Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ISSUE
2020
Enemy of My
Enemy:
Falsely Framing
War with Iran as Jihadist
Victory in Defeat
Essential Lessons Drawn Real Talk with a Contemplating Nawawi’s
from Ibn Abbas’ Debate 40-Hadith:
with the Khawarij
Caliphate Recollections
Returnee of a Former Jihadi’
CONTENTS
04
LETTER FROM THE EDITOR
06
REAL TALK WITH A CALIPHATE RETURNEE
11
ENEMY OF MY ENEMY:
FALSELY FRAMING WAR WITH IRAN AS JIHADIST VICTO
RY IN DEFEAT
20
REPATRIATIONS:
INSIGHT FROM A FORMER FOREIGN
FIGHTER
26
CONTEMPLATING IMAM NAWAWI’S 40HADITH:
RECOLLECTIONS OF A FORMER JIHADI ‘SALAFI JIHADI’
30
THE AWAKENING
34
INTERVIEW WITH AVERAGE MOHAMED:
SO
SOMALIAMERICAN DEDICATED TO THE PROMOTION
OF PEACE AND PREVENTION OF EXTREMISM
Assalamulaikum warahmtaullahi wabarakatuhu, FROM
THE
E
May the peace, mercy and blessing of Allah aza wa jaal be upon all of you.
Welcome to the third edition of Ahul Taqwa. A lot has occurred in the world
at large since we launched the last edition coincident to the 18th anniversary
of the September 11, 2001 Al-Qaeda led attacks which marked the onset of
the War on Terror.
D
Over past weeks and months, the landscape has grown more complicated.
First, in early October U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly pulled out of
Northeastern Syria, essentially abandoning the Syrian Democratic Forces
that bore the brunt of fighting in Syria against ISIS. That paved the way for
Turkey’s incursion into Kurdish territory, in what was seen as an occupation
I
and expansion into Syria. Then, on October 16, 2019, the so-called Caliph
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a hideout in Northern Syria. While
experts debated about his successor and contemplated whether the group
would sustain influence, a new “caliph,” with flimsy credentials, was
appointed. Supporters and group affiliates soon flocked online to pledge
T
their allegiance.
A few weeks later, almost out of nowhere, pro-ISIS accounts were purged
from Telegram in an operation led by Europol. ISIS was soon moving around
from obscure platform to platform but found it difficult to find any of them a
safe haven. Still, the group’s resiliency remains evident. When Usman Khan,
O
a terrorist returnee from incarceration in the U.K. carried out an attack in
London, for the first time ISIS first took credit on TikTok, one of those obscure
platforms the group was experimenting with. Over recent months, jihadists
have suffered defeats; Al-Qaeda has lost leaders in Somalia, Libya and,
pehaps most importantly Yemen, where a potential successor to Ayman
R
al-Zawhari was killed in a drone attack. Apart from the killing of Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, ISIS’ spokesman Abu Hassan al-Muhajir was also assassinated.
Nevertheless, there is much to worry about.
The Usman Khan attack documents that ISIS still impacts westerners and
that many remain connected to the movement. Some 60,000 women and
children remain in Al-Hol refugee camp. Thousands of ISIS fighters remain
imprisoned, and almost no one will repatriate citizens that traveled to join
the now defunct caliphate. In the shadows, in places like Libya, the Sinai,
Syria and Iraq, ISIS and Al-Qaeda are both regrouping. Ambassador James
Jeffrey, U.S. Special Representative for Syria, recently stated that ISIS
retains strength as an insurgency and that it retains between 14 and 18,000
fighters in Iraq and Syria.
While there is much for those combating ISIS and jihadists in general to be happy about, there
is reason for alarm. Concentration seems to be shifting from Sunni jihadists and onto Iran after
the Trump administration assassinated Qassem Solaimani, longtime general in the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Now, with focus on Iran, salafi jihadists will try to fill
vacuums in ways similar to how they survived and then thrived in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring, silently regrouping as the world discussed Al-Qaeda’s defeat after killing of Osama bin
Laden, questioned an end to the war on terror, contemplated a future democratization of the
Middle East and as American troops and diplomats left Iraq.
Other variables indicate that the jihadist ideology remains potent. As The Economist magazine
put skeptically after Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbatobad, ‘Now, Kill his Dream.,’ we
should realize that ideas are eternal. Jihadists know this all too well. This third edition of Ahul
Taqwa recognizes that even in periods of apparent decline, combating the narrative of jihadi
terrorists remains crucial. We must remain consistent and vigil. So, after a bit of a delay due to
having to reactivate an ability to disseminate the magazine into newer pro-ISIS and Al-Qaeda
English-language channels, we are pleased to release this third edition.
In it, we’ll discuss an array of topics related to these recent developments. We have an article
on how pending conflict with Iran will be framed by jihadists. It is a warning to not be deceived
by claims that savagery and destruction can ever lead to justice. I initiate a series on Imam
Nawawi’s 40 hadith. Each article will cover one selection and discuss it in terms of our contem-
porary afflictions. A repatriated ISIS supporter shares some of his experiences with us in an
honest take, and we get articles from Ahul-Taqwa team members Jason Walters and Bryant
Neal Vinas. The interview in this edition is with Mohamed Amin, or Average Mohamed, a So-
mali-American in Minneapolis that utilizes motivational speaking and cartoons to prevent
youth from falling into the barbarous trap set by jihadist recruiters.
So much is going on in the world today. There is reelection rhetoric gearing up in America. In
Britain, Brexit has gone through after a landslide parliamentary electoral victory for Boris
Johnson and the Tories. Protests sustain themselves in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, as
conditions seem ripe for an eventual global economic recession. The Trump administration’s
‘Peace Plan’ for the Middle East set stage for an escalation of Palestinian/Israeli conflict, as
ISIS released a seeming shift in strategy promising a concentration on and attacks in Israel.
Long story short, we must not get complacent. The long war with Bin Laden’s ‘far enemy’ in the
United States has only opened doors for the ascension of authoritarianism, alongside pros-
pects of global conflict. Legitimate jihad has nothing to do with creating destruction. Legiti-
mate jihad seeks only the right to practice the religion, something completely preserved in the
liberal democracies that are declining. For certain, this is victory for no one, and Muslims and
non-Muslims everywhere should do whatever they can to understand and prevent themselves
from falling into such deception. In conclusion, we thank our readers and invite any and all to
Jazku
contribute or simply to have a conversation. Jazkum’Allahu Khairan!
