE CHANGE: Aggressive Measures Reference ID: #08BERLIN122 Classified By: 13. (C) Chancellor Merkel and the rest of Germany's political leadership remain serious about pursuing aggressive international measures to meet the challenges of global warming. Merkel has made climate change a priority of her Chancellorship and enjoys the overwhelming domestic support on this. Merkel's support for mandatory, targeted global limits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and an international cap-and-trade regime reflects a deep-seated belief that only drastic, concerted efforts on the part of the international community can slow -- and ultimately reverse -- the human contribution to global warming. If anything, Steinmeier supports tougher standards. While the Germans have been willing to consider alternative solutions, such as new technologies for clean coal and renewables, fundamental differences in our approaches to the issue of climate change remain, and could lead to more public disagreement in the future. For example, while Germany will send a delegation to the January 30 Major Economies Meeting (MEM), the German Government remains skeptical about the value that the Major Economies Process (MEP) adds to the UNFCCC track. The Germans are particularly concerned about the need to avoid duplication of effort in the various other climate change-related forums, including the UNFCCC and the G-8.

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6th of June 2008: Denmark & USA meet on Greenland
Subject: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH DANISH FM MOELLER IN GREENLAND Reference ID: #08COPENHAGEN322 Classified By: Regional Environmental Officer Erik Hall. 1. Summary: In a May 27 meeting before the opening of the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland, Deputy Secretary Negroponte and Danish FM Per Stig Moeller exchanged perspectives on cooperation in the Arctic; underlined shared goals for a climate change agreement and resolution of the Doha trade round; reviewed prospects for NATO membership for Georgia and discussed the current situations in Georgia, Afghanistan, Pakistan. The Deputy Secretary urged Denmark to consider the candidacy for IOM DirGen of Amb. Swing; Moeller said he would do so “constructively and positively.” [...] Climate Change 10. The Deputy Secretary raised the issue of global climate change negotiations, saying the U.S. had shifted its position and would be willing to accept binding emissions mandates as long as China and India accept some form of enforceable obligation under the post-Kyoto regime. Moeller mentioned the Montreal Protocol as a good model for greenhouse gas emissions. Under that arrangement, which solved the problem of the ozone hole, developing countries were given an extra 10 years to meet their phase-out targets. Taksoe-Jensen said China and India want the U.S. to commit to emissions reductions first. The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that EU criticism of the U.S. might give China and India the impression they were “off the hook.”

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2nd of September 2008: Pulling strings to avoid Iranian scientist in IPCC
Subject: LIFELINES FOR IPCC WORKING GROUP ELECTION Reference ID: #08STATE93970 Classified By: Classified by IO/DAS Gerald Anderson

Note related cables include #08OSLO461 and #08BRASILIA1112 [...]
2. (C) Summary. Missions should be prepared to assist the U.S. Delegation to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its efforts to secure a positive outcome to elections for working group co-chair positions at the IPCC Plenary being held in Geneva, August 31-September 4. USDEL is working actively to prevent the election of an Iranian scientist to the developing-nation co-chairmanship of Working Group Two, a position which would pair him with a U.S. scientist running unopposed for developed-nation cochair of the same group. The focus of USG efforts is to support an alternate candidacy for the position, although the full slate of active candidates and their potential for election will not be known until the later stages of the plenary sessions. Curricula vitae of some of the leading candidates are at paras 6-10. 3. (C) Action Request. Missions should assign a Point-ofContact for this issue and provide phone and e-mail information to the US Mission to the UN in Geneva. USUN should appoint its own POC and relay contact information for all POCs to USDEL IPCC. In the event that USDEL requires assistance in working with counterpart delegations (e.g., coming to a consensus on a single strong alternate candidate to support), USDEL may contact Mission POCs directly, or via US Mission Geneva, to ask that Missions apprise host governments of the situation, with a view to arranging for instructions from capitals. Missions should do everything possible to assist USDEL if they receive such a request. Until such a call is received, however, Missions should take no action on this issue; USDEL will be interacting directly with host-country expert delegations in Geneva, and

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premature contacts/demarches with host country government officials in capitals, even to preview the background of the situation, could be highly counter-productive. Point of Contact for USDEL is OES/EGC,s Donna Lee XXXXXXXXXXXX. 4. (C) Background. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (http://www.ipcc.ch) is a highly influential body established by the World Meteological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to assess scientific issues related to climate change. This year, the U.S. has nominated Stanford Professor Christopher Field to the developed-country chair of IPCC Working Group Two, which assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic and natural systems to climate change and the options for adaptation. His nomination is unopposed. Iran, however, has nominated Dr. Mostafa Jafari to be the developing-country co-chair of the same working group. Jafari is a highlyqualified scientist with research ties to the UK and Japan, but he is also a senior Iranian government employee who has represented Iran in international negotiations. Co-chair appointments are for a minimum of four years, and require close collaboration and often travel to or extended residencies in each others' countries. Having U.S. and Iranian co-chairs would be problematic and potentially at odds with overall U.S. policy towards Iran, and would significantly complicate the U.S. commitment to funding the Working Group Two secretariat. U.S. withdrawal of its nominee, however, would effectively give Iran a veto over future U.S. nominees in UN bodies. Moreover, having a U.S. co-chair at the IPCC significantly bolsters U.S. interests on climate change, a key foreign policy issue. 5. (C) Background continued. Prior to arrival in Geneva, USDEL contacted IPCC Chairman Dr. Rajendra Pachauri (please protect), who agreed to work on this issue to avoid the potential for disruption to one the organization's three core working groups. Next, USDEL contacted the Austrian delegate serving as EU representative on the nominating committee that manages the election process, who showed an understanding of U.S. equities. USDEL contacted the Malian and Argentinean delegations, who have nominated highlyqualified co-chair candidates (see below), and the German delegation, who have been interested in advancing the Malian for co-chair of Working Group Three, for which Germany has nominated an unopposed candidate as developed-country co13

chair. The Malians subsequently told USDEL that their candidate, Dr. Yauba Sokona, prefers Working Group Two to Working Group Three. Also prior to arrival in Geneva, USDEL contacted the UK and Netherlands delegations, both of which we have worked closely with in the past. Based on experience at prior IPCC plenaries, events related to the Working Group elections will likely unfold unpredictably and rapidly, necessitating a rapid and flexible USG response. 6. (SBU) CV of Iranian candidate: Mostafa Jafari Personal Information: DPoB: 1956, Tehran Education: -- Post doctorate research in Plant Ecophysiology Methodology in 1997 (Japan). -- Ph.D. in Plant Science (Ecology) in 1990 (UK). -- Short course in Agricultural Economy in 1983 (Tehran). -- B.Sc. in Forest and Range graduated in 1978 (Iran). [...] 7. (SBU) Biographic Summary of Malian candidate [...]

8. (SBU) CV of Argentinean candidate
9. (SBU) CV of Moroccan candidate

10. (SBU) Biographic Summary of Maldivan candidate [...signed:] RICE

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8th of May 2009, Beijing: China positive about COP15
Subject: BEIJING-BASED G-5 CHIEFS OF MISSION ON DPRK, GTMO UIGHURS, SINO-JAPAN RELATIONS, DALAI LAMA Reference ID: #09BEIJING1247 Classified By: Acting DCM William Weinstein [...] 8. (C) UK DCM Wood said the UK Environment and Science Minister had recently had talks with Chinese officials on climate change. In the lead up to Copenhagen, China would not agree to targets on emissions but was willing to be constructive and would come to Copenhagen with a package of action items related to nuclear power, renewable energy and reforestation. Wood said his impression was that China could be induced to do more on climate change.

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26th of May 2009, Moscow: An ice cold Russian
Subject: RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC: POLICY AND COMPETING VOICES Reference ID: #09MOSCOW1346 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells [...] Environmental Concerns 5. State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev told Levin April 15, that climate change “was not a matter of any concern,” and added that it may work to Russia's advantage by reducing the cost of transportation and easing access to petroleum resources in the far north. Despite potential economic benefits, influential voices in the Russian scientific community disagree with Kosachev, acknowledging that climate change also poses a danger. A November 2008 report on climate change by Russia's Federal Hydrometeorological Service (Roshydromet) noted that the minimum seasonal level of Arctic sea ice has receded by 9 percent per decade since satellite observations began in 1979; in September 2007, the ice cover reached the lowest level ever recorded. Roshydromet noted that climate change affected the Arctic region disproportionately compared to lower latitudes. The habitat of such threatened species as the polar bear have especially suffered. Warming could increase the spread of certain vector-borne diseases, negatively affecting human health. Large-scale permafrost melting threatens Russian cities, such as Yakutsk, whose foundations are built on permafrost. [...] 13. [...] Increased scientific cooperation, particularly on climate change, could increase trust and build confidence.

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19th of June 2009: Briefing after hacking attack
Subject: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY Reference ID: #09STATE63860 Classified by: Derived from Multiple Sources [...] 24. (SBU) CTAD comment: In June 1992, a United Nations Conference on Environment and Development -- informally known as the Earth Summit -- was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. During this conference, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) -- a treaty intended to achieve stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system -- was produced. The UNFCCC, primarily focused on the voluntary stabilization of GHG emissions by industrialized countries, was ratified and put into effect March 21, 1994. In order to evaluate the progress of UNFCCC signatories, the parties involved gather annually in meetings dubbed Conferences of the Parties (COPs). At COP-3 held in Kyoto, Japan, in December 2007, a protocol to the UNFCCC called the “Kyoto Protocol” was adopted, outlining in part legally binding commitments for the reduction of GHG emissions for developed nations. The terms of this protocol are set to expire in 2012, and the goal of this year's COP-15, which will be held December 1 to 18 in Copenhagen, Denmark, is to establish a new agreement among concerned nations prior to the Kyoto Protocol's end. [...] 26. (SBU) CTAD comment: On June 1, CTAD's Technical Analysis/Special Operations monitoring detected a malicious e-mail massage targeting five DoS individuals employed within the Division of Ocean Affairs, Office of the Special Envoy for Climate Change. The socially engineered message had the subject line “China and Climate Change” and was spoofed to appear as if it were from a legitimate international economics columnist at the National Journal. In addition, the body of the e-mail contained comments designed to appeal to the recipients
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as it was specifically aligned with their job function, and a signature block with contact information for the spoofed sender was present. Attached to the message was a PDF file, also titled “China and Climate Change” which harbored malicious code designed to exploit the Adobe Collab getIcon(), JavaScript vulnerability (CVE-20090927). This vulnerability, if executed successfully, would have allowed malicious actors to remotely execute arbitrary code on a victim computer. The PDF document also contained the Poison Ivy Remote Administration Tool -- a malicious software program that provides a remote user with nearly complete control over a comprised system. However, since the DoS users targeted in this intrusion attempt were operating with currently patched versions of Adobe software, there was neither compromise nor data lost as a result of this incident (for technical information about the incident, see CTAD Report TR-09034). 27. (C//NF) CTAD comment: DoS employees dealing with sensitive diplomatic matters are often targets of socialengineering schemes conducted by actors seeking to harvest sensitive information from DoS computer systems and networks. As negotiations on the subject of climate change continue, it is probable intrusion attempts such as this will persist. CTAD recommends personnel involved with climate change issues or topics relating to the upcoming COP-15 continue to remain aware of the elevated risk of targeted socially engineered e-mail and report any suspicious messages to their information systems security officer (ISSO).

