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Wikileaks > Cablegate > Climate Change

The following pages contain climate change and


UNFCCC COP15 related excerpts from the US
Embassy documents released on Wikileaks Monday
November 29, 2010.
None of these texts contain information that can
in any way endanger anyone's life.
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Table of Contents
20th of April 2007: Merkel pledge climate change
effort, gets pragmatic US backing.....................4
7th of November 2007: American eyes on Greenland......6
26th October 2007, Paris: Trying to impress the French 8
29th of January 2008: Merkel “aggressive” on climate
change...............................................10
6th of June 2008: Denmark & USA meet on Greenland....11
2nd of September 2008: Pulling strings to avoid Iranian
scientist in IPCC....................................12
8th of May 2009, Beijing: China positive about COP15. 15
26th of May 2009, Moscow: An ice cold Russian........16
19th of June 2009: Briefing after hacking attack.....17
26th of June 2009: EU & US security talks............19
22nd of September 2009, Berlin: US evaluating German
environmental policy.................................23
28th October 2009, Stockholm: Pragmatic Swedish
ambitions............................................24
3rd of November 2009, Paris: The French are ambitious
and have doubts about USA............................27
5th of November 2009, Berlin: Germany proposes US-EU
team play............................................28
30th of November 2009: Preparing for Nobel Peace Prize
.....................................................30
4th of December 2009, The Hague: “Roadmap, please” (the
Dutch predicting everything).........................32
9th of December 2009: UK and France wants Tobin tax
linked with climate change efforts...................34
15th of December 2009, London: Commonwealth keen on
legally binding treaty...............................36
22nd of December 2009, London: Briefing..............38
23rd of December 2009, Brasilia: Disappointment – but
not that much........................................40
31st of December 2009: EU Energy Commissioner is “lame
duck”................................................41
4th of January 2010, Brussels: President of Europe says
it like it is........................................42
10th of Janurary 2010: No snow in Afghanistan........44
21st of January, The Vatican: Pope backs Accord......45

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26th of January 2010, Riyadh: Saudis governed by
petroleum ministry...................................47
28th of January 2010, The Hague: Dutch afterthoughts. 48
2nd of February 2010: Ethiopia wants monitoring of
climate change mitigation funds......................52
5th of February 2010, Copenhagen: Evaluation of COP-15
.....................................................53
9th of February 2010: Cooperation with Brazil........58
9th of February, La Paz: Morales derailing Accord....59
11th of February 2010, Riyadh: Saudis worried about oil
income...............................................62
12th of February 2010: Saudi schizophrenia...........63
17th of February 2010: Tactical discussion with the
European Union.......................................68
17th of February 2010: Climate strategy agreed with
Europe...............................................71
26th of February 2010: Guantanamo and Copenhagen in the
same sentence........................................75

3
20th of April 2007: Merkel pledge climate change effort, gets
pragmatic US backing
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN WASHINGTON:
GOALS FOR EUROPE, GOALS AT HOME
Reference ID: #07BERLIN802
Classified By: DCM John Koenig.
Summary: [...] Achieving her [Merkel's] goals for the EU
- in the trans-Atlantic context these are focused on
climate change and the Transatlantic Economic Initiative
- will reinforce her position at home and in the EU, and
serve as a springboard to success on the larger G-8
stage. A success for Merkel is also a success for the
U.S. Even after the German EU Presidency, we will want
the Atlanticist Merkel to remain a dominant force within
the EU. In Berlin, a successful summit will strengthen
her and other trans-Atlanticists against those who favor
a policy of vocal, public antagonism. […]
3. […] she has vigorously pursued the Transatlantic
Economic Initiative within the EU to remove regulatory
barriers, and has pushed for agreement on the new EU
climate change and energy initiatives. She has not
succeeded in all her undertakings -- prospects for a new
EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia
remain distant, for example. […]
4. (C) […Merkel] is focused on our political cooperation
in key areas - climate change and energy security as well
as the Transatlantic Economic Initiative. We recognize
that in these and other areas, European goals are not
exactly aligned with our own. Nonetheless, success in
these areas, the former a key concern of European publics
and the latter important to sustaining European growth,
after a long period in which trans-Atlantic relations
were dominated by negative headlines and exchanges
focused on other regions, would prove Merkel's particular
competence at succeeding in Europe's key external
relationship. After success in Washington, Merkel can
count on maintaining her position in Europe against any
incoming French President and UK Prime Minister-in-
waiting Brown. Success in Washington will also strengthen

4
her hand in the follow-on summits with Russia, Canada,
and Japan and sets the stage for success in G-8 summit
deliberations on climate change.
5. (C) At home, a Summit success may enable Merkel to end
the SPD's ability to use loud, public "principled"
criticism of the U.S. as a winning tactic. Gerhard
Schroeder won the 2002 election with his public attacks
on U.S. Iraq policy, but if Merkel brings home meaningful
agreements -- especially on issues with domestic
resonance such as climate change and trans-Atlantic
economic cooperation -- she will have shown the German
public that her policy of constructive engagement with
the U.S. brings real benefits on issues of concern to it.
Foreign policy, especially trans-Atlantic relations, is
one of the few areas where the SPD still enjoys greater
public support than does the CDU/CSU. Success in
Washington may undercut the SPD on that theme, as the
CDU/CSU has already undercut it on many domestic social
themes.

5
7th of November 2007: American eyes on Greenland
Subject: SHAPING GREENLAND'S FUTURE
Reference ID: #07COPENHAGEN1010
This cable contains sensitive but unclassified and
proprietary business information.
High Stakes for the U.S. in Greenland
4. With the planet's fastest moving glaciers, Greenland
is an iconic adventure destination for hardy
Congressional delegations and down-encased journalists
looking for visual proof of climate change. Its gleaming
icebergs will be the backdrop for a May 2008 ministerial
hosted by Denmark on Arctic issues. But Greenland holds
strategic value for the United States beyond its starring
role in the global narrative of climate change. [...] A
U.S. Air Force base at Thule, 500 miles north of the
Arctic Circle, hosts important radar that alerts us to
incoming missiles over the Pole. American investors are
poised to commit $5 billion this year to develop
hydropower and smelting facilities there. Exploration and
development of Greenland's energy resources are just now
beginning in earnest, with enormous potential for
American industry.
5. [...] we have reassured sometimes skeptical
Greenlanders of our good will and interest in
partnership. Although part of the Danish kingdom and
traditionally oriented toward Europe, Greenland
nevertheless has a growing appreciation for the logic of
geography and its own potential as part of North
America. Our [efforts] have reinforced Greenlandic
desires for a closer relationship with the United States,
just as Greenland assumes ever-greater charge of its
international relations and edges closer to full
independence. Our intensified outreach to the
Greenlanders will encourage them to resist any false
choice between the United States and Europe. It will also
strengthen our relationship with Greenland vis-a-vis the
Chinese, who have shown increasing interest in
Greenland's natural resources.
[...]

6
11. A recent study of hydrocarbon potential, led by the
U.S. Geological Survey, concluded the continental shelf
off northeast Greenland alone could harbor oil and gas
reserves to rival Alaska's North Slope. The USGS will
complete additional studies on similarly promising areas
in northern and western Greenland next year. After a
thousand-year interval of cooling, average temperatures
in Greenland have in this century climbed to the level
they were during the first Viking settlements of 986 AD.
Whether because of man-made climate change or a massive,
cyclical shift in weather patterns, Greenland's carbon
riches are more easily accessible now than ever.
12. Meanwhile, the resource possibilities in Greenland
are not limited to oil and gas. The Greenland government
has issued 68 mineral exploration licenses to
international companies, and expects at least five
significant new mines to open in the next five years,
harvesting everything from diamonds and rubies to
molybdenum and zinc.

7
26th October 2007, Paris: Trying to impress the French
Subject: PRESIDENT SARKOZY’S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE
U.S.: POLICY COORDINATION WITH A SELF-CONSCIOUSLY
INDEPENDENT FRANCE
Reference ID: #07PARIS4357
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton
[...]
3. [...Sarkozy] stated publicly that he would not be a
“vassal” of the U.S. He will also continue to highlight
differences on selected issues such as the environment,
GMOs [...]
16. [...] high priority issues which Sarkozy will also
want to discuss include his top issue, climate change,
along with Iran, Kosovo, Burma, Darfur, counterterrorism
and climate change.
[...]
22. (SBU) Environment/Climate Change: Climate Change: On
his election day, Sarkozy called for a greater U.S
leadership role on climate issues. He will want to come
out of his meeting with the President able to say that he
again pushed the President to lead. The Embassy, backed
closely by Washington agencies, has impressed on not only
Sarkozy and his staff, but also officials across France
that the U.S. has been leading and continues to lead in
the fight against climate change. We’ve impressed on them
-- and Sarkozy should be told again -- that the U.S. has
spent $37 billion in the past six years -- more than any
other country -- for climate science and energy research.
We’ve developed new international partnerships, part of a
real strategy of international engagement to reduce
carbon emissions. We’ve shown the French that even with
considerably greater economic and population growth than
in Europe, we’re doing a better job at reducing both
energy intensity and carbon emissions. After the
President’s Major Economies Meeting (MEM) in late
September in Washington, French officials offered to host
the next meeting while expressing some disappointment
with both the lack of agreement on a post-Kyoto emissions

8
goal and U.S. reluctance regarding market-based cap and
trade measures. Areas of potential conflict include
concerns that a failure for a broad adoption of similar
carbon reduction schemes will put European industry at a
competitive disadvantage and the possible French advocacy
of a European imposed carbon tax on imported goods.
Despite extensive U.S.-French collaboration in developing
next generation climate-friendly technologies, the French
also criticize what they see as U.S. over-reliance on
yet-to-be-developed technologies (carbon capture and
storage, second generation bio-fuels, and advanced
nuclear) to address emissions. France is skeptical that
China and India and other major emerging economies will
take steps to reduce emissions unless the U.S. moves
first. This is an opportunity to convince Sarkozy that we
take this issue seriously and have a concrete plan to
make real progress.

9
29th of January 2008: Merkel “aggressive” on climate change
Subject: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN KOENIG
CLIMATE CHANGE: Aggressive Measures
Reference ID: #08BERLIN122
Classified By:
13. (C) Chancellor Merkel and the rest of Germany's
political leadership remain serious about pursuing
aggressive international measures to meet the challenges
of global warming. Merkel has made climate change a
priority of her Chancellorship and enjoys the
overwhelming domestic support on this. Merkel's support
for mandatory, targeted global limits on greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and an international cap-and-trade regime
reflects a deep-seated belief that only drastic,
concerted efforts on the part of the international
community can slow -- and ultimately reverse -- the human
contribution to global warming. If anything, Steinmeier
supports tougher standards. While the Germans have been
willing to consider alternative solutions, such as new
technologies for clean coal and renewables, fundamental
differences in our approaches to the issue of climate
change remain, and could lead to more public disagreement
in the future. For example, while Germany will send a
delegation to the January 30 Major Economies Meeting
(MEM), the German Government remains skeptical about the
value that the Major Economies Process (MEP) adds to the
UNFCCC track. The Germans are particularly concerned
about the need to avoid duplication of effort in the
various other climate change-related forums, including
the UNFCCC and the G-8.

10
6th of June 2008: Denmark & USA meet on Greenland
Subject: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH DANISH FM
MOELLER IN GREENLAND
Reference ID: #08COPENHAGEN322
Classified By: Regional Environmental Officer Erik Hall.
1. Summary: In a May 27 meeting before the opening of
the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland,
Deputy Secretary Negroponte and Danish FM Per Stig
Moeller exchanged perspectives on cooperation in the
Arctic; underlined shared goals for a climate change
agreement and resolution of the Doha trade round;
reviewed prospects for NATO membership for Georgia and
discussed the current situations in Georgia, Afghanistan,
Pakistan. The Deputy Secretary urged Denmark to consider
the candidacy for IOM DirGen of Amb. Swing; Moeller said
he would do so “constructively and positively.”
[...]
Climate Change
10. The Deputy Secretary raised the issue of global
climate change negotiations, saying the U.S. had shifted
its position and would be willing to accept binding
emissions mandates as long as China and India accept some
form of enforceable obligation under the post-Kyoto
regime. Moeller mentioned the Montreal Protocol as a good
model for greenhouse gas emissions. Under that
arrangement, which solved the problem of the ozone hole,
developing countries were given an extra 10 years to meet
their phase-out targets. Taksoe-Jensen said China and
India want the U.S. to commit to emissions reductions
first. The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that EU
criticism of the U.S. might give China and India the
impression they were “off the hook.”

