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COpy no.

ORAFT

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?AR'I' V

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OF

PART V.

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l APPEHDIX E l

;·:!L!TAP.Y AS3ISTANC:S CO!I:·]_t,,:;J ~':'[;:::I=:S AND 05S~~VA?!C~ bROU~ AnD THE ST?AT~GIC T:SHHICAL DI_itE:CTORATE INCEP(,ION'. ORGANIZATION J E'/OLU'I'ION

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HACSOG: Incep~ion. Evolution.

EAternal Relatto~ships .•

I P •• Int!'Gcl!ct!oQ

B. Act!~~tion ~f MACSOG

. C •. ~'i!;:;:: ivr. and; Ob ~ ect 1 yes

o. HACSOG tional Development

E. F.

G. t1ACSOG. Operat ~o{l.S a~d Intel!i.genc e

H. COlltingency Planning' I. _ Personnel ar.:1 Training

J. Logistics

K. Counterpart Relations The Strategic Technical Directo~ate

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~:~iji1J B-1~~3) B-337 8-3-48

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GROUP 1

EXCLUDED FRor·~ AU1'C~lATIC DOWNGRAD!NG AND :;:':CLASSIFICATICtl

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Part V

to A;:p~nalx B

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PART V

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~!ACSCJ; I~j-:;EP_rIC?!! E7GLUTIOH! EXI'l'"FJ!AL ?.3~TTO~!S:!IPS

A. ~) r::?~CDUCTlOi.J

1. Y'> This pa.rt elabcrates EACSO::Z and provides the overall background data fjee":~j in con .. nec t Lcn :'rith the various covert/?!l

progra.":ls of cperaticns ir. North Vietna.r.l, Laos, and Cambodia.

These pro~ra.r.ls are outlined in the succeeding appendices. In presenting this part, a horizontal or functional approach is

used, i.e., the subject area described is presented across-the· 'board as it relates to all of the l·!ACSOG..act1v1ties. In:depth detail of this subject area as it pertains to a spec1ric pro· gram, e.g. j SALEi·! H:)USE, is set forth in the succeeding volw::.e dealing l:lth operations in Cambodia.

2. y6) The prinCipal subject areas of this part, present~d in thIs sequential order. are:

a. Activation of l'lACSOG.

b. :·assion and ObJectives.

c. Organizational. Development.

d.

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[bll1J [bU3J

e. Cccmand and Control.

f. Operations and Intelligence.

g. Contingency Pla.~ing.

h. ?ersonnel and Training.

i. Logistics.

J. CO".L"lterpart Relationships - The. Strategic Technical

Directorate.

E. (j) AC!'~!ATION OF !·lACSQ·}

1. ytf) CC:·:US;·:ACV activated the ~pecial Operations Group (SeC;) on 24 January 1964, 'I:ith an init1al It.1Utary personnel.

strength of: s Ix off:icers and two enlisted men. SOG was under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff. HACV. Further,

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. Appendix B

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it vras desi;nated as a separate staft section of ;·;ACV 1-rith J-5 cexercising s.pecial cognfz ance o~ actions accornplished.·

2. k6) The u.."-i t name \:as sub sequerrt Ly changed to Studies and Observations Group (SOG).·

3. jZ) The raticnale for the act1 vation of ;·:ACS03 \·!as the

need for a joint portions of OPLAN 34A.

ganization to execute tne ap~~fbd [bU3l

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C. ~) ::!SSIO!": Aim OBJECTIVES

I. ~ Based on initial Joint State-DOD-CAS gUidance,* overall mission of ~·iACSOG as stated in O~N 34A was: ** .

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.! ;: 1. C21}. An.'"'lex A, 1964 '·:ACV Command History. p .I-I. The activation crder 1·1a.SGeneral Order o , ~eadquarters ;·tACV 21.;. Je~'1uary 1964.

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Objectives and

SOG Control

.I\ppendix B

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CINC.?!T.C ap:>roved the above mission statement. added that the assi~ent of additional approved operations, such as SHIHINC BRASS and psychological ,·ra:t:fare misSions, to

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l·1ACSOC by COHUS.Af.ICV was considered appropriate in view of the transition of MACSOG at a llllter date to the status of a· joint

uw task force, as stated in the current contingency plans.** 5. ~) A comparison of the above original (Joint Sta~eDOD':'CAS) and revised (CIUCPAC-COMUS;,IACV) mission statement

follows:*""*

Joint State-DOD-CAS****

a. Overall political control in Saigon - ~bas5ador

CINCPAC-COMUSMACV# a. • • ~ "rith the concurrence of the U;::. :'::-:oassy

****

.. , ~:A~' Nsg 37284,· DTG 210229Z Oct 65. CIilCPAC Msg.DTG IB2128z Nov 65

Chief, Special OpElrations DiVision; OSACSA, Memorandum to General Anthis. "Change in State:r.ent of :,ussion

II 22 November 1965.

~~"""""~~~""~~","IIII Oct 65.

Nov 65.·

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TOP SEC!'tET

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e. noted by the Ambassador.

6. ¢') The orig:1..'1a1 charter under "rhich ~-iJ\CSOG was established waa the. result ot' a jOi!'lt DOD-CAS-State dccunent , The revised charter w.as subClitte::i by Cm.IDS:·!ACV and approved by CINCPAC.

T:tere 'fIas no pa~1cipe;tion or coord1ne.tion ",ith the Joint Chiefs of Staff or elSe\'1here in DOD. state and CAS.*

7. ~ Current pL:.blicatio!1s cite the MACSOG mission as follo"'5: **

a. Exercise operational control over US forces and-person-

nel assigned or attached to ~~CSOG to execute such cissions

as may be directe:! by CO~mS;'iACV or CQcpetent hJ,gher authority. b. Advise. assist end support the G'nl and RVNAF in planning, coordinatL~g ~~d L~91ementing such~ssionB 80S may be mutual11 agreed upon bet,-!een the US and OW and as directed by CO:-ZUS;·:JIC'\· ,.. ¢) c:::.lef. Spec!.al Operations Div .• OSACSA. j·femorandum to

3eneral An~~is, ou. cit.

fH 1. (.Z) Hq iJS:·:;;:;:.~~re;~tive 10-11. "0rganize.tion a:ld FLlnct1onsCo~_a."ld 3.ele.t1cnshtps and Terms ot' Reference for US:-!ACV (U)

1 ..• ~'be'" .~:: ~ '='l J.o./e~~~ ..... :. ~:, _:-- .. __ •

2. (') :iq ,·_,,;_S ... J ... r~a.nlzation and Funct10ns l-lanue.l ~ 20 Jun

P .1.2~ .

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,. Joint Ste.te-DC'D-CAS

b. Ove re:::ll cpe re:t ~ cna; co::;;!'o 1 - CO;::;S::';;'':;"!. ? la!1!".i:',!; j liaison. logistics, :-~'ainin; e_"l:l ad'/i::::e - ja:l!~t ::.J,.'::'.i!CAS ?as}: Fo rc e , r·~=~!""~!.:!";;:'

ct!~'2cth" ":;0 c·~::·:~.::::'~";-.. Ch1ef' cr .:.:as:;, ~ crce to c e a co.Lone L» Leve I r,ilitar:.: c:~:'i::er

selected. by CC:·:-JE:·::':".: j !:Jeputy Chlef of Zas~ ?ol"ce to 'Of! a

c. All operations against :':VI-t tlill be unde r -:l:e ':'ask F'orce described accve , and ell ir.-country reso~r::es of the US ::-:.111 te.rYJ UI ;':1H be available for 5U p v of app~oved operations.

d. Concurred in ~y State, DOD, and CAS.

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cmCPAC-CC~·:US:·lACV

(b)[U (bU3J

b. CO;·:llS:·:.ACV ~'rl11 exercise his ope r-a t Lcna.L cent rot thrcu.~h the noir:.al ::JJCV ccci-,e.!l.d ::!'ie.."lnels. ~:orr.;al staff' l'elaticnships pertco.in. In ccnjunc t ton ,·:ith CAS 'end e.s :::ire~~ed 'by cr;:C?J~C j CC:·:U'S:·LAG·\' :':i11 aevise, train and support R~; military and p:.! forces in out-of-country un and pSYCholo~ical ~larfare activities, and ttill exercise operational contro~ of SaG assets.

c. As di ree te d by COHUm,IACV and with' the concurrence of 1 the US Et:!bassy. SOG .r111

advise. train. and support 1

counter;art !'orces in out-{b)[1J Of-country UW \Olarfare and (b)[3J 1 psycholog1cal ~larfare

operations. 1

d. SOG \'li11 conduct uni- 1

lateral plaIU1.ing fer UW .rarfare activities under exist-

in; CO!·~USEASIA p Lans ~ and

'I-:i11 be prepared when direct·· ed to activate and command

the JU1'7TF SEASIA.

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c. Coordinat~ activities of ;·;ACSOG with other' US forces

and agencies in all matters of ~utual concern and in conso~a~ce

with policies prescribed by COMUSMACV.

d. Prepare unilat eral US and coordinated US/GVij plans for

contingency or general emer-gency operations as directed by C0I1USMACV; develop GVN capabilities to provide su;::port for US forces as may be requlred under existing assu:::ptlQns or

agreements pertinent to such contingency or general

emergency operations.

e. Act as Conunander (iesignate), JOQTF ror SEASIA.

Develop

for implementation, upon order. plans for UW warfare in

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SEASIA.

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t . Provide intelligenl:e and counterintelligence s:.tpport

to COMUSMACV.

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~. Coordinate post-SAR personnel recovery matters in .

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SEASIA.

8. ~) The scope of the MACSOG mission was expanded with the initiation of cross-border operat1ons into Laos and Ca~bodla in 1965 and 1967, respectively. Though influenced 9Y

political restriction~ and/or evolving requirements, the broad overall mission has continued unchanged ,since 1967. The current abbreviated mission of MACSOG is:-

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To plan and conduct covert/clandestine operations in NVN. Laos. and Cambodia and special 'operations

in SVN, as dIrected, 1n such a manner that operations can be plausibly denied by the US and RVN governr.ents. These operations are planned and ·conducted in ~oordination with various other US agencies and

with the RVNAF STD. '.

9. ~) Current publications list MACSOG's objectives as follows:

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i kq MAtSOG Year-End ~ Vietnam 1968, p. 7.

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a. "To accomplish the m.ission, it ;.;as ~IACSOG's objective

. \'Iith resp~¢t to NVU to:

1. Produce an adverse effect on the i~VN economy.

2. Cause the ~IVN to expend and divert military and

gove~"mental resources to defe~~e and internal security

operations in reaction to "''-.1' ·"l'fu";;s,

3 '_ Increase US/RVN capabilities t.o collec t s tra teg1c and tactical intelligence in NVN.

~. Engender resentment and foment dissatisfaction on

on the part of tne NVN populace agaInst the NVN government. 5. Convince the NVl~ leadership that its support and direction of the war in SEASIA must cease.

6. Create a prevailing feeling of distrust, suspicion and uncertainty 1n N~~. Promote war weariness and engender the feeling that the war 1s futile. wasteful, ~nd contrary

to national w~lfare.

b. With respect to operations 1n Laos and "the DMZ, it was i,IACSOCi's ooJectlve to:

1. Increase US/RVN intelligence collec.~ion capabil1ties in Southern Laos.

2~ Destroy or disrupt VC/PL/NVA support facilitIes in

Southern Laos.

3. Retard VC/NVA infiltration of personnel. suppiies

and materiel tnrough Southern Laos into Cambodia and RVN. 4. Deny the use of Southern Lao~ as a sanctuary for

the VC/NVA.

5. Prevent continued enemy exploitation of the Lao

population. "

6, Assist in the location and recovery ot US and Allied

personnel \iho ar'e eva.ding capture. have" escaped confinement or are in confinement.

