Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence and Social Power Author(s): Bertram H.

Raven Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 493-520 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791662 Accessed: 24/06/2009 14:44
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Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1990

Political Applications of the Psychology of InterpersonalInfluence and Social Power1
Bertram H. Raven2

A Power/Interaction model of interpersonal influence and social power is presented with particular attention to its applicability to the analysis of confrontation between major political figures. The analysis follows a series of steps, both from the perspective of the influencing agent and the target:First, it examines the motivations to influence and to resist influence, motivations which are often much more complex than the immediate extrinsic goals. These, in turn, determine the choices of influence strategies, the selection of the bases of power (reward, coercion, legitimate, expert, referent, or information) or more complex strategies, the manner or mode in which the power is exercised or resisted, and the stage-setting or preparatory devices to influence or resist influence. The degree and form of compliance are determined by all of these factors. Following the influence attempt, successful or unsuccessful, there is a reassessment of the interpersonal relationship by both the target and the agent, with the stage set for different strategies of influence and resistance in the next go-round. For illustration, the model is applied to the analysis of confrontations between Hitler and von Schuschnigg and between Truman and MacArthur.
KEY WORDS: social power; interpersonal influence; political behavior; interpersonal conflict, dominance.

INTRODUCTION In the latter part of 1950 there was increasing evidence that U.S. General, and commander of the United Nations forces in Korea, Douglas MacAr'Portions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Amsterdam, June 1986. 2Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles 90024. 493
0162-895X/90/0900-0493$06.00/1 ? 1990 International Society of Political Psychology

once and for all.Churchill's attemptsto influencede Gaulle. described hereinwill also have though. attacked the South Korean. flush with victory in drivingthe North Koreanforces out of South Korea.I shallpresentone suchtheoretical In model. the Therehave undoubtedly been manymajorpoliticaleventswhichhave on the successful unsuccessful or of hinged attempts one majorpoliticalfigure to influence another. foreignpolicyin Europeandthroughout world. Chinese Communistforces.Churchill. by Christmas. Robert Kennedy'sinfluence over J. this paper. he foresaw the possibility of disaster in the eventthatthe People'sRepublic Chinawouldthenenterthe war. as we shallsee.He also foresawseriouseffects on by U.S. all of these confrontationsoccurredwithin a largerpolitical and historicalcontext. The eventsfollowingthe Wake Islandmeetingthen affected not only the war in Koreabut international relationsthroughout globe for manyyearsto come (Lowitt. As our analyticaltool. appears it that in fact he had failed. we will utilize a Power/Interactionmodel of influenceon whichI and othershavebeenworkingovermany interpersonal . However. Edgar Hoover regardingthe role of the FBI in civil rights activities.Overthe years.particularly if accompanied NationalistChinese. of influenceprocessNonetheless.000 fighting men.and WoodrowWilson's attemptsto influenceClemenceau Lloyd Georgeafter WorldWar or I.Within48 hours.determined influenceMacArto thuron thisveryissue. 1950. and Truman. he was also inclinedto acceptmilitarysupport offered by ChiangKai-Shekand the NationalistChinesegovernment in Taiwan.which of he thoughtlikelyif Americantroopscrossedinto North Korea. To be sure.Thoughhe felt thathe had beenpersuasive.UnitedNations. issued a specialcommuniqueannouncinghis final offensive to end the war and unify all of Korea.Hitler'sinfluence over Chamberlain Munich. or over von Schuschnigg at with regardto the Austrian Anschluss.494 Raven thur. 1967).was planninga majorAmericanand UnitedNationsoffensiveacross the 38th parallelinto North Korea in order to end the war. with over 200.Truman MacArthe met thur on WakeIslandon October15.We will be focusingparticularly the interpersonal at level.MacAron thur.PresidentHarryTrumanhad supported use of SouthKorean the troops in North Korea. and shall furtherattemptto illustrate its applicability. Despitethe restrictions his activities.Onecanreadlyspeculate alternate on outcomesof major encounters suchas Stalin's variousattempts influence to Roosevelt. someof the processes applicabilityto intergroupand internationalinteraction.In this action. the importanceof which should not be minimized. whichI believeto be helpful.social psychologyhas produceda verysubstantial literaturewhich examinesthe dynamicsof interpersonal influenceand socialpowerrelationships. on November24. and UnitedStatesforces.an understanding the basic interpersonal es in such eventswould seem to have majortheoreticalas well as practical significance.

P. presentthe full disagreement all of its nuances. however. the target.This model originatedwith the basesof powertaxonomywhichJohn R.and the subsequent effects of the use of power on the influencingagent.Essentially. ogy of power and interpersonal Suffice it to say that PresidentTruman.S. (see the 1988). and such the mightalso be the case for the target. armedforces. Army of the Far East. reference (or identification). and the various stage-settingand preparatory deviceswhich each might use to influenceor resistinfluence. attitudes. BASES OF POLITICAL POWER: AN EXAMPLE IN TRUMAN AND MacARTHUR In discussingTruman's attemptsto influenceMacArthur. bringingin much of the work on interpersonal influence processescarriedout by varioussocialpsychologists Raven.Our purpose in hereis primarily illustratehow an analysisin termsof the social psycholto influencemight be applied.we cannot.or even a nation. 1983.S. I shall use the Truman/MacArthur purposes. was faced with some particularly difficult problemsin attemptingto influencethe commandinggeneralof the U. 1988).our approach proposesthat there are six bases of power.or behaviorsof a target. Frenchand I developeda numberof years ago (Frenchand Raven.or behaviorof a person(the targetof influence)whichresultsfrom the action. who was then also the designatedcommanderof the United Nations forces in South Korea.In presenting basesof poweranalyencounterfor illustrative sis.the basesof poweranalysis has since been expandedto a numberof other areas of social interaction of examination social influence (Raven.threatof punishment(coercion). Though originallydevelopedto understand ways in which a supervisorin a worksituationinfluencesa worker. The power/interactionmodelthen also considersthe motivationsfor the use of power by the influencingagentand for resistance complianceby the target.we consideredthe the influencing agentandtargetas individuals.includinga verypreliminary in political conflict (Raven and Kruglanski. There were a number of critical issues of . 1959). and information (persuasion). attitude.1970).as commander-in-chief the of U.In most of our writings. 1965.Political Power 495 years. resourceswhich an influencing agentcan utilizein changingthe beliefs.it is frequently case that the agent can be a group. and on furtherattemptsat influence and resistanceor compliance. promiseof reward. of course. or presenceof anotherperson(the influencingagent).as the potentialfor suchinfluence. However. simply. Therehas. an organization.expertise.legitimacy. We had definedsocial influenceas a changein the belief. Socialpowerwas defined.been considerableexpansionand development over the years.

