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THE
PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

by Edward L. by Clark L. Anderson. by Edward C. Robinson. *THE PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. *PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOR IN ANIMALS AND MEN. *GREAT EXPERIMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGY.D. Symonds. *PHYSIQUE AND INTELLECT. Tolman. PH. SUGGESTION AND HYPNOSIS. Anderson. by Florence L. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.THE CENTURY PSYCHOLOGY SERIES EDITED BY RICHARD M. by Edward S. translated by George and Muriel Humphrey. by Edna Heidbreder. Hull. by Edwin G. by Edwin G. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. Boring. M. by Charles Bird. OTHER VOLUMES TO BE ARRANGED * Published of April. by P. Boring. Goodenough and John E. *EFFECTIVE STUDY HABITS. by Henry E. Thorndike. University of Minnesota *EXPERIMENTAL CHILD STUDY. *SEVEN PSYCHOLOGIES. Chandler. *HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. *AssoCIATION THEORY TO-DAY. by Charles Bird. Toops. by Donald G. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY. BEAUTY AND HUMAN NATURE. A. *DIAGNOSING PERSONALITY AND CONDUCT.. by Albert R. by Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard. HUMAN MOTIVES AND INCENTIVES. 1933 As . *HUMAN LEARNING. by H. Garrett. *THE WILD BOY OF AVEYRON. Goodenough. by John E. Paterson. by Florence L. ELLIOTT.

centurs psscboioos settes RfcbarD A. NEW YORK LONDON . BUtott. BWtot THE PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS BY EDWIN G. BORING PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY THE CENTURY : CO.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. A. INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE THIS BOOK. 8.. 1933. OR PORTIONS THEREOF.COPYRIGHT. . IN ANY FORM 3122 PRINTED IN IT. BY THE CENTURY CO.

However. the 'speculation' in this book is for the most part not mine but every one's. as to the nature of the correlation which it seeks to establish. and it seems to me that there cannot be any longer a doubt that profitable observation must be of consciousness which this predetermined. a view fundamental to the relational theory does not support a strict book propounds. support. Actually this whole matter can be regarded as a question of the use of hypothesis in science. I am convinced that careful consideration opposition between observation and speculation. and at times slightly vehement. and naive epistemology holds that science espouses observation and rejects speculation. that I look upon the contents of this book as 'useful hypothesis/ but perhaps he needs to be told that I shall not be disappointed if there are those who contemn this text as is The 'dangerous speculation.' Neither physiology nor psychology yet ready to do without its cautious conservatives. and here the line of demarcation is necessarily indeterminate and reader will have no difficulty in discovering personal. My general purpose in the treatment of physiological hypotheses has been to render .PREFACE In both physiology and psychology therF*is a'sfrohg'and healthy tradition against what is called 'speculation. At least every observation is also essentially an interpretation. The valid dichotomy lies between useful hypothesis and dangerous speculation.' Experimentalism is not yet so firmly established in either of these new sciences that it does not need a fully conscious. Nevertheless. by hypothesis.

imply the occurrence of physiological processes that cause. as a rule. and that psychology stands just as ready to provide sanctions for neural theory as physiology is prepared to render a symmetrical service to psychology. or parallel. but . This the basic psychophysiological hypothesis and most psychological facts and theories presuppose such a correlais tion. my have assumed such a book is partly an example That I find myself led to an rate I is identity hypothesis of the relation of 'mind' to 'body' a detail in contrast with this larger matter. but I feel that conservashould also be glad to have discovered to them the in- secure timbers in their own house. I hope that approve my courage.VI explicit the Preface assumptions that underlie the accepted psychophysiological thinking of to-day. that the data of consciousness. At any reversible logic. I conestablished it when fess that me to be a comment upon the vanity of and the modesty of psychologists that it is only physiologists recently that we have begun to hear the suggestion that it seems to this important hypothesis is reversible. that a physiological theory of neural action ought not seriously to be maintained if it is incompatible with psychological fact. Because he accepts this assumption. and physiologists also prefer to have their psychological theories grounded in physiology. that a psychological theory most firmly can be provided with an explicit physiological foundation. Perhaps the fundamental problem of hypothesis arises in connection with the principle of psychophysiological correlation. the psychologist is believes. or are identical with the conscious events. and perhaps of what happens as a result. I have tried to make explicit what plicated usually only implicit. as introspection yields them. and to follow such eximplications along to their natural consequences is wherever any radicals will tives profit seemed ready to accrue.

devoted to the problem of assessing our progress and I have therefore called it by what will seem to some a paradoxical title. or dimensions. and here I think especially of Dr. seems to me very important and the correct approach to the adequate description of mind. However. because I have been associated with irrepressible. C. but I think we are already seeing how it can come about that we shall eventuto the dissatisfacally be able to do without them. to the happy monism of the scientific heaven. are scientifically arbitrary and temporary. We are not yet ready to give up the conof scious dimensions. Thus it comes about that this book is in this direction. which I believe without proof to be essentially Titchener's way of meeting the challenge of Gestalt psychology and the anti-atomists. I am its not willing to friends much as some of would because I believe that categories of description. as phenomenological ex- Anyhow. We need them now. The Physical Dimensions Consciousness. C. them longest and because they are both However. J. Beebe-Center. mass.Preface vii The doctrine of conscious dimensions. there are several of us who have . one makes them up and uses them igencies require. the ideal would be ultimately to get away from conscious dimensions to physical dimensions. is My chief intellectual debt in these chapters undoubt- edly to the perpetual colloquium which exists in the Harvard Psychological Laboratory because my colleagues and I can- not avoid argument. and time. stress the doctrine as like. attributes. I hope tion of some of those these lines that progress who have stimulated my thought along may be rapid in this direction. One does not attempt to discover conscious elements. whether they be the psychological dimensions of quality and intensity or the physical dimensions of space. matters of the convenience or economy of description. G. Pratt and Dr.

The next morning I recopy of the third volume of Troland's The Prinof Psychophysiology. the volume on Cerebration and my Action. I The manuscript evening of March ceived ciples of these chapters was finished on the thirty-first last. am inclined to think of the more constructive hypotheses of this book as what Lashley might have said had he been less cautious and conservative. The editor and Professor Miles A. for the wanton take this opportunity to apologize to way in which I have used his theories. have since appeared. Several other scientific papers. reader will have no difficulty in discovering the great extent of my debt to Karl S. Lashley. I am stimulated by his thought. Smith Stevens of the Harvard Laboratory has read manuscript and made valuable suggestions which have adopted. I like the flavor of his thought. a radical to some.viii Preface argued and differed with enough enthusiasm for us to bewe must be essentially in agreement. As far as practicable I have added these new references to the notes. Perhaps it is in this yet lieve that appears only by implication. I have read nothing new that would have altered any fundamental exposition. Mr. Tinker at Minnesota have also read in detail and I have profited this entire I . more likely The the importance of his research and the experimental work which he has inspired. I believe in his outlook upon psychology. and now I expect at any time a new pronouncement by Nafe on his quantitative theory of feeling. S. seems him conservative to me. relevant to the text. We do not know what our common faith is. I am impressed by it book. I admire his freedom I from scholasticism. while I have been waiting upon certain unavoidable exigencies of publication for the appearance of these chapters. although I might have written differently here and there had I been in possession of these additional materials at the time of composition. Since he.

Bray and the Psychological Review for Figs. Adrian and W. 7 and 16. William H. Halverson and K. W. Wever and C. Lashley and the University of Chicago Press for Figs. to Professors E. G. 8 and 9. many To Mr. 13. Mrs. D. of the figures in the text: to E. to Professor K. Koffka and the Clark University Press for Fig. to Professors H. and to Professor K. Dallenbach for Fig. 5. to Professor Alexander Forbes and the Clark University Press for Fig. G. Withington has turned my bad and dangerous typing into good safe copy. 14 and 17. M. Frances E. November 16. ix My wife has criticized the manuscript trench- antly and scrutinized the proof meticulously. sometimes with modification. Dr. the following authors and publishers I am grateful for permission to reproduce. E. S. Massachusetts . W. M. n. 6. B. Norton Company for Figs.Preface by their labor. Stavsky has drawn many of the figures. 1932 Cambridge.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 PAGE 3 3 MIND AND BODY Dualism Psychophysical Correlation 8 Notes 2 14 THE DIMENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 17 17 22 Sensation and Attributes The Dimensions Notes of Consciousness 32 3 INTENSITY 36 Nerve Excitation 37 The Multiple Fiber Theory The Frequency Theory The Volley Theory Sensory Intensity 42 46 50 55 Notes 4 57 EXTENSITY 62 of Space The The Psychological Problem 62 Projection Theory 67 75 Psychophysiological Correspondence Extension 78 Visual Dimension The Third Size 86 94 99 107 115 xi Form Localization Notes .

xii CHAPTER 5 Table of Contents PAGE TIME Judgments of 127 Time and Duration of Protensity 129 133 Protensitive Integration The Physiology Notes 6 137 146 QUALITY Modality Quality within the Modality Visual Quality 150 151 158 162 165 171 181 Auditory Quality Somesthetic Quality Notes 7 THE ORGANIZATION Intelligence OF CONSCIOUSNESS 187 188 Attention 194 201 Learning Notes 8 212 OF CONSCIOUSNESS 221 THE NATURE The Relational Theory of Consciousness 222 Relational Physiology 229 233 The Dimensions Notes of Consciousness 236 239 243 INDEX OF NAMES INDEX OF SUBJECTS .

THE PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS .

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If Desmodern ical civilization. if psychology is coordinate with physics and if the scientific method is applicable to both. just at the time when science was about to begin the course of development which has made it the dominating influence in We all know how successful the physhave been and we can also see that biology has prospered in abandoning a vitalism and identifying itself with the physical side of the Cartesian dichotomy. empiricism and associationism. 3 It is implicit in British The view that an external . Yet. then it seems strange that psychology has come such a little way when so far. sciences cartes there are these two worlds. This view in psychology. into mind and matter. Descartes cut the world in two. he provided both the raison d'etre of modern psychology and the has never completely dissolved. physics has ramified into many fields and has come Dualism The Cartesian dichotomy has been impressed upon psychology from the very beginning. is common psychologists speak of the classification of the sciences they are usually sure of only two sciences When psychology and physics.Chapter i MIND AND BODY Descartes established the scientific dichot- WHEN mystery which omy between mind and it body. then the success of science in attacking the one forms a challenge for right. if was the creation of a science of the other.

adopted Avenarius's formula that psychology deals with regarded as dependent upon the experiencing while physics deals with independent experience. but most psychological thinking for more than two centuries has been but by ignoring referred to a bifocal frame of reference. This chapter must serve simply as an elementary introduction to the monistic point of view from which this book is written. The behaviorists have sought to keep to one side of the dichotomy and there to explain everything that used to belong to the other side. diate Wundt contrasted imme- experience (psychology) with mediate experience (physics). it as subject-matter for science. There were monistic 'objectivists.4 Mind and Body world gradually impressed itself upon an inner mind (Locke) is dualistic. even when its intent has been to emphasize the one focus and to ignore the other. Into the evaluation of these views it is not the purpose of the present book to enter. like Kiilpe and Titchener. There have been monistic systems proposed. In the nineteenth century the dichotomy between spiritual- ism and materialism became important and led Fechner to the invention of his psychophysics. not by identifying consciousness with matter nor by denying consciousness. It is was Wundt's view that immediate experience the subject- .' of course. The reader must not infer that protests against dualism have not been frequent and loud during the last two decades. Psychophysical parallelism has been the usual theory of experience dualistic. and pluralists. Even the view that mind is the only reality (Berkeley) becomes dualistic a when it leads to the problem of how knowledge of an external world comes about. individual. Later introspectionists. The author believes that neither Wundt's nor Avenarius's formula is satisfactory for a scientific psychology. mind and body. Behaviorism began. but Descartes's interactionism was just as Even the 'double-aspect' theory of mind and body is a dual theory.

is systematically both prior and posterior to physics. Any such circle must result in epistemological vertigo. individual. Avenarius's position is that there are two ways of re- restated (as Titchener experience. Experience. Here we seem to have two coordinate points of view and to have avoided the derivation of physics from psychology. instead of being prior to physical entities. reverses the relationship. The brain is a physical entity. is now held to be dependent upon the experiencing dividual is. Such an inversion of historical fact must. then they are both the stuff which yields an object like the brain and also the consequences of the activity of this brain. However. which. however. like the nervous system. be unsatisfactory. in a sense. and the experiencing in- Thus we for all practical intents. Psychology Avenarius) regards experience as dependent upon the experiencing individual. If conscious are the materials of experience. psychology has now become factually mediate. whereas physics regards it as inde- garding pendent. If psychology deals with experience and physics is derived from experience. the nervous system. so it seems to the . But the brain is phenomena actually the essential condition of experience. it would seem that physics must be derived from psychology. Experience is the cognitive ground of those inferences which yield the material of physics (Wundt). as the science of consciousness. Psychology. which is mediate to experience because its entities are inferentially derived. This view leads to the conclusion that psychology deals with "direct experience" (Kohler's term) or with phenomena as such. The correct avoidance of this circle.Dualism $ matter of psychology. Hence Kiilpe and Titchener adhered to Avenarius's view. and makes psychology equivalent to a phenomenology and thus propaedeutic to physics. Physics deals with experience mediately. come out with a circle.

is A no longer regarded sensation.' but is the systematic subsumptive power of the concept. Physics deals with very real entities. Perception is seen now to be a classificatory term. The sensory attributes have nowadays given way to abstract dimensions of consciousness. attention. as we as actual but as a systematic construct. inferentially. That the terms of introspectional psychology are not actual in experience but are conceptual reals is attested by the entire trend of systematic psychology. There is no reals. way psychology must deal with existential which are similarly mediate to experience. emotion. with ever be patterned as a single sensation in attentive isolation all of its attributes intact. are mediate to experience. action. Psychology. shall see in the next chapter. The test of the reality of a psychological entity can no longer be an appeal to 'immediate introspection. Such realities exist. imagination. idea. unrealizable as reality except inductively. which stands in the background as the dator of scientific data. The question as to whether used to mean the question as to whether experience could itself In the same up to science indirectly. and there is no introspective difference between sensation and per- ception. Historically science if it is physical science. In like manner thought all the other entities of conventional psychology feeling. is Mind and Body essentially Kulpe's. way of getting at 'direct experience/ because experience gives by the experia sensation exists mental method. but reality and existence in this sense are the results of must be like of which elec- inductive inferences accomplished by the experimental method.6 author. The new logic asserts that if sensations exist fruitful hypothesis for a scientific the conception of their reality proves a psychology. Thus the events of physics. trons and atoms are typical examples. is to be a science. physics. as Wundt said. memory. turn into conceptual reals that are .

Whatever exists as reality for psychology is a product of inductive inference usually from ex- perimental data. of which organization is thus far the most important. it has to create new ones. Nevertheless. and enters prior to reality. and the 'unconscious mind' a reality that partakes of some of the characteristics of the other. because psychologists have thought that experience enters immediately into psychology. To say that these constructs is not to alter the truth. The make way always tentative and have to and prove their worth. a product of induction. he then cannot realize his desire to make psychology scientific. Its validity their is attested power of physical subsumption. realities The atom by its are hypothetical is a construct and a reality. Real experience is what the psychologist knows about. If the psychologist will accept this premise. Real experiderived from actual experience. he is landed in the esoterics of direct experience. that the paradoxical concept of the conscious Both consciousness and unconsciousness is are inferred. but are inferred from it. he has no one but himself to blame. This ex- kind is perience is chology. he will not accept if it. as it develops. at last be ready to start his quest If on a par with the physicist. and. . They are as temrealities are porary as all truth. That experience different. but it is mediate and is something is ence not direct. Experience is the ground of all scientific induction. they have spoken of their psychic reals as if they were experience. It is in this way mind gains validity. We thus arrive at the first premise which underlies the discussion of this book. but.Dualism 7 not to be found in experience. It underlies physics and psyinto neither as a reality. One serious difficulty that enters into all discussion of this the two-faced meaning of the term experience. Organization is inferential. Gestalt psychology gets along without these terms. There is no other scientific meaning he for will reality.

served correlation of this sort is An obof causal in Hume's sense . upon The independent he has the generalization that b depends variable. spoken of as a cause of the dependent variable. the goal is always the physical reality. the conceptual system that yields the most orderly view of nature. a. can now properly be b. Psychophysical Correlation We now chapter to the second matter of importance in this and we the nature of psychophysical correlation come must first examine the scientific fact regarded as an observed correlation. For such an aspiration no lationship between apology is required. The sanction for speculation is its fruitfulness.8 If it Mind and Body be objected that is tion. In the simplest experiment there are always at least two terms. and it is the purpose of this book to enquire how nearly we may approxi- mate to this goal at the present time. The ultimate abandonment of dualism leaves us the physical world as the only reality. and in fact we shall often have to begin with a dualism in order to annihilate it subsequently by the establishment of some identifying re- its terms. Consciousness will ultimately be measured in physical dimensions. The experimenter varies a and notes how b changes. or he removes a and sees if b disappears. logically considered. method of the induction of a generalized correlation by means of controlled concomitant varia- The tions. is. However. a experimental method. He repeats until he is satisfied that a. and the great scientists are those who have speculated wisely and successfully. upon which all science rests. an independent variable and a dependent variable. the reply premise gives license to speculathat speculation has always been free in this science. We shall not always avoid the implications of dualism.

which these correlations apIt is analytic because inductive generalization requires analysis. which Fechner himself thought had raised and Let us now . a relationship. and the simplest fact is a correlation between two terms. but science is a tremendously complex correla- A tional structure fabricated from these simple elements. such as scientific fact is hue. the touch of a finger upon a stone may 'cause' an avalanche. Often when a correlation a-b seems to be established and then breaks down. the correlations are more complex and involve several terms on each side. is by experiment functional dependencies when x which states the law whereby y changes varied. We learn by ex- perimental correlation that the cause of the quality green is the wave-length and not the energy of light. and the belief that cause and effect is tively equivalent in terms of energy The slight energy of a whispered insult may 'cause' a despot to move an army. we find that the difficulty really lies in between a and incomplete analysis. In simple systems of fact. A great deal of scientific refinement of correlational However. progress consists in analytical terms. Still at a very simple establish someof we may the form y = f(x). and by the same procedure we learn to correct this gross analysis. like the facts of the visual negative after-image. and that the cause of its brilliance is the energy and not the wave-length approximately. turn to the fundamental problem of psychophysics. the correlation was which are sometimes but not always /?. associated respectively with a and b. 9 must be quantitano longer rigidly held. but a total experiment generally thing more complex. saturation. the process relation of a with b is also synthetic. brilliance.Correlation cause. The simple cor- may be realized in the experimental yields level moment. total scientific process in The pear is both analytic and synthetic. and duration.

but we can observe sult of We it cannot observe energy indirectly when we are of the scale of the protractor satisfied to let the reading stand for the energy which it implies. The law holds ap- body. for R is physical and is thus 'mediate experience. This point has always been freely admitted of R. The first thing to note is that R and S are conceptual realities. where S R is the measis the measured sensory intensity of the stimulus. which are controlled by black and white disks on a color-mixer. One makes other assumptions in determining the energy of light that any setting of the disks provides as a stimulus. One makes photometric determinations of the reflecting power of the black and the white papers and assumes constancy for these values.' However. the becomes. psychologists have generally failed to see that the same situa- . the more their realities. In quantitative work nearly accept a sign for the precise the quantitative work inferentially remote are the symbols from We more all observation reduces to the judgment of spatial identity or difference of marks on scales. We may suppose that the observer in an experiment is making intensive judgments of pairs of grays. We do not ured magnitude (often energy) need to question the general validity of the law. No stimulus or reis sponse ever directly observed. The value of any particular R is thus the re- an elaborate inference. and.io Mind and Body mind to settled the question of the nature of the relation of log R. The Weber-Fechner function k S and where is = proximately for middle ranges of such a stimulus. In observing that they are not 'immediate data of observation/ the most immediate datum is a judgment R of visual spatial relations as one reads a protractor placed against the disks. directly. reality signified. One assumes that all angles on the protractor are spatial or temporal equal and that they remain equal with any change of the protractor.

Of course. experiment reveals In all is physical or introspective. did it not take us too far from our primary concern.Correlation tion exists with respect to S. or of distances between then we infer to a real scale of sensory magni- We can make judgments tudes. psychology. the magnitude of If the formula were accurate and the inferences involved R and S. He is making an interpretative judgment under the influence of a particular intent. working with realities by directly to grips way of their symbols. inferring to reality in the case of R. as when an observer notes the presence of a tone. ought not the psychologist to be satisfied? He has a fact. R R causes S. less 1 1 We can do no more and no with S than with R. Obviously Fechner established in certain limited cases the k log R. It is enough to assert that the most immediate data of observation yield the realities of physics. They have sought to appeal to 'immediate experi- that a scarlet and have said that any one can see many pinks. he fleeting is not merely catching a phenomenon and fixing it in a report. and the way in which were unchallenged. of difference S's. with that in which one One never comes is primarily interested. A but then nobody has doubted the validity of of one gram. Even in the simplest case. one experimental observation. as if a greater magnitude must appear more complex to direct observation. and psychophysics only inferentially. and two and of identity between two S's. ence' in the case of S is not so pinks. A very great deal might be said on this point. The formula is a statement of correlation. Psychologists have been peculiarly dull about this matter. its real quantity is the of 100 grams does not seem in weight direct observation to be 100 times as complex as a weight if a scarlet is really so many result of inference. Any careful introspection in the psychophysical this fact. S = relation between determines the magnitude of S is stated. .

" whether the logarithmic relation does not and the sensation. what We know just a about the process in the receptors in the retina and much more about the nervous impulses that follow in the fibers of the optic nerve. One thinks naturally of the conscious realities as immediate experience. He Even Fechner really belong the question as to raised the question of "inner psychophysics. Causality between the excitation of the nervous system may be only correlation. but no one is satisfied with causal action at a Always he wants to make the causal chain temporally and spatially continuous. as distance. to avoid. as the impalpable and imponderable stuff of thought contrasting with a hard objective matter. in ultimate knowlsaid. Hume edge. in a causal series. but physiological events all the motor muscles that utter stimulus. If we start with the visual stimulusobject. Interactionism asks the psychologist to give such flimsy mind-stuff a place in the rigid causal system of physical events. the we know from situation is when little physical and physiological optics the light strikes the retina. immediately wants to goes on between R and S. gaps in the series. series? we might establish certain from the retina to the vociway the sounds that describe the Where does the sensation appear in such a causal In terms of Cartesian dualism there is no satisfactory answer to this problem. We can trace the connections from the optic fibers to the thalamus and in the cerebrum. For instance we are pretty sure that a bright light gives rise to a greater frequency of discharges in the nerve than is the case with a dimmer light. It may well have been the disbelief that two .12 However. Let us take the case of visual sensation. he is Mind and Body not satisfied. know what. Nowadays the gaps are being filled. it some cases to the less occipital cortex of is Certainty gets conceivable that some day as we go inward.

However. because the system usually will not close. We may see what can be done toward putting them into a single closed system. there mystery. it might seem. In the early stages of research this like interactionism. for we seem in some unexpected manner to have bridged the chasm between the two worlds of mind and body. in this view. At any rate. With an increase of our knowledge of psychophysiology the view would come to resemble psychophysical parallelism. a mystery. and such is the purpose of the present book. parallels with it We tion is can see this popular difficulty in the interpretation of the Weber-Fechner function. mystery remains only so long consciousness is as we hold that direct experience. a sensation is a real datum or event to be fitted into a closed causal system by the method of view looks experimental correlation. which is another way of saying that the physical terms are just as impalpable as the psychological. proportional to the logarithm of the stimulus. if is proportional to the logarithm of ex- then we have. But. However. The psychological entities are just as pal- pable as the physical. because we find stimulation causing sensation or sensation causing movement.Correlation such different worlds can interact that led cause must 13 men to say that transfer of energy. Fechner thought he had. If the law means that excitais it no means that sensation citation. It evaporates as soon as we accept the conception of the present chapter about psychological reality. parallelism is unsatisfactory. The alternative is psychophysical parallelism: there is a physical event in the causal series. Ordinarily there is lacking knowledge of the neural term that the conscious event parallels. Thus. we have only a physical relationship. and the conscious event is separate but mean it. because . the data of introspection and the data of physics are at last coordinate and on all fours.

Ultimately. and conversely. A. in knowing about a. and. which deals both with the dualism of actuality and reality. that they are real. 1931. If we were to find a perfect correlation between sensation A and neural process a.. 187-213. conversely. see the author's dis- de Laguna. and the sensation and its process in the brain cannot be could still keep our prejudice in favor wished. if We of dualism we cise correlation which we had reason to believe never identify failed. At this stage of knowledge the parallelism is not precise. but not in experience nor in a world that exists independently of its being known. the ideal of parallelism must defeat itself. If introspection yielded A. Dualism and Gestalt ibid.14 then series of events Mind and Body we should know something about a continuous neural from stimulation to motor response. the exposition of the present book is based on the assumption that it is scientifically psychological data are of the ness is a physiological event. and the sensation would seem to parallel some middle part of this series. G. cussion of this matter in Psychol. 38. t 37. a prefully identified. chapter presents an abstract and difficult beginning to the undertaking in hand. and with . the physiologist would. and that. psychology. 1931. We must remember that A and a are both yield would inferred entities or events. if A always means a. knowledge of the nervous system. the author can offer no better excuse than that it has seemed to him necessary to clear out of the way some of the limitations that na'ive dualism habitually imposes upon the thought of psychologists. know about sensation. Rev. more useful to consider that all same kind and that conscious- Notes On the way the psychologist's circle and out. Cf. we should then it A and a. 177-182. there is If this no choice but to identify the two. While there is no possibility of disproving or proving dualism. however.

Ander Empfindungen. 2).. should dispel so simple a view. 62-69. Yokoyama's. E. esp. On osophers and psychologists have urged it. chology: 5. 4 Columbia Univ. 22. sect. see Text-book sect. Mach of 1930. 222-229. Contrib. 18881890.Notes the dualism of phenomena and the brain. the next to the last paragraph of the chapter. Psychology. it runs counter to dominant it but also is not novel. PsychoL. 39. mediately. 1927. his own convictions about the interpretative nature of introspection were formed when he was an observer in an experiment of M. 8. book of C. See.. 27. World-Order. /. T. in the availability of experience* is so firmly established that its denial almost in- view of conscious data to stimuli or is as responses The belief as stimuli to fit motor in 'direct responses bound to the inter- mediate genetic stage discussed evitably provokes dissent among the Ever since Descartes doctrine has been that to be conscious is to be aware psychologists. Die Realisierung. Avenarius and the standpoint of pure experience. 1924. of Titchener. 134138). n. f. trans... Mach. 1905. pp. Grundriss der Psychologie. 301-304. taken together with the role of the Auf- sion of 'independent* and 'dependent' experience is in R. 1930. 1910. PsychoL Rev. PsychoL. Eng. cf. 1929. 22- quoted Krause: "Problem: To carry out the self-inspection of the Ego. 119-123. 113-119. no. no. Versuche iiber Abstraktion. Systematic PsyProlegomena. see the present author's note on this experiment. see and various Eng. Mind and the 2. the more sophisticated view is not. 1896. The monistic doctrine of the present chapter may be difficult be- Kongr. esp. with which R. The present author favors The genis Kiilpe's solution to the problem of eral discussion of this matter con- the priority and posteriority of experience. 1886 et i. 1904. dominant of being conscious. Thus the . S. Divergent data and the need of introspective technique. gabe in introspection. Amer. From a limited acquaintance with the writings of philosophers. Bush. 6. However. J. I tinued in chap. however. P kilos. as putting the matter convincingly. In the latter work Titchener gives excellent summaries of the positions of Wundt (pp. 237f. Amer. 68. the author selects the recent Titchener. (also Arch. To experience is to know what is experienced. Avenarius's discus- is no problem in introspection. What the author regards as Kritik der reinen Erfahrung. 1915. to and PsychoL. trans. novel. ii. 98-113) and Avenarius (pp. d. Kiilpe. sect. i. worth on mental re- Wood action. See O. exper. Avenarius. I. 259-266.. Solution: It is carried out im- and Gestalt psychology and the concept of reaction stages. B." (See E. 5666-68. the author's discussion in Psychologies cf. 10. For Wundt's view that psychology deals with immediate experience and physics with mediate experience.. i. Wundt. Lewis. cause belief. Any 1912-1923. 35. for instance. PsyckoL. W. Ber. Phil- Pkilos.) But this is to say that there W. chap. 1929. alyse seq. 1897.

Tro- Psychophysiol- To the auis thor a perfect correlation iden- cgy. cf. or are really identical aldifferent. mental two classes of identified with and all events that interact. Holt goes more to physiology than to introspection for his terms. do not admit of consideration as spatial correlation. are not two events but the same event. The point of view of the preceding paragraph is that the burden of proof is upon dualism. the double-aspect theory. is another sophisticated rejection of Cartesian dualism. not upon monism. III. without any temporal or spatial differentiation at all. T. red. He is entitled to his view. If some one wishes to inthat red is a pair of perfect covariants. praeter necessitate. formulated at present. Psychol. Entia non sunt multiplicanda. they reduce to matters A response interpretation of simple correlation in time. 38. need for identification is no The less of consciousness. or are different as- the symptoms of it are perfect correlates. other three views involve respectively the correlation of events. parsimony was justified. Principles of 10.. ferentiate. must be in this context. author reads with sympathy and approbation E. though they seem to be There is no way of judging should we assume If amongst these four views. Holt's Animal Drive and the Learning Process. if there are not two distinct worlds Two together at the events that always occur same time in the same place. and references . simply because we idenwe cannot difbeing always itself. But why sist an pects of the same underlying Ding sick. In the The concern ories of the text in theis of mind and body purely Interactionism. The mind-body correlations. urgent in this case. as why from which to choose. but. these dualistic theories cannot be absolutely disproved. all face of perfect correlation tify. when one is ever William of Occam's principle of The jected in most scientific thought. formal identity. we cannot confound him. 1932. there cited.i6 Mind and Body tity. 1931. B. is Thus red. L. S. should the term matter? H. 1931. Interactionism implies a break in the physical causal system and thus is re- enough? it two. the identity theory negative. 87-108. or are parallel with each other. and the identification of aspects. these views recognize a fundaduality. psychophysical parallelism. so Langfeld's presidential address before the American Psychological Association. Rev. the correlation of aspects. Of course. as the text observes. On land.

To say with reason that a conscious a physiological event would not be to make it any less conscious. By the time of James Mill (1829). and the hard-headed monist is forced to include in his system. as they enter into it scientific psychology. We may hold to the faith that ultimately the conscious reality and the physiological reality should merge into a single identity. and yet speak persistently of consciousness. cannot be denied. For this reason the present chapter is about the fundamentals of consciousness. when the physiology of sensation had 17 . of the dualism of mind and body. a psychology that has to do with the world of consciousness Scientific as distinguished from the physical world. John Locke (1690) called the contents of consciousness ideas. Hume (1740) distinguished between impressions and ideas. we shall not need greatly to diverge from the conventional vocabulary of the psychophysical parallelist. consciousness. The thoroughgoing dualist is the naive behaviorist is who ignores consciousness. However. thus asserting that there something to be ignored in a world so different from his own world that he can safely disregard it. though it may be imperfectly ignored. Sensation and Attributes psychology began as introspective psychology. in the last chapter.Chapter 2 THE DIMENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS FOR datum is all our disparagement.

in Titchener's introspective laboratory at Cornell.g. Stumpf are sensations. were new kinds of this of mental elements. and made of psychology a kind of 'mental chemistry/ Sensations for him were the representative mental elements. James (1884) had held that emotions are characterized by their sensory content. In the last twenty years the pendulum has been swinging away from the failure to establish a multiplication of mental elements. them faint copies of impressions. inspired perhaps by the chemists' successes in filling in Mendel6yev's table. who impressed upon the science the doctrine of elements.. Other psychologists had argued that the simple feelings (e. the muscle sense. The images never quite gained an independent status.. and feelings. is seeking The most noteworthy Kulpe's Wiirzburg example search the effort of school (1901-1909) to find a new element of thought. the distinction between sensations and ideas had become clear. In a psychology that attempts to limit itself to a description of consciousness. sensations are but sensations whether they be aroused by central processes or by the stimulation of sense-organs. in the present century. the 'founder' of experimental psychology. The feelings. came experimentally to the conclusion that the simple feelings. Kulpe's new thought element started it swing- ing backward. Titchener in 1910) was holding to three classes of elements: sensations. Some psychologists. pleasantness and unpleasantin 1907) . or at least prevented psychologists from seeking further for new kinds of conscious data. and much later (1896) the feelings became for him an equally important class of elements. to Aristotle's five. introspective psychology (e. too.g. Hume had called and Klilpe (1895) had argued that they are centrally excited sensations.1 8 Dimensions of Consciousness advanced and Sir Charles Bell had added a sixth sense. Thus. began to give way before the sensations. images. It was Wundt (1874). Finally Nafe (1924).

extensity. Titchener could conclude (posthumously. as we as shall see in a moment. and attensity. for Wundt to assign the two attributes of quality and intensity to sensation. With sensation equated to consciousness the concept of sensation lost much of its significance. but Klilpe (1893) saw that extension and duration must be added to the list of attributes consciousness. 1929) that introspective psychology deals solely with sensory ma- No wonder terials. Wundt dealt with space and time in the mental world as providing forms of sensory organization. protensity. Conscious content is ipso facto sensory. Titchener (1908). in his opinion. which designates it as red or yellow or bitter or cold or C:#?. supposed to have only two As long sensation was . tinguished by to have an attribute of quality. no longer attributes. facing the problem of the description of attention. as the different sensory characteristics were called. intensity. Later (1924) he named them quality. are simply bright 19 and dull qualities of sensory pressure. Sensation had won the day. Fechner (1860) first their qualities. It was natural. therefore.Sensation and Attributes ness. Sensations have always been disEvery sensation can be said accomplished the measurement of sensations by measuring their intensity. if spatial and temporal forms are found in a visual extent as readily as a visual quality. Every one four attributes and Titchener held to five. now concluded that sensations have an attribute of clearness. except for the fact that they were. which thitherto had appeared in One can observe systematic psychology in sinister dynamic guise. For the differentiation of conscious terms it was natural for psychologists to look to the attributes of sensations. By these co-relative technical terms he gave the attributes professional status in psychology. that a sensation in passing from the margin to the focus of attention is really changing first admitted the its degree of clearness.

The relationship was never reversed in thought. In logical analysis the attribute and not the sensation is the mental element. However. quality as approximating a sensation. if all quality or all extension or all duration us say. One thinks of a perceived dot on a piece of paper attributes. because. a line would also be a row of sensations. Nevertheless the attributes must be independently you take away variable or they cannot be regarded as separate attributes. That which is essential to the existence of a sensation. gether Yet to introspection a line is a sensation like a single dot in all attributes except extensity. because it supposed the form to be a new element. a visual sensation. let left at all. This preoccupation with sensation as the mental element caused psychologists for nearly half a century to overlook the fact that it is the attribute. It ical was essentially this log- difficulty that the school of form-quality (1890-1899) sought unsuccessfully to solve unsuccessfully. since a is row of dots very close to- a line. whereas the solu- tion required an abandonment of elementarism. when extensity and what we may now refer to as protensity (duration) were added to the list of attributes. The attributes are not really isolable. one never had a red faintness or a bitter strength. trouble began. which . and. An intensity ing. as In the first was regarded decade of the present century the sensation an element because it was supposedly the simplest bit of conscious content ideally isolable in experience. a loud noise. everything was plain sailwas the individualizing attribute. a number of dots as a number of sensations.2O Dimensions of Consciousness and intensity. as Calkins argued. but which can be changed without change of other characteristics. Quality was always an intensity of a quality: a mild warmth. is an independent attribute of that sensation. and not the sensation. you have no sensation from. On this view a row of dots would yield a row of sensations.

where the degree of precision is his that of the psychophysical methods. and description tended to become phenomenological after the manner of the Gestalt school. The author has no quarrel with experimental phenomen- ology as a temporary procedure in a young science.Sensation and Attributes 21 becomes the object of observational attention. the concept of the attribute provided to consciousness. while the attribute is the immediate introspective datum. short-lived. In all introspective experimental work. Phenomenology provides no rigid . It may afford a necessary freedom after a period of slavery to the sensation and its attributes. with it the sensations. but not of the sensation as a whole. however. the attributes were left suspended in midair. The reign of the attribute was. freedom is dangerous and readily runs to license. just when the concept of sensation was losing its significance because it no longer served to classify a part of differentiae consciousness. Kiilpe (1904) realized this fact and raised the question as to whether the or whether times. with no sensations for them to be attributes of. The phenomenology of Gestalt psychology has in the last decade been making great headway. It doomed elementarism and With the sensation completely gone as a useful concept. the observer makes judgments of quality or of extent or of some other at- tribute. Thus it came about that. The result was that the attributes also disappeared as concepts. However. entire sensation ever actually exists as such in consciousness it is not merely an inferred reality built up out of attributive fragments which are realized at different Rahn (1913) subsequently pressed this argument home. The attributes gained sys- tematic importance because they were belatedly discovered to be the actual observational data of the quantitative introspective experiment. so that even Titchener (1915) was brought to explain that sensation is a logical systematic construct.

for Titchener never published on this topic and the present writer knows what he was thinking only from casual conversation and hearsay. .22 Dimensions of Consciousness rubrics for analysis and there lies in it the danger of a chaotic multiplication of descriptive terms and a consequent loss of the systematic integration that is necessary in a (ca. scribed the differentiation of the chemical is elements was 'qualitative. time. the description of any physical event. of as constituting a single dimension. and mass are the ultimates. As far as possible the realities of physical science are de- by reference to the c-g-s system.' Moreover. The Dimensions of Consciousness In order to understand the systematic role of the dimensions of consciousness we must turn to physical science. These exceptions and refinements need not bother us. and it is satisfactory science. This ideal is not always realized. Space. 1920) saw the way of the newest view of the attribute to the new pheadapting nomenology by the doctrine of conscious dimensions. and a young science do well to emulate it. Ideally the centithe second. always the model for psychology. 'Qualitative' distinctions have often to be used. and. any system Space and time are now in theoretical physics being thought subject to change. It is plain that each of these fundamental its dimensions of physics may contain dimensions within itself. and the gram provide sufficient terms for meter. Unfortunately there is no way of telling how nearly the author's views represent Titchener's. psychology may We must not let ourselves be confused by this use of the word dimension. Physics went far throughout a long period with like three dimensions. It appears that Titchener the concept of conscious dimensions that the author sets forth in the following paragraphs. until very recently.

Sensation varies in quality when the change is one of color. chology certainly cessors the old and protensity. However. but. which physics has used so successfully. has. and the line from gray to red has also been supposed to be qualitative. or from warmth to cold.Quality 23 Euclidean space. Titchener's fifth dimension. in the view of the present author. attensity. The exact nature of the qualitative continuum in each department is disputed. intensity. Hence it comes about that the conventional view posits three qualitative attributes: hue. become unnecessary. However. this view leaves intensity out of account. Modern psyneeds four dimensions: quality. It is conventional to consider brilliance as varying vertically in the pyramid and to think of the white-gray-black series as qualitative. degree of freedom in establishing a set of conscious dimensions. or from bitter to sweet. Thus saturation is left as the radial variable of the pyramid. is tridimensional. but we shall do well to summarize the status of the problem for each of the five senses present without entering into the controversial details. 2 so that conceptually we have a squared or bidimensional time. when we come to describe an acceleration in c-g-s terms. At any rate we can ignore it for the time being. i) has represent a solid qualitative continuum. whereas . we find that it must be expressed in terms of centimeters per second per second or cm. Time seems to be unidimensional. or from one odor to another./sec. We shall need the same . ( The dimensions to of consciousness are the immediate suc- attributes of sensation. white. ured circumferentially about the center. or of the pitch of tones. gray. and black are also sensory qualities. brilliance. and satura- yellow-green-blue-purple-red series tion. of sense For vision the color pyramid (Fig. extensity. The hues been supposed to are measand the red-orange- is the type of what is meant by a qualitative continuum.

Without the gray the central point would be simply a visual 'silence. brilliance varies vertically. vision.' and from it would run intensive series of more- . are obviously recent conception supposes to be included in the pyramid. Miiller's notion of a constant gray (arising perhaps in the brain independently of stimulation of the retina) added to every other quality. E. In the conventional view the pyramid is Hue ways tive of regarding the pyramid as showing a combination of the qualitaand intensive dimensions. is a hollow shell and that radial lines that the pyramid A in all directions from the central point are White really intensive reen THE COLOR PYRAMID field of varies circumferentially around the figure. saturation varies radially from the central axis out to the periphery. See the text for The color pyramid illustrates the qualitative dimension in the solid.24 Dimensions of Consciousness intensive changes. continua. Such a view adopts G. if they occur at all in vision.

tones have been said to have a qualitative attribute of Vocality'. Perhaps the continuum is a spiral and thus bidimensional. even though we may dispute some of the alleged instances of its variation. in spite of far from being solved. much more probable that 'brightness' is simply a better descriptive term for the high pitches.Quality ing to the direction of the line. but no decision is necessary here. yellow. volume must be an extensive dimension. a system of seven qualities a constant gray. and cold. particular orange may have equal intensities of red and yellow. accordstill simpler relationship. Some psychologists think that tones vary in brightness and dullness independently of their changes in pitch and other qualitative aspects. and red. but there is no evidence that Vocality' is a new qualitative dimension. and 'dullness' for the low pitches. Because particular pitches characterize the different vowels. The noises can be regarded as complex combinations of incompletely established tones. orthodox opinion supports the existence of four qualities: pressure. This last view seems to the A author the most obvious and the most probable solution of the relation of visual quality to visual intensity. pain. Such perceptions as roughness or wetness are 'touch blends' . green. If tones have volume. white and black of variable intensity. Thus a poorly saturated red is a low intensity of red combined with the constant gray. have merely to recognize that We quality pertains to visual sensation. and a reddish orange a greater intensity of red than of yellow. The problem as to what makes the tonal series repeat is itself in successive changed pitch. In hearing the qualitative dimension is probably just the linear series of tonal pitches from the lowest audible tone to the highest. but it is octaves. In the somesthetic sense. warmth. Many color theories imply a 25 and-more red or orange or pink or white or black. blue.

26 Dimensions of Consciousness of these principal qualities qualitative-intensive-extensiveprotensive patterns. and equilibration furnish nothing new. then. and bitter. salt. of which these six principal classes represent the corners (Figs. and burned. ethereal. putrid. Heat might be a fifth principal quality it is aroused by simultaneous excitation of cold and is is warmth and the point in dispute yet introspectively different from either. Henning has suggested that the taste continuum is taste certain. but and need not be stressed here. 2). The conventional view assigns . spicy. and the perception of the movement are all patterns of the fundamental qualities. 4). He has also presented a great deal of evidence to show that all odors can be thought of as located in the surface of a triangular prism. and smell the qualitative continua are also unis no doubt about the existence of four principal qualities: sweet. the surface of a tetrahedron with these four qualities For each at one of the four corners (Fig. Nafe has recently argued on experimental grounds that the only qualitative differences in somesthesia are brightness and and that the differences between pressure. Hundizziness. In general. but is consciously nothing but the knowing by a person of his own of a member because behavioral tendencies. firmation. we see that the gross facts of the qualitative dimension are known for each of the five senses and as that the details are disputed. thirst. He has named six principal classes of odors: fragrant. resinous. In taste there areal. The internal organs and the mechanisms of articulation ger. Appetite does not even have a fixed sensory basis. This prismatic system has been verified an inexact approximation by several investigators. In smell Henning has contributed the most modern and generally accepted theory. 3. This is a radical theory and still needs condullness. of brightness. and cold are intensive-extensive-protensive patterns warmth. However. pain. sour.

1916. and a plausible unconventional view assigns seven discrete qualities to Taste and smell are thought of as involving areal continua. Henning. There is no reason to suppose that these systems might not later dissolve into discrete qualities if and weet FIG. . such a view prevails for somesthesia and vision. The difference between a sight and a sound is like the difference between a red and a yellow in that it is a difference in the qualitative dimension. Hearing. The figure supposed to be hollow. 2 HENNING'S TASTE TETRAHEDRON The is tetrahedron illustrates the qualitative dimension in taste. however. seems to require a linear qualitative continuum. After H. with four principal points of reference for taste vision. It should be said that the differences between the senses are also supposed to be qualitative. and there is at present no theory as to how a few principal tones could mix to give all the others. six for smell. Der Geruch.Quality 27 four discrete principal qualities to somesthesia.

capable of . In vision intensive variation is obscured by the Putri Ethereal Burnec lesinous Spicy FIG. most obvious as a dimension of vision and Extensity touch. tastes and smells may be strong or weak. and colds may be great or mild. After H. This figure also supposed to be hollow. to every sense. pains. which makes every sensory into an intensive-qualitative pattern. warmths. 3 HENNING'S SMELL PRISM The prism illustrates the qualitative dimension in smell. both common-sense experience and analogy with the other senses demand the validation of intensity for vision. pressures. 1916. However.28 Dimensions of Consciousness this For purposes of immediate description although we shall need to examine it The intensitive dimension applies view may stand. and we have seen above how is it probably enters in. is datum existence of the constant gray. Der Geruch. Henning. carefully in chapter 6. Tones and noises may be loud or faint. The retina and the skin are areal organs.

difficult. Tones have been shown to vary in volume or size. two tive only at accurate. Physiological considerations indicate that extensity. although some recent research fails to confirm earlier quantitative findings as to tonal volume. The perception of habitual in both senses. In hearing the external auditory situation is effectwo points. the direction determined by the In vision spatial are projected upon an areal retina. and the primary localization seems to be unidimensional in the right-left direction. and the simplest 'pat- . and the visual patterns perception of bidimensional form is relatively simple and relative position of the ears. The examples are selected from almost three hundred substances and objects which Henning places more or less definitely in the prism. should also exist for hearing.Intensity differential stimulation and Extensity 29 by spatial patterns. but the case is peculiarly THE SMELL PRISM DEVELOPED The three sides of the prism of Fig. although spatial gustatory patterns #re usually obscured because they are comform is bined with tactual patterns in the mouth. and almond for durian fruit. The figure substitutes the more familiar grapefruit for Henning's shaddock. if it exists for three senses. 3 are opened put. the two ears. as well as giving specific examples for some of his general groups. Presumably extenspatial sity is similarly applicable to taste. of odorous objects whose smells belong in the various and examples continua are given. Of course sounds are localized.

and thus does not come For similar reasons we are not likely to become aware of the extension of smells. With more noses we might do better. especially if they were relatively meaningless readily into observation. Any sensory datum can vary in duration or can contribute to temporal patterns.30 terns' Dimensions of Consciousness are linear.' who could argue that observation is instantaneous and that duration cannot be observed because it The transition does not exist at any one moment for observation. from the doctrine of attributes to the docis so easy that one is apt to lose sight of the fact that the latter combines the freedom of phetrine of dimensions nomenology with the systematic organization of abandoned elementarism. The description of consciousness now re- sembles the description of a picture. widely separated upon the face. in a particular instance. One knows about probecause one knows about it. nevertheless he assumes a responsibility to relate his account to the known dimensions of .The psychologist ficial is not forced to make an arti- analysis into elements. We do not with smells have a purely olfactory localization because the two nostrils are located practically at the same point. The question as to when one observes a duration is to be answered by saying that one cannot accomplish the observathat every fact is tensity. With a picture one simply describes the qualitative-intensive-extensive pattern. Presumably sounds have extensity.. but is not representative of any external it is since their extension reality. Protensity offers few difficulties. For consciousness one adds the protensitive dimension and extends the qualitative account over the various sense-de- partments. It is only the dualistic believer in 'direct experience.' The thesis of this book is that nothing is 'directly observed/ The only an implication. tion until the duration is completed. difficulty that arises in respect of protensity is the question as to whether it can be 'directly observed.

there We in cases of necessity. With such a defiant apology we may address ourselves to the task of formulating a physiological psychology of the dimensions of consciousness in the light of the scientific evidence available to-day. and the way to make psychology 'objective' or monistic is not to ignore consciousness but to bring it into a monistic scientific system* Consciousness turns out to be. further than the full introspective and physiological data have become so closely related that we cannot distinguish the one from the other. and many. At present the appeal must be in part to introspection. not only to would never have been a psychology if there had not been a problem of consciousness. The sensory data are organized in respect of at least four conscious dimensions: quality.Dimensional Description consciousness or to show cause as to 31 departs from why he them summarize the present discussion. but also to lay down the program for succeeding chapters. the underof the physiology of the dimensions of consciousstanding ness. and protensity. sensory. perhaps most. complete knowledge of the psy- A chology of sensory data would be an approximately complete knowledge of consciousness. All obser- A vation is subject to the errors of inference. There is no prospect that psychology will shortly comit plete that task. We have nothing to seek account of mental organization in respect of these dimensions. The immediate task before us is. and fearful of speculation. . are now in a position." is a little speculation. For all the objectivists and behaviorists have said. but we shall not be satisfied until intensity. but speculation must be must undertake it. if one speaks accurately and carefully about it. extensity. "I see a green. therefore. speculation in this sense even the introspective statement. of the hypotheses of to-day may eventually have to be abandoned. In so doing much risked. There is no reason to be is an interpretation.

had performed the Hegelian synthesis by showing that either Talbot or Calkins ing Nafe. Calkins. M. Ber. The person who becomes in this 308-313.. are to be found in O. Titchener. 1913. Washburn. 1929. n. 5O7-544. Titchener's conclusion that there attribute. decade earlier the been raised as to Sensation and Attributes convincing identification of came about. had said that the attribute must be the element. PsychoL 67. Feeling tention (op. Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention. B. ibid. PsychoL. a fifth and Atis Titchener's reply. foredoctrine of the con- scious dimensions by admitting. F. no. The 1931. Versuche iiber Abstraktion.. feeling with sensation B. his book shadows 1915. of its ning of this chapter can be found in the author's A History of Experimental Psychology. 87^2. and for see ex- Sensation and 26. Amer. 171-206. 258-267.. d. and remarks about the con- scious actual and the psychic The relation of bright pressure to affectivity. cit.These results. 1899. that the material Rahn. 445-462. E. 4. 1908. An experimental the affective qualities. 1904. see E. had given the argument for sensation. B.. On Titchener's sion ultimate concluof tainly tique. psychology.. 506-514. Rev. 6. 1929. exposed the logical and Systematic Psychology: Prolego- mena. A question had whether the sensation or the attribute is the true mental element. 1908. pressure correlate of emotion. PsychoL Rev. Hunt. W. see W. study of ]. 3-30. Rahn. so . Ktilpe's experiment (with in W. the elementaristic position as represented by Titchener: C. Talbot. 1924. but from the introspective experiments of J. upon the is right. The 1895. Psycho!. ii. dependdefinition of element. von Frey and Stumpf (cf.. 265f. Rev. ibid. E. Monog. ]. L. Kiilpe. f.Dimensions of Consciousness Notes Details of the historical in de- hibits the state of sophisticated in- velopment outlined the begin- trospective elementarism as date. but for his epistemology see his Die Realisierung. The relation of sensation difficulties of On see the general systematic probits to other categories in contemporary lem of sensation and attributes. Titchener. 600-605. his system. ibid. 35. regarded at first with some Bryan) on the separability of perceptual tion characteristics his observareal skepticism. 1912-1923. influenced by Kiilpe Stumpf. Philos. PsychoL. 43. 81-121 ). Amer. I Kongr.. Localization of bright 1932. 154-166. A. M. have been confirmed in other researches. and dull Amer. 16. Titchener. 1902. 44. Thus clearness. PsychoL. systematic issue should cerread Rahn's excellent cri- psychology is best characterized by the word sensory. P. /. 56-68.). cxper. Philos. interested and dull pressure. not from the arguments of Bourdon.