TO~RET" ;;;>'

Appendl<t B

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c. The Objective of !·iA.C:SOG operations in Cambodia was to:

1. Increase US/RVN lritelligence collection capabilities

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in Cambodia.

2. Destro~ or disr~pt VC/NVA support facilities in Cambodia.

3. Limit 7C/;:VA inflltration of personnel and supplies from Ca~bodia into RVN.

4. Create security problems for those ene~y forces using

the Camoodlan area as a sanctuary, training area and

logistics base.

5. Determine the extent of support being provided the

insurgents in RVN by the government of Cambodia.

6. MACSOG1 s objeCU;le in operating the Joint Personnel

Recovery Center was to return a maximum number of US and Allied evadees and escapees to friendly control.

ao, ¢> Inter-ctel!?,tlc:':shlp Cf' 5tn spa and MACSOG ;'118510n8

e.. -:rhe question as to \'lhether there has been a du?lication or lack of econo~y of effort by MACSOG, with its .. ~ssion of out-of-country operatIons, and 5~h SFG, with its

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~~ssion of in-country.operatiuns. has surfaced on several oc~a5ions. One occasion, for which documentation is reaaily avad.Lab l.e , was in Haj' 1966, when the question as to which organization. j,;ACSeG or 5th SFG, should be assigned the ca.:::oodian cross-coreer r.lis s Lon . At that time. the t·IACV J - 3.

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in a memorandum to t ae COIll:nanding Ofnter. 5th SFG and the Chief, . ,

(1) Noted the.t the observation had been made that there

~as a duplicat10n of effort on the part on the 5th SFG and

:.I.ACSOG.

Ii ;,~CV AC of S. J-3 i-:emorano.um for Command1ng Officer, 5th S,ec1al Forces Grou? and Chief, Studies and Observations Group. 30 i4ay 1966. ThIs memorar.:iu.'l and the ensuing report are attached as .Annex H to this A~pendix.

Appcnd1A B

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(2) Requested that the Conunanding Cf:'icer, 5th SFa

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and CI:ief, i.fACSOG together prepare a z-epor-t including, but not limited to, the follou1l:g:

(a) The adv~~tages and disadva~:ages of the thee

preser.t system of op~rations.

(b) 7he duplications that existed.

(c) The agency ",hich shoilld as suae functions ':Iherein dupl1cati·:m of effort was involved.

(d) Recommendations for future cperations.

b. The above report, submitted to.the· '·:ACV AC of S~ J-3 in June, is appended a~ Annex H. In essence:

(I) COl:!lllWlding Officer, 5th SFG Group recommended that the mission for carr,ririg·out the then cross-border operations (S~INING BRASS) into Laos and such operations into Cambodia, should the requisite authority be obtained, be assigned to the 5th SFG. Hence, the 5th SFG would be 8.ssigned both out-or-country and 1n-cour.try missions. In justification of that recocmendatlon, these major oper-

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a't Lona.L conside rations were advanced:

CO, 5th SFGA should assume responsibility for the SHrI1'n!G BRASS portion of the SOG I!".ission. The personnel in SHIHmG BRASS a.re all SF prefix t::ree qualified personnel and therefore must remain assigned t9 a Special Forces Unit. This plan is ir: keeping uith COi·:US:·:ACV considerations of four ccnths ago as stated

in :';~S from COj.;uSl·!ACV to CnJCPAC, ~ 05405. 190921Z

Feb 00:. . .

We do not w1sh to transfer Srtlr~n.r::; BRASS .to tl:e 5th Special Forces Group at this time, but ... re anticipate such a recollUllendatic:l uill be forth-

c c::.1ng "'Ii thin the next six mcrrt as based to some extent upon the deve~opment "'/it:"1L-: the 5th Special Forces Group of the capability fer operations into Car.:bodia.. Recog."l1z1l"..g that present author1 ty in'cludes only cla.ndest~e int~lli~ence operations. "re intend for the present to use 'this new capability for operations just inside the border on the Vietn~ese side.

CO, 5th SFGA already has responsibility. ror the special operations of Project Delta* and Det C-5.* Det C~5 (Project HORSE) 1s schedUled to expand. C-5 1s operating

~ At that t~!e, Project Delta co~prlsed mainly in-country operations. Fro~ the summer of 1964, when cross-border operat1cr.s into Laos cor.~,enced. until 7 March 1965, ~E~TA included such ope rat.Lons , On the latter· date, Cm.1US.·!AC'! transferred the res;onsibili t:r for cross-border operatior..s into Le.o6 frc::'. t~e 5th SPG to I·;;'CSOG. The 5th SFG established De t acnmerrt C-5 as a control headquarters for field operations.

Appendix 3

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both in V~ and across the border. It is more 'logical

c to consolida~e spscial o~erations und~~ 5th G~o~p than SOG c e c aus e 5th Gr-oup already has r-e s p oris Lb Ll Lt y on bo~h ~ide3 of the borjer. Furth~~. ~e~ C-5 is presently oper-at i ng a c Lande s t.Lne agent not. ,Ic.ich is an area in which SOG is not o~erating.

To consolidate in cou~try activities of Det C-5 and P!'o.ject Llelta unde~ sea is not feasible under . present circumsta~ces o~cause a major rev~~ping of SOG would be necessarJ in order to provide the means to cocr-da nac e missions :';ithin South '1iet!i.~i1. 'rhis coordination is a relatively simple'matter for the 5th Group because of toe existing communications and camp facilities.

The reaction force companies would be consolidated under the 5th Group fcr rr.ore effective utilization and training. The force can be used to·foeinforce a SF camp or. alternately. to react to a contact or to intelligence gatne!'ed by anyone of the special operational units.

(2) Chief. l·:ACSOG recoJ:nended that his organization retain the mission for executing out-ot-country operations and be

assigned the Cambodian w~saion. should the requisite authority be forthcoming. ~ur.ther. that the 5th. SFG retain its mission for carrying:;lut in-country operations. Hence ~

Chief. j·iACSOO held the V11H1 that there should be no change in orgar.izational respons1bilities tor i~plem.enting out-otcountry and in-country missions. In Justification of that recommendation. these major operational considerations were

advanced:

SOG assets in being and command and control system in being can be u~ed in Laos and shifted to Cambodia

if and when such operations are approved whereas the 5th mus t "build t e ams 8:1.j exploitation fcrees which may not be used for an indefinite per"iod or may never be used. T~ls is not efticient utili~at!on of forces. _ SOG could transition ~;hile expanding to the new mission by additional recruiting.

SOG. by its hi~hly su~cesstul operations in Laos. has gained tne confidence of bigher ·authority •. the State Department and C~S that it can carryon covert operations across a hostile border. witnout compromise

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SC:; is xcre likel~' to get early political, app rova.L

for Cer.bo;;;'ia ~!"os:;;-b()rder oce ra.t Lcne because of its

cove r t nat ure . Once apPl'cved. SI)G :':culd not be suaj ec t to the' S8."':".C ve t o pcwer held ~or its !.e.oti~ope,:a,tio:1 by the :S:.::-:.aSSjP Vier..tia'1e because the TJS has no Er:lbe.ssy in . Ca::-:o co ie. , Ti1erefore!, SC,; wcut.d be just 8.5 re scons Ive to :,:I;C"1 dirs::-:lcr:. as 5th S?Gp l:ould be, as :!.ACV he.s ;J?CCI! of SO:}

Appro:,:~":.e.tely fifty individuals, formerly or then ,currently., associated ';71th ;,;ACSOG's activities ~rere i!ltervie~ted

in connec t Lon '.:1 tll this study, Representative of their views

concerning the :::issions anti obJectives assigned to ~IACSO~ are

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the follO"ring (their detailed vie'rrs on this subject are pre-

sented in Ar~ex I.):

a. Colonel Clyde R. Hussell. USA (1964-1965). The

obj ec t Lves of OP!.A:I 34A were not clearly spelled out so we did not' :r~o~·: exactly whnt "Ie 'l'lere tr~'1ng to accomplish.

b. Tie~ter:g!1t Colonel Da.;rid E. Arno. USAF (1964-1966).

The basic r.!ssicn of MACSOG could probably have been better stated. If the ~~ssion had been stated so that the initial

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tea:::s cOi.:.ld nave been oriented to\.,ard developing an indigenous base of support# then the various actions required to carry out the mission could have acco~plishedj these m'~ opere.tions e ou.Ld have possibly proved a major threat to the ~~orth Vie1~n8.I:lese regime .. I feel that a truly covert operation probably should be conducted by CAS.

c. Cc'or.el ·ro!"~ K. S:ln.:;laub. USA (1966-1968) ~

(1) The :·[ACSO::; mUs10n ttas not a.l,.rays coopletely clear because it was J::is1nterpreted by some who \'Tere in a positicn to p rovd de support or to pass on our plans

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a."ld p rcg razis at the GIHCPAC -level. There uere some

a;encies ~~d activities (CAS# and Army and Air Ferce intelligence ~its) that considered they had the

right to conduct ope:L"atlons in NVN lr1thout coordination

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with MACSOG.· It was my understandi·ng that MACSOG would have the total responsibility for the conduct of current operations into NVNj further. that MACSOG would have the responsibility for coordinatIng any other operations into

NIJN •

. (2) The mission should have· been exPliCit that: SOG

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woul~ conduct all covert operations ·including UW •. guerrilla warrare. escape and evasion, etc., in the area under the

control of NVNj CAS Saigon would exercise coordination responsibility for intelligence operations.

d. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan D. Carney. USA (1966-1968).

(1) We were~· by charyer~ prohibited trom carrying out left unilateral operations, and were forced into a partnership with the South Vietna=ese who never believed in the agent

program. It. in the future, we ·are going to conduct ·special

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operations in Asia. we ~hould do them on the basis ot unilateral~ not allied,operations. The conduct ot pure intelligence collection missions 1nto derued areas in Asia would probably be best lett to CIA ~d the military sh~uld get out ot it entirely.

~.(~) .··The ba.sic concept ot the establishment C!f. -.

subversive ~vement or a guerrilla-type operation in denied areas is sound. However, MACSOG was forbidden from engaging in such activ1ties. thus reducing its scope to low-level bl~k operations. entirely intelligence o~1ented and· largely unsuccessful •..

e. Caota1n Bruce B. Dunning. USN (1966-1969).

(i) Th~ mUitary Services nave a: definite respons1.bp.1ty . to participate in US cove.rt actions •

. (2) In the MACSOG eeneexe , physicai hiLras.s:nent by itseJ.t' seldom achieves much of anything. In order to bring heavy pressure to bear on the opposing regime. phYsical harassment

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must be either tied-in to some large, perhaps PSyCholog1cal, objective or be of.sUCh a nature that it will make the

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enemy th1nk that he I:; threatened pol1t1cal1y.

,(3) The real. objectives "of the FOOTBOY Pr5>gram we re not adequately spelled out by Wash1ngton; further, the Program was not backed by a well thought out concept~

" (4) . ~te111gence c()11ectlon was· nevar- properly'_"!ACSOG' s primary mission. If intelligence collection was to be the primary mission. the FOOTBOY Program. should· have been asslgried to as 1nt·eiligence agency ~ # (The implication

here was that psycholog1cal warfare should have been MACSOG's primary miss1on.)

15) It 1.s dou.btflti ·that MACSOG ever had a re~y clear-

.cut miSSion. The listlng of obJect1ves was rather a

. sho~gun app.roach. SOG never had a statement of ·~hat

the FOOTBOY program wal3 .i~tended to achieve and what SOG should do. The concept of the origlnal program was rather shallow and was motivated largdy by a,.~fr~·t!at19;il .. syndrome .. 1.e ••. we have the unltu so we should use ~hem. It d1d

not make sense to use t;hem ·~~~sS. i!e had a well conce1ved miss1on. There was too little ass~ssment of North

Vietnam vulnerabilit1es and how they could be explolted.

The mission of physical destruction. e.g •• Should have

been tied to some well-identified vulnerability.