with disastrous results. Truman tried to convince MacArthur that an offensive into North Korea would be disastrous. A third closely related issue was Truman's concern that MacArthur not give press interviews and public statements which attacked or undermined the administration's positions. 1956): decisionI madein connectionwith the Koreanconflict had this one aim in "Every mind:to preventa thirdworldwarandthe terrible destruction wouldbringto the it civilizedworld. then the broadening of the conflict would become quite likely. The other was MacArthur's desire to accept Chiang KaiShek's offer of Chinese Nationalist troops from Taiwan in support of such an invasion. whom he sent to meet with MacArthur. 345) Up until that point.496 Raven disagreement involved. is based on the information. Truman's motive for influencing MacArthur not to exercise these options is spelled out in his memoirs (Truman. at their meeting on Wake Island.S.This meantthat we shouldnot do anythingthat wouldprovidethe excuseto the Sovietsand plungethe free nationsinto an all-out war.." (p. or logical argument. One was MacArthur's belief in the necessity of a fullscale American invasion of North Korea. was not bluffing when he announced that PRC troops would enter the combat if the American and United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallelinto North Korea.S. forces in Korea. Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.S. He could also point to the serious impact on U. The advantages of successful use of informational power are that the target of influence ac- . How might the bases of power which we had presented in our earlier writings apply to an analysis of such influence attempts? THE SIX BASES OF SOCIAL POWER Informational Power Informational power. or if Chiang KaiShek's nationalist army troops were involved. or persuasion. Thus Truman was determined to influence MacArthur not to attempt either of these options... that Chou En-Lai. Truman exercised informational power in his direct communications with MacArthur. and through information communicated through his emissary. in concert with the armed forces of South Korea. that the influencing agent could bring to bear on the target in order to implement change. and detail the dangers of committing all of the U. foreign policy. Presumably. thus inviting attacks in other parts of the world. There was also the possibility that involvement of troops from Taiwan would trigger an invasion of the Chinese Nationalist stronghold by the PRC. Averill Harriman. Truman felt that if U. the armed forces of the People's Republic of China were not formally involved in the Korean conflict. Truman could draw on intelligence reports of the massing of Chinese troops. troops crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea.

341). . or to relievehim of his command. documented severalreports.Coercivepower. 1967.Political Power 497 thereis less dangerof distrust.. Given the implicatarget tions of firinga generalwithverystrongpopularsupport. MacArthur PresidentTrumancould threatento reprimand fluencingagent..). p. anyone who favored the generalissimo might wellarousethe president's disfavor" 1964. Surveillancemight appearto be simple in this case. p. 7-8). of course. then informationalpower will prove ineffective. 1967. . althoughthey are buildingairstrips" (Lowitt.1967.He was openly critical"(Truman. but the commanding . need less privately. also remained convincedthat only a show of strongforcewouldbe effective in counteringthe aggressionin the Far East. .and the likelycriticisms in Congressfor being "soft on Communism.To pursue other coursewould be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victoryto any a potentialenemy"(MacArthur quotedin Lowitt.accordingthe Harriman.pp. 29).p. In responseto intelligencereports.coercivepowercan be effectiveonly if the is believesthat the threatenedpunishment likely. or cannot understand acceptthe arguments. ceptsthe changedbehavior for surveillance.requiressurveillanceif the target of influencecomplies only becausehe is concernedabout his beingpunishedfor not complying.MacArthur said that "hisintelligenceand photographsshow no undueconcentration of forces. and posto on the battlefieldsof Europe" siblylost. At the close of the WakeIslandmeeting.p. MacArthur concludedthat Truman's concernaboutassistancefrom Taiwanwas coloredby a major blind spot: "President Trumanhad conceiveda violent animosity toward Chiang Kai-Shek. 1956. It seems clearthat in as suchwas indeedthe case with MacArthur. 441ff. has deeplyingrained get is extremelycommittedto an alternative or valueswhichoppose such action. and more wholehearted cooperation. The generalremained convincedthroughthe WakeIslandmeetingthat there in wasverylittlechanceof interference Koreafromeitherthe People'sRepubalso lic of Chinaor the SovietUnion (Lowitt. However. CoercivePower mediatedby the inThis basisof powerinvolvesthreatof punishment. (Lowitt. The general (MacArthur.then therewouldbe no reasonto comply unlessthe influencingagent could determinethe natureof his compliance.it will indeedbe fought. 1967.However.if the tarposition.p." MacArthur must have consideredit unlikelythat he would be fired or reprimanded failing to for heed Truman's requests. as he stated to the president of the United Press. ". "If the fight is not wagedwith courageand invincible determination meetthe challengeshere.Trumanrealizedthat he had been unsuccessful in his use of informationalpower:"I had hoped and triedto convincehim that the policy he was askedto follow was right. 20). 10).This may have been impliedin some of theircommunications. He had disagreed.

Immediately after the Wake Islandmeeting. Defense.A promotionmightbe if an effective rewardundersome circumstances. p. and the Presidentis intenselydesirousof supporting in the most effectivemanyou nerwithinourmeans. . and presumablythere could be other such honors in the future a smallreward. and I did not intendto do it now. A specialcommendation or medal? Perhaps. one not lackingin symbolic significance.At the end of the Wake Island meeting.The firmnessof some of Truman's ordersto MacArthur clearlyimthe posibilityof dire consequencesif these were not obeyed. but perhaps. Thereis the additionalcost for the use of coercivepower-the targetwill verylikelydevelopnegativeaffect towardsthe influencingagent. pp.p.if it is used successfully. we arefacedwithan extremely grave international situation. and. 1956. the RewardPower The influencingagent can promisesome sort of rewardif the target complies. 294-295). State..Truman says that he was restrainedfrom reprimanding MacArthurafter the Chinesetroops invadedand pushedthe United Nations troops back south of the 38th parallelbecause"I have neverbelievedin going back on people whenluck is againstthem.Truman decoratedMacArthurwith a fourth oak-leaf cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal. Reward.Thereis no directevidencethat Trumanovertlythreatenedto reprimand removeMacArthur he continuedto disobeyorders. But GeneralMacArthur mighthave been moreimpressed an offer to alby low him greaterfreedomin some of his othermilitaryadventures. Nor did I want to reprimand general.pp.like coercion.."(Truman.At the sametime.. the Generalin this case but was probablyabout as high as he could possiblygo. and was considered. Marshall via of to MacArthur November1950:"Everyone in here. 1956. 298).the aftereffectsare likely to be more positive than with coercion. surveillance. 383-384).Thereis the questionas to what rewardPresidentTrumancould have offered to GeneralMacArthur he complied.498 Raven generalcan surreptitiously engagein a numberof escalationactivitieswhich are not readilydiscernible.. 409). at least or to give him firm supportfor his overallpolicies. Perhapsthis is what was intendedby a communication Secretary DefenseGeorgeC. or if but it shouldhavebeenclearthat sucha possibilitydid exist. requires However.1973. which mightundermine effectivenessof the otherbasesof power.1973. leaving plied MacArthur with his face "asredas a beet"(Miller. in fact. thereis some evidencethat suchdid indeed occur."(Whitney. MacArthur beto countermand Truman'sorderby secretlyorderingAmericantroops gan acrossthe Yalu River(Miller.

