WEEKS v. UNITED STATES No. 461 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 232 U.S. 383; 34 S. Ct. 341; 58 L. Ed. 652; 1914 U.S.

LEXIS 1368 Argued December 2, 3, 1913 February 24, 1914 PRIOR HISTORY: ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was charged with the use of the mails to transport coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a lottery. The District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri denied defendant's pretrial petition to suppress the evidence seized in a warrantless search of his room and to return the seized property. The district court retained jurisdiction of the property. Defendant appealed the denial of his petition. OVERVIEW: In review of defendant's contention that the warrantless seizure of his private correspondence violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the Court held: 1) that the letters in question were taken from defendant's house by an official of the United States acting under color of his office in direct violation of the constitutional rights of defendant; 2) that having made a seasonable application for their return, which was heard and passed upon by the court, there was involved in the order refusing the application a denial of the constitutional rights of defendant; and 3) that the district court should have restored the letters to defendant. In holding the private correspondence and permitting their use at trial, prejudicial error was committed. The police did not act under any claim of federal authority such as would make the Fourth Amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizure as they acted before the finding of an indictment in the federal court. The Court did not inquire as to what remedies were available to defendant, as the Fourth Amendment was not directed to individual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reached only the federal government and its agencies. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case.

ISSUE: Should the illegally gained evidence be admissible

MAPP v. OHIO No. 236 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 367 U.S. 643; 81 S. Ct. 1684; 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081; 1961 U.S. LEXIS 812; 86 Ohio L. Abs. 513; 16 Ohio Op. 2d 384; 84 A.L.R.2d 933 March 29, 1961, Argued June 19, 1961, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. DISPOSITION: 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N. E. 2d 387, reversed. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio, which affirmed her conviction for possessing obscene literature in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.34. Defendant contended that the evidence seized during a search and that was introduced at the trial was prohibited under U.S. Const. amend. IV. OVERVIEW: It was apparent that the materials introduced into evidence in the prosecution of defendant were seized during an illegal search of defendant's residence in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the state supreme court affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing lewd material in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.34 on the basis that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply in the state court prosecution of defendant for a state crime to forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. On appeal, the Court reversed the state supreme court's decision. The Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the States the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. And, as necessary to ensure such rights, the exclusionary rule, which prohibited the introduction into evidence of material seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, likewise applied to the State's prosecution of state crimes. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court and remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.

POSSEORY INTREST AND PRIVACY INTRENCE ARE VIOLATED BY THE COPS STATE ACTOR…

OVERTURNS WOLF…THAT SAID THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DID NOT APPLY…HISTORICAL POINTS: MORE STATE ARE USING THE RULE, OTHER REMIDIES ARE NOT WORKING THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE: DETURANCE; NOT CORRECTION [VIOLATION OCCURS AT THE TIME THE POLICE TAKE YOUR STUFF OR INTFREAR W/ PLP INTRESTS ARGUMENT IS A LITTLE TRICKY… DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED AT THE TRIAL, WHEN CORRECED CONFESSIONS ARE LET INTO COURT…COURT SAID THAT THIS EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD WORK THE SAME THE ASSUMPTION UNDER QUESTION IS THAT THE EXCUSIONARY RULE COMES FROM THE CONSTIUTION, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT EXPRESSLY IN THE CONSTIUTION AND THUS SHOULD NOT BE PUT UPON THE STATES 4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION CAN NOT BE FIXED, IT HAPPENED, IT IS ALREADY THERE, THUS, IT CAN ONLY HAVE THE EFFECT OF DETURANCE BY NOT ADMITTING IT AT TRIAL DECENT: IT IS MERLY A SUPERVISORY RULE, AND THUS CAN NOT BE FORCED UPON THE STATES HARLEM: SAYS THE FED GOVT SHOULD NOT BE FORCEING SUCH SUPERVISORY RULS UPON THE STATES COURT CAN NOW WIDDLE AWAY AT THE EXCSIONARY RULE…THE SC HAS NOT SAID THAT IT IS GOING TO APPLY THE EXCUSIONARY RULE; NEVER OVERTRUN WEEKS OR MAPP

KATZ v. UNITED STATES No. 35 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 389 U.S. 347; 88 S. Ct. 507; 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2 October 17, 1967, Argued December 18, 1967, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. DISPOSITION: 369 F.2d 130, reversed. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought review of a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which, in affirming defendant's conviction for transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1084, rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by defendant. OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. At the trial, the government was permitted, over defendant's objection, to introduce evidence of defendant's end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth where he had placed his calls. A court of appeals, in affirming his conviction, rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of U.S. Const. amend. IV because there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a person in a telephone booth could rely upon the protection of U.S. Const. amend. IV. One who occupied a telephone booth, shut the door behind him, and paid the toll that permitted him to place a call was entitled to assume that the words he uttered into the mouthpiece would not be broadcast to the world. The Court determined that the government agents ignored the procedure of antecedent justification, which was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in the case. OUTCOME: The Court reversed defendant's conviction.

WHETHER THERE WAS A SEARCH WHEN A DEVICE WAS PUT OUTSIDE A PHONE BOOTH AND CONVERSTION WAS RECORDED COURT OVERRULES THE TRESPASS DOCTRINE; THUS CAN VIOLATE THE 4TH EVEN IF THERE HAS NOT BEEN A PHYSICAL TRESPASS.

ESTABLISHING A SEARCH DOES NOT START THE 4TH, IT MUST BE AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH FOR THE EVIDENCE TO BE EXCLUDED

UNITED STATES v. WHITE No. 13 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 401 U.S. 745; 91 S. Ct. 1122; 28 L. Ed. 2d 453; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 132 November 10, 1969, Argued April 5, 1971, Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reargued October 20, 1970. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. DISPOSITION: 405 F.2d 838, reversed. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The government sought review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed the trial court's judgment convicting defendant under two consolidated indictments charging various illegal transactions in narcotics violative of 26 U.S.C.S. § 4705 (a) and 21 U.S.C.S. § 174 and sentencing him as a second offender to 25-year concurrent sentences. OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted under two consolidated indictments charging him with various illegal transactions in narcotics violative of 26 U.S.C.S. § 4705 (a) and 21 U.S.C.S. § 174 and sentenced as a second offender to 25-year concurrent sentences. The lower appellate court reversed respondent's conviction, and the government sought writ of certiorari. The Court concluded that the lower appellate court misinterpreted both Katz and U.S. Const. amend. IV and erred in applying Katz to events that occurred before that decision was rendered by the court. The Court concluded that under pre-Katz law, the electronic surveillance of defendant involved did not violate his rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not bar from evidence the testimony of governmental agents who related certain conversations which had occurred between defendant and a government informant, and which the agents overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter carried by the informant and concealed on his person. OUTCOME: The lower appellate court's judgment reversing defendant's conviction for various illegal transactions in narcotics was reversed because the testimony of governmental agents who related certain conversations which had occurred between defendant and a government informant, and which the agents overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter carried by the informant and concealed on his person was not

IT FAILS ON THE SECOND PRONG OF THE TEST. THIS IS NOT A SEARCH. YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO TRUST WHAT YOU SAY] ARE PRIVACY INTRESTS MORE IMPLICATED WHEN THE POLICE OUT IN A CAR RECORD THE INFORMATION…PIVACY INTRESTS WOULD NOT BE IMPLICATED IF A INFORMANT ACTUALY CAME IN .precluded by the Fourth Amendment. GOVERNMENT ACTION IS HEARING THE CONVERSTATIONS…IS THIS A SEARCH NO. [POLICY CONSIDERATION: PEOPLE NEED TO HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE COMUNICATION IS CONFIDENT…IN THIS CASE.

at the central telephone system in order to determine the identity of the numbers that petitioner.SMITH v. 61 L. they charged him with robbery. amend. After the police discovered that petitioner had called the victim. was dialing. LEXIS 134 March 28. The Court found that petitioner did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone because those numbers were automatically turned over to a third party. IV. DISPOSITION: 283 Md.S. ruling that petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by warrantless use of a pen register. Ed. 2d 858. 389 A. the police installed a pen register. the Court concluded that installation of the pen register was not a "search" and no warrant was required. this expectation was not one that society was prepared to recognize as "reasonable.S. OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the order from the state court. OVERVIEW: After the victim of a robbery began receiving phone calls from the person who claimed to be the robber. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner challenged an order of the Court of Appeals of Maryland that determined that the use of a pen register without a warrant to obtain the identity of numbers petitioner dialed from his home telephone did not violate petitioner's U. 2d 220. 1979. 156.S. . The Court also ruled that even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private. a suspect. IV rights. without a warrant. Argued June 20. 99 S. MARYLAND No. the phone company. Const. 1979.S. 735. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. 1979 U. amend." Thus. Const. Ct. On review of the state court's decision that it did not. amend. Petitioner alleged that use of the pen register constituted an illegal search within the meaning of U. 78-5374 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 442 U. the Court determined that petitioner's U.S. Const. affirmed. 2577. IV rights were not violated.

82-1273. the court affirmed the validity of the open fields doctrine.S. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Writ of certiorari was granted from judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.S. IV protection against unreasonable searches did not extend to intrusions into open fields. Because the court found that there was no reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields. investigated and discovered a marijuana field a mile from petitioner's home that was surrounded by "no trespass" signs. affirmed.L. 1983.S. 453 A. Applying the open fields doctrine. . evidence of marijuana found on respondent's property was suppressed by the lower court as a violation of respondent's privacy. the court affirmed the introduction of the evidence in petitioner's case and reversed the suppression of evidence in respondent's case. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. Const. the officers' actions in entering such open fields without a warrant or probable cause did not violate the Constitution. Noting that the U. which ruled that the open fields doctrine permitted introduction of evidence of the discovery of a marijuana field located in a field surrounded by no trespass signs a mile from petitioner's home. Ct. Decided * * Together with No. OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment.S.2d 356. Ed. amend. LEXIS 55. 52 U.S. In a second similar case.W. 2d 214. UNITED STATES No.OLIVER v. reversed and remanded. Because privacy for outdoor activities conducted in fields only extended to the area immediately surrounding the home. IV had not been violated. and of the Supreme Judicial court of Maine. 80 L. DISPOSITION: 686 F. Thornton. 170. Maine v. 1984 U. Const. on certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 4425 November 9. without a warrant and without probable cause. 1735. 104 S. 82-15 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 466 U. and remanded for further proceedings. which suppressed evidence obtained under similar circumstances. OVERVIEW: Petitioner was arrested and indicted after police officers. 2d 489. amend. Argued April 17. the lower court held that petitioner's rights under U. 1984.

Nor did the mere fact that defendant had erected a 10-foot fence around his yard preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he had a right to be and which rendered activities clearly visible. The Court stated that Fourth Amendment protection of the home had never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. LEXIS 154.S. Ed. the Court held that. 1985. App. Ct.S.L. amend.CALIFORNIA v. OUTCOME: The court reversed the appellate court's judgment and found that defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied. and defendant pled guilty to a charge of cultivation of marijuana. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS OF CALIFORNIA. . Argued May 19. IV. DISPOSITION: 161 Cal. although defendant's yard was within the curtilage of his home. IV. 54 U. Const. 1986. FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT. petitioned for writ of certiorari from decision of the Court of Appeals of California. the State of California.W. First Appellate District. 93. 90 L. 208 Cal. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff. Defendant's expectation that his yard was protected from observation was unreasonable and not an expectation that society was prepared to honor. Const. reversed. 106 S. 2d 210. 207. which reversed trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of search on ground that the warrantless aerial observation of defendant's yard violated U. amend. On certiorari. OVERVIEW: The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a search.S. The appellate court reversed on the ground that the warrantless aerial observation which led to the issuance of a search warrant violated U. this did not bar police observation. CIRAOLO No. 1809. 4471 December 10.S. 3d 1081. 1986 U. 84-1513 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 476 U. Rptr.S.

S. holding that the agent's manipulation of the bag was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. reversed. J. 2000 Colo. methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.A. Service 2877. 98-9349 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 529 U. 2d 365.C.C. The court reversed the lower court's judgment. UNITED STATES No. Ct.L. 2000.S. 2000 Cal. LEXIS 2520. and possession with intent to distribute. C. on grounds that the court improperly affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress the drugs. and possession with intent to distribute. 334.S. DISPOSITION: 167 F. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner challenged the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit convicting him of conspiracy to possess. petitioner's personal luggage was protected by the Amendment because he had a privacy interest in it. amend.W. The court held further that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because petitioner sought to preserve privacy in the luggage by using an opaque bag and placing that bag directly above his seat and because the agent's physical manipulation of the bag went beyond the handling that petitioner could reasonably have expected.S.S. 2000 Daily Journal DAR 3853. S 247 February 29. Const. Daily Op. stored in an overhead rack above his seat.S. . § 841(a)(1). Petitioner was a passenger on a bus boarded at a permanent checkpoint by a border patrol agent who found the drugs in petitioner's carry-on luggage. 146 L. 1462. 68 U. Weekly Fed. L. by physical manipulation of the luggage. 4255..S. 2000 U. after the lower courts denied his motion to suppress the drugs on grounds that they were seized in an illegal search violative of U. 120 S. OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed because petitioner's motion to suppress evidence should have been granted. The search by which the drugs were obtained was illegal because the physical manipulation of petitioner's carry-on luggage violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. 2000. 2053.STEVEN DEWAYNE BOND v. § 841(a)(1). methamphetamine in violation of 21 U. 13 Fla. Ed. IV. Argued April 17.3d 225. OVERVIEW: Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to possess.R.S.

Without holding that a property interest was required. OVERVIEW: The Court affirmed petitioners' convictions for armed robbery because their motion to suppress a sawed-off rifle and shells seized by the police during the search of a vehicle in which petitioners were passengers was properly denied. THIRD DIVISION. 1978. Ed. which affirmed their convictions for armed robbery on the ground that their motion to suppress evidence was properly denied because they lacked standing to object to the unlawful search and seizure of a vehicle under U.S. Const. LEXIS 2452 October 3.S. App. E. Using this analysis. v. Const. 58 L. 421. amend. the Court found that petitioners' rights were not violated where they had no legitimate expectation of privacy in areas of a car in which they claimed no property or possessory interest. ILLINOIS No. 2d 387.S. the Court decided that U. rather than on the concept of standing. 128. affirmed. 3d 569. amend. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners sought review of a decision from the Appellate Court of Illinois. the Court expressed that the preferred analysis for determining the scope of constitutional rights protected by the exclusionary rule focused on the substantive question of whether petitioners had their own rights infringed by the police's search and seizure. Further.RAKAS ET AL. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS. 360 N. IV protected only those places in which petitioners themselves had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 1978. 2d 1252.S. Ct. 1979. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition For Rehearing Denied January 15. the Court determined that the appropriate measure of rights was no longer guided solely by whether petitioners were legitimately on the premises that the police searched. Argued December 5. as previously decided. 1978 U. IV. OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment convicting petitioners of armed robbery because their motion to suppress evidence was properly denied where petitioners' own rights were not violated. Petitioners had no legitimate expectation of privacy in areas of a car in which they claimed no . 99 S. Third Division. DISPOSITION: 46 Ill. 77-5781 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 439 U. Noting that the inquiry was essentially the same.

