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START to STOP: Strategic Arms
Reduction in the 21st Century
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Strategic Arms Reduction in the 21st Century

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8/31/2010

By Craig S. Byrnes

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Introduction

Even though the Cold War has ended the threat posed by nuclear weapons has not. Over

the last decade the world has seen an increase in nuclear proliferation, and an erosion of the

international bodies--and mutual agreements--designed to impart a semblance of order on the

anarchic system. New concerns have materialized--like nuclear terrorism for instance--which

underscore the need for a shift in nuclear policies.1

As a result, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States lists, "reversing the

spread of nuclear weapons," as a top priority of the Obama Administration, citing that, "success

depends upon broad consensus and concerted action."2 This success can only be realized,

according to the NSS, by pursuing "the goal of a world without nuclear weapons." In keeping

with this strategy, the US and Russia--in the interest of mutual security--have made an effort to

produce predictability, credibility and stability by cultivating a strategic alliance based on trust

by signing a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on April 8, 2010.3

The implications of an agreement of this magnitude require that a study be done to assess

how the global security environment will be affected.4 By increasing security and verification

protocols on existing nuclear warheads and fissile materials the opportunity for terrorists--or

rogue states--to acquire nuclear technologies via theft or the black market will be drastically

reduced. However, measurable success can only be achieved if transparent verification protocols

1
"Proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their potential use by states or terrorists is the most
urgent challenge facing the national security, and therefore the intelligence community in the post Cold War world,"
(Deutch 1996).
2
The NSS also intends to extend a "negative security assurance not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
those non-nuclear nations that are in compliance with the NPT and their nuclear nonproliferation obligations," as
well as, "investing in the modernization of a safe, secure, and effective stockpile without the production of new
nuclear weapons."
3
A central purpose of New START is to, "reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons," (DOS
2010). Text of the New START treaty signals the commitment, "to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing
humanity from the nuclear threat," (DOS 2010).
4
Furthermore, it is necessary to determine if ratification of new START will increase or decrease the level of
national security enjoyed by the US.

2
are put in place. Consequently, the feasibility of a bilateral verification regime must be

investigated, requiring an analysis of existing and proposed transparent verification regimes to

uncover patterns of success--past studies have not offered practical solutions (Berry 2009).

Components of any successful verification regime intended to determine whether or not the

parties are in fact living up to the force reduction requirements of a new START treaty will

necessitate the need for transparent state behavior.5 This will facilitate an analysis from a

realist/neorealist standpoint by using international regime theory to provide a framework for

measuring to what extent the verification structures will be affected by the surrender of national

sovereignty required by transparency.

The purpose of this concurrent mixed methods study will be to determine if the

ratification of a new START treaty with Russia will enhance global security. A greater

understanding can be gained by combining expansive statistical trends obtained through

quantitative research with comprehensive qualitative research. Therefore, the hypothesis--that

verifiable reduction of nuclear arsenals will enhance global security--will be tested using

quantitative methods--such as linear regression--to measure and predict the relationship between

the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the US and Russia and multiple indicators of global

security levels. At the same time, the idea of strategic arms reduction--and verification--will be

explored by examining scholarly studies and government documents that focus on nuclear non-

proliferation, disarmament and nuclear terrorism.6

Literature Review

5
For the purpose of this study transparent state behavior will be defined as employing a transparent verification
regime capable of demonstrating tangible weapon reduction.
6
For the purposes of this study strategic arms will be defined as deliverable nuclear warheads and the fissile
material present in their creation and destruction.

3
 A thorough review of literature available on the topic of nuclear arms control will show a

large number of studies conducted in direct support of reducing the number of nuclear weapons

in the world to the ultimate goal of zero, but there is a lack of effort within these cases to

determine whether the security situation will actually benefit beyond the obvious fact that

verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals will enhance global security.

Literature focusing on the idea of nuclear disarmament is readily available, however it is

noted that any particular emphasis on costing or assessing the security situation, should this

occur, is lacking. Alger and Findlay perform an informative study for the Nuclear Energy

Futures Project centering on research concerning the costs of dismantling and destroying nuclear

arsenals and delivery systems (Alger and Findlay 2009). They claim, "the cost of dismantling

and destroying nuclear weapons is more accurately attributed to being a normal part of weapon

life cycles rather than to nuclear disarmament," (Alger and Findlay 2009). Additionally, their

study asserts that, "a multilateral verification regime will be a bargain given the benefits of a

world free of nuclear weapons," an idea that may uncover Russian motivations for signing new

START (Alger and Findlay 2009).