MacArthur reportsthat at theirinitialmeetingon WakeIsland.I send you on my warmestcongratulations the victorywhichhas been achievedunder in your leadership Korea.. 1988).Truman ".1964.Political Power 499 powerin termsof tanThoughwe usuallythinkof coercionandreward rewardsand real physicalthreats.He had been led to believethat Truman had a violenttemper." to" "should. 361-362).he was taken aback by Truman'samiability. pp.prepared coercivepowfor er. MacArthur's statementthat Trumanwould disappoveof anyone who was of an of coersupportive ChiangKai-Shek suggested awareness suchpersonal cive power.a quickand wittytongue. As a side effect. nor thatingratiation contributed MacArthur's to his accepting recommendations...radiated and nothingbut courtesy good humorduring our meeting. Instead.Unfortunately Truman. I saluteyou and say to all of you from all of us at home. p. LegitimatePower This methodof influenceis basedon a structural between relationship the influencingagentand the target. it appears. 1964. In the military. the lavish praise and the authorizationfor invasion may havehad an unintended side-effectin thatit helpedconvinceMacArthur further of his superiorknowledgeand skills. and I liked him from the start"(MacArthur..." Thus termssuch as "obliged.or disapproval considerablecoercivepower.MacArthur might have felt more rewarded the authorization crossthe 38th parallel.Implicitly.He has an engagingpersonality. can powerfulreward power. Ingratiationis one means for estabprovide reward coercive and lishingpersonal power(Jones. and furtherlessenedhis relative respectfor PresidentTruman's expertise.Mitchelland Liden.""required may signal the use of legitimatepower. 'Well and nobly done"'(Lowitt.it is unlikelythat MacArthur for valued Truman's approvalsufficientlyfor this basis of power to be effective." "ought. 1967.and was.the agentsays. 13).or explicitly.thoughwith South to by Koreantroops only.Mightthis not have been an attemptby Trumanto establishpersonalrewardpower and referentpower? Ingratiationcan also build a basis for personal coercive power.legitimatepower of superior . Perhapsit was in part to build such a personalrewardrelationship that Trumanwent to greatlengthsin congratulating on MacArthur his success in occupyingall of South Koreain the summerof 1950:".we should recognizethat the possigible bility of personalapprovalfrom someonewhom we like can resultin quite fromsomeonewe like. "I have a rightto ask you to do this and you havean obligationto comply.rejection.

sinceMacArthur also actingas supreme in was commanderof the allied forces and commander-in-chief the United Naof tions Command.and indeedhe had said that such was the case. armedforces.obey any ordersthat he receivedfromthe President.") When legitimatepower can be effectivelyimplemented.")Legitimate poweris most obvious whenit is basedon some formalstructure a supervisor a higher-ranking or officer influencinga subordinate.1972). accepted such as (a) The legitimatepowerof reciprocity["Idid this for you.. Trumanmighthave reliedon the general's longtimededicationto a military code which recognizedthe power of superiorofficers.The LondonDailyMirroreditorialized "Iceland muststop exploiting fact that the she is a small and weak countryup against a large and powerfulone."] (Gouldner.(b) equity ["You did somethingto harm me.. couldthen be seenas havinglegitimate powerover MacArthur. as a soldier.and.1960).. or a normwhichsays that we have some obligationto help otherswho cannot helpthemselves. Despite such verbaldeclarations.Thus the weak may have a legitimatepower over the strong.whichdrawon generally socialnorms.As an old solider. troops in this command will no longersmokein the latrine.it does have an advantageover coercion and reward.S.Truman's legitimatepoweras Presidentof the United States over a militarycommanderwould seem quite unambiguous. pp. accordingto AverillHarriman-even though he appearednot to accept the logic of Truman's that request. it might invoke less personalfeeling on the partof the target.thereareotherformsof legitimatepower whichmaybe moresubtle.andMacArthur even reassured Truman's emissary. as a soldier.However.Yet MacArthur such legitimatepowexplicitlyrecognized er. (In the height of a to to disputeoverfishingrights.AverillHarriman.otherswho aredependent upon us (Berkowitz. 351-353).in that surveillance would not be required. 351-353). as commander-in-chief military Truman.500 Raven officers is expectedto be so firmlyingrainedthat an emphaticfuturestatement from a superiorofficer conveyslegitimatepower. 1978).Heacceptedthe President's but positionandwill act accordingly withoutfull conviction" (Truman."] (Walsteret al.Trumanmight have had some clue that MacArthur Truman's mightnot havereallyrespected legitimatepower: .that "hewould. The legitimacywas not so unambiguous this case. 1956.pp. so I have a right to ask you to do something to makeup for it. so I expect that you should do this for me.. Trumanfelt thatsuchlegitimate powerwouldbe in effectin anycase. of the U. ("Asof 1800hours on July 15.Icelandonceappealed Britain acceptIceland's limitedresources theirdependence and upon fishingfor theirlivelihood." whichmay or may not be followedwith orderof the Commanding "By Officer.1956.obey any ordersthat he received fromthe president" though even he impliedthat he did not acceptthe rationalefor some such orders(Truman.(c) responsibility dependence.with perhapsa tinge of coercivepower."heanswered he would. as comparedto coercion. MacArthurmight have been expectedto respectsuch authority.

. is not used to persuade the target. but don't you ever again keep your Commander Chief waiting. 1973. and then he apologized for allowing his name to be put forward as a potential contender for the presidency in 1948. p.. That knowledge. Expert Power This base of power depends upon the target's attributing superior knowledge or ability to the influencing agent. nearthe runway there. in I'dhavebustedhim so fast he wouldn't haveknownwhathappened him. and also apologized for publicly disagreeing with Truman's policy in his statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. So I just sat there. MacArthur appeared to experience guilt. and I said..I just waited. Finally. I've come halfwayacrossthe worldto meetyou. Truman noted that the general was not among the welcoming party. He apologized for that. It is also customary for the subordinate officer to come out to greet a visiting superior officer. Certainly.. posture. but don'tworryaboutthat. As he later described the event to Merle Miller in typically salty fashion. but he said(sic) . 294) If MacArthur had expected this strategem to reduce Truman's sense of legitimate power. One might have expected that he would have been ripe for Truman'suse of legitimate power based on the equity norm (Walster et al.Is that clear? in His facegot as redas beet. 1978). (Miller.I'd havewaiteduntil hell froze over if I'd had of to. When expert power is used effectively. per se. why he wentarounddressedlike a nineteen-year-old second lieutenant. a superior officer is not kept waiting for his appointment with a subordinate. Perhaps so. dress. and we went on from there. an old man like that and a five-stargeneralto boot. neverdid understand. in terms of behavior. his expectations were rapidly corrected. I tell you this. etc. however. If he'dbeen a lieutenant my outfit going arounddressedlike that. Now you look here. I took one look at him. Truman used this event to emphasize both his legitimate and coercive power: Whenhe walkedin..the son of a bitchwalkedout of one of the buildings He was wearingthose damnsunglasses his and a shirtthat was unbuttoned of and I a cap with a lot of hardware. Yet when the presidential plane landed for their meeting on Wake Island. I wasn'tgoingto haveone of my generals embarrass President the United the States. it certainly has advantages over coercion or rewardpow- . Indeed. I just want you to knowI don'tgivea good goddamwhatyou do or thinkaboutHarryTruman. ... pp. he indicated he understood that what I was talkingabout. 294-295) Once he was aware of his obvious violation of military protocol with regard to the commander in chief. Rather the target is expected to have faith that the influencing agent really knows what is best. (Miller.Political Power 501 The military has quite well-defined protocol regarding the manner in which a military officer receives a superior officer. to 1973. but it appears that in the long run the degree of such power was not sufficient.