• Seizure of the Defendants…they stopped the car [they had standing to challenge this.property or possessory interest. however court overtruns this rule and inacts a new rule [uner Jones if you owned or were on the premises you had auto-standing THIS WAS A BRIGHT LINE RULE]=whether a person has a reasonable/legitimate expectation of privacy [katz test] • Relationship of passenger to car…if there in a place where they don’t have control no standing • This case does not provide a bright line rule…now you are basing it on property law concepts [in katz we rejected the physical trespass doctrine o And this decreases the amount of people who have standing . however they did not…you always have standing to object to the seizure of ones own stuff or person] • Question is o Search for glove box o Search under seats • JONES CASE: A person invited has standing.

2d 169 (first judgment) and 180 (second judgment). 83. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Amended October 21. had standing to assert a U. 142 L. OUTCOME: The court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision.S. J. IV purposes than residential property. 1998 U. Ct.A.S. . 1998. MELVIN JOHNS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. but one who was merely present with the consent of the householder could not. and respondents were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit a controlled substance crime. Daily Op. IV. Based on that observation. IV claim based on their alleged legitimate expectation of privacy. In addition. One who was merely present with the consent of the householder could not claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. property used for commercial purposes was treated differently for U.L.S.R. IV legitimate expectation of privacy claim. 97-1147 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 525 U. amend. the State of Minnesota. C. Const. WAYNE THOMAS CARTER No. 1998. Respondents made a motion to suppress the evidence.S. Argued December 1. 1998 Colo. sought review by a writ of certiorari a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court that held that respondents. DISPOSITION: 569 N. amend.S. defendants who were charged with conspiracy to commit a controlled substance crime. 67 U. reversed and remanded.S. the state supreme court determined that respondents had standing to assert a U. a warrant was issued. 98 Daily Journal DAR 12129. holding that an overnight guest in a home could claim the protection of U.W. amend. W. The court reversed and remanded. Ed. LEXIS 7844. 469. 1999. The officer observed respondents bagging cocaine in the apartment. 4017. Ultimately. PRIOR HISTORY: MINNESOTA V. amend. Const. holding that property used for commercial purposes was treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes than residential property. 98 Cal. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner. OVERVIEW: A police officer looked through a window blind in a lessee's apartment based on an informant's tip. 5991 October 6. Const. PETITIONER v.MINNESOTA. 119 S. contending that the officer's observation was an unreasonable search. Const.S. Service 8754. 2d 373.

The trial court said the defendant had no standing in any case the looking into the window was not a search . all the evidence would be excluded. Thus. literal reading…Their house. The court of appeals reversed finding that thye had standing and it was a search 1. was it legal? Standing: defendant had no standing to claim of 4th Amendment violation the issue whether all of the evidence c`ould be excluded if the looking into the window was unlawful. If the look into the window was unlawful then all the other evidence would have been tainted. Action: --Police looked in window --Police stopped car --looked in car --Arrested the people --latter searched car --obtained warrant and searched house ==evidence gained was stuff from the car . their effects Breyner: Standing but no search Kennedy: Almost all social guest have standing but not commercial guests 3 dissent…anyone you’ve invited has standing RULE: SOCIAL GUESTS HAVE STANDING . statements the arrestes made. No prior Connection Scalia: Textual. Couple of Hours 4.Substantive Argument: They said the initial search was illegal…thus everything that followed was unlawful Govt. Purpose of Visit=Business 3. stuff from the apartment Was it a search. Not Their Apt 2.

said hearsay can from the basis to form probable cause Court says: this is enough to arrest . It didn’t provide a test.DRAPER Based on totality of the circumstances…would lead officer to reasonable conclude that the person is committing the crime.

.

The warrant was granted by a magistrate judge upon an affidavit stating that the FBI had observed defendant's travels to and from an apartment and that a confidential reliable informant had informed the authorities that defendant was operating a gambling operation. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment from the court of appeals. the court found that the application for the warrant was inadequate because it failed to set forth the underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate to independently judge the validity of the informant's information. 584. Argued January 27. 1968." The bald assertion that defendant was "known" as a gambler was entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision and the Court rejected as imprecise the "totality of circumstances" approach embraced by the court of appeals. 21 L. 89 S. . The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected his contention that the search warrant that led to incriminating evidence against him was not supported by probable cause and affirmed his conviction.S.SPINELLI v. 410. 1969 U. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. OVERVIEW: Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrant that authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) search. Ed.S. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was convicted of traveling across the state line from Illinois to Missouri with the intention of conducting gambling activities proscribed by Missouri law. the affidavit fell short of providing probable cause as necessary to support the issuance of the search warrant. LEXIS 2701 October 16-17. Also the affiant-officers failed to support their claim that their informant was "credible" or his information "reliable. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.2d 871. 2d 637. On certiorari. UNITED STATES No. The Court granted certiorari of that decision. reversed and remanded. 1969. 8 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 393 U. Ct. which uncovered the evidence necessary for his conviction. DISPOSITION: 382 F. Thus. which affirmed the petitioner's conviction after finding the search warrant supported by probable cause.

AGULARA TEST: [1] RELIABILITY--. veracity) [2] BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE ---IN THIS CASE WE DON’T KNOW HOW THE INFORMAT GOT THE INFO .IN THIS CASE WE NEED TO KNOW WHY THE INFORMATN IS RELIABLE. (can be coroberated (helps w/ great details). track reckord. A TRACK RECORD WOULD HELP.

2d 527. The Court held that the elements of an informant's veracity and knowledge should be understood simply as issues that could illuminate the commonsense inquiry of whether there was probable cause to issue a search warrant. 423 N. The Court held that probable cause determinations were not susceptible to the rigid." and not a prima facie showing. 2d 887. a husband and wife. of criminal activity. 1983 U. 1983. LEXIS 54.S. technical methodology that had been read into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Ct. 2317. the Court reversed. 81-430 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 462 U. reasoning that the search warrant was based on a confidential informant's tip that did not satisfy the purported "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" prongs for probable cause.W.S.L.S. OVERVIEW: A state supreme court ruled to suppress evidence against respondents. as having been obtained pursuant to a search warrant improperly issued on the basis of a confidential informant's tip in violation of the Fourth Amendment. which required only the "probability. because the suppression was based on an erroneous application of an overly rigid and technical standard for determining whether a confidential informant's tip established probable . 103 S. 213. Holding instead that probable cause was determined by a traditional totality-of-thecircumstances analysis. reversed. afforded probable cause to believe that respondents had drugs in their possession. 1982.ILLINOIS v. Ed. 2d 376. Argued June 8. GATES ET UX. No. 4709 October 13. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reargued March 1. DISPOSITION: 85 Ill. 51 U. when corroborated by observation by police officers. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. which affirmed the decisions of lower state courts granting a motion to suppress evidence against respondents. 1983. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner state appealed a judgment from the Illinois Supreme Court. a husband and wife. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment that suppressed evidence against respondents. E. though relating to innocent activities. a husband and wife. 76 L. The Court held that the informant's recitation of detailed facts. The Court held that this approach comported with the standard of proof for a warrant.

cause. 1They have an annomous letter 2have coroberating evidence --wife drive to FL --husband flys donwn --husband stars flying back We have something on basis of knowledge. commonsense approach. under the proper. but we don’t know about reliability So they want to put these two away. can not understand A/S --thy will instead just do warantless searches --if its two narrow then criminals will get away with it Disent: --now Magistrates have no guidelines . so the court uses totality of the circumstances --lay people Magistrates and Police. the corroboration by police of the facts of the tip established probable cause to believe that respondents possessed drugs.

affirmed. 300. We don’t use officers subjective defense. 135 L. 1996. 9 Fla. App.W.MICHAEL A. officer's probable cause to believe petitioners violated traffic code rendered the vehicle stop reasonable and the evidence seized admissible. 806. Defendants were arrested and illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle.C. 96 Cal. and performance of balancing analysis was unnecessary where probable cause existed and a traffic stop out of uniform did not remotely qualify as an extreme practice. S 652 April 17. 95-5841. DISPOSITION: 311 U. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. D. 53 F.L. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: On grant of certiorari. Service 4123. and we are not going to establish a reasonable officer clause Defense says that the stop was unreasonable and pretextual…should look at what a reasonable officer would have done .S. defendants challenged a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that upheld their convictions for various federal drug law violations after holding that defendants' motion for suppression was justifiably denied by the trial court. defendants accepted that the officer had probable cause to believe the traffic code was violated. OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed.3d 371.S. 4409. 116 S. LEXIS 3720. 1996 U. When the officer approached defendant driver's car window. Argued June 10. WHREN AND JAMES L. Ct. 1996. 2d 89. who acted reasonably. 1769. Weekly Fed. 96 Daily Journal DAR 6635. BROWN. he observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in defendant passenger's hands. 64 U. An officer who had observed traffic violations approached a vehicle that was occupied by defendants. On appeal. Defendants had sought suppression of evidence that was seized following a traffic stop. L. would have made stop for the given reason. Ed. Court disagreed because the officer's motive did not apply outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection. PETITIONERS v. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 517 U. OVERVIEW: Plainclothes vice-squad officers were patrolling "high drug area" in an unmarked car. UNITED STATES No.S. but argued that the test for traffic stops should have been whether a police officer.S. Daily Op.

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On defendant's petition for certiorari review. OVERVIEW: Police received information from a confidential informer that unknown persons were smoking opium in a hotel.S.C. § 2553(a) and the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act. Ct. and her conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. This Court granted certiorari.S. holding that the warrantless arrest and search violated the Fourth Amendment even though the officers may have had probable cause to obtain a warrant. p. Petitioner was convicted in a Federal District Court on evidence obtained by a search made without a warrant. 92 L. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. § 2553(a) and the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act. turning up incriminating opium and smoking apparatus.S.2d 562. 1947. 21 U. 807. UNITED STATES No. § 174.2d 562. 1948 U. OUTCOME: The Court granted the petition and reversed. 10. the United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions for violating I.C. including I. § 174. talked to defendant.S.S. 329 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 333 U.C. and asked her about the opium smell. The police went to the hotel with federal narcotics agents. The evidence was admitted at trial over defendant's objection. which affirmed her conviction on four counts of violating federal narcotics laws. Argued February 2. which led them to defendant's room. reversed. The Court found no exigent circumstances. 1948.S.R. . The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. and they all recognized the strong odor of burning opium. Ed. DISPOSITION: 162 F. The officers knocked on the door. The Court held that the warrantless arrest and search violated the Fourth Amendment.S. LEXIS 2583 December 18. The officers arrested her and searched the room. 17. 68 S.C. Nor was the inconvenience and slight delay in preparing papers and presenting the evidence to a magistrate a sufficient basis to justify bypassing the warrant requirement. 367. even though officers may have had probable cause to obtain a search warrant.R. 332 U. she was convicted. Reversed. 436. which defendant denied noticing.JOHNSON v. 162 F. 21 U.

thus frezzing the probable cause determination. prevents form ad hoc additions to building probable cause What Johnson says is that if the police are ingaging in a search.Government Action: Not go into the hall/ Not smell Opium. but Entry into the room and looking around Probable cause: Tip + Coroberated Circumstances But the Court says that we generally need warrants b/c it protects privacy It is important b/c the warrant is then at the suppression hearing. The presumption is that there is a warrant requirement…prevents from police getting to wraped up and ad hoc probable cause Exception: Emergency has to be specific artulated facts .

UNITED STATES v. Therefore. and informant gives probable cause to past crimes Issue is if you need an areest warrant for past crims/fellonies. . 1975 January 26.R. and which yielded the credit cards upon which his conviction was based. 2d 598. That defendant was not informed of his right to refuse consent to the search did not render the search invalid. 96 S. and (2) the arrest was made pursuant to 18 U. which reversed defendant's conviction for possession of stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S. 1976 U. the United States Supreme Court reversed. WATSON No. The Court first ruled that defendant's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment because (1) it was based upon probable cause.S. had not been the product of an illegal arrest.S.S. 411. 1976 PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The government sought review of a judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. so the issue is whether the arrest is invalid Did they have probable cause? They have an informant. and gives signal. as the government acted upon information from a reliable informant that defendant possessed stolen cards. 74-538 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 423 U. § 232. the Court ruled the post-arrest search of defendant's car to which defendant consented to. § 3061(a)(3) and 39 C. was reversed when the appellate court determined that the warrantless arrest of defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the post-arrest search of defendant's car was coerced.S. OVERVIEW: Defendant's conviction for possession of stolen mail.C.C. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. and Seach of Car [but this was concentual] Fruit of Poisiones Tree (FOPT). b/c everyone agrees that seeing a crime in front of her you don’t need an arrest warrant. which authorized the government to make warrantless felony arrests upon reasonable grounds. Ed.S. 18 U.S. On certiorari. 46 L. LEXIS 121 Argued October 8.5(a)(3). Government action: Arrest. § 1708. 820. Ct.C. § 1708.S.F.

but says that it is good RULE: Can always arrest someone for a mister meaner of felony committed in presence and can arrest someone for a past felony w/o a arrest warrant [b/c felons pose a public danger] .Justification: There is a statute that says this is ok There is also a Historical Analysis [common law arrest is ok for felonies] Hampering Law Enforcement Citing Precedent [we got cases that says this is ok] It is also the current state practice Concurring: Undercuts Historical Analysis…it has never been before us before.

the introduction into evidence of petitioner's business records seized during an otherwise lawful search did not offend or undermine any of the policies undergirding the privilege. amend. Const.S.S. which contained statements made by petitioner. Investigators obtained a search warrant to search petitioner's offices for evidence of the crime. V.S. Const. Const.S. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment. was convicted of false pretenses for defrauding a purchaser of property. This pertains to the place and the items. 96 S. amend. amend. 1976 June 29. Petitioners argument is that it lacks items received . Ct. Petitioner. MARYLAND No. Thus. Ed. 74-1646 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 427 U. The warrants referred only to the crime of false pretenses and were sufficiently specific. 1976 U.S. V. compelled petitioner to testify against himself in violation of U. V rights because petitioner was not compelled to do anything. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that the searches were unreasonable because they were based on general warrants. holding that petitioner was not asked to say or to do anything.S. 49 L. 1976 PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Certiorari was granted to review from a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 463. amend. selfincrimination privilege.ANDRESEN v. and that the search had not violated petitioner's U. The court disagreed. Petitioner argued that the admission of his business records. OVERVIEW: The introduction of petitioner's business records into evidence was not a violation of his U. which held that search warrants were supported by probable cause and did not authorize a general search in violation of U. as the closing attorney. Was there probable cause: yes foot note 9 Warrant was out for 3 months…staleness is not an issue b/c it is business records Warrants must reasonably descrive the thing or person to be seized [particularity requirement]. Const. IV. 2737. 2d 627. LEXIS 78 Argued February 25.