11
2nd of September 2008: Pulling strings to avoid Iranian scientist
in IPCC

Subject: LIFELINES FOR IPCC WORKING GROUP ELECTION


Reference ID: #08STATE93970
Classified By: Classified by IO/DAS Gerald Anderson
Note related cables include #08OSLO461 and
#08BRASILIA1112
[...]
2. (C) Summary. Missions should be prepared to assist the
U.S. Delegation to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) in its efforts to secure a positive outcome to
elections for working group co-chair positions at the IPCC
Plenary being held in Geneva, August 31-September 4. USDEL
is working actively to prevent the election of an Iranian
scientist to the developing-nation co-chairmanship of
Working Group Two, a position which would pair him with a
U.S. scientist running unopposed for developed-nation co-
chair of the same group. The focus of USG efforts is to
support an alternate candidacy for the position, although
the full slate of active candidates and their potential for
election will not be known until the later stages of the
plenary sessions. Curricula vitae of some of the leading
candidates are at paras 6-10.
3. (C) Action Request. Missions should assign a Point-of-
Contact for this issue and provide phone and e-mail
information to the US Mission to the UN in Geneva. USUN
should appoint its own POC and relay contact information for
all POCs to USDEL IPCC. In the event that USDEL requires
assistance in working with counterpart delegations (e.g.,
coming to a consensus on a single strong alternate candidate
to support), USDEL may contact Mission POCs directly, or via
US Mission Geneva, to ask that Missions apprise host
governments of the situation, with a view to arranging for
instructions from capitals. Missions should do everything
possible to assist USDEL if they receive such a request.
Until such a call is received, however, Missions should take
no action on this issue; USDEL will be interacting directly
with host-country expert delegations in Geneva, and

12
premature contacts/demarches with host country government
officials in capitals, even to preview the background of the
situation, could be highly counter-productive. Point of
Contact for USDEL is OES/EGC,s Donna Lee XXXXXXXXXXXX.
4. (C) Background. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (http://www.ipcc.ch) is a highly influential
body established by the World Meteological Organization
(WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to
assess scientific issues related to climate change. This
year, the U.S. has nominated Stanford Professor Christopher
Field to the developed-country chair of IPCC Working Group
Two, which assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic and
natural systems to climate change and the options for
adaptation. His nomination is unopposed. Iran, however, has
nominated Dr. Mostafa Jafari to be the developing-country
co-chair of the same working group. Jafari is a highly-
qualified scientist with research ties to the UK and Japan,
but he is also a senior Iranian government employee who has
represented Iran in international negotiations. Co-chair
appointments are for a minimum of four years, and require
close collaboration and often travel to or extended
residencies in each others' countries. Having U.S. and
Iranian co-chairs would be problematic and potentially at
odds with overall U.S. policy towards Iran, and would
significantly complicate the U.S. commitment to funding the
Working Group Two secretariat. U.S. withdrawal of its
nominee, however, would effectively give Iran a veto over
future U.S. nominees in UN bodies. Moreover, having a U.S.
co-chair at the IPCC significantly bolsters U.S. interests
on climate change, a key foreign policy issue.
5. (C) Background continued. Prior to arrival in Geneva,
USDEL contacted IPCC Chairman Dr. Rajendra Pachauri (please
protect), who agreed to work on this issue to avoid the
potential for disruption to one the organization's three
core working groups. Next, USDEL contacted the Austrian
delegate serving as EU representative on the nominating
committee that manages the election process, who showed an
understanding of U.S. equities. USDEL contacted the Malian
and Argentinean delegations, who have nominated highly-
qualified co-chair candidates (see below), and the German
delegation, who have been interested in advancing the Malian
for co-chair of Working Group Three, for which Germany has
nominated an unopposed candidate as developed-country co-

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chair. The Malians subsequently told USDEL that their
candidate, Dr. Yauba Sokona, prefers Working Group Two to
Working Group Three. Also prior to arrival in Geneva, USDEL
contacted the UK and Netherlands delegations, both of which
we have worked closely with in the past. Based on experience
at prior IPCC plenaries, events related to the Working Group
elections will likely unfold unpredictably and rapidly,
necessitating a rapid and flexible USG response.
6. (SBU) CV of Iranian candidate: Mostafa Jafari Personal
Information: DPoB: 1956, Tehran Education: -- Post doctorate
research in Plant Ecophysiology Methodology in 1997 (Japan).
-- Ph.D. in Plant Science (Ecology) in 1990 (UK). -- Short
course in Agricultural Economy in 1983 (Tehran). -- B.Sc. in
Forest and Range graduated in 1978 (Iran). [...]
7. (SBU) Biographic Summary of Malian candidate [...]
8. (SBU) CV of Argentinean candidate
9. (SBU) CV of Moroccan candidate
10. (SBU) Biographic Summary of Maldivan candidate
[...signed:] RICE

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8th of May 2009, Beijing: China positive about COP15
Subject: BEIJING-BASED G-5 CHIEFS OF MISSION ON DPRK,
GTMO UIGHURS, SINO-JAPAN RELATIONS, DALAI LAMA
Reference ID: #09BEIJING1247
Classified By: Acting DCM William Weinstein
[...]
8. (C) UK DCM Wood said the UK Environment and Science
Minister had recently had talks with Chinese officials on
climate change. In the lead up to Copenhagen, China would
not agree to targets on emissions but was willing to be
constructive and would come to Copenhagen with a package
of action items related to nuclear power, renewable
energy and reforestation. Wood said his impression was
that China could be induced to do more on climate change.

15
26th of May 2009, Moscow: An ice cold Russian
Subject: RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC: POLICY AND COMPETING
VOICES
Reference ID: #09MOSCOW1346
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells
[...]
Environmental Concerns
5. State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Konstantin
Kosachev told Levin April 15, that climate change “was
not a matter of any concern,” and added that it may work
to Russia's advantage by reducing the cost of
transportation and easing access to petroleum resources
in the far north. Despite potential economic benefits,
influential voices in the Russian scientific community
disagree with Kosachev, acknowledging that climate change
also poses a danger. A November 2008 report on climate
change by Russia's Federal Hydrometeorological Service
(Roshydromet) noted that the minimum seasonal level of
Arctic sea ice has receded by 9 percent per decade since
satellite observations began in 1979; in September 2007,
the ice cover reached the lowest level ever recorded.
Roshydromet noted that climate change affected the Arctic
region disproportionately compared to lower latitudes.
The habitat of such threatened species as the polar bear
have especially suffered. Warming could increase the
spread of certain vector-borne diseases, negatively
affecting human health. Large-scale permafrost melting
threatens Russian cities, such as Yakutsk, whose
foundations are built on permafrost.
[...]
13. [...] Increased scientific cooperation, particularly
on climate change, could increase trust and build
confidence.

16
19th of June 2009: Briefing after hacking attack
Subject: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY
Reference ID: #09STATE63860
Classified by: Derived from Multiple Sources
[...]
24. (SBU) CTAD comment: In June 1992, a United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development -- informally
known as the Earth Summit -- was held in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. During this conference, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) -- a
treaty intended to achieve stabilization of GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough level to
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system -- was produced. The UNFCCC, primarily
focused on the voluntary stabilization of GHG emissions
by industrialized countries, was ratified and put into
effect March 21, 1994. In order to evaluate the progress
of UNFCCC signatories, the parties involved gather
annually in meetings dubbed Conferences of the Parties
(COPs). At COP-3 held in Kyoto, Japan, in December 2007,
a protocol to the UNFCCC called the “Kyoto Protocol” was
adopted, outlining in part legally binding commitments
for the reduction of GHG emissions for developed nations.
The terms of this protocol are set to expire in 2012, and
the goal of this year's COP-15, which will be held
December 1 to 18 in Copenhagen, Denmark, is to establish
a new agreement among concerned nations prior to the
Kyoto Protocol's end.
[...]
26. (SBU) CTAD comment: On June 1, CTAD's Technical
Analysis/Special Operations monitoring detected a
malicious e-mail massage targeting five DoS individuals
employed within the Division of Ocean Affairs, Office of
the Special Envoy for Climate Change. The socially
engineered message had the subject line “China and
Climate Change” and was spoofed to appear as if it were
from a legitimate international economics columnist at
the National Journal. In addition, the body of the e-mail
contained comments designed to appeal to the recipients

17
as it was specifically aligned with their job function,
and a signature block with contact information for the
spoofed sender was present. Attached to the message was a
PDF file, also titled “China and Climate Change” which
harbored malicious code designed to exploit the Adobe
Collab getIcon(), JavaScript vulnerability (CVE-2009-
0927). This vulnerability, if executed successfully,
would have allowed malicious actors to remotely execute
arbitrary code on a victim computer. The PDF document
also contained the Poison Ivy Remote Administration Tool
-- a malicious software program that provides a remote
user with nearly complete control over a comprised
system. However, since the DoS users targeted in this
intrusion attempt were operating with currently patched
versions of Adobe software, there was neither compromise
nor data lost as a result of this incident (for technical
information about the incident, see CTAD Report TR-09-
034).
27. (C//NF) CTAD comment: DoS employees dealing with
sensitive diplomatic matters are often targets of social-
engineering schemes conducted by actors seeking to
harvest sensitive information from DoS computer systems
and networks. As negotiations on the subject of climate
change continue, it is probable intrusion attempts such
as this will persist. CTAD recommends personnel involved
with climate change issues or topics relating to the
upcoming COP-15 continue to remain aware of the elevated
risk of targeted socially engineered e-mail and report
any suspicious messages to their information systems
security officer (ISSO).

18
26th of June 2009: EU & US security talks
Subject: WORKING WITH THE EU ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY: NIC ENGEL VISIT
Reference ID: #09BRUSSELS912
Classified By: CDA Christopher W. Murray
1. Summary: In Brussels, June 15-17, Major General
Richard L. Engel, USAF (Retired), Director, Climate
Change and State Stability Program, Long Range Analysis
Unit, National Intelligence Council (NIC) heard from high
level Europeans that: the connection between security and
climate change -- including, but not limited to
adaptation and emergency response -- is a shared concern;
a positive outcome of the UNFCC December meeting is
vital; that China and India are major players; the
countries of Africa face multiple challenges, and there
are excellent possibilities for increased U.S.-EU
cooperation in research.
2. Rich Engel, NIC's Director of Climate Change and
State Stability Program, discussed the security aspects
of climate change and urged increased U.S.-European
research cooperation. He briefed colleagues in Embassy
Brussels, USEU and USNATO and met with EU and NATO
representatives. The previous week, Engel had been in
London, participating in an interactive geo-political
modeling conference -- the Arctic Game -- to explore
national interests of an opening Arctic organized by the
National Intelligence Council. The trip to Brussels was a
natural add-on, strongly supported and coordinated
between U.S. Mission and the U.K. Permanent
Representation.
3. Engel spoke to 80 officials at the European
Commission's DG RELEX during a lunch time debate. The
mixed audience of Commission and Council staffers, and
think tanks, NGOs and media representatives, was convened
as part of a training program, held under Chatham House
rules, to discuss important policy issues. He gave a
presentation on the results from a National Intelligence
Assessment on the national security ramifications of
global climate change. Noting that the study went only to

19
2030 and did not consider mitigation effects, Engel said
the expectation is that climate change will aggravate
existing problems such as poverty, social tensions,
environmental degradation, ineffective leadership and
weak political institutions that threat state stability,
but will not be the fundamental cause of any failed
state. He listed three principal ways climate change
would affect national security: water availability,
agricultural productivity, and extreme weather threats to
economically significant infrastructure. He also briefly
described the Arctic Game and explained how this type of
event provides insights to analysts. In response to
audience calls for recommendations, Engel stressed the
NIC's role in providing information to policy makers,
turning aside questions on what should be the optimal
results of the December UNFCC meeting in Copenhagen.
4. The USEU Charge d'Affaires hosted a dinner for Engel
that was attended by, among others, The Norwegian
Ambassador to the EU; the Canadian DCM; the Special
Counselor to HR Solana for Climate and Energy; and Tom
Spencer, a former MEP, and now with the NGO International
Environment Security. Engel reviewed the Arctic Policy
Game run in London the previous week and discussed the
security risks global warming poses to India and China,
particularly those associated with glacier melt. He
focused on Russian behavior during the Arctic exercise,
much to the interest of the Norwegian, Canadian, and
other officials. Spencer said that unlike western states,
China and India will not have the capacity to adapt and
this shortcoming will have serious regional, if not
global, repercussions. The Charge added that the United
States and the EU must intensify efforts to getting China
and India to agree to a deal at Copenhagen. Solana's
climate advisor said that the security dimension of
climate change was a major focus for the EU and the
Norwegian Ambassador stressed the importance of the High
North --the Arctic – to Norway.
5. At an informal breakfast meeting of the EU Political
and Security Committee, Engel reviewed the work done by
both U.S. and EU analysts on the issue of climate change
and national security noting in particular a well-known