But GeneralMacArthur and rightly.or superiorknowledgeand insight based on his exworldleaders seasonedinternational and and perience contactwithimportant in Washington..As to Truman's had "Were politicaladvisers his advisers.. MacArthur expertise. the 1954." felt MacArthur that he personallyhad a much greaterin"thosewho advocateappeasement defeatism and sightinto Asianmentality: in the Pacific. Asunsuccessful. thereby.. facts withoutthe logic and reasoning encompassing dictatingthese facts. Trumancould claim to have the advantageof certaincareful intelligence reportsand estimates. presentinga strangecombinationof distorted historyandvaguehopes.. 361-362).502 Raven er. 383-384)."bypractically by everymilitary leaderconcernedwith the Koreancampaign.would havecourt-martialed secondlieutenantwho gave pressinterviews exto any press his disagreement. superior's the legitimate power alwaysaccept shouldstill hold sway.. Referent Power This basis of power stems from a sense of mutualidentity.pp. it seemed to me that in spiteof his havingreadmuch." (Truman. 341).later commentedin return: courseeverysecondlieutenant "Of knowsbestwhathis platoonought to be given to do. Truman..and his militaryadvisersplayingpolitics?"(pp.MacArthur concluded sessing "he seemedto take great pride in his historicalknowledge. to his weresingularly Truman's attempts establish expertise Trumanfollowingthe Wake Islandmeeting.His meetingwith Harriintelligencereports man "left me with a feeling of concernand uneasinessthat the situationin and the FarEastwas littleunderstood mistakenly in downgraded highcircles in Washington.do not understand Orient.. pp. 341-342). and it may even avoid some of the problemswith legitimatepower.He concludedthat criticisms his strategy of camemainlyfrom"laycircles" while his own viewsweresupported the trueexperts. Of the Far East he knew little.He referred such intelligence to reportsand indistrategists catedthat he had readwidelyand studiedthe historyand politicsof the Far East quitecarefully. with coercivepoweralwaysat the readyto help reinforce it.1951).drawingon his own militaryexperience. officer mightnot EventhoughTrumanunderstoodthat a subordinate the expertpowerof his superior."(MacArthur. and he alwaysthinksthe higher-upsare just blind when they don'tsee it his way.MacArthur seriousquestions: playing strategist.p.it was of a superficial character.. 1956.includingour own Joint Chiefs of Staff" (MacArthur. from the target feeling a sense of oneness with the agent and feeling.Trumanalso could cite the expertadvicewhichhe was receivingfrom his own militaryand political advisors."(MacArthur.too . 1964.but.that .He had his own clearlydid not respectTruman's which he consideredsuperior.

General George C. p. If he could not rely on his own referentpower.Political Power 503 he/she wishes to see things similarly. both have similar roots in the middle of the American continent. seem to feel some communality with Harriman: "Harriman and I were friends of long standing. MacArthur did.. One form is environmental manipulation. think. His choice of Averill Harriman as his emissary was likely quite deliberate. 341). He might also have realized that MacArthur did not feel any real sense of identity with Truman. Truman might have appealed to such mutual identification with MacArthur-they were. The secretary of defense. . They were clearly so different in style and in manner. There are several other approaches which are less direct. A high barbed-wire fence may have more influence on habitual trespassers than a sign threatening prosecution.Defense. Truman might have attempted to use referent power. Though both had a history of military service. 409) There is no evidence that any of these attempts to use referent power proved effective. Congress controlled the purse strings and it appeared that they might thus limit his ability to engage in such a venture. Such a device was once used by Theodore Roosevelt when he wished to send the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific and to Japan as a show of force. 1956. . Other Less Direct Methods of Influence The six bases of power are not the only means which people use in influencing one another. Marshall. However.Everyone andthe President..State. in support of Truman.. intensely is desirous supporting in the mosteffectivemanner of you within our means . both patriotic citizens of the same nation. including service in the First World War. but I wantyou to knowI understand here.this appears. indeed. or what Cartwright (1965) has called "ecological control": Rather than influencing the target directly. the agent may change the situation so that the target is pressed to comply. it is possible that. after all. p. 1964. (Whitney. yourproblems.to be unavoidable. the difficultyinvolvedin conductingsucha battle I undernecessarily limitingconditions. Wouldn't they then be expected to see things similarly? Again. etc. While superintendent at West Point I had hunted ducks on his preserve near Tuxedo" (MacArthur. may have been attempting to establish referent power by communicating a sense of mutual understanding and common outlook: We all realizeyour difficultyin fightinga desperate battlei11 mountainous a region underwinterconditionsand with a multinational force in all degreesof preparedness. perhaps he might instead invoke the referent power of others in the administration. there was a sharp difference between MacArthur's long-term commitment to the military and his very high rank and Truman's relatively brief servicesas a lower-levelofficer. I also understand. both have had military backgrounds. at one time or another. .

this method would not appear to have been very applicable to the current situation. or referent power. Invoking or Reducing the Power of Third Parties Sometimes an influencing agent can bring about change in a target by invoking the power of third parties. expert. THE POWER/ACTION MODEL OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE Now that we have examined the six bases of power and some alternative methods of influence. 1967. he.504 Raven Roosevelt. eliminated the possibility of MacArthur's carrying out military actions with which Truman was not in agreement. the Defense Department. he might also have invoked the legitimate power of both houses of Congress.in removing MacArthur from his command. and the State Department. In a somewhat parallel method. Thus such action served the dual purpose of severely restricting MacArthur's behavior as well as following through on the threat implied in the use of coercive power. in effect. If Truman had sufficient political influence. let us next examine a more encompassing model of power and influence. MacArthur did not receive nearly the military resources that he felt that he needed to carry out a full-range aggressive campaign. the agent may determinewhat other persons support the action which the influencing agent opposes and to attempt to undermine their legitimate. . MacArthur later used such limitations as means of explaining defeats and attacking the administration for its lack of support. provided they could be persuaded to pass a joint resolution opposing escalation of the war. Truman was particularly concerned that Chiang Kai-Shek might have some influence on MacArthur's stance with regard to the People's Republic of China and North Korea. We have already suggested that Truman may have attempted to invoke the referent power of Harriman and perhaps Marshall. such funds became available (Neu. ordered the fleet to the Pacific and Japan nonethelesshe had sufficient funds for such a movement there. The final form of environmental manipulation was eventually resorted to by Truman . Needless to say. He clearly indicated that he felt that Chiang had his own personal agenda and could not be trusted. His requests for further reinforcementswere denied even while General Eisenhower was receiving additional troops in Europe. However. but he indicated that he would need additional funds to bring them back. Again. Marshall'sletter also invoked the expert power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Was this one means of restricting MacArthur from escalating the war? This is not clear. 150). It appears that Truman did not find this option to be very feasible. p. however.