Thus the case boils down to how you read the word “crime” in the warrant With looking through papers or compter files the govt. is going to look at a lot of information before getting to what they want .

Argued February 24. Before the officers executing the warrant became aware that they were in a separate apartment occupied by defendant.MARYLAND v.S.S. Certiorari was granted. 2d 72. 1986. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was convicted of violating Maryland's Controlled Substances Act after marijuana and related paraphernalia were discovered in his apartment. However. 4190 November 5.W. LEXIS 559." The police reasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the premises described in the warrant. 1987. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the state court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion. 94 L. The Court held that the warrant was valid when it was issued and the manner in which it was executed was reasonable. 85-759 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 480 U. but the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded with instructions to remand the case for a new trial. 1987 U. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment. 385. 55 U. The officers' execution of the warrant reasonably included the entire third floor. 2d 193. and their conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. DISPOSITION: 303 Md. there were two apartments on the third floor. 1013. or had a duty to discover and to disclose. 79. OVERVIEW: The evidence had been seized in a search conducted pursuant a warrant that specified a location of "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment. to the issuing magistrate. reversed and remanded. The state court of special appeals affirmed. 494 A.L. GARRISON No. Ct. The question presented to the Court was whether the seizure of the contraband was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 107 S. which was denied by the trial court.S. The validity of the warrant was assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed. Ed. they had discovered the contraband that provided the basis for defendant's conviction. Had probable cause .

. If it is for the future an Anticipatory Warrant will be issued if there is no other way to do it. …less clear but reasonable b/c ================================================= Franks v.Issue: 1 Was the warrant valid. Best example is a drug bust where it is undetermined where they are going to make the sale. Delewarewhen defendat shows that the probable cause showing was based on an intentional or recklessly false statement the court hs to take out that evidence from the warrant and still determine if there is probable cause (notes 101) Anticipatory Warrant: The requirement of the search warrant is that the item to be seized is at the place of the place to be searched at the time the warrant is issued. …there is a mistake in the warrant b/c there is 2 apartmentsbut the mistake was reasonable 2 was it reasaonably excuted.

927. Issue: Whether the Popo is required to knock before they ente . DISPOSITION: 317 Ark. 9 Fla. OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of delivery and possession of drugs after police officers.L. 2d 976. in executing a search warrant.S. 95 Daily Journal DAR 6470. Argued May 22. Ed. 1995. IV required police officers to knock and announce themselves before entering a residence when executing a search warrant. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed a judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas that affirmed her conviction for delivery and possession of drugs. amend. Weekly Fed.W. L. 115 S. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. 1995. 95 Cal. finding no authority for the theory that the Fourth Amendment required police officers to knock and announce themselves before entering a residence when executing a search warrant. The state supreme court affirmed defendant's conviction on appeal. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Const. 131 L. 878 S. 548. OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.SHARLENE WILSON. S 67 March 28. ARKANSAS No. W. Daily Op.S. 2d 755. 63 U. holding that the common-law knock and announce principle formed a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry and a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers entered without prior announcement. and remanded the case to determine whether the unannounced entry was reasonable under the circumstances. entered through an unlocked screen door without first knocking or announcing their presence. reversed and remanded.S. 1995 U. Service 3823. finding no authority for the theory that U. 94-5707 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 514 U. LEXIS 3464. 4456. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.S. Ct. PETITIONER v. 1914.

WISCONSON  not going to allow per se rules for exclusion of knock and announce RAMIREZ not going to establish a different rule for when property is destroyed LAYNE reports coming along w/ the warrant is an addition and unreasonable invasion of privacy . must knock and announce…it gives the owner the chance for officer to come in before destruction of house.Rule. and the safety of the officer RICHARD V. … also protects privacy interests.

Const.S. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition for Rehearing Denied September 18. even if the warrant was subsequently found to be defective. IV exclusionary rule.UNITED STATES v.2d 187. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner United States appealed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that there was no good faith exception to the U. DISPOSITION: 701 F. . During trial. 1984 PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.S. 2d 677. good-faith reliance on a search warrant. OVERVIEW: This case presented the question whether the exclusionary rule should be modified so as to allow the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. 897.S. amend. Supreme Court reversed and held that the exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable.S. Ed.L. 82-1771 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 468 U. Supreme Court reversed and held that the exclusionary rule should be modified to allow the admission of evidence seized in reasonable. Ct. The U.S. 1984. LEON ET AL. 104 S. LEXIS 153. 82 L.W. 1984.S. No. 5155 January 17. Argued July 5. 3405. The Court concluded that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant could not justify the substantial costs of exclusion. 1984 U. reversed. respondents filed motions to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant and said motions were granted in part based on the conclusion that the warrant was not supported by probable cause despite the fact that the police officer was acting in good faith reliance on what he believed to be a valid warrant. good-faith reliance on a search warrant that was subsequently held to be defective. OUTCOME: The U. 52 U. The lower court affirmed and held that there was no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

THE NEED TO LOCK PEOPLE UP DETURANCE RATIONEL DOESN’T WORK IF THE POLICE ARE ACTING IN GOOD FAITH: IF YOU DON’T KNOW YOU ARE BEHAVINING ILLEGALY YOU CAN BE DETURED FROM ACTING ILLIGALLY 4 THINGS THAT MAKE THE GF NOT WORK: THE OFFICER CAN NOT DELIBERATELY OR RECKLESSLY [AWARE OF THE RISK OF PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION] MISTATED THE FACTS…B/C THE OFFICER IS NOT ACTING IN GOOD FAITH WHEN THE MAJISTRATE IS NOT NEUTRAL WHEN THE INDICIA OF RELIABLITY IS LAKING…NO REASOANALBE OFFICER COULD THINK PROBABLE CAUSE OR NO REASONABLE OFFICER COULD THINK THE WARRANT IS REASONABLY PARTICULAR .LAC OF PROBALBE CAUSE: UNDER STRICT APPLICATION OF AGULAR/SPENILLI TEST WARANT WAS HELD INVALID BY LOWER COURTS WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT NOT ASK THE SC TO REMAND AND HAVE IT DONE UNDER GATES…THIS IS NOT DONE THOGH B/C THE SC HAS BEEN SIGNALING FOR A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION WAS THERE A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION. IF SO WERE THE OFICERS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH…TO DATE THIS EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO WARANTLESS SEARCHES IF THE WARANT IS INVALID B/C OF LACK OF PARTICULARITY OR PROBABLE CAUSE…THE GOOD FAITH RULE STILL APPLIES WHAT IS THE REASONALING THAT ALLOWS THE MAJORITY TO CREATE THIS EXCEPTION BALANCEING: INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY V.

and the court overturned the conviction. OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment. they looked all through the house --there is a debate about how narrow or broad of an area can the police search. affirming judgments from the lower court convicting him of burglary. LEXIS 1166 March 27. Police then asked for permission to "look around. Ct. Police seized a number of coins and medals. Argued June 23. reversed. 2034. that respondent State later used to convict petitioner of burglary. 439 P. They looked through the entire house and had petitioner's wife open drawers and physically remove contents of the drawers so they could view items. 2d 333.S. 2d 685. police arrested him. 1969 U. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. [this would include containters. 770 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 395 U. Even searching through desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas of the room where the arrest occurred was not appropriate. CALIFORNIA No." It found that there was no justification for searching any room other than that in which the arrest occurred.S. the officers conducted a search. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner appealed from a judgment of the Supreme Court of California. 1969. incient to a lawful arrest --Rule: Immediate lunging area/ wing span/ grapping area can be searched. 89 S. but a locked containt of which the person does not . 1969. OVERVIEW: Police came to petitioner's home with an arrest warrant to arrest him for an alleged burglary. Ed. the court held that the search was "unreasonable. among other things. 752. When petitioner returned from work.CHIMEL v. SICA SEARCH: --no search warrant. DISPOSITION: 68 Cal. 2d 436. Extending the search to the entire house was not proper." Even though petitioner objected. Reversing the appeals court's affirmance of conviction. 23 L.

than they can reley on the emergency excedption or exigency exception --CHRISMAN. but in this case the arrestee requested this. seach w/in the wingspan of the arreste is ok.reasonably have access is debateable]…if there are facts that raise risks. PAGE 139 .

a more extensive exploration of the suspect's person was authorized. D. amend. When an officer had probable cause for an arrest. The officer felt there was something in the package that was not cigarettes. Const. 72-936 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 414 U. 1973. Const. but also to preserve evidence. 467.S. The officer reached into the coat and pulled out a cigarette package. LEXIS 21. IV. App. and held that a search of defendant's person violated U. C.C. The fact that defendant was to be arrested for a driving offense did not lessen the officer's right to search defendant. Argued December 11. 2d 202 October 9. 2d 427. as the officer in the present case did. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the appellate court's decision. The officer opened the package and found what was later determined to be heroin.UNITED STATES v. 218. 114. 66 Ohio Op. This was to protect the officer.S. 38 L. 471 F. 94 S.S.2d 1082. S. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and found the search permissible under U.S. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. ROBINSON No. amend. A search incident to a lawful arrest was clearly authorized. § 4704(a).S. an officer was only allowed to conduct a protective frisk for weapons. Ed. 1973 U. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States sought review of the judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appellate court's decision was incorrect in that it concluded that even with probable cause for an arrest. Once probable cause to arrest defendant was established. 1973.S. The officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving after his license had been revoked. DISPOSITION: 153 U. finding a police officer was clearly authorized to reach into defendant's coat as part of his search because the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant. The officer then searched defendant and felt an object under defendant's coat. OVERVIEW: Defendant was pulled over by a police officer. reversed. a full search incident to that arrest was authorized in order to protect the . which reversed defendant's conviction for possession and facilitation of concealment of heroin in violation of 26 U. Ct. IV.

for the officers safty [this is weird b/c it is a warrantless seach w/o probable cause] Everyone on the court agrees that the police can pat the guy down for their own protection --Pat down= search --Takes container= search and seizure --Take the container out and look inside=search Officer says that his actions were based on procedure for safety and to look for evidence --lower court said couldn’t take it out b/c knew it wasn’t a weapon --Majority says this is too narrow and adopt [CHIMIAL DOES NOT APPLY B/C THERE IS NO MORE EVIDENCE NEEDED FOR THE DRIVING W/O A LICENCE. ALSO THIS IS “BRIGHT LINE” AND MAKES IT EASY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT. THE RULE ADDS THE POLICE CAN LOOK ANYWHERE ON ONES PERSON AND IN ANY CONTAINER ON ONE’S PERSON WHEN THE PERSON IS ARRESTED THE RATIONELL IS…THAT DURRING A FULL COSTODIAL ARREST IS MORE DANGERIOUS THAN THE STOP AND FRISK UNDER TERRIE. AND THE RATIONEL ABOUT PROTECTING DANGER DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE] THUS. AND IN THE NEXT CASE THEIR CAR . TERI…Police can do a pat down only during an incouter that is not an arrest…why. Rationel: p.officer's safety and to preserve evidence. 129 brightline rule= make it easy for the police ALL YOU NEED IS A VALID ARREST WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE. THE POLICE CAN ARREST FOR ANY TRAFFIC STOP AND THEN SEARCH THE PERSON.. WINGSPAN. OHIO V.YOU DO NOT NEED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH KNOWLES…MUST ARREST IN ORDER TO SEARCH BUT NOW AFTER ATWATER.

1981. 69 L. Upon stopping the car. BELTON No. Y.NEW YORK v. The state was granted certiorari. an occupant thereof. were lawfully seized during the exigencies of the situation and such seizure . 454. He also searched defendant's jacket in the vehicle and found cocaine. the trial court denied his motion to suppress the items seized in the search of the vehicle. Const. reversed.S. Const.W. In defendant's subsequent drug prosecution. 2d 447. XIV. He therefore required the occupants to get out of the vehicle and proceeded to search them. incident to a lawful custodial arrest. He opened the envelope and found that it contained marihuana. 407 N. 49 U.S. 1981.S. incident to defendant's lawful custodial arrest. holding that the search of the jacket was not incident to defendant's arrest. 1981. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The state sought review of a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York that reversed a judgment of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. OVERVIEW: Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that sped by a police officer at a fast rate. DISPOSITION: 50 N. IV and U. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition for Rehearing Denied September 23.L. However. amend. 2d 420. Ct. the search did not violate the safeguards of U. amend. Ed. 80-328 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 453 U. LEXIS 13. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the lower state court and held that items seized in the warrantless search of a passenger compartment of a vehicle. E. the final state appellate court reversed.S. the officer smelled marihuana smoke and saw an envelope on the car's floor that was marked with a name for marihuana. Argued July 1. 4915 April 27. 2860. 1981 U. Thus.S. 2d 768. 101 S. holding that the items seized in the warrantless search of the vehicle's passenger compartment. which upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of an automobile incident to a custodial arrest of defendant. and the Court reversed the decision of the state court. were justifiably seized because of the exigencies of the situation.

BUT WE ARE UNAWARE IF THE GLOVEBOX IS LOCKED OR IF THERE IS A LOCKED CONTAINER IN THE BACK SEAT HOLD THAT OFFICER CAN LOOK IN THE PASSANGER COMPARTMENT AND CONTAINERS INSIDE THE PASSANGER COMPARTMENT RATIONEL: BRIGHTLINE RULE…SOMETIMES SUCH DEFENDANTS CAN REACH INTO THE CAR. SAME A CHIMMEL ARREST MUST BE NEAR THE PERSON’S CAR .did not violate the safeguards of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the constitution. SIEZURE—DEFENDANT FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION LOOKING INTO CAR IS VALID SEARCH SEARCH ISSUE. WHAT IS FOUND IN THE JACKET…IS THE COCAIN IN THE JACKET UNLAWFULLY SIEZED THEY USE CILA EXCEPTION WE KNOW THE POLICE CAN LOOK INTO THE GLOVE BOX BUT NOT THE TRUNK.