Existing studies regarding non-proliferation are widespread and mainly highlight the

tumultuous state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).7 Considering the implied point

of the new START treaty is to ultimately eliminate nuclear arms it is important to note studies

which investigate why states choose to proliferate or to disarm. Procida offers a unique and

compelling perspective on the way the international community views nuclear proliferation.

Referring to the nuclear domino theory, he claims, "virtually all practitioners agree that either

security concerns or a desire for status are the primary causes of proliferation, accompanied by

7
"The U.S. and Russia, which possess close to 95% of the world's nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility,
obligation and experience to demonstrate leadership, but other nations must join," (Schultz et al 2008).

4
the widespread consensus that a state's decision to go nuclear inevitably prompts others to

follow," (Procida 2010). In essence Procida believes this is a defective way of thinking that

warps, "policy debates on the risks and costs of nuclear disarmament and further proliferation,"

(Procida 2010). Procida’s argument directly supports ideas advanced in the 2010 NSS when he

claims, "massive cuts in the arsenals of the major nuclear powers, a prohibition once and for all

on nuclear tests, and even a global convention outlawing nuclear weapons," will, "embolden the

fight to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction, as the United States regains the moral

high ground," (Procida 2010).

Tagma offers an analysis of nuclear disarmament from the realist perspective. He details

both the defensive and offensive schools of thought, and points out the importance of viewing

the realist school through these distinctions (Tagma 2010). "This article advances two defensive

realist hypotheses on state behavior to explain nuclear rollback," (Tagma 2010).8 In particular it

argues, "that in certain strategic environments the insecurity caused by possessing nuclear

weapons outweighs the security provided by nuclear weapons against rivals in an uncertain

future," (Tagma 2010).

Kartchner et. al., "explore the advantages and disadvantages of several approaches to

arms control agreements, including formal treaties that are legally binding on their state parties,

non-binding political agreements, and parallel or reciprocated initiatives," (Kartchner et. al.

2002). The study claims, "it is possible that the US and its prospective arms control partners in

the future will find that hybrid approaches combining some elements of formal agreement with

8
"The absence of an existential threat is a necessary condition of nuclear disarmament, and the absence of a secure
second-strike capability is a necessary condition of nuclear disarmament as well," (Tagma 2010).

5
some informal arrangements will best meet their respective national security objectives,"

(Kartchner et. al. 2002).9

Cooper--a former Director of Strategic Arms Control Policy at the Department of

Defense--submits a valuable analysis of new START during the negotiation phase, and delivers

an assessment of Russian motivations, calling into question the wisdom of ratifying the new

START treaty.10 Cooper says it is too soon to tell whether the treaty will improve the

international situation, but explains, "a simplistic perspective might be that any reduction in

existing nuclear arsenals intrinsically helps to lessen the panoply of dangers that these weapons

pose; that fewer weapons anywhere equals less danger everywhere," (Cooper 2009). 11

Discussions on the topic of nuclear terrorism generally address the danger posed by non-

state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD).12 Van De Velde highlights the issue

of nuclear terrorism and attempts to provide conceivable deterrence scenarios. Arguing that, "the

most important strategic objective of any president's strategy to protect the United States is to

prevent terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction," Van De Velde determines

no true deterrence is possible (Velde 2010). As a solution he believes it necessary to label the

individuals who are "irredeemably committed to acquiring a nuclear weapon as irrational,

apocalyptic, and dangerous," (Velde 2010).