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26th of June 2009: EU & US security talks
Subject: WORKING WITH THE EU ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: NIC ENGEL VISIT Reference ID: #09BRUSSELS912 Classified By: CDA Christopher W. Murray 1. Summary: In Brussels, June 15-17, Major General Richard L. Engel, USAF (Retired), Director, Climate Change and State Stability Program, Long Range Analysis Unit, National Intelligence Council (NIC) heard from high level Europeans that: the connection between security and climate change -- including, but not limited to adaptation and emergency response -- is a shared concern; a positive outcome of the UNFCC December meeting is vital; that China and India are major players; the countries of Africa face multiple challenges, and there are excellent possibilities for increased U.S.-EU cooperation in research. 2. Rich Engel, NIC's Director of Climate Change and State Stability Program, discussed the security aspects of climate change and urged increased U.S.-European research cooperation. He briefed colleagues in Embassy Brussels, USEU and USNATO and met with EU and NATO representatives. The previous week, Engel had been in London, participating in an interactive geo-political modeling conference -- the Arctic Game -- to explore national interests of an opening Arctic organized by the National Intelligence Council. The trip to Brussels was a natural add-on, strongly supported and coordinated between U.S. Mission and the U.K. Permanent Representation. 3. Engel spoke to 80 officials at the European Commission's DG RELEX during a lunch time debate. The mixed audience of Commission and Council staffers, and think tanks, NGOs and media representatives, was convened as part of a training program, held under Chatham House rules, to discuss important policy issues. He gave a presentation on the results from a National Intelligence Assessment on the national security ramifications of global climate change. Noting that the study went only to
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2030 and did not consider mitigation effects, Engel said the expectation is that climate change will aggravate existing problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffective leadership and weak political institutions that threat state stability, but will not be the fundamental cause of any failed state. He listed three principal ways climate change would affect national security: water availability, agricultural productivity, and extreme weather threats to economically significant infrastructure. He also briefly described the Arctic Game and explained how this type of event provides insights to analysts. In response to audience calls for recommendations, Engel stressed the NIC's role in providing information to policy makers, turning aside questions on what should be the optimal results of the December UNFCC meeting in Copenhagen. 4. The USEU Charge d'Affaires hosted a dinner for Engel that was attended by, among others, The Norwegian Ambassador to the EU; the Canadian DCM; the Special Counselor to HR Solana for Climate and Energy; and Tom Spencer, a former MEP, and now with the NGO International Environment Security. Engel reviewed the Arctic Policy Game run in London the previous week and discussed the security risks global warming poses to India and China, particularly those associated with glacier melt. He focused on Russian behavior during the Arctic exercise, much to the interest of the Norwegian, Canadian, and other officials. Spencer said that unlike western states, China and India will not have the capacity to adapt and this shortcoming will have serious regional, if not global, repercussions. The Charge added that the United States and the EU must intensify efforts to getting China and India to agree to a deal at Copenhagen. Solana's climate advisor said that the security dimension of climate change was a major focus for the EU and the Norwegian Ambassador stressed the importance of the High North --the Arctic – to Norway. 5. At an informal breakfast meeting of the EU Political and Security Committee, Engel reviewed the work done by both U.S. and EU analysts on the issue of climate change and national security noting in particular a well-known
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U.K. research center. He urged greater cooperation in research and modeling data in the near term (6 months to 5 years) and called for more work on precipitation and major circulation patterns. Engel offered to provide U.S. studies and expressed a strong interest in EU expert evaluations as to how changing conditions will effect Europe. Helga Schmid, Director at the Council Policy Planning Early Warning Unit, noted the discussions she had had with Engel in Washington and spoke about EU papers on Africa, Asia, the Middle East and on Latin American and Southeast Asia. The U.K. Ambassador said that they had ongoing climate change studies with France on the Sahel and with China. The German Ambassador said that major coordination was needed in the international science community and that government funding was necessary to transform science knowledge into action. Engel described the process used in the National Intelligence Assessment and provided a readout on the geo-political Arctic policy game held in London. 6. In response to the Irish Ambassador's query about business community reactions, Engel quoted NIC Chairman's report to Congress that energy, environment and the economy are interdependent. The Danish Ambassador pointed out that security aspects were a subset of climate change and that countries in Africa have more immediate problems, many of which require better governance, including land and water management. The Dutch Ambassador suggested that in addition to looking at North Africa and its possible impacts on Europe, it was equally important to consider the tropics, as large African populations below the Sahel will also seek to move north. The Spanish Ambassador introduced the topic of “good news” and the possibility of improvement in agriculture in some areas. Engel said that there could be short term benefits, but gave the example of Russia where warmer temperatures will also increase aridity and melting permafrost will cause serious problems with energy producing infrastructure. Turning to energy issues, the Romanian Ambassador asked about effects on oil and energy resources in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. Engel said that energy destabilization anywhere in the world was a concern but that during the period considered in the U.S. assessment
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-- up to 2030 -- the climate effects on hydrocarbon sources of energy were not significant. The Lithuanian Ambassador argued that climate change might just be a normal historic pattern with human activity only a small component. Engel replied it was a sensitive debate, but that from a national security standpoint, the cause of change doesn't really matter, it's the results and the response that count. The French Deputy inquired about the public role in the NIC's deliberation, process and results. Engel noted that this subject had significant unclassified components and noted the unprecedented posting of certain reports on the internet website at www.dni.gov.

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22nd of September 2009, Berlin: US evaluating German environmental policy
Subject: MERKEL VS. STEINMEIER? WHAT DO THE GERMAN ELECTIONS REALLY MEAN FOR U.S. INTERESTS? Reference ID: #09BERLIN1176 Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS […] 20. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE (No Change): There is little difference between the parties on issues in play at the upcoming UNFCCC's COP-15 in Copenhagen, and Merkel maintains strong control over German policy in this area. There will be a new Environment Minister should a blackyellow government be formed, however, and it is unclear which party would then control the Ministry. In previous CDU/CSU-FDP coalitions, the CDU ran it but if the FDP does as well as current polls suggest, it might make a play for the Ministry. Current SPD Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel has had a high profile in his party's Bundestag campaign and could remain in place in a Grand Coalition.

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28th October 2009, Stockholm: Pragmatic Swedish ambitions
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER REINFELDT VISIT TO WASHINGTON Reference ID: #09STOCKHOLM677 Classified By: Ambassador Matthew Barzun Related cables include #09STOCKHOLM679. [...] 3. (SBU) Reinfeldt's top priority for the Swedish EU Presidency is a successful outcome at the December COP-15 climate change negotiations. He has focused Sweden's EU Presidency on an "eco-efficient" economy for Europe, i.e. growing the economy while reducing carbon emissions. (Between 1992-2008, Sweden increased GDP 46% and reduced green house gas emissions by 9%). Realizing that a comprehensive agreement is unlikely without U.S. legislation in place, Reinfeldt told his officials to cease criticizing U.S. climate change policy and to seek a political agreement to resolve some issues, such as financing, with a commitment to conclude a comprehensive treaty with emission targets in early 2010. The day after he meets with you, Reinfeldt will travel to India for the EU Summit there. Later in November, he will travel to China for that EU Summit. Because Reinfeldt is focusing the India and China Summits on climate change, we recommend you coordinate messages to those governments with him when you meet. Climate Change 4. (SBU) Swedish officials have told us we need to understand how important climate change is to Reinfeldt -- that it is "in his heart." Reinfeldt talks about climate change constantly and is directly active in trying to manage the negotiating process among EU Member States heading into COP 15. His governing coalition has pinned much of its hopes for re-election on a successful EU Presidency, and how voters judge Sweden's EU Presidency will depend considerably on what happens in Copenhagen. Opinion polls in Sweden show around 85% of people putting environmental issues as the top priority their government should address.
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5. (C) The main public theme of Sweden's EU Presidency has been the drive toward an "eco-efficient" economy, i.e. growing the economy while reducing carbon emissions, which Sweden has done successfully after introducing a carbon tax in the early 1990's. Realizing that a comprehensive agreement is unlikely without U.S. legislation in place, Reinfeldt ordered his Cabinet to stop criticizing U.S. climate change policy, and since then his officials have become more pragmatic, telling us it is important to "deliver something even it if is not the end of the road." In the absence of a legally binding treaty, Sweden and EU officials will seek a framework or political agreement to resolve some issues, such as financing, with a commitment to conclude a comprehensive treaty with emission targets in early 2010. Swedish officials are concerned, however, that we are running out of time to agree on climate change financing before Copenhagen. The Swedish Presidency is using EU Summits with Brazil, South Africa, Russia, China and India to push for progress on climate change. Swedish officials have called on the U.S. to show greater leadership in pressing the emerging economies to seriously discuss climate change financing. 6. (C) Reinfeldt will be traveling to India and China in November, and you may wish to coordinate message with him when you meet. Sweden has a long-standing, well-developed dialogue with China on climate change and reducing the energy intensity of China's economy. This includes regular exchanges between environmental officials, a Swedish-Chinese advisory panel to the Chinese government on climate change, and Swedish companies like Volvo holding their firms in China to the same environmental standards as for plants in Sweden. Reinfeldt's State Secretary for Climate Change Lars Erik Liljelund, who frequently visits China, tells us China looks to Sweden as a model on climate change and other issues because Sweden was the first Western country to recognize the Mao regime (in 1950), and is viewed by China as a good example of a "harmonious society" with a highly developed social benefits, taxation and environmental protection system. Liljelund says this special relationship is helping Sweden push China to reduce the energy intensity
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of its economy. Liljelund and Reinfeldt's State Secretary for Internal Policy Coordination have both suggested that the U.S. and Sweden coordinate efforts to narrow the gap between Chinese and U.S. positions in the climate change negotiations.