(b) By the time of the standdoWn'~ Novemb~r 1968, the FOOTBOY Program was 1n the stage 1n whl~h we were develop1ng a misslon statement that was pred1.C.&ted-·

North Vietnamese vulnerabi11t~s and·on our real.capabi1ities

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I 2,

-I

21

~!

21 -i

1 21

-I

2'

-~ 2;

i 2·1

-,

or assets.

TOP~T :::>

8-187

Appendix B

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MORl DoclD: 570391

TOP_T 7'

D. ,!.l'S) "MACSOG ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOR-tENT

c

1. (jlS) General

a. As indicated in para~raph above, at the time of its inception on 24 January 1964, MACSOG \~a5 assigned six officers and tl-IO enlisted meo. Organized as a. Joint MACV/ CAS task force to execute the approved porticns of OPLAN 34A, 1.e., covert operations against NVN, ~~CSOG initially depended largely on TDY personnel augmentations for the accomplis~ent of its m1ssion~

b. Since its inception, MACSOG baa;

(l) Develcped and operated three major programs involving operations in three countries ---North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. "These programs, presented in detail in succeeding appen4ices, are:

(a) The FOOTEOY).eJ Progr2JII. .covert operations.

. i

~ga.1.nst· iNN •. " FOOTBOY {..e) conta.1ns the~e 'four sub-programs \

1. PLOWMAN - maritime operations, .

g. TIMBER~ORK - agent team operations. 1', HUMIDOR - psychological operations .

. '

4. MIDRIFF air operations.

(b). The PRAIRIE FIRE Prcigr&ln. Cross-border

. ,.

operations into L~8 •

(c) "The SALEM HOUSE Program. Cross-border operations into Cambodia.

(2) Prepared and operated und~r five JTDs in order

to meet the organiza"tionaJ.. and personnel. needs geneTated by evolving missions and objectives. Personnel strengths authorized in the in1tial (,?-964) ~nd current. (i969) JTDs

8-188

·Appendix B

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MORl DocID: 570391

TQ.E..-B'¢RET
>
( , 1964 1969
,
C Officers 511
·128
Enlisted Men 60 ~65
Civilians ·30 11
Total 144 404 In addition to autihor Lz ed assigned personnel, .Chief. MACSOG has under his operational control various field

orga.nizations. the main elements of wl:Uch include· thre.e command and control (C&C) detachments which handl~

. airborne/ground operations. a tra~ping.detachment at Camp Long Thanh. and naval training teams. US personnel for the C&C and training detachments are provided by the 5th SFG. The naval personnel rotate from Coronado. California on a six-~onth TOY baSis. The organizational aspects of the detachments. which include both us and indigenous personnel, are presented in paragraph 4. below.

(3) BaSically. this section of the study traces the organizational eVolution of MACSOG from its initial JTD to its current one. In tracing this eV~lution. organizational changes are set forth in the cont~xt ot the· MACSOG:

(a) "Missions, ob.Ject1ves, and functions, and the the headquarters and field organizations needed to accomplish them.

(b) External relati~nShipB which inrluenced the MACSOG organizational setup, e.g., with Headquarters,

.r

USMACV.

(c) Counterps.rt relationships with the South Vletnal!lese STD.

Tok¢RET

>"

B189

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

(

2. ~ Organizational Expansion

a. 1964

(1) As reflected in par-agzaph BI , above. J.LACSOG's personnel strength on 24 January" 1964, its activation

.c

date, was six officl~rs and two enlisted men. Personnel

needed for initial operations came largely from TOY augmentation.

(a) CINCPAC established TOY Navy support for the US Naval Advisory Detachment at Danang (NAD) as

follows:*

r:

1. Repa1r and Maintenance Team ~

~. First increment - two otficers, 11 enlisted me·n.:-

~. Sel~nd increment (for support ot tour boats) - seven additional enlisted men.

c. Third increment (tor supp,:,rt ot· six boats - five add1tional enlisted men.

d. Fourth increment (tor support ot eight boats) - six add1tIonal en11sted men .

_ ,

. '

_g. Boat ~rrainlng Team: strength to vary

depending on the number ot boats and the rate at wh1ch Vietnamese crews completed traIn1ng,- ·based on an allowance of two officers and ten ·enl1sted

men per PTF.

1. Seal 'rra1ning Tea.m:_ two otf1cers and ten enl1Sted men.

~. Marine Reconnaissance Team: one otticer and three enlisted m~n.

• 1. ~l crNcpAc Msg DTG 292126z Jan 64.

2. ~) Annex A, 1964 M~CV Command History, pp. I-I--I-4.

TOP~ET ?

B-190

Append1x B

MORl DoclD:

570391

1

(b) CNO provided that Headquarters, Support Activities, Saigon would handle the administration ot personnel records for Mobile Support Tea,m (t.!ST) and

ing of the initial MACSCG JTD to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC authorized a TDY Army augmentation of one officer and fifteen enlisted men to assist in

boat training t eams , *

(c) Meanwhile, w_~ttl the review and approval of portions of OPLAN 34A, the SecDer, based upon recommendations from CAS, COMUSMACV, and C1NCPAC, had ordered that certa.in personnel be moved to Saigon on Ib)[11

Ib)(3J a priority basis (see paragraphs B3b(2) and (3)! to

,.

the training of Vietnamese agents at Camp Long Thanh.*** Coz.nJSMACV had r-eque s t ed the Commanding Gener~~J

.'

USARYIS to provide this augmentation by 25 March 1964.

and to emphasize the following pre-deployment .train-

ing.-**

'1. Demo:J..iti~~ and sabotage cross training. 2. Surviv'!Ll techniques pertinent to·SEAsia. 1. River .9.nd obstacle (:rosslng techniques. 4. Advanced first aid.

2' Tactics. Methods of instructing all of

the above subjects.

(bUn (bIl3)

2.

** 1. •

2'!! 7 7' ., nl~ e ,r~ ?~ "'?? f"

3: ~ JCS Mag tf2e,;ll*gec$!

*** 1. bid,. p. 1-3. .

2. ~CINCPAC Msg 292l26z Jan 64. **** ~) CCMUSMACV Msg 140730Z Feb 64.

8-191

Appendix B

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MORl DoclD: 570391

TO~RET

>

(2) With respect to permanent personnel, as noted

in the' preceding paragraph, in February 1964. CQl·:USfo1ACV submitted the initial MACSOG JTD to CHCPAC for approval.

. .

It called for a total of 167 personnel -- 138 military and 29 civilian. In forwarding the JTD on 17 l~arch 1964. to the Joint Chiefs (,f Staff, CINCPAC recommended that the total figure ~e :reduced from. 167'to 96 (68 milita!"y and 28 Civilia~).* Meanwhile. COMUSMACV r~co~hended th~t

f'

further consideration be given to approval of the original

The Joint Ch1er'.qf Starf approved. an I

interim figure of 100.*** Subsequently. CINCPAC submitted

to the Joint Chiefs of Staft a revised JTD for 128 personnel !

i

!

! I ! 1 !

figure (167).**

(97 military and 31 ~ivllian).*"* The Joint Chiefs of

Staff approved t~t figure. plus two additional Air Force

spaces.'

(3) Miscellaneous personnel changes, both TOY and

. \

permanent. during 196ij are as follows:

(a) On 13 July 1964. COMUSMACV requested TOY Marine agumentatlon ot one secur~ty officer and four enlisted men. This a.ugm.entation was "to improve the security of the J~s a.nd the USNAD in general~## CINCPAC a.pproved the request and the personnel'were pla.ced on TOY pendi~g a JTD change a.nd the arrival of PCS personnel.###

I I·

j

* [,Z) cINcMc tetter, "Pr-epoaed Table of Distribution,

.. Special Operations Group, USMAC Vietna.m. (u) ," 17 Mar.ch 1964.

CINCPAC 5320/40, Seria.l 00385.

_ ~ COMUSMACV Msg DTG 280505Z Mar 64.

*** JCS Mag 5622, DTG 02l812Z Apr 64.

*_* CINCPAC Letter, "Revised Special operations GrouPJ .

USMACV. Joint Table of Distribution \( U)." 24 'April 19b4,

Seria.1 00589.

# (.8') JCS Msg 7391, DTG 141955 Ju~ 64. . -

## i .. ~ COMUSMACV Msg 6036, DTG l30911Z Jul 64.

2. J:8") Annex A. op. cit., p. 1-4. .

### ~. cINcpAc Msg DTG 132334Z Jul 64.

2. ) Annex A, ~~ •• p. 1-4. .

B-192

Appendix. B

MORl DocID: 570391

TOPA¢fET :;>

(b) On 17 August 1964. COI.fUSMACV requested an increase of three officers and fourteen enlisted men to enable the ~!.ACSOG Communications Branch to operate

on an around-the-clock basis and to handle ~he

security requirement~ set forth in the preceding paragraph. 1'110 officers and four enlisted men of this' increase werE: to be carried on other TDs.

request.*

CINCPAC and the Jc,int Chiefs of Staff approved the

(c) In August 1964, COMUSMACV requested. that the enlisted element elf the TDY Army augmentation at Camp Long Thanh (Ilaragraph 2a(1) (d» be increased

f'rom fifteen to t"renty-one. The Justification therefor was that. based upon six-months I experience, a larger and more diversified mobile training team was needed."

1

(4) .. In September 1964, the Joint Chief's of Start approved the following permanent manpower authorization

-; ,

~l i

~{

for MACSOG:*-

~ NI~ Air Force Marine CorES Total
.
Officer 16 :L9 13 6 54
Enlisted 16 18 14 12 ~][1J
](3)
Total 32 37 27 18 114 I I

I

. j

(5) Meanwhile. tollowing six months of operational experience; COMUSMACV/CmCPAC submitted tor JCS approval a revised MACSOG JTD which would be effective 1 January

"

i

,

;1

j

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! iI

t

t ,

1

• ~) JCS Msg 141225 Sep 64. -

- CSOG Mag 7225, DTG Ol0705Z Aug 64. .

*** 1.. m JCS Msg 9003, DTG 241725Z Sep 64. - -

2. . Personnel-Directcrate (J-l). Manpower Division,

Jes{ Memorandum. "Revised Studies and Observations Group (SOG)_, .USMACV. 1 Ja.nuary 1965 JTD (U),U 5 Ja.nuary 1965.

Appendix B

1

J

1 I

_I

MORl DoclD: 570391

(dIm (bU3)

.e

1955. This JTD would ,add 1 USIS civilian

fcregoing changes is as follows;*
Army Navx, Air Force I,!eri ne Coros Total
O:'ficer +7' +2 +1 +1 +11
(bUn
Enlisted +11 -,J. +2 -1 +7 (bU3] :i

" I

(a) The basis,fQ~ the CAS personnel reduction was that they would c~cupy positions where:

1. This contributlonto executing MACSOG programs was necessary and unique from the standpoint of their "training and experience.

g. The function required a particular qualification not otherwise ,available.

(b) ,The addition of the USIS civilian space~ agreed to by USIS, was tor th~ purpose of proyiding policy and ,programming coordination related to' US operated or intlue~~ed broadcasts.

(6) Final action on the proposed 1 January'1964 JTD

,I 'j

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1

,

' .. :as cOIf.pleted during that mont~ and is covered in the ;:precedlng paraSraph~

b • .!222

1bU1J (bIl3)

(1) The proposed January 1965 JTD was approved as submitted it,

5-194

Appendix B

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MORl DoclD: 570391

hid recommended the space be converted to Military (Army). , (a) consequently, effective 1 January 1965, the 1~.ACSOG JTD authol'ized the following personnel: *

~ Na~ A1r 'Force Marine Corps ~1J

Officer 23 ai 14 7 6~bJl3J
Enlisted 26 16 6 _2 67
Total 49 37 30 16 132 (b) At FigurE~ B-3 1s an organizational chart i6Jl1J

HACSOG as of 1 JE-ouary 1965. ** lbJl3]

(2) On 7 August 1965'J COMUSMACV, with CmCPAC

concurrence, requested an augmentation of nine mi11tary personnel spaces. thereby increas1ng the total personnel

authorization from

*** The Joint Chiefs of

Staff approved the request.**** A breakout of the nine

spaces is as followlI:

/.

