5. Baviera v. Standard Chartered Bank, et al.
Facts: SCB acted as a stock broker, soliciting
from local residents foreign securities called
GTPMF. These securities were not registered
with the SEC and were then remitted outwardly
to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB-Singapore. The
Investment Capital Association of the
Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC a
complaint alleging that SCB violated the
Revised Securities Act, particularly the
provision prohibiting the selling of securities
without prior registration with the SEC; and that
its actions are potentially damaging to the local
mutual fund industry. Notwithstanding the BSP
directive, SCB continued to offer and sell
GTPMF securities in this country. Petitioner
learned that the SCB had been prohibited by the
BSP to sell GPTMF securities. Petitioner filed
with the DOJ a complaint for violation of
Section 8.1 of the Securities Regulation Code
against private respondents but was denied
holding that it should have been filed with the
SEC.
Issue: Whether the SEC has jurisdiction over
the case.
Held: Yes. A criminal charge for violation of
the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized
dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an
administrative agency of special competence,
i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where
the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the
specialized knowledge and expertise of said
administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact. The Securities
Regulation Code is a special law. Its
enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC.
Hence, all complaints for any violation of the
Code and its implementing rules and regulations
should be filed with the SEC. Where the
complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall
indorse the complaint to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation and prosecution.
 CHARTERED BANK, PAUL SIMON
MORRIS, AJAY KANWAL, SRIDHAR

RAMAN, MARIVEL GONZALES, CHONA

FIRST DIVISION REYES, MARIA ELLEN VICTOR, and
ZENAIDA IGLESIAS,
Respondents.

x-----------------------------x

MANUEL V. BAVIERA, G.R. No. 168380

Petitioner,

- versus -

ESPERANZA PAGLINAWAN, in her

capacity as Department of Justice State
Prosecutor; LEAH C. TANODRA-
ARMAMENTO, In her capacity as Assistant MANUEL V. BAVIERA, G.R. No. 170602
Chief State Prosecutor and Chairwoman of Petitioner,
Task Force on Business Scam; JOVENCITO
R. ZUNO, in his capacity as Department of
Justice Chief State Prosecutor; STANDARD
 - versus - Present: RAMAN, MARIVEL GONZALES,
CHONA REYES, ELLEN VICTOR,
RAMONA H. BERNAD, DOMINGO
CARBONELL, JR., and ZENAIDA
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, IGLESIAS (Standard Chartered Bank-
PUNO, C.J.,Chairperson,
BRYAN K. SANDERSON, THE RIGHT Philippines Branch Heads/Officers),
HONORABLE LORD STEWARTBY, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
EVAN MERVYN DAVIES, MICHAEL Respondents.
BERNARD DENOMA, CHRISTOPHER *CORONA, x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AVEDIS KELJIK, RICHARD HENRY
MEDDINGS, KAI NARGOLWALA, AZCUNA, and DECISION
PETER ALEXANDER SANDS, RONNIE
CHI CHUNG CHAN, SIR CK CHOW, GARCIA, JJ. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
BARRY CLARE, HO KWON PING,
RUDOLPH HAROLD PETER ARKHAM,
DAVID GEORGE MOIR, HIGH
EDWARD NORTON, SIR RALPH Promulgated: Before us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on
HARRY ROBINS, ANTHONY WILLIAM
PAUL STENHAM (Standard Chartered Certiorari assailing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Bank Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and
G.R. SP No. 873281[1] and in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.2[2]
Members of the Board), SHERAZAM February 8, 2007
MAZARI (Group Regional Head for
Consumer Banking), PAUL SIMON
MORRIS, AJAY KANWAL, SRIDHAR

* On leave.
2[2] Id., G.R. No. 170602, Vol. I, pp. 63-73. Written by
1[1] Rollo, G.R. No. 168380, Vol. I, pp. 48-62. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate
Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Associate Justice
concurred in by Associate Justice Rosemarie D. Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring.
Carandang and Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-
Zenarosa.
 The common factual antecedents of these cases as shown government agencies) of the Philippines
to non-residents. At the end of the second
by the records are:
year, the above ratio shall be 50%, which
ratio must be observed continuously
thereafter;

