SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 193169, April 06, 2015 ]

ROGELIO ROQUE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide in an Information that reads as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2001, in the municipality of Pandi,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and shoot with a gun complain[an]t Reynaldo
Marquez, hitting the latter on his right ear and nape, and kick[ing] him on the face
and back, causing serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the
death of the said Reynaldo Marquez, thus, performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that
is[,] by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Reynaldo Marquez
which prevented his death.

[1]
CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded “not guilty.” During the
pre-trial conference, the defense admitted the identity of petitioner; that he is
a Kagawad ofBarangay Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan; and that the day of the incident,
November 22, 2001 was the Thanksgiving Day of the said barangay. Trial
thereafter ensued where the parties presented their respective versions of the
incident.

The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo
Marquez (Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella
Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz (dela
Cruz) and shouted to him to join them. At that instant, petitioner and his wife were
passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that Rodolfo’s shout was directed at him,
petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo apologized for the
misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he warned the
Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if they continue to
perturb him.

Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to
ask for assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who
had already gone home, was fetched by dela Cruz and brought to the house of
Tayao. But since Tayao was then no longer around, Reynaldo just proceeded to
petitioner’s house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon
arriving at petitioner’s residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but the
latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he came out,
he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in
his right ear. Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in
the nape. Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the face and back. Reynaldo
pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those around not to
get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo’s parents arrived and took him to a local
hospital for emergency medical treatment. He was later transferred to Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital in Manila where he was operated on and confined for three
weeks. Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a medical certificate
stating that a bullet entered the base of Reynaldo’s skull and exited at the back of
his right ear.

Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that on November 22,
2001, petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a tricycle to fetch his child.
While driving, he was cursed by brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly
intoxicated. Petitioner ignored the two and just went home. Later, however, the
brothers appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives against him.
Petitioner’s brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed to leave but
not without threatening that they would return to kill him. Petitioner thus asked
someone to call Tayao. Not long after, the brothers came back, entered petitioner’s
yard, and challenged him to a gun duel. Petitioner requested Tayao to stop and
pacify them but Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his gun. Hence,
as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice.

On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84,
rendered its Decision[2] finding petitioner guilty as charged, viz:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years [of] prision correccional, as minimum[;] to ten (10)
years of prision mayor in its medium [period], as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order [4] dated
August 16, 2007.

Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision [5] dated
February 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the RTC’s Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration[7] thereto was likewise denied in a

Resolution[8]dated July 30, 2010.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari[9] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
where petitioner imputes upon the CA the following errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED

THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY
PROVEN SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY
SHOWN THAT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS INDEED
ARMED WITH A GUN.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED

THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT
GRANTING FOR THE BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS
INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER
JUSTIFIED IN FIRING AT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FOR
THE SECOND TIME.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSULY APPRECIATED
THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT INTENT
TO KILL ON THE PART OF PETITIONER WAS PRESENT CONSIDERING:
(A) THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO
GUNSHOT WOUNDS, AND (B) THE PETITIONER PREVENTED
BARANGAY OFFICIALS FROM INTERVENING AND HELPING OUT THE
WOUNDED PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.[10]

Our Ruling

The Petition must be denied.

The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to “appreciation of evidence”
or factual errors which are not within the province of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court had already explained in Batistis
v. People[11] that:

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court,the
review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a
penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for
review on certiorari.

A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule
45,Rules of Court, explicitly so provides, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review oncertiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek
the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its pendency.

Petitioner’s assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and re-

examination of the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature. [12] The Petition
must therefore be denied on this basis because “one, the petition for review
thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the
Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA,
unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of
origin,”[13] which was not shown to be the case here.

Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
the said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed
by the CA,[14] as in this case. After all, the RTC “had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth.” [15] “To [thus]
accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court’s
findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of fact of the RTC,
particularly after their affirmance by the CA”[16] as petitioner was not able to
sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance which merits a departure from
the said doctrine.[17]
In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s ruling
that petitioner is guilty of frustrated homicide and not merely of less serious
physical injuries as the latter insists. As aptly stated by the CA:

In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the
victim. If there is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for
physical injuries only. Vice-versa, regardless of whether the victim only suffered
injuries that would have healed in nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is sufficiently
borne out, the crime committed is frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-266).

Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and
the parts of the victim’s body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the
wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the
victim in the latter’s abdomen, the intent to kill can be presumed (Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, 13TH ED., P. 431).

It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head.
Indeed the location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready
indications that the accused-appellant’s objective is not merely to warn or
incapacitate a supposed aggressor. Verily, had the accused-appellant been slightly
better with his aim, any of the two bullets surely would have killed him outright.
Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the accused-appellant
even prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x x x the bleeding
victim. Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously able to live
through the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that the crime
ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries.
After all, as was mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not
the gravity of the resulting injury but the criminal intent that animated the hand
that pulled the trigger.[18]

The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant is also
proper, there is a need to modify the assailed CA Decision in that awards of
damages must be made in favor of the victim Reynaldo.

The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be awarded to
Reynaldo due to the absence of receipts to prove the medical expenses he incurred
from the incident. “Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages
suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate damages, which may be
allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss
cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party
suffered some pecuniary loss.”[19] Since it was undisputed that Reynaldo was
hospitalized due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by petitioner, albeit as observed by
the RTC there was no evidence offered as to the expenses he incurred by reason
thereof, Reynaldo is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
Aside from this, he is also entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00. These awards
of damages are in accordance with settled jurisprudence. [20] An interest at the legal
rate of 6% per annum must also be imposed on the awarded damages to
commence from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. [21]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31084 affirming in its entirety the March
12, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84 in
Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002 convicting petitioner Rogelio Roque of the crime of
frustrated homicide, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is
ordered to pay the victim Reynaldo Marquez moral damages and temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000,00 each, with interest at the legal rate of
6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, p. 13.
 FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014 ]
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof
of such intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be
established through the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before,
during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and number of the wounds
inflicted on the victim.

The Case

Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on

September 27, 2006,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction
for frustrated homicide committed against Alexander Flojo under the judgment
rendered on September 10, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in
Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-MD.[2]

Antecedents

The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:

x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at about ten o’clock in the evening, Alexander Flojo
(hereafter “Alexander”) was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay
Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly
Alfredo DeGuzman (hereafter “Alfredo”), the brother of his land lady, Lucila
Bautista (hereafter “Lucila”), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about
what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, “Pasensya ka na
Mang Alex” and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs.
He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M.,
Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a
container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his
left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left
portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo
stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride)
and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the
hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander.
Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40
minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he
was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic
General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further medical examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the
zygoma, left side, and about one (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest
which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line
measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the
thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the
thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove
the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the
victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and
could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical intervention. (Tsn, July
8, 1998, p.8).

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on
December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then,
fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the
latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued
between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek
causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.[3]
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:
PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds
accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., “JUNIOR,” guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article
250 of the Revised Penal Code and in the absence of any modifying circumstance,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and
One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One
(1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM.

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant compensatory

damages in the amount of P14,170.35 representing the actual pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proven.

SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical element of the crime charged, was
not established; that the injuries sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks
inflicted in the heat of anger during the fistfight between them; that he did not
inflict the stab wounds, insisting that another person could have inflicted such
wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries on Alexander, for
which he should be accordingly found guilty.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
September 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[5]
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007. [6]

Issue

Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide?

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim,
as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained
fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3)
none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is present.[7] Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts
found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be
present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other
elements.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight
between him and Alexander. He claims that the heightened emotions during the
fistfight naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted
minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have
sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries because
the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was
not sufficiently established. He avers that such intent to kill is the main element
that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide; and
that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the

offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the
information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as
differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.[8] Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned
by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the
accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v.People,
[9]
we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill,
namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors
before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the
offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.
[10]

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present.
We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds
sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or
as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in
his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander
sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other
on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife
used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly
proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound
on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the
timely medical intervention.

With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the
acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely
medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated
homicide.

We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial
and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander’s testimony. It is not disputed
that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed to
support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling
application when the lone witness is the victim himself whose direct and positive
identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with indubitable credibility,
owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus
strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the manner in which the
latter committed the crime.[11] Moreover, it is significant that the petitioner’s mere
denial of the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible physical
evidence corroborating Alexander’s statements. Under the circumstances, we can
only affirm the petitioner’s conviction for frustrated homicide.

The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the indeterminate penalty

of “Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to
Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM”[12] fixed by the RTC
erroneous despite the CA concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of
theIndeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the
offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. [13] The maximum
term is the penalty properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code after
considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the minimum term is
within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the offense committed. Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised
Penal Code,[14] frustrated homicide is punished by prision mayor, which is next
lower to reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of
theRevised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances
present, however, prision mayor in its medium period – from eight years and one
day to 10 years – is proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years and one day
of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not within the
medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence is
four years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day
of prision mayor, as the maximum.

The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of
P14,170.35 as compensatory damages “representing the actual pecuniary loss
suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven.”[15] We need to revise such civil
liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,[16] we emphatically declared to be “imperative
that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and
determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery.” We
explained why in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it
was of conviction, state: “(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by
the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by
his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability
by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.” Their disregard
compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of
their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of
the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the
final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at
any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that
the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts.
Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine
the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full
determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office
of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious
in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should
prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and
expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and
ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the
civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining
victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do
so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been
reserved or waived.[17]
Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the
offender committed violence that nearly took away the victim’s life. “Moral damages
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for
omission.”[18] Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the
right of the victim in crimes resulting in physical injuries. [19] Towards that end, the
Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable
award of moral damages.[20] In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity
of P30,000.00.[21] Both of these awards did not require allegation and proof.

In addition, the amounts awarded as civil liability of the petitioner shall earn
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment by the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 27,

2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
ofFRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and
one day of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to
Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00; moral damages of P30,000.00; and
compensatory damages of P14,170.35, plus interest of 6% per annum on all such
awards from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, Chief Justice, Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr.,* and Perez, JJ., concur.

*
Vice Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per Special Order No. 1885 dated
November 24, 2014.

[1]
Rollo, pp 74-79; penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with the
concurrence of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a Member of this Court)
and Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon.

[2]
Id. at 29-35; penned by Presiding Judge Amalia F. Dy.

[3]
Id. at 75-76.

[4]
Id. at 35.

[5]
Id. at 79.

[6]
Id. at 90.

[7]
Serrano v. People, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 322, 339.

[8]
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA
737; Rivera v.People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 196.

[9]
Rivera v. People, supra at 197, citing People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January
28, 2003, 396 SCRA 386, 400.

[10]
Serrano v. People, supra note 7, at 335-336.

[11]
Cabildo v. People, G.R. No. 189971, August 23, 2010, 628 SCRA 602, 609.

[12]
Supra note 3.

[13]
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
theRevised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished
by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same.

[14]
Article 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. — The
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.

[15]
Supra note 3.

[16]
G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 229.

[17]
Id. at 239-240 (the bold underscoring is part of the original text).

[18]
Article 2217, Civil Code.

[19]
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:

xxxx

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

xxxx

[20]
Nacario v. People, G.R. No. 173106, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 262,
268; Angeles v. People, G.R. No. 172744, September 29, 2008, G.R. No. 172744,
567 SCRA 20, 30;Adame v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139830, November 21,
2002, 392 SCRA 305, 316.

[21]
Flores v. People, G.R. No. 181625, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 611, 626.
515 Phil. 824

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 166326, January 25, 2006 ]
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA,
PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 27215 affirming, with modification, the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 6962-99, entitled People of
the Philippines. v. Esmeraldo Rivera, et al.

On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of
hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal injury on his
head and on the different parts of his body, the accused thus commenced the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts, but failed to perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some causes other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to
ran (sic) away and the timely response of the policemen, to his damage and
prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in
April 1998 after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was even given a citation
as a Bayaning Pilipino by the television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be
victim. His wife eked out a living as a manicurist. They and their three children
resided in Barangay San Isidro Labrador II, Dasmariñas, Cavite, near the house of
Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.

At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo
mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben
resented the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words
ensued.

At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food
and to look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily,
Esmeraldo and his two brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house
and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and
he fell to the ground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with
a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling
Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: "Awatin sila! Awatin sila!" Ruben felt
dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the
back. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and
Edgardo fled to their house.

Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto Cagingin,
Jr., signed a medical certificate in which he declared that Ruben sustained lacerated
wounds on the parietal area, cerebral concussion or contusion, hematoma on the
left upper buttocks, multiple abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma
periorbital left.[4] The doctor declared that the lacerated wound in the parietal area
was slight and superficial and would heal from one to seven days. [5] The doctor
prescribed medicine for Ruben's back pain, which he had to take for one month. [6]

Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his
house and banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his brothers to come out
and fight. When he went out of the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched
him. They wrestled with each other. He fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and
pushed Ruben aside. His wife arrived, and he was pulled away and brought to their
house.

For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother
Esmeraldo, but Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free himself from
Ruben and the latter fled. He went home afterwards. He did not see his brother
Edgardo at the scene.

Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing
garbage in front of their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to
avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged the gate and ordered him to get out of their
house and even threatened to shoot him. His brother Esmeraldo went out of their
house and asked Ruben what the problem was.
A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben aside.
Ruben fell to the ground. When he stood up, he pulled at Edgardo's shirt and hair,
and, in the process, Ruben's head hit the lamp post. [7]

On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt and are sentenced to an imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt the culpability of the accused. Likewise, the accused are to pay,
jointly and severally, civil indemnity to the private complainant in the amount of
P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the accused and
their witnesses. The accused appealed to the CA, which rendered judgment on June
8, 2004 affirming, with modification, the appealed decision. The dispositive portion
of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is
MODIFIED in that the appellants are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as
minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects,
the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[9]
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, alleging that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision. They insist
that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intention to kill Ruben when
they mauled and hit him with a hollow block. Petitioners aver that, based on the
testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a superficial wound in the parietal
area; hence, they should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only. Even if
petitioners had the intent to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed to prove treachery;
hence, they should be held guilty only of attempted homicide.

On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners'
intent to kill Ruben:
On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound inflicted and the
kind of weapon used. Intent to kill was established by victim Ruben Rodil in his testimony as follows:

Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what happened next?
A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with a piece of hollow
 block xxx and hit me thrice on the head, Sir.

And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were hit with a hollow
Q:
block by Dagol?
I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while Dagol was hitting,
A:
Sir.

As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the
hollow block directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so
that the brothers scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death,
but intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the
fact that the (3) brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even
after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them even picked up a
cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three
times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants
desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil. [10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the decision of
the CA is correct, thus:
The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the presumption
of innocence raised by petitioners. The crime has been clearly established with
petitioners as the perpetrators. Their intent to kill is very evident and was
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly and
categorically declared that the victim Ruben Rodil was walking along St. Peter
Avenue when he was suddenly boxed by Esmeraldo "Baby" Rivera. They further
narrated that, soon thereafter, his two brothers Ismael and Edgardo "Dagul"Rivera,
coming from St. Peter II, ganged up on the victim. Both Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita
Villejo recounted that they saw Edgardo "Dagul" Rivera pick up a hollow block and
hit Ruben Rodil with it three (3) times. A careful review of their testimonies
revealed the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of petitioners. In this
case, the victim did not even have the slightest warning of the danger that lay
ahead as he was carrying his three-year old daughter. He was caught off-guard by
the assault of Esmeraldo "Baby" Rivera and the simultaneous attack of the two
other petitioners. It was also established that the victim was hit by Edgardo
"Dagul" Rivera, while he was lying on the ground and being mauled by the other
petitioners. Petitioners could have killed the victim had he not managed to escape
and had the police not promptly intervened.

Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the victim
was superficial and, thus, not life threatening. The nature of the injury does not
negate the intent to kill. The Court of Appeals held:
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the
hollow block directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so
that the brothers scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death,
but intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the
fact that the three (3) brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and
even after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them picked up a
cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three
times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants
desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil. [11]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated,

frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a
specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial
evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony
by dolo.

In People v. Delim,[12] the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in
crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the
killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and
the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the
victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself
against the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three
times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still
managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound
and cerebral contusions.

That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not
have produced his death does not negate petitioners' criminal liability for attempted
murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are
still criminally liable for attempted murder.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to
commit a felony, thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by

overt acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony;
3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or
accident other than his spontaneous desistance.[13]

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.[14]
The Court in People v. Lizada[15] elaborated on the concept of an overt or external
act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison
d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to
be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that
quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which
may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act
or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for
the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with
certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should
have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards
the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need
not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that
the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the
offense.[16]
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of
murder by mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they
narrowly missed hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so,
Ruben would surely have died.

We reject petitioners' contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in

the commission of the felony. Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and
unexpected manner as Ruben was walking with his three-year-old daughter,
impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He had no chance to defend himself and
retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of the three siblings.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim.
[17]
Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity
for the victim to repel it or defend himself, there would be treachery. [18] Obviously,
petitioners assaulted the victim because of the altercation between him and
petitioner Edgardo Rivera a day before. There being conspiracy by and among
petitioners, treachery is considered against all of them.[19]

The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two

(2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to six years
and one day of prision mayor in its maximum period, as maximum. This is
erroneous. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
petitioners are guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced by
two degrees, conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph
2 of Article 61, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is
prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of
the felony (other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery), the maximum of
the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision
mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision correccional, which has a range of
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from

two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine
(9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of from two (2) years ofprision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to
nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban,. C.J., (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Chico-
Nazario,JJ., concur.

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos (Chairman), with
Associate Justices Danilo B. Pine and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring; rollo,
pp. 17-29.

[2]
Penned by Judge Dolores L. Español; CA rollo, pp. 15-19.

[3]
Records, p. 1.

[4]
Exhibits "B" and "B-1," records, p. 9.

[5]
Id.

[6]
TSN, June 19, 2000, p. 29.

[7]
TSN, September 24, 2001, pp. 2-18.

[8]
Records, p. 257.

[9]
CA rollo, p. 136.

[10]
Rollo, pp. 25-26.

[11]
Id. at 70-71.