~ NE':,!l Air Force Marine corEs ~
.
Officer 3 1 1 5
Enlisted 1· 1 4
Total 6 1 1 1 .. 9
The just1fication g:lvel?- for the above 1ncrease was that:
(a) MACSOG ruld been directed to prepare a detailed JUWT.F operatlonal"adminlstratlve. and logistical plan for UW.~perations in SEAs1a~ and to mainta1n detailed estimates of resistance potential in that area.

I'·

I

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~ .

L I

:

* 1. Ibid.

2. ~JCS Msg 3714, DTG 131517Z.Jan 65.

** (.zj MACS.OG JTD, 1 January 1965, Part II, p. 1.

*** 1.' . CV Msg 27654. DTG 070556z Aug 1965.

2. CINCPAC Msg D'rG 280555Z Aug 65.

3. Personnel Directorate (J-l). Manpower Division, Memorandum, "Studies and Observations Group, USMACV 1 Sep 1965.

**** JCS Msg 1153. DTG 091447Z Sep 65.·

ToP,.ȢRET 7

O.JCS. (u) J n

8-195

MORI DocID: 570391

.c

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MORl DoclD: 570391

(b) The preparation of the above plan· in a timely manner was beyond the then current personnel resources

of fl.ACSOG.

(c) This augm!~ntation would constitute the MACSOG Plans Branch, then n~n-existent. In addition to carrying out the above tasks. the Branch would assist in preparing inputs for other operations plans relevant

to SEAsia.

(3) In November 1965. COMUSMACV!CINCPAC submitted for JCS approval a new J'rD ref'lecting.Gn increase of' 63

personnel spaces.·

1 ·1

.j

,

(a) A recapitulation of those spaces follows:

.)

·1

I

.,

1 .1

&si. ~~ .. Air Force Marine CorEs Total
Officer 35 2;2 24 8 89 [bUll
~ [bU3l
Enl1sted 21 £l 10 114
Total 92 41 52 18 203 (b) A breakout of the increase of 63 spaces follows:"

~ Navl Air Force Marine corEs· Total
Officer 9 9 1. 19
Enl1sted 28 1 12 II
Total 37 3 21 . 1 62
USIa 1
Grand Total 63 tar of 16 November i965. Serial-OOI605. Personnel Directorate (J-l). Manpower Division. OJCS. emorandum, "Proposed JTD for Studies and Observations Group. USMACV, 15 October 1965 eU)," 7 December 1965

I.

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TOP~T

>

8-196

Appendix B

MORI DocID: 570391

(c) Key changes in the proposed JTD were:

1. The adlU tion of

~. A Plans_ Eranch (previously approved as an augmentation - paragraph D2b(2). above).

b. A Medical Section.

c. A Special Assistant for Airborne Operations; an Army colonel, to supervise SHINING BRASS.

d. A Civilian Personnel Officer for

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administering foreign nationals.

~. A Liaison Officer*to the South Vietnamese counterpart organization, then known as the Strategic Technical Service. 1. An EXecutive Officer.

2. Redes1gnation of the CAS deputy to SpeCial . Advisor to commander, SOG.

I i I I.

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.

(d) Justification for the above increase was that

a general increase in personnel waS needed to support SHINING BRASS,* & new program, and OPLAN 34A operations.

(e) In the process of staffing the proposed

15 October 1965 JTD, the Navy questi~ned the requirement tor a Special Assistant for Airborne Operations

and recommend~d the addit10n of' a Comptroller~Section.** All Services concur~ed 1n the addition of a comptroller Section.***· The Air Force considered that if the pos1t10n of Special Assistant_tor Airborne Operations were retained, t,,,o new.positions -- a Special

Assistant for Ai:!' operations and a Special Assistant

*' SitiNJJm BRASS was· th,!! code name assigned to c'ross-border _ operations into taos, which began in September 1965

** un Navy Personnel Policy Memorandum for the Director tor 1-ersonnel, The Joint Staff (J-l), "Proposed Joint Ta.ble of Distribution for Studies and Observations Group (SOG). USMACV, 15 OCtober 1965 (U)," 22 December 1965. Navy PM 17-65. (Responsible f.or the financial planning and budgeting f'or the funding of OPLAN 34A ·and SHINING BRASS,

the Navy pOinted out that such funding during FY 66 should I amount to at least $15 million and that a Comptroller section! of five Naval personnel should be added to the JTD.) !

***.(~) Chief, Spec1al Operations Division/OSACSA MemoranduM,to tieneral Anthis, "MACSOG Proposed JTD (U)," 27·December 1905

TOP~ET 5-197 Appendix B I

7 i

MORl DoclD: 570391

TOP "S?C'RET :;;>"

for ~iarit1me Operations -- should be adde'd , both in the grade of 0-6.* .CINCPAC's views.on the foregoing

were requested.**

rhe Ser~1ce staffing of the JTD

\"Ias cor::p1eted in 1966. its ultimate disposition is

set forth in succeed~ng paragraphs.

c. 1966

(1). In response to the JCS request for his views' on the requirements for' a Special Assistant for Airborne Operations. and a Conlptro11er Section. as -indicated in the succeeding paragraph. CINCPAC ~ ii**' ..

(a) Provided additional justification for the Special Assistant and recommended~hat other Section Ch1ef positions not' be upgraded.

(b) Concurre~ in the addition of the Comptroller

Section.

(2) Accordingly. 1n approving the 15 October 'JTD on 2 March 1966. the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized an increase of 67 spaces for MACSOG.****

(a) With that approval. the ,manpower breakout of

"

MACSOG was as follows:#

~ ~avy Air Force Marine CO!J!s Total
Officer 35 24 24 8 91lbU1J
Enl1sted...21 21 28- 1£ 116lb1l31
Total 92 45 52 18 207 us IS

2

..

,

I

t

• ()?5) AIr Force Policy ~,:emorandum tor the Dlre~tor for Personnel. the J01n1; Staff. "Proposed JTD for Studies and Observations Group. USMACV. 15 October 1965."

23 December 1965. AF PM 19-65. .._

** ~ JCS Msg 9523. D~['G 2921llZ Dec 65.

*** CINCPAC Msg 192102Z Jan 66. .

**_ he initial COMUSI.IAI:;V/CINCPAC recommendation was an increase of 63 spac.ea , The difference of tour spaces

,~as accounted for by the addition of a Comptroller Section : of five and the subtraction of an existing space from anott:J,e;, MACSOG'staff agency and the converting and shifting of it to I ~~ Comptroller' Section.

# ~) JCS Msg 5162. DTG 021850Z Mar 66.

TOP~ET 8-198 Appendix B

7'

MORl DoclD: 570391

(b) At FLgure B-4 1s an organizational chart of ~~CSOG embodying the structural changes in the

15 october 1965 JTD.*

(3) In February and March 1966, CO:·1USr.lACv/cnrCPAC

~ NavL Air Force i·!arine CorEs Total
Officer 2 8 2 12
Warrant 1 1
Officer
Enlisted 2 1 8 .2 25
Total 8 7 16 1 38 \

1 J

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recorr.mended further 1,L4.Cl?OG manpower changes. (a) The net additions were:**

(b) The prill'.a:ry. justification for the above increase was the need ror ·personnel to handle expanded SHnrING BRASS activities.

(c)· With JCS approval on 4 May 1966, the manpower

aut·horizat1on for MACSOG was:***

; ~

,

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~ Nav: Air Force Marine CorES Total
Officer 38 24 32 10 1041bJl1J
Erilisted 62 28 36 12. l411bJ(3)
Total 245 us IS

2

(4) In April and May 1966, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC

recommended the.net addition ot o~e Ar~ officer space .and two Air Force enl1ste~ spaces to the MACSOG JTD.*-*

I.

,

I

J.iAesog iIm, 15 Odober 1965, ~rt II. .

CO CV Msg 033 DTG 200225Z·Feb 66.

CO~~USMACV Msg 053~, DTG 070920Z Mar 66. . CINCPAC t-;8g D'ra 250513Z Mar 66.

Personnel Dir·ectorate. (J.l), Manpower Division,

JCS Memorandum, "Changes· to MACSOG ·JTD (U)," 7 April 1966

*** (51 JCS Msg 1047, DTG 042047Z May 66. .

**** r'·m COMUSMACV Msg 1026, DTG 151l52Z ~pr 66.

2. CINCPAC Msg DTG 222333 Apr 66. .

3. CINCPAC Msg DTG l42059Z May 66.

4. CINCPACt>lsg DTG 070218z Jun 66.

5. Personnel Directorate (J-l), Manr,0wer Division, OJCS,

Memorandwn~ "MACSOCl J'l'D Changes (U), 1 14 June 1966. ..

TO~RET B-199 . APpe~d1x B

/' .

.!¥."

2. 3· 4.

.-----------~-~~--,--+"----- __ ~ .. __ .~. +___'_~~ .. ...._... __!~_::::.:-_~ .. .:..t .. -:- __ ~ ... ~!!"!_~~~~_.::..:.::.':!:~.t "' -"'-""~"""' """ . .r_+- ~_

.. , ...

U1 -..J o W \.0 I-'

Fl~ure 0-4

ORGANIZATIONAL CHA..1!tT, §TIJD~E5 ~D OnSERVATIONS GROi)P

AS OF 15 OCTOBER 1965

ul S~t!:!a All~':S;D I
CC~~:.:!'l:::J S!l~ .TD C:.::!:l. SOG I

r I I
·lr·02 I ~ 03 ~~;~ I I
At:l:;::SHlr,TrJ£ t;:TElu:a;c£ I -. -:~,.""'!"~~ ..... ,.~ L"~'~rcs J- ~3 cr::':.:::::1Cnn:::s
I C·, C .... ".II_,,_) .... J .. '.:~"" ..
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I
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0 I I I
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0 SEC!l:l1TY I I ------ p~::.;;~
Sf.tTml I CPZ;!~it(;::S I
.-- :m:r~;1 I ST AU SJ,;?::::rm:
, ..
r-- --------:_--~ • L-------------"1
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I I I S!:Cr:::1 I
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10 rJ:J· 09 PSYC:lttCGtCAl C7:::r.r,Tt::::S G~ r,r.~,::~::r 01 ;.:r,~ITi:.i[
OP[llmO:IS O~Lp.l\m~S S;!;TI~:I [S!11 Oi'rn!':1iCr:iS OrE~t;TI~:iS
Gr.tCi' G:lij:JjI· C''l!1!l· map·
......... +
, 1 I J I 3: o ;:d

H

t:) o o H t:)

MORl DoclD: 570391

(6) During the staffing of the proposed personnel increase outlined in paragraph (5) above, CO~IUSMACVI CINCPAC recom:nended.the.'fdd1tlop of five spaces to the MACSOG JTD for mannIng of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center. SEAsia.*

(a) A breakout of those five spac~s follows: ~ !!!:!Z Air Force ~

Officer

1

1 1

1

3

Enlis\ed 1

2

Total

2

2

1

(b) Justlflca.tlon for the "above spaces was that they were needed to establish a JPRC. The center would: serve as a focal point for the coordination and

~ollation"of all~nformation and intelligence bearing on personnel" recoverYj plan and coordinate the ope.rational aspects of recovery for ass~stance of US/ Allied personnel" either" detained or hel"d prisoner by enemy forces.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staf,f approved the increase on 19 October.** This approval resulted in the following revised MACSOG J'l'D:

~ !!.~ Air Force Marine CorES Total
Officer 40 :25 33 10 108
En~isted ~ "" .E 38 .!2 l481bll1l
" 2561bll3J
Total 103 57 71 . 25 USIS

2

~~r--.,..,...,'I""""I'1"l'{'n •• ~7'l!"I'I,"" Mag "!J1342, DTG 140420Z Sep 66. . - I

COMUSlo1ACV Msg 2924, DTG 150717Z Sep 66. j

3. CINCPAC Msg DTG 230314Z Sep 66. 1

4. Personnel Directorate (J-lj, Manpower Division. lIMACV .

Studies and Observations Group! (SOG) JTD" Changes," 7 Oct 66.!