Jeee Mooon
If you or anybody you know has been touched or affected by the hate of anther or
by a hate-based movement in any way, please call our 24/7 Helpline:
202-486-8633
parallelnetworks@pnetworks.org
In order to grasp just how jihadist beliefs and scripture translate to strategy and practice, it is crucial to
recognize the actual roots of a constantly mutating salafi jihadist ideology. Both ISIS and Al-Qaeda are in
fact branches borne by the same tree, with roots that rest not so much in an absolute cult-like reliance on
prophecy, but on a rational synthesis of religious, political and military strategy. What Graeme Wood once
controversially described as a “very Islamic” tends to be traced to a number of intellectual progenitors.
These typically highlight Syed Qutb, an Islamist ideologue and prolific author hanged for plooing the as-
sassination of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966, or the thirteenth century scholar Ibn Taymiyya, who influ-
enced Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, intellectual founder of the Saudi State, and jihadists that twist his
religious verdicts to justify aaacks on the Middle East’s authoritarian regimes. However, the most appro-
priate ideological origins that spurred Al-Qaeda and the numerous splinters and offspring the organiza-
tion has spurred since then are rooted in what Islamists call the ‘Sahwa al-Islamiyya’, or Islamic Awaken-
ing, a political movement of sorts in Saudi Arabia, largely induced by a controversial fatwa of the Grand
Muſti of Saudi Arabia Abdulaziz ibn Baz in 1990.
Bin Baz’s fatwa permiied the presence of American military forces on Saudi Arabian soil during the first
Gulf War and spurred protests om a younger generation of Saudi scholars as an influential ‘Sahwa’
leader, Safar al-Hawali, described in a 1991 sermon, "What is happening in the Arabian Peninsula is part
of a larger Western design to dominate the whole Arab and Muslim world." A collective of ‘Sahwa’ clerics
eventually signed a memorandum that addressed the House of Saud and called for a larger role of the reli-
gious establishment in formulating the politics and policy of the Saudi State. It was an aaempt to break
om a tradition that traced the founding of Saudi Arabia back to a merger in the late-eighteenth century
between Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, a merger that leads to a sort of Saudi
fundamentalist secularism.
The House of Saud exclaims that the historic pact granted Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and the schol-
ars that would follow him control over the state’s religion and that, in exchange for that
support, the House of Saud would retain political and economic sovereignty. The ‘Sahwa’ challenged this
traditional presupposition, and when the Saudis started to round up ‘Sahwa’ clerics, Osama bin Laden
took the ‘Sahwa’s sentiment to extreme conclusions. First, in 1995 bin Laden declared the House of Saud
apostates, thereby permiiing violent jihad against the Saudi government. Shortly thereaſter, Bin Laden
justified his ‘far enemy’ doctrine on the grounds that, “The [Saudi] regime is fully responsible for what has
been happening to this country. However, the occupying American enemy is the principal cause of this sit-
uation. Therefore, efforts should be concentrated on destroying, fighting and killing the enemy until, by
the Grace of Allah, it is completely defeated.” Bin Laden’s diatribe couched socio-political grievances under
revolutionary religious tenets. It was a amework the Sahwa facilitated, and a methodology the Sahwa
clerics labeled fiqh al-waqia (the
jurisprudence of current affairs).
Fiqh al-Waqia is the name of a treatise authored by Nasir al-Umar, a key Sahwa enthusiast and professor
at Muhammad ibn Saud University in Riyadh. Nasir Al-Umar was jailed for his political elaborations, and
particularly for the content of the treatise. In Fiqh al-Wakia, al-Umar outlines just how political policy is
to be derived om an understanding of the current context and understanding of fundamentalist scrip-
ture. One of the primary evidences Al-Umar utilized is a series of verses om the thirtieth chapter of the
Quran, Al-Rum, or the Romans.
Al-Uma
Al-Umar argues that the need to synthesize religion and politics is apparent om a reading of these
verses. Surah Rum was revealed to the prophet Muhammad in the early days of his preaching in Arabia,
and these verses addressed distant geopolitical realities that could have had a disheartening
effect on Muhammad’s followers at the time. However, they would have a profound effect on the
history of humanity in the long-run open up the entire Middle East for Islamic conquest. The 30th Qura-
nic chapter begins by noting that Persian polytheists had defeated the Roman Byzantines Christians at
the Baale of Antioch. As a consequence, the early Muslims were deflated. The Quraish tribe Muhammad
was challenging with monotheism was polytheistic as well. So, they were vociferous in announcing that
the Persian victory foretold the demise of Muhammad’s monotheism. The Byzantine defeat at Antioch
seemed so devastating there could be no recovery om it. Yet, in subsequent verses, the Quran prophesied
that the Byzantine Christians would ultimately prevail. In fact, it even gave a timeeame of 3 to 9 years,
which is what occurred some seven years later, when the Byzantine emperor Heraclius initiated a counter-
aaack that eventually reestablished Byzantine control over Jerusalem and eventually most of the territory
the Romans had lost.
For al-Umar this clearly refuted the Saudi establishment’s claims that Islam was a religion void of
(geo)political reference. The students of knowledge (tulab al-ilm) could derive several benefits om this
chapter. Current events were an important part of religion. What the early Muslims interpreted as defeat
proved, in the long-run, divine providence. The war that unfolded between the two superpowers of the
time, the Romans and Persians, was akin to the struggle between America and Russia. Therefore, these
Quranic verses were not, in any way, an actual endorsement of the Byzantines, but an indication of future
triumph. As the prophet Muhammad lay the foundations of Islamic conquest in Arabia then, the Per-
sians and the Romans wore each other out. The consequent weakness of both superpowers paved the way
for Islamic conquest of both the Byzantine and Persian empires in the years aſter the prophet of Islam’s
death. In that same manner, jihadists would view a war between America, the contemporary Romans,
and Iran and its allies throughout the Shiite crescent, the modern-day Persians, as hearkening to their
eventual ascendance.