[12]
G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003).

[13]
People v. Lizada, G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 444 Phil. 67 (2003).

[14]
Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 1981, Vol. I, p. 98.

[15]
Supra at note 13.

[16]
Id. at 98-99.

[17]
People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 142905, March 18, 2002, 429 Phil. 124, 126
(2002).

[18]
People v. Coscos, G.R. No. 132321, January 21, 2002, 424 Phil. 886, 903
(2002).

[19]
People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 125896, May 11, 2000, 387 Phil. 668, 682 (2000).
680 Phil. 527

[ G.R. No. 151258, February 01, 2012 ]

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 154954]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO,
JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL
MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN,
PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B.
PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO,
AND RONAN DE GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 155101]

FIDELITO DIZON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NOS. 178057 & 178080]

GERARDA H. VILLA, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL LORENZO

ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO
CRUZ SARUCA, JR., AND ANSELMO ADRIANO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa - the victim in this case
- on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. [1] Due in
large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were
organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in
1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage
members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity,
organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the
exculpatory implications of "consent" and "initial innocent act" in the conduct of
initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country. [5]
Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged - those
of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San
Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis
Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine
Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the
Philippines in Baguio City.[6]

Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the
general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a
fundamental principle in our criminal justice system - "[N]o act constitutes a
crime... unless it is made so by law."[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even
if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it
cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As
interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being
swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of
the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.

Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v.People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101
(Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).

Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA) [8] and the trial
court,[9]are as follows:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity
(Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza,
Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy"
Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufo's Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house
of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect
during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical
beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled
to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and
insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and
walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional
forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes
to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while
the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans
charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites),
while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on
their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies' Privilege Round," in which the
auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day - 9 February 1991 - the neophytes were made
to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity's principles. Whenever they would give a
wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them
physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner
of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members [10] Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the
carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering
and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings,
as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny
was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his
condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly
tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal
Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be
resolved first.[12]

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29
November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.[14]

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified
the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants - Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,

Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et
al.) - wereacquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants - Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,

Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) - were
found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20
days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of ?30,000 as indemnity.
 3. Two of the accused-appellants - Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal -
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal.
They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny
Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P1,000,000
by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
[16]
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court
denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
90153[18] reversed the trial court's Orders and dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.[19]

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court.

G.R. No. 151258 - Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareal's Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in
its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 - first, denial of due
process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. [20]

While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for
petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to
the Notice, petitioner Villarealdied on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the
subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the
death of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101 - Dizon v. People

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA's
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R.
No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues - first, that he was denied due
process when the CA sustained the trial court's forfeiture of his right to present
evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not
apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other
accused."[22]

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon's right
to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence
on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented
separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been
considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He
argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact
insisted that he was ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned
schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.

Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been
acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional
initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that the additional
paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out
that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites
"decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so
Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling...."[24]Further, petitioner echoes the
argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual blows inflicted by Dizon
and Villareal could not have resulted in Lenny's death."[25] The Solicitor General
purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries
suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken
collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim." [26]

Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He
claims that Lenny's father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon's father,
since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place
or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive of
Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space were
only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lenny's co-
neophyte - witness Marquez - who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he
was just making it up...."[27]

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his
show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of
one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the
neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latter's chills.
When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a
sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill
motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the
victim's well-being.

G.R. No. 154954 - People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA's Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of
the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. [28] According to
the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no
conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.

In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have
been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victim's death, petitioner posits that
the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide,
pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article provides:
"Criminal liability shall be incurred... [b]y any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."

Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to
the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court's finding of conspiracy
and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of
the crime.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 - Villa v. Escalona

Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the
reversal of the CA's Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May
2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal
of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for
accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S.
Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after
proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall
have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-
38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993.
For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March
2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.

Petitioner Villa assails the CA's dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9
accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the
accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of
time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as
the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were
still in the appellate court.

We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

ISSUES

1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon's right to present evidence

constitutes denial of due process;

2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual
participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.

DISCUSSION

Resolution on Preliminary Matters

G.R. No. 151258 - Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioner's Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal
penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal
liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final
judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,[31]while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,[32]including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense
complained of (i.e., civil liabilityex delicto).[33] However, civil liability based on a
source of obligation other than the delictsurvives the death of the accused and is
recoverable through a separate civil action. [34]

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability
for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising
from thedelict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and
the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)

In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of
evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and
the 5th and 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that "it will not
entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented
their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their
evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required
shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence."[36]

However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court
that his client - Antonio General - would no longer present separate evidence.
Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who
had already testified.[37] Because of this development and pursuant to the trial
court's Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line," the trial
court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date - 25 August 1993 -
instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start
two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not
able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel
filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously
scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates
originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the
same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of
the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court. [40]Consequently, the trial court
ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that
right.[41]

Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law
when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the
postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered
justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until
8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he
was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out
that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact
insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court.
Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of
presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.

The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel..." This constitutional right includes the right to present
evidence in one's defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself
in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]

In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the

defense's presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995
hearing was cancelled due to "lack of quorum in the regular membership" of the
Sandiganbayan's Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The
hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel
failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order
directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation
of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to
present evidence because of his nonappearance at "yesterday's and today's
scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held thus:

Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court,Crisostomo's non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was
merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and
not for the succeeding trial dates...

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, Crisostomo's absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have
been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While
constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present
case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally
made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present
evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the
consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The
court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature
and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The
Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present
evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June
1995 hearing.

Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case

involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of
the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally
conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence
on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it
should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for
another accused - General - had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial
evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not
scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned
five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its
Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days
set for Dizon's testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned
trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.

Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the

right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of
guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial
court.[47] InPeople v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been
represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has
prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver,
the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is
supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. [48]

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve
the case at bar. Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that
would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of
the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition
corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is
really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial
court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny
Villa by alleging in his Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of the
traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not
outside the official activity of the fraternity."[49]He even argues that "Dizon did not
request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was
sanctioned."[50]

For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge
or justice to another - at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court.
Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only
inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for almost two
decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the
case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)

Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano
should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy
trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed to
raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that
they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against
their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied
the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano,
because it found that "the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the
movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require
were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals." [51]

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and
16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. [52] This right requires that there be a trial
free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed
violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or
when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for
no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the accused to speedy
trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. [55] The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors
such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the
prejudice wrought upon the defendant. [57]

We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case
pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. [58] As
a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a
violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed,
however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on
double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order
of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion
amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy
from attaching.[62]

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA's dismissal of the case against
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their
right to speedy trial. The court held thus:

An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the
following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case
below:

xxx xxx xxx

5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and
the prosecution's failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them
to secure certified true copies of the same.

xxx xxx xxx

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless
hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the
records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and
theprosecution's failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from
the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already
issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to
secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution
did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by
the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was
complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said
records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it
was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-
accused Concepcion x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, orfor a
period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the
court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the
petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner
Saruca's motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act
upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution
frowns upon x x x.[63](Emphasis supplied)

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was
filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon,
Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.
[65]
Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005
or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or

inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the
accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases - a clear
violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. [67] Thus, we
held:

The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the
disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found
the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a
speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and
in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information
which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and
thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
89060 that accused Escalona et al.'s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there
is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes
accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling
shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)

The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It
dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated
- either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused - the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical
offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.
[70]
It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law
of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence. [71] It found
expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our
own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, [72] viz:

Article III - Bill of Rights

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. -- When an accused has

been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment
in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a
regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by
certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. [74] The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the
case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
defendant's express consent.[75]

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of

acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal,
even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it
prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty." [76] We further stressed
that "an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal."[77]

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower
court's acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in
the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion.[80]

The third instance refers to this Court's judicial power under Rule 65 to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of
law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as
to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. [83] In such an event, the
accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy. [84]

The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal
of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of
facts and evidence. According to the Petition, "the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not in accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were
denied due process of law when the public respondent completely ignored the a)
Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the
petitioner's Comment x x x."[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted
the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor
General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon
and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villa's consent to hazing. [87]

In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. [88] In People v.
Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. [89] Mere
errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.
[90]
Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny
the Petition contra Victorino et al. - the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug - the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly
applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the
accused.[91] We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to
correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of
discretion.

In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:

Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the
fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries
sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on
him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim,
there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity
or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and
the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor,
the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much
the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R,
June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime
committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De
los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this
Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson,
Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.
[93]
(Emphasis supplied and citations included)

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the
four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the
CA, because of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to
determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required." [95] The
reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that
the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the
victim's injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical
attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even serious.
[98]
Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical
injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CA's ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own
findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused "were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such
initiation rites on the person of Villa."[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal
officer's findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villa's death was the "multiple
traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites.[100]Considering that the CA
found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in
nature,"[101] it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to
slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable
for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended.
Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the
unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts
are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction
of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.

The CA's application of the legal framework governing physical injuries - punished
under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable
felonies - is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise
of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code,
the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be
based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished
under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable
felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these
two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in
that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual
death occurs.[102]

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon - as if only their acts, in and
of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa - is contrary to the CA's own
findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal
responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of
bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we
therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.

Resolution on Ultimate Findings

According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a
crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a
felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling
against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it
was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.[104]

The CA modified the trial court's finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could
have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly
consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused
fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their
individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused - Victorino et al. - were acquitted; 4
of them - Tecson et al. - were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the
remaining 2 - Dizon and Villareal - were found guilty of homicide.

The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator
clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to
harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex
ante situation in which a man - driven by his own desire to join a society of men -
pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals,
just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal
laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to
make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as
well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as
hazing.

Intentional Felony and Conspiracy

Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. [105] The classical
theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute
free will to choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be
adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired.[107] The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are
rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the
principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with
punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in
committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and
moral blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea - defined as a guilty mind, a
guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent - is the predominant consideration.
[111]
Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. [112] In order for an
intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means
of dolo or "malice."[113]

The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements

of freedom,intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act
done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things. [115] The
second element,intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of
human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.
[116]
The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.
[117]

The element of intent - on which this Court shall focus - is described as the state of
mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of
the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. [119] It does not refer to
mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the
act.[120] While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite
result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.
[121]
On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous,
and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. [122] With these elements taken
together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious
intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden
act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus - that
the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent,"
and "with malice aforethought."[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the
existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. [125]

In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to

attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code - which provides that "conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it" - is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies
committed by means ofdolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an agreement"
connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element
present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the
injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result
of an act performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs
an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. [127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do
an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a
felony committed by means of culpa.[128]

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital

ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.
[129]
Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice
or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.
[131]
Intent to kill - or animus interficendi - cannot and should not be inferred, unless
there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. [132] Furthermore, the victim's
death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. [133] If
death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent - but with
lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence - the act must be qualified as reckless
or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide. [134]

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society. [135] It is said that,
throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with
organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes. [136] Some say that
elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new
students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or
challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for
battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these
values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends
historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective members are
asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek
to attain membership through hazing.[141]

Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student
wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for
a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.
[143]
During the "program," neophytes are required to interview and to get to know
the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the
principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to
participate in the organization's activities; and to show dignity and respect for their
fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members. [144] Some
chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during
the entire neophyte stage.[145]

Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as

prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge,"
"neophyte," "initiate," "applicant" - or any other term by which the organization
may refer to such a person - is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating
situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or
activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade,
abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the organization.
[148]
These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury. [149]

The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a
century ago, our national hero - Andres Bonifacio - organized a secret society
namedKataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The
Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).
[150]
The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be inspired
by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved by
the Catholic Church.[151] TheKatipunan's ideology was brought home to each
member through the society's initiation ritual. [152] It is said that initiates were
brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a
series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. [153] They were
made to go through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" or
"[pagtalon] sa balon."[154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the
blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a "matalas na punyal." [155] As
a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with the his own blood. [156]

It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to
the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances,
the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by
the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.

Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to
do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical
damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate
themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional
investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point. [158]

In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was

injured during the shriner's hazing event, which was part of the initiation
ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was known as the
"mattress-rotating barrel trick."[160] It required each candidate to slide down an
eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel,
over which the candidate was required to climb. [161] Members of Hejaz would stand
on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to
the barrel.[162]

In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump
wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers' chests. [163] The victims were shown
writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the
shirts and into the chests of the victims. [164]

In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter
of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.
[165]
The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse
including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning
of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a
heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees;
various kicks and punches to the body; and "body slamming," an activity in which
active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to
the ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-
station circle of physical abuse.[167]

In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by

fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.
[168]
The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it
after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2)
receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls
or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and
"yerks" (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5)
doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity
house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a
couple of hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were
pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of
stairs.[169]

In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim - Sylvester Lloyd
- was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha
Fraternity.[170]He participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of
physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment. [171]

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim

suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternity's initiation rites.
[172]
Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical hazing,
including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times. [173]

In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones - a university student in Florida - sought initiation

into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06
academic year.[174] The pledge's efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series
of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates,
was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks. [175] In these
rituals described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received
approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the
hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes
during the four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.
[179]

The purported raison d'être behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire,"
through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or
her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to
enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish
unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the
organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit d'corp associated with close, almost filial, friendship
and common cause.[182]

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the
military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so
prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not. [184] It
was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing
conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom." [185]

However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of
theCommittee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that
states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing
hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes
proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a
misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe
situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in
case death or great bodily harm occurs. [189]

Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that
results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony. [190] In a Class 4
felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year
and not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who
recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]

The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.

[193]
As an element of a Class C felony - criminal recklessness - resulting in serious
bodily injury, death falls under the category of "serious bodily injury." [194] A person
who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and
eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years. [195] Pursuant to
Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial
risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a
Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to
exceed seven years.[197]

In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony. [198] An
individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a
state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less than 180 days.
[199]
Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a
third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony
may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years. [201] West
Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony,
the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.
[202]
In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death
of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed
10 years, or both.[204]

In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as
there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma
Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballou's family resorted to a civil action for
wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.
[206]

The existence of animus interficendi or intent

to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt

The presence of an ex ante situation - in this case, fraternity initiation rites - does
not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is
proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty
mind - whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise - they
are still criminally liable for intentional felony.

The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that - with the
exception of Villareal and Dizon - accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did
not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes.
We shall no longer disturb this finding.

As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and
found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa,
not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide
against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will while
beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father's parking space had been
stolen by the victim's father.[207] As toVillareal, the court said that the accused
suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a
hand in the death of Villareal's brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:

The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very
clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is
unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon andVillareal must
and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for
the crime of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to

determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which
the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of
witness Marquez's testimony:

Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngi's] room and we were briefed as to what
to expect during the next three days and we were told the members of the
fraternity and their batch and we were also told about the fraternity song, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngi's] house and we were made to ride a
van and we were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to
be the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and
then the driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left
us inside the van, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka,"
"Asuncion Patay ka" and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks
uttered upon your arrival?

Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices,
sir.
 xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what
were the voices or utterances that you heard?

Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir.

Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking
of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?

xxxxxxxxx

Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was
there any utterances by anybody?

Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a
fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?

Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan,
kayang-kaya pa niyan."

Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could
not really pin point who uttered those words, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express?

Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you
remember?

Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he
would say that and I quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung
kapatid ko," so that would in turn sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious
 pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and
then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that "this guy, his
father stole the parking space of my father," sir. So, that's why he inflicted
more pain on Villa and that went on, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.

Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family
have his brother killed, what was your response?

Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up
sir. So he said that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after
the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in
turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villa's
father stole the parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were
within hearing distance when that utterance was made?

Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were
different people who heard from time to time, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny
Villa's father was made?

Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when
Lenny Villa's turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villa's father?

Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.

Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?

Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villa's thighs and sometime he stand up
and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
 xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also
that accusations made by Dizon "you or your family had his brother killed,"
can you inform this Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations that
were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you in particular?

Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his
family who had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I
knew that it was just a story that he made up and I said that I knew nothing
about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident was
when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court and I
was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I
quote: "Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung
pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin," sir.

Atty. Tadiar What else?

Witness That's all, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came
around as promised to you earlier?

Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there
Purisima was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to
what to expect during the initiation, did I hear you right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Who did the briefing?

Purisima

Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Judge Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the
Purisima initiation?

Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be
mocked at, sir.

Judge So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Purisima

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Purisima

Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All
the bruises would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular
school uniforms like long sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no
thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.

Judge So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body
Purisima but that will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisimaSo, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create
bruises to your body?

Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle,
sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Judge Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is
Purisima psychological in nature?

Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation,
meaning body contact, is that correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you,
 scare you, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I
repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the
initiation, is this correct?

Witness Sometimes sir, yes.

Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you that your family were responsible for the
killing of his brother who was an NPA, do you remember saying that?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you did
not believe him because that is not true, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I
have mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into
quitting the initiation, this is correct?

Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying
those things was because he wanted to inflict injury.

Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?

Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting
me.

Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of
initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said
something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?

Witness No, sir.

Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run
on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not
only on you but also on the other neophytes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was also administered by one master on a
neophyte, was also administered by another master on the other neophyte,
this is correct?

Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to
Dizon andVillareal were "baseless,"[213] since the statements of the accused were
"just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the
neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido
Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of
`tradition' concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their
initiation rites."[214]

We agree with the Solicitor General.

The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial

proportion on the part of the CA - it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those
of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CA's
primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby
making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to
Bienvenido Marquez's testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered
both "accusations" against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation
whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who]
stepped on [Marquez's] thigh"; and who told witness Marquez, "[I]to, yung pamilya
nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villa's thighs
while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With the
testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of
intent to kill based solely thereon.

As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the

entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and
understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were
briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare
them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They
heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin
ka," "Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo
sa amin," or some other words to that effect.[215]While beating the neophytes, Dizon
accused Marquez of the death of the former's purported NPA brother, and then
blamed Lenny Villa's father for stealing the parking space of Dizon's father.
According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused
Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila
Fraternity.[216]

Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon's way of inflicting psychological pressure

was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the
fictitious stories, so that he could "justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in
the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes
admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.