2. The trust operations of SCB shall be

Manuel Baviera, petitioner in these cases, was the former
subject to all existing laws, rules and
head of the HR Service Delivery and Industrial Relations of regulations applicable to trust services,
particularly the creation of a Trust
Standard Chartered Bank-Philippines (SCB), one of herein
Committee; and
respondents. SCB is a foreign banking corporation duly licensed
3. The bank shall inform the appropriate
to engage in banking, trust, and other fiduciary business in the
supervising and examining department of
Philippines. Pursuant to Resolution No. 1142 dated December 3, the BSP at the start of its operations.
1992 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP), the conduct of SCBs business in this jurisdiction is
subject to the following conditions:

Apparently, SCB did not comply with the above

conditions. Instead, as early as 1996, it acted as a stock broker,
1. At the end of a one-year period from the
soliciting from local residents foreign securities called
date the SCB starts its trust functions, at
least 25% of its trust accounts must be for GLOBAL THIRD PARTY MUTUAL FUNDS (GTPMF),
the account of non-residents of the
denominated in US dollars. These securities were not registered
Philippines and that actual foreign
exchange had been remitted into the with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These
Philippines to fund such accounts or that
were then remitted outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB-
the establishment of such accounts had
reduced the indebtedness of residents Singapore.
(individuals or corporations or

SCBs counsel, Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc
and Delos Angeles Law Office, advised the bank to proceed with
the selling of the foreign securities although unregistered with
the SEC, under the guise of a custodianship agreement; and
should it be questioned, it shall invoke Section 723[3] of the
General Banking Act (Republic Act No.337).4[4] In sum, SCB
3[3] SEC.72. In addition to the operations specifically authorized elsewhere in this Act,
banking institutions other than building and loan associations may perform the
following services:
a) Receive in custody funds, documents and valuable objects, and rent safety
deposit boxes for the safeguarding of such effects;
b) Act as financial agent and buy and sell, by order of and for the account of their
customers, shares, evidences of indebtedness and all other types of securities;
c) Make collections and payments for the account of others and perform such
other services for their customers as are not incompatible with banking
business;
d) Upon prior approval of the Monetary Board, act as managing agent, adviser,
consultant or administrator of investment management advisory/consultancy
accounts.
was able to sell GTPMF securities worth around P6 billion to
some 645 investors.
However, SCBs operations did not remain unchallenged.
On July 18, 1997, the Investment Capital Association of the
Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC a complaint alleging that
SCB violated the Revised Securities Act,5[5] particularly the
provision prohibiting the selling of securities without prior
The banks shall perform the services permitted under subsections (a), (b),
and (c) of this section as depositaries or as agents. Accordingly they shall keep the
funds, securities and other effects which they thus receive duly separated and apart
from the banks own assets and liabilities.
The Monetary Board may regulate the operations authorized by this
section in order to insure that said operations do not endanger the interest of the
depositors and other creditors of the banks.
4[4] Now repealed by The General Banking Law of 2000 (Republic Act No. 8791).
5[5] Batas Pambansa Blg. 178. Now repealed by Republic
Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code), which
took effect on July 19. 2000.
registration with the SEC; and that its actions are potentially
damaging to the local mutual fund industry.
In its answer, SCB denied offering and selling securities,
contending that it has been performing a purely informational
function without solicitations for any of its investment outlets
abroad; that it has a trust license and the services it renders under
the Custodianship Agreement for offshore investments are
authorized by Section 726[6] of the General Banking Act; that
its clients were the ones who took the initiative to invest in
6[6] Supra at footnote 3.
7[7] SEC. 4. Requirement of registration of securities. (a) No
securities, except of a class exempt under any of the
provisions of Section five hereof or unless sold in any
transaction exempt under any of the provisions of
Section six hereof shall be sold or offered for sale or
distribution to the public within the Philippines unless
such securities shall have been registered and permitted
to be sold as hereinafter provided.
securities; and it has been acting merely as an agent or passive
order taker for them.
On September 2, 1997, the SEC issued a Cease and
Desist Order against SCB, holding that its services violated
Sections 4(a)7[7] and 198[8] of the
8[8] SEC. 19. Registration of brokers, dealers and salesmen.-
No broker, dealer or salesman shall engage in business
in the Philippines as such broker, dealer or salesman or
sell any securities, including securities exempted under
this Act, except in exempt transactions, unless he has
been registered as a broker, dealer, or salesman pursuant
to the provisions of this Section.
Revised Securities Act. On August 31, 1998, SCB sent a letter to the BSP
confirming that it will withdraw third-party fund products which
could be directly purchased by investors.