1924. 30if. J.Notes it 33 is essential validity of tions. protensity. that both saturation that regions of the skin between the spots sometimes responded to pre- and brilliance. is had something of this sort in mind. Wiss. pr. 1928. in Gesichtsempfin- d. and cold spots. Rev. KL. like is leagues. 1920. Psychol. For all this nobody seems to have said right out that the color pyramid is a hollow surface.. the tendency has been to . Titch- den. The tale of the somesthetic qualities seemed to be fixed for the skin when Blix in 1883 discovered the Amer. However. He introduced the terms.. 3iof. Titchener alive did not always confirm the author's interpretations of his views. Rich's investigation of the number of attributes by the method of liminal differences. See also R. the Rahn's objecregrettable black and dark intensity an increase of and not a decrease. however. 1917. 48-75.. Hearing. no explication of the His students and his col- and that they mix in varying degrees which are matters of relative intensities. was a live problem.. 35. The Amer. points on the surface are lines of increasing intensity. as well as sumably inadequate stimuli. warmth.. Akad. Dimensions of Consciousness Papers bearing on the relation of quality to intensity in the color pyramid are those of K. Abh.. their combinations. that the center can be regarded as the point of zero intensity. supposed then that there are four kinds of receptors in the skin and that each of these receptors mediates one of these principal quali- 311-318. Dimmick. and that Titchener never published on the dimensions of consciousness. 30. 1929. and Goldscheider added the pain spots in the following year. Amer. of the Twenty years ago the question number of tonal attributes view. that radial lines from the center to all This theory persisted in spite of the fact that separate nerve-endings could not be established and ties. G.. L. 156. and in a twelve-line note. k. 1923. J. 34. ibid. 36.. 31. It was pressure.. 35. M. It is seems to the present author. knew that he including the present aufelt that he was so obviously the immediate consequence of theories that it in possession of the right key to the of introspective description mind. Stumpf. that there are six qualities besides constant gray but there doctrine. 1924. Yet Titchener and the others that the dimension. Kohler and G. 1919. d. phil. author's view. ReVesz investigated the matter at length. thor. Hering's or Ladd-Franklin's has no right to claim orig- and the author has presented in this chapter what he believes to have been approximately Titchener's inality. W. J. 83-90. Og- Die Attribute dungen. that the approach to In the somesthetic field at large. Psychol. J. attensity it is only the persistence of constant gray that prevents these relationships from being obvious. F. ibid. The status of the problem is shown in G. ener. J. are matters of intensity.-hist. Psychol. 121-164. Psychol. Rich.

extensive .protensive patterns. Ever since E. six organic qualities (18) nausea. H. cardiac sensation. Nafe. 1884). (Goldscheider. 1915. (Mach. The psychol- sensibility. There was never any good ground for believing that the qualities from the muscles. Since a list Rev. (20) (21) pulmonary sensation. T^16 pendulum is swinging far back from multiplicity to simplicity. R. and nausea. 1927. PsychoL. Weber (1846). pressure by 1920 the list might be said to have been reduced to the first nine items. put together in intensive . 1889). somesthetic pressure. Amer. vestibular translation sensation 1875). and C.' In the preceding list (15) -(21) can be asserted to be either inten- ogy of felt experience. deep (Blix. (19) sex. pressure 1884). so sure (Goldscheider. Luce. 1920. tried to appetite (Carlson. with some doubt as to whether the distinctions between the different kinds of presunique. 31. heat.. E. 367-389. differing only in pattern.. G. hunger. but on ence. joints. vestibular for 1917. it may be well to give it here. Psy306-331 or. (17) thirst. deep prick (5) (6) (7) (Head. quick pain (Becher. claim and the date of Cf. 3. not on research. the . 39. (15) (16) pain. /. Exper. sensory data like argued on the basis of introspective experiments that the somesthetic qualities are only brightness and dullness. multiply qualities. and repletion. Amer. 1889). in 1907-1909 listed these six and also satiety. J. were and tendons (io)-(i2). lar (Blix. Boring and A. PsychoL. has never been printed. (13) ampullar sensation and the different kinds of pain is were valid. Cf. 443-453. pressure. together with the name of the investigator who established its as appetite and thirst. 1889). cold 1883). See J. It this view that the are qualities merely saf- or dizziness (Mach. 28. a knowledge in sometimes of in behavioral E. 21 3f. 1920. patterns. (14) or sense of 1875). Psy- his publication. 1883). the qualities into a single The last areal figure. (8) (9) heat (Alrutz. and now Nafe has depend.. Warmth. fullness (of the stomach). In the second decade of the present century there were about a score of supposed somesthctic qualities. chol. (4) pain (Goldscheider. 1905). P. common experiMeumann. 1915). J. 1915). (10) (Head. 95f. tickle. 1905).34 Dimensions of Consciousness sive-extensive-protensive patterns of see the author's analysis (i)-(i4) of thirst. Amer. on appetite. all pain and the rest are qualita- and shudder have been repeatedly mentioned in connection with the Gemeingejuhl or 'common itch. 22. cold. pain 1883). Psychol. Mach's sensation disappeared want ty-one somesthetic qualities: (i) Griffith of support. warmth. and cold (and perhaps heat) that seems est at the present moment. Titchener bine all com- hunger. muscular (11) pressure articu- (Goldscheider. disposed of dizziness as a pressure (Blix. (12) tendinous strain (Goldscheider. (2) (3) contact special quality.. About 1915 a psychologist might have made a reasonable case for the following twen- chol. however. tively similar. warmth *897). /. However.

6 (pp. .. 1922. /.). Findley. n6f. In hearing the facts are not quite clear. Der Geruch. 1927. See H. That protensity can become an object of extensity was shown Duration and tis. of number studies Psychol. Psychol. F. Psychol. not whereas sharply bounded. that it is thus an im1916. directly observation as by the J. There have been a taste forms are forms. on the protensitive dimension.. since contours are easily dein chap. /. Curtemporal 27. The qualitative continua for veloped tactual visual and smell are Henning's taste tetrahedron and smell prism. N. confirming the smell prism in the gross and contradicting it in detail. Dimmick. see chap. 80-85. 184-186). 34. 423-425.. judgment. present book takes the position that a protensive pattern is real. these figures have been accepted jaute de mieux. does not have to be regarded as Rev. L. MacDonald. and 80-98 for smell. 33. 127-145. 1-46. 43^-445. The and that it therefore ibid. See the detailed discussion of the research volume in the text on tonal and notes of as chap. 4 (pp. 1924. for 'direct in observation/ general and somesthesia is the basis of most of the work on space perception.. 33. 497513 for taste.Notes further discussion of this matter in In these two fields different laws apply. K. 1922. See M. pp. plication. 321-335Extensity in the realms of vision existing at some instant However. 35. Amer. 535-553.. ibid. 5. A. 171-181. 1916. E. Henning. Since there had never been any such figures before and since smell had always been a great problem. Amer.

A single nerve-fiber responds to excitation with only one intensity. The applicability of this principle to all sensory and motor fibers is no longer doubted. Obviously some new theory of intensity is required. However. a corresponding increase in the degree of central excitation. Research in the experimental physi- ology of nerve-conduction has considerably extended our knowledge within the last dozen years. we must take time to understand the nature of nervous excitation. the excitable fiber is more like a train gunpowder which has the energy of 'excitation' inherent in itself. before we consider the possibilities of a theory of intensity.Chapter 3 INTENSITY the older physiological psychology a convenient ignorance allowed a simple solution of the problem of intensity. if set off at all. and which. and hence an increase in sensory intensity. this simple theory became untenable when physiologists discovered the all- or-none law of the nerve-impulse. 36 . of various of However. transmits the disturbance by consuming itself with a maximal expenditure of energy that depends only upon the amount of powder in the train. It was supposed that an increase in stimulation means an increase in the amount or the degree of the IN nerve-impulse in all the nerve-fibers affected. and the presumption is that it must apply similarly to the neurons of the central nervous system. The case is not like that of an electric wire that can conduct currents amounts.

allowing the nerve-impulse to pass only from axon to dendrite and not in the opposite direction. which form a complex network. always passes in only one direction through the neuron. A called axons. the afferent fiber (dendrite) that runs from it to the central nervous system (spinal cord or brain). because an individual can be said to be conscious only with the achievement of certain functional relationships which the nervous system makes possible. and branched. It is. and the fibers that conduct consists essentially The nervous system system of interconnecting neurons. numerous. The synapse presumably has its numerous is it special properties. the organ of mind. in a sense. The axon is usually a long single fiber. under normal conditions. The fibers that conduct impulses inward are called dendrites. and this juncture between two dendrites. the long afferent fibers that lead them outward are from the sensory receptors to the central nervous system are and many of the neurons of the brain have elaborately branched axons and dendrites. It is conventional to speak of the integrative units in the nervous system as reflex arcs. and the efferent fiber (axon) that passes outward to the effector (the ending in a muscle . neurons that is called a synapse. of a complex neuron is a nerve-cell with conducting fibers. Ordinarily the dendrites are short. However. It is because of the connection of neurons through synapses that the impulse. The reflex arc consists of a receptor (the sensitive cell in a sense-organ). The ends of an axon are in close conjunction with the ends of dendrites. but most important function acts like a valve. generally one or more neurons in the central nervous system.Reflex Arc 37 Nerve Excitation The nervous system is the chief integrating system of the individual organism.

learned. conduct in only one direction. and not We there would allow the formation of patterns of excitation which would form fairly freely even though the fibers them- from one another and can. in the new nervous system just forming in the embryo. the all-or-none law. the afferent and the efferent. As a matter of fact. autoand unconscious.. The nerve-impulse in a single fiber follows.ooi sec. the reflex arc may be very long and complicated indeed. This period of inexcitability is called the absolute refractory period. not even with the strongest stimulus. every effector. for it means that in man we should probably never. at least potentially. the psychologist who adopts a principle of selves are insulated parsimony in thinking about nervous connections. Intensity A true reflex is supposed to be fixed.oi sec. even in warm-blooded animals.38 fiber or gland). any stimulation affects. We must remem- ber this latter figure. and now-a-days psychologists speak of variable. as we have said. After the fiber has been excited once. knee-jerk is even thought to involve only two neurons. on account of the synapses. In short. Reflexes. However. and that only as specific relationships are established the system develops. get impulses aroused in a single fiber at a rate greater than one . is almost sure to go wrong. Usually many neurons are all of them are connected in a simple can hardly guess intelligently at what happens in the brain. and it is improbable that it is ever less than o. The period may in a cold-blooded animal be almost as long as o. the conception of the arc is too simple. even those reflexes that are confined to the spinal cord. series. The reflex matic. it cannot be immediately excited again. One modern view is that.. are not so fixed and stable as they were once supposed to be. involving few neurons. but we can see that the elaborate network involved. conscious reflexes as conditioned reflexes.

Adapted from E. Time interval after initial excitation FIG. After the absolute refractory period there is a relative refractory period^ during which excitability this period the fiber gradually returns to the fiber. strictly period. possible limited by the length of the refractory however. Adrian. 5 EXCITATION CURVE FOR NERVE-FIBER the strength of stimulus necessary to excite a nervetime after an initial excitation. Fig. No stimulus can be strong enough to arouse a series rates weak stimulus impulses.01 Sees. It is a consequence of this function that a continued strong stimulus can excite a fiber with rapid successive discharges. The times are shorter in warm-blooded animals. and that a continued of discharge of a fiber are. The gives rise to a slower rate of successive . and during is for excitation it the strength of stimulus necessary continuously reduced until it reaches the Relative refractory period c o 2 -a r I o .Nerve Excitation 39 thousand per second. 5 shows how excitability returns after an initial stimulation. fiber at various intervals of The curve shows normal threshold value. At the beginning of can be excited only by a very strong stimulus.005 . D. These values are for the frog.

in by constructing the membrane theory Physiologists have sought to account for these phenomena of nerve-conduction. which is being restored after the passage of the impulse. The membrane theory supposes that the nerve-fiber is surrounded by a very permeable to small ions hydrogen ions (Fig. correctness of this theory need not concern us here. separated intervals longer than the total (absolute relative) to set + refractory period.4O of impulses. MEMBRANE THEORY OF NERVE-CONDUCTION Hypothetical and schematic. 6). Direction of impulse. Foundations of Experimental Psychology (1929). Adapted from A. It assumes further that the nerve is polarized about the memthat is thin membrane like the electrically positive . is shaded. It The is a useful picture for fixing the facts in mind. and the membrane. Thus the diagram also shows the refractory periods. The impulse is traveling from left to right. Unless there is summation. ^ Membrane-4- Normal excitable fiber FIG. It consists of a local current as the positive and negative ions unite when the membrane becomes permeable. The permeable membrane is shown in white. The semi-permeable membrane is shown black with the positive ions on the outside and the negative ions on the inside. and this current renders permeable the membrane ahead of it so that the impulse continues on. separated Intensity by intervals shorter than the absolute is refractory period. no stimulus weak enough by up a series of excitations. Forbes.

This local current. are concentrated on the outside. They all deal primarily with the peripheral nervous system. inexcitable in the absolute refractory period. and a local current flows from the outside to the inside. . and (3) the volley theory. leaving the larger negative ions on the inside. There are at present three important theories of intensity: (i) the multiple fiber theory. it begins to recover. first. Such a situation all the current moves the way progressive and the site of along the fiber to its end. the membrane remains ineffective. Now we know enough about the elementary physiology of the nervous system to come back to the problem of intensity. however. one of the four dimensions of consciousness. however. the difference in and the fiber passes gradually potential the relative refractory period to the normal resting through reestablished. At after the current has passed. passing through the membrane. this theory summarizes the accepted facts with sufficient accuracy for our purposes. nevertheless Fig. the membrane is rendered completely permeable or is destroyed. so that positive ions. All these relations are shown in Nowadays physiologists give a less thorough credence to the membrane theory than formerly. but it is supposed to be a property of the neuron as a living cell. electric current or maintains a difference of electrical potential between the When the fiber is stimulated by an by mechanical action. the membrane be- impermeable is to negative ions. In the resting nerve the membrane outside and the inside. and the comes fiber is Presently. makes the membrane permeable site is in the next adjacent region and thus the of the local current moves on. the difference of potential has been discharged. which is based on the first two. but they carry implications for consciousness. (2) the frequency theory. 6. state again. The theory does not explain how this recovery takes place.Nerve Excitation 41 brane.

42 Intensity The Multiple Fiber Theory The upon multiple fiber theory supposes that intensity depends the number of fibers excited. so that the bright stars are visible whether their images center upon cones or between them. . or else a stellar when centered upon when centered between image. However. It is plain that the first cause of dispersion lies in the defects of the eye as an optical instrument. The quanta would be too numerous and too small to be detected by psychophysical measurement. the great star Betelguese. For instance. incorrectly. there must also be irradiation visible in the retina. these intense points of light upon the retina are blurred in being refracted. there is other evidence of retinal dispersion. In vision peripheral irradiation is suggested The by the phenomenon of the 'magnitude' of the stars. Moreover. which is supposed to be about 240 million miles in diameter. that there should be spread or irradiation at the periphery. theory demands that a strong stimulus should be capable of affecting a large number of receptors in the sense-organ. a distance less than one ten-thousandth of a millimeter and about one hundredth of the distance between two visual receptors (cones). where the perceived 'magnitude' is a function of the brilliance of the star and not of its actual diameter. barely a cone. The absolute threshold for might be reached when only a single fiber is excited. would become invisible cones. and intensity would then increase by quanta as more-and-more fibers became excited by an increasingly intensity energetic stimulus. to be a continuous function of the stimulus with an infinite number of intensities available. of arc. subtends on the retina only an angle of about 0. and intensity would thus appear.047 sec.

The deforma- tensions within the skin tion of the skin increases with the pressure upon it. ordinarily find certain colors diminishing and then others. may penetrate deeper to additional There is also evidence that the separate receptors in the skin do not act in isolation but are interrelated like the receptors in the retina. and whites. A small purple disk. grays. large stimulus. However. may turn dark blue and then black. so that in the outer zones there would we should be only the blacks. of purple paper before the eye We and cannot place a large sheet see three zones purple. surrounded by blue. Two pressures at adjacent points. because the larger the moved from the stimuli the larger the zones. does not have to be so bright as a A small one. and the must increase with the deformation. surrounded by black. A very warm widespread the skin. though each is too weak to be felt alone. Irradiation on the skin may be mechanical. nerve-terminations. effect or a very cold stimulus would have a more than a stimulus near the temperature of When the load it is increased upon a needle as a stimulus to pain. 43 upon we find evidence in the experiment the least perceptible brightness. may together give . In passing from the center to the periphery of the a duration.Multiple Fiber Theory For instance. to be visible. The entire field purple because the stimulus is now so large that the central zone of best color-vision extends to the limits of the is field of vision. colors. The same is The retina retina first. nor does a stimulus of long duration have to be so bright as a brief stimulus in order to be seen. In this experiment the size and duration of the stimulus must be controlled. the zones are hard to map. center to the periphery of the field of vision of a single eye. There is for intensity a summation within an area and throughout sort of phenomenon happens with most sensitive to colors in a central zone.

the cochlea. The exact action of a tonal stimulus within the inner ear is. In hearing. disputed. It is almost inevitable. however. So much is One way theory assumes that a weak tone extends only a little into the cochlear tube. whereas a strong tone extends far into the tube and excites many receptors. Sometimes the relationship it is reversed. When the upper window is pressed in. Higher pitches are excited close to the entrance to the cochlea and low pitches at the other end. canal through a The tube is The sound waves enter the upper membrane-covered window and escape from the lower canal through a similar window. touching a hair on the skin arouses positive anatomical fact. the partition-membrane is pressed down. The terminations of the fibers are closely inter- penetrated. that a more intense stimulus should affect a greater number of fibers. There many nerve-terminations in the skin. This theory accords well with the multiple fiber theory of intensity. just as excitation. and one fairly strong pressure inhibits the effect of another that occurs near are and at the same time. The other theory of tone is the resonance theory. and thus to excite their nerve-fibers.44 rise Intensity to a single sensation. The receptors are hairthe organ of Corti in the inner ear. and conversely. The movement of the partition-membrane is such as to drag the hairs of the receptors across a fourth membrane that lies upon them. and a great deal of the skin is supplied by fibers from more than one nervetrunk. It assumes that different fibers in the mem- brane of the partition resonate to different frequencies of tone. every stimulus inevitably comes into relation with a large cells in number of receptors. This organ lies on a membranous partition which separates an upper and a lower canal in a coiled tube. therefore. exciting a few receptors. and the lower window is pressed out. This theory lends . filled with a liquid lymph.

and this area ought. mm. which we shall discuss presently. on cones to the other figure of 542 brightnesses that seems to support the multiple fiber theory. for spatial differentiation in the t^sts of acuity.2 mm. It might be that an intense tone of 256 cycles would spread farther on either side of the fiber tuned to 256. = the side. That left 542 brightnesses for the cones. would include cones of sensitivities extending over the entire range.2 mm. and.04 sq.04 sq. Hecht assumed that the cones are differently sensitive. Hecht then noted the fact that visual acuity. In poor illumination only one cone in such an area might be excited. the retinal receptors that mediate vision in very low illumination.. The multiple fiber theory has received support in the case of vision from a very interesting calculation by Hecht. 33 x i'2o" 40'. Hecht observed in Konig's classical data on the discrimination of brightness. on the retina. ths . than a weak tone of the same frequency. mm. increases with the illumination. and thus excite more receptors. the discrimination of spatial contours. whereas in very poor illumina- tion the separation between the contours may have to be as much as 33 times as great.Multiple Fiber Theory itself 45 best to the frequency theory of intensity. that there should be 572 discriminably different brightnesses from the least to the greatest. but it is not necessarily incompatible with the multiple fiber theory. would be 0. An area on the retina. which represents about 0. The only difficulty with this view is that an intense tone ought then to be a complex of pitches. to contain about 540 cones. On certain other grounds he assumed that 30 of these brightnesses result from the functioning of the rods. In good illumination contours can be separately distinguished when separated on the retina by i'2o" of arc. the organs of daylight vision. from certain data of Helmholtz's. It is the approximation of this figure of 540 0. and that a sample area of 0.

however. and Hecht favors a combination of the two theories.2 Intensity next excited cone would.e. as increasing illumination continues to overtake their spective thresholds. and they find that the action currents show a rapid succession of discharges which becomes more rapid when the . Such a conclusion is wise. the thresholds of about by the bringing into excitation of additional receptors. in averaged results. about the same number of quanta of brightnesses. away. the facts is less when intensity is less. because acuity ever. sociates leave when a normally adequate stimulus is applied to the receptors. and acuity would become greater. They have recorded action currents in sensory nerves nerve-fibers involved. re- This theory requires further complication to explain how many cones in a single area can contribute collectively to a single intensity and at the spatial differentiation in perception. are just as inescapable as the facts of spatial summation and irradiation. in the next adjacent area. even though it must remain unsatisfactory until the way in which the two factors work together has been made out. The Frequency Theory The frequency theory attributes increase in intensity to an increase in the frequency of the impulses in each of the The researches of Adrian and his asno doubt as to this fact in the peripheral nerves.. Thus there might. How- upon which the frequency theory of intensity founded. i. There are. cones act collectively for is same time act separately to give Hecht assumes that the intensity and differentially for acuity.46 0. cones lying closer together would be excited. have to be about mm. As illumina- more and more cones would be reached. be 540 quanta of acuity. on the average. Hence it is easy to suppose that increase in brightness comes tion increased.

and moving the cat's hairs. thus showing that it is not due to a Volley' of discharges from a large a logical number of receptors of different latent periods. a weaker stimulus is below the threshold and does not excite at all. A A continuing stimulus will excite the fiber later in the relative refractory period and arouse a slower rate of discharges. They have plotted the curves which show frequency as a function of stimulation. They have also found it for variation of the energy of light in the eye of an eel. 5 again. in the receptor to give time for the arousal of at least a diminishing frequency of . They have found this relationship for variation of tension upon a muscle. Conversely the intervals will The never be shorter than the absolute refractory period. As a matter of fact. matter how All this is This result comes about because the process in the receptor may persist longer than the stimulus. intervals between discharges will never be longer than the total refractory period. necessity from the nature of the excitation curve of the strong continuing stimulus a fiber early in the relative refractory period and will excite weaker give rise to a rapid succession of discharges. an abrupt stimulus of very short duration can also. arouse different intensities in perception. as it is varied in degree.Frequency Theory 47 stimulation is more vigorous. light touch on the cat's toe-pad. the result follows almost as nerve-fiber. no strong the stimulus is. See Fig. However. pressure against the toe-pad of a cat. A quick thrust upon the toe-pad of the cat excites a process in the receptor that dies out relatively slowly. In one experiment this result has been obtained from a single muscle fiber. pricking the skin. Thus one always has enough continuation of the process impulses in the nerve-fiber. true for a continuing stimulus. A stronger quick thrust excites a stronger process that fades away even less rapidly because there is more of it to fade away.

7 FREQUENCY THEORY OF INTENSITY IN AFFERENT NERVE-FIBERS WITH A CONTINUOUS STIMULUS The process in the receptor falls off under adaptation.. The excitatory process in is maximal at first but decreases continuously under adaptation.^l^. The stimulus is as continuous in amount. We to accept the facts indicated in the first three curves reserve judgment as to why the sensation itself and to seems smooth. and Adrian supposes that the 'sensation* diminishes continuously in intensity. | | | | | | | | | Sensation -. Hence the discharge of impulses in the nerve-fiber is rapid at first and slows down as adaptation the receptor reduces the excitation of the receptor. 7 is Adrian's summary of the facts. there is no escaping these facts. Basis of Sensation (1928). D. The 'sensation/ Stimulus (Change in environment) Excitatory process Impulse discharge in nerve fiber mm. Adrian. FIG. the final theory of intensity would seem to have . As we have said. but since the perceptual process appears smooth to introspection Adrian shall do well draws the curve for sensation in this way. On the other hand.48 shown Intensity Fig. The sensation is caused by the frequency of discharge in the nerve-fibers. After E. follows a smooth course like that of the excitation in the receptor. the frequency of discharges in the nerve-fiber diminishes. Adrian thinks.

We have examined the evidence from summation and irradiation in the case of vision. can readily assimilate the frequency theory of intensity. except that it is so tiny that the minute fibers might not resonate selectively without affecting adjacent fibers. It was this notion of the physiology of quality that influenced Helmholtz. Hence there are more than enough fibers to go around. The greatest difficulty. but a frequency theory of pitch has certain other . with a different for each of the pitches. when this pitch is loud. but now somewhat discredited. and Helmholtz believed There are that there is receptor and a different nerve-fiber. For seventy years psychologists have been trying to achieve a satisfactory theory of tonal pitch.ooo discriminably different pitches. Helmholtz started the investigation (1863) with his resonance theory of hearing. old. However. however. the sense which but one of Adrian's ex- periments employed. given pitch can be thought of as having its particular fiber. the resonance theory of pitch has never been convincingly established. arises in the case of hearing. be seen that the resonance theory of hearing. theory of 'the specific energies of nerves/ the theory that every quality has a place in the brain to which a fiber that functions for that quality leads. the frequency of impulses in this fiber A would be great.000 of these fibers in the ear and about n. We know that there are all similar phenomena in somesthesia. It explains the analytical nature of hearing. He at least 14. concluded that different fibers in the inner ear respond resonance to different frequencies of the tonal stimulus. and the need for a synthesis of the multiple fiber and the frequency theories. by The structure of the inner ear is admirably adapted for this result.Frequency Theory to be 49 more complex. Such a theory is consistent with the a different resonating fiber. and. It will in assigning different pitches to different fibers.

Excitation of the auditory nerve creates a difference of electrical potential between these two electrodes. They placed an- other electrode somewhere else in the brain tissue. the volley theory has advanced the answer to this question. Now. there flows in the wire a current of action corresponding to . two combinaand we had better pass at cat. by an operative technique in the contrived to hook a small electrode about the auditory nerve at the point where it enters the medulla. Wever and Bray. The conscious dimensions in question are quality and intensity. every one capable of only one intensity of response but of various frequencies. if the electrodes are connected by a wire. Pitch may depend upon the particular fiber excited and intensity upon the frequency of impulses in it. and. This is the modernized resonance theory. Neither view was completely satisfactory. Or intensity may depend upon the number of fibers excited and pitch upon the frequency of impulses in them. however. The Volley Theory The volley theory is new and has been developed to account for certain new discoveries about the action of the auditory nerve. experiments showed that the location of the second electrode had no effect upon the results. once to the experiments that led to its formulation. a theories. for the sense of hearing. This is the frequency theory of pitch. The problem of the theorists has been to mate correctly conscious data with neural events. Conversely the frequency theory of intensity seemed to require the resonance theory of pitch. and we shall do well to turn to that theory instead of dis- cussing further an old dilemma. It tion of the other is.$o Intensity advantages. In the aud- itory nerve we have many fibers. The fre- quency theory of pitch seemed to require the multiple fiber theory of intensity.

cat's investigators obtained similar results Wever and Bray were from the able in this fashion to transmit ear to the loud speaker frequencies up to 4.' as from cutting off the blood supply. clangs. Tones. clusive that there in the cat's ear. On the other hand. in the loud speaker. and difference tones were transmitted cat's ear A variety of checks seemed to be conwas no simple artifact of electrical induction operating. for other The mammals. this effect ceases.000 times and put it through a loud speaker in a remote room. invented originally by Wever and Bray to account for the transmission of high frequencies (and of speech) by the auditory nerve. remains very useful as a compromise between the two theories of sensory intensity. beats between tones. and that the transmission of sounds depended upon the keeping intact and alive of the auditory mechanism with equal success. When the tissues are made to 'die. without noticeable alteration. the electrical properties of dead and of living tissues differ greatly. They found that sounds reaching the could be heard. and it may revive if blood is returned to the region soon enough. bio-microphonic effect of the stimulation of the inner ear and are not forwarded Be this as it may.Volley Theory the excitation of the nerve. It is thus clear that the Wever-Bray effect is a biological phenomenon and not an artifact of electrical induction ex- ternal to the organism. say) are transmitted as a as action currents in the nerve-fibers. 51 amplified this Wever and Bray current about 6. Speech was understood. its original purpose may pres-' effect seems to show a current of action end of the auditory nerve corresponding to the stimulus-tone in the ear in both frequency and amplitude. The Wever-Bray at the central . the volley theory.000 cycles per second. even though ently disappear. and the critics of Wever and Bray have urged that the higher frequencies (above 800 cycles.

W. However. 8 50 libers i A A A A VOLLEY THEORY OF PITCH IN AUDITORY NERVE WITH A CONTINUOUS TONE AS STIMULUS No one fiber responds with the frequency of the tone. the frequency is realized as the sum of the impulses in many fibers. 1930. but. the simple sine-wave of a tone. without great distor- The in Fig. Rev. then the fiber would be . and Wever and Bray proposed the volley theory to account for their findings. Sound wave Fibers a b c a e f a-f 1 A . hair in bending would not excite its nerve-fiber until it had reached a certain critical A point. Bray. upon the hairs of the hair-cells. tion. After E. Adrian's results for frequency as the correlate of intensity are not to be denied. G. Psychol. Wever and C. 8. the wave-form could go no further.. 37. FIG. relationships that the volley theory assumes are shown At the top of the figure is shown a stimulus. the receptors in the inner ear.52 At first Intensity thought such a result appears to indicate that the stimulus is transmitted in kind by the nerve and that a frein- quency theory of pitch and a multiple fiber theory of tensity are to be preferred. There is every reason to believe that this wave-motion is impressed. However. except at the very start.

) Fig. and the discharges in every fiber occur more rapidly. and such an equivalent to saying that they vary in their assumption refractory periods.Volley Theory 53 discharged in accordance with the all-or-none theory and would become immediately refractory. has a refractory period a little longer than the wave-period. and it is well reconstitutes known that its it takes several waves of a tonal stimulus characteristic pitch. 5. as Adrian's theory requires. At the bottom of the figure is shown the sum of the discharges is and indicated above and also the sum of the discharges in fifty fibers of various excitabilities. Fiber c is discharged by every fourth wave. (Consider Fig. It establish the total differences would be these sums that of potential upon which the see at once that the staggerin the sums the original current of action depends. the human ear responds to frequencies up to 20. and the refractory period of What happens the the auditory fibers cannot well be less than o. that auditory is receptors vary in sensitivity. However. in accordance with Adrian's theory. with tones between 1. Thus every succeeding wave would discharge the fiber once. and so on. The more frequent the discharges.. ing of We discharges frequency.000 and 20. In the lower half the tone is loud. a.ooi sec.000 cycles? Wever and Bray suppose.000 cycles per sec. provided the period of the wave were not greater than the refractory period of the fiber. as Hecht did for vision. which no single fiber is capable of receiving. Fig. the greater the number of coincidences and the larger the . 8 assumes that the most sensitive fiber. and that it is therefore dis- charged by alternate waves. 9 extends the argument to include differences of intensity. In the upper half of the figure the tone is weak and to establish the discharges in every fiber are at a slow rate. Only at the very start is there a lack of correspondence. Fiber b in to be less sensitive this figure is supposed discharged by every third wave.

both a simple and a remarkable conclusion. although every single fiber It is nevertheless following the all-or-none law. Fig. The stronger stimulus (cf. The volley theory also restores plausibility to a frequency theory of pitch. d FIG. and yet an electrode merely hooked about the nerve could pick Sound wave Fibers a b c d a b c * . 9 VOLLEY THEORY OF INTENSITY The figure repeats the schema of Fig. fiber is responding them out all in their original form because the effect depends upon the sum the differences of electrical potential in the fibers in the nerve. 8 for two intensities of stimulus. in spite of the fact that tensity and that the frequency in the single fiber means insingle fiber cannot transmit frequencies as great as those of the higher pitches. 5) gives a greater frequency of discharges so that the sums are greater. . After Wever and Bray. It is thus that the volley theory of all represents an intelligible combination of the multiple fiber and the frequency theories of intensity. Freis quency and amplitude could be scrambled in the nerve. Hence the amplitude of the current of action would vary with the amplitude of the stimulus. Thus the intensity of the stimulus is realized for the nerve as a whole although every under the all-or-none law.^4 Intensity sums.

The volley theory has assumed that the process of excitation of the auditory receptors is purely mechanical. for the single fiber. now summarize the present theory of afferent exThe frequency theory of intensity has been estab- as far as research has gone. can citation. and. we are left with a vague sense of mystery as to how such a phy- . This atomistic view of consciousness does not agree with the dynamic nature of physiological processes. It is probable that the process in the visual and tactual receptors is chemical. Sensory Intensity But what about consciousness and the sensation? The older view of psychophysical parallelism sought in the brain for a physiological correlate of conscious intensity. although neither is actually represented in any one fiber. The fre- quency theory would seem to call for frequency of central excitation as the correlate of intensity. depends upon a physiological process localized at some spot in the brain. The multiple fiber theory would probably require some conception of summation. The volley theory shows that the frequency and amplitude of the stimulus may still exist by implication in the total auditory nerve. existing at some moment. even when we assert the correlation. Intense stimulation of the auditory organ more fibers. Intense stimulation of the retina or skin leads to irradiation and more fibers are activated.Sensory Intensity The bearing visual 55 of the volley theory upon the problem of and tactual excitation is not yet clear. but tion of all may it or may not lead to the activation of does at least give a more frequent excitathe fibers affected. We lished. so that equal impulses from many fibers could summate to give a great difference of potential in some part of the brain where the all-or-none law would not apply. Both theories seem to imply that a sensory intensity.

In the stitute throughout their course a locus of the mental func- . effect. it is plain that all the fibers or tracts involved in the process of being aware of an intensity (or of a difference between intensities) con- function in the brain. and not in any of its separate fibers. howsuccessive impulses. Thus it would seem reasonable to suppose that intensity is some such totalized difference of potential in the brain. we cannot entirely get rid of the multiple fiber fibers act to- We gether in ever. And the kind of effect movement and of course. The simple electrode on the auditory nerve can pick out a frequency and a potential that exist only in the nerve regarded as a whole. simply a response. who ceases to search in the brain for a replica of consciousness. will. The psychologist. see the significance of the volley theory for the solution of this problem. Such us also to suppose that required by the frequency theory. there does not have to be a single concentration of ions at some single spot. because our knowledge of the 'existence' of a particular intensity is little else than our capacity to respond discriminatively to it. This view leaves us with a kind of gross localization of first place. It this crements of enough to suppose that the various difference of potential exist near enough is in- to- gether to have some collective is. interpretable in terms of behavior. however. can also act together. In this view. known to occur. must assume that various adjacent producing a cognitive response. are forced to the theory of intensity as a total potential We because theory. and it is probably in some such way that frequency becomes a difference in potential effective for cognition. Summation of rapidly successive impulses at a synapse is forces a view.56 siological Intensity event can imply such a totally different conon the other side of the gulf between scious event as lies mind and body.

there is the problem of the location of the critical region where the differences of potential of many fibers act collectively to produce the discriminative effect. support from the fact that an iron wire. 128-143. 1925. but may be abolished by removing too much of the cortical tissue. Lillie. Gen. 1917. On the all-or-none law and re- the acid wire film the wire dissolving the film. but remember that conduction with a decrement does not oc- has /. will con- logische psychology in PhysioUntersuchungen im Ge- view W.Notes tion. Lashley has found that the discrimination of brightnesses by rats depends upon no single spot in the occipital cerebral cortex. 104 f. and cur and was an artifact of earlier experimental methods. Introduction to Neurology. The membrane theory derived 1863: A. See also R. 7. When ment the function be regained by of a partly the cortex. Conduction of the Nervous Impulse. it may reeducation. 3. is then refractory until a The new Cf. fractory period. it. Herrick. The research of G.) Notes significance of the chapter be more apparent to the reader who already knows the convenwill The duct an impulse after the manner of a nerve-fiber.g. pp. S.. The acid oxidizes tional elementary physiology of the the iron forming an insulating film on the surface. biete der Optik. 6). Lucas. Multiple Fiber Theory The problem the stars was point of of the Protoplasmic Action and discussed of magnitude of from the Nervous Action. 1863. Volkmann. e. A lit- . 1923. 1920. presumably by the establishis lost by 'insult' to new locus. and mechanical or electrical penetration of the film starts a local current (see Fig. J. Lillie. been formed on Physiol. Kato has revised Lucas's earlier conclusion. see C. lies in Lashley's experiments seem to imply that this region the brain below the level of the cortex. since no one is part of the cortex a sine qua non of the discrimination of brightnesses. 473. 38f. which travels down nervous system. See almost any neurology or the chapters on the nervous system in any large physiology. immersed in acid.S07J other references there cited. The positive ions of are on the outside. For instance. I. In the second place. (Cf. see K. 1931. 57 The locus may change.

clear-cut evidence for the still For Hecht's discussion of the dependence of visual acuity on the variation in sensitivity of the visual receptors and its relation to the summation of pressure stimuli seems to be the rather scanty data of Bruckner who was working in von Frey's laboratory: A Bruckner. or The Retinal Processes Visual the summation of rapidly successive pressures to give pain. Gregg. but E. /. which inhibited. a considerable literature on brightnesses. 67-70. about Bernstein.. As sensibility returns after an injury to a nerve and with the regeneration of multiple fiber The Frequency Theory Priority for the frequency theory of intensity seems to belong to A. 354-359. 1930. 10. Bulletin Cf. 1918. 'protopathic' sensi- of the present situation. See H. The 1905. Hecht. Bernstein. 26. 225-329. 323-450. 255-281. Neurology. and other references to Hecht there 25-29. Bruckner Concerned with Acuity and Color Vision (Howe Lab. number of discriminably different There is Psychol. 47. Mcd. 11. esp.. Astro- 31. R. /. Exper. 1916. thought that the simultaneity of two pressures might result in the inhibition of one.' has made the same assumption of an inhibitory relation between different fibers. 170-202. G. PhysioL. Head and W. in which the central point seems to be the separation of an epicritic sensibility from a protopathic sensibility. PhysioL. Quart. Harvard Sch. Zsch.Intensity tie later Bernstein developed the notion of central irradiation. but it is only indirectly relevant here. 1920. no. 1928. bility lation comes gives first and with it stimusensa- very of intense tions. Rivers. in reprinted in phys. see P. i-io. see J. II. and it is easy to suppose that other fibers with an inhibitory effect have this final Untersuchungen ungsvorgang im uber den Erreg- N erven- kelsystem. 1901. 86-94. /.. 1931. Adrian and Y. Sensitivity of the Periph- Retina. 1-95.. With further the intensity the regeneration sensations is diminished. Reeves. Gen. Zotterman have finds in done most to extend and establish it. and that the reenforcement of attention would determine H. W. Psychol. Brain. see the text and und MusFor more stage.. 1908. Gen. Boring. On the variation of the zones of color vision with size of stimulus. see S. Amer. Hoagland. eral Baird. J. pp. D. 1915. /. Forbes and A. 1871. usfFor the effect of size of stimulus upon the absolute threshold of vis- who does not agree with Head's dichotomy of 'epicritic' and 'protopathic. Ophthal. cited. in connection with the theory of the projection of peripheral space upon the brain and the theory of the threshold of consciousness: J. /. See Adrian's excellent summary The Basis the nerve-fibers. 3. PhysioL. ual intensity. Studies I. . notes of the next chapter. E. 172-235. Head. one was felt and which theory also Head's theory of support cutaneous sensibility. 4). 38-47. 39. 141-145. grown back at Even the present author.

is The matter still Analytical ternal T. H. H. Hardine and C. rabbit and rat. 344-350. We port pitch to the resonance theory of by showing that the weighting and tension of the resonating fibers. sec E. it may gations of auditory action currents. Wever. PsychoL. 44. 638highly controversial. and the author has taken advantage of his proof sheets to ]. PsychoL. must be taken into account. Amer. 1930.. 157-188. Wcvcr and Bray. 365-380. reader should not expect to evaluate this controversy unless he un- derstands the mechanism of the Volley Theory For the experiments of Wever and Bray and their volley theory. Proc. 1930. II. Wever and Bray. 1924. but the paper still shows the grounds for the multiple fiber theory of in- tween sound frequency and the frequency of impulses in the auditory nerve. the relation beC. 1918. The add this very recent reference to Kreezer and somewhat to amplify the text.. W. 1932. have given supof hearing. 161-254. as well as the argument for the bio-microphonic action. no. are given by G. /. 1926. . Graham. /. Hoagland. Keith. tend from the base of the cochlea an amount proportional to the amplitude of the disturbance: Univ. 6-14. Present possibilities for tensity and sets many problems that are ordinarily neglected in cludes auditory theory (informulation of the volley auditory plausible theories. /. considerable revision at present. 13. Wever and Bray. A. Nature of acoustic response. A critical examination of the investivestigators. 37. 16. PsychoL. I. fect has The Wever-Bray been verified by several in- must be content with saying that G. The references to the verifications. The Mechanism of the Cochlea. 457-462. 154-159. theory). Acad. Cell and Comp. as well as their length. Nerve impulses from single receptors in the eye. Exper. 37. K. Amer.Notes of 59 Sensation. /. 276-295. 6. into a bibliography of the theories We 1931. first It was the the Max most ex- Meyer who made that argument PsychoL Rev. Sci.. Nat. Gen. Wever. Auditory nerve responses in the reptile. 43) I93i citation of the inner ear would ex- Amer. 676. ef- Missouri Studies. Kreezer. Physioi. Impulses from the acoustic nerve of the guinea pig. PsychoL. These views would need . in and the suggestion that be bio-microphonic is only very recent. Acta Oto-LaryngoL. 277-295. Wrightson's Enquiry into the Mechanism of the InEar. See also H. G. Wilkinson and A. 1928. i. cannot enter here 1907. Sci. 1932. 1932. Ser. 1930. 16. An excellent account of the mechanism of the inner ear is also given by A. and of Wever and Bray: Boring. Action currents in Arguments theory fiber in favor of a frequency of pitch and a multiple theory of auditory intensity were put forth by the present author prior to these researches of Adrian acoustical the auditory nerve in response to stimulation. 373-387. ] PsychoL. Specific afferent impulses and cutaneous sensibility. Gray.

. Physiological dynamic organization in The following posi- and negative statements about are true at the present time. See on points (i)-(3). Mass action in cerebral but that the general condition of diminishing returns is usually found. (3) In some cases data fit better a sigmoid or ogival function inversely with the amount of tissue removed. slowly. cit. Cerebral control versus reflexology. R have nevertheless learned.6o Sensory Intensity There is Intensity there cited. Sensory intensity practically always follows a law of diminishing returns v/hen regarded in relation to the increase of his Brain Mechanisms and 1929. Science. The occipital cortex is best adapted for these functions in the case of the discrimination of brightnesses. 168-170. even the awareness of sensations cortical as some suppose. is not. The law is a siatement of the dependence of sensory intensity upon the magnitude of the stimulus. The last article is the in most to explicit on the matter nothing in startling hand. way in which total is regarded the theory of physiological gradients: C. 3-18. not that to be satis- Lashley. Gen. 1924. Lashley suggests that the cerebral cortex functions as a whole in memory and learning. 73. Lashley has cautiously faced and discussed lem in this sort of probesp. are differently localized in effect the brain. (i) Foundations of Behavior. a definite formula fied. 1931. /. esp. S. H. but rats entire occipital cortex between S and log R (the relationwould be a straight line k log R). modern physiology the sugges- tion that the physiological account of the intensity of a sensation Weber-Fechner sion of the Law should be the description of events which. and that speed of relearning varies ranges. the There has been so much discusWeber-Fechner law in psychology that some mention of it seems necessary here. S. = loss of habits ably is not exact even in the middle roughly proportional to the amount of cortical tissue removed. Thus the localization. although their total may have a more specific Cf. 5. and references Hoagland. 248f. function. It is obvious that for S no general formula can be written ship that = with the extirpated so long as the units of the stimulus are not generally defined. the magnitude of the Intelligence. Child. The wonder fails is. op. Psychol.. that is (2) The formula Inten== k log (stimusity of sensation k log R. Gen. 245-254. and they never have been defined. K. See K.. always expressed would require a subthough would depend upon the cortex. habitually lus). 157-174. or S fails at the two extremes and probstimulus.. 1931. M. to discriminate brightnesses as accurately as normal rats. The Weber-Fechner law and the all-or-none theory.. actually it is expressed in ergs or grams or often. as in testing the law for taste or smell. in arbitrary units of some in- strument. tive it locus. 'sensation' itself in terms of energy. regarded in separation from one another. /.

Suppose were an ogive when plotted between E and log R and suppose R were so defined that this function be that S is E." However. The say. and has then shown them to fit an ogive. the implication would be that S is at least proportional to E. Gen. visual discrimination of intensity /. The physiologists are usually considering some form of nervous excitation as a function of the stimulus: E = It is a neural process. 235-267. and the Weber-Fechner law. departments of sense.Notes PsychoL. has come away with genuine sensations. . 351-373. 61 psychologist might object and "But E is not the sensation.Cf. S. but the may we are method would become only all that the generalization was established for R could be generalized interesting if for some class of phenomena. and it f (R). Unfortunately not yet in a position to draw such an inference. 7. got by introspection. 1924. law there is In this recent discussion of the Weber-Fechner one suggestive point for our purposes. 3. Physiol. Hecht has gone to Konig's data. let us say. 1930.. also Hecht. If both E and S give ogives.

because their organs are surfaces richly supplied with nerve-fibers. and is largely a matter of the organization of consciousness in the dimension of extensity. The The Psychological Problem of Space was that the nerves old naYve view of these matters are conductors of the properties of objects to the brain. where the sensorium somehow apprehends what the nerves present to it.Chapter 4 EXTENSITY THE shall position perception of spatial extent as size. the physiologists raised the question as to why we do not see everything upside down. The fact that the inversion of the retinal image still seems to so how in many persons to present something paradoxical shows natural this old naYve view was. An object acting upon the skin or an illumi- nated object imaged upon the retina gives rise to a spatial pattern of excitation of the nerves. We understand the present status of this problem better. It was plain that touch and vision are spatial senses. When it was realized from physiological optics that the image on the retina is inverted. if we begin by sketching its history. with the consequent implication that the sensorium might perceive the pattern as such. for there is nothing to modern psychological conceptions lend a shred of significance or interest to the problem. However. there was in this primitive view a hint of the 62 . shape.

It was Miiller's study of binocular vision that pointed to this view. 1838). He perceiving mind thus implied that there is within the brain a that can become directly aware of the state of the nerves which end in the brain. that some fibers cross and some do not. light on the skin is sensed aware of the as warmth because it affects the tactual nerves. the 'envelope' which contains the mind and upon which characteristics of external objects must be 'projected' if they are to be accessible to the mind. from one side of the field of vision go to the same side of the and that fibers from corresponding points in the two eyes lead to the sort is same point in the brain. He knew about the horopter and about corresponding points on the two retinas. Pressure on the eyeball is sensed as light because it affects the optic nerve. which became explicit in the nineteenth find that theory in an intermediate stage imcentury. We plied by Johannes Miiller (ca. Miiller's view of space perception was essentially the projection theory. but it defines. Mutter's doctrine of the specific energies of nerves was a theory of the qualitative differences between the senses. the other hand. as the case may be. The explicit form of the projection theory is to be found . which are specific for each of the five senses. Miiller was denying that the nerves transmit any properties other than their own energies. and he concluded that fibers brain. as it were. This conception is not a projection theory of quality.Problem of Space 63 projection theory. The visual or tactual On stimulus impresses its spatial pattern upon the retina or the skin. A notion of this almost equivalent to saying that the retinas are pro- jected in their spatial relationships upon that field in the brain which is the 'envelope' of the mind. It asserted that the mind is state of the nerves and not of the properties of external bodies. and the nerves conduct the pattern to the sensorium. He knew that the optic nerves divide at the optic chiasma.

it We is enough to see that a fundamental tradition of the the tradition of psychology of the later nineteeth century Lotze. and depth. while the disparity between the signs for . but discussion until the next section.64 Extensity in the ideas of Bernstein (1868). breadth. fitted in much more satis- factorily with the projection theory. we must reserve this physiological psychology was ushered in at the middle of the nineteenth century with considerable interest in the problems of space perception. held that the structure of space inherent in the sensations themselves. these signs can be supposed to get themselves ordered into a spatial continuum as the result of the experienced relationships that occur in the continuous skin or the retina. Nativists. It assumes that every point has a conscious local sign which identifies it qualitatively without in itself placing the point spatially. According to the genetic theory we have nothing to start with but an unorganized congeries of local signs. and Wundt got along without believing that the structure of space is given immediately to the mind in the native constitution of the psychophysical organism. on the other hand. The signs for height and field breadth. fixed a spot in the bidimensional of vision. and considerable discussion of the theoretical problems of nativism and geneticism. movement of stimulation across the need go no further into the genetic theories nor need we undertake to understand how the kinesthesis of movement came to be essential to all of them. he supposed. like Hering is (1864) and Stumpf (1873). The genetic theory of space makes the projection theory unnecessary. which Wundt and many others held later. Helmholtz. Hering assumed that every retinal point has three conscious characteristics height. However. Nativism. It was Lotze in his Medicinische Psychologie (1852) The new who put forth his famous theory of local signs and laid the foundations of the genetic theory.

an attribute coordinate vith quality and intensity. :ame about (pp. who are not physiologists and who no longer speak habitually of "physiological psychology. i It was similar insight that influenced Kiilpe to assert that exensity is an attribute of sensation. for what nativism could be simpler than :he actual projection of the spatial relations at the periphery jpon the brain itself? In the present century the most important development n the psychology of space has been the development and acceptance of the concept of extensity as an immediate phenomenal datum. nevertheless correctly anticipated . the physiologist. Hering. Nowadays such a view seems absurdly naive. We have already seen how this result The doctrine of form-quality igf. but Johannes brain. Except for this difone might suppose that Hering would have couched jection nativism in the simple physiological terms of the protheory." saw more importance in a thoroughgoing psy:hology of conscious phenomena than do the modern psy:hologists.).Problem of Space 65 depth furnished the basis for localization in the third dimension when there is binocular parallax. while it was in error in supposing that form s a separate mental element based upon other more fundanental sensory elements. working what was then called "physiological psychology. Miiller it was a great advance over thought of the mind as in the perceiving what the nerves brought to it. and thus he tried to fabricate the structure of space out of conscious sensory data. and to characterize sensory ." Nineteenth :entury dualism in psychology told against physiological nterpretation in many cases where twentieth century monism ference lis ndicates the physiological approach. (1890 et seq.). Miiller's.he future in asserting the phenomenal status of form as romparable with the phenomenal status of quality. Hering thought of the mind as being sensory experience. Paradoxical in as it may seem.