The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In

fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former
Senator Lina spoke as follows:

Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."

xxx xxx xxx

So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but
the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already
described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the
readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his
desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or
playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the
recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing
outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but
the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building
- these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these
organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the
public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that
they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to
prevent.[217](Emphasis supplied)

Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon's behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa.
Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternity's psychological
initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the fathers
of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence
to the veracity of Dizon's threats. The testimony of Lenny's co-neophyte, Marquez,
only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that
[Dizon] was just making it up...."[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the
utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative acts of all the
accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as
part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x."[219] The Solicitor General shares the same
view.

Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent
to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the
finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the
fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]

The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent

to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt

The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General
then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be liable for
the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of
the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be coupled
with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer - iniuria ex
affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as
to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and
intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself,
make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances [224] that the mere infliction of physical
injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an
intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a bamboo
stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of
discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment.
In reversing the trial court's finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries,
this Court stated thus: "Independently of any civil or administrative
responsibility ... [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with
criminal intent ... the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not
motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable
laws, we then ruled that "as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal
liability for her act of whipping her pupil." In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused
members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima -
under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" - plunged the head of the victim into a
barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and
stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous
breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The
collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent
was not proven, we reversed the trial court's finding of liability for murder under
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be
held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 thereof.

Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused's initial acts of inflicting
physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a
felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to
Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be
judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused. [227] What persons
do is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method
employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury
was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator. [229] The Court
shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of
Lenny Villa.

Lenny died during Aquila's fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told
that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three
days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to
"traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds,"
and the "Auxies' Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the
neophytes' arms and legs.

In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite
the Aquila Fraternity's principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again
subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened
on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another
"traditional" ritual - paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The
auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding
them from those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on
the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows;
to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would circulate;
to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and
water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.

These rituals were performed with Lenny's consent.[231] A few days before the
"rites," he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity. [232] His
father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone
for three days.[233]The CA found as follows:

It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented
to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration
of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of
the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on
what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity,
the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that
traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. Theyknew that the initiation would involve
beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness
Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that "after a week, you can already
play basketball." Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he
knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that a wooden
paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms
and legs.... Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting
neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)

Even after going through Aquila's grueling traditional rituals during the first day,
Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.

Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing
clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus
iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking,
paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely,
and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in
the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the
acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional "rounds" on the
second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations
were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the
accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling,
which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other
"weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were
predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of
auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to
and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the
presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went
through the same process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny
Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that
Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.
[235]
The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.

The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was
rooted may also be determined by Lenny's continued participation in the initiation
and consent to the method used even after the first day. The following discussion of
the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:

SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the
Revised Penal Code.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the

charge would be murder or homicide.

Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide

or serious physical injuries.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can
be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this
definition of the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a

sorority, fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation
that has already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no
group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can
become a member without being held criminally liable.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition?
Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere
organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or
organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et
cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing,

abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more
charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable under
the Revised Penal Code.

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a
person or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining
entry into an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is
not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us
say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is
the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the
sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called
"hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness
are even committed initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why
there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang
fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong
makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o
pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng
murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa
mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at
kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished
Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does
not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death,that resulted in the
serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or
deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in
proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation
where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent,
which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate,

then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that
the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or
a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the
acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven
by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb
the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being

criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities
and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their
intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of
inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped,
deterred, discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters
intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of
the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical
pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the
intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do
not have any intention to kill or maim."

This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged
therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where
the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are
separate offenses.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and
a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a
law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have
to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or
not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs,
there is no need to prove intent to kill.

SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be
hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)

During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of
whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator
Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the
inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to
be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or
without consent.

To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced
into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be
modified by the phrase "without consent" for purposes of this section.

SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the
concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without
consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results from hazing
aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person
joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be
with or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person
joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of
hazing.

This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that
attend initiation which may have been announced with or without physical infliction
of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is announcement
that there will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and therefore,
the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is
important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.

The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself
if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the
individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the
crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the
victim.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished
Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes
adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.

In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some
individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the
private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in ways
that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not
something that the State should prohibit.

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act
may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of
pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed,
that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte
accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said,
"Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that
reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we
would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we
pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed
the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to
prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of
inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable
act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not
going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offenseif it
is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of
this proposed law will collapse.

SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.

The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The
Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237]

(Emphasis supplied)

Realizing the implication of removing the state's burden to prove intent, Senator
Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:

I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of
intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical
amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special
law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal
Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.[238](Emphasis supplied)

Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core
principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not
simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing,
founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is
further proof of how the nature of hazing - unique as against typical crimes - cast a
cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong
conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lenny's parents would
not have consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternity's initiation rites if the
practice of hazing were considered by them asmala in se.

Furthermore, in Vedaña v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice

(now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nation's very recent history,
the peoplehave spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive
of ... hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal."[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing - or the conduct of initiation rites
through physical and/or psychological suffering - has not been traditionally
criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna
in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there
is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo.

For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule
against the trial court's finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala
in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature
of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.

The accused fraternity members guilty of

reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised
Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice,

from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person
committing it.[241]In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by
the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done
without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and
the danger is not openly visible. [244]

The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is
as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence
is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take
precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.[246]

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness,
the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the
danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of
causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that
particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid
damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.
[249]
It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence
that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most
vigilant effort."[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care
will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. [251]

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to
multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the
failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to
the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victim's heart could no longer work as
a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen. [254] The
deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire
circulatory system - including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries - to
the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple
hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,
[256]
indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the
victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows to those
areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating
blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also
found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen
in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the
lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms. [259] It was concluded
that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from
a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]

The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa's arms and thighs, resulting
from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs
and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the
hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the
testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed,
kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.
[261]
They were also "paddled" at the back of their thighs or legs; [262] and slapped on
their faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez
testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine."[265] The NBI medico-
legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:

Atty. Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of
Tadiar defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the
deceased Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by
themselves would not cause the death of the victim. The question I am going to
propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked from
Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for
us to isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same
 manner that as a car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in
human approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and not in part.[267]

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were
drinking during the initiation rites.[268]

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to

recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be
remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause
them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused
are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal
officer found that the victim's death was the cumulative effect of the injuries
suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in
and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.

It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity - accused
Dizon and Villareal - restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation
rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would show that the
other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites - having in
mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities - the implication of the presence of
alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note
that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lenny's initiation rites.
In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly - or unwittingly -impose the misery
of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a
better way to establish "kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity
to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips
during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he feared
being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.
[271]
Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity
entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left
their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to
which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.

Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had
the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members
would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment).[272]Since there was no law prohibiting the act of
hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at
the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.'s individual participation in the infliction of
physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.[273] As to accusedVillareal, his criminal liability
was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the

applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicideshall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

The accused liable to pay damages

The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of
P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and P1,000,000 as moral damages, to be
jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the
amount of P30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the
victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CA's
award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000.

The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including
expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is
supported by tangible documents.[276] Though we are prepared to award actual
damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft
of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial.
Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for
actual damages.[277]

The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on
account of the victim's death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the
Civil Code, which provides that the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants
and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the
CA's award of moral damages in the amount of ?1,000,000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The
appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 - finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries - is also MODIFIEDand set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ?50,000, and moral damages in the amount
of ?1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from
the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. [280] Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is

hereby affirmed. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano,
are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
Artemio Villareal deemed closed andTERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the
Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident
or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that
would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1]
Sponsorship Speech of former Senator Joey Lina, Senate Transcript of Session
Proceedings No. 34 (08 October 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 21-22
[hereinafter Senate TSP No. 34].

[2]
Id.

[3]
Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 47 (10 November 1992)
9 Congress, 1stRegular Sess. at 20-21, 24-27 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 47].
th
[4]
Id.; Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 62 (14 December 1992)
9thCongress, 1st Regular Sess. at 15 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 62].

[5]
Senate TSP No. 34, supra note 1.

[6]
Id.

[7]
U.S. v. Taylor, 28 Phil 599 (1914). The Court declared, "In the Philippine Islands
there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and England as
common law crimes;" id. at 604.

[8]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520), pp. 1-5; rollo (G.R. No.
151258), pp. 62-66.

[9]
RTC Decision [People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 1-
57; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 109-167.

[10]
As explained in the Petition for Review of Villareal, "resident brods" are those
fraternity members who are currently students of the Ateneo Law School, while
"alumni brods" are those fraternity members who are graduates or former students
of the law school; see Villareal's Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No.
151258), pp. 5-7;rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 17-19.

[11]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 2, supra note 9; rollo, p. 110.

[12]
Id.

[13]
Id. at 66-67; rollo, pp. 175-176.

[14]
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC, CA-G.R. SP No. 89060), p. 4; rollo (G.R. No.
178057), p. 131.

[15]
Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. de los Santos (with Concurring Opinion).

[16]
RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. 38340), p. 21; rollo (G.R. No.
178057), p. 1114.

[17]
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 12-14, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 139-141.

[18]
Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by
Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
[19]
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 37-39, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 166-168.

[20]
Villareal's Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 13; rollo,
p. 25.

[21]
Dizon's Petition for Review (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 1; rollo, p. 3.

[22]
Id. at 17; rollo, p. 19.

[23]
Id. at 10; rollo, p. 12.

[24]
Id. at 22; rollo, p. 24.

[25]
Id. at 23; rollo, p. 25.

[26]
Id. at 23-24; rollo, pp. 25-26.

[27]
Id. at 26; rollo, p. 28.

[28]
People's Petition for Certiorari (People v. CA, G.R. No. 154954), p. 2; rollo, p.
13.

[29]
Id. at 167; rollo, p. 118.

[30]
Villa's Petition for Review on Certiorari (Villa v. Escalona, G.R. Nos. 178057 and
178080), p. 1; rollo, p. 84.

[31]
Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 644.

[32]
People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA
122, citing J. Aquino's Concurring Opinion in People v. Satorre, G.R. No. L-26282,
August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.

[33]
People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA
239; People v. Bunay, G.R. No. 171268, 14 September 2010, 630 SCRA 445.

[34]
People v. Bunay, supra, citing People v. Bayotas, supra.

[35]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 7, supra note 8; rollo, p. 68.

[36]
Id.

[37]
Id.
[38]
Id.

[39]
Id. at 7-8; rollo, pp. 68-69.

[40]
Id. at 8; rollo, p. 69.

[41]
Id.

[42]
People v. Banihit, 393 Phil. 465 (2000); People v. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123
(1996),citing People v. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957 (1980); and People v. Angco, 103
Phil. 33 (1958).

[43]
People v. Hapa, 413 Phil. 679 (2001), citing People v. Diaz, 311 SCRA 585
(1999).

[44]
People v. Hapa, supra, citing Parada v. Veneracion, 336 Phil. 354, 360 (1997).

[45]
Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 718 (2005).

[46]
Id.

[47]
People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838 (2003).

[48]
Id.

[49]
Dizon's Petition for Review, supra note 21 at 20; rollo, p. 22.

[50]
Id. at 23; rollo, p. 25.

[51]
Villa's Petition for Review on Certiorari, supra note 30 at 19; rollo, p. 102.

[52]
People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, 28 August 2006, 499 SCRA
688.

[53]
People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 (1995), citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199
SCRA 298 (1991); Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 146 Phil. 820 (1970).

[54]
People v. Tampal, supra; Acebedo v. Sarmiento, supra.

[55]
People v. Tampal, supra.

[56]
Id.
[57]
Id.

[58]
People v. Hernandez, supra note 52, citing People v. Tampal, supra; Philippine
Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, 471 SCRA 94, 107 (2005); People v. Bans, 239
SCRA 48 (1994);People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142 (1989); and People v. Quizada,
160 SCRA 516 (1988).

[59]
See People v. Hernandez, supra note 52.

[60]
Id.

[61]
Id.

[62]
Id.

[63]
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 24-30, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 151-157.

[64]
Id. at 4; rollo, p. 131.

[65]
Id.

[66]
Id.

[67]
Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985 (2001).

[68]
Id.

[69]
Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).

[70]
Id.

[71]
Id.

[72]
Id.

[73]
People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438.

[74]
Id.; People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169 (1999).

[75]
People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517 (2000), citing Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule
117, Sec 7; Paulin v. Gimenez, G. R. No. 103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA
386; Comelec v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108120, 26 January 1994, 229 SCRA
501; People v. Maquiling, supra note 74.

[76]
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, G.R. No. 159261, 21 February 2007, 516
SCRA 383, 397, citing People v. Serrano, 315 SCRA 686, 689 (1999).

[77]
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra, citing People v. Velasco, 340
SCRA 207, 240 (2000).

[78]
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986), citing People v. Bocar, 138
SCRA 166 (1985); Combate v. San Jose, 135 SCRA 693 (1985); People v. Catolico,
38 SCRA 389 (1971); and People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 (1975).

[79]
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76 [citing People v. Tria-
Tirona, 463 SCRA 462, 469-470 (2005); and People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207
(2000)]; People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, 468 Phil. 1 (2004); Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, supra, citingPeople v. Bocar, supra.

[80]
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76, citing People v. Serrano,
supra note 76 at 690; People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588
SCRA 550.

[81]
People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, 7
April 2009, 584 SCRA 506.

[82]
People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, supra.

[83]
People v. De Grano, supra note 80, citing People v. Maquiling, supra note 74 at
704.

[84]
Id.

[85]
People's Petition for Certiorari, p. 8, supra note 28; rollo, p. 19.

[86]
Id. at 80-81; rollo, pp. 91-92.

[87]
Id. at 82-86; rollo, pp. 93-97.

[88]
See Francisco v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154117, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA
50, citing First Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, 4 July 2007, 526
SCRA 564, 578.

[89]
People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Teknika Skills and Trade Services v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, 273 SCRA 10 (1997).
[90]
People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Medina v. City Sheriff of Manila, 276
SCRA 133, (1997); Jamer v. National Labor Relations Commission, 278 SCRA 632
(1997); andAzores v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 252 SCRA 387 (1996).

[91]
De Vera v. De Vera, supra note 81; People v. Dela Torre, 430 Phil. 420
(2002); Peoplev. Leones, 418 Phil. 804 (2001); People v. Ruiz, 171 Phil. 400
(1978); People v. Pomeroy, 97 Phil. 927 (1955), citing People v. Ang Cho Kio, 95
Phil. 475 (1954).

[92]
See generally People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76;
and People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, supra note 79.

[93]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.

[94]
People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948).

[95]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.

[96]
People v. Penesa, supra note 94.

[97]
Id.

[98]
Id.

[99]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 16, supra note 8; rollo, p. 77.

[100]
Id. at 21; rollo, p. 82.

[101]
Id.

[102]
See footnote 1 of Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969).

[103]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; rollo, p. 170.

[104]
Id. at 58; rollo, p. 167.

[105]
Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code - Volume One 3
(1961); see People v. Estrada, 389 Phil. 216 (2000); People v. Sandiganbayan, 341
Phil. 503 (1997).

[106]
Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Penal Code: Annotated and Commented -
Book One 4 (3rd ed. 1958); see People v. Estrada, supra.
[107]
Francisco, supra at 4; People v. Estrada, supra.

[108]
Aquino, supra note 105 at 3.

[109]
Id.

[110]
Guillermo B. Guevara, Penal Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law 6 (1974).

[111]
People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).

[112]
Francisco, supra note 106 at 33.

[113]
Id. at 33-34.

[114]
Mariano A. Albert, The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) 21-24 (1946).

[115]
Id. at 21.

[116]
Id. at 21.

[117]
Guevarra v. Almodovar, 251 Phil. 427 (1989), citing 46 CJS Intent 1103.

[118]
Black's Law Dictionary 670 (8th abr. ed. 2005); see People v. Regato, 212 Phil.
268 (1984).

[119]
Guevarra v. Almodovar, supra note 117.

[120]
Albert, supra note 114 at 23.

[121]
People v. Ballesteros, 349 Phil. 366 (1998); Bagajo v. Marave, 176 Phil. 20
(1978),citing People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A.
193.

[122]
Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 118 at 520.

[123]
See Francisco, supra note 106 at 34; Albert, supra note 114 at 23-25.

[124]
U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911); U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910).

[125]
U.S. v. Barnes, 8 Phil. 59 (1907); Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521 (2002), citing
Mondragon v. People, 17 SCRA 476, 481 (1966); People v. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488
(1928);U.S. v. Reyes, 30 Phil. 551 (1915); U.S. v. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691
(1918); People v. Montes, 53 Phil. 323 (1929); People v. Pacusbas, 64 Phil. 614
(1937); and People v. Penesa, supra note 94.

[126]
People v. Fallorina, 468 Phil. 816 (2004), citing People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
(1943); Francisco, supra note 106 at 51-52, citing People v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939
(1931).

[127]
See generally Francisco, supra note 106 at 51.

[128]
Id. at 52; People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943), citing People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil.
232 (1922); People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15 (1931).

[129]
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA
737, citing Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 188,
196-197.

[130]
People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).

[131]
Mahawan v. People, supra note 129, citing Rivera v. People, supra note 129.

[132]
Dado v. People, supra note 125.

[133]
People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003), citing Wharton, Criminal Law - Vol.
1, 473-474 (12th ed., 1932).

[134]
See People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102 (2004), citing People v. Carmen, G.R. No.
137268, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 267; U.S. v. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476
(1912); see generally U.S. v. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468 (1909).

[135]
A. Catherine Kendrick, Ex Parte Barran: In Search of Standard Legislation for
Fraternity Hazing Liability, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 407 (2000)

[136]
Id.

[137]
In re Khalil H., No. 08110, 2010 WL 4540458 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 9, 2010)
(U.S.) [citing Kuzmich, Comment, In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol-
Related Deaths, 31 McGeorge L Rev. 1087, 1088-1089 (2000); and Symposium,
The Works of Plato (The Modern Library 1956)]; Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night
Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S.
Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 368-9 (1998); Kendrick, 24 Am. J.
Trial Advoc.