The Sahwa period did not lead to reform or revolution in Saudi Arabia, or anywhere else. Nevertheless,
the amework Al-Umar and his compatriots developed, a synthesis of fundamentalist salafism and
Muslim Brotherhood anti-imperialist discourses, lay a basis for the eschatological narrative the salafi
jihadi movement has weaponized and continues to employ. Today, the amework the period formulated
serves as a foundation upon which a constantly mutating jihadist propaganda strategy evolves. As a
result of recent setbacks, both Al-Qaeda and ISIS will need to lend hope to jihadist supporters, retain a
flow of recruits and aaempt to snatch victory om the jaws of defeat. War with Iran would seem to make
this easy. Were the U.S. to shiſt its primary focus away om Sunni jihadists and onto Shiite Iran, salafi ji-
hadists would ame it in the context of the Quranic prophecy of the Roman-Persian war. They may even
go so far as to aaempt to provoke it, a strategic shiſt that would not be altogether new. The invasion of Iraq
embroiled the United States in a protracted war against Sunni insurgents that prevented the plans of
Bolton and other neoconservatives to proceed into conflict with Iran. At first, jihadists seemed content
with that situation. Iran has provided Al-Qaeda higher-ups sanctuary in exchange for Al-Qaeda reeain-
ing om aaacks in Iran. That ‘enemy of my enemy is my iend’ strategy was first challenged by Abu
Musab Zarqawi, first when he merged and formed Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers in 2005, and
then later when his progeny officially broke om Al-Qaeda and declared themselves ISIS in 2014.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was intent on creating sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiites in Iraq, a
strategy Al-Qaeda disagreed with. In 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then deputy to Bin Laden, addressed
Zarqawi in a leeer that linked the struggle in Iraq to prophecies in the Quran and the Hadith, but Zawa-
hiri amed the discourse to express his opinion that expelling Americans om Iraq and establishing an
emirate should take priority over, “extending the jihadi wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq,”
and Shiites in particular. From the onset of the invasion Zarqawi had targeted Shiites on the grounds that
th
they were assisting the American occupation and that American forces were hiding behind the
shields of Shiite civilians. Despite his teacher, jihadist ideology Abu Muhammad
al-Maqdisi rebuking him, Zarqawi continued to aaack Shia wantonly.
In August 29, 2003, Zarqawi went a step further, authorizing an aaack on the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf,
where Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, an Iraqi-cleric exiled in Iran since the Iran-Iraq war of 1979,
delivered a sermon that called for Shia unity and cooperation with the Americans. On al-Hakim’s way out,
however, a truck bomb detonated and reduced the shrine, and al-Hakim, to rubble. In his leeer, Zawahiri
stressed that ordinary Muslims could not comprehend the sectarian targeting, and that their questioning
the strategy, “increases more when the aaacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali.” Zawahiri realized that
aaacking Shiites would further compel the Iranians to support the Iraqi regime and by extension the
Americans. He inquired, “Do the brothers forget that both we and the Iranians need to reeain om harm-
ing each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us?,” despite recognition that, “The colli-
sion between any state based on the model of prophecy with the Shia is a maaer that will happen sooner
or later. This is the judgment of history, and these are the uits to be expected om the rejectionist Shia
sect and their opinion of the Sunnis.”
Al-Qaeda’s population-centric approach versus Zarqawi’s strategy of all out savagery represented an ini-
tial riſt between the two organizations, but by the time Zarqawi was killed in an American aaack on June
8, 2006, the strategy of aaacking the Shiites had failed miserably. Iraqi “Awakening” councils made up of
Sunni tribesmen had rallied against Zarqawism and slowly depleted Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s influence. Docu-
ments found in his safehouse aſter his death revealed that Zarqawi found the situation then “gloomy;” to
rectify it he proposed that, “the best solution in order to get out of this crisis is to involve the U.S. forces in
waging a war against another country or any hostile groups…We mean specifically aaempting to escalate
the tension between America and Iran, and America and the Shiites in Iraq.” Yet, it seemed too late. Zarqa-
wi was dead. By the end of 2011, bin Laden was as well. As the jihadi insurgency depleted, and the last
American troops leſt Iraq it seemed the jihadist’s ambitions were destroyed. However, they would be resur-
rected with a Syrian civil war that increasingly turned jihadist.
From this history, most would conclude that ISIS and Al-Qaeda hold divergent perspectives, and that this
was a repercussion of argumentation over strategy derived om prophecy versus one based on strategic
logic and patience. Yet, it is important to consider that both Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Ayman
al-Zawahiri were gentle in their criticism of Zarqawi. For Zawahiri, Zarqawi was, “more knowledgeable
about the field conditions,” while Maqdisi recanted, “Our mujahidin brothers in Iraq have their own inter-
pretations and choices that they choose as they see fit in the baalefield that we are distant om.” The
ev that occurred om 2012 unto the present seem to further confirm this reality. Despite clear differ-
events
ence in their interpretation on the jurisprudence behind killing civilians and other issues, there remains
an ideological glue and strategic precedent between each khariji organization.
In 2005, Sayf al-Adl, a high-ranking member of Al-Qaeda with intimate ties to Zarqawi, penned two docu-
ments, a thorough biography of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his history with Al-Qaeda and a ‘Master Plan’
for jihadists. Penned on forty-two pages in a safehouse in Iran, they eventually made their way to a Jorda-
nian journalist, Fouad Hussein, who had been incarcerated with Maqdisi and Zarqawi.
Al-Adl justified the Master Plan, explaining that, “Drawing up a clear plan is one of the divine laws.” He
outlined the vision in seven stages and proved undeniably prescient. First, was an ‘awakening’ stage that
began with the plans for 9/11 and ended with the occupation of Baghdad in 2003. Second, the stage of
‘eye-opening’ was predicted to last until 2006. The phase was to make the world aware of Al-Qaeda and
turn the organization into a transnational movement.
Third, ‘Arising and Standing Up’ - om 2007 to 2010 -would expand the jihad into Syria. Then, om 2010
to 2013 Al-Qaeda would make the U.S., “weak, exhausted and unable to shoulder the responsibilities
of the world order.” Arab regimes would then be overthrown, as seemed the case with an Arab Spring bin
Laden endorsed, and Al-Qaeda would continue it expansion. The fiſth, a ‘stage of declaring the state,’
predicts a caliphate in the Levant by the end of 2016, while the sixth, the stage of all-out connontation -
which would begin with caliphates declaration. Then, the seventh stage would be the ‘stage of final victo-
ry.’ The elements and timeeame Al-Adl outlined remain remarkable, however, while the jihadists have
dwindled and American influence indeed seems on the wane, they’ve only thus far paved the way not for
a caliphate, but rather a new authoritarian international order that will be way more harmful than the
liberal order which protects Muslim rights to worship wherever it reigns.
Hussein included an analysis of the document in his book, Zarqawi...the Second Generation of Al-Qaeda.