66 Extensity spatial organization as spatial colligation. and the associative context must be supposed to be determined by particular fibers leading from particular points at the periphery. It was Titchener who supplied the word dimension. vary in degree. yet held to a genetic theory of the way in which the structure of space is worked up in experience. Titchener later followed Kiilpe in respect of extensity as a sensory attribute. primitive. like intensity. they realized that localization may often be mediate and secondary. that it can. for a tactual sensation is usually localized either by touching or visualizing the supposed point of stimulation. up to this He time (ca. It assumes that every peripheral point has the . These motor and visual mechanisms are obviously touched off by association. Although Kiilpe and Titchener thought of extensity as immediate. still the significance of this fact seems not to have become apparent until it was exhibited by Gestalt psychology. Wertheimer and Koffka made it quite clear that primary as quality. and phenomenal. 1910) introspectional psychology never seemed able to free itself completely from Wundtian elementarism in which a form seemed to be the sum of is its parts. However. although the sensory core of the experience is not specific as to locus. believed that bare extensity must be native to sensation. While it true that the proponents of form-qualities and Kiilpe and Titchener did not think of a line as a continuous row of sensations. but it was the Gestalt psyextent is as chologists who forced the new conception upon psychology by reiteration. Such a view just misses being a projection theory. and that form is merely mental organization given in the dimension of extensity. Kiilpe and Titchener are best summarized by saying that the points of stimulation have 'unconscious local signs/ and that they are indespecifically pendently capable of giving rise to specific localizing con- texts.

to hold a theory that if we consider first Bernstein's naive projection theory. unmodified form. Thus the modern view to some sort of phenomenal space tends to look for support of projection hypothesis.Projection Theory 67 capacity for specific connections in the brain. The To Projection Theory suppose that spatial patterns of excitation at the periphery on the skin or the retina are projected by the nerve-fibers is upon some central field of excitation in the brain this is both pretty and improbable in simple. as we shall see presently. The Gestalt psychologists went further. P. is Bernstein's theory jection. 10. gists. may still account for many phenomena of local- This particular issue no longer interests psycholobut it has been worth considering because the view of is space that also to link itself with consistent with the nativistic hypothesis tends a physiological hypothesis. We may summarize this brief sketch of a confused and ponderous literature by saying that the attack upon the psychological problem of space has resulted. where perceived space is correlated with spatial relations established in the nervous system without learning. after four score years of discussion. in the acceptance of the notion that is phenomenally given. Thus nativism seems to have triumphed as to the capacity to perceive spatial form in respect of its internal relations. in such a The nerve- fibers at the periphery. and illustrated in Fig. although organized extensity geneticism ization. but it does not assume that the terminations in the brain maintain the spatial relation of the fibers at the periphery. pass to the central field of pro- way that the spatial relations at the . C. Nevertheless we shall come most readily to an understanding of the business in hand. then see how it has been qualified.

Stimulation of a fiber at a gives rise to the dispersed excitation indicated by the curve A. T represents the threshold of consciousness and has been added to Bernstein's figure. there may be irradiation or dispersion at the center. Fig. A and B might both lie entirely below T. C. the result at the center would be S. Bernstein added the conception of central dispersion: stimulation at a> projected in upon a'. like the retina or the skin. 10 might give illustrate just this case. If the stimulation of a and b were small.68 of Extensity periphery are not altered at the brain. supraliminal S above T. so that similar relationships occur at P and C. The spatial relations of stimulation at P are supposed to be projected along the nerve-fibers. stimulation would be said to be subliminal. N. S FIG. upon the center. the point of projection of a. Similarly stimulation of b gives the dispersion B about b' Thus. spreads as A. if a and b were stimulated together. which centers upon a '. C=central nervous system associated with consciousness. However. Nevertheless subliminal A and B might summate to give a . The theory has been used to explain the facts of the limen of dual impression upon the skin. Stimulations at a and at b set rise to two stimulating points . To this simple notion projection. the sum of A and B. 10 BERNSTEIN'S THEORY OF CENTRAL PROJECTION AND IRRADIATION P=periphery or sense-organ. It is well known that close together upon the skin the perception of a single point.

There fact that Bernstein's altered by dispersion itself is in the pattern of central excitation perceptual pattern yielded by inseeks to explain the relationship of trospection. although these facts do not. If a and b were far apart the central excitations. This theory asserts that the pattern of the stimulus is maintained by projection and is. larger. the equivocal cases of incomplete separation. One must identify conscious datum with cerebral excitation or at least assume that the two closely .Bernstein's up the central excitations. The dispersion may be peripheral.' Thus Bernstein's theory the facts of the two-point limen excellently. however. the perceptual pattern to the stimulus by expounding the nature of the dependence of the central excitation upon which like the The theory the stimulus. Intermediate between these two extremes there are. speculation. something to be learned from the very would be a satisfying theory if projection and dispersion were true. A and B. y Theory A and B which. prove the theory. where the perceptual pattern is described as a 'dumb-bell' or 'double paddle/ This would be the case where 'hills' fits A and B connected are so far apart as to give (Fig. would not affect each other. Perception corresponds to S. The principle of projection is a however. 10) two by a 'saddle. occurring simultaneously. 69 summate as S. a blunter impression. and two separate impressions would be perceived. Why should any one suppose that the establish- between central excitaand stimulus would imply a theory of the correlation between perceptual pattern and stimulus? Obviously such a view becomes a satisfying theory only if there is an apof the nature of the correlation tion ment proximate identification of perceptual pattern with central pattern of excitation or if the relationship between the two data is known. of course. it might be nothing other than the deformation of the skin. but nevertheless a single point.

he argued that the logarithmic dependency which the WeberFechner law expresses truly describes the relation of sensation to the "inner" physiological event. Thus they sometimes substitute neural excitatory terms for introspecif they believed in the theory of direct The latest example of this confusion has correspondence. Both Miiller and Wundt. E. Miiller. howscious structural constitution of the ever. or one must abandon Bernstein's It is in this surreptitious way that the projection theory has come to imply the theory of psychophysiological cor- respondence. G. ordinarily they naturally regard the "mind" as cerebral. held to the belief in a direct correspondence between the sensation and its physiological basis.jo resemble theory. Since they are not concerned with the use of the introspective method. tried to localize this logarithmic functional in the dependency nervous system. Psy- seem always to demand proof of any complex or involved relationship between mind and body but to accept a simple proportionality or correspondence as probable withchologists out proof. tive terms. therefore. and Wundt tried to localize it in the conscious mind. For such parallelists less correspondence is not to be confused with identity. should they. It is true that Fechner is a notable exception to this tendency. The parallelists among the psychologists have tended most naturally to think of the parallelism as applying in detail with a one-to-one correspondence between con- and cerebral events and also with a similarity in the two kinds of events. Extensity each other. unless they are influenced by the possibility of an ultimate demonstration of identity Why between the two? The support physiologists this have also unintentionally tended to theory of correspondence. neverthethe one view easily passes over into the other. just as been the attempt of certain physiologists to reinterpret the .

On the other hand. Now we know from psychological experimentation that Fechner's law is be. Perhaps one should not be surprised that. For the most part both theories have remained implicit in psychological thought even in the face of occasional explicit denial. (Cf. in more modern terminology. They wanted the to deal physiologically with the problem of perception of space and they also wanted to avoid vague physiological speculation. Let us.) come in this fashion to a partial understanding of the We which the modern theory of extensity has come about. There is nothing at all improbable about the contention that cor- common responding points of the two retinas are projected upon some point or.Projection and Correspondence 71 Weber-Fechner function. present-day attitude in this matter is the direct consequence of the theory of projection which has carried with it the theory of correspondence. that the . therefore. The psy- way The in chologists. These physiologists find that the relation between excitation and stimulation sometimes follows a law that resembles Fechner's law but differs significantly from it. Then they argue that Fechner's law is incorrect. examine these physiological concepts. The of this theorizing has validity of a theory is largely all been mere measured by its capacity to subsume observed fact without contradicting other observed fact. not guesswork. an argument against Fechner's law unless accepts the principle of direct correspondence. as a matter of fact. in the face of such conflict. 6of. it not correct. but this argument of the physiologists cannot of course. pp. were faced with a dilemma. which formulates the relation between the intensity of sensation and the magnitude of stimulus. Certainly in the field of vision the gross fact of projection has been accepted for more than a century. the physiological theory more often remained implicit and escaped the ex- posure of explication.

perhaps it is always learned of re- in the lifetime of the individual. response In the field of touch it is plain that afferent paths do not fuse into common paths before they reach the point where the connections effecting localization can be made. stimulation of one retina cannot be distinguished by introspection from stimulation of the other and there is only one field of vision. usually a context of visual imagery added to the sensory core or a context of a localizing movement which indicates the point stimulated. We may say that the two retinas are projected upon a common central field and that therefore the field of vision is one. if there were any errors in localization. they would be just as likely to be large as small. Localization may be learned or 'conditioned' that . Localization requires spatial differentiation ceptors at the periphery should tion of paths at be reflected in differentiathe center. spots on the same forearm might Two be confused no oftener than the nose with the great toe. It is only a step from this view to the acceptance of Bernstein's theory in explanation of the facts of the two- . The inference is almost unavoidable when we remem- ber that. it is not possible to condition a that discriminates one retina from the other. There are two alternative formulas for this situation. It is not merely that the anatomy of the chiasma and the pathology of hemianopia support this optic common view. That there is actually an apis proximate projection indicated by the fact that large If the errors of localization are less common than small. since the systems of paths from the two retinas join in a corresponding system of common paths. then. Tactual localization is a context. although visual localization is otherwise very accurate indeed. all paths maintained their independence but were mixed up at the region of the localizing connections.72 paths Extensity from two corresponding points finally fuse in a path. or we may say that.

73 The present what seems present author has gone a little further to to him a plausible theory of the facts of returning sensitivity after injury to a peripheral nerve. and is often. The present author has remarked that the facts of localization two would follow if the regions of projection for the ears were adjacent. the facts which led Henry Head to posit two classes of tactual still sensation.Visual. as the case may be. and if Bernstein's theory applied for the intermediate localizations. The be differentially stimulated at any of a very large number of points. Tactual and Auditory Projection point limen. effected in terms of visual consimilarities textual images. However. When the ears are stimulated separately and successively. but there is no doubt that it has failed to gain favor. extensive research upon auditory localization has shown that it possesses some to the other spatial senses. the 'protopathic' and the 'epicritic. the ears. One localizes in accordance with the relative effectiveness of stimulation at perceives a sound at the right or the left the two ears.' The author thinks of his own view as plausible and consistent with conservative opinion. Its primary dimension is left dimension determined by the position of the skin. a surface. touch and vision. can and two right. Auditory localization is fully as immediate as tactual. like the tactual. There can be little doubt that there is spatial differentiation at the center in the projection of the paths that lead from the two ears (after some of the auditory fibers have crossed in the brain). but there are only two points of reception for hearing. A difference almost as small as 0. Again it is true that con- . is discrimi- nated correctly as to the ear of prior stimulation. the judgment as to which ear is stimulated first is very accurate.002 sec. because it ventures to make explicit these assumptions that are so often left to implication. and or at some in- termediate position. It is only recently that psychologists have come to think of hearing as a spatial sense.

(3) conscious perceptual datum. Tradition supports them. In their most general forms they are plausible and sometimes probable inferences. Now we can turn to the of correspondence as our primary concern in the theory inconsistencies of modern present chapter. and thus we needed to examine tradition critically in order to understand the opinion. support from the research of Wever and Bray. The middle term. method. We have examined the nature of the evidence for these theories. Why then has the psychologist tried to make a plausible guess about the nature of central excitation? Beyields correlations cause the nature of the relationship between body and mind in a dualistic universe is inscrutable and therefore repugnant to a scientist. Nevertheless there is an objection to speculating too much about the inacces- and the psychologist seems in general to have compromised by accepting these theories of projection and correspondence surreptitiously and even unknown to himsible (2). Observation dominance of between (i) and (3). Perhaps the situation with respect to these theories is about as satisfactory as could be expected under the a faulty dualism. nevertheless this view is still approximately consistent with the facts and has gained. If one can minimize this mysterious relation- ship by reducing it to simple correspondence between (2) and (3) and then undertake to explicate the whole physical in system which (2) follows upon (i). has not yet surrendered to any available observational (2). at least temporarily. The psychologist has usually posited three terms: (i) peripheral stimulation. one finds himself with the least objectionable dualistic system. self. They are not made up out of whole cloth.74 Ex tensity servative psychologists have feared to venture so far. (2) central excitation. .

perception. This fact once led to the belief that the 'properties' of objects are conducted by the nerves we might say that the fact gives rise to to the mind. have just seen how itself this theory of correspondence has introduced into psychology and some of the grounds The principal ground would seem to lie in the fact that perception is surprisingly accurate." Kohler is. In the sense in which they have raised the objecAlthough there is apt to be a resemblance in between stimulation and perception pattern.' at least in the case of extensity. of course. the resemblance is respect of spatial experimentation is not a simple duplication. is He We got for it. it resemblance. not saying here that. there is somewhere a circular excitation in saying that we may expect a gross correspondence of ordered relationships and that the one totality will resemble the other in its topographic structure. should not also partake of the same stimulus. all experienced order in space is a true representation of a corresponding . and needed in order to affirm or correct the . after all. when we see a circle. with the two end terms resembling each seems highly improbable that the middle term. exceptional. the brain. Illusion and error are. the other. Gestalt psychologists have objected to a 'constancy hypothesis' of the relation between the stimulus and the phenomenal tion they are right. . central excitation. Now a 'constancy hypothesis. for the perceptual pattern resembles the pattern of the and. At this point we must pause to clarify the relation of our view to the well-known tenets of Gestalt psychology. order in the underlying dynamical context of physiological processes.Isomorphism 75 Psychophysiological Correspondence The principle of psychophysiological correspondence has been recently formulated by Kohler: ".

the conventional phenomenal visual space is truly three-dimensional and it may. Koffka urges that to hold to a confusion. Nevertheless there a paradox here that we holds The 'constancy hypothesis' as a general tendency. A is a dynamical whole. have stressed the aspect that psychology However.76 must fully understand. who invokes the 'constancy hypoin suppose that constancy experimentation (and a is the formula quoted above. Extensity is hypothesis. be correlated with physiological processes of three dimensions in the brain substance (1930). Here. but the experimental psychology of perception exists solely because this constancy relation is inexact so that the precise dynamics of perceptual structure require investigation. and inconstancy in the psychophysical relation between stimulus and phenomenon. a psychologist. is not a mere congeries of parts. we may is the fact in the gross. It A Gestalt cannot include such disparate entities as mind and body. there is in Gestalt psyserious much more source of psychologists appear dualism. dualism is Gestalt psy- Gestalt chology's worst enemy. Kohler's notion of psychophysiological correspondence can mean noth- . We must not blame Gestalt psychology if it has seemed to find constancy in the psychophysiological relation between brain and phenomenon. at least in the present author's opinion. And yet. therefore. It seems in each case to most needed chology Gestalt a at the time. Kohler has dealt with electrical fields in the brain as the correlates of conscious phenomena (1920) and formulates this law of resemblance between the "experienced" and the "physiological" orders (1929). and that method for such experimentation!) needed before we can say that resemblance means exact correspondence. too. The mysterious mind-body relation admits of no dynamical laws. In the case of the relation of central Gestalt thesis' nervous events to introspective phenomena it is Kohler.

not without distortion nor without loss of some characteristics. 229-233). To this extent we may accept the theory of pro- There need be. does the relationship between such neural systems come to be the fundamental condition of consciousness ? The answer to this question we must defer until chapter 8 (pp. No stage projection. The activation of some such secondary sys- tem must be specifically conditioned upon the spatial relations of the first system which results directly from stimulation. Here we face the crucial condition of an awareness of spatial pattern. . The way that the spatial order of excitation in the brain is essentially a specific function of the spatial order at the periphery. of course.Psychophysiological Correspondence c 77 more intimate than an and-connection' (Und-Verbindung). it may be asked. but in such a were. jection. that is the ground for the awareness of spatial arrangement. Just how. The 'seat of consciousness' can only be the region of this crucial selective response of the first. try to restate Kohler's principle with the Gestalt avoidance of dualistic implications psychology. of this composite system of discharges can very well be called a field of projection. secondary system to the spatial character of the There remains. no fixed central field of The peripheral stimulation initiates a dynamical system of neural discharges which is finally expended in some way that need not for the moment concern us. specifically representative of the primary spatial relations. ing Let us. Nevertheless it must be true that some stage in the course of this system within the brain where some other neural system or a single pathway there is can be activated by the spatial properties of the first system. however. therefore. as it 'outgestalting' spatial pattern of stimulation at the periphery is preserved in the brain. much more to be said on the general problem. It is this secondary system. at which Wertheimer once so convincingly sniffed.

for to be aware of visual extension is somehow to perceive visual space.78 Extensity Extension One needs to distinguish between the awareness of extension and the perception of space. as an areal spread. The weight of tradition is against the contention that visual extension is volumic or three- dimensional. This distinction is well sponsored. No doubt exists about the primary fact nor about the further fact that extension gets itself organized in at least two dimensions. Kohler has pictured what would go on in electrostatic fields suffering little constraint from insula- . for instance. We shall find this point illumined in the next section by Koffka's discussion. at least to realize form or formlessness and something of position. But. On the was other hand. we begin to see ground for Titchener's meticulosity. Titchener. In the brain visual extension must be represented by excitatory extension or the multiplicity of excited paths. It is these sensory data which vary in the dimension of extensity that are capable of being worked up into adequate perceptions of space. Such is the most conservative general statement. tradition is but it seems probable that the weight of wrong. Vision is the most obviously extensional sense. the distinction does not seem to be of great importance in so highly developed a spatial sense as vision. and the awareness of visual extension would mean a secondary neural system conditioned for its response upon the spatial characteristics of the first. a nativist in his recognition of the sensory 'attribute of extent/ and a geneticist when he came to show how spatial perceptions were built up from attributive extensity. when we ask whether tones or smells may not have a volumic extension that is not al- ways involved in any specific spatial reference.

there is evidence from congenitally blind persons and from those rare laboratory observers the skin He finds that he visualizes the spread of the touch who support all visual imagery that tactual space can without dependence upon vision.Visual and Tactual Extension tion of the nerve-fibers. tention we can become conscious region of the skin a toe. Is touch also an extensional sense? Tradition tive is affirma- and positive on this point. The total may be thought of as distributed over many fibers. or the end of the of . Perhaps the extensional nature of vision is emphasized lack almost itself by the fact that the entire visual field is always excited in visual perception. However. the case of touch introspection than is less obvious to ordinary gate himself for tactual the Most persons surrowith visual imagery. It is the one which suplatter we come poses that the central excitation is confined to fiber-paths. There is also a compromise view. Even black is a 'sensation. The pheof tactual excitation must be similar to the visual. Although under atalmost any specific a finger-tip. This view goes further than Kohler's because it tells how to know about the existence of visual extension. and there seems to be no convincing nomena reason for contradicting tradition. but notes that the elaborate branching of the axons and dendrites of many neurons in the central nervous system practically creates a reticulum in which Kohler's fields might be approximated. Traditional 79 spread physiology permits a similar view which is less picturesque. is However. One asks of space question: Has this touch simple extension? the case of vision.' so that no visual sensory datum ever arises except as a spatial differ- entiation from the rest of the field. upon and returns an answer based upon the visual substitute. and it exists as a unitary Gestalt only as it functions as a totality for setting up a specific response or other specific context.

and we must examine the case with great care. they do not. there lies in this denial of spatiality in hear- ing a ground for admitting the possibility of bare extension. with a forearm. the beginnings of spatiality before there is even enough form to What show whether solid. vision are the spatial senses. it has to do merely with the genesis of the can be answered by the appeal to introspec- . to lack shape is not necessarily to lack extension. and have argued that the judgments depend upon 'association. It may the tones should be regarded as areal or be that tones actually furnish us with an ex- ample of primitive. Nobody has ever argued that tones have form or shape. Tradition Touch and tial. completely missing here. and that high tones come from small stimulus-objects.80 nose it is Extensity clear that a tactual sensation is not fitted into a tactual field in a manner analogous to the case in vision. have any definite or significant shape. perhaps. hearing is not spaHowever. prespatial extension. the conscious 'skin' is very patchy. i. 29f. but. This objection is. Are tones volumic? are faced next with the problem of auditory extenhave already seen in chapter We 2 (pp. However. too vague to be telling..e. and an elbow presently turning up close We sion. Unless it judgments. The more sophisticated objectors to the doctrine of tonal extension have generally admitted the fact that observers can render consistent judgments of the 'size' or 'volume' of tones. however. Having position. having size. a knee and a shin gone there.) that there is a dispute as to the correct answer to this question. is against the belief in the extension of tones. to a shoulder. Consciously one does not live within a continuous tactual 'bag of skin'. as one might expect. they can move.' Some of these objectors say that low tones are large because they are known to be produced by large objects or instruments. they have is position and size.

We do not have for this problem of tonal extension evidence from congenitally blind persons as we do for touch." and and a low tone represented by a visual image? Well. He said: "I point with my horn. This is just what happens with touch." Is it not possible that the tone never had extension of its own and that it gained extension merely because it was solid. however. Fernberger gave results comparable with the others in immediacy and the nature of the function derived from them. but he had no visual imagery for the tones. S. the visual surrogates function for the tactual data until the visual surrogates are prevented. but it is by no means necessary. was one of Halverson's observers in preliminary experiments on the localization of tones. dark. On the other hand. tial it is possible. brownish and gaseous. Fernberger.Tonal Volume tion: the observers are 81 of tones making judgments and not of associated objects. then they turn out to be non-essential. blue "large. this very introspection reveals the fact that the great majority of observers speak a little loosely when they say that the judgments are "of the tones. All these indirect arguments. The author knows of direct observation that of tactual bears out this point." Usually the judgments refer directly to visual surrogates of the tones. experi- ments in which all the other observers described the locali- zation (and later the size) of visual images representing the tones in the spatial field. the observer has visual imagery representing the tones and describes their extensitive characteristics. who has very little visual imagery indeed. Spa- judgments impressions are almost always mediated by visual imagery and yet extension is not denied to touch. bright. A high tone may be "small. W. will be of little ." meaning that he indicated the localization to himself in kinesthetic terms as if he were pointing with a horn on the forehead. but the visual surrogation is so similar in the two cases that the presumption of its irrelevance in both cases is strong.

Titchener claimed for tonal volume the status of an attribute and guessed from casual observation as to the nature of the quantitative functional relation be- tween perceived volume and the frequency of the stimulus. Rich was the first person actually to experiment.82 importance observation search in Extensity comparison with the verdict of experimental the necessary when body of experimentation be- comes available. The thresholds for pitch show no such between 100 and 6. For instance the threshold for pitch near middle c may be a single cycle or less. is a musical comma or the fifth of a There has been somewhat of a puzzle as to why pitch and volume should be covariants with frequency. He used the tones of Stern variators and found that his observers had no difficulty at all in saying which of two tones of different pitch was the larger. and found that the threshold stant proportion (between 3 the frequency at which it is determined. whereas the threshold that Rich found for volume is about 12 cycles. Halverson accustomed his observers to the frequency of the tonal stimulus was varied. which musical semi-tone. that volume and intensity should vary together an hypothesis that Halverson undertook to test experimentally. and besides they are much smaller than the volumic thresholds. It would seem more probable. in view of what we know about visual and tactual dispersion. that is to say. He determined six differential thresholds at intervals cycles. Stumpf and others had observed that high tones are small and low tones large. it varies logarithmically with frequency in the way that musical interval varies.400 approximately a conper cent and 4 per cent) of is simple logarithmic relationship to the frequency. and then asked for the make judgments of volumic differences when . nor in remaining quantitatively consistent in the making of such judgments. is The brief history of the experimental re- as follows.

hence the scale of the figures is arbitrary. and 80 60 40 50 100 150 200 Energy of stimulus FIG. Fig.000 cycles. ii RELATION OF TONAL VOLUME AND INTENSITY TO THE ENERGY OF THE STIMULUS Halverson's data. n volume turned out to be much larger than the thresholds for . The observers reported volumic differences under the new conditions. The energy of the tone was varied by changing the resistance in a telephone circuit. The thresholds for 1. The differential limens for volume and the differenlimens for intensity are different functions of the energy of the stimulus and different amounts for any given value of the stimulus.Tonal Volume same kind of judgments when the frequency was kept constant and the energy of the stimulus varied. tial Halverson determined the volumic thresholds and also the thresholds for intensity at various energies for a tone of shows his results. numbers taken from the scale of the rheostat.

Pattie attempted to vary both frequency and intensity at the same time so as to equate volume. If both Halverson's and Rich's results are correct. amplitude. If two tonal stimuli have the same energy and different frequencies. if they were approximately equal in energy. . F. like intensity. Nevertheless the volumic judgments have proved difficult and the matter is not settled one way or the other. A. depend upon the energy or the amplitude of the stimulus. but. working in cooperation with the has found the utmost difficulty in duplicating Rich's author. but greater frequency has the lesser amplitude. would seem that these experiments of Halverson's and Rich's ought to be conclusive. Extensity cases. And there are other constants of a tonal stimulus besides frequency. pitch was kept constant. P. Pattie found that such heterophonic judgments were very difficult and unreliable. and energy to which appeal might be made. and it would seem that tonal volume must there- fore. then their amplitudes would have been very different. a faint low pitch might be made the same size as a loud high pitch. and the shape of the functions was different in the Thus tonal volume seemed to be established as a covariant with intensity and a datum separate from two intensity. it was not possible to keep intensity constant because there is no certain way of equating the intensities of two different pitches. Zoll. volume cannot be dependent upon the freit may depend upon energy or amplitude or some related variable. It is not impossible to see consistency in these two results. Gundlach has raised objections the results. In the experiment on volume and intensity.84 intensity. He did not publish It M. the tone of The situation is much more complicated than seems quency of the stimulus. Rich's stimuli were uncontrolled in energy. possible at first thought. and Halverson's thresholds. In the experiment upon volume and pitch.

we leave this topic it is perhaps interesting to ask whether there are any physiological grounds for expectBefore ing to find extensity among tones. All in all. One could not become aware even of bare extension unless it varied in amount. and that our inability to answer the question at once is due to the fact taste that gustatory spatial patterns are almost always accompanied by tactual patterns. although the perception would have so little practical to be realized frequently without the particular pressure of a laboratory instruction. Certainly. for auditory extension to be- ought to furthe ground of for come conscious. some think that the spread would be from the base of the cochlea up as the amplitude of excitation increases. and Gundlach and Bentley have failed to distinguish volumic thresholds from thresholds for tonal is thresholds for pitch. however. There are no data. . but it seems reasonable to suppose that taste must be like touch. most theories assume that the spread of excitation would vary with the energy of the stimulation. others think that the spread would be around some central resonating point of excitation. However. it would presumably also be necessary be stimulated differentially in respect of space. it would seem rather surprising than otherwise if we were not able to perceive a bare extensity attaching to tones.Tonal Volume 85 to the simple sensory status of tonal volume. one perceives vaguely gustatory forms when different sapid substances diffuse irregularly in water that fills the mouth. There remains. of course. then. the question of extension for use that we should not expect it and for smell. It "brightness" or even from the evident that we must await still more research. it of Corti is an extended organ like the skin and the nish a field of excitation capable of becoming perceived extension. In spite of the controversies this excitatory field to about the operation of the cochlea in hearing. The organ retina.

for its and yet there is problem that can be settled by existence. The point is not important at this level . Observers can judge olfactory sensations as of different volumes. Little is known of taste. less precisely organized than vision. The Visual Third Dimension Sensory extension does not sionality. which is perhaps not to be regarded as implicit in bare tion. The organ does not present a large surface. and the different parts of it cannot be differentially stimulated in respect of space. Of olfactory extension nothing is known. sensory extension. Auditory extension is not accepted ported by visual surrogates. Tactual sensation. is by the majority of psychologists as some definite experimental evidence sents a a fact. but the experi- On menter who made this observation was not sufficiently con- fident of the meaning of the results to publish them. although often supthe second spatial sense. It is in itself imply spatial dimen- conventional to think of visual and tactual ex- tension as areal. it is not so clear that we ought to expect extension in smells. partly because the retina and the skin are surfaces and stimulation takes place in areal fields in the sense-organ. a simple kind of organization of sensory material into a form. and partly because a projection theory implies that the spatial relations at the periphery are represented by a spatial pattern in the cross-section of the afferent conduc- Even such primitive dimensionality involves. but it is probably like touch. It prefurther research. We may summarize this section by saying that visual sensation is organized in the extensitive dimension and so highly organized that extension practically always appears as form and localization. and it is not even clear that the physiology of excitation is such that extensitive organization ought to result.86 Extensity the other hand. however.

Visual Third Dimension

87

of discussion. Obviously visual and tactual perceptions are always organized at least into areal extension. Sensation in
either of these sense-departments never occurs without ex-

tension in at least two dimensions. However, the matter becomes more important when we come to consider the
status of the third visual dimension. If the first

two

di-

mensions of vision already imply a certain degree of formal organization, we shall certainly expect the third dimension
to be understood only in relation to the structure of form. In the case of tones extension has been supposed to be

volumic. Tonal volume, however, furnishes us with an example of unformed extension rather than of a literally three-

dimensional volume.
face

The

ear does not function as a sur-

upon which
is

there

no

a stimulating field can be projected, and immediate pressure therefore to regard tones, to differ in size, as areal.

when they seem

The term volume

connotes a lack of form as compared with the constraints of
limitation to a surface or a line.

A very special problem appears, however, in connection with the third visual dimension. Let us first understand
clearly the

view of the older introspective psychology about view
the view of

this matter.

The
cists

traditional

Wundt and

in spatial theories

held that visual space

the genetiis, at the

primary level of organization, two-dimensional, and that the third dimension arises only out of further complication. There are three possible kinds of such complication.
(i) In the first place, the perception of distance may be dependent upon the convergence of the two eyes or the

accommodation of the lenses of the eyes, that

we may

is to say, discriminate differences in the distances of visual

objects because specific degrees of convergence and accommodation are required for the different distances and thus

come

to 'mean' those distances.

But how do convergences

88

Extensity

and accommodations affect the perception? This question has not always been specifically answered, but the most a view consonant with Titchener's context explicit reply
is that convergence and accommodaand that the kinesthetic sensations of convergence and accommodation supplement the visual core of

theory of perception
tion are sensed,

the perception, indicating the distances of the seen objects. Thus distance would be a 'meaning' added to a visual core

by an appropriate

kinesthetic context.

FIG. 12

STEREOGRAM OF TRUNCATED PYRAMID
such a card in a stereoscope has the left drawing shown to the eye and the right drawing to the right eye, the observer sees the pyramid solid and convex toward himself. If the card is cut in half and the two halves interchanged for the two eyes, then the perspective reverses and the perception is as if the observer were looking inside a hollow pyramid or were looking down a corridor.
left

When

visual perception of solidity often arises as the result of the disparity between the retinal images, a disparity
(2)

The

caused by parallax of the two eyes. The stereoscope is the instrument that demonstrates the effectiveness of this factor.
Fig. 12 represents a simple geometrical stereogram. If the

image at the right is projected upon the retina of the right eye, and the left image upon the left retina, and the two
are allowed to coincide
optically

the stereoscope effects this result
see a truncated

then one

may

pyramid extending

perception results because (we say) the images provided for the two sides
this

far out convexly

toward himself. And

Visual Third Dimension

89

are like those which would naturally come to the two eyes with the difference that parallax would give to a pyramid thus convex toward the observer. If Fig. 12 is cut in half

and the halves interchanged for the two eyes, then one same geometrical form concave, as if he were looking down a long corridor; and the explanation in terms of parallax is the same as before. Since for the two eyes there
sees the
is

but a single

field of vision,

it

is

natural to suppose that

the solid figure results simply from the superposition of the two images. However, the contemplation of Fig. 12 shows
that the two figures cannot exactly be superimposed; if the bases coincide, the tops are double; if the tops coincide, the bases are double. Sometimes in viewing such a diagram

through the stereoscope

this

persistent doubleness

of one

part or the other of the figure is introspectively apparent. There can be no doubt that it is this potential disparity that
is

situation

the ground of the perception of solidity. While such a is not readily subsumed under the context theory

of perception, the naive old-fashioned view was that the retinal disparity came to 'mean' solidity, as if the disparity were seen but the idea of solidity were all that got into

knowledge. Perhaps no one has ever quite reached this level of naivete*; certainly Titchener believed that the disparate fields managed to fuse in some inexplicable way; but the
jection theory of areal visual space

preceding sentence expresses the natural trend for a prowhen it comes to the
solidity.

problem of perceived
(3)

are also the secondary criteria, as they are called, of visual distance and solidity: linear perspective, light and shade, and all the other factors that can

Of course there

give depth in a picture. However, of these criteria there seems never to have been any theory at all, except the vague associationistical one that they have come through past

experience to 'mean' depth.

go

Extensity

It is easy to expose the weaknesses of these traditional views and even to caricature them, but it is very much more difficult to displace the ignorance upon which they are based.

However, there
be

is

one constructive theory, one to which

Koffka has recently lent the weight of his opinion. It may so the new view runs that the visual perception of
a three-dimensional

space involves
this view.

neural

pattern

in

the
for

brain. Let us see

how good an argument we can make

tion of Fig. 12.

begin with the case of the stereoscopic percepWe can distinguish consciously between different parts of the field of vision, but we cannot distinguish
is

We may

excitation of one retina

obvious conclusion

that the

from excitation of the other. The two fields of excitation fuse

with each other in a point-to-point correspondence. This is the old theory of corresponding points and of projection.
It leads to the

conclusion that the doubling of the combined

images

is,

in

ever, involves

ing points

is

solidity. Such a notion, howan inconsistency. The theory of correspondbased upon the evidence of introspection, and

some way, the

therefore to accept as equally valid the introevidence about solidity. Introspection shows that, spective although sometimes the disparity of images is seen in stereoscopic observation, ordinarily the perception of solidity as truly tridimensional as the perception of a surface
areal,
is

we ought

is

and that perceived disparity

is

not normal to stereo-

How can these things be? Plainly it is impossible to superimpose the two halves of Fig. 12 without disparity between either the large squares
scopic solidification.

or the small squares. If both the large squares and the small squares combine at the same time and introspection indicates that they may then the fusions cannot be due to the movements of the eyes and the consequent movements of the images upon the retinas; they must therefore involve

Visual Third Dimension
some
relative shift of excitation within the central

91
nervous

system. Let us suppose that the drawings of Fig. 12 are presented in a stereoscope to an observer and that, for the

few moments, the disparity remains apparent in the perception, with the two large squares fusing into one and the two small squares overlapping inside. Presently the small squares pull together and fuse without the large
first

square's being resolved into its components, and at the same time the figure stretches itself out in the third dimension. The simultaneous fusion of both the large and the small

and

squares occurs only when they appear in different planes, it is natural for us to transfer this phenomenon of per-

ception to the neural pattern as we have been accustomed to do in accordance with the theory of correspondence or, in
respect of bidimensional patterns, the theory of projection. The readiness with which areal patterns, binocularly perceived, may become tridimensional has been shown by

experiments with optical
consist of a

illusions.

Most

of these illusions

primary stimulus-pattern which is distorted in perception by the addition of a secondary stimulus-pattern. For instance, in the Zollner illusion the primary stimulus is a set of parallel lines, and the secondary stimulus consists of little cross-bars that cross the odd lines in one direction and the even lines in another. This secondary stimulus distorts the primary so that the lines no longer appear parallel.
It
is

a very obvious experiment to try physiologically to

localize this effect of the

secondary stimulus upon the pri-

mary by
ment
is

presenting the primary stimulus to only one eye and the secondary stimulus to the other eye. The experi-

easy with the use of the stereoscope. If the illusion persists, the interaction of the stimuli must be in the central nervous system; if the illusion fails, it might lie in the retina.
result.

However, the experiment brings a surprising
illusion neither succeeds

The

nor

fails,

but the pattern extends

but the figure remains always a cube. But. It cannot be seen as a flat diagram in the plane of the paper. one actually sees the bound- a FIG. When the pyramid of Fig. The problem is to see a simply as the simultaneous presentation of b and c without the perception of solidity. With continued scrutiny the perspective of the cube may reverse. Yet b and c added together give a. with the odd lines lying from the even lines. both b and c can easily be seen as flat diagrams. As soon as we understand the necessity for the tridimensional organization of visual perception. This "glassy sensation" is well to psychologists and has been the subject of observational study. known It is necessarily equally obvious that visual tridimensionality does not depend upon retinal disparity even though the more in Fig. we can begin to see significance in the tridimensionalities that appear immediately in introspection. 13 be some REVERSIBLE PERSPECTIVE IN THE NECKER CUBE In a one sees a cube. reversed.92 itself Extensity into in a different plane the third dimension. After Koffka. striking illusions of depth are stereoscopic. 12 is seen as solid in the stereoscope. Thus we see how easily visual organization passes into a third dimension. However. The cube ija is irrresistibly a cube. ing surfaces of the solid as transparent planes through which the black lines are visible. It is . As one examines it. it is still a solid figure. its perspective reverses so that the far surface becomes the near and one sees the bottom of the base instead of the top of the base.

configured in accordance with general laws of the same kind as those that describe the patterning of electrical charges within a conducting medium. accept than we. However. It is on such illustrations that Koffka bases his argument for the tridimensionality of the cerebral field of visual excitation. I3a as a plane combination will appreciate how insistently tridi- mensional Fig. Koffka can. they do believe in psychophysiological correspondence. Figs. this sort of we are still quite uncertain that freedom exists within the brain. The cerebral dynamics is not worked out. Thus we are faced with a dilemma between two opposite have the hypotheses about the action of the brain. We . of course. I3a. conducting impulses which converge at synapses upon other neurons or which diverge from them. The figure in perspective can be regarded as arousing a tridimensional excitation because of internal stresses that are relieved in a certain symmetrical form. this conclusion more easily other Gestalt psychologists do not believe in the theory of projection. of course. and ordinarily they accept Kohler's He and conception of central excitation as consisting of relatively unconstrained fields. ija is. ijb tries to see Fig. The simplest facts of stereoscopy seem to require more freedom than conventional physiology has allowed.Visual Third Dimension 93 practically impossible to see the figure as the plane pattern of black lines on a white surface which it 'really' is. it is very doubtful whether we need to accept the extreme constraints of traditional physiology and to regard the central nervous system as consisting of insulated neurons. Stereoscopic solidity occurs because certain parts tend naturally to fuse and in fusing eject themselves from other parts. but it comes as something of a shock to discover that the combination of these two plane and I3C figures will give the solid Fig. ijb and ijc can easily be seen as plane patterns. The reader who of Figs.

and yet the impulses. the amount of extension. and we have the systems of reflex arcs of conventional physiology on the other. If size the amount be it is plain that its is meaning will usually relativistic. as it were. given in the notes to this chapter Size For convenience we may distinguish the problem of size from the problems of extension and of form. Even in the judgments of everyday life our estimates of size in the external world are fairly accurate only because there are always in the world of observation so many known sizes which may serve as standards of com- parison. Size is. There are such good grounds for both views that it rather seems as if some sort compromise were likely to be discovered.94 Ex tensity principles of dynamic organization of Gestalt psychology on the one hand. and large in respect of a smaller. and it is not at all of tion impossible that the well-recognized principles of nerve-conduction. might seem to exhibit great freedom of organization. we say what are the sensory phenomena which vary spatially and which may thus become organized in the dimension of extensity. worked out for peripheral nerve-fibers. In this connecwe must remember that the elaborately branched axons and dendrites in the brain may give it more the character of a network than of a system of chains. respect of extensity. In the psychological laboratory experiments upon . Extension is primary. (pp. one that would reverse is result in a if tndimenthe retinal disparity were reversed. because of the branching of the neurons. might apply strictly here. ii8f.). sional field A speculative example of how the strict binocu- lar projection of a stereogram might of excitation. A sensory impression small in respect of another that is larger. Form is is the organization of the sensory material in of extension.

Only will explain physiological theory how a man a complex can correctly and immediately point to the larger of two objects. involving various differentiations. Such a conception is very difficult to reconcile with the traditional neuron theory of the central nervous system. must be reduced in its consequents to some simple judgment. If we wish to translate this statement into physiologi- and at the zenith. although they may comparing is it with familiar objects. The illusion involved in the size of the moon is the most striking example. in this sense involve a physiological 'convergence'. 95 almost invariably require a comparison between two In fact it is difficult to give a meaning to the notion of absolute size. It gigantic. Thus it appears we can only say that two parts of a system of must differ in extension and that the nervous system must respond differentially to these differentiated excal terms. However. Any theory of space perception must. a spatial field. nevertheless size may be 'abso- lute' psychologically when the perception includes no conscious comparison. . At the zenith the moon appears to be of a given differ greatly in size.Size size sizes. as it seems to occur. It requires that some simple and presumably narrowly localized system of excitation be set up as the essential consequence of a differential within a large and widespread system. for example. in the illusion of the difference in size of the moon on the horizon that. excitation tensions. the instances of the perception of 'absolute size' throw more light on the matter. the perception of size consists of the discrimination of relative sizes. This illusion has been discussed seems not to be due to comparison of the visible horizon-moon with objects on the earth's surface. On the horizon the moon since antiquity. In strict logic size has meaning only relativistically. size as the 'natural' size of the and most persons accept this moon. however. in the great majority of cases.

the 'horizon' image may be almost twice as large as the one at indicates that size the 'zenith. However. the linear size of the retinal We know image decreases in proportion to . Thus Helmholtz's test of projecting the horizon-moon to the zenith and the zenith- moon to the horizon by means of a mirror is apt to fail because the surface of the mirror (or reflecting prism) remains visible. It may be. that it is greater at the greater distances. causing an actual shrinkage in the size of the excitatory field upon which the judgment depends. Size Nevertheless size is free to vary in this way only when. or in as far as..' Thus the evidence and dis- tance are closely related and that they tend to be codeterminate. has shown that the illusion is measurable with cardboard discs at distances under 33 m. as Zoth and Schur have suggested.96 Extensity Rather does it seem to be dependent upon the position of the head and eyes in viewing the moon. and that at 33 m. Distance is most accurately determinate for short distances. the illusion seems also to depend in part upon the indeterminate for upward gaze distance of the moon. for it is diminished if the moon be projected upon a near surface. Size 'stays put. on other grounds that perceived size is strictly dependent upon perceived distance and the size of the retinal image. The illusion then would be maximal in the case of the moon where distance is entirely indeterminate. in one of the most recent experi- mental studies. that the raising of the head and eyes to view the zenith 'drains' the lunar image. and distance are codeterminate because size is most definitely determined when distance is most determinate. As a perceived object recedes from an observer. as if the posture 'shrank' the lunar image.' The illusion increases for the greater and less determinate distances. distance is indeterminate. and there the illusion of the horizon and the zenith is least. Schur.

it is impossible to be sure that size does not vary with attention. nor does it remain unchanged. It is easier to make the negative assertion and to say that ordinarily we are quite unaware of the absolute size of sensory impressions. is any larger in perception page than the small half-page? Let us try this experiment. As distance becomes great and therefore indein distance. Most judgments of size are relative and not absolute. The size changes in accord- ance with a definite function which has been made out in the "alley experiments. We may The still believe that perceived size depends upon the magnitude of a central field of excitation. Note the breadth of the pencil. size image. such as the position of the head and eyes in viewing the zenith. Hold shall Who a pencil vertically at arm's length." experiments in which various near extents are successively equated to a fixed remote extent. may enter in to influence size. so . Now we can see what a vague thing size is. when two terminate.Size 97 the distance of the object from the eye. It is is more effective is said that a half-page of magazine advertising than a quarter-page. other factors. as one looks down the alley. illusion of the moon indicates that there some meaning to the notion of 'absolute size/ but it is very difficult to find other examples. Visual size does not depend wholly upon the visual angle of the retinal objects vary depends on the distance in an exactly measurable (but otherwise unpredictable) way. as one were defining the loci of the walls of an alley so that the two side-walls. For instance. The perceived size does not decrease so rapidly as the size of the retinal image. shall be if everywhere equidistant. but that the half of a large page no more effective than the half of a small page. when the is the field of attention. Halve the distance of the pencil from the eyes. say that the large half-page. but we cannot is maintain any simple theory of projection.

This view of cortical function is more compatible with the facts of the perception of size than is any simple projection theory. however. the attention shifts? Again it is almost impossible For the author the perceived change in size is somein the case of the attentional shift what greater than in the case of the change of distance. somehow enter into any . Does the pencil change in perceived size as to say. although any large part is equally useful. We Then extend the attention over the field of vision as widely as possible so that the pencil becomes merely a small object in the midst of the field. the perceived breadth to double. thus making spatial (spatially discrimination (Cf. that the judgment is difficult and at best uncertain. might vary with attention. in any case. but the point is. the attention is not really narrowed to the object.) At any rate the psychological fact of the limited range of apprehension must physiological theory of perception. but the object is perceptually expanded to the a small region attention (and hence to the cortex). and concentrate the attention upon it. We know. for example. but that the more his highly intelligent or discriminative functions require a larger part of the cortex ("mass action"). but can you be sure expect that it has at all increased in size? Now hold the pencil again at arm's length. Lashley interprets lute size is experiments upon the cerebral cortex as meaning that. In this connection we may anticipate the mention of Lashley's experiments in the next section. when not otherwise controlled. 101-104. differentiated reaction) easier. Abso- not easily perceived. noticing every possible detail in the texture of its surface. pp. within certain limits. that discrimination of fine details within is possible only under concentrated attention. Perhaps.98 Extensity do not that the retinal image becomes twice as broad. any part of the cortex can perform any cortical function ("equipotentiality"). It also suggests how size.

when. if one makes allowance for significant thing is The most its the absence of sharp tactual contours. Usually the form of the stimulus. that the deviations are cerebral. we perceive the form. the square is 'founded' as a secondary or derived 'formquality. and that. imaged upon the retina so the theory projected. and we can assume that the dynamics are physiological.' We have no reason at all to believe that the lines are psychologically prior to the square and that the square is founded upon immediately as the lines. in which projection of form is a central tendency and a constancy hypo- . Square stimulus square retinal image square central excitation square perception such is the is would run norm. The form and not a sum of four perceived a perceived square lines.Form Form 99 about the perception of form Visual experience seems to come formed. Consider the visual perception of a square. the optical illusions exhibit a number of ways in which dynamic principles of organization establish deviations from this norm. at least approximately. is The square is 'there' as held the key to the problem of perceived form. brain. The old school of the form-quality held that the four lines are the elements of the square. given these elements and the relations between them. immediacy. upon the because of psychophysiological correspondence. just as much as a line is a perceived form and not 'a row of sensations' (as the older psychology used to imply). Such would be a dynamical projection theory. However (the theory would continue). At first thought it seems as if a modified projection theory them.' This view has become nonsensical because no sensible meaning can be given to the fact of 'founding. and that psychophysiological correspondence is as direct as ever for the illusory perception. So also does tactual experience.

the greatest of our troubles is not the failure to be able to explain the condensation of an actual excitatory form to the simpler physiology of a judgment that the form what it is. but most from Lashley's experiments which we must now Traditional psychophysiology has accepted. The evidence for compliis cation particularly consider. we have to say how. in reality.ioo thesis fails only Extensity because of dynamical principles of organi- from the central tendency. the theory of sensory centers or areas in the cerebral cortex. with such a theory the lesser is that it is. while a rhombus with angles of 85 and 95 However. The perception has turned out to be ever so much more complexly determined than we should have dared to assert a mere decade ago. comes to some extent from psychopathology. zation that create deviations Of two difficulties A retinal well. along with the theory of spatial projection. The will final physiological theory of the perception of will excite this final form have to show how a square common will not. path. In fact the notion of sensory centers is quite old. the projected pattern comes to lead to so simple a discriminatory endproduct as the introspective judgment. A very simple introspection a which the observer raises his finger for perceived square and does nothing for any other perceived is one in form. Suppose that we were to admit the physiological view in the preceding paragraph. only an incomplete theory. Very the square? How does this of introspection series of events The physiology to terminate in adequate perception? must constitute one-half of the problem of perception. If we believe in projection and thus in the conduction of nerve-impulses along relatively insulated fibers. how do we know about come square becomes a brain square by projection. in the brain. being implicit in Johannes Miiller's admission that the specific energies of sensory nerves may re- .