[138]
In re Khalil H., supra; Rutledge, supra.
[139]
Jamie Ball, This Will Go Down on Your Permanent Record (But We'll Never Tell):
How the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act May Help Colleges and
Universities Keep Hazing a Secret, 33 Sw. U. L. Rev. 477, 480
(2004), citing Rutledge, supra.

[140]
Id.

[141]
Id.

[142]
Kendrick, supra note 135, citing Scott Patrick McBride, Comment, Freedom of
Association in the Public University Setting: How Broad is the Right to Freely
Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. Dayton L. Rev. 133, 147-8 (1997).

[143]
Id.

[144]
Id.

[145]
Id., citing Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.).

[146]
See generally Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), otherwise known as the
Anti-Hazing Law.

[147]
Id.

[148]
In re Khalil H., supra note 137, citing Webster's Third International Dictionary,
1041 (1986); and People v. Lenti, 44 Misc.2d 118, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. Nassau
County Ct. 1964) (U.S.).

[149]
See generally Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 1, otherwise known as the
Anti-Hazing Law; Susan Lipkins, Hazing: Defining and Understanding Psychological
Damages, 2 Ann.2007 AAJ-CLE 2481 (2007).

[150]
Reynaldo C. Ileto, The Diorama Experience: A Visual History of the Philippines
84 (2004).

[151]
Id.

[152]
Id.

[153]
Id.; see Philippine Insurrection Records, Reel 31, Folder 514/10 - Cartilla del
Katipunan, quoted in Luis Camara Dery, Alay sa Inang Bayan: Panibagong
Pagbibigay Kahulugan sa Kasaysayan ng Himagsikan ng 1896, 16-24 (1999).
[154]
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in Dery, supra at 17.

[155]
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in Dery, supra at 18.

[156]
Ileto, supra note 150.

[157]
Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point 222
(1999).

[158]
Id.

[159]
Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985)
(U.S.). (The South Carolina Supreme Court held, inter alia, that (1) evidence
supported the jury finding that the manner in which the association carried out
"mattress-rotating barrel trick," a hazing event, was hazardous and constituted
actionable negligence; and (2) the candidate was not barred from recovery by the
doctrine of assumption of risk. Id.)

[160]
Id.

[161]
Id.

[162]
Id.

[163]
CNN U.S., Pentagon Brass Disgusted by Marine Hazing Ceremony, January 31,
1997,available at (visited 3 December 2010); see also Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell
Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S.
Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 364 (1998).

[164]
CNN U.S., supra; see also Rutledge, supra.

[165]
State v. Allen, 905 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Mo. 1995) (U.S.). (One of the pledges -
Michael Davis - blacked out and never regained consciousness. He died the
following afternoon. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's
conviction of hazing. Id.)

[166]
Id.

[167]
Id.

[168]
Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.). (The Alabama Supreme
Court ruled that the (1) pledge knew and appreciated the risks inherent in hazing;
and (2) pledge voluntarily exposed himself to hazing, supporting the fraternity's
assumption of the risk defense. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Civil Appeals and reinstated the ruling of the trial court, which entered
the summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to the victim's
negligence claims. The case was remanded as to the other matters. Id.)

[169]
Id.

[170]
Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, No. 96-CV-348, 97-CV-565, 1999 WL 47153
(Dist. Ct., N.D. N.Y., 1999) (U.S.). (The plaintiff filed a law suit against Cornell
University for the latter's liability resulting from the injuries the former sustained
during the alleged hazing by the fraternity. The New York district court granted
defendant Cornell's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. Id.)

[171]
Id.

[172]
Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super.Ct. 2002).
(The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that: (1) the fraternity owed the duty to
protect the initiate from harm; (2) breach of duty by fraternity was not established;
(3) individual fraternity members owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm;
and (4) the evidence raised the genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
fraternity's chapter advisor breached the duty of care to initiate. Id.)

[173]
Id.

[174]
Morton v. State, 988 So.2d 698 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (U.S.). (The District
Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the conviction for felony hazing and remanded
the case for a new trial because of erroneous jury instruction. Id.)

[175]
Id.

[176]
Id.

[177]
Id.

[178]
Id.

[179]
Id.

[180]
Rutledge, supra note 137.

[181]
Rutledge, supra note 137, citing Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a
Brother?, TRIAL, September 1991, at 63.
[182]
Rutledge, supra note 137, [citing Robert D. Bickel & Peter F.
Lake, Reconceptualizing the University's Duty to Provide A Safe Learning
Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. & U.L. 261 (1994);Jennifer L. Spaziano, It's All Fun and
Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: An Analysis of University Liability for Actions
of Student Organizations, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 213 (1994);Fraternity Hazing: Is that
Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, Sept. 1991, at 63; and Byron L. Leflore,
Jr., Alcohol and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities: Re-evaluating Vicarious and
Custodial Liability of National Fraternities, 7 Rev. Litig. 191, 210 (1988)].

[183]
Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-Fraternity and
Non-Collegiate Hazing, 61 Miss. L.J. 111, 117 (1991), citing Benjamin, The Trouble
at the Naval Academy, 60 The Independent 154, 155 (1906). According to Lewis,
the 1874 statute outlawing hazing was directed specifically at the United States
Naval Academy.

[184]
Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing Rites: A
Proposal for Strengthening New Jersey's Anti-Hazing Act, 26 Quinnipiac L. Rev.
305, 311 (2008), citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118.

[185]
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118-119.

[186]
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 119.

[187]
Acquaviva, supra at 313.

[188]
Amie Pelletier, Note, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of Current
Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 377, 377 (2002).

[189]
Id.

[190]
Id., citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/10 (1992) (U.S.).

[191]
730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1482 of the 2010 Sess.)
(U.S.).

[192]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).

[193]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).

[194]
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.)
(U.S.) citing State v. Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. App. 2008) (U.S.).
[195]
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-6 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).

[196]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 578.365 (2001) (U.S.).

[197]
Mo. Stat. Ann. § 558.011 (West, Westlaw through 2010 First Extraordinary
Gen. Ass. Sess.).

[198]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 37.152 (Vernon 1996)
(U.S.).

[199]
Tex. Stat. Code Ann., Penal Code § 12.35 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2009
Legis. Sess.) (U.S.).

[200]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107.5 (1999) (U.S.).

[201]
Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 76-3-203 (Westlaw through 2010 Gen. Sess.) (U.S.).

[202]
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing W. Va. Code § 18-16-3 (1999) (U.S.).

[203]
See Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Wis. Stat. § 948.51 (1996) (U.S.).

[204]
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.50 (Westlaw through 2009 Act 406) (U.S.).

[205]
Pelletier, supra note 188 at 381.

[206]
Id.

[207]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 15, supra note 8; rollo, p. 76.

[208]
Id.

[209]
Id.

[210]
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-
91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134.

[211]
TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43.

[212]
TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.

[213]
People's Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 131; rollo, p.
626; People's Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 120-3; rollo, pp.
727-730.

[214]
People's Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp.
625-626; People's Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-
123; rollo, pp. 727-730.

[215]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp.
127-144.

[216]
People's Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp.
625-626; People's Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-
123; rollo, pp. 727-730.

[217]
Senate TSP No. 51 (17 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess., pp. 12-
13.

[218]
TSN, 21 April 1992(People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-
91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134; see TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim.
Case No.C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43; and TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim.
Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.

[219]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; rollo, p. 167.

[220]
Dado v. People, supra note 125.

[221]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; rollo, p. 167.

[222]
The aforementioned articles refer to the Revised Penal Code provisions on
Physical Injuries. These are the following: (a) Art. 262 - Mutilation; (b) Art. 263 -
Serious Physical Injuries; (c) Art. 264 - Administering Injurious Substances or
Beverages; (d) Art. 265 - Less Serious Physical Injuries; and, (e) Art. 266 - Slight
Physical Injuries and Maltreatment.

[223]
Cf. United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910); and Calimutan v. People,
517 Phil. 272 (2006).

[224]
Cf. Calimutan v. People, supra, citing People v. Carmen, 407 Phil. 564
(2001); Peoplev. Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018 (1947); People v. Sara, 55 Phil 939 (1931);
and People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil 204 (1925).

[225]
176 Phil. 20 (1978).

[226]
People v. Carmen, supra note 224.
[227]
People v. Regato, supra note 118.

[228]
Id.

[229]
Cf. People v. Penesa, supra note 94.

[230]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 38-44, supra note 9; rollo, pp.
147-153.

[231]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp.
127-144.

[232]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147;
TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 108.

[233]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147;
TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 109.

[234]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 13-14, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 74-75.

[235]
Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.

[236]
Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.

[237]
Senate TSP No. 62, supra note 4 at 13-15.

[238]
Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.

[239]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147;
TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 108-109.

[240]
Vedaña v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332 (1998).

[241]
Caminos v. People, 587 SCRA 348 (2009) citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised
Penal Code: Criminal Law - Book One 995 (15th ed. 2001); People v. Vistan, 42 Phil
107 (1921),citing U.S. vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 14068, 17 January 1919
(unreported); U.S. v. Manabat, 28 Phil. 560 (1914).

[242]
People v. Vistan, supra, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra.

[243]
Id.
[244]
Id.

[245]
Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 489; Gan v. Court of
Appeals, 247-A Phil. 460 (1988).

[246]
Gaid v. People, supra; Gan v. Court of Appeals, supra.

[247]
Gaid v. People, supra; People v. Vistan, supra note 241, citing U.S. vs. Gomez,
supra note 241.

[248]
Id.

[249]
Id.

[250]
See Gaid v. People, supra note 245, at 503 (Velasco, J., dissenting).

[251]
Id.

[252]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.

[253]
Id.

[254]
Id. at 36; rollo, p. 145.

[255]
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 52-67.

[256]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.

[257]
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-69.

[258]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146;
TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 70-71.

[259]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146.

[260]
TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), p. 50.

[261]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 18-21, supra note 9; rollo, p.
127-130.

[262]
Id. at 23; rollo, p. 132.

[263]
Id. at 25; rollo, p. 134.
[264]
Id. at 26; rollo, p. 135.

[265]
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 175-176.

[266]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; rollo, p. 170.

[267]
TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 92-93.

[268]
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 110-111.

[269]
Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. App.
1986) (U.S.) citing Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d
753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.).

[270]
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 34, supra note 9; rollo, p. 143.

[271]
Id. at 27; rollo, p. 136.

[272]
Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 4(1), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing
Law.

[273]
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 22, supra note 8; rollo, p. 83.

[274]
Briñas v. People, 211 Phil. 37 (1983); see also People v. Yanson, G.R. No.
179195, 3 October 2011, citing People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, 9 February
2011.

[275]
People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, 30 May 2011 [citing People v. Flores, G.R.
No. 188315, 25 August 2010; People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, 9 August
2010; People v. Ogan, G.R. No. 186461, 5 July 2010; and People v. Cadap, G.R.
No. 190633, 5 July 2010].

[276]
Seguritan v. People, G.R. No. 172896, 19 April 2010, 618 SCRA 406.

[277]
People's Consolidated Memoranda (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p.
144; rollo, p. 1709.

[278]
Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 170071, 9 March
2011, citing Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad, 486 Phil. 574, 592-593 (2004).

[279]
Id.
[280]
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 17 July
1994, 234 SCRA 78.
15 Phil. 488

[ G.R. No. 5272, March 19, 1910 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. AH
CHONG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the
testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and
from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings
rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or
to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the
doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to
which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclosed by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No.

27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto,
deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27"
is a detached house situated some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in
August, 1908, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in
the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the
rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along
the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of
the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire
length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt
or lock, and the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook
or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this
somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In
the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the
porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind
in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
retired for the night, was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the
door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He
heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and
the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet
and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was
struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against
the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had
been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed
to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran" out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in
a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to
his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to
secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of
the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the
defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of
these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have
been on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and
acquaint his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the
evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano
Ibanez, servants employed at officers' quartersNo. 28, the nearest house to the
mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino
and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries
for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28
and called Lieutenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but
said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he
forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascual
suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a
trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frighten him by forcing his way into
the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah
Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the
military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following
day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty
by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty
prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his
roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without
any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that -

"The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal
liability:

"4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:

"(1) Illegal aggression.

"(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

"(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would
be entitled to complete exemption from criminal liability for the death of the victim
of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in
fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one,
under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and
repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding
defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the
darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings, defendant would have been wholly
justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault,
and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron."
That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his
charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there
was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant
believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for
the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his
charge.

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be
held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an
act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we
hold that under such circumstances there isno criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact

is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged (e. g., in larceny, animus furendi; in murder,
malice; in crimes and misdemeanors generally some degree of criminal intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those
cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1
of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be
different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec.
87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S.,
28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yatesvs. People, 32 N.
Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential
element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and
penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there
given of these as well as most other crimes and offenses therein defined, do
not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense
must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may
be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various
definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears
that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code, which treats of exemptions. But while it is true that contrary
to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of
crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the
crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate
that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes
and offenses therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the
general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended
to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more
apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will
to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore
carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative
criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313) ; and, again, "There
is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to
do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the
other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm,
which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or
less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that
the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according
as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p.
11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a
corrupt mind, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one
particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

"Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.

"Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless
the contrary shall appear.

"Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal

liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he
had intended to commit."
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, says that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary"
implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of
1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant,
being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1,
p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be
said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually
intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or
imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the
provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can
be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the
exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

"In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declares that where
there is no intention there is no crime * * * in order to affirm, without fear of
mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there isno act, an act which
must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury." (Vol. 2, The
Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for
example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:
"It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the
malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause
the injury which may be the object of the crime."
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering
that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made
by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can
be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention,
which characterizes every action or omission punished by law; nor is he guilty of
criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the
following language:
" * * * Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice
or their absence in the commission of an act denned and punished by law as
criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment
and decision of the trial court."
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined
becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are
as follows:
"He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice,
would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty ofarresto
mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degree, and
with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degrees if it shall constitute a less
grave crime.

"He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum degrees.

"In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their
discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

"The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for
the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in
which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they
may consider proper."
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the
words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal
intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the
actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American
statutes to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the
word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it
is more frequently understood to extend a little further and approximate the idea
of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean,, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily
in a statute it means "not merely 'voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other
words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice,"
"malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent,
more purely technical than "willful" or "willfully," but "the difference between them
is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general
malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from
which flows any unlawful and injurious act committed without legal justification.
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, sees. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in
the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," "willfully,"
"maliciously," "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally
construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general
principles it will always be found that, with the rare exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop,
who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus
forcefully presents this doctrine:
"In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule
as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animowith which
a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only
from a criminal mind. So that -

"There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sequence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or moral sentiment would any
people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was
so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every
other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not
exist. We find this doctrine confirmed by -

"Legal maxims. - The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is
distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims asActus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, 'the act itself does not make a man guilty unless
his intention were so;' Actus me invito factus non est meus actus,'an act done by
me against my will is not my act;' and others of the like sort. In this, as just said,
criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also -

"Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. 'By reference to the
intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to
the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it
may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the same
ground, we hold him innocent.' The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine
among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of
justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of
reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act
from his neighbors does not offend. And -

"In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to
man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an
upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to
suffer a punishment which the community deems hot his due, so far from its
placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even
infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what
has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth
is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior
to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds,
that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong." (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, sees. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure
from this doctrine of abstract justice results from the adoption of the arbitrary rule
that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without
which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the
legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to
make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without
discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the
courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is
clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc, vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77) ; and the rule that ignorance of the law
excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because
"the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and it suffices if it is simply to do
the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300,
and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefor, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise than in strict accord
with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here
is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of
supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of
evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided
always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C. C, 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.,
65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46
Barb., 625;. Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C, 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209;
Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he
honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the
mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might
reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or
otherwise, upon which he acted.
"If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing - or, in terms more, nicely
in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them - he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though
he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately
extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and
the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently
sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the
facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus
supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme measure." (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application
of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night
and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled
pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and
that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed
them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly
exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when
he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of
homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake
of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since
malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law"
in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the
presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by
law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parsons, C. J., in the Massachusetts court, once said: "If the party killing had
reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design
against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and
the probable grounds of such belief." (Charge to the grand jury in Self ridge's
case, Whart. Horn., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p. 7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
"A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with
an outstretched arm and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against
his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A,
who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the
pistol is discharge; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was
loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will
any reasonable man say that A is more criminal than he would have been if there
had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the
pistol is loaded - a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of
self- defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not
the party killing,.are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle." (Lloyd's
Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by
Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat
analogous to those in the case at bar.
"Question III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at
night, in company only of his wife, without other light than that reflected from the
fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there
suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or
two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned,
seized the person and took from him the stick with which he had undoubtedly
been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and
afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on
the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-
in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and
who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from
there blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant
relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness,
demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from
criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances
related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exist rational necessity for the employment of
the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code
condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and
costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court,
under the following sentence: 'Considering, from the facts found by the sentence
to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his
house beside his wife, who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and
beaten, without being able to distinguish the person or persons attacking, nor the
instruments with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because
of the fact that the attack was made from behind and because there
was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation
and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his
existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his
assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the
same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-
defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly
because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house
and the consternation which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was
not given him to know or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants,
nor the arms which they might bear, nor that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there
existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc.' (Sentence of supreme
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.)" (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.)

"Question XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated
in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light,
heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: 'Face down, hand
over your money!' because of which, and almost at the same moment, he fired
two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends
(who had before simulated a different voice) saying, 'Oh! they have killed me,' and
hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried,
'Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined,' realizing that he had been
the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a
corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from
responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense
under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code ? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of
the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness
of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the
accused to eight years and one day of prision mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused
was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the
person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and
remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable.
(Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)" (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

"Question VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night,
by a large stone thrown against his window - at this, he puts his head out of the
window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered 'the delivery of all of his
money, otherwise his house would be burned' - because of which, and observing in
an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one of the men, who, on the next morning was
found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisities of law?
The criminal branch of the Audienciaof Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of
the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal
responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correccional for the homicide
committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that
the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attacked his mill at night in a
remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-
defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877)." (I
Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that
the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the
firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a
thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the
time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had
the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believed threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and
his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson, Moreland, and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C. J., and Mapa,J., dissent.