OUTCOME: The Court reversed and remanded the cases for further proceedings because the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the police from making warrantless and nonconsensual entry . 1980 U. Reargued April 15. 380 N. E. to make a routine felony arrest.Y. reversed and remanded. Penal Law §§ 140. 2d 300.15(4). 1979. Ed.S. The Court held that to be arrested in the home involved not only the invasion attendant to all arrests. Decided * * Together with No. absent exigent circumstances. 100 S. Police officers entered without a warrant and found incriminating evidence in plain view that was admitted at defendant's trial. which held that N. 78-5421. NEW YORK No. In the first case. 1979. OVERVIEW: Two cases on appeal challenged the constitutionality of N. 78-5420 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 445 U. if necessary. police officers entered defendant's house to arrest him without a search warrant and found narcotics in the dresser. but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. DISPOSITION: 45 N.15(4). Riddick v. even when it was accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause was present. police officers established probable cause against defendant in a murder case. 1980. New York. 120. PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.S. On appeal.80. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendants sought review of an order from the Court of Appeals of New York. the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cases for further proceedings because the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. 120.80. also on appeal from the same court. Penal Law §§ 140.PAYTON v. authorized police officers to enter a private residence without a warrant and with force. 63 L. Argued. 2d 224. LEXIS 13 March 26. which was too substantial. 1371. and went to defendant's apartment to arrest him. October 9. Ct. In the second case. 2d 639.Y. Defendants contended that the statutes violated the constitutional prohibition against illegal searches and seizures. 573. Y.

into suspects' homes in order to make routine felony arrests. PRIVACY INTEREST INTO PRIVATE PLACES…ANY PLACE WHERE YOU HAVE EXPECTION OF PRIVACY [IS THE PLACE A PRIVATE PLACE TO THAT PERSON THE OFFICER MUST HAVE A REASON TO BELIVE THE PERSON IS THERE TO GO INTO A PRIVATE PLACE TO GET A SUSPECT OF WHICH THERE IS A VALID ARREST WARRANT .

204. Const.2d 540 and 615 F. entered petitioner's home and searched for the subject of an arrest warrant without first obtaining a search warrant. but the agents did observe cocaine while in the house. and in the absence of exigent circumstances. LEXIS 89.S. which affirmed the denial of petitioner's suppression motion and held that petitioner's U. UNITED STATES No. in the absence of consent and exigent circumstances. OVERVIEW: Based on information received from a confidential informant. Const. 1981. IV rights were not violated when law enforcement officers searched for the subject of an arrest warrant in petitioner's home without first obtaining a search warrant. Argued April 21. IV interests of petitioner. Petitioner was arrested and indicted on federal drug charges. 2d 38. OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment that affirmed the denial of petitioner's suppression motion where petitioner's U. Drug Enforcement Administration agents entered petitioner's home with an arrest warrant in an attempt to locate a federal fugitive. 1981 U.S.STEAGALD v.S. After obtaining a search warrant. 68 L. While the arrest warrant protected the fugitive from an unreasonable seizure.S. DISPOSITION: 606 F.L.S. IV rights were violated when drug enforcement officers. Ct. 79-6777 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 451 U. 49 U. Ed. Const. reversed and remanded. who was not named in the warrant and whose home was searched without his consent. amend. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court. the agents uncovered additional incriminating evidence. it did nothing to protect petitioner's privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home. 4418 January 14. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner sought review of a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 101 S. which affirmed the denial of petitioner's suppression motion. 1981. amend. The agents did not have a search warrant. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. The fugitive was not found in the house. The court concluded the arrest warrant was not adequate to protect the U.2d 642. amend. .W.S. 1642.

IF THE PO PO WOULD HAVE GOT A SEARCH WARANT FOR SEGALD RESEDENCE THAN THEY COULD USE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST STEGALD [IF THEY SEE SOMETHING IN PLAIN VIEW] .STEADGALD: AS TO LIONS THEY HAVE A VALID ARREST WARRANT…IF THEY WANT TO USE EVIDENCE AGENST STEAGALD THEY NEED AN ARREST WARANT ARREST WARANT GIVES SOME PRIVACY INTEREST TO THE ARRESTE. PO MUST THINK THE ARRESTE IS HOME AT THE TIME OF EXERSIZING THE WARRANT’ CANT USE THE ARREST WARANT FOR ONE PERSON TO GET EVIDENCE AGAINST ANOTHER PERSON ===== IF OFFICER THINKS YOUR HOME. CAN LOOK AROUND IN PLACES THAT ARE REASONABLE THAT SHE MAY BE. HAS AN ARREST WARRANT. NO PRIVACY INTEREST……. COMES INTO HOME. ARREST HER. AND DO A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST ARREST WARRANT ONLY PROTECTS THE INTERESTS OF THE ARRESTE GO BACK OF SPEGALD SANTANA CASE= THRESHOLD OF HOME IS PUBLIC PLACE..

were seized during a search of his home and were admitted into evidence without objection. reversed. On appeal by the warden.S. 1642. 1967. 2d 782. the Court found that the seized clothing matched the description of those worn by the robber and the police could have reasonably believed that the items would aid in the identification of the culprit. The Court further found that the seizure of clothing occurred prior to or immediately contemporaneous with the inmate's arrest. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the order granting habeas corpus relief to the inmate. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES= HOT PERSUIT . OVERVIEW: The inmate was convicted of armed robbery. LEXIS 2753 April 12.S. Finally. DISPOSITION: 363 F. as part of an effort to find a suspected felon. the lower court granted habeas corpus relief to the inmate. jacket. 18 L. 87 S. 294. within the house into which he had run only minutes before the police arrived. armed. HAYDEN No. the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner warden sought review of an order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granting habeas corpus relief to respondent inmate after the inmate was convicted of armed robbery. After unsuccessful state court proceedings. MARYLAND PENITENTIARY v.2d 647. Ct. Ed.WARDEN. 1967. 1967 U. the Supreme Court found that neither the entry of the inmate's home nor the search for him without a warrant was invalid. including a cap. finding that the clothing was improperly admitted into evidence because the items had evidential value only and were not subject to seizure. Items of his clothing. and trousers. Under the circumstances of the case. 480 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 387 U. Argued May 29.

RATIONEL IS TO PROTECT POLICE AND PUBLICE…THIS MEANS THEY CAN ONLY LOOK FOR WEAPONS AND THE PERSONYOU CAN’T LOOK FOR EVIDENCE POLICE NEED TO HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR EXIGENCY VALE.IF SUSPECT HAS BEEN CAUGHT. ANDACTIVE HOT PERSUIT SCOPE [THE PLACE AND TIME]: WHEREEVER THE PERSON CAN BE FOUND. AND NO TIME TO GET A WARRANT RATIONALE: DANGER TO PO AND OTHERS SHOWING: PC THAT THE PERSON COMMITTED A FELLONY.IF IMERGANCY OK. AND NO OTHER PEOPLE IN HOUSE. THE SEARCH FOR WEAPONS MUST STOP ---EXIGENCY ALSO INCLUDES: DANGER TO PO OR OTHERS—HOSTAGE SITUATION. OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE OR CONTRABAND=A REASONABLE BELIEVE THAT THE STUFF WOULD BE GONE IF THE PO PO GOT A WARANT [DOESN’T WORK WHEN THE POLICE CAUSE THE EXIGENCY…AND USE IT AS AN EXCUSE AS A WARANTLESS SEARCH] ROBINSON PERSON CHEMMEL WINGSPAN BELTON THE INTERIOR OF CAR .. SUISIDE. BUT IF NO PC THAN CAN’T GO IN—NOT AUTOMATICALY THERE MUST BE EXIGENCY.. OR FOR WEAPONS ….

Defendant was convicted in state court of possessing heroin and was sentenced as multiple offender to 15 years' imprisonment at hard labor. OVERVIEW: Police officers. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought review from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The state supreme court affirmed his conviction and rejected defendant's claim that evidence introduced at trial was the product of an unlawful search and seizure. 1970. searched defendant's dwelling.S. The Court concluded that the Louisiana courts committed constitutional error in admitting into evidence the fruits of the illegal search. and recovered additional narcotics. IF YOU DO HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE THAT EVIDENCE IS BEING DESTROYED THAN CAN GO IN…THIS IS A CASE BY CASE CONTEXT ANALYSIS MCCARTHER—ALOWED WARANTLESS SEIZURE. 30. LEXIS 18 March 4-5. 2d 811. Ed. OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. who had warrants for defendant's arrest. reversed and remanded. Argued June 22. The Court dismissed the appeal but treated defendant's papers as a petition for certiorari. 1970 U. the Court declined to hold that an arrest on the street outside of defendant's dwelling justified a warrantless search of defendant's dwelling as providing its own "exigent circumstance" so as to justify a warrantless search of defendant's house. 26 L. In granting the petition and reversing defendant's conviction.VALE v. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA. which affirmed his conviction for possession of heroin and rejected his claim that evidence introduced at trial was the product of an unlawful search and seizure. 90 S. 2d 409. DISPOSITION: Appeal dismissed and certiorari granted. AND ALLOWED POLICE TO REASONABLY DETAIN PEOPLE FROM GOING INTO AN AREA TO DESTROY . The officers arrested defendant on the street outside of his dwelling. LOUISIANA No. observed defendant engaged in what the officers believed was a narcotics sale. 215 So. 1969. 1056. Ct. 727 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 399 U. Defendant appealed. 252 La.S. 1970.

EVIDENCE…IN THIS CASE THE PO PO DETAINED A PERSON AND WENT TO GET A WARRANT .

--DOG SNIFF NOT AN ILLEGAL SEARCH B/C ONLY REVEALS PRESENCE OF CONTRABAND --ARREST --SEIZE CAR AND LOCKER --SEARCH LOCKER AT THE STATION WE ARE IN THE PERSONAL EFFECTS DOCTRINE B/C THE EFFECT IS OUTSIDE THE CAR [THUS TAKING IT OUT OF THE VEHICLE EXCEPTION DOCTRINE]INTRODUCES A SEPARATE RATIONEL FOR VEHICLE EXCEPTION=THAT THERE IS A REDUCED PRIVACY EXPECTATION IN ADDITION TO LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE .UNITED STATES v. 1977 June 21. 2d 538.S. OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the order from the appellate court that affirmed the suppression of marijuana seized from defendants. OVERVIEW: After arresting defendants. The Court held that the search was too remote to have been considered incident to arrest. The Court held that there being no exigency it was unreasonable for the government to have conducted a search without the safeguards a judicial warrant provided. After several appeals. 1. the Court held that by placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker. Const. LEXIS 133 Argued April 26. No. Ed. IV's Warrant Clause. the appellate court affirmed the suppression of the seized marijuana holding that probable cause was not sufficient to sustain a warrantless search. CHADWICK ET AL. The Court held that the expectation of privacy was no less than one who locked the doors of his home to intruders and that defendants were due the protection of U. 97 S. The Court affirmed the order from the appellate court.S. which affirmed the suppression of marijuana seized from defendants. 75-1721 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 433 U. 1977 U.S. 2476. agents opened and searched defendants' locked foot locker without a warrant and seized marijuana from the locker. On review. 53 L. Ct. as amended PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRSTCIRCUIT CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States sought review of the order from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. defendants manifested an expectation that the contents would have remained free from public examination. 1977. amend.

STILL GOOD LAW. AND WOULD TURN OUT SAME TODAY. ON THESE FACTS THE SICA RATIONEL DOEN’T COME IN .

opened the trunk. 1991. 565. 91 Cal. and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. Fourth Appellate District concluded that the marijuana should have been suppressed. IF THERE IS PC. 2d 619. 1991 U. The same probable cause to believe that a container held drugs allowed the police to arrest the person transporting the container and search it.W. DISPOSITION: 216 Cal. 91 Daily Journal DAR 6569 January 8. CHARLES STEVEN ACEVEDO No. Ct. 89-1690 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 500 U.S.S. Argued May 30. Rptr. 1991. 4559. App. LEXIS 3016.CALIFORNIA. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant pled guilty to possessing marijuana for sale. but appealed the denial of his motion to suppress marijuana found in a paper bag in a car's trunk. YOU CAN LOOK IN THE AREA IN WHICH YOU HAVE PC TO LOOK .S. The Court of Appeal of California. PETITIONER v. The police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the car's trunk contained marijuana and probable cause allowed a warrantless search of the paper bag. reversed and remanded. The police could search containers found in an automobile without a warrant if their search was supported by probable cause. OUTCOME: The judgment concluding that marijuana found in a paper bag in the trunk of a car should have been suppressed was reversed. Ed. 265 Cal. 59 U. 3d 586. The Fourth Amendment did not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extended only to a container within the vehicle. 111 S. 1982. Service 3898. FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT.L. Daily Op. Police officers stopped him. The State was granted certiorari. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA. and found marijuana. OVERVIEW: Defendant placed a bag in the trunk of a car. WE GET RULE. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lacked probable cause to search the entire car. 114 L. 23.

PART OF A ROBBERY. BUT AS SOON AS IT LEAVE THE CAR THE CONTAINER THEN COMES UNDER THE CONTAINER RATIONEL…ALTHOUGH IT IS STRANGE TO THINK A SUIT CASE HAS GREATER EXPECTATION OUTSIDE A CAR RATHER THAN INSIDE A CAR CARNEY CASE…A MOBLE HOME IS STILL A VEHICLE HOLTON CASE: 205 THIS EXTENDS TO CONTAINERS OF PASSANGERS TO CARS… COURT HAS NERVER SAID THAT PC TO SEARCH A CAR MEANS PC TO SEARCH A PERSON W/IN THE CAR === IF COPS WERE LOOKING FOR A GUN. AND FIND AN UNLOADED GUN IN THE CAR. THAN CAN CONTINUE LOOKING FOR THE BULLETS AUTO EXCEPTION APPLIES IF IT IS PRIVATE PROPERTY.…CAN SEARCH IT INSIDE THE CAR. OF WHICH THE PUBLIC IS INVITED TO .