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3rd of November 2009, Paris: The French are ambitious and have doubts about USA
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO PARIS -- NOVEMBER 8, 2009 Reference ID: #09PARIS1473 Classified By: Ambassador Charles H. Rivkin [...] AN URGENT FOCUS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 10. (SBU) The French remain divided on how to respond to the Obama Administration's approaches to climate change. Most of the interested public and many in the government believe that interim 2020 reduction targets, and the level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and concentrations at that time, will determine success or failure in slowing global warming. For them, the EU's target of 20 to 30 percent reductions below 1990 is the sole measure of an acceptable policy. Even sophisticated observers are skeptical that long-term reduction goals legislated in the United States can be counted on as more than aspirations, especially if radical cuts are not imposed up front. We have reiterated that U.S. laws are reliably enforced by the Federal government and by U.S. courts, using the Clean Air Act as our example. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials agree that legislation moving through Congress and the Administration's proposals would establish a system comparable to the EU's measures. These officials regard Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo's public criticisms of Waxman-Markey as "insufficient on the medium term goal" as distracting attention from the need for China and India to reduce their rates of growth in GHG emissions.

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5th of November 2009, Berlin: Germany proposes US-EU team play
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO BERLIN, NOVEMBER 8-10 Reference ID: #09BERLIN1403 Classified By: Ambassador Phillip Murphy Summary: [...] Assurances that Germany and the EU will work with the U.S. at Copenhagen and not seek to isolate […] 10. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cutoffs of natural gas supplies, especially given the departure of former Foreign Minister Steinmeier -- known for his relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect Germany to continue to place a heavy emphasis on maintaining good relations with Russia, believing that constructive engagement and assistance with modernization are the best way to deal with this difficult "strategic partner." Germany is Europe's largest energy user and is highly dependent on Russia for energy supplies, but Berlin does not view this as a vulnerability, believing that Moscow is equally dependent on Germany as a consumer. Germany nevertheless recognizes that it must diversify its sources of supply, routes, and means of energy generation to gain greater energy security. 11. (C) As the Chancellor's remarks underline, German officials want strong U.S. leadership going into the Copenhagen Summit. They are advocating for a unified US/EU position towards the major emerging economies, particularly China and India, to urge them to commit to ambitious national actions at Copenhagen. They are looking for signals of our commitment to domestic and international actions that will allow us to collectively meet science-based targets. German leaders recognize the challenge of passing climate change legislation in the U.S. and have lowered their expectations for the possibility of reaching a legally binding agreement next month at Copenhagen. They have begun to describe the
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Summit as one step in a larger process -- a politically binding framework -- and may be preparing the German public for a less ambitious outcome.

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30th of November 2009: Preparing for Nobel Peace Prize
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO OSLO Reference ID: #09OSLO739 Classified by Ambassador Barry B. White. [...] 3. The Nobel Peace Prize shines an exclusive spotlight for a few moments each year on this country of mountains, fjords, and vast quantities of natural resources. Ultimately, awarding you the Prize is the Norwegian Nobel Committee's way of welcoming your presence on the world stage. The Prize demonstrates their approval of your goal to free the world from nuclear weapons, your commitment to reversing global climate change, your promotion of dialogue and multilateral engagement to achieve foreign policy goals, including sustainable economic growth in developing nations, and even your desire to bring universal health care to Americans. [...] 4. [...] In particular, Stoltenberg seeks our global cooperation on maternal and child health (safe birth), carbon capture and storage, and deforestation. Stoltenberg is personally committed to addressing climate change. The Norwegian population shares the Norwegian government's efforts to protect the environment, as reflected in the past awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and to former Vice-president Al Gore in 2007. Norway has been active in COP-15 preparatory meetings, and maintains that developed countries should take on quantified emissions reduction commitments while developing countries should receive technological and financial support. Norway is investing heavily in carbon capture and storage technology in hopes that it will play a significant role in emissions reductions, and is a partner in the U.S.-led Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. Norway also works closely with us in the Arctic Council, where we co-chair a task force on search and rescue capacity to support increased shipping traffic in the Arctic as the polar ice melts.
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Energy and the Economy 5. While Norwegians pride themselves on their climate change policy and maintain one of the cleanest oil and gas production systems in the world, they understand the paradox their efforts represent, given that Norway's wealth comes mostly from the oil and gas industry. Indeed, energy is at the heart of the U.S. - Norway economic relationship, with nearly 70% of Norway's total exports to the U.S. coming from crude oil and petroleum products, and with about 60% of U.S. direct investment in Norway in the offshore petroleum sector. Norway, as the world's fifth largest exporter of oil and third largest exporter of natural gas, plays a key stabilizing role in global energy markets and in Europe's energy security. Norway serves as a reliable counter-weight to Russia's decidedly mixed record on energy security. Norwegians are also keen to emphasize indicators other than the oil and gas industry that demonstrate their economic success. For example, they are the second largest exporter of seafood after China, and their maritime shipping industry is the fifth largest in world.

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4th of December 2009, The Hague: “Roadmap, please” (the Dutch predicting everything)
Subject: NETHERLANDS: SEEKING CLEAR 2010 ROADMAP FOR CLIMATE TALKS POST-COPENHAGEN Reference ID: #09THEHAGUE730 Sensitive. 1. SUMMARY: The Dutch will work in Copenhagen to secure a pragmatic, operational agreement at COP-15 as proposed by Danish PM Rasmussen. But they are concerned the climate negotiations process will bog down after political momentum subsides in 2010. They also fear domestic backlash in Europe if the targets contained in a COP-15 outcome fall far short of a pathway that limits global warming to two degrees centigrade. [...] STILL PUSHING FOR 30 PERCENT EU EMISSIONS CUT 3. (SBU) Kaasjager said the Netherlands still wants the EU to bump up its 2020 emissions reduction commitment from 20 to 30 percent. He acknowledged this move would not persuade other developed countries to put forward more ambitious commitments; the aim would be to create a more positive atmosphere in the negotiations and encourage developing countries to accept a deal. He said he would like to see the EU announce the 30 percent commitment heading into the last weekend of COP-15 as a "final push" to political leaders. POST-COPENHAGEN ROADMAP 4. (SBU) Kaasjager said EU political leaders are facing a credibility problem at COP-15. They will support a pragmatic, operational agreement even if it falls short of their ambitions. But they are politically vulnerable because they sold the European public on a two degree limit for warming. If an agreement at COP-15 drifts too far off the two degree trajectory, it will put EU leaders in a "tough position." To compensate, Kaasjager said the EU would push hard to get a clear, strong timeline for treaty talks in early 2010.
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5. (SBU) Kaasjager said the Netherlands fears the United States will be content with a political agreement at COP15 and backtrack on an international legal agreement. EconOff assured him this fear is unfounded and the United States remains committed to expeditious work towards a legal agreement. Kaasjager emphasized the Netherlands is extremely preoccupied with having a 2010 roadmap before leaving Copenhagen. During COP-15 the Dutch will seek a clear vision of what the structure of a legal agreement will look like. They favor a structure that "uses what we have" and preserves the name "Kyoto" even if in practice it is adapted substantially to accommodate U.S. and emerging economy commitments/plans. DUTCH "FAST-START" FINANCING OFFER 6. (SBU) Jonk said the Netherlands has proposed to the EU it would provide 100 million Euros per year in 2010, 2011, and 2012 to fund "fast-start public support" for climate action in developing countries. This translates to approximately 1.5 to 2 percent of the European Commission's estimated figure of 5 to 7 billion Euros per year needed in fast-start financing. The Netherlands remains very concerned that developing countries will balk at a climate deal without a clearer picture of financial support numbers and sources. CHINA 7. (SBU) Kaasjager said the Netherlands is currently plugging China's November 26 'offer' into various climate models to determine how much of a deviation from Business as Usual it represents. The Dutch preliminary impression is that China can do more with relatively little effort. LEVIN

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9th of December 2009: UK and France wants Tobin tax linked with climate change efforts
Subject: PRIME MINISTER STILL FOCUSED ON TOBIN TAX, DISAPPOINTED IN U.S. POSITION Reference ID: #09LONDON2742 Classified by: Ambassador Louis Susman 1. (C/NF) Summary. Prime Minister Brown continues to press hard for international adoption of a Tobin Tax, despite being aware of U.S. opposition to the tax. He has raised this issue - and bonuses - on several occasions directly with the Ambassador, and said that he saw cooperation on financial services and Afghanistan as the critical elements of U.S.-UK relationship. Brown first highlighted the Tobin Tax at the November G-20 Ministerial in St. Andrews, and subsequently told Ambassador that he was disappointed that Treasury Secretary Geithner publicly refused to support the UK position. The political opposition in the UK also is questioning the lack of U.S. support. The PM is using the issue for domestic political gain but also for reasons of “social justice.” The UK may feel emboldened on this issue, given French Foreign Minister Kouchner’s proposal at COP-15 for an international tax on financial services for programs for poverty reduction and climate change, and would likely criticize the U.S. if there were no further international movement on this issue. Prime Minister Raises Tax and Bonuses with Ambassador 2. (C/NF) Prime Minister Brown continues to press hard for international adoption of some form of a Tobin Tax on financial transactions, despite being fully aware of U.S. opposition to the tax. In recent speeches to major business groups, at the Commonwealth Summit, and in press conferences, the PM has emphasized that a Tobin Tax must be among the options explored to ensure that taxpayers do not bear the cost of future bank bailouts. The Prime Minister has raised this issue several times with Ambassador Susman, most recently during the Ambassador’s call to discuss the Afghanistan strategy on November 30, and in a Thanksgiving call from the PM to the Ambassador.
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The Prime Minister has stated that he saw coordination of our actions on Afghanistan and financial services as the cornerstones of the UK-U.S. bilateral relationship, and has expressed disappointment that on the latter, the U.S. has not been as supportive as he had hoped. We expect that the PM will become emboldened to push harder for the tax after France’s Foreign Minister Kouchner, at the Copenhagen COP-15, proposed a .0005 percent tax on financial transactions to fund poverty reduction and combating climate change in developing countries.