517 Phil. 408

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 152644, February 10, 2006 ]
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID AND PEDRO B.
HERNANDEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and the
Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001
Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch
94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven
Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the
President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for
Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque

Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the
tunnel's end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel's end. In
a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the
Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the

Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B),
[4]
sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the
Philippines ("PD 1067"),[5] Section 8[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), [7] Section 108[8] of Republic Act No.
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), [9] and Article 365[10] of the
Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property.[11]

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the
Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than
one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid
were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations
took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal
excuse or justification.

The Ruling of the MTC

In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC [12] initially deferred
ruling on petitioners' motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the quashing of the
[I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners' arraignment in February
1997. However, on petitioners' motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28
April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order
and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC
maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine
tailings" which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers
due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to
institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and
Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be undertaken under
the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.

The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to
prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the
Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the same
single fact of pollution, in proving the elements constituting violation of the
conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances,
the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were
allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is required in proving
violations of the three (3) special laws.

After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and
after taking into consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is
convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the
Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other
words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water
Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting
the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute
violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).

Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the
Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the
Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[]
Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby
retained to be tried on the merits.

The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also
be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation
therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the
damage to property which the law punishes not the negligent act of polluting the
water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a
bar to the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to
property.[13]
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners' arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and
29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were
willing to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not
on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated
Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of
record petitioners' manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and
ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and
Article 365 of the RPC.

Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court,
Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the
Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners' petition was raffled to Branch
94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondent's appeal was raffled to Branch
38. On public respondent's motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent's appeal
consolidated with petitioners' petition in Branch 94.

The Ruling of Branch 94

In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondent's appeal

but denied petitioners' petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so
far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered
those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other
respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there
can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts
penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. The elements of
proving each violation are not the same with each other. Concededly, the single act
of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac
rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging a
distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that –
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x."

xxxx

[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each
crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not although they stemmed from a
single act.[15]
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that
Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC "proceed
from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the
Informations contravenes the ruling inPeople v. Relova.[16] Petitioners further
contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067,
PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts complained of" in the charge for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners
should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC. [17]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94's
ruling. The appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the
aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds upon which an
information may be quashed. x x x

xxxx

[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule

117].
 xxxx

We now go to petitioners' claim that the resolution of the public respondent

contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their
right against multiple prosecutions.

In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People's argument with respect to
the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The
Court, however, decided the case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV
(22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x

xxxx

[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at
Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four
separate and distinct laws which are national in character.

xxxx

This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent's understanding that the laws by
which the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as
the elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of
an additional fact or element which the other does not, although they stemmed
from a single act. x x x

xxxx

[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would
give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial
Court's quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067
and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial court's denial of the
petitioner's motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
[18]

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in
its Resolution of 14 March 2002.

Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN

MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE
MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR
 VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE

(P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A
SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE
TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND
MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN
INPEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT "AN
ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE
PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT
FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED
BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL
ELEMENTS."

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE
PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE
UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT
FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL
LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST
PETITIONERS[.][19]

The Issues

The petition raises these issues:

(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property should stand; and

(2) Whether Branch 94's ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,

contravenes People v. Relova.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

 No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case

Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more

than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.[21]

Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity
of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules
prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing
his defense.[23] Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four
offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On
this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.

The Filing of Several Charges is Proper

Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only — Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property — because (1) all the charges filed
against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the charge
for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element
of "ack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence" is common among them.

The contention has no merit.

As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions
of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.
[24]
The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."[25] In People v.
Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are
not "the same" —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which
the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of
the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle
to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if
each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element
of the other.[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.
[28]
However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners' claim that they
should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94's
comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC
showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one
essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is
the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River
System without prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the
offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This
element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-
Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the
absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its
Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary
precautions to prevent damage to property.

In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the
existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence
of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law although there was
unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent
damage to property.

In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is
the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the
terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that
the Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from
reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and
that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to
ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does
not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-
Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.

On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of
the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence,
recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to
property. This element is not required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it
is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to
the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms
of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by
special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised
Penal Code which are mala in se.[29]
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based
on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.

On petitioners' claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
"absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to
say that a mala in sefelony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property) cannot absorbmala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD
984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.

People v. Relova not in Point

Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution
contravenes this Court's ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite
the Court's statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the
accused by "multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one
another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
technical elements."

This contention is also without merit.

The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power under the
RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencia's right against
double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those
two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was
punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription
against multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in
Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. We held:

The petitioner concludes that:

"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas
City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code];
that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or afrustration
thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information."

The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is
clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved – which
reads as follows:

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." x x x

and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioner's
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first
sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but ratherunder the
second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets
forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and
second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is
available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute
such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts. x x x[30](Italicization in the original; boldfacing
supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners' claim against multiple prosecutions
based on a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at
issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being
prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an
ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first
sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for
the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same
incident.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November

2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis with Associate Justices
Ramon A. Barcelona and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring.

[3]
Mine tailings or mine waste refer to "soil and/or rock materials from
surface or underground mining operations with no present economic value to the
generator of the same" (Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Administrative Order No. 96-40 (1996) ("DENR DAO No. 96-40"), Section 5[be]).
Waste from milling operations or mill tailings is defined as "materials whether solid,
liquid or both[,] segregated from the ores during concentration/milling operations
which have no present economic value to the generator of the same" (DENR DAO
No. 96-40, Section 5 [au]).

[4]
This provision states: "A fine exceeding Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) but
not more than Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) or imprisonment exceeding three
(3) years but not more than six (6) years, or both such fine and imprisonment in
the discretion of the Court, shall be imposed on any person who commits any of the
following acts:

xxxx

5. Constructing, without prior permission of the government agency concerned,

works that produce dangerous or noxious substances, or performing acts that result
in the introduction of sewage, industrial waste, or any substance that pollutes a
source of water supply.

6. Dumping mine tailings and sediments into rivers or waterways without

permission."

[5]
The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-
44, 96-45, and 96-46. Except for the names of the accused and their respective
designations at Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 54-62):

That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto,
in the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously dispose, discharge or introduce industrial
waste, particularly mine tailings, without permission into the Makulapnit River and
the entire Boac River system which is a source of water supply and/or dump or
cause, permit, suffer to be dumped, without permission, mine tailings or other
waste matters discharged due to breach caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel,
thus causing pollution and siltation in the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac
River system which became a dead river, resulting to damage and/or destruction of
living organisms, like fish or other aquatic life in the vicinity, and to health and
property in the same vicinity.
[6]
This provision states: "Prohibitions. — No person shall throw, run, drain, or
otherwise dispose into any of the water, air and/or land resources of the
Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to seep or
otherwise dispose thereto any organic or inorganic matter or any substance in
gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution thereof.

No person shall perform any of the following activities without first securing a
permit from the [National Pollution Control] Commission for the discharge of all
industrial wastes and other wastes which could cause pollution:

(1) the construction, installation, modification or operation of any sewage works or

any extension or addition thereto;
(2) the increase in volume or strength of any wastes in excess of the permissive
discharge specified under any existing permit;
(3) the construction, installation or operation of any industrial or commercial
establishments or any extension or modification thereof or addition thereto, the
operation of which would cause an increase in the discharge of waste directly into
the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines or would otherwise alter their
physical, chemical or biological properties in any manner not already lawfully
authorized."

[7]
The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-
47, 96-48, and 96-49. Except for the names of the accused and their respective
designations at Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 63-71):

That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto,
in the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into
the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system and/or cause, permit, suffer
to be drained or allow to seep into such river/waterway, mine tailings or other
waste matters discharged due to breach caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel
for his failure to institute adequate measures as a managing head thereof, thus
causing pollution of such rivers/waterways due to exceedances [sic] in the criterion
level for cadmium, copper, and lead, as found by the Pollution Adjudication Board,
which rendered such water resources harmful, detrimental or injurious to public
health, safety or welfare or which adversely affected their utilization for domestic,
agricultural, and/or recreational purposes.

[8]
This provision states: "Violation of the Terms and Conditions of the
[E]nvironmental Compliance Certificate. — Any person who willfully violates or
grossly neglects to abide by the terms and conditions of the environmental
compliance certificate issued to said person and which causes environmental
damage through pollution shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
months to six (6) years or a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court."

[9]
The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-
50, 96-51, and 96-52. Except for the names of the accused and their respective
designations at Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 72-80):

That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto,
in the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into
the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system and/or cause, permit, suffer
to be drained or allow to seep into such river system, mine tailings or other waste
matters discharged due to breach caused on its Tapian drainage tunnel for his
failure to institute adequate measures, thus causing pollution and siltation in the
entire Boac River System thus, willfully violating or grossly neglecting to abide by
the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued
to [Marcopper Mining C]orporation x x x, particularly that the Marcopper Mining
Corporation should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from
reaching the Magpog and Boac Rivers, resulting to damage and/or destruction of
living organisms, like fish and other aquatic life in the vicinity, and to health and
property in the same vicinity.

[10]
This provision states, in part: "Imprudence and negligence. — Any person
who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

xxxx

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

xxxx

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to

do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place."

[11]
The Informations under this charge were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-53,
96-54, and 96-55. Except for the names of the accused and their respective
designations at Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 81-91):

That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto,
in the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then and
there negligently, imprudently, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise
dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River or Boac River system and/or cause,
permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such river system/waterway, its
mine tailings due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage pit/tunnel of the
[Marcopper Mining C]orporation so managed and operated by said accused, in a
negligent, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regard and in gross
violation of the conditions set forth in the Environmental Compliance Certificate
issued by the Environmental Management Bureau to the said corporation on April 6,
1996, and the accused, x x x, did not take the necessary or adequate precaution to
prevent damage to property thus causing by such carelessness and imprudence
said corporation operated by him to discharge mine tailings into the Makulapnit
River at the rate of 5 to 10 cubic meters per second then resulting to damage
and/or destruction of living organisms, like fish or other aquatic life in the said river
system and which also affected agricultural products, the rehabilitation and
restoration of which will cost the government the approximate sum of not less than
P50,000,000.00.

[12]
Presided by Judge Celso De Jesus Zoleta.

[13]
Rollo, pp. 120-122.

[14]
Penned by Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano.

[15]
Rollo, pp. 202-203.

[16]
No. L-45129, 6 March 1987, 148 SCRA 292.

[17]
CA rollo, pp. 1-18.

[18]
Rollo, pp. 43, 45-46, 48, 50 (internal citations omitted).
[19]
Id., pp. 17-18.

[20]
Substantially reiterated in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, effective 1 December 2000 ("Revised Rules").

[21]
See Reodica v. CA, 354 Phil. 90 (1998).

[22]
This provisions states: "Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses[.]" This is substantially
reiterated in Section 3(f), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules.

[23]
People v. Ferrer, 101 Phil. 234 (1957).

[24]
See Nierras v. Dacuycuy, G.R. Nos. 59568-76, 11 January 1990, 181 SCRA
1; Peoplev. Doriquez, 133 Phil. 295 (1968); People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472
(1923); People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64 (1922); United States v. Capurro, et al., 7
Phil. 24 (1906).

[25]
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 21.

[26]
133 Phil. 295 (1968).

[27]
Id. at 305 (internal citations omitted).
[28]
Under Section 7, Rule 117, of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
(substantially reiterated in Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules), the following
requisites must obtain for the accused to claim protection against double jeopardy:
(1) a valid complaint or Information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, (2) a competent court; (3) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; (4) the defendant had been convicted, or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent;
(5) the second offense charged is the same as the first, or is an attempt to commit
the same or a frustration thereof, or that the second offense necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense or information. Only the first three elements
are present in this case.

519 Phil. 591

THIRD DIVISION
 [ G.R. NO. 157171, March 14, 2006 ]
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.

This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 24547[1] that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial
Court[2] of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of
Republic Act No. 6646.[3]

Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995
senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel
Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The
information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the
May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R.
Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-
Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de
Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, did,
then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by
senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred
ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the
one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of
said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421,
008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as
reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and
Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand
seventy-seven (5,077) votes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for
insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
 xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces
her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under
Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator
Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881,
considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is
thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as
maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the
minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS;
however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation;
further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office
and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.

The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the

Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of
Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further
orders from the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification
the RTC Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with
modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six
(6) months to one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.[6]
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
appeal assigning the following as errors of the appellate court:
I

ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT

COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO
DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED
ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN
THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING
[MACHINE] TAPE.

II

ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE
TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE
TO HER.

III

ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO
ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS
(COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.

IV

THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT

WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.[7]
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals' judgment is erroneous, based on
speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2)
there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the
violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified
undermala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be
valid defenses?

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se,
even if they are punished by a special law.[8] Accordingly, criminal intent must be
clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts
are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they
are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been
violated.[9] Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy.[10]

Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646[11] provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses.— In addition to the prohibited acts and election
offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who
tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election
or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to
credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.[12] For otherwise, even
errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of
time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the
intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However,
intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate
is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act
which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.[13] Thus, whoever invokes
good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.

Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of
Canvassers of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:

1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos

were tallied, the results thereof were sealed and forwarded to the
Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;

2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was

then recorded in the Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity
as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from the
precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board,
entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the
appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes
received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each
precincts were entered by accused Viray in the Statements of Votes,
these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the
use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding
machine tapes were handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of
votes received by each candidate in the precincts listed in each
Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the
proper column in the Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators
accused Palisoc and de Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all
Statement of Votes.
 6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the
grand total was reflected was handed to appellant who reads the same
and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the column for
grand total in the Statement of Votes.[14]

Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes
(SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes
received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an
issue.

At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the

subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159
precincts in SOV No. 008423.[15] The grand total of the votes for private
complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000
votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This
error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by
petitioner, Viray and Romero.[16]

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who
announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused
Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.[17] Petitioner likewise admitted that
she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty.
To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention
to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.[17]

Neither can this Court accept petitioner's explanation that the Board of Canvassers
had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private
complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner's concern was to assure accurate, correct
and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as
a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law. [19]

The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by
private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial
candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No.
6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is
already punishable under the said provision.[20]

At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the
appellate court. The Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial
court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court on the matter coincide.[21]

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the

members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any
error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of
votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized. [22]

In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998. [23]

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private
complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a
difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or
error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to
remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere
transfer of totals from one document to another.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in
her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Carpio Morales and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 101-115. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with
Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino, and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. concurring.

[2]
Id. at 60-99.

[3]
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.—In addition to the prohibited acts and election
offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who
tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election
or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to
credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
[4]
Records, pp. 1-2.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 98-99.
[6]
Id. at 114.
[7]
Id. at 20, 26 & 30.
[8]
Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 55 (13th ed).
[9]
See United States v. Go Chico, No. 4963, 15 September 1909, 14 Phil 128, 134.
[10]
Ibasco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117488, 5 September 1996, 261 SCRA 449, 454
citing People v. Conosa, C.A. 45, O.G. 3953.
[11]
"The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987". An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the
Electoral System and for Other Purposes (5 January 1988).
[12]
Domalanta v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125586, 29 June 2000, 334 SCRA 555, 564.
[13]
United States v. Apostol, No. 5126, 2 September 1909, 14 Phil 92, 93; Rules of Court, Rule
131, Sec. 3, par. (b).
[14]
Rollo, p. 105.
[15]
Records, p. 342.
[16]
Rollo, p. 106.
[17]
Id. at 87.
[17]
Id. at 90-91.
[19]
Id. at 97-98.
[20]
Id. at 113.
[21]
Sps. Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 102526-31, 21 May 1998, 290 SCRA 330,
342; Engineering & Machinery Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 52267, 24 January
1996, 252 SCRA 156, 163.
[22]
Domalanta v. Commission on Elections, supra note 12, at 563.
[23]
See Exhibit A-1 to A-6, records, pp. 39-45.
Statement Votes Based on SOV Votes per SOV
of Votes Subtotals
008417 1,131 1,174
008418 1,068 1,068
008419 1,139 1,139
008420 864 864
008421 1,137 1,171
008422 1,090 1,090
008423 492 492
TOTAL 6,921 6,998
614 Phil. 66

EN BANC
[ G. R. No. 175605, August 28, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA A.KA. JUNIOR; JOEY
PAMPLONA A.K.A. NATO AND JESSIE GARCIA Y
ADORINO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-
HC No. 00765 which affirmed an earlier Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Binan City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No.9440-B, finding accused-appellants
Arnold Garchitorena y Gamba, a.k.a. "Junior," Joey Pamplona, a.k.a. "Nato," and
Jessie Garcia y Adorino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs
of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P16,700.00 as actual damages,
P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity and to pay the costs of the suit.

The conviction of accused-appellants stemmed from an Information [3] dated January

22, 1996, filed with the RTC for the crime of Murder, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about September 22, 1995, in the Municipality of Binan, Province of

Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Arnold Garchitorena y Gamba, alias "Junior", Joey Pamplona alias "Nato" and Jessie
Garcia y Adorino, conspiring, confederating together and mutualy helping each
other, with intent to kill, while conveniently armed with a deadly bladed weapon,
with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one Mauro Biay y Almarinez with the said
weapon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their counsel, pleaded not

guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses; namely, Dulce Borero, elder sister
of the victim Mauro Biay and eyewitness to the killing of her brother; Dr. Rolando
Poblete, who conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim and prepared the
post-mortem report; and Amelia Biay, the victim's widow. The evidence for the
prosecution, as culled from the CA Decision under review, is as follows:

In the proceedings before the trial court, witness for the prosecution Dulce Borero
testified that on September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she
was selling "balut" at Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Binan, Laguna.
Her brother, Mauro Biay, also a "balut" vendor", was also at the area, about seven
(7) arms length away from her when she was called by accused Jessie Garcia.
Borero testified that when her brother Mauro approached Jessie, the latter twisted
the hand of her brother behind his back and Jessie's companions- accused Arnold
Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona - began stabbing her brother Mauro repeatedly
with a shiny bladed instrument. Joey was at the right side of the victim and was
strangling Mauro from behind. Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to free
himself while being stabbed by the three (3) accused., until her brother slumped
facedown on the ground. Arnold then instructed his two co-accused to run away.
During cross-examination, Borero claims that she wanted to shout for help but
nothing came out from her mouth. When the accused had left after the stabbing
incident, witness claimed that she went home to call her elder brother Teodoro
Biay, but when they returned to the scene, the victim was no longer there as he
had already been brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital. They learned from the
tricycle driver who brought Mauro top the hospital that their brother was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Rolando Poblete, the physician who conducted an autopsy on victim Mauro Biay
and prepared the post-mortem report, testified that the victim's death was caused
by "hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds." Witness specified the
eight (8) stab wounds suffered by the victim - one in the neck, two in the chest,
one below the armpit, two on the upper abdomen, one at the back and one at the
left thigh - and also a laceration at the left forearm of Mauro. According to the
expert witness, the nature of stab wounds indicate that it may have been caused by
more than one bladed instrument.