We are assuminga rationalagent.thus in parthumiliating targetwhileexercising his influence. to restrainMacArthur from orderingAmericantroops into North Koreaand from acceptingassistancefrom the Chinesenationalists. the basesof power and methodsof influencewhich are availableto the influencingagent.Political Power 505 From the Perspectiveof the InfluencingAgent Figure 1 presentsa model of power/interactionfrom the perspective of the influencing agent.For examcould convince ple. who is attemptingto determinewhat basis of power or method of influencehe/she wishes to utilize in implementing change.othermotives.less obvious. to to the U. if it is directed to the attainmentof some extrinsicgoal..but insteaduse coercivepower. To the extent that this was true. it is also useful to examinewhat motivatesthe influencingagent to exert influence.influencingagentshave been knownto use coercivepowerwheninformationalpowerwould be even more effectivein influencinga changein behavior. Coercive powerwouldalso showothersthat he.escalation into a fullscaleworldwar. to subtleor overt. citizenry.was reallythe boss. Truman might then have chosen not to use informationalinfluence... As the quotationcited earlier indicates. over and above the specific influencesituation. MacArthur that there were good reasonsnot to escalatethe war. However.We note in the uppermiddlebox. his communications MacArthur.to the leadersof othernations-that he was reallythe boss. The Motivation to Influence The motivationto influenceis sometimesquite obvious.and thus avoid a numberof other unfavorable outcomes the invasionof Chineseforces.Perhapshe wantedto demonstrate others-to Congress. mightalso operate. evenif he had felt that he couldreasonwithMacArthur.hopingand expectingthat the targetwouldnot complyso that the . Truman.as it had been spelledout in the Constitution maintainingthis power relationshipwould then have been an extremelyimportantend in itself. for somepreviousslights(suchas takingissuewithTrumanin unauthorized sucha motivationwouldbe reflectedin his choiceof powpressinterviews). at the expenseof informationalpower.PresidentTrumanclearlyhad such goals.S. er strategyand in the manneror mode in whichit was presented. avoidingdifficultywith otheralliesof the UnitedStates. Indeed. mighthave emphasized legitimatepower. If Trumanhad been espewith eveningthe score ciallyconcernedwith punishingGeneralMacArthur.and even coercive power.Perhapsthe satisfaction of some personalneeds:A need for power?A need to enhancehis self-esteem?A need to demonstrate own independence? is clearthat his It Trumanwas very concernedabout the legitimatepower of the presidency and the civilianadministration over the military. But to understandsuch choices.

Po 2.of Assessment Available PowerBases 1. 3. ltwg._ b of Fig. hird paties status. 7.. security. Normsand values 1 4. Assessme. Reward resources Coercive resources Legitimacy Expertise Reference (identification) Information Manipulation possibilities influence Indirect possibilities or power Invoking diminishing of thid parties 1. 6. 2. 9. Motivaion theinfuenceeor deire to benefit harm 5. Desired statusin eye sel..iofAailableBases to in Relation Target Power Prefereocesan obhibitins 1. 1. Sid a . 4. se-esteem 3.. higher authorty o 4. 1. Costsandefforts 2. Secondary gainsandlosses - 4A^~~~~ 1 3. .. 5. Rolerquirements. Time perspective 1.. Model of poweraction from perspective influencingagen . 3. 2. 4. tain exbinicgoals needs2. Relation self-perception to 5.... Pu p 3.. 8. Satisfyinterni pOr.

but from many of MacArthur'ssupportersin Congress. Truman might have carefully weighed this factor in deciding whether to try this strategy. even if it might be effective.PoliticalPower 507 agent could follow through with the threatened punishment. A rational influencing agent assesses his/her power bases in terms of the situation and the nature of the target upon whom influence would be attempted. Informational power might have been more effective if Truman had more opportunity to talk to MacArthur and present his rationale. but determine that some prior preparations may be necessary. 301). 1973. 10. Assessment of Available Power Bases Having determined what bases of power might be available. Is informational pow- . then informational power. informational. He might also have weighed the choice of influence strategy against his value system-there are those who would avoid the use of coercive power. Thus they would have to be implemented with great caution. as would personal reward or personal coercion. Miller. or persuasion. would be set aside. Preparing for the Influence Attempt Often an influencing agent may select an influence strategy. an appeal to legitimate power of dependence ("I really must depend on you for seeing to it that things are done properly here") might for the same reason be avoided. p. He indicates that he at least considered earlier the extreme form of ecological manipulationremoving MacArthur from his post (Lowitt. the target must assess these alternative courses to action in terms of whether they would be effective in implementing change. What is the likelihood that he would be successful or unsuccessful? Thus referent power. since it would appear to emphasize the agent's weakness. If so. deemed ineffective in this case. simply because they feel that no decent person should threaten another. Assessment of the Costs of Differing Influence Strategies The agent must also examine the costs of the influence. p. to set an example for the future. might be more consistent with our values of rationality. Truman might have considered that he could be successful in influencing MacArthur with a very severe threat of punishment for noncompliance. But the use of these influence strategiesmight have led to serious hostility not only from MacArthur. 1967. and legitimate power would be utilized instead. expert power. On the other hand.

1980. As we noted. He did try to impress MacArthur. Legitimate? Then the basis for legitimacy should be stressed (e.. the communality with the target must be demonstrated (Truman might have made more specific reference to the fact that both MacArthur and Truman fought in World War I. the availability of rewards must be stressed. Varela. Schlenker. The target might be reminded of other times in which he has not complied or has embarrassed the agent (invoking guilt). Is it coercion? Then it may be important to demonstrate to the target that not only are the means available for coercion. or of times when the agent had done a favor for the target. etc. Thus Truman did remind MacArthur of the embarrassment he had caused Truman by MacArthur's press interviews and speeches in which he openly expressed his disagreement with his commander-in-chief. In preparation for either reward power or coercive power. In this way there would be preparation for legitimacy based on equity and reciprocity norms. flattery. the influencing agent would want it clearly understood that surveillance of the target'sbehavior could and would be carriedout.) Is it reward power? Then. or have emphasized that he too had taken a firm role in dealing with opponents in the Cold War). Similarlyfor referentpower. 1959. and that he was prepared to accept or deal with any censure or reprimand from Congress. One can also enhance one's influence by setting a proper scene for the encounter (Goffman. and with all of the paraphernaliawhich emphasizes the legitimate pow- . (Truman might have indicated more explicitly that he had serious intention of removing MacArthur from command. with well-placed compliments. 1977). If it is personal reward or coercionoffering approval or threatening rejection-then the agent may first attempt to ingratiate her/himself with the target. that he like MacArthur had the well-being of their nation at heart. a reference to the laws governing the relationship of a general to his commander-in-chief). that he had support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Truman might have been somewhat more effective if he could have arranged his meeting with MacArthur within the imposing setting of the Oval Office in Washington. but that the agent is ready and willing to pay the costs that coercion implies. making reference to his reading and studies of the Far East. For expert power. examine the logic. such preparatory devices proved unconvincing and therefore unsuccessful. giving him a home court advantage.g. as there is in athletic contests (Conroy and Sundstrom. An influencing agent may sometimes enhance his/her power by the location and form of the influence encounter. 1971).508 Raven er the choice? Then the agent might carefully rehearsehis/her speech. so to speak. again. practice the delivery. a few choice demonstrations of one's superior knowledge would be useful (emphasizing access to secret intelligence information which he could not yet share even with the general). There is evidence for a "home court advantage" in interpersonal confrontation. Preparations can also be established for other forms of legitimate power.