However. c and n seem to include all the points from which Lashley got muscular movement from direct stimulation of the cortex. The boundaries between the anatomical regions are not so sharp as the lines for somesthesia. repeated direct stimulation of a given point within the 'motor' area may continue to give rise to the same movement until an- . For instance. The right half of the dorsal aspect of the cortex in Fig. are areas distinguished by Fortuyn Fig. of the figure. shown for the dorsal and lateral aspects of the rat's cortex. For instance. shows for the rat the modern topographical view. the auditory center was assigned to the temporal lobe. and k for smell. /'. on more reliable evidence than was available for the other senses. was localized in the occipital cortex. nine lettered areas. m' and aa. The letters are Fortuyn's and we shall presently have a great deal to say about area w in the visual cortex. and then Fritsch and Hitzig described motor centers fissure of in the region of the cortex in front of the Rolando. None of these functions is limited strictly to the corresponding area. 14 The on the anatomical grounds of difference in arrangement of the half dozen laminations of the cells in the cortex. There is no persistent finer localization of function within an area. Fig. /. 14 distorts the facts. Presumably . 14 shows the functions that can be most satisfactorily assigned (in part from analogy with evidence for mammals higher than the rat) to Fortuyn's various areas. Afterwards the area back of this fissure came to be regarded as a region functioning for somesthetic sensations. All areas seem to participate in some intelligent behavior. and vision. There is a great deal of evidence that visual functions tend to involve the areas w. Broca's supposed discovery of a speech center came somewhat later (1861).Cerebral Localization side 101 in the central terminations of these nerves (1838). is especially important p for audition.

IO2 Extensity FIG. The actual shape of the areas is Lashley's modification of Fortuyn. These and Visual areas. In the lateral and left dorsal aspects are shown the chief cyto-architectural areas as established by Fortuyn. Somesthetic. 14 TOPOGRAPHY OF THE CEREBRAL CORTEX IN THE RAT: FORTUYN'S AREAS The figure shows the projections of the lateral aspect (one hemisphere) and the dorsal aspect (two hemispheres) of the rat's brain. as they have been established in tradition and verified by recent research. In the right dorsal aspect are shown. Auditory. in relation to certain groupings of Fortuyn's areas. Lashley's theory is that all areas higher functions like intelligence. function of area k is perhaps olfactory. Figure adapted from Fortuyn and Lashley. the more specific functions of these areas. and that different parts of a small area are equipotential with one another for the specific localized functions of the area. There seem to be normal correlations between points of the cortex and par- . The approximate. The letters identifying the areas are Fortuyn's and are used by Lashley and in the present text. although it may recur again after a time. Then the original correlation be- tween point of stimulation and movement no longer holds. The abbrevia- tions refer to the Motor. See text. correlations are only are equipotential for other point is stimulated.

the discrimination of a given triangle from the same triangle inverted). take away area w as would result from impeded an equal area elsewhere. which can be regarded a visual projection area. This variability of function of different cortical regions seems to be the general rule. This fact seems to affirm the visual function of the area. for the areas are equipotential. 14). Learning a a rat. Regions which normally have specific functions also participate in general functions. The portion of this area seems to be essential for the visual discrimination of patterns (e. blind rats can learn the maze and of such a habit is as much are more disturbed by the subsequent removal of area w . Thus Lashley finds that in intelligent activities all parts of the cortex may be equipotential. for which substitution is very easily made whenever central conditions are disturbed by stimulation of another part of the cortex. but not at all upon upon the particular areas which make up the total amount. area w is also equipotential with all other parts of the cortex for the and the acquisition learning of a maze.. When the area is and cannot be reestablished by destroyed such discriminatory habits are abolished training. Area w does not contaking away tribute to the learning of a maze only because learning the maze involves vision. Now lateral let us examine the functioning of area as w (Fig. maze may be regarded as requiring 'intelligence' in The capacity to learn a complicated maze is diminished of cortical tissue. by the destruction and the diminution of the capacity varies directly with the amount of tissue destroyed. or under changed central conditions give over their specific functions to other regions. However. and one is as good as another in making up a sum.g. This is Lashley's law of mass action: Intelligence (the kind required for a rat to learn a maze) depends the amount of cortical tissue available.Equipotentiality ticular 103 movements.

and incomplete 'insult' to the area interferes with the function as to degree but not specifically as to kind. In the case of the discrimination of brightness this area has an intermediate effect. as in the visual discrimination of forms. In the first place. although such acquisition is not retarded in its initial phases. dependent upon the mass action of the entire cortex and Then parts of the cortex are equipotential in respect of it. incomplete 'insult' of seems rather to decrease visual acuity than to estabis lish a blind spot in the field of vision. are in the presence of something like a hierarchy of functions in respect of equipotentiality and specificity of localization. Insult to fected. Its removal does not abolish eyes. It depends upon mass action of equipotential parts of the lateral portion of area w. simply the maze. Some of the details of the preceding paragraph may prove to be incorrect. the capacity to discriminate brightnesses. However. ex- Obviously the situation which we are considering tremely complex and interpretation of these experiments must be made with great care. The acquisition of a habit dependent upon the dis- crimination of brightnesses is made more difficult by the removal of area w. presumably at a third level. while Extensity than normally trained rats are disturbed by blinding the specific for the perception of visual patcontributes to mass action in performance in terns. area w For instance. as measured by ability to learn a maze. When parts of area w act specifically.IO4 Area w. the parts of such an area are equipotential. At an upper level It all is the general picture is pretty clear. it is clear that we is intelligence. any other part of the cortex leaves this function unafThen. these parts have shown no further specificity within themselves. but it renders the discrimination less accurate and the differential threshold larger. at a lower and more specific level there is the per- ception of spatial form. there is the gross .

Spatial differentiation exists for form . the visual discrimination of bright- which persists when the optic radiations are interrupted. Presumably partial insult to the area befogs vision. suppresses detail in the same way that detail is eliminated at the periphery by the diminution of the size of it a stimulus-object. relatively indifferent as to locus. We must look here for dynamical organization of excitation.Specificity of Localization 105 perception of objects and their position. This function depends upon the optic radiations persists with the from the internal capsule to the cortex. indeexcitable tissue available for finer differentiation. The conclusion as to visual specific projection form is that its perception dethe functioning of a fairly well localized region pends upon in the rat the lateral portion of area w. from an approximately of peripheral excitation. At the periphery and the lower levels we have localization of function. since it reduces the excita- ble area. but would be abolished at some still lower level. is no greater than the problem of how the organization comes about. there nesses. at is the lowest level. and acuity and the discrimination of detail depend upon mass action. for there can be no perception of pattern or even of gross form when the optic radiations are interrupted. which is the introspection of it. lem as to how pendent of locus. but in general a lack of specificity. this region there All parts are equipotential. This discrimination occurs to the total brightness of a field. Within of the cortex seems to be no further specific localization. Finally. but dependent upon the amount of The probsuch an organization converges upon a common path. but complete destruction of area w. without discrimination of pattern or form. or else. There is represents visual no reason to suppose that the organization that form in area w is anything other than a spatial organization. In the cortex we have some localization for certain functions.

Tactual forms. required with disparity and also for the various conditions that depth give depth monocularly. Presumably it retains its dimensional integrity. n8f. two areas w. Simplicity of projection is inevitably upset by the fact that the field of vision always involves both hemispheres of the brain. In human beings there is. one fundamental difference between visual and tactual form.) Area . are natural shown us that certain forms. Spatial organization in area j is possibly less sharp. (Fig. corresponds in tactual function with the function of the lateral part of area w for vision. It of the type of organization of form in that there occur presumably here in area w the perception of forms. we have no ground for asserting a simple projection theory. A seen circle is not necessarily a circular excitation. however.io6 at the Extensity periphery and is projected inward. On the other hand. and that incomplete forms tend toward these natural shapes. though the cause may be at the periphery where the skin with its tensions and deformations would tend to blur contours into "edges. (See pp. they have blurred "edges" only." It may be observed that we come here upon a datum as to the relative primacy of the conscious dimensions. and which may even separate a figure from its ground in perceptual depth. Presumably then some part of area . From such data we ally get may eventu- some notion is the cortex. is fundamentally organized with contours. 86-94. Area w in man ought to be the seat of this fundamental dichotomizing principle of visual organization. however. It has . as Rubin has shown. boundary lines that differentiate sharp contours. as Rubin has also shown. and for the tridimensional certain experiments indicate that its insult in the rat leads to temporary disturbance of sensitivity to posture. Gestalt psychology has like the circle. that an object of attention from its ground. Visual form. 14) is historically the somesthetic area. do not show is to say.

Localization 107 been asked: Is quality prior to extensity or can space just as easily be primary? Can the same square in phenomenal experience be both cold and red? Apparently modal differis ences in quality are physiologically prior to form. the visual square and the tactual square. localization. However. there must be first in excitation two squares. It is true that form implies a certain intrinsic kind of localization. We have already seen that tactual space is constantly judged as if it were visual. like the objective world of visual perception. It gives the impression of being absolute.. is extrinsic. is a 'dumb-bell/ and he sees the two stimulusdumb-bell in visual imagery. probable that area p has an auditory function in the as it has long been supposed to have in man. the facts of tonal volume in relation to auditory localization are too uncertain for us to speculate upon the function of area p with respect to them. One observes that the tactual pattern on the forearm. However. in the more usual use of the word. An observer localizes a single point of stim- . since every part of a form is localized in respect of the other parts. If a square both seen and felt. for the reason that it places a stimulus definitely with relation to a large and permanent frame of reference. If they are perceived as a single square. w is and . then the judgment is much more complex than the introspective reaction to one or the other. Localization The term localization can usually be understood to refer to a process that is somewhat more highly integrated than the perception of form. Somehow there must be an integration of the events in areas It rat. created by points. is Ordinarily the conscious frame of reference in localization visual.

it is not essential. but it is not necessarily so. given at the two ears in certain relations of intensity and phase. or because the difficulty of inhibiting it acts as a distraction. The habitual frame of reference for auditory and tactual sensory data is visual. while vision provides the most frequent medium of localization. as they are in the case of the congenitally Moreover. or what not. it Extensity and he sees the point even while he kinesthetically and tactually with a pointer. blind. as thick or thin. If the stimulus a tone. The attries to find tempt to inhibit visual imagery in tactual localization in- creases the errors greatly. He may do almost as well in localizing with open eyes on a photograph or plaster model of his arm. as misty or polished. where a motor response follows automatically upon the tactual stimulation without intermediation of any visual process. a situation in which kinesthetic and tactual cues cannot occur. It for this reason that we say that localization is more highly integrated than the perception of form. .io8 ulation on the forearm. the observer nearly always sees the tone which he localizes sees it perhaps as pink or blue or gray. The rare observer who lacks visual imagery and the exceptional visual observer who can inhibit visual imagery show that. it is visualized. either because the visual imagery provides accurate cues. The touch or the itself placed by virtue of its association with a sight that fits into a recognized visual frame of reference. The frame of reference is usually visual. If a familiar object is makes a noise. there is the unconscious or obscurely con- scious localization. Nevertheless. To the sensory core there accrues sound gets is a localizing context of visual imagery. Auditory localization works in the same way. tactual and auditory localization furnish splendid examples of the operation of the context theory of meaning in perception. Tactual and auditory phenomena can be localized with reference to a somesthetic frame.

which the child acquires with difficulty because there is no clear requires a asymmetry. Everybody realizes that there must be in every localizable sensory excitation some local characteristic that pertains to the place of origin of the sensation and has thus the potentiality for localization. The distinction between right and left in the visual field is largely a motor habit. therefore. and we may know that a conscious context is not even a sine qua non of localization. Lotze. We sensory core. Presumably the distinction between up and down is originally no more obvious. On the other hand. it is plain that the sensory core itself must include the essential datum for localization. Psychology has fussed about local signs ever since Lotze invented them in 1852. In other words. There is very little that can be said of the physiology of psychological the localizing process. We are here in the realm of sensory organization across departments of sense "compliand the eventual cations. we are not yet quite ready to dismiss the of localization into the limbo of our ignorance. of how the correct visual image or the adequate movement follows upon a tactual. and a great many other psychologists characteristics made the mistake of supposing that these local 'local signs/ must be immediately conscious as . Wundt. auditory or visual sensory excitation. Conscious visual localization. It of the visual it transcends itself only occasionally when motor context.Visual Localization 109 sic. tends to be intrina matter of internal relationships within the gross form field. problem may not understand fully how a context is added to a Nevertheless. localization is either the relativism of form or it is a context. and its physiology is the physiology of tion will be the solution also of the accrued contexts or association. though its importance to the organism may lead to the earlier acquisition of the discriminatory motor response." Herbart called such integrations answer to the problem of learning and of sensory integraproblem of localization.

' In the case of cutaneous sensibility we get a hint from the facts of the experiment on the limen of dual impression. separated. facts which we have already discussed in the present chap- ter in connection with the general theory of projection and Fig. The discrimination of two points can be regarded as the localization of one point with respect to the other. 10 (pp. but not quite. two points is simultaneous points close together give far apart give two areas. Is it central. and is effective only as it gives rise to a conscious or motor context. of excitation that corresponds with Further evidence for the existence of such a central pattern comes from the experiments on the return of sensibility with the regeneration of cut or injured cutaneous nerves. he localizes it somewhere a diffuse. The direct evidence lies in the fact that the areas We know . is a physiological account of these 'local characteristics. that the majority of spots on the skin have multiple innervation. fields of separation gives the 'dumb-bell.? Or is is show peripheral. ill-defined area. A single point as stimulus gives the perception of an observer is asked to localize such an area accurately by pointing. If near its middle. but it seems probable that there must be in the brain some organized pattern this account. It is is related to the lack of sharp What the experiment does not the locus of the dispersion. perhaps a characteristic of the organization of form in area . 67-69). due perhaps merely to the deformation of the skin or to the spread of stimulating tensions within the skin? There is at present no certain answer to these quesit tions.1 10 is Extensity that the local characteristic is whereas the truth generally immediately unconscious. an inter- mediate critical ous that there a single point. Two a larger area. therefore. dispersion are almost. What is needed.' It is obvidispersion of excitation in stimulation with and that the 'dumb-bell' occurs when the two also plain that this dispersion contours in tactual perception.

. in suppressing one innervation. There is no reason to assume that area . Later these abnormalities are corrected. and that severing one of the nerves diminishes sensitivity without establishing anesthesia in such a region of overlap. nevertheless it is of importance for us to see that a complicated system of facts of this sort is readily consistent with a conception of partially unconstrained spatial organization within a small part of area .Tactual Localization in for different nerves overlap. hence we should not expect two innervations to make themselves felt at the same moment. the stronger were weakened. One of the fundamental principles of organiza- tion in the brain would seem to be selection. It would not be surprising if. for instance. should show different regions of projection for different parts of the body. A similar problem occurs in connection with auditory local- . and such a relationship would account for the diminution of sensory intensity as recovery becomes complete. In the same way shifts of localization would occur when the two innervations are differently projected. and Henry Head quite plausibly assumed that changes of this sort would be the result of dual innervation. to suppose that dual innervation sometimes gives less intense excitation than sim. There is an indirect argument made from the fact that returning sensitivity often passes through a stage where sensory excitation (for a fixed degree of stimulation) is abnormally intense and where localto be ization is grossly incorrect. All these facts of returning sensibility after cutaneous nerve-division are capable of explanation in terms of rather simple principles of organization in the brain. There is no virtue in pressing these speculations far. where in area We ple innervation. One never becomes conscious of all of his skin at once. in the cortex. a later innervation inducing the changes in the earlier. but there is nothing novel in the concept of incomplete inhibition between two simultaneous disparate excitations. perhaps some- need.

the dimension of separation of the two ears. provided the two a click.. There are three ways of controlling localization in this left-right dimension. The sound is localized toward the ear in which it (1) a diotic is For more it intense.g. With the tones in phase. The localization if from the side of the is earlier click toward the median sec. If the intensity of a discrete noise. a lead of three fourths of a wave-length is identical with a lag of one fourth.ii2 Extensity ization. for a greater lead is more easily interpreted as a lag. The primary dimension of auditory localization is left-right. e. median plane. plane. a critical point is reached. When the lead has become half a wave-length. then a single click clicks shifts is heard. is If it is then localized in the equally intense in the two ears. and lengthening one tube so as to make the phase lag localization the corresponding ear. decreased from about 0. The phase can be varied electrically (3) If a diotic tone has for an observer who wears a telephone head-piece. is ears are equally sensitive. (2) diotic. Midway between the extremes is the median plane. in the tone sweeps to the right. If phase is then made to lead for the right ear. a plane in visual space but merely a point localization within the plane may in auditory space since be indeterminate. like and the times of stimulation are is dichotic. when the interval to nothing. in the same way that a lead or a lag of an entire .002 sec. somewhat the temporal displacement of the less than 0. is in the median plane if the ears are equally sensitive. of the leading phase. [same in both ears] noise or tone. the be varied dichotically [differently in the two intensity may ears]. or it can be varied by leading the tone to the two ears through two tubes.0007 its phase relations varied dichotithen the perceived tone is localized toward the side cally.

the excitation which leads to localization is a bifocal projection. but it becomes a series of discrete impulses as excitation in the auditory nerve-fibers. since the two waves At this critical point the tone disappears from one side and reappears on the other. Since intensive differences and temporal differences have same effect in localization. the experimental facts make it pretty clear that However. they must in some way reduce to the same effectual cause. course both views can be held together. would be more effective than a later equal excitation. On making demand upon the same field of projection. the very short timeintervals that have been found to be determinative of localization for clicks are consistent with the time-intervals in- volved in the phase-differences of localized tones. are in phase again. Thus the tone will sweep repeatedly about the head as long as the phase-relations at the two ears can be shifted continuously. In general. Bousfield has suggested that differences of the intensity might reduce to differences in time plausible conditions of stimulation within if certain rather the inner ear were to be the other hand. It is obvious that these last facts about phase represent a special case of the more general facts about time-relations. at the brain? Again we can only speculate. intensities can be changed into times at the inner ear and back again into intensities at the cortex. Of tation. or else changes so rapidly that it seems to move through the head. Does one reduce to the other? W. Difference of phase as a condition of localization is simply a continuous repetition of differences of time.Auditory Localization wave-length is 113 no lead or lag at all. it is quite reasonable to that differences in time would reduce to differences suppose in excitatory intensity by the principle that the earlier excitrue. A. The tonal stimulus is a continuous wave-form as a stimulus. The foci for the two ears must be spatially distinct What happens .

Lashley's experiments seem to show that gross localization may occur without the cortex.ii4 Extensity is a relation quite different from the one that supposed to hold for two corresponding points on the two retinas. and yet we get primary continuum of localization. the essential condiears have it tion of auditory localization. it cannot be peripheral where the auditory tracts are separate. Auditory localization is the result of dichotic stimulation. as when localized visually or a visual impression a tactual impresis localized by a precise motor response. the rats could not discriminate visual patterns. The is conclusion of this section is that accurate localization is inherent dependent upon that it is sometimes nothing more any organized form. In vision and in tactual sensibility we have sensory surfaces which can be projected upon the proper areas. and we look for the local characteristic after the fibers from the two come together and integration is possible. but they . On the other hand. with its center nearer the more intense focus. In hearing we have only tory localization the two ears. optic radiations When area w was destroyed and the from the internal capsule were left intact. is we must notice that audi- a very special case. Perhaps would be in area p that we find the resultant diffuse bifocal pattern. Thus a median localization presumably means some kind of a median excitation between two uniat least a unidimensional aural foci. The implication is that the cerebral cortex is involved. On the other hand. Such a view is consistent with our remarks about tactual localization. but that usually it the relative localization that in involves sion is some higher integration. The fundamental excitatory continuum must be established in the brain. than the relationships within the form. The center of such a simply organized form of excitation would be the local characteristic. and thus but two focal points.

I38f. Miiller.. Boring's. PsychoL. 75. Hoag- Projection and Correspondence present author has discussed Johannes Miiller's views on the specific land. 568ff. Henri. 351373- The For Bernstein's theory. Outlines of Psychology.. is argument of the presE. G. G. energies of nerves and on sen- iiber Untersuchungen den Err e gun gsv or gang im Nerven- Bernstein. 388later exposition is said to 393. Physiol. 343-351. [1893]. 1878. (not very helpful). E. The birth of the theory was the brief article three years earlier: Zur (GestaltquaUtat) . Text-book of Experimental Psychology. 433-440. To be a psychologist was to know at least something of freed of this controversy. Kiilpe. 1930. 1877. and imply that the projection pattern can sometimes become effective in before it reaches the cortex. I. The same book also discusses the school of formquality sory projection in his A und Muskelsystem. 720-723 (good). 162197- 1905. 223 (good. Anat. Gen. . 1932. responsibility and W. HI. and geneticism ("emin 1868. though tion it does not men- Bernstein). u. such as O. 1871. Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen. Ueber die Raumwahmehmungen des Tastsinnes. 221S. Wcber-Fechner law by H. 1898. 7788. Myers. 374-380 (better). see G. Foris sources. 170-202. or V. 32-39. Such localizations are of the nature of motor responses. G. For secondary would be superfluous. its spatial relations Notes A some general brief discussion of the this book. Sci- physiologists' unwitting support of the theory of direct psychophysiological correspondence were suggested in part by the epistemology in the article on the implicit physiology of ence. 1894. Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik. Med. History of Experimental Psychology. Boring. 98-105.. illustrated The author's comments about the problem of by of the ent chapter. 368-373. 1911. 1929. The consciousness. wi$s. therefore needs a reference. f. see J. E. To the older generation of psychologists a reference to the topic of nativism Bois-Reymond's] Arch. Fechner. 3.Notes 1 1 5 could localize visual stimuli roughly in space and even estimate seen distances approximately for the purpose of jumping from one platform to another. T. Nagel. C. /. In Sa- tunately the younger generation this chen der Psychophysik. du 448-450. be Bernstein's Lehrbuch der Phy- A piricism") theories of space siologif. 92f. Theorie des Fechner'schen Gesetzes der Empfindung [Reichert u.

1932. 58-69. Kohler opposes the 'constancy hypothesis' him in Gestalt The a (1922) is only when it is inade- quate. 57ff. That tonal volume should have a definite relationship to tonal localization implies that . and to the difference land.Extensity /. 87-94 (most recent).. loc. For the pre-experimental view. quiring into the fundamental prin- under which physiological hypotheses can be established. 360367. esp. 1919. Titchener. 526-534. Halverson. between ory. 1910. recovers after a lesion in a peripheral nerve. Psychol. 1924. 110-114. and he still has similar problems before ciples 527. cit. 66. 1922.. f. 10. 64. physiological 94f. 1916. W. 30. Amer. has similarities to the discussion of the present text. Exper. see J. Both these matters are discussed of the problem of more fully in the text and notes of completely given in a few references. when tactual sensibility On projection in general. B. be points out that the ability to construct the external world from subjective experience argues for the capacity to construct reliable physiological hypotheses for Principles III. see Trocit.. see Amer. M.. Zsch. esp. and L. 86-94 (applies theory to cutaneous sensibility). his discussion ceived tones. 21-43. 361. Quart. Kohler tends to think terms. T. where the tones were much fainter. text makes reference to the use of Bernstein's theory in accounting for the abnormalities of sensation phenomenal events (pp. is consistent with the possibility applied extension that to volume is more of the 'constancy hypothesis' originated with Kohler. isomorphism. Ill. Troland. The fact that Rich's volumic limens 1916. esp.). 1929. 13-22. I. volume the last section of this chapter. In this article we find Kohler en- volume with varying frequency were merely preliminaries to two other studies: H. PhysioL. Psychology. 35. and ibid. op. For Rich's first experiment. 6of. in general. It this also view and Head's thementions a similar Tonal Volume The tonal history is application of Bernstein's theory to the facts of auditory localization. pp. This last reference to Halverson (1924) is the paper p. see E. principle in dualistic The other name to for this is tended to be smaller in the second experiment. a section which illustrates how much Rich. that intensity than to 'Weber's law' was Halverson's limens for Uebcr unbemerkte Empfindungen und Urteilstauschungen. 51-80. 124-126. on the relation of tonal volume to preceding reference study of how tonal volume varies with localization and phase-relation for binau rally perintensity. /. 33. The of Psychophysiology. The concept closely allied pitch and responsible. For Kohler's principle of psychosee correspondence. Text-book of Psychology. Psychol. 1929. 1913. and. J. Gestalt Psychology. Exper. 1932. 149-153. Psychol. In Gestalt Psychology. when the Gestalt necessarily is a larger totality than the stimulus and its sensation. Kohler. For instance. and for his second. G... Psychol. J.

560-578. Boring's hypothesis. R. On 1929.. E." In this case the observer's judgments are relative. Bentley. F. Bentley. S. 466-493. In other tempt at the psychophysical equation of the volumes of heterophonic tones took place in the Harvard Psychological Laboratory. Psychol. 1927. . S. cited spections. 66-75. 35. and were touch. Gahagan.. tones Auditory theory with special reference to intensity. Psy- Psychol. Fernberger. Amer. chol. /. 68-70. volume. Psyfre/. Wcver and K. 436-440. The unpublished experiment on olfactory The dependence volume was performed un- upon phase. On the absolute judgment of lifted weights. to (The proof sheets of when conditions make the book provide an opportunity add the statement that Zoll's conclusion is final that the volumic limens. of G. Auditory tonal theory: a criticism of Professor ]. Gund- 501. not to the standard stimulus (which may actually be omitted). A. were never published. L. psychophysics. 1928. R. of tonal attributes J. theories of 12. Psychol.. he but change the stimuli. 42. 12. hearing. 187- 1931. weight experiments. H.. and therefore the concept of volume. varied at will if by the experimenter. to what have been called "absolute judgments. Banister. failed to verify Halverson's conclusion that tonal vol- der the guidance of Professor H.. 27-30. Stev- judgment difficult. and P. R. 490absolute in lifted Tonal attributes and 1929. 1924. The method absolute judgment in volume as a 'primary attribute/ see H. 38. W. and relative judgments quency Exper. Weld of Cornell. who is the author's informant. Amer. Amer.' Of even greater significance is the fact that the indi- come extensity might about. P. see the author's article. 519-543. Exper. without the knowledge of the observer. Rev. Watt. Gundlach and M. /. For a negative view of the chosen set of comparison stimso that the 'threshold' can be ogy of Sound. choL. M. 37. vidual differences among their sub- jects for the pitch limens and the volumic lirnens were so great that 157-188. the usual relative judgments give place. Pattie's at- the probable error of the difference between the averages is about as great as the difference. 1930. E. Psychol. 1924. ens is continuing the research. M.. Zener. and localization. esp. Cf. 43. are instable. Fernberger's introin the text. Ogden. Amer. this Zoll has been working there in periments that. 1926. J. Hearing. lach. Psychol. 1917. words.Notes volume does tion 117 varies tributes a true extensity and conto space perception as it in the realms of vision and is ume with phase. Field of Psychology. /. Psycholesp. upon tonal volume 1931-1932. but to uli. S.. pitch itself enough in this is hardly stable experiment to be assuredly a 'primary attribute/ general difficulty with these One exis M.g. 196. of As to how in this organiza- unable to establish a significant difference between the thresholds for volume and what has been called 'brightness.) of A number psychologists (besides Titchener and the present author) have accepted a doctrine of tonal volume: e.

PsychoL." see E. even were the doubling in retinal disparity consciously available in perceiving still stereoscopic solidity. 36. Lau. 12. The standard reference for the indicating the kind of explanation that would be a satisfactory compromise. has avoided un- the two retinas to fuse is repre- necessary complication in an argu- sented by the kind of field of pro- . 15 has been drawn as there cited (pp. If retinal disparity is regarded as merely the disparity of superposition. NeverFig. 12 as it is imaged on the left retina. theory. PsychoL Forsch." how such a compromise can be made until we have much more theless Amer. 1925. and it refers the reader to these notes. Koffka's discussion of the of visual tridimensionality phenomena and the possibility of underlying tridimensional fields of excitation in the brain. dren Zustand.. von Frey and Jaensch 285. 2. see E. 249and the references to Hering. 1-4. 161-187. 1930. but the con- and that ab' is the edge of the which is imaged on the right retina. esp. of Fig. It is impossible to say On F. the datum as to which pattern goes with which eye. 1924. The "glassy sensation. perception. 249fT. Nevertheless it should be pointed out here that. 12. Schumann.). see in text. large square very difficult Die physischen station- Gestalten in Ruhe und im 1920. On the ways in which the third dimension gets itself introduced into optical illusions is no way of distinguishing between the convex and the concave solids. Psy- ment that is already complicated enough. for cd is displaced toward one side of ab and c'd' toward the other side of a'b just as we can ( '. the "glassy sensation. The is crucial datum is the one which when the primary stimulus given to one eye and the secondary to the other (by use never available to introspection. The earliest notion of this sort within that school was the idea that the p/u'-phenomenon of seen movement depends upon a cortical 'short-circuit/ images acdb and a'c'd'b' are disparate. 1922. then there would be taken from this which contains numerous other examples of the same sort. article. knowledge of these things. in discussing the stereo- The gram Suppose now that the tendency of similar patterns on Fig. Let us suppose that ab is Gestalt psychologists' picture of the physiology of the brain is W. Kohler's the edge of the large square of Fig.Extensity Visual Third Dimension For K. for- space the a real projection theory of visual and Koffka's tridimensional and 6. 13 is of 1930. see his Some problems of space perception. Moller. Then cd and cd' can be the edges of the small squares the stereogram as imaged on ception is illustrated repeatedly in the writings of Kohler and Koffka of and others of that school. 121-126. it would be insufficient as a basis for the chologies Fig. the mer on the Zollner illusion. Ver- compromise between suche iiber das stereoskopische Schen. The the two respective retinas. The sibility text of a also suggests the pos- of a stereoscope). /.

Notes 119 where paths from its common points meet. Mondtauschung und Sehgrossenkonstanz. If the disparity were reversed. Nagel's Handbuch der /. PsyO. then there must be between cd and c'd'. Forsch. 98-102. Schur. the logical facts it requirements of the known of stereoscopic vision. if the smaller images were ef instead of cd and e'f instead of c'd'. 1924. Angell. Reimann. Is physio- logically possible? Perhaps. 7. the disparity were reversed. Moreover. Physiologie des Menschen. III. 161-195. 1925. W.e. 44-80. in Mondes am Horizont. and at the same time allows us to keep to the belief FIG. To the data of the literature the . in a plane on the other side of AB from CD.. 1902. at EF. Psychol. jection sketched in Fig. lies in the fact that dicates the kind of relations in- that Koffka's theory is likely to require. Die scheinbare VerSonne und des der 30. in the author's opinion. 15 in relatively in- sulated fibers. Zsch. Its chief value. Thus ab and a'b' would fuse along AB. an(i F.. but cd and c'd' would fuse along CD. PROJECTION SYSTEM FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF AN AREAL DISPARITY INTO TRIDIMENSIONAL DEPTH In such a system. 35. i. 195> 39i-393 ]. the illusion of the size of the at the horizon and at the zenith. is in a different plane fiom AB. 15. in the field of projection ab and ab' would fuse into AB. see the general accounts of grosserung chol. and the disparity at the periphery is thus translated in if CD into actual tridimcnsionality the field of projection. also the experiments and discussion of E.. where fusion without rivalry means the localization of a pattern at the point Psychol. if there is no disparity between ab and ab' at the periphery. CD Zoth. Amer. Size On moon E. then the fusion would be on the other side of AB. and cd and c'd' would fuse into in a plane in front of AB. Thus 15 fulfils this dia- gram of Fig. 1-38. disparity However. although it is much too simple to be probit able. then the fused projection of ef and e'f would be at EF. as it would be if ef and e'f were substituted for cd and cd'.

else how can one estimate size pers give the references to the experiments of Poppelreuter (1910) when the with size. ges. d. For the alley experiments. To the author the horizon as does the retinal image. Viewing the horizon moon between straddling legs seems to give a shrinkage which is less striking (to the author) than the shrinkage for the prone position. 101-149. ward the moon. Martins. Ueber die scheinbare Grosse der Gegenstande und ihre Beziehung zur Grosse der Netzhautbilder. See G. Such a view fitted in with the philosophy that underlies inal the theory of the specific energy of nerves. He has as a standard the horizontal extent between two distant points of lights. of Then came the alley experiments. it was apparent that a given object looks smaller at a distance than when near. of course. prone position of observation. 1911. the visual perception of size tances from the observer separated . of objective the correct estimation of the relevant experimental literature. (and could be understood as the apprehension by the 'sensoriunV of the one can assume the the posture for observing the Lie down on moon at the zenith. the retinal image varies distance? Berkeley was and Hillebrand (1902) and other speaking. He adjusts two nearer points of light to give an horizontal extent equal to the remote extent. Beitrage zur Kenntnis des Sehraumes auf Grund der Erfahrung. When the gigantic moon is seen at the horizon. Psychol. Zsch. it did not take it long to discover that phenomenal size neither remains constant like the objective magnitude that it represents nor varies Its under the shoulders. back. 1911. seen thus. so that the head can be thrown back to see the moon on the horizon. Untersuchungen iiber die scheinbare Grosse im Sehraume. Philos. 601-617. Blumenfeld. When psychology came to stand upon its own feet. PsychoL. 1709. the visible objects on the horizon also shrink in the experiment. Two centuries ago Berkeley argued that the perception of size is dependent upon the perception of distance. From such data there results a characteristic curve along which the lights should be placed to be at all dis- Johannes Miiller. 65. 241-404.. f. 5.I2O author adds perience his Extensity own the personal ex- experience of some of his friends). laws had to be established by moon. Schubotz. /. to come to the belief that apparent size is proportional to the size of the ret- the image. Nevertheless. An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. and it was natural for psychologizing physiologists. 20. In the best technique of the alley ex- magnitude of an object. Then the experiment is repeated with the distance of nearer points changed. see F. Berkeley. Stud. and one of the earliest experiments was that of G. W. Arch. with head toan object image upon the retina. is just as small as the zenith moon. like periment (Blumenfeld) the observer works in the dark so that comparison with objects and perspectives is eliminated. 1889. seen normally. Moreover. These pay Only gradually did the concept phenomenal or perceptual size emerge.

Blumenfeld gives the experimental answer. Perhaps the hypothesis still remains plausible for actual solid objects (not observer to make judgments of ab- Cutler's pen-and-ink drawings). Appl. however. This is the phenomenon fied of 'memory-color. It was this experiment with advertising that suggested the one on distance and size. phenomenal size. it is very difficult to become convinced that the 620-623. Amer.) In the author's opinion the failure to find striking changes of size in was against results this hypothesis. but result has decreased the its solute size under these conditions. sensory impression of the person compare plain cardboard squares at different distances as to size. parallels would be perceived as curves. On form-quality in general and on how the school of Gestaltquali- tdt failed to grasp the concept of the immediacy of form. sought to test this hypothesis by having observers 1931. more readily under changing conditions of the stimulus than do unob- . May it be that objects are relatively stable in respect of phe- nomenal size? T.Notes by equal distances from each other. The square and the hand gave similar results.' The 'figure' in a visual field is objecti- and whether and more stable than the 'ground. . If one asks whether these curves are therefore perceived as parallels. and then having them make similar comparisons of a light-and-shade drawing of a human hand. 44^-450. which are straight lines. The moving the same seem to change in judgment of size It is object does not stay size. also possible. (We know that the impression does not grow at the rate that the visual angle grows. Psy- choL. probability of It correctness. 433-44. Cutler. The result gets larger as rapidly as the results of the alley experiment require. consistent with the approach and recession of familiar objects is primarily due to the inability of the the findings in the alley experiment. /. It might be that familiar objects do not change size with distance as readily as do the bare extensions of the alley experiment. If one watches another person approaching oneself. Objects hold their colors Form See also the next section of these notes for Lashley's work. 465-469. it simply does not size is was also Cutler. relation- duce stroboscopic seen movement than do simple lines on geometrical figures. 1930. that in this case the limita- tion of attention to the ject may have an effect moving obupon its showed that half a small page may be as good for advertising as half a large page. under the proper instruction. another possibility that it would be well for us to keep in mind. The loci of points perceived as equidistant jectified 121 visual fields. 14. 43. These ships are not simple. who because the impracticable. arrange parallels. Visual size and distance. ] PsychoL. as the text suggests. H. see the author's A History of Experimental Psychology. There is.' Objects more readily pro- are not perceived as parallel. The observer can also. 1929.

/. E.. 258-267. On the bearing of Johannes Miiller's doctrine of the specific energies of nerves upon the question of central localization of sensory function. see E. no. For the latCategories ter's in Lash ley Lashley's experiments have for the most part employed the rat as subject. Extensity. 67. see the author. world of psychological systematizaand thus the separation and of freeing It the attributes in inde- Visuell wahrgenotnmene Fig- pendent phenomenal cxistentiality. The modal differences of quality between the five senses are primary because they are and for the further statements about sensations cannot be reversed. Rahn. does not apply to qualitative differences within a single sense-mode." we do not mean equally siological systems. Rubin. see ibid. "This cold intense. In the classical doctrine the sensation This development tended definitely against notion of psychologically prior to quality as the other was pri- mary and arable its attributes were insep- and supposedly coordinate. intensity. On tion. 1921. 94-107. the pp. 1932.. This argu- seems to be of the quality. The text indicates the kind of solution that is meaningful from the point of view of this book. 58-76. For reason that many initiated by distinctly different phy- example. B. of course. see L. This suspicion and some others like it were voiced by C. Amer. Psychophysiology..122 Extensity Psychol. uren. that "This intensity is cold. for the reason that sensations are named by their qualities. and that the On the history of cerebral localization of function. 8sf. The best topographical sys- reply see. In general on cortical patterns. Monog. Nevertheless there was a suspicion that quality might be fundamental to the other attributes." Quality seems to be primary and intensity and protensity pertain to these excitations before there can be any integration of the events that belong to different senses. Rahn had argued that the total sensation is merely a physiological category. there scious arose the doctrine see dimensions. Titchener. The question of the primacy of the conscious dimensions arose in the following manner. dimensions (attributes). Quite probably this original question will never be answered. Titchener replied that sensation is a systematic concept. 26.. in The Relation of Sensation to Other ment. actualities of phenomenal experience are this the attributes. tem for the fixing of localization in . Rahn was in a way explicating views of Kulpe and Stumpf and criticizing Titchener. Principles of was out of this view of that con20-22. but will cease to be meaningful as the pattern of psychological interest changes. 1915. 1913. T. ground and contour and tactual edges. At that time.j 16. especially J. Contemporary Psychology. is when we say. Soury as the classical secondary source. Troland. 93*. there cited. III. Psychol. view constituted a relegation of the sensation to the conceptual visual figure. and the references ibid. Sensation and system.

esp. a monograph of the Behavior Research Fund. /. Fortuyn 16): A. the auditory functions of area Wiley. The following references are not complete. spective is Lashley's presidential address before the American Psychological Association. It is natural that the work of Franz should seem mostly negative because it showed the inade- Rev. is actually equipotentiality seems the brain to exist for clarity and definition to the the gen- mass action. 1-24. of Rats and an elementary exposition of the whole subject of the functioning brain. 245-254. 1930. The reaction away from the fixed. Fortuyn. The concepts of equipotentiality correlative. Science. The best Lashley's research up These areas are distinguished by characteristic differences in the general text is K. Lashley's three previous studies on The mechanism of vision are there cited. and was taken over by Lashone of his students. B. all the others from On p. and cautious reports of the experiments themselves. the serious student should be warned of ment concepts. S. 419-478. able to provide new conceptions to take the place of the old. 1929. D. researches I. but should study the detailed Neur. telligence. persistent. Lashley. see ibid. ously upon to 1926. see Lash- The cerebral areas necessary for in However. it is too early to attempt a detailed re- Harvey Society (New York). 1931. cerebral function of S. and draws gener- C. whereas Lashley's work seems more positive because it. Neur.. Cortical cell-laminations of the brains of some rodents. 1926. Brain Mechanisms and In- arrangement of the of the cellular layers cortex in respect of thickness of the lamina and of the sizes. view of the experiments. but especially the very lucid exposition in his lecture before the eral picture of the functioning brain that is now emerging from work of Lashley and his students. The function of .Notes to 123 J. 73. 1931. the cortex of the rat is a reference the cyto-architectural fields of (Fig. On the notion of levels of visual organization and of the "fragility" of functions. pattern vision the rat. 37. Arch. 4 66f. see the two references to Lashley just cited. quacy of the then well-established hypotheses. 53. The best short summary and per- summarizes a work up to began with the Franz about 1902. but it is easy to find them. They will presumably require both correction as to detail and the further develop- On ley. which shapes. On these concepts. 459-467. 221354. 1914. While there is considerable and of mass action arc mass action depends mass... and exact localization of great deal of this 1929. E. Mass action in cerebral function. against resting content with the casual generalizations of the present chapter. Basic neural mechanisms in behavior. Comp. 1917. Brains is Men. 4. about ley. upon the equipotentiality of the parts of the and in coming later. especially in respect of the learning of the maze. and Psychiat. and groupings of the cells.. Her rick. see L. the visual functions of area w and related phenomena. E. Psychol.

tries to move it. 54.. see also the other side of the controversy. 230-234. in Localization edly borne in upon one that the poor or incorrect protopathic fibers meaning of localization is a relationship between tactual. Localization That localization is normally a dawns Herbartian 'complication' upon one as he reads the detailed accounts of the tactual experiments in Henry Head's theory is that the skin is supplied with two systems of nerve-fibers. 3. 5. or down. See Lashley. /. as in Lashley. for specificity against Lashley. that another finger moves. They mediate all cu- V. that is to say. when sensibility is tion of a visual perception. 1932. action. the visual and the kinesthetic. also 1931. 5. so that epicritic sensibility is added to protopathic to create normal sensibility. to the left. Neur. and finds. localization is One in Here merely obviously identifica- the kinesthetic the fact that. Localization becomes a meaningful problem in these cases sus reflexology. The "epicritic" experiments consists in a usually regenerate later. 1930. ation of W. up. only when we consider how position in the visual field leads to adequate motor responses to the right. /.. to correct or refine its faulty localization. the skin first gets hypersensitive lationship between two perceptions and the change of sensitivity then . For this same reason it is difficult to give meaning to the problem of visual localization within the Gen. 4SS-468.. A considerLashley's theory of the S. Extensity in the brain in audition. after They usually return first injury. PsychoL. generally at unusually is In this book great intensities. and pressure. in this connection. 193*. 1931.'. it is taneous pain and the extremes of temperature. 5. Henri. one looks at a particular finger. equipotentiality of cerebral ibid. see incidental references. Cerebral control ver- zation the retinal image were right side up instead of upside down? Obviously such problems can have little meaning in visual terms. as like as The epicritic inhibit the system extreme is supposed to of intensities the protopathic system. ibid. Gen. The "protopathic" more primitive fibers represent the system. since the visual relations remain unaltered if the whole field is reversed or inverted. Psychol. 3-20. peculiar way of folding the hands so that the fingers 'get mixed up' and cannot be identified. 8. Hunter. different departments of sense. and kinesthetic impressions. On the somesthetic functions of area . Tastsinnes. But. visual.. an imperfectly established organized re- returning with a regenerating nerve. Comp. How does right differ visually from Lashley has replied with an account of the U ft? What if difference would it make way in which specific locali- gives way to mass action. /. Hunter has made the argument and projection upon the retinal surface. of the chief arguments for the existence of two such systems lies to add the sensation of not. 109-142.1 24. Ueber des die Raumrepeat- wahrnehmungen 1898. One of Henri's sensibility.

yet he formulated the different interpretation of the facts which is sugall Psychol. was made in 1901. Thus intensity becomes time. Psychol. The time-theory of sound localization: a restatement. volume. obvious that. Psychol. II. /. J. See Head. The present author. 1926. W. 1924. On the unresolved factual dif- One expects auditory localization. and 1908 by Head and W. Cong. See E. see Boring.. 37. bility. Auditory theory with spereference to intensity. This is a reprint of the full account of Boring. M. 44. Amer. it is usual to look for two opposing 125 chief facts of reverses zation about the localisounds and the suggestion of the text as to the interrelation The of the three factors ir factors of which it is the sum. the excursion of the hairs of the re- 1-95.. the limen of dual The relation of impression to whether dependent upon differences of time or of intensity. ways the same proximate cause. 86-94. when Quart. Studies in Neurology. 157-188. The two-point limen and the error of localization. I. Prof. function and the intensive function Amer.. by no means simple. See E. after nerve-division. chol. G. amount of bending of the hairs of is the hair-cells. It hapless sure than may approximate agreement between Head and the author. /. threshold of the receptors must correspond to some approximately fixed amplitude. 1916. 42. Rivers. esp. 57-62. The more intense tonal when frequency is diotic. R. is stimulus. The important thing seems to be organization in the face of incomplete opposition The would have the greater amplitude. Boring. Bousfield's suggestion. in performing a similar experiment. came to the conclusion that he had verified of Head's findings but one. in this sense one condition must be translated into the other unless both are changed to a third. but. a certain between independent parts of the system. Head. 164-173 for the facts. gested in the text. 805807. 1930. it now appears that the relationship is (Oxford). It i. to have al- Head's theory of cutaneous sensiVII Internat. Amer. for the theoretical inter- pretation and stein's relation to Bern- ceptors must reach the fixed amplitude of the threshold sooner. that dichotic differences of intensity would be translated in the inner ear into differences of time as follows. a frequency theory of intensive excitation. 446-449. and the experiment itself localization. H. 225-329. Cutaneous sensation J. The author has argued elsewhere that the two-point limen involves the localization of one of the points between the temporal with respect to the other. A preliminary report was printed in 1905. PhysioL. 10. von Hornbostel. 822824. ference. op. . On the other hand. esp. See effecting cial localization are given in H. 1920. See Boring. 2 vols. its the total amplitude is greater. 1932. although it also remain intensity in respect of a multiple fiber theory or pens that Head was the author of the theory. cit.e. esp. a temporal function reaches an extreme and reverses its course. Exper..Notes When in a return to normality. A.

linear. 13. Observers always mick. standing on his head. /. That some funda- the front- back and up-down directions and the conditions of distance have yet to be worked out. The text has regard only to the spatially above the other. but cf. The most interesting discovery in this field is Pratt's. tions of localization in The condi- pitch is explained on a simple psychological basis. left-right dimension of auditory localization. 278-285. Thus the use of the terms high and low for primary. PsyckoL Bull. 1932. 1930.126 Report of a Discussion Extensity on Audition. PsyckoL. in the absence of other loin calizing criteria. 29. found the tones of high pitch spatially lower (with respect to the earth) than the tones of low pitch. L. Pratt. calize two tones an octave apart with the tone of greater frequency 120-127. . The spatial character of high are definitely deter- mined.. See C. He finds that. C. so far as these localizations mental physiological principle of patterning is involved is suggested by the fact that one observer. Dim- high in space. Physical Society (London). F. Exper. tones that are high pitch (frequency) are localized lo- and low tones. 1931.

so there came also to be nativistic and geneticistic theories of time. but they always spoke also about temporal forms. whereas protensity is truly unidimensional. There were nativistic and geneticistic theories of space. Thus within systematic psychology time has always followed along where space led. Wundt practically began experimental psychology in 1862 with his experiments on the perception of space. Modern theoretical physics even attempts to get rid of the distinction between them and to substitute a space-time continuum. and Titchener followed Kiilpe. except for the fact that exten- sity may actually involve within itself the three dimensions of space. All this seems quite natural when considered as a logical matter.Chapter 5 TIME the temporal dimension of consciousthat protensity is coordinate with extensity. Wundt's sensory elements had only the attributes of quality and intensity. PROTENSITY by problems The modern view assumes arise in respect of the one dimension are apt to be matched for the other. The advocates of form-qualities in the '90*8 found most of their examples in the field of space. When Kiilpe added extensity he also added duration. and that the problems that is ness. Kant recognized their resemblance when he made them categories of the understanding. Space and time are linked together in philosophy. and Mach published on the 'time-sense' in 1865 with Vierordt's Zeitsinn coming only three years later. Mach held to the belief in sensations of space 127 .

Temporal atomism is the most insidious kind of atomism. Think first of the immense the variety of possible spatial patterns that can occur at a single instant. Later Titchener coined the word protensity to match extensity." In spite of all this formal coupling of time with space. The best example of a form-quality is the temporal form of a melody. since the complication of relationships might easily vary with the square of number of dimensions available for complication. Kohler paral- law of psychophysiological correspondence for extensity by a similar law for the correspondence of "experienced order in time" with a "concrete order in the underlying dynamical context. Time is a dimension to which obser- vation generally referred and hence has repeatedly slipped out from being observed. there has never been nearly the degree of interest in the psychology of time that there has been in the psychology lels his of space. but ever so much harder to be- . and quality. intensity. However. and that there ought to be three times as much research on space perception as on time perception or perhaps the ratio is more nearly nine. where the form not only remains when but where the form qualities the quality (pitch) of the notes composing it is changed.ia8 Time and of time. the unidimensionality of protensity is not. and then of the puny paucity of temporal patterns that can occur at a single spot. the chief reason for its relative unimportance in psychology when it is compared with extensity. Time has so little to give to form. in the author's opinion. It is easy to see that a line itself is is not a row of sensations. is remembered or recognized when the are forgotten. One may say that space involves three dimensions and time only one. Helmholtz's hypothetical dwellers in a one-dimensional world were almost as limited in their stock of spatial experience as are we Euclidean beings in our world of time. and Gestalt psychology began to talk about extensive and temporal Gestalten.

observed mental "processes" seem to be capable of every kind of spread except in duration. especially called the duration be long. therefore. Nevertheless. nized." as no one takes its meaning seriously. introspection is common path. Not at its end. because the beginning is no longer there to be observed when the end has come. and the problem of tents. However. WHEN do you observe it? Not at beginning or its middle because it is not yet all there to be observed. time cannot be observed. The danger has always been the recog- Introspectionism has mental element a if perpetually in the very name to keep that the stuff of introspection is not fixed but flowinsisting ing on in time. James wrote the vivid chapter on the "stream of thought. introspection makes it quite clear that short durations can be observed quite as 'immediately' as can ex- The problem as to how an entire time can be condensed into a simple judgment of itself is no more difficult than the problem as to how a spatial form can converge toward a judgment.Protensitive Observation lieve that a duration is 129 if not a series of events. Because observation in an experiment seems to be fixed at a moment." with the mental processes changed into 'currents' and 'eddies'. but the introspectionists have always had to be reminded of the figure. Judgments of Time and Duration It is plain that consciousness is not so elaborately organized in the dimension of protensity as it is in the dimension . in spite of its simiits . there is little use in a name when "mental process. The paradox appears in the following question and answer. Perhaps. Let us the problem of the innervation of a final first see how the perception of time varies in typical cases. In both cases the judgment can become as simple as the movement of a finger. larity to space. Can you observe a duration? // you can.