The victim's widow, Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred burial expenses
amounting to P16,700.00 due to the death of her husband. Also, her husband
allegedly earned a minimum of P300.00 a day as a "balut" vendor and P100.00
occasionally as a part-time carpenter.

The accused-appellants denied the charge against them. Specifically, accused-

appellant Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing of Mauro Bay,
accused-appellant Jessie Garcia interposed the defense of alibi, while accused-
appellant Arnold Garchitorena interposed the defense of insanity. Succinctly, the CA
Decision summed up their respective defenses:

On the other hand, accused Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the
stabbing of Mauro Biay. Joey Pamplona claims that he was seated on a bench when
co-accused Arnold came along. Then the "balut" vendor arrived and Joey saw
Arnold stand up, pull something from the right side of his pocket and stab the
"balut" vendor once before running away. Joey Pamplona testified that after the
stabbing incident, due to fear that Arnold might also stab him, he also ran away to
the store of a certain Mang Tony, a barangay official and related the incident to
Aling Bel, the wife of Mang Tony. Joey Pamplona said that he stayed at Mang Tony's
store until his father arrived and told him to go home.

Danilo Garados testified that on Septemebr 22, 1995, he was at the store of Mang
Tony to buy cigarettes and saw Arnold and Joey seated on the bench near the
artesian well. Arnold and Joey allegedly called Mauro Biay and he saw Arnold
stabbing Mauro. Jessie Garcia was not there and Joey allegedly ran away when
Arnold stabbed Mauro.

Clavel Estropegan testified that on September 22, 1995, around 9:00 p.m. Joey
Pamplona entered her store and told her that Junior or Arnold Garchitorena was
stabbing somebody. She did not hear any commotion outside her house which is
just four houses away from the artesian well. However, she closed her store for fear
that Arnold will enter her house.

Barangay Captain Alfredo Arcega testified that he investigated the stabbing incident
and, although he had no personal knowledge, he found out that it was Arnold
Garchitorena who stabbed Mauro Biay. Upon questioning Arnold, the latter admitted
that he did stab Mauro.

Defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo testified that on September 22, 1995, he was
in his shoe factory at his house located at 186 Sta. Teresita Street, Almeda
Subdivision, Binan when he heard Mauro Biay shouting, and so he went out of his
house. He allegedly saw two persons "embracing" each other near the artesian well.
He recognized these two persons as Mauro and Arnold. He saw Arnold pulling out a
knife from the body of Mauro and the latter slowly fell down on his side. After
Arnold washed his hands at the artesian well and walked away towards the house
of his aunt, this witness approached Mauro and seeing that the victim was still
breathing, went to get a tricycle to bring Mauro to the hospital. When he got back
to the area, there were many people who helped board Mauro in the tricycle and
they brought him to the Perpetual Help Hospital in Binan.

The other co-accused Jessie Garcia took the stand and claimed that on September
22, 1995, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening, he was still riding a bus from his
work in Blumentritt. He arrived at his home in Binan only at 11:00 p.m. On
September 24, 1995, he was fetched by two (2) policemen and two (2) Barangay
Tanods from his house and brought to the Binan Police Station for questioning.
Thereafter, he was put in jail and incarcerated for six (6) months without knowing
the charges against him. He was only informed that he was one of the suspects in
the killing of Mauro Biay by his mother.

With respect to Arnold Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen, Medical Officer III and
resident physician of the National Center for Mental Health, testified that she
examined the accused Arnold and based on the history of the patient, it was found
that he had been using prohibited drugs like shabu and marijuana for two (2) years
prior to the stabbing incident in 1995. The patient is allegedly suffering from
schizophrenia, wherein he was hearing auditory voices, seeing strange things and is
delusional. However, Dr. Belen also testified that the accused Garchitorena had
remissions or exaservation and understands what he was doing and was aware of
his murder case in court.[4]

On May 9, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision, [5] as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court

finds accused Arnold Garchitorena y Gamboa alias Junior, Joey Pamplona alias Nato
and Jessie Garcia y Adorino GUILTY beyond reasonable of the crime of "MURDER"
as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
by Republic Act 7659, (Heinous Crimes). Accordingly, all of them are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

Furthermore, all of the accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
Amelia Biay, widow of the victim Mauro Biay, the following sums:

a) 50,000.00 - as and for civil indemnity

b) 50,000.00 - as and for moral damages
c) 50,000.00 - as and for exemplary damages
d) 16,700.00 - as and for actual damages
e) 408,000.00 - as and for loss of the earning capacity of Mauro Biay; and
f) To pay the costs of suit.
Likewise, the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, is hereby
ordered to transfer/commit the three (3) accused to the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt hereof.

Considering that death penalty was meted against all of the accused, let the entire
records of the above-entitled case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment pursuant to Rule 122, Sec.10 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Accused-appellants appealed to the CA. Pamplona and Garcia reiterated their denial
of the charge against them. Garchitorena who never denied his participation in the
killing, insisted, however, insisted that he is exempt from criminal liability because
he was suffering from a mental disorder before, during and after the commission of
the crime.

On May 31, 2006, the CA rendered the Decision [7] now under review, affirming
RTC's Decision in toto, thus:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

Accordingly, the appealed March 9, 2001 Decuision of the Regional Trial Court of
Binan, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED in
its entirety.

SO ORDERED.

In arriving at the assailed Decision, the CA ratiocinated as follows:

After studying the records of this case, we do not find any reason to overturn the
ruling of the trial court.

Despite the testimony of defense witnesses that it was only accused-appellant

Arnold Garchitorena who stabbed the victim Mauro Biay, we find reason to uphold
the trial court's giving credence to prosecution witness Dulce Borero who testified
as an eyewitness on the circumstances surrounding the incident and the manner by
which the crime committed.

Defense witness Garados testified that he was at the store and saw both Arnold and
Joey at the vicinity where the stabbing incident happened, seated on a bench near
the artesian well, when they called the victim Mauro. Defense witness Gonzalgo was
in his house when he heard the commotion and went outside to see Arnold and
Mauro "embracing" near the artesian well and the former pulling a knife from the
body of the latter. On the other hand, prosecution witness Borero was merely seven
arms length away from the incident and could easily see the victim Mauro
overpowered and attacked by his assailants, Arnold Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona
and Jessie Garcia. She witnessed the stabbing incident in its entirely and positively
identified the accused and their criminal acts. It is a well-settled rule that the
evaluation of testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with
the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the
witnesses on the stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not. (People
vs. Cardel, 336 SCRA 144)

Evidence presented by the prosecution shows that the accused conspired to assault
the victim Mauro Biay. Accused Jessie Garcia was the one who called the victim and
prompted the latter to approach their group near the artesian well. When the victim
was near enough, accused Jessie Garcia and co-accused Joey Pamplona restrained
Mauro Biay and overpowered him. Witness Borero then saw the two accused, Jessie
Garcia and Joey Pamplona, together with their co-accused Arnold Garchitorena
instructed his two co-accused to run. Conspiracy is apparent in the concerted action
of the three accused. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People
vs. Pendatun, 434 SCRA 148). Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the
accused which show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted action and
community of interest among the accused (People vs. Sicad, et al., 391 SCRA 19).

Likewise, we affirm the trial court's appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of

abuse of superior strength to qualify the crime into murder. "While it is true that
superiority in number does not per se mean superiority in strength, the appellants
in this case did not only enjoy superiority in number, but were armed with a
weapon, while the victim had no means with which to defend himself. Thus, there
was obvious physical disparity between the protagonists and abuse of superior
strength attended the killing when the offenders took advantage of their combined
strength in order to consummate the offense." (People of the Phils. vs. Parreno,
433 SCRA 591). In the case at bar, the victim was rendered helpless when he was
assaulted by the three accused. He was restrained and overpowered by the
combined strength and the weapons used by his assailants.

We do not find improbable Borero's failure to act or shout for help upon witnessing
the stabbing of her brother Mauro Biay. It is an accepted maxim that different
people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or
startling experience. xxx There is no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident. The workings of the human mind when placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable. (People of the Philippines vs. Aspuria,
391 SCRA 404)

Accused-appellant Jessie Garcia's denial of any involvement cannot prevail over

Borero's positive identification. As ruled by the trial court, allegations that accused
Jessie Garcia was somewhere else when the crime was committed is not enough.
He must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been present at the crime
scene, or in its vicinity. He also could have sought the help of his co-worker,
employer or anyone in the area to support his defense of alibi. Indeed, we affirm
that accused Jessie Garcia's allegation that he was elsewhere when the crime was
committed is not substantiated by evidence. Alibi can easily be fabricated. Well-
settled is the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused by the victim. (People of the Phils. vs.
Cadampog, 428 SCRA 336)

Finally, the defense of insanity cannot be given merit when the expert witness
herself, Dr. Belen, attested that accused Arnold Garchitorena was experiencing
remission and was even aware of his murder case in court. The trial court had basis
to conclude that during the commission of the crime, Arnold was not totally
deprived of reason and freedom of will. In fact, after the stabbing incident, accused
Arnold Garchitorena instructed his co-accused to run away from the scene. We
agree that such action demonstrates that Arnold possessed the intelligence to be
aware of his and his co-accused's criminal acts. A defendant in a criminal case who
interpose the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact
that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed. There must
be complete deprivation of reason in the commission of the act, or that the accused
acted without discernment, which must be proven by clear and positive evidence.
The mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not preclude imputability.
Indeed, a man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that
he is legally so. (People of the Philippines vs. Galigao, 395 SCRA 195)

Having found the court a quo's decision to be supported by the evidence on record,
and for being in accord with prevailing jurisprudence, we find no reason to set it
aside.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

Accordingly, the appealed March 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED in
its entirely.

SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. The People and the
accused-appellants opted not to file any supplemental brief. The respective
assignments of errors contained in the briefs that they filed with the CA are set
forth hereunder.

For accused-appellant Pamplona:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL AND TOTAL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS DULCE BORERO

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF

THE APPELLANT

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT HAS NOT
BEEN DULY PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

For accused-appellant Garcia:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
ALLEGED EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT GIVEN BY DULCE BORERO, ELDER SISTER OF
THE VICTIM AND PROSECUTION WITNESS, IN RESPECT OF THE PARTICIPATION OF
THE HEREIN ACCUSED DESPITE GLARING INCONSISTENCIES, INHERENT
IMPROBABILITIES AND UNRELIABLE DECLARATION ATTENDING THE SAME; AND,
ON THE OTHERHAND, IN DISREGARDING THE COHERENT, CONSISTENT AND
CREDIBLE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF DEFENSE WITNESSES - ALL IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES GOVERNING QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL
CASES AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENSE EXISTING IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED
GARCIA;

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT JESSIE GARCIA WHO WAS SOMEWHERE
ELSE AT THE TIME AS TO RENDER IT PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO HAVE
BEEN AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AND EVEN IF THE SAME IS SUBSTANTIATED
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT IS, THE TESTIMONIES OF OITHER
DEFENSE WITNESSES WHO WERE ONE IN SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT PRESENT
THEREAT;

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION FOR JESSIE

GARCIA INSTEAD OF ACQUITTAL WHEN NONE OF THE OTHER ACCUSED, AFTER
HAVING ADMITTED THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIME, IMPLICATED HIM;

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED, IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN

THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THEREFOR.

For accused-appellant Garchitorena:

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE OVER THE
TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS.

II

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED ARNOLD GARCHITORENA TO HAVE

WILLFULLY EXECUTED THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF.

Accused-appellant Pamplona capitalized on Dulce Borero's inaction at the time

when she had supposedly witnessed the slaying of her younger brother. He argued
that if she really witnessed the crime, she would have had readily helped her
brother Mauro instead of fleeing. Accused-appellant Garcia anchored his acquittal
on his defense of alibi, while accused-appellant Garchitorena used his alleged
mental disorder, specifically,schizophrenia, as a ground to free himself from
criminal liability.

The core issues raised by the both accused-appellants Pamplona and Garcia are
factual in nature and delve on the credibility of the witnesses.

Since the accused-appellants raise factual issues, they must use cogent and
convincing arguments to show that the trial court erred in appreciating the
evidence. They, however, have failed to do so.

Accused-appellant Pamplona contends that the trial court's decision was rendered
by a judge other than the one who conducted trial. Hence, the judge who decided
the case failed to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand so as to
gauge their credibility. This argument does not convince the Court for the reason it
has consistently maintained, to wit:

We have ruled in People v. Sadiangabay (G.R. No. 87214, March 30, 1993, 220
SCRA 551), that the circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the decision had
not heard the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses would not taint his decision.
After all, he had the full record before him, including the transcript of stenographic
notes which he could study. The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by
the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at
the trial, unless there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion in the factual
findings reached by him.[8]

A perusal of the trial court's decision readily shows that it was duly based on the
evidence presented during the trial. It is evident that he thoroughly examined the
testimonial and documentary evidence before him and carefully assessed the
credibility of the witnesses. This Court finds no plausible ground to set aside the
factual findings of the trial court, which were sustained by the CA.

The eyewitness Dulce Borero's testimony clearly established Pamplona and Garcia's
participation and, consequently, their culpability in the appalling murder of Mauro
Biay:[9]

"Fiscal Nofuente (To the witness)

Q: Madam witness, do you know Mauro Biay?

A: Yes sir.
xxx
Q: Do you know likewise the cause of his death?
A: Yes sir.

Q: What was the cause of his death?

A: He was repeatedly stabbed sir.

Q: You said that Mauro Biay was repeatedly stabbed, who stabbed Mauro Biay repeatedly?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena, was stabbing repeatedly the victim sir.

Q: Was Arnold Gatchitorena alone when he stabbed Mauro Biay?

A: They were three (3) who were stabbing Mauro Biay, sir.

Q: You said that they were three who were stabbing Mauro Biay, who are the other two?
A: Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona sir.

Q: So that when you said three, you are referring to Arnold Gatchitorena, Joey Pamplona and
Jessie Garcia?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Now, when [did] this stabbing incident [happen]?

A: On September 22, 1995 sir.

Q: Do you know what was [the] time when this incident happened on September 22, 1995?
A: 9:00 o'clock in the evening sir.

Q: Where [did] this stabbing [happen]?

A: At Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Biñan, Laguna sir.

Q: Could you tell Madam Witness, where in particular place in Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision this
stabbing incident happened?
A: In the street near the artesian well sir.

Q: Do you know where is that street?

A: Sta Inez St., Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Biñan, Laguna sir.

Q: You said a while ago that accused Arnold Gatchitorena, Jessie Garcia, Joey Pamplona
repeatedly [stabbed] Mauro Biay, do you know these three accused?
A: Yes sir.

xxx

Q: Will you kindly step down from your seat and tap the three accused that you have pointed to
us to be the persons who stabbed and killed your brother Mauro Biay?

Court: Police Officer Dionisio will you kindly accompany the witness.

P02 Dionisio: Yes sir.

Fiscal: I would like to manifest Your Honor, that the witness was crying when she was pointing to the
three accused, uttering that "Sila ang pumatay sa aking kapatid!".

xxx

Q: What is the name of that person wearing that blue t-shirts?

A: Arnold Gatchitorena sir.

Q: We would like to confirm if he is really Arnold Gatchitorena pointed to by the witness?

Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness wearing blue t-shirts identified himself as Arnold
Gatchitorena.

Fiscal: Do you know the name of second person whom you tapped on his side wearing white t-shirts?
A: Yes sir.

Q: What is his name?

A: Jessie Garcia sir.

Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness identified himself as certain Jessie Garcia.

Fiscal: Likewise Madam Witness, do you know the name of a person in longsleeves polo shirts-
checkered?
A: Yes sir, Joey Pamplona sir.

Interpreter: The person pointed by the witness identified himself as certain Joey Pamplona.

xxx

Q: How far were you from Mauro Biay when he was being stabbed by the three accused Joey
Pamplona, Jessie Garcia, and Arnold Gatchitorena?
A: Seven (7) arms length sir.

Q: You said that your brother was stabbed successively by the three accused, how did it [happen]
Madam Witness?
A: They called him sir.

Q: Who was called?

A: Mauro Biay sir.

Q: Who called Mauro Biay?

A: It was Jessie who called sir.

Q: When you said Jessie, are you referring to Jessie Garcia, one of the accused in this case?
A: Yes sir.

Q: When Mauro Biay was called by Jessie Garcia, what was [M]auro Biay doing there?
A: Mauro Biay approached sir.

Q: By the way Madam Witness, do you know why Mauro Biay was in that place where the
incident happened?
A: Yes sir.

Atty. Witness would be incompetent Your Honor.

Pajares:

Court: Witness may answer.

Fiscal: Why was he there?

A: He was selling "balot" sir.

xxx

Fiscal: When Mauro Biay approached Jessie Garcia, what [did] Mauro Biay do, if any?
A: Jessie Garcia twisted the hand of my brother and placed the hand at his back sir.
Q: Who were the companions of Jessie Garcia when he called [M]auro Biay?
A: Joey Pamplona and Jr. Gatchitorena sir.

Q: When you said Jr. Gatchitorena are you referring to Arnold Gatchitorena?
A: Yes sir.

Q: So that when Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay, he was together with Arnold Gatchitorena
and Joey Pamplona?
A: Yes sir.

