Protective Order Motion - SDOG Opposition

1 JOHN MORRIS, ESQ.
(SBN 99075)
jmmorris@higglsaw.com
2 PAUL J. PFINGST, ESQ. (SBN 112967)
pfingstp@higgslaw.com
3 RACHEL E. MOFFITT, ESQ. (SBN. 307822)
moffittr@higgslaw.com
4 HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK LLP
401 West “A” Street, Suite 2600
5 San Diego, CA 92101-7913
TEL: 619.236.1551
6 FAX: 619.696.1410
7
CORY J. BRIGGS, ESQ. (SBN 176284)
8 cory@briggslawcorp.com
ANTHONY N. KIM, ESQ. (SBN 283353)
9 anthony@briggslawcorp.com
BRIGGS LAW CORPORATION
10 99 East “C” Street, Suite 111
Upland, CA 91786
11 TEL: 909.949.7115
FAX: 909.949.7121
12
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
13 SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT
14
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
15 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO – CENTRAL DIVISION
16
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN Case No. 37-2019-00015139-CU-MC-
17 GOVERNMENT, CTL
18 Plaintiff,
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
19 v. OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER;
20 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; and DOES 1 DECLARATIONS OF STEVE PEACE
through 100 et al. AND CORY J. BRIGGS; SUPPORTING
21 EXHIBITS
Defendants.
22 Date: February 7, 2020
Time: 10:30 a.m.
23 Dept.: 64
Judge: John S. Meyer
24
Complaint Filed: March 21, 2019
25 Trial Date: February 21, 2020
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Opposition to Motion for Protective Order

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3
I. SUMMARY 4
4
5 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 5

6
III. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD 7
7
8 IV. DISCUSSION 8
9 A. No Case Law Supports Issuance of a
Protective Order in a Case Like This. 8
10
B. The City’s Declarations Establish No
11 Basis for a Protective Order. 9
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V. CONCLUSION 10
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2
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
Page(s)
3
Cases
4
5 GT, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984)

151 Cal.App.3d 748 8, 9
6
Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Superior Court
7 (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 888 8,9
8 Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261 7
9
People v. Superior Court
10 (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 276 7
11
12 Code of Civil Procedure
13 Section 2025.420, subdivisions (a) and (b) 7
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1 Plaintiff, SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT (“SDOG”), submits this
2 memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion for protective order
3 filed by Defendant, the CITY OF SAN DIEGO (the “City”):
4 I.
5 SUMMARY
6 The City filed the present motion ostensibly seeking to preclude SDOG and its
7 counsel, Cory J. Briggs (“Briggs”), from using the deposition testimony of two City
8 employees, Gerard Braun (“Braun”) and William Gersten (“Gersten”), “for any purpose
9 other than in connection with this lawsuit.” (Motion, p. 1:22.) The City represents that
10 it is bringing this motion “out of an abundance of caution to prevent the misuse of pretrial
11 deposition testimony and, more importantly, to protect its employees from any
12 unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression by being involuntarily
13 interjected into the political fray merely due to their City employment.” (Motion, pp. 1:25-
14 2:1. See also id. at p. 5:4-5 [representing that “the City brings this motion to prevent the
15 potential misuse of pretrial discovery and to protect its employees from being unwittingly
16 drawn into the political arena”]; id. at p. 5:14-16 [representing that the motion “seeks
17 nothing more than to protect unelected City employees from being used as political
18 pawns . . .”].)
19 SDOG responds that the City’s motion is unwarranted, unsubstantiated, and
20 unjustified. It is unwarranted because there is nothing in the history of this case—or in

21 the history of Briggs’s conduct before this Court (in this case or in others before it)—to
22 suggest that SDOG or Briggs would ever use information obtained in discovery for any
23 improper purpose (whether professional, personal, or political), and the City points to no
24 such “bad conduct” in support of its motion. It is unsubstantiated because there is
25 nothing in the City’s moving papers or the accompanying declarations that identifies any
26 sensitive information disclosed during discovery that even might be improperly utilized
27 by SDOG or Briggs. And it is unjustified because there is nothing in the statutes or the
28 case law cited by the City that supports the issuance of a preemptive protective order in
4
1 an otherwise routine case like this one (that just happens to include an attorney who is
2 running for public office against his legal adversary), the City Attorney, Mara Elliott
3 (“Elliott”).
4 SDOG’s discussion, below, exposes the City’s motion for the cynical “hit-job” it
5 is, attempting to poison this Court’s view of the merits of this case. SDOG also exposes
6 the irony of the City falsely accusing SDOG and Briggs of attempting to draw City
7 employees “into the political arena”—and castigating SDOG and Briggs for their
8 supposed willingness to “parlay” City employees into “political rhetoric” (Motion, p. 5:4-
9 7)—when the transparent goal of the City’s motion is precisely to draw this Court into
10 the political arena in an effort to prompt some “headline” the City is hoping to obtain
11 (perhaps about the Court “admonishing” or “gagging” Briggs) for use by the City Attorney
12 as part of her own political rhetoric in her campaign for reelection. In sum, it is true that
13 Briggs has a long history of lawsuits against the City, and legal and personal conflicts
14 with Elliott and her Chief of Staff (Braun), and it is true that Briggs has been (and intends
15 to remain) vocal in his criticisms of the City, the City Attorney, and the City Attorney’s
16 Chief of Staff in his campaign for office. But there is no overlap between that campaign
17 and this lawsuit—except arguably one document, already in the public domain—and no
18 justification in the facts, in the law, or in public policy to issue at this time what would, in
19 essence, be a preemptive “gag order”—a constitutionally disfavored “prior restraint”—
20 against SDOG and Briggs in an attempt to protect information the City has not shown
21 to be private or prejudicial in any way.
22 II.
23 STATEMENT OF FACTS
24 The only facts truly relevant to this motion are that SDOG, through its attorney
25 (Briggs), filed the present lawsuit against the City; that, in the course of this lawsuit,
26 SDOG has taken the deposition of both Braun and Gersten; that trial in the case is
27 presently set for February 21, 2020; and that the City has not presented any compelling
28 evidence to suggest that discovery revealed anything of a confidential or privileged

5
1 nature with respect to Braun or Gersten, or that Briggs has any intention of using any
2 such discovery for any purpose other than as would be proper in the context of this
3 lawsuit. (See Declaration (“Dec.”) of Briggs (“Briggs Dec.”), ¶ 3.) On the basis of those
4 facts alone, the City’s present motion for a protective order should be denied.
5 Still, the City’s motion—under the patently false heading “Relevant Facts and
6 Background”—indulges in a three-page digression, reciting that Briggs has declared
7 himself a candidate for the City Attorney position and then recounting a one-sided
8 history of the conflicts between Briggs and Braun (asserting, for instance, that Briggs
9 characterized Braun as a “kneecap breaker,” that Briggs vilified Braun as someone
10 engaged in a cover-up of child abuse, and that Briggs accused Braun of being a “leaker”
11 of confidential information). (Motion, pp. 2:16-3:20.) From those already misleading
12 and one-sided anecdotes, the City jumps to the conclusion that there is some credible
13 and imminent risk that Briggs will misuse the discovery obtained in this case in a public
14 forum—something Briggs has never done before—and will use Braun or Gersten as
15 “political pawns” to “heap unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression”
16 upon them. (See Motion, p. 5:13-16. See also id. at p. 8:14-17 [accusing Briggs, without
17 reference to any specific misconduct, of having “demonstrated a willingness to
18 recklessly interject [Braun] and other city employees into his campaign rhetoric”].)
19 The suggestion is insulting, and the facts alleged in the declarations of Gersten
20 and Deputy City Attorney David Karlin (“Karlin”) reveal nothing—no sensitive
21 information, and no credible concern about improper disclosure—to warrant the
22 protective order the City seeks. But now, SDOG is compelled to include with this
23 opposition an extensive declaration from Briggs (and a corroborating declaration from
24 percipient witness, Steve Peace) to tell a more complete and more accurate story of the
25 disputes between the parties, and to substantiate the ultimate points that any conflict
26 between Briggs and the City Attorney’s office generally, and Braun in particular, pre-
27 date this lawsuit by many years; and that Briggs has not been the protagonist in his
28 conflicts with Braun, but rather has been the victim of a protracted—and baseless—
6
1 smear campaign by Braun (against Briggs himself, against his clients, and, most
2 offensively, against his wife). In sum, Briggs never has, and never will, abuse the
3 discovery process, and the City’s transparent attempt to embroil this Court in the politics
4 of the parties’ relationship—while pretending to point that finger at SDOG and Briggs—
5 must be rejected.
6 III.
7 THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
8 The City cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivisions (a) and
9 (b), for the threshold authority that permits a trial court to issue a protective order with
10 respect to deposition testimony. (Motion, pp. 4:12-5:16.)
11 SDOG acknowledges the statute, which provides that, “[b]efore, during, or after
12 a deposition, any party . . . may promptly move for a protective order,” and that, “for
13 good cause shown,” the court “may make any order that justice requires to protect any
14 party [or] deponent . . . from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.”
15 (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420.) What the City neglects, however, is the heavy burden
16 on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause, and that the trial court
17 must balance the various interests—including the private or public nature of the
18 information and the opposing party’s First Amendment rights—in deciding whether
19 dissemination of any given information should be preemptively restricted. (Nativi v.
20 Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318 [where the Court of
21 Appeal reversed a trial court order granting a protective order because the motion for
22 such protective order—like the City’s motion here—“was entirely conclusory and lacked
23 any factual specificity”]. See also People v. Superior Court (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 276,
24 281-282 [ruling that a declaration containing mere conclusions—like the declarations of
25 Karlin and Gersten here—was not sufficient to establish good cause].)
26 SDOG explains next that, in this case, the City’s motion and its two conclusory
27 declarations hardly satisfy the high burden necessary to support its request.
28
7
1 IV.
2 DISCUSSION
3 A. No Case Law Supports Issuance of a Protective Order in a Case Like This.
4 The City’s motion makes perfunctory reference to two cases where trial courts
5 have issued protective orders to prevent pre-trial disclosure of information gathered
6 during discovery. (Motion, at pp. 4-5, citing GT, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 151
7 Cal.App.3d 748 (“GT”), and Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Superior Court (1985) 170
8 Cal.App.3d 888 (“Coalition”).) Those cases, however, involve extreme circums-tances
9 that bear no relationship to the vague, benign, and largely unsubstantiated facts of this
10 case.
11 To explain, GT involved two newspaper publishers in litigation over the issue of
12 predatory pricing for their advertisements, with one party seeking “each financial
13 statement, profit and loss statement, balance sheet, financial projection document, and
14 general ledgers for the past five years. (151 Cal.App.3d at p. 751.) The trial court issued
15 a protective order that prevented one party’s attorney from showing that financial
16 information to his client. (Ibid.) With proprietary financial information at stake, the Court
17 of Appeal affirmed, explaining that, otherwise, it “would invite misuse of antitrust
18 proceedings to obtain information about competitors or other legal proceedings to obtain
19 trade secrets or other confidential information.” (Id. at p. 755.) In less extreme
20 situations, the Court of Appeal directed reference to the “good cause standard,” which
21 “enables trial courts to distinguish between proper use of discovery and misuse of
22 discovery,” and “to treat each in the appropriate manner.” (Ibid.)
23 The circumstances in Coalition were also extreme. That case involved a group
24 of individuals and organizations who challenged the Los Angeles Police Department’s
25 use of undercover officers. Pursuant to a protective order, the LAPD turned over about
26 300,000 pages of highly confidential documents relating to police procedures and, at

27 the end of the case, the LAPD wanted its documents back. The trial court ordered the
28 documents be returned, and the Court of Appeal affirmed (with a small modification),
8
1 rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims that they needed to retain the documents to monitor future
2 compliance with the consent decree in the case, to pursue ongoing investigations, to
3 release to news media, to use in other litigation, and to participate in continuing public
4 debate on the issue of police spying. (Id. at p. 899.) The Court of Appeal expressly
5 ordered that the plaintiffs “be permitted to retain a copy, and to disclose and
6 disseminate, all documents . . . which were disclosed or disseminated to the public
7 before the date of [the petition for writ of mandate].”
8 Here, unlike the highly confidential and proprietary nature of the documents at
9 state in bot GT, and unlike the highly sensitive and expansive nature of the documents
10 in Coalition, the City makes no credible presentation that there are any confidential,
11 proprietary, or sensitive documents involved in this case. And the only document from
12 this lawsuit that happens to be relevant to Briggs’s campaign is a document that is not
13 privileged and has long been in the public domain. (See Briggs Dec., ¶¶ 9-12.) In sum,
14 this case is simply nothing like GT or Coalition, meaning the City has not established
15 good cause and its request should thus be denied.
16 In sum, the burden is properly and sensibly very high to obtain a prior restraint,
17 pretrial protective order on disclosure of discovery documents, and the City has not
18 come close to satisfying that burden here.
19 B. The City’s Declarations Establish No Basis for a Protective Order.
20 The City’s motion is supported by only two superficial declarations that reveal
21 nothing but public information and personal aspersions that do not support the City’s
22 alleged “concerns.”
23 First, the declaration of Gersten alleges only that his deposition was taken on
24 October 24, 2019, that he anticipated he would be asked at that deposition about one
25 line of inquiry (having to do with the City’s response to a particular Public Records Act
26 request), that Briggs spent the “vast majority of the deposition” asking about his
27 motivations for “seeking to amend the [Public Records Act]” (as if that substantiated the
28 City’s supposed concerns about embarrassing information), and that Briggs otherwise
9
1 asked what he deemed to be “argumentative” questions, “designed,” Gersten declares,
2 “not to elicit admissible evidence on that issue,” but to “bolster [his] campaign for City
3 Attorney.” (Gersten Dec., ¶¶ 3 and 4.)
4 Second, the declaration from Karlin is equally benign (though it attaches a stack
5 of inconsequential documents that are never put into context and, in any event, do not
6 bolster the City’s motion). All Karlin adds is that Briggs has indicated an intention to run
7 for City Attorney, that Briggs has written certain articles and op-ed pieces critical of the
8 City Attorney’s office, that Briggs has filed various legal actions against the City, that
9 Briggs has testified on certain matters before the City Council, that Briggs has been the
10 subject of certain news articles, that Briggs has made Public Records Act requests to
11 the City, that Briggs took the depositions of both Braun and Gersten, that Briggs declined
12 to stipulate how he would use that discovery, and that part of Briggs’s political campaign
13 is a promise that, if elected City Attorney, the public “won’t see the Office fraught with
14 conflicts of interests” or “deputies ordered to fabricate criminal charges against political
15 opponents.” (Karlin Dec. ¶¶ 1-16.) As with Gersten, Karlin makes no reference to
16 confidential information elicited at his deposition.
17 In sum, nothing in those declarations—or in the exhibits attached to Karlin’s
18 declaration—even speaks to the only two questions that matter on a motion like the
19 City’s—whether confidential or sensitive information is truly at stake, and whether there
20 is a credible risk that, without a protective order, that information will be misused. The
21 answer to both of those questions is no, and the City’s motion must therefore be denied
22 for failure to even mention facts suggesting, let along establishing, good cause.
23 V.
24 CONCLUSION
25 A trial court has a right in very narrow circumstances to issue a pretrial protective
26 order to restrain one from misusing private information obtained during discovery. But
27 the City has not come close to establishing the good cause necessary to support such
28 an order in this case. There is no confidential information at stake, and there is no

10
1 credible suggestion that SDOG or Briggs intend to misuse any of the information
2 disclosed in discovery. Indeed, SDOG and Briggs submit, the only reason the City filed
3 this motion was to try to grab a headline from this Court with respect to issues that are
4 far beyond the purview of this case. Those efforts should be denied.
5 For those and all the reasons stated, SDOG respectfully submits that the City’s
6 motion seeking a protective order must be denied.
8 Dated: January 27, 2020 HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK LLP
10 By: ____________________________
JOHN MORRIS, ESQ.
11 Attorneys for Plaintiff,
SAN DIEGANS FOR
12 OPEN GOVERNMENT
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DECLARATION OF STEVE PEACE
1 DECLARATION OF STEVE PEACE
3 I, STEVE PEACE, declare as follows:
5 A. Introduction and Summary.
6 1. I, Steve Peace, am over the age of eighteen. I have personal knowledge
7 of the matters stated in this declaration, and would competently testify to such
8 matters if called as a witness.
9 2. I provide this declaration to corroborate the fact of Bill Evans’s apology
10 to Cory Briggs regarding the efforts by the City, and by Evans and others, to smear
11 Briggs’s reputation, presumably in retaliation for Briggs’s legal challenge to City
12 and City-supported projects.
13
14 B. Evans Apologizes to Briggs
15 3. I was one of the representatives of John Moores when he was working
16 with John Kratzer of JMI Realty, Richard Lawrence and Pedro Quiroz Jr. of San
17 Diegans for Open Government, and Donna Frye on what would come to be known
18 on the November 2016 ballot in the City of San Diego as Measure D, the “Citizens’
19 Plan” for reforming the City’s tourism-related finances and related matters. Mr.
20 Lawrence, Mr. Quiroz, and Mrs. Frye were represented in the negotiations by
21 attorney Cory Briggs.
22 4. In late 2015, Bill Evans (accompanied by his hotel’s corporate lawyer)
23 represented the San Diego Tourism Marketing District (“TMD”) in negotiations over
24 the language to be included in Measure D when it was finally circulated for voter
25 signatures. During the final face-to-face negotiation session, which ran late into the
26 evening, Mr. Evans and the rest of us decided to go to a nearby Mexican restaurant
27 because we still had a couple more hours of work to do but were famished. While
28 1
Declaration of Steve Peace in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order

1 we ate and worked to refine some of the points discussed earlier in the day, Mr.
2 Evans brought up a different subject. Sitting a couple people away from Mr. Briggs,
3 Mr. Evans said that he had heard many of the stories that Inewsource had been
4 running about Mr. Briggs but had come to realize, from the multiple negotiating
5 sessions, that Mr. Briggs was nothing at all like the person described in those
6 stories.
7 5. Mr. Evans admitted that the TMD was actively working with Mr. Braun
8 and the City Attorney’s Office to smear Briggs’s good name by giving Inewsource
9 information obtained through discovery. Mr. Evans then got up from his seat,
10 walked over to Mr. Briggs, extended his hand to shake Mr. Briggs’s hand, and said:
11 “I realize now that it was wrong for us to go after you and even more wrong to go
12 after your wife. You are an honest, decent person, and I am very sorry for what
13 we’ve put you through.”
14 6. Mr. Briggs shook Mr. Evans’s hand but was visibly shaken and started to
15 cry. Mr. Briggs then went to the restroom, presumably to regain his composure.
16 When he returned and I asked him whether he was okay, he said that he needed to
17 go write down what Mr. Evans had said because he (Briggs) would never be able to
18 tell his wife without breaking down, and then he patted his shirt pocket, which had a
19 folded piece of paper in it that was not present when he left the table. Everyone
20 then got back into talking about Measure D.
21
22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
23 the foregoing is true and correct.
24
Dated: January 27, 2020 _______________________
25
Steve Peace
26
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28 2
Declaration of Steve Peace in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order

DECLARATION OF CORY J. BRIGGS, ESQ.
1 DECLARATION OF CORY J. BRIGGS, ESQ.
2 I, CORY J. BRIGGS, declare as follows:
3 A. Introduction and Summary.
4 1. I am the sole shareholder of Briggs Law Corporation, the law firm that
5 represents Plaintiff and Petitioner San Diegans for Open Government ("SDOG") in
6 this lawsuit. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration, and
7 could competently testify to such facts if called as a witness.
8 2. I submit this declaration in support of SDOG's opposition to the City's
9 motion seeking a protective order to gag and restrain me from some supposed risk
10 that I might misuse deposition testimony obtained in this case from either Gerry
11 Braun ("Braun"), the non-lawyer Chief of Staff to City Attorney Mara Elliott ("Elliott"),
12 or attorney William Gersten ("Gersten"), in an effort to "annoy," "embarrass," or
13 "oppress" them by "involuntarily interjecting [them] into the political fray merely due
14 to their City employment." (See City Motion, p.i:25-2:1.)
15 3. In short, this declaration substantiates that I have done nothing (in this
16 case or ever) to raise a legitimate concern that I would ever misuse information
17 obtained by way of discovery (in this case or any other); to confirm that, indeed, I am
18 a candidate for the City Attorney's job with legitimate criticisms on which I intend to
19 campaign regarding how the City Attorney's Office is being mis-managed by Elliott
20 and Braun, but that there is no correlation between my campaign for City Attorney
21 and my client's discovery efforts in this case; and to explain that, far from me being
22 the protagonist in a long-running dispute with Braun, I (and my clients and my family)
23 have been victimized by Braun (and others associated with the City) for years, with
24 misguided efforts to paint me falsely as unethical, unscrupulous, and dishonorable,
25 and even to attempt to have me disbarred.
26 Ill
27 Ill
28
Declaration Cory J. Briggs in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order