In that work, he also discussed Al-Adl and Zarqawi’s perspectives on Iran, claiming that instigating war
between the U.S. and Iran was a key component of Al-Qaeda’s strategy, a strategy derived itself om an
analysis of End of Time prophecy. In it, Hussein explains that Al-Qaeda interpreted peace talk between
Palestinian and Israelis in February 2005 as aimed at countering Iranian influence on the Palestinian re-
sistance. and the “first step toward launching an aaack on Iran.” Ultimately, Hussein explained that
Al
Al-Qaeda expects the U.S. and Israel to aaack Iran and then remove the regime of Bashar al-Assad in
Syria. Thereaſter, the country would be infiltrated by Al-Qaeda.
While the U.S. did not aaack Iran, the infiltration of Syria occurred alongside clear covert operations
meant to support Syrian rebels against Assad and his Iranian allies. Interestingly, the process for infil-
tration of the Syrian resistance was outlined in another document wriien by an Al-Qaedist om a safe-
house in Iran under the nomme de guerre Abu Bakr al-Najdi. The book, entitled Management of Savage-
ry, offers a strategic outline that includes a call for creating all out chaos and luring the superpowers into
connontation, while indoctrinating and recruiting the Muslim masses. One section, labeled ‘Mastering
the Security Dimension: Surveillance and Infiltrating Adversaries and Opponents of Every Kind’ calls
for, “infiltrating the police forces, the armies, the different political parties, the newspapers, the Islamic
groups, the petroleum companies, private security firms, sensitive civil institutions and etcetera.” With
the situation in Syria deteriorating, jihadists may aaempt a similar approach with regard to Iran.
Recent documents discovered at bin Laden’s Abbooabad compound have revealed more on the nature of
Iran’s clandestine dealings with Al-Qaeda. One leeer, om an unknown Al-Qaeda higher-up, claims that
Iran offered money, training and weapons in exchange for an aaack in Saudi Arabia. Others gave more
information on the ‘core facilitation pipeline’ that made it possible for personal and communications
such as al-Adl’s Master Plan and the Management of Savagery to pass safely through the country. How-
ever, while mostly downplayed in the media and halls of academia, the papers also reveal a great deal of
con
contention. Bin Laden wrote directly to Ayatollah Khamenei and demanded the release of family mem-
bers. In another document, bin Laden mused over the best methods for containing Iranian influence in
the region. Another directed the kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat to exchange for prisoners. When
bin Laden died, a sustained relationship with Iran seemed absolutely necessary, but it is likely that both
parties will change the calculation of that marriage of convenience going forward.
In 2007, there was a flurry of concern that Al-Qaeda would aaempt to carry out an aaack and blame to
on Iran. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Bruce Reidal stated, “The biggest danger is that al Qaeda will deliber-
ately provoke a war with a “false-flag” operation, say, a terrorist aaack carried out in a way that would
make it appear as though it were Iran’s doing. At the same time, Vice President Dick Cheney proposed
taking advantage of a high-casualty event in Iraq that could be blamed on Iran to aaack an Iranians Rev-
olution Guard Corps base in Iran in the summer of 2007. In May 2007, former CIA director George Tenet
publish a memoir that described how the Bush administration threatened diplomats that Iran would
published
be held accountable in the event an Al-Qaeda terrorist aaack in the United States was planned in Iran.
in a way that would make it appear as though it were Iran’s doing. At the same time, Vice President Dick Cheney
proposed taking advantage of a high-casualty event in Iraq that could be blamed on Iran to aaack an Iranians Rev-
olution Guard Corps base in Iran in the summer of 2007. In May 2007, former CIA director George Tenet published
a memoir that described how the Bush administration threatened diplomats that Iran would be held accountable
in the event an Al-Qaeda terrorist aaack in the United States was planned in Iran.
In February of 2007, the first emir of the Islamic State in Iraq, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi announced that he welcomed
the increase of troops in Iraq and informed the Muslims that, “we stand at the same point that was stood upon by
the Companions with the Prophet, at the start of al-Medina phase, and our baale with the Persians has started as
it has with the Romans, but the maaer of the Persians is easier and more banal than that of the Romans, and it will
especially be so aſter the impending limited American nuclear strike against Iranian military and nuclear facilities.”
With this apparent parallel to the situation outlined in Surah Rum in the Quran, the predecessor to ISIS’ so-called
caliph, suggested that war with Iran was pending and that it would ultimately create a void similar to the one that
paved the way to Islamic conquest in the years following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. That aaack never
matriculated. However, now, war with Iran seems like the jihadists only hope, a conflict that would permit them to
continue a crazed narrative that can turn defeat into victory with prophetic replete.
One of the primary works jihadists rely on for their eschatological analyses relating to politics and the End of Times
is a collection penned by the Damascene scholar Ismail Ibn Kathir, a student of Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn Kathir wrote a vo-
luminous collection he called ‘Al-Bidaya wal-Nihaya’ – The Beginning and the End.’ In it, he outlines world history
om the creation of the world and Adam and Eve up unto resurrection and eternity, either in hell or heaven. A sec-
tion of the voluminous work was isolated and published alone. Called Kitab al-Fitan (The Book of Tribulations) it
includes prophetic narrations, with political connotations, that culminate in the reestablishment of a caliphate
meth
‘upon the methodology of prophethood,’ and final global domination. Before this immaculate period, however, the
Muslim must enter into a period of immense fitnah (tribulation). Most of the events occur around Syria where the
prophet Muhammad reported that, “the nations will gather together against you as though they are ready to feast
on meal.” Time will converge and there will be an abundance of killing.
The notorious American Al-Qaeda ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki once reported on Kitab al-Fitan in a notorious lec-
ture he called ‘Allah is Preparing us for Victory.’ “When I was young, 20 years ago, reading the book, I thought these
were going to be wonderful times, but they were going to be very, very far away, because the hadith talk about certain
areas, these areas are” Iraq, Khurasan (Afghanistan), most of the hadith talk about Syria and the Levant,” he ex-
plained before his death on September 29, 2011. In the same way that Al-Awlaki wrapped apocalyptic scripture
around current affairs, the jihadists would ame a U.S. led war with Iran as divine providence and indications of
victory forthcoming, thus rescuing the movement om the throes of defeat, not unlike the period that followed 2011.
First, Ibn Kathir includes a narration that “the Black Flags will come om Khurasan,” interpreted by jihadists to
mean Afghanistan, “and they will not be stopped until they reach Jerusalem.” However, prior to that the prophet re-
ported that the Arabs “will make a truce of peace with Rome; you and they will conquer an enemy om behind
them. You will be safe and you will achieve spoils. Then you will descend in a fertile soil that has many mounds in it.