S. amend. 2d 1000.S. was not present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings. The court reasoned that the police were indisputably engaged in a caretaking search of a lawfully impounded automobile. the inventory itself was prompted by the presence in plain view of a number of valuables inside the car. Ed. 1976 PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH DAKOTA CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: State sought review of the judgment from the Supreme Court of South Dakota.S. as applicable to the states under U. 1976 July 6. IV. The court held that there was no suggestion whatever that the standard procedure was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive. contending that the search and seizure was not unreasonable.S. OVERVIEW: State appealed the judgment that held that local police violated U. Ct.S. Const.S. LEXIS 15 Argued March 29. IV. Const. IV when they conducted a routine inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police. Const. IV. 49 L. PROTECTS: . XIV. 75-76 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 428 U. Const. AND NO WARRANT JUSTIFICATION. On appeal. having left his car illegally parked for an extended period and thus subject to impoundment. when they conducted a routine inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police for violations of municipal parking ordinances. 1976 U.S. which held that local police violated U. amend. OUTCOME: The judgment that held that local police violated the constitution when they conducted a routine inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police for violations of municipal parking ordinances was reversed because the conduct of the police was not unreasonable. Further. --CAR IS TAKEN TO IMPOUND LOTS [LAWFUL B/C THERE IS A STATUTE AND CAR WAS IN VIOLATION] --THERE WAS NO PC FOR THE SEARCH.SOUTH DAKOTA v. amend. amend. OPPERMAN No. Const. amend. The court concluded that in following standard police procedures the conduct of the police was not unreasonable under U. The issue on appeal was whether the search and seizure was unreasonable pursuant to U. 364. 3092. 96 S. the judgment was reversed and remanded on the basis that the police were indisputably engaged in a caretaking search and such was not unreasonable. The court reasoned that the owner.

IT WOULD BE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE] --SCOPE INCLUDES LOCKED GLOVEBOXES AND TRUNKS…AS LONG AS PROPERTY IS NOT DAMAGED BY OPENING IT --IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND SOMETHING TO FIND PC TO JUSTFY A SEARCH BEYOND THE STANDARD INVATORY SEARCH .--OWNER’S PROPERTY --PO PO FROM FALSE CLAIMS --“POTENTIAL” DANGER REDUCED EXPECATION OF PRIVACY B/C MOVILE AND PULIC TRAVEL --PC IS IRRELEVANT TO MEET GOVERNMENT NEEDS. IT JUST DOESN’T MAKE SENSE ~ THERE IS JUST NOTING TO DERTERMINE --WHAT DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TO SHOW INORDER TO USE THIS EXCEPTION [THIS IS A THRESHOLD QUESTION]: --SHOW REGULARY OPPERATING PROCEDUERS --SHOW A LAWFUL SIEZUER [IF IT WAS NOT.

which was conducted pursuant to standard booking procedures as an inventory of defendant's belongings. the police could search any container in defendant's possession. Third District. Specifically. was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. THIRD DISTRICT. App. OVERVIEW: Defendant was arrested for disturbing the peace. The warrantless search of defendant's shoulder bag. Argued June 20. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS. The Court reasoned that such a search was supported by the State's interest in safeguarding defendant and his property as well avoiding possible claims of theft by the police. Ct. LAFAYETTE No. E.S. the state trial court suppressed the drugs and that judgment was affirmed on appeal. LEXIS 71 April 20.ILLINOIS v. As part of a routine booking procedure. In such circumstances. On certiorari. the search was not unreasonable. warrantless search at a police station. DISPOSITION: 99 Ill. 103 S. a majority of the Court held that the search was not invalid under the Fourth Amendment. an officer emptied and inventoried the contents of the bag. 81-1859 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 462 U. he removed cigarettes from the shoulder bag he was carrying and then placed it on the counter in the station. The narcotics found in the bag were thus improperly suppressed. 1983 U. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: On certiorari. 1983. 77 L. Ed. which affirmed a trial court's decision granting defendant's motion to suppress narcotics that were found in his shoulder bag during a postarrest. Narcotics were found in the bag and defendant was subsequently charged with violating the state's controlled substances statute.S. When he arrived at the police station. 2605. On defendant's motion. 640. 1983. the Court held that because the search was conducted as a part of a routine administrative procedure that was incident to defendant's arrest and incarceration. reversed and remanded. 425 N. 2d 1383. 3d 830. OUTCOME: The Court reversed and remanded the judgment below. 2d 65. ARREST THAT IS LAWFUL . the State challenged a judgment from the Appellate Court of Illinois.

AND FOR IDENTIFYING THE ARRESTTE GOVERNMENT HAS TO SHOW A LAWFUL AREST. ESTABLISHED INVENTORY PROCEDURES SCOPE: IS OK TO SEARCH A BAG.SEARCH OF LAFAYETTE AND HIS BAG SEARCH INSIDE A CONTAINER [EFFECTS HAVE HIGH PROTECTION UNDER 4TH] BRIGHT LINE RULE. AND PERSON…STRIP SEARCH AS NEEDED . REASONABLE BELIF THAT PERSON WILL BE INCARSERATED. SAME JUSTIFICATIONS FROM ABOVE FOR CAR INVATORY.

Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO. 107 S. 738.W.S.S. There was no showing that the police chose to impound defendant's van in order to investigate suspected criminal activity. 1987. Argued January 14.S. even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure. acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Ed. LEXIS 286. 85-889 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 479 U. 4105 November 10.COLORADO v. AND EVEN WHEN THE PERSON . The police were potentially responsible for the property taken into their custody. related to the feasibility and appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than impounding it. 55 U. The State petitioned for certiorari. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the suppression of evidence. On the State's interlocutory appeal. reversed. BERTINE No. 1987 U. INVENTORY SEARCH OUTSIDE THE IMPOUND LOT. DISPOSITION: 706 P. The discretion afforded the police was exercised in light of standardized criteria. The trial court found that the police department's procedures mandated the opening of closed containers and the listing of their contents. which he alleged exceeded the permissible scope of such search under the Fourth Amendment. 367. Reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfied the Fourth Amendment. There was no showing that the police. who were following standardized procedures. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during an inventory search of the closed backpack and containers in his impounded vehicle after he was arrested.L. Ct. 1986. the police protected the property from unauthorized interference. By securing the property. OVERVIEW: The state court held that searches of closed trunks and suitcases violated the Fourth Amendment. the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed. 2d 411. 2d 739. The district court granted the motion based on the Colorado Constitution. 93 L.

STILL NEED PC. RATIONEL IS MOBILITY AND REDUCED PRIVACY EXPECTATION] . MUST FOLLOW STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDUERS IS PRESENT AND COULD MAKE OTHER ARANGEMENTS =========================== REVIEW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS UNDER THE 4TH INCLUDE: --SEARCH --ARRESTS --SEIZURES OF PROPERTY SEARCHES MUST BE REASONABLE: --WARRANT --GENERALLY NEED A WARANT TO SEARCH --NEED WARNT TO ARREST IN PUBLIC FOR A PAST MISTERMEANER. IT CAN’T BE INVESTIGATORY. IN A PRIVATE PLACE ALWAYS NEED A WARRANT…ALL CURRENT AND PAST FELLONIES DON’T REQUIRE A WARRANT…AND IT IS PERSUMED YOU NEED A WARANT TO SIEZE IDOMS --PROBABLE CAUSE --ALWAYS NEED PC.JUSTIFIED BY BRIGHT LINE RULE. STILL NEED PC. CONTAINER EXCEPTION. REASONS YOU SIEZE THESE THINGS IS FOR EVIDENCE OR CONTRABAND VEHICLE EXCEPTION ALOWS SEARCH W/O A WARRANT. ALLOWS PO PO TO SIEZE. [CAN SIEZE B/C IF THEY DON’T THE EVIDENCE WILL GET DISTROYED…BUT THEY CAN’T SIEZE [WHAT THEY DISCOVER CAN CREATE ADDITIONAL PC.

71-732 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 412 U. the Court held that individual consent could only be ascertained by analyzing all of the circumstances. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. DISPOSITION: 448 F. on the grounds that the determination of voluntariness did not require proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the decision of the court below. 2041. 93 S. 1973. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner sought certiorari to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Argued May 29.S. 2d 854. CONSERVATION CENTER SUPERINTENDENT v. which vacated an order that denied a writ of habeas corpus to respondent and that remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court disagreed that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent was a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating "voluntary" consent. Rather. NO PC TO SEARCH THE CAR NOT ARESTED NOT IMPOUNDED…THUS NO EXCEPTIONS .2d 699. reversed. Ct. Respondent moved to suppress the introduction of certain material as evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired through a warrantless search and seizure that were unconstitutional. 218. Ed. The court of appeals held that consent to a search could not be found solely from the absence of coercion and a verbal expression of assent.S. LEXIS 6 October 10. 1973 U. 36 L. which the Court adhered to. reinstating the affirmation of respondent's conviction and the denial of a writ of habeas corpus to respondent. OVERVIEW: Respondent was brought to trial on a charge of possessing a check with intent to defraud. The traditional definition of voluntariness. 1972. The court of appeals vacated an order that denied the petition for habeas corpus relief on grounds that there was insufficient proof that respondent knew that he had a right to refuse to give his consent to the search. BUSTAMONTE No. did not require proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search.SCHNECKLOTH.

IT IS DETERMINED BY THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES FACTS THAT HELP: TIME. so presumably the cop can look in any unlocked container when they get pers when they get permission to look for drugs in a car WARRANT REQUD? PC REQUD? . HAS THE BURDEN OF VALID CONSENTPART OF THE SHOWING IS THAT THE PERSON ORDINARILY IN TRIAL HAS TO KNOW THEY HAVE THE RITGHT…BUT IN THIS CASE. LANGUAGE ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ REVIEW GOVT. ACTION SEARCH ARREST CS OF PERSON SEIZURE OF PROPERTY TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES GO TOWARDS WHETHER THE CONSENT WAS VOLUNTARY FOR ANY WARRANT OR CONSENT EXCEPTION. NOT KNOWING. All containters have privacy interests. THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE BURDEN OF SHOWING…THEY DON’T HAVE TO SHOW THAT THE PERSON KNEW THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO REFUSE JIMENO: resasonableness goes towards scope and amount of time. WEAPONS. AGE. REPEDITIVE.THUS ONLY THING THAT IS LEFT BUT CONSENT IS THERE VALID CONSENT… DEFENDANT DIDN’T KNOW HIS RIGHTS. TONE. HE SAID DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 4TH AND TRIAL RIGHTS…GOVT. RACE. THEY DON’T HAVE TO MAKE THE SAME SHOWING IN REGARDS TO PRIVACY B/C RULE: CONSENT HAS TO BE VOLUNTARY.

The Court noted that defendant's own out-of-court admissions would have surmounted all objections based on the hearsay rule both at the suppression hearings and at the trial itself. LEXIS 8 December 10-11. DISPOSITION: 476 F. there was no apparent reason for the trial judge to distrust the evidence and to exclude the third party's declarations from his own consideration. the government challenged a judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. MATLOCK No. the risk of prejudice. Argued February 20.2d 1083. if any. the Court noted that because the third party was a witness for defendant at the suppression hearing. 94 S. Ed. OUTCOME: The judgment of the lower court upholding a judgment in favor of defendant was reversed and remanded for reconsideration. under the circumstances. which affirmed the district court's judgment that the government had not satisfactorily proved a third party's actual authority to consent to a search. 2d 242. 164.S. 1974. 1973. The Court also noted that. she was available for cross-examination. Ct. finding that the government had proven the third party's actual authority to consent to the search. and would have been admissible for whatever inferences the trial judge could have reasonably drawn regarding joint occupancy of the east bedroom. 39 L.S. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. 1974 U. Thus.UNITED STATES v. The Court reversed the judgment. . OVERVIEW: The question before the Court was whether the evidence presented by the government with respect to the voluntary consent of a third party to search defendant's living quarters was legally sufficient to render the seized materials admissible in evidence at defendant's criminal trial for bank robbery. from the use of hearsay was reduced. reversed and remanded. 72-1355 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 415 U. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In connection with defendant's trial for bank robbery. Finally. 988.

RODRIGUEZ No. Defendant asserted that permitting a reasonable belief of common authority would cause his Fourth Amendment rights to be "vicariously waived. and the Court granted certiorari. The State sought review. Argued June 21.S. 1990. OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further determination whether the police officers possessed a reasonable belief that defendant's former roommate had common authority over the apartment. FIRST DISTRICT. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the State's petition for leave to appeal. OVERVIEW: The State argued that defendant's former roommate still retained control over defendant's apartment and.S. therefore. Ct. but the lower courts failed to render a decision on the issue. The officers' reasonable belief that the roommate had common authority over the apartment could have validated the search.ILLINOIS v. 110 S. the search and seizure was still proper under the Fourth Amendment because the police reasonably believed that she had authority to consent. 177." The Court held that "common authority" rested on mutual use of the property and that there was sufficient proof in the record that the State failed to satisfy its burden that defendant's former roommate had joint access or control over the apartment. 1990 U. 88-2018 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 497 U. Ed. 2d 148. 111 L. 58 U. 1990. ACTUAL AUTHORITY=NO APPARENT AUTHORITY=YES… AND RESUTS IN THE EVIDENCE COMING IN .W. 4892 March 20. DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS. The State also argued that even if the roommate lacked control or authority. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's decision. Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest was granted by the state trial court. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.S. 2793.L. LEXIS 3295. had common authority over the premises to consent to the police search.

A NUMBER OF STATES HAVE REJECTED THIS CASE…STATES CAN GIVE CITIZENS MORE RIGHTS .

The scope of the search was not enlarged in the slightest by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant. 1990. 88-7164 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 496 U. PETITIONER v. OUTCOME: The court affirmed petitioner's armed robbery conviction because weapons seized from his residence were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant and the seizure was authorized by the plain view doctrine. When the weapons were discovered. so that the items seized from petitioner's home were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant. but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had been used in the crime he was investigating. DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 4694 February 21. The Court concluded that. which affirmed his conviction for the armed robbery of the treasurer of a coin club following denial of his motion to suppress weapons seized by police from his residence. The Supreme Court affirmed. LEXIS 2937. OVERVIEW: Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of the treasurer of a coin club following denial of his motion to suppress weapons seized by police from his residence.TERRY BRICE HORTON. 128. The search was authorized by the warrant. 1990. though inadvertence was a characteristic of most legitimate plain view seizures.S. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California Sixth Appellate District. not only to obtain a warrant to search for the stolen property. 110 S. 58 U. CALIFORNIA No. Argued June 4. and the seizure was authorized by the plain view doctrine. Ct. 2d 112. The officer had probable cause. SEARCH DOES NOT HAVE TO BE INADVERTANT . 2301. Ed. petitioner sought certiorari.S. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner sought certiorari review of a judgment from the Court of Appeal of California Sixth Appellate District.L. 110 L.W. it was not a necessary condition.S. it was immediately apparent to the police officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. 1990 U. After an appellate court affirmed the conviction.