1 B. My Candidacy for City Attorney.
2 4. In the Spring of 2019, I decided to run for the non-partisan position of
3 San Diego City Attorney against the incumbent, Elliott. I did so primarily for two
4 reasons: first, I was asked to do so by a number of women who supported Elliott
5 when she ran in 2016 but had come to believe, based on their interactions with and
6 observations of her in Office, that she was dishonest, incapable, and political rather
7 than honest, competent, and lawyerly; and second, because I had personally
8 observed, based on years of litigating against the City of San Diego, that the Office
9 has become plagued by a variety of abuses of power orchestrated by Braun, once a
10 columnist at the Union-Tribune and later an advisor to San Diego Mayor Jerry
11 Sanders.
12 5. Braun handled press relations for Elliott's predecessor, and I had hoped
13 that she would see fit to sanitize the Office. Instead she elevated Braun to the
14 position of "Chief of Staff." Because of my first-hand observations and dealings with
15 Braun - which predate the filing of this lawsuit - I was willing to answer the call of
16 the women who wanted me to run against. Elliott. The things I've learned about him
17 since the filing of this lawsuit, combined with the very transparently political nature of
18 this motion, only confirm that I made the right choice.
19 C. The City's Unfounded Attack on My Ethics.
20 6. Before describing Braun's history of wrongdoing against the public,
21 want to respond to one of the suggestions in the moving papers. Although the City
22 concedes that I have done nothing inappropriate at this time, it expresses a concern
23 that I might do something inappropriate and therefore should have my First
24 Amendment rights curtailed.
25 7. Let me be clear: I have never, and would never, abuse the discovery
26 process - not for personal gain, not for political gain, not even for my client's benefit.
27
28 2

1 As this Court knows from years of experience, I vigorously represent my clients
2 within the bounds of the law.
3 8. In my view, the real purpose of this motion is to suck the Court into a
4 political campaign and obtain some sort of damaging statement in a ruling that can
5 then be pasted into a campaign ad. I trust that the Court will see through Elliott's
6 misuse of her Office - and taxpayer resources - by bringing this motion. I freely
7 acknowledge that Braun's role in the City Attorney's Office is bad for the public, and
8 seeing integrity, confidence, and transparency restored to that Office is a substantial
9 motivating factor in my running to lead the Office. I also believe, as I have for years,
10 that the public needs to know the full extent of Braun's illegal conduct and other
11 wrongdoing.
12 D. The Single Document of Interest from this Lawsuit Is Already in the Public
13 Domain.
14 9. All but one of the public records that Elliott's office withheld have now
15 been turned over. There is one remaining document, an e-mail communication, that
16 the City is claiming to be subject to the attorney work-product privilege even though
17 it was knowingly and voluntarily given by Gersten to Braun so that Braun could
18 submit it to the California Legislature in support of Senate Bill ("SB") 615. Braun
19 knowingly and voluntarily sent the e-mail communication to the California Legislature
20 containing information about Elliott's reasons for attempting to amend the California
21 Public Records Act ("CPRA") last year to make it harder for members of the public to
22 retain attorneys to prosecute CPRA lawsuits against stonewalling public agencies.
23 10. I came into possession of the e-mail after this lawsuit was filed, when the
24 Legislature responded to a subpoena that my office had issued for communications
25 between the Legislature and the City Attorney's Office concerning SB 615. To my
26 mind, the e-mail confirms that the Office is used by its leadership to go after people
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1 (like me) whom the leadership believes to be political opponents, rather than being
2 used to advance the City's legitimate legal interests.!
3 11. Only after I sent a copy of the Legislature's production to the City as part
4 of an admission request for authentication did the City inform me that it wanted to
5 claw back the e-mail communication. In the course of further discovery, I learned
6 that the City never sent anything in writing to the Legislature to claw back the e-mail
7 communication and in fact knew before sending it to the Legislature that it would be
8 included in the legislative history for SB 615 (that is, had the public outcry over
9 Elliott's attempt to neuter the CPRA not pushed the Legislature to withdraw the
10 proposal).
11 12. During depositions in this case, I learned that nobody outside the City
12 Attorney's Office had asked anyone in the Office to draft the proposed legislation
13 and that it was the sua sponte brainchild of Gersten. Simply put, there is nothing
14 about the e-mail communication that constitutes attorney "work product"; and even if
15 it did, that protection was voluntarily waived when the drafter of SB 615 knowingly
16 and voluntarily forwarded the e-mail communication in question to Braun for the
17 express purpose of forwarding it to the Legislature. (Attached hereto as Exhibits 1,
18 2, and 3 are true and correct copies of the deposition transcripts (sans exhibits) of
19 Aaron Brieno (the staffer in the Legislature who received the e-mail communication},
20 Braun, and Gersten, each obtained from the court reporters in the ordinary course of
21 business. A review of those transcripts confirms that there is nothing in any of them
22 that is inflammatory, or that could annoy, embarrass, or oppress Braun or Gersten if
23 it was disclosed publicly outside of this lawsuit, though I have no intention of doing
24 that.)
25
26 1 The Office is staffed by many talented, hard-working, dedicated
professionals with whom I regularly interact on my cases against the City. My
27 concerns are with the Office's leadership, not with the people who do the real legal
work on a day-to-day basis.
28 4

1 E. My Long-Standing Conflict with Braun.
2 13. Wher. Braun worked for Mayor Sanders, it was frequently my
3 impression that Braun was hired to carry out political operations (more than as
4 someone responsible for carrying out executive functions in furtherance of the
5 Mayor's executive responsibilities).
6 14. My first close-up confirmation of my observation was during 2012 and
7 2013 when he was given a no-bid, $15,000-per-month contract (for a grand total
8 exceeding $144,000) to work on the Balboa Park centennial committee. Under his
9 leadership, the committee ended up losing millions of taxpayer dollars - the City
10 Auditor concluded that he "Did Not Follow Procurement Process" and "Inconsistently
11 Adhered to Funding Agreement" - and the centennial celebration had to be
12 canceled. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the City
13 Auditor's report, obtained from the City in the ordinary course of business.) To the
14 dismay of many Balboa Park preservationists and taxpayers, Braun was not
15 prosecuted for his malfeasance. Instead, just days after the City Auditor's report
16 was released, Braun was hired as the Communications Director for the City
17 Attorney's Office.
18 15. Even before Braun was hired by the City Attorney's Office, I was
19 regarded as "something of a thorn in the city's side" and did not have the smoothest
20 relationship with then-City Attorney Jan Goldsmith ("Goldsmith") - to the point that
21 one political-pundit organization called a complimentary exchange between
22 Goldsmith and me as "an Unlikely Goldsmith-Briggs Bromance."~ <Attached hereto
23 as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the organization's article.) However,
24 shortly after Braun started working in the City Attorney's Office, I was alerted to a
25 coming storm.
26
~ Toward the end of his tenure, Goldsmith and I had some frank
27 conversations about our relationship over the years and came to have a better
understanding of each other.
28 5

1 16. In the very early days of January 2015, I was informed by an employee
2 in the City Attorney's Office that Braun was working with one of his former
3 colleagues (Lorie Hearn) at a news organization called "lnewsource," which is
4 embedded in the taxpayer-subsidized studios of KPBS, and was providing his former
5 colleague and her staff with information obtained about my wife and me during a
6 confidential deposition that, per court order, was conducted under seal. I was
7 informed that "Braun's marching orders are to make sure your law license is
8 revoked," which included working with his former colleague and trying to gin up a
9 criminal prosecution against me for filing false public records.
10 17. Later that month, lnewsource reporter Brad Racine ("Racine") came to
11 my office under the auspices of asking me questions about one of my client's
12 settlements with the Port of San Diego, but shortly after the interview began he
13 pivoted to questions about my "business dealings" - at one point making that
14 preposterous accusation that I was being paid millions of dollars by two men who
15 sold landscape materials in Chino, California, to get former Democratic Mayor Bob
16 Filner removed from office. The reporter's supposed "smoking gun" was a lien that
17 my firm had recorded against the homes of the businessmen (after complying with
18 the Rules of Professional Conduct for doing so) because they could not afford the
19 retainer and their insurance company was acting in bad faith by denying their claim
20 for coverage.
21 18. What confirmed that the tip I received about Braun was correct came
22 when Racine, as he was leaving my office because I would not answer his questions
23 (and could not without revealing client confidences), told me that he knew my wife
24 was my firm's vice-president going back many years, including the time she worked
25 for an environmental consultant to the City on a matter one of my clients
26 subsequently sued over and settled, and that if I refused to answer his questions he
27
28 6

1 would write a series of reports about my wife's conflicts of interest.~ Because my
2 wife's role as vice-president had only been disclosed during the deposition under
3 seal - it wasn't even on my law corporation's annual report to the State Bar because
4 the form does not ask for that information - the only way Racine would have known
5 about her role was someone leaking information from her confidential deposition.
6 19. Shortly after the first story ran, the City Attorney's Office made an
7 emergency application to Judge Wohlfeil to unseal my wife's deposition transcript
8 because of the alleged media interest in alleged conflicts of interest that my firm had
9 in cases against the City; not surprisingly, only lnewsource was interested. The
10 transcript was officially unsealed by Judge Wohlfeil after my wife (represented by

11 attorney Marco Gonzalez) voluntarily released the signed, corrected transcript
12 showing that she had not been my wife for the many years that Racine had believed;
13 the uncorrected version contained a typo from the court reporter erroneously
14 suggesting that my wife had been my vice-president for 20 years (longer than I'd
15 even known her, including years before she became my wife).
16 F. The lnewsource Disinformation Campaign Against Me.
17 20. Over the next several months, lnewsource ran a series of attacks
18 against my clients, my family, and me- somewhere around three dozen "stories," as
19 I recall. Some of them erroneously accused my wife and me of filing false public
20 records, such as property deeds in which we called ourselves "husband and wife"
21 even though there was no record of us being married.
22
23
~ Racine had been provided incomplete information. My wife did not
24 become my firm's vice-president until years after she stopped working for the
environmental consultant. My relationship with her was disclosed to the City during
25 the litigation that was eventually settled (in an abundance of caution), fully and
independently investigated by the City Attorney's Office to make sure there was no
26 impropriety affecting the settlement (there was not), and then covered by the
ordinary and customary waives and releases in the settlement agreement made long
27 after she had stopped working for the consultant.
28 7

1 21. Racine and the so-called "experts" he consulted were apparently
2 unaware of Family Code Section 500, which at the relevant time authorized people
3 living together "as husband and wife" to get a confidential marriage license,! and the
4 California Department of Public Health's ("CDPH") website at the time, indicating
5 that people seeking a confidential marriage license would have to attest to their
6 relationship under penalty of perjury. If my wife and I were going to have to attest to
7 living together as husband and wife when we applied for our confidential marriage
8 license, it obviously was not illegal in any way, shape, or form to state before
9 marriage in the land deed transferring our residence to our living trust that we were
10 "husband and wife." To my knowledge, lnewsource still has never corrected its
11 reporting on this. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of Family
12 Code Section 500 as it existed prior to 2015; and attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a
13 true and correct copy of the CDPH website on confidential marriage prior to 2015
14 obtained from www. archive. org.)
15 22. In another attempt to demonstrate some sort of criminal wrongdoing,
16 lnewsource falsely accused my wife and me of committing mortgage fraud because
17 we executed a deed of trust containing a covenant to make the collateral property
18 our principal residence; according to the story containing the false accusation and
19 the so-called "experts" cited therein, the fraud that my wife and I were falsely
20 accused of committing was akin to the rampant real-estate fraud that caused the
21 Great Recession.
22 Ill
23 Ill
24
25 ! Prior to January 1, 2015, Family Code section 500 provided as follows:
"When an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, not minors, have been living
26 together as husband and wife, they may be married pursuant to this chapter by a
person authorized to solemnize a marriage under Chapter 1 (commencing with
27 Section 400) of Part 3, without the necessity of first obtaining health certificates."
28 8

1 23. It turns out, however, that lnewsource's board chair (Karin Winner) and
2 Executive Director (Mrs. Hearn) jointly owned a condominium in North Park that was
3 secured by a deed of trust containing a covenant substantively identical to the one in
4 the trust deed executed by my wife and me. Significantly, the chair and executive
5 director each owned separate residences elsewhere in the City that were receiving
6 property-tax exemptions for homeowners. Both before and after executing the trust
7 deed for the jointly-owned condo, the two women must have filed annual
8 homeowners' exemptions for those properties under penalty of perjury with the
9 county tax collector; that's how the exemption is obtained.! (Attached hereto as
10 Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of their trust deed of the North Park condo,
11 obtained from the San Diego County Recorder's Office. Attached hereto as
12 Exhibits 9 and 10 are true and correct copies of the county's records showing that
13 Mrs. Hearn and Mrs. Winner, respectively, received the homeowners' exemptions for
14 their primary residence, not the North Park condo, while their own principal-
15 residence covenant for their North Park condo was in effect.)
16 24. Even worse, nobody at lnewsource ever asked my wife or me whether
17 we ever obtained the bank's consent to have a principal residence different from the
18 collateral or had other extenuating circumstances. The applicable covenant required
19 principal residency unless (with my emphasis) the lender consented otherwise or
20 extenuating circumstances existed: "Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish,
21 and use the Property as Borrower's principal residence within 60 days after the
22 execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as
23 Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy,
24 unless Lender otherwise agrees in writing, which consent shall not be
25
26
.§. I never saw and am not aware of any reporting by lnewsource about
27 how Mrs. Hearn and Mrs. Winner were violating their primary-residence covenant.
28 9

1 unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are
2 beyond Borrower's control."
3 G. The Coordinated Campaign - by Braun and Others -to Smear Me.

4 25. By this time, more than one person in the City Attorney's Office was
5 telling me that Braun was continuing to look for some sort of criminal or unethical
6 conduct on my part to prosecute and/or report to the State Bar. Their warnings were
7 confirmed again when I received a letter from Lead Deputy City Attorney Joe
8 Cordileone containing a thinly veiled threat against me because my signature does

9 not always look the same on my declarations.
10 26. Those warnings were confirmed once more in January of 2017, when I
11 learned that, according to a Superior Court complaint by a former career prosecutor
12 in the City Attorney's Office, Braun told her that Goldsmith "wants you to get your
13 hands dirty. If you would just get your hands dirty, they would let you in the room."
14 The complaint went on to state that the former prosecutor "refused, as Rule 5-110
15 required her to do, Goldsmith's demand to file criminal charges against a political
16 rival, Cory Briggs, she believed there was an absence of any evidence Briggs had
17 committed a crime." (Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of
18 Cordileone's letter. Attached hereto as Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of the
19 complaint.)
20 27. During the period in 2015 when lnewsource was writing all the stories
21 about me, I compared its list of donors right after the stories started to the list before
22 the stories started. One of the two new names on the list of donors in the $5,000-
23 plus range was Anne Evans, the matriarch of the Evans family hotel dynasty in San
24 Diego; members of that family are big donors to candidates for public office,
25 including Elliott.§. What I later discovered is that a publicly subsidized non-profit run
26
§. Unlike Elliott, I am not accepting campaign donations from lobbyists or
27 anyone doing business with the City.
28 10

1 by Mr. Evans was working with the City Attorney's Office to concoct a basis for
2 prosecuting me or having me disbarred, to the point that the non-profit itself was
3 budgeting money to prosecute me at the State Bar.
4 28. Back when lnewsource was running its false stories, I was also deeply
5 involved in a lawsuit challenging the City's so-called Tourism Marketing District
6 ("TMD") "self-assessment," in which SDOG was claiming that the "self-assessment''
7 was actually a tax in disguise and was invalid because it had not been approved by
8 the voters.Z Since its creation, the TMD has been a publicly financed private
9 corporation controlled and managed by hoteliers, including Mr. Evans; during the
10 pendency of the lawsuit, he was the board chair or filled other director-level positions
11 with the TMD.
12 29. Because the TMD tax raised about $25-30 million per year back when
13 the lawsuit was pending, the hotel industry had a lot on the line. TMD therefore
14 hired attorney Michael Colantuono ("Colantuono"), who eventually was appointed to
15 the governing board of the State Bar. While that lawsuit was pending, Colantuono
16 repeatedly threatened to have me disbarred (despite the ethical prohibition against
17 such threats and the obvious impropriety of a governing board member throwing his
18 weight around) if my client did not capitulate to various demands along the way.
19 Colantuono conducted extensive discovery on many of the same issues raised in the
20 lnewsource reporting. TMD's strategy in the lawsuit was to (ab)use the discovery
21 process to prove that SDOG was a bogus non-profit corporation- specifically, was
22 my alter ego- and had no legitimate existence of purpose.
23 30. My wife's deposition was taken, under seal as described above, as part
24 of Colantuono's effort to prove that SDOG lacked standing to prosecute the lawsuit.
25 Eventually the trial was bifurcated, with the issue of standing tried first. After hearing
26
27 Z Judge Wohlfeil presided over the lawsuit, which is the one in which my
wife's deposition was taken under seal (for reasons to be explained shortly).
28 11

1 and reviewing more than a week of evidence, including accusations that parroted the
2 lnewsource reporting, Judge Wohlfeil concluded that there was no merit to any of
3 the claims against SDOG's standing, that I was not SDOG's alter ego, and that
4 SDOG could proceed to the merits of the case. Judge Wohlfeil concluded: "As is
5 clear from the trial evidence, Briggs is integrally involved in Plaintiff's activities and
6 the pursuit of its corporate purpose. Indeed, based on the witness testimony as well
7 as the letter issued by Mr. Quiroz, Lawrence and Ms. Quiroz (Exh. '160'), it is an
8 open question as to how much, if any, of its objectives Plaintiff could accomplish
9 without Briggs' 'abilities and convictions.' That acknowledged, there is no
10 persuasive reason, based on the totality of the evidence including the autonomy
11 exercised by and the credibility of Lawrence and Mr. Quiroz as Plaintiff's directors,
12 for the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs TAC [third amended complaint] is a 'sham' or
13 'ultra vires,' or that Plaintiff should be deprived of standing to pursue this lawsuit
14 because its alleged status as Briggs' alter ego." (Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 is a
15 true and correct copy of Judge Wohlfeil's ruling on the issue of standing.)
16 H. Evans's Late Apology for Participating in the Smear.
17 31. In late 2015, while waiting for Judge Wohlfeil to rule on the standing
18 issue, I was also working on a ballot measure that eventually came to be known as
19 Measure D - known as the "Citizens' Plan" for reforming the City's tourism-related
20 finances and related matters - on the November 2016 ballot. Two of SDOG's board
21 members were sponsors of Measure D, along with open-government advocate and
22 former City Councilmember Donna Frye. They teamed up with former Padres owner
23 John Moores and Petco Stadium builder John Kratzer to bring forward Measure D.
24 Mr. Evans (on behalf of the TMD and accompanied by one of his lawyers) engaged
25 in negotiations with me and a few other representatives of persons sponsoring
26 Measure D over the language to be included in Measure D when circulated for voter
27 signatures.
28 12

1 32. During the final face-to-face negotiation session, which ran late into the
2 evening, Mr. Evans, the other people in attendance {i.e., Mr. Kratzer, Pat Shea, and
3 Steve Peace), and I decided to take our conversation to a Mexican restaurant
4 because we still had a couple more hours of work to do but were famished. While
5 we ate and worked to refine some of the points discussed earlier in the day, Evans
6 brought up a different subject. Sitting a couple people away from me, he said that
7 he had heard many of the stories that lnewsource had been running but realized,
8 from our multiple negotiating sessions on Measure 0, that I was nothing at all like
9 the person described in those stories. He admitted that the TMD was actively
10 working with Braun and the City Attorney's Office to smear my good name by
11 sharing information obtained through discovery with lnewsource. And that's when
12 he got up, walked over to me, extended his hand to shake mine, and said: "I realize
13 now that it was wrong for us to go after you and even more wrong to go after your
14 wife. You are an honest, decent person, and I am very sorry for what we've put you
15 through." I shook his hand and started to cry. I then went to the restroom to regain
16 my composure and to write down what he had told me because I knew that I could
17 never repeat it to my wife without losing my composure; she'd have to read it
18 because I would be unable to speak it.
19 I. Confirmation of the Smear Campaign and My Growing Concern about
20 Braun
21 33. Eventually the TMD lawsuit was dismissed as moot because the City
22 and the TMD made changes that SDOG believed had turned the tax into a bona fide
23 self-assessment. In connection with SDOG's motion for attorney fees (under the
24 catalyst theory), I made a CPRA request to the TMD. Among the documents turned
25 over was a budget that included a line item for putting together supporting evidence
26 and a complaint against me to the State Bar, consistent with what Mr. Evans had
27 apologized for during our dinner described above.
28 13

1 34. Elliott was sworn into the City Attorney's Office on December 12, 2016.
2 Shortly after that, Braun was promoted to Chief of Staff overseeing everyone in the
3 City Attorney's Office other than Elliott. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 14 is a true and
4 correct copy of an internal organization chart for the City Attorney's Office dated
5 February 13, 2017, which I obtained from the City pursuant to the CPRA.)
6 35. I learned about Braun's promotion to Chief of Staff in January 2017 and
7 immediately questioned the propriety of a non-lawyer being in charge of every staff
8 member in the City Attorney's Office. I wasn't the only one raising questions about
9 it, however. VoiceofSanDiego.org published two articles about the problems
10 associated with Braun's role as Chief of Staff. (Attached hereto as Exhibits 15 and
11 16 are the two articles obtained from VoiceofSanDiego.org's website.)
12 36. Since Braun's promotion, I have spoken to multiple City employees

13 about his role. Many of them are concerned about the amount of responsibility that
14 Elliott has delegated to him on legal matters even though he does not have a license
15 to practice law, and at least one of those persons has confided to me about having
16 left the City Attorney's Office because of concerns over the wide berth that Elliott
17 gives Braun to make lawyer-level decisions. I do intend to make his inappropriate
18 leadership role a campaign issue because it demonstrates incredibly poor judgment
19 (if not unethical conduct) by Elliott, but I was aware of his role and her bad judgment
20 long before this lawsuit was filed. And as I indicated above, I would never use
21 information from a pending lawsuit for personal political gain.
22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
23 the foregoing is true and correct.
24
25
26
27
9475051.1
28 14

Exhibit 1
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
--o0o--
SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN

GOVERNMENT,
Plaintiff,
vs. No. 37-2019-00015139
CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________/
--o0o--
Videotaped Deposition of
AARON BRIENO
Friday, September 27, 2019
--o0o--
Reported by: Kayla Knowles, CSR License No. 14071

Deposition of AARON BRIENO SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT VS. CITY OF SAN DIEGO
1 A P P E A R A N C E S
3 For the Plaintiff:
4 BRIGGS LAW CORPORATION

By: CORY J. BRIGGS, Attorney at Law
5 99 East "C" Street, Suite 111
Upland, California 91786
6
7 For the Defendants:
8 OFFICE OF THE SAN DIEGO CITY ATTORNEY

By: DAVID J. KARLIN, Attorney at Law
9 1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1100
San Diego, California 92101
10
11 For the Witness:
12 OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

By: CARA L. JENKINS, Attorney at Law
13 1315 10th Street, Room 3021
Sacramento, California 95814
14
--o0o--
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16
17
18
19
20
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Golden State Reporting & Video Services (866) 324-4727 Page: 2

1 INDEX
2 WITNESS
3 AARON BRIENO
4 Volume I
5
EXAMINATION PAGE
6
EXAMINATION BY MR. BRIGGS 6
7
EXAMINATION BY MR. KARLIN 37
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1 EXHIBITS
4 (None marked.)
10
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1 BE IT REMEMBERED, that on Friday, the 27th day of
2 September, 2019, commencing at the hour of 10:02 a.m.
3 thereof, at 601 University Avenue, Suite 135, Sacramento,
4 California, before me, Kayla Knowles, a Certified Shorthand
5 Reporter, in and for the State of California, the following
6 proceedings were had:
10:02:25 7
10:02:26 8 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Hello. My name is Bob
10:02:27 9 Fennessy, and I'll be videotaping this deposition today.
10:02:30 10 I'm here on behalf of Golden State Reporting, 601
10:02:34 11 University Avenue, Suite 135, Sacramento. The date is
10:02:38 12 September 27, 2019. The time is 10:02. We are located at
10:02:45 13 601 University Avenue, Sacramento.
10:02:48 14 We're here in the matter of San Diegans for Open
10:02:52 15 Government vs. City of San Diego. This will be the
10:02:56 16 deposition of Aaron Brieno. The attorney taking the
10:03:00 17 deposition Cory Briggs. The court reporter is Kayla
10:03:04 18 Knowles from Golden State Reporting.
10:03:05 19 The attorneys will now introduce themselves.
10:03:09 20 MR. BRIGGS: Want to go first, Cara?
10:03:09 21 MS. JENKINS: Sure. I'm Cara Jenkins with the
10:03:13 22 Office of Legislative Counsel representing this California
10:03:14 23 State Senate.
10:03:17 24 MR. KARLIN: I don't have a microphone, but David
10:03:21 25 Karlin -- David Karlin on behalf of the City of San Diego.