the agent will want to assess the effects. Information can be presented a calm collectedtone.It is quite possiblethat such a senseof was in communications MacArto emergency suggested the tone of Truman's thur.followingthe adviceof President (1901). 1976.Indeed. However. 293).secretary state. Assessing the Effects of Influence Followingthe influenceattempt. p. but also the power coercive mode.Sometimes with a loud and boomingvoice. the manneror tone in whichinfluenceis exerted. sometimessome of the negativeeffects of coercioncan Or be mitigatedwith a bit of humor. Was he successful?Is there evidencethat the target has actuallyaccepted the influence. Litman-Adizes al.Is theregreater et Have personal likingor disliking? the powerbases previouslyavailableto the agent increasedor decreasedin their potency?The agent may then attemptto repairthe damageand reassess his relationshipwith the target. Truman'sapparentamiabilityat Wake Islandmight have represented attemptto soften any later use of legitihis mateor coercive Theodore Roosevelt power. who felt that MacArby thur in Washingtonwould "stirup the ChinaLobby [supporters Chiang of in Kai-Shek Congress elsewhere]" "domoreharmthangood"(Miller. or in a moreemotionalsense in whichsuggestsa seriousemergency. Choice of Mode of Influence The agent may not only choose the power base. . has actuallyalteredhis behaviorin accordancewith the outcomedesiredby the influencingagent?Does the targetreallyaccept the changepersonally.he of was dissuaded GeneralMarshall.Trumanplannedto do just that.and be more likely to use coercion in the future (Kipnis. affectedthe target'sperceptionand evaluationof the agent? Has his respectfor the agent diminished? Thereis evidencethat whencoercion resultsin successfulinfluence.or is the change socially dependent?Is surveillance for to behavior important the changeto continue willthe targetrevert earlier as patterns soon as the agentcannotcontinueto checkon the degreeof comeffects?How has the influenceattempt. to speak softly (and amiably?)while carryinga big stick..the agent may then view the targetless favorably. though such is not clearlyindicatedin the reportswhich I have examined.sucpliance?How about secondary cessful or not. 1978).PoliticalPower 509 er of the presidency. and and 1973. powermay be madeeven morethreatening and threatand coupledwith facialexpression posturewhichindicateextreme determination.

and not to the target. An influencing is agentwho feels that his poweris threatened especiallyconcernedthat any which he/she successfullybringsabout in the target is attributable change to the agent. was 1964. he now may have somehostilitytowardthe target. apparently. Changefollowinginformationis morelikelyto be attributed the target's to own choice(Kipnis. The social psychologyof attribution is particularly reletheory vanthere. it is more pleasantfor the agent to feel responsiblefor the change.whichin turnwill affecthis choice developed of influencestrategythe secondtime around.Kelley.1970).ratherthan"Harto ry"as he mighthave signedcommunications others.Truman's inabilityto persuadeMacArthur throughlegitimate. 1972. 1986).then it is likelythat the Whereas maychange: previagentwilltry again.he immediately summonedGeneralOmarBradley. When he recalledthat event for biographerMerl Millermany years later.It is for this reasonthat coercionis sometimes preferred information.Shaw and Condelli.The mannerof such communications clearlynotedby the general(MacArthur. From such theorizing. 1972).LitmanAdizeset al. of Morethanthreat. Of additionalinterestis the mannerin whichMacArthur removed was from office.Butthistimehis motivations ously he had merelywantedto achievethe extrinsicgoal.referent. 1978. Perhapsit was his realizationthat referentpower was not effective that led Trumanto sign his later communications MacArthur "Presito as dent of the UnitedStates.Ravenand Kruglanski.The agent'ssuccessor failure will also lead to a reassessment the availablebases of powerand the deof velopmentof a quite differentstrategy(Kipnis.particularly thoseaspectswhichdealwiththe attribution causalof ity and locus of control (Jones et al. 1976.Thusin casesof confrontation.chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 341). Thus."emphasizing legitimatepower. and informationalpowermay have led him eventuallyto the threatof more extremecoercion-the threatto relieveMacArthur his command. when Trumanwas told that somehowthe opposition newspaperthe Chicago Tribunehad heardthe rumorand was about to publicizethe news that Trumanmight fire MacArthur.sincechangewhichresultsfrom coercionis to more likely to be attributedto the agent.Such a choice of strategywas. morepleasantfor the targetto feel or demonstrate othersthat the change to was really voluntary. .p.he would be especiallyconcernedabout one possible outcome-MacArthur might hear about such a plan and might resignbefore he was fired.1976. Later. forceof whichmightalso havehelpedto establish for Truman'slater encountersboth the legitimateand coercivepower of the presidency.510 Raven If the first influenceattemptsare unsuccessful..it would follow that once Trumanhad decided to fire MacArthur.it appearsthat eventually Trumanresorted the ultimate to the ecologicalmanipulation.also dictated by Truman'sanger and frustationwith MacArthur..

" "atthat moment but his blue eyes blazed with fury":"And I told Bradley. signed.MacArthur's to personalcommitment his positionis presented quite forcefullyin his messageto the Joint SenateCommitteeon ArmedServices and ForeignRelations(Lowitt. We can also examineit from the perspective of the targetof influence. obviously. communicated MacArthur.We will not dwellso muchon this partof the analysis in this presentation. In . I want himfired. be other more subtle reasons for resistinginfluence.The targetmay also be concerned abouthis appearance beforethirdparties.to presenta strongimageto otherobservers."' And so the orderwas drawnup. 1964).I says.Theremay also be a desireto harmthe influencing agent. We may initiallyassumethat the targetresiststhe influenceattemptbecausehe has a commitment his previouspatternof behavior.and immedito immediately thereaftera pressconferencewas hastilycalled (Miller.for power. 10). to not give him the satisfactionof compliance(MacArthur. however.Political Power 511 Trumanwas 77 yearsold and seemedrather"fragile. 1967. 1978).Suchwould not seem to be true in this particularcase. because or other influencingagentshave alreadypressedhim to behavein his current fashion.or a strong personality tendencytowardconformity(Comreyet al.the targetmayprepare resistinfluence.there may be reasonsfor compliancewith the requestfor personalreasonsotherthan beingconvincedthat such complianceis in the serviceof a desirableextrinsicgoal: acceptanceof role relationship.1938). Just as the influencingagent preparesthe stage and scene for an influenceattempt. p. A need for independence. and in his memoirs(MacArthur.becausehe tends to to continuea stateof behaviorto whichhe has becomeaccustomed.perhapsto use ingratiationso as to make the agent feel more restrainedfrom using coercivepower. There may. etc. 1973. 'The son of a bitch isn't going to resignon me. p.His convictionthat a failureto take strongaction againstcommunistforces in the Far East would lead to ultimatedisasterwas everybit as strong as Truman'scommitmentto his positions. 2. had neitherlove nor respectfor HarryTruman)..may mitigateagainstinfluence. ately From the Perspectiveof the Target We havethus far examined Power/Actionmodelfromthe perspecthe tive of the influencingagent. 305). set a stagewhich to to will forestallvariousinfluencestrategies.but we can see the parallelanalysisin Fig.or personalitytendencies.even if the requestmay be reasonable.How wouldMacArthur'sdevotedsubordinates about him if he surrendered readilyto feel too a civilian(even though that civilianwas also the commander-in-chief)? In other instances.suchas a needfor deference(Murray. for self-esteem.

re-evaluation other of d.0 r %A V 4.. Costsof XYIIIQ Fig. bargaining b. Preparatory a. tyingone's hands" e. recruitment defenders of g Evaluation CLv ~~~ x. Views of sr. Satisfaction internal of needs-power. developingcounter-arguments b. Preparatory resistance a.. D I Assesnsent of Self in Relation tLoAgoeDt PercergtiQn Power Bases of ot of Assessweot of Likelihood ImplementtiQro of Threat s and.sl .r.. defensesagainst coerciol c.Sid ... A 4.intpetKence self-esteem.depemdence 3. 1.- 1. negotiation 2. Effecton 3. C Promises of Motivations Tamaet 1... Motivation the agent. Altn atpin of Influence Atenlit acceptance 1.. Model of power action from perspective of influence targ .. ropriet 2.third parties 4 ._ - - 3. Desiredstatus in eyes of self.. 2. Role requirements 4.desire of to benefitor harm 5.:~. agent.u. Maintain currt state or oppe state 2.. C 2..