The rule is how same obvious in varies greatly with what there 7 speech-making. The it bare 'pretension/ as were 'immediate' perception we leave to the next section. not the time as short. We tend to judge present time as short when the is concentrated. 'Time hangs conscious content is varied and attention because we heavy on our hands' when the demands upon attention are fewer and the question of time frequently intrudes into consciousness. that is to say. intellectual and inconstant. This general principle applies even to times of less than a minute. bears little temporal The rule reverses for past at the time is when there is nothing time. In an experiment. It is 'long' to wait thirty seconds idly in front of the fire while a three-minute egg finishes boiling. if we see how such localization occurs after or during sleep.130 of extensity. Time We have for consideration in the present section the judgments of time as referred to a temporal frame of reference and the judgments of duration as dependent upon some simple secondary of duration criterion. A three-minute it speech with ten-minutes talk to go in resemblance to a three-minute speech to say. The judged time is to be said. a week. We can gain an impression of how very complicated must seemed so short be the various mechanisms of temporal localization during normal waking life. The judgments are involved. but it 'quickly' that half-minute goes if one tries to occupy with a different activity in another part of the room. but because we have experience not been making any judgments of time at all. there is no unitary temporal organization which can become focused physiologically upon a judgment. certain observers who lived in a quiet rural community were awakened five o'clock at dif- ferent times between midnight and during long . a year are not directly perceived. The busy hour that adjusted in memory to a duration that will appropriately contain its varied content. Long times an hour.

The various cues to time were. we can man. approximately in order of importance. but let a By contrast with the condition of this how well oriented in time must be experiment. The average error turned out to be about fifty minutes. they were asked to estimate the time and to record the conscious basis of the estimate. among It is not possible always to be sure of what cues we have see for time. sleep soundly for six hours. . One might expect under such circumstances that a temporal frame of reference would be almost entirely lacking and that the judgments would be very difficult and uncertain and the errors large. and find within his own body a state of affairs that serves as a pretty good frame of reference for the time. Since positive and negative errors tended to offset each other. the average person the sights and sounds of a familiar day-time world. However. very sleepy (except for some observers at very beginning of sleep) Still Late in the night Rested Restless. in the course of his ordinary social be mistaken in respect of the time by one full routine. the error of the average was much smaller (about fifteen minutes).Protensitive Judgments 131 winter nights. awaken in complete darkness and silence. hence tends to center No No sensations from stom- stomach ach or bladder dreams recalled Altogether it appears that a person may go to bed at eleven o'clock in the evening. easily awakened Ideas continue retiring topic in Thought vague and on coming day Sensations from or bladder Dreams recalled scat- mind on tered. as follows : Early in the night fatigued Inert. the protocols showed the nature of the frame of reference under these conditions.

and then the cause of it. A the counting of sixty at some comparison of two times of in the order of a few seconds may be made terms of breath- muscular strain. has sometimes been supposed that the capacity to wake oneself at a desired time in the morning indicates the existIt ence of some fairly accurate unconscious 'mental clock/ Some persons assert that they can wake themselves. auditory. in but they would mean waking in a any case if they apply to times of familiar active environment where auditory cues are not excluded. and organic sensory processes. The little facts are not well established. The judgments of short times are less apt to be referred to the general frame of reference. and the same process with the second duration. for short times need no fur- . but to be made in terms of some familiar process. and has found an average error of wak- were ing of only about ten minutes.132 Time hour. first his minor maladjustment to his world.. after a night of sound sleep. but rate habitual much better by for seconds. Brush has experimented upon himself in this matter. or of holding the breath. within a few minutes of an ap- pointed time. A minute can be estimated fairly well by the visual imagery of the revolving second-hand of a watch. and he soon discovers. rate the experiment gives us no ground to suppose that the temporal frame of reference is anything other than the total constellation of visual. all available to introspection if attention At any is directed to them. It is ing. or of to measure off a duration by instituting with it a possible then to process of increasing sensed muscular strain. Since these awakenings the fact that the errors nearly all between six and ten A. tended to be smaller than in the other experiment of guessing the time may be due to sensory cues from the environment.M. so that set up the comparison is made in These judgmental mechanisms terms of kinesthetic intensity.

but the longer the time the more likely is it to fall out of the class of 'immediately' perceived pretensions and to become the object of a judgment based on some secondary cue or a frame of reference." Very short times are apt to be "immediately given in expeThere is no harm in our later that using these phrases about perception. However. perception of duration is very easy to A device is arranged to give three successive clicks. perceived times of a second or less are of this order.' Almost inevitably. To introspection the first interval . defining two successive electrically intervals. The let and is to say which interval is longer.Pretension 133 ther comment. the other from the second to the third click. Protensitive Integration rience/' to be "directly perceived. the point of the experiment is that the observer discovers the observer tion at nature of a simple protensitive integration. may be of this kind. or of any reference to a temporal frame. second and the second set for three quarters of a a tenth of a second longer than the first. To introspection most immediate data are bare 'pretensions. Longer times. and he makes a correct judgment with the greatest ease. although we shall see they refer to an integration of the durational events with the judgment. There is no quesall of breathing or of a muscular strain that lays off one interval in intensive terms against the other. or of the translation of time in visualized extension. except the observation that they tend to be based upon the protensitive integrations with which the next section is concerned. one interval from the first to the second click and The immediate demonstrate experimentally. up to five seconds or even more. of the intervals interval is is is The duration interval us say that the first variable.

" The as simple. the present is an instant. like the eight- at least pairs. a protensitive integration. the present a mere point of time without duration. or some higher be a pair of pairs of pairs. One hears integration. one thinks logically in terms of objective time. in the inescapable fact of can only mean an actual conscious present. are conscious presents. and can pick out of the continuous stream of time unities that. Regarded in this way the present is specious. A series of objectively equivalent clicks are grouped subjectively. The fact of the conscious present is clearly demonstrated in the phenomena of subjective rhythm. without having one end lost in the past and the other present in the future." is Time and the second comes as "too long. However. Wundt was inclined to accept rhythmical integration as the measure of the temporal range of consciousness. and yet it is all available to the introspector. One way of understanding that If is lies behind it and the future all that lies beyond it. At a very slow rate the successive strokes may not . the past is all eye-movement. Logically considered time is continuous. as uncomplicated. The is quite real to introspection. Having no duration. Obviously this state of affairs that we find. introspection is against this view. as is experience the similar experience of comparing the lengths of two lines. the critical point where the future becomes the past. a principle of organization that can briefly preserve mental events from instantaneous obliteration in the past. which may this problem are Dietze's in Wundt's laboratory at Leipzig (1885) and Bolton's in Stanley Hall's laboratory at Clark (1894). meaning certain durations. It is 'immediately given' as a going on.134 simply "is there. The classical studies of group. as direct. it cannot exist as a duration. both of which can be seen quickly and distinctly without this experience is to be found in the conception of a conscious present.

135 the As the rate increases number of strokes in a unit increases. These different results are not necessarily contradictory. In his experiments the duration of the rhythmical group varied from 0. or as 'overrun' with one stroke too many.. The test of an integration is that it is recognized. Koffka's more recent results accord with Bolton's. These are very large integrations rate of and very long times for the conscious present.6 seconds. with a mode between i. With this criterion Dietze found an integration. Integration is a relative matter. at the rate of four strokes per second. It seems pretty clear that Dietze was considering a larger. i. At the one stroke in three seconds. The proper generalization seems to be that the conscious present can certainly include a rhythmical grouping that occupies a second or a second and a half. and that with somewhat less 'immediacy' a consciousness may extend to include a rhythm of a quarter or perhaps even half a minute. With a two-grouping and the strokes given more slowly. which is forty strokes in all and a range of consciousness of about ten seconds. There is another experiment that seems to have at least an indirect bearing on the question of the duration of the conscious present. it has been found by half a dozen experimenters that very short intervals tend to be overesti- .e. without counting. as complete with the correct number of strokes.6 seconds. more complicated and looser integration than was Bolton. and for this group the average total time was just over one second. or the total group may group groups. it follows no principle of the all-or-none. Bolton reported no group longer than eight strokes. the average time for the group was 1. for five groups of eight strokes each. In the investigations of the estimation of short intervals of time. Dietze found an of three groups of four. twelve strokes and integration thirty-six seconds in all.65 to 5.59 seconds. or as incomplete with one stroke too few.i and 1.Pretension be grouped at all.

for it is the most accurately estimated temporal interval. the upper limit is somewhere between one second and one minute. but this functional relation breaks down when the time becomes as long as four or five seconds. then. protension is as immediately observable is extension. what we mean by the phrase immediately observed. a conclusion consistent with the results of the experi- ments on rhythm. in the case of protension. The errors in estimation of times greater than the indifference point tend roughly to be proportional to the time estimated. so that on this criterion the safe upper limit of time for the conscious present would be said to be several seconds only. There is no apparent reason why there should not be longer integrations of an hour or a year. but they do not seem to happen. critical is The time at which overestimation changes to undercalled the indifference point estimation and it lies at about 0. As durations lengthen beyond the con- . It is quite possible that the failure of the functional relation beyond this point is due to the insecurity of integration for longer times.75 of a second. is reason three quarters of a second recommended as the ideal interval for the preparation of this For attention between a warning signal and the presentation of a stimulus. find as a matter of fact that this close direct integration does not occur for long times.136 mated and that longer Time intervals tend to be underestimated. but the difficulty of placing the 'act' of ob- to define servation in time has forced us. Duration is is 'immediately observed' when a prolonged event We integrated with the response that is the report of it. as In a word. It is obvious that events separated by an interval of time of this order are easily integrated into a conscious present. probably much nearer one second. Immediate observation occurs when an integration is directable and directed upon a response which bears such a significant relation to the integration as to be in part a report of it.

to involve loose surrogations of other data for the original pretensions.Pretension 137 scious present they begin to break down. Observation is a process. However. for it implies that mere . and finally to become mere uncertain relations to a temporal frame of reference. in a in question. asked. and it ends a little the integration has fulfilled itself observationally. begins with the duration after it when say that the observation is the end phase of the integration and therefore comes after it. The pretension gets intellectualized. WHEN. and it can be just as much of a time-consuming process when it is when the observation of intensity. It is just as true to way. The integration of the duration with the report observation to be called 'immediate/ If the reader asks is too loose for the what has become of the problem of the time of observation of a time. In either case it is a process. The Physiology of Protensity Psychophysical parallelism seeks to find in the brain a concomitant for experienced duration. the answer is that that problem disappeared when we became clear about the meaning of the term observation. In the case under consideration the observation. do you observe it? At the beginning with the end in the future? Or at the end with the beginning in the past? The reason that the question baffled us was that it is we a foolish question. extensity. and the observation becomes a complex judgment. It is not instan- taneous and therefore cannot be confined to any single moment. Left in this form the theory gets into trouble. and a theory of psychophysiological correspondence suggests that conscious protension must be paralleled by neural duration. the truth of any such statement is based on the choice of meanings for the words. If duration is immediately observed. or quality as it has to do with protensity.

but as a temporal integration. and so on.138 Time it. takes. not as a mere lapse of time. there can be no dispute about that. However. Another way to put it is to say that temporal organizations are evolutions. . The it fall is a single event and takes time. We may of cases of physiological procbegin with what the physi- ologist calls physiology and end with what the psychologist generally calls physiology. as as first if it be regarded advantageously falling through one then through the second foot. An integrated temporal event occurs under some law of temporal organization. we have already seen that this difficulty is avoided when we think of physiological duration. falling successively through a series of seconds. because this is exactly what we mean by an integration. time. the occurrence of a definite process that takes time. it also does are a total something more than take time of fall Its it characteristics continuous function of the time Thus the and the total distance of fall are perfectly rep- resented in the velocity that the body has attained at the end of the fall. and the terminus of a temporal organization implies the whole if the integration is complete. is a perfectly integrated event. A man is a grown-up baby. There is no false analysis here in saying that time and distance are cumulated in the terminal velocity. so that the duration is all there at the end of itself in order to act selectively on whatever comes next as the report or observation of the duration. or else as foot. However. There is no all in A par- meancould ing at dividing it into a series of events. duration can act as the cause of some event that follows without the duration's being represented by some cumulated surrogate. and that the state of an evolution at any time implies the past. A ticular fall freely falling body is just such a physical event. We shall best get on with our problem if we display for brief consideration a number esses that use up time.

) as a CURRENT OF ACTION IN FROG'S SCIATIC The action rise and fall of nerve-impulse Adrian.Protensitive Physiology 139 Fig. The and may take process of Fig.001 FIG. which consists of the changes during the refractory period. travels difference of electrical potential along a nerve-fiber. Fig. The represents a unitary physiological event that takes current of time. moves along the nerve. 16 . which runs in an evolutionary course. 16. 6.M. Cf.F. Fig. 40).002 NERVE (E. The rest of the process. After cold frog's nerve. The current is the result of the change of electrical potential as the nerve-impulse.0005 . occurring under the conditions of the all-or-none law. 6 (p. Certainly the event shown in Fig. is not given in this picture of a current of action. . See also Fig. indicates the nature of the whole and could conceivably act causally 1 6 is instant its for the whole. Yet every phase of it. a unitary integrated event. including the refractory phase that comes after it. 6 follows the function of as much as two milliseconds in a I Sees. o . 16 shows a graph of a current of action in a sensory nerve.

Two successive stimuli. The intervals are very itself. The interval must be very short (of the order of 0. persists until the second stimulus has acted.0021 of a second for the a certain increment left over knee-jerk and 0. Goldscheider reported the optimal interval to lie between thirty and seventy milliseconds. The facilitation of a reflex after the excitation of an opposing minutes. It has been supposed that the first stimulus leads to some change of the distribution of ions which. howon the skin. The argument is strengthened by the fact that one increment is .140 ical Time Another case where a short interval is of great physiologimportance is that of successive summation.0106 of a second. The best-known argument for this characteristic of the synapse is as follows. Successive summation also is found for the excitation of reflexes. It seems certain. The and the times times of action for the receptors and the effectors for conduction along the nerve-paths can be in observed or computed each case. each too faint to arouse pain. each too weak alone to excite an impulse in a nerve. been disputed.0008 seconds). It is generally supposed that reflex action is delayed at the synapses. When these times are subtracted from the total reflex time. It is supposed that these times represent synaptic delay. will elicit this quality when given in rapid succession. when summation occurs.0043 of a second for the flexion reflex. may 'summate' so that the second stimulus sets off the impulse if it comes soon enough after the first. The reflex time for the knee-jerk has been measured as 0. muscle-group ("successive induction") may last for several The occurrence of successive summation in somesthat electric shocks thetic excitation has ever. much longer than for summation in scratch-reflex the nerve For example.0055 of a second and the time for the flexion reflex has been measured as 0. a was elicited by forty-four shocks at the rate of eighteen per second. there turns out to be 0.

(5) The phi-phenomenon of seen movement is a temporal perception. For instance. The resonance theory of hearing is an attempt to account for such condensation by getting different frequencies (2) on to different fibers. An abrupt intense stimulus can give rise to a high frequency of impulses only by setting up an intense continuing process in the receptor. the greater the intervening space the greater must be the intervening time. The short-circuit theory holds that the second stimulus must . In vision there is no such thing as a state of no adaptation. Frequency of impulses in a single fiber is often the stimulus to intensity. as 141 would be the case if the flexion reflex involved two synapses and the knee-jerk only one. Somehow the time must get condensed into a simple dis- criminatory response. all laws depend on what adaptation precedes (4) their operation.Protensitive Physiology just twice the other. Adrian has treated it as if and most it were a fundamental characteristic of sensory excitation. listing ten examples briefly. and frequency is a rate and cannot exist at a single instant. (3) The fact of adaptation applies to all visual somesthetic stimulation. and the intensity of them. which formulate relations between the time separating discrete stimulations. presumably in the receptors concerned. It is so obvious that physiological processes take time and that they nevertheless can in their entirety act as causes. the space separating them. Temporal processes are the rule where sensation is concerned. (1) Frequency of vibration is the stimulus to tonal pitch. The phenomena images of vision and of the positive and negative aftersomesthesia are examples of temporal processes of long duration. if seen movement is to be optimal. that the multiplication of instances is unnecessary. It depends upon Korte's laws. Let us turn rather to instances of sense-physiology.

142 Time be timed and placed just rightly in order that it may 'drain' the excitation of the first an excellent. a tactual stimulus was perceived about 0. (7) Judgments of successive stimuli in the psychophysical experiment occur as an integration. with expectation directed toward a sound. Kohler has shown the course of this process to be a continuous decrease of intensity after an early maximum a course that is demonstrated by (and therefore accounts for) the operation of the law of obliviscence in the field of memory. but the judgment comes automatically because the second stimulus comes in upon a process initiated by the first stimulus. where it is not complicated by (6) The the role of eye-movements. Especially can there be no question of the working of some such principle in the fading of the memory after-image in the first few seconds after the material to be memorized has been re(9) moved. Stone found that. The is classic example of time-relations in psychophyat- siology the experiment on reaction time. if speculative. There is rarely an image of the first stimulus to compare with the second. but if an excitation can wait upon a synapse.05 of a second later than if the excitation were directed toward the touch and away from the sound. Where is the Vestibule of consciousness' in which the one excita- tion loiters for fifty milliseconds because 'attention' favors it not? Nobody can say. Under one . there can be no doubt that the lapse of time tends to make reproduction more difficult or less probable. While the the time-errors of psychophysics. it can wait upon attention too. ex- ample of a nicely integrated temporal process. (8) At longer intervals of time we have reason for this law is much debated at the present time. principle of the inertia of attention and of the prior entry of a sensory datum under accommodation seems to hold for hearing and touch.

Thus early in the 'go's did Kiilpe recognize the difference between additive complication and unitary because it integration. Wundt's notion was that the first reaction required 'apperception* and that the second did not. While the process set up in the perception of a rhythm is probably more loosely list. but the 'empty' interval must be filled with something.' not had something added to it. (10) Finally we may refer again to the facts of rhythm discussed in the preceding section. Might there be some such special "tprocess." which measures an otherwise empty interval by increasing continuously in intensity while the interval en- . that the reaction was longer than the 'muscular.12 of a second ('muscular reaction').Protensitive Physiology titude of expectancy a simple auditory reaction 143 may require at- 0. it is in- tegrated than any of the others in this rhythmical group is much more plain that the than a series of sounds. and that the tenth of a second was therefore needed for the 'apperception. It would be a very happy and convenient solution to the problem of protensity. but also because there must be some process to 'carry' the temporal judgment. thus saving about a tenth of a second. but because it was a longer process. and that each group within the rhythm has through a definite evolutionary course that runs itself in the few seconds of its life.22 of a second titude it ('sensorial reaction') . not only because consciousness is continuous. It is just as easy to make judgments of 'empty' times as of filled times. that the earlier sounds prepare for the later while the later fall in upon this preparation. under another may require only 0. if perceived duration could be re- duced to an intensity which substitutes for protensity.' This "subtractive procedure" was finally abandoned beoriginal cause a it became in difference 'sensorial' plain that the difference of attitude made the nature of the total process.

Moreover. it is clear that. because it shows that duration. intensity is not at all All the experiments in an unlikely surrogate for protensity. If it were the first known that Kohler's function applies only to intensity. C. the second with the first. and a process means that something that is not time varies in time.] In the comparison of durations one compares two successive intervals. with so few dimensions from which to choose. On the other hand. then we might assume that duration is really translated into intensity. seemed to follow Kohler's law for intensity. However. indicate that Moore has some preliminary results that judgments of duration follow Kohler's law for the time-errors of intensity. Moore's finding will be useful. just as we know introspectively that there . 16 it is the E. R.M. and we could conclude to an intensitive surrogate for protensity. [Cf. In the process of Fig. lation We 'direct' must be careful not to put too much stress on the observation of protensity in considering this conscious dimension. leaves a trace whose subsequent history can be made out. we do not know that Kohler's function applies only to intensity. occurring under these conditions. (7) of the immediately foregoing list of processes.F.144 Time dures? Such a process would be a mental 'hour-glass/ always ready to be started on the demand for temporal estimation. It is possible that in experiments for times lying within a conscious present there is a pretty definite surrogation. if it is substantiated. which an earlier duration is pres- ently compared with a later duration imply a temporal process. It is obvious therefore that we cannot rest content with the mere statement of the functional re'clock-measured' dura- of sensed protensity to the tion of the stimulus. that varies with time. Moore varied the how the 'trace' of It interval between intervals to determine time changed with elapsed time.

with the still further possibility that they apply merely to the artificial conditions of the protensitive observation. Since a process is not a mere duration but a change of something in time.' he has been trained to run twice around the block to the right and then twice around the other block to the left. a long process that sets off the judgment. Most of the time we are not thinking about time. have other results which. which does not presuppose the same processes that would makes a projudgment when. predisposed for these temporal judgments finds the two successive stimulusintervals integrated into a single organization. a rat tensitive necessarily identical with the ground of introspection in the conventional experiment on the 'time-sense. the difficulty of observing time at a time. we have also disposed of so simple a theory as the psychophysiological correlation between mere brain-time and thought-time. give a knowledge about protensitive organization.' to come to the end of the chapter with less information about protensity than we had at the positive end of the last chapter about extensity. For instance. Either or both of these conditions might be true. in a 'temporal maze. They may. It is also possible that an observer. We see that the physiological account of protensity must be in terms of a process. We must look for some process that distinguishes his second return to the starting point from his first return. and most of the temporal processes have no result in knowledge. Intensity may be the other . where breathing or muscular strain become the measuring process. We of the main difficulty to an understanding of the problem. however. it is because of If we seem the historical fact that much less attention has been given to the supposedly simple psychology of time than to the have disposed obviously complex psychology of space. being observed. yet such a process is not exist in introspection.Physiology of Protensity 145 may be with the short times outside of a conscious present.

Rhythm. and on other occasions be otherwise. Time but we have as yet no way of knowing. 581 pp. Psycho!. 255-279. B. Both relationships are. Amer. which can somewhat vaguely be called fault 'excitations. ii. chologif and V. /. J. esp.146 dimension of this process. 1-46. Lehrbuch der tion The study of rhythm as exhibit- experimentellen Psychologie. Der Zeitsinn nach Persuchen. Curtis. the temporal judgment during sleep. Wundt. 453-529. N. 27. Amer. Psyder Zeitauffassung. Benussi. see L. Temporal judgments after Psychology (Titchener Commemorative Volume). The psychology of time. Brush's. II. 60-112. Vierordt. 1891.. (for ancient history and modern theory) 453-502. Duraand the temporal judgment. Nichols. 408411. Observations on chologist finds when he undertakes to fill in the gap between K. as the psy- Boring. Extensity reduces to re- spatial relations in the nervous system. Bolton. An idea of the scope and intent of the literature can be got 1868. G. 379-395- I. Stud. 1891. Experimental Psychology. relationships of something. Probes.' when it is intentional Such vagueness and considered. there is a certain symmetry between the theory and protensity of extensity and the theory of protensity. Studies in only relative. Amer.. or the process may sometimes be a process of intensity-in-time. from H. }. 1930. of condes Unterauf suchungen iiber den Umfang Bewusstseins bei regelmassig Temporal Judgments For the experiment on guessing the time on being awakened in the night. J. (for experiments up to Protensitive Integration An experimental introspective study. 4. of course. 1917. The experiment on predetermined times of awakening is E. sciousness range Dietze. Psychologies physiologischen 1911.. 1916. 362-393Similar implications (and shorter times for the range) are to be found in T. ing the temporal is G. tion. 1-98. 1923. L.. . Psychol. 1885. D. 1913.. 42. J. 2. Psychol. Philos. Titchener. Amer. duces to temporal relationships. 191 pp. Boring and E. Grundzuge der III. I95> 393-404. E. W. 3. N. is 1890) 503-529. is not a Notes The tive sense' organization is lack of interest in protensiand the 'time- sleep. which demonstrates the immediacy of the judgment of durathat of J. Moreover. einander folgenden Schalleindriicken.

PsychoL. 1909. Most of these facts are irrelevant to the present complication. 1912). Vierordt. 392.. Bayliss. 72. 37. Rhythmus. wrote a little introduction to psy- and psychology and need no support from elaborate citation of the literature. Prior entry in the auditory-tactual complication. Stud. James. J. see S. An integration of parts. Amer. Zsch. discovered the indifference point. 397-432. von HautreiI. 284-287. On the summation sensations. Cf. 1911 (Eng.. James. or the corresponding phenomena of the 'complication' experiment. but this is no place for a bibliography of rhythm. 271-296. on delay at the ibid. but times were too long loc. 1898. Kinematoskopische Untersuchungen. M.. 393-430.. 6. Meumann. trans. Wundt. Physiologische Psychologic. I9 I S> /. !93-296. op. The classical ex- periments all used a complication . Principles of General Physiology. esp. cit. 249-322. James. and as we see in simplest kinds of 52. cit. PsychoL.. (cf. Summation Gesammelte Abhandlungen. his For Korte's laws and the phiphenomenon (seen movement). Ueber die zen. Koffka's times are consistent 147 problem. Zsch. loc. See K. op. H5-238. Korte. (for temporal integration. cit. these times) 35f. when threshold as measured an excellent exercise is demonstrating the nature of integration. esp. results is no mere summation For the tual of auditory-tac- the sensations are in different sense- departments. see chology in which this unity of the ihythmical consciousness is the text. 616-618.. on successive summation and successive induction in reflexes. 1890. Untersuchungen zur Psychologic und Aesthetik des this Protensitive Physiology P kilos. 111-114. 1894. synapse. Stone. 1926. Einjuhrung in die Psy- chologie. For example. Psychol. 213216. Principles of Psychology. 10. 489-492. zur Experimental-Untersuchungen Lehre vom Rhythmus. 1-109. 611-619. esp. The great deal of the literature on the perception of time is occupied A with such topics as the temporal at which physiological implications of the relationships of Korte's three variables for optimal working out of the by the rate two sensations can succeed each other without fusing.Notes Psychol. Koffka. cit. Goldscheider. 1924. I. Somebody (Titchener?) once remarked that Wundt started his metronome ticking in the first chapter of this book and just it tick all the way through. I. ibid.). see A.. on summation in a nerve. 426. let W. Another classic is E.. is There A. Wundt.. 1894. see of tactual a good summary of the results of experiments on the estimation of short times and thus of the 'indifference point* in W. as the term is used in this in movement chapter. Many of the facts mentioned in of the text are the stock of the textbooks of physiology section W. except as they illustrate the general fact of physiological latency of process (as in the fusions of color-mixing) those facts the with Bottom's. f. when in the same sense and the same place.

On compound and tions. C. derestimated are of the cases. then it increasingly underesti- mated with less and less rapid change up to twelve seconds. or Wundt. Kohier was. then the intensity estimated up it is increasingly overto an elapsed time of is about one and a half seconds. R. The function has been verified for other intensities completing themselves (Vierordt) or in the interval after they have completed themselves (Moore). when is there is no error. and durations after a long interval are un- W.. If this relationship were true. Here is the problem.148 clock. (Moore). Zur Theorie des Sukund der Zeitfehler. 148-165. and that long durations be no time-error at zero time. sider their relation in to the esti- Rev. the limit of the experiment. see J. Time Relations of Mental Phenomena. still thinking of intensity as meaning concentration of ions in the cortex. with vision one of the senses employed. 1923. the function is as follows: There can as three is about seconds. Jastrow. point whereas Vierordt's indifference point is supposed to be a little less than one second.. Can . Dunlap. zessivvergleichs Kohier. and durations after a short interval are overestimated (Moore). researches on the 'time-sense' (Vierordt). It is conceivable that the two functions are the same. 4. that a short duration. then decreasingly overestimated up to an elapsed time of about three seconds. Physiologischt Psychologie t III. see conversely. we shall then have to con- oratory. coincidence. simple reac- than sound in the Har- the effect of vard Psychological Laboratory. 1910. Moore has worked with the time-errors for judgments of time Hunter has really faced this same question in the problem of double alternation in a temporal maze. the subtractive attitude. and his theory at that time fol- 424-451- lowed these lines. but even begins to 'expand' before it is completed (Vierordt). 1890. and procedure. Forsch. Psychol. made it mations obtained the standard that rhythmical eye-movements might account for the results under such conditions. and with Time two the in the Harvard Psychological Lab- method the calling for a judgment on basis of rhythmically repeated If Moore's unpublished preliminary results are finally established. clear 17. 1911. Short On Kohler's function for the 'trace* of an by the dependence intensity. 115-175. as indicated of the time-error in succes- are overestimated (Vierordt). Kohler's results are for same order though Kohler's the two indifference sound intensities when the interval between successive stimuli varies from one and a half to twelve seconds. If we take the second sound a standard of comparison. The times in Psychol. K. durations on the temporal interval sive psychophysical comparisons. Kohler's function ought not to hold for a successive comparison they ultimately are 'contract' either while of two long durations. 157-191. not only begins to 'expand' after it is completed (Moore). in 1923. esp. long durations are underestimated (Vierordt).

374-388. since Hunter seems to think it is an index of intelligence. The white rat and the double alternation temrats learn to piling 149 up in the nervous system of the retained effects of the responses already made" (cf. Psychol. 374-378. Hunter's symbolic process is apparently not any mere surrogative process. whereas surrogation may mean nothing more than the "cumulative piling fects. lem. S. /. Hunter and J. if of the retained efis many similarities to the this cumulation capa- of this chapter. a Human by acquiring "symbolic process.. See W.Notes go to the right twice around the same closed path and then start going to the left? It seems that rats just barely can. Nagge. the total inte- grated process of the present text) or (2) a "symbolic process" (cf. . 193 1. /. This article gives the See Hunter. Genet. esp. 39. work on the problem by Hunter and his assoreferences to earlier 1928. ciates. The behavior of raccoons in the double alternation temporal maze. the surrogative process of the text)." eral discussion of the Hunter's gen- However." problem bears discussion up . He (i) there must be suggests that "a cumulative ble of acting causally for the total process cumulated. Genet. 303-319. W... 35. it Raccoons can solve the probmonkeys can solve it easbeings are apt to solve a verbal formula.. Psychol. poral maze. 386f. and ily. if they are bright enough.

In general. The series of oranges between red and yellow seems to be as much a matter of quality as the pitches. at the present state of psychological knowledge. we have still not avoided the concept of quality since we have now the discreteness of the red and the yellow to consider. with the development of a science. we must not think of quality as a scientific ultimate. Differences of tonal pitch are qualitative because the scale of pitches has no direction of more or of less. the scale does not imply the existence of a zero at or beyond either end. Inevitably this relationship must follow as long as measurement continues to be the most useful form of scientific observation.Chapter 6 QUALITY THE concept of quality is usually opposed to the concept of quantity. and that. qualitative because they are discrete. to reduce to quantitative ones. It is a truism of scientific methodology that qualitative distinctions tend. The consequences for our thought are that. we can no more expect to get along without it than we can It is expect science to become complete or finished. on the other hand. not true that quality is an important concept only 150 . as qualitative (i) when when they do not imply a relaThe differences between the five sense-modalities are. it seems that difare ferences regarded they are discrete or (2) tionship of more-and-less. If we say that orange is complex and that the series consists of varying relative amounts of red and yellow. on the one hand.

saw. Modern physics assigns to the elements atomic numbers from I to 92. we have possible to set now only come far enough to see how it might be attained. unanalyzable. for continua that seem not to represent magnitudes. but we still need it either for discrete elementary excitatory processes. It is nevertheless certain . If it were all its up functional laws whereby the various could be deduced or qualitative properties of the elements the days of usefulness predicted from the atomic numbers. the coach. numbers which represent the number of planetary electrons in the atoms and thus also the charge of the nucleus of the atom. or. When Mendeleyev formulated law (1869) we had a first step beyond classification periodic toward quantification. both as an extremely important category because of its usefulness to thought. to wit.Concept of Quality in 151 psychology. Thus. as in the pitches. I walk out and enter into it. The most physical science appeared elements. for the concept of quality in the consideration of the chemwe have istry of substances would have passed. to quantitative continua. In the same way we must think of quality in psychology. and also as a category that may some day be reduced. and touched the same thing. not yet attained this level in chemical theory. It is obvious that we need the concept to characterize the gross differences between the senses. Its applicability to differences within a single sense is always less certain. For many years the elements were just so many each separate substances. I look through the casement and see it. or be logically reducible. and characterized striking example of quality in in the discreteness of the chemical by the properties. However. common speech would incline one to think that I heard. Modality Berkeley wrote in 1709: "Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street.

the touch. you go into the same room in the dark and hurt yourself. with constantly increasing assurance. and wish that the maid would not drag that table about. the smell. the specific meaning Pick up the portmanteau. However.152 the ideas intromitted distinct Quality by each sense are widely different. the sound. Here the meaning of a particular table is carried by three modes of perceptive experience. the general meaning It's time to go. the idea that difference of sensory modality we have had is the funda- mental qualitative difference in psychology. all have the same meaning. and Berkeley. Or suppose a friend. so that the fact of the same coach or table being seen. Suppose Berkeley had heard the coach driving up to the door and his hand had reached down to grasp his portmanteau as he was about to take his departure. Or he might even have smelled the tea prepared against his departure and have reached for his portmanteau. The sight. had reached for his portmanteau. we face in converse problem as to how the modalities are distinguished. and that the problem of meaning is secondary. you hear a noise overhead. that a sight and a sound and a touch are as different as any things ever could be psychologically. and there see a table." Thus. had placed his hand on Berkeley's shoulder. and from each other. knowing that the coach must have arrived. Or suppose he had seen the coach coming and had reached for the portmanteau. and you complain that you ran against the table. noiselessly entering the room. they are spoken of as one and the same thing. having been observed constantly to go together. It can be said that the meanings are the same because they have ." Titchener wrote in 1915: "You walk into a room. and felt must be explained in terms of relationthis section the ships between the sensory modalities. but. heard.

perhaps this sight. the movement to pick up the Nevertheless the case is no whit changed if the portmanteau. that it has tended to overlook the identity of context. Traditional introspective psychology has been so concerned with the variety of sensory cores that the same meaning can have. In respect of these problems it would be possible to get along without stressing the distinction between sight and hearing. a visual image. means it. that it has also overlooked the necessary contextual identity for different modes of the same meaning. correlations. From such adequate enfor responses vironment. and it is of such meanings the larger view of psychology from John Locke to the present final day that the mental life is constituted. this same behavioral touch or this smell would have brought at once the visual image of Dublin Castle. Moreover.e. the various processes all converge upon the same event a bodily movement. the only test of knowledge lies in contextual response. and then we produces the same adequate response in different ways.. Nevertheless we should certainly not be content with mere ject i. is the context of it. The the (the coach) typical case then is that in which the same object by different senses (sight and hearing) leads to same psychological event (movement or image). we also we know how an organism is related to its know what the organism knows. There would be no should seek for insight and conshould discover that the stimulus-ob- . this sound. We tinuity. it is quite clear why these meanings are the same. Modern Gestalt psychology has been so anxious to stress the importance of meanings for the psychologist and to avoid the traditional interest in sensory difference within the same meaning. context be conscious. The term intends the stimulus. by different channels of sense.Modality the 153 context. whither Berkeley was to be driven. The correlation between stimulus and ultimate response if one takes is a meaning.

it would be said. The answer is itself. ical Dator of data. Nevertheless they seem to be their inferential nature does not appear immediately in in- Now we trospection called it. However. whereas qualitative experience supposed to be predescriptive and primary. convinced that reality layman is an artificial construct derived from experience.154 difficulty Quality about making the discovery. but by experience In this manner we are unexpectedly brought face to face with the fundamental epistemological question that under- lies sense the author's answer the theory of this book. there is a certain ambiguity about the words experience and reality which suggests the ground of the present difficulty. Every one knows of himself that now one channel of sense and now another mediates his knowledge of his environment or his responses to it. Objects do not experience objects as such. No. and is description is analytical. The questions before us are: How does he know? In what way is a sight different from Of course. Hence experience seems "unconscious inference. he finds that such derived reality seems unreal. any attempt to deal with this question in words is sure to yield a false answer. in experience because perience. The psychologist recognizes it when. Every one. the usual answer is: different to introspection. They or inferences derived from the data of exare constructs are real. which are nevertheless recognized as derived from experience. in introspection. Is experience real? In any strict the metaphysis. because verbalization is descriptive." Helmholtz therefore to contain the reals. The paradox when. Experience. However. a sound ? sight A and a sound are is "given" in excannot be explicated or explained. is prior to reality. he suddenly realizes recognizes this . not in words. is aware in immediate intuition of the nature of sights when seeing and of the nature of sounds when difference The perience. It hearing and thus of the fact that they are different. given.

No one will dispute the obviousness of the fact that a sound. Is it obvious that a sight and a sound are immediately different as they are given in experience? Very well. that we we are can distinguish between a sight and normally aware of the difference. Starting with the coach as the primary term. after all. How do we tell a sight from a sound? We can tell the one from the other because they furnish physiologically distinct grounds for discrimination. the movement of re- . Peripheral localization of function is specific. Let us see where this other path leads. It must suffice that we have been given warning that we are on dangerous ground. they tell us about knowledge of reality. the author replies. and that the path now turns sharply from the usual road that psy- chologists travel. It is impossible at this point to go more deeply into the epistemological problem.Modality that 155 is. The sight or the sound produces the same movement (or the same image). Let us return to the figure of Berkeley and the coach. as it were. Here at the periphery the visual and auditory events are quite distinct. an and not the great what he is describing as experience inferential construct like all other objects Dator of data. These phrases tell us nothing about experience. As the projection tracts lead on in the brain. we find that the physical light and sound diverge. their isolation is diminished by various connections and presumably other means of initiating differential excitation. Ultimately the two paths converge upon a common path. The whole problem becomes simplified as soon as we recognize that we are talking about knowledge. that we can tell the one from the other. to effect stimulation in different sense-organs. We neither hear with our eyes nor do we see sound with them. it is also obvious that obviousness does not always point to the truth.

sponse to we cannot tell whether Berkeley heard the coach or saw How could feel could ask him. He would have known that he was seeing and not hearing (if he was seeing) because the visual path. secondary cues are not essential. smelled. as it were. as the two converge upon the common path of the common response. we pretty well assured that know? He might know. and so must have heard it. before its merger with the auditory. The same rule holds within a . before it became inextricably merged with the path for another sense. and we may we find out? Well. had been set up by excitation of the path for that sense. felt. Berkeley would have known. This theory of modality is frankly that the peculiar quality of vision is our capacity to distinguish vision from the other modalities. no longer any localization of have passed. He knows when he a corresponding process. and he would have known because some contextual process. the qualitative sign of a modality. because he would have no other sense-qualities from which to distinguish his one possession. for instance. The Bishop knows when he sees because he knows that he using his visual apparatus. core to the context that is the meaning. would arouse the visual qualitative sign in the way of a contextual process. or tasted the coach. A being with only one sense would have no way in which he could become aware of the peculiar quality of that sense. from the fact that he was in such a position that he could not have seen.1 56 and then there Quality is sponse. Knowledge is always a relativistic. It asserts matter of discriminative response. information about the coach and the restill it. beyond the sensory function. from secondary cues. perceptual We With all this it. that still is hears by including the projection paths belong peculiarly to vision. as. It is really all very simple. How would he of course. the good Bishop of Cloyne could tell us. However.

However. is There remains. therefore. On the cerebral cortex to If he could tell other hand. which Helmholtz thought . the difference between night and day without a cortex. 14. a portion of area w. a concentrated attention of that sort ness. but a state of concentrated hypnotic attention upon a tremendous fatigue sensation. although we may We hazard a guess that this distinction is so primitive that we should expect it to survive the destruction of the corresponding projection area in the cortex. of course. said Muller.Modality single sense. there is still a good deal of differentiation of function as regards the sense- are not forced to assign modalities. The traditional view grew out of Johannes Miiller's doctrine of the specific energies of nerves. we have seen. p. that in spite of the equipotentiality and the mass action of cortical regions. 102. he ought to be able to tell the difference between a sight and a sound without cortical innervation. are now in a position to appreciate the advantages of the present theory over the conventional theory of cortical We centers. Fig. We saw in an earlier chapter (pp. (Cf. but that perception of visual pattern with any great degree of acuity requires a particular part of the cortex.) modal differentiation to a subcortical level. the question of the locus of qualitative differentiation in the brain. 103-105) that the discrimination of brightness may take place without the cortex. It has been suggested that sleep is not an unconsciousness. would be nothing other than unconscious- You cannot be aware you with a variety to provide of something unless there frame of reference for it. The nerves of the five senses have each their specific energy. known what red were bright red we should never So too we are conscious only be- cause the contents of consciousness are forever changing. It is not necessary. if 157 all is sights like. That was the theory of modality. to suppose that the Bishop used his know that he was seeing and not hearing.

the theory of sensory cerebral evidence centers (cf. supported by an increasing amount of pp. that? But on the other hand. right there the theory stopped. before they converge upon common paths. Thus. the only thing that was obviously specific about the nerves was that they were in different places and seemed to go to different parts of the brain. 101-105). and we see anatomically or functionally distinct system is the sort of system to provide the ground for the judgment of Shall modality. we is a sound recapitulate? The difference between a sight and that you know they are different. a theory which is by no means entirely discredited by Lashley's recent research. then at once if. grew up. At any rate that is what it became. However. All differences between modalities are thus discriminative contexts or responses to physiological systemic differences. you'll hear. or that part. which are qualitative signs of the difference. Why should you see for this part and hear for was systemic connections innervate the process which is the first term in the knowledge that the visual system is in use. are distinct and capable of exciting distinctive events.i $8 Quality for psychology as the doctrine of the con- was as important servation of energy for physics. you'll see. However. Quality Within the Modality Johannes Mtiller's theory of the five specific nerveenergies might be called a 'place theory' of quality. It a mere correlation and ever so unsatisfactory as a theory. You know they are different because the visual and auditory systems. The traditional theory of cerebral sensory centers is a place theory of qualities for . this part and its localization why an of function becomes meaningful. It said nothing more than: If you stimulate this part.

Quality and Specific Nerve Fibers modal difference. Here was the great color. including white. Newton had shown that all the colors." and that it is possible that "each sensitive filament of the nerve may consist of three portions. It was Helmholtz how who was effective in extending Miiller's theory to take account of the qualitative differences or continua within a single modality. 159 The view in a sense. named the resultant theory after Young. Helmholtz began with qualitative continuum of well understood because known since Newton. In had been that the colors vision (1852). could be produced by three. all theories of color have thus to resort to . it appeals to the spatial differentiation of the five sensory systems to explain the differences become recognized. but this physiology was no longer admissible in the nineteenth century with Miiller's doctrine carrying the implication that nervous excitation is a function of the nature of nervous tissue and not of the nature of the stimulus.f the three are variable. each principal color. The actual history of this theorizing illumines the modern problem. since of the preceding section is also. then any color produce can be differentiated from all the others with respect to three If three variables will Thus Thomas Young had concluded long before (1807) that there are three "principal colors" or "simple sensations. the colors. a place theory. one for variables. with its relationships pretty the laws of color-mixing had been Newton's day the traditional view were somehow transmitted by the nerves from the object to the sensorium. provided the amounts of each all o. In general." Helmholtz seized on this idea. posited three specific energies to account for all the visual qualities. and worked out the quantitative relations of the three kinds of excitation. different colors arise each How could thousands of from the appropriate stimulation of one small point on the retina? The natural way of solving such a problem was by analysis.

160 Quality analysis. if we could get all the pitches by mixing in different amounts a high pitch with a low. Mach suggested that dull all tones are mixtures of different amounts of just such a theory that and clear components. Helmholtz came to the problem of a theory of hearing (1863) after he had explicated his theory of vision (1860). It if we should hold law of tonal mixture to support it. There is many thousands is that all theories of color vision have of been theories of color discrimination. However. the higher is the clearer. No theory necessity has ever done more than to show how a given color sets up for us to notice an excitation so specific for it entiated in excitation from all that it is potentially differthe other colors. and discrimination. The Young-Helmholtz theory posits three elementary excitations. the most important point theory. of course. the lower the duller. E. Since there is no such law. and to suppose that there are as many different specific nerve-energies as there are discriminably different pitches about 11. Nevertheless analysis is again called for and. Miiller added "cortical gray" as an additional central process.000. when these ideas are predicated in so many of the accepted theories. This was extending Miiller's theory with a . Helmholtz a we had was obliged to consider every separate pitch as elementary. In the series of tonal pitches we have. unfortunately for is simple thinking. no plausible analysis available. capacity. a much simpler continuum than we have with the colors. It is a little puzzling to understand why experimental psychologists have so generally objected to the functional concepts of awareness. especially if nerve-fibers act as we know they act. The Hering theory requires three reversible processes (six 'specific energies'?)? and to them G. seemed to be forced by facts to an analytical We no other way of conceiving how a great of different excitations could originate at a single small spot in the retina.

Quality and Specific Nerve Fibers vengeance. pain. In the theory as Helmholtz left it. but we also know that Helmholtz has not had the last word on the matter of theories of hearing. however. warmth. and hence the several thousand specific energies could be scattered all over the The organ of hearing. It of this research that there developed the classical theory of four kinds of cutaneous 'spots' spots of pressure. since pitch depends upon place or pattern of excitation in the basilar membrane. Resonance explained the analysis of wave-forms into a combination of tones. It was this place-notion that guided Blix (1883) his m search for specific cutaneous nerve-energies. On finding four kinds of was out spots intermingled in the skin it was reasonable to conclude to four specific energies belonging to four superimposed punctiform areal systems. and the famous resonance theory of hearing established. Blix undertook to use small stimuli to see if he could find differently sensitive spots on the skin which might have different kinds of nerve-fibers leading from them. In such a theory we ought to expect four projection areas in the brain. because hearing seemingly lacked extensity. instead of all being concentrated at every point as they have to be on the retina. Helmholtz ultimately found the basilar membrane in size in such a in the it way that organ of Corti tapering might consist of a series of was thus resonators.' The earliest of these difficulties was the discovery that the excitations for . There had before that time been no simple analysis of complex tactual experience. 161 extension was possible. showed why no other laws Thus this theory of specific energies became the usual place theory that the general doctrine always implies. the question arises as to why pitch is not extensity. and the complex multitude of specific energies of mixture were to be found. but the simplicity of the theory has always been spoiled by certain complex interrelationships between the 'modalities. and cold.

three senses of taste We can afford to limit ourselves to and somesthesia. to consider the present state of We psychophysiological theory of quality within the different 'energies/ must now undertake departments of sense. spatial form of the projected image must be there were supposed to be three or even six preserved. then. warmth and is said warmth and In brief. In the ear the 'energies' were scaled off along a series of resonators. unprejudiced scientific inference in the theoretical Hecht and Troland. which in turn derives some of its validity from the better established theory of vision. but Troland on good . heat. There was no problem of the auditory perception of projected spatial pattern. Both of these investigators tend to favor a tRree-component theory of color vision.162 Quality cold fuse to give a new quality. the history of the theories of sensory quality is a history of an on to different nerve-fibers. In the retina. Any theory would hardly be more than an analogy to the theory of somesthesia. In the skin four 'energies' were attempt to get different qualities distributed in four superimposed and partially interpenetrated systems. audition. that no disvision. a type of theory that fits in with the very exact observations that have been made under the influence of the YoungHelmholtz theory. cussion of this topic could be quite so dignified as silence. Visual Quality controversy that has for many years continued about theories of color vision we come closest to discussions of In the fruitless informed. where all concentrated at every point. which introspectively to resemble pressure more than cold. For the Hering theory it would be possible to conceive of six separate excitations. Our ignorance of the psychophysiology of smell is so great.

Hecht finds support for the three-cone theory in the fact that he himself regards visual acuity is much lower for differences of hue than for differences of brilliance. rate of transmission. Presumably all nervous impulses are exactly alike except in frequency. but his idea as highly speculative. unless different degrees of the same excitation are dichotomized in the cortex. A discrimination between two colors means a response to one set of relationships in certain corresponding parts of the three systems as against another differential .Visual Quality 163 grounds. and then to differentiate between lesser degrees and greater. with the cerebral mechanism tuned to respond to a mid-degree as neutral. We have no right to suppose that the excitations of these of several three systems are qualitatively different in any neurological way. An anatomical fact a largely determines this view. Obviously a colored pattern would depend upon the stimulation of fewer cones than does a pattern of blacks and whites. at least tentatively. of vision is 'statistically' The three-component theory theory that posits the existence of three intermingled kinds of cones. Hence there cannot be two kinds of excitation in a single cone. since three processes are already a good many for the crowded retina to accommodate prefers to think of three excitations for the Hering theory. Troland has an ingenious suggestion as to how several different frequencypatterns (analogous to the modulation of wave-forms in radio broadcasting) could be got on to the same fiber. Both Hecht and Troland think of the diiferent processes as localized in different cones. and other such characteristics. but nowhere in the retina is there more than one fiber for a single cone. the notion (presumably three) systems of retinal excitation dependent upon different sets of cones. For these reasons it seems clear that we should accept. In the periphery of the retina there may be more than one cone for a single optic fiber.