20
U.K. research center. He urged greater cooperation in
research and modeling data in the near term (6 months to
5 years) and called for more work on precipitation and
major circulation patterns. Engel offered to provide U.S.
studies and expressed a strong interest in EU expert
evaluations as to how changing conditions will effect
Europe. Helga Schmid, Director at the Council Policy
Planning Early Warning Unit, noted the discussions she
had had with Engel in Washington and spoke about EU
papers on Africa, Asia, the Middle East and on Latin
American and Southeast Asia. The U.K. Ambassador said
that they had ongoing climate change studies with France
on the Sahel and with China. The German Ambassador said
that major coordination was needed in the international
science community and that government funding was
necessary to transform science knowledge into action.
Engel described the process used in the National
Intelligence Assessment and provided a readout on the
geo-political Arctic policy game held in London.
6. In response to the Irish Ambassador's query about
business community reactions, Engel quoted NIC Chairman's
report to Congress that energy, environment and the
economy are interdependent. The Danish Ambassador pointed
out that security aspects were a subset of climate change
and that countries in Africa have more immediate
problems, many of which require better governance,
including land and water management. The Dutch Ambassador
suggested that in addition to looking at North Africa and
its possible impacts on Europe, it was equally important
to consider the tropics, as large African populations
below the Sahel will also seek to move north. The Spanish
Ambassador introduced the topic of “good news” and the
possibility of improvement in agriculture in some areas.
Engel said that there could be short term benefits, but
gave the example of Russia where warmer temperatures will
also increase aridity and melting permafrost will cause
serious problems with energy producing infrastructure.
Turning to energy issues, the Romanian Ambassador asked
about effects on oil and energy resources in the Caspian
and Black Sea regions. Engel said that energy
destabilization anywhere in the world was a concern but
that during the period considered in the U.S. assessment

21
-- up to 2030 -- the climate effects on hydrocarbon
sources of energy were not significant. The Lithuanian
Ambassador argued that climate change might just be a
normal historic pattern with human activity only a small
component. Engel replied it was a sensitive debate, but
that from a national security standpoint, the cause of
change doesn't really matter, it's the results and the
response that count. The French Deputy inquired about the
public role in the NIC's deliberation, process and
results. Engel noted that this subject had significant
unclassified components and noted the unprecedented
posting of certain reports on the internet website at
www.dni.gov.

22
22nd of September 2009, Berlin: US evaluating German
environmental policy
Subject: MERKEL VS. STEINMEIER? WHAT DO THE GERMAN
ELECTIONS REALLY MEAN FOR U.S. INTERESTS?
Reference ID: #09BERLIN1176
Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
GEORGE GLASS
[…]
20. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE (No Change): There is little
difference between the parties on issues in play at the
upcoming UNFCCC's COP-15 in Copenhagen, and Merkel
maintains strong control over German policy in this area.
There will be a new Environment Minister should a black-
yellow government be formed, however, and it is unclear
which party would then control the Ministry. In previous
CDU/CSU-FDP coalitions, the CDU ran it but if the FDP
does as well as current polls suggest, it might make a
play for the Ministry. Current SPD Environment Minister
Sigmar Gabriel has had a high profile in his party's
Bundestag campaign and could remain in place in a Grand
Coalition.

23
28th October 2009, Stockholm: Pragmatic Swedish ambitions
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER REINFELDT
VISIT TO WASHINGTON
Reference ID: #09STOCKHOLM677
Classified By: Ambassador Matthew Barzun
Related cables include #09STOCKHOLM679.
[...]
3. (SBU) Reinfeldt's top priority for the Swedish EU
Presidency is a successful outcome at the December COP-15
climate change negotiations. He has focused Sweden's EU
Presidency on an "eco-efficient" economy for Europe, i.e.
growing the economy while reducing carbon emissions.
(Between 1992-2008, Sweden increased GDP 46% and reduced
green house gas emissions by 9%). Realizing that a
comprehensive agreement is unlikely without U.S.
legislation in place, Reinfeldt told his officials to
cease criticizing U.S. climate change policy and to seek
a political agreement to resolve some issues, such as
financing, with a commitment to conclude a comprehensive
treaty with emission targets in early 2010. The day after
he meets with you, Reinfeldt will travel to India for the
EU Summit there. Later in November, he will travel to
China for that EU Summit. Because Reinfeldt is focusing
the India and China Summits on climate change, we
recommend you coordinate messages to those governments
with him when you meet.
Climate Change
4. (SBU) Swedish officials have told us we need to
understand how important climate change is to Reinfeldt
-- that it is "in his heart." Reinfeldt talks about
climate change constantly and is directly active in
trying to manage the negotiating process among EU Member
States heading into COP 15. His governing coalition has
pinned much of its hopes for re-election on a successful
EU Presidency, and how voters judge Sweden's EU
Presidency will depend considerably on what happens in
Copenhagen. Opinion polls in Sweden show around 85% of
people putting environmental issues as the top priority
their government should address.

24
5. (C) The main public theme of Sweden's EU Presidency
has been the drive toward an "eco-efficient" economy,
i.e. growing the economy while reducing carbon emissions,
which Sweden has done successfully after introducing a
carbon tax in the early 1990's. Realizing that a
comprehensive agreement is unlikely without U.S.
legislation in place, Reinfeldt ordered his Cabinet to
stop criticizing U.S. climate change policy, and since
then his officials have become more pragmatic, telling us
it is important to "deliver something even it if is not
the end of the road." In the absence of a legally binding
treaty, Sweden and EU officials will seek a framework or
political agreement to resolve some issues, such as
financing, with a commitment to conclude a comprehensive
treaty with emission targets in early 2010. Swedish
officials are concerned, however, that we are running out
of time to agree on climate change financing before
Copenhagen. The Swedish Presidency is using EU Summits
with Brazil, South Africa, Russia, China and India to
push for progress on climate change. Swedish officials
have called on the U.S. to show greater leadership in
pressing the emerging economies to seriously discuss
climate change financing.
6. (C) Reinfeldt will be traveling to India and China in
November, and you may wish to coordinate message with him
when you meet. Sweden has a long-standing, well-developed
dialogue with China on climate change and reducing the
energy intensity of China's economy. This includes
regular exchanges between environmental officials, a
Swedish-Chinese advisory panel to the Chinese government
on climate change, and Swedish companies like Volvo
holding their firms in China to the same environmental
standards as for plants in Sweden. Reinfeldt's State
Secretary for Climate Change Lars Erik Liljelund, who
frequently visits China, tells us China looks to Sweden
as a model on climate change and other issues because
Sweden was the first Western country to recognize the Mao
regime (in 1950), and is viewed by China as a good
example of a "harmonious society" with a highly developed
social benefits, taxation and environmental protection
system. Liljelund says this special relationship is
helping Sweden push China to reduce the energy intensity

25
of its economy. Liljelund and Reinfeldt's State Secretary
for Internal Policy Coordination have both suggested that
the U.S. and Sweden coordinate efforts to narrow the gap
between Chinese and U.S. positions in the climate change
negotiations.

26
3rd of November 2009, Paris: The French are ambitious and
have doubts about USA
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO PARIS -- NOVEMBER
8, 2009
Reference ID: #09PARIS1473
Classified By: Ambassador Charles H. Rivkin
[...]
AN URGENT FOCUS ON CLIMATE CHANGE
10. (SBU) The French remain divided on how to respond to
the Obama Administration's approaches to climate change.
Most of the interested public and many in the government
believe that interim 2020 reduction targets, and the
level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and
concentrations at that time, will determine success or
failure in slowing global warming. For them, the EU's
target of 20 to 30 percent reductions below 1990 is the
sole measure of an acceptable policy. Even sophisticated
observers are skeptical that long-term reduction goals
legislated in the United States can be counted on as more
than aspirations, especially if radical cuts are not
imposed up front. We have reiterated that U.S. laws are
reliably enforced by the Federal government and by U.S.
courts, using the Clean Air Act as our example. Ministry
of Foreign Affairs officials agree that legislation
moving through Congress and the Administration's
proposals would establish a system comparable to the EU's
measures. These officials regard Environment Minister
Jean-Louis Borloo's public criticisms of Waxman-Markey as
"insufficient on the medium term goal" as distracting
attention from the need for China and India to reduce
their rates of growth in GHG emissions.

27
5th of November 2009, Berlin: Germany proposes US-EU team
play
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO
BERLIN, NOVEMBER 8-10
Reference ID: #09BERLIN1403
Classified By: Ambassador Phillip Murphy
Summary: [...] Assurances that Germany and the EU will
work with the U.S. at Copenhagen and not seek to isolate
[…]
10. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian
bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cut-
offs of natural gas supplies, especially given the
departure of former Foreign Minister Steinmeier -- known
for his relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect
Germany to continue to place a heavy emphasis on
maintaining good relations with Russia, believing that
constructive engagement and assistance with modernization
are the best way to deal with this difficult "strategic
partner." Germany is Europe's largest energy user and is
highly dependent on Russia for energy supplies, but
Berlin does not view this as a vulnerability, believing
that Moscow is equally dependent on Germany as a
consumer. Germany nevertheless recognizes that it must
diversify its sources of supply, routes, and means of
energy generation to gain greater energy security.
11. (C) As the Chancellor's remarks underline, German
officials want strong U.S. leadership going into the
Copenhagen Summit. They are advocating for a unified
US/EU position towards the major emerging economies,
particularly China and India, to urge them to commit to
ambitious national actions at Copenhagen. They are
looking for signals of our commitment to domestic and
international actions that will allow us to collectively
meet science-based targets. German leaders recognize the
challenge of passing climate change legislation in the
U.S. and have lowered their expectations for the
possibility of reaching a legally binding agreement next
month at Copenhagen. They have begun to describe the

28
Summit as one step in a larger process -- a politically
binding framework -- and may be preparing the German
public for a less ambitious outcome.

29
30th of November 2009: Preparing for Nobel Peace Prize
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO OSLO
Reference ID: #09OSLO739
Classified by Ambassador Barry B. White.
[...]
3. The Nobel Peace Prize shines an exclusive spotlight
for a few moments each year on this country of mountains,
fjords, and vast quantities of natural resources.
Ultimately, awarding you the Prize is the Norwegian Nobel
Committee's way of welcoming your presence on the world
stage. The Prize demonstrates their approval of your goal
to free the world from nuclear weapons, your commitment
to reversing global climate change, your promotion of
dialogue and multilateral engagement to achieve foreign
policy goals, including sustainable economic growth in
developing nations, and even your desire to bring
universal health care to Americans.
[...]
4. [...] In particular, Stoltenberg seeks our global
cooperation on maternal and child health (safe birth),
carbon capture and storage, and deforestation.
Stoltenberg is personally committed to addressing climate
change. The Norwegian population shares the Norwegian
government's efforts to protect the environment, as
reflected in the past awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize
to the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and
to former Vice-president Al Gore in 2007. Norway has been
active in COP-15 preparatory meetings, and maintains that
developed countries should take on quantified emissions
reduction commitments while developing countries should
receive technological and financial support. Norway is
investing heavily in carbon capture and storage
technology in hopes that it will play a significant role
in emissions reductions, and is a partner in the U.S.-led
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. Norway also works
closely with us in the Arctic Council, where we co-chair
a task force on search and rescue capacity to support
increased shipping traffic in the Arctic as the polar ice
melts.

30
Energy and the Economy
5. While Norwegians pride themselves on their climate
change policy and maintain one of the cleanest oil and
gas production systems in the world, they understand the
paradox their efforts represent, given that Norway's
wealth comes mostly from the oil and gas industry.
Indeed, energy is at the heart of the U.S. - Norway
economic relationship, with nearly 70% of Norway's total
exports to the U.S. coming from crude oil and petroleum
products, and with about 60% of U.S. direct investment in
Norway in the offshore petroleum sector. Norway, as the
world's fifth largest exporter of oil and third largest
exporter of natural gas, plays a key stabilizing role in
global energy markets and in Europe's energy security.
Norway serves as a reliable counter-weight to Russia's
decidedly mixed record on energy security. Norwegians are
also keen to emphasize indicators other than the oil and
gas industry that demonstrate their economic success.
For example, they are the second largest exporter of
seafood after China, and their maritime shipping industry
is the fifth largest in world.