Q: If you know Madam Witness, what did Joey Pamplona and Arnold Gatchitorena do after
Jessie Garcia twisted the arm of Mauro Biay on his back?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena repeatedly stabbed [M]auro Biay at his back and also Jessie Garcia also
stabbed my brother sir.

xxx

Q: Were you able to know the weapon used to stab Mauro Biay?
A: It was like a shiny bladed instrument sir.

Q: Now, what was the position of Mauro Biay when being stabbed by the three accused?
A: He was struggling to free himself sir.

Q: You said that he was struggling to free himself, why did you say that he was struggling to free
himself?
A: Because I could see sir.

Q: You see what?

A: Because that three were repeatedly stabbing Mauro Biay sir.

Q: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay, what was Joey Pamplona doing to Mauro Biay, if you can
still remember?
A: He was also repeatedly stabbing my brother sir.

Q: Aside from that stabbing, what else if any Joey Pamplona was doing to Mauro Biay?
A: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay Joey Pamplona was also struggling [strangling] the neck of
Mauro Biay sir.

Q: You said that Mauro Biay was stabbed by the three accused successively, was Mauro Biay hit
by these stabbing?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Why do you know that he was hit by stabbing of the three?

A: Because I saw the blood oozing from the part of his body sir.

Q: Now, what happened to Mauro Biay, when he was stabbed and hit by the successive stabbing
of the three accused?
A: The victim Mauro Biay was suddenly slumped face down on the ground sir.

xxx

Q: What did you learn if any when you went to the hospital to see your brother [M]auro Biay?
A: He was already dead sir.

Even under cross-examination, Dulce Borero was unwavering, straightforward,

categorical and spontaneous in her narration of how the killing of her brother Mauro
took place.[10]Notably, her testimony as to the identification of Garchitorena as the
one who stabbed Mauro Biay was even corroborated by defense witness Miguelito
Gonzalgo,[11] thus:

Q: From the time you saw these two persons near the artesian well, what happened after that,
mr. witness?
A: Mauro Biay slumped on the floor and I saw Junior stabbed once more the victim but I am
not sure if the victim was hit at the back, ma'am.

Q: How far were you from the two when you saw the incident, mr. witness?
A: More or less 7 to 8 meters, ma'am.

Q: Were there anything blocking your sight from the place where you were standing to the place
of incident, mr. witness?
A: None, ma'am.

Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of Borero, we sustain the lower court
in giving her testimony full faith and credence. Moreover, the prosecution's version
is supported by the physical evidence.[12] Borero's testimony that the victim was
successively stabbed several times conforms with the autopsy report that the latter
suffered multiple stab wounds.[13]

Accused-appellant Pamplona's argument that there were inconsistencies in the

testimony of prosecution witnesses Borero is not convincing. He specifically points
out that in the direct examination of Borero, she stated that it was Jessie Garcia
who twisted the hand of Mauro Biay backwards when the latter approached the
former.[14] In the cross-examination, she stated that it was Joey Pamplona who
strangled the victim when the latter approached Jessie Garcia.

The seeming inconsistencies between her direct testimony and her cross-
examination testimonies are not sufficient ground to disregard them. In People v.
Alberto Restoles y Tuyo, Roldan Noel y Molet and Jimmy Alayon y De la Cruz,[15] we
ruled that:

...minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even
tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the
testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the
weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a
testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.

Moreover, such inconsistencies did not contradict the credibility of Borero or her
narration of the incident. On the contrary, they showed that her account was
the entire truth. In fact, her narration was in harmony with the account of defense
witness Gonzalgo. We note further that both the Sworn Statement [16] of Borero and
her testimony before the lower court[17] were in complete congruence.

Undoubtedly, accused-appellants' identities as the perpetrators were established by

the prosecution. The prosecution witness was able to observe the entire incident,
because she was there. Thus, we find no reason to differ with the trial court's
appreciation of her testimony. Positive identification, where categorical and
consistent, and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.[18]

Accused-appellant Garcia's alibi has no leg to stand on. In People v. Desalisa,[19] this
Court ruled that:

...for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was
at some other place when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through
clear and convincing evidence.

Here, the crime was committed at Binan, Laguna. Although Garcia testified that he
was still riding a bus from his work in Blumentritt and arrived in Binan only at
11:00 P.M. or two hours after the killing incident, still, he failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity. His alibi must fail.

Accused-appellant Garchitorena's defense of insanity has also no merit. Unlike other

jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a more stringent criterion for the
acceptance of insanity as an exempting circumstance.[20] As aptly argued by the
Solicitor General, insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance.
As such, it must be adequately proved, and accused-appellant Garchitorena utterly
failed to do so. We agree with both the CA and the trial court that he was not
totally deprived of reason and freedom of will during and after the stabbing
incident, as he even instructed his co-accused-appellants to run away from the
scene of the crime.

Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as "there was
no evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or that he
participated in their criminal designs."[21] We are not persuaded. In People v. Maldo,
[22]
we stated:

"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential,
for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or
subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of
action or community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each
of the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all." (citations
omitted, emphasis ours)

In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants were together in

performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed
the victim's hands and twisted his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with
Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him on the ground, then stabbed him.
The victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were too strong. All
means through which the victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to
the ground and expired. The three accused-appellants' prior act of waiting for the
victim outside affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design
and purpose.

Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused

rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the intent and the character of their participation, because the act of
one is the act of all.[23]

The aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be appreciated against

the accused-appellants. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, considering that a
situation of superiority of strength is notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
and is selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.
[24]
This circumstance was alleged in the Information and was proved during the
trial. In the case at bar, the victim certainly could not defend himself in any way.
The accused-appellants, armed with a deadly weapon, immobilized the victim and
stabbed him successively using the same deadly weapon.

All told, the trial court correctly convicted the accused-appellants of murder,
considering the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Since an
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the commission of
the crime, each of the accused-appellants should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of death in accordance with Article 63[25] of the Revised Penal Code. Murder, under
Article 248[26] of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Following Article 63 of the same code, the higher penalty of death shall be
applied.

In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346,[27] otherwise known as the Anti-
Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, reclusion
perpetuawithout eligibility for parole should instead be imposed. Accordingly,
accused-appellants shall be sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole in lieu of the penalty of death.

While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous.[28] Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
In People v. Quiachon,[29] we explained that even if the penalty of death was not to
be imposed on appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the
civil indemnity of P75,000.00 was still proper. Following the ratiocination in People
v. Victor,[30] the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death
penalty, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the commission of the crime.

Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity by the trial court from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00. Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Likewise the award
of P50,000.00 for moral damages is modified and increased to P75,000.00,
consistent with recent jurisprudence[31] on heinous crimes where the imposable
penalty is death, it is reduced toreclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. 9346. The
award of moral damages does not require allegation and proof of the emotional
suffering of the heirs, since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of the
victim cannot be denied.[32] The trial court's award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 shall, however, be reduced to P30,000.00, also pursuant to
the latest jurisprudence on the matter.[33]

As to the award of actual damages amounting to P16,700.00, we modify the same.

InPeople v. Villanueva,[34] this Court declared that "...when actual damages proven
by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the
award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of
a lesser amount." In the light of such ruling, the victim's heirs in the present case
should, therefore, be awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.

The award of P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity is justified. As a rule,

documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages
for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1)
the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased
is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.[35] It cannot be disputed that the victim, at the time of his death,
was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws. The computation arrived at by the trial court was in accordance with the
formula for computing the award for loss of earning capacity. [36]Thus,

Award for = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% (GAI)]
lost earnings
= 2/3 [80-29] x P24,000.00 - P12,000.00
= (34) x (P12,000.00)
= P408,000.00

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00765,

finding the three-accused appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of
death imposed on accused-appellants is REDUCED to RECLUSION
PERPETUA without eligibility for parole pursuant to RA 9346; (2) the monetary
awards to be paid jointly and severally by the accused-appellants to the heirs of the
victim are as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu
of actual damages; (3) P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (4) interest is
imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until
fully paid.[37]

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Chico-Nazario, Velasco,

Jr., Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, and Abad, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on official leave.
Nachura, J., no part. filed pleading as Solicitor General.

[1]
Penned by then Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion (ret.) with Associate
Justices Noel G. Tijam and Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo concurring; rollo Vol. II, pp.
3-10.

[2]
Penned by Judge Hilario F. Corcuera, Records, Vol. II, pp. 427-444.

[3]
Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[4]
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 4-7.

[5]
Rollo, pp. 25-42.

[6]
Id. at 41-42.

[7]
Supra note 1.

[8]
People v. Fulinara, G.R. No. 88326, August 3, 1995, 247 SCRA 38.

[9]
TSN, April 23, 1996, Dulce Borero, pp. 4-14

[10]
TSN, May 8, 1996, Dulce Borero, pp. 13-20.

[11]
TSN, February 24, 1997, pp. 9-10.

[12]
Exhibit "B," Records, Vol. I, p. 127.

[13]
Id.

[14]
Pamplona's Appellant's Brief.

[15]
G.R. No. 112692, August 25, 2000, 339 SCRA 40, citing People v. Flora, G.R.
No. 125909, June 23, 2000, 334 SCRA 626.

[16]
Exhibit "A," Records, Vol. I, p. 8.

[17]
TSN, Dulce Borero, May 8, 1996, pp. 13-20; TSN, Dulce Borero, April 23, 1996,
pp. 5-14

[18]
People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260.

[19]
People v. Desalisa, G.R. No. 148327, June 12, 2003, 403 SCRA 723.

[20]
People v. Belonio, G.R. No. 148695, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 579.

[21]
Garcia's Appellant's Brief, rollo, Vol. I, p. 119.

[22]
G.R. No. 131347, May 19, 1999, 307 SCRA 436.

[23]
People v. Salison, Jr., G.R. No. 115690, February 20, 1996, 253 SCRA 758.
[24]
People v. Cortez, G.R. No. 131924, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 663, 674.

[25]
Art. 63. x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1) When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

[26]
Art. 248. Murder - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Art. 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.

2. x x x

[27]
Approved on June 24, 2006.

[28]
People v. Salome, G.R. No. 169077, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 659, 676. See
alsoPeople v. Ranin, G.R. No. 173023, June 25, 2008; and People v. Entrialgo, G.R.
No. 177353, November 11, 2008.

[29]
G.R. No. 170235, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 719.

[30]
G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998, 292 SCRA 186.

[31]
People v. Audine, G.R. No. 168649, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 531,
547; People v. Orbita, G.R. No. 172091, March 31, 2008; People v. Balobalo, G.R.
No. 177563, October 18, 2008.

[32]
People v. Caraig, G.R. Nos. 116224-27, March 28, 2003, 448 Phil. 78, 98
(2003).

[33]
People v. Sia, G.R. No. 174059, February 27, 2009.

[34]
G.R. No. 139177, August 11, 2003, 408 SCRA 571.

[35]
People v. Oco, G.R. Nos. 137370-71, September 29, 2003, 412 SCRA 190, 222.
[36]
People v. Ibañez et al, G.R. No. 148627, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 146, 163.

[37]
People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009; People v. Guevarra, G.R.
No. 182199, October 29, 2008.
672 Phil. 712

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 186412, September 07, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
ORLITO VILLACORTA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02550, which affirmed the Decision [2] dated September 22, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No.
27039-MN, finding accused-appellant Orlito Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus the costs of
suit.

On June 21, 2002, an Information[3] was filed against Villacorta charging him with
the crime of murder, as follows:

That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim
serious wounds which caused his immediate death.

When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty. [4]

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja)

and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).

Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store
located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular
customers at Mendeja's store. At around two o'clock in the morning, while Cruz
was ordering bread at Mendeja's store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without
uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz's body using a sharpened
bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz's body. Immediately
after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch
Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron
removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruz's body. [5] Mendeja and Aron then
brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.[6]

Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital.
When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the
Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only
brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died the
following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he did not personally
treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz's medical chart and
diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound. [7] Dr.
Belandres specifically described the cause of Cruz's death in the following manner:

The wound was exposed x x - spurs concerted, the patient developed difficulty of
opening the mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain and the cause of
death is hypoxic encephalopathy - neuro transmitted - due to upper G.I. bleeding x
x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.[8]

The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who
attended to Cruz at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and defense
agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias' testimony based on the stipulation that it would
only corroborate Dr. Belandres' testimony on Cruz dying of tetanus.

For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz.
Villacorta recounted that he was on his way home from work at around two o'clock
in the morning of January 21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee
then went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. When Villacorta was about
to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacorta's shoulder. This prompted
Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did not notice
that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruz's death upon his arrest on
July 31, 2002.[9]

On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of
murder, qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito Villacorta
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim plus the costs of suit.
[10]
Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), filed a notice
of appeal to assail his conviction by the RTC.[11] The Court of Appeals directed the
PAO to file Villacorta's brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.

Villacorta filed his Appellant's Brief[12] on May 30, 2007; while the People, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's Brief [13] on October 2,
2007.

On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in
toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.

Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.

Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as he was

adopting the Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of Appeals. [14] The OSG,
likewise, manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief. [15]

In his Appellant's Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, HE COULD

ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.[16]

Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing incident.

It was Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in
the early morning of January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts that Mendeja's account of
the stabbing incident is replete with inconsistencies and incredulities, and is
contrary to normal human experience, such as: (1) instead of shouting or calling for
help when Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja attempted to run after and
catch Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendeja's own account, there were other people who
witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after Villacorta, yet, oddly, only
Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and suddenly as Mendeja described,
then it would have been physically improbable for Mendeja to have vividly
recognized the perpetrator, who immediately ran away after the stabbing; (4) after
the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran in opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja
had said that the bamboo stick, the alleged murder weapon, was left at her store,
although she had also stated that the said bamboo stick was left embedded in
Cruz's body. Villacorta maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies are
neither trivial nor inconsequential, and should engender some doubt as to his guilt.

We are not persuaded.

To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full
weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such
determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling
examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor. [17]

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to
the testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected
Villacorta's attempts to impugn Mendeja's testimony, thus:

Appellant's reason for concluding that witness Mendeja's testimony is incredible

because she did not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails
to impress the Court because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.

"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and
there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking
incident.

Equally lacking in merit is appellant's second reason which is, other persons could
have run after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As explained by witness
Mendeja, the other person whom she identified as Aron was left to assist the
appellant who was wounded. Further, the stabbing occurred at 2:00 o'clock in the
morning, a time when persons are expected to be asleep in their house, not
roaming the streets.

His [Villacorta's] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident
rendered impossible or incredible the identification of the assailant cannot likewise
prosper in view of his admission that he was in the store of witness Mendeja on
January 23, 2002 at 2:00 o'clock in the morning and that he assaulted the victim
by boxing him.

Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot support
appellant's argument. Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja,
both being her friends and regular customers. There was light in front of the store.
An opening in the store measuring 1 and ¼ meters enables the person inside to see
persons outside, particularly those buying articles from the store. The victim was in
front of the store buying bread when attacked. Further, immediately after the
stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional opportunity
to identify the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly
ascertained.[18]

Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for Mendeja to
fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz on January 23,
2002. We have ruled time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness was
familiar with both the victim and accused, and where the locus criminis afforded
good visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for
testifying against the accused, then her version of the story deserves much weight.
[19]

The purported inconsistencies in Mendeja's testimony pointed out by Villacorta are

on matters that have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja testified
on: that Villacorta stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002, right in
front of Mendeja's store.

In the face of Mendeja's positive identification of Villacorta as Cruz's stabber,

Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an
exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to
blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[20]

Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the

event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for
slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate
cause of Cruz's death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred." [21]
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of
January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo
Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro
Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day,
on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency
medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by
Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment
of his stab wound, or Cruz's activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.

In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[22] the Court was confronted with a case
of very similar factual background as the one at bar. During an altercation on
October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo, inflicting an incised wound on
Javier's hand. Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier
was rushed to the hospital with lockjaw and convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who
attended to Javier, found that Javier's serious condition was caused by tetanus
infection. The next day, on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information was
filed against Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court found Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's
death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano
appealed before this Court, arguing that Javier's own negligence was the proximate
cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr. Meneses examined Javier's
wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that Javier could have acquired
the tetanus germs when he returned to work on his farm only two (2) weeks after
sustaining his injury. The Court granted Urbano's appeal.

We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening
cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance
of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of
patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates
severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the
mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

"Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache

are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain
and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease
progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty
opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is the commonest manifestation of tetanus
and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In
a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region
of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some
degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle
groups affected.

"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an

interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a
short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity
and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting
spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or
tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation.
Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.

"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an

onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent
and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia
and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during
spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an
onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal
Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he
parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on
October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have
been infected with only a mild case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six
days. Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. [23]

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the
hacking incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in
the mind of the Court that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the
hacking incident. We explained in Urbano that:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas,
supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mindbeyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remotecause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition
or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances,
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act
or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125) [24]

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the
conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between
the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro
Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe
tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot
sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection
has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms
with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%)
mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz's stab wound was merely the
remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the
proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz's stab wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to
the time of his death.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of

slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab
wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for
murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be
made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since
the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those
constituting the offense of murder.[25]

We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder

because the prosecution was not able to establish Villacorta's intent to kill. In fact,
the Court of Appeals expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an
intent beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:

Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him
on the left side of the body and then immediately fled. The instrument used is not
as lethal as those made of metallic material. The part of the body hit is not delicate
in the sense that instant death can ensue by reason of a single stab wound. The
assault was done only once. Thus, there is doubt as to whether appellant had an
intent to kill the victim, which should be resolved in favor of the appellant. x x x.[26]

The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus
probandi lies not on accused-appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that
the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking
but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries
only.[27]

Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for
medical treatment immediately after the stabbing incident. Right after receiving
medical treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-
patient. There was no other evidence to establish that Cruz was incapacitated for
labor and/or required medical attendance for more than nine days. Without such
evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.[28]

We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently

alleged in the Information and proved during trial.