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15th of December 2009, London: Commonwealth keen on legally binding treaty
Subject: COMMONWEALTH TACKLES CLIMATE CHANGE, MOSTLY STEERS CLEAR OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES Reference ID: #09LONDON2819 Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville. Climate Change Consensus 2.(C/NF) The UK government, members of civil society, and the Commonwealth Secretariat are both publicly and privately praising the climate change consensus issued from Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on November 28 as part of the biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) for its importance and strength ahead of the COP-15 meetings in Copenhagen. In a December 11 meeting, Director of Political Affairs at the Commonwealth Secretariat Amitav Banerji told Poloff that the consensus, a 14-point declaration that called climate change "the challenge of our time" and called for a "comprehensive, substantial and operationally binding agreement" at Copenhagen that would set the stage for a "legally binding outcome by 2010," would be seen as key for consensus-building ahead of the Copenhagen talks. Banerji noted that the declaration pointed out that many low-lying coastal states and small island nations-- which carry equal weight within the Commonwealth-- face an existential threat as a result of climate change but have contributed least to the problem. The declaration also expressed support for the initiative to establish a Copenhagen Launch Fund that would provide fast-start funding for climate change adaptation in the most vulnerable countries; this fund would start in 2010 and build to $10 billion annually by 2012. 3.(C/NF) Banerji said that Prime Minister Brown was "especially keen" for the Commonwealth to issue "an ambitious declaration," and that it was Brown who brought French President Sarkozy into the meeting in hopes that he could help "drum up a consensus." Banerji said that it was always the intent of the Commonwealth to have the declaration be a political statement and said that the
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power of the agreement was political, in that it allowed the Commonwealth to say that it gave a "major push to the quest for an agreement" at Copenhagen. Banerji said that Australian Prime Minister Rudd played a "star role" in the negotiations, essentially taking over for Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Manning in leading the drafting process and "pushing for a meaningful statement." Banerji further said that Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, and French President Sarkozy chaired the special session but were not involved in the drafting process, making the consensus a true product of the Commonwealth. 4.(C/NF) Brendan Cox, Special Advisor to Prime Minister Brown, told Poloff on November 30 that the special climate change session provided an "important opportunity to gather momentum before Copenhagen," and noted that the proposal to establish the Copenhagen Launch Fund was put forward by the British and subsequently agreed to by all member states. In a December 11 meeting, Mike Smith, Communications Officer at the Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit (CPSU), called climate change the "dominant issue" at the CHOGM and said it was seen as "the sparring before the big fight" in Copenhagen. Smith said the strength of the statement came as a surprise to CPSU; in particular, Smith said that Commonwealth support for the Copenhagen Launch Fund was unexpected.

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22nd of December 2009, London: Briefing
Subject: POST COP-15 PRESS BRIEFING BY UK ENERGY SECRETARY MILIBAND Reference ID: #09LONDON2873 Unclassified. 1.(U) Summary: Ed Miliband, UK Secretary for Energy and Climate Change, briefed the diplomatic corps, press and environmental NGOs on December 21, on results of the Copenhagen Conference (COP-15). Prime Minister Gordon Brown joined by satellite from Scotland. Together they focused on three key points: (1) the UK should persuade other countries, notably the US, China, and other European countries, to agree to more ambitious carbon emissions reduction targets; (2) the UK and other countries should work toward a legally binding international treaty that would, among other things, set up a transparent mechanism to evaluate all countries' progress; (3) the decision-making process in the Copenhagen talks should be streamlined to allow the 192 countries to find common ground on substantive issues. 2.(U) PM Brown told the group that although it was disappointing not to achieve an international legally binding climate change treaty, the UK would continue to press for it. The main outcome of COP-15 is the agreement to limit the increase in global warming to 2 degrees Celsius. Brown outlined steps that need to be taken next. First, by January 31, 2010, all countries should submit their emissions targets. Second, other countries should be persuaded to set higher range emission reduction targets to reduce overall carbon production from 55 gigatons to 40 gigatons by 2020. Brown also said developing countries, such as Bangladesh and Maldives, should receive climate change mitigation funding as part of the USD 30B pledge from developed countries over the next three years. Third, "barely a handful of countries" oppose a legally binding treaty and the best time to move forward with talks is at the next climate change conference in Bonn, Germany in six months hosted by Chancellor Merkel. Lastly, Brown complained there is no vehicle in the UN decision-making process for countries
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to find common ground or bridge the differences. 3.(U) Miliband's remarks focused on steps the UK must continue domestically. He claimed the British government is taking action, but needed to "re-win" the case, and he explained the UK will benefit economically in being at the forefront. Miliband said the UN is central to the process, although he expressed frustration that too much time was spent arguing over procedural issues rather than on the more important substantive ones. Miliband noted that important movements in history were never successful on the first attempt and that COP-15 had generated an "irreversible shift" toward addressing climate change. Miliband specifically mentioned the U.S. when stating that many countries still need domestic climate change campaigns to build more support in-country. Susman

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23rd of December 2009, Brasilia: Disappointment – but not that much
Subject: BRAZIL IS PROUD OF ITS AMBITIOUS APPROACH TO COPENHAGEN COP15 DESPITE DISAPPOINTING RESULTS Reference ID: #09BRASILIA1516 Sensitive but unclassified; not for Internet Distribution. Note related cables include #09BRASILIA1411. 1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The Government of Brazil (GOB) expressed disappointment and frustration with the Conference of the Parties-15 (COP-15) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen. President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva principally blamed the position of the United States on mitigation, which he called "too little" and one that did not evolve during the conference. The modest USG goal for 2020 led to Europe not increasing its mitigation proposal from 20 percent to 30 percent for 2020, he explained, and the USG's position incentivized Japan and others to try to eliminate the Kyoto Protocol. Still, Brazil accepts the Copenhagen Accord and sees it as a step forward. Moreover, Lula crowed that Brazil had the best image at COP15 due to its ambitious proposal. END SUMMARY DISAPPOINTMENT AND FRUSTRATION, MAINLY WITH USG 2. (SBU) The Brazilian press has generally viewed the Conference of the Parties-15 (COP-15) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen as a failure. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, however, has taken a slightly more moderated stance. He has not called COP15 a failure nor a fiasco. In fact, Lula commented that the final results were "better than expected" compared with the low expectations at the beginning of the conference. Lula and the Brazilian delegation have expressed deep frustration on the lack of progress at COP15.

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31st of December 2009: EU Energy Commissioner is “lame duck”
Subject: Lame Duck German Governor Kicked Upstairs as New Energy Commissioner in Brussels Reference ID: #09BERLIN1636 Sensitive but unclassified; not for Internet Distribution. 3. […] The EU Energy Commissioner is responsible for issues such as supply security, energy R&D and efficiency, competition in the gas and electricity markets, infrastructure and low carbon technologies. However, key issues such as energy security and climate change are not in the portfolio; nor will Oettinger take over the role of EU Commission Vice President from Verheugen.

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4th of January 2010, Brussels: President of Europe says it like it is
Subject: EU PRESIDENT VAN ROMPUY’S PLANS FOLLOWING COPENHAGEN AND FOR AFGHANISTAN Reference ID: #10BRUSSELS4 Classified by: Charge D’ Affaires Richard M. Eason 1. (C//NF) Summary: The Ambassador discussed the Conference of Parties (COP) Conference in Copenhagen and Afghanistan with EU Council Permanent President Herman Van Rompuy over coffee December 23 after delivering the congratulatory letter (reftel) from President Obama. Van Rompuy called the Copenhagen Conference a disaster in which Europe was excluded and mistreated. He predicted Mexico COP 16 would be a disaster as well, and added that multilateral conferences would not resolve the climate problem. He proposed coming to an agreement between the EU and the United States during the possible upcoming U.S. - EU Summit in Madrid, and then approaching China to achieve a workable solution. On Afghanistan, Van Rompuy opined that no one in Europe believed in Afghanistan anymore. He said Europe was going along in deference to the United States; there must be results in 2010, or Afghanistan is over for Europe. [...] Copenhagen was a disaster for Europe 3. (C//NF) Van Rompuy raised the recent COP 15 conference in Copenhagen, calling it an “incredible disaster.” He was not angry, in the sense that he never seems angry, but he was as animated and as frustrated as I have seen him. He thought that Europe had been “totally excluded” and was “mistreated.” He thought the only saving grace was that he was not there. Van Rompuy said, “had I been there, my Presidency would have been over before it began.” He said he was criticized for not being present in Copenhagen, and added that he did not need to be there because he does not start in his new position until January 1. He thought it was a wise decision not to attend the conference despite the pressure.
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4. (C//NF) I responded by saying that I had no idea what actually happened since I was not there, but offered that from the reports I was seeing, it looked more like a chaotic meeting had occurred rather than any decision to exclude Europe. But Van Rompuy did not give that explanation much credence, responding, “they could certainly have called Europe and told us to come.” 5. (C//NF) Van Rompuy did seem to ascribe some blame to Europe. He said, “no one knows who to call: Merkel, Barroso, who knows who.” He said he planned to take control of getting Europe on the same page. He mentioned that he had scheduled an informal EU meeting in February to discuss the economy, but he was now going to use the meeting to discuss Copenhagen in addition to the economy. He intends to get the EU lined up. U.S. and EU Need to Talk Climate at Madrid 6. (C//NF) Van Rompuy said he has, “given up on Mexico City,” with Van Daele calling the planned U.N. COP 16 meeting to be held there November to December 2010 “Nightmare on Elm Street 2,” and stating, “who wants to see that horror movie again.” Van Rompuy said, “multilateral meetings will not work.” He indicated that Europe first had to get on the same page; then Europe had to meet with the U.S.; and finally they (I think he meant Europe and the U.S.) had to meet as well with China. Rather than waiting for a failure at Mexico City, he intends to address Copenhagen issues with the United States at Madrid; he envisioned engaging China thereafter. In his mind, talks with the U.S. would have to focus on Madrid and not Mexico City.

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10th of Janurary 2010: No snow in Afghanistan
Subject: KARZAI AND CODEL MCCAIN ON PROGRESS, ELECTIONS, AND REINTEGRATION Reference ID: #10KABUL85 Classified by: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry

[...] 6. [...] Karzai [...] pointed out that climate change was a new and growing concern - at this point in the year there should be abundant snow and there had been none to date.

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21st of January, The Vatican: Pope backs Accord
Subject: “GREEN” POPE SUPPORTS US PATH FORWARD FROM COPENHAGEN Reference ID: #10VATICAN13 Classified by: Julieta Valls Noyes 1. (C) Summary: The Holy See supports USG efforts to have countries associate themselves with the Copenhagen Accord by the January 31 deadline (ref. A), and will encourage them to do so. The Pope’s recent environmental messages offer Vatican officials a strong platform to leverage the moral authority of the Church to combat climate change. While the Vatican supports the inclusion of all countries in international environmental discussions and decision-making, it is not naove about the political motives behind Cuba’s and Venezuela’s criticism of Copenhagen. 2. (C) On January 20, P/EOff met with Dr. Paolo Conversi, the Vatican’s point person on climate change at the Secretariat of State, to deliver ref. A demarche. Conversi immediately expressed the Holy See’s genuine desire to see the Copenhagen process move forward. He was aware of the January 31 deadline but did not know which countries had agreed formally to join the process. Conversi agreed to encourage other countries discreetly to associate themselves with the Accord, as opportunities arise. (Note: For practical reasons, the Holy See will not formally associate itself with the Copenhagen Accord: Vatican City State’s carbon footprint negligible. The Vatican decision is consistent with its practice of not becoming a formal party to agreements if they require substantial technical expertise and reporting commitments). 3. (C) Conversi was pleased overall with the process leading to Copenhagen and with the Conference itself. He said expectations were too high before the event. Regarding the group of dissenting countries, including Venezuela and Cuba, Conversi said the Vatican was sympathetic to their complaints about inclusion in decision-making but believed their criticism was largely politically motivated. Noting that Pope Benedict had firmly established his “green” reputation using his New Years’ Day Peace message to highlight environmental protection (ref. B), Conversi said he looked forward to further collaboration with the U.S.
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prior to Bonn and Mexico City. 4. (U) In a separate meeting, Monsignior James Reinert, the environmental analyst at the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (a Vatican think tank), confirmed to P/EOff that the profile of environmental issues in the Vatican is at an all-time high. Secretariat of State officers represented the Holy See at environmental meetings now, where in the past his own office would have had the lead. (Note: Justice and Peace will continue to produce analytical documents on environmental issues for bishops around the world, while the Secretariat will have the lead on policy, particularly in multilateral fora.) 5. (C) Comment: Conversi’s offer to support the U.S., even if discreetly, is significant because the Vatican is often reluctant to appear to compromise its independence and moral authority by associating itself with particular lobbying efforts. Even more important than the Vatican’s lobbying assistance, however, is the influence the Pope’s guidance can have on public opinion in countries with large Catholic majorities and beyond.