31
4th of December 2009, The Hague: “Roadmap, please” (the
Dutch predicting everything)
Subject: NETHERLANDS: SEEKING CLEAR 2010 ROADMAP FOR
CLIMATE TALKS POST-COPENHAGEN
Reference ID: #09THEHAGUE730
Sensitive.
1. SUMMARY: The Dutch will work in Copenhagen to secure a
pragmatic, operational agreement at COP-15 as proposed by
Danish PM Rasmussen. But they are concerned the climate
negotiations process will bog down after political
momentum subsides in 2010. They also fear domestic
backlash in Europe if the targets contained in a COP-15
outcome fall far short of a pathway that limits global
warming to two degrees centigrade.
[...]
STILL PUSHING FOR 30 PERCENT EU EMISSIONS CUT
3. (SBU) Kaasjager said the Netherlands still wants the
EU to bump up its 2020 emissions reduction commitment
from 20 to 30 percent. He acknowledged this move would
not persuade other developed countries to put forward
more ambitious commitments; the aim would be to create a
more positive atmosphere in the negotiations and
encourage developing countries to accept a deal. He said
he would like to see the EU announce the 30 percent
commitment heading into the last weekend of COP-15 as a
"final push" to political leaders.
POST-COPENHAGEN ROADMAP
4. (SBU) Kaasjager said EU political leaders are facing a
credibility problem at COP-15. They will support a
pragmatic, operational agreement even if it falls short
of their ambitions. But they are politically vulnerable
because they sold the European public on a two degree
limit for warming. If an agreement at COP-15 drifts too
far off the two degree trajectory, it will put EU leaders
in a "tough position." To compensate, Kaasjager said the
EU would push hard to get a clear, strong timeline for
treaty talks in early 2010.

32
5. (SBU) Kaasjager said the Netherlands fears the United
States will be content with a political agreement at COP-
15 and backtrack on an international legal agreement.
EconOff assured him this fear is unfounded and the United
States remains committed to expeditious work towards a
legal agreement. Kaasjager emphasized the Netherlands is
extremely preoccupied with having a 2010 roadmap before
leaving Copenhagen. During COP-15 the Dutch will seek a
clear vision of what the structure of a legal agreement
will look like. They favor a structure that "uses what we
have" and preserves the name "Kyoto" even if in practice
it is adapted substantially to accommodate U.S. and
emerging economy commitments/plans.
DUTCH "FAST-START" FINANCING OFFER
6. (SBU) Jonk said the Netherlands has proposed to the EU
it would provide 100 million Euros per year in 2010,
2011, and 2012 to fund "fast-start public support" for
climate action in developing countries. This translates
to approximately 1.5 to 2 percent of the European
Commission's estimated figure of 5 to 7 billion Euros per
year needed in fast-start financing. The Netherlands
remains very concerned that developing countries will
balk at a climate deal without a clearer picture of
financial support numbers and sources.
CHINA
7. (SBU) Kaasjager said the Netherlands is currently
plugging China's November 26 'offer' into various climate
models to determine how much of a deviation from Business
as Usual it represents. The Dutch preliminary impression
is that China can do more with relatively little effort.
LEVIN

33
9th of December 2009: UK and France wants Tobin tax linked
with climate change efforts
Subject: PRIME MINISTER STILL FOCUSED ON TOBIN TAX,
DISAPPOINTED IN U.S. POSITION
Reference ID: #09LONDON2742
Classified by: Ambassador Louis Susman
1. (C/NF) Summary. Prime Minister Brown continues to
press hard for international adoption of a Tobin Tax,
despite being aware of U.S. opposition to the tax. He has
raised this issue - and bonuses - on several occasions
directly with the Ambassador, and said that he saw
cooperation on financial services and Afghanistan as the
critical elements of U.S.-UK relationship. Brown first
highlighted the Tobin Tax at the November G-20
Ministerial in St. Andrews, and subsequently told
Ambassador that he was disappointed that Treasury
Secretary Geithner publicly refused to support the UK
position. The political opposition in the UK also is
questioning the lack of U.S. support. The PM is using the
issue for domestic political gain but also for reasons of
“social justice.” The UK may feel emboldened on this
issue, given French Foreign Minister Kouchner’s proposal
at COP-15 for an international tax on financial services
for programs for poverty reduction and climate change,
and would likely criticize the U.S. if there were no
further international movement on this issue.
Prime Minister Raises Tax and Bonuses with Ambassador
2. (C/NF) Prime Minister Brown continues to press hard
for international adoption of some form of a Tobin Tax on
financial transactions, despite being fully aware of U.S.
opposition to the tax. In recent speeches to major
business groups, at the Commonwealth Summit, and in press
conferences, the PM has emphasized that a Tobin Tax must
be among the options explored to ensure that taxpayers do
not bear the cost of future bank bailouts. The Prime
Minister has raised this issue several times with
Ambassador Susman, most recently during the Ambassador’s
call to discuss the Afghanistan strategy on November 30,
and in a Thanksgiving call from the PM to the Ambassador.

34
The Prime Minister has stated that he saw coordination of
our actions on Afghanistan and financial services as the
cornerstones of the UK-U.S. bilateral relationship, and
has expressed disappointment that on the latter, the U.S.
has not been as supportive as he had hoped. We expect
that the PM will become emboldened to push harder for the
tax after France’s Foreign Minister Kouchner, at the
Copenhagen COP-15, proposed a .0005 percent tax on
financial transactions to fund poverty reduction and
combating climate change in developing countries.

35
15th of December 2009, London: Commonwealth keen on
legally binding treaty
Subject: COMMONWEALTH TACKLES CLIMATE CHANGE, MOSTLY
STEERS CLEAR OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
Reference ID: #09LONDON2819
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville.
Climate Change Consensus
2.(C/NF) The UK government, members of civil society, and
the Commonwealth Secretariat are both publicly and
privately praising the climate change consensus issued
from Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on November 28 as
part of the biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting (CHOGM) for its importance and strength ahead of
the COP-15 meetings in Copenhagen. In a December 11
meeting, Director of Political Affairs at the
Commonwealth Secretariat Amitav Banerji told Poloff that
the consensus, a 14-point declaration that called climate
change "the challenge of our time" and called for a
"comprehensive, substantial and operationally binding
agreement" at Copenhagen that would set the stage for a
"legally binding outcome by 2010," would be seen as key
for consensus-building ahead of the Copenhagen talks.
Banerji noted that the declaration pointed out that many
low-lying coastal states and small island nations-- which
carry equal weight within the Commonwealth-- face an
existential threat as a result of climate change but have
contributed least to the problem. The declaration also
expressed support for the initiative to establish a
Copenhagen Launch Fund that would provide fast-start
funding for climate change adaptation in the most
vulnerable countries; this fund would start in 2010 and
build to $10 billion annually by 2012.
3.(C/NF) Banerji said that Prime Minister Brown was
"especially keen" for the Commonwealth to issue "an
ambitious declaration," and that it was Brown who brought
French President Sarkozy into the meeting in hopes that
he could help "drum up a consensus." Banerji said that it
was always the intent of the Commonwealth to have the
declaration be a political statement and said that the

36
power of the agreement was political, in that it allowed
the Commonwealth to say that it gave a "major push to the
quest for an agreement" at Copenhagen. Banerji said that
Australian Prime Minister Rudd played a "star role" in
the negotiations, essentially taking over for Trinidad
and Tobago Prime Minister Manning in leading the drafting
process and "pushing for a meaningful statement." Banerji
further said that Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen, UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, and French President
Sarkozy chaired the special session but were not involved
in the drafting process, making the consensus a true
product of the Commonwealth.
4.(C/NF) Brendan Cox, Special Advisor to Prime Minister
Brown, told Poloff on November 30 that the special
climate change session provided an "important opportunity
to gather momentum before Copenhagen," and noted that the
proposal to establish the Copenhagen Launch Fund was put
forward by the British and subsequently agreed to by all
member states. In a December 11 meeting, Mike Smith,
Communications Officer at the Commonwealth Policy Studies
Unit (CPSU), called climate change the "dominant issue"
at the CHOGM and said it was seen as "the sparring before
the big fight" in Copenhagen. Smith said the strength of
the statement came as a surprise to CPSU; in particular,
Smith said that Commonwealth support for the Copenhagen
Launch Fund was unexpected.

37
22nd of December 2009, London: Briefing
Subject: POST COP-15 PRESS BRIEFING BY UK ENERGY
SECRETARY MILIBAND
Reference ID: #09LONDON2873
Unclassified.
1.(U) Summary: Ed Miliband, UK Secretary for Energy and
Climate Change, briefed the diplomatic corps, press and
environmental NGOs on December 21, on results of the
Copenhagen Conference (COP-15). Prime Minister Gordon
Brown joined by satellite from Scotland. Together they
focused on three key points: (1) the UK should persuade
other countries, notably the US, China, and other
European countries, to agree to more ambitious carbon
emissions reduction targets; (2) the UK and other
countries should work toward a legally binding
international treaty that would, among other things, set
up a transparent mechanism to evaluate all countries'
progress; (3) the decision-making process in the
Copenhagen talks should be streamlined to allow the 192
countries to find common ground on substantive issues.
2.(U) PM Brown told the group that although it was
disappointing not to achieve an international legally
binding climate change treaty, the UK would continue to
press for it. The main outcome of COP-15 is the agreement
to limit the increase in global warming to 2 degrees
Celsius. Brown outlined steps that need to be taken next.
First, by January 31, 2010, all countries should submit
their emissions targets. Second, other countries should
be persuaded to set higher range emission reduction
targets to reduce overall carbon production from 55
gigatons to 40 gigatons by 2020. Brown also said
developing countries, such as Bangladesh and Maldives,
should receive climate change mitigation funding as part
of the USD 30B pledge from developed countries over the
next three years. Third, "barely a handful of countries"
oppose a legally binding treaty and the best time to move
forward with talks is at the next climate change
conference in Bonn, Germany in six months hosted by
Chancellor Merkel. Lastly, Brown complained there is no
vehicle in the UN decision-making process for countries

38
to find common ground or bridge the differences.
3.(U) Miliband's remarks focused on steps the UK must
continue domestically. He claimed the British government
is taking action, but needed to "re-win" the case, and he
explained the UK will benefit economically in being at
the forefront. Miliband said the UN is central to the
process, although he expressed frustration that too much
time was spent arguing over procedural issues rather than
on the more important substantive ones. Miliband noted
that important movements in history were never successful
on the first attempt and that COP-15 had generated an
"irreversible shift" toward addressing climate change.
Miliband specifically mentioned the U.S. when stating
that many countries still need domestic climate change
campaigns to build more support in-country.
Susman

39
23rd of December 2009, Brasilia: Disappointment – but not that
much
Subject: BRAZIL IS PROUD OF ITS AMBITIOUS APPROACH TO
COPENHAGEN COP15 DESPITE DISAPPOINTING RESULTS
Reference ID: #09BRASILIA1516
Sensitive but unclassified; not for Internet
Distribution.
Note related cables include #09BRASILIA1411.
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The Government of Brazil (GOB)
expressed disappointment and frustration with the
Conference of the Parties-15 (COP-15) to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen.
President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva principally blamed
the position of the United States on mitigation, which he
called "too little" and one that did not evolve during
the conference. The modest USG goal for 2020 led to
Europe not increasing its mitigation proposal from 20
percent to 30 percent for 2020, he explained, and the
USG's position incentivized Japan and others to try to
eliminate the Kyoto Protocol. Still, Brazil accepts the
Copenhagen Accord and sees it as a step forward.
Moreover, Lula crowed that Brazil had the best image at
COP15 due to its ambitious proposal. END SUMMARY
DISAPPOINTMENT AND FRUSTRATION, MAINLY WITH USG
2. (SBU) The Brazilian press has generally viewed the
Conference of the Parties-15 (COP-15) to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen as a
failure. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, however,
has taken a slightly more moderated stance. He has not
called COP15 a failure nor a fiasco. In fact, Lula
commented that the final results were "better than
expected" compared with the low expectations at the
beginning of the conference. Lula and the Brazilian
delegation have expressed deep frustration on the lack of
progress at COP15.

40
31st of December 2009: EU Energy Commissioner is “lame
duck”
Subject: Lame Duck German Governor Kicked Upstairs as New
Energy Commissioner in Brussels
Reference ID: #09BERLIN1636
Sensitive but unclassified; not for Internet
Distribution.
3. […] The EU Energy Commissioner is responsible for
issues such as supply security, energy R&D and
efficiency, competition in the gas and electricity
markets, infrastructure and low carbon technologies.
However, key issues such as energy security and climate
change are not in the portfolio; nor will Oettinger take
over the role of EU Commission Vice President from
Verheugen.