The Court affirmed the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized. 1986. DISPOSITION: 146 Ariz. OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence due to a violation of the Fourth Amendment. When.L. 1987. 4258 December 8. BEFORE HE PICKS UP THE TERN TABEL. 107 S. which was not present by the State's admission.SO IT ALL DEPENDS ON WHETHER THERE IS PC . and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry. 94 L. affirmed. 2d 331. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.S. which affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized in plain view during a warrantless search of a private area as violative of the Fourth Amendment. 2d 347. 55 U. IT IS NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENTLY SIEZABLE THAT THERE IS PC TO SEARCH THE TURN TABLE…. it was confirmed that a turntable had been taken in an armed robbery.ARIZONA v. victims. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA. HICKS No. He thought these anomalous in the context of the squalor of the apartment. Argued March 3. and defendant was subsequently indicted for robbery. OVERVIEW: When law enforcement officers entered defendant's apartment under exigent circumstances after a bullet was fired into the apartment below. LEXIS 1056. Such a search was not "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment because it was not sustainable under the "plain view" doctrine absent probable cause.S. 533. the officer seized the equipment. 707 P. Ct. 321.W. and moved some of the components in order to read and record their serial numbers. 85-1027 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 480 U.S. two sets of expensive stereo equipment were noticed by one of the officers. 1149. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State sought certiorari review of a judgment from the Court of Appeals of Arizona. holding that the officer's moving of the equipment constituted a "search" separate and apart from the search for the shooter. 1987 U. after phoning the numbers into headquarters. Ed.

SAYS THAT DOESN’T WANT TO GET INTO CURSERY INSPECTION…THUS. BRIGHTLINE RULE ========================== .

amend. On certiorari the court affirmed petitioner's conviction. IV. Ct. and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. LEXIS 1345. under U. 2d 889.S. and posed a threat to him and to others justified both the officer's "stop" of petitioner and the "frisk. Const. 1968. that petitioner and his companions were about to commit a daytime robbery. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. OVERVIEW: Petitioner sought review of his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon.S. 2d 383 December 12. OUTCOME: The court affirmed a judgment that affirmed petitioner's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon because the "stop and frisk" tactics used by the police in the search of petitioner's person and the seizure of the weapon produced from the search were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. IV: the officer had a reasonable suspicion. Furthermore. the search satisfied the conditions of U. amend.S. the court ruled that the search of the outer clothing of petitioner and his companions was properly limited in time and scope in order for him to determine the presence of weapons and to neutralize the danger posed. of petitioner's overcoat. contending that the weapon seized from him was obtained through an illegal search. Petitioner contended that the weapon seized from his person and introduced into evidence was obtained through an illegal search. DISPOSITION: Affirmed. under U. 1868." or pat-down. OHIO No. 20 L. IV. Ed. 44 Ohio Op. Argued June 10. and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner sought review of a judgment from the Supreme Court of Ohio that affirmed petitioner's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. 1968 U. and his belief that petitioner was presently armed. 1967. The court ruled that despite the fact that the arresting police officer lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner at the time he made the "stop and frisk" warrantless intrusion upon petitioner that produced the weapon at issue. amend. 1.TERRY v. as the arresting officer reasonably .S. based upon his experience. Const. dangerous. 67 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 392 U.S. 88 S. Const.

concluded that petitioner was armed and was about to engage in criminal activity. .

DUNAWAY v. and questioned after being given Miranda warnings. Y. NEW YORK No. 200. Ct. they seized petitioner for interrogation. Ed. 99 S. 60 L. 2d 490. FOURTH JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.S. Div. without probable cause. He was taken to the police headquarters. they were inadmissible since no intervening events broke the connection between petitioner's illegal detention and his confession. The police questioned the informant but did not have enough information to get a warrant for petitioner's arrest. 78-5066 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 442 U. Petitioner waived his right to counsel and made incriminating statements. Supreme Court of New York. The police located petitioner and took him into custody. he would have been restrained if he had attempted to leave. Petitioner had been convicted of murder. SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK. An informant supplied a possible lead that implicated petitioner. Fourth Judicial Department for clarifying the Fourth Amendment's requirements as to the permissible grounds for custodial interrogation. . reversed. 402 N. 1979. Although he was not told he was under arrest. the Court held that the detention for custodial interrogation intruded on the interests protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the constitution and held that the police violated the constitution when. 2d 824. OVERVIEW: A murder occurred during an attempted robbery. On appeal.S. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The court granted certiorari on a decision from the Appellate Division. Argued June 5. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the lower court's judgment that convicted defendant of murder because the police violated the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment by illegally detaining petitioner for interrogation without probable cause. 1979. 1979 U. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION. DISPOSITION: 61 App. 2248. The Court held that while proper Miranda warnings were given and petitioner's statements were "voluntary" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 2d 299. LEXIS 126 March 21. S.

1980. Incounter between popo and an individual.UNITED STATES v. weapons. even though defendant was not expressly told that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry. The court held that the totality of the evidence was adequate to support the district court's findings that defendant voluntarily consented to accompany the officers and that defendant consented to the search of her person freely and voluntarily. The lower appellate court reversed. On appeal.S. holding that defendant's consent to the search of her person had not been voluntarily given. 78-1821 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 446 U. MENDENHALL No. 100 S. OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment of the lower appellate court that had reversed defendant's conviction for possession of heroin. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition for Rehearing Denied June 30. the court reversed the judgment of the lower appellate court. Ed. race.2d 706. have to figure out what that incounter is. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. [it is helpful to know if they were informed that they were free to go]. which reversed defendant's conviction for possessing heroin with intent to distribute. 1980 U. capacity [test= what would a .S. 544. Argued May 27. 64 L. DISPOSITION: 596 F. The court held that a person had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if. 1980. in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. 1980. reversed and remanded. a reasonable person would have believed that she was not free to leave. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States appealed the judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. age. 2d 497. OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of possessing heroin with intent to distribute after the district court denied her motion to suppress the introduction of the heroin at trial. what they say. have to calisify what that incounter is Plurality says: no seizure~ # of police. LEXIS 102 February 19. The court held that defendant was not seized when she was approached by the federal agents who asked to see her ticket and identification. Ct. 1870.

coming from a drug area. no luggage. suspicious. meet a profile [meeting a profile is not enough. Plurality sees it as not a seizure so doen’t have to talk about 4th amendment. last off the plain. b/c there is such a compelling government interest The plurality says that the other governemtn actions of accompany and search of purse and person were purley consensual No seizure Nothing Mere stop Reasonable suspiscion Equiv of arrest Probable cause Formal arrest Probable cause .reasonable person in mendenha’s shoes feel free to leave]. there has to be individual reasons] We are going to lower the standard in drug cases. The test= reasonable person think they are free to leave 7 say that this is a stop [thus a lesser kind of seizure compared to an arrest] The 3 concurrers says it was a stop and that it was justified by reasonable suspision She meets reasonable suspision.

L. 429. the state supreme court reversed. 89-1717 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 501 U. and respondent pled guilty to drug trafficking. Ed. OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision and remanded the case to determine whether respondent's consent to search was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Amended June 21. they asked respondent's consent to search his luggage. OVERVIEW: Respondent was travelling on an inter-city bus that was at a stopover. Respondent gave his consent. Argued June 20. 1991. Ct. his consent was voluntary. the court held that if the police indicated that respondent was free to refuse consent and terminate the encounter. BOSTICK No. under the totality of the circumstances. holding that because respondent was on a bus.W. 111 S. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner State obtained a writ of certiorari for the review of a decision by the Supreme Court of Florida. 2382. reversed and remanded. Because there was no finding by the lower court using that standard. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA. LEXIS 3625. police found illegal drugs. 1991. and that the police would not detain him if he refused.S. 59 U. 4708.FLORIDA v. On certiorari. and his consent was involuntary.S. 1991. 1991 U. indentify defendant. 115 L. Service 4671. and asked if could search luggage . 2d 1153. when police boarded the bus. and thus determine if respondent's consent was voluntary. On appeal. a reasonable person would have felt free to refuse to cooperate with the police. which reversed respondent's plea of guilty for drug trafficking and held that the illegal drugs found in respondent's luggage should have been suppressed because respondent's consent to the search of his luggage was involuntary. he was not free to leave the bus without the risk of being stranded. Cops w/ badges and insignia. 2d 389. Without any reasonable suspicion. the court reversed the decision of the state supreme court and remanded the case to determine if. 91 Daily Journal DAR 7328 February 26. DISPOSITION: 554 So. 91 Cal. Daily Op.S.

Things to talk about [possible searches and seizures]: --initial encounter --search of a suitcase Simply the fact that the encounter was on a bus does not make it a seizure Remand b/c have to do a free to decline test. where they look at the totality Rule: would a reasonable person would feel free to decline the requests of the oficers .

Argued April 23. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA. and he was untouched at the time he discarded the cocaine. The Court remanded the case. 59 U. 1547. The Court held that with respect to a show of authority regarding the application of physical force. 111 S. The state supreme court denied the State's application for review. Service 2893. which denied its application for review of the decision that found that defendant had been unreasonably seized under the Fourth Amendment and that evidence of cocaine had to be suppressed as the fruit of that illegal seizure. 89-1632 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 499 U. The Court reversed and remanded the judgment. The Court found that the test for a show of authority was an objective one and that defendant was not seized until he was tackled.L. HODARI D. a seizure did not occur when the subject had not yielded. 2d 690. 113 L. FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT. LEXIS 2397. Ed. 1991 U.S.W. 91 Cal. 91 Daily Journal DAR 4665 January 14. Defendant's case did not involve the application of any physical force.CALIFORNIA v. 4335.S. The Court held that defendant was not seized until he was tackled. DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded. No. 1991. Ct. 1991. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment that suppressed evidence of cocaine as the fruit of an illegal seizure. Possible government actions: --The chase ~~~~evidence discarded . CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State challenged a judgment of the California Supreme Court. OVERVIEW: The court granted certiorari on the issue of whether defendant had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at the time he dropped the cocaine when he saw an officer running towards him. Daily Op. 621.S. The cocaine abandoned while defendant was running was not the fruit of a seizure and not excludable. The state appellate court held that defendant had been seized when he dropped the cocaine and that the evidence had to be suppressed.

--then the tackle Govt. concieded that there was no reasonable suspision to chase when kid’s started to run Would a reasonable person stop when popo yells stop when being chsed --import the common law rule of arrest into a seizure There has been no search or seizure at the time the evidence is thrown away Summission to authority test is the hidori test .

The lower appellate court reversed. in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. the court reversed the judgment of the lower appellate court. 78-1821 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 446 U. MENDENHALL No. On appeal. Argued May 27. 2d 497. 544. OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment of the lower appellate court that had reversed defendant's conviction for possession of heroin. 100 S. The court held that defendant was not seized when she was approached by the federal agents who asked to see her ticket and identification. 1980 U.2d 706. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States appealed the judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.S. reversed and remanded. which reversed defendant's conviction for possessing heroin with intent to distribute.UNITED STATES v. 64 L. a reasonable person would have believed that she was not free to leave. Ct. 1980. The court held that the totality of the evidence was adequate to support the district court's findings that defendant voluntarily consented to accompany the officers and that defendant consented to the search of her person freely and voluntarily. 1980. Ed. The court held that a person had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if. even though defendant was not expressly told that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry. . DISPOSITION: 596 F. 1870.S. holding that defendant's consent to the search of her person had not been voluntarily given. OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of possessing heroin with intent to distribute after the district court denied her motion to suppress the introduction of the heroin at trial. LEXIS 102 February 19. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition for Rehearing Denied June 30. 1980.

4708. 1991 U. and his consent was involuntary. which reversed respondent's plea of guilty for drug trafficking and held that the illegal drugs found in respondent's luggage should have been suppressed because respondent's consent to the search of his luggage was involuntary. his consent was voluntary. 2382. Without any reasonable suspicion. . and thus determine if respondent's consent was voluntary. Because there was no finding by the lower court using that standard. 429. 91 Cal. 1991. 91 Daily Journal DAR 7328 February 26. the court held that if the police indicated that respondent was free to refuse consent and terminate the encounter. under the totality of the circumstances. On certiorari. and that the police would not detain him if he refused. Ed. and respondent pled guilty to drug trafficking. DISPOSITION: 554 So. reversed and remanded. 59 U. 115 L. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner State obtained a writ of certiorari for the review of a decision by the Supreme Court of Florida.S.S. 89-1717 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 501 U.S.FLORIDA v. a reasonable person would have felt free to refuse to cooperate with the police. Service 4671.L. On appeal. holding that because respondent was on a bus. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA. 2d 1153. 1991. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Amended June 21. police found illegal drugs. 1991. Ct. BOSTICK No. they asked respondent's consent to search his luggage. the state supreme court reversed.W. the court reversed the decision of the state supreme court and remanded the case to determine if. Daily Op. OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision and remanded the case to determine whether respondent's consent to search was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. LEXIS 3625. when police boarded the bus. 2d 389. OVERVIEW: Respondent was travelling on an inter-city bus that was at a stopover. 111 S. Argued June 20. Respondent gave his consent. he was not free to leave the bus without the risk of being stranded.

Ct. Ed. 2d 690.CALIFORNIA v. OVERVIEW: The court granted certiorari on the issue of whether defendant had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at the time he dropped the cocaine when he saw an officer running towards him. 1991 U. Service 2893. DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded. . Daily Op. 621.L. 1991. No. The Court reversed and remanded the judgment. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment that suppressed evidence of cocaine as the fruit of an illegal seizure. 1991.S. The Court found that the test for a show of authority was an objective one and that defendant was not seized until he was tackled. 113 L. The cocaine abandoned while defendant was running was not the fruit of a seizure and not excludable. The Court remanded the case. The Court held that defendant was not seized until he was tackled. The Court held that with respect to a show of authority regarding the application of physical force. The state supreme court denied the State's application for review. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA. Defendant's case did not involve the application of any physical force. HODARI D. LEXIS 2397. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State challenged a judgment of the California Supreme Court. The state appellate court held that defendant had been seized when he dropped the cocaine and that the evidence had to be suppressed. 91 Daily Journal DAR 4665 January 14. 59 U. 111 S.W. Argued April 23. a seizure did not occur when the subject had not yielded. and he was untouched at the time he discarded the cocaine. FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT.S. 89-1632 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 499 U.S. which denied its application for review of the decision that found that defendant had been unreasonably seized under the Fourth Amendment and that evidence of cocaine had to be suppressed as the fruit of that illegal seizure. 91 Cal. 4335. 1547.