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26th of January 2010, Riyadh: Saudis governed by petroleum ministry
Subject: SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESSING CHINA TO STOP IRANIAN PROLIFERATION, CONCERNED ABOUT TSA REGULATIONS Reference ID: #10RIYADH118 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith Summary: […] A/S Feltman urged Saudi Arabia to associate itself with the Copenhagen Accord by January 31. […] 8.(SBU) A/S Feltman noted the importance that the President places on Climate Change, and the Copenhagen Accord. Given that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi was involved in crafting the final agreement, A/S Feltman noted the United States is counting on Saudi Arabia to associate itself with the accord by January 31. Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia was very pleased the United States was more actively engaged in this issue, and said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports trying to address this issue. He noted that the MFA will have to consult with other involved ministries, such as the Ministry of Petroleum, and promised to respond before January 31.

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28th of January 2010, The Hague: Dutch afterthoughts
Subject: SUPPORT FOR COPENHAGEN ACCORD Reference ID: #10THEHAGUE54 Classified By: DCM Edwin Nolan. SUMMARY: The Netherlands will join the EU in inscribing a conditional emissions reduction target of 30 percent if others commit to comparable efforts. The Dutch had pushed to make the 30 percent offer unconditionally. Dutch climate officials are recalibrating their negotiating strategy after COP15 and putting greater emphasis on pragmatism. They have praised several facets of the Copenhagen Accord and are eager to make it operational. The Dutch are concerned that failure by donors to get fast-track financing flowing quickly will lead to more friction with developing countries later this year. AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CLIMATE WITH ENVIRONMENT MINISTER 2. (SBU) Ambassador delivered reftel points January 13 during her initial call on Environment Minister Jacqueline Cramer. Cramer said the EU should inscribe its target as a single entity. She also emphasized the need for developed country pledges, taken as a whole, to add up to a convincing number for the developing world. She expressed concern that the January 31 annex would be insufficient because this bottom-up approach will not get to a 25 percent developed country commitment. She advocated a specific negotiating track led by the U.S. and others to determine how the developed world can come up with a convincing target. Cramer acknowledged this is a delicate process and offered Dutch help. Regarding the Dutch national goal, Cramer reiterated the Dutch government’s long-standing target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 30 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. (Note: Most domestic environmental and energy analysts consider this unachievable. End note.) Given this ambitious domestic goal, Cramer cautioned that Dutch government and industry were looking for comparable efforts and a level playing field with other EU member states and major global emitters.

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NETHERLANDS JOINS UK IN PUSH FOR 30 PERCENT EU COMMITMENT 3. (C) EmbOffs reinforced reftel points January 25 with the Dutch Foreign Ministry climate negotiator Sanne Kaasjager. He said the Netherlands would join the EU in inscribing a conditional, collective target of 30 percent (the so-called “20/30” commitment, either/or). He described a “vicious” January 20 COREPER meeting where the UK’s and the Netherlands’ push for an unconditional 30 percent target (or at least “20-30” percent, leaving the option for a figure in between) met stiff resistance from Italy and Poland. The Netherlands will not inscribe its own national target -- 30 percent by 2020 -- for fear of distracting attention from the EU target and because its national commitment is a political rather than legal one. ENTHUSIASM FOR COPENHAGEN ACCORD 4. (C) Kaasjager said the Netherlands considered the Copenhagen Accord a significant accomplishment. Specifically, he called the Accord a “breakthrough” for setting out political consensus around the 6 to 8 most contentious issues in climate negotiations. The Dutch were pleased the Accord reiterated the 2 degree Celsius objective. Kaasjager praised President Obama’s hands-on role in securing the Accord while sharply criticizing the “inept” Qsecuring the Accord while sharply criticizing the “inept” Danish performance as chair of COP15. 5. (SBU) The Dutch government is taking steps to convince developing countries to “associate with” the Accord. Kaasjager has drafted messages for embassies in capitals receiving Dutch development assistance to solicit support. This is an unprecedented move for the Dutch government, which traditionally recoils at any suggestion to use aid money as political leverage. But at the annual Dutch chiefs of mission conference in mid-January, ambassadors were clamoring for guidance on how to engage and persuade developing countries on climate negotiations. However, Kaasjager said the Netherlands would find it difficult to make association with the Accord a condition to receive climate financing.

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EU INTROSPECTION AFTER COP15 6. (C) According to Kaasjager, the Copenhagen endgame has caused the EU to take a hard look at its role in climate talks. He was taken aback by the sight of European leaders (e.g., PM Brown and Chancellor Merkel) hovering around the VIP room sofas where the Chinese, Indian, South African, and Brazilian representatives were consulting, trying in vain to get pull asides with the BASIC leaders. Kaasjager took exception with the media’s portrayal of the EU’s exclusion from the final stages of the Copenhagen talks, but delivered a harsh verdict on the EU’s performance at COP15. He lamented the lack of Member State discipline and the failure to bring a “tactical plan” -- meaning the EU was unprepared to adjust quickly to changing dynamics as the talks unfolded. He said his EU counterparts are coming around to the notion that Europe’s strategy must shift from “How to involve the U.S.?” to “How to involve China?” PATH FORWARD FOR CLIMATE TALKS 7. (SBU) In a word, Kaasjager said what emerged from Copenhagen was “pragmatism.” More than ever, Dutch climate officials appreciate that climate negotiations will be an incremental “process of small steps.” They are still deliberating on what the right long-term negotiating track is going forward: bilateral cooperation between major emitters; coalitions of the willing (such as the Major Economies Forum, G20, or Greenland Dialogue); or the legalistic UN process. The Dutch think a bottom-up bilateral approach will not achieve enough emissions reductions. They worry about exclusion from MEF and G20 fora. And they are currently disenchanted with the top-down UN process vulnerable to spoiler countries. Kaasjager said the Netherlands will work to forge a middle road that is achievable and inclusive. In the near-term the Dutch are eager to use the next several months to make the Copenhagen Accord operational and bring its elements to the formal negotiating table in Bonn in June. FAST-TRACK FINANCING PIVOTAL 8. (SBU) Kaasjager was particularly concerned about
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bottlenecks in the flow of fast-track financing envisioned in the Copenhagen Accord. Without serious effort by donor countries, he predicted a worst case scenario in which G77 members use the late 2010 Cancun meeting to accuse the developed world of failing to follow through on its fast-track financing promises. He identified three potential areas of friction with developing countries on financing: most of the pledged funding is not “additional”; it is skewed towards mitigation programs rather than adaptation; and much of it is already committed without much say from recipients. Kaasjager has circulated a proposal for donor country counterparts to meet informally at working levels with recipients countries to address these issues head-on rather than wait for them to surface as a PR disaster later.

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2nd of February 2010: Ethiopia wants monitoring of climate change mitigation funds
Subject: UNDER SECRETARY OTERO’S MEETING WITH ETHIOPIAN PRIME MINISTER MELES ZENAWI - JANUARY 31, 2010 Reference ID: #10ADDISABABA163 Classified by: Under Secretary Maria Otero [...] 4. [...] On climate change, Meles said the GoE fully supports the Copenhagen accord, but is disappointed with signs the U.S. may not support his proposed panel to monitor international financial contributions under the accord. [...] GoE Prepared to Move Forward from Copenhagen 13. (C) U/S Otero urged Meles to sign the Copenhagen accord on climate change and explained that it is a point of departure for further discussion and movement forward on the topic. She noted that while the agreement has its limitations, it has the international community moving in the right direction. Meles responded that the GoE supported the accord in Copenhagen and would support it at the AU Summit. However, he expressed his disappointment that despite President Obama’s personal assurance to him that finances committed in Copenhagen would be made available, he had received word from contacts at the UN that the U.S. was not supportive of Ethiopia’s proposal for a panel to monitor financial pledges regarding climate change. Ms. Gavin assured the Prime Minister that she would look into his concerns.