41
4th of January 2010, Brussels: President of Europe says it like
it is
Subject: EU PRESIDENT VAN ROMPUY’S PLANS FOLLOWING
COPENHAGEN AND FOR AFGHANISTAN
Reference ID: #10BRUSSELS4
Classified by: Charge D’ Affaires Richard M. Eason
1. (C//NF) Summary: The Ambassador discussed the
Conference of Parties (COP) Conference in Copenhagen and
Afghanistan with EU Council Permanent President Herman
Van Rompuy over coffee December 23 after delivering the
congratulatory letter (reftel) from President Obama. Van
Rompuy called the Copenhagen Conference a disaster in
which Europe was excluded and mistreated. He predicted
Mexico COP 16 would be a disaster as well, and added that
multilateral conferences would not resolve the climate
problem. He proposed coming to an agreement between the
EU and the United States during the possible upcoming
U.S. - EU Summit in Madrid, and then approaching China to
achieve a workable solution. On Afghanistan, Van Rompuy
opined that no one in Europe believed in Afghanistan
anymore. He said Europe was going along in deference to
the United States; there must be results in 2010, or
Afghanistan is over for Europe.
[...]
Copenhagen was a disaster for Europe
3. (C//NF) Van Rompuy raised the recent COP 15 conference
in Copenhagen, calling it an “incredible disaster.” He
was not angry, in the sense that he never seems angry,
but he was as animated and as frustrated as I have seen
him. He thought that Europe had been “totally excluded”
and was “mistreated.” He thought the only saving grace
was that he was not there. Van Rompuy said, “had I been
there, my Presidency would have been over before it
began.” He said he was criticized for not being present
in Copenhagen, and added that he did not need to be there
because he does not start in his new position until
January 1. He thought it was a wise decision not to
attend the conference despite the pressure.

42
4. (C//NF) I responded by saying that I had no idea what
actually happened since I was not there, but offered that
from the reports I was seeing, it looked more like a
chaotic meeting had occurred rather than any decision to
exclude Europe. But Van Rompuy did not give that
explanation much credence, responding, “they could
certainly have called Europe and told us to come.”
5. (C//NF) Van Rompuy did seem to ascribe some blame to
Europe. He said, “no one knows who to call: Merkel,
Barroso, who knows who.” He said he planned to take
control of getting Europe on the same page. He mentioned
that he had scheduled an informal EU meeting in February
to discuss the economy, but he was now going to use the
meeting to discuss Copenhagen in addition to the economy.
He intends to get the EU lined up.
U.S. and EU Need to Talk Climate at Madrid
6. (C//NF) Van Rompuy said he has, “given up on Mexico
City,” with Van Daele calling the planned U.N. COP 16
meeting to be held there November to December 2010
“Nightmare on Elm Street 2,” and stating, “who wants to
see that horror movie again.” Van Rompuy said,
“multilateral meetings will not work.” He indicated that
Europe first had to get on the same page; then Europe had
to meet with the U.S.; and finally they (I think he meant
Europe and the U.S.) had to meet as well with China.
Rather than waiting for a failure at Mexico City, he
intends to address Copenhagen issues with the United
States at Madrid; he envisioned engaging China
thereafter. In his mind, talks with the U.S. would have
to focus on Madrid and not Mexico City.

43
10th of Janurary 2010: No snow in Afghanistan
Subject: KARZAI AND CODEL MCCAIN ON PROGRESS, ELECTIONS, AND
REINTEGRATION
Reference ID: #10KABUL85
Classified by: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry
[...]
6. [...] Karzai [...] pointed out that climate change was
a new and growing concern - at this point in the year
there should be abundant snow and there had been none to
date.

44
21st of January, The Vatican: Pope backs Accord
Subject: “GREEN” POPE SUPPORTS US PATH FORWARD FROM
COPENHAGEN
Reference ID: #10VATICAN13
Classified by: Julieta Valls Noyes
1. (C) Summary: The Holy See supports USG efforts to have
countries associate themselves with the Copenhagen Accord by
the January 31 deadline (ref. A), and will encourage them to
do so. The Pope’s recent environmental messages offer
Vatican officials a strong platform to leverage the moral
authority of the Church to combat climate change. While the
Vatican supports the inclusion of all countries in
international environmental discussions and decision-making,
it is not naove about the political motives behind Cuba’s
and Venezuela’s criticism of Copenhagen.
2. (C) On January 20, P/EOff met with Dr. Paolo Conversi,
the Vatican’s point person on climate change at the
Secretariat of State, to deliver ref. A demarche. Conversi
immediately expressed the Holy See’s genuine desire to see
the Copenhagen process move forward. He was aware of the
January 31 deadline but did not know which countries had
agreed formally to join the process. Conversi agreed to
encourage other countries discreetly to associate themselves
with the Accord, as opportunities arise. (Note: For
practical reasons, the Holy See will not formally associate
itself with the Copenhagen Accord: Vatican City State’s
carbon footprint negligible. The Vatican decision is
consistent with its practice of not becoming a formal party
to agreements if they require substantial technical
expertise and reporting commitments).
3. (C) Conversi was pleased overall with the process leading
to Copenhagen and with the Conference itself. He said
expectations were too high before the event. Regarding the
group of dissenting countries, including Venezuela and Cuba,
Conversi said the Vatican was sympathetic to their
complaints about inclusion in decision-making but believed
their criticism was largely politically motivated. Noting
that Pope Benedict had firmly established his “green”
reputation using his New Years’ Day Peace message to
highlight environmental protection (ref. B), Conversi said
he looked forward to further collaboration with the U.S.

45
prior to Bonn and Mexico City.
4. (U) In a separate meeting, Monsignior James Reinert, the
environmental analyst at the Pontifical Council for Justice
and Peace (a Vatican think tank), confirmed to P/EOff that
the profile of environmental issues in the Vatican is at an
all-time high. Secretariat of State officers represented the
Holy See at environmental meetings now, where in the past
his own office would have had the lead. (Note: Justice and
Peace will continue to produce analytical documents on
environmental issues for bishops around the world, while the
Secretariat will have the lead on policy, particularly in
multilateral fora.)
5. (C) Comment: Conversi’s offer to support the U.S., even
if discreetly, is significant because the Vatican is often
reluctant to appear to compromise its independence and moral
authority by associating itself with particular lobbying
efforts. Even more important than the Vatican’s lobbying
assistance, however, is the influence the Pope’s guidance
can have on public opinion in countries with large Catholic
majorities and beyond.

46
26th of January 2010, Riyadh: Saudis governed by petroleum
ministry
Subject: SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESSING CHINA TO STOP
IRANIAN PROLIFERATION, CONCERNED ABOUT TSA REGULATIONS
Reference ID: #10RIYADH118
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith
Summary: […] A/S Feltman urged Saudi Arabia to associate
itself with the Copenhagen Accord by January 31.
[…]
8.(SBU) A/S Feltman noted the importance that the
President places on Climate Change, and the Copenhagen
Accord. Given that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi was
involved in crafting the final agreement, A/S Feltman
noted the United States is counting on Saudi Arabia to
associate itself with the accord by January 31. Prince
Torki said that Saudi Arabia was very pleased the United
States was more actively engaged in this issue, and said
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports trying to
address this issue. He noted that the MFA will have to
consult with other involved ministries, such as the
Ministry of Petroleum, and promised to respond before
January 31.

47
28th of January 2010, The Hague: Dutch afterthoughts
Subject: SUPPORT FOR COPENHAGEN ACCORD
Reference ID: #10THEHAGUE54
Classified By: DCM Edwin Nolan.
SUMMARY: The Netherlands will join the EU in inscribing a
conditional emissions reduction target of 30 percent if
others commit to comparable efforts. The Dutch had pushed
to make the 30 percent offer unconditionally. Dutch
climate officials are recalibrating their negotiating
strategy after COP15 and putting greater emphasis on
pragmatism. They have praised several facets of the
Copenhagen Accord and are eager to make it operational.
The Dutch are concerned that failure by donors to get
fast-track financing flowing quickly will lead to more
friction with developing countries later this year.
AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CLIMATE WITH ENVIRONMENT MINISTER
2. (SBU) Ambassador delivered reftel points January 13
during her initial call on Environment Minister
Jacqueline Cramer. Cramer said the EU should inscribe its
target as a single entity. She also emphasized the need
for developed country pledges, taken as a whole, to add
up to a convincing number for the developing world. She
expressed concern that the January 31 annex would be
insufficient because this bottom-up approach will not get
to a 25 percent developed country commitment. She
advocated a specific negotiating track led by the U.S.
and others to determine how the developed world can come
up with a convincing target. Cramer acknowledged this is
a delicate process and offered Dutch help. Regarding the
Dutch national goal, Cramer reiterated the Dutch
government’s long-standing target of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions 30 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. (Note:
Most domestic environmental and energy analysts consider
this unachievable. End note.) Given this ambitious
domestic goal, Cramer cautioned that Dutch government and
industry were looking for comparable efforts and a level
playing field with other EU member states and major
global emitters.

48
NETHERLANDS JOINS UK IN PUSH FOR 30 PERCENT EU COMMITMENT
3. (C) EmbOffs reinforced reftel points January 25 with
the Dutch Foreign Ministry climate negotiator Sanne
Kaasjager. He said the Netherlands would join the EU in
inscribing a conditional, collective target of 30 percent
(the so-called “20/30” commitment, either/or). He
described a “vicious” January 20 COREPER meeting where
the UK’s and the Netherlands’ push for an unconditional
30 percent target (or at least “20-30” percent, leaving
the option for a figure in between) met stiff resistance
from Italy and Poland. The Netherlands will not inscribe
its own national target -- 30 percent by 2020 -- for fear
of distracting attention from the EU target and because
its national commitment is a political rather than legal
one.
ENTHUSIASM FOR COPENHAGEN ACCORD
4. (C) Kaasjager said the Netherlands considered the
Copenhagen Accord a significant accomplishment.
Specifically, he called the Accord a “breakthrough” for
setting out political consensus around the 6 to 8 most
contentious issues in climate negotiations. The Dutch
were pleased the Accord reiterated the 2 degree Celsius
objective. Kaasjager praised President Obama’s hands-on
role in securing the Accord while sharply criticizing the
“inept” Qsecuring the Accord while sharply criticizing
the “inept” Danish performance as chair of COP15.
5. (SBU) The Dutch government is taking steps to convince
developing countries to “associate with” the Accord.
Kaasjager has drafted messages for embassies in capitals
receiving Dutch development assistance to solicit
support. This is an unprecedented move for the Dutch
government, which traditionally recoils at any suggestion
to use aid money as political leverage. But at the annual
Dutch chiefs of mission conference in mid-January,
ambassadors were clamoring for guidance on how to engage
and persuade developing countries on climate
negotiations. However, Kaasjager said the Netherlands
would find it difficult to make association with the
Accord a condition to receive climate financing.

49
EU INTROSPECTION AFTER COP15
6. (C) According to Kaasjager, the Copenhagen endgame has
caused the EU to take a hard look at its role in climate
talks. He was taken aback by the sight of European
leaders (e.g., PM Brown and Chancellor Merkel) hovering
around the VIP room sofas where the Chinese, Indian,
South African, and Brazilian representatives were
consulting, trying in vain to get pull asides with the
BASIC leaders. Kaasjager took exception with the media’s
portrayal of the EU’s exclusion from the final stages of
the Copenhagen talks, but delivered a harsh verdict on
the EU’s performance at COP15. He lamented the lack of
Member State discipline and the failure to bring a
“tactical plan” -- meaning the EU was unprepared to
adjust quickly to changing dynamics as the talks
unfolded. He said his EU counterparts are coming around
to the notion that Europe’s strategy must shift from “How
to involve the U.S.?” to “How to involve China?”
PATH FORWARD FOR CLIMATE TALKS
7. (SBU) In a word, Kaasjager said what emerged from
Copenhagen was “pragmatism.” More than ever, Dutch
climate officials appreciate that climate negotiations
will be an incremental “process of small steps.” They are
still deliberating on what the right long-term
negotiating track is going forward: bilateral cooperation
between major emitters; coalitions of the willing (such
as the Major Economies Forum, G20, or Greenland
Dialogue); or the legalistic UN process. The Dutch think
a bottom-up bilateral approach will not achieve enough
emissions reductions. They worry about exclusion from MEF
and G20 fora. And they are currently disenchanted with
the top-down UN process vulnerable to spoiler countries.
Kaasjager said the Netherlands will work to forge a
middle road that is achievable and inclusive. In the
near-term the Dutch are eager to use the next several
months to make the Copenhagen Accord operational and
bring its elements to the formal negotiating table in
Bonn in June.
FAST-TRACK FINANCING PIVOTAL
8. (SBU) Kaasjager was particularly concerned about

50
bottlenecks in the flow of fast-track financing
envisioned in the Copenhagen Accord. Without serious
effort by donor countries, he predicted a worst case
scenario in which G77 members use the late 2010 Cancun
meeting to accuse the developed world of failing to
follow through on its fast-track financing promises. He
identified three potential areas of friction with
developing countries on financing: most of the pledged
funding is not “additional”; it is skewed towards
mitigation programs rather than adaptation; and much of
it is already committed without much say from recipients.
Kaasjager has circulated a proposal for donor country
counterparts to meet informally at working levels with
recipients countries to address these issues head-on
rather than wait for them to surface as a PR disaster
later.