A man om the Romans will stand, raise the cross, and say, 'victory is for the cross.' A man om the Muslims will
rise and kill him. At that point, the Romans will betray their agreement and there will be massacres. They will gather
for you, advancing toward you with 80 banners, and with each banner there will be 10,000." The notion is that the
West (modern-day Rome) will ally in Syria against a common enemy of the Muslims. The modern-day Romans
would lead an aaack against a ‘common enemy,’ interpreted to mean Iran, Russia, and Assad. However, in the end,
the West would betray the truce and all out conflict or Armageddon (malhama in Arabic) would occur. The forces
of the West would remain overwhelming, but waves of mujahideen would be sent to sacrifice, while those that stayed
behind would be destroyed. “The killing will be such as 'nothing similar to it will have been seen, to the extent that
a bird will pass by their sides and will not pass by them until it falls down dead,” a section of the narration that ji-
hadists would indicate may means the utilization of nuclear weapons.
advancing toward you with 80 banners, and with each banner there will be 10,000." The notion is that
the West (modern-day Rome) will ally in Syria against a common enemy of the Muslims. The mod-
ern-day Romans would lead an aaack against a ‘common enemy,’ interpreted to mean Iran, Russia, and
Assad. However, in the end, the West would betray the truce and all out conflict or
Armageddon (malhama in Arabic) would occur. The forces of the West would remain overwhelming,
but waves of mujahideen would be sent to sacrifice, while those that stayed behind would be destroyed.
“The killing will be such as 'nothing similar to it will have been seen, to the extent that a bird will pass
by their sides and will not pass by them until it falls down dead,” a section of the narration that jihad-
ists would indicate may means the utilization of nuclear weapons.
In fact, this eschatological amework is part and parcel of the perseverance witnessed in the jihadist
community since 9/11, an ultimate war of aarition bin Laden explained early into the conflict as “the
White House and us are playing as one team towards the economic goals of the United States, even if
the intentions differ.” While war with Iran would grant jihadists a refuge by permiiing
proclamations that they were thereby on their way to fulfilling Al-Adl’s vision, most scholars of
history and Islam explain these politicized prophetic narrations as probable fabrications recorded over
100 years aſter Muhammad’s death and tracking closely to events om that time period.
In reality, policies aimed at fulfilling end of times hadith have only wrought more destruction. Even if
you take End of Times narrations completely at their word, the Prophet (saws) actually praised the
West. Al-Mustawrid reported of Ahul Rum that Amr ibn al-‘As said he heard the Messenger of Allah
(saws) say, “The Hour will be established while the Romans are the predominant and majority of the
people,” to which detractors replied, “Be careful what you say.” But Amr said, “I have said what I heard
om the Messenger of Allah say. Indeed, there are four good qualities in them: they are the most for-
bearing of people in tribulation, they are the quickest to recover aſter a calamity, they are the most eager
to return aſter retreat, and they are good to the poor, the orphan, and the vulnerable. Their fiſth quality
is good and beautiful: they are the best at stopping the oppression of their kings.”
Additionally, when the Prophet (saws) spoke of violence in the End of Times, he categorized it as sense-
less, warned people not to get involved and even endorsed commitment to non-violence. In one of many
examples, the Prophet (saws) did not discuss tribulation as victory but rather informed that, “There will
be a tribulation (fitnah) – the one who is lying down during it is beeer than the one who is seated; the
one who is seated is beeer than the one standing; the one who is standing is beeer than the one who is
walking; and the one who is walking is beeer than the one who is seeking it out.” So, he (saws) was
asked,
as “O Messenger of Allah (saws), what do you order me to do then?” The Prophet (saws) said,
“Whoever has camels, then let him go to his camels; whoever has sheep, then let him catch up with his
sheep, and whoever has land, then let him go to his land. And whoever does not have any of that, then
let him betake himself to his sword, crush its blade with a rock, and then save himself as much as he is
able to do so. (Abu Dawood).”
There many more narrations that indicate the same. Of course, the jihadists have mastered cherry-
picking om End of Times hadith, while at the same time negating the principles of the Quran. In con-
clusion, we can expect more statements to stem om jihadists that try to proclaim America’s connonta-
tion with Iran and the wanton, indiscriminate destruction they call to and wage as victory in clear
defeat, but Muslims everywhere should not be deceived. The only way Muslims will regain self-determi-
nation is to return to the essence of their religion, a religion derived om peace, that forbids such bar-
barism and that is so much more spiritual than these scriptural adulterations indicate. Do not be de-
ceived by these callers to the gates of hell. They destroy whatever they touch. Do not permit them into
your heart and mind, where they can destroy your spiritual, mental and
physical condition as well.
LightUponLight.Online
R E P A T R I A T I O N S:
INSIGHT FROM
A
FORMER
FOREIGN FIGHTER
BY
BRYANT NEAL VIÑAS
MARIA JUNCAL FERNÁNDEZGARAYZÁBAL
The controversy surrounding the repatriation of foreign fighters has had me thinking a lot about myself. I
can’t avoid but seeing my own history and fate in the hundreds of Western mujahedeen being held in Syrian
and Iraqi prisons. I don’t sympathize with them, but I do feel for them. I was once in their shoes. I am Ameri-
ca’s first foreign fighter after 9/11, but now I am evidence that transformative change is truly possible.
Like these foreign fighters, I was also once a mistaken idealist who had self-convinced himself that I was
acting upon Allah’s will. Like them, I didn’t surrender or turn myself in; I was captured. Like them, I was held
in a prison in a foreign country, waiting for extradition. Like them, I feared what my fate would be. There is
also one more thing I have in common with Western foreign fighters. At the time of my arrest, I was still heav-
ily influenced by a strong anti-U.S. sentiment. It’s true that I had seen and experienced enough to grow disil-
lusioned with Al-Qaeda’s endeavors, but was nowhere near to where I am today, neither ideologically nor
personally. In fact, upon my arrest, I was negotiating the price of a rifle scope with a local store owner in Pe-
shawar.
It was November 5th, 2008 and I was 25 years old. Only a year earlier, I’d boarded a plane at JFK Airport
(New York City) with the original intention of joining the Taliban. Instead, I ended up joining Al-Qaeda by
pure chance and haphazard networking.
As I was speaking to the store owner, a local police officer entered the store and started talking to me.