The Information specified that "accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon
one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended
party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown by evidence to
conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such means of
execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of
execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness,
surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving
the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of
the crime without risk to the aggressor.[29] Likewise, even when the victim was
forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since
what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or to retaliate.[30]

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this
case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly,
unexpectedly, and without provocation. It was two o'clock in the morning of
January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying bread at Mendeja's store, was
unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was totally unprepared for an attack on his
person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened
bamboo stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his
body, then swiftly ran away. Villacorta's treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with
no opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.

Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. - The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party from labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.
The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days. [31] The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since said law excludes from its
coverage cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed one (1) year. [32] With
the aggravating circumstance of treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with
imprisonment anywhere withinarresto menor in the maximum period, i.e., twenty-
one (21) to thirty (30) days. Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta a straight
sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has been in
jail since July 31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his imposed
sentence, we order his immediate release.

Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages
compensate for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by
the victim and his family as being a proximate result of the wrongful act. An award
requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, an award
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is appropriate for less serious,
as well as slight physical injuries.[33]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding
Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries,
as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has
been incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacorta's immediate release,
unless Villacorta is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court,
within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with such
order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages
in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.
ROLLYADRIANO Y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN,
ABBA SANTIAGO YADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE,
ACCUSED, ROLLY ADRIANO Y SAMSON, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2011 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028, which affirmed the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court
dated 7 April 2009, convicting accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano)
for the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia
Bulanan (Bulanan) and for the crime of Murder (Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the
killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of the Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y
Sales."

Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of Information
read:
Crim. Case No. 13159-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit,
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of
superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan,
hitting her on the different parts of her body, resulting in her death to the damage
of her heirs.[3]

Crim. Case No. 13160-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit,
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of
superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Danilo
Cabiedes, hitting him on the different parts of his body, resulting in his death to the
damage of his heirs.[4]
Version of the Prosecution:

On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (PO1
Garabiles) and PO2 Alejandro Santos (PO2 Santos), in civilian clothes, were on their
way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan
National Road.[5]

While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue
Toyota Corollo (Corollo) with plate no. WHK 635, heading towards the same
direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV (CRY)
with plate no. CTL 957.[6]

When the Corollo reached alongside the CRY, the passenger on the front seat of the
Corollo shot the CRY and caused the CRY to swerve and fall in the canal in the road
embankment. Four (4) armed men then suddenly alighted the Corollo and started
shooting at the driver of the CRY, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the
shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment, was
hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back to the Corollo and
immediately left the crime scene. PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos followed the
Corollo but lost track of the latter.[7]

Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to
three (3) gunshot wounds on the left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the
spot after being shot in the head.

During the investigation, the police learned that the Corollo was registered under
the name of Antonio Y. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the
owner of the Corollo but clarified that the Corollo is one of the several cars he owns
in his car rental business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that
day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corollo, where he was identified by
PO2 Santos and PO1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants who alighted from the
passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corollo and shot Cabiedes. He was
immediately arrested and brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group
(PSOG) headquarters in Cabanatuan City.[8]

In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office
recovered one (1) deformed fired bullet from a .45 caliber firearm and five (5)
cartridges from a .45 caliber firearm.[9]

Yersion of the Defense

Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the
incident, he was at his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes
of his child. After doing the laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left
it there.[10]

At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari),
to ask for a lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in
Mallari's house,Adriano went home and brought his child to his mother. On his way
to his mother's house, he met his brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After
leaving his child at his mother's house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch
cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon). After the fights, he left
the cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest. [11]

After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and
stayed there. At around 5:00 p.m., he went back home. After a while, he received a
call from a certain Boyet Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corollo from him,
which he rented from Rivera.[12]

At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corollo back. After dropping Garcia
off, Adrianowent to Rivera to return the Corollo, where he was arrested by police
officers, thrown inside the Corollo's trunk, and brought to a place where he was
tortured.[13]

The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon
corroborated Adriano's testimony.[14]

When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias
"Denden," Abba Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large.

During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2)
PO2 Santos, (3) Police Senior Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4) SPO2 Alejandro
Eduardo, (5) PO2 Jay Cabrera, (6) PO3 Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida Cabiedes,
widow of Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky Flores.

On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and
Dizon as witnesses.

Ruling of the Lower Courts

After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's defense of alibi
on the ground that it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
According to the RTC,Adriano's alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies of credible
witnesses, who positively identified Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Also, contrary to the allegations of the defense, the RTC gave full credence to the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos. The RTC
determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or indicate that PO1
Garabiles and PO2 Santos were impelled by improper motives to testify
against Adriano.

The RTC found as proven the assessment of damages against the accused. Thus did
the RTC order Adriano to pay the heirs of Cabiedes the amount of P222,482.00
based on the following: (1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as funeral
expenses; (2) Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as expenses for the food served
during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos
(P12,482.00) as groceries used and served during the wake; and Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the CRV. [15]

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php50,000.00
and to pay the sum of Php222,482.00 as actual damages.

And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as
charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan, likewise, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the offense, he is further
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years
and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to indemnify
the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php50,000.00. [16]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the RTC erred when it failed
to appreciate his defense of alibi, as well as the testimonies of the other defense's
witnesses. Adriano contended that the RTC erred when it gave credence to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses which are inconsistent and contradictory. In
detail, Adrianoreferred to the following particulars: 1) whether the culprits started
shooting when the victim's vehicle was still in motion; 2) which side of the vehicle
did the shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal
shot; 4) whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos going to Camp Olivas,
Pampanga was official business; 5) the precise distance of the assailants' vehicle
from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the precise minutes of the shooting
incident.

The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution
witnesses' positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime
cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies in their testimony. The Court of
Appeals ruled that these trivial differences in fact constitute signs of veracity.

On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC
that Adriano's claim that he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the
incident does not convince because it was not impossible for Adriano to be
physically present at the crime scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija,
which can be reached by car in less than an hour.[17] The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07 and 13160-07 is
AFFIRMED subject to the Modification that the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00). In addition, the Accused-Appellant is
ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Our Ruling

In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following
elements:

1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.

3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements
of murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive
identification ofAdriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance
of treachery as a qualifying aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and
abuse of superior strength as generic aggravating circumstances.

Death of Cabiedes

The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried
out to ensure that the victim is killed and at the same time, to eliminate any risk
from any possible defenses or retaliation from the victim [19] ambush exemplifies the
nature of treachery.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the
direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present:
(1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of attack employed by him.[20] The "essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its
commission without risk of himself."[21]

Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed
defenseless at the time of the attack. Adriano, together with the other accused,
ambushed Cabiedes by following the unsuspecting victim along the national
highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes and then immediately fled
the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of multiple gunshot wounds. When the
Corollo swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly tum to the right
and on to the road embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRV was
trapped, precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other logical
conclusion, but that the orchestrated ambush committed byAdriano, together with
his co-accused, who are still on the loose, was in conspiracy with each other to
ensure the death of Cabiedes and their safety. The means of execution employed
was deliberately and consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give Cabiedes no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.[22]

All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was committed with
the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, which absorbs the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and use of firearms.
Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of escaping or defending himself.

Death of Bulanan

We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a
bystander, was killed by a stray bullet. He was at the wrong place at the wrong
time.

Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding
the unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending himself. At the
outset, Adrianohad no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular
means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the
method used to kill her, as she was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means,
deliberate. Nonetheless, Adrianois guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code,[23] pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which
imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have
been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him.
Bulanan's death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct
consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.

As we already held in People v. Herrera[24] citing People v. Hilario,[25] "[t]he fact that
accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment."
Evidently,Adriano's original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the
commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is
responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import
of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing People v.
Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who commits an
intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the
rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado',
or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. [26]
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida.
[27]
In the aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-appellants should be convicted not
of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two counts of murder and seven
counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims were not the
result of a single act but of several acts.[28] The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and
applicable.

In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime,

when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, and complex
crime proper, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
Moreover, we also made a distinction that "when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes," [29] not a complex
crime.

As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office
recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber firearm. This does not
indicate discharge by a single burst. Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or
more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is thus
no complex crime. The felonious acts resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the

prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora,[30] where the Court ruled
that treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was
convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita,
the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due
to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings
to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow
the Flora doctrine.

Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan's death was not established,
a perusal of the records would reveal that Bulanan's fact of death was duly
established as the prosecution offered in evidence Bulanan's death certificate. [31]

On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are
inherently weak and unreliable because they can easily be fabricated. [32] For alibi to
prosper, the accused must convincingly prove that he was somewhere else at the
time when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene.[33]In the case at bar, Adriano claimed he was in Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed to persuade. As
admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour away from the
crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not
physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene at the time of the
incident.

It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated
not by credible witnesses but by the accused's relatives and friends. Therefore, the
defense's evidence which is composed of Adriano's relatives and friends cannot
prevail over the prosecution's positive identification of Adriano as one of the
perpetrators of the crime.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetuato death. In the case at bar, as the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the lower penalty should be
imposed, which is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code.

To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the claimant
must establish with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss by
means of competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. [34] Documentary
evidence support the award of actual damages in this case. The RTC computed the
amount of actual damages as P222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records
reveals that the amount of award of actual damages should be P232,482.00 as duly
supported by official receipts.[35]Therefore, we hereby increase the award of actual
damages from P222,482.00 to P232,482.00.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant-appellantROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER(Criminal Case No. 13160-07) for the killing
of DANILO CABIEDES and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused appellant ROLLYADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the
heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as
moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and
Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (P232,482.00)
as actual damages.

Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13159-07) for the
killing of OFELIA BULANAN and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered
to pay the heirs of OFELIA BULANANin the amount of the amount of Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages in
lieu of actual damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe,

JJ., concur.
674 Phil. 150

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 177218, October 03, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. NOEL T. SALES,
APPELLANT.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may
not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining
them.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines
Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC'03-782 and RTC'03-789, convicting
appellant Noel T. Sales(appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical
injuries, respectively. The Information[3] for parricide contained the following
allegations:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o'clock in
the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident
premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of his legitimate
eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring
more or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby]
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said
victim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter's heirs in such amount as may be
proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

On the other hand, the Information[5] in Criminal Case No. RTC'03-789 alleges that
appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the following manner:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused]
assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor,
his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which have
required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and
prejudice of the victim's heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for
the charges of parricide[7] and slight physical injuries[8] respectively. The cases
were then consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution which was not
objected to by the defense.[9] During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to
stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar)
and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellant's family was
living in the conjugal home located inBarangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police. [10]

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years
old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of
Peñafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that
night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day,
she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father's rage,
Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon
them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o'clock in the evening of
September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped
them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their
house. With Noemar's and Junior's hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant
continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria
stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with
appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully
followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemar's head and injuries in his legs. She also
saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior.
Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive
him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant
that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria
then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told
them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to
take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them
to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met
at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son
back to their house.

Noemar's wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following
day. His body was never examined by a doctor.

The Version of the Defense

Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three
separate occasions without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant
merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something
untoward might happen to them. During those times, Noemar and Junior were
never physically harmed by their father.

However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents' permission
on September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant
received information that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant
had to borrow money so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When
his sons finally arrived home at 8 o'clock in the evening of September 20, 2002,
appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He
hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping
his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and
frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a
hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was seven
kilometers away from their house.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his
difficulty in breathing. The pupils of Noemar's eyes were also moving up and
down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his
chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came. It was
then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their
house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or
her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In
fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled
that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002
and diagnosed with having a weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever
he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would
regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he
gets hungry or when scolded.

The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.[11]
Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily. [12]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,[13] the trial court held that the evidence presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the
crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the
Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is
no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt
of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim.
Case No. RTC'03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He
is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000,00 as exemplary damages
and to pay the costs.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC'03-789 and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the
Revised Penal Code. Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive
imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he
has undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the
conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[15] which was given due course in an

Order[16] dated September 21, 2005.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of its Decision[17] reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision

dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC'03-782 and RTC'03-789 for
Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed
before this Court.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Issues

Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE

TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.[19]

Our Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

The Charge of Parricide

Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary

measure, but denies battering Noemar to death. He believes that no father could
kill his own son. According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in
attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth. He claims that
Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would take a
vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and
complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar
died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his
wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to
epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline
on children of tender years must always be with the view of correcting their
erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in
administering the proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of
their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to
remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended
punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.

Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they
left the family dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three
other similar incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole
a pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much
so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring
them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by
an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of
venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in
his head, face and legs. It was only when Noemar's body slipped from the coconut
tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the
beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have
ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for
Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the child's life. It
bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor
child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.

Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended

to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4
of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

xxxx

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which
he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the
crime committed by the perpetrator.[20] Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating
his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a
direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant's
criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellant's claim that it was Noemar's heart ailment that caused his death deserves
no merit. This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not
substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due
to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was
due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemar's cadaver was
never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence
to his contention, the latter's testimony did not help as same was even in conflict
with his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart
which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from
epilepsy. Interestingly, Maria's testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are
present in this case.

All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court,
that appellant committed the crime of parricide.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua to death.

"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of accused."[21]

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element,
that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain
consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father.
Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by
Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day
after. Noemar's Death Certificate[22] was also presented in evidence.

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the
appellant killed the deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive
testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria testified that on September 20, 2002,
Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father,
inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this time,
the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the
lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a
tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack
was too much for Noemar's frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died
from his injuries immediately after the incident.

As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.
While Noemar's birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial
relationship may be considered.[23] As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact
that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made
the same declaration while under oath.[24] Maria also testified that Noemar and
Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to
establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.

There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention

to Commit so Grave a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police
station a day after the barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The
presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous
manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities the trouble and
expense that may be incurred for his search and capture" [25] which is the essence of
voluntary surrender.

However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of

intention to commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the
success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree
to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain
as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately
caused his death. "The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts
employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually
produce the death of the victim."[26]

The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial court's award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the
award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[27] "In addition, and in conformity with
current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest
at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid." [28]

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The

trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the
presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong. However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court
erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of
said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the
presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with
no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides
in part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance

and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

xxxx

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion

perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender,
and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper. [29]

The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries

The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were
beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He
recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined
by a physician thereafter.[30] Maria corroborated her son's testimony.[31]

Junior's testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr.
Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical
injuries. He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the same.
His findings were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of
Junior's face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have been caused by
hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of
brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been
sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked
how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two
weeks.[32] But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in a week. [33]

We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior
that he was beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries.
His testimony deserves credence especially since the same is corroborated by the
testimony of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical examination. We thus
find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries.

Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the
injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the
trial court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article
266 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. - The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.

xxxx

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission

of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct
in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its
medium period.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC'03-782 and
RTC'03-789, convictingNoel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical
injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary
damages is increased to P30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on
all monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
610 Phil. 100

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009 ]
GEMMA T. JACINTO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto

seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime
of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution[2] dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera
and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed
as follows:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then all
employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH
DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment,
with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account,
Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00,
representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc.
to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of
P10,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more
credible, reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.

In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino,
handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14,
1997 in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's
purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of
Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of
Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of
petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.

Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone

call sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila.
The customer wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of
Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had
apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega
Foam payable to CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call
from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso
Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check
deposited in his account had been dishonored.

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of

Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from
Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call
and relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a
phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-
employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.

Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and
instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia
also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for
herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the
advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega
Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that
the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 sometime in June
1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. [4] Baby Aquino further
testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell
her that the BDO check bounced.[5]Verification from company records showed that
petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino
said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as
replacement for the dishonored check. [6]
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject
BDO check in his bank account, but explained that the check came into his
possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week
of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange
for the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or
her address. When he was informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely
disregarded it as he didn't know where to find the woman who rediscounted the
check.

Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of
P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent
powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked
to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.

On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner,
who was then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to
Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the
check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed
to meet again on August 21, 2007.

On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner's house, where she met
petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to
the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group
because she decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband,
Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby
Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises
of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However,
the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the P10,000.00 marked
money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and
upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been
watching the whole time.

Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist
found fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands.
This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed
a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later
identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.

The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and
presented the following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on
June 30, 1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby
Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from the company. She further
testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother's house,
where she was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany her
(Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal
check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with
the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan
City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep,
which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when
Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.

Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she
resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from
customers. According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called
her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to
the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her
admission during cross-examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino
resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to
Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but
requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out
and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, "What is
this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.

The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the
RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale
De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofQUALIFIED THEFT and
each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was
promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in

that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 monthsarresto
mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for
petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated
March 5, 2004.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone,
assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are
as follows:

1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in

the information;

2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and

3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[8]

The petition deserves considerable thought.

The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the
elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to
Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as
shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the
customer's check payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself;
(2) said property belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it
was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to
gain - this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the
fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-
law; (4) it was done without the owner's consent - petitioner hid the fact that she
had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the
check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things - the check was voluntarily
handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the
company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence - petitioner is
admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.

However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal
Code,the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as
the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further
bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on
the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega
Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently
dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was
actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals[9] is highly instructive and applicable to the present case.
InIntod, the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter's bedroom with
bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to
him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon
review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as
defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the
Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime.
Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

xxxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or

property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)

Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the
means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to
commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same
but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act
intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means
employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired
by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality
shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a
fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would
be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil
intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent
impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod[10] in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature
one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or
(2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the
act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime.

xxxx

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances

unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. x x x [11]

In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility
given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega
Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact
that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was
not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the
crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to
be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega
Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.

The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked
money, which she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of
no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People[12] that under the definition of
theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there is only one operative act of
execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of
another." Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:

x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one
apparent answer provided in the language of the law -- that theft is already
"produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter's
consent."

xxxx

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity
in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property
due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all
the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property
stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such
acts of execution. x x x

xxxx

x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed

complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he
has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x

x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one's personal property, is the

element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x [13]

From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that
petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner
receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check
was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the
check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank.
Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the
cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most,
the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely
corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check
replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme.
Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in
the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise,
it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent
scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004,
areMODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE
CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

MISSING

Urbano vs IAC
Intod vs CA