Troland finds it necessary to posit the existence of cortical "receivers" for each of the three color excitations. if we follow our previous theorizing (pp. 86-94). Such it view is still a place theory of quality. We about such matters change as research have only recently discovered that the rat .164 set of relationships a Quality in different corresponding parts. There is. or more of likely every point in it must include three excitations. There is the areal projection in two dimensions organized as a pattern. which must certainly be central. at a different level ! Miiller posited fact that there constant "cortical gray" to explain the 'silence/ that there are no gaps in the visual field as there may be temporal gaps in the audia is no visual There tory course of events or spatial gaps in the tactual field. a reorganization of the pattern into three dimensions. There can be binocular mixture of colors. In any case the total organization is by no means simple. Or else it may turn out that color perception belongs from pattern discrimination. and not wholly on the working of the retina in the way that the color theories generally suppose. But now we see that either the pattern must be repeated thrice. Opinions progresses. is a general expectation that the phenomena of color contrast will ultimately be explained in terms of central laws. G. Think what is involved in the perceiving of a set of shelves filled with books There have been a good many hints that the phenomena of color vision depend in part on principles of organization in the brain. Imagine the visual perception of a library filled with cases of variegated books. which the relationships form a ground for response to color. and in vision leads to tremendous complexity because the color systems have to be maintained in the face of adequate perception of extensitive patterns. E. although this account pictures it as no more complex than it ought to be in view of the amazingly specific and precise adequacy of visual perception.

place theory of color. Moreover. we should have reached a degree of complication which would seem too great to be satisfied even in the brain. and here the analytical aspect of the place theory of color helps us. even when we consider the indisputable facts of . Nevertheless. and that the pattern is organized within this region and yet is not literally projected upon it. a space theory of quality and a space theory of extensity. however. be- cause it can reduce the spatial differentiation on account of quality to only three sets of spaces. In other words. say. it- seems. In the case of hearing. If 125 separate and individually complete we had to have. and which together translate other spatial differentials into color. We shall do well not to try in thought to outfit the visual cortex with too rigid a mechanical equipment. of audition contrasts at almost every point were forced to an analytical We we posited three (or more) spatially separate systems. each of which maintains the spatial values of pattern. one system for each of the discriminably different spectral hues. no very great reduction of the qualitative continuum is possible. Many psychologists think we are just on the threshold of some new conceptions and perhaps discoveries of principles of organization in the brain that will make the older 'switchboard' theories of historical interest only. There are several thousand different pitches and no analytical way of reducing them to a dozen or even a hundred components. Auditory Quality The problem with the problem of vision. Helmholtz was able to hold to a place theory of hearing for he had no problem of extensity to consider. The two kinds of spaces have got somehow or other to be kept from interfering with each other. in vision we require. spatial systems.Auditory Quality 16? needs a certain part of area w if he is to perceive pattern.

resonance-frequency theory has at once would be heard. In other words. in vision acute capacity for space perception astonishingly and a necessity few (three?) physiological color trust to the analogy with vision However. in hearing.1 66 Quality of tonal volume. and color depends upon entiation. if a frequency of 400 impulses per second could be got on to the fiber that leads from the receptor that pitch corresponding to is tuned to 150 cycles. and that extensitive perception depends on a secondary spatial differentiation. but it supposes that. whereas in differentiation vision the converse relationship obtains. In Helmholtz's thought the place theory of pitch (the theory based on specific energies) was identified with the resonance theory. for there the primary spatial differentiation gives us the perceptions of extensity. It supposes that resonance occurs and that ordinarily a given frequency is put on to a particular set of nerve-fibers. all A the advantage that has accrued to the resonance theory from the evidence that the inner ear actually does contain . that a resonance theory of hearing does not necessarily presuppose a place theory. the not the pitch for 150 cycles. a simple secondary spatial differwe have in hearing a multitude of pitches and a meager capacity for only a we have an processes. We may have the fact of resonance and a frequency theory of pitch. It is recognized. the primary is the physiological ground for the discrimination of pitch. binaural localization and the considerably more dubious facts we are not forced from Helmholtz's place theory of pitch. because in Helm- holtz's mind the former suggested the latter. and because the use of resonance seems to be to get different frequencies (pitches) on to different nerve-fibers. spatial We can argue that. for space perception. however. 400 cycles. we must not to further the theory of hearing. Such a resonancefrequency theory of pitch was held by Wundt and was recently espoused by Troland.

After all the chief mechanical objection to the resonance theory has been this situation arises a band that the structure of the organ of Corti would not permit the high degree of selectivity required for several thousands is of different pitches. the experiment of Wever and Bray it plausible than renders the frequency theory more has been at any previous period in its history. and we can suppose that because the resonance is not perfect and of receptors responds to the stimulus. The resonance-frequency theory provides an excellent ground for Ohm's law.Auditory Quality 167 an organ excellently adapted for selective resonance. especially with respect to the explanation of auditory localization (cf. a resonance-frequency theory also enjoys most of the advantages of a frequency theory. a resonance-frequency theory consistent with the results of the experiments on tonal volume (cf. The more intense the tone the wider the band of resonators excited. 112-114). However. 80-85). and thus the greater the volumic spread of the tone. as we have already seen (pp. A resonance-frequency theory is wholly consistent with these results. 50-54). and how complex waves are analyzed in hearing into their harmonic components (Ohm's law). Moreover. Besides. The plained chief objection to a frequency theory of pitch has it is been that no theory at all. It might also be true that low tones would tend to be larger than high tones (when the energy is the same). since the low tone would have a greater amplitude and a wider strip of the basilar membrane would be thrown into vibration. pp. Ordinarily different frequencies would be projected upon different points in the brain response. because the Wever-Bray volley theory requires that a stimulus of a given frequency should affect a goodly number of receptors. When and could easily result in discriminative complex and incompleted frequencies get on . pp. that it has always left unex- how response to a frequency could occur in the brain.

discrete to the stimulus- frequency. whereas a capacity for the absolute identification of pitches is unusual. a relationship that would seem to be unfavorable for the setting up of two distinct simultaneous temporal patterns of exci- . however. the analysis into components would be difficult or impossible. At a certain phaserelation every impulse of the 256-frequency will coincide in time with every other impulse of the 512-frequency. Let us consider the octave. more fundamental. nearly every intervals. Another objection to the frequency theory is.168 to the Quality same fibers. Suppose we have the octave of analyze 256 and 512 cycles sounding. that tonal interval which seems most probably a 'natural' interval.e. as probably would happen with a noise. the hardest to under Ohm's law. We can make much more impulses sense out of what frequencies we know we of corresponding have. For this kind of discrimination resonators are not suitable. i. is analyzed into its two components in the inner and that frequencies of 256 and 512 impulses per second are projected along different tracts of fibers (volley theory) upon different adjacent cortical areas. We Against this complaint is it can be pointed out that pitch discrimination notoriously relativistic. For the latter perhaps a differentiation of response for a hundred one can appreciate tonal different frequencies is enough. Such a theory requires us to believe in a central response that is differential as to frequency. must imagine that different frequencies can excite different paths. an interval for which a physiological explanation will have some day to be The octave is the best fusion. the octave ear. We must suppose now that made out. of the relation of frequencies. that is to say. and thus we seem to be asking for an imaginary set of resonators in the brain when we already have a real set in the ear. and the important problem of pitch becomes the problem of the perception of intervals..

and seems to partake of the immediacy of the response to the fusions. and that the relationships are carried over by 'learning' and 'memory' to the perception of successive intervals. In a similar manratio. 169 Simultaneous related excitations seem either to com- bine (as we have supposed they may do in binaural localization) or to effect an inhibition of one by the other. a little elaborately. responding to a change is we alter the interval is not greatly altered when a quarter of a musical whole-tone of frequency of impulses. precisely determined than it is for absolute judgments of pitch. with a suggestion as to the physiology of the degree of fusion and with the details incomplete. unitari- ness of the octave would be accounted We should not expect as integration when the frequencies have the where every third impulse of one coincides with every second impulse of the other. Another difficulty arises from the fact that change of phase-relation does not alter the degree of fusion. and thus constitute the fact of memory. course. In either case we should have a unitary resultant. much should exhibit ner it less fusion than the octave. In perceiving successive tones as intervals one is. However. would come out that the more simple the the old rule that the better the fusion we believed before Brues found that the degree of fusion by and thus make the ratio very complex. Let us now repeat briefly what we have been saying about . It is perfectly in the The response much more possible that the fusions are genetically primary. and we may leave the matter thus. and thus the musical fifth ratio 2:3. So Brues's finding offers a difficulty. at least in so far as they are integrated in a single resultant. Both these objections could be met. and thus the for.Auditory Quality tation. such speculation ought not to be forced too far. by assuming certain inductive relationships that tend to bring the two frequencies more nearly in step. are not ready We yet to discuss the formation of those organizations which persist and recur.

because every impulse of the lower tone would reenforce and become assimilated to every other impulse of the upper tone. Projected at the cortex we tudes and broader bands of resonance. because the spread is greater. The octave. Intense tones and low tones would tend to have large regions of projection. of which the locus. drawn into single integrations. . or were not.170 hearing. presumably transverse strips of the basilar membrane. Low tones tend to have larger ampli- The frequency of the transmitted as a volley of impulses along the tract of fibers thus stimulated. Quality Complex wave-forms are analyzed into harmonic components in the inner ear by the system of resonators of the organ of Corti. Their discrimination constitutes the fact of Ohm's law. Other fusions would depend upon the ease with which the impulses of one excitations fitted into the The pattern of the other. would determine the localization of the sound. There is no evidence that one can recognize more than 100 different pitches ('absolute pitch'). according to relations of intensity or time. Two simultaneous tones from the same ear would be differently projected because they were separated by resonance in the ear and put on different sets of adjacent fibers. except in this sense of noting a change in frequency. The band is larger for more intense tones. would be the best fusion. they would be discriminated with various degrees of ease according as they were. from the two ears would integrate into a single resultant. stimulus is should find the following relationships. The statement that there are 11. where the ratio of frequencies of impulses is 2:1.000 different auditory sensations means simply that 11. Selectivity is not very precise. a band of the membrane resonates and a group of adjacent receptors re- sponds. However. Judgments of pitch are mostly relative and depend upon the capacity for differential response to a change in frequency.000 such discriminable changes in frequency can result in adequate response.

Cutaneous Sensibility

171

Somesthetic Quality

The next sense we can afford to
and
for the

for our consideration

is

somesthesia. Here

limit our inquiry to cutaneous sensibility

most part to the relationships of the traditional qualities of pressure, pain, warmth, and cold. There is no evidence of novel psychophysiological problems in somesthesia inside the body. Kinesthesis involves dull pressure and dull pain; parts of the alimentary canal give rise to
dull

membranes may
in

warmth, and cold; muscles and yield pressure or pain. These qualities differ extensitive pattern from the patterns of their arousal on
pressure, dull
pain,
It
is

the skin.

possible

that

they also
not.

differ

in

quality,

although Nafe thinks that they do
like thirst,

Organic perceptions

hunger, appetite, nausea, and sex are obviously

patterns of qualities that are familiar under

more general

meanings or functions for the individual. The skin provides the most useful
as regards their
field of

names and unique only

study for somesthesia.
raise the question
is

We

must

includes several modalities or

whether cutaneous sensibility only one; and first we may

note the history of opinion on this matter. Aristotle, in distinguishing five senses, established touch as a single sense,

although he observed that touch had a greater variety of sense-qualities than the other senses. The doctrine of the
specific energies of nerves was essentially a theory of the differentiation of the traditional five senses, of the modalities

and not of the qualities within the modalities. Charles Bell had a clear conception of such specific energies in 1811; Johannes Miiller had got the view into a theory by 1826 and into a formal doctrine by 1838. Helmholtz, as we have
just seen, extended the doctrine to take account of qualitative differences of color (1860)

and tone (1863), seemingly

172

Quality

without realizing at the time that the doctrine had been doing service as a theory of modality and that he was now
extending
it

been
tative

until

to intramodal quality. It seems not to have 1878 that Helmholtz used the word Modalitdt

for the different senses,

and defined a modality as a qualisystem discontinuous with other coordinate qualitative

systems.

Meanwhile the complexity of cutaneous sensibility had been continuously recognized, although there had been no permanent subdivision of the sense. E. H. Weber (1846)
distinguished the Gemeingefuhl (which included pain) from the Tastsinn, which was in turn divided into a Drucksinn,

Temper atursinn and an Ortsinn. Obviously Weber was using the word Sinn loosely as sensibility and not as a
a

sense-department. No clear view emerged until Blix in 1883, seeking to study specific nerve-energies for the skin and working with small stimuli, discovered pressure, warmth,

and cold

spots,

and concluded

of course that he

had discov-

ered three kinds of nerves. Goldscheider verified the gross fact of Blix's discovery the next year. Pain spots were some-

what uncertainly added to the list. It was von Frey who dressed this theory up in good clothes and successfully presented it to psychology. He made it clear that pressure,
warmth,
cold, and pain are four distinct modalities, and he attached to each of the four, by a not incontrovertible argu-

ment (as was only

proved), a separate sense-organ. However, it 1920 that Titchener was trying to bring all the cutaneous qualities into one continuum by means of his
it

in

"touch pyramid," and in 1927 that Nafe was reporting an
all these qualitative distinctions correlations with sense-organs were Prey's never established, except for the relation of pressure spots

experiment that told against

in touch.

Von

to

follicles. Goldscheider (1886) and Dallenbach found at cold and warm spots nothing but free (1927)

hair

Cutaneous Sensibility
nerve-endings, the endings that were supposed to function for pain.

173

by von Frey

All this history is important because it has been incorrectly stated that the doctrine of four cutaneous modalities,

unsupported in fact, is an erroneous view fixed upon psychology for a century by the great prestige of Johannes Mullen The four modalities date from the relatively unimportant Blix, in 1883; there were important objectors at once, like Dessoir (1892); von Frey made it the standard

view about 1895; but, except for the elementary textbooks where the expert voice is but faintly heard, there was a good deal of doubt all along. For not a great deal more than twenty-five years (1895-1920) has von Frey's theory been
the belief of
in order. Temperature spots metal point much are easily demonstrated on the skin. colder than the skin, when dragged across the skin, brings out the bright cold sensation at tiny areas and elicits no

Let us

many experts. now get our facts

A

cold in between. There

may be a dozen such spots in a centimeter on the back of the hand. If the point is a square few degrees above the temperature of the skin, then diffuse
sensations of

warmth

are found, the spots are large and

may be only two or three in the same square centimeter that contained the dozen cold spots. The two kinds of spots appear to be distributed without relation to each other; a spot on the skin may be sensitive to both warmth
there

and

cold, to either, or to neither.

A

very

warm

stimulus on

give rise to 'paradoxical' cold. Hence a warm stimulus on both warm and cold spots ought to very give rise to a cold warmth, but actually this fusion is reported as a new quality, 'heat/ which is said to resemble
a cold spot

may

pressure and pain introspectively. Heat can be experimentally aroused by cold on a cold spot with warmth on an

adjacent

warm

spot.

174
vice versa.
ceptors.

Quality
The evidence from the spots favors separate reThe evidence from adaptation and from fusion in

Adaptation to warmth means sensitization to cold, and

heat favors a single mechanism. However, the evidence from the spots is not univocal. The spots are the places that are relatively sensitive to

warmth and

doubtful areas. Sometimes

cold respectively. In between them are large it seems as if there were almost

no part of the skin from which a vague fleeting warmth or cold could not be aroused by the appropriate stimulus
if

the thermal difference from the skin

is

fairly great.

Some

spots can be marked and their location verified day after day, but in general it is very difficult to duplicate in a second exploration the thermal topography of a first one.

Von Frey recognized the fact that, in order to get consistent topographical results, the observer must learn the Merkmale of warmth or cold,
The
spots

seem to vary

in sensitivity.

which

may

easily

mean

that he

is

to take the 'honest-to-

goodness' spots and leave the 'doubtfuls* alone. Probably Goldscheider counted the 'doubtfuls/ since he found very
spots than von Frey. Excision of the positive and histological examination of the excised tissue respots veals no nervous structure but free endings, which are distributed ever so much more densely than is required by

many more

the conventional topography of the temperature spots. Histologically all the cutaneous receptors look alike.

In brief, then,

we

are sure only of an uneven distribution

of sensitivity to warmth and a differently of sensitivity to cold. It is possible that

uneven distribution
all

or nearly

all

of

the skin

is

sensible to

be effective

warmth and to cold if the stimulus enough. The resultant vague warmths are often

confused with pressure; the faint colds may resemble prick. In any case warmth and cold are related in that they involve
antagonistic processes. If they have separate receptors, at

Cutaneous Sensibility
least the receptors

175

must be involved

in a

common mechestablished
of the skin,

anism.

The existence of pressure spots seems to be by the observed relation of the spots to the hairs
every pressure spot
'to

the windward' of a hair, as if the free endings of nerve-fibers at the hair-follicles were the receptors. There is no doubt about this topographical correlation
if

sures, the 'solid/ 'granular' pressure sensations,

one considers only the 'honest-to-goodness' preswhich have

It is presumably this sort of presthe hairs are touched; they act as sensitive levers to excite the nerve-terminations near their

the traditional

Merkmale.

sure that occurs

when

bases.

However, come from these

all

pressure sensations of the skin do not spots. A light touch upon the intervening

regions, such as can be made with the end of a piece of horse-hair as a stimulus, practically always gives rise to some sort of vague, light, pressure sensation, an experience that is the sensory core of 'tickle' and one that has been

given the technical name 'contact/ It is not at all certain that this contact and the granular pressure are qualitatively
as with temperature, the turns out to be only a gross approximation. 'spot' theory The skin can everywhere be stimulated by light pressure to give the sensory response called 'pressure'; the hairs are
different,

and thus with pressure,

especially effective organs and thus the spots over the hairfollicles are very sensitive spots; and elsewhere one finds
variability without complete insensitivity at any point. The pain spots never really did get established. Von

Frey

believed in them, but they are so densely distributed a couple to the square millimeter as to be incapable of accuprick quality comes out for a thrust of any point in the skin. Again there is variability in sensitivity, and the needle must penetrate deeper in some
rate mapping.

The

a needle at

places than in others. Hence, with

little

weight upon the

All along there had been doubt as to whether pain might a stimulus. In this sense there are certainly sensory 'spots.176 in between. as bears on the problem of modality. May not the pain of the brilliant light come from the optic fibers themselves? Is it not possible that the direct stimulation of any nerve-fiber ground stimuli view lay in the fact that all blinding lights. There are receptors for cutaneous somesthesia. that there are pain receptors any kind of intense somesthetic is merely intense somesthesia. It is weak not be "common for this sensibility" or a "summation sense. gives rise to pain. The simplest theory in is which become involved stimulation. and is truly somesthetic. This it Our knowledge of cutaneous sensibility. the investigator finds pain spots with analgesic spaces but the analgesia seems to be simply an artifact of probably true that the conical point of a needle cannot penetrate far into the skin without affecting at least some one of the very numerous free nerve-endings. It is certainly true that the histology of these cutaneous receptors furnishes no more ground for a belief in different kinds of receptors than does the histology of the retinal cones or of the cochlear hair-cells in the cases of vision and hearing. . or by way of summation? These definite have mostly been dismissed. boils down to the following statements. Visual and auditory pain comes from the extremes of muscular accommodation to a very intense stimulation. a sensation common to all nerves? Or at least may it not be true that extreme pressure. extreme heat and extreme cold tend to arouse pain. warmth. Quality needle. There is certainly no convincing evidence for a summation cold results in pain theories sense. or that pain latter view is Nafe's.' No histological difference among these free endings has been clearly established (although it is possible that there are two or three kinds of free endings)." The very intense deafening sounds. the free endings in the skin.

Nafe's Cutaneous Theory 177 On not it is equally true that histology does a theory of the differentiation of cutaneous against receptors for it seems unlikely that a functional difference the other hand. sensitivity Nafe has recently argued against a plurality of somesthetic modalities with what he calls a "quantitative theory of feeling. Heat. introspecstudy. that there is a difference in the to cold. experimental. to warmth. beit is not inconsistent with a theory of plural modalities that pain should always be associated with the violent excitation that involves other modalities. Thus we come back to our principal positive fact. tell should be microscopically Blix's original discovery as visible. viz. There is no physiological evidence for differ- and stimuli that would be expected to excite pain an animal are found to give rise to higher frequencies of impulses in the nerve than stimuli that would be expected to entiation. in cause excite only pressure. Pain is associated with any intense stimulation and might thus be the pattern for intense stimulation. is a prickly pres- seems to be the cutaneous quality and intensitive-extensitive-protensitive patterns of it may account for the variation that occurs." He has exhibited in a careful. Faint warmth is confused with pressure. evidence for differentiation. He suggests four presumptive dimensions of variation and four corresponding "conscious experiences". a tive fusion of cold and sure. "Brightness" warmth stimulations. thus: .) Nafe has next asked about the capacities of cutaneous nerves for differentiated conduction of afferent excitation.. for the free nerve-endings all look alike. Nafe also appeals to the facts Cold and warmth fuse in heat and are otherwise opposed in stimulation as well as in adaptation. topography of the and to pressure. Cold and prick are alike. There is no anatomical of stimulation. (This last point is merely negative. the qualitative similarities and confusions amongst the supposedly modal differences.

first He three dimen- However. a warmth of a given intensity. is 'pressury/ And pain is What intense warmth-cold. although it seems like a flouting of introspective facts. Physiological Dimension Frequency of the impulses 2. does not of course serve as a direct substitute for the abandoned dimension. al- seems to the present author improbable. a fact which would explain why heat. some unless we are given extensity. though It seems improbable because it is not necessary. quality. and protensity. So the change must be primarily in density. Intensity Protensity Extensity 4. Nafe is clearly wrong in thinking that all the properties of a nerve lie in the nerve itself. 1. density. This it is a possible view. exactly alike. 3. then should we do about pressure? Well.178 Quality Conscious Dimension I. extensity. or it might be a weak warmth-or-cold. Duration of excitation Area of excitation of fibers excited within the area 2. exactly alike. Nafe's view is not impossible. and here we can see that perhaps all colds are dense and all warmths diffuse. and protensity? to believe that we make the change by altering expected it We intensity. a mixture of antagonistic warmth and cold. The Helmholtzian place theory of quality is an explanation of how two fibers. pressure might be an intermediate density. How do you change into a cold of a given (perhaps similar?) are scarcely to be intensity. extensity. and it is . 3. does not need a fourth dimension for his view. Number 4. let us say. and protensity definite account of the way the change is made. carrying impulses. are nevertheless differentiated by the loci of their central terminations. You experience. Density Nafe's fourth dimension. since he argues that what has been supposed to be quality is really the pattern of (relationship among) the sions.

and whatever theory works for the retina offers a possibility for the skin. one for tension and one for relaxation. it do not look any more alike than two cones in At any rate a conventional and plausible theory of somesthetic quality could run as follows. (3) mechanical pressure. There are four kinds of receptors in the skin for warmth. We are much less likely to experience one of these qualities pure than we are to see a pure color. their adequate stimuli are (i) temperature above the level of cutaneous adaptation. pitches. that stimuli penetrates directly to the receptor. we might have to conceive of a single thermal receptor. the seat of a process which a view deviates above and below a point of equilibrium like Troland's for a cone that would work according to the warmth and . If the opposition is neural and peripheral. Most adequate of one class are inadequate stimuli of the other classes. Respectively. and two free endings in the retina. The skin presents less complex problems than the retina. After all the skin resembles the retina. and confusion results more for the skin because discrimination in all dimensions is less precise. Obviously the stimulus implied by (4) is any strong stimulus of the nature of (i). (2) temperature below the level of adaptation. or a stimulus. Nafe suggests that it might be peripheral and muscular. like a blue that is neither reddish nor greenish. There must be some mechanism of opposition between cold. and (4) a large change of energy at the receptor. Such a view is consistent with the notion of two receptors. pressure. like a tension for cold and a relaxation for warmth. touches are to be got rid of so simply by identifying them with intensitive-extensitive-densitive patterns. Fusion is the rule of the skin and of the retina. (2) or (3). like a needle. and pain. cold.Cutaneous Quality 179 hardly likely that all sensory qualities colors.

we have set ourselves the much more difficult task of enquiring into the physiology of introspection. then there is no reason to believe that it should not have become abstracted from the qualities with which it is associated. warmth. it also jumps over to a 'pain' tract and excites that projection area. and are constantly being fused and confused. However. we never should have been able to discriminate between them. if we accept the distinction between pressure and temperature. we want is to keep the four funda- mental qualities of somesthesia They pressure. for no one of the other qualities is the invariable concomitant of pain. If all intense cutaneous stimulations were painful. if it is intensity. warmth. and even parallelism so simple a physiology as is implied by the concept of the conditioned reflex makes it seem improbable that pain could be discriminated from pressure. However. what cold. two experiences. simple psychophysical A would say then: Two regions. The sole difficulty lies in the answer to the question as to how pain. then. if it were always a con- On the other hand. and regard pain as an comitant of intense pressure. besides exciting the normal projection areas intensely. we could accept a summation theory of pain. too. Color-mixture requires a central explanation in the form of a response to differential excitations between three or more systems. i6zL).180 Quality Hering theory of vision (pp. There cannot be two different responses to the same condition. invariable concomitant of extremes in these modalities. pain. The old summation theory assumed that an intense pressure involves such violent excitation that. They . if there should be other grounds to support it. the opposition might be central. It is not unreasonable to regard pain as an intense degree of anything else in somesthesia. In brief. ever got itself differentiated from intensity. or between pressure. On these grounds. and cold. The facts of heat seem to require a similar explanation.

on the science to quantification. Titchener. All this and Attention. extenand protensity. Miiller. Titchener mind the matter of the zero-point. The one hand." since may and since there are be but a single receptor for warmth and cold. We must not press the logic too vigorously. and would also meet with most of the difficulties that appear in visual theory. but we are also forced to go useful tributes of intensity proper. we can urge that atomic numbers are discrete. Notes There is no advantage to be de- rived from pressing the distinction between qualitative tive to the limits of able logic. 321was here influenced by Mullen.e. But the uniformity of nature (the choL. At most there may be four kinds of receptors. to refer it to a zero- See E. 1-4. cue to the difference. however. i. and the "intensive" atsity. 1908. But of course Miiller and Titchener had economy of thought?) requires the reduction of the many entities to a no suppressed desire to see conscious quality reduced to something else. 1896. B. 10.'s of intensity. on the other. but then so are the quanta of light as other well as the sensory j. /. further and to equate 'quantity' to magnitude.. Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feel- problem is tied up with the tendency of the scientific to reify its concepts (qualitative distinction) and then to deal with amounts of the resultant entities point. . On the hand.d.Notes i8r have certain definite interrelations which require that they be considered as forming a single modality. Zsc h. lies in the concept of discreteness. See G. Any further elaboration of a theory of somesthetic perception would follow the lines already laid out for visual perception. At least there should ceptors. who had brought up ing 327. 25-33. needed at least two other modalities to explain the differentiation of pain if it occurs as summation without a specific receptor. distinguishing between qualitative attributes. and quantita- The an irreproachdistinction arises be- few as knowledge advances. Psy- (quantitative distinction).n. Titchener has discussed this general There in is also the general belief that 'qualification' gives place historically the matter. one for each of these fundamental there qualities. 3-30. E. Zur Psychophysik der Gesichtsempfindungen. since pain may be two kinds of rebe a "summation sensation. cause qualitative differences are generally supposed to be unmeasurable or at least inexactly describable.

182
On
ciples

Quality
the general psychophysiology
of

more complex and
ter

less

certain

matof

of quality, see L. T. Troland, Prin-

than

the

establishment

a

Psychophysiology,

III,

differential

relation

between

two

1932, 109-128.

immediately successive intensities of a noise, where the difference lies

Modality

change in an intensity within an integration.
as a

On

the differentiation of mean-

ing from sensory quality (and for the quotations that introduce the
section), see G. Berkeley,

Intramodal Quality
For
gies,

An Essay

a

discussion

of

Johannes
ener-

Towards a

New

Miiller's

doctrine
to

of

Theory of Vision,

specific

Helmholtz's extension of the
qualitative
difference

1709, pars. 9, 10, 16-18, 45-47; E. B. Titchener, A Beginner's Psy-

doctrine

chology, 1915, 26-30. For references to

the

context

modality, Helmholtz's use of the extended doctrine in his
within
the
of vision and of hearing, what Thomas Young actually said about color theory, what Blix and theories

theory of meaning, see the author's

A

ogy, 1929, 429.

History of Experimental PsycholOf course the theory of meaning of the present book is

the
to

others

did

to

find

cutaneous
see

more general than Titchener's. Here a context is regarded as a response, and a response is necessarily some kind of a context.

much

specific energies,
all

and the references
sources,

these

original

the author's

A

History of Experi1929,

mental
also

Psychology,
298f.,

77-94;

A

context of imagery is a response; a discriminative response to a stima context that gives meaning to the stimulus as stimulus. The discussion of the text sugis

283-295,

ulus

the dull For Mach's and clear elements in pitch, see E. Mach, The Analysis of Sensations,

308. theory of

gests why the comparison of attributes across modalities is difficult.

Eng. trans., 5th German ed., 1914, 291-299, or the corresponding discussion in the earlier editions in
the chapter, The sensations of tone. On the fusion of excitations for warmth and cold to give heat, see
S. Alrutz's easily accessible
in

possible to equate the pressure of a weight to the loudness of a
It
is

tone, but not with great reliability. One can do better in comparing

account

tactual and visual extents, but then the reference is apt to be to some
visualized
like a

English, Mind, N. S. 7, 1898, F. Amer. J. Cutolo, 141-144;
J.

common

denominator,

Psychol, 29, 1918, 442-448;
Alston,
ibid.,

H.

of tones, odors,

centimeter scale. Brightnesses and colors can be

303-312; N. C. Burnett and K. M. Dallen31,

1920,

equated without great consistency of results. Obviously in such equations it is necessary to establish a
differential

bach,

ibid.,

38,

1927, 418-431.

Visual Quality
the psychophysiology of visual perception, see especially L. T.

between unintegrated excitations. This is a very much

On

Notes
Troland, Principles of Psychophysiology, II, Sensation, 1930, a great deal of 51-205, but esp. 121-136,

now

conclusive; dations, loc. cit.

cf.

Hecht,

in

Foun-

which is mostly on Hecht's theories, and 187-202, which is Troland's

Auditory Quality
competent resonance-frequency theory of hearing, see Troland,

own
The
sion

theorizing.

Then

see S. Hecht,

For a

Retinal

Processes

Concerned

with Fisual Acuity and Color Vi(Howe Lab. Ophthalmol., Harvard Med. Sch., Bull. no. 4), 1931,
esp.

that

op. cit., 254-260. a frequency theory

The

idea

chaps.

I,

3,

5,

u. See

also

preclude the belief in the inner ear is not new.

does not resonance in

Wundt
reso-

Hecht, in Foundations of Experimental Psychology, 1929, 216-272. Troland is discussing a possible
neurological
basis
for

and

Ebbinghaus

both

had

the
color

Laddvision
of

Franklin

theory
suggests
op.

of

nance-frequency theories. See W. Wundt, Grundziige der physiologischen Psychologie, II, 1910, 131136; H. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge der
I, 1905, 330-346. Troland's entire discussion, 240-260, is

when

he

modulation
in

Psychologie,

frequency-patterns
nerve-fiber,
cit.,

a

single

2Oof.

much
ences

in

point. In places

its

infer-

As an example

of

the need for

differ

markedly

from

the

special cortical processes in explaining the facts of color vision, or at
least

interpretations of the present text. modern experimental study of

A

for

processes

at

more than

one

neurological level, see C. E Ferree and G. Rand, Some areas of

the degrees of tonal fusion is that of C. C. Pratt, Some qualitative
aspects of bitonal complexes, Amer.
J.

color blindness of
in

an unusual type
/.

the peripheral retina,

Exper.

Psychol., 2, 1917, 295-303, similar views of Schumann

and the and G.

PsychoL, 32, 1921, 490-515. For Brues on fusions of quarter-tone tempered intervals, see A. M. Brues, The fusion of non-musical
intervals,
ibid.,

E. Muller there cited.

38,

In view of the plausibility of a frequency theory of pitch, the question arises as to why a frequency

a

paper which

1927, 624-638, includes an excel-

lent

summary

of

various

classical

theory of color
viting.
light

is

not equally

in-

theories, 626f. It must be observed that any theory of tonal fusion that
is

However, the frequency of is several hundred thousand
per second, a rate

based
of

upon
the

the

simplicity

of

ratios

billion vibrations

must
of

also

stimulus-frequencies include some principle
ratio

far

removed from the capacities of nervous tissue. Yet the frequencies are differentially effective and thus
one looks to photochemical reacwhich can be selective in this way (as they are on the phototions

assimilation, whereby a that is close to a simple

ratio

functions as

if

it

were the approxi-

mate simple
case
slight

ratio.

On any
ratio 2:3

other
ruin
is

mistunings would

fusion utterly.

The

the

plate). The evidence for this sort of reaction in the retina is

graphic

simple ratio for the musical fifth, but a variation of one tenth of one

1

84

Quality
nerven, Zsch.
f.

per cent in the difference between the two frequencies would change the ratio to 2000:2999, without a
possibility
fifth
is

BioL, 20, 1884, 141-

156; 21, 1885, 145-160 (the original publication is cited as in the much
less

of

numbers. Thus
in

substituting simpler the ratio for the
a
12

available

Upsala

la'kareforenre-

ings forhandlingar, 18, 1883, 871!.).

the musical tempered scale
ratio
7.

For

Goldscheider's

extensive

theoretically

of

incom-

searches in cutaneous psychophysiology, see A. Goldscheider,

V2 Plainly these mensurables, i: theoretical values are only approximated
in

Gesam-

practice.

melte Abhandlungen, 1898, I, esp. 53-218 which is the reprinting of
six

The

reader

may

be again referred

to the author's advocacy of a frequency theory in relation to the

One
f.

papers appearing in 1884-1885. of the early skeptics was M.

Dessoir,

Ueber den Hautsinn, Arch,

problems of auditory volume and localization, Amer. /. PsychoL, 37,
1926, 157-188.

1892, 175-339 (also separate). For the 'traditional' theory of cutaneous sensation, see M. von Frey, the four short papers in
Physiol.,

Somesthetic Quality

Ber.

d.

kgl.

sacks.

Gesellsch.

d.

On

the reduction of the various

and organic perceptions to the fundamental qualities of presvisceral
sure,

zu Leipzig, math.-phys. CL, 46, 1894, 185-196, 283-296; 47, 1895, 166-184 (end-organs for temWiss.

the

pain, warmth, and cold, see text and notes of chapter 2,

perature); the long

49,

1897, 462-468;

and

monograph
(includes

and

pain

pressure discussion of
d. kgl.

on

pp. 25f., 33f.

end-organs),
Gesellsch.
d.

AbhdL
Wiss.

sacks.

secondary reference to the history of the theory of specific energies of nerves has been given above. For Helmholtz on modality (a lecture in 1878), see H. v. Helmholtz, Die Thatsachen in der Wahrneh-

A

zu

Leipzig,

math.-phys. CL, 23, 1896, 169-266; or the concise summary in his Vorle sun gen iiber Physiologie, 1904,
308-326.

mung,
226).

1879,

8-13

(reprinted

in

Nafe's Theory
For Nafe's introspective study of
the
similarities

Vortrdge und Reden,

1884, II, 223-

and confusions of

For Weber's subdivision of the sense of touch, see E. H. Weber, Der Tastsinn und das Gemeingefukl, in R. Wagner's Handworterbuch der Pftysiologif, III, ii, 1846,
481-588; and later separates. The first application of the theory of specific energies to touch was

tactual data, see J. P. Nafe, The psychology of felt experience, Amer.
/. Psycho!.,

39,

Titchener's

"touch

1927, 367-389. For pyramid," see

Nafe, op.

cit.,

384-387; E. B. Titch-

ener, ibid., 31, 1920, 2i3f. For Nafe's theory, see his Quantitative theory of feeling, /. Gen.
2, 1929, 199-211; The sense of feeling, Foundations of Ex-

made by M.

Blix, Experimentelle Beitrage zur Losung der Fragc iiber die specifische Energie der Haut-

PsychoL,

perimental Psychology,

1929,

392-

Notes
406.

185
in

Both

these

expositions

are

ent day, to be quantitative
to

order

marred by an attempt to make it appear that the traditional theory (von Prey's) has been accepted by psychologists, presumably for a century, because of the weight of Johannes Miiller's dictum about
specific nerve-energies. Blix in
is a more plausible Miiller in 1838, and it

be physiology.

Cutaneous Receptors

On
tiated

the functioning of undifferenfree

nerve-endings
sensibility,

in

all

1883

cutaneous

see

K.

M.

date
is

than

probable that the assurance complacent about von Prey's theory has existed mostly in elementary textbooks.

Dallenbach, Temperature spots and end-organs, Amer. /. PsychoL, 39, 1927, 402-427. In ibid., 41, 1929,
344,

Dallenbach

gives

the

refer-

ences to the others

who have made
Donaldson,
(a thor-

Perhaps Nafe
fect

will

correct this de-

the direct histological examination
of temperature 'spots':

and

also

clear

up

his
in

somea
re-

what obscure exposition
vised

1885;

Goldscheider,

1886

forthcoming second edition of the Foundations,
op.
cit.

chapter

in

the

ough study, see his Abhandlungen, 1898,
Ilaggqvist,

Gesammelte

In calling his theory a "quantitative theory of feeling," Nafe implies that other theories of quality are

219-249); I, Pendleton, 1928. There can be no doubt that von
1913;
Prey's correlations of sense-organ with temperature spot must be dismissed completely. On the other hand, as the text points out, there may be invisible
differentiation,

not quantitative. The distinction is almost too fine to be observed. Of
course, Miiller's phrase, "specific energies of nerves," implied the existence of five kinds (qualities)

as

we

believe

that

there
cones.

must be among the

retinal

of energies within the five kinds of

qualitative view was already giving way to the spotin-the-brain theory of quality when

nerves;

but

this

Blix was writing. Specific energies came to mean specific cortical loci. Hence the theory of cutaneous

quality has always been a quantitative theory unless one thinks of
cerebral
localization

Moreover, according to the argument of the text, the crucial case is the differentiation between warmth (or cold) and pressure, since warmth and cold may need the same receptor, and pain may come from 'summation.' Apparently not less than two, nor more than
four, kinds of receptors are

needed
light of

as

and not quantitative

qualitative perhaps be-

by current theory. In the these remarks it becomes
ing to

interest-

cause the significant loci are discrete and not continuous. For inhis entire

stance, the present author thinks of book as being, in Nafe's a quantitative theory of sense,

note that histologists have distinguished among the cutaneous nervous structures in a way that

consciousness.
sciousness

A

would have,

physiology of conin the pres-

might indicate the required differThere are (i) the terminal ramifications between the colentiation.

umnar

cells of

the epithelium (von

1

86
endings

Quality
endings), (2) the hederiof Ranvier in the
Since this text was written Hoag-

P'rey's free

form

near the epithelium, especially sweat-ducts, endings that have flattened leaflike enlargements at their
terminations but that nevertheless
closely resemble the terminal ramifications,

land has reported experiments that indicate the existence in the skin
of the frog of
tors

two kinds

of recep-

corresponding patSee terns of the current of action.

and

two

(3)

a rcticulum beneath

pulses
/.

H. Hoagland, Specific afferent imand cutaneous sensibility,
Gen.
PsychoL,
6,

with the fibers epithelium, dividing and anastomosing, without its being clear whether or not there
the
is

1932,

276-

295.

a

direct

connection

with

the

see

endings in the epithelium, and (4) other hederiform endings (von Frey
said "free endings") well below the

pain as "common sensation," the long discussion of C. S. Schafer's Sherrington, in E, A.

On

epithelium about the hair-follicles. See E. A. Schafer, Quain's Ele-

Text-book of Physiology, II, 1900, (cf. esp. 998f. on pain as summation). This exposition shows
965-1001

m

ments of Anatomy, II, i, 1912, 273276. There is, however, no need to
press
this
slight

how uncertainly experts accepted the four-modality view of cutaneous
sensibility
in

1900.

On

cutaneous

histological

evi-

summation, see also Goldscheider,
op.
cit.,

dence into a theory.

397-432.

And is quality once the theory of leads us into the minute cerebral centers elaborate theories. for us to consider the total effect of fibers it forces many and the possibility of some frequencies in many kind of summation before they can be effective. that consciousness speaking. we now see that we were mistaken. protensity and quality would. distinctions are discriminative. The problems of extensity are almost entirely problems of spatial organization. If we supposed that the discussion of intensity. Such a view implies that all broadly 'knowl- edge' is potentially spatial in a physiological sense. in each case. Hence the afferent corhave always to be trans- latable into physiological spatial specificity. extensity. resolve itself into a choice among simple THE sions study of the physiology of the conscious dimenmakes it clear that the fundamental problem hypotheses. that is to say. the awareness of a conscious difference can be reduced to a selection (discrimination) between their spatially distinct efferent relates of the conscious dimensions two reactions and paths. It is no wonder then that the supposedly simple problems of the conscious dimensions require an appeal to intricate principles of organ187 . The theory of protensity must be a theory of temporal organization that also involves space. discrimination.Chapter 7 THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS of psychology is organization. abandoned most The preceding chapters have implied that all conscious is. Even intensity cannot be regarded simply as neural frequency.

Intelligence is common to all persons. It is common to a very large number of seemingly disparate . And there are. In psychology the term intelligence has come to mean a common factor in intellectual activity. In a certain sense we all are looking for a 'place theory' of every dimension. However. we requires temerity to use the can delimit the term sufficiently to serve it that it us in the present context without penetrating deeply into controversial matters. Intelligence There has been so much talk about intelligence and sd many definitions of word. implications about attention. to those intelligence. without any attempt at completeness. There are too many flaws in our psychophysiology of perception for us to employ it yet awhile as a foundation for the psychophysiology of the 'higher' mental processes. Intelligence is another term that would seem to require an organizational or integrative account for itself.1 88 Organization of Consciousness they ization. learning and which are immediately appropriate as conse- quences of the four preceding chapters. Although these organizations are not simple. since denominator of have to be reduced finally to a common spatial differentiation. it would be futile to attempt to extend the scope of this book to the limits of psychology. of course. Nevertheless there are other levels of organization to be considered in psychology. and upon this priperceptual level other levels depend. In this chapter we shall limit ourselves. Memory is a that raises questions about higher organizations in time. topic and attention is a topic that raises questions about higher mary organizations in simultaneity. but varies amongst them in degree. However. The dimensional problems give us the organizations of perception. they are clearly primary. many other topics which a thoroughgoing psychology would have to consider.

and it can be said of the creased tests. Time comes into the picture. the evidence seems to adults. Mental activity always takes time. but a speed test among well educated English-speaking adults.Intelligence as Speed intellectual activities 189 activities but varies amongst the in degree. and the method indicates the epistemological nature of intelligence. The plausibility of equating intelligence to speed is in- when one reflects that most intelligence tests are Time is one measure of animal intelligence in speed the maze or for the puzzle-box. This point becomes clearer when we see that all-or-none tests for children may be speed tests for all-or-none tests. Spearis man's method of the 'tetrad-difference' a statistical way of analyzing out such a common factor. but only secondarily sciousness. However. not fundamentally the rate of mental . The range of consciousness would seem to be the fundamental variant in differences of intelligence. is. What. We but the same accomplishment different persons. where time is irrelevant. for example. That is preclude so simple a definition.). fellows in the acts The most intelligent persons do better than their that require the most intelligence. 2i3f. is the opposite of impecunious? an all-or-none test for those who do not know the word. The usual intelligence test of persons is made against time. Intelligence comes into all reality at a high level of inference. It seems so plausible that intelligence might be the rate of mental activity. have first to consider the relation of intelligence to the speed of mental activity. This point If intelligence is because a limited range slows down the total flow of conis elaborated in the notes (pp. It is not at the kind of entity that could be regarded as given imme- diately in experience. that they are measures since the time required is always simply poor minimal or infinite. may take different times for The rate of mental work would bear to human accomplishment the sort of relationship that intelliand rate is the sort of factor that intelligence gence bears.

' The rat in the simple maze discriminates the right path from the wrong. and human intelligence has for this rea- son come to be regarded as essentially social and usually verbal. and the intelligent rat is the 'learned' The intelligence of persons in verbal tests is measured by their present facility. The rat in the temporal maze. but it seems possible to go further. In such a definition we should be equating The intelligence of the intelligence to aptitude for learning. are measures of the capacity of the subject to be right. One possibility is that intelligence may reduce to the capacity to acquire these conventional relationships. 'A* is the opposite the rule of the game. The rules of right-and-wrong for persons are very apt to be social and cultural. rat in the maze is measured by his rat. in so far as they are not measures of the rate of activity. Learning itself involves discrimination. With rats the rules of right-and-wrong are alimentary.190 activity. which depends upon the ease with which they learned in the past. it Organization of Consciousness must be whatever else appears in intelligence is tests. in learning to go around the block twice to the right before turning to the left. the correct act is the act that gets the food. Whatever could the physiology of 'correctness' be like? correct Well. Opulent is the opposite of impecunious if is that of the if V way is such the English language is. ease in learning. discrimination between 'right' and 'wrong. It is a plausible view. The . A response is if it bears a particular relation to some preestablished criterion of truth. otherwise it is not. All the tests. and there is every evidence that persons responses also acquire who have new ones acquired many correct easily. The obvious alternative to speed in the tests rectness/ The all-or-none tests are tests in which 'cor- the re- sponse is either right or wrong. correctness is plainly a relationship. must discrimi- nate the second trip around to the right from the first. if he learns.

Intelligence as Discrimination

191

human among

subject in the verbal test is

very often discriminating

confusing possibilities and has certainly acquired his

present knowledge by discrimination. Stern's classical definition of intelligence as the "general ability of an individual consciously to adjust his thinking to new requirements" implies discrimination as the essential

ground. Discrimination

might in our definition be a substitute for learning. However, recent psychology has been tending to emphasize insight as a condition of learning.

The

indication

is

that,

given insight into a situation, learning

may

be instantaneous.

The reason
is

that learning ordinarily takes time and repetition that complete insight is dependent upon trial-and-error for its achievement or that the task is so large that insight
into part of it occurs at the expense of insight into other a phenomenon usually called 'interference.' Howis

parts
this

ever, insight

the organization of discrimination, and on

view learning becomes dependent upon discrimination. There is no need for us actually to arrive at a formal definition of intelligence. It is quite enough if it becomes
is ordinarily called 'intelligence' is so related to discriminative insight that the measure of closely the latter would have similar if not identical significance let us turn to the with the measure of the former.

apparent that what

Now

physiological problem. Lashley, as we have seen (pp. 103-105), measured the intelligence of rats by the rate at which they learned a maze.

He showed

that the entire cerebral cortex

is

involved in

such intelligent activity. The destruction of part of the cortex reduces this kind of intelligence; the reduction is propor-

amount destroyed; the various parts are equiwith one another, for the destruction of any one potential is no more effective than the destruction of any other; the
tional to the

projection areas are equipotential for intelligence with other regions of the cortex, and intelligence is thus dependent upon

192

Organization of Consciousness
The more the
better
is

the mass action of the cortex.
of the cortex for intelligence.

the rule

The preceding chapters have indicated how relatively complex must be the organizations involved in the simplest sensory perceptions. Obviously the complications must be

many
of the

times multiplied in the intelligent acts of the learning maze by the discrimination of the right path to the

food. Any one who has attempted to describe in introspection the process of solving a puzzle realizes the persistent complexity of learning by trial-and-error and also the elab-

orateness of the flash of insight which may terminate the learning. It is, therefore, not particularly remarkable that

such organizations should need all of the cortex in order to realize themselves. The law of mass action is a most probdifficult to

able principle; it is the principle of equipotentiality that understand.

is

When some of the cortex is destroyed, presumably the general pattern of organization can be maintained, but the differentiation is reduced. Hence the capacity for discrimination is diminished. The rule seems to be that differentiation takes

available cortex
less

Fig. follow a definite average law in proportion to the size of the body, and it has been held that the more intelligent

up space and time. Reduce the amount of the and some differentiation is crowded out, unthere is more time into which it can be 'squeezed.' See 17. In the animal world the size of the brain seems to

animals are those whose brain weights exceed this general average,

inference

is

that, the

and conversely for weak-minded animals. The more intelligent a person, the larger

should be his brain. However, there

may

easily

be individual

functional differentiability that are independent of mere amount of tissue.
in

and phylogenetic

differences

There is nothing very new about this conception. It was really an idea of this sort that led Henry Head and his

Intelligence and

Mass Action

193
144*.

MAZE
1-10
11-20

31-30

3M0
FIG. 17

41-50

51

f

Percent destruction

LASHLEY'S FUNCTION FOR MASS ACTION IN LEARNING THE

MAZE

Relation between extent of cerebral lesion, difficulty of problem to be learned, and number of errors in learning. Mazes I, II and III are spaced proportionally to their difficulty for normal rats. The abscissae are the
percentages of destruction of the cerebral cortex.

The

function shows

how

errors increase with difficulty of maze and also with diminution of available cerebral tissue. Thus the function also shows the relation of cerebral mass to complexity of maze. If a horizontal plane cut the surface at a height for some given number of errors, then the line of inter-

section between the plane and the surface is a function which shows the amount of cerebral tissue required for any given difficulty of maze, in order that the maze shall be learned with only the given number of
errors.

194

Organization of Consciousness

word epicritic for the higher (epi) disfunctions. Head used the word at first criminatory (critic) only for the higher differentiating class of cutaneous sensaassociates to coin the

but Rivers employed it in its general meaning. The functions of the cortex can be regarded as epicritic, and, the must more cortex there is, the more critical they can be.
tions,

We

develop this conception further in the following section.

Attention
There has been so much controversy about what attention and is not, about whether its laws are true or not, and whether they are properly laws of attention, that one is apt to lose sight of the truth that there really is a fundamental
is

fact of attention.
is

The

fact of attention

is

that consciousness

requires inattention to others. If you are paying attention to the old lady in the pew in front of you, presumably you are not paying atten'thing'

limited. Attention to

one

tion to the sermon. Patting your head rapidly with your right hand interferes with stroking your stomach slowly

the hidden donkey in the puzzle picthe donkey appears but the original picdiscovered, ture blurs out. The range of attention, we say, is limited.

with your
ture
is

left.

When

however, that we cannot formulate the principle of limited range without taking account of mental organization. We can attend simultaneously to the old lady

We

soon

find,

and the preacher, if we begin to notice that she nods with approval whenever the preacher raises his voice in denunciation. It is not nearly so hard to learn to pat one's head rapidly with one hand while rubbing one's stomach slowly
with the other as
it is

One may be
same time
if

able to see the

to learn to operate an automobile. donkey and the picture at the

he becomes interested in

how

are also parts of the other. However, there

parts of the one is no proof that

Attention and Organization

195

the range of attention is enlarged in these cases. may have a reduction of conscious content by analysis or by habituation. When the old lady and preacher get organized
into a single unit of her-response-to-his-emphasis, there is less of each of them in the field of attention than when
either

We

was there

alone.

The simultaneous
it

bing depends upon habituation;

is

patting and rubeasy to begin to rub

the stomach voluntarily after the patting of the head has become so automatic that it will continue without attention.
It
if is plain that we must we are to understand The rapid exposures

resort to

some

sort of

measurement

the fact of limited range. of tachistoscopic experiments

show

not abruptly limited or at least that adventitious factors prevent the appearance of abrupt limits in experimentation. However, this view has not always been
us that range
is

held.

For

to be six. Six

a long time the range of attention was supposed what? Six "items" or six "units," where a

group of units becomes a unit. The nature of the unit was never clear. The "six" came in part from Sir William Hamilton, who threw marbles on the floor, estimated quickly the number at a glance, and concluded that six was the maximal
instructive early experiment is that of the logician, Jevons. He performed Hamilton's experiment by estimating at a glance the number of beans thrown into a box. The percentages of correct rapid estimates

correct

number.

A much

more

for various

numbers
3

of beans

is

as follows:

No. beans... Per cent
correct
...