Needless to say, I didn’t understand a word of what was being said. The friend I was with and I decided to
step out of the store, only to be “kindly escorted” to the police headquarters. I was never given an explana-
tion as to why I was there, so, in my mind, I was being held with no charges.
I didn’t understand how or why it was happening. To my knowledge, only a handful of people knew that I’d
left for Pakistan. When I radicalized, there was no such thing as encrypted platforms or blockchain mes-
saging apps, so I was always extremely careful whom I shared any information with. I went as far as to
book my tickets to Pakistan in person, at a travel agency owned by a Pakistani. What I didn’t know was
that he had contacts in the Pakistani embassy, so he ultimately handled the visa arrangements for me. All
I could think about in that cell in Peshawar was what could possibly be going on.
I got a hint after several days. It came after a violent altercation I had with the lieutenant that was followed
by a severe beating and my transfer to the local jail. I was only taken back to police headquarters to meet
some people from the U.S. consulate. But I spent the night in the local facility. The next day, some uni-
formed men I’d never seen before came into my cell. They took me out. I was chained and blindfolded. I
panicked. Who were these people? Where were they taking me? In retrospect, I understand the security
measures, but back then it felt like I was being kidnapped.
They sat me in a truck, in the front seat, guarded by to individuals. My ears were my only guide as to what
might be going on. We stopped. I heard a conversation between my custodians and a third individual. The
truck pulled backwards and we started driving. After some minutes, we stopped again. Another conversa-
tion. It was the same voice as earlier. This time, however, some metal doors opened. I imagined I was in
a compound of some sorts. The next thing I knew, I was in another cell. But I still didn’t know exactly where
I was at. It was an ISI prison.
Somebody came to get me, and took me to a basement. Interrogation time. It felt like being put in a dun-
geon. The jail I’d been sitting in for the past days was no better, but this time my eyes were blinded and I
was being asked all sorts of questions in a less than friendly manner. My charges weren’t read to me until
the U.S. authorities took custody of me. Therefore, I still saw myself as being held against my will and for
no apparent reason.
These perceived irregularities aggravated me. From where I stood, I had traveled to Pakistan to join a just
cause: Afghanistan is a country at war, and I had decided to support my Muslim brothers and sisters
against a foreign invasion. My involvement with Al-Qaeda didn’t go beyond protecting a group that fired
rockets at a military base on the Afghan side of the border. Back in the U.S. and after cooperating with au-
thorities, however, I ultimately pled guilty to receiving military training from a terrorist group, providing mate-
rial support to a terror organization, and wanting to fight U.S. military as U.S. nationals abroad.
While in Peshawar, I assisted in planning an attack in Long Island Rail Road. I travelled that line often
before leaving to Pakistan, so my insight on routes and times was crucial for those actually planning the at-
tacks. Though I’m now horrified by my own actions, I once justified them. I had only left for Pakistan to fight
in the Afghan war. But my mindset changed the day I heard that an orphanage had been wiped out during
a U.S. drone strike. I could no longer stick to ‘defensive action,’ I had to do something more. If the West
didn’t care about those babies and children, I couldn’t afford to care about those back in the U.S.
To be clear, I’m not condoning my past actions in any way. However, I do feel the need to be transparent
about who I was because I’m proud of who I am today. I was once unrepentant, and felt like any damage
done to the U.S. was legitimate. I supported Osama Bin Laden’s “war of attrition” and the need to focus on
the “far enemy.” Back when I was in Afghanistan I agreed with the idea of destroying the only mass transit
route that connects Long Island to Manhattan and cause major damage to the U.S. economy. Back then, I
believed that the death toll was merely a side effect. Being in a war zone had desensitized me to the idea
of death. Yet, eventually, I found myself thinking: was contributing to the death of innocent civilians in the
Long Island railroad any different to the unjustified death of those children at the orphanage?
What set me off in the path towards actual change were trust and compromise. And none of the two initially
came from me. As I sat in that godforsaken ISI prison I was terrified of the possibility of repatriation. I was
convinced that if the U.S. government ever claimed me, it would be to take me to Guantanamo and lock me
up forever. The day finally came. Again the chains, the blindfold…and this time, noise-cancelling head-
phones too. Until I was told that we were actually going back to the U.S., all I could think about “This is it, I’m
going to Cuba (Guantanamo).”
After what seemed to be the longest trip of my life, I was back in the U.S. Being in New York was rather sur-
prising. I thought I’d be taken somewhere around the D.C. area, probably the same place that Jose Padilla
was being held as an enemy combatant. In any case, I could have easily been taken to Guantanamo, and
nobody would have ever missed me. Instead, the U.S. government took a chance on me. Although it took
me a while to reflect on this, I couldn’t continue being angry at my own country when instead of letting me
rot in a Pakistani prison, or taking me to Guantanamo and throwing away the key to the cell, they were willing
to at least listen to what I had to say and trusted that I could become an asset.
Being in a U.S. prison and not anywhere else helped me reflect on all the reasons why I was locked up. It
was far more complex than a simplistic ‘the West is at War against Islam’ argument. It was about the damage
and harm I could have caused. In the beginning, I sat by myself for 23 hours a day. Eventually my lockdown
hours were reduced, but I was behind bars for almost nine years. I’ll admit it was dreadful, but I was able to
put my own beliefs and my own experiences into perspective. That’s when reality kicked in.
I remembered when I first got to Waziristan, and how I felt fulfilled. I had longed for that feel-
ing of eagerness and enthusiasm for so long before I departed for Pakistan. I was excited
about the training and the fighting, and hungry to pray alongside my Muslim brothers in the
front lines. Although it was in prison when I came to accept the truth of about the fight in Wa-
ziristan, it’s true that I was already very disappointed with the cause while I was there.
The land where the will of Allah was supposedly taking place had been corrupted by the
goods of the dunyah: money, power, strength, privilege. There was no such thing as pro-
tecting the ummah, and incoherence prevailed. Corrupt warlords who were allegedly con-
nected to the Pakistani Intelligence services controlled the area; the Taliban who helped
al-Qaeda navigate the mountainous areas were allegedly connected to the drug lords; the
rumor that the drug lords were connected to the Afghan President’s brother were wide-
spread. In the meantime, everybody was getting a cut out of illegal mining profits. There
was no such thing as pure intentions in Waziristan. Allah’s will was secondary to greed and
personal interests.