** ~) JCS Mag 5932, DTG 192356z Oct 66. ,

! l

TO~RET 7'

8-201

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

••

TOP...gt(RET :;;>

(a) Justification for the ~n~rease was on the ba'sls that additional personnel were needed in the Airborne Section and. the Al~.Operations Section.

(b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the increase on 21 June 1966, it This. approval resulted in the following revised MACSOG JTD~

Army ~~ Air Force Marine CorES Total
Officer 39 :~4 32 10 105
Enl1sted 62 :~8 38 15 ~)[11
)[31
Total 101 52 70 25 248 US IS

2

(5) In Septem.ber'l-9661 CCMUSMACV/CINCPAC recom:nended an increase of thre(l Navy enl1stfld spaces to the MACSOG JTD.-.

(a) Justification for the increase was the Qeed for communications techn.1.cians to support a new communications sUb-station.

.'

(b) The. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the increase on 20 O(:tober 1966. *** This approval resulted in the following revised MACSOG JTD.

~

Officer 39

Enlisted 62

Total

!!!:!l.' Air Force
:~4 32
J.! ~.
55 70 Marine CorES 10

105 146 251

.!.2. 25

Total 101

1 I

• kt) JOs Msg 48331 DTG 211458z Jun 66, I

•• 1. ~ COMUSMACV Msg 3004, DTG 220147Z Sep 66. Ii

2. CINCPAC Msg DrG 272021Z Sep 66. .

3. Personnel Directorate (J-l), Manpower Division, OJCS, 11 Memorandum, "Studies and Observations Group JTD,

15 October 19.66 (!J)," 3 october 1966. I .[

••• (..S') JCS Msg 5937. DTG 20?010Z. Oct 66. I

TOP4RET 8-200 Appendix B .

7

MORl DoclD: 570391

(7) In November l~66, COMUS!>!ACV/CWCPAC recommende,d a net addition of four personnel spaces to the MACSOG JTD.*

~,!arlne Corps

(a) A br-eakout; of" these four spaces follows:

Army ~avy. Air Force

Total

Officer

2

1

3 1 4

Enlisted 1

Total

3

1

(b) Justification for this incr~ase was the need for: an officer to provide overall 'research and development coordination and supervision; an officer to develop procedures and plans for search and recovery operati,ons, ··to coordinate with external agencies, and to "brief air cre\.,s of all Service;B on escape and evaaa.on (E&E) procedures 1n SEAsia; an officer to develop.a .survival and E&E p.rogra.m for .8011 Army aviation in the theater and ~o coordinate the program, and an NCO to assis'j: the operations o,fficer in the developlrumt of plans and. procedures for search and recove~y activities.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the increase on 6 December 1966.** This approval. resulted in the following revised MACSOG JTD.

~ Navy Air Force Marine CorES ~
42 34' I
Officer 25 10 111 I
- ' !
Enlisted 64 Jg, ~ 15 149 (b)[U i
Total 106 57 72 25 6 lb)[3J:
2 0 I
i
I
US IS 2 I
I sg 3527. DTG 020104z No~ 66. CINCPAC Msg DTG· 160212Z Nov 66.

Personnel Dlreetorate (J-l).Manpower Divi,sion. OJCS, emorandum( "MACV Btudies and Observations Gt-oup (SOG) JTD Changes (U}." 22 November 1966.

** JCS Msg 9654. DTG 061806Z'Dec 66.

TOP~ET 5-202 Append\x B

7'

MORl DoclD: 570391

TOP~ET ;>

e , 1967

(1) On 30 October '1967, COHUSlMCV forwarded for CINCPAC and JCS approva~ a ne~.MACSOG JTD.* Subsequently approved by CINCPAC, the JTD embodied a manpower increase

of 141 (from 275 to 41~).**

(a) A recapitulation of the above 416 spaces follows:

Army !!avy Air Force r.[arine Corns Total
Officer' 77 27 40 11 155 (bU1J 1
(bU3l
Enlisted 138. 2 47 . 14 251
Total 215 79 87 25 406 USIS

1****

(b) A br-eakotrt of the increase of 141 follows:

~ ~avy Air Force Marine Corps Total
Officer 35 2 6 1 44
Enlisted 74 20 ....2 -1 102
Total 109 22 15 0 141
.
CAS -ll
US IS -1
Grand Total 141 * Ps' inclosure to cOMUSMAav Letter. Propos~d Joint Table of Distribution (JTO) for Studies and Observations Group. USMACV, for 1 oct.ccer ~967, (U). It 30 October 1967.

Serial 00141:3.

** 1. 1. . .

2. ne1 Direct~rate (3-1). Manpower Div1sion, randum" "Proposed SOG JTD, dated 1 October

II November •

iii.. • •••• (bun.

(bll31

I'

t

!

..

TOP ¢"RET

:7

8-203

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

::s-

I ,

TO~ET 7

Q

(c) Just1rication for the ~bove increase was that two additional major prograt'ls, DANIEL BOONE and MUSCLE SHOALS, had be en adde.dj in addition other operations had greatly increased in scope.*

(d) The staffin~ of the above proposed JTD was completed in 1968.

e. 1968

(1) A major staffing action at~endant to the proposed ~~CSOG JTD, to be effective 1 October 1967, centered around the transfer fromMAOSOG to the 7th'Air Force 44 personnel spaces for operating C-123 aircraft.

In this connection, MACSOQ and 7th Air Force agreed to . .]

the consolidation of' supporting USAF assets at Wha

Trang under a Deputy Commander of Sp~cia~ Air Warfare.·*

The transfer of these 44 Air Force spaces, concurred in

by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC, commensurately decreased the proposed JTD from 416 to 372 spaces. Actual transfer

was made on 15 August 1968.***

o!<

* 1. COMUSl-tACV Letter ~ o~. cit., p. 1. .

2. (~) Annex G, 19Q7~CV Co~~~nd Histor~, p. G-I.

The DANIEL BOOrlE Program inItiated Inune 1967, involved cross-border operations into Cambodia. The MUSCLE SHOALS, later changed to IGLOO \OTHITE, Program )las initiated in oe t.ccer 1967. It was an air-supported anti-inf.iltration system. near the 11th parallel. MACSOG" activities in support of the system were largely incorporated into the Laotian cross-border operations,

l. e.. the SHmING BRASS, later changed to PRAIRIE FIRE,

Prostrarr_.

CD1CPAC Msg DTG, 030120Z Jan 68. CO!>lUSMACV Msg loB_l DTG 071006z J-an· 68:

CINCPAC Hsg UTO O~1650Z Jan 68. COHUS~IACV MSI~ 02255, DTG 201l30Z Ja.n 68. CINCPAC Msg DTG 020135Z Feb 68.

cmCPAC Nsg DTG 032253Z Feb 68.

C01.1USMACV Msg 732 DTG 120530Z Feb 68.. .

og cmCPAC Hsg DTG 060125Z Mar 68 (repeated to JCS

in Msg DTG 150"21:~ Mar 68). . .

*** (;PS) Annex F. 1?6S l·IACV Command History, pp. F-2j a.nd F-3.

** 1. 2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

~:

TOP SE('RET ;7

B-204

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

(2) With ens'lir:g SCS approval of the JTD, . MAC SOG was
,
a
authorized the fc11c~ring manpowe r ; *
Arr.1Y !:a.v;,' Air Ferce r·larine Coros Total
Officer 77 27 20 11 135
Enlisted 138 52 .. 23 14 227 (bU1J
=.!-{bU31
Total 215 79 43 25 362 US IS

1

(3) At Figure B-5 is an organizational chart of ~ACSOG as conta1ned 1n the above JTD.**

{4) On 3 oc tcber 1968, COl·mSMACV directe"d a decrease of 11 m11itar] sp~ces, thereby reducing the MACSOG

e

reorganized the headquarters into more clearly defined lines and staff organization. At Figure B-6 is a ehart depictIng

that organization.****

~. 1969

(I) COloIUSJyL4,CV, in his letter of 18 i'lovember 1968, proposed adjustcents a.nd/or augmentation to six MACV JTDs. The HACSCG J'I'D r.equested the decrea.se of eleven military spaces set forth in paragraph e(4), above.#

* ~) Jcs Msg 4339, DTG 22la49Z Mar 68 .

** tnclosure to CC:.:·..;"sZ·:'IlC:V Letter, op. cit., Part II, page 48. *** 1. Annex F, ~O. cit., p. F-2.

2. un Per5cnr.e.:. DlrE:ctorate. (J-l) .Memorandum.., "CORDS, OSMACV JTD, i:ov 68 (U)," 6 January 1909, paragraph

3e(5). JIN-8-69. .

**** Ibid. p. F-A-l. . -

# ~ COI.~US'.:'4.CV Letter, "Proposed Change to USMACV JTD, n 18 Nove~ber 1968.

2. (CY) Personnel· Dirt~ctorate (J-1) Memorandum, "CORDS, tYSl~CV JTD, Iiov 68'(U}," 6 January 1969, paragraph 3e(5).

JlM-8-69.

ToP,..s¢RET 7'

B-205

Appendix B

MORI DocID: 570391

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MORl DoclD: 570391

TOP~ET
/"
(a) A recapitulation of the adjusted JTD follows:
ct ~ _!!avy Air Force !,:ar'ine Corns Total
Officer 71 24 19 .. '11 121b][1J
Enlisted 138 .52 II 13 22fIb][31 (b) In subsequent staff actions one DOD-supported Navy civilian wal; added to the 48,bbve.TTD. Thus~ MACSOG was authorized 362 personnel: 125 officers, 226 enlist.ed, and ,1 civ11ian, 1 USIS

personnel. *

(2) On 22 Februal'y 1969 .. COMUSMACV fOI'\tarded for CIHCPAC and JCS approval a proposed change to the

MACSCG JT.D.** This change involved a net addition of ' 12 military spaces, increasing the manpower authorization

(a) A recapitulation of the JTD, .after incorporating into it the above changea , tollotls:

~ Na!l, Air Force l·;arine Corps Total
Orricer 68 27 19 8 122
Enlisted 130 78 23 10 e41 I
'. I
\ I
Civilian 1 1 I
,I
Total 198 105 42 . 18 364 I * ~ Jcs Esg 1308, DTG 213l955Z Ja.n 69. . -

** CCl"!US:·rACV Letter, "Proposed Change to USl-!ACV Studies nd Observations Group ,Joint Table of Distribution,

30 October 1967," 22 February 1969. MACV Serial 001386-69.

[bll1J [b](3)

B-206

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

TO~ET

>"

(b) A breakout of the a.ddi"tions, deletions, and adjustments follows:

~ N<~ Air Force Marine CorES Total
Officer -3 +3 -3 -3
Enlisted -8 +:~6 -3 +15
Civilian
Total' -11 +:~9 -6 +12 (c) Justification for the above changes was the need for a Naval t.tobil,~ Support Team of 39 per~onnel This team would :provide continued"maintenance support of craft used in rrAritime operations. Since 1964 that

.

support had been performed by naval personnel on a

TDY basis. The provision of such personnel on a permanent basiS t,ould simpl1fy strength accounting procedures.

(d) The Joint Ch1efs of Staff approved the

adjusted JTD as reflected above.*

(3) On 12 April 1969, COMUSMACV forwarded for CINCPAC

,.

i

and.JCS approval a proposed rev~sion to the MACSOa JTD.** This revision involved a realignment of military personnel authorizations, with no change in the total number of authorized personne:L CmCPAC approved the revision in

Hay 1969.-*

(a) A recapHulation at \he revis~d JTD follows:**

• JeS Msg 5~51. bTa 261934Z Mar 69.

