SALONGA VS HERMOSA
provided by law.
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the Revised Securities Act.
Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold
departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner’s passport, based on
the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to
show that the accused has left the country without the knowledge and the permission
of the court.
Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.
Held:
The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has
been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid
restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself
available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges
may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to
return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant
if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court
where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that
while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion
to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security,
public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J.,
Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the
previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates
of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs.
Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing
his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his
right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended
party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best
interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality
without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court
Orders and processes
CAUNCA VS SALAZAR
GR. No. L-2690 January I, 1949
Liberty of abode and travel
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin
Estelita Flores, an orphan and an illiterate, who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment
Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein.
An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her
to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was
disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to
her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be
allowed to leave.
Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?
Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee
or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no
physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make
less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external
moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an
imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological
element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another,
the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is
illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
Ratio:
On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid reason for respondents
to obstruct, impede or interfere with her desire to leave. Such indebtedness may be multiplied
by thousands or millions but would not in any way subtract an iota from the fundamental right
to have a free choice of abode. The fact that power to control said freedom may be an effective
means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental
human right. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental
human freedom. Human dignity is not merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other
business enterprise.
Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any person who, in order to
require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his
will, as household servant or farm laborer."
Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is prevented
from leaving her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her.
MANOTOC VS CA
● A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
● The constitutional right to travel is not an absolute right. The Constitution provides: "The
liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court xxx."
The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order.
Facts:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc., a stock brokerage house. He was in US for a certain
time. He went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee
for both businesses. Pending disposition of the case, the SEC requested the Commissioner of
Immigration not to clear Manotoc for departure, and a memorandum to this effect was issued
by the Commissioner.
Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal complaints for estafa
against Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in all cases. He then filed a motion for permission to
leave the country in each trial courts stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United
States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." His motion was denied. He
also wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's
memorandum, but said request was also denied. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the
communication-request of the SEC, denying his leave to travel abroad. The same was denied;
hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. He contends that having been admitted to bail as
a matter of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.
Issues:
1. Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines.
2. Whether the constitutional right to travel is absolute
Held:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to
leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the
courts.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section
5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (Sec 6. Art. III, 1987 Constitution) states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court,
or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.
The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision. (Ricardo Manotoc vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986)
SILVERIO VS CA
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal
Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.
More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-
departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several
times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment
and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and the
Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was
based primarily on the Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information, “the
accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates
scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this
Court”. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to
make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by
the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that “An
accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts
to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the
power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts
the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211 (1989)
The Right to Travel
PARTIES:
Petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al.
Respondents Raul Manglapus (Secretary of Foreign Affairs), et. al.
SUMMARY:
The Marcoses petitioned the Court to order the respondents to issue them travel documents
in order to return to the Philippines invoking their right to travel under the Bill of Rights. The
Court dismissed the petition.
DOCTRINES: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved here is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the
right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one’s country, a totally distinct right
under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights, though it may well be considered as a generally accepted principle of
international law which is part of the law of the land.
FACTS:
The Marcoses are in exile for three years in Hawaii, after being ousted through People Power.
This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Court to order the respondents to
issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and enjoin
the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
(A) Bill of Rights, Section 6:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.
(B) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 13.
Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country.
Respondent’s Arguments:
The right of the State to national security should be given primacy over individual rights. The
decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of
national security and public safety has international precedents. The following are deposed
dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments:
Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic
Anastacio Somoza, Jr. of Nicaragua
Jorge Ubico of Guatemala
Fulgencio Batista of Cuba
King Farouk of Egypt
Maximiliano Martinez of El Salvador
Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat: (a) the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of
a state (b) the right to leave a country, and (c) the right to enter one’s country as separate
and distinct rights.
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one’s
country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return MAY be considered, as a generally accepted principle
of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec.
2)
Thus, the rulings in the US cases of Kent and Haig, which refer to the issuance of passports
for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case
and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action
and the exercise of a protected right.
The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American
jurisprudence. Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well- debated issue of whether or
not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is
rendered unnecessary.
(2)
The Court held that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations (Art. VII, Sec. 14-23)
on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it does not define what is within the scope
of “executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. The power involved is the President’s
residual power to protect the general welfare of the people.
The power to bar the Marcoses must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed
to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.

ISSUES:
(1) WON there is violation of the Marcoses right to abode and right to travel? (NO)
(2) WON the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines? (YES)

RATIO:
(1)
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the
right to travel.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote.

Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one’s country, a totally distinct right
under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.