I guess what also helped me put things into perspective was the self-proclamation of ISIS’
so-called caliphate. I was still incarcerated when it happened. I remember how thousands
worldwide answered Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s call to migrate. And I remember what followed:
unwarranted brutality, indiscriminate attacks towards Muslim scholars who they deemed
apostates for not conforming to their excessiveness, and blanket attacks towards ahlul-ki-
tab (People of the Book). It shocked me that those who claimed to be the perfect followers
of Prophet Muhammad (saws) weren’t even able to remember Bukhari’s narration: “He who
wrongs a Jew or a Christian will have myself as his accuser on the Day of Judgement.”
Governments and citizens worldwide have been terrorized by ISIS’ violence since 2014.
Only in Europe, the total number of completed, failed and foiled ISIS attacks mounted up to
89 between 2014 and 2018. Yet, ISIS’ caliphate had been distorted by excessiveness and
had nothing to do with the jihad I’d read about in the Qur’an. And neither did Waziristan. I
broke: would Allah have ever approved killing the store owners, teachers, mechanics,
nurses, retail store workers, mothers, school-aged kids, etc. that traveled every morning
into New York City, when it was in the name of a corrupt cause?
For centuries, Muslims across the globe have read and referred to Imam Nawawi’s
40 Hadith (Al-Arbain al-Nawawiyyah). This colleccon of 40 narraaons of the
Prophet Muhammad (saws) – 42 actually (but the Arabs tend to round down in
numbers), has inspired and encouraged countless Muslims to cullvate a core
character based on the actual message of Islam. Indeed, almost every Muslim on
the planet is familiar with it.
In the introduccon
i to his explanaaon of the 40 hadith, Imam Nawawi described his
objeccve as an effort to compile the most prominent narraaons of the Prophet
(saws), narraaons the scholars of Islam had described with aaribuuons such as
“The ennre religion revolves around it.” These descrippons suggest that the
message and meaning of these hadith is so crucial to the universe of Islam that
their understanding and implementaaon is an imperaave component of craaing an
Islamic personality.
Unfortunately, for many today, there is too much miscomprehension and not
Un
enough implementaaon of what one learns. Our present age is marked , simultane-
ously, by severe disregard for spirituality and religion and an ugly fundamentalist
extremism that chases others away from the religion and fails miserably in its os-
tensible objeccve of removing authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and
so-called “Western” influence from so-called “Muslim” lands.’ I should know. I’ve
experienced both sides of extremism.
View at
LightUponLight.Online/Dialogue-of-Civilization
THE
AWAKENING
My name is Jason Walters. I was part of the Dutch De Hofstadgroep case went to trial, Jermaine was ac-
Salafi jihadi terror cell known as De Hofstadgroep. My quitted. He avoided the solitude and the agony of in-
colleague, Mohammed Bouyeri murdered Dutch film- carceration. Yet, his freedom was also unfortunate.
maker Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004. I was Jermaine wasn’t able to separate himself from the ji-
arrested shortly after, and originally sentenced to fif- hadist echo-chamber we had been immersed in over
teen years in prison. the years. While incarcerated, I was able to take a
step back and reconsider the path I’d taken. Unfortu
I spent almost eight years in a maximum security nately, even after I was released from prison, I wasn’t
prison in the Netherlands. During that time, I studied able to lead my brother down the same road. In 2014,
philosophy and ended up rejecting the worldview I’d he and his family left for Syria to join the self-pro-
constructed my entire youth around. It was an existen- claimed Islamic State.
tial angst that first connected me with Islam, and it was
the same desire to answer existential questions that I opted for rejection of violence. My brother chose
led me to reject the violent ideas I once espoused. jihad and death for what he thought was a greater
good. Both decisions, as different as they were, were
I’ve realized a ton from these experiences and today I made based on what we each understood was a pur-
explore radicalization as an existentialist choice. I poseful life. What was different in each case? The
don’t want to present radicalization as just a choice fact that each radicalization and deradicalization pro-
that one ‘thinks through’ from an exclusively rationalist cess is unique is nothing new. But I do want the con
standpoint. It’s not just a cognitive thought process. It clusion of my story to reveal an important take on vio-
is a decision made by an individual as a thinking, feel- lence. Violence is a choice, not an irremediable con-
ing and conscious being. It is a decision taken based sequence of your religious convictions. And, as any
on what one considers an authentic existence, one decision you may take in life, there will be conse-
that provides meaning to one’s life. quences. Not just for you, but also for those you love.
I know this now because I wasn’t the only one in my I will describe the essentials of radicalization as an
family who chose Salafi jihadism. My younger brother, existentialist choice in a three-article series for
Jermaine, was radicalized under my guidance. He Ahul-Taqwa. It seems to me that radicalization is a
was, at least in some sense, luckier than I was. When two-tier process. There’s an initial aesthetic phase
that is followed by an engagement or commitment phase. Some will recognize my
description of this first aesthetic phase as the phase you want to become a living
Qur’an. Similarly to what Ibn abd al-Wahhab described, one expands the defini-
tion of worshipping God to every aspect of one’s life. It is a very powerful phase
where one immerses in a world of spirituality, almost detached from this earthly
world. This detachment also leads to rejection, rejection to anything that doesn’t
come from Allah. This phase precedes jihad, the acceptance phase. Jihad be-
comes more sensual than ever. It becomes the defining criteria for what it means
to be a good Muslim. But prior to this, there is a phase of what could be called an
‘Islamic awakening phase.’ It is during this phase that one seems to find answers
to each and every existential question. I remember exactly how and when this
happened to me.
My childhood was a pretty happy one. I grew up in the Dutch village of Amersfoort
with my brother and my parents, an African American soldier and a Dutch mother.
It was a Christian household. I went to a Christian school. We read the Bible. We
used to go to church on Sundays… Yet, there was something missing, something
experiential that I couldn’t quite grasp. I understood life has a meaning. I knew I
existed, but I wanted to know why I existed. Then, one night, I had a horrible
nightmare. I was being burned alive and felt so much pain. I interpreted this as me
not being in the right path and that I was going to hell. Of course, I didn’t want to
burn in hell. But what could I do? The Christian environment I grew up in didn’t
give me such insight. I saw Christian doctrine reduce ‘living’ to a “be nice” morali-
ty, through which not even priests could solve my existential questions, what to
expect from life or where I came from. Everybody has asked themselves such
questions at some point in life, but I started at a very early age, when I was around
6 or 7 years old. Getting no answers only increased my existential angst.