** L ()!1 COMUSMACV Letter. "Proposed 'Revision to .USt·tACV Studies

and Observa.tions Group Joint Table of.Distribution (JTD),II

12 April 1969. Serial S001991-69.·· -

2. tz1 Personnel Directorate (J-l), Manpower Division. OJCS, Memorandum for Record," USMACV SOG JTD, March 1969 (U),"

20 f.1ay 1969. .

*** CINCPAC Msg 1302l9Z May 69.

TO~RET ;>

8-207

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

T~T
,.; .
~ -, Army Navy Air Fo r-c e r·:arine CorEs Total
,
G 6
Offi'cer 66 28 19 119
Enlisted 139 72 - 23, 10 244
(bl(f)i
Civilian 1 (bJl3J
Total 205 J_Ol .. 42 16 364
us IS 1 ("6) A breakout of the adjustments follows:

Army !Iavy Air Force l·!arine CorES Total
Officer -2 +1 -- -2 -3
Enlisted +9 -q +3
Civq.ian -
Total +7 ' -5 -2 0 i

i.

(c) Justification for the above adjustments was to align personne~ authorizations with mission requirements.

(d) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the revised 1

JTD as reflected above.*

(e) At Figure ~7 is an organizational chart of

MACSOG as contained in the &bove JTD.** _'

(4) On.24 May 1969. COMUS~CV/CINCPAC recommen~ed that the ~~CSOG JTD be increased by 55 military personnel spaces. The change would be effective in September;

\

meanwhile, documenta:t,1on for the. change woulld be provided. **' I

l -, .!

• Wv JCS Msg 9't63. DTG 212040z May 69.

** Part II to Enclosure 2 to CONUSMACV Letter, Proposed

evision to USMACV Studl,es and Observations Group Joint

Table of Distribution (JTD)," op. cit. -

***, (p) CINCPAC Msg 242236z May 69. , _

B-208

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

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MORl DoclD: 570391

TO~ET 7

In subsequent staffing actions the figure vras dec rea.sed

~ ..

from 55 to 49.*

(a) A recapitulation of the revised JTD follows:

Army W!:.!.t Air Force I·larine CorEs Total
Offic~r 77 :~8 20 6 131
Enliste,d· 168 ,[2 31 10 281
Civilian • .1. .hlm
--fbJl31
Total 245 l()l 51 16 413
US IS '1 (b) A br-eakout of the additions foll:ows:

~ !!!~ .. Air Force Marine CorEs Total
Officer +11 +1 +12
Enl1st,ed +29 +8 +37
Civilian
:
Total +40 +9 +49 (c) Justific.a.tion for the above increase was the need for additional personnel tq handle the lncteased scope of the PRAIRIE FIRE and IGLOO ~1iITE (formerly

MUSCLE SHOALS

the ant1-intl;Ltration system)

programs.

(d r The Joint Chiefs of Staff apPl'oved the

l ~

rexised JT.O.as reflected above."

* 1. z;ej COMusMcv Letter. "Proposed Change to USMACV Studies and ObservationS_Group'SOG) Joint Table ot .

illi tribution (JTD), March 1969. 1 September 1969.

2. CINCPAC Msg li2327Z Sep 69.

3. Personnel Directorate (J-l), Manpower Dl~sion, OJCS, morandum, "USMll.CV Studies and Observations Group JTD

~}J\" 15 September 1969. JlM-294-69.

4. ) Personnel Directorate (J-l). Manpower Division. OJCS, emorandum for Record, "tlsMACV Stud:1.ea and Observations

,,,I. Group JTD {U)," 7 October 1969. I.

** ~) JCS Msg 1012. D1~ 072109Z Oct 69.

TOP SECR'ET

/'

B-209

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

TOP-e*¢RET

?

~ (5) en 25 Septe::l:er ~969) coausnscv reccmmended that

the t-IACSOG JTD be reduced 19 rr:il1t:uy spaces. it

cnlCPAC r-ec ommended appzove.L. **

{a} A recapitulation of the revised JTD follows:

!!
1
I,
I
Army Na''.Z Air Force Marine CorEs ~ I
Officer -1 -2 -3 1
"
Enlisted -7 -9· -16
Civilian
Total -8 -a.i -19
" c ..

(c) Justification for the above !eductions was that they were a part of an overall CINCPAC red'lction progralll.-*

(d) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the revised JTD as reflected above."·*

.< e) At ~iguI'e &-8 is an organizational chart of MACSOG as contained in its Otganlzation and Functions Manual of 20 JW1e 1969.#

c

. 1.~' cOAUSttACv Letter, ''Propcs~d Change to USMACV ' Stud1es and Observaticns Group ~SOG) Joint'Table of Distribut10n (J'l'D), M~rch 1969( 25 September 1969·

2. ($) Personnel Directorate (J-l) MemOranduD\',-"USMACV ~tudles and Observations Group JTD (U)," 100ctol::ler 1969. J]1.!-323-69.

**·m CINCPAC Nsg DTG 012U6Z Oct 69.

*** CINCPAC Msg DTG 262159Z Sep 69. -

**** JCS Mag 2703, DTG 171432Z oct 69.

# !~CSOG Organization and FUnctions Manual, 20 June

p. U.

B-210

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

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MORI DocID: 570391

T~ET

,.>

.c

3. (u) fo'.ACSOG Staff OrEani zation

There ·is no effort he re to trace the organizational

eVolution and functions of ~ffiC~OG'S individual staff

. c omponent s . These data ar e in the ~1ACSOG Com:rAnd Histories (1964-1968) and, more cur-r-errtLy , in the MACSOG or gani.ze.t i on and Functions Manual at Annex J to this Appendix:

4. (JZ) ·MACSOG Command ,and Control Detachments

·a. Basic to the conduct of cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia (currentlY the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM

HOUSE Programs, respectively) are the~MACSOG command and control (C&c) detachments. Personnel assets for that

purpose are o~ganlzed into three such detach~ents: Command and Control North (CCN) ·at ··Danang_; Command and Control Center (CCC) at Kontwn; Cor.unand and Control South (CCS) at Ban Me

I

.j

• ! ·i

I

i

Thuot.. Operational dE!tails concerning thes e detachments

are outlined in para.greLph I below.

b. ~lhile the internal organizations of these detachments

may vary somewhat, each of them is organized alon~ battalion lines and consist of: a headquarters element. a reconnais-

sance company, t~o reaction or exploitation companies, and a security company. The reconnaissance company is . authorized 30 teams, each generally composed of three us

and nine indigenous par-aonne L, At Figure B-9· is an organizatibnal chart depicting the three detachments, as ~ell as

the structure and strength of each.*.*

~ c. The current organization of these deta.chments was evolved over a period of some five yea.rs. Cross-border

* 1. I.$} Part IV to Enclc)sure 2 to COt'{USMACV Letter., "Proposed 1\evision to USMACV 8tudles and Observat1ons Group Joint Table of Distribution (JTD),"12 April 1969. p. nr-2. Serial 5001997-69.

. 2. ('U") Chief, MACSOG T..etter to Commanding Officer. 5th special forces Group. "Proposed Reorganizatfon (U)," 1 December 1968.

** Chief, MACSOG Letter). "Commander'S Notes,"13 February

9 9. SOG Control # OO()25b5-69.

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Appendix B

Figure B-9

lJl -...J o W 1.0 I-'

-------------...;._-----_ .... _-_ ..... _._ .. _ .....•. - .... --_._--_.-_. __ .... - .. - ......

-.

MACSOG

COMMAND AND CONTROL DETACHMENTS ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS AS OF 13 FEBRUARY 1969

CBOUND STUDIES GROUP (OP35)

, I.'

-------.~.------ ~----~

j aJPPPAC ~'-'-'-'-'-'-'l r"-"-"_"_" ~"I ill DET ,.

i ---=5.;."..1, .1 j" • i lj • It

r- .-._. -._ .. -._. -,I

1_ •• _ •• _ .... _ • .-- ... _ •• _ ... _'-._ ... ._ •• _:r,._ •• _t._._'

~ ~l>ii:J "'''_-'':'~:'':S----_'

3: o :::0 H

. CMD SEC '1

17 117

t:l o o H t:l

~ECON co >,

II 91

LAUNCH TEAM

20

2

5

a

5

, .

COORDINATION

_._._.-

_ ....... _ ..

TOTALS

OFF EM

100 615

II Incl in CCN II. Orne; om CCS

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TOP.c?¢RET

operations into Laos c ommencec in the summer of 1964 under

the code name DELTA and, subsequently LEAPING LENA.* From then until 7 I-iarch 1965, these cpez:at:!.ons ~.,ere conducted by the 5th SFG l'lith ARVN teams inserted through parachute drops, Generally, these operations were not ccnsidered productive, one of the main reasons being the absence of US personnel

on the teams. On 7 March 1965, CO"!uS~~[ACV transferred the responsibility for the program from the' 5th SFG to MACSOG and changed its code name to SHINING BRASS. U

d. The basiC field operations elements of the C&C

] .

detachments are. first. the reconnaissance company which consists of thirty reconnaissance teams and. second the

exploitation companies .. These elements have been supported by three types of faci~1ties: a training base. the C&C

!_; i 1·

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. detachment headquarters. and the' forward operating bases l!

(FOBs) J t,hich were later redes ignated as mobile launch teams } !

-I

(MLTs). A brief description of the organizational development of these supporting facilities follows:'"

(l) Camp Long Thanh had been activated for sometime in support of training for other !.tACSOG programs. When the concept for crOSS-border operations was approved. training techniques were initiated and facilities of the

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camp were modified or ~stablished as necessary to . support training of reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces. Classrooms, equipment, training areas, and an air strip were already available. Minor modir1cations

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were required to inHiate training.

nterv~ew 0 Colonel Theodore Leonard, USA, 'pp. 1-3· Annex N. 1965 l-1ACV Command History. pp. II-B-1 to 1I-

HACSOG Reconnaissa.nce Techniques. 1 July 1969.

•••

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Appendix B

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(2) The first e&e facility was established on the air field at Danang to control the preparation, launching,

operations. and ~ecove~y of re~onnaissanc~ teams dispatched into Laos. The e&e detachment: supervises

the FOBs (~LTs); prepa~es operations orders; coordinates with various supported and supporting elements. including

air support elements; and coordinates co~~unications.

-

administration and logistic support for FOBs OfLTs),

reconnaissance tear:lS and exploitation !'orces. Su~sequent to initiation of Cambodian cross-border operations, a

second c sc de t achmerrt was established at Ban 1>le Thuot. These two elements were then designated C&C North (CCN) and C!'C South (CeS)." "The heavy enemy activity in the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and SVN and the

r-equar-ement for inl:reased surveillance in that area

brought about the establishment or C&e Central (CCC) in Kontum in January 1969.

(3) Initially, em FOB was established at Danang with

the C&C detachment. Eventually, there were six FOBs

scattered from just south of the DMZ to Ho Ngoc Tau, near Saigon. The FOB was designed to be relatively selt

,,"

sufficient. having a small staff of personnel, its own encampment "and its own security force. This was generally the home base of the force which remained ready for

commitment to exploit targets located and developed by ," the reconnaissance teams. ,FOBs were charged with

prOViding administrative support, conducting advanced and unit training. briefing. stli!,ging, infiltrating. exfiltrating and debriefing of reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces and they acted as the field operations agencies tor CIC detachments.

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e (4) The MLT concept was implemented 1n Januar'y 1969.