51
2nd of February 2010: Ethiopia wants monitoring of climate
change mitigation funds
Subject: UNDER SECRETARY OTERO’S MEETING WITH ETHIOPIAN
PRIME MINISTER MELES ZENAWI - JANUARY 31, 2010
Reference ID: #10ADDISABABA163
Classified by: Under Secretary Maria Otero
[...]
4. [...] On climate change, Meles said the GoE fully
supports the Copenhagen accord, but is disappointed with
signs the U.S. may not support his proposed panel to
monitor international financial contributions under the
accord.
[...]
GoE Prepared to Move Forward from Copenhagen
13. (C) U/S Otero urged Meles to sign the Copenhagen
accord on climate change and explained that it is a point
of departure for further discussion and movement forward
on the topic. She noted that while the agreement has its
limitations, it has the international community moving in
the right direction. Meles responded that the GoE
supported the accord in Copenhagen and would support it
at the AU Summit. However, he expressed his
disappointment that despite President Obama’s personal
assurance to him that finances committed in Copenhagen
would be made available, he had received word from
contacts at the UN that the U.S. was not supportive of
Ethiopia’s proposal for a panel to monitor financial
pledges regarding climate change. Ms. Gavin assured the
Prime Minister that she would look into his concerns.

52
5th of February 2010, Copenhagen: Evaluation of COP-15
Subject: DENMARK: GOVERNMENT WEATHERS COP-15 AFTERMATH
Reference ID: #10COPENHAGEN69
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED--NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION
1. (SBU) Summary: Unrealistic public expectations for the
outcome of COP-15 and initial confusion over how to
interpret the Copenhagen Accord led to intense media and
opposition questioning of Denmark's role as host of the
conference, in particular focused on PM Lars Loekke
Rasmussen's performance as President of the COP. In
response, the Government has defended the Copenhagen
Accord as the best outcome possible at COP-15 and a
positive step forward toward a legally binding agreement,
and public interest appears to be shifting to other
issues.
2. (SBU) While it remains publicly committed to pursue a
legally binding accord under its COP presidency (which
ends in December when Mexico assumes that role at the
next COP in Cancun), we note signs that the Government
seeks to play a less exposed role in international
negotiations this year, preferring to work privately with
the UN, Mexico, and the EU in search of a way forward.
Denmark will continue to be a useful partner on climate,
especially on Copenhagen Accord implementation, and we
will continue to work closely with the Government and
others in pursuit of shared interests. End Summary.
3. (SBU) The Danish Government (like the USG) admits that
the Copenhagen Accord did not fulfil all its hopes for
COP-15, but defends the Accord as an important outcome of
the COP-15 climate conference. Critics, including the
parliamentary opposition, have criticized the Accord for
its non-binding nature and criticized PM Lars Loekke
Rasmussen for a weak performance as President of the 15th
Conference of Parties (COP-15) climate conference held in
Copenhagen December 7-18, 2009 (for a complete
description of the COP-15 endgame and results, see Ref
A).
4. (SBU) National media have fully aired opinions about
the handling and results of this historic event for

53
Denmark, to the point where public interest is beginning
to reach saturation levels. Most awkward for the
Government has been a focus on the PM's performance
during COP-15. Danish conservative daily 'Berlingske
Tidende' cites an unnamed Foreign Ministry source who
reportedly witnessed an angry Prime Minister dressing
down his leading climate advisor, Bo Lidegaard, in front
of Danish delegates during COP15 after feeling himself
humiliated by foreign diplomats when he assumed the chair
of the conference as it entered the crucial final days.
Press have also highlighted procedural errors made by
Rasmussen while in the chair, and the opposition has
criticized the PM for "throwing in the towel" by giving
up the chair in the waning hours of the conference after
being thwarted by stubborn opposition from the ALBA
countries to COP approval of the Copenhagen Accord. One
anonymous analyst charged that the PM was unprepared to
assume leadership over this international event, and
letting him do so was equivalent to "throwing him to the
sharks."
Defending the Accord
5. (SBU) In several public appearances since COP-15, PM
Rasmussen and new Climate Minister Lykke Friis have
answered pointed questions from the press and the
opposition on the significance of the Copenhagen Accord
and the way ahead before Parliament. While freely
admitting the Accord was not ideal, they have defended it
as the best agreement possible at COP-15, and an
important step forward towards a binding international
agreement to address climate change.
6. (SBU) In an appearance before Parliament on January
26, the PM was faulted by the opposition for his
inability to push through a legally binding agreement.
Social Democrat climate spokesperson Mette Gjerskov
criticized a "much too close" Danish alliance with the
U.S. in the lead-up to the COP, saying "it was not enough
just to get Obama to town and hope to then buy the votes
of developing nations." Gjerskov said the PM had chaired
COP-15 "as though it was a village hall discussion, not a
gathering of world leaders," and urged the government to
admit its mistakes and assume greater responsibility for

54
the negotiating process in the lead-up to COP-16 in
Mexico. Continuing, she declared that "it is now over a
month since delegates saw their COP15 chairman throw in
the towel and walk out of the conference and nobody has
seen or heard from him since. No meetings have been
called, no strategy has been laid out. Where's the
leadership? Our Prime Minister seems to be suffering from
a climate coma."
7. (SBU) In response, PM Rasmussen defended the accord as
the best possible outcome and a reflection of "the art of
the possible" and "the reality of the situation." The PM
said the Copenhagen Accord was an important step forward
towards a binding agreement that remains the end goal of
the Government. While acknowledging the opposition had a
right to try to label the outcome of the COP a
'disaster,' the PM said that view displayed "a very
modest understanding of what was--and is--at stake in the
international climate debate." On forming alliances, the
PM dismissed the criticism and indicated that he sees a
much broader alliance behind the Copenhagen Accord. The
accord, he said, was supported by countries responsible
for more than 80 percent of global CO2-emissions.
Friis to the Front--Still Ambitious
8. (SBU) Climate and Energy Minister Lykke Friis, who
assumed her ministerial duties when her predecessor,
Connie Hedegaard, stepped down just before COP-15 (see
Ref B), told Parliament on January 26 that Denmark was
committed to pursuing international collaboration on
climate change along all tracks (i.e. UN, Kyoto,
Copenhagen Accord).
9. (SBU) To do so, she said, Denmark will specifically:
--Work with EU and other developed countries on
delivering the finance outlined in the accord;
--coordinate its efforts with the UN, Mexico, Germany
(for the June UNFCCC meeting in Bonn);
--keep working through diplomatic channels, via its
embassy climate attaches in strategic countries (adding a
new one in Mexico City and extending its current attache
in South Africa, in anticipation of South Africa's
hosting of COP-17 in 2011);

55
--the Minister said she would attend the World Economic
Forum in Doha January 26-27, and would subsequently visit
Delhi (Feb 5-6, coupled with a visit to Beijing). (Note:
Friis' staff told REO on January 26 that she is also
considering whether and when to continue her
predecessor's "Greenland Dialogue" process.)
But Not Too Ambitious
10. (SBU) PM Rasmussen has flatly rejected calls from the
opposition and - intriguingly - from some within the
governing coalition (specifically from the Conservative
Party of former Climate Minister and EC Commissioner-
designate Connie Hedegaard), for more ambitious
international leadership by Denmark on climate issues in
the wake of COP-15. On January 13 during another
appearance before Parliament, the PM was denounced by
Social Liberal Party leader Margrethe Vestager for
"trying to lead from the back seat." Instead, she said,
"Denmark could do something on its own. We should say:
first we will go for 30 percent, and we are willing to go
even further."
11. (SBU) Rasmussen responded that "we could say 100
percent. We could declare that we will end the
consumption of fossil fuels by the end of the year, then
we would have made a marginal, marginal contribution to
the fight against global warming. Because even if we did,
even if the whole EU did, even if all developed nations
of the world did it, it would still not be enough to
reach the 2 degrees target. We would then probably have
set ourselves some challenges that are...very challenging
financially. It's about balance. And I accept that there
is a positive competitive effect of being a frontrunner,
but there is also a competitive disadvantage by being too
much of a front-runner, and therefore the right place for
this discussion right here and now is (within) the EU."
Comment
12. (SBU) COP-15 was certainly a disappointment to the
Danish Government in that it did not provide the public
relations boost it had hoped for. Yet neither was it a
bust--the opposition has not been noticeably boosted, and
recriminations over COP-15 seem to be losing public

56
interest, especially as implementation of the Copenhagen
Accord gathers steam. Instead, Danes seem eager to leave
the mixed results of COP-15 behind, choosing to move on
to focus political debate on other issues. Polls show a
slight opposition lead over the government, but that edge
was not significantly affected by COP-15. That said,
emerging disagreements within the governing coalition and
with the opposition over international climate
negotiations have the potential to play out further, with
electoral implications.
13. (SBU) While the outcome of COP-15 is not directly
destabilizing the Rasmussen Government in the short term,
the PM appears chastened by his experience and unlikely
to risk further high-stakes appearances on the
international stage. We expect Minister Friis to now
assume a more visible role enunciating Danish climate
policy, as Denmark transitions to a more modest role in
international negotiations. As COP-15 president for the
remainder of 2010, however, Denmark will remain an
important player in international climate negotiations,
and we will continue to work together with the Government
on shared interests in encouraging full implementation of
the Copenhagen Accord and building support for an
effective international agreement. In coordination with
the Department, we will engage with Minister Friis to
exchange views on the best way forward.
FULTON

57
9th of February 2010: Cooperation with Brazil
Subject: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MRE SECRETARY-
GENERAL PATRIOTA
Reference ID: #10BRASILIA45
Classified by: Thomas A. Shannon
6. (C) Referring to President Lula's emphasis on the need
for close U.S.-Brazil coordination heading into the
UNFCCC COP-16, Patriota said he hoped SECC Todd Stern
would be able to come to Brazil soon. He said Lula was
committed to the following through on the Copenhagen
communique and, unlike other BASIC countries, would not
backtrack. "We have to move forward," he said, suggesting
that NSC Deputy Froman might be able to make time for
talks on climate change during his upcoming visit.

58
9th of February, La Paz: Morales derailing Accord
Subject: Morales Continues to Attempt to Derail
Copenhagen Accord
Classified By: John S. Creamer, Charge d'Affaires
Reference ID: #10LAPAZ33
1. (C) Summary: Declaring the Copenhagen UN climate
change summit a failure, Bolivian President Morales
announced he will convoke the first "People's World
Conference on Climate Change and the Mother Earth" in
Cochabamba April 20-22 -- coinciding with Earth Day. The
conference's stated objective is to improve the position
of social movements in the climate change process and
develop an alternative work plan to take to the United
Nations. As one of only five countries that did not sign
the Copenhagen Accord (besides Tuvalu, Venezuela, Sudan,
and Cuba), the Bolivian government hopes to raise doubts
about the ability of the UN process to advance the
climate change agenda and address the concerns of the
world's poorest nations. More fundamentally, Morales
views climate change as a vehicle for raising his and
Bolivia's international political stature, especially
among sympathetic anti-globalization groups.
2. (C) President Morales seemed to revel in his high-
profile opposition to the UN process at the Copenhagen
summit, ridiculing developed nations' proposals, making
extraordinary demands for reparations and aid, and
alienating the conference organizers and most
delegations. Danish Ambassador to Bolivia Morten Elkjaer
told us Morales canceled most of his bilateral program at
the last moment, including meetings with clean energy
firms, sustainable energy experts, and leading Danish
businesses and labor federations. Danish Prime Minister
Rasmussen spent an unpleasant 30 minutes with Morales,
Ambassador Elkjaer said, during which Morales thanked him
for bilateral aid (Denmark provides Bolivia approximately
$30 million a year in aid), but refused to engage on
climate change issues. The Danes said they are "fed up"
with Bolivia and the ALBA countries, who continue to
mount legal and propaganda arguments against the
Copenhagen Accord, but that they will continue to consult