4

5

6

7

8

9 10

n

12 13

14 15
I

100 100 96 82 73 56 62 43 38 42 23 28

8

Jevons thought that these results meant that between four and five beans could be crowded into attention at once. A more accurate statement of Jevons's results would be that,
although four beans can always get into attention, fifteen

be as often correctly apprehended as not. you can perceive (as often as not) six isolated lines.5 one short sentence as often as not.e. and short sentences very briefly to observers. much better to appeal to statistical constants. though they are not so complete as Jevons's. Investigation shows that the average letter contained about three lines. that is to say. and For the purposes of discussion let us neglect the decimals and consider the integers for these limens. classical centages. twelve lines organized as letters. the number of beans that should. approximately true that the observers could letters. While these data whose correct apprehensions can be stated in perdo not admit of careful statistical it is treatment. under Jevons's conditions. the range depended upon the organization of the material within it (as Hamilton had already pointed out). there is with increasing com- . and that the sort of sentence correctly apprehended contained about six short words. thirty lines organized as words. the range. telPs ranges of attention may be said to be: I = 12 lines 2 words = 10 letters = 30 lines sentence = 6 words = 30 letters = 90 lines 4 letters 6 lines In other words. Here are in Cattell's tachistoscopic experiments point.2 words. letters. however. On the other hand.196 beans Organization of Consciousness may be apprehended is in almost one case out of five. short words. 2. extremely probable that the only way in which Jevons could estimate a dozen beans correctly was by seeing it is Now that they formed groups or patterns. 4. Cattell exposed lines. Fernberger has computed the limen at 10.. It ordinary is.3 lines. eighteen beans might under Perhaps eighteen circumstances sometimes be correctly estimated.28 beans. Hence Cat- correctly apprehend 6. that the average word contained about five letters. i. and ninety lines organized into a printed sentence.

is contained the key to the and the 'higher mental processes. Many such wholes. and a part functions in attention for a whole. Ex- pose for a tenth of a second ten consonants in a row.Attention and Organization 197 plexity of organization a loss in the number of units. and so on to superior a of any degree in the functional heirarchy of symbolism. and then a part can come to function for this new whole and combine with other parts. reliably of the range of apprehension for any material in any formal system of organization. of the ideas of brick. Such a worked However. gives the complete results table. wood. you cannot get tachistoscopically as many sentences as words. James Mill remarked on the complexity of the idea of a house. and the observer will seem to perceive them all correctly. rafter. reduced each to a part. the functioning under habituation of a part for a whole. as he In the foregoing discussion psychology of thought supposed. Then expose the ten letters of the word PHILOSOPHY. and the observer will seldom perceive them all correctly. glass. he 'knows what the word was. a part of it stands for the whole because the whole is familiar.' Then expose the word PHYCHOLOBY. Hence it appears that being correct is not necessarily a measure of differentiation in perception. The reason why one perceives in a tenth of a second PHILOSOPHY correctly and fails for PDWMGSFRBT. nail. composed. and then he raised the climactic ques- . out. it is range of attention not necessarily to be supposed that the is really increased by organization. can form a new whole within the limits of attention.' What distinguishes thought from perception and idea is symbolism. and so forth. is that not all of PHILOSOPHY is perceived. and the observer will almost inevitably say that he has perceived the word PSYCHOLOGY. nor as many words as letters. mortar. Thus it is that habituation makes an analysis. nor as many letters as lines.

as modern psychology realizes. both logically and psychologically. here is the answer to James Mill's question. At a given moment a person can think of so much and no more because he has only just so much brain with which to do the thinking. The be predetermined by abiding interest or tran- one sort of object and to neglect others. What is wanted and wanting here is some reasonable conception of a facilitation that will show why a loud noise. how this conception of attention accords with the principle of mass action and with the discriminational theory of intelligence set forth in the preceding It is not difficult to see section of this the amount chapter. Attention is limited in range by of tissue available for functional differentiation in the perceptual or ideational whole. Moving objects are apt to field is still. not by thinking of every different thing at once. (1) Attention is dependent upon compulsory conditions. There are other problems of attention besides the problem of range." Well. and we may now consider briefly three of these. be attended to when the novel is The among rest of the perceptual the familiar or the familiar among the novel observer may generally singled out for attention. classical experiments on the fluctuation of faint stimuli The and of reversible perspectives are not relevant. a pretty face.198 tion as to Organization of Consciousness how many ideas there would be "in the idea called Every Thing. but nevertheless there are rapid and con- . but by thinking that symbol which implicates everything. (2) When attention is caught it does not endure long. We can think of Every Thing. because the implications can become explicit if there is any later requirement that they should be. and an interesting idea have more command than their neutral competitors upon the neural activity that sient intent to notice leads to discriminatory response. Sudden intense stimulation conditions attention.

There is no conventional physiological approach to this . com- bating atomistic elementarism. Geissler's observers. However.Laws of Attention 199 stant changes in consciousness. This stimulus was so simple that there was not much chance for the attention to wander within the field that means the stimulus.) The observer was to release a key when his attention left the dot and to press it again when attention returned to the dot. Among the experiments. The Wundtians had it in mind when they called the mental element a process. will always the chance that the observer become inattentive by attending to the idea that he is (Of course. because he was instructed to attend to the dot and thus it would have been just as easy to keep on attending as to release the key. 'attended' for two or three minIt is utes to a weight on the skin. But he could generally. The alternations of attention thus constituted a very elementary splitting of the personality. although not always. James had it in mind when. are shown by their printed introspections to have been continuously varying the contents of consciousness as they pertained to the weight. there is attending. in point. he described the stream of thought. Critical introspection immediately reveals this fact. who obvious in any perception. manage to signal when his attention returned from wandering. or with which a single phase of one organization gives place to a discrimin- ably subsequent phase of the same totality. he could not very well release the key when his attention left the dot. and these double alternations were on the average from one to two seconds long. Pillsbury concluded that a "wave of attention" might be as short as half a second. Pillsbury's is He had the observer attend to a undoubtedly most tiny ink dot. Undoubtedly half a second indicates the order of the rapidity with which one conscious organization gives place to another. Since some of the alternations were missed by the observers and all were double.

but its differentiation in respect of the reaction that introspection is. some marginal zone? There ought to be. Attention is reportability. examine this controversy here. Focal consciousness is readily reportable as compared with margiis some systematic difficulty the obscure marginal contexts are ever described. unreflectively and spection without doubt. Introspection upon the margin of con- . and with low assurance. It is clear that it could offer no account of attention limited It is We other than a cognitive one. It is that dichotomy of reportabilities might be formed possible between those reports that come quickly. The two-level theory is conventional. Presumably Pillsbury's times represent. however. It and decay. are Organization of Consciousness The times of action currents and of synaptic delays shorter than any interval that can be discriminated in introspection. There has been too little intro- upon introspection for introspection's good. What cannot be reported at all is unconscious. cannot. reflectively. not much the elementary phases of the physiological event. The confusion in general discussion comes about princi- nal consciousness. determined by whatever determines these organized is ever changing with the change of such under the physiological laws of rapid growth organization neural activities. but it never has.aoo problem. Is there some intermediate level. In fact there in showing how pally because attention is sometimes regarded as a sensory matter to be described and sometimes as a cognitive process of description. (3) There remains the question of the degree of attention. This book presents a cognitive theory of all sensory process. Whatever conscious content can be easily reported is focal and available to introspection. and those that come slowly. It is by the range of the organizations that underlie report. It assumes two degrees of clearness in consciousness. since clearness seems to be a condition of description. a focus and a margin. or how did the two-level theory ever gain credence? Introspection might answer this question.

but the emphasis has lain on successivity because so of learning much and memory is verbal and language is serial.Learning sciousness often that is 201 is the focal apprehension of a sensory process a surrogate for an immediately past marginal process.) Thus it is possible that the two levels may turn out to represent two degrees of immediacy in report. pp. city to learn dependent upon of intelligence. and most of the experiments upon association show that the kind of organization is not a simple bonding together of distinct units but complex integration of a whole. Discrimination ing. The fundamental problem memory of course. Perhaps we have only dismissed Peter and elected Paul. Obviously learning must consist in the formation of an organized differentiated pattern to which selective response can be made. for after all association has to be considered as both simultaneous and successive. but discrimination is is the only possible evidence of learnalso a measure of attention and the capacity for discrimination furnishes a practicable conare talking about only one thing ception of intelligence. We when we tention is discuss learning. attention. Gestalt psychology has done a service in stressing the simultaneity of involved a associative organization. Nevertheless. Wundt also stressed simultaneity. of such organizations upon the principle mass action and upon the amount of available nervous tissue has been the principal topic of discussion in the present of The dependence chapter. Oldfashioned psychology expressed this idea by saying that at- a necessary condition of learning is and that the capais. 225-227. and intelligence. Learning The criticism by Gestalt psychologists of the conventional hypotheses of learning and memory has tended to result in the substitution of the concept of organization for the concept of association. (Cf. pre- .

either items or predetermined. we knew more about how these potentialities we might be able to guess how they can persist. Every to themselves. and that. cut into a smaller region. All learners. Learning a disconnected series of a list of nonsense syllables or the alphabet is diffi- cult because no organization is given in the materials. The concept of the equipotentiality of regions is opposed to this view. rhythms are predetermined by the ex- perimenter. The answer to the one question is probably the answer to the other. It is found . while the gross form remains. Thus ing. exists potentially excitation. If and strictly localized in the peripheral are realized. It means that a localized pattern is not localized in any place. throw such a series into a one of us probably now uses for the alphabet the rhythm that he imposed upon the series of letters in childhood. At least two possible kinds of organizcomplication. of which the central localization is irrele- how vant. if it is crowded it is complete part of out' of all not know 'squeezed of it.2O2 Organization of Consciousness To sented in the question: How do these organizations persist? this question there is not even a wise speculative answer available at the present time. In perception the pattern of organization. What (i) free One sort of things help or facilitate learning? of the simplest aids is rhythmical grouping. Since we do how such a pattern is formed. it ought to come by seems that the answer to the problem of memory a further knowledge of the laws of learnis and here the outlook we now know ational little more promising. one that helps learning and memory a that there are and one that hinders. the simple trochee is generally used. if left rhythm. we cannot guess off. but differentiation no is spatially it might persist. The reflexological theory is that the learned patterns persist in space by new connections or lowered resistances established in learning. In the formal experiments of the learning of lists of nonsense syllables.

next but seven. This result especially interesting because in many other cases the putting of old terms into new relationships is more difficult is than the original establishment of the first relationships. . For instance. Thus. showing that the first organization was not completely altered in the second. like a poem of several stanzas. It is generally believed that verbal material cannot be learned at all if rhythmization is completely prevented. if a part of an originally learned series had included TOB-VID-RUD-ZEN-DAK. (Hence we make indices of the first lines of poems. next but three. it may be added that Ebbinghaus found a saving. may show this positional function holding for the entire material with the same function for each of the parts superimposed upon it. (2) There are conditions under which an apparently discursive loose organization gets itself structured into a whole. However. While we see here differences in the effectiveness of groupings. the new series to be learned would include TOB-RUD-DAK. and this is the point of the experiment the new series would be learned more quickly than the original series. not only for syllables next but one to each other.) Still longer materials.Facilitation of Learning 203 that these tiny groups are better organized in memory than the larger units that contain them. one of Ebbinghaus's classical experiments con- sisted in the learning of various series of nonsense syllables. all grouping of this sort is an aid to learning. and last for the middle. not the last lines nor the middle lines. next for the end. and then subsequently the learning of new series made up of syllables which had been next but one to each other in the first learning. and next but one backwards. but also for syllables next but two. the subject learns to complete the metrical foot before he learns to connect the feet. In longer materials the organization is perfected first for the beginning. every part benefiting from its participation in the whole.

Although exceptional persons same experiment SIR is performed with these words: FUN TOP WED all NAG BOX DAY HEM PUT RIB Here the majority get fail ten words correct and few persons The averages approximate to get as many 93 per cent correct (ranging from 92 per cent to 94 per cent for 1 6 of the 19 cases). It is clear that a great deal of the transfer of learning from the general knowl- . for undergraduates see at once a meaningful relationship between WED and NAG. one words are already knit up as units. although the author intended no such connection when he made out the series. Then the remember. it is true that some of the chance connections may be already partly learned.204 Organization of Consciousness in the foregoing (3) It can be said that the advantage of the first learning experiment was partially transferred to the second learning because the syllables became familiar or in the first learning. it that familiarity with language renders words a much plain easier material for learning than nonsense. Moreover. the easier to learn than the nonsense syllables? Well. In a threeletter word FU might be combined with N or R but hardly anything else. Be that as it may. What makes the words so much as eight right. as it were. Most thing. the average for the syllables class is every year not far from 65 per cent correct (14 out of 19 cases lie between 62 per cent and 68 per cent). For a number were impressed is of years the author has had the members of his introductory course in psychology read aloud twelve times in chorus the following list of ten nonsense syllables : MAX PIB GUK TOV DEC ZID is FEP EOT RUZ WAM After the twelfth reading the list dents immediately write down all taken away and the stuthe syllables they can may get all ten correct or only two correct.

(4) of the Mnemotechnical systems supply various illustrations way in which meaningful relationships aid learning. Furthermore. can function in perception for PSYCHOLOGY. have seen that We PHYCHOLOBY. tained (5) The mnemotechnical systems provide examples of absurd effective relationships. presented tachistoscopically for a fraction of a second. If consciousness is discrimination and if discrimination ultimately reduces to spatial differentiation. We us only with must go to . How often one recalls where on a 'right' or a 'left' page a sough t-for statement occurred without the least idea as to what page or what chapter conit. Its importance is what one might expect from the law of mass action. Then this is the natural contion. Perhaps familiarity means the reduction of a unit of organiza- Perhaps words make less demand upon cerebral space than do nonsense syllables. However. it is of great interest to note that the spatial relation is remark- ably effective for learning as compared with other apparently adventitious relationships. one can see how spatial difference would be peculiarly effective for learning. it seems probable that we are justified in supposing that. there is an attentional economy for the familiar material of language. like Often these useful devices are bizarre or the rela- tionship of WED to NAG already referred to.Facilitation of Learning 205 edge of language to the learning of a list of words is due to the fact that language provides some ready-made parts which can be assembled for the new structure. Four unrelated objects can be quickly impressed on memory by imaging them. After that the memorizer stands in memory in the room and picks the images off of the walls. in addition to this principle. clusion of this line of thought perhaps the learning of a material consists simply in its reduction so that the organi- zation required for mastery can be accommodated within the available mass of tissue in the available time. silly. one on each of the four walls of a room.

). The second learning was harder than the first because it included an unlearning of the first. it is not possible to separate activation from insight. it was harder to learn to sort the cards when the specifications were changed and the same cards had to be differently distributed among the boxes. The two are correlated. and it is probable that the dynamic factor in the conditions of learning is nothing other than that which favors attentive differentiation. reduced consciousness with sur- prisingly insight is content. it is hard to learn to say Kathman has been frightened by a snake. Introspection. we do not always that . If a always called a person Kate. Now we may (i) It is turn to the other side of the picture. The occur- rence of insight seems to imply an elaboration of differentiation.206 Organization of Consciousness the normal process of education to find the sensible meaningful relationships in use. However. in this chapter (pp. Insight seems usually to occur under an active attitude. each card to a specified box. However. The 'flash of insight' is a little however. it is hard for him to learn to be friendly with one. 2i4f. What sort of things inhibit learning or interfere with memory? plain that interference may come when one learning directly contradicts an established learning. If one has arine. Learning is easy when there is insight. It is hard to break a habit in order to form a new one. but logical organization psychological. The subsequent rationalization of the apt to be a difficult process which results in is an not elaborate logical structure. So Bergstrom showed when a person had learned to sort cards into boxes. Here it can be said that a very great part of the educational problem is to make learning sensible. reveals no such elaboration. learning Passive mechanical reading of a list of syllables might never (6) As we have noted elsewhere is get them learned. aided by the active participation of the learner.

Why was the second learning easier than the first? Bergstrom used the same boxes and cards. Why was his second learning harder? There is really no answer to this say that Ebbinghaus found transfer. There is very little difference between Bergstrom's experiment which shows interference and the experiment of Ebbinghaus. zero. It is generally believed that interference of this sort is greatest for similar activities. and negative transfers. is the term applied to a loss due to the mental activity that (2) Retroactive inhibition in the effects of learning follows learning. or negative.' and that Bergstrom. cited above. and what we measure in an experiment establishes relationships that is the algebraic sum. We know so little about the detailed analysis of learnings that we should not at present expect to be able to predict in a given case whether transfer would be positive. which shows facilitation. After learning nonsense syllables more nonsense lesson would be worst for memory to learn syllables.Interference with Learning 207 get this kind of interference when we expect it. dilemma We must asfound 'negative transfer/ that positive transfer means that the first learning accomplishes some of the organization required in the second. under similar but not 'positive at present. and reading the newspaper would it hardly interfere at all. The most plausible conclusion that can be formed at present from our knowledge of the transfer of learning from one task to another is that any two learnings would involve elements of both positive and negative transfer. zero. had to unlink the syllables that were already connected. Ebbinghaus. in linking up alternate syllables. And the researches on transfer give exactly this result an unpredictable distribution of positive. and that negative transfer means that the first learning identical conditions. We sume must be 'unorganized' before the second pattern can be formed. To play tennis after studying one and before starting the next should lead to little inter- .

for he thought that the mere lapse of time was enough to let impressions fade away. (4) It is more difficult to learn a long list of nonsense syllables than a short one. The curves where the interval was filled with normal waking activities show the usual continuous decrease from 100 per cent immediately after learning to about 30 per cent after two hours and about 10 per cent after eight hours. that forgetting all is forgetting slowed but it not abolished in the early hours of [light?] sleep. If.208 ference. They determined the forgetting functions of two observers for an eight-hour period after learning. like identifying them when they are individually presented in a tachistoscope. but required thirty repetitions to learn a list of sixteen syllables. the learner then uses the same syllables in some other way. then there might be a positive retroactive transfer from the subsequent impression of the earlier learning. This means that. . vers They also performed the experiment with the obser- sleeping in the laboratory after learning and being waked for testing. However. after learning a list of syllables. Organization of Consciousness There are many demonstrable cases of retroactive inhibition. Ebbinghaus learned a list of twelve syllables in sixteen repetitions. and that is abolished in the later hours of [deep?] sleep. it is plain that there may be positive cases of retroaction. In this experiment memory fell off from 100 per cent to about 55 per cent in the first two hours and then remained constant for the subsequent six hours. It is a is possible inference from this experiment that due to retroactive inhibition. (3) The experiment of Jenkins and Dallenbach shows that a mental state which gives very little retroactive inhibition perhaps none at all is sleep. where the subsequent mental activity serves to fix the original learning. The princess who slept soundly for a hundred years would re- member perfectly when she awoke much to Ebbinghaus's embarrassment.

the added syllables interfere with the learning of the others.) is The time is almost doubled when the amount of the material increased by only a third. and. However. Six or seven nonsense syllables are learned within a single repetition. and that successive repetitions yield successively diminishing returns in the establishment of learning. If this inference is true. 17 (p. When difficulty of measured by the number of syllables in a list same sort of function. That figure shows. "they fall within the range of attention. Presumably it is hard to learn a long list because the parts of the organization have to be somewhat reduced before the entire pattern can be material is we have the squeezed into the brain. you can reduce the range of attention with a scalpel. as every psychologist knows. Now the only case where more than one repetition is needed (as we have just been saying) is true is when . the disproportionately increasing retardation of learning as the number of cul-de-sacs in the maze (difficulty of the maze) increases. We can call this a case of inter- ference similar to the interference in retroactive inhibition. Certainly the function is measured by the proportion of the learning total material that is completely mastered after any given number of repetitions.Interference with Learning at the rate of list 209 one syllable per second. the twelve-syllable took 192 seconds (sixteen seconds per syllable) and the sixteen syllable list 480 seconds (thirty seconds per syllable. the range of attention is the range of the cerebrum (so our argument runs) ." However. we should expect to find that a very few syllables could be learned at once without the repetitions necessary to get the pattern re- duced to practicable size. 193). (5) Most psychologists believe that the first repetition of a material has the greatest effect upon learning. the empirical finding is just that. for any size of cerebrum. we can also see that we have a situation similar to the one depicted in Fig." we say. "Because.

The the total material come start first any repetition organizes some part of part. The organi- We duction is process.). aigf. which the complete material does not pop into complete mastery at the same moment. and on the average the repetitions just before complete mastery are least effective because they have the least chance of being effective. Let us see if we can delineate it quickly. of such reduction. This discussion of the conditions favorable and unfavorable to learning has been long and involved.2io when Organization of Consciousness the material is too large to come immediately within the range of attention. The effect of successive repetitions must be to 'reduce' the material to the scope of a single have seen that insight furnishes an example organization. Learning is a matter of the establishment of neural organcult ization. The second repetition is at a dis- advantage. the picture that it implies for cerebral events is fairly simple. that organization is a as soon as a unit gets organized it bulks less large in the competition for cerebral space. shows this fact. Simple within the adequacy of the cortex organizations that lie (within the 'range of . The implication is that reimplicit in organization. It is mass action and its rate is a function of the amount of tissue cerebral available. of a It needs to effect the organization and reduction new mere tition. and that zation that is the learning is built Every learning experiment. and also that any orderly attentional fixation may act in that way. a and depends largely upon the cerebral cortex. and it is largely wasted if it is simply a repetition of the physiological events of the first repe- When the total material is almost learned the chances of bringing just the right part into organization on a succeeding repetition are minimal. in up gradually piecemeal. However. This point is a diffi- one and is discussed further in the notes (pp. Thus it happens that the principles of chance to apply. portion. for it is all unorganized to with (let us say).

Reduction is illustrated by the difference for organization of a brand new nonsense syllable and a familiar monosyllabic word. The instantaneous learning with insight would thus illustrate all simple learning. when the material transcends the range of consciousness. 211 be learned instantaneously in a single repematerials that cannot at once be comprehended Larger within a single 'attention' are organized piecemeal. It is not at all clear as to whether all reduction is a matter of symbolic surrogation.Physiology of Learning attention') tition. and the all-or-none character of learning is obscured by the fact that the total organization is achieved gradually. more than it would Consciousness is When we ask how continuous. At any rate learning is a process of getting into a single consciousness originally hold. Forgetting may be merely negative retroaction. The facts of positive and negative transfer and of positive and negative retroactive that there transfer follow from these assumptions. Organization results in the functional 'reduction' of any material. may be due to mutual interference among the It seems quite possible that learning occurs at an elementary level in accordance with an all-or-none principle. different conscious activities affect each other in memory. we find that there is sometimes mutual aid which may be due to community of organized units. as it perpetually does in the integrations which life demands. except perhaps for sleep. We talk about the degree of mastery of a material . The difficulty of learning long materials parts. may so that parts after reduction can be comprehended in a single 'attention. and is sometimes opposition which may be due to the incompatibility of organized units.' when before reduction they would have crowded each other out. However. then the larger organization is formed piecemeal. Some of this reduction is due to surrogation. the substitution of a symbolic part for a whole.

1904. The two W. On the other hand. 1931. Pintner. paths are spatially distinct at the periphery. telligence and its measurement. It is in this sense that the text remarks that all theories of dimensional discrimination ultimately reduce to 'place efferent theories. 45-102. All-or-none functions that are subject to adventitious variations can thus be translated into intermediate degrees by applying principles of probability to them. 123-141. of Stern. excite and any other event another path. Intelligence Testing. 12. Spearman 1914. Psychological Intelligence. 2d ed. is habitually and consciously done in psycholittle There is probably hope that the psychophysiology of the 'higher mental processes' will ultimately be worked out with the relative simplicity of the generalizations of the present chapter. esp.g. There is an excellent summary in R. 1927. e. 15.. Stern's classical definition. PsychoL. the right fore- finger and can be flexed for event A extended for event not. 3-102. symposium thirteen distinguished authors. the modification of this law is of primary importance to psychology at the present time. but the view fell into disrepute when it was found that simple sensory individual differences do not show high correlations with intellectual dif- . Amer. originally thought of intelligence as discrimination. ]. Notes A very simple way to think of the nature of consciousness is to realize that introspection is discriminative and that a discrimination can be reduced to a differential see the gence. this picture seems to the author to be a reasonable presentation of the more sophisticated thought of the present day.. as indeed physics.A. see The For Thus must A must excite the path for finger-flexion. Spearman." objectively determined and measured. See also C. /. 1921. 195-216.212 as is Organization of Consciousness might be it if it that is all half-learned. Methods trans. Abilities of Man. Educ. 1-135. when the indubitable fact half all-learned. by In- response. 201-292. if that thought is to be brought into relation with some law of mass action of the cerebral cortex. his Intelligence For definitions of intelligence and discussion of the concept of intelli- "General intelligence. if necessary. The establishment or the refutation or. cf. PsychoL.' Testing 1-5.

because. in role of McFarland. The factor of speed in intelligence. G. /. he lived twice as long. The symmetrical point of view would be expressed as accomplishment 'speed' test measures the rate of mental work. must be occupied. and conversely. because a man (or a rat) has only one life to live. The rate of mental work speeded up by the greater range attention. The rats learned even Maze III when they had only half a cortex. A follows: A was more with intelligent than B because. For some of the contra- The total differentiation is spatial- temporal. It is for sideration this is rate of nervous conduction would common factor. is rate of mental work (speed). 287- within the same period of time. theory' of intelligence must also be a 'time-theory/ The more that can Intelligence as Speed The text finds inadequate as conception of intelligence the the al- be got into a space at one time the sooner is that space free for still more. but it took longer. Psychol. noted that variation in 9. Psychol. /. Power in physical science means the rate of work. The mental ability. the primary variable under con- Exper. It is obvious therefore that a 'space- cerebral cortex. The position of the present text differs from this older notion in that it assumes that total organizations. 17. space is See H. there is only so much in dictory views of intelligence. there is nothing in the new theory that supposes that time cannot do duty for space. 71-94. 25. how and it is interesting to see individuals vary in respect of trait. The author is inclined to stress the dimension of simultaneity considering intelligence. speed A. Speed 290. A had two minutes for every minute that B had. Peak and E. The change of view in the present text is a shift of emphasis from a time- theory of intelligence to a spacetheory. However. Boring. are much larger and more complex than the simpler organizations which are involved in sensory discriminations and which are limited either to a part of the cortex or to a subcortical region. i. and rate is secondary and dependent upon space. the less time required.. reason that the present view not truly a 'speed-theory. 595-^12. 1928. Kennedy. it where be a is 1926. Soc. involving the entire 213 capacity for mental accomplishment in any given time. In this way the space-theory is a the more time-theory.Notes ferences. since though the present author has previously of consciousness made just that suggestion.. Traffic is speeded up by increasing the width of the highway. based upon different kinds of investigation. Bull. M. as a personality time. see R. See Fig.. the ease with which the argument about simultaneity and time assumes paradoxical form suggests that some of the inconsistencies of this literature may be explained definition by the of fact that every in intelligence terms of range must also imply a definition in relation to time. However. 1930. Psychol. space available.' However. an equal power Psychologists have used the word for the tests that are all-or- .

The term insight was first introduced by Kohler to describe the way in which apes. but he will have no quarrel with those who want a different word. and then to remain master of the situation. M. allies cf. du cerveau psychol. See R. Simpler mazes give lower correlations. 156. whereas time is only indirectly a measure because errors take time. The mind of a gorilla. 61-67. esp. upon the precise difelaborate organizathinks that the is of The author intelligence word appropriate in such a context. Le poids /. 1927. 5-23. Kohler. "the intelligent person. 1'intelligence. k I22O/ 2.03. Psychol. the two sexes should be equally intelligent. Fig." "the discriminating per- Intelligence as Insight The I23f. Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence. sought in give meaning . In this connection it is convenient to note that common language also discrimination. Since k is practically the same in both cases (with - = = = . the average upon discrimination. constant. argument of this chapter whether or not psychologists will accept a definition of intelligence as capacity for that differentiation which leads to discrimination.. The argument that insightful all learning is have been given chap. after failing to solve a problem. S. ferentiation tions. 4. 17 really matters very little to and K. but k is not the intelligence to same in different animal species. Genet.73. to solve the problem. seem suddenly to become aware of the relationships involved. the correlations between amount of destruction and time of learning are lower than when errors are used instead of time as the measure. 155-168. 70-75. see L. plain that many intellectual de and seemingly are dependent that is to say. The trans. 1929. Kohler extended to Yerkes insight has Apes. a k brain formula. 50 For men weight/ (body weight) 56 this becomes k 13607(6600 )For women. See. the simpler the lower.. mately correct measure of the discriminatory capacity which depends upon mass cerebral action. presumably because the number of errors is an approxi- such terms of objectively definite criteria.86 db 0.74. presumably because they all must be indirect. See tality are not so complex as to require of the cortex for the mental W. et 19. of Moreover. activity of the discriminating rat. Yerkes. It is the For the modern view of the tion of rela- the size of the brain to intelligence. Lashley." son. intelligent activities Lapicque determined 1922. amount errors Lashley's correlation between of cortical destruction and made is maze in learning a difficult 0. Monog. It is too bad. references to Lashley's in work pp.214 none Organization of Consciousness in their results and are there- fore not speed tests. on these particular Intelligence as Discrimination It matters. 2. such an exact reversal of the mean- ing of a word. Lapicque. 56 ( 5400) 2. - = a single point of difference for courtesy). new Men1925.

1-85. no. Lewin's introduction to his Untersuchungen zur Handlungs. actual ground in must be purposeful. series Zeigarnik writes and represents Lewin's conception dike. I. 3d 1926. Some experiments in learning and retention. see also ture the way in which insight K. F. W. 40. Thorn- 1931. 302-304. and the further indication that sheer passive repetition may not give rise to any memory at all.. ibid. Tolman. f. 1929. 1912. On M. C. Kiihn. PsychoL.. Animal Mind. Koffka.. McDougall. see die Tragheit der Netz- . I76f. cf. McK. M. Purposive Behavior in Animals and maze Silben nach dem Erlernungs. I. A. The 275. Recitation as a factor in memorizing. Univ. E. Nature. 1926. learning. 1932. trans. 1920. for insight. Nachweis die der Unzweckmassigkeit sinnlosen gebrauchlichen Assoziationsexperimente mit performance of rats. does much to enlighten the problem. C. 28if. 143-237. 269-300 in his book that make the argument against frequency of contiguity as the theory of learning and (by implication) in favor of insight. The Growth of the esp. 1927. Attention Sir William Hamilton tells of throwing the marbles in his Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. point in ing McDougall had the same mind in saying that learnOutline of Psychology. ed. they learn rapidly and may overtake in their learning the rats who are learning the maze with regular feed- and ing in each trial at the food-box. see 219-232. S. One interesting thing about this literais On this point. Rats. but it is pp. 1929. 113-134. Zeigarnik. 9. 1917. PsychoL. In this matter see is condition of interbecome motivation changeable. 109-210. 7. the the See H. L. B. 349-394. PsychoL Forsch. become 'familiar* with the maze. so that later. 1-24. Ueber Einpragung durch Lesen und durch Rezitieren. Calif.und Trefferverfahren zur exakten Gewinnung elementarer Reproduktionsgesetze zu verwenden. 1859. Brit. of PsychoL. Arch. left free and unfed in a maze.. Washburn. Human Learning. see his The power of numerical discrimination. 48-50. A. also E. Cattell's PsychoL. Cf. 294-385. a relationship that. 68. Blodgett. Mc- Dougall. For J. 10. in Lewin's his Ueber tachistoscopic experiments. 179-230. Gates.. Jevons and the beans. Tolman uses the term inventive ideation ibid. it. Poppelreuter. see in general K. /.und Affekt-Psychologie.Notes the 215 activation is concept greatly in Gestalt that necessary for Psychology. Men. Smith and W. for his general discussion of see Zsch. 396-481. 3. Mind. 1924. 61. For W. Das Behalten erledigter und unerledigter Handlungen. Publ. for these views The lies the experi- ments that show that mechanical repetition not nearly so good as a learning as frequent efforts at recitation. 1914. ibid. 1923. Cf. when food is supplied at the food-box. 4. introduction of The effect of reward upon W. when recognized. another way in which familiarity with the maze reduced the time of learning it. 1871.

Pillsbury's experi"Fluctuations of attention" W. Principles of Psychophysiology. Wundt's tural word process (Vorgang) be used as came to the ele- designating Apperception has retained a cognitive meaning even after Wundt defined it in structural terms. J. 121-133. Wundt saw this distinction and mentary mental material. ment is B. the first Amer. and and puts him into a S. 1932. 309-321. T. 3. Klarheit and Deutlichkeit. since For William James on the stream thought.. /. 3. 1890. reviews this literature. ideas. had made the phrase mental equivalent to the out corresponding pointed kinds of clearness. hence necessary to go back to Cattell for the data of the text. 126. It seems fair to say that haut und des Sehcentrums. I. Meanwhile 0. 181-185. 18. a more important publication than its length suggests. the principal historical outlines of the psychology of attention. 12. Amer. Geissler. 32. I. observations were approximated roughly by drawing similar ogives through his plotted data. 1903. James Mill comments on the Attention as Cognition We must note here very briefly complexity of thought in his Analysis of the Human Mind. 499. Fernberger. It is a nice question as to just how the of they have been ignored in the text. imsensations. 1885. computes the relative frequencies and the limen for Jevons. Kiilpe. has been pretty clearly recog- W. but the experiments did not cleave to the one or the other. hension. sect. Outline of Psychology. 1921. see his Principles of Psychology. see L. Rev. Titchener. Consciousness ment. The distribution of attention. 3. Their exact values are unimportant. pressions. 1893. cites other discussions of it. chap.. A preliminary nized since about 1890. Psychol. although the sect. perceptions. /. Wundt tended to speak of elements. the general psychophysiology see L. 121-127. and E. 224-290. For prolonged attention. III. Fluctuations of attention to cutaneous stimuli. Stud. 1829 (or the 1869 ed.. 10. 1913. study of the range of visual apprePsychol. Aufmerksamkeit has to be kept from its literal meaning of notice ability.216 Organization of. /. the process-nature of con- 4986*. par. the fact of change flux. The limens for Cattell's it is and the refractory period. On of attention. Hylan. 1896.). 10. which certainly included internal fluctuations. cf. with accurate psychophysical technique for the determinations of range. distinction between the sensory and the cognitive. esp.. Fernberger's conditions were chosen to prevent grouping. aspects of attention was not sharply drawn in the nineteenth century. I37-IS4. 1907. 4. Philos. followed Kiilpe. the struc- The and the functional. Troland. term mental process was no longer unusual for him in 1902. Psyckol. Grundriss der Psychologie. table... and reports a modernized form of the experiment. esp. B. R. Philos. process mental ele- and we shall not be far . summarizes Cattell little sciousness. P.

cognitive meaning. B. 1920. although (it seem) to little else. Titchener still managed to have something to say about the old laws of attention: tuation. and F. 1908. and thus to investigate the one by means of morphosed into a fifth dimension of consciousness. E. of course. esp. M. sensory.). It is not even clear that the legal title does not lie thus. see Miiller and Schumann. On the importance of the kind of rhythm. At present it seems to have little systematic significance. Fernberger used the former phrase in 1921 (op. Experimented Beit rage zur Untersuchung des Gedachtnisses. 1894. attention for cognitive clearness. 106-130. Smith. sume that Klarheit is the essential condition of Deutlichkeit. between the range of at- Attributive vs. Nothing serious happens to a system of psychology if the concept of attensity as a structural. The discussion in the text of the degree of attention should make it clear why elsewhere there has been no attempt to make the Wundtian distinction range. Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention. Titchener. 171-206.. cognitive clearness. Briefly on these . Miiller cognitive clearness. Dallenbach. cit. It K. 197-277. Thus of attention as see sensory. Rhyth- word mus und Arbeit. would 1900. the in 1920 (op. see G..) because of Dallenbach 's distinction cit. 183to take the logical step of separating the facts under the heads of attributive clearness and 230. Psychol. attributive clearness. tention (focus. Philos. Stud. and he tried to rescue attention functional from the show. 254-265. Schumann. Blickpunkt) and the range of consciousness (focus and Exper. f. This act of justice resulted in stripping attributive clearness of On giving most of its them to cognitive facts and clearness. margin. Psychol. Lectures on tween such phrases as range of apprehension and range of attention. Learning the necessity of rhythmization for learning. K. own psychological manage as an attribute of sensation called clear- should now be obvious why the text makes no distinction be- ness for (1908. It was Titchener who was most distinctly to draw the line between structural. esp. 156-158. 6. 16. fluc- remained /. levels. The present author believes that it is in the public interest to take the term M. E. Meanwhile ceased for demonstration that the 'bonds' are stronger within rhythmical feet than between them. Zsch. see the For sensory clearness has idem. 3. for accommodation. 280-285. 1910) (1915) or attensity or vividness the doctrine (1924). future study will the other. descriptive category It is household by establishing it in his left out.Notes from the truth if we say that the psychology of 1900 tended to asTitchener attributive 217 and Dallenbach to be and has become metaattensity. Blickfeld). believed that attributive clearness still held title to the attention. Dallenbach. Whether attensity is a necessary dimension of consciousness. sensory process and functional. However.

Robin- The similarity factor in retro- which the work of learning in- action. 39. 263 f. trana. as Memory. in cur when the second task like neither 1913. t 40. 37. in one simple mental related Psychology of Learning. nection 1894. negative. ibid. see Organization of Consciousness also . 1905. 35. 6. experiment upon retention during sleep. see Hunter. Obliviscence Dallenbach. provements process esses. T. 611-615. during sleep and waking. 459-474 as showing how positive. Hunter points to A. Eng. Demonstrational in experi/. H. see J. 267273. The examples of insight in the is translated The relation of interference to effect appeal to the practice of association. 5i3f. ment of degree of mastery by counting the frequency of promptings is an example of the kind of function where an all-or-none event into degrees by an the relative frequency of its occurrence. 6. An experimental study of some of the conditions of mental activity. nor enough different to leave it is due to E. 1894. after delay. For the way in unaffected. /. A. !893 356-3^9. 605-612. 1927. and end) and some other of these matters. PsychoL. trans. 1913. PsychoL. 9. ibid. the next section of these notes. classical Boring. tion 5. In this consee the general discussion S. see his chap. Amer. see his 297-312. For the experiment that shows negative transfer through interference. 1915. cit. Vide infra. Amer. Jenkins and K. For the author's class-demonstraof the difference between learning sense and nonsense syllables. of the essentials among a tremendous complexity of poten- . 599-605. f. 1905.. The value P. PsychoL. the method of promptings. 222-234. Ebbinghaus's classical Ueber das Gedachtnis. J. On the effect of position within a material (the comparison of the beginning. Hunter in Foundations 1929. that rebe negative or positive and that the maximum idea The fundamental troactive transfer may of retroactive inhibition would ocis 1885. experiment on the repetitions is ments memory. Psy- of successive chol. PsychoL. Zsch. S. G. On /. Some of the examples of the text are taken from H.. Amer. Bergstrom. son. creases rapidly with the increase in the length of a series. chap. Poffenberger. M. middle. 433-442. by W. G. Grundzuge der Psychologic. see his discussion of the matter For the striking and dramatic when eleven teen) (instead of ninecases were available. retroaction in general. 1928. PsychoL. op. Meumann. Experi- Ephrussi. and zero transfers occur in different cases with seeming adventitiousness.. and the many references there cited. Experimented Beitrage zur Lehre vom Gedachtnis. Amer. For the way which enough it the first to reenforce learning in a series transfers to the connections between remote members. 1924. who worked with ments upon physiological memory by means oi the interference of associations. The influence of im- apes and higher mammals generally involve the chance apprehension. 5. see upon other proc- Educ. see J.2i8 matters. 653-656. Of course the measuref. 6. of Experimental Psychology. E. Ebbinghaus. I.

Gen. Either difference or tion as to is we can observe a we cannot. Psychol. So also a sensation either not.' as if sublimiassociations were of various measured by the It seems then as if we were measuring something about a sensation. He plots against degree of stimulation the frequency with Skinner. and there again we meet an all-or-none principle. it has no strable intensity. then one might expect learntial 219 good psychology to-day. and if these essentials are well within the range of attention.e. it does demontalked age. the point gence as Insight. insight) to occur instantaneously on the first perceptual relating of the essentials. the point where sensation is as likely as not to occur. Introspecthe amount of difference This seems to be exactly what B. If conditions could be made so simple that attention is practically limited to essentials. ally we are measuring a only the will probability that sensation occur under the given conditions.. F. /. On the rate of formation of a conditioned reflex. statement of probability is empirically only a statement of relative A strengths. See also the section of these notes. We are forced to comparison. frequency function of this sort can apply only to an aver- A occurs from stimulation or it does not. Frequency Functions A separate note is in order on the power of frequency functions apparently to transform phenomena that occur under the all-or-none principle into phenomena of variable and measurable degree. Intelli- which the all-or-none sensation is all there. 274-286. In either case the psychologist to resorts a function of relative culiarly relevant to the content of the present chapter. It has been conventional to speak of 'strong subnal liminal associations. If frequency of occurrence. but introspection cannot directly measure these degrees. and a frequency cannot apply to a single sensation. but actuits precipitancy of coefficient precision. supra. where one might suppose that the none would change to the all. F. with the limen tion The phenomena of both and memory follow the none principle. Above the Hmen we can sense degrees of intensity. but the inference as to subliminal strength is indirect and uncertain. frequencies. No item in itself is observed as halfremembered. ing (organization. Skinner has found with the rat in experiments which are pe- not quantitatively reliable. is called a psychometric The limen. i.Notes perceptual data. On either side of the psychometric function progresses toward the limits of 100 per cent and o per cent. See B. 1932. but that is not about negative (The particular chances of drawing any card from a pack are . and he gets what in psychophysics function. it pertains to a group and is meaningless as applied to a single case. 7.. becomes sophisticatedly the point which yields 50 per cent of none and 50 per cent of all. The memorial sensaall-or- repro- duction of an item of a material either occurs or it does not. Fechner de(subliminal) grees of intensity.

The important point to note here is that we are not facing a fundamental biological fact in noting the absence of abrupt changes in biological functions where we might expect them.) ble The memory experiments resemthe psychophysical ones. an artifact that is often missed because conventional scientific language applies to the in- providing enough chances for all parts of a large material finally to get within the 'range of attention* dividual phenomenon what actually pertains only to the massed group. but also functions that are smoothed out toward their limits. If one draws. The maximum erally the all is zero of is gen- drawing it is the improbable that always happens. of The for of function many repetitions may simply be that abrupt change of direction. G. 28. The is asymptotic. of it is half-learned. we mean that half of it is all-learned. There also a very much more theory of probabilities will change the discreteness of sensory events (or of coin tosses) into continuprobabilities general significance to this property of a frequency function. . A chart of the psychometric function. one particular card. By such a form be anticipated? Well. Discrete quantal phenomena of the allboundaries. matter of common scientific intuition that functions in approachlimits ing of as this sort inheres in a single gradually. This paradox arises from the faulty language of the theory of probabilities. 465-470. The reader can see how the and be organized is into a stable totality. but is an artifact of the method of measurement. measurable is haus's quency learning is a statistical artifact.. which makes it appear that a probevent. curving if approach toward the longs. Such a frequency function. or E.22O only i Organization of Consciousness in 52. when affected by chance variation and translated into relative frequencies. give not only continuous curves. not that all material. always draws in a The minimum is often the something. /. The that chief point of this dissertais tion for the present text to show learning may proceed essentially by the all-or-none principle in spite of the fact that degree of It in large mapossible that Ebbingfundamental law of freis mastery terials. Thus all meas- or-none kind. so that the function does not even show an ures of degree of mastery hold only on the average for materials where chance variation occurs. In biology and psychology we are constantly finding functions that by consulting various texts on and least squares. Amer. whereas it can pertain only to the total group to which the event beability Hence a function It is a of something. chol. 1917. Boring. it is the natural form of a frequency function. what right can all-or-none of reproduction relative trans- formed into degree by considering frequency within a total When a material is said to be ha If-learned. We are presented rather with the logical fact that the smooth function does not indicate continuity in the phenomenon. Psyities have limiting maxima and minima.

in a sense. which may be called a relational theory of The problems of the larger organizations of take us into a consideration of the parts played consciousness by local and momentary differentiation under the limitations consciousness. By lending a speck of credulity here. inductive. The problems must lean nevertheless a little upon of extensity lead us somewhat fur- ther into the conventional assumptions of psychophysiology. by endorsing a very small assumption there. . Our approach to these larger theoretical issues has been. Of the dimensions of consciousparticular ness intensity comes nearest to being able to stand on its of the first IT time for us to consider some of the more general implications about consciousness to be derived is now own feet. but such speculation tends to reenforce this same view. the unexplained dimension. Quality. we have done our best to consider the before the general. has largely to be speculated about. Hence we must now sum up the account of consciousness in order to see whether our new enterprise 221 is sound. At any rate. and seems to force us to a view of consciousness as discrimination or reaction. by the nervous system. although it extensity. set ing. This procedure may be convinc- but it involves a dangerous subtlety. except for the necessary preliminary considerations chapter.Chapter 8 THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS from the preceding chapters. Protensity raises a difficulty for the theory of simple corre- spondence between conscious and neural duration. we may find ourselves rationally bankrupt.

The reason that the first statement reduces to the second is that a it is meaning is a relation. in . A newer way. meets with very Titchener held that a sensation in itself is general acceptance. The child in learnessentially a reaction theory. and his finger At first he knows consciously that b he knows the same thing unconsciously. Titchener's context if sufficiently extended. a little skilled. suggestion. sensation or image accrues to it. when he has become takes care of is consciously even the key itself. but that it receives a meaning when another theory of meaning. it is 'reaction' to the 'core/ nevertheless plain that this 'context' is a The context theory of meaning is Moreover. to be flatted. when b to be flatted.222 Nature of Consciousness The Relational Theory of Consciousness There are two ways of expressing the view of the nature of consciousness that has been developed in this book. The perceived face lacks meaning until the name comes." Although Titchener would have repudiated the from the light. of what he is to do with his finger. but. the answer to that question comes later (pp. 229-233). The test of such a meaning can only be behavioral. We point ask what the relations are between. Meaning is given by the addition of a "context" to a "core. One way an old-fashioned way is to say that (i) the data of consciousness are meanings. and a way that is free of the hackneyed connotations of the word meaning. in very familiar perceptions is ing to play the piano has a very conscious context. philosophers tell us this. The protozoan must turn before the light can have a meaning for the protozoan. Titchener held that meaning may become unconscious and be carried only by nervous processes. meaningless. later he no longer remembers which he plays. is to say that (2) consciousness exists as relations and exists must not at this only in the sense that relations exist. The but also evident in psychology.

regards experience as given in its own within psychology. Titchener said that it takes two mental processes to make a conscious meanin either case. Absurdly paradoxical as it may seem. These contents were supposed in general to exist. the true cog- make Meaning is response. Phenomenal experience stands on right its own feet. has tended to include with the phenomena many items that Titchener's existential school would have regarded as meanings. They were sometimes called existential on this account. we may We are saying that it takes two events in relation to a meaning. the context theory of meaning. makes behaviorism. it gets these 'meanings' into direct experience by robbing them ters of their relational character. To the depreciation of the value of this view the present section of this book it matter is devoted. the emphasis shifted to the chology provided. the meaning is there meaning. It exists and psychology may take it and do what can with it. it seems. fathered by Titchener. The traditional view is quite otherwise. However. because a discriminatory reaction is there. ing. Introspectional psychology up to about 1915 had to say that nitive psychology. phenomena that phenomenological psyThen it seemed clear that phenomena are given in experience. that they are the existential subjectmatter of psychology. however. Gestalt psychology. All these matneed concern us only in so far as they show that introspectional psychology. Titchener would have said. which Titchener excommunicated. meaning is response is not to say that consciousness is meaning. been formulated in terms of such conscious contents as sensations and images. When it became clear during the last decade that the conscious contents were only systematic constructs. We can get some idea of what consciousness is like by . both the Gestalt branch and the 'existential' branch.Consciousness as Relational in either case 223 same he has. the add. Observation here is the crux of the does not change the observed.

if the subject had no memory at all of what was immediately past. we find hard to assert the existence of consciousness. Could we under these circumstances distinguish between the anesthesia and the amnesia? A little consideration shows that we could not. and will go over the same statements again as if they were new. be any moment at which he would be aware of his own consciousness. but the hypothetical case is sufficient for our purpose. Yes. because dualism provides no answer to such a question. nor would there. A person is struck on the head with resulting concussion. what he was doing when struck. He need not say why they do not occur. Yet a few minutes later he has no memory at all of his recent conversation. Without memories of a second's duration no introspective report would be possible. Now amnesia persists us try to imagine a condition of progressive which consciousness is normal but no memory for more than a second of time. Some descriptions let in of the scopolamine syndrome ('twilight sleep') resemble such a state of affairs. We may lay it down as a premise that consciousness is abolished in anesthesia. This person could give an introspection of His memory is long enough for that. Under complete general anesthesia a person may properly be said to be 'unconscious. Even when memory it is not so drastically affected. the brain is partly thrown out of function and the phenomena do not occur. his name. Nevertheless we .224 Nature of Consciousness considering the nature of anesthesia. his address. his occupation. person at such a time conscious? Presumably we say. He is taken to the hospital and on the way he babbles intelligently and correctly about himself. Is such a must sorts.' To imagine that he may be conscious and unable to tell of it at the time or to remember it afterward is to formulate a scientifically useless conception of consciousness. The dualistic phenomenologist can easily accept this view.

is relational. He could not remember the fatigue afterward. He meant that the feelings have nothing to do with attention. Could we disprove such a theory? Suppose the same sensory phenomenon could occupy the range of consciousness all through the night. as he put it. was once suggested that sleep is not unconsciousness after all. They cannot come into the focus of attention nor stay out. for of what could such a memory consist? A mere imaginal reproduction of the fatigue would not date it as having of hysterical states It occurred the night before or at any particular time at all. the attribute of clearness. The same problem arises in connection with the cognitive function of attention. Suppose Titchener were right about the feelings and about observation. And memory. At the same time Titchener believed (he changed both views later) that attention is involved in observation. The subject would not even know that the memory was a memory. lack. All these instances go to show that consciousness actually depends upon memory for our knowledge of it. but a state of concentrated attention upon a fatigue sensation. and that the concept of a consciousness is that exists independently of a concept pretty far removed from the actual memory consciousnesses that enter as subject-matter into scientific psychology.Consciousness as Relational 225 see that such a 'consciousness' with a very short memory resembles what is sometimes called the 'unconsciousness' and divided personality. They are neither clear nor obscure. pleasantness and unpleasantness. which reciprocally implies the first. They cannot be attended to or attended from. Years ago Titchener believed that the feelings. of course. It means that an initial term is represented in a subsequent term. one attends in order to observe. How then could we ever know . Since the sleeper is aware only of his fatigue he will not have been aware of his consciousness.

philosophers' objection to introspective psychology that there can be no introspection because the mind alters itself in observing itself. Titchener's formula is the argument for a relational theory of consciousness because it includes report. Psychology undertook to meet this objection by establishing the doctrine of immediate experience. to a denial that introspection is a method. who emphasizes a distinction between immediate and mediate experience. It must issue in Both the attentive focalization and the reportorial report. that is the view of any psychologist.226 Nature of Consciousness about these feelings? Feelings would have to be observed before they could exist for psychology. since introspection would always mind introspecting. issuance must occur under the psychological point of view. In this way Titchener has made for us the formal argu- ment for a relational theory of consciousness. To have experience like it. To introspection consciousness In this business we find the ought to be introspection. the observation would turn out to consist of a reaction to the feeling in some all sort of report or cognitive note-taking. are dealing indirectly with the old. for him psychology was not immediate experience but experience got from the psychological point of view. in the opinion of the present author. although he himself undoubtedly would have repudiated the theory. a doctrine which amounted. A strictly neutral phenomenology encounters this same difficulty. The vivid ex- . In 1915 he wrote the formula for psychological method thus: Introspection = psychological (vivid experience report) Experience must be focalized in attention. Moreover. Wundt. for an experience is already mediate when it is had. that it accomplishes something. However. the having of immediate is to be aware of is a contradiction in terms. Titchener tried to experience avoid the trouble by an appeal to Avenarius's formula.

the response to it is the report of it. the experimenting observer can similarly interpret the behavioral reactions of a rat who knows nothall about scientific psychology. I never perceive inclined to believe that none is any phenomenon as fixed. but the experimenter has it. to resort. I am pools. However. if it is all 227 for to be known. They have been constantly reenforced since that time. Report sorts of contexts to the vivid a word.Consciousness as Relational perience must be reacted Titchener could include core to. and one is therefore forced to take personal experience seriously. but is truly as continuous as a stream with eddies The most tinual flux and change. to 'armchair' psychology. No. The author's present convictions about consciousness arose in an introspective experiment in 1921. might seem that a final appeal in the matter of this relational theory of consciousness ought to be the introspection of introspection. Titche- is equally applicable to 'animal introspection/ the process whereby an animal by discriminatory response gives information about his consciousness. He ventures to set them down here in the belief that others who have extensively attempted to introspect spection will affirm their validity. the pressing of a key. Titchener would have said: But the animal does not have the psychological point of view. Unfortunately formal descriptions of ing at It this sort are lacking. that change . The 'experience' ner's formula occurs. The experiment may be so arranged that the response will mean the event to which it is a response. and currents and fixed. upon intro- striking thing about consciousness is its conIt is not split up into elements or Gestalten. If the introspecting observer can interpret his own conscious reactions for the purposes of introspection. a fleeting contextual image that 'carries a meaning' for the introspection. the unexpressed fleeting processes of introspective 'note-taking' as the 'experience' proceeds. as it were. a sentence.

not the 'core. rug? Does it enter consciousness as a sensation. However. Thus I believe quite firmly in the context theory of meaning. while I take note of it for the purposes of subsequent verbal report? Not at all. is absurd. I never am aware of this or any other conscious datum as being present in mind. the original describing is past and it is presumably the new description of the description that is present. The phenomenologist and the existentialist will of course not be able to understand this view. perhaps for a second. They will insist that an experience is given. there must be in consciousness something more palpable than the implication of a past event. The experience described. The rainbow may have an end and the end be somewhere. if the knowledge of it were . but I do not know that they then is it that I perceive this red diamond in the do. that the accrual of one process to another may establish a meaning. if there be any such. Such relations inhering in the flux of consciousness seem to me to be just what consciousness can best be said to be. that they appear to exist only after they have ceased to exist. To find myself thus landed in an infinite regress is to find myself just where I seem to myself to be.' not the 'context/ but the accrual of the context to the core. The nearest actual approach to immediate introspection is early retrospection. To such a statement I can only oppose my own 'experience' and the query: What would consciousness seem to be like. Experience itself is at the end of the introspective rainbow. any more than I can understand theirs. they will say.228 is Nature of Consciousness perfectly continuous. the description is present. At any given waking moment. that a phenomenon exists. They might persist a little while. is always just past. a phenomenon. but I am bound to admit that I only that I do not know that they are fixed. and linger there. yet I seem never to get to it. a perception. a Gestalt. However. a conscious organization. To be aware of a conscious datum is know How to be sure that it has passed. my awareness of consciousness or of any conscious phenomenon seems always to be the having of such meanings. and that my statement. if I ask myself how I know that the description is present. I find myself describing the processes that made up the description.