9
"This view is reinforced by the widely held conviction that Russia's nuclear arsenal will continue to decline
regardless of whether new formal arms control agreements are reached or not," (Kartchner et. al. 2002)
10
"Russia will likely push for an outcome that, while reciprocal on its face, would in reality provide a net nuclear
forces advantage over the United States. . . Putting it mildly, it is difficult to imagine how any outcome that even
approaches this presumed Kremlin blueprint would contribute to U.S. national security interests," (Cooper 2009).
11
Cooper's tone generally leans towards a, "framework for analysis based on a clear hierarchy of nuclear dangers,"
(Cooper 2009). He places the Russian threat at the bottom when he claims Russia does not have the means to,
"maintain its strategic force levels over time," (Cooper 2009). According to Cooper, Russia "needs deeper
reciprocal reductions, particularly in delivery vehicles, to maintain any semblance of strategic equivalency with the
United States."
12
"Observers have noted that U.S.-Russian cooperation to counter nuclear terrorism is facilitated by a partial
convergence of views in Washington and Moscow about the nuclear threats posed by non-state actors," (Parrish et al
2005).

6
 Overall the literature addresses the general components required to foster an environment

within which disarmament and verification is within reach. Alternatively it makes it clear that

States with limited conventional forces--including Russia--will continue to feel threatened by the

United States despite the number of nuclear weapons it possesses because of a large gap in

conventional force abilities. The resulting security imbalance may lead weaker countries to seek

nuclear weapons in order to counter the perceived conventional threat, thus negating any

symbolic gesture strategic arms reduction may be intended to project. The following section

discusses the theoretical framework chosen for the purposes of this study.

Theoretical Framework

An analysis based on the realist school of thought will provide for valuable insight into

the formation, implementation, and verification of a new START treaty.13 This study will

facilitate pointed impartial analysis by applying two theories--International Regime Theory and

Balance-of-Power Theory.

Post-Cold War nuclear policy has shifted from a policy of proliferation to one of

disarmament where most states--including the US and Russia--seek strategic alliances that will

ensure their survival in the face of implicit threats posed by nuclear weapons.14 As a result,

international regimes--such as the START treaty--are put in place to allow for, "transparent state

behavior and a degree of stability under conditions of anarchy in the international system," (IR

Theory Knowldege Base 2010).15

13
Additionally, any potential threats to global security are more likely to be exposed.
14
"In a world of anarchy, the only currency that matters is power -- the material capability to ward off pressure or
coercion, while being able to influence others. The anarchic global structure also makes it impossible for
governments to fully trust each other, forcing states to be guided solely by their own national interests," (Drezner
2010).
15
International regime theory is, "a perspective that focuses on cooperation among actors in a given area of
international relations,"(IR Theory Knowldege Base 2010).

7
 International regime theory will be used to determine how the forefiture of some level of

national sovereignty will affect the durability of any verification regime put in place to verify

reductions.16 It is appropriate for the issue of new START because it, "taps into something

important," (Brahm 2005). "In essence, the study of regimes is an effort to understand the means

and conditions under which states cooperate with one another," (Brahm 2005). Any bilateral

verification regime will be vulnerable due to the parties sensitivity to relative gains.17 Krasner

explains that, "one way to show that institutions, as opposed to simply the power and interests of

actors, matter is to demonstrate that they endure even though the interests and capabilities of

specific actors differ," (Krasner 1999).18 According to Krasner, "once an institution is in place,

regarless of how it got there in the first place, it can generate shared expectations that become a

force for stability," (Krasner 1999). This an example of how International regime theory

provides a favorable environment within which to test the hypothesis that verifiable reductions in

nuclear arsenals will enhance global security.

The Balance of Power Theory is the second theoretical foundation the study will

operationalize.19 It allows for an analysis of potential exploitations of strategic alliances to

determine if their existence will be a force for stability or a catalyst for utter annihilation.20 A

majority of available data concerning nuclear arms control , disarmament, or non-proliferation is

16
Durability can be defined as, "the extent to which principles and norms endure in the face of changing
circumstances," (Krasner 1999).
17
The realist school views relative gains and relative losses as a threat to international regimes. "States fear being
the sucker and suffering relative losses," (Brahm 2005).
18
"Rules or norms can, however, endure but have only a limited impact on actual behavior. Actors can say one thing
and do another. They may pick and choose among different, and mutually incompatible, norms. They may adopt
institutional arrangements that are inappropriate for their own material circumstances. Their identity, and the
identity that they present to others, may be influenced by abiding principles and norms, but their actual behavior
may be driven by a logic of consequences that is detached from principle," (Krasner 1999).
19
Balance of Power is "an international system in which states enjoy relatively equal power," states form alliances
to counteract the amount of power enjoyed by others in the international system (Mingst 2004).
20
When looking at this issue from a realist perspective one must consider that the exploitation of the threat could be
used to settle old scores by any party involved (Drezner 2010).