Meantime, the SEC indorsed ICAPs complaint and its

supporting documents to the BSP.
However, notwithstanding its commitment and the BSP
directive, SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF securities in
this country. This prompted petitioner to enter into an
On October 31, 1997, the SEC informed the Secretary of
Investment Trust Agreement with SCB wherein he purchased
Finance that it withdrew GTPMF securities from the market and
US$8,000.00 worth of securities upon the banks promise of 40%
that it will not sell the same without the necessary clearances
return on his investment and a guarantee that his money is safe.
from the regulatory authorities.
After six (6) months, however, petitioner learned that the value
of his investment went down to US$7,000.00. He tried to
withdraw his investment but was persuaded by Antonette de los
Meanwhile, on August 17, 1998, the BSP directed SCB
Reyes of SCB to hold on to it for another six (6) months in view
not to include investments in global mutual funds issued abroad
of the possibility that the market would pick up.
in its trust investments portfolio without prior registration with
the SEC.

Meanwhile, on November 27, 2000, the BSP found that

SCB failed to comply with its directive of August 17, 1998.
Consequently, it was fined in the amount of P30,000.00.
 The trend in the securities market, however, was bearish
and the worth of petitioners investment went down further to
only US$3,000.00.
On October 26, 2001, petitioner learned from Marivel
Gonzales, head of the SCB Legal and Compliance Department,
that the latter had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF
securities. Petitioner then filed with the BSP a letter-complaint
demanding compensation for his lost investment. But SCB
denied his demand on the ground that his investment is regular.
On July 15, 2003, petitioner filed with the Department of
Justice (DOJ), represented herein by its prosecutors, public
respondents, a complaint charging the above-named officers and
members of the SCB Board of Directors and other SCB officials,
private respondents, with syndicated estafa, docketed as I.S. No.
2003-1059.
For their part, private respondents filed the following as
counter-charges against petitioner: (1) blackmail and extortion,
docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1059-A; and blackmail and perjury,
docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1278.
On September 29, 2003, petitioner also filed a complaint
for perjury against private respondents Paul Simon Morris and
Marivel Gonzales, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1278-A.
On December 4, 2003, the SEC issued a Cease and
Desist Order against SCB restraining it from further offering,
soliciting, or otherwise selling its securities to the public until
these have been registered with the SEC.
Subsequently, the SEC and SCB reached an amicable
settlement.
 On February 23, 2004, the DOJ rendered its Joint
Resolution10[10] dismissing petitioners complaint for
On January 20, 2004, the SEC lifted its Cease and Desist
syndicated estafa in I.S. No. 2003-1059; private respondents
Order and approved the P7 million settlement offered by SCB.
complaint for blackmail and extortion in I.S. No. 2003-1059-A;
Thereupon, SCB made a commitment not to offer or sell
private respondents complaint for blackmail and perjury in I.S.
securities without prior compliance with the requirements of the
No. 2003-1278; and petitioners complaint for perjury against
SEC.
private respondents Morris and Gonzales in I.S. No. 2003-1278-
A.
On February 7, 2004, petitioner filed with the DOJ a
complaint for violation of Section 8.19[9] of the Securities
Regulation Code against private respondents, docketed as I.S.
No. 2004-229. Meanwhile, in a Resolution11[11] dated April 4, 2004,
the DOJ dismissed petitioners complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229
(violation of Securities Regulation Code), holding that it should
have been filed with the SEC.