59
with their European Union partners on ways to influence
the GOB position.
3. (C) Chinese DCM in La Paz, Huang Yazhong, told the
Charge that he has raised the Copenhagen Accord twice
with Bolivian MFA Multilateral Affairs director MarC-a
Cecilia ChacC3n, urging the GOB to rethink its radical
opposition to the deal. Noting he had made little
progress, the Chinese diplomat suggested that further
engagement was pointless and argued that it is up to
Brazil to bring around Bolivia and the other ALBA
countries. Brazilian officials told us Bolivia refused to
adopt Brazil's position on Copenhagen at a November 26
meeting in Manaus organized by President Lula da Silva.
Still, Itamaraty official Marcel Biato (and future
Brazilian Ambassador to La Paz) said Brazil will continue
to press Bolivia on Copenhagen, hoping that Bolivia's
isolation on this issue will eventually bring it around.
4. (C) Gisela Ulloa, a member of Bolivian delegations to
earlier COP meetings (but not COP-15, where she
represented Papua New Guinea and the Coalition for First
Nations) told us the GOB's position is aimed at creating
an alternative development model consistent with
Morales's anti-capitalist philosophy. In addition to
demanding enormous reparations from developed nations,
the GOB opposes using markets as a mechanism to reduce
emissions. Ulloa suggested that Morales recognizes
Bolivia will not be included in the deliberations of the
major players and is keen to create an alternative forum
where he can style himself as the leader of anti-
globalization groups and other social movements MAS
Senator Ana Maria Romero added that Morales sees
environmental issues as one area where he can carve out
an international identity independent from that of his
close ally, President Hugo Chavez. She recounted to us
that an animated Morales told her he was surrounded by
well-wishers in Copenhagen urging him "not to abandon
them," while Chavez was alone in the corner.
5. (C) Many Bolivians are quick to observe that Morales's
climate change campaign is about enhancing his global
stature, not about the environment. Former Morales
Production Minister and MAS replacement (suplente)

60
Senator Javier Hurtado said there is a huge gap between
Morales' strident, pro-environmental rhetoric in
international fora and his domestic emphasis on
industrialization as they key to development. The
foundation of this effort is large-scale natural gas,
iron, and lithium production projects, enterprises that
have historically proven extremely damaging to the
environment. In fact, the Inter-American Development Bank
has presented a report to the GOB that details the
serious potential for environmental damage in extracting
lithium.
6. (C) Comment: Bolivia is already suffering real damage
from the effects of global warming, but Morales seems to
prefer to score rhetorical points rather than contribute
to a solution. This radical position won him plaudits
from anti-globalization groups, but has alienated many
developed nations and most of Bolivia's neighbors .. Our
assessment is that Bolivia remains beyond reach on
Copenhagen, at least until Morales sees the limits of his
approach.

61
11th of February 2010, Riyadh: Saudis worried about oil income
Subject: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S FEB 15-16
VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES SMITH
Reference ID: #10RIYADH178
[...]
11. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE: Your visit offers an important
opportunity to head off a serious clash over climate
change. Saudi officials are very concerned that a climate
change treaty would significantly reduce their income
just as they face significant costs to diversify their
economy. We want to get beyond the obstructionism that
Saudi negotiators have often shown during the
negotiations and persuade senior leaders to work with us
in a partnership to meet their strategic concerns,
including by cooperating on developing solar and biomass
energy. The King is particularly sensitive to avoid Saudi
Arabia being singled out as the bad actor, particularly
on environmental issues. Your conveying the importance
the President places on working as partners with Saudi
Arabia on the Copenhagen process will be very important
in making this dialogue more constructive. Secretary Chu
intends to explore specific areas of collaboration during
his February 21-23 visit.

62
12th of February 2010: Saudi schizophrenia
Subject: TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA’S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING
POSITION
Reference ID: #10RIYADH184
Classified by: Ambassador James B. Smith
1. (S) Saudi Arabia is officially still studying the
issue of whether to associate with the Copenhagen Accord
on Climate Change. Behind the scenes, we understand
serious discussions are taking place about which road
will best serve the Kingdom’s long term interests. On one
hand, Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator has
criticized the Copenhagen process in private and in
public, arguing that the UNFCCC process is the only
acceptable legal framework. On the other hand, Saudi
officials are very eager to obtain investment credits for
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and other technology
transfer projects that will only become available once an
agreement has been reached. Saudi officials express
concern about the impact a transition to a low-carbon
energy mix will have on the country’s revenue stream at a
time when it faces enormous financing needs to transform
its economy to create jobs for its young, growing
population. It also fears imposed economic costs
associated with “demonizing” oil. Part of the explanation
for this schizophrenic position is that the Saudi
Government has not yet thought through all the
implications of a climate change agreement, in part
because it may not fully understand the various demand
scenarios. There appears to be a growing sense within the
SAG that it may be in danger of becoming isolated on
climate change, which may prompt a re-examination of its
position. Saudi officials have suggested that they need
to find a way to climb down gracefully from the country’s
tough negotiating position. More sustained engagement in
coordination with other governments, particularly if
pitched as an effort to develop partnership, may help
them do so.
Saudi Arabia not yet Decided on Copenhagen Accord
2. (C) Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator Dr.

63
Mohammad Al-Sabban told Econoffs February 3 the United
States should adopt a more inclusive, transparent
approach to United Nations Forum for Climate Change
Cooperation (UNFCCC) negotiations. Although he was
encouraged by President Obama’s attitude towards
developing country partners in the negotiations, Al-
Sabban said the parties needed to “learn from the
mistakes” of Copenhagen in thinking about preparing for
the next Conference of Parties (CoP) in Mexico. Al-Sabban
said developing countries felt their Danish hosts forced
them to decide on the Copenhagen Accord with practically
no notice. Heads of state were also called into the
negotiations too early and they applied too much pressure
“when the deal was not there,” he said. In specific
response to the U.S. request for support for the
Copenhagen Accord (ref H), Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia
was still studying the accord to determine its position.
The SAG cares about the environment, but it also must
care for its citizens, he said.
Addressing Saudi Economic Concerns Key to Progress
3. (C) Asked how to move forward on a global climate
change commitment, Al-Sabban agreed negotiations need a
“speedy outcome,” and said countries need to rebuild
trust and confidence through more transparent
negotiations. He reminisced fondly about the inclusive
nature of the initial Kyoto Protocol negotiations, which
he said should be replicated in Cancun. Al-Sabban said
climate change negotiations should remain under the
UNFCCC and not be pursued under alternative frameworks.
4. (C) Asked about tangible actions to reach national
climate change goals, Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia’s
nationally appropriate actions would include carbon
capture and storage (CCS) credits. He emphasized Saudi
Arabia’s need for technology transfer and foreign direct
investment to mitigate the adverse impact that emissions-
reducing policies may have on the Kingdom. Al-Sabban said
the SAG had closely studied climate change policies’
potential negative impacts. The Kingdom will need time to
diversify its economy away from petroleum, he said,
noting that a U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia with
its economic diversification efforts would “take the

64
pressure off climate change negotiations.”
5. (C) Al-Sabban said the development of renewable energy
and energy efficiency technologies was key to addressing
Saudi Arabia’s domestic energy demand, and he acknowledged
the need for increased energy efficiency awareness. The
deployment of CCS technology, he said, was “crucial” for
Saudi Arabia. He said the U.S. Administration’s rhetoric to
end dependence on foreign oil, reiterated by President Obama
in Copenhagen, is antagonistic and causes genuine fear in
Saudi Arabia. The SAG is concerned about the outlook for oil
demand and global production, and fears it will not be able
to diversify in time to reach its development goals.
Shadow Negotiator Suggests Partnership
6. (C) Senior Advisor to the President of Meteorology and
Environment (PME) Fawaz Al-Alamy told Econoffs January 27
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the same values on
climate change, but have different negotiation tactics.
Al-Alamy, who joined PME in late 2009 and led Saudi
Arabia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations,
said Saudi Petroleum Minister Ali Al-Naimi wants to move
forward in UNFCCC negotiations. (Note: PME sends three
representatives with Al-Sabban to climate change
negotiations. End note.) Al-Sabban’s negative approach to
negotiations “disheartens” him, as does the ongoing
“blame game” on climate change. Saudi Arabia, like China
and India, needs to behave like an emerging economy
rather than a developing country, he said. Al-Alamy noted
he had met the previous day with both the Chinese and the
Indian Ambassadors to the Kingdom to discuss climate
change.
7. (C) Al-Alamy recommended several steps for U.S.
engagement with Saudi Arabia on climate change, including
active outreach to all the key players including Al-
Sabban, Petroleum Minister Al-Naimi, and PME President
Prince Turki bin Nasser. Al-Alamy recommended the U.S.
reach out to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary
General, who has the power to tone down the alarm in the
rest of the Arab world, such as in Egypt. Al-Alamy
recommended the U.S. continue to coordinate its approach
with other Embassies, which he said has been very
effective. Asked how to get beyond the Kyoto Protocol

65
lens through which Al-Sabban views climate negotiations,
Al-Alamy quickly replied “he only has two more years to
talk about Kyoto” before it expires.
8. (C) Al-Alamy said that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi
strongly supports solar energy as he believes it will
displace oil currently used in the power sector and
ultimately increase oil exports. Saudi Arabia currently uses
1.5 million barrels per day to produce electricity and
water, he said. The Kingdom is considering beginning a
civilian nuclear program, and top leadership including
Minister of Foreign Affairs Saud Al-Faisal supports the
increased use of renewable energy sources. Some, however,
view Copenhagen as a serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s
economic stability. “Ask any Saudi,” Al-Alamy said, “they
all think Saudi Arabia will be asked to foot the bill for
climate change.” Al-Alamy outlined Saudi Arabia’s top
concerns, including its strong aversion to mixing trade and
environmental priorities. If duties are placed on oil and
gas, Saudi Arabia will not be able to move ahead with its
economic diversification plans, and this creates a “phobia”
of climate change talks, he said. The Saudis also resent the
U.S. when it makes decisions “without consulting its
friends.” Al-Alamy said Saudi Arabia, and Al-Sabban in
particular, needs to feel like a partner of U.S. decision
making.
Is Al-Naimi the Problem?
9. (S) Minister Al-Naimi has consistently been rational
and practical in talking with western delegations about
climate change, noting that Saudi Arabia had to address
its development concerns, but conceding that the world
needs to work together to address climate change. These
reassuring statements stand in sharp contrast to Al-
Sabban’s public comments, such as questioning the science
behind climate change just before Copenhagen, and his
often obstructionist behavior, as reported by a number of
Embassies in Riyadh, during working-level negotiations.
Senior Ministry of Petroleum officials have reassured us
after each of Al-Sabban’s public outbursts over the last
six months that he has been “tamed” and brought back onto
the reservation. The frequency and number of times that
Al-Sabban steps out of line, and the apparent lack of any
sanction, raises questions about the real Saudi position

66
on climate change.
10. (S) A recent conversation with UK Embassy officers
suggests that indeed Al-Naimi may have some questions
about climate change. They report that Al-Naimi was
sharply critical of the Copenhagen meetings and the
climate change effort in general, in marked contrast to
earlier meetings. He complained that heads of state were
brought in to negotiate the final stages, which prevented
Saudi Arabia from voicing its true opposition to several
elements. He also questioned the legality of the
Copenhagen process and its future direction.
11. (S) A senior Ministry of Petroleum official explained
that, leaving Copenhagen, the Saudi delegation was
convinced that the Copenhagen accord would not attract
significant support, apparently largely based on Al-
Sabban’s analysis. The Minister’s office was unpleasantly
surprised by mid-January, when it was clear that a number
of countries had already associated themselves with the
accord. Assistant Petroleum Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin
Salman told EconCouns that he had spent two days walking
Minister Al-Naimi through each of the 90 plus submissions
on the UNFCCC web site. Prince Abdulaziz told the
Minister that Saudi Arabia had missed a real opportunity
to submit “something clever,” like India or China, that
was not legally binding but indicated some goodwill
towards the process without compromising key economic
interests. The Prince intimated to EconCouns that Al-
Sabban would not long retain his position, and said the
challenge for Saudi Arabia was to find a way to “climb
down” from its negotiating position.