8
viewed from a liberal perspective. While this study does not address the liberal school of

thought in much detail it would not be unreasonable to believe policymakers could be potentially

blinded to flaws in the new START treaty as a result of the, "belief that cooperation is still

possible in a world of anarchy," (Drezner 2010).21

Research Design and Methods

This study will be a concurrent mixed methods study. Incorporating both quantitative

research and qualitative research will allow for a higher level of understanding, but at the same

time it will pose some challenges. One such challenge will be the time consuming nature of

analyzing numerical data and textual data.

On a quantitative level the hypothesis that verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals will

enhance global security will be tested by exploring the relationship between the quantity of

nuclear warheads and global security levels. Multiple security indicators have been chosen in

order to reduce the chance for unintended variations. In turn this will allow for statistically

significant conclusions and sound statistical inferences. The global security level will be

exemplified by the Global Peace Index (GPI) , factors of political stability, Corruption Index, the

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Minutes to Midnight," and the Political Terror Scale (PTS).22

Preliminary quantitative analysis was performed compiling data from the PTS. Linear regression

analysis shows a reasonably strong negative linear correlation between average global human

insecurity levels and the number of existing nuclear warheads. In fact, as the number of nuclear

21
Certain elements of new START are vulnerable to exploitations by both the US and Russia.
22
GPI is compiled and calculated by Vision of Humanity. The corruption index (CPI 2009) is compiled by
Transparency International.

9
warheads decrease, global human insecurity increases.23 Further study is warranted in order to

determine if this trend will continue across other measures of global security.24

Nuclear warhead totals can also be compared to various global conflict trends--compiled

by the Center for Systemic Peace--to assess any potential relationships. For instance,

preliminary distributional analysis of nuclear warheads from 1945 to 2010, and global trends in

armed conflict from 1946-2009, shows a positive linear relationship between variables.25

Qualitative data can be obtained through many different avenues. A number of intensive

interviews would contribute useful data to the study by providing insight into the thoughts and

opinions of experts on the subject of nuclear arms control, disarmament and proliferation. It

would benefit the study to be able to quantify these thoughts and opinions because it seems

everyone has one and not one is the same. The population would consist of non-governmental

organizations, such as the Center for Arms Control, Counter Proliferation Institute, and include

US government policymakers, past and present. A truly random sample of the population would

be difficult to obtain. The best way to attempt one would be to acquire a list of NGO experts,

23
Considering Human Insecurity levels were measured on a scale of one to five, levels for 185 countries were
averaged by year from 1978 to 2006 and statistical computations were performed using Statistical Data Analysis and
Graphics Software. The equation of the straight line relating human insecurity levels and number of nuclear
warheads is estimated as: Y = 2.6618 using the 29 observations in this dataset. The y-intercept, the estimated value
of human insecurity levels when nuclear warheads equal zero, is 2.6618 with a standard error of 0.1032. The slope,
the estimated change in human insecurity levels per unit change in nuclear warheads, is 0.0000 with a standard error
of 0.0000. The value of R-Squared, the proportion of the variation in human insecurity levels that can be accounted
for by variation in nuclear warheads, is 0.2553. The correlation between human insecurity levels and the number of
nuclear warheads is -0.5052. A significance test that the slope is zero resulted in a t-value of -3.0420. The
significance level of this t-test is 0.0052. Since 0.0052 < 0.0500, the hypothesis that insecurity levels are not affected
by the number of nuclear warheads is rejected. The estimated slope is 0.0000. The lower limit of the 95%
confidence interval for the slope is 0.0000 and the upper limit is 0.0000. The estimated intercept is 2.6618. The
lower limit of the 95% confidence interval for the intercept is 2.4501 and the upper limit is 2.8735.
24
PTS is, "a yearly report measuring physical integrity rights violations world-wide," (Gibney et. al. 2010). " The
data used in compiling this index comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty
International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices," (Gibney et. al. 2010).
25
This indicates support for the hypothesis that verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals will enhance global security
if you equate a reduction in armed conflict with increased global security. Graphics can be found in the appendix
section of the proposal.