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5th of February 2010, Copenhagen: Evaluation of COP-15
Subject: DENMARK: GOVERNMENT WEATHERS COP-15 AFTERMATH Reference ID: #10COPENHAGEN69 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED--NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 1. (SBU) Summary: Unrealistic public expectations for the outcome of COP-15 and initial confusion over how to interpret the Copenhagen Accord led to intense media and opposition questioning of Denmark's role as host of the conference, in particular focused on PM Lars Loekke Rasmussen's performance as President of the COP. In response, the Government has defended the Copenhagen Accord as the best outcome possible at COP-15 and a positive step forward toward a legally binding agreement, and public interest appears to be shifting to other issues. 2. (SBU) While it remains publicly committed to pursue a legally binding accord under its COP presidency (which ends in December when Mexico assumes that role at the next COP in Cancun), we note signs that the Government seeks to play a less exposed role in international negotiations this year, preferring to work privately with the UN, Mexico, and the EU in search of a way forward. Denmark will continue to be a useful partner on climate, especially on Copenhagen Accord implementation, and we will continue to work closely with the Government and others in pursuit of shared interests. End Summary. 3. (SBU) The Danish Government (like the USG) admits that the Copenhagen Accord did not fulfil all its hopes for COP-15, but defends the Accord as an important outcome of the COP-15 climate conference. Critics, including the parliamentary opposition, have criticized the Accord for its non-binding nature and criticized PM Lars Loekke Rasmussen for a weak performance as President of the 15th Conference of Parties (COP-15) climate conference held in Copenhagen December 7-18, 2009 (for a complete description of the COP-15 endgame and results, see Ref A). 4. (SBU) National media have fully aired opinions about the handling and results of this historic event for
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Denmark, to the point where public interest is beginning to reach saturation levels. Most awkward for the Government has been a focus on the PM's performance during COP-15. Danish conservative daily 'Berlingske Tidende' cites an unnamed Foreign Ministry source who reportedly witnessed an angry Prime Minister dressing down his leading climate advisor, Bo Lidegaard, in front of Danish delegates during COP15 after feeling himself humiliated by foreign diplomats when he assumed the chair of the conference as it entered the crucial final days. Press have also highlighted procedural errors made by Rasmussen while in the chair, and the opposition has criticized the PM for "throwing in the towel" by giving up the chair in the waning hours of the conference after being thwarted by stubborn opposition from the ALBA countries to COP approval of the Copenhagen Accord. One anonymous analyst charged that the PM was unprepared to assume leadership over this international event, and letting him do so was equivalent to "throwing him to the sharks." Defending the Accord 5. (SBU) In several public appearances since COP-15, PM Rasmussen and new Climate Minister Lykke Friis have answered pointed questions from the press and the opposition on the significance of the Copenhagen Accord and the way ahead before Parliament. While freely admitting the Accord was not ideal, they have defended it as the best agreement possible at COP-15, and an important step forward towards a binding international agreement to address climate change. 6. (SBU) In an appearance before Parliament on January 26, the PM was faulted by the opposition for his inability to push through a legally binding agreement. Social Democrat climate spokesperson Mette Gjerskov criticized a "much too close" Danish alliance with the U.S. in the lead-up to the COP, saying "it was not enough just to get Obama to town and hope to then buy the votes of developing nations." Gjerskov said the PM had chaired COP-15 "as though it was a village hall discussion, not a gathering of world leaders," and urged the government to admit its mistakes and assume greater responsibility for
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the negotiating process in the lead-up to COP-16 in Mexico. Continuing, she declared that "it is now over a month since delegates saw their COP15 chairman throw in the towel and walk out of the conference and nobody has seen or heard from him since. No meetings have been called, no strategy has been laid out. Where's the leadership? Our Prime Minister seems to be suffering from a climate coma." 7. (SBU) In response, PM Rasmussen defended the accord as the best possible outcome and a reflection of "the art of the possible" and "the reality of the situation." The PM said the Copenhagen Accord was an important step forward towards a binding agreement that remains the end goal of the Government. While acknowledging the opposition had a right to try to label the outcome of the COP a 'disaster,' the PM said that view displayed "a very modest understanding of what was--and is--at stake in the international climate debate." On forming alliances, the PM dismissed the criticism and indicated that he sees a much broader alliance behind the Copenhagen Accord. The accord, he said, was supported by countries responsible for more than 80 percent of global CO2-emissions. Friis to the Front--Still Ambitious 8. (SBU) Climate and Energy Minister Lykke Friis, who assumed her ministerial duties when her predecessor, Connie Hedegaard, stepped down just before COP-15 (see Ref B), told Parliament on January 26 that Denmark was committed to pursuing international collaboration on climate change along all tracks (i.e. UN, Kyoto, Copenhagen Accord). 9. (SBU) To do so, she said, Denmark will specifically: --Work with EU and other developed countries on delivering the finance outlined in the accord; --coordinate its efforts with the UN, Mexico, Germany (for the June UNFCCC meeting in Bonn); --keep working through diplomatic channels, via its embassy climate attaches in strategic countries (adding a new one in Mexico City and extending its current attache in South Africa, in anticipation of South Africa's hosting of COP-17 in 2011);
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--the Minister said she would attend the World Economic Forum in Doha January 26-27, and would subsequently visit Delhi (Feb 5-6, coupled with a visit to Beijing). (Note: Friis' staff told REO on January 26 that she is also considering whether and when to continue her predecessor's "Greenland Dialogue" process.) But Not Too Ambitious 10. (SBU) PM Rasmussen has flatly rejected calls from the opposition and - intriguingly - from some within the governing coalition (specifically from the Conservative Party of former Climate Minister and EC Commissionerdesignate Connie Hedegaard), for more ambitious international leadership by Denmark on climate issues in the wake of COP-15. On January 13 during another appearance before Parliament, the PM was denounced by Social Liberal Party leader Margrethe Vestager for "trying to lead from the back seat." Instead, she said, "Denmark could do something on its own. We should say: first we will go for 30 percent, and we are willing to go even further." 11. (SBU) Rasmussen responded that "we could say 100 percent. We could declare that we will end the consumption of fossil fuels by the end of the year, then we would have made a marginal, marginal contribution to the fight against global warming. Because even if we did, even if the whole EU did, even if all developed nations of the world did it, it would still not be enough to reach the 2 degrees target. We would then probably have set ourselves some challenges that are...very challenging financially. It's about balance. And I accept that there is a positive competitive effect of being a frontrunner, but there is also a competitive disadvantage by being too much of a front-runner, and therefore the right place for this discussion right here and now is (within) the EU." Comment 12. (SBU) COP-15 was certainly a disappointment to the Danish Government in that it did not provide the public relations boost it had hoped for. Yet neither was it a bust--the opposition has not been noticeably boosted, and recriminations over COP-15 seem to be losing public
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interest, especially as implementation of the Copenhagen Accord gathers steam. Instead, Danes seem eager to leave the mixed results of COP-15 behind, choosing to move on to focus political debate on other issues. Polls show a slight opposition lead over the government, but that edge was not significantly affected by COP-15. That said, emerging disagreements within the governing coalition and with the opposition over international climate negotiations have the potential to play out further, with electoral implications. 13. (SBU) While the outcome of COP-15 is not directly destabilizing the Rasmussen Government in the short term, the PM appears chastened by his experience and unlikely to risk further high-stakes appearances on the international stage. We expect Minister Friis to now assume a more visible role enunciating Danish climate policy, as Denmark transitions to a more modest role in international negotiations. As COP-15 president for the remainder of 2010, however, Denmark will remain an important player in international climate negotiations, and we will continue to work together with the Government on shared interests in encouraging full implementation of the Copenhagen Accord and building support for an effective international agreement. In coordination with the Department, we will engage with Minister Friis to exchange views on the best way forward. FULTON

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9th of February 2010: Cooperation with Brazil
Subject: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MRE SECRETARYGENERAL PATRIOTA Reference ID: #10BRASILIA45 Classified by: Thomas A. Shannon 6. (C) Referring to President Lula's emphasis on the need for close U.S.-Brazil coordination heading into the UNFCCC COP-16, Patriota said he hoped SECC Todd Stern would be able to come to Brazil soon. He said Lula was committed to the following through on the Copenhagen communique and, unlike other BASIC countries, would not backtrack. "We have to move forward," he said, suggesting that NSC Deputy Froman might be able to make time for talks on climate change during his upcoming visit.

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9th of February, La Paz: Morales derailing Accord
Subject: Morales Continues to Attempt to Derail Copenhagen Accord Classified By: John S. Creamer, Charge d'Affaires Reference ID: #10LAPAZ33 1. (C) Summary: Declaring the Copenhagen UN climate change summit a failure, Bolivian President Morales announced he will convoke the first "People's World Conference on Climate Change and the Mother Earth" in Cochabamba April 20-22 -- coinciding with Earth Day. The conference's stated objective is to improve the position of social movements in the climate change process and develop an alternative work plan to take to the United Nations. As one of only five countries that did not sign the Copenhagen Accord (besides Tuvalu, Venezuela, Sudan, and Cuba), the Bolivian government hopes to raise doubts about the ability of the UN process to advance the climate change agenda and address the concerns of the world's poorest nations. More fundamentally, Morales views climate change as a vehicle for raising his and Bolivia's international political stature, especially among sympathetic anti-globalization groups. 2. (C) President Morales seemed to revel in his highprofile opposition to the UN process at the Copenhagen summit, ridiculing developed nations' proposals, making extraordinary demands for reparations and aid, and alienating the conference organizers and most delegations. Danish Ambassador to Bolivia Morten Elkjaer told us Morales canceled most of his bilateral program at the last moment, including meetings with clean energy firms, sustainable energy experts, and leading Danish businesses and labor federations. Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen spent an unpleasant 30 minutes with Morales, Ambassador Elkjaer said, during which Morales thanked him for bilateral aid (Denmark provides Bolivia approximately $30 million a year in aid), but refused to engage on climate change issues. The Danes said they are "fed up" with Bolivia and the ALBA countries, who continue to mount legal and propaganda arguments against the Copenhagen Accord, but that they will continue to consult
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with their European Union partners on ways to influence the GOB position. 3. (C) Chinese DCM in La Paz, Huang Yazhong, told the Charge that he has raised the Copenhagen Accord twice with Bolivian MFA Multilateral Affairs director MarC-a Cecilia ChacC3n, urging the GOB to rethink its radical opposition to the deal. Noting he had made little progress, the Chinese diplomat suggested that further engagement was pointless and argued that it is up to Brazil to bring around Bolivia and the other ALBA countries. Brazilian officials told us Bolivia refused to adopt Brazil's position on Copenhagen at a November 26 meeting in Manaus organized by President Lula da Silva. Still, Itamaraty official Marcel Biato (and future Brazilian Ambassador to La Paz) said Brazil will continue to press Bolivia on Copenhagen, hoping that Bolivia's isolation on this issue will eventually bring it around. 4. (C) Gisela Ulloa, a member of Bolivian delegations to earlier COP meetings (but not COP-15, where she represented Papua New Guinea and the Coalition for First Nations) told us the GOB's position is aimed at creating an alternative development model consistent with Morales's anti-capitalist philosophy. In addition to demanding enormous reparations from developed nations, the GOB opposes using markets as a mechanism to reduce emissions. Ulloa suggested that Morales recognizes Bolivia will not be included in the deliberations of the major players and is keen to create an alternative forum where he can style himself as the leader of antiglobalization groups and other social movements MAS Senator Ana Maria Romero added that Morales sees environmental issues as one area where he can carve out an international identity independent from that of his close ally, President Hugo Chavez. She recounted to us that an animated Morales told her he was surrounded by well-wishers in Copenhagen urging him "not to abandon them," while Chavez was alone in the corner. 5. (C) Many Bolivians are quick to observe that Morales's climate change campaign is about enhancing his global stature, not about the environment. Former Morales Production Minister and MAS replacement (suplente)
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Senator Javier Hurtado said there is a huge gap between Morales' strident, pro-environmental rhetoric in international fora and his domestic emphasis on industrialization as they key to development. The foundation of this effort is large-scale natural gas, iron, and lithium production projects, enterprises that have historically proven extremely damaging to the environment. In fact, the Inter-American Development Bank has presented a report to the GOB that details the serious potential for environmental damage in extracting lithium. 6. (C) Comment: Bolivia is already suffering real damage from the effects of global warming, but Morales seems to prefer to score rhetorical points rather than contribute to a solution. This radical position won him plaudits from anti-globalization groups, but has alienated many developed nations and most of Bolivia's neighbors .. Our assessment is that Bolivia remains beyond reach on Copenhagen, at least until Morales sees the limits of his approach.