67
17th of February 2010: Tactical discussion with the European
Union
Subject: DEPUTY NSA MICHAEL FROMAN VISIT TO BRUSSELS,
JANUARY 27, 2010
Reference ID: #10BRUSSELS183.
SUMMARY
[...]
2. (C) DNSA Froman and Hedegaard committed to work
closely to define the right Post-Copenhagen climate
negotiating group and process, and agreed to hold a DVC
prior to the February 11 European Council.
[...]
CLIMATE CHANGE: BUILDING UPON THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD
12. (C) Climate Commissioner-designate Hedegaard thanked
Froman for President Obama's efforts in Copenhagen. She
asked about U.S. legislative efforts on climate and U.S.
political dynamics around mid-term Congressional
elections and how they might impact U.S. international
cooperation moving toward COP-16 in Cancun, Mexico.
Froman responded that the U.S., overriding international
goal, to work on implementing the Copenhagen Accord as
well as on the other UN tracks, will not change. We will
still work toward domestic legislation as well, Froman
said. He thought midterm dynamics would not strongly
impact our work going into Cancun.
13. (C) Froman and Hedegaard reviewed Copenhagen
outcomes. Froman said that while nobody considered the
agreement complete, it is a good step forward. Hedegaard
said Copenhagen left some disappointed in the UN process,
but stressed that we can't give up. The Accord contains a
lot of good points, she said, that should not be wasted.
She hoped that the U.S. noted the EU was muting its
criticism of the U.S., to be constructive.
14. (C) Both officials agreed we must focus now on
operational steps to implement the Copenhagen Accord. Froman
said the U.S. will work in the next few weeks on getting
countries to sign up for (“associate themselves with”) the

68
Accord, and to inscribe their targets. The U.S. would be
happy, he suggested, with the seven emerging market
countries in the Major Economies Forum (MEF), saying others
would then follow. We also need to work on financing, he
added.
15. (C) Froman emphasized that we need to determine the
right process and grouping of countries to go forward.
This could be the Greenland group of 28 countries from
Copenhagen, MEF members, or countries signing the Accord,
he speculated. The U.S. is not wedded to a particular
grouping, he said, but there seems to be broad consensus
that relying on the two UNFCCC working groups is
insufficient. Hedegaard agreed, suggesting that an
informal MEF grouping might be effective. It would be
critical that this have legitimacy, she said. The
Greenland group is an option, she said, but others might
resent this designation.
16. (C) It is vital to get G-77 agreement to whatever
grouping we use, Hedegaard continued. Both agreed it will be
important to talk to incoming G-77 chair Yemen, with Froman
adding it will also be important to be in close touch with
Mexico as COP-16 chair. In fact, Froman added, we need all
major groups ) the EU, MEF, BASIC, G-77, the island
countries ) to agree to a negotiating mechanism. Hedegaard
responded that we will need to work around unhelpful
countries such as Venezuela or Bolivia. Froman agreed that
we will need to neutralize, co-opt or marginalize these and
others such as Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador. Hedegaard noted the
irony that the EU is a big donor to these countries, while
Cuba, for example, is actively discouraging others from
signing on to the Accord.
17. (C) Both agreed that we need processes for
coordination and avoiding recriminations. Hedegaard said
the EU will use the February 11 informal European Council
meeting to reflect on how to be more focused and
effective on climate. Froman noted he will do likewise
for the U.S. in meetings with Climate Special Envoy Todd
Stern and other Administration officials. He suggested
that he and Hedegaard speak before the Council meeting to
coordinate; she agreed to a videoconference February 10,
the day after the new Commission is expected to be
formally approved by the European Parliament.

69
18. (C) Froman and Hedegaard then discussed specific goals
for the Bonn and Cancun meetings. Hedegaard said we must
have universal acknowledgment that “the world cannot afford”
failure to reach a binding agreement. Froman thought that we
should try for progress by Cancun on MRV (monitoring,
reporting and verification), the adaptation framework,
technologies, and some resolution of process. Both agreed
that we should also get countries to inscribe 2020 targets.
19. (C) Froman and Hedegaard also discussed their
respective domestic policy developments, noting the
complex issue of carbon border taxes. This is an issue of
great concern to China, Froman noted. Hedegaard noted the
EU's struggle with how to manage inclusion of aviation
and maritime sectors in the EU's Emissions Trading
Scheme. Both agreed it is vital to show economic benefits
and potential job creation from bilateral cooperation on
climate and clean energy technologies, to build public
support for our efforts; Hedegaard committed to provide
to Froman EU studies showing such impacts.
20. (C) Froman summarized his climate points for the
Member State Ambassadors; while some Post-Copenhagen soul
searching is warranted, he said, we need to focus on
avoiding a damaging replay of our division there in the
runup to Cancun. We need to work to make the Copenhagen
Accord real, getting all countries that matter to
associate themselves with the agreement and inscribing
their targets. We need early U.S.-EU agreement on the
right group and process to take discussions forward, and
need progress on financing, technical points and
transparency and verification; all are important, he
concluded.

70
17th of February 2010: Climate strategy agreed with Europe
Subject: CLIMATE: PERSHING AND HEDEGAARD COMMIT TO CLOSE
COOPERATION
Reference ID: #10BRUSSELS186
This cable is sensitive, but unclassified.
1. (SBU) Summary: Deputy Special Envoy for Climate Change
Jonathan Pershing met with EU Climate Action Commissioner
Connie Hedegaard on February 11. Also present was
Ambassador William Kennard. Pershing and Hedegaard agreed
that the U.S- EU cooperation remains important,
particularly in light of the statement issued by the
BASICs following their January 25 meeting. They agreed on
the need to operationalize the Copenhagen Accord and
ensure it is incorporated into the UNFCCC process.
Pershing said it would be important to convene the
ministers prior to the May meetings in Bonn and suggested
a meeting of the MEF, to include relevant non-members.
Hedegaard questioned whether guaranteed loans should be
included in the $30 billion Fast Start financing package,
and Pershing suggested a meeting among the key donor
states be held in the near term to discuss, and if
possible, agree on a common approach to what financing
would be listed in each country’s contribution.
2. (SBU) Pershing told Hedegaard that the prospects for
climate and energy legislation this year increased
following the State of the Union address. He said the
President is very focused on this issue and committed to
a legislative package - not just an energy bill.
Hedegaard said that she would be traveling to Washington
in mid-March as part of an EU delegation and asked if it
would be useful for the delegation to meet with Senators.
Ambassador Kennard cautioned the Commissioner, noting
that any messages to the Hill must be constructive.
3. (SBU) Pershing said the focus for the U.S. team in
January had been to encourage as many countries as
possible to associate with the Copenhagen Accord. He
expects the final number to be about 120 countries, which
is in the range of the 100-150 that the USG had hoped
for, although still less than would be desirable. He said

71
that submissions by some major economies were “opaque”;
Hedegaard said China’s submission was open to
interpretation. Pershing said Brazil’s and India’s
submissions were as well and were probably the result of
their January 25 agreement. Citing Special Envoy for
Climate Change Todd Stern’s February 9 speech, Pershing
stressed two points: (1) the heads of states made
commitments at Copenhagen and the United States does not
take these commitments lightly and (2) the Accord is the
result of a long and arduous process - there is no plan B
for negotiation of a different agreement.
4. (SBU) Hedegaard asked about China’s perceptions on the
Accord. Pershing said the letter from Premier Wen to UN
Secretary general Ban Ki Moon and Danish Prime Minister
Rasmussen was positive, but he was more concerned about
communications from Su Wei, China’s Climate Negotiator.
He noted that there had been no formal bilateral climate
discussions between the US and China since Copenhagen,
but indicated that these would likely resume in February.
Pershing said the U.S. and EU must deal with China,
specifically on the subject of transparency. Hedegaard
then asked “did you agree with China on MRV or not? I was
presented with a paper that China, India and the U.S.
could agree upon.” Pershing replied: “the question is
whether they will honor that language.” Hedegaard said
she does not have high expectations for COP 16 in Mexico
and that we must avoid the expectations that it will
resolve all of the unanswered problems from Copenhagen.
She asked whether the Copenhagen Accord could be moved
into the LCA (Long-term Cooperative Action) or KP (Kyoto
Protocol) working groups for future discussions. Pershing
said the two tracks have not yielded much progress but
the LCA would be easier, particularly since the United
States is not a member of Kyoto. He said in theory, the
Accord should guide the work of the COP, but he’s not
sure if the BASICs will allow this. He said the BASICs,
led by India, are resisting any changes to the UNFCCC
guidelines (under which developing countries report on
their GHG emissions and actions). He said African and
Latin American states are looking to turn Copenhagen into
a binding agreement, but the BASICs are opposed to this.
Hedegaard suggested the AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island

72
States) countries “could be our best allies” given their
need for financing.
5. (SBU) Hedegaard said that in light of the BASIC
announcement, the U.S. and EU must coordinate more
closely. She asked whether the MEF process should be
continued and suggested a meeting of Annex I countries.
Pershing said the forum for further discussions has not
been resolved, but he suggested that non-members could be
invited to participate in MEF discussions. He said a
meeting of the MEF ministers prior to the May/June
meeting in Bonn could help frame expectations for Mexico.
Hedegaard said she supports the MEF process but said a
constructive signal from the COP at Bonn will be
important.
6. (SBU) Hedegaard asked if the U.S. was prepared to move
forward on Fast Start funding. She said some countries
like Japan and the UK will press the inclusion of loan
guarantees as part of the package and asked whether the
U.S. will need to do any “creative accounting”. She
added: “$30 billion had been promised - - it cannot be
lent.” She asked for Pershing’s thought on the Soros
proposal, which she said was “tempting in the long-term,”
but she is not sure it will work for Fast Start funding.
[Note: In December 2010 George Soros proposed that
developed countries return their IMF special drawing
rights (SDRs) to the IMF, which could in turn lend the
funds to developing countries for mitigation and
adaptation. Soros estimated the amount from SDRs could
provide about $150 billion. End note.] Pershing replied
that this proposal is just another form of loan
guarantee, and we were skeptical of its utility; he also
said he would share our analysis on it. On Fast Track
financing, Pershing said the administration anticipated
the need and budgeted funds in 2010 and 2011. He said
some U.S. funding would be directly applied for
mitigation and adaptation and other sources would be
indirect, citing for example program funds from various
agencies and funds for food security. He concurred that
it would be valuable to agree on what funds would be
included in each country’s reporting, and said donors
have to balance the political need to provide real

73
financing with the practical constraints of tight
budgets. He suggested that the small group of key donors
- those that provide about 90% of the financing - convene
quickly to discuss this issue.

74
26th of February 2010: Guantanamo and Copenhagen in the
same sentence
Subject: MALDIVES AMBASSADOR’S WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS
Reference ID: #10STATE18437
Classified by: SCA A/S Robert O. Blake, Jr.
[...]
2. (C) Pre-viewing Ambassador Ghafoor’s meetings with Deputy
S/SECC Pershing and S/GC Ambassador Fried, SCA A/S Robert
Blake expressed appreciation to Ghafoor for Maldives’s
willingness to accept a Guantanamo detainee, and President
Nasheed’s strong personal effort in Copenhagen to reach an
Accord. Blake also pulsed Ghafoor on Maldives’s candidacy
for the Human Rights Council. [...] Blake offered quiet U.S.
assistance if it would be helpful; Ghafoor appreciated it
and said Maldives might take us up on it. But Maldives
needed to be seen as earning the seat in its own right. As a
small country, he said, Maldives can’t play other countries
against each other; it needs to take principled positions
(e.g. Kosovo recognition).
[...]
Climate Change: Maldives Seeks Concrete Action
5. (SBU) Meeting with Deputy S/SECC Jonathan Pershing,
Ghafoor referred to Copenhagen as a stepping stone toward
a legally binding agreement; Maldives is prepared to
accept any form of treaty/accord that would lead to
concrete action. He said he saw a reluctance within the
United States Congress to take action. He would like
Maldivian President Nasheed to have the opportunity to
speak before Congress in order to provide a sincere voice
for the urgency of climate change. Pershing asked if
Ghafoor had a sense of why only 105 of 192 countries had
associated themselves with the Accord. Ghafoor replied
that, following the commitments of the U.S., China and
India at Copenhagen, and despite opposition from a small,
vocal minority of countries, there had been a political
shift; many countries from CARICOM, the African Union
(led by Ethiopia), and AOSIS will come to associate with
Copenhagen and engage on subsequent agreements. These
coalitions must be coaxed and not pushed into making

75
decisions and meeting deadlines. Pershing noted that
chairmanship of organizational meetings was vital.
6. (SBU) Ghafoor added that Maldives would like to see that
small countries, like Maldives, that are at the forefront of
the climate debate, receive tangible assistance from the
larger economies. Other nations would then come to realize
that there are advantages to be gained by compliance.
Pershing noted that Copenhagen provides a generic framework
for assistance, but that the next steps are procedural. He
asked about Maldivian adaptation programs. Ghafoor referred
to several projects, including harbor deepening and
strengthening sea walls, that are in the development stage.
These projects would cost approximately $50 million.
Pershing encouraged Ghafoor to provide concrete examples and
specific costs in order to increase the likelihood of
bilateral assistance and congressional appropriations.
Ghafoor proposed that President Obama deliver a speech on
climate change from Maldives when he next visits the region.
He said Maldives would provide a dramatic backdrop and draw
further attention to environmental challenges the islands
face.

76