10
assign them arbitrary numbers, and then pull a sample from that list large enough to be a

representative sample.26

Another method benefiting the study would be conducting multiple focus groups. Focus

groups would contribute a great deal of valuable data to be utilized. It would provide many

different scenarios for approaching the issue of strategic arms reduction. Groups would include

scholars, policymakers, and people with a great deal of experience in the subject area. However,

it would also include people of minimal education who have had no experience only general

knowledge on the subject.

A second group would consist of people with mediocre levels of education who are in

support of total disarmament, and a group of highly educated people who believe these weapons

are necessary. As a result differing opinions could be matched against one another allowing for

new and interesting approaches. Additionally, data to be gained from all levels of education and

knowledge meshing together could provide for unique solutions and bring about a new

perspective that could not be obtained by viewing the opinions and information in isolation.

Another useful data collection technique would be conducting a survey. A survey could

provide generalized information from a population based on a sample so inferences can be made

in regards to nuclear disarmament and global security. Surveying the population of US college

students would provide useful insight. According to the US Department of Education as of 2007

there were 18,248,128 college students in the US. A sample size of 2,401 would be required in

order to achieve a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence interval of two. The survey

would be tailored for rapid turnaround and all data would be collected at one time. Because of

the size of the sample an online survey would be designed and then implemented by selected US

26
A random sample of past and present policymakers would be difficult to acquire and counterproductive in my
opinion. In order to have substance in the responses it may be necessary to seek out certain individuals who have
had a stake in policy/decision making on the subject.

11
universities. As a result all data would return in electronic form making it much easier to

analyze.

The hypothesis will also be tested by viewing other instances of international regimes and

gauging their successes. Alternatively the actual ideas championed within the new START

treaty and nonproliferation circles will be closely examined. Other case studies have been

chosen because of their contributions to the field of study.

Since this study will employ a concurrent triangulation strategy, all data collected will be

placed into two separate databases with the intention of converging them. This will allow for a

confirmation that the two variables do in fact have some level of correlation. There will be

significant discussion on the areas of similarity. The use of statistical software suites will be

required in order to provide detailed analysis and charts and graphs confirming or disconfirming

correlations.27

Summary

This study will explore the utility of strategic arms reduction from a realist standpoint,

applying International Regime Theory and Balance of Power Theory with the intention of

determining if the global security environment will benefit from reductions of nuclear warheads.

The amount of literature available concerning nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is

substantial, however an assessment of the security situation and an analysis of resulting costs has

not been completed on a widespread or in-depth level. Initial analysis highlights the need to

perform a comprehensive study which isolates and ranks indicators of global security and

compares them to nuclear warhead totals from 1945 to the present. Any resulting trends can then

be investigated so a realistic path to a stable and secure world can be mapped.

27
Some problems may arise in the collection process because of the limited amount of declassified data pertaining
to this issue.

12
Reference List

Alger, Justin and Findlay, Trevor. 2009. "The Costs of Disarmament". Nuclear Energy Futures
Project. www.icnnd.org/research/alger_findlay_cost_of_Disarmament.pdf (accessed July 20,
2010).

Berry, Ken. Review of Recent Literature on Nuclear Issues. Literature Review, International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2009.

Brahm, Eric. "International Regimes." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi
Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September
2005 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/international_regimes/>.

Bukharin, O. “U.S.-Russian Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU”,

Science & Global Security, Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School,
Princeton University, September 2002.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/sgs10bukharin.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency. 1991. Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict
Through the Year 2000. National Intelligence Estimate Key Judgments. Copy 47.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2000. Proliferation Digest. CIA DI PD2000-02JX. February/March

2000. Copy 0406.

Cooper, David A. " Aligning Disarmament to Nuclear Dangers: Off to a Hasty START?.
Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University Press. No
244. 2009:1-8.

Deutch, Dr. John M. "Conference on Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Weapons Proliferation and
Terrorism." Central Intelligence Agency. May 23, 1996. https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/speeches-testimony/1996/dci_speech_052396.html (accessed July 22, 2010).

Drezner, Daniel W. 2010. "Night of the Living Wonks: Toward an International Relations
Theory of Zombies". Foreign Policy. Vol. 180. July/August 2010
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/night_of_the_living_wonks?page=full
(Accessed August 30, 2010).