10:03:24 1 MR. BRIGGS: And I'm Cory Briggs for the
10:03:26 2 plaintiff.
10:03:26 3 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The court reporter will now
10:03:34 4 swear in the witness.
10:03:34 5
10:03:34 6 AARON BRIENO,
10:03:34 7 called as a witness who, being by me first duly sworn, was
10:03:34 8 thereupon examined and interrogated as hereinafter set
10:03:35 9 forth.
10:03:35 10 EXAMINATION
10:03:35 11 BY MR. BRIGGS:
10:03:37 12 Q. Good morning. Would you please state and spell your
10:03:38 13 name for the record.
10:03:38 14 A. My name is Arthur Aaron Michael Brieno, A-r-t-h-u-r
10:03:47 15 A-a-r-o-n M-i-c-h-a-e-l, Brieno, B-r-i-e-n-o.
10:03:56 16 Q. Mr. Brieno, you commonly go by Aaron; is that right?
10:04:01 17 A. Yes, Aaron, typically.
10:04:03 18 Q. Okay. Good. Have you ever had your deposition
10:04:04 19 taken before?
10:04:04 20 A. No.
10:04:05 21 Q. You may have had a chance to talk to your lawyer to
10:04:09 22 prepare for today. I'd like to just go over a few
10:04:13 23 guidelines to help today go as quickly as possible. All
10:04:16 24 right?
10:04:16 25 A. Sure.

10:04:17 1 Q. I'm going to ask you a series of questions. You're
10:04:21 2 required to answer those questions truthfully. The court
10:04:23 3 reporter sitting to your right is taking down everything
10:04:26 4 that I've said, but she can only take down one person at a
10:04:29 5 time.
10:04:30 6 For that reason, it's important -- excuse me --
10:04:34 7 that you let me finish my questions. I will let you finish
10:04:38 8 your answer so that we have a clean transcript. At least
10:04:42 9 in the beginning until we get a feel for how you and I
10:04:45 10 converse, pause just a brief moment to see whether there's
10:04:50 11 an objection from either of the other lawyers here.
10:04:54 12 They're entitled to assert objections, but they have to do
10:04:57 13 so before you answer the question; so just give them a
10:05:00 14 chance to do that. Once they state the objection, you're
10:05:03 15 free to answer the question. They're simply doing that to
10:05:06 16 preserve it for a judge to decide later on.
10:05:09 17 There may be an occasion when your attorney
10:05:12 18 instructs you not to answer a question. I'll confirm that
10:05:15 19 you're going to take that instruction, and then we'll
10:05:19 20 proceed. If you don't answer a question, we may have to do
10:05:22 21 this again. A judge could order you to answer the question
10:05:25 22 later, pay attorneys' fees, things like that. We will deal
10:05:29 23 with it if that comes up, but do allow her to finish doing
10:05:34 24 her job before you proceed.
10:05:36 25 Even though you've -- you've taken an oath to

10:05:41 1 tell the truth just as if we were in a courtroom with a
10:05:43 2 judge and a jury, the -- the setting is somewhat informal
10:05:47 3 here in a conference room. If at some point you need to
10:05:50 4 take a break to get some fresh air, use the restroom, talk
10:05:53 5 to your lawyer, there's no problem at all doing that. Just
10:05:58 6 tell me you want to take a break. My only request is that
10:06:00 7 you finish the question on the table so that we have a
10:06:02 8 clean break in our transcript. Do you understand that?
10:06:05 9 A. Yes, I understand.
10:06:06 10 Q. Okay. Another thing that's really important -- and
10:06:08 11 you're doing great so far -- is that you give verbal
10:06:11 12 responses instead of mere nods of the head, shrugs of the
10:06:16 13 shoulder, rolls of the eyes, things like that. In informal
10:06:19 14 conversation we understand body language, but the court
10:06:21 15 reporter is not allowed to interpret body language.
10:06:24 16 If we fall into a pattern of doing that, I may
10:06:28 17 ask you a follow-up question such as, "Did you mean yes, or
10:06:32 18 did you mean no?" I'm not picking on you; I'm just trying
10:06:36 19 to make sure we have a clean verbal transcript for
10:06:40 20 posterity's sake. Do you understand that?
10:06:41 21 A. I understand.
10:06:42 22 Q. Okay. At times today, I may ask you a question that
10:06:46 23 requires an answer, and you don't know the precise answer,
10:06:49 24 but you know an approximate answer. I never want you to
10:06:52 25 guess. If you don't know something, it's fair to say "I

10:06:56 1 don't know." But if you have a rough idea or a pretty good
10:07:00 2 idea but it's not perfect, I'm entitled to your best
10:07:03 3 estimate.
10:07:04 4 The example I give to witnesses between a guess
10:07:07 5 and an estimate is that if I were to say, "How long is the
10:07:10 6 table we're sitting at," you'd look at it and say, "Well,
10:07:13 7 based on life experience, it's in the 10- to 12-foot
10:07:16 8 range." And if I asked how long my dining room table is,
10:07:20 9 you'd say, "I have to guess because I've never seen it."
10:07:23 10 Do you understand that?
10:07:23 11 A. I understand.
10:07:24 12 Q. Okay. Is there any reason you can't give your best
10:07:28 13 truthful testimony today?
10:07:29 14 A. No.
10:07:30 15 Q. Okay. Before the deposition began, I conferred with
10:07:34 16 your counsel. I have a check to present to you. It's
10:07:41 17 Check Number 2501 from my firm. It's paid to the Senate
10:07:44 18 Rules Committee because I understand that you are on the
10:07:47 19 clock for this deposition. It's for $40, which covers the
10:07:51 20 witness fee and should be more than enough to cover any
10:07:54 21 mileage. I'm going to give that to you. I assume you'll
10:07:58 22 get it to whoever the appropriate person is.
10:07:58 23 A. Yes, I will.
10:07:59 24 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.
10:08:03 25 Are you employed?

10:08:04 1 A. Yes.
10:08:04 2 Q. Where are you employed?
10:08:06 3 A. Currently, I'm employed for the California Senate.
10:08:10 4 Q. Okay. How long have you worked for the California
10:08:13 5 Senate?
10:08:14 6 A. I've worked for the California Senate since 2016,
10:08:19 7 technically. I want to say October 2016.
10:08:22 8 Q. Okay. Where did you work before that?
10:08:25 9 A. Previous to that, I was actually in the California
10:08:29 10 Senate, but I was technically an employee of the California
10:08:33 11 state university system. I was a senate fellow for Senator
10:08:33 12 Hueso --
10:08:33 13 Q. Okay.
10:08:39 14 A. -- through a joint program by the California Senate
10:08:42 15 in the CSU system.
10:08:45 16 Q. How long were you a senate fellow?
10:08:47 17 A. I was a senate fellow for approximately ten months
10:08:50 18 with Senator Hueso's office.
10:08:52 19 Q. Before you started working in the senate as a
10:08:55 20 fellow, where did you work?
10:08:56 21 A. I worked for a nonprofit organization called the
10:08:58 22 Church State Council. They were a legal firm that did
10:09:01 23 employment discrimination law, and I worked on a contract
10:09:09 24 basis with them.
10:09:10 25 Q. Okay. So is it fair to say that your work history

10:09:14 1 in the legislature begins when you are a senate fellow?
10:09:22 2 A. Technically, I was also an intern in the California
10:09:24 3 assembly during the summer of 2013 for Assembly Member
10:09:33 4 Henry T. Perea.
10:09:35 5 Q. Okay. Is that the sum and substance of your
10:09:38 6 legislative experience?
10:09:39 7 A. Yeah, it is.
10:09:39 8 Q. Okay. And you were currently, as a senate employee,
10:09:44 9 assigned to Senator Hueso's office?
10:09:46 10 A. Yeah, currently I'm his legislative director in his
10:09:51 11 office.
10:09:51 12 Q. Have you been with Senator Hueso the entire time
10:09:55 13 since October 2016?
10:09:56 14 A. I have.
10:09:56 15 Q. Okay. Who is your supervisor in that office?
10:09:59 16 A. Anna Molina, our chief of staff.
10:10:04 17 Q. And Ms. Molina is supervised by Senator Hueso?
10:10:14 18 A. Correct.
10:10:15 19 Q. Okay. Are you familiar with some proposed
10:10:18 20 legislation known as Senate Bill 615?
10:10:21 21 A. I am.
10:10:22 22 Q. If I refer to that proposed legislation as SB-615,
10:10:26 23 is that okay with you?
10:10:28 24 A. Yes.
10:10:28 25 Q. Okay. What's your stand -- what's your

10:10:31 1 understanding, in general terms, of SB-615?
10:10:34 2 A. My general understanding of that bill proposal was
10:10:39 3 that it was an attempt to make the California Public
10:10:42 4 Records Act process both more efficient and expedited.
10:10:48 5 Q. Okay. When did you begin working on SB-615? And by
10:10:54 6 that, I don't mean the proposed legislation once it had a
10:10:58 7 formal number, but I mean the essence of the bill. When
10:11:01 8 did you begin working on that?
10:11:02 9 A. I officially began working on that piece of
10:11:06 10 legislation on February 21, 2019.
10:11:18 11 Q. And how did you become -- withdrawn.
10:11:21 12 How was that assigned to you?
10:11:22 13 A. So, typically, my capacity as legislative director
10:11:26 14 for the senator, all pieces of legislation usually come --
10:11:30 15 or proposed pieces of legislation will come, sort of,
10:11:33 16 before me at some juncture. Both myself and our chief of
10:11:39 17 staff, Anna Molina, will usually confer on any pending
10:11:44 18 proposals before the senator, and, typically, that will
10:11:46 19 either be a request by an entity, nonprofit organization.
10:11:51 20 There will be -- they'll ask the senator to review a piece
10:11:53 21 of legislation that's a possible bill for introduction. So
10:11:57 22 almost every piece of pending or proposed legislation I
10:12:02 23 have at one point reviewed and conferred with either the
10:12:06 24 senator or chief of staff.
10:12:08 25 Q. So I've never worked in the legislature. Let me see

10:12:11 1 whether my assumptions are correct, and correct me if I'm
10:12:15 2 wrong.
10:12:16 3 A proposed bill up for consideration by the
10:12:21 4 senator to carry your support, at some point, lands on your
10:12:26 5 desk because you're in the pecking order of people in the
10:12:29 6 office who would review that and advise the senator, yes?
10:12:32 7 A. That's typically correct. At times, because of the
10:12:36 8 sheer volume, maybe I won't have the opportunity to look at
10:12:38 9 every piece of legislation. Maybe Anna will just, you
10:12:41 10 know, take a lead, or I'll take a lead. But the vast
10:12:44 11 majority of the time, typically, I will have looked at
10:12:48 12 almost every proposal to some degree.
10:12:51 13 Q. Okay. And so a piece of proposed legislation
10:12:54 14 somehow arrives in the senator's office, and, shortly
10:12:59 15 thereafter, you lay your eyes on it; correct?
10:13:01 16 A. Correct.
10:13:04 17 Q. Okay. Can you tell me what it is a legislative
10:13:08 18 director does?
10:13:09 19 A. So, typically, in my role, I will oversee the
10:13:15 20 responsibilities and duties of legislative aides, interns,
10:13:19 21 other staff who are handling legislation. Typically, I
10:13:22 22 will give them directives as far as the legislative
10:13:25 23 process, what steps they'll need to take, what
10:13:28 24 organizations they'll need to reach out to, what research
10:13:31 25 they'll need to do as they prepare to move a piece of

10:13:35 1 pending legislation or proposed legislation through the
10:13:38 2 legislative process.
10:13:39 3 I'll also advise the senator on policy concerns
10:13:42 4 related to any piece of legislation, political concerns
10:13:46 5 that he should be aware of, as well as make recommendations
10:13:49 6 or suggestions as far as timing and other things of that
10:13:51 7 nature. My primary focus, though, is on his legislative
10:13:56 8 bill package.
10:13:57 9 Q. And by "his legislative bill package," you mean his
10:14:01 10 legislative priorities?
10:14:03 11 A. Correct, and any piece of legislation that has
10:14:06 12 actually been introduced in -- in the California Senate.
10:14:10 13 Q. Okay. As the legislative director, does your role
10:14:16 14 include working with legislative counsel on a bill?
10:14:19 15 A. Yes.
10:14:19 16 Q. Okay. So for lack of a better description, are you
10:14:24 17 the point of contact for the senator's office in dealing
10:14:30 18 with the lawyers in the Legislative Counsel's Office?
10:14:32 19 A. For bills -- typically, for bills that are under my
10:14:39 20 direct purview in our office and in most offices and
10:14:42 21 legislature, individual staffers will be assigned to bills.
10:14:46 22 So part of my responsibility is collaborating with our
10:14:50 23 chief of staff and the senator to identify legislative
10:14:53 24 aides, policy consultants, or interns who have the
10:14:59 25 requisite experience to staff a particular piece of

10:15:01 1 legislation. So if an individual has a strong background
10:15:04 2 in binatural border issues, then I would recommend the
10:15:09 3 senator to this piece of legislation be staffed by that
10:15:12 4 staffer. So that individual would be the direct point of
10:15:14 5 contact for the legislative counsel, deputy assigned to
10:15:19 6 that bill.
10:15:21 7 Q. Are you familiar with something called the
10:15:27 8 "legislative history"?
10:15:29 9 A. Yes, I am.
10:15:30 10 Q. What's your understanding of what that term means?
10:15:34 11 A. I believe that's a term of art that's usually
10:15:38 12 referenced in a -- not only in a judicial proceeding but
10:15:42 13 also, at times, in the legislative process where an entity
10:15:48 14 or public body may have -- requests information relating to
10:15:53 15 that bill, and then you would reference legislative history
10:15:56 16 of that bill, and I think, typically, that would encompass
10:15:59 17 the process that it's gone through through the legislative
10:16:01 18 body.
10:16:01 19 Q. Do you -- is it your understanding that the
10:16:03 20 legislative history includes correspondence from
10:16:08 21 stakeholders for and against a bill?
10:16:10 22 A. Yes, that's my understanding.
10:16:12 23 Q. And is it your understanding that legislative
10:16:14 24 history includes information that people would provide to
10:16:18 25 support the policy reflected in the bill?

10:16:22 2 Q. And is it your understanding that the legislative
10:16:26 3 history includes correspondence between legislator's
10:16:28 4 offices and outside parties concerning the substance of the
10:16:32 5 bill?
10:16:34 7 Q. And what is the process by which information that's
10:16:37 8 given to your office is transmitted to wherever it needs to
10:16:44 9 go in order to make it into the legislative history?
10:16:46 10 A. So, typically, at the conclusion of the legislative
10:16:49 11 session -- and that would be at the conclusion of the
10:16:53 12 year -- of the legislative calendar -- then we will
10:16:57 13 provide -- and I believe it's State Archives -- a folder or
10:17:01 14 file, and it relates to everything that was pertaining to
10:17:05 15 that bill.
10:17:05 16 Q. Okay. Do you know whether there are any rules that
10:17:10 17 govern the destruction of information that your office
10:17:15 18 receives concerning the substance of a proposed bill?
10:17:18 19 A. I -- you know, typically, we provide everything
10:17:27 20 that's within our purview to State Archives.
10:17:31 21 Q. Do you ever destroy information --
10:17:33 22 A. No.
10:17:33 23 Q. -- that comes to your office?
10:17:34 24 A. No, we never do.
10:17:36 25 Q. Have you ever been instructed by anyone on the

10:17:38 1 legislature to destroy information that came into the
10:17:41 2 office?
10:17:41 3 A. I can't recall ever being instructed by anybody in
10:17:45 4 the legislature to ever destroy any item that had been
10:17:49 5 provided to -- provided to our office.
10:17:52 6 Q. Have you ever been asked by anybody outside the
10:17:55 7 legislature to destroy information provided to your office?
10:17:57 8 A. On one occasion pertaining to this bill, there was a
10:18:02 9 communication that was deemed confidential that was sent to
10:18:08 10 our office that I was asked to delete.
10:18:09 11 Q. Did you delete it?
10:18:11 12 A. No, I did not.
10:18:11 13 Q. Okay. We will come back to that in just a bit.
10:18:17 14 Who was the person in your office who was
10:18:19 15 assigned to staff SB-615?
10:18:23 16 A. That was me.
10:18:24 17 Q. Okay. Who was your -- withdrawn.
10:18:32 18 Did Senator Hueso write SB-615?
10:18:36 19 A. No, he did not.
10:18:37 20 Q. Do you know who wrote the substance of that proposed
10:18:40 21 bill?
10:18:40 22 A. I would be speculating because I'm not sure who
10:18:46 23 drafted the bill language itself.
10:18:48 24 Q. Let me ask you a different question.
10:18:50 25 Where did your office get that bill?