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11th of February 2010, Riyadh: Saudis worried about oil income
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S FEB 15-16 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES SMITH Reference ID: #10RIYADH178 [...] 11. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE: Your visit offers an important opportunity to head off a serious clash over climate change. Saudi officials are very concerned that a climate change treaty would significantly reduce their income just as they face significant costs to diversify their economy. We want to get beyond the obstructionism that Saudi negotiators have often shown during the negotiations and persuade senior leaders to work with us in a partnership to meet their strategic concerns, including by cooperating on developing solar and biomass energy. The King is particularly sensitive to avoid Saudi Arabia being singled out as the bad actor, particularly on environmental issues. Your conveying the importance the President places on working as partners with Saudi Arabia on the Copenhagen process will be very important in making this dialogue more constructive. Secretary Chu intends to explore specific areas of collaboration during his February 21-23 visit.

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12th of February 2010: Saudi schizophrenia
Subject: TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA’S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING POSITION Reference ID: #10RIYADH184 Classified by: Ambassador James B. Smith 1. (S) Saudi Arabia is officially still studying the issue of whether to associate with the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change. Behind the scenes, we understand serious discussions are taking place about which road will best serve the Kingdom’s long term interests. On one hand, Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator has criticized the Copenhagen process in private and in public, arguing that the UNFCCC process is the only acceptable legal framework. On the other hand, Saudi officials are very eager to obtain investment credits for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and other technology transfer projects that will only become available once an agreement has been reached. Saudi officials express concern about the impact a transition to a low-carbon energy mix will have on the country’s revenue stream at a time when it faces enormous financing needs to transform its economy to create jobs for its young, growing population. It also fears imposed economic costs associated with “demonizing” oil. Part of the explanation for this schizophrenic position is that the Saudi Government has not yet thought through all the implications of a climate change agreement, in part because it may not fully understand the various demand scenarios. There appears to be a growing sense within the SAG that it may be in danger of becoming isolated on climate change, which may prompt a re-examination of its position. Saudi officials have suggested that they need to find a way to climb down gracefully from the country’s tough negotiating position. More sustained engagement in coordination with other governments, particularly if pitched as an effort to develop partnership, may help them do so. Saudi Arabia not yet Decided on Copenhagen Accord 2. (C) Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator Dr.
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Mohammad Al-Sabban told Econoffs February 3 the United States should adopt a more inclusive, transparent approach to United Nations Forum for Climate Change Cooperation (UNFCCC) negotiations. Although he was encouraged by President Obama’s attitude towards developing country partners in the negotiations, AlSabban said the parties needed to “learn from the mistakes” of Copenhagen in thinking about preparing for the next Conference of Parties (CoP) in Mexico. Al-Sabban said developing countries felt their Danish hosts forced them to decide on the Copenhagen Accord with practically no notice. Heads of state were also called into the negotiations too early and they applied too much pressure “when the deal was not there,” he said. In specific response to the U.S. request for support for the Copenhagen Accord (ref H), Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia was still studying the accord to determine its position. The SAG cares about the environment, but it also must care for its citizens, he said. Addressing Saudi Economic Concerns Key to Progress 3. (C) Asked how to move forward on a global climate change commitment, Al-Sabban agreed negotiations need a “speedy outcome,” and said countries need to rebuild trust and confidence through more transparent negotiations. He reminisced fondly about the inclusive nature of the initial Kyoto Protocol negotiations, which he said should be replicated in Cancun. Al-Sabban said climate change negotiations should remain under the UNFCCC and not be pursued under alternative frameworks. 4. (C) Asked about tangible actions to reach national climate change goals, Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia’s nationally appropriate actions would include carbon capture and storage (CCS) credits. He emphasized Saudi Arabia’s need for technology transfer and foreign direct investment to mitigate the adverse impact that emissionsreducing policies may have on the Kingdom. Al-Sabban said the SAG had closely studied climate change policies’ potential negative impacts. The Kingdom will need time to diversify its economy away from petroleum, he said, noting that a U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia with its economic diversification efforts would “take the
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pressure off climate change negotiations.”
5. (C) Al-Sabban said the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies was key to addressing Saudi Arabia’s domestic energy demand, and he acknowledged the need for increased energy efficiency awareness. The deployment of CCS technology, he said, was “crucial” for Saudi Arabia. He said the U.S. Administration’s rhetoric to end dependence on foreign oil, reiterated by President Obama in Copenhagen, is antagonistic and causes genuine fear in Saudi Arabia. The SAG is concerned about the outlook for oil demand and global production, and fears it will not be able to diversify in time to reach its development goals.

Shadow Negotiator Suggests Partnership 6. (C) Senior Advisor to the President of Meteorology and Environment (PME) Fawaz Al-Alamy told Econoffs January 27 the U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the same values on climate change, but have different negotiation tactics. Al-Alamy, who joined PME in late 2009 and led Saudi Arabia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, said Saudi Petroleum Minister Ali Al-Naimi wants to move forward in UNFCCC negotiations. (Note: PME sends three representatives with Al-Sabban to climate change negotiations. End note.) Al-Sabban’s negative approach to negotiations “disheartens” him, as does the ongoing “blame game” on climate change. Saudi Arabia, like China and India, needs to behave like an emerging economy rather than a developing country, he said. Al-Alamy noted he had met the previous day with both the Chinese and the Indian Ambassadors to the Kingdom to discuss climate change. 7. (C) Al-Alamy recommended several steps for U.S. engagement with Saudi Arabia on climate change, including active outreach to all the key players including AlSabban, Petroleum Minister Al-Naimi, and PME President Prince Turki bin Nasser. Al-Alamy recommended the U.S. reach out to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary General, who has the power to tone down the alarm in the rest of the Arab world, such as in Egypt. Al-Alamy recommended the U.S. continue to coordinate its approach with other Embassies, which he said has been very effective. Asked how to get beyond the Kyoto Protocol
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lens through which Al-Sabban views climate negotiations, Al-Alamy quickly replied “he only has two more years to talk about Kyoto” before it expires.
8. (C) Al-Alamy said that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi strongly supports solar energy as he believes it will displace oil currently used in the power sector and ultimately increase oil exports. Saudi Arabia currently uses 1.5 million barrels per day to produce electricity and water, he said. The Kingdom is considering beginning a civilian nuclear program, and top leadership including Minister of Foreign Affairs Saud Al-Faisal supports the increased use of renewable energy sources. Some, however, view Copenhagen as a serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s economic stability. “Ask any Saudi,” Al-Alamy said, “they all think Saudi Arabia will be asked to foot the bill for climate change.” Al-Alamy outlined Saudi Arabia’s top concerns, including its strong aversion to mixing trade and environmental priorities. If duties are placed on oil and gas, Saudi Arabia will not be able to move ahead with its economic diversification plans, and this creates a “phobia” of climate change talks, he said. The Saudis also resent the U.S. when it makes decisions “without consulting its friends.” Al-Alamy said Saudi Arabia, and Al-Sabban in particular, needs to feel like a partner of U.S. decision making.

Is Al-Naimi the Problem? 9. (S) Minister Al-Naimi has consistently been rational and practical in talking with western delegations about climate change, noting that Saudi Arabia had to address its development concerns, but conceding that the world needs to work together to address climate change. These reassuring statements stand in sharp contrast to AlSabban’s public comments, such as questioning the science behind climate change just before Copenhagen, and his often obstructionist behavior, as reported by a number of Embassies in Riyadh, during working-level negotiations. Senior Ministry of Petroleum officials have reassured us after each of Al-Sabban’s public outbursts over the last six months that he has been “tamed” and brought back onto the reservation. The frequency and number of times that Al-Sabban steps out of line, and the apparent lack of any sanction, raises questions about the real Saudi position
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on climate change. 10. (S) A recent conversation with UK Embassy officers suggests that indeed Al-Naimi may have some questions about climate change. They report that Al-Naimi was sharply critical of the Copenhagen meetings and the climate change effort in general, in marked contrast to earlier meetings. He complained that heads of state were brought in to negotiate the final stages, which prevented Saudi Arabia from voicing its true opposition to several elements. He also questioned the legality of the Copenhagen process and its future direction. 11. (S) A senior Ministry of Petroleum official explained that, leaving Copenhagen, the Saudi delegation was convinced that the Copenhagen accord would not attract significant support, apparently largely based on AlSabban’s analysis. The Minister’s office was unpleasantly surprised by mid-January, when it was clear that a number of countries had already associated themselves with the accord. Assistant Petroleum Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman told EconCouns that he had spent two days walking Minister Al-Naimi through each of the 90 plus submissions on the UNFCCC web site. Prince Abdulaziz told the Minister that Saudi Arabia had missed a real opportunity to submit “something clever,” like India or China, that was not legally binding but indicated some goodwill towards the process without compromising key economic interests. The Prince intimated to EconCouns that AlSabban would not long retain his position, and said the challenge for Saudi Arabia was to find a way to “climb down” from its negotiating position.

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17th of February 2010: Tactical discussion with the European Union
Subject: DEPUTY NSA MICHAEL FROMAN VISIT TO BRUSSELS, JANUARY 27, 2010 Reference ID: #10BRUSSELS183. SUMMARY [...] 2. (C) DNSA Froman and Hedegaard committed to work closely to define the right Post-Copenhagen climate negotiating group and process, and agreed to hold a DVC prior to the February 11 European Council. [...] CLIMATE CHANGE: BUILDING UPON THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD 12. (C) Climate Commissioner-designate Hedegaard thanked Froman for President Obama's efforts in Copenhagen. She asked about U.S. legislative efforts on climate and U.S. political dynamics around mid-term Congressional elections and how they might impact U.S. international cooperation moving toward COP-16 in Cancun, Mexico. Froman responded that the U.S., overriding international goal, to work on implementing the Copenhagen Accord as well as on the other UN tracks, will not change. We will still work toward domestic legislation as well, Froman said. He thought midterm dynamics would not strongly impact our work going into Cancun. 13. (C) Froman and Hedegaard reviewed Copenhagen outcomes. Froman said that while nobody considered the agreement complete, it is a good step forward. Hedegaard said Copenhagen left some disappointed in the UN process, but stressed that we can't give up. The Accord contains a lot of good points, she said, that should not be wasted. She hoped that the U.S. noted the EU was muting its criticism of the U.S., to be constructive.
14. (C) Both officials agreed we must focus now on operational steps to implement the Copenhagen Accord. Froman said the U.S. will work in the next few weeks on getting countries to sign up for (“associate themselves with”) the
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Accord, and to inscribe their targets. The U.S. would be happy, he suggested, with the seven emerging market countries in the Major Economies Forum (MEF), saying others would then follow. We also need to work on financing, he added.