Gibney, M., Cornett L., Wood, R.. "Political Terror Scale 1976-2008." Political Terror Scale.
2010. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php (accessed August 10, 2010).

International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict. High Stakes Distributional

Conflicts. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado. 1998. accessed August 16,
2010 http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/problem/histake.htm

13
IR Theory Knowldege Base. 2010. http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm (accessed July 20, 2010).
Procida, Frank. "Nuclear Dominoes: Real or Imagined?" International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence , 2010: 461-473.

Kartchner, Kerry M., and Pitman, George R. “Alternative Approaches to Arms Control in a
Changing World”, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 62, February 2002.
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd62/62op1.htm

Krasner, Stephen D. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton University Press. 1999.

p44-63. accessed August 16, 2010
http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/lib/apus/Doc?id=10031906

Mingst, Karen A.. 2004. Essentials of International Relations. New York, NY. W.W. Norton Co.

Parrish, Scott, and Potter, William C. “Nuclear Threat Perceptions and Nonproliferation
Responses: A Comparative Analysis”, Paper commissioned for WMD Commission, August
2005. http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No36.pdf

Russian Academy of Sciences, “Reducing Nuclear Tensions: How Russia and the United States
Can Go Beyond Mutual Assured Destruction”, Moscow, 19 January 2005.
http://nti.org/c_press/analysis_mad_011905.pdf

Schultz, George P., Perry, William J., Kissinger, Henry A., and Nunn, Sam. “Toward a Nuclear-
Free World”, The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries

Tagma, Halit Mustafa Emin. "Realsim at the Limits: Post-Cold War Realism and Nuclear
Rollback." Contemporary Security Policy 31:1, 2010: 165-188.

The Stanley Foundation. Realizing Nuclear Disarmament . Policy Memo, Muscatine: The
Stanley Foundation, 2009.

U.S. Department of State. 2010. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
April 8, 2010. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements.

Velde, James R. Van De. "The Impossible Challenge of Deterring "Nuclear Terrorism" by Al
Qaeda." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2010: 682-699.

14
Appendix A--Political Terror Scale (Preliminary Data)

Average Global Insecurity Levels vs. Total Nuclear Warheads (1978-2006)

Insecurity Nuclear
YEAR
Index(C2) Warheads(C3)
1978 1.79 51024
1979 2.1 53360
1980 2.14 55246
1981 2.11 56467
1982 2.15 58629
1983 2.24 60882
1984 2.27 62753
1985 2.29 64519
1986 2.37 70481
1987 2.41 68479
1988 2.35 65726
1989 2.3 62525
1990 2.39 59239
1991 2.41 53562
1992 2.48 49022
1993 2.52 45336
1994 2.57 42715
1995 2.43 40344
1996 2.29 37159
1997 2.41 36060
1998 2.47 34981
1999 2.49 33859
2000 2.33 32632
2001 2.42 31477
2002 2.58 30425
2003 2.52 29371
2004 2.52 29308
2005 2.55 28245
2006 2.56 26854
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org and http://www.thebulletin.org

http://thebulletin.metapress.com/home/main.mpx

Global Insecurity Data taken from Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on US State Department reports.
Nuclear Warhead data from BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, GUARDIAN/DEFENCE ESTIMATES

15
 Average Global Human Insecurity Levels
(1978-2006)
3
lowest to highest human insecurity

2.5

1.5

Insecurity Index
1

0.5

0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
YEAR

Data supplied by Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on US State Department reports

Total Nuclear Warheads (1978-2006)

80000

70000
Number of Nuclear Warheads

60000

50000

40000

30000 Nuclear Warheads

20000

10000

0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
YEAR

Nuclear Warhead data from BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, GUARDIAN/DEFENCE ESTIMATES