When coercionwas threatened. indeedcontributing a politicalclimatesuchthatTruto man would not seek reelectionin 1952.As with the influencingagent.MacArthur for his personalresourcesin preparation the verbalassault.certainly referent power. Trumanobservedthat MacArthur who wouldalwaysagreewith whatever himselfwith yes-men("asskissers"). a form of "ecological control.S.both to justify himself and to help steerthe nation in the directionwhichhe felt was critically necessary. he could still claimsome home courtadvantageon WakeIsland.He mighthavetriedto anticipate to use and have preparedto counterthese one by Trumanwould attempt one.legitimate power. and even greaterintractibility in the face of later influenceattempts.1973. He had to fire MacArthur.The damagewhichthis causedto Trumanand his administration was quitesubstantial. The resultwas an even firmer convictionthat he was absolutelycorrectin his judgments. had to he reduce He dissonance. MacArthur. The removalof MacArthur from his commandwas not only pushing. thus freed. of course. it also was.to greatermalleabilityfor a second influence attempt. thereis. but. what then did MacArthur that he had enduredwhat was for him a very severepunishment.andhe mighthave convincedhimselfthat Trumanwouldneverdareto acceptthe consequences of using the ultimatecoercivepower.Political Power 513 of mightwellhavemarshalled anticipation the influenceattempt. also hadto justifyhis actionsto otherAmericognitive cans.have committedhimselffirmly to and stronglyto his previouscourseof action so as to make "surrender" surrounded Trumaneven moredifficult. .whichwas in his Pacific whatbasesof power theaterof operations. and lead to differing forms of resistanceor. Trumancould no longerinsist that MacArthur refrain from publicstatementsattackingthe administration's policies. to firmlyestablishhis place in history. to of possible and United Nations forces in the Far East. His counterinfluence might have been more effective if he could have arrangedto meet in with Trumanat his headquarters Tokyo. However.it also had a further side effect: It removedwhatever legitimateor coercivepowerTrumanmight have had over him.p.can lead to furtherrejectionof the influencingagent. failing that. He mighteven have used thirdparties. followed by punishment. again. sometimes. 291). certainlyspoke quite openlyand forcefully.affect of the commitmentof the targetto his earlierposition."makingit imfor MacArthur continuehis policies as commander the U. not give Trumanthe satisfactionof the president's successfullyutilizingexnot pertpower. positionMacArthur mighttake (Miller.Unsuccessfulcoercion.and resisted. a feedbackloop-the aftereffectsof the influenceattemptfeed backto changethe relationship targetto agent.Truman'shand was forced. Havingsufferedthe humiliationof beingremovedfrom his high comdo? He had to justify to himselfthe fact mand. as we pointedout. He would.

von Schuschnigg should be expected to show his loyalty in the same way. a process which was further enhanced by Hitler's simply addressinghim as Herr Schuschniggas he would a servant. to each accept the integrity of the other. and his brutal choice of strategies might well have been expected. particularly Hitler's concern about Austrian restrictions on the actions of the Austrian National Socialists. and a professor. Hitler was thus setting the stage for the use of both referent and legitimate power-he was the leader of the great German nation. or Herr Bundeskanzler. If this was meant to ingratiateor to forestall the likelihood of the forceful use of power. The meeting was held on Hitler's home ground. von Schuschnigg attempted counterinfluence. von Schuschnigg began with diplomatic pleasantries. but a member of the German race as well. Hitler was also appealing to his referent power-he was. He alluded to their need to live together. Hitler hated professors. who in turn drew on the very vivid description of the confrontation given by von Schuschnigg (1947). Thus the motivation for influence by Hitler certainly went beyond the extrinsic goal. a product of middle-class Catholic Austria." Austria was behaving inappropritory ately. Payne points out that Hitler had nothing but contempt for von Schuschnigg. after all. with his troops everywhere evident. The grandness of the scene may have served to diminish von Schuschnigg. Hitler stopped this immediately-they had not come. no less. it failed. He proceeded to upbraid von Schuschnigg and Austria for a long hisof "treason to the [German] race. he said. I am drawing on the account by Robert Payne (1973). For this analysis. to which von Schuschnigg should also show proper respect and obedience. Hitler began to set the stage for his exercise in social power. von Schuschnigg. The stage setting for establishment of power was carefully orchestrated in Hitler's impressive study. Soon after their meeting began. a meeting which eventually paved the way for German annexation of Austria. The meeting was called to discuss outstanding issues between the two countries. with Frederick the Great observing from a magnificent painting. avoiding the more formal titles of nobility.514 Raven HITLER'S POWER OVER VON SCHUSCHNIGG IN THE AUSTRIAN ANSCHLUSS Having illustrated the applications of the Power/Interaction model to the Truman/MacArthur confrontation. an Austrian. and Hitler was legitimately entitled to demand a stop to such harassment. Austria is a little . to discuss beautiful views or weather. let us next examine one more political power confrontation in terms of the model: the interaction between Adolf Hitler and Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg in their 1938 meeting at Hitler's retreat at Obersalzberg. and complimented Hitler on the breathtaking view from their meeting place.