10:18:52 1 A. Okay. Our office received the bill text from the
10:18:56 2 City Attorney's Office.
10:18:57 3 Q. San Diego?
10:18:59 4 A. Yeah, sorry. Excuse me. The City of San Diego's
10:19:01 5 Attorney's Office.
10:19:02 6 Q. And do you know the name of the individual in the
10:19:05 7 office who transmitted the language to your office?
10:19:07 8 A. Yes. It was Gerry, the city attorney's chief of
10:19:12 9 staff, and I'm blanking on his last name.
10:19:16 10 Q. Is it Braun?
10:19:17 11 A. Yes, sorry. That is correct.
10:19:19 12 Q. So for the court reporter's benefit, that would be
10:19:22 13 G-e-r-r-y, last name, B-r-a-u-n.
10:19:26 14 And do you remember when Mr. Braun transmitted
10:19:28 15 the bill to your office?
10:19:29 16 A. I do. It was February -- it was Thursday,
10:19:33 17 February 21st. I'm not sure on the time because it was
10:19:37 18 transmitted to our chief of staff, Anna Molina, and then
10:19:41 19 she provided it to me.
10:19:43 20 Q. Okay. Was -- who in the City Attorney's Office was
10:19:49 21 your point of contact?
10:19:50 22 A. My primary point of contact was Gerry Braun.
10:19:53 23 Q. Did you ever have any communications with anyone
10:19:56 24 else in the City Attorney's Office concerning SB-615?
10:20:00 25 A. Yes. There were frequently, at times, other deputy

10:20:05 1 attorneys who were cc'd on our conversations. I want to
10:20:10 2 say Bill, and I'm blanking on his last name.
10:20:13 3 Q. Gersten?
10:20:15 4 A. Yes, Gersten may have been cc'd on some of those
10:20:19 5 conversations as it related to the policy.
10:20:22 6 Q. And for the court reporter's benefit, that is
10:20:25 7 G-e-r-s-t-e-n.
10:20:27 8 Apart from seeing Mr. Gersten cc'd on e-mail
10:20:31 9 communications, did you ever actually talk to him?
10:20:33 10 A. I want to say we had a conversation where he was at
10:20:37 11 least a participant in a conference call, and it was
10:20:42 12 relating to the policy itself.
10:20:44 13 Q. Okay. How many telephone conversations with anyone
10:20:49 14 in the City Attorney's Office did you have concerning
10:20:53 15 SB-615?
10:20:54 16 A. Now, this would be an estimate, and I would -- but I
10:20:57 17 would say roughly 10 to 15 short conversations, likely.
10:21:03 18 Q. By "short," you mean less than ten minutes?
10:21:06 19 A. Yes.
10:21:06 20 Q. Okay. And over what period of time did those 10 to
10:21:15 21 15 conversations occur, meaning date-wise?
10:21:19 22 A. Yeah. So in my estimation, it would be between
10:21:26 23 Thursday, February 21st, when the piece of legislation was
10:21:30 24 first brought to our office, and I want to say March 12th
10:21:38 25 or 13th when Senator Hueso officially announced that he

10:21:44 1 would no longer be moving that legislation through the
10:21:47 2 process.
10:21:48 3 Q. Okay.
10:21:48 4 A. Roughly, I would say the 12th or 13th. I would need
10:21:51 5 to, you know, verify that for sure.
10:21:54 6 Q. Did you ever have any of those conversations in
10:21:57 7 which Gerry Braun was not involved?
10:21:58 8 A. I think Gerry Braun was always involved in those
10:22:05 9 conversations.
10:22:05 10 Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned that you had a
10:22:10 11 conversation with Mr. Braun in which he asked you to delete
10:22:15 12 or destroy something. Do you recall that?
10:22:17 13 A. I had a conversation with Mr. Braun, and he had
10:22:22 14 brought to my attention that, in his opinion, he had
10:22:29 15 inadvertently shared with me and our office confidential
10:22:32 16 and privileged information that was between their office.
10:22:38 17 Q. Okay. When did that conversation occur?
10:22:40 18 A. I can -- I can't remember the date of that.
10:22:43 19 Q. How about approximate?
10:22:44 20 A. It would have been in that time range, and I -- so
10:22:47 21 approximately -- this is just a guess, but I would say --
10:22:54 22 Q. I don't want you to guess. Do your best to pin it
10:22:58 23 down.
10:22:58 24 A. It would have probably been a couple days after the
10:23:01 25 transmittal of that e-mail.

10:23:03 1 Q. Okay.
10:23:03 2 A. I would say maybe three days after that. But I
10:23:10 3 can't -- I can't remember for sure.
10:23:11 4 Q. It wasn't more than a week, was it?
10:23:14 5 A. Probably not, no. I would say it was not more than
10:23:15 6 a week.
10:23:18 7 Q. And how did that conversation come about? Did you
10:23:27 8 call him, or did he call you?
10:23:29 9 A. Mr. Braun called our office, asked to speak with me,
10:23:32 10 and had mentioned in relation to requests I had made to
10:23:38 11 their office for more information on the topic itself -- he
10:23:42 12 had provided me the context of a case, and I can't
10:23:47 13 pronounce it correctly, but --
10:23:51 14 Q. Sukumar --
10:23:51 15 A. Sukumar, yeah, relating to the Sukumar case. And I
10:23:55 16 had requested that their office provide me more context, as
10:23:58 17 I was providing materials for the senator in relationship
10:24:03 18 to this bill, and he had provided me what was an excerpt of
10:24:08 19 the case.
10:24:09 20 However, he had mentioned at the conclusion of
10:24:11 21 that e-mail chain there was privileged and confidential
10:24:16 22 information, which I had not -- I had not caught myself or
10:24:19 23 had seen that.
10:24:20 24 Q. Okay. For the court reporter's benefit, Sukumar is
10:24:23 25 S-u-k-u-m-a-r.

10:24:27 1 How long did that conversation last with
10:24:31 2 Mr. Braun?
10:24:31 3 A. It was very brief, given that period of time was
10:24:35 4 incredibly busy for our office, and I would say probably
10:24:40 5 less than two minutes.
10:24:41 6 Q. Okay.
10:24:41 7 A. It as a very brief conversation.
10:24:44 8 Q. Did you tell Mr. Braun -- well, withdrawn.
10:24:46 9 Did Mr. Braun ask you to delete the e-mail?
10:24:49 10 A. I believe he -- he did in relation to -- to the fact
10:24:57 11 it was privileged. He had mentioned -- I think he may have
10:25:01 12 asked me to delete it or discard it or something to that
10:25:05 13 extent and not, like, reference it -- or not read it or
10:25:08 14 something to that degree.
10:25:09 15 Q. When you say "the fact that it is privileged," what
10:25:11 16 makes you think that e-mail is privileged?
10:25:13 17 A. He had mentioned that it pertained to internal
10:25:18 18 conversations between their office, I believe privileged
10:25:23 20 Q. But has anybody other than Mr. Braun told you that
10:25:25 21 that e-mail is privileged?
10:25:26 22 A. No.
10:25:27 23 Q. Okay. So --
10:25:28 24 A. And I didn't, you know, seek -- unfortunately, I was
10:25:32 25 busy at the time. I didn't seek a legal position from

10:25:36 1 legislative counsel.
10:25:37 2 Q. Not a problem. I just -- when you say the fact that
10:25:39 3 it's privileged, what you're really saying is the fact that
10:25:42 4 he told you it was privileged?
10:25:43 5 A. Exactly. He asserted it was privileged.
10:25:45 6 Q. Okay. You don't have any independent reason for --
10:25:45 7 A. No.
10:25:48 8 Q. -- thinking it's privileged.
10:25:48 9 (Reporter instruction.)
10:25:48 10 BY MR. BRIGGS:
10:25:50 11 Q. Just so the record is clear, you don't have any
10:25:54 12 independent reason to believe that that e-mail
10:25:55 13 communication is privileged; correct?
10:26:00 14 A. I didn't have any independent idea or belief at the
10:26:05 15 time, but, I mean, I --
10:26:07 16 Q. You have a belief --
10:26:09 17 A. Maybe. I don't know.
10:26:10 18 Q. Do you have that belief today?
10:26:12 19 A. I think it may be -- may have been privileged
10:26:17 20 communication.
10:26:17 21 Q. What's that belief based on?
10:26:19 22 A. I -- afterwards, I looked at it, and I was like,
10:26:24 23 this pertains to communications they had; so I won't -- I
10:26:27 24 won't read further into it.
10:26:29 25 Q. So after you had that conversation with Mr. Braun,

10:26:31 1 you actually went and read the e-mail that he said he
10:26:34 2 thought was privileged?
10:26:37 3 A. I recently read it when I printed it out, I think,
10:26:40 4 when I provided it to legislative counsel in regards to the
10:26:43 5 public records request.
10:26:45 6 Q. Okay. When you spoke to Mr. Braun and he asked you
10:26:52 7 to delete it, did you tell him that you would delete it?
10:26:55 8 A. I told him I would look into it. I said, "Well, let
10:26:59 9 me take a look at it."
10:27:01 10 Q. When you told him that, did you have a plan to
10:27:04 11 delete it?
10:27:04 12 A. At that point, I didn't.
10:27:08 13 Q. At some point, did you develop a plan to delete it?
10:27:12 14 A. Not without, you know, further guidance, which,
10:27:15 15 unfortunately, I really never got.
10:27:17 16 Q. So you never sought guidance on whether you could
10:27:20 17 delete that e-mail or not; correct?
10:27:21 18 A. Correct.
10:27:22 19 Q. Okay.
10:27:22 20 A. So I -- so I didn't.
10:27:23 21 Q. Okay. And you haven't deleted that e-mail to this
10:27:26 22 day; correct?
10:27:27 23 A. Correct.
10:27:27 24 Q. Okay. Did you ever share the e-mail with anybody?
10:27:31 25 A. Yes. I -- upon the California Public Records Act

10:27:36 1 request that our office received --
10:27:37 2 MS. JENKINS: Sorry. I want to say it was a
10:27:40 3 subpoena; it wasn't a Public Records Act request.
10:27:42 4 THE WITNESS: Yeah, sorry. Subpoena. Pursuant
10:27:45 5 to the subpoena, I had provided that conversation as well
10:27:49 6 as every single other conversation I had with the City
10:27:54 7 Attorney's Office to the Office of Legislative Counsel as
10:27:57 8 well as the secretary of the senate and then allowed them
10:28:04 9 to make the determination which information would or would
10:28:08 10 not be released.
10:28:08 11 BY MR. BRIGGS:
10:28:09 12 Q. Okay. And at the end of the legislative session,
10:28:12 13 are all of your communications on SB-615 something that you
10:28:16 14 would send to the State Archives?
10:28:17 15 A. Typically, we will send all information in the bill
10:28:24 16 file. Frequently, that will -- frequently, we wouldn't, I
10:28:31 17 think, send -- typically, our office wouldn't send a lot of
10:28:36 18 e-mail chains. Or usually that information, I think, is
10:28:39 19 more sensitive. But anything that's publicly been
10:28:44 20 discussed in our office, we will provide.
10:28:46 21 Q. Okay. Why -- let me back up.
10:28:53 22 I think you said earlier that Mr. Braun sent you
10:28:56 23 that e-mail in a response to a request that you had made
10:29:00 24 for more information about the Sukumar case; is that
10:29:00 25 correct?

10:29:03 1 A. Correct. And to clarify, I hadn't necessarily asked
10:29:07 2 about the case itself. I had just asked for further
10:29:10 3 information relating to the issue itself and justification
10:29:16 4 for the proposed piece of legislation.
10:29:17 5 Q. So you asked Mr. Braun, without referring to the
10:29:24 6 case itself, to provide your office with more
10:29:29 7 information -- information to justify the need for SB-615;
10:29:29 8 is that correct?
10:29:34 9 A. Correct.
10:29:34 10 Q. Okay. And did Mr. Braun tell you that he would
10:29:41 11 honor your request?
10:29:42 12 A. Yes. He informed me that, in regards to my, sort
10:29:45 13 of, general -- general inquiry for information relating to
10:29:49 14 the justification for the proposed piece of legislation,
10:29:52 15 that he would provide me with a variety of information,
10:29:58 16 including a current -- including a current case in
10:30:02 17 California that would provide uncertainty or would provide
10:30:09 18 an undue hurdle for municipalities and other agencies to
10:30:13 19 have to overcome in relation to California Public Records
10:30:18 20 Act requests.
10:30:19 21 Q. When you asked him for that information, did you
10:30:21 22 make any threats about dropping the legislation if he
10:30:27 23 didn't comply with the request?
10:30:28 24 A. No. But I had asked him -- I said, "Typically, our
10:30:33 25 office's protocol is to receive as much information as we

10:30:38 1 can as we start to craft the senator's talking points on
10:30:42 2 the issue, as we start to craft internal documents, public
10:30:46 3 documents such as a fact sheet. Things of that nature I
10:30:51 4 would need a justification to include to demonstrate the
10:30:53 5 need for this piece of pending legislation." And then I
10:30:55 6 also referenced to him that, in the legislative process,
10:31:00 7 that we would have to be -- we would go to a committee, and
10:31:05 8 the documents that I was asking for now would typically be
10:31:08 9 provided to a committee consultant as they analyze the
10:31:11 10 bill.
10:31:12 11 Q. So you were asking him for information that you
10:31:17 12 expected would eventually be provided to a committee
10:31:20 13 consultant in analyzing SB-615; is that correct?
10:31:23 14 A. Correct.
10:31:24 15 Q. Okay. Did anyone in the City Attorney's Office ever
10:31:31 16 tell you that one of the reasons they were proposing to
10:31:36 17 amend the Public Records Act was to reduce the City's
10:31:42 18 exposure to attorneys' fees when the City gets sued by
10:31:47 19 members of the public?
10:31:49 20 A. I believe that was one of the concerns that was
10:31:52 21 raised --
10:31:53 22 Q. Okay.
10:31:54 23 A. -- as a justification.
10:31:55 24 Q. And was it your understanding, when Mr. Braun sent
10:31:59 25 you the information you asked for, that the information he

10:32:04 1 provided would help substantiate that reason for the
10:32:09 2 amendment?
10:32:10 3 A. I think that was probably discussed, and that was
10:32:19 4 part of the justification -- but not necessarily just for
10:32:25 5 the City but I think generally, policy-wise.
10:32:27 6 Q. Okay. And I am not trying to put words in your
10:32:27 7 mouth.
10:32:27 8 A. Yeah.
10:32:29 9 Q. I just want to make sure that you and I are on the
10:32:30 10 same page.
10:32:33 11 You were asking him for information to help the
10:32:37 12 senator and the committee and the committee consultant and
10:32:41 13 anybody else in the legislature who looks at this to
10:32:45 14 understand why the City Attorney's Office thought that this
10:32:48 15 amendment was important. Is that a fair statement?
10:32:51 16 A. Yes.
10:32:52 17 Q. Okay. In the subpoena for today, I asked you to
10:33:18 18 bring a variety of documents, and it's my understanding
10:33:25 19 through Ms. Jenkins that the only documents you have that
10:33:30 20 are responsive to the subpoena for today are the documents
10:33:35 21 that were already provided in response to the earlier
10:33:39 22 subpoena. Do you have that same understanding?
10:33:40 23 A. Correct.
10:33:42 24 Q. When you received the subpoena for today, did you
10:33:46 25 read it?

10:33:46 1 A. Yes.
10:33:47 2 Q. And did you look at the description of documents
10:33:51 3 that we were requesting?
10:33:52 4 A. Yes.
10:33:53 5 Q. Did you independently, meaning on your own, confirm
10:33:58 6 that the documents previously provided to my office under
10:34:02 7 the earlier subpoena were the only responsive records for
10:34:07 8 today's subpoena?
10:34:08 9 A. Yes.
10:34:08 10 Q. Okay. And you have nothing further to provide; is
10:34:08 11 that correct?
10:34:14 12 A. Correct.
10:34:14 13 Q. Okay. Does your office ever agree to keep
10:34:39 14 communications with outsiders confidential when it's
10:34:43 15 working on legislation?
10:34:44 16 A. Can you clarify the term "outsiders"?
10:34:48 17 Q. Yes. Someone who is not employed by the
10:34:51 18 legislature.
10:34:52 19 A. So somebody, like an outside party, that has an
10:34:55 20 interest like a piece of legislation?
10:34:58 21 Q. Exactly.
10:35:01 22 A. Yeah, typically, we keep most communications
10:35:04 23 confidential as it pertains to, you know, pending
10:35:08 24 legislation.
10:35:08 25 Q. Do you have written confidentiality agreements?

10:35:15 1 MS. JENKINS: Can I interject?
10:35:17 2 MR. BRIGGS: Sure.
10:35:18 3 MS. JENKINS: Members of the legislature and
10:35:21 4 their staff have legislative immunity based on common law,
10:35:26 5 just case law, and so anything that they -- that they work
10:35:30 6 on on pending legislation is subject to this legislative
10:35:35 7 immunity; so that's why a lot of their communications, when
10:35:39 8 they're working with outside entities, are presumed
10:35:42 9 privileged.
10:35:43 10 MR. BRIGGS: Well, let me ask the question a
10:35:45 11 little bit differently.
10:35:45 12 BY MR. BRIGGS:
10:35:48 13 Q. Does Senator Hueso's office ever tell people who are
10:35:53 14 employed outside the legislature that you won't tell
10:35:57 15 anybody about the communications from those outsiders?
10:36:01 16 A. Typically, when we are engaged in -- in, you know,
10:36:12 17 working actively in relation to pending legislation, we do
10:36:16 18 not disclose conversations we may have had with
10:36:19 19 stakeholders, unless they expressly authorize us to do so.
10:36:24 20 As an example, if we are working on a
10:36:29 21 controversial piece of legislation, we may have
10:36:31 22 conversations with specific stakeholders. And if they do
10:36:37 23 not wish to have those conversations disclosed, I will not
10:36:41 24 share with another stakeholder that I've had those
10:36:44 25 conversations unless we agree that I can share those

10:36:47 2 Q. On SB-615, did you ever have a discussion with
10:36:53 3 anyone in the City Attorney's Office about keeping your
10:36:57 4 conversations confidential?
10:36:59 5 A. No, I don't believe we had that conversation, and
10:37:06 6 I -- and I think I expressly stated to Gerry that, when
10:37:10 7 appropriate, I would be sharing, you know, the details of
10:37:15 8 our conversations with other parties as we negotiated or
10:37:20 9 attempted to negotiate a policy agreement with all
10:37:23 10 concerned parties.
10:37:24 11 Q. You made it clear early in the process to Mr. Braun
10:37:28 12 that whatever information the City Attorney's Office
10:37:31 13 provided would eventually be shared with other persons in
10:37:35 14 the legislature interested in the legislation; correct?
10:37:39 15 A. I shared with him that some components of our
10:37:43 16 conversations could be made public.
10:37:43 17 Q. Okay.
10:37:46 18 A. Obviously, certain elements of our conversations,
10:37:50 19 you know, for privacy concerns, would not be made public.
10:37:53 20 But I would let him know what conversations we had -- you
10:37:55 21 know, I would share the California Newspaper Association, a
10:38:01 22 group that was adamantly opposed to this bill.
10:38:05 23 (Reporter clarification.)
10:38:05 24 BY MR. BRIGGS:
10:38:05 25 Q. Okay. Did you ever tell Mr. Braun that you would

10:38:09 1 keep communications from the City Attorney's Office
10:38:16 2 confidential?
10:38:16 3 A. I'm trying to recall if I ever explicitly stated
10:38:22 4 that. To some degree, I think I may have conveyed that --
10:38:31 5 that portions of our conversations would be kept
10:38:37 6 confidential until otherwise, you know, agreed upon, and
10:38:39 7 that's typical on any piece of legislation that we handle.
10:38:43 8 A lot of times, maybe the sensitive nature of the
10:38:47 9 legislation or because of something maybe very
10:38:52 10 controversial, we may work with stakeholders, and I'll be
10:38:55 11 pretty upfront that I won't disclose elements of that
10:38:58 12 conversation unless they expressly agree to it; so that may
10:39:02 13 very well have been expressed to him.
10:39:04 14 Q. Was there something about SB-615 that you felt
10:39:06 15 needed to be kept confidential?
10:39:09 16 A. Not necessarily anything related to the policy, but
10:39:12 17 I told him, at times, given the sensitive nature of
10:39:15 18 negotiations, that I may keep, you know, certain
10:39:18 19 conversations confidential, unless, you know, he was party,
10:39:23 20 you know, to a stakeholder conversation or --
10:39:26 21 Q. Did Mr. Braun ever tell you in one of your telephone
10:39:32 22 conversations that he wanted something kept confidential?
10:39:35 23 A. No. He never expressly mentioned anything -- you
10:39:39 24 know, keeping anything confidential relating to our
10:39:42 25 conversations other than that one e-mail which he asserted

10:39:45 1 was privileged and confidential. And then I later was able
10:39:48 2 to verify that it actually -- there was express language on
10:39:52 3 that e-mail that said such.
10:39:53 4 Q. When -- but that conversation happened after he
10:39:56 5 provided you the e-mail; correct?
10:39:58 6 A. Correct.
10:39:58 7 Q. Okay. When you asked for that information, did
10:40:04 8 Mr. Braun tell you that he would have to get it from Bill
10:40:09 9 Gersten?
10:40:09 10 A. No. He didn't tell me where he would be getting it.
10:40:14 11 And, again, it was a very general inquiry for all
10:40:17 12 information relating to the policy itself, anything he
10:40:20 13 could provide me.
10:40:21 14 Q. Do you recall how many conversations you had with
10:40:25 15 the City Attorney's Office concerning the need to restrict
10:40:33 16 an agency's exposure to attorneys' fees in public records
10:40:37 17 litigation?
10:40:38 18 A. You asked for the exact number? Like how many,
10:40:43 19 generally?
10:40:44 20 Q. Approximately.
10:40:44 21 A. I would say -- so probably two to three
10:40:47 22 conversations initially included conversations about
10:40:52 23 exposure, generally. And let me clarify -- use this time
10:41:01 24 period to clarify.
10:41:03 25 Typically, when the senator -- Senator Hueso, in

10:41:05 1 our office, runs pieces of legislation, we never typically,
10:41:09 2 you know, try to focus on specific regions of the state.
10:41:12 3 We always look towards statewide applicability.
10:41:17 4 So in that relation, using that sort of metric, I
10:41:21 5 was always and the senator was always looking at statewide
10:41:24 6 applicability. So, yes, the City Attorney's Office
10:41:27 7 provided one example, but we were always ensuring that this
10:41:32 8 would be something that could be of statewide significance,
10:41:37 9 not just benefitting one particular group.
10:41:39 10 Q. Did Mr. Braun ever tell you that there were lawyers
10:41:42 11 who he thought were taking advantage of the Public Records
10:41:47 12 Act?
10:41:47 13 A. Not as explicit as you just stated, but he had
10:41:54 14 raised concerns that there were firms that were filing a
10:42:02 15 litigation that were causing unnecessary costs to
10:42:08 16 entities -- public entities across the state.
10:42:09 17 Q. Did he ever -- in talking about those firms, did he
10:42:13 18 ever talk about my law firm or about me?
10:42:15 19 A. I don't ever recall, you know, specific, you know,
10:42:19 20 firm or conversations. He kept it pretty general in nature
10:42:23 21 when we'd discuss it -- you know, those conversations. So
10:42:27 22 it was usually general -- you know, general references to
10:42:32 23 firms -- firms, lawyers, in those natures. But nothing
10:42:38 24 really like -- he didn't specifically target anybody or any
10:42:42 25 entity.