16
17
 Average Global Insecurity Levels vs. US/Russian Warheads

YEAR USSR/RUSSIA USA Insecurity Index TOTAL

1978 25393 24826 1.79 50219
1979 27935 24605 2.1 52540
1980 30062 24304 2.14 54366
1981 32049 23464 2.11 55513
1982 33952 23708 2.15 57660
1983 35804 24099 2.24 59903
1984 37431 24357 2.27 61788
1985 39197 24237 2.29 63434
1986 45000 24401 2.37 69401
1987 43000 24344 2.41 67344
1988 41000 23586 2.35 64586
1989 39000 22380 2.3 61380
1990 37000 21004 2.39 58004
1991 35000 17287 2.41 52287
1992 33000 14747 2.48 47747
1993 31000 13076 2.52 44076
1994 29000 12555 2.57 41555
1995 27000 12144 2.43 39144
1996 25000 11009 2.29 36009
1997 24000 10950 2.41 34950
1998 23000 10871 2.47 33871
1999 22000 10824 2.49 32824
2000 21000 10577 2.33 31577
2001 20000 10527 2.42 30527
2002 19000 10475 2.58 29475
2003 18000 10421 2.52 28421
2004 18000 10358 2.52 28358
2005 17000 10295 2.55 27295
2006 16000 10104 2.56 26104
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org and http://www.thebulletin.org

http://thebulletin.metapress.com/home/main.mpx

Global Insecurity Data taken from Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on US State Department reports.
Nuclear Warhead data from BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, GUARDIAN/DEFENCE ESTIMATES

18
 USA
30000

20000

10000 USA

0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

USSR/RUSSIA
50000
40000
30000
20000 USSR/RUSSIA
10000
0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

TOTAL
80000
60000
40000
20000 TOTAL

0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Insecurity Index
3

1 Insecurity Index

0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

19
 Average Global Insecurity Levels vs. Total Nuclear Warheads (1978-2006)

Insecurity
YEAR Index(C2) Nuclear Warheads(C3)
1978 3.04 51024
1979 2.816667 53360
1980 2.963636 55246
1981 2.981818 56467
1982 2.875 58629
1983 2.852459 60882
1984 2.765625 62753
1985 2.825397 64519
1986 2.691176 70481
1987 2.638889 68479
1988 2.814286 65726
1989 2.555556 62525
1990 2.608108 59239
1991 2.621622 53562
1992 2.698795 49022
1993 2.62963 45336
1994 2.802469 42715
1995 2.714286 40344
1996 2.6125 37159
1997 2.811594 36060
1998 2.844156 34981
1999 2.777778 33859
2000 2.75 32632
2001 2.728395 31477
2002 2.682927 30425
2003 2.654762 29371
2004 2.62963 29308
2005 2.594937 28245
2006 2.675 26854
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org and http://www.thebulletin.org

http://thebulletin.metapress.com/home/main.mpx

Global Insecurity Data taken from Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on Amnesty International reports.
Nuclear Warhead data from BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, GUARDIAN/DEFENCE ESTIMATES

20
 Average Global Human Insecurity Levels
(1978-2006)
3.1
lowest to highest human insecurity

3
2.9
2.8
2.7 Insecurity Index(C2)
2.6
2.5
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
YEAR

Data supplied by Political Terror Scale, 1976-2008, all available scores based on Amnesty International reports

Total Nuclear Warheads (1978-2006)

80000
70000
Number of Nuclear Warheads

60000
50000
40000
30000 Nuclear Warheads(C3)
20000
10000
0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
YEAR

21
22
Appendix B--Center for Systemic Peace Data (Preliminary Data)

SRC: http://www.systemicpeace.org/CTfig03.htm

Nuclear Warheads (1945-2010)

80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Nuclear Warhead data from BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, GUARDIAN/DEFENCE ESTIMATES

23
Appendix C--"Minutes to Midnight" (Preliminary Data)
Global Security Levels and Nuclear Warhead Quantities
YEAR Minutes to Midnight Nuclear Warheads
1947 7 32
1949 3 236
1953 2 1557
1960 7 22069
1963 12 33977
1968 7 38974
1969 10 38274
1972 12 42810
1974 9 46990
1980 7 55246
1981 4 56467
1984 3 62753
1988 6 65726
1990 10 59239
1991 17 53562
1995 14 40344
1998 9 34981
2002 7 30425
2010 6 23188
Source: BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, GUARDIAN/DEFENCE ESTIMATES

Nuclear Warheads
100000

50000
Nuclear Warheads
0
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
-50000

Minutes to Midnight
20
15
10
5 Minutes to Midnight
0
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

24