After emphasizing own importance the Germannation. but it was soon to follow.he shouted a commandfor GeneralKeitel to enter the conferenceroom. Gradually. waved his hands with excitement. An appealto the legitimatepowerof dependence? it did not work. HerrSchuschnigg. But Hitlerbethe that ganto makecredible possibility he coulddo justthat. or he would immediatelyorder a marchinto Austria. The SA and the Legion would just tear the Austriansapart."But then Hitlerreverted coerto cive power.and his contemptwas now complete. and hav- .Hitlerwas demonstrating abilityto maintain his almost completesurveillance over what was happeningin Austria-an essential elementof coercivepower. he said. he said.Political Power 515 state. Hitler rantedlike a maniac.a lifting of the ban on the NationalSocialistsin Austria. nextto a big one.Hitlerbeganto set the stagefor the exerciseof the most extremecoercivepower.Hitler.At times he must have seemedcompletelyout of control. The mode of influencealso becamemore strident.Hitlermay thenhavemadehis most behavinglike an uncontrolled extreme coercive threatsseemcredible. As to the aftermath this encounter. von Schuschnigg clearlyaffected. as Thatwouldbe an honorable deed and everything would be settled. and eventuallyhe succumbedand agreedto all of Hitler'sdemands:an economicunion with Germany.war. Hitler had had real regardfor the Chancellor. but Hitler had his evidence. and finance. By madman.In addition.clearlyvon Schuschnigg virof was andcouldoffer no realresistance anyof Hitler's to tuallydestroyed demands. HiBut tlerwouldnot hearit. von Schuschnigg deniedit. Most of us are not willingto pay the price of the most extremeforms of coercion. The resultwas to put von Schuschnigg the defensive. if Austria did not bend to Hitler'sdemands.he said. But first he temperedhis threatswith rewardpower.and appointment NationalSocialiststo key government of ministries interior. He insistedthat von Schuschnigg to sign an agreement accepteveryone of his demands. andis willingto listento Hitler's complaints.He emphasized abilityto bringthe full weightof the German his armed forces againstAustria. on the otherhand. he knewthatAustriawasfortifying borders its with Germany.The Anschlusswas not yet complete. He beganto see extremedanger was to himself and to his nation.more shrill. felt morepowerfulthan ever. Afterall. Honorable statesmen wouldnot deign to take into custodythe visitingchancellorof anothernation. What was his strategy?It may well have been partof the stage-setting devicefor coercivepower.Extremecoercive power can be most threatening providedthe target believesthat the agent has both the means and the will to exert such coercion. At one point.in terms of the legitimacy of reciprocity.generalamnestyfor NationalSocialistprisoners. uniqueopportunity havingyour the of namerecorded wellin the rollof greatGermans. Hitleradded.to give Hion tler yet additionallegitimatebasis for demands. his in "I am givingyou.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION In this paper. successful or unsuccessful. I have attempted to present a basic model for interpersonal influence and social power. the stage-setting or preparatory devices to influence or resist influence. the selection of the bases of power. there is a reassessment of the interpersonal relationship by both the target and the agent. By the same token. My presentation then speaks to Robert Jervis's concerns about social psychology playing a greater role in the analysis of political behavior (Jervis. reference. However. the manner or mode in which the power is exercised or resisted. I feel a greater sense of understanding of these two critical interactions. 1989) that social psychologists test their theories beyond the restrictions of the experimental laboratory. though I have obviously studied several sources of information in this analysis. and to show how such an analysis might be applied to the understanding of political behavior. Following the influence attempt. 1976). both from the perspective of the influencing agent and the target. with the stage set for different strategies of influence and resistance in the next go-round. legitimacy. The analysis of interpersonal influence can be examined as series of steps.516 Raven ing completed the annexation of Austria. I have illustrated the application of six bases of power: coercion. as he laid the groundwork for the Austrian Anschluss. Having gone through these two exercises in preparing this paper. developed by social psychologists. 1989)-I do not claim to be a political scientist or historian. The degree and form of compliance is determined by all of these factors. Rather. and hesitate to suggest that I have fully and accurately analyzed these events. I accept Holsti's admonitions for psychologists attempting to be political historians (Holsti. I hoped to point out how a rich resource of theory and empirical evidence. 1989a. he was now prepared to exert his power on ever stronger adversaries. expertise. We can examine the motivations to influence and to resist influence. and a power/interaction model as these might have applied to President Harry Truman's confrontation with Douglas MacArthur. could be utilized in the analysis of major political confrontations. This was not my purpose in this paper. 1989b). I would see this approach as in line with the concerns expressed by David Sears (1986. reward. . and information. It is a particularly clear example of the potentially negative effects of the use of power on the powerholder (Kipnis. I further hope that others who are more skilled in this important field will find these tools useful. and in Adolf Hitler's confrontation with Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg. motivations which are often much more complex than the immediate extrinsicgoals. These in turn determine the choices of influence strategies.

Perhapssuch actions shouldreceivemore consideration. and 1970) form. target.As Jervis(1989) of pointsout. or both.a bidirectional analysiswouldhavebeenmuchmorecomshouldconsiderpowerin both directions. Second. whichmay be dictatedby less thanrationor al considerations.PoliticalPower 517 of Unfortunately. I would hope that it might providesome guidelinesso that politicaland historical of diaristsmightprovidemoresensitiveand completedescriptions suchconfrontations. thereareseriousquestions misrepresentation.)Here. and strategicbehaviors(p.legitimate. attemptedjust such an analysis.as they each carefullyassess ly theirrespective actionsand theiroutcomes.We only brieflynotedthe possibility von Schuschnigg attemptthat was was deliberate ing to influenceHitler. havenot allowedfor rash.we tended to assumea unidirectional power was relationship. 486) in such reports. Thereare severalother limitationswhich should be consideredin the analysiswhich I have presented: abovepresents agentandtargetas largethe First. indeedthese may accountfor some and failuresin the confrontationon the part of the agent.Yet a full understanding In a muchearlierpaper. we must be sensitiveto the fact that in examiningthe validity of the model. If the tools of the Power/Interactionmodel are indeeduseful.referent. we cannot determinewhetherthe influencestemmed from coercion. plicated. we would hope that the politicalscientistand historianwho are accustomed workingwith to such resourceswill be more skilledin evaluating interpreting and such data. reward. self-presentation.expert.or informationalpower. 1956)as compared his reports biographer additionalanalysismight (1973)some seventeenyearslater. such a limitedpresentation for our purposesof illustration-the unidirectional was powerrelationship complexenough.Froma simplestatement and persuadedhim to lend his supportto passageof a given congressman the Civil Rights Bill. (An interesting be carriedout on the operationsof dissonancetheory or other social psychologicalprocessesin the reportingof the same eventsby politicalfigures at varyingtimes after these events occurred.ArieKruglanski I (RavenandKruglanski. . In part.the modelas discussed in rationalparticipants the confrontation.We did not fully considerthe likelihoodthat MacArthur to evenwhileTrumanwas influencing MacArattempting influenceTruman thur. for illustration. again. we did note some differencesin the mannerin whicheventsweredescribedby Trumanin his memoirs to to MerlMiller (Truman. spontaneous We actionswhich are taken withoutdue regardfor their consequences. thereis not the sort of detailedinformationwhichallows us to make that LyndonJohnsonmet with a completeanalysis.in most historicalpresentations politicalconfrontations.We assumesomerationality even whilewe acceptthat some of these assessments be affectedby motives may whichmay not be appropriate. though in a very preliminary Third.Indeed. we are drawingon reportsfrom personswho themselves were in active participants the events which we are analyzing.

It also providespoliticalscientists and historianswith an entree for the applicationof a large and rich body of literaturefrom the social psychologyof interpersonal influenceand social power. G.and otherfactorsaffectinghelpingand altruism. (1972). I shouldthink it would be usefulto have a seriesof case studies of majorpoliticalconfrontations.leadership. similarattentionmight thus be directedto the analysisof importantpolitical encounters. REFERENCES L.Of particular of confrontationswhich led to undesirable outcomesbecauseof a misperand ceptionof the powerrelationships strategies the two partiesinvolved. thereby how such confrontaprovidingsome meansof suggestingto policy-makers tions could be dealt with moreeffectivelyin futureencounters. D.consideran influencingagentwho feels that he or she is using and informational expertpower. Advancesin Experimental L. Berkowitz. Rand McNally. New York.pp.butthe targetinsteadperceives coercive power. and control. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am verygrateful PeterClapham his assistance library to for in research on the Hitler-vonSchuschniggconfrontation. 6). For socialpsychologists. The modelprovidesa framework use in gathering reviewing to and informationon politicalconfrontations. In March.whichmay have been moremomentousthan battlesin their ultimateresults.Socialnorms. 1-47.the model offers an additionalmeansof testing the validityof conceptsand theoriesin that area. . Academic Press. of Organizations.analyzedin termsof the powerstrategies utilizedby the respective influencing agentsandthe targets. In Berkowitz. (1965).and BenjaminKarneyand David Levy for theirassistancewith regardto the Truman-MacArthur confrontation.518 Raven Yet there are also a numberof advantagesto such an applicationof a model.if one or the otherhad adoptedalternative strategies. Influence.Only furtherexercisesin applyingthe modelto case studies of a numberof differing confrontationswill determineits true value.feelings.Just as militarystrategists studypastbattlesandexaminehow theiroutcomesmighthave developeddifferently. SocialPsychology(Vol. an alternative the more to restrictive laboratoryapproach.Chicago. (ed. by For example. (ed. Handbook Cartwright.J.I would like to think that it would provide a tool whereby such critical confrontationscould be evaluated.).whichmightthen are providefor some generalconclusionsabout whatsortsof strategies likeinterestwould be case studies ly to lead to specificoutcomes.).

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