9[9] Sec. 8. Requirement of Registration of Securities: Commission may prescribe, shall be made available to
each prospective purchaser.

8.1. Securities shall not be sold or offered for sale

or distribution within the Philippines, without a 10[10] Vol. I, Rollo, G.R. No. 170602, pp. 451-473.
registration statement duly filed with and approved by
the Commission. Prior to such sale, information on the
securities, in such form and with such substance as the
11[11] Vol. I, Rollo, G.R. No. 168380, pp. 241-43.
 Petitioners motions to dismiss his complaints were
denied by the DOJ. Thus, he filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85078. He
alleged that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his
complaint for syndicated estafa.
He also filed with the Court of Appeals a separate
petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ Resolution dismissing
I.S. No. 2004-229 for violation of the Securities Regulation
Code. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87328.
Petitioner claimed that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding
that the complaint should have been filed with the SEC.
On January 7, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its Decision dismissing the petition. It sustained the ruling of the
DOJ that the case should have been filed initially with the SEC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied in a Resolution dated May 27, 2005.
Meanwhile, on February 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078 (involving
petitioners charges and respondents counter charges) dismissing
the petition on the ground that the purpose of a petition for
certiorari is not to evaluate and weigh the parties evidence but to
determine whether the assailed Resolution of the DOJ was
issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. Again, petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it
was denied in a Resolution of November 22, 2005.
Hence, the instant petitions for review on certiorari.
For our resolution is the fundamental issue of whether
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the DOJ did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
complaint in I.S. 2004-229 for violation of Securities Regulation
Code and his complaint in I.S. No. 2003-1059 for syndicated
estafa.
G.R. No 168380
Re: I.S. No. 2004-229
For violation of the Securities Regulation Code
Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code provides:
SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and
Prosecution of Offenses.
53. 1. The Commission may, in its
discretion, make such investigation as it deems
necessary to determine whether any person has
violated or is about to violate any provision of
this Code, any rule, regulation or order
thereunder, or any rule of an Exchange,
registered securities association, clearing
agency, other self-regulatory organization, and
may require or permit any person to file with it
a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise,
as the Commission shall determine, as to all
facts and circumstances concerning the matter
to be investigated. The Commission may
publish information concerning any such
violations and to investigate any fact, condition,
practice or matter which it may deem necessary
or proper to aid in the enforcement of the
provisions of this Code, in the prescribing of
rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing
information to serve as a basis for
recommending further legislation concerning
the matters to which this Code relates: Provided,
however, That any person requested or
subpoenaed to produce documents or testify in
any investigation shall simultaneously be
notified in writing of the purpose of such
investigation: Provided, further, That all
criminal complaints for violations of this
Code and the implementing rules and
regulations enforced or administered by the
Commission shall be referred to the
Department of Justice for preliminary
investigation and prosecution before the
proper court: Provided, furthermore, That in
instances where the law allows independent
civil or criminal proceedings of violations
arising from the act, the Commission shall take
appropriate action to implement the same:
Provided, finally; That the investigation,
 prosecution, and trial of such cases shall be not determine a controversy involving a question within the
given priority.
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
The Court of Appeals held that under the above
matters of fact.12[12] The Securities Regulation Code is a
provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule
special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC.
administered by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the
Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its
Commission finds that there is probable cause, then it should
implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the
refer the case to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with
SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall
the foregoing procedural requirement, the DOJ did not gravely
indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation
abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-
and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.
229.

We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner

A criminal charge for violation of the Securities
committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal
Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be
complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of
referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e.,
the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will