10:42:42 1 Q. Did my name ever come up in those conversations?
10:42:48 2 A. I don't recall, other than when I later saw -- you
10:42:52 3 know, referenced in that e-mail, I think there was a short
10:42:55 4 reference. So other than that reference in that e-mail
10:42:58 5 that he asserted was privileged, I never recall any
10:43:02 6 specific reference to you or your firm.
10:43:05 7 Q. So what reference are you talking about?
10:43:08 8 A. I think the e-mail -- the February 26th e-mail,
10:43:16 9 which I think the City's Attorneys Office asserted as
10:43:20 10 privileged, I think there was a reference to you.
10:43:22 11 Q. Okay. Do you recall what the reference was?
10:43:25 12 A. I think your -- your name was briefly mentioned, or
10:43:34 13 your firm's name was mentioned in relation, I think, to the
10:43:38 14 policy itself. But --
10:43:42 15 MR. KARLIN: And, again, just for the record, we
10:43:44 16 have a standing objection that this is attorney-client work
10:43:46 17 product. I mean, that's the scope of this lawsuit, and
10:43:48 18 I'll put that on the record regarding the subject e-mail
10:43:51 19 Mr. Brieno is discussing. I don't believe it is dated
10:43:51 20 February 26th.
10:43:51 21 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I might be wrong.
10:43:57 22 MR. KARLIN: It might actually be February 25th.
10:43:58 23 But I think, Mr. Briggs, are we not in agreement
10:43:58 24 that that's the e-mail that we're discussing that's the
10:44:02 25 source of this particular lawsuit?

10:44:04 1 MR. BRIGGS: I don't -- that e-mail is not a
10:44:09 2 source of this lawsuit. The source of this lawsuit was the
10:44:12 3 City Attorney's Office didn't produce all responsive
10:44:16 4 records in a timely manner.
10:44:18 5 MR. KARLIN: Understood, but I think one of the
10:44:20 6 contentions that's raised or one of the issues in this
10:44:22 7 lawsuit is the assertion of attorney work-product privilege
10:44:26 8 towards a particular e-mail, an e-mail that Mr. Brieno has
10:44:30 9 testified this morning that Mr. Braun asked him to delete.
10:44:34 10 And that's my reference of what I'm talking about in terms
10:44:36 11 of that e-mail.
10:44:37 12 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. I don't think I have any
10:45:01 13 other questions for the witness.
10:45:02 14 David, do you have any?
10:45:03 15 MR. KARLIN: I just have a few. Do you need me
10:45:05 16 to mic up?
10:45:07 17 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: You either can switch places,
10:45:09 18 or he can pass the mic, or I can give you another mic.
10:45:12 19 However you want to do it.
10:45:13 20 MR. KARLIN: I think this will work. I just saw
10:45:17 21 you go to the earphones there to make sure I was being
10:45:19 22 heard.
10:45:20 23 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: There's four mics in the room;
10:45:23 24 so you were heard.
10:45:24 25 MR. KARLIN: I usually don't have a problem.

10:45:24 1 EXAMINATION
10:45:24 2 BY MR. KARLIN:
10:45:28 3 Q. Good morning.
10:45:29 4 A. Good morning.
10:45:29 5 Q. Just looking at my notes. After having a
10:45:32 6 conversation with Mr. Braun that you relayed this morning
10:45:36 7 where we asked you to delete the one e-mail that he was
10:45:38 8 asserting was privileged communications, you mentioned, at
10:45:42 9 least according to my notes, that you would seek further
10:45:45 10 guidance. Do you recall that?
10:45:46 11 A. Yes.
10:45:47 12 Q. What guidance would you have sought, and who would
10:45:51 13 you have sought guidance from?
10:45:52 14 A. So in relation to that testimony earlier, I would
10:45:58 15 have sought guidance from the Legislative Counsel's Office,
10:46:02 16 which serves as the standing -- standing set of lawyers for
10:46:09 17 the legislature, the elected members, and their staff.
10:46:12 18 Q. And as I understand your testimony, though you might
10:46:16 19 have intended to seek that guidance, you, in fact, did not;
10:46:19 20 is that correct?
10:46:20 21 MR. BRIGGS: Let me just object that it misstates
10:46:24 22 his testimony.
10:46:25 23 You can answer.
10:46:25 24 THE WITNESS: Correct. I didn't seek that --
10:46:27 25 that guidance.

10:46:27 1 BY MR. KARLIN:
10:46:27 2 Q. Did you communicate Mr. -- excuse me -- Mr. Braun's
10:46:31 3 request with anyone else?
10:46:33 4 A. No.
10:46:35 5 Q. Okay. So you didn't tell Anna Molina?
10:46:39 6 A. I did not.
10:46:40 7 Q. Anybody else in Senator Hueso's office you would
10:46:45 8 have communicated Mr. Braun's request to?
10:46:47 9 A. No.
10:46:49 10 MR. KARLIN: I have nothing further.
10:46:54 11 MR. BRIGGS: Could we just go off the record real
10:46:57 12 fast and make sure that we're done?
10:46:59 13 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Time is 10:47. Off the
10:47:01 14 record.
10:47:02 15 (Off the record.)
10:48:00 16 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Time is 10:48. Back on the
10:48:06 17 record.
10:48:07 18 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. So there are no more
10:48:09 19 questions for this witness today. The witness is going to
10:48:12 20 have 15 days after being notified that the transcript's
10:48:16 21 available to review it and make any changes to it.
10:48:20 22 The court reporter will retain the transcript and
10:48:24 23 let any -- let everybody know about its signing and any
10:48:28 24 corrections per the code. And the parties to the lawsuit
10:48:30 25 will have the transcript available for any purpose,

10:48:36 1 including certified copies per code as well.
10:48:40 2 MR. KARLIN: So stipulated.
10:48:42 3 MR. BRIGGS: You okay with that too, Cara?
10:48:44 4 MS. JENKINS: Yes.
10:48:45 5 MR. BRIGGS: Thank you, everybody.
10:48:47 6 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This now concludes the
10:48:48 7 deposition. The time is 10:48. Off the record.
10:48:48 8 THE REPORTER: Mr. Karlin, would you like a copy
10:48:53 9 of this?
10:48:53 10 MR. KARLIN: Yes, please.
11 (Off the record at 10:48 a.m.)
12 --o0o--
13 PLEASE be advised that I have read the foregoing
14 deposition, pages 1 through 39, inclusive.
15 I hereby state there are:
16 __________NO CORRECTIONS
17 __________CORRECTIONS PER ATTACHED
18 __________________________________/_________________
19 (Signature of Witness) (Date)
20
21 --o0o--
22
23
24
25

1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
3 I, Kayla Knowles, a Certified Shorthand Reporter
4 in and for the State of California, duly appointed and
5 commissioned to administer oaths, do hereby certify:
6 That I am a disinterested person herein; that the
7 witness, AARON BRIENO, named in the foregoing deposition
8 was by me duly sworn to testify the truth; that the
9 deposition was reported in shorthand by me, Kayla Knowles,
10 a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of California,
11 and thereafter transcribed into typewriting; that the
12 foregoing is a true and correct record of the testimony
13 given by the witness.
14 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby certify this
15 deposition at my office in the County of Sacramento, State
16 of California, this 9th day of October, 2019.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Exhibit 2
Gerard Braun 9/12/2019
1 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION
4 SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT, )

)
5 Plaintiff and Petitioner, )
) Case No.:
6 vs. ) 37-2019-00015139-
) CU-MC-CTL
7 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; and DOES 1 )
through 100, )
8 )
Defendants and Respondents. )
9 _____________________________________)
10
11
12
13 VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF GERARD BRAUN
14 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
15 SEPTEMBER 12, 2019
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 REPORTED BY: Kathryn L. Edwards, CSR No. 7288
23
24
25
Peterson Reporting Video & Litigation Services

2 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL DIVISION

)
) Case No.:
6 vs. ) 37-2019-00015139-
) CU-MC-CTL
7 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; and DOES 1 )
through 100, )
8 )
9 _____________________________________)
10
11 VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF GERARD BRAUN,
12 taken by the attorney for the Plaintiffs, commencing
13 at the hour of 12:59 p.m., on Thursday,
14 September 12, 2019, at 530 "B" Street, Suite 350,
15 San Diego, California, before Kathryn L. Edwards,
16 Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of
17 California.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Peterson Reporting Video & Litigation Services 2

1 APPEARANCES:
2
For the Plaintiff:
3
BRIGGS LAW CORPORATION
4 BY: CORY J. BRIGGS, ESQ.
99 East "C" Street
5 Suite 111
6 909-949-7115
7
For the Defendant:
8
OFFICE OF THE SAN DIEGO CITY ATTORNEY
9 BY: DAVID J. KARLIN, DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY
1200 Third Avenue
10 Suite 1100
11 619-533-5800
12
13 Also Present:
14 Jana Ferraro, Law Clerk

Briggs Law Corporation
15
16 Abel Sibrel, Videographer

Peterson Reporting, Video & Litigation
17 Services
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 I N D E X
2 WITNESS: GERARD BRAUN
4 EXAMINATION PAGE
5 BY MR. BRIGGS 6
7 E X H I B I T S
8 EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION PAGE
9 1 28 pages various email 43

documents
10
2 16 pages various email 47
11 documents
12 3 4-page document entitled 71

"Request #19-904"
13
14 WITNESS INSTRUCTED TO NOT ANSWER
15 PAGE LINE
16 12 16
14 5
17 15 23
16 17
18 23 11
19
INFORMATION REQUESTED BY COUNSEL
20
PAGE LINE
21
73 23
22 87 4
23
24 Witness' Signature Page 89
25 Reporter's Certificate 90

1 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2019
2 12:59 P.M.
3 ---o0o---
4 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Good afternoon. The
5 time on the record is 12:59 p.m. Today's date is
6 September 12, 2019. My name is Abel Sibrel, with
7 Peterson, Reporting, Video & Litigation Services.
8 The court reporter today is Kathryn Edwards of
9 Peterson Reporting, located at 530 "B" Street,
10 Suite 350, San Diego, California 92101.
11 This begins the videotaped deposition of
12 Gerry Braun, testifying in the matter of San Diegans
13 for Open Government vs. City of San Diego, 5139,
14 taken at Peterson Reporting.
15 Will counsel please identify yourselves
16 and state whom you represent.
17 MR. BRIGGS: Cory Briggs, of Briggs Law
18 Corporation, for the plaintiff.
19 MR. KARLIN: David Karlin, on behalf of
20 the City of San Diego.
21 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Thank you.
22 The court reporter may now swear in the
23 witness.
24 ///
25 ///

1 GERARD BRAUN,
2 having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:
4 EXAMINATION
5 BY MR. BRIGGS:
6 Q Would you please state and spell your name
7 for the record.
8 A My full name is Gerard Michael Braun,
9 G-E-R-A-R-D, common spelling of Michael, Braun is
10 B-R-A-U-N.
11 Q Mr. Braun, have you ever had your
12 deposition taken before?
13 A Yes.
14 Q When is the last time you had it taken?
15 A I cannot recall.
16 Q Would it be helpful for you if we went
17 over some guidelines to make today go quickly and
18 smoothly?
19 A Certainly.
20 Q Okay. Even though we're in an informal
21 setting, in a conference room, you understand that
22 you've taken an oath just as if you were in a
23 courtroom in front of a judge and a jury?
24 Yes?
25 A Of course.

1 Q Okay. I'm gonna ask a series of questions
2 today. You're required to respond to them. It's
3 important that you let me finish my question before
4 you answer, because the court reporter can only take
5 down one person speaking at a time.
6 Also, it would be helpful if you'd pause
7 just a moment after the questions, in case your
8 attorney has an objection. He'll state it, and then
9 when he's done you can go ahead and answer the
10 question, unless he tells you not to answer.
11 Do you understand that?
12 A I understand that.
13 Q Okay. It's also important that you give
14 verbal responses today. Sometimes in informal
15 communications we start nodding our head, shrugging
16 our shoulders, rolling our eyes, things like that.
17 The court reporter can't interpret body language.
18 So if we start getting loose like that and if you
19 give me an answer and I say, "Is that a yes" or "Is
20 that a no," I'm not picking on you. I'm just trying
21 to make sure that we have a clean record and we're
22 on the same page in terms of what your answer is.
24 A I do.
25 Q Good. And that was a good pause, to see

1 if there was an objection.
2 A I'm working on my pauses, Cory.
3 Q If -- If today I ask you a question and
4 you don't know the precise answer, but you know an
5 approximation, I'm entitled to your best estimate,
6 but I never want you to guess. So whether we're
7 talking about a date or a time or a quantity or
8 something like that, tell me what you best recall.
9 But if you don't know, it's okay to say "I don't
10 know." If you're gonna guess, just say "Hey, I
11 would have to guess. I don't know the answer."
12 The difference I give people between an
13 estimate and a guess is that, if I asked you how
14 long the table is we're sitting at, you'd say "Well,
15 based on life experience, it's somewhere in the
16 15-to-20-foot range." And if I asked you how long
17 my dining room table is, you'd say "I have no idea.
18 I've never been to your house."
20 A I do.
21 Q During the deposition, if you need to talk
22 to your attorney about anything, go ahead and let me
23 know. We'll take a break. The only thing I ask is
24 that you answer the question that's on the table, so
25 that we have a clean break in our transcript.

2 A No.
3 Q Okay. If you get an answer [sic] from me
4 and decide you want to talk to your lawyer, I'm
5 happy to honor your request to take a break. Or you
6 might hear a question and decide you need to go to
7 the bathroom. I'm happy to honor your request to
8 take a break. I simply ask that you answer the
9 question, so that the court reporter has a clean
10 break between questions and answers, and then say
11 "Hey, I want to take a break." I'll be happy to
12 honor that.
14 A I do not.
15 Q Okay. We will just play it out, because I
16 can't explain --
17 A Okay.
18 Q -- it any better than that. And if you
19 need to take a break at some point, you tell me, and
20 we'll deal with it when we get across that bridge.
21 Okay?
22 A Terrific.
23 Q Good.
24 Is there any reason you can't give
25 truthful testimony today?

1 A Not that I'm aware of.
2 Q Okay. Are you currently employed?
3 A I am.
4 Q What is your position?
5 A I am the chief of staff in the city
6 attorney's office in the City of San Diego.
7 Q How long have you held that position?
8 A A little more than two years.
9 Q When did you start in that position?
10 A In December of 2016.
11 Q Where did you work prior to December 2016?
12 A Immediately prior I worked in the City of
13 San Diego city attorney's office.
14 Q Okay. What did you do in the city
15 attorney's office before you were chief of staff?
16 A I was the director of communications.
17 Q Okay. And how long were you director of
18 communications?
19 A More than two years.
20 Q When did you start as director of
21 communications?
22 A I believe, in September or October of
23 2014.
24 Q Prior to working as director of
25 communications were you employed anywhere?

1 A Yes.
2 Q Where, immediately before you were
3 director of communications?
4 A I was in -- I worked for myself. I was a
5 communications consultant with a number of clients.
6 Q How long were you a communications
7 consultant?
8 A Approximately two years.
9 Q Did you have your own company?
10 A I did.
11 Q What was it called?
12 A It was called Gerry Braun & Associates.
13 MR. KARLIN: Mr. Briggs, I'm gonna
14 interject at least an objection to this line of
15 questioning. I know that these are simply
16 foundational, but I do have an objection that it's
17 not relevant or, given the limited scope in Public
18 Records Act litigation, in terms of Mr. Braun's
19 prior work history, certainly you can ask him
20 questions, I believe, that would be unobjectionable
21 regarding his involvement in this particular issue,
22 the issues presented in this case, but to delve any
23 further into his prior work history would be beyond
24 the scope of permissible discovery.
25 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. Your objection is

1 noted.
2 BY MR. BRIGGS:
3 Q Did you have a job before you were a
4 communications consultant working for yourself?
5 A I'm gonna look to my attorney.
6 Q Well, he didn't tell you not to answer.
7 A I was merely saying that I was going to
8 look to my attorney.
9 MR. KARLIN: Do you need standing
10 objections to this line of questioning, or I could
11 object at every question.
12 MR. BRIGGS: You should object every
13 question to preserve, but the witness needs to
14 answer the question, unless you're instructing him
15 not to answer.
16 MR. KARLIN: I'm gonna instruct him not to
17 answer the question. And if this line of
18 questioning continues, we'll move for a protective
19 order.
20 MR. BRIGGS: Really? Your witness, I
21 think, has worked with the city -- for the City of
22 San Diego for a lot longer than he's told me about
23 so far.
24 MR. KARLIN: And again, given the limited
25 scope of discovery in a Public Records Act or a

1 Public Records Act litigation, how is any of this
2 going to facilitate you or your clients addressing
3 the issues that are presented in this case?
4 MR. BRIGGS: Because of his familiarity
5 over the years with the Public Records Act is a
6 central issue.
7 MR. KARLIN: Then how are his questions,
8 in terms of our meet and confer conversation right
9 now, regarding his employment as self-employed for a
10 communications consultant?
11 MR. BRIGGS: I didn't. He's the one who
12 offered that up. I'm trying to go backwards to
13 figure out when he stopped working for the City of
14 San Diego. If the answer is he didn't work for the
15 City of San Diego before he was a communications
16 consultant, there's no reason to go further.
17 MR. KARLIN: I think you've misunderstood
18 his testimony, and maybe another question regarding
19 his direct employment after -- or prior to his
20 employment as a director of communications in the
21 city attorney's office will be applicable.
22 MR. BRIGGS: You're welcome to ask him the
23 questions how you'd like.
24 BY MR. BRIGGS:
25 Q I would like to know whether you had a job

1 before you were a communications consultant working
2 for yourself. Did you?
3 MR. KARLIN: Again, objection. Beyond the
4 scope of admissible discovery.
5 I'm instructing the witness not to answer.
6 BY MR. BRIGGS:
7 Q You're not gonna answer the question
8 whether you had a job before you were working for
9 yourself for a couple of years as a private
10 communications consultant; is that correct?
11 MR. KARLIN: He's asking you if you're
12 going to follow the advice of counsel not to answer
13 this question. My objection on the record is it's
14 beyond the scope of permissible discovery. And if
15 this line of questioning again continues, we can
16 adjourn the deposition and seek a protective order.
17 I don't wish to do that at this time, but his
18 question pending is are you gonna follow that advice
19 not to answer the question.
20 THE WITNESS: I'm going to follow the
21 advice of my attorney throughout this deposition.
22 BY MR. BRIGGS:
23 Q Other than working for the San Diego city
24 attorney's office, have you ever worked anywhere
25 else in the city of San Diego -- for the City of

1 San Diego?
2 Are you gonna answer that or are you gonna
3 look at your lawyer? He didn't object.
4 Have you ever worked for the City of
5 San Diego, other than in the city attorney's office?
6 A You've now asked me three questions.
7 So --
8 Q Here's the question. Other than working
9 in the city attorney's office, have you ever worked
10 anywhere else for the City of San Diego?
11 A Yes, I have.
12 Q What office?
13 A I worked in the mayor's office.
14 Q When?
15 A From approximately September of 2008,
16 until December of 2012.
17 Q Any other employment with the City of
18 San Diego, that you haven't already testified about?
19 A None.
20 Q What did you do for the mayor's office?
21 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Beyond the scope
22 of permissible discovery.
23 I'm instructing my witness -- the witness
24 not to answer the question.
25 ///

1 BY MR. BRIGGS:
2 Q What position did you hold when you worked
3 in the mayor's office?
4 A If I'm not mistaken, you're asking the
5 same question that my attorney instructed me not to
6 answer.
7 Q He didn't. You can answer the question.
8 MR. KARLIN: You can tell him, if you can,
9 the title of your position or positions that you
10 held within the mayor's office.
11 THE WITNESS: I was the director of
12 special projects.
13 BY MR. BRIGGS:
14 Q Can you give me a general description of
15 what the director of special projects did when you
16 held the position?
17 MR. KARLIN: Again I'm gonna object as
18 beyond the scope of permissible discovery and
19 instruct the witness not to answer.
20 MR. BRIGGS: Really? You're gonna
21 instruct him not to answer the question about his
22 general job duties?
23 MR. KARLIN: Again, how is this relevant
24 to the issues that are presented in this case?
25 MR. BRIGGS: Well, maybe he worked on the

1 Public Records Act, but --
2 MR. KARLIN: Why don't you ask him?
3 MR. BRIGGS: Because I don't want to have
4 to ask a hundred different questions if he can give
5 a general description and it expedites this and we
6 can be out of here faster.
7 MR. KARLIN: Then on the limited aspect,
8 then I'll --
9 MR. BRIGGS: I just want to know what he
10 did as the director of special projects, David.
11 This is not complicated.
12 MR. KARLIN: Understood.
13 MR. BRIGGS: I understand, from our
14 conversation before these questions, that you've
15 been asked to come here and carry some water. I get
16 that, but let's just get to the questions and the
17 answers so we can wrap this up.
18 MR. KARLIN: But again -- Well, again, if
19 it's a general question, I'll withdraw my objection
20 or at least the instruct to not answer, but I don't
21 want to go too far afield into everything that
22 Mr. Braun has either done for the City of
23 San Diego -- If it's relevant to the issues
24 presented in this case, I would argue that it's
25 permissible.