Before Teri: you had a seizure or an arrest [showing required for arrest was PC and in some circumstance a warrant] After Teri: nothing/ stop~reasonable showing/ arrest~probable cause New case: shinging a light on a person is not a stop~not a sufficiently suffer showing of govt.. and going for only 48 hours these are all suspicious Hensley: you can stop a person for past crimeadditional showing for it being a right person and that the crime occurred .one way ticket and different name on luggage and paying cash. authority Reid: general profile is not acceptable Royer: says right to walk away……….

120 S. Weekly Fed. Ed. The Court found that the determination of reasonable suspicion had to be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. DISPOSITION: 183 Ill. Argued January 12. WILLIAM AKA SAM WARDLOW No. defendant's presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight upon noticing police created a reason This is a close case .S. 2000. 2000 U. 2d 570. 701 N. but the appellate court reversed. 119. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 2000 Cal. which upheld the grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 2d 306. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.ILLINOIS v. 1999. 145 L. C. L. evasive behavior was a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. concluding that sudden flight in a high crime area did not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. 2d 484. Ct. The Court found that nervous. OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed and remanded. Service 299. and that headlong flight was the consummate act of evasion. J. S 20 November 2.A. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress.38-caliber handgun.S. Two of the officers caught up with him. 1999 Colo. 98-1036 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 528 U. and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. OVERVIEW: Defendant fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. The state supreme court agreed.R. Daily Op. E. Defendant was arrested when officers discovered a . 183. LEXIS 504. and that officers were justified in suspecting that defendant was involved in criminal activity based on his presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State appealed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois. 13 Fla. concluding that sudden flight in a high crime area did not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. reversed and remanded. 673. 2000 Daily Journal DAR 389.

110 S. When the officers stopped respondent. 1990. 325. and reasonable suspicion could arise from information less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 2d 1074.W.S. Apparently the consent was voluntary and the search was w/in the scope . The level of suspicion required for a Terry stop was less demanding than that required for probable cause. 58 U.L. Ed. PETITIONER v. did not violate U.S.ALABAMA. The investigative stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. amend. VANESSA ROSE WHITE No. 89-789 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 496 U. 1990 U. IV. 4747 April 17.S. 1990. Argued June 11.S. the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. the anonymous tip from the informant had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity. which held that officers did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of respondent's car and that the marijuana and cocaine that the officers seized were fruits of respondent's unconstitutional detention. DISPOSITION: 550 So. On appeal. there was reason to believe that the informant was honest and well-informed. reversed and remanded. the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity. The investigative stop. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Certiorari was granted to review an order of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded for further proceedings because when the officers stopped respondent. 2d 301. noting that a "totality of circumstances" approach was used to determine whether an informant's tip established probable cause or the reasonable suspicion required by an officer to make a Terry stop. Ct. therefore. OVERVIEW: The State sought review of a judgment holding that officers did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of respondent's car based on an anonymous tip and that marijuana and cocaine seized were fruits of respondent's unconstitutional detention. LEXIS 3053. Const. 2412. 110 L. When significant aspects of the informant's predictions were verified. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA.

semi-verfication of destination. apt.Argument: that the stop was not based on reasonable suspicision Before the stop the popo verified her car. building. and the direction of the car was traveling. and drugs The tipsters basis of knowledge: 1st hand Veracity: don’t know Relaiblity: in this case good If there were no coroberation in this case there would be no reasonable suspision—but this is a CLOSE CASE . Unverified before the stop= name.

Weekly Fed. affirmed. No. 2000 Cal. Further. 146 L. 2000 Colo. the court declined to modify the Terry standard to license a "firearm exception" since it roved too far from the court's established reliability analysis. DISPOSITION: 727 So.A. OUTCOME: The court affirmed a judgment holding that a Terry "stop and frisk" search of respondent based only on an anonymous tip was constitutionally invalid since an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was. insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. LEXIS 2345. 13 Fla. 2d 204. L. IV. 2000. Everyone on the court says that this is not reasonable suspission . L. not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. C. Service 2409. 4236. the accurate description of respondent's appearance was not enough since the reasonable suspicion at issue required that the tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality.W.R. The tip pointing to respondent lacked the moderate indicia of reliability necessary because the call provided no predictive information to enable the police to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. Respondent was searched after an anonymous caller reported to the police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. S 216 February 29.S. without more. J. insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. 68 U. J. without more. Ct. 120 S. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA. 1642. Argued March 28. 2000 U. OVERVIEW: The court affirmed a judgment holding that a Terry "stop and frisk" search of respondent based only on an anonymous tip was invalid under U.S. without more. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Court granted certiorari to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida to decide whether an anonymous tip that respondent was carrying a gun was. 2000. sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of respondent. Const. 1375. Daily Op. The court held that an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was.S. Ed.FLORIDA v.S. 2d 254. 98-1993 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 529 U. 2000 Daily Journal DAR 3226. Finally.L. 266. amend.

in a sparce area that is suspect for drug trafficking. Court said reasonable suspissioneverything that looks purely inoscent can give rise to reasonable suspission . driver stiff and ridgid & didn’t look at the cops.Dictum in this case suggests that reasonable suspission can be brought down for circumstances that are very dangerous [bomb threat or anthrax] =============================================================== =============================================================== ARVIZU: Sensors in the road. kids neas are up high.

TEXAS…reiterated Dunawaycops can’t take you down to the station .REVIEW: Taking fingerprint or hair is not a search b/c there is no reasonable expectation of privacy KAUPP V.

Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA. 811. SECOND DISTRICT. 1985. 53 U. LEXIS 1523. 105 S.S.HAYES v.L. 84 L.S. 1985 U. 2d 896. Second District.W. DISPOSITION: 439 So.S. Argued March 20. FLORIDA No. Ed. 83-6766 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 470 U. reversed. 4382 January 9. Ct. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought certiorari review of a judgment from the District Court of Appeal of Florida. 2d 705. claiming the fingerprint evidence entered into the record at his trial for burglary and sexual assault should have been excluded Ditum is important: . 1643. 1985.

Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. 1983 U. When defendant refused to consent to a search of his bags. how long he might be dispossessed. 2d 110. The agents retained the bags until Monday morning when they secured a search warrant for the bag wherein they discovered cocaine.UNITED STATES v. 4844 March 2. 81-1617 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 462 U. 1983. The agents transported the bags to another airport to subject them to a sniff test by a narcotics detection dog that reacted positively to one of the bags. an agent told him that they were going to take the bags to a federal judge to obtain a search warrant.S. affirmed. The violation was exacerbated by the agents' failure to accurately inform the defendant where they were transporting his bags. LEXIS 74. DISPOSITION: 660 F. 77 L.2d 44. 696. PLACE No.S. The government appealed. The 90-minute detention of respondent's luggage went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. which reversed defendant's conviction on a drug possession charge on the ground that a prolonged seizure of defendant's baggage amounted to a seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.L. The Court affirmed the reversal of defendant's conviction on the basis that the evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible. Ninety minutes had elapsed since the seizure of the bags. OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of . Ed. Argued June 20. Ct.S. OVERVIEW: When defendant arrived at the airport on a Friday afternoon. 1983. and what arrangements would be made for return of the bags if the investigation dispelled the suspicion.W. 103 S. he was met by drug enforcement agents. 51 U. 2637.

the seizure was unreasonable. The dissent says that bringing a dog to a traffic stop changed the nature of the dog. or a full seizure [arrest]needs PC …………………answer to this question is yes But in this case. than case would probably be very different . The dog got there right away and was walked around a car that was lawfully stopped. So is the seizure of the luggage only a mini seizure [i. stop]only needs RS.e. ==================================================== ==================================================== Kabias Case: the presence of the dog did not change the traffic stop. took to long and took the bag to another airport. --Probably had reasonable suspicion when defendant encounter w/ police in New York --Seize luggage [ --Dog Sniff [gives probable cause] --Additional seizure over weekend --Search of Suitcase Threshold: can you seize a belonging errespective to the seizure of the person.defendant's conviction on a drug possession charge. If the person would have been held after the initial traffic stop so as to allow the dog to come. Here the popo could have had the dog at the seen You can seize an item just like a person An interesting point is that the movement of a persons stuff is not as stringent as with a person…the prof thinks that the court would alow for the minimal movement of the luggage.

1983. 2d 1201. 1983 U. holding that the search of the passenger compartment of respondent's automobile. DISPOSITION: 413 Mich. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner state sought review of a decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan. Ed. 51 U.W. 320 N. OVERVIEW: The police officers found marijuana in the passenger compartment and in the trunk of the vehicle that respondent was driving. which suppressed the evidence that was obtained from a search of the passenger compartment of respondent's vehicle on the ground that the sole justification of the search. was permissible since the police officers possessed a reasonable belief based upon specific and articulable facts that reasonably warranted the belief that respondent was dangerous and could gain immediate control of weapons.S. limited to those areas in which a weapon could have been placed or hidden. As such. 3469. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN. 1032. Articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile were within the area into which a suspect might reach in order to grab a weapon. the search of respondent's vehicle was permissible since it was limited to those areas where a weapon could have been placed or hidden. did not warrant the search in this case. especially during roadside encounters.S. 2d 866. At issue was whether a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence of probable cause to arrest. W. 77 L. Argued July 6.MICHIGAN v. Protection of police officers justified protective searches when the officers had a reasonable belief that the suspect posed a danger. 103 S. OUTCOME: The court reversed. 82-256 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 463 U. Ct. Government Action: . reversed and remanded. LONG No. The officers searched respondent's vehicle because they had reason to believe that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers.L. the protection of the police officers and others nearby. LEXIS 7. 461. 5231 February 23.S. 1983.

ask him name. This is not about evidence. Seeing the gun. and refused to give name…Navada statute allowed to arrest if refuse to give name. is it reasonable to arrest him…it matches the justification of Terri stop…and if they don’t arrest him now. they will never get his identity --during a risk popo can remove anything that is immediately apparent that is a weapon or contraband . so government interest goes up+ it is the middle of the night in a rural area. b/c searched the pouch first and then arrested New rule: can search the are inside the car for the sake of police protection have a knife and drunk guy. and that may gain control to weapons. it is about weapons and such things which endanger the officer. Issue. Government showing is= reasonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous. discovers pouch…find it in a pouch --frisk --arrest --impounded the vehicle --trunk To facts which give PC to search the car…prior to lifting up the armrest= no PC to search the car JUST B/C THERE IS SOMETHING SUSPICIOUS. IT DOES NOT GIVE US PC This is not a search incident to lawful arrest case.--Encounter w/ defendantok b/c car in ditch --see weaponok b/c open to public view --seach the passenger compartment. or prior knowledge of armed criminal activity may work to give the popo a reasonable suspicion that there is a weapon ==================================================== ==================================================== Mimms police can order driver out during a traffic stop Wilsonpolice can order passengers out of a car during a traffic stop Hibble stop suspect.

L.S. S 373 March 3. the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after squeezing. retrieved a lump of cocaine from respondent's pocket. 61 U. 113 S. The state supreme court found that based on the record before it. Ed.W. DISPOSITION: 481 N. 1993. 2130. Argued June 7. The state supreme court affirmed the state court of appeals' decision reversing the trial court. 1993 U. Respondent proceeded to trial and was found guilty. 2d 840. 93 Cal. 7 Fla. Daily Op. PETITIONER v. The court affirmed. W. 1993. affirmed. The state supreme court held that the stop and the frisk of respondent was valid under Terry. The trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress the cocaine. 124 L. Government Action: --government conseeds it was a stopattorney should have contended the legality of the stop . 4544. 91-2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 508 U. LEXIS 4018. L. Weekly Fed. 93 Daily Journal DAR 7077. and otherwise manipulating the contents of respondent's pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to hear petitioner government's case to determine whether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer's sense of touch during a protective patdown search. The court stated that the state supreme court was correct in holding that the police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the "strictly circumscribed" search for weapons allowed under Terry.S. Service 4134. TIMOTHY DICKERSON No. during a stop and frisk. 366. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the state supreme court's judgment that the police officer overstepped the bounds of the "strictly circumscribed" search for weapons allowed under Terry when the officer retrieved a lump of cocaine from respondent's pocket. Ct.MINNESOTA.S. sliding. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. OVERVIEW: Respondent was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance after a police officer. but that the seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional. 2d 334.

but it was not plain that the lump was contraband The frisk is ok b/c it is near a crack house.--the officers friskofficer squeezed the lump in his pocket. and it is assumed that guns may be present is such an area The additional viewing can’t give you probable cause…the popo blew it by giving the pocket an extra squeeze. and it was immediately apparent that it was not a weapon. . Can seize drugs und the “plain feel” doctrine.

1990 U. The Court granted certiorari and vacated the court of appeal's decision.2d 79. suppressed evidence seized in plain view during a protective sweep because the officer who conducted the sweep did not have probable cause to believe that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed. look in spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. police arrested defendant in his home after defendant came up from his basement. 88-1369 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 494 U. 58 U.S. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress and convicted defendant. 1093. 2d 276. would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbored an individual posing a danger. . does popo have a lawful vantage point to seize the evidence. but the court of appeals reversed.S. PETITIONER v. in plain view. Ed. LEXIS 1176. 4281 December 4. --need reasonable suspicion. at defendant's armed robbery trial. JEROME EDWARD BUIE No. Police conducted a protective sweep of the basement and found. OUTCOME: The Court vacated the judgment below suppressing evidence and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. Ct. The Court found that no search warrant was required and that officers could. which.S. 110 S. as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. the Court held that there had to be articulable facts which. Valid warrant and PC that he is present for the arrest warrant …Issue. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State sought certiorari review of an order of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. and during. 550 A.L. 1990. the arrest. finding that arresting officers were permitted to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after. DISPOSITION: 314 Md. 1989. OVERVIEW: Following armed robbery by two men. 151.MARYLAND. a sweat suit like the one worn in the robbery for which defendant was arrested.W. 108 L. and where they reasonably think someone is hiding. and that interest was sufficient to outweigh the possible intrusion. Beyond that. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. Argued February 28. taken together with the rational inferences from those facts. 325. vacated and remanded.

armed.Reasonable suspicion that someone is hiding down there= 2 people. ==================================================== . don’t start w/ a conclusion that Popo had reasonable suspicion. and have reasonable suspicion --holding also expands the wingspan in a SILA to adjoining areahas to be lawful arrest and have to be validly present ==================================================== General Notes: Start w/ the government action. have to be lawfully there.

YBARRA: NO PC. NO INDIVIDUALIZED REASONABLE SUSSPISION THAT PERSON IS ABOUT TO INGAGE IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITY AND THAT SHE IS DANGEROUS ========================================================= ========================================================= SUMMERS: .