12[12] Saavedra, Jr. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, citing Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar
G.R. No. 80879, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 57, 62, Mining Co. Inc., 94 Phil. 932 (1954).
discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioners
complaint.
G.R. No. 170602
Re: I.S. No. 2003-1059 for
Syndicated Estafa
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provides that all criminal actions,
commenced by either a complaint or an information, shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor. This mandate is founded on the theory that a crime
is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large, an
13[13] Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, G.R. Nos. 41213-14, October 5,
1976, 73 SCRA 306, 310.
outrage against the very sovereignty of the State. It follows that
a representative of the State shall direct and control the
prosecution of the offense.13[13] This representative of the
State is the public prosecutor, whom this Court described in the
old case of Suarez v. Platon,14[14] as:
[T]he representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffers.
Concomitant with his authority and power to control the
prosecution of criminal offenses, the public prosecutor is vested
with the discretionary power to determine whether a prima facie
14[14] 80 Phil. 556 (1940).
case exists or not.15[15] This is done through a preliminary against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the
investigation designed to secure the respondent from hasty, prosecutor.
malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary
investigation is essentially an inquiry to determine whether (a) a
crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is probable
Given this latitude and authority granted by law to the
cause that the accused is guilty thereof.16[16] In Pontejos v.
investigating prosecutor, the rule in this jurisdiction is that
Office of the Ombudsman,17[17] probable cause is defined as
courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary
such facts and circumstances that would engender a well-
investigations or reinvestigations or in the determination of
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
corresponding information against an offender.18[18]
It is the public prosecutor who determines during the
Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for
preliminary investigation whether probable cause exists. Thus,
that of the executive branch.19[19] Differently stated, as the
the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint
matter of whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on
his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the

15[15] Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944 (1958).

18[18] Glaxosmithkline Philippines, Inc. v. Malik and Ateeque,
G.R. No. 166824, August 17, 2006, p. 5, citing Punzalan
16[16] Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317, February v. Dela Pea and Cagara. 434 SCRA 601 (2004).
6, 2006, 481 SCRA 609.

19[19] Alcaraz v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 164715, September 20,

17[17] G.R. Nos. 158613-14, February 22, 2006, p. 11. 2006, 10, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
v. Tonda, 392 Phil. 797 (2000).
corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the
evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an
In determining whether the DOJ committed grave abuse
action in court. In sum, the prosecutors findings on the
of discretion, it is expedient to know if the findings of fact of
existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the
herein public prosecutors were reached in an arbitrary or
courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made
despotic manner.
with grave abuse of discretion.20[20]

The Court of Appeals held that petitioners evidence is

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and
insufficient to establish probable cause for syndicated estafa.
whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
There is no showing from the record that private respondents
concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
herein did induce petitioner by false representations to invest in
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be as patent and gross
the GTPMF securities. Nor did they act as a syndicate to
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
misappropriate his money for their own benefit. Rather, they
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
invested it in accordance with his written instructions. That he
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
lost his investment is not their fault since it was highly
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
speculative.
hostility.21[21]

20[20] Glaxosmithkline Philippines, Inc. v. Malik and Ateeque, 21[21] Soria v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 153524-25, January 31,
supra, p. 5, citing Cabaling v. People, 376 SCRA 113 2005, 450 SCRA 339. 345, citing Duero v. Court of
(2002). Appeals, 373 SCRA 11 (2002), Perez v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 429 SCRA 357 (2004).
 Records show that public respondents examined
petitioners evidence with care, well aware of their duty to
prevent material damage to his constitutional right to liberty and
fair play. In Suarez previously cited, this Court made it clear that
a public prosecutors duty is two-fold. On one hand, he is bound
by his oath of office to prosecute persons where the
complainants evidence is ample and sufficient to show prima
facie guilt of a crime. Yet, on the other hand, he is likewise duty-
bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or
malicious prosecution.22[22]
On petitioners complaint for violation of the Securities
Regulation Code, suffice it to state that, as aptly declared by the
Court of Appeals, he should have filed it with the SEC, not the
DOJ. Again, there is no indication here that in dismissing
petitioners complaint, the DOJ acted capriciously or arbitrarily.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions and AFFIRM
the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87328 and in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.

Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in

Costs against petitioner.
dismissing the petition for review against private respondents
and in concluding that the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

22[22] Vda. de Bagatua v. Revilla and Lombos, 104 Phil. 392

(1958).
 Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
CERTIFICATION
Chief Justice

Chairperson

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution,

it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

(On leave)

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

 REYNATO S.
PUNO

Chief
Justice