15. (C) Froman emphasized that we need to determine the right process and grouping of countries to go forward. This could be the Greenland group of 28 countries from Copenhagen, MEF members, or countries signing the Accord, he speculated. The U.S. is not wedded to a particular grouping, he said, but there seems to be broad consensus that relying on the two UNFCCC working groups is insufficient. Hedegaard agreed, suggesting that an informal MEF grouping might be effective. It would be critical that this have legitimacy, she said. The Greenland group is an option, she said, but others might resent this designation.
16. (C) It is vital to get G-77 agreement to whatever grouping we use, Hedegaard continued. Both agreed it will be important to talk to incoming G-77 chair Yemen, with Froman adding it will also be important to be in close touch with Mexico as COP-16 chair. In fact, Froman added, we need all major groups ) the EU, MEF, BASIC, G-77, the island countries ) to agree to a negotiating mechanism. Hedegaard responded that we will need to work around unhelpful countries such as Venezuela or Bolivia. Froman agreed that we will need to neutralize, co-opt or marginalize these and others such as Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador. Hedegaard noted the irony that the EU is a big donor to these countries, while Cuba, for example, is actively discouraging others from signing on to the Accord.

17. (C) Both agreed that we need processes for coordination and avoiding recriminations. Hedegaard said the EU will use the February 11 informal European Council meeting to reflect on how to be more focused and effective on climate. Froman noted he will do likewise for the U.S. in meetings with Climate Special Envoy Todd Stern and other Administration officials. He suggested that he and Hedegaard speak before the Council meeting to coordinate; she agreed to a videoconference February 10, the day after the new Commission is expected to be formally approved by the European Parliament.
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18. (C) Froman and Hedegaard then discussed specific goals for the Bonn and Cancun meetings. Hedegaard said we must have universal acknowledgment that “the world cannot afford” failure to reach a binding agreement. Froman thought that we should try for progress by Cancun on MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification), the adaptation framework, technologies, and some resolution of process. Both agreed that we should also get countries to inscribe 2020 targets.

19. (C) Froman and Hedegaard also discussed their respective domestic policy developments, noting the complex issue of carbon border taxes. This is an issue of great concern to China, Froman noted. Hedegaard noted the EU's struggle with how to manage inclusion of aviation and maritime sectors in the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme. Both agreed it is vital to show economic benefits and potential job creation from bilateral cooperation on climate and clean energy technologies, to build public support for our efforts; Hedegaard committed to provide to Froman EU studies showing such impacts. 20. (C) Froman summarized his climate points for the Member State Ambassadors; while some Post-Copenhagen soul searching is warranted, he said, we need to focus on avoiding a damaging replay of our division there in the runup to Cancun. We need to work to make the Copenhagen Accord real, getting all countries that matter to associate themselves with the agreement and inscribing their targets. We need early U.S.-EU agreement on the right group and process to take discussions forward, and need progress on financing, technical points and transparency and verification; all are important, he concluded.

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17th of February 2010: Climate strategy agreed with Europe
Subject: CLIMATE: PERSHING AND HEDEGAARD COMMIT TO CLOSE COOPERATION Reference ID: #10BRUSSELS186 This cable is sensitive, but unclassified. 1. (SBU) Summary: Deputy Special Envoy for Climate Change Jonathan Pershing met with EU Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard on February 11. Also present was Ambassador William Kennard. Pershing and Hedegaard agreed that the U.S- EU cooperation remains important, particularly in light of the statement issued by the BASICs following their January 25 meeting. They agreed on the need to operationalize the Copenhagen Accord and ensure it is incorporated into the UNFCCC process. Pershing said it would be important to convene the ministers prior to the May meetings in Bonn and suggested a meeting of the MEF, to include relevant non-members. Hedegaard questioned whether guaranteed loans should be included in the $30 billion Fast Start financing package, and Pershing suggested a meeting among the key donor states be held in the near term to discuss, and if possible, agree on a common approach to what financing would be listed in each country’s contribution. 2. (SBU) Pershing told Hedegaard that the prospects for climate and energy legislation this year increased following the State of the Union address. He said the President is very focused on this issue and committed to a legislative package - not just an energy bill. Hedegaard said that she would be traveling to Washington in mid-March as part of an EU delegation and asked if it would be useful for the delegation to meet with Senators. Ambassador Kennard cautioned the Commissioner, noting that any messages to the Hill must be constructive. 3. (SBU) Pershing said the focus for the U.S. team in January had been to encourage as many countries as possible to associate with the Copenhagen Accord. He expects the final number to be about 120 countries, which is in the range of the 100-150 that the USG had hoped for, although still less than would be desirable. He said
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that submissions by some major economies were “opaque”; Hedegaard said China’s submission was open to interpretation. Pershing said Brazil’s and India’s submissions were as well and were probably the result of their January 25 agreement. Citing Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern’s February 9 speech, Pershing stressed two points: (1) the heads of states made commitments at Copenhagen and the United States does not take these commitments lightly and (2) the Accord is the result of a long and arduous process - there is no plan B for negotiation of a different agreement. 4. (SBU) Hedegaard asked about China’s perceptions on the Accord. Pershing said the letter from Premier Wen to UN Secretary general Ban Ki Moon and Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen was positive, but he was more concerned about communications from Su Wei, China’s Climate Negotiator. He noted that there had been no formal bilateral climate discussions between the US and China since Copenhagen, but indicated that these would likely resume in February. Pershing said the U.S. and EU must deal with China, specifically on the subject of transparency. Hedegaard then asked “did you agree with China on MRV or not? I was presented with a paper that China, India and the U.S. could agree upon.” Pershing replied: “the question is whether they will honor that language.” Hedegaard said she does not have high expectations for COP 16 in Mexico and that we must avoid the expectations that it will resolve all of the unanswered problems from Copenhagen. She asked whether the Copenhagen Accord could be moved into the LCA (Long-term Cooperative Action) or KP (Kyoto Protocol) working groups for future discussions. Pershing said the two tracks have not yielded much progress but the LCA would be easier, particularly since the United States is not a member of Kyoto. He said in theory, the Accord should guide the work of the COP, but he’s not sure if the BASICs will allow this. He said the BASICs, led by India, are resisting any changes to the UNFCCC guidelines (under which developing countries report on their GHG emissions and actions). He said African and Latin American states are looking to turn Copenhagen into a binding agreement, but the BASICs are opposed to this. Hedegaard suggested the AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island
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States) countries “could be our best allies” given their need for financing. 5. (SBU) Hedegaard said that in light of the BASIC announcement, the U.S. and EU must coordinate more closely. She asked whether the MEF process should be continued and suggested a meeting of Annex I countries. Pershing said the forum for further discussions has not been resolved, but he suggested that non-members could be invited to participate in MEF discussions. He said a meeting of the MEF ministers prior to the May/June meeting in Bonn could help frame expectations for Mexico. Hedegaard said she supports the MEF process but said a constructive signal from the COP at Bonn will be important. 6. (SBU) Hedegaard asked if the U.S. was prepared to move forward on Fast Start funding. She said some countries like Japan and the UK will press the inclusion of loan guarantees as part of the package and asked whether the U.S. will need to do any “creative accounting”. She added: “$30 billion had been promised - - it cannot be lent.” She asked for Pershing’s thought on the Soros proposal, which she said was “tempting in the long-term,” but she is not sure it will work for Fast Start funding. [Note: In December 2010 George Soros proposed that developed countries return their IMF special drawing rights (SDRs) to the IMF, which could in turn lend the funds to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation. Soros estimated the amount from SDRs could provide about $150 billion. End note.] Pershing replied that this proposal is just another form of loan guarantee, and we were skeptical of its utility; he also said he would share our analysis on it. On Fast Track financing, Pershing said the administration anticipated the need and budgeted funds in 2010 and 2011. He said some U.S. funding would be directly applied for mitigation and adaptation and other sources would be indirect, citing for example program funds from various agencies and funds for food security. He concurred that it would be valuable to agree on what funds would be included in each country’s reporting, and said donors have to balance the political need to provide real
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financing with the practical constraints of tight budgets. He suggested that the small group of key donors - those that provide about 90% of the financing - convene quickly to discuss this issue.

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26th of February 2010: Guantanamo and Copenhagen in the same sentence
Subject: MALDIVES AMBASSADOR’S WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS Reference ID: #10STATE18437 Classified by: SCA A/S Robert O. Blake, Jr. [...]
2. (C) Pre-viewing Ambassador Ghafoor’s meetings with Deputy S/SECC Pershing and S/GC Ambassador Fried, SCA A/S Robert Blake expressed appreciation to Ghafoor for Maldives’s willingness to accept a Guantanamo detainee, and President Nasheed’s strong personal effort in Copenhagen to reach an Accord. Blake also pulsed Ghafoor on Maldives’s candidacy for the Human Rights Council. [...] Blake offered quiet U.S. assistance if it would be helpful; Ghafoor appreciated it and said Maldives might take us up on it. But Maldives needed to be seen as earning the seat in its own right. As a small country, he said, Maldives can’t play other countries against each other; it needs to take principled positions (e.g. Kosovo recognition).

[...]
Climate Change: Maldives Seeks Concrete Action

5. (SBU) Meeting with Deputy S/SECC Jonathan Pershing, Ghafoor referred to Copenhagen as a stepping stone toward a legally binding agreement; Maldives is prepared to accept any form of treaty/accord that would lead to concrete action. He said he saw a reluctance within the United States Congress to take action. He would like Maldivian President Nasheed to have the opportunity to speak before Congress in order to provide a sincere voice for the urgency of climate change. Pershing asked if Ghafoor had a sense of why only 105 of 192 countries had associated themselves with the Accord. Ghafoor replied that, following the commitments of the U.S., China and India at Copenhagen, and despite opposition from a small, vocal minority of countries, there had been a political shift; many countries from CARICOM, the African Union (led by Ethiopia), and AOSIS will come to associate with Copenhagen and engage on subsequent agreements. These coalitions must be coaxed and not pushed into making
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decisions and meeting deadlines. Pershing noted that chairmanship of organizational meetings was vital.
6. (SBU) Ghafoor added that Maldives would like to see that small countries, like Maldives, that are at the forefront of the climate debate, receive tangible assistance from the larger economies. Other nations would then come to realize that there are advantages to be gained by compliance. Pershing noted that Copenhagen provides a generic framework for assistance, but that the next steps are procedural. He asked about Maldivian adaptation programs. Ghafoor referred to several projects, including harbor deepening and strengthening sea walls, that are in the development stage. These projects would cost approximately $50 million. Pershing encouraged Ghafoor to provide concrete examples and specific costs in order to increase the likelihood of bilateral assistance and congressional appropriations. Ghafoor proposed that President Obama deliver a speech on climate change from Maldives when he next visits the region. He said Maldives would provide a dramatic backdrop and draw further attention to environmental challenges the islands face.

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