1 You stated that you wanted to talk about
2 his involvement in California Public Records Act.
3 You have yet to ask that type of question.
4 MR. BRIGGS: I'm asking foundational
5 questions. We're five minutes into the deposition.
6 I want to know -- I'm gonna ask about his service
7 in the City. I'm gonna ask about whether he's
8 familiar with the Public Records Act. I may have to
9 ask him whether he has other familiarity with the
10 Public Records Act. But if you're just gonna
11 obstruct this deposition from the get-go, that's a
12 problem.
13 MR. KARLIN: I'm allowed, am I not, to put
14 my objections on the record?
15 MR. BRIGGS: You are allowed to put them
16 on the record, but you're not allowed to instruct
17 the witness not to answer a question, unless it
18 deals with privilege --
19 MR. KARLIN: Right.
20 MR. BRIGGS: -- and you know that.
21 MR. KARLIN: Okay.
22 MR. BRIGGS: And we've been around this
23 bush before, David.
24 MR. KARLIN: I understand, but I also
25 understand the special nature of discovery in

1 relation to the Public Records Act. It's not a
2 general civil case, and you are well familiar that
3 there's a case directly on point to that fact.
4 MR. BRIGGS: The case you're referring to
5 says that I can't be doing discovery into the
6 documents that are the set that have been withheld.
7 You can't use discovery as an end-run around getting
8 the documents under the Public Records Act.
9 There's no case that says in a deposition
10 in a public records case I can't ask foundational
11 questions. You've asked questions just like this
12 hundreds of times, to every witness you've ever
13 deposed.
14 MR. KARLIN: That I can't disagree with,
15 in terms of my ability to ask questions of a
16 foundational nature.
17 MR. BRIGGS: That's right.
18 MR. KARLIN: But what you're asking,
19 though, is now his specifics as to what he did in
20 the mayor's office.
21 MR. BRIGGS: I didn't ask specifics. I
22 literally said, "Can you give me a general
23 description?" I said "general description."
24 MR. KARLIN: Okay. Then I'll withdraw the
25 objection.

1 MR. BRIGGS: Thank you.
2 MR. KARLIN: Continue.
3 BY MR. BRIGGS:
4 Q Can you give me a general description of
5 what you did as the director of special projects?
6 A I worked on projects at the direction of
7 the mayor and his chief of staff.
8 Q Okay. Did you ever deal with public
9 records when you were the director of special
10 projects?
11 A Could you be more specific in describing
12 "deal with public records"?
13 Q Did anybody ever make a public records
14 request to you?
15 A No.
16 Q Did anybody ever ask for public records
17 that you had in your possession?
18 A Yes.
19 Q Did you ever work to respond to a request
20 for public records?
21 A No.
22 Q Have you ever had any training on the
23 Public Records Act?
24 A I don't know.
25 Q Before you worked for the City, were you a

1 journalist?
2 A I was.
3 Q Did you ever make a public records request
4 as a journalist?
5 A I did.
6 Q How many occasions?
7 A I can only guess.
8 Q More than a hundred?
9 A Certainly not.
10 Q Okay. More than fifty?
11 A No.
12 Q So how about more than twenty-five?
13 A No.
14 Q More than ten?
15 A I can only guess.
16 Q Well, but you know it was not more than
17 twenty-five; right?
18 A Yes.
19 Q Okay. And you don't recall any training
20 in the Public Records Act while you were a
21 journalist?
22 A I'm not sure.
23 Q Have you had any training on the Public
24 Records Act while you've been an employee of the
25 City of San Diego, at any time?

1 A I can't recall any.
2 Q Okay. Do you hold any professional
3 licenses?
4 A No.
5 Q So you're not an attorney; correct?
6 A Correct.
7 Q Did you go to law school?
8 A No.
9 Q You hold a bachelor's degree?
10 A I do.
11 Q Any other college-level degrees?
12 A No.
13 Q Okay. So is it fair to say that you've
14 worked for the city attorney's office consecutively
15 about five years now?
16 A That's fair.
17 Q Are you familiar with some proposed
18 legislation known as Senate Bill 615?
19 A I am.
20 Q Okay. If I refer to that legislation as
21 SB615 today, will you understand that I'm talking
22 about Senate Bill 615?
23 A I will.
24 Q Okay. Did you do any work -- Well, let
25 me back up.

1 What's your understanding of who wrote
2 SB615?
3 MR. KARLIN: Again I'm gonna interpose an
4 objection that this is beyond the scope of
5 permissible discovery. And again, the grounds
6 are -- is how is this related to the issues
7 presented in this case?
8 MR. BRIGGS: Are you telling him not to
9 answer the question?
10 MR. KARLIN: I will.
11 I'm instructing him not to answer the
12 question.
13 MR. BRIGGS: Because I asked him whether
14 he knew who wrote SB615, you're telling him he can't
15 answer that question?
16 MR. KARLIN: Again, how is this, again,
17 within the permissible scope, the limited
18 permissible scope in litigation under the California
20 MR. BRIGGS: The lawsuit's literally about
21 documents concerning the writing of SB615. This is
22 squarely at the heart of this case.
23 MR. KARLIN: Not who wrote it, but there
24 is a particular document that the City -- If I
25 understand the issues presented in this case, there

1 was one particular e-mail or e-mail string that the
2 City exempted from production or stated that it was
3 a response to public record but exempt as attorney
4 work product. You haven't asked about that.
5 MR. BRIGGS: You're -- Well, that's --
6 that's one issue. I'm also concerned about the
7 reasonableness of the search --
9 MR. BRIGGS: -- and who was involved in
10 it, and I want to make sure that this witness
11 actually knows something about the bill. Maybe he
12 just doesn't know anything and he shouldn't be here
13 at all. So I'm going to try to find out what he
14 knows about the bill so that we can get through this
15 expeditiously.
17 BY MR. BRIGGS:
18 Q Okay. Do you have any idea who wrote
19 SB615, sir?
20 A I don't.
21 Q So do you know whether the bill originated
22 in the Legislature or originated in the city
23 attorney's office?
24 A I believe that the bill originated in the
25 city attorney's office.

1 MR. BRIGGS: Okay.
2 MR. KARLIN: I'm gonna object on the
3 record that the response was an answer that it's
4 speculative.
5 BY MR. BRIGGS:
6 Q When is the first conversation that you
7 ever had with anybody in the city attorney's office
8 about SB615?
9 A I can't recall the first conversation I
10 had.
11 Q You don't recall the date?
12 A The date of the first conversation?
13 Q Yeah.
14 A I can't recall the conversation.
15 Q Okay.
16 A I'd have trouble recalling the date.
17 Q Can you recall any conversation you've had
18 with anybody in the city attorney's office
19 concerning SB615 prior to April 1 of this year?
20 A I can.
21 Q Okay. How many conversations about that
22 subject matter can you recall?
23 A I would have to spend some time trying to
24 answer that question.
25 Q Okay. Feel free to start.

1 A Okay. I can recall maybe a half a dozen
2 conversations.
3 Q Okay. What's the first conversation in
4 that half dozen you can recall? When did it occur?
5 A I'm gonna have to just give a blanket "I
6 don't know" to when did it occur. I did not consult
7 a calendar, and I'm -- frankly, would be guessing at
8 dates of when conversations occurred.
9 Q Who was involved in that conversation with
10 you?
11 A An attorney in our office.
12 Q What's that attorney's name?
13 A Bill Gersten.
14 Q Do you know whether this conversation was
15 before or after your office wrote SB615?
16 MR. KARLIN: I'm gonna object as to
17 foundational aspects. I think it also misstates the
18 deposition testimony of the witness in terms of the
19 city attorney's office writing SB615.
20 But you can answer.
21 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. The question
22 again was --
23 BY MR. BRIGGS:
24 Q Do you know whether that conversation with
25 Mr. Gersten occurred before or after your office

1 wrote SB615?
2 MR. KARLIN: Same objection.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you for restating the
4 question, which I understand from my attorney I
5 can't answer.
6 MR. KARLIN: I've not instructed you not
7 to answer the question. I simply put an objection
8 on the record in terms of it misstating -- it either
9 lacks foundation or it misstates your deposition
10 testimony, but you can answer, if you know.
11 THE WITNESS: I recall a conversation with
12 Bill Gersten in which we discussed a approach to
13 Public Record Act requests that would require a meet
14 and confer before litigation could proceed.
15 BY MR. BRIGGS:
16 Q Was anybody else in that conversation with
17 you?
18 A Not as I recall that conversation.
19 Q Okay. What's the next conversation that
20 you recall?
21 A I recall a conversation with the City
22 attorney.
23 Q Mara Elliott; correct?
24 A Correct.
25 Q Okay. Do you recall when that

1 conversation occurred?
2 A I do not.
3 Q And what did you and the city attorney
4 discuss in that conversation, about SB615?
5 A That she supported the idea of legislation
6 that would require a meet and confer before
7 litigation could proceed --
8 Q Okay.
9 A -- on a Public Record Act dispute.
10 Q Did you two discuss anything else about
11 SB615 during that conversation?
12 A Only that I would attempt to find a
13 legislative sponsor for that.
14 Q Okay. So that second conversation you
15 had, the one with Mara Elliott, if you were
16 discussing trying to find a sponsor, that
17 conversation would have occurred before
18 Senator Hueso agreed to sponsor it; correct?
19 A Correct.
20 Q Okay. What's the -- Was anybody else in
21 the conversation between you and Mara Elliott that
22 you just mentioned?
24 Q Okay. What's the third conversation you
25 recall having?

1 A I recall a conversation in which I
2 informed the city attorney that Senator Hueso was
3 going to carry the legislation that became SB615.
4 Q Okay. So let me make sure I have this
5 right. The first conversation you can recall was
6 with Bill Gersten, the second conversation was with
7 Mara Elliott pre-sponsorship, and then the next
8 conversation you can recall was with Mara Elliott,
9 during which you informed her that Senator Hueso
10 would sponsor the measure; correct?
11 A That's correct.
12 Q What was the -- Was anybody else in that
13 third conversation?
15 Q Okay. What's the fourth conversation you
16 can recall?
17 A The fourth conversation I can recall was a
18 conversation with Bill Gersten, and it concerned an
19 e-mail that I had sent to Aaron Brieno in
20 Senator Hueso's office, which, upon my review of
21 that e-mail, I became concerned contained privileged
22 information that should not have been released
23 outside of our office.
24 Q What made you concerned?
25 A My review of the e-mail.

1 Q What was it -- It was an e-mail that you
2 had sent; correct?
3 A Yes.
4 Q So what is it about the e-mail that
5 concerned you after you sent it, that didn't concern
6 you before you sent it?
7 A I discovered that the e-mail contained an
8 analysis of a legal decision that struck me, on
9 second reading, as potentially confidential.
10 Q On first reading it didn't strike you that
11 way, but on the second reading it did; correct?
12 A I cannot recall how it struck me on the
13 first reading.
14 Q But it didn't strike you as problematic to
15 share it on first reading, because you shared it;
16 correct?
17 A Again, I cannot recall my reaction to it,
18 to say whether it did or did not strike me in any
19 particular way.
20 Q Well, if it did strike you as problematic
21 to share, would you have sent it anyways?
22 A In error I would have sent something like
23 that, yes.
24 Q Would you have knowingly sent it, meaning
25 you knew you had a concern or question about it, but

1 you sent it anyways?
2 A No.
3 Q Okay. And how long after you sent this
4 e-mail did you read it for a second time and grow
5 concerned?
6 A I do not know.
7 Q Know an approximation?
8 A A matter of weeks, perhaps.
9 Q Okay. Two, three weeks?
10 A No idea.
11 Q Well, you said, "A matter of weeks." I
12 mean "weeks" is plural. So I started with the
13 lowest number of plural at two.
14 A I appreciate your effort. What I'm
15 suggesting is that it doesn't strike me that it
16 happened within the same week.
17 Q So more than a week later?
18 A Yes.
19 Q So at least in the second week after; is
20 that fair?
21 A At least.
22 Q Okay. And it could have been more than
23 two weeks; right?
24 A Yes.
25 Q Okay. What's the fifth conversation --

1 Well, sorry.
2 Back on the fourth conversation, was
3 anybody else involved in it, other than you and Bill
4 Gersten?
6 MR. BRIGGS: And for the court reporter's
7 benefit, we should just let her know that Bill
8 Gersten's last name is G-E-R-S-T-E-N. I assume you
9 know "Bill." Mara is M-A-R-A, E- double L-I-O-
10 double T.
11 BY MR. BRIGGS:
12 Q Okay. What's the fifth conversation you
13 can recall about SB615, with someone in the city
15 MR. KARLIN: Again I'm gonna object. I
16 think that misstates his testimony. I think the
17 testimony is that he had half a dozen conversations
18 regarding SB615. I don't believe it's limited
19 strictly to within the city attorney's office.
20 MR. BRIGGS: Fair enough. Let me ask it
21 again.
22 BY MR. BRIGGS:
23 Q What's the fifth conversation you can
24 recall about SB615?
25 A I recall visiting the office of the city

1 attorney and informing her that I had mistakenly
2 provided, to Aaron Brieno in Senator Hueso's office,
3 an e-mail that, upon review, contained confidential
4 information that should not have been released, and
5 I apologized to her for doing that.
6 Q Was anybody else present for the
7 conversation?
8 A Not as I recall the conversation.
9 Q Okay. What did she say to you in
10 response?
11 A She assured me that mistakes like that
12 occur and that there was a legal process by which
13 that e-mail could be clawed back, so that it could
14 not be used by any third party and could not harm
15 the office through a breach of confidentiality.
16 Q Okay. And -- And did she tell you what
17 that process involved?
18 A She did not.
19 Q Okay. Did she give you any instructions
20 to do follow-up work on the matter?
21 A She did not.
22 Q Okay. Did you have -- And was -- is that
23 the extent of the conversation you had with her?
24 You apologized, she said don't worry about it,
25 there's a process, and it was over?

1 A That's what I recall.
2 Q Okay. What's the next conversation you
3 can recall concerning SB615?
4 A The next conversation I recall is a
5 conversation with Aaron Brieno.
6 Q Okay. And where did that conversation
7 occur?
8 A It occurred by telephone.
9 Q Okay.
10 A I was in my office. I assume he was in
11 his office in Sacramento.
12 Q And what did you and --
13 And Aaron is double A-R-O-N. Last name
14 B-R-I-E-N-O.
15 What did you and Mr. Brieno discuss during
16 that conversation?
17 A I explained to Mr. Brieno that I had
18 inadvertently provided to him an e-mail which
19 contained confidential information and that I was
20 now clawing back that e-mail. I explained to him
21 that he should not read the e-mail, that he should
22 not share the e-mail with anyone else, and that he
23 should destroy any copies of the e-mail.
24 Q And did you tell him anything else?
25 A Not that I recall.

1 Q What did he say in response?
2 A He said that he understood, that he had
3 not read the e-mail, and that he would follow my
4 request to the letter.
5 Q What did you say in response to those
6 words from him?
7 A I do not recall. Although, I think it's
8 fair to say that I thanked him.
9 Q Did you keep any notes from any of these
10 conversations?
11 A No.
12 Q Is it your practice not to keep notes of
13 conversations you've had with people?
14 A It is.
15 Q Was that a practice you developed working
16 for the City, or did you have that when you were a
17 reporter, too?
18 A As a reporter I kept some notes and did
19 not keep other notes.
20 Q And now that you work in the city
21 attorney's office you don't keep any notes of
22 conversations; is that correct?
24 Q Okay. Is it -- Is it fair to say that
25 the city attorney's office was -- worked hand in

1 hand with Senator Hueso's office to get SB615
2 through the Legislature? Is that a fair statement?
3 I realize it ended up being killed, but,
4 before that, your office was working pretty hard
5 with Senator Hueso's office to move that legislation
6 forward. Is that a fair statement?
7 A Your first statement, which was that we
8 worked hand in hand is a correct statement.
9 Q Okay. Are you aware of anybody else who
10 was working on SB615, other than Senator Hueso's
11 office and the city attorney's office?
12 A I'm gonna take a break here to get some
13 water. It won't be long.
14 Q Hang on. Is there an answer to the
15 question before we take the break?
16 A Oh, I was gonna -- Yes, my -- I'm sorry.
17 I will need clarification on "working on."
18 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. Let's go off the
19 record.
20 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the record. The
21 time is 1:37 p.m.
22 (Recess: 1:37 p.m. to 1:40 p.m.)
23 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Back on the record.
24 The time is 1:40 p.m.
25 ///

1 BY MR. BRIGGS:
2 Q Sir, do you want to change any of your
3 answers, now that you've spoken to your attorney at
4 the break?
5 A Our conversation did not concern any of my
6 answers. So no. I have no desire to change any of
7 my answers.
8 Q Good.
9 A I can clarify now the question I asked of
10 you, which is, by "working on," I'm going to assume
11 that you mean working in support of.
12 Q That's a safe assumption.
13 A Okay. That's all I wanted to be sure of.
14 Q So is it a fair statement that the city
15 attorney's office and the -- Senator Hueso's office
16 were the primary offices working on -- in support of
17 SB615?
18 A Correct. That is a true statement.
19 Q Okay. What was your role in that process?
20 A I was the liaison between the two offices,
21 on behalf of the city attorney's office. So I
22 communicated with Mr. Brieno.
23 Q Who put you in charge as the liaison?
24 A The city attorney.
25 Q Okay. Did you and the city attorney have

1 a conversation during which she said you were gonna
2 be the liaison on SB615?
3 A I'm sure we did.
4 Q But you don't remember it?
5 A I do not.
6 Q Okay. Is it fair to say that the city
7 attorney was your sole supervisor with respect to
8 the work you did on SB615?
9 A She is my sole supervisor in all things I
10 do in the city attorney's office.
11 Q So the answer to that question is yes?
12 A Yes.
13 I'm sorry. I should have been clearer.
14 Q Does Bill Gersten report to you?
15 A No.
16 Q Where are you in the hierarchy in the city
17 attorney's office, as the chief of staff?
18 A Hierarchy is not a term that applies in
19 our office. We have -- You could create flow
20 charts or organizational charts, but hierarchy is --
21 Q Okay. Well, where are you on the
22 organizational chart, in relation to Mara Elliott?
23 A In an organizational chart, as I imagine
24 it in my head, the city attorney is at the top, and
25 there is a box, that has my name and title in it,

1 that is to the left or right of that box, with a
2 straight line.
3 Q Okay. And where is Bill Gersten, in
4 relation to you and the city attorney?
5 A Bill Gersten is an employee in -- or is
6 a -- sorry -- a deputy city attorney in one of the
7 three divisions of the city attorney's office. All
8 of those divisions are under Mara Elliott.
9 Q So let's back up. What does a chief of
10 staff in -- in the city attorney's office do?
11 A I work, at the direction of the city
12 attorney, on whatever project, issue, or problem she
13 wants me to address, in the way she wants me to
14 address it.
15 Q Do you ever supervise any of the other
16 staff in the office?
17 A I do.
18 Q Do you sometimes supervise lawyers?
19 A I do not.
20 Q So who -- What levels of staff do you
21 supervise then?
22 A I have a -- or I -- Scratch that.
23 There is a director of communications and
24 a senior public information officer who report up
25 to -- through me, to the city attorney.

1 Q Do you ever deal with the clients, or you
2 only work for Mara Elliott?
3 A There's a discord in that question, that I
4 think it should be addressed at the outset, because
5 "deal with" and "work for" are two different
6 concepts.
7 Q Well, does a client ever ask you for
8 advice? Let's make it precise.
9 A Never.
10 Q Okay.
11 A And if the client were to ask for advice,
12 I would certainly explain that I am not a lawyer and
13 I don't give advice.
14 Q Do you ever talk to the clients without
15 lawyers present?
16 A The client of the city -- or of the city
17 attorney's office is the City of San Diego. The --
18 To describe clients in the context of the charter
19 role of the city attorney's office is incorrect. We
20 have only one client.
21 Q Okay. Well, you represent city employees.
22 The city attorney's office represents city
23 employees; right -- in litigation?
24 A I'm not certain what to make of the word
25 "represents."