Th1s concept ~~vi5ioned a small, mob1le staff element being sate1l1ted on a fr1endly 1nstallaUon (usually US) located

as close as possIble to the area of operation of the reconnaissance teams. 'rhe ;,lLT depend on the f:'iendly

force for secur1ty. There are two MLTs on each C&C detachment TD. In addit10n, CCN is author1zed a "L1aison Detach-

ment " which fulfllls the MLT functions on a semi-permanent ~

basis at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. This, seven man detach- ~

ment 1s known as Suppo:rt Facility (5tJPPFAC), -Nakhon Phanorn (NKP). and operational control is retained by Ground Studies Group (SOO-35).

H

1]

e. The C&C detachments report directly to MACSOG, more ~

speci~icallYJ to the Director of the Ground Studies Group ~

(oP- 35). \1ho supervises command over them. US personnel, ~

on duty with the detachme?ts are assigned to the 5th SFa 1

and under the operationll.l control of Chief. MACSOG. In ! !

this connection, the ad'll1nlstrative relationship between 11

the Commanding Of~icer, 5th SFO and the Chief, MACSQG :'

is elaborated 1n paragraph below, which deals with

personnel and training aspects.

5. J.2S) KII,CSOG Position within MACV

a. It will be noted in paragraph Bl. above. that, upon its activation on 24 January 1964, MACSOG was designated as ,.a special staff aec t Lon of' MACV, - wl th J -5 exercising

special cognizance of actions accomplished.

This poaiti,on \

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accorded MACSOG appears to be at variance "lith the basic

e

joint State-DOD-CAS guidance, cited in paragraph C, above which called for the formation of a ~~CV/CAS task force to

. .

carry out the approved portions of OPLAN 34A.

b. In this connection, the available documentation

indicates that in August 1968, MACV J-5 studied MACSOG's status and relationship to J-5. The results of that

study are su:rJll.ar.lzed as follows: *

(1) Discussion

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(a) MACV J-5.1n coordinatiPti w.ith CAS, Saigon, .,

.,

planned the establishment of SaG. Upon SOG's ·establ1Shmen":

!

MACV J-5 had priJllary statf cognizance. "This appears :)

logical. since SaG was established as a result of ;1

MACV J-5 planning and was initially staffed by only .1

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. six officers and two enlisted men. As time progressed th~ SOG organization was greatly expanded. The J-31 study in September 1965 indicated that following a year and a half of SOGts growth the MACV J-5 position was one of a central point of co~tact within the MACV staff in order to limit knowledge and to provide security for the sensitive 34A prcgram.** In the

.1,,-

¥ ~J(CV J -54 }·!ec:.orandum for Record4 "MACV J -5 Relationshi? with SOG," 16 August 1968. J-5 (Chief, Special Plans) forwarded this memorandum to J-5 on 19 August 1968 .

. ** (2S) MACV J - 3 Memorandum tor Brigadier General DePuy, "34A .

Project," 8 September 1965. The enclosure to that memorandum is a study of OPLAN 3J~A the purpose of which was: to determine > _ the validity and effe<:tiveness of current organizations and

.-' programs 1n support oj~ OPLAH 34A arid to make recommendations for future actions in support of this plan. Paragraph 3e to the enclosure/study s-cated in essence that: the former MACV Chief of Staff had acted in the capacity cif immediate superior to Chief, SaG and .had provid~d the.necessary general officer supervision required t.e selve a substantial number cf major SaG actions. The Chhf of Staff had forwarded to COMUSMACV those SOG matters requiring hie personal attention; MACV J-5 had acted as the cent:ral point of contact for the 1-IACV staff; under that arrangement, SOG brought all matters requiring MACV staft action to '~he J-5 Section whlch staffed them. as necessary to other ap:propriate agencies:

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last three y~ars (Sept~mber 1965 to August 1968). the number of MACV staff members cleared for access to

SOG information nas 1.nc reased to forty- three. SOG conducts frequent coordination \~ith J -2, J - 3 (COC),

J -5 and occasional cco rdf.na t Lon ~11th other f.1ACV sta.ff sections. It would appear that "security for sensitive programs" is no Longer- a prime justification for' a MACV J-5/S0G special relationship, particularly in

view of, MACV Staff' HeClorandum 380-7 J dated 16 July 1968, which states that ~he autbority to grant access to SOG information within MACV rests only with COMUSMACV. Deputy COMUSMACV, l4ACV Chief 'of Staff j

MACV J -2. and Chief. ·MACSOG.

(b) A review.of special operations (e.g., PRAIRIE 'FIRE, DANIEL BOONE)' indicates that;, ~Ihen such new concepts were initially being considered MACV J-5 coordinated the study effort. Once these operations

were approved. the programs were turned over to SOG for implementation.

(2) Conclusions

(a) SOG is not a ~~cv staff section but rather a supporting command, equivalent to a Field Force, under the operationa,l control of COMUSMACV. *

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(by SOG coordinates a majority of its matters

(mostly operational) \11th !-1ACV. staff sections other than J-5.

4 ~) }.IACV Directive 10-11. "Organization and Functions

ommand Relationship and Terms. 9f Reference for VSf.1ACV (U);" 1 November 1968. Paragra.ph 9a(10) of that directive lists HACSOG under the MACV ce.t egory of "Component Commands. Subordinate Commands, Advisory Groups and Detachment.s," In Annex A of the directive, an organizational chart is presented which depicts SOG as a separate organizational reporting directly to COMUSMACV.

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(c) The "apec La.L" position MACV J-5 rr,ay have had as'a planner of the original SOG (eight personnel) has been overtaken b~ events. ,·lith the grc\,/th. of SCG

branch within the SOG organization.

and the establishment of a p1'fllfl1l (bUll

(d) t-1ACV J-5 is not really a "cover" for SOG \'/ithin the MACV staff as some may think. since existing clearances permit SOG·to deal directly with almost all staff sections as \~ell as most ,major

component and supporting commands.,··

(e) The MACV J-5 function to "monitor" the activities of soer is interpreted as meaning "to keep abreast of SOG pol1c1-esJ programs and operations" for purposes of permj.tting an educated approach in matters

. related to special operations and m~ planning.

Additionally. MACW J-5 is an interested agency for SOG planning functions requiring NACV staff' review or coordination.

6. ~). Vie,~s Concerning the Organizat-1on of HAeSOG

On the subject of the organization of ~1ACSOG. representa;;;i ve views of persons intl~rviewed 1n connection ~li th their :.~<\CSOG association are set forth below. Their detailed views

on the subject are presented ~n Annex K.

a. Colonel \>lill1am R. Becker. USAF (1964)

The MACSOG organization star.ted out rather loosely and grew rapidly in different directions, none of which had been predicted, The organization had to be constantly changed and added to. Pel'haps_ this ~ounds as if MACSOG was rather disorganized fr':lm the standpoint of organization,

but that is not so. I would contrast the ~ACSOG organization with Ii JUWTF. When I last saw it. the JUWTF organization

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TC~T ;:>

was to have a set JTD and \tould come into existence when a

SOG-type' organization \'ras needed. Any future SeG must be tailored especially to the ?ituation ~r theat,r in which it ,·till be operating. I cannot visualize any two SOGs being the same. \'lhen I \'las assi.gned to SOG, the organization needed was not the same even within a three or four month

period. The organizaUon has to be flexible and adaptable to changing conditions, in order to be able to assume new

missions and operate under new concepts.

b. Lieutenant COlOnE!1 David H. Aroo, ,USAF (1964-1966) (1) A covert operation should be conducted by a clearly defined task force or command. It"is only by forming an organization-such as JUWTF can the Services

provide the neces9a~y person~el and other resources. ~lACSOG ',%uld have operated more efficiently if it had

been so organized.

(2) Althqugh a truly covert operation is difficult

for a uniformed Ser',ic e to perform# it; can be done provided there is a clear understanding of what covert operations neceSSitate, including the special funding

and personnel ar-r-angement.s needed if the operation is to be covert. I feel that a truly covert operation-probably should be conducted by..CAS.

c. Celonel Edward A. Partain, USA (1964-1965)

If the mil1tary :L6 to be involved in SOG-type

operations, an organizu.t1on,. with the necessary personnel, should be set up beforl~hand. One example of an organization

for this purpose 1s a JUWTF.

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TO P ,;.S2C1!ET 7"

d. Cclonel John J. Hinclsor, Jr., USMC (1965-1966)

A SOG-type ::)rganizll..tion should be t a ak cr gam aed

exactly as it "las, 1. e •• have task elements that can be

added liKe building blocKs to the task force based upon the

nature of the c~erations tq be conducted.

e. Colonel Donald D. Elackburn. USA (1955-1966)

~rganization and operations in accord \'Iith the

JtnlTF c one ept we r e not accepted' at various higher echelons. I had to use the basic tolACSOG organization as it existed upon my arrival although I felt that_tne·appllcat~on of a true JUWTF·operational concept would have enabled us to produce better results.

t . Colonel John T. Mc)'ore-, Jr.! USAF (1965-1966)

MACSOG should have been organized and operated in a

JUWTF.

g. Lieutenant Colonel Vincent W. Lans. USA (1965-1966) The JU'vT'i'F provides a command structure far more suited for special operations than that of' r·1ACSOCl.

h~ Colonel John K. Sing1au~. USA (1966-1968)

(1) I am not completely sold that the JUWTF organization, as taught 1n our Service schools, is the inpst efficient way of performing UW missions. I obje~t to retaining Service components Within the JU'..rTF concept. Unconventional warfare should be conducted as a national

effort, in which the Services lo?e their identity.

While this type of organization requires personnel.of particular Skills that are attained as a result of duty in a Service, I see no rea~ advantage to retaining component identity and organization within the Jm~~ concept. There should be a task force ta1lorea in each case for the particular area ot operations. The task force should include ·those Service per aonne L ot the appropriate skill but not Service components' representing the concepts and doctrines of a particular Service.

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MORl DoclD: 570391

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e

11ACSOG is really a .~j oint task force.

(2) The establishment of a JUHTF of ~he type portrayed in our manuaLs and i.n some of" c:lUr \>lur plaQs should be tied to the establishment of a theater of cperations under a single corrmandt-r rather than trying to apply

the concept under the present unu~ual ccm~an1 relations in Southeast Asia.

1. Captain Bruce B. Dunning. USN (1966-1969)

(1) I am opposed to the JUWTF organization insofar

as it is applied· to a program eU~A as·FOOTBOY, that developed into an irLtegrated subversion program in which

:1

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many OW techniques were employed. The reason for my

oppesi tion 1s that I sea the JlIVTTF organization as an extension ·of conventional military organizational concepts arid of Service parochialism; these extend down

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to t~e lowest. operating, level through the inclusion of component commanders in the organization. In work1ng

to achieve a fully lntegrated program, we should organize functionally, with resources assigned to enable the carrying out of functions regardless of Service.

The organization should be completely integrated· or. if it is compartmented, it should be compartmented along functional and not Seryice lines.

(2) The JIDvTF concept does have advantages, however, particularly in the more conventional unconventional operations. When using either US forces primarily ·or

j

.1 J j

purely direct action-type forces, e.g., ranger forces~

on raids, military reconnaissance., or more conventionalized

UW operations. a J~~ may offer advantages simply because it is an understands.ble organization from a Service viewpoint. .There is also an advantage in providing logistic

,

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MORl DocID: 570391

support of converrt Lcna I Lt ems ; I might add here. hcweve r , that this advantaE;e is negated.to some degree in that the JlMTF concept is inapprc:priate ~11th respe c t to the provision of logistic support of sophisticated

unconventional "Iarfare ite::;.s needed for Covert cpez-a.t i ccs -,

J. Colonel Benten !.!. Austin, USA (1966-1967)

I am sure there were better ways to organize ~he MACSOG effort than "rere used. Perhaps the distribution of Service representation was not as , .. ell balanced as it should have been. In addition, the c~mpetltlon for

pe r s onne L between :-tACSOG and the 5th SFG would not have been of the magnitude it was lt, in the first place, ~~CSOG had been tailored. for its mission. The JUWTF organization,

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with its own Special Forces operational base and equivalent air ahd naval units, ':10u'ld have been advantageous.