Some years later, my parents divorced. For a young child, it is never an easy situ-
ation to cope with. My father resettled in a Muslim-majority area, close to Amers-
foort. He himself eventually converted to Islam. At first, Islam was an exotic reli-
gion, mysterious even. But then I discovered it was the same thing I had been
taught growing up - even Jesus was in the Qur’an. But not only was it compatible
with what I had learned thus far, in a sense it was more logical and consistent, a
sort of improved version of what I already knew. There was another thing that fas
cinated me about Islam: its strong sense of identity and structure. Islam provided
not just a sense of being, but also a strong set of rules for what can and cannot
be done, what is halal, haram and what is in between.
I chose to convert. I was only 12 years old, and it was Ramadan. The mosque
was full. Seeing people praying together, sharing food and building a community
has a very profound impact on me. It was so much nicer than the dead-looking,
museum-like, cold churches I’d been in. It was like comparing a ‘dead religion’ to
a ‘live religion.’ It was a very spiritual experience, as if angels were flying over the
congregation. I took my shahada that same day. Thus, my relationship with Islam
began. At first, it was very ritualistic. I learned Arabic. I learned how to pray, fasted
during Ramadan, and acquired basic knowledge. But, for once in my life, every-
thing started to make sense.
At the age of 16, everything changed. It was September 11, 2001. Al-Qaeda at-
tacked the World Trade Center, killing almost 3,000 people. A little less than a
month later, on October 7, the United States invaded Afghanistan. For me, 11
marked ‘the end of history.’ The future was now stagnant, it would become an extension of the present,
and nothing would change much, let alone improve. The 9/11 attacks were a derailment of history.
They had such an impact that they required an explanation. What did 9/11 actually mean? What’s
more, as a Muslim, I wanted to know what Islam said about this.
Coincident to 9/11 was the birth of the Age of Information. Access to information technology was wide-
spread and fast. It opened up a new world by providing widespread access to information. Events and
debate worldwide could now be followed (almost) live. I found answers to my questions online easily.
I was able to follow the debates between moderate and extremist Islamists online. Extremists, in my
eyes, had better arguments. They convinced me. Their interpretation and perception of time and histo-
ry were an appropriation of the texts. The extremist worldview combined past and future into the pres-
ent, a discourse that seemed to answer what 9/11 meant from an Islamic perspective.
Extremists deny that there is something called ‘history.’ They strategically use texts and Islamic sourc-
es to explain how history stopped after Prophet Mohammed founded the first Islamic State. It was a
perfect society, and it is therefore their duty to recreate a world that mirrors that Islamic State. Even
military doctrine depends on that worldview. They point out the first military expansion of Muslims was
a historical project to make the world into one ummah that replicated the Prophet’s city-state. Al-Qaeda
and ISIS claim to be the groups that will reestablish the caliphate. The rest of the ummah are apostates
– they are no longer Muslims according to them, or they are jaahil (ignorant). Anything that changes or
deviates from the perfection established by the Prophet is a degeneration. This Prophetic past is pre-
sented alongside a future of al-Malhama (apocalypse), perfectly represented in ISIS’ taking of Dabiq,
a town in Syria prophesied to be the potential location of Jesus’ return to fight the antichrist and usher
in Islam’s domination. To justify their view and legitimize themselves they use ahadith pick and choose
at will. It is a very strategic narrative that justifies the overthrowing of governments, and the reestab
lishment of the caliphate, one that allows politics to predominate in the religious discourse and to
expand Islam’s role in explaining every aspect of life.
Based on these premises, I became convinced. I was “awakened” to what I thought was the truth. I
was now convinced that this life, dunyah, was just an investment that would determine your life in the
hereafter. The complete solution was to sacrifice your life for the sake of God. I would now become the
perfect Muslim. I wanted my life to become the perfect worship of God. This feeling prevailed when I
was first incarcerated. But then something else happened. As in any totalitarian ideology, there is only
one truth. So, at a given point, you learn everything there is to know. Theology had just become an in-
dexation of heresies. Shariah, as interesting as it is, is very specialized in some ways though shallow
in essence. I got bored. And when I’d finally reached this point, somebody recommended I read Abu
Majid al-Zindani. I’d never heard of it, and despite it being a bit of a conspiracy theory, it made sense:
God creates heaven and earth, God creates everything, and it all comes together.
The book said all true insights of modern science can be found in the Qur’an. So, I started studying sci-
ence. I wanted to start assimilating science into faith. I wanted to Islamize science. I wanted to use sci-
ence and scientific means to make dawah and convert people. After all, people in the West are mostly
non-religious, but they would accept scientific arguments, and even Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity
is in the Qur’an. However, something different happened, something unexpected.
Instead of assimilating science into faith, I assimilated modern rationality. It’s different to religious ratio-
nality. Religious rationality is based on rhetoric and language. That rhetoric is capable of convincing you
that if God is all-powerful, then you are free. It makes sense at first glance, but it doesn’t follow a logic.
I found that scientific rationality has different boundaries, different criteria to establish what the truth is.
This changed me. Yet, I was unable to explain my new approach to understanding life. Science doesn’t
give you language. I was then that I was introduced to philosophy. Once I lost the fear to think for
myself, I was able to understand what Plato said about truth being able to emerge triumphantly by the
use of reason alone, without arguments from any authority.
This changed me. It was my second awakening. The same existential angst that had led me to adopt
Islam, espouse jihadism and embrace violence, as well as a desire to prove Wester atheism wrong, that
same critical thinking, allowed me to reconsider my worldview. And along with it came the second rejec-
tion phase, which meant more than a rejection of violence. I rejected everything I had stood up for.
With this first article I do not wish to tell anybody how to live a meaningful life. Each individual should
be free to make that choice. I would encourage everybody to strive to become, not a perfect Muslim like
I once strived to be, but rather a perfect version of themselves. Violence is only an option. And the con-
sequences of it go beyond you going to jail. There’s families, friendships, religious freedom, and human
brotherhood at stake. Although I have now embraced science over faith, I cannot avoid but remember:
Somali-American
Dedicated to the Promotion
of Peace and Prevention
of Extremism
It is simple. There was an open, inclusive society post
9/11. You also have to understand that we are black,
and there are issues with black people in America.
But what we’ve come to learn because of terrorism is
Islamophobia. Terrorists have tamed our community
and have actually amplified racism within our commu-
nity. Minnesota has accounted for the largest number
of recruits for terrorism in America. This shocked me;
this shocked the community. I was a businessman,
and I decided that I would go ahead and fight this
problem. I looked at the problem and determined the
solution is law enforcement (which the government
jumped on immediately), but it is also community,
which the government has not addressed that much.
The solution is addressing ideology itself.