This typical relation can be applied to any They all terms of the causal sequence. typical relation is is reaction. response. It is now apparent that the final appeal as to the nature of consciousness will not be to the introspection of introspection if the results are like those of the three preceding paragraphs. A conscious event may be re- garded as the 'response' to a stimulus or as the 'stimulus' . Relational Physiology From one tion is relational organ. Its point of view the central nervous system is a primary funcIts coordination. a reasonable alternative to the static view of mental elements and their big cousins. differentiation. Introspection in such a case yields not fact but conviction. reflex.Consciousness as Relational 229 always ex post facto and the knowledge of the knowledge of it ex post facto. this relation is the relation of cause and effect. the necessarily specific Response stimulus-response and thus it is discriminatory. with consciousnesses of this sort. test is not to do? In the author's opinion. discrimination. of course. A movement becomes a response when it is known as the effect of a stimulus. It exists for integration. Per- haps the discovery of a relational physiology will help us to make a choice. we have found the relational view of conscious- What are we ness plausible. relation. a physical event at a receptor becomes a stimulus when it is known as the cause of a response. we are to appeal to physiology. Fundamentally. in the present section of this book. still be able to hold to their belief in immediate experience? I think they would. imply a specific relation. and conviction unsupported by any external enough. In terms of any one of these words could a cognitive systematic psychology be written: reaction. It is enough if. and so on? Would not the phenomenologists. the Gestalten.

However. the psychologist's interest centers especially in those relations of the nervous system that are subject to change in the lifetime of the individual. The color-blind person.230 to Nature of Consciousness some movement. because when released in air we fall toward it? Hardly. for this reaction is not learned. Consciousness is concerned with awareness and the acquisition of knowledge. and for convenience they can be divided into phases. it has often been said that if you see red where I see green. then. Ultimately it is the business of psychology to knit up the successive phases of the total integration that is bounded. a specific response to a specific stimulus. There is not. both . It is important for us to realize that causal events are not necessarily serially linear. a necessary tool. and conversely. Do I and that stone each know where the earth is. causal theory. Any simple causal sequence is almost certain to be an oversimplification of the facts. Moreover. so the author argues. Psychophysiological events constitute dynamic wholes. do I know that that object is green because I have 'a green sensation'? Yes. It is here that the thesis of this book differs from existential psychology. The relational any actual fashion. Well. has less specificity of response. Analysis it Nevertheless is theory of the nervous system is fundamentally the de- terministic. each of which is predetermined by its prior conditions. on the other. Learning has been considered rightly as the criterion of consciousness in the animal scale. by response. and actual total events can be best understood as parts in relation. for instance. Knowledge is properly that which has been learned. by stimulus and. but only if I have learned that the green sensation is green and that it means that object. a green sensation except as a learned relation. on the one hand. Nevertheless they proceed in time. These phases need not be distinct in is only the tool of description.

the peripheral relationships are for the most part However. It is in the brain that the dis- criminatory reactions. It has been said that. as the criterion of consciousness. can be left out of account when the formation of new relations is the business in hand. obverse and reverse. we can now see why it is that consciousness is ordinarily supposed to be localized in the brain. it takes an eye to see. The peripheral relationships. Now it is plain that most learning is localized in the brain and that a great deal of that learning depends upon the cerebral cortex. So discrimination belongs in the brain where it is finally determined. are formed and have to be studied. therefore. nothing else counts in the choice.The Brain as a Relational Organ 231 of us with consistent systems. conscious- selective. then we should never be able to find out that there is any difference between our seeings exist for science only as a statement that says that phenomena they are reported. instead of learning. when consciousness is represented by the relation of stimu- lus-response. which make up consciousness. it is localized in the peripheral as well as the central nervous system. The is chosen at the fork of the roads. Attention and consciousness are almost . and that the report depends on learning. come under the more usual criterion of consciousness. correct road /we come out with the same conclusion attentive. It is for this reason and for this reason alone that we think of consciousness as localized in the brain. fixed and not subject to ready establishment and disestab- abolished by lishment. Since consciousness depends upon learning. which are formed readily and. being approximately fixed. and also in the receptor and the muscle. It is true that a particular consciousness would be peripheral extirpation. to learning and unlearning. attention if we stress atten- tion. For this reason they are not nearly so important to us as the central types of organization. Consciousness ness is is is selective.

sensations which do not exist. Does not this functional picture of the brain lead us in the same instant to abandon dualism is to embrace the relational theory of consciousness ? Forty years ago. We are now Now that the relational view of the brain the only view that could interest psychologists. The traditional view of mental processes which do not proceed. that there should be an idea for every cell and an association for every synapse. but we can be sure that its function is is relational. in a position to revert to the problem of the section of this chapter. and then turned to physiology. and a picture of the brain as made up of neurons connected by synapses.232 Nature of Consciousness synonyms. dynamic integrations which get stabilized as Gestalten or forms. and selection is the fundamental principle of both. It is no wonder that these two criteria yield the same conclusions. the selection is a selection among the various peripheral excitations which are available for central organization. The law of exercise was built up on this assumption. The parallelism was inescapable. We have most distressingly of all meanings consciousness self-contradictory. psychologists found themselves in possession of a picture of mind as made up of ideas connected by and associations. when psychophysical parallelism was well entrenched. that this psychology Now we know was wrong and we are not any too sure of the physiology. There we argued that a preceding relational theory of consciousness is plausible on introspecwe see tive grounds. The selection is central and mostly of the brain. we have argued in the preceding chapter that the selection (which is attention) is the ground of learning. It gives us . Our conception of the nervous system is not nearly so simple. However. In this sense too we have a reason for speaking of consciousness as localized in the brairj) Of course.

and which are seen most typically in the relation of stimulus-response. We know the general nature of the neural events which yield the relations that concern us. disappears when we form our realities on this pattern. ulti- mately physical tute a brief dogmatic These paragraphs will thus constiresum of our entire excursion into psychophysiological theory. learning. really neural. where have at selection. Psychology is interested in the specific causal relationships. thgjnatter? all What /'The author offers as the solution for these difficulties tn~felational theory of consciousness. other events. The Dimensions Now that the significance of Consciousness of our liberation from the tyranny of an impracticable parallelism is clear. and discrimination occur. in which the events of con- sciousness lend themselves to insightful relationships with The gap between mind and body. never more than feebly bridged by isomorphism.The Brain is as a Relational Organ 233 which are relations between terms which are not there. If consciousness seems to introspection to be relational and yet we cannot find the terms that are related. which represent the reaction of the individual to his environment. Let the realities be neural. These relations are . we may examine again briefly the conclusions which we have reached in respect of the dimensions of consciousness which are realities. it is because the terms are The relational theory of consciousness means that introspection reveals the relational nature of merely some of the events in the central nervous system. We last a causal theory of mind. It is especially concerned with such relationships when they are established (or disestablished) in the lifetime of the individual as the result of organization under attentive selection.

234 Nature of Consciousness may be said imperfectly indicated in introspection. but there must be a correspondence of spatial orders. Spatial the mechanism of introspection implies is also neural spatial differentiation in the immediately preceding events. for introspection can be reduced to a selection between two neural paths. there is no simple appears any longer to be adequate for the ways in which peripheral events are transformed into require 'place theories. and we must look in the brain in the sense that discriminative specificity originates there within the differentiated field that may be imposed by the periphery. Discrimination depends tom upon differ- nervous system for the differentiation. Quite possibly . and they to constitute consciousness. and discrimination is the sympof consciousness. but there differentiation in no evidence that it is not. Discrimination may ultimately be spatial. except where perception is inadequate or illusory. or have to do with knowledge and meanings. both frequency of impulses in a single fiber and the total number of fibers are concerned. In this noetic.' set of formulas that central organizations. number of adjacent fibers in Extensity seems to require for its comprehension spatial organization in the brain. There can be no exact projection. Consciousness is localized in the necessary entiation. Consciousness is discriminative. to way consciousness is seen to be cognitive. that is to say. not exactly to a space-time summation in the brain before the consciousness can issue. In this sense all the dimensions of consciousness On the other hand. We infer then. It is not clear that verbal introspection is thus spatially differentiated. but to a single resultant that is a function of the total excitation in a limited a limited time. Intensity at the more peripheral levels seems to imply total excitation in limited space and time.

Discrimination. In vision it seems as if nothing but a place theory of three elements could satisfy the requirements of color. presents the greatest difficulties of all. may be the at least in part. Apparently form size. more definitely determined by the stimulus than its and its locus is only roughly guaranteed by the stimulus is within certain approximate limitations of projection. For and discrimination is a differential of this gross spatial differentiation. and Lashley's work now makes it reasonable to suppose that this limitation is. A relativistic interpretation of temporal perception robs it of much of its mystery. Protensity. The law . It can be supposed that selection for organization occurs in part by chance from available possibilities. The author argues that cutaneous should resemble visual sensibility in this regard. amount pected if all of spatial differentiation possible. must be represented by some terminal event that is specific for the lapsed time and capable of producing a discriminative response. as might be exdiscrimination must at some stage of reaction be spatial differentiation. Quality. the durational dimension. depends on selecThe limited range of consciousness seems to be one of the most obvious facts of psychology.Summary this organization is 235 its sometimes tridimensional. as we have just noted. the projection paths of the five senses are different. In respect of hearing. however. but that organization for among the memory is immediate upon be a statistical of frequency would thus artifact that explains the way in which a selection. under the law of mass action. Intelligence. tion. Within the modalities we are faced with puzzles. dependent upon the amount of tissue available for the differentiated organization of nervous processes. the author inclines to a fre- quency theory of pitch because of its subsumptive power. difference of modality we have obviously the place theory.

C. see his Boring. B. so in science in general the demarcation is never clear. G. . this view will work only if it is supplemented by some conception of a way in which organized material is reduced upon organization. book as is now possible after the intervening six chapters. If it seems paradoxical that such elaborate means should be required to achieve simplicity. Notes The present chapter is such a continuation of the first chapter of this Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-Processes. Such a reduction may come about by surrogation in which a part functions for the whole. A Text-book of Psychology. we must remember that the inertia of human thought is so great that not even a minor simplification is ever the result of a simple process. C. Consciousness as Relational For E. the impalpable and imponderable consciousness that will not lock horns with physical reality or honestly assume a part in a closed causal system. However. 1910. 1929. 174-184. 408-412). also the further references cited in E. 364-373. Titchener and the context theory of meaning. The Meaning of Music. If we have been led in these chapters into highly inferential speculation about the nervous system. Pratt. we have yielded only to the necessity for defining the boundaries of the fundamental problems of a physiological psychology and for ridding ourselves of the mystery of an unanschauliche Bewusstheit. that so much sophistication should be needed to justify common sense. 429 (cf. the discussion of Titchener. but it is by no means certain that no other kind of reduction can occur. Just as we have been saying that there is in introspection no distinguishable line between observation and inference. so that it makes less claim upon the range of consciousness.236 Nature of Consciousness complex material is drawn piecemeal into the range of consciousness. A History of Experimental Psychology. 1909.

F. The esp. 61-176. however. ]. avoids the issue that anything that is called meaning ought to be essentially relational. Dodge. as it were. Psychol. t which. 485-508. See G.. Kiilpe). Boring. Shepard. see his Lectures on the sciousness terest is cause it being considered. see L. 301- Men. and thus at- Zur Analyse der Gedachtnistdtigkeit und des VorstellungsverI. 1915. a Consciousness and the Brain therefore. 51-60. The reader will find some pre- liminary remarks on the problem of introspection in Boring. op.. Troland. 1912. T. of consciousness really much less important than the question of the localization of is interest when con- For Titchener's view of feeling as incapable of becoming the object of attention. 1931. paper of The schema of ibid. The Titchener's 23. the introspection of introspection. cit. J. 427-448. C. 35. Washburn. It is Miiller behavior as a criterion of consciousness. and then see p. spection. selectivity. Boring. op. introlatter summarizes about were Mulier. E. different Amer.. 594 for the references. quoted in the text. meaning. The Animal Mind. Attribute and sensation. 237 Amer. Miiller. Yokoyama's on the problem of the par excellence. 326-329 (Wundt). G. E. isomorphism.. F. concentrated state of The question of the localization is attention. Prolegomena to a study of intro- is an increasing tendency apply Kohler's term. Principles of Psychophysiology. On the other hand. more briefly his Text-book. how learning as a criterion involves discrimination. laufes. or n't. 390-392 (Mach. 1914. 8-28. explicitly pre- cerebral For the idea that sleep represents hyperemia and perhaps. esp. For a view that more nearly resembles the exposition of this book. 1911. cf. PsychoL. E. see J. has a lucid discussion of spection. 19. see R.Notes 1931. For a surprisingly view of the localization of consciousness. III. Titchener. Titchener's formula for introspection. Conditions and Consequences of Human Variability. behaviorism has generally dealt with meaning without saying so. 25-33. and thus tention. 135-162. Avenarius. is 1932. 23 if. On learning or modifiability of from his A Beginner's Psychology. 1924. Circulation and Sleep. 588. 1908. phenomenal concurrence of sensory attributes. 304. see M. Inlocalized in the brain beis here that the crucial Elementary Psychology of Feeling relations specific and Attention. most sents this view. to the general correspond- There to . cit. 69-77. 1926. The the author's of convictions nature consciousness and the present author has to tried make it clear that behaviorism provides the psychology of meaning formed when he was an observer at Clark University in an experiment of M. op. Tolman's Purposive Behavior in Animals and 1932. lie. This discussion also shows and Titchener who discuss. 76-78. Cf. and 410-412 (Titchener).

that perfect in goes further. i body relation. and thought quality neural 'what-you-may-call-it. Cf. double-aspect A chology. then it is an identity (p. . Kohler used the author. The identity theory has for an advantage the it avoids easily the traditional habit of regarding conscious processes as stable and fixed. the notes of chap. however. 61-67.23 8 ence between Nature of Consciousness the orders of phe- theory. must imply the same reality. perfectly correlated. 16). thought time neural thought intensity time.' It however. as if thought space were neural space. this ness must be conception of consciousclassified among the conventional theories of the mind- theory does not seem to him to be tenable. or at least the two aspects. W. principles for but had simitime and for Gestalt Psy- space (if the question of localiza- organization. It would not be to substitute difficult. for it a double-aspect theory. neural intensity. nomenal mind and the orders of neural body. see his tion can be raised at all) is evidence of identity. He that believes is any correlation time and also in word only lar for space. If 1929. The fact that should be clear now that no such simple correspondence can possibly be correct.

E... I2of. H. L. H. 81. 64. 226. 34 Bell. 59. D.. 32. 1461". I34f. M. R. C. 184-186 Graham. 171 Avenarius.. v. G. 125 Blix. 15 Calkins. K. 46. P. G. 2l6f. 182 Bernstein.. 39. A. 34 HO.. 4f. 148 Ebbinghaus... 19. T... 146 Goldscheider. M.. 123 Franz. 58 Bourdon. J. 215 Blumenfeld. 123 Frey. 115.. E... A. S.. 119 Aristotle. 101 Brues. M. E. 117 Benussi. Cutler. Fortuyn. 174.. K. 184-186 Fritsch. 182 Dallenbach. A.. 67-70. N. H. W. 15. McK.. 203. 74. ioif. A. G.. 146 Bryan... R.. A. 184 Dietze. W. L. C. 53. 171 Bentley. 32 Carlson. M. 185. 172-175... 182 Alston.. 220 218 H. W.. 73 "5*-. 218.. 184*.. 35. 121 Cutolo. C. 183. Ferree. 177. 2o6f. 219 Fernberger. W. 237 Donaldson. 34 Cattell. Broca. 182 48!. 151-153. Gundlach. 60 Curtis. Bray. L. 4. M. 146 W. 182 A. G.. 101 Frobes. L. 183 Brush... 182. 184. E. 18.. 126 Dodge. 32 Burnett. G.. 15 Dessoir. 213. A.. G. Blodgett. 236f. 14*. 216 Gahagan. 2i7f. Boring.. R. E. 196. M. H. 58.. 59 Gray.. 120. 3f. A. 172*-. 199. 121. L. W.. W.... 237 Baird. D. 157. 146 Angell.. E. 220. Bush. A. L. Descartes. 32 Bousfield. P. J. Bolton. H. 40. B. T. 70!. Bergstrom.. 185 Hall. 84!. 34.INDEX OF NAMES Adrian. 85. 58f. M.. i5Fechner.. 167 L. 147 Becher.. 58 Banister. 58 Griffith. C. J. N.... 2071". 161. Child.. 169. C... 146 B. J. R. 117 Haggqvist. $8f. W... F. 18. F. G. 117 Gates. 139 Alrutz.. A. 214 Geissler. 113. C.. S. S. J. A. Boring. 20. A.. 218 Berkeley.. 115. F. H7 17*. 33*-.. nf. V.. M. 183 Findley. J. 132. 182.. R.. 185 Dunlap. R. 196. 117 Bayliss. D. T.. C... 34.. T.... H. H. W.. 33. 146. M. 125 50-54.. 2i5f. L. 33*. Ephrussi. 173.. 59 Gregg.. 208. C.. 35. 172. J.. 125.. N.. S. J.. 35 Forbes. 117. 117. I34f. 134 239 . 218. 146 Dimmick.. E.

214 Lashley. R.. H. R. 100. 164. "6. 124 Herbart. W.. 66. E. H. 147. P.. H. 32. 35 Henri. 59 Mill. de. C... 109 Lucas. W. 115. E. 215 Hartline. Martius. K. 183. 237 J. 125. I92f. 18. 148. G.. Nagel. K.. 4. 122. I. Ogden.... A. A. 122. I97f. 127. F. 141. C.. 214 McFarland. 118. 214 Pratt. 17. v. 12. 237!. J..... 33.. 15 Lillie. 120. Hylan. C. 218 Muller. 218 Jevons. 128. Muller. G. E. A.. i84f.... 65. 120. 116 Hamilton. 15 Kreezer. 122-124.. E. H. 218 Poppelreuter. G.. 35 Mach. 21. 142!. P. 147. 186 Holt. 159 Nicholas. B.. 14 Langfeld.. 182. F. W. 84. 109 MacDonald. F. 213 Pendleton. E. 59 Nagge. 115. 217. v. 49. Hunter. 64. 218 216 Hoagland. 115 18.. W.. G. 214 Kiilpe. W. M. 126. E. P. J. 118 Lewin. M... J. 32 Meyer. 116 235 Rivers. 236 147. H. S. 119 Kant. A... 17.. 57 Locke... 34. 127. 26-29. R. L. 127 Kato. 157-160. W. 193.. 73. C. 199!. 183 Helmholtz. Rahn. 45 Koffka.. K. 76.. C. 5. 143... 216. 32.. A. 58. 16 Lapicque. 90. 146 Kennedy. G. H. D.. 114. 151 Meumann. Moller. 182.. 237 Quain... 144. 185 S. J. 184 Henning. H. S. 148 E. 2H Korte. 119 Rev6sz... C. 58. 216 Pintner.. G. I. L. 21. 58 Reimann. 641". 0. W. Nafe. A.. Hunt. 61.. R.. 34 Halverson. M. 185 Pillsbury. 115. W. 148 Jenkins.. W.... A.. 93. 194 . i62f. "if "6 I24f. I.. 123 Hillebrand. J. C. 154.. 78. i62f. 179.. Peak. 96... G. 183 Reeves... 98.. A.. M.... 58-60. K. 118 Moore. 135... 171. 214. 208. R. R. 215!. R. 59 Kiihn. I7if. 147 Krause. Hecht.. R. 176- Jastrow. W. 33. G.. 213 Kohler. 213 Mendeleyev. W. W. 149 Newton. 16 Hornbostel. James. 57. J. 4-6. 82. 32. 70. 115.. E. 4Sf. 53. 214 Lewis... 212 Poffenberger. 122 G. M. C. A.. 33. 181. 60. 160. 237 Hering. 24. 120 Hitzig. D. i8f.. C. 34.. 195. 183. 216 Myers. 92!.. 63. 34. Rand... i59.. 57 Luce... S. J... James. 160. S. 199. M.. K. 33 Rich. 17!. 57 Keith.. 117 Konig... 84. I. B. H. 213. 101 McDougall.. 15. 75-79. I9$f. 59 Head. E.... 191. 125 Hume. 57.l62 128. 117 Pattie.. V. E. 216 I48f. 157. T. 58. 15. 129. 8.. K. 153 Lotze. H. ii8f. 120 182. H. 34. S. R.. 100-103. H. 82-84. l6 5f. 124. F.. 64. A. 173. Herrick. xyif. 18. F. S. F.. J. J. 186 Laguna. 65f.240 Index of Names Lau. 158.

96. L.. 184.. 18. 32 Thorndike. i8if. I46f.Index of Robinson. E. 166... M. Smith. Stevens. 237 Schubotz. 84. 1821.. 237 Troland. 237 Sherrington. 122. W. J. S. 225-227. Tolman.. 148 241 Volkmann. S. P. 15. 222f. Yerkes.. R. 117 Weber. T.. 117. J. 64. 57 Washburn.. 212 Wopdworth.. M. 34. Talbot. F. 64. 179... A. 217 172. 117 Zotb.. 152.. 215 K.. 219 Wertheimer. E. E. 50-54.. 147 Wrightson. B. 226. P. Y. C. 96. 77 Wever. 15 19. C. 183.. 146. 2l6f. E. 15. 122.. S. 117 Zoll. M... L. 4!.. 237 127.. 214 Yokoyama.. 183.. Soury. 119 Zotterman. K. M. S. I27f. 4-6. 122 134.. 70. 166. 74. 1461. S. 123 Wilkinson. E. C. 16. 212 J. 119 Shepard. B. 58 . 66. ii6f. 167 Wiley.. 78. 116. Stumpf. 216. T.. 180 Skinner. 117 32. E.. F. H. Stern. E. 184 Schur. 88f. S. 186 Names Vierordt. 215. H. 236f. 122 Schafer.. 217 122 Spearman. 191. 117 Stone.. C. K.. B. M. 22.. 218 Rubin. 66. 237 Zeigarnik. 215. 0. A. 87.. 16 Smith. 1 20 Schumann.. 237 i8f... E.. R. Weld. 172. F... 162164. W. 106. E. E. T.. 214 Zener. 159. 59 Wundt. 82. E. G.. 143. E. 32f. W..... L.. 59 William of Occam.. Young. 216.. H. F.. May. B. 182 32-34. G.. F. 59.. Watt. M. 214 Titchener. 127.

.

. 49-54. 217 Attributes. 194. 44f. tonal. 224 relation to amnesia. 198 relation to mental organization. 97f. 26. inertia. ^96^. 229 as relational organ. 160. as limitation of consciousness. 243 . in science. 37 After-images. 170 physiology. as sensory clearness.. i67f.INDEX OF SUBJECTS Absolute judgments. 36.. 184 Helmholtz's. Affect ivity. Jevons's experiment. 2cof. I96f. 20of. 2Oof. 141 Alley experiments. set Localization Auditory quality. 88f. I47f.. i66f. analysis. 226f. 183 170. 216 focus and margin. 194-197. functions. as protensitive process. All-or-none law. relation to amnesia. 198 degree. 170 resonance-frequency. frequency. as protensitive event. All-or-none statistical. 87!. 216 fluctuation. 237 Afferent fibers. primacy among.. 201 Atomism. relation to anesthesia. Accommodation. 37 Behaviorism. 225 conditions. physiology of. 23. as protensitive history of concept. introspection of. 34 quantitative. 215-217 as affecting size. 168-170 Attention. 2i$f. 194-201... 32!. 18. 217 Attention. 198-200. temporal.. i67f. 117 Absolute pitch. 194. 141. 20f. 182 Ohm's law. 93!. 32!. Apparent movement. 141!. 167. 147 Appetite. 196 two-level theory. visual. 19. see Quality Auditory theory. 121 as cognitive process. relation to mass action. i6of. 3. I95f. 2Oof. 2Oof. 161. 2isf. 19-23. as unconsciousness. 2l6f.. 198-200. 217 Brain. as protensitive events. 200. Body and mind. n8f. 170. 22Sf. phenome- Actuality^ conscious. visual. 224f. 33 Auditory localization. cognitive function. i65f. I28f. 224f. quality. as object of observation. 142.. 198 relation to introspection. 235 as reportability. 216 range. Axon. Body see Mind and duration. 32 Acuity. range limited. Attensity.. 59 Associationism.. non. 170 resonance. as integrating organ. relation to intelligence. 215 Pillsbury's experiment. 217 Cattell's research. as sensory. 199. 181 sensation. 2isf. Anesthesia. 4$f. 17 Binocular parallax. 122 Amnesia. 38-41. 32 introspection on.. neural. 2i6f. Mach's analysis.. Analysis. 229-233 excitatory patterns. 8f. I2of. 58 Adaptation. 4.

236! as process. Correlation. 61.. 224 as dependent on attention. i8sf.. iS5f. see Localization of function Clearness. 164 dependence on discrimination. see Quality Cutaneous receptors. 45 f.. 182 Contour. as experimental method.. 33 Color theory. 160 frequency of light. 2361.. 99*-.. ii6 central factors. see Localization of function organ of consciousness. 173-181. as correlation. 58 Causality. of meaning. Brain. 2 3? as discrimination.. 14 Cause and effect. 222f. 8 as identification. regress of meaning in introspection. 231. 222f. 224f. 139 Cutaneous limen of duality. 8f. 124. 5. as cognitive.. 38 Conscious present. 8-14. 222-233.. 164 Current of action. 229-233 Brightness. 26 tonal. 221-238 process-nature. 225. 233-237 adaptation. See also Introspection Constancy hypothesis. 142. 12. Gestalt psychology. 115. 237 as dependent on nervous system. 234 as defined by anesthesia. no. 216 Convergence. 14. 128. psychophysiologi- Common 69-77. 184-186 free endings. 24f. 23f. 183 photochemical reaction. cutaneous. 24f. 162-165. I82f. I37f. 237?. see Attensity Colligation.244 Index of Subjects Consciousness. 187. 106. 87f. 212. 23 if. 7Sf. 24!. 74 Correspondence. 99. 3 if... 227f. 184- as relational.. Conditioned reflex. 183 cortical gray. 238 psychophysical. localization of function. I04f. 1 60. 8 continuity... 6$L Color pyramid. i64f. 88f. I44-H6 Corresponding points. 125 Cutaneous quality. as dependent on learning. 90 Cortical gray. 183 three components. 122 75. 7if. 230. visual. 232f . 230 tion. 234 as meaningful. 1551. 1 60. as relationship of consciousness. psychophysical. 176 Comparison. 222f. H4f.. 160 sensibility. 75-77.. 174 . no psychophysiological. relation to knowledge. 183 Helmholtz's. differentiation. 163 Young-Helmholtz. histological research. of perception. 159 Bering's. physiology of. 227-229 localization in brain.. 228 relation to amnesia. form. 73. successive. 236f. 23f. 182. io8f. as experimental method. Cutaneous 186 sensibility. relation to sleep. 234 visual. 116 Constructs. 33.. retinal. 148 Concomitant variation. as protensitive process.. 68f. 181. afferent.. 172-174. 25 Stf also Brilliance Brilliance. 16. i8sf. 7 Context theory. as sensory. 237 relational theory. Cerebral localization of function. 232. discrimina- 237 nature. I76f. 179. 134-136 Consciousness... 229!. in science. 75-77? 93? n6j protensitive. 234 inconsistencies of traditional view. introspective description. 16. pain. as protensitiye. visual. cal. 12 concept. 160 Ladd-Franklin's.

35. cerebral. 191. I3f. 184 temperature spots. Discrimination. visual imagery. perception Form. relation to illusions. 58 Nafe's theory. 62-126 as dimension. 228 Cutaneous summation. Epicritic sensibility. 78. 199 Dualism. Elements. I54f.. iof. 14 Experimental method. 184 quantitative theory. mental. I93f. 17-35. 4-6. n8f. 37 Experience. 177 Head's theory.. I3f.. 3 Epicritic functions. 86f. I48f. 4-6. 87!. 23. 88f. 123. Extension.. ipf. dependent. 184 pain spots. 44. 184 Equipotentiality. problem of 234f. 16. 112-114. 58. Double aspect theory. 4-6. 28-30 auditory. i87f. present status. 9. visual. 35 See also Depth. criteria. 44!. Fechner's law.. 237 Forgetting. 37 Elementarism. place theories. 145. 184 pressure spots. 68 retinal.. 245 afferent ex- citation. 173-175. 6. 43*. 175. 5-7. 118. 34 F Double-alternation maze. Tonal volume 229 Disperson.. 76f See also Parallelism Duration. relation of place theory of qual7-' I6S -r * relation to protensity. structure of cochlea. 59 Effector. of consciousness. intelligence. 32 Feeling. 177-179. 238 Double personality. 86-94. of conscious data. ^iiSf. brightness. 18.. 92. 79 tactual. iof. see Protensity . 2of. 22f. 92f. history of problem. n Efferent fiber. 118. 32 . 221. 224 Gestalt psychology. 86. 225f. 62-68. iof. 184 Cutaneous spots. 78f. 78-86 cerebral. tion. glassy sensation. 212. 67 physiology.. 37 Fact. 14-16. I77f.Index of Subjects Cutaneous sensibility.. 18 Empiricism. visual. 89. 5 Distance. 42f. 78f. relation to size. 115 phenomenal. 36-41 Existent iality. 122 of physics. 14 mediate. 234f. 14 direct. 154*.. visual. 87f. Epistemology of reality. ambiguous concept. 202 Excitation of nerve. 91-93. 79f. retinal disparity. 57f. 8f. 88-91. 80 Gestalt psychology. 4. tactual.. 226 independent. 173-175. secondary solid excit- atory fields.. 118. Depth. convergence. 223. relation to form.. as correlation. physiology. see Depth Dizziness. 146 tactual. 85 primacy..... 177-179. 3-8. n8f. introspection on. 212. 161. auditory.. Bernstein. 12. as function of brain. 236 anesthesia. Dichotic stimulation. I2 S^ distinguished from form... taste. Space Ear. 74. binocular parallax. 175. 117 Dimensions. immediate. i87f. 94 smell. 1271. 124!. accommodation. 93. 92f. 7. 30. 78-80 See also Extensity. i65f. 18. perspective. perceptual. LocalizaSize. see Weber-Fechner $ function as sensation. as protensitive process. H. 98. 103105. Extensity. 4-6. 69 Dendrite. relation to memory. 73.

as aptitude for learning. 213!". 57f. 228 . 18 Identification. 15 as retrospection. 34 Hypotheses. 128 Frequency.. 55-57. Intelligence. 128 relation to size. 99 protensitive.. 213 relation to attention. 26.. 191-193. 226. 26. 28 60 frequency theory. 192. school. Inference. 191. 191 relation to learning.. 121 extensitive. 46-48 191-194. 201 Gestaltqualitdt. 2i3f. 58f. 214 rats in maze. 235 as common factor. 91-93. 225 multiple fiber theory.. 206. 49-54. concept. 4. 66 learning. i6*if. 20 65 2l8f. 8f. Form-quality. Intensity. 226 volley theory. physiology of. 168-170. 226 as behavioral.. 215 relation to intelligence. 188 as correctness. significance. functions. by correlation. 236 as interpretative. 127 visual depth. concept. 46- as cerebral differentiation. as motivational. relation to unconsciousness. 36. 122 See also Depth 148 Induction.. 34. 226 as cognitive. see Form-quality Glassy sensation. 60 as cerebral localization. 55-57. to pitch. 59 Fusion. 118 Gray. 160. I3f. 2i4f. 184 Generalization. 23. experimental. of intensity. 60 visual. 4-6. relation of time to range. 183!. Lashley's experiments. iof. 214 as discrimination. to intensity. 198 relation to brain size. 99. 141. ngi. musical. 103. extensity. Gemeingefiihl. nonmusical intervals. Form. 23-25. 2i3f. 103. contours. as method. cerebral localization. 226 as inferential. 50-55. iQof. I3f. I3$f. 214 power 7. 234 sensory. Heat. 92. 16. as protensitive stimulus. i83f. 16. 56f. 21 tests. tonal. iof. i88f. 42-61. 76f. 182 Hunger. moon. 42-46. 24f. 59 Interactionism. of pitch. 36-61 as central summation. quality. 115 protensitive. quality. 2i2f. 951. 190 temporal.. 6f. 215 concept. 168-170. 214 as dualistic. perceived. Hi Frequency 219!. 2i3f. 118 Image. phenomenology. as dimension.. as altering mind. 227 as context. 191". as speed.. 87 Gestalt psychology. 33 Idea. somesthetic. 94 visual. 212-214 as insight. iSoi. Frequency theory. iof. 173. 99-107. 31.. related to sensation. 18 Immediate experience. 74 Hysteria. 189. Introspection. 46-50. 188-194. 238 Illusions. 212-215 all-or-none tests. in science. 210-212. Insight. 50. 8f. 12. 8. optical relation to visual depth. 189. 172.246 Index of Subjects Indifference point. 190 as dependent on mass action. in science. Geneticism.. 238 Identity theory. S8f.. cortical. 106. 123. 189... 228 as immediate experience. 213 speed tests. time-sense. 164 space theory. 16 Interval. i83f.

Index of Subjects Introspection.. 227 dependence on report. 123!. 113. 19 if. 209f. 206. s6f. 21 if. 231. 124. Korte's laws. in large organizations. iO4f. Kinesthesis.. as relativistic.. 105. sensory. 220 of organization.. 103-105. sense. relation to consciousness. I07f. modality. I24f. Hunter's criticism. igit. 206. 31 Irradiation. 73.. transfer. see Correspondence. 201 relation to mass action.. Ii2f. conditions. icx^f.. 126. 237 of introspection. 2251. 247 by animals. cerebral. 72. fragility. 107. 218 retroactive inhibition. 230 206f. reduction to time difference. 218 purposeful. 2O4f. iiof. 123. 218. 201 of function. 205 statistical artifacts in curve. 2O7f. 206. visual imagery as surrogate. I25f. 201-212. heirarchy. for different frequencies. 215 relation to attention. 205 nonsense. 217-220 active participation as aid. as basis for intelligence. 218 organization as aid. 147 Learning. 124 209 diminishing returns of repetitions. 122-124. 77-79. I04f.. 123. 201 as function of difficulty of mateas rial. 210. 4-6... 113.. physiology of. 64. see Quality.. physiology of. 220 dependent Localization. 237 physiology 212 of. Lashley's 102-105. Franz's research. 124!. 210-212 relation to range of consciousness. instantaneous with insight.. I07f.. 237 Mass action. Isomorphism. 79. somesthetic Knowledge. 201 relation to range of atttention. 237. H4f. as discrimination.. see Dispersion retention during sleep.. 100-107. relation to insight. 202f. relation to form. 215 as all-or-none process. 231. visual. 180.. 81. H4f. Localization 214 interference. 211 frequency functions as measures^ tactual. 215 mnemotechnical aids. iiof. 112-114. I22f. 218 law of frequency.. 230 relation to learning.. trial-and-error. surrogatipn. 218- on principles of probability. research. 2o8f. 203. 100. 218 direct interference. positive and negative. 66. 228 Titchener's formula. 125. 157!. 191-194. meaningfulness as aid. significance of nerve-division. 124. Fortuyn's areas. facilitation. 2o6f. 129 of feeling. as associative. 2i9f. 107-109. 98. 227-229.. auditory.. 204-206. ioif.. Introspectionism. 218 spatial localization as aid. 141. 125 perceptual. 122. 113!. 217!. consciousness in brain. relation to intelligence. 17. Latent time. 206-211. 226f. 202f. 66. 218 mechanical not effective. 214 . 209-212 relation to mental organization.. 208.. 202-206. 170. 227 Learning. 206. I2j. 23 5f. of objects. 200. 2l8f. 7 if. 218. 147 Local signs. 204-206. 125!. of duration. 235*. psychophysiological rhythm as aid. regress of meaning. reduction to intensitive difference.

as problem of psychology... Moon 4> I5f 7 17 illusion. 3-16 psychophy&ical parallelism. Octave. I57f. of feeling. 176. 148 Musical 170. 198. 70. 236f. 137 relation to inference. i87f. 235 relation to learning. 4. 38-41 Nervous system. as i8of. iof. 16. 156 variation with fixed meaning. Hecht's evidence. as explaining anesthesia.. 223. 168- 227 as relation.. use of term. Helmhpltz's immediate in introspection. 232f.. perception Organic qualities. Mind and body. 25 Memory. 121 Observation. 236 aspect identity theory. 16. 27f. 8f.. 171-181. relation to equipotentiality. 7. IS2f. as quality. in relation to psychology. function Localization 37.. 224. 238 Objects. as integrator. psychophysical. 37 Noise. 238 interactionism. 30 immediate. i84f.. as altering the existential. 157 cognitive differentiation. i$6f. 31. 185 spots. n6f. 57 Nerve excitation.. 171- chology. relation to stimulus Nativism. as datum of introspection. 182. persistence of organization.. interval. 235 relation to intelligence. 235 qualitative signs. cutaneous sensibility.. 237 of protensity. 234f. Modality. I3f.. 224. 4of. perceived. as fundamental in psy- direct. 25f.. 175 See also Quality Monism. 127 and response. psychophysical. 222f.. experimental. 78. of nerve conduc- 57 Neuron. 188 of consciousness. 4. 58 of intensity. 151153. 153.. of.. common 186 sensibility. perception. i6f. differentiation of exci- tatory pattern. 20lf. 192-194. as inferential. 57f. 15 1-15 j. protensitive. 182 cutaneous.. 176. 184-186 discrimination. 209-212 Meaning. 182 Measurement. i8of.. extensitive... 9$f. 4of.. 182 as intense sensation. 155?. 144-146. 237 context theory. 18 Muscular reaction. 22Sf. meaning of concept. 236f. I37f. 236 168-170 33f. i37f. 115 protensitive. 154 physiology. Muscle sense. 16 problem. 229 See also Brain. 214 relation to attention. i6f. 172 Organization. levels within psychology. 1 80. 144-146 . 173 Parallelism. 36-41 Nerve impulse. as response. 236 Pain. as relativistic. stability. 182 relation to consciousness. 42-46. 70. for protensity. 13f.Index of Subjects Mass action. 18 Method. relation to reduction. 180 as summation. 4. 181. 180. Paradoxical cold. Nerve conduction. I28f. cerebral localization. 222f.. 45f. 226 . 222f. 202 as See also Learning Mental chemistry. 158 comparison across. 4. 10-12 of Membrane theory tion.. 222f. perception. 23 2f. 143. double theory. 12. Multiple fiber theory.

141-143 surrogation. I04f. nsf. terms 'high' and 'low*. 23-31. Gestalt psychology. as protensitive event. i64f. I3$f.. m in physics. of objects. 146 relation to mental flux. 235 psychophysiological ence. I3of. secondary criteria. of conscious dimensions. cessive comparison.. of short times. 128 correspond- Young's analysis. 99. 33f. 67-74. 142. in temporal maze. 127 bodily cues. extensity. Projection I47f.Index of Subjects Parsimony. 181 smell. 184!". concept.. auditory. 178. judgments by theories of. theory. 146 estimation of duration. 30 attribute of duration. specific nerve energy. Quality. 106 Pretension. i6sf. 147149 Protopathic sensibility.. 159 in chemistry. Psychophysical parallelism. 148 145. relation to quality.. I27f. 144-146 physiological processes. I48f. 73. 26-29. Color theory. 182 taste. 58. is8f. see Correlation Physical science. 16. 5. 73!.. 146 Protensity. 142.. I9f. 137-146. primacy among dimensions. 150-186 analysis in hearing. 151 in modality. I4if... I34f. as protensitive nomenon. 171-181. I9f. inner. Bernstein's. 1841. 158. 181 range of consciousness. Specific nerve energy Quantity. 1271". 166.. 2i9f. 22 place theory. 131 concept. Modality. 165-170. 25f. see Parallelism 234 phe67- of consciousness. 13 if. 23-25. 127. 134-136 immediately perceived. 212 Prior entry.. I3$f. rhythm. 126 Place theory. 133-138. Psychophysics. 226 of form. 129 .. brightness. relation to extensity. 30 Hering's. 25. 148. Cutaneous sensibility. 2 if. sensory processes. 122 reduction to quantity. 23. 130132. I5f. cutaneous. I5of. 12 70. I46f. ill.. judgments. 146 Phi-phenomenon. I59f. 65 method. 4-8 dimensions of. observation of. 117 frequency functions. 147 sucintegration. 33 '47 physiology of. 177 concept. 147 estimation of time after sleep. 62f. sensation of time. 162 somesthetic. differentiated by variation. I46f. 133-137. Helmholtz's visual theory.. auditory. 133-137. 22f. in temporal maze. intensitive 143-146. Psychophysical correlation... Pitch. visual. io6f. 146 indifference point. 121 Phenomenology. 99 of pretension. 35. principle of. I46f. I34f... 235 visual.. isof. 4 absolute judgments. I32f.. 249 38 Perception. 150 See also Auditory theory. of long times.. analytical theories of color. 133-137. rats. 271". 34. 162 25f. 139-141. 146f. 26f. cutaneous... conscious present. 171-181. 181 cutaneous. 149 temporal processes.. 93 of form. 149 surrogation. I28f. i87f. 147 Protensity.. isof. i83f.

37 latent time. I2of. 140 Summary of this book. alley experiments. I97f. 94f. 143. 158. 146!. Rhythm. see Quality Smell prism. as protensitive process. relation to extension. 146 voluntary waking. 236 by surrogation. Localization. 166 auditory theory. Receptor. 134!. 121. 8 7 speculation in.. 35 Solidity. 143. 115 nativism. relativism of.78 history. 18 Sensorial reaction. Response. Ii8f. Smell. 115. relation to distance. 97. geneticism. see Depth Space. see Localization Tactual quality. 32f.250 Range Index of Subjects of consciousness. Subtractive procedure. 225. Sleep. volume 64. 65 as theory of centers.. 118 audition. cutaneous. 184 as cortical localization^ 185 as projection theory. 88-91. O2f. see Quality Tactual two-point limen. 94-98. see Attributes Stereoscopy. i97f. Reduction of conscious content. 3-6 realities in. 38 Size Specific nerve energy. as any neural effect. 233-236 concept. 95f.. 94. 97!". 121. I2of. n8f. 95. 182 color theory.. perceived.. as protensitive integration. 93. Reflex. . as aid to memory. 21 attributes. 94. 2iof. 182 Helmholtz's extension. 229f.. 182 localization of cerebral function. physiology. Extensity. 224 Sensation. 205. 85 quality.. I4<5f. 120 tactual theory. 176 physiological. 67 See also Extension. 148 Successive comparison. Refractory period. to form. ^ relation to size. i6if.. I07f. perceptual. of perceived size. 96!". Retinal disparity. extensity. 157.. 124 Symbolism. 143 Science. 119121 . 182 Specious present. 147 Surrogation. see Twopoint limen Taste.... 17-22. 26-29. 8 Scopolamine syndrome. 13. 74 in science. iS9f. 236 in learning. 93. see Consciousness Relativism. 142. extensity. 38 conditioned. relation to stability of objects. relation to attention. 81. 148 Size. 140.. in higher mental proc- solute. 148 Successive induction. as protensitive. classification. 64f. i6of. 117 quality. as any neural cause. 195. as protensitive process. 159.. 92!. Form. 146 Tactual localization. 13 if. 134 Speculation. 37 67.. 6-8 Space perception. 17if. 182 Reflex arc. 79. 32 scientific. 58 abpain. I2of. 95-98.. 62-68. in localization. 38-41 Relational theory of consciousness. 119-121. 142!.. relation to posture. 237 estimation of time. 1191. ^208. 97.. as a construct. concept.. 1541". 132. Summation. 98.. I34f. 86. see Tonal olfactory. auditory. muscle sense.. 96f. 30 Reaction time. Reversible perspective. relation Synapse. 88-91. 218 as concentrated attention. esses. as construct. 37f. 154! psychic. see Quality . 148 Reality. 94!". Stimulus. 31.

82. 6 1 Weber's law. 154 Unconscious mind. as function of intensity. 184 relation to auditory localization. 6of. see Quality Vocality. 25 Volley theory of intensity. Time. 168-170 physiology.. Touch pyramid. 224 Two-point 125 73. 146 indifference point. 82-85. 117 Tonality. 84. Ii6f. 35 Temporal maze. as unformed. Quality Visual quality. 85.. 170. 197!. as symbolic function. ^of. see Pretension. 117 experimental measurement. Thirst. HO. 145. 85. 80-85. 82. 117 59 Wever-Bray effect. Extensity. 83f. as attribute. see Localization Visuai perception. 148 Time-sense. Tonal volume Weber-Fechner function. 74. as ogive. 34 Wever-Bray 167 effect. of tones. Extension. Protensity Time-error.. 29f. 26.^ 1 15 correspondpsychophysiological ence. 167. Extensity. 59. 59 dependence on absolute judgments. ii6f. 116 as function of frequency. see Extension. 68f. 50-55. ii6f. 50-52. .Index of Subjects Taste tetrahedron. 142. physiology of. 117 criticism. 10-13. 7of.. 34 Thought. 148!. parallelism. 81. Volume. 7 Visual imagery. physiology of. 148 for judgment of time. quality. relation to brightness. Unconscious inference. 25f. as associative. 8of. 87 as visual imagery. limens. ii6f. n6f. 82-85. see Weber-Fechner function Touch blends. n6f. fee Depth. 6of. 26f. Twilight sleep. as localizing surrogate. Tonal volume. I35f. 144. 81 Visual localization. 251 limen. 78. 50-52. 144. 79.

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