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k. Colonel Robert C. Kendrick, USA (1966-1969)

(1) I have often wondered \"lhy MACSOG and the 5th spa were not put under a single headquarters or control agency. The personnel who run MACSoafs field operations are assigned to the 5th SFG, under the Headquarters, US Army Vietnam, while ~~CSOG itself is under Headquarters, MACV. Should Chief, MACSOG and Commanding Officer, 5th SFG not get along , ... ell .. together. l .. :ACSOG's operations could be impaired •. Moreover, I feel that administrative and logistical syste~s could be s.treaml1ned, with savings

~ in personnel, if MACSOG and the 5th SFG were placed

under a central comrr~nd.

(2) With resp~ct to the ~urren~ organizat~on OP-35.· who commands the forces engaged 1n crOSS-border operg,ticns into Laos and Cam~odia. should move out of Saigon and establisp'his headquarters closer the the scene of his operations, possibly in Kontum. Such a move would facilitate coordination of these operations.

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~T

1. Colonel Eugene A. Hahl, USA? (1966-1967)

(1)' I deflr.itely feel that there is a place in the

military establishment f9r an or.s:anization .such as HACSOG. \,ihen we stopped bombing the north we should

have been stronger t her e than 'tIe were; in fact, '.ole

should have had a strong covert capability there and, with cessation of rne bombing, we should have increased

our covert activity.

(2) The need for intelligence is so great that t·!.,\C;::OG

should be expanded to enable it to~obtain the intelligence.

m. Colonel George A. Maloney. USA (1967-1969)

(1) Cross-border operations require a highly trair.ed and very responsible 'organization if they are to be successful. Such a~ organization tends to be top-heavy and its cutting edge: 'is not as proportionately large as

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that of conventional forces.

(2) Equipment such as helicopters should not be used to perform dual roles of supporting both special and conventional operations. Th1s applies not only from the viewpoint of security, ·i. e., plausibll1! denlabili ty, out from the need to respond rapidly to sensi t1 ve opera.tional

situations, e.g., extracting a team on an emergency basis.

n. r:.,loncl· HA.~old K. Aaron, USA. (1C!!'i7 1969)

(1) Chief. MACSOG was responsible for so many operations of varied scopes that hl~ ~pan of control far exceeded his capabilities. Limiting his responsibilities to operations against North Vietnam would have been a practical approach to the ~pan of control problem.

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MORI DocID'

570391

(2) the.~oa. a p.,p •• a1 t' .r.·te toO spe •• al pDr.e' grOUP' in 5Duth V ••• n.n -- on. for .n_.DU"·' DP·rat'D" an' tne other for ,ut_Dr_MUn'" Dpe.~t'D",· these groUP' ooul' have nee n uo,e' ••• ogl •• D"',a· .. r. '0 my

vieo, th1' p'DPD'" had .Do.,derabl' m.r,t.

(3) l th'" that the '"'t' .Dn.ept b.,rs .D~·

.Dn.,.eratio. in ,ts ,ppl,.at,D' to M'CSOG·

D'~)·

(1) ,",CSOO .Duld op .. at ••• • J"""" ".0, it

oper&tes effectivelY now.

(2) In all of our pregrams, •••• pt for .ro •• _border

DP.r.t'D'.' •• ar •••• i""Y th .... i.or• .i~h • .." .«.ptio., .h. v, •• na .• ,s. pre.u"".l>' ,un .he prD"'~s.

. . .

ThU., ., ..". thiS dieMtO,," of .h. fu nc t'o'. of ","CSOO,

•• v,.or,; DP.,.tional; o""s._op.rational (i' thO •••• ·of thO >it O'p.,.tio'. ,,,au.l; .. visor, ••• support (in

toe c~se of MAROFS).

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(3) f·1ACSOG should have its elm heliccpter resources.

These can be either dedicated or ~ss::'e:r:ed to SOG.

P. C~lcnel Her~ert O. Graeser, USA (lg59)·

:·~CSOG greH like topsy. Pe rhaps ~here ',:as no

\.;;_y cf foreseeing the ~ype of crgan:.:::at':".::n that wou Ld

eventuate. Howeve r, \~hen the ;Jth SF';;, ~·i!'!.!~h has a

separate mission of its own and repcrts to US Army V::'et!:am, has to furnish personnel, en an operat10rlal ccc t r c), basis, to HACSOG, which reports to z"lACV, there are built-in problems that have caused acme friction. This 1s not to say that the problem cannct be worked cut by the t\iC unit heads, but there is no' need to create problems if l:ontrol of the resources and the 'cperations themselves can be placed uncer a single

orgar.ization. In short, the operations have been ccnducted along personality lines rather than organiza-

tional 11nes.

q, Lieute:'lant Colcn,;!l James R. z,~cCarthy, USAF (l968-lg69) :';hat trle needed to do was to orga.nize a unit. maybe

a ·JU'.-:TF, in which each Service would provide a package. Organize and then ope rat e and not vice versa as in ·the

case of NACSOG.

~. Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh. USA (lg6S-'g69)

(1) The reorganization o~ MACSOG 1n December 1968 was c~sibned to provide a complete. joint and special staff and to organize the various staft and operating elements. s·.lcn as OP-34 and CP-35. and OP-31 end OP-32 into

act~al field commands. Pr1.or to ~ece~ber 1968 they

we r e independent staff agencies.

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(2) An organi,zat:!.on such as NACSOG must be joint in tha. t these are Army, Navy, Air For-:e, and r·larine type

functions \~hich mus t. be pulled .~ogether.

(3) The 5th SPG Group should be divorced from SOG,

\':hich should have been. provided \·:i th its own o.rganfc reconnaissance capability. A Special Forces unit should have been organized and provided to MACSOG not cnly for

security but for control and adminlstraion reasons.

(4) It ls essenti.al that helicopter assets, both

troop carrier and ~~ ships, be or~anically assigned

and dedicated to the MACSOG miSSion. Seventy percent

of the assets being used by HACSOG in July 1969, for example, are fragged· irom helicopter units of the

general support type or are organiC to US divisions.

These aircraft and their crews are generally rotated

by th~ir parent units into the MACSOG mission approximately every two or three weeks. Therefore, the C~C Detachments are habitually training new crews in the.techniques of insertion and extraction, and briefing them on the rules of engagement which apply in the various operational areas. This lack of dedlcated aircraft has resulted in numerous aircraft accidents and losses of

of team members. In a~dition, it precipitated.an incident of international proportions due to the lack of familiarity \-Ji th the operational area and the inadequate training ot the crews.

(5) By not handling important administrative and morale matters, e.g., decor.at1ons, for those. personnel· under his cperationa.l·control only, Chief, MACSOG lacks a principal tool of command •

. T~

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(6) Hat/ever. my working relationships 'Iith the 5th

C Spec1,l Forces Group were close and effective. I do not

believe I could have had any better suppor~ from any

other unit except one that was directly assigned to

!-IAeSOG for cOr.lplete control a~!!llnistration. etc.

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Appemt1x B

MORI DocID: 570391

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* ..J;!fl RAcv oJ - 31 J.lemorandum for - Br1gad1er General DePuy ~

34A proJect," 8 September 1965. Paragraph 36 in the IbU1J

enclosure to that lIlemcra.ndulIl contains limited lntorma.tionlbU3J 00 the transfer ot assets.

8-227

Append1x B

MORl DoclD: 570391

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SA/Exec Officer Militar~ Secretary,

Documentation," 14 November 1969. Dn.~_"'O'"

memorandum forwards CIA inputs

(This Project.)

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* By "sAn 280, dated 14 ·Pebruary 1964, the Pres1dent-establ1shed a committee "tor the management or us policy and operations

SVN " .

**

B-231

Appendix B

MORl DoclD: 570391

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.'

sg , DTG 092026z Oct 64.

JCS Memorandum for the SeeDef J ."North Vietnam Operations U)," 19 May 1964. JCSM 426-64., As presented in Part IV OPLAN 34A)J above, the President approved initially a four month program of actions against NVN. That progrBm covered

the period 1 February-·31 May 1964 and was referred to a.s Phase I wi thin the tota1_prclgram of twelve months. Pha.se II would

begin on 1- June 1964. .

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Appendix. B

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Memorandum ~or the Cha.irmanr Joint

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* The suoJect of a resistance movement'ln NVN is tr~ated In Appendix C (Operations AgaInst NVN). In the final analySiS, US policy precluded the development of this moveme~t. For example, see JCS l-tsg 21~55, DTG 24l352Z Sep 65 (TS). which in essence stated that national policy would not authorize resistance and guerrilla warfare. Plans for such warfare

ld be processed as corrt Lngency plans.

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B-236

Appendix B

MORI DocID: 570391

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• 181 ~nclosure to SACSA informal memorandum to the nlrector~ Joint Starf~ 12 June 1964.

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Appendix B

MORI DocID: 570391

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Appendix 8

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L 1·lsg 531 DTG 260315Z Aug 65.'

CINCPAC l-Isg DTG o8o#07Z_Sep 65. .

:R5 t-lACV seers J -5 Dispos1 t10n Form to COMUSMACV "Grow1ng 1scord Between CAS aod SOG".{TS LDIDIS SPECAT), n 30 March

1966. . -

**** ~ Tab A to MACV ACorS J-5 Dispos1tion Form, £E. cit., p. 3·

B-251

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8-255

Appendix B

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·.sg 38, DTG 211415Z Oct 65.

** 1. m CQl·lUSHACV Msg 976, DTG 231005Z Oct 65. 2. ;g CINCPAC f.lsg DTG 231820Z Oct 65.

3. CIrlCPAC f.lsg DTG 272139Z oct 65.

*- (..:PS' CC1·WS~;ACV t-Isg 1276, DTG 030720Z D~c 65· *_ .. {~ CQf<ltlSMACV Msg 12t18, DTG 040350Z Dec 65.

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Appendix D

MORl DocID: 570391

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* (P5") tHeMe Msg DTG 010009Z Jan 66. .

** r. ~) CINe·PAC referred specifically to JCS Msg 3995.

DTG 212235Z Jan 65 as containing the procedures which u1d govern the submission and approval of proposed . erations.

MORl DoclD: 570391

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* ~j Cn~ef. SpecIal operations Div1s1on/OSACSA Informal f.lemorandu~. to l4ajor General P1ers,,- "Attached Proposed Ans1t1e.r to Mr. Colby J" ]. l·larch 1960.

**~) Tab A to MACVACof'1:i J-5 Dispos1tion Form. £E. cit., p , 4.

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Appendix B

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Appendix B

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1. t'tS1 ,sii.C5.:i Memorand'.lm for the Deputy SecDei' ~ ""Operation han 34A (U)," 30 i{ove::."cer 1965.

2. ~) CI::CPAC lotsg Dr'} 240245Z Nov 65. " -

** (~) Tab A to MACV ACo~S J-5 Disposition Form, ~. cit., p. 6.

*** Cnief, ~":ACSOG Disposition Fcr:r. to Colonel SchweITer-,- i

16 January- 1966. Chief, M.ACSOG cOmmented"" on General. Aothll',1 - I Hutchin exchange of letters regarding CINCPAC·s SO~ missiod ! stat~men\.

'I'OP ~ET 7

Appendix B

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*iI' . fm CQ!ms:·!ACV !.!sg DTG Ol0953Z Atlr 66.

2. CliiCPAC l.fsg DTG 251830Z Apr - 66. . .,

3. Chief. Special Operations Divisicn/CSACSA

, .. e::-.;::r~ndum for Ma~r General peers]. "CAS/SCG Coordination

r::: JTD Problems ," 26 April 1906.

**'* S";CSA l·:emorandi..t or Mr. \Ul1.iam E. Colby, Central

E~gence Agency, "CIA 'Support of OPIA;l 3~A. North Vietna.:r. Opera.tions ~," 27 Aprll 1966. SACSA 101-435-66.

5-267

Appendix B

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