1 Q Is the attorney for.
2 A The city attorney's office is the attorney
3 for employees of the City of San Diego in certain
4 litigation. I believe that's correct, yes.
5 Q Do you under -- Do you understand that
6 when lawyers work for clients they are representing
7 the clients, or have you never heard that use of the
8 word "representation" before?
9 A I have.
10 Q Okay. How -- Let's do it this way.
11 What word do you use to describe the work
12 that the city attorney's office does for the various
13 officials and employees of the City of San Diego?
14 We don't have to use my word. Let's use yours.
15 A We advise.
16 Q What about in court? Is that all
17 advisory?
18 A I'm sorry. You asked for the word I use.
19 Q Well, that's --
20 A That's the word I use.
21 Q Okay. So when the city attorney's office
22 goes to court to defend an employee, let's say a
23 police officer accused of -- of brutality or sexual
24 abuse, in your mind, the city attorney's office is
25 advising that officer who is a defendant in the

1 lawsuit?
2 A I think it's reasonable to say that we
3 defend, as well as advise.
4 Q Okay. So let's use "advise" and "defend,"
5 instead of "represent." Is that fair?
6 A Excellent.
7 Q Are you ever, as chief of staff, part of
8 conversations concerning the defense of city
9 officials or employees?
10 MR. KARLIN: Again I'm gonna object. This
11 is beyond the scope of admissible discovery. But
12 instead of instructing the witness, I'll allow him
13 to answer, but I think we're getting far afield now.
14 MR. BRIGGS: We're gonna get back to SB615
15 shortly. I just need some foundational stuff so I
16 can accelerate my questions.
17 You can answer that question.
18 THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question?
19 MR. BRIGGS: The court reporter will be
20 happy to read it to you.
21 THE WITNESS: Terrific.
22 (Record read by the reporter.)
23 THE WITNESS: Yes.
24 BY MR. BRIGGS:
25 Q Okay. Do you, yourself, ever defend any

1 city officials or employees?
2 A In court?
3 Q However you use the word "defend." It was
4 your word.
5 A When I use the word "defend," I mean
6 defend in court, and of course I do not, because I
7 am not an attorney.
8 Q Okay. So the answer would be "no"?
9 A The answer would be "no."
10 MR. BRIGGS: I'm gonna show you an exhibit
11 we've marked as number 1.
12 (Exhibit 1 was marked for
13 identification and attached hereto.)
14 BY MR. BRIGGS:
15 Q Number 1 is a series of documents that the
16 City produced in response to my client's public
17 records request, the one that's the subject of this
18 lawsuit. Take a look at Exhibit 1 and tell me
19 whether you recognize those documents.
20 A I recognize these documents.
21 Q Do you have any idea how they came to be
22 in my possession?
23 A I do.
24 Q What's your understanding of how they came
25 to be in my possession?

1 A My understanding is that you filed a
2 Public Record Act request with the City of
3 San Diego, and as a result of that Public Record Act
4 request those documents were produced.
5 Q Were you involved at all in searching for
6 the responsive public records included in Exhibit 1?
7 MR. KARLIN: Objection as to the ambiguity
8 regarding the word or term "involved." If you could
9 maybe further explain that, I mean, because again it
10 is so broad.
11 BY MR. BRIGGS:
12 Q Now this -- These aren't trick questions.
13 You under -- Did you do any work in order to
14 respond to my client's public records request?
15 A Okay. That's a different question. Your
16 initial question concerned the documents in your
17 hand, and I assume that the documents in your hand
18 were the result of an I.T. search, which I would
19 have nothing to do with.
20 Q Okay. So --
21 A So that's -- that was --
22 Q Well, then you can --
23 A That was just my problem.
24 Q You can just say that.
25 A Well, I was --

1 Q That's --
2 A -- pausing. I was pausing. I was parsing
3 your sentence there.
4 Q So you didn't print out any of the
5 documents in Exhibit 1 here today?
6 A That's correct.
7 Q Okay. Did you discuss my client's request
8 with anybody before the documents were provided to
9 my client?
10 A I assume I did. Although, I cannot recall
11 any particular conversation.
12 Q Well, what work do you recall doing in
13 response to my client's request?
14 A I recall reviewing my own e-mail that
15 would be responsive to that request.
16 Q Did you give anybody copies of those
17 e-mails that were responsive?
18 A I don't recall.
19 I know that our office has a practice of
20 doing an I.T. search so that nothing is left behind,
21 because any human search would potentially omit
22 something that could lead to a lawsuit.
23 Q Well, before the documents were produced
24 to my client, did you review any documents to make
25 sure that all of your responsive records were being

1 turned over?
2 A No.
3 Q Who did?
4 A Your question is who reviewed my records
5 to determine that all responsive records were being
6 turned over?
7 Q That's correct.
8 A That would be the function of the I.T.
9 search.
10 Q Without you looking at them, how would
11 they be sure that they had all of your e-mails?
12 A By the wizardry of computers.
13 Q So you don't actually look at the finished
14 product immediately before it's turned over to the
15 public, to make sure that the public's getting
16 everything that they asked for, at least when it
17 concerns responsive records that you have?
18 A I trust that the I.T. search will capture
19 all documents that meet the search criteria.
20 Q Did you provide any search criteria to the
21 I.T. department for this request?
22 A The PRA requester provides the search
23 criteria.
24 Q That didn't happen in this case. The PRA
25 requester provided the request.

1 A Okay.
2 Q The search criteria that go to the I.T.
3 department, you know well, are developed by somebody
4 other than the requester, unless they ask, which
5 didn't happen.
6 So let me ask you again. Were you
7 involved in developing the search criteria that the
8 I.T. department used? Yes or no.
9 A No.
10 Q Okay. Do you know who was?
11 A No.
12 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. I'm gonna show you an
13 exhibit we'll mark as number 2.
16 BY MR. BRIGGS:
17 Q Why don't you take a look at Exhibit 2 and
18 tell me whether you recognize Exhibit 2 as the
19 second half of the documents provided by the city
20 attorney's office in response to -- or as the second
21 half of the documents provided by the City in
22 response to my client's request.
23 MR. KARLIN: Cory, just for clarification,
24 your comment to the second batch, are you referring
25 that there were multiple batches uploaded into the

1 NEXTREQUEST system? Is that where you're saying --
2 MR. BRIGGS: That is factually --
3 MR. KARLIN: -- it's the second batch?
4 MR. BRIGGS: Factually, that is what
5 happened.
6 MR. KARLIN: Okay.
7 THE WITNESS: I recognize these.
8 BY MR. BRIGGS:
9 Q Okay. You recognize these as the other
10 half of the documents produced?
11 A I recognize these as documents that I've
12 seen before. I don't know what -- how they were
13 produced.
14 Q Okay. Were you involved in gathering any
15 of the documents in Exhibit 2 and providing them to
16 my client in response to its request?
17 A No.
18 Q Is your answer -- If I ask you the same
19 questions about Exhibit 2, that I did about
20 Exhibit 1, in terms of the search criteria that I.T.
21 uses, whether you review documents before they're
22 turned over, all those questions, would your answers
23 be the same?
24 A Except for the one where you corrected me
25 concerning who creates the search criteria. I would

1 not give that answer again.
2 Q Okay. You would give the follow-up
3 answer, though; correct?
4 A I believe so, yes.
5 Q Okay. Great. See, we just saved five
6 minutes.
7 A Excellent.
8 Q Did you ever have -- Well, let me ask
9 this.
10 As the liaison -- As Mara Elliott's
11 liaison on SB615, is it a fair statement that you
12 were the point of contact for the Legislature in
13 dealing with the legislation?
14 A That's fair to say.
15 Q Okay. Whatever communications were
16 happening between the two offices were essentially
17 going through Gerry Braun; correct?
19 Q Okay.
20 A Not all, but I'm -- I'm sure, but --
21 Q And the city attorney wasn't representing
22 Senator Hueso in connection with SB615, was it?
23 A The city attorney can only represent the
24 City of San Diego.
25 Q That's not what I asked you.

1 A I'm sorry.
2 Q The city attorney wasn't representing
3 Senator Hueso in connection with SB615; is that
4 correct?
5 MR. KARLIN: In what capacity? Legal
6 representation?
7 MR. BRIGGS: In any capacity.
8 THE WITNESS: Okay. Well --
9 MR. BRIGGS: You're --
10 THE WITNESS: -- earlier we defined
11 represents in a way --
12 MR. BRIGGS: Well, let me ask you this.
13 THE WITNESS: -- that's no longer being
14 used. So --
15 BY MR. BRIGGS:
16 Q Well, let's put it this way. Was
17 Senator Hueso ever the city attorney's office's
18 client with respect to SB615?
19 A No.
20 Q Okay. Was any individual in Mr. Hueso's
21 office ever a client of the city attorney's office
22 with respect to SB615?
23 A No.
24 Q Was the California Legislature ever a
25 client of the city attorney's office with respect to

1 SB615?
2 A No.
3 Q Are you familiar with statements made by
4 the mayor of the City of San Diego, that he was
5 unaware the city attorney's office had authored
6 SB615?
7 A No.
8 Q You never heard those statements before?
9 A No.
10 Q Do you know whether the city attorney's
11 office got the mayor's permission to author SB615?
12 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Beyond the scope
13 of admissible discovery in this particular lawsuit,
14 and I think again we're getting into that territory.
15 MR. BRIGGS: No, the question is about the
16 client, and we're -- we're well within.
17 BY MR. BRIGGS:
18 Q Did the city attorney's office get the
19 mayor's permission to author SB615?
20 A No.
21 Q Did the city attorney's office get the
22 permission of any member of the city council to
23 author SB615?
24 A No.
25 Q The city attorney authored SB615 on her

1 own initiative; is that a fair statement?
2 A Yes.
3 Q Okay. Have you ever heard the term
4 "legislative history"?
5 A Yes.
6 Q What's your understanding of the term?
7 A My understanding of the term "legislative
8 history" is that it is -- it refers to the records
9 kept by the Legislature, by which you can
10 reconstruct the passage of a bill and changes to the
11 wording or nature of that bill as it passes through
12 the Legislature.
13 Q And does your understanding of legislative
14 history include the concept that the record that you
15 just made mention of will include evidence and other
16 information for and against a particular piece of
17 legislation?
18 A It does.
19 Q Does your understanding of legislative
20 history include the concept that the record will
21 include the reasons why the Legislature adopted the
22 law in question?
23 A It does not.
24 Q Okay. So do you have an understanding
25 that legislative history will include information

1 about why the law is necessary?
2 A I would say it can, but I'm not certain
3 that it will.
4 Q Okay. Do you have an understanding that
5 legislative history will include information about
6 why a law is good or bad?
7 A Again I would say "can," but not "will."
8 Q Okay. When you were working with
9 Senator Hueso's office on SB615, were you ever
10 providing information to that office to help them
11 understand the need, as your office understood it,
12 for SB615?
13 A I was.
14 Q Were you trying to, for lack of a better
15 term, educate the senator's office on the need for
16 SB615?
17 A For lack of a better word, yes.
18 Q Okay. And did you understand that the
19 information you gave to Senator Hueso's office would
20 be used by the Legislature in processing SB615?
21 A I did not.
22 Q And what did you think was gonna happen
23 with the information you were giving to Mr. -- to
24 Senator Hueso's staff?
25 A That they would use it in whatever way

1 they thought was most advisable.
2 Q Okay. You didn't know exactly what they
3 would do with it when you gave it to them, but you
4 knew that they would be doing whatever they thought
5 was best with the information; correct?
6 A That is correct.
7 Q Okay. And you didn't have any qualms
8 about giving Senator Hueso's office information
9 concerning SB615, did you?
10 A Well, I think, since the subject of this
11 deposition is information that was inadvertently
12 given, I guess "qualms" is a term that I would --
13 saying I do not have any qualms is a term I would
14 not necessarily embrace.
15 Q At the time you shared information with
16 Senator Hueso's office, you didn't have any qualms
17 about sharing it; right?
18 A So long as I was authorized to share that
19 information, it was not confidential.
20 Q Okay. When did Mara Elliott authorize you
21 to share any information with Senator Hueso's
22 office? When she made you the liaison or at some
23 other time?
24 A When she made me the liaison.
25 Q Okay. And when she made you the liaison,

1 did she tell you that there was anything that you
2 would have to go back to her for in order to get
3 further authorization?
4 A She may have. I don't recall.
5 Q Okay. What was the -- What was the
6 extent of the authority that she gave you when she
7 authorized you to be the liaison?
8 A To work with Senator Hueso's office to see
9 that the bill was introduced.
10 Q Did she tell you to be candid with
11 Senator Hueso's office or did she tell you to be
12 dishonest with Senator Hueso's office?
13 A Neither.
14 Q Okay. What did she tell you in terms of
15 your frankness and candor toward the senator's
16 office? Anything?
17 A No.
18 Q Is that normal in your dealings with the
19 city attorney, that she doesn't have to tell you to
20 be candid and frank with people?
21 A Yes.
22 Q Okay. Is it your sense that she doesn't
23 give you those instructions because the default
24 position for you is always gonna be frankness and
25 candor in who you deal with?

1 A I hope so, but that's getting into what's
2 in her mind.
3 Q Well, in your mind, do you think that she
4 believes you're gonna operate, as a default
5 position, with frankness and candor?
6 A In my mind, yes.
7 Q And in your mind, do you always operate
8 with frankness and candor?
9 A You would have to be more specific in
10 answering that -- or in asking that question.
11 Q Well, you -- you have a mind.
12 A Yes.
13 Q And it's yours?
14 A Yes, thank you.
15 Q And you know what frankness and candor
16 mean --
17 A Yes.
18 Q -- because you've asked questions about
19 them already. So in your mind, do you always
20 operate with frankness and candor in doing your job
21 as chief of staff?
22 A That's helpful. Those last words helped
23 clarify the sentence. Thank you.
24 I always operate with the appropriate
25 frankness and candor, yes.

1 Q Well, you said the last words were
2 helpful. Are there times when you don't operate
3 with frankness and candor?
4 A Of course. There are always times, when
5 you are dealing with individuals, in which you do
6 not tell them everything that's on your mind.
7 Q Did that -- Did that ever happen when you
8 were dealing with Senator Hueso's office on SB615?
10 Q Okay. Can you think of any instance, at
11 all, that might have given you reason to be less
12 than fully frank and candid with Senator Hueso's
13 office on SB615?
14 A None.
15 Q Okay. At some point did you have a
16 conversation with Senator Hueso's office about
17 what's commonly known as the Sukumar decision?
18 S-U-K-U-M-A-R.
19 A I did.
20 Q Okay. How many conversations did you
21 have, with anyone in Mr. Hueso's office, concerning
22 the Sukumar decision?
23 A I can't recall any specific conversation,
24 but I know that the topic came up.
25 Q Okay. Did you ever -- Did you ever offer

1 to send information, to anyone in Mr. Hueso's
2 office, concerning the Sukumar decision?
3 A I don't recall.
4 Q Did they ever ask you to send information
5 about the Sukumar decision?
6 A I believe they did.
7 Q Okay. Who asked?
8 A I believe, Aaron Brieno.
9 Q Okay. What do you recall him asking you
10 for?
11 A He wanted to understand the effect that
12 Sukumar was having on municipalities.
13 Q Okay. Now I think you testified earlier
14 that, after you sent the -- a certain e-mail, that
15 you think you shouldn't have sent, in hindsight,
16 that you were the one who realized you shouldn't
17 have sent it. Have I captured that sentiment
18 accurately?
19 A You're in the ballpark.
20 Q Okay. So there's an e-mail, that you
21 sent, that subsequently you regret sending. Is that
22 a fair statement?
23 A That's a fair statement.
24 Q And this e-mail, according to you, has
25 some information that you think is confidential. Is

1 that a fair statement?
2 A I was informed it was confidential.
3 Q Informed by whom?
4 A By Bill Gersten, who reviewed it.
5 Q Okay. And when did Mr. Gersten tell you
6 it was confidential?
7 A When I showed him the e-mail and asked him
8 that question.
9 Q So you send an e-mail to Mr. Brieno. And
10 then after you sent it, you print a copy for
11 Mr. Gersten and show it to him? Do I have that
12 right?
13 A I don't recall printing it, but that
14 sounds right.
15 Q Okay. And how long after you sent it to
16 Mr. Brieno before you showed it to Mr. Gersten? Was
17 that the week or two possibly?
18 A Yeah, that was the -- Yes.
19 Q A couple weeks, maybe?
20 A Yes.
21 Q I think we agreed that it was not a week.
22 It was plural. So it was two weeks or longer;
23 right?
24 A Something like that. That's my memory
25 anyway.

1 Q Okay. And when you showed it to
2 Mr. Gersten, what prompted you to show it to him in
3 the first place?
4 A A Public Record Act request came in asking
5 for all correspondence between the city attorney's
6 office and, I believe, Senator Hueso's office,
7 concerning SB615. And when I became aware of that
8 Public Record Act request, I -- or I became aware of
9 that Public Record Act request through an e-mail,
10 through the -- or through a notice from the
11 NEXTREQUEST, and at that time I decided to go
12 through my e-mails and look at that.
13 MR. BRIGGS: And for the court reporter's
14 benefit, it's capital N-E-X-T, capital
15 R-E-Q-U-E-S-T, and it's all one word.
16 BY MR. BRIGGS:
17 Q So you got some notice, through
18 NEXTREQUEST, that somebody had made a public records
19 request; correct?
20 A Don't be so modest, Cory. That somebody
21 was you.
22 Q I just -- I was about to ask you who made
23 the request.
24 A It was you.
25 Q Okay. And so what did Mr. Gersten tell

1 you when he saw your e-mail?
2 A He looked at it, and he said that the
3 e-mail contained confidential information that
4 should not have been sent.
5 Q Okay. Where did you get that confidential
6 information that you included in the e-mail to
7 Mr. Brieno?
8 A My recollection is that I got it from
9 Mr. Gersten.
10 Q Did you tell Mr. Gersten why you wanted
11 it?
12 A I assume I did, yes.
13 Q Okay. And did Mr. Gersten -- Mr. Gersten
14 was also working with you on SB615; right?
15 A Working with me might overstate it, but
16 Mr. Gersten was always helpful when I needed
17 information.
18 Q Mr. Gersten was actually at least one of
19 the scribes for the legislation; isn't that correct?
20 A I don't know that.
21 Q You don't actually know who did the
22 physical typing of SB615 in the city attorney's
23 office?
25 Q You don't know whose mental work product

1 is in the legislation?
2 A That's correct.
3 Q Do you even know whether somebody in the
4 city attorney's office actually wrote that
5 legislation, as opposed to having it given to the
6 city attorney's office by somebody outside?
7 A I guess I don't.
8 Q Okay. So what did you tell Mr. Gersten as
9 the reason why you wanted this information about the
10 Sukumar decision?
12 Q Did you tell him anything?
13 A Well, assuming the conversation occurred,
14 and I'm willing to embrace that assumption, I must
15 have told him something.
16 Q Do you have any idea why you would have
17 been asking about -- him about the Sukumar decision?
18 A I believe it was because Mr. Brieno was
19 interested in the Sukumar decision, if I remember.
20 Q Is it safe -- Is it safe to assume that
21 you told Mr. Gersten that Senator Hueso's office was
22 interested in the Sukumar decision?
23 A I'm not sure what "safe" means, but I'm
24 willing to assume that that's the most reasonable
25 explanation.

1 Q Okay. You can't think of any other reason
2 why you would get the information from Mr. Gersten
3 about the Sukumar decision, other than to share it
4 with Mr. Hueso's office; correct -- or
5 Senator Hueso's office; correct?
6 A Not at this time I can't.
7 Q Okay. Is there anything that would help
8 your recollection, to come up with a better
9 explanation? We know you don't have any notes. So
10 is there somewhere else we could go to --
11 A I can't think --
12 Q -- jog your memory?
13 A I can't think of anything --
14 Q Okay.
15 A -- or any place.
16 Q So what did Mr. Gersten tell you when you
17 told him that Senator Hueso's office wanted
18 information on the Sukumar decision?
19 A Again, I don't have a recollection of the
20 conversation. I would assume that the resulting
21 information was -- was provided to me because of
22 that conversation.
23 Q Okay. The most reasonable explanation is
24 that after you and Mr. Gersten spoke about
25 Senator Hueso's interest in the Sukumar decision,

1 Mr. Gersten gave you information about the Sukumar
2 decision; correct?
3 A That's reasonable, yes.
4 Q Okay. And then you forwarded that
5 information to Senator Hueso's office; correct?
6 A That is correct.
7 Q Did you read the information before you
8 sent it?
9 A I don't have a recollection of reading the
10 information. I believe I understood what I was
11 doing was providing to Senator Hueso's office a
12 summary of Sukumar that was not confidential.
13 Q Well, is there a summary of Sukumar in the
14 city attorney's office that's not confidential?
15 A I don't know.
16 Q So why would you think that you were
17 giving a non-confidential summary to Senator Hueso's
18 office?
19 A I believe I made a mistake.
20 Q So -- But if your intent was to give a
21 non-confidential summary, where would you have gone
22 for the non-confidential summary of Sukumar?
23 A I would have gone to Mr. Gersten.
24 Q Okay. You're not aware of any
25 confidentiality agreements between the city

1 attorney's office and Senator Hueso's office, are
2 you?
3 A No.
4 Q Are you aware of any confidentiality
5 agreements between the city attorney's office and
6 the California Legislature?
7 A No.
8 Q Did Mr. -- Did Senator Hueso's office
9 need to be persuaded to carry SB615? Did you have
10 to make a sales pitch or something like that to get
11 them to carry it?
13 Q Do you know how it came to be that they
14 sponsored the legislation?
15 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Calls for
16 speculation.
17 But you can answer, if you know.
18 BY MR. BRIGGS:
19 Q Yeah, if you know.
20 A What I know is that I sent the proposed
21 legislation to Anna Molina, who is Senator Hueso's
22 chief of staff, and that sometime later she
23 responded and said that they were going to carry the
24 legislation.
25 Q Did you send it to anybody else, trying to

1 get anybody else to carry the legislation?
2 A I don't recall.
3 Q Did you have any conversations with Anna
4 about SB615 before Senator Hueso agreed to carry it?
5 A I remember the conversation where she
6 called me and told me that they were going to carry
7 it.
8 Q Did she ever tell you that Senator Hueso's
9 office would need more information in order to back
10 up the bill if it made its way through the
11 Legislature?
12 A She did not.
13 Q Did anybody ever tell you that?
14 A After the bill had been introduced, yes.
15 Mr. Brieno told me that they were going to write a
16 fact sheet and they would like our input.
17 Q Okay. And was the Sukumar information
18 something that was going to go into the fact sheet,
19 as far as you knew?
21 Q Did you have any input into the content of
22 the fact sheet?
23 A I believe I did.
24 Q Okay. Did you want the Sukumar decision
25 to be part of the information that was given to the

1 public about the need for SB615?
2 A I don't know. It seems unlikely, though.
3 Q Why is that unlikely?
4 A Because argument for a bill is generally
5 much more streamlined.
6 Q So you weren't concerned at all about the
7 Sukumar decision being one of the motivators for
8 SB615?
9 A I'm not sure what that question gets at.
10 Q Do you understand it?
11 A Whether I was concerned about Sukumar
12 being a motivator for SB615?
13 Q Yeah.
14 A I would guess I would have to say that I'm
15 not aware that Sukumar was a motivator for 615.
16 Q Did you want it to be?
17 A Did I want Sukumar to be a motivator for
18 SB615?
19 Q Yeah.
20 A No, as I understand that question.
21 Q What -- So why did you send information
22 about the Sukumar decision to Senator Hueso's office
23 if you didn't want it to be part of the motive
24 for -- motivation for the legislation?
25 A I believe it was requested by Mr. Brieno.