The student alleged that the search of her purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 463 A. 733.NEW JERSEY v. No. O. 53 U. 1985.W. T.S. amend IV. Therefore. 2d 720. and discovered evidence of marijuana and a list of alleged users from the school. The Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. J. which resulted in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing by the student. 83 L. L. 4083 March 28. The State of New Jersey brought delinquency charges against the student. reversed. Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reargued October 2. Ed. 2d 934. The Court held that a search by a school official was permissible in its scope when the measures adopted were reasonably related to the objectives of the search and were not intrusive in light of the age and the sex of the student. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner State of New Jersey appealed the judgment from the Supreme Court of New Jersey that reversed the lower court's judgment and suppressed evidence found during a search by school officials in an action where respondent student alleged that the school officials violated respondent's rights under the U. was reasonable. 83-712 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 469 U. Const.S.S. 105 S.S. 1984. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the state supreme court's holding against the State of Jersey in which the evidence of drug dealing was suppressed and the Court held that the search. LEXIS 41. . DISPOSITION: 94 N. 1985 U. Ct. the Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court and held that the evidence of marijuana was admissible. 1984. NORMALLY YOU WOULD NEED PC AND A WARRANT OR WARRANT EXCEDPTION TO DO A SEARCHGRANTED IT IS NOT CONSENT OR AN INVENTORY. 325.L. 331. PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY. The principal discovered that the student had the cigarettes in her possession. Argued January 15. OVERVIEW: The student's purse was searched after she was suspected of having cigarettes.

students have lesser expectation of privacyschool officials are like parents. court doesn’t say whether it is ok to search without reasonable suspicion If you got reasonable suspicion of a violation of a school rule…can do a full search and seizure w/o PC . There is a need for order. and it is a highly regulated environment. B/c reasonable suspicion to search.But the court finds that this is not appropriate…uses Teri balancing.

433. 4781 February 27. amend. 110 S. OVERVIEW: Petitioners set up programs for sobriety checkpoints. sought review of a judgment from the Court of Appeals of Michigan. the checkpoints were generally effective.S. Argued June 14. and the subjective intrusion on individual liberties was not substantial.L.S. 88-1897 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 496 U. 1990. and the insubstantial subjective intrusion on individual liberties. PETITIONERS v. 1990 U. Const. Respondents argued that the analysis had to proceed from a basis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The State program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who were briefly stopped weighed in favor of the State program. DISPOSITION: 170 Mich. all licensed drivers. 2d 412.W. 110 L. IV. The court found that a seizure occurred when a vehicle was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. However. ET AL. the court held that such stops were reasonable considering the increasing number of alcohol-related deaths and mutilation on the nation's roads.S. 429 N. 58 U.. Ed. No. OUTCOME: The judgment finding that the State's sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion because the proper analysis was a three prong test balancing the state's grave interest in curbing drunk driving. and there must be some governmental need beyond the normal need before a balancing analysis was appropriate.MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE. reversed and remanded.W. which affirmed the circuit court's determination that the State's sobriety checkpoint program violated U. On review the court found that a three prong test was appropriate. the Michigan Department of State Police and its director. 2481. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Michigan. LEXIS 3144. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners.2d 180. challenged the constitutionality. the effectiveness of the stops. . ET AL. Ct. 444. 1990.S. App. and respondents. RICK SITZ. balancing the state's grave and legitimate interest in curbing drunk driving.

Texas Test MARTINEZ-FUERTE Fixed border Checkpoints --The court has forbidden Roving Sobriety Stops Dicent: This is huge…seizure w/o individualized reasonable suspissionthey say that this is almost no more effective than pulling over people who are swerving around and give rise to individualized suspission . Use of the 3 part Brown v.Everyone agrees that the sobriety checkpoint is a seizure…usually for a seizure you need PC or individualized reasonable suspicion.

which reversed the denial of respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction and determined that petitioner city's checkpoint program with the primary purpose of interdicting illegal narcotics violated the Fourth Amendment. 2000 Colo.S.S. 2000 U. IV. 99-1030 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 531 U. Const. 6401. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. 2000. S 9 October 3. OVERVIEW: Petitioner city operated vehicle checkpoints to interdict unlawful drugs. Because the authorities pursued primarily general crime control purposes at the checkpoints. Ed. 32. the stops could only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion. 2000.CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS. an officer advised the driver that he or she was being stopped at a drug checkpoint and asked the driver to produce a license and registration. 2000 Cal. Respondents' preliminary injunction motion was denied.S. . amend. DISPOSITION: 183 F. 2d 333. the court affirmed the determination that the checkpoints violated U. LEXIS 8084. At each checkpoint location. On certiorari. Daily Op. No. v. A narcotics-detection dog walked around the outside of each stopped vehicle. 4009.W. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment determining that the checkpoint program violated constitutional law because the primary purpose of the checkpoint program was ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control. C. U. Const. ET AL. JAMES EDMOND ET AL. but this decision was reversed on appeal.R. 148 L. 69 U.3d 659. IV because the primary purpose of the narcotics checkpoint program was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Service 9549. amend. L. 121 S. the police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles. J. Weekly Fed.S. Pursuant to written directives. 447. Respondents were stopped at a narcotics checkpoint and filed a class action lawsuit against petitioners.L. affirmed. The officer looked for signs of impairment and conducted an open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 14 Fla.S. Ct.S. Const. Argued November 28.A. amend. IV. claiming that the roadblocks violated U.

can ask for ID. cops can also ask questions. athletes were drug leaders. athletes could get hurt. interest is strong. the individual intrusion is low =============================================== === Court says can’t do random pull overs…rather they should just look for evidence of DUI Can’t do for general investigatory purposes…investigating the individuals that are stoped Can stop you at a border…this is a point of wherever they decide to put the check point =============================================== ==== Flores-Montano no property or privacy interest…and at borders there is a high level of govt.Can order you out of the car under mimswhen they stop you w/ reasonable suspission. interest they can detain and do legthy detentions SkinnerDrug Gernoniaresent rise in drug use. most parents said ok --Drug and urin tests are searches LOOK ON 423 . LIDSTER Court distinguishes Edmond b/c it is not about ferreting out crime. but to ask citizens to help solve a crime. They are just doing investigation of these drivers in this case…it’s not like the highway safety concern of drunk driving. It doesn’t make sense to use individualized suspicion. Govt. discaplin problems.

S. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the appeals court's judgment. 657. 96-126 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 520 U. L. 97 Cal. Ct. GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA. LEXIS 806. 117 S.W.E. Cas. OVERVIEW: The Court held that Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test was outside the category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches. public safety was not genuinely jeopardized. sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner candidates sought review of a judgment entered in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 12 I. ZELL D. (BNA) 1233. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT. CHANDLER.. Fed. S 393 January 14. which held that Ga. 1295. reversed. App. the candidate drug test Georgia devised diminished personal privacy for a symbol's sake. 1997.S. § 21-2-140 was constitutional. PETITIONERS v. DISPOSITION: 73 F. Service 2723.L. LEXIS 2505. The statute in question required candidates for designated state office to certify that they had taken a drug test and obtained negative results. and officials barely attempted to support the statute on that ground. 1997 U.R. 10 Fla. 65 U. in justification of Ga. However well meant. the Fourth Amendment precluded a suspicionless search. ET AL. 2d 513. 4243.WALKER L. .S.3d 1543. No. § 21-2-140.S. MILLER. 137 L. 97 Daily Journal DAR 4831. ET AL. 145 A. state action that is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. no matter how conveniently arranged. Reported at: 1996 U. Weekly Fed. as in this case. Ed. Where. 305. Code Ann. The Court found that Georgia failed to show. Argued April 15. Daily Op. Notably lacking in respondent officials' presentation was any indication of a concrete danger that demanded departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule. Code Ann. The statute was not needed and could not work to ferret out lawbreakers.L.R. 1997. a special need of that kind. The Court emphasized that the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial--important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest.

REVIEW:
Ebara Case: Search Warrant for the Bar, stopped and searched a patron, were they justified in frisking everyone in the bar. Court said no, to PC that everyone had narcotics, and Teri Balancing requires individualized suspicionand there was no individualized suspicion Summers: Search Warrant for contraband, detain the resident of the home, there is some suspicion attached to the home does the suspicion transfer to him. Just keeping him in his home [not a public place], Govt. interest=making sure he doesn’t flea, making sure doesn’t come back and ambush police [court has never said can detain resident during a warantless search, or if you could detain non-residentsa non resident is less likely to be seen as attached to the contraband, and visitors could not help police in the search] McCarther: Popo detain guy when they go to get a warrant. Concern for destruction of evidence/flight…yes detain him but it is just outside his home…this was ok TLO: full search of student’s pursebefore this never allowed full search on less than PC. Case allows school official to do a full search just based on reasonable suspicion =========== Suspissionless Searchesprior to this there was some govt. showing Stizallows popo to stop and search with no cause [helps to think of these as special needs cases 3 categories of special needs cases: --Road Blocks [In Stiz, court said ok to do DWI, fixed for the duration of the check, momentary stop, everyone is stopped, there is notice [so no surprise], and govt. interest in apprehending DUI’s is high. Brown is the test for special needs cases. Brown= Govt. interest, Effectiveness for meeting interest, Individual interest. Other OK stops is at boarders, not only can they stop you and do full search, and disassemble you car, with no showing of suspicion or PC Lidster: It is ok to do a stop to investigate a crime. Brief stop, minimal individual interest, high govt. interest in catching criminal. Effectiveness= narrowly tailored. The only roadblock that is not ok is a General Crime Road Block: When the purpose of the RB is to investigate if the drivers themselves are engaging in illegal activity [section 2 on p. 404 gives good review of special needs cases] once department starts getting into a department wide [implicit intent to get people] than starts getting away from Wren --Drug Test [ok for athletes and other students involved in extra curricular activity… special interest for these people b/c they stay after school and travel, student has lowed expectation of privacy. Govt. interest in fighting drugs, and student health.] Skenner case: people involving in operating trains where there is accidents. High govt. concern for safety where people operating trains and on drugs.

Channler: not ok for drug testing. Brown test no interest b/c appears no problem and would not be effective Ferguson: govt. argued special need to protect women and unborn childrenbut if this was there real concern they would hand stuff over to health officials, but really your handing it off to the police --Administrative/ Regulatory [deal w/ housing and fire codes] SEARCH/SEIZURE None

Minimal

Full search or arrest [or equivalent]

More than a full search or arrest

TENNESSEE v. GARNER ET AL. No. 83-1035 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 471 U.S. 1; 105 S. Ct. 1694; 85 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 195; 53 U.S.L.W. 4410 October 30, 1984, Argued March 27, 1985, Decided * * Together with No. 83-1070, Memphis Police Department et al. v. Garner et al., on certiorari to the same court. PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. DISPOSITION: 710 F.2d 240, affirmed and remanded. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: On writ of certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, appellant sought review of the finding that police officers could not use deadly force in the apprehension of all criminals. OVERVIEW: Appellee brought suit for violations of his son's constitutional rights against appellant city and appellant police department, and appellant state intervened after the court of appeals reversed the decision made by the district court on remand, finding the use of deadly force was unwarranted. Affirming the judgment, the Court found that the apprehension of a suspect is a seizure for the purposes of the Constitution and the use of deadly force to achieve a seizure was only permitted under certain circumstances. The Court held that deadly force was only allowed to apprehend felons who the police had probable cause to believe were dangerous to them or to the public. The Court further found that the shooting of appellee's son, who was a suspect in a burglary, was not an acceptable use of deadly force. OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment. Govt. Argument: He will escape, it’s a deterrence [it will encourage peaceful submission], common law rule. Argument: the need to capture the suspect is not better than death, peaceful submission argument is not warranted by any evidence, common law argument= felonies were defined differently and were all punishable by death.

or.e. not what the actual officer was thinkig but what a reasonable officer would do in the situation] if the suspect threatens the officer w/ a weapon.[this is a reasonable test—i. DF is necessary to prevent excape .We are maxing out on individual interest in this case Rule [438]-. PC suspect committed a dangerous crime [of serious bodily injury to officer or others]…AND popo must give a warning…AND.

County of Los Angeles. The state court affirmed the conviction and petitioner sought review. which affirmed petitioner's conviction of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Court upheld petitioner's conviction. 86 S. and his right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. or to otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA. 2d 908.S. OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the state court's judgment of conviction. 16 L. Ed. his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 757. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Certiorari was granted to review a decision of the Appellate Department of the California Superior Court. 1966. . OVERVIEW: Petitioner contended that the drawing of his blood for an alcohol analysis test without his consent denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment and violated his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. 1966. because the arresting officer could have reasonably concluded that the delay in obtaining a warrant could result in the destruction or disappearance of evidence and because the test was conducted in a reasonable manner. Argued June 20. 658 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 384 U. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.SCHMERBER v. 1826. LEXIS 1129 April 25. DISPOSITION: Affirmed. and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis did not involve compulsion to these ends. The Court also held that the record showed no violation of petitioner's right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.S. 1966 U. Ct. It held that the privilege against selfincrimination protected an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself. CALIFORNIA No.

interestest PC yes. . Govt. in hosbital. govt. done by doctor.Beyond a full search…Individual interestfairly minimal. Warrant doesn’t make sinse. needs evidence to prosecute him.

S.W.S. amend. Ed. ET AL.S. Govt. The court affirmed the injunction against petitioners' request. has PC…govt. DISPOSITION: 717 F. 83-1334 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 470 U.L.2d 888. OUTCOME: Affirmed the order of the appellate court and granted an injunction against petitioners' attempt to force respondent to undergo surgery in order to remove potential evidence from respondent's chest because such act was a substantial intrusion and violated respondent's constitutional rights. Petitioners sought a motion to compel surgery to remove the bullet. The court held that the reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin depended on a case-by-case approach. The court held that the proper safeguards were present and exhausted. want’s to remove bullet to match to gun. 1984. 53 U. OVERVIEW: Petitioners alleged that a bullet in respondent's chest was evidence that would link respondent to a crime. 4367 October 31. 1611. LEE No. 105 S.S. affirmed the order from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia where petitioners sought to compel surgery to remove a bullet from respondent. The court held the operation would substantially intrude on respondent's protected interests. Govt.WINSTON. IV. Such surgery required the use of a general anesthetic. LEXIS 76. 1985 U. Const. had other evidenceso really didn’t need the bullet . which under the U. 1985. in which the individual's interests in privacy and security were weighed against society's interests in conducting the procedure. Decided PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. 753. 2d 662. Argued March 20. v. IV.S. amend. Respondent alleged that removal of the bullet from his chest was a substantial violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. affirmed. 84 L. Const. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners challenged an order from the United States Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit. Individual interest: The surgery was rather dangerious. U. SHERIFF. Ct.

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