1 Q Okay. So you were providing that
2 information in response to a request from
3 Senator Hueso's office?
4 A That's my recollection.
5 Q Okay. And nobody put a gun to your head;
6 correct?
7 A No.
8 Q You sent that information voluntarily;
9 correct?
10 A Yes.
11 Q You had an earlier conversation with
12 Mr. Brieno about the Sukumar decision voluntarily;
13 correct?
14 A All of my conversations were voluntary.
15 Q So the answer is "yes"?
16 A Yes.
17 Q And then you had a conversation with
18 Mr. Gersten about the Sukumar decision, and that
19 conversation was voluntary; correct?
20 A Correct.
21 Q And Mr. Gersten voluntarily gave you
22 information about the Sukumar decision after you had
23 your conversation with him; correct?
24 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Calls for
25 speculation.

1 But you can answer, if you know. You
2 don't know the motivation of Bill Gersten giving
3 that to you. That's the point.
4 BY MR. BRIGGS:
5 Q You didn't put a gun to Mr. Gersten's head
6 to get him to give you the Sukumar information, did
7 you?
8 A I did not.
9 Q And since you're not his supervisor, you
10 couldn't threaten him with his job; right?
12 Q So you simply asked him for the
13 information, and he complied; correct?
15 Q Did you do anything to suggest to him that
16 there would be recriminations if he didn't comply
17 with your request?
18 A No.
19 Q Okay. And then he gave you the
20 information. Was it in electronic form? Did he
21 dictate it? How did -- How did you actually get
22 the information?
23 A I believe it was in an e-mail.
24 Q Okay. And did you then cut and paste that
25 information into an e-mail to Mr. Brieno or did you

1 forward Mr. Gersten's e-mail to Mr. Brieno?
2 A I believe I forwarded Mr. Gersten's e-mail
3 to Mr. Brieno.
4 Q Okay. And you did that voluntarily;
5 correct?
6 A Yes.
7 Q Okay. And then it's a couple weeks after
8 that when you run that e-mail by Mr. Gersten, to see
9 whether it was a mistake to share that information;
10 correct?
11 A It was that period of time that we have
12 described previously.
13 Q At least two weeks, maybe longer; correct?
14 A Something like that, yes.
15 Q Okay. When my client made the request
16 for -- that is the subject of this lawsuit, the City
17 provided one tranche of documents and withheld the
18 rest on grounds of work-product privilege. Do you
19 understand that, generally?
20 A I understand what you're saying. I don't
21 know that your statement is true.
22 Q Well, let me -- Okay.
23 You know what the NEXTREQUEST system is;
24 right?
25 A I understood earlier that you said that

1 there were two tranches of documents.
2 Q I did.
3 You understand what the NEXTREQUEST system
4 is; right?
5 A To the best of my ability, Mr. Briggs.
6 MR. BRIGGS: I'll show you an exhibit
7 we'll mark as number 3.
10 BY MR. BRIGGS:
11 Q Number 3 is called "Request Number 19-904"
12 from the NEXTREQUEST system. Take a look at that
13 and tell me whether you recognize it, sir.
14 A I can tell you right away I do not
15 recognize this.
16 Q You've never seen that document before?
17 A I have never seen this document before.
18 Q How about the substance of it? Have you
19 ever seen, for example, under -- on the top page,
20 where it says, "Details," that first paragraph, have
21 you ever seen that?
22 A I suspect I have.
23 Q Okay.
24 A I suspect that was the NEXTREQUEST that I
25 previously discussed as calling to my attention your

1 Public Record Act request.
2 Q Good.
3 Who is Nancy Shapiro?
4 A Nancy is an employee of the city
5 attorney's office, who works on Public Record Act
6 requests.
7 Q Do you know how long she's worked in that
8 capacity?
9 A I do not.
10 Q Before you started to work for the city
12 A I do not know that.
13 Q Okay. Who is her supervisor?
14 A I do not know that.
15 Q Could you -- Do you have access to that
16 information?
17 A Now? At this moment?
18 Q Not this second.
19 A I could guess if -- yeah, if it was --
20 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. I'm gonna ask the
21 clerk to put a blank line in the transcript here.
22 When you read it, when we're all said and done, just
23 right in the name of Nancy Shapiro's supervisor.
24 Okay?
25 MR. KARLIN: If it's helpful, Cory, I mean

1 I can give you that information. We can document
2 the transcript when it's done.
3 Nancy Shapiro, if you take my
4 representations -- and I'm not being deposed -- is a
5 paralegal within the Office of the City Attorney,
6 and she is supervised by a senior paralegal whose
7 name I do not know, and then there is a principal
8 legal -- not legal secretary -- paralegal, and then
9 the principal legal -- paralegal. So there's two
10 levels of supervision.
11 MR. BRIGGS: So let's do this. Let's put
12 two lines.
13 Dave knows I'll always accept his
14 representation, but you can tell by the gray hair he
15 doesn't even remember everybody right now. So let's
16 put in two lines. You just fill them in when you
17 review it, and you can work on that with Dave, and
18 that will be fine. Okay?
19 THE WITNESS: Sounds good.
20 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. Good.
21 (Information Requested: ____________________________
22 ___________________________________________________)
23 BY MR. BRIGGS:
24 Q Why don't you take a look at Exhibit 3.
25 And if you start from the back page and go in

1 reverse order, tell me whether that chronology of
2 entries refreshes your recollection, at all, about
3 the City's response to this request.
4 A It does not.
5 Q Okay. So you had -- Did you talk to
6 anybody about responding to request number 19-904,
7 prior to April 1 of this year?
8 A That's such a broad question.
9 Q It's actually quite narrow. I literally
10 asked you the number of the request.
11 A No, you said did I talk to anybody about
12 "responding to."
13 Q Yeah.
14 A So do you mean in terms of my response to,
15 the city attorney's response to, your response to?
16 Q Well, I didn't respond to it, because it
17 wasn't sent to me.
18 A Okay.
19 Q Well, why don't we start with the City's
20 response?
21 A Yes. Okay.
22 Q Did you talk to anybody about the City's
23 response to request 19-904 prior to April 1 of this
24 year?
25 A I may have.

1 Q Who?
2 A Anybody who asked me about it.
3 Q Can you tell me anybody who asked you
4 about it?
5 A I don't -- I -- I have no recollection
6 of any conversation.
7 Q Okay. Did you -- Do you recall talking
8 to anybody in the city attorney's office concerning
9 request number 19-904?
10 A Let me amend my previous answer --
11 Q Great.
12 A -- to take a second --
13 Q Sure.
14 A -- to say, with -- with the exception of
15 those conversations previously described concerning
16 the e-mail that was sent in error and was
17 subsequently clawed back, I have no recollections of
18 any particular conversations.
19 Q Okay. Can you tell me what you think your
20 role was -- I don't mean in a perfect world. I
21 mean in this world.
22 A Uh-huh.
23 Q What was your role in responding to
24 request number 19-904?
25 A When I am aware of a Public Records Act

1 request that comes into the office, in which I may
2 have any responsive document whatsoever, I search my
3 own personal files to ensure that there's no paper
4 document, that I have retained, that is responsive.
5 And if there is a paper document that I have
6 retained, that is responsive, then I generally will
7 make a copy of it or a pdf and send it to the person
8 who, in our office, is organizing our response, so
9 that it can then be reviewed by an attorney to
10 determine whether it can be legally released.
11 With respect to e-mail, I allow the I.T.
12 search, which I consider to be far more
13 comprehensive and correct than any search I could
14 do, to handle those. And then I also search my own
15 text messages to determine whether there are any
16 text messages that are the City records. And when
17 found, then go through a process of transferring
18 those text messages from my telephone into some sort
19 of document that can be produced.
20 Q Do you have a City-issued telephone?
21 A I do.
22 Q Do you ever use -- Do you have a personal
23 telephone?
24 A I do not.
25 Q You don't. So the only cell phone you

1 have is issued by the City of San Diego?
2 A That's correct.
3 Q Do you ever use it for anything other than
4 City business?
5 A Of course, yes.
6 Q Okay. Did you have any text messages
7 concerning SB615 on your phone?
8 A None.
9 Q Never?
10 A No.
11 Q Any voicemails?
12 A No.
13 Q Some of the e-mails, as I recall,
14 indicated voicemails were left, but no voicemails
15 were turned over.
16 A I don't recall that.
17 Q Okay. Do you ever delete your voicemails?
18 A My voicemails are to my City phone, and
19 all conversations concerning SB615 were conducted on
20 my City desk landline phone. All voicemails to that
21 phone are stored by the City and are permanent
22 records, and on my outgoing voicemail message I
23 inform callers that any message they leave is a
24 public record.
25 Q What's your office phone number, your

1 direct line?
2 A (619) 533-4782.
3 Q Did you search for any voicemails in
4 response to request 19-904?
5 A Yes.
6 Q And what -- Describe that search for me.
7 What did you do?
8 A All voicemail messages that are left on my
9 desk landline phone have a -- a identical or similar
10 line, so that you can search for them as a group.
11 They all say, I think, Cisco, C-I-S-C-O. And so I
12 went through those and looked. But as I knew would
13 be the case, there were no voicemail messages left.
14 Q Okay. Have you now described to me
15 everything that you did personally in response to
16 request 19-904?
17 A I believe I have.
18 Q Okay. So you think that there's an
19 e-mail, that you sent to the -- sent to
20 Senator Hueso's office, that you shouldn't have
21 sent. And you -- Right? Do I have that correct?
22 A Yes.
23 Q And the reason you think you shouldn't
24 have sent it is because it contains attorney
25 work-product information. Do I have that correct?

1 A Not quite.
2 Q Okay. What -- What is the -- What's
3 confidential about that e-mail, that you think
4 entitles it to be clawed back?
5 A So I have no opinion on the
6 confidentiality of that e-mail. What I did was I
7 reviewed that e-mail, as I was curiously looking at
8 my e-mails, and it suddenly dawned on me that I
9 should have asked someone to review this before I
10 sent it to Senator Hueso.
11 So I then, as previously recounted, had a
12 conversation with Bill Gersten about that e-mail, in
13 which he informed me that I should not have provided
14 that e-mail to Senator Hueso's office, as it was
15 confidential work product.
16 Q What is --
17 A So that's -- that's the point at which I
18 knew that I had made an error and inadvertently
19 provided a confidential document to an outside
20 party.
21 Q What is it that prompted you, two weeks or
22 more after you sent that e-mail, to go back and
23 review your e-mails?
24 A I was notified, through NEXTREQUEST, that
25 you had filed a Public Record Act request for all

1 e-mails. So I guess what prompted me was curiosity.
2 Q Okay. So what prompted you was when you
3 were notified of my client's request?
4 A Yes.
5 Q Okay. Did you communicate with anyone in
6 writing, within the city attorney's office, about
7 the fact that you had turned over this e-mail by
8 what you think was a mistake?
9 A Never in writing, no.
10 Q Okay. So -- So all the communications
11 that occurred, regarding what you called an error,
12 were oral communications; correct?
13 A So far as I can recall, yes.
14 Q Okay. What part of the e-mail that you
15 sent to Senator Hueso's office do you think is
16 confidential?
17 A I have no opinion on the confidentiality
18 of the e-mail. I've been informed by an attorney of
19 that fact.
20 Q You don't even know, actually, whether the
21 e-mail is confidential; is that right?
22 A I know that my attorney has told me it is.
23 Q Who told you that?
24 A Mr. Gersten.
25 Q Okay. Well, he's not your lawyer.

1 Mr. Karlin's your lawyer; right? You and
2 Mr. Gersten were working on this together.
3 A Well, Mr. Karlin, I -- That's a fair
4 point. And I would say that Mr. Karlin agreed with
5 that assessment and may have arrived at that
6 assessment independently, and may have arrived at
7 that assessment after I asked him to review --
8 Q I don't want to know about you talking
9 to -- to Dave Karlin. Okay? So --
10 A Well --
11 Q Don't tell me more about David Karlin, but
12 I do want to know about your --
13 A I'm sorry. You introduced Mr. Karlin into
14 the conversation. I'm sorry. I shouldn't have
15 fallen for it.
16 Q I want to know about your conversations
17 with Bill Gersten, because you and he were
18 colleagues on this; right? He wasn't your legal
19 adviser; correct?
20 A I'm not sure.
21 Q Well, Mara Elliott made you the pointman
22 for SB615; right?
23 A Correct.
24 Q And you were going to Mr. Gersten for
25 information that you could give to the sponsor of

1 SB615; correct?
2 A Correct.
3 Q You weren't going to Mr. Gersten for legal
4 advice; correct?
5 You were going to him for information
6 about the Sukumar decision; correct?
7 A Incorrect.
8 When I went to him with the e-mail, I was
9 going to Mr. Gersten as the CPRA expert in our
10 office, for his advice on whether or not that e-mail
11 should have been produced.
12 Q I'm not asking about that conversation,
13 but I'm asking about the conversation you had when
14 you went to Mr. Gersten and asked him for
15 information about the Sukumar decision, that you
16 could give to Senator Hueso's office.
17 A Previously we were talking about the
18 conversation that led to me to understand that the
19 e-mail was confidential. So I'm sure you understand
20 my confusion.
21 Q Let me make this clear for you. In the
22 conversation you had with Mr. Gersten, when you
23 asked him for information about the Sukumar decision
24 that you could give to Senator Hueso's office, you
25 were not going to Mr. Gersten for legal advice;

1 correct?
2 A I think that's correct.
3 Q You were going to him as a colleague, to
4 get information that you could share with the
5 California Legislature; correct?
6 A Yes.
7 Q Okay. Is there any doubt about that in
8 your mind?
9 A About which part?
10 Q About you going to Mr. Gersten to get
11 information that you could share with the
12 Legislature?
13 A No.
14 Q Okay.
15 A I do have doubt as to whether he was my
16 attorney at the time, because I'm not sure exactly
17 when attorney-client privilege begins and ends.
18 Q Well, you work in the city attorney's
19 office; right?
20 A Correct.
21 Q So you're not sure whether you were
22 consulting Mr. Gersten for advice, as opposed to
23 information?
24 A I think that's a question that attorneys
25 might have different answers on.

1 Q I didn't ask about attorneys. I asked
2 about you.
3 A And your question was whether I'm sure,
4 and the answer is, no, I'm not sure.
5 Q So I just want to make sure I understand
6 your testimony, because to my ear you're
7 flip-flopping.
8 When you went to Mr. Gersten, to ask him
9 for information about the Sukumar decision, you were
10 going to him as a colleague, in order to get
11 information that you could share with the California
12 Legislature; is that correct?
13 A Yes.
14 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. Can I have
15 clarification? Was that question "were" or "weren't
16 going"?
17 MR. BRIGGS: When "you were going" --
18 THE REPORTER: Okay.
19 MR. BRIGGS: -- to Mr. Gersten.
20 Okay. Let's take a quick break. I want
21 to check my notes. We might be done.
22 MR. KARLIN: All right.
23 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the record. The
24 time is 2:42 p.m.
25 (Recess: 2:42 p.m. to 2:48 p.m.)

1 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Back on the record.
2 Time is 2:48 p.m.
3 BY MR. BRIGGS:
4 Q Now, Mr. Braun, do you know who at the
5 City made the decision -- Well, withdraw.
6 Is the only document that is allegedly
7 exempt from disclosure this one e-mail that we've
8 been talking about?
9 A I wouldn't know that.
10 Q Okay. So you actually don't know how many
11 responsive public records the City has withheld
12 based on an exemption, for this particular request?
13 A I do not.
14 Q Do you know who would know?
15 A I do not.
16 Q Do you have a way of finding out?
17 A I assume so.
18 Q Do you know who made the determination
19 that there are exempt public records --
20 A The --
21 Q -- for this request?
22 A Oh.
23 Q For this request?
24 A I do not.
25 Q If we put a blank or put two lines there,

1 can you find out who made the determination and put
2 their names in?
3 A I'm not sure I can.
4 Q Can you ask?
5 A Okay. I'm not sure how depositions
6 normally work. I'm not sure.
7 Q We're allowed to ask you to --
8 A Absolutely.
9 Q -- fill out a blank when you correct it.
10 What I want to know is whether you're
11 physically capable of going back to the office and
12 asking somebody, who's likely to know who made the
13 decision, who made the decision. Is that something
14 you're capable of doing?
15 A I am.
16 Q Okay. And you're capable of writing the
17 answer on the blank lines when you get the
18 transcript in a few weeks?
19 A I would consult with an attorney, to make
20 sure that I -- that's information that you're
21 entitled to have. And if it was, then I think I am
22 capable of doing that, yes.
23 Q Fantastic. I'm confident that my good
24 friend, David Karlin, will help you hold the pen and
25 write the letters.

1 A Awesome.
2 (Information Requested: ____________________________
3 ___________________________________________________)
4 MR. BRIGGS: I don't have any more
5 questions for this witness.
6 How long is the transcript? Seventy
7 pages?
8 THE REPORTER: Eighty?
9 MR. BRIGGS: How long are you gonna need
10 to read eighty double-spaced pages? You'll get it
11 in about three weeks, and then you'll need to turn
12 it around, correct it and sign it, fill in some
13 blanks.
14 THE WITNESS: That sounds like maybe a
15 four-hour job. Probably less.
16 MR. BRIGGS: Why don't we take fifteen
17 days, just knowing the schedule's gonna be tight.
18 Is that reasonable?
19 MR. KARLIN: So you'd have fifteen days,
20 from the date that the deposition transcript is
21 delivered to you, to review it, to make any
22 corrections, to add these additional information or
23 fill in the blanks, sign it, and we'll let
24 Mr. Briggs know at that time.
25 THE WITNESS: At this point, that sounds

1 perfectly feasible.
2 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. So I propose that as
3 the stipulation.
4 A certified copy may be used in lieu of
5 the original, as supplemented by any timely changes
6 that my office is notified about.
7 Mr. Karlin will keep the original and
8 produce it upon prior request, for all purposes of
9 the lawsuit.
10 Is that acceptable?
11 MR. KARLIN: It's acceptable and
12 stipulated to.
13 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. Thanks everybody.
14 MR. KARLIN: Thank you.
15 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're off the record.
16 The time is 2:51 p.m.
17 THE REPORTER: Before I close the record,
18 Mr. Karlin, are you ordering a copy, in addition to
19 receiving the original?
20 MR. KARLIN: Not at this time, but I have
21 your card.
22 (Deposition adjourned at 2:52 p.m.)
23 - - -
24
25

1 Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury
4 I, GERARD BRAUN, the witness herein,
5 declare under penalty of perjury that I have read
6 the foregoing in its entirety; and that the
7 testimony contained therein, as corrected by me, is
8 a true and accurate transcription of my testimony
9 elicited at said time and place.
10
11 Executed this ___ day of ___________ 20__,
12 at _____________________, _________________________.
13 (city) (state)
14
15
16 ________________________
17 GERARD BRAUN
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Exhibit 3
William J. Gersten 10/24/2019
2 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION

)
)
6 vs. ) No. 37-2019-00015139-
) CU-MC-CTL
7 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; and )
DOES 1 through 100, )
8 )
9 _______________________________________)
10
11 DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM J. GERSTEN, DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY
12 VOLUME I, PAGES 1 THROUGH 65
13 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
14 THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2019
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 REPORTED BY: ANTONIA SUEOKA, CSR 9007, RPR
22
23
24
25

2 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION

)
)
6 vs. ) No. 37-2019-00015139-
) CU-MC-CTL
7 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; and )
DOES 1 through 100, )
8 )
9 _______________________________________)
10
11
12
13
14
15 DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM J. GERSTEN, DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY,
16 taken by attorney for the Plaintiff and Petitioner,
17 commencing at the hour of 1:01 p.m., on Thursday,
18 October 24, 2019, at 530 B Street, Suite 350,
19 San Diego, California, before Antonia Sueoka,
20 Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 9007, in and
21 for the State of California.
22
23
24
25

1 APPEARANCES:
3 FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND PETITIONER:
4 BRIGGS LAW CORPORATION

BY: CORY J. BRIGGS, ESQUIRE
5 99 East C Street, Suite 111
6 909.949.7115
8 FOR THE DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENTS:
9 OFFICE OF THE SAN DIEGO CITY ATTORNEY

BY: DAVID J. KARLIN, DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY
10 1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1100
11 619.533.5800
dkarlin@sandiego.gov
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 I N D E X
3 EXAMINATION PAGE
4 WILLIAM J. GERSTEN, DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY
5 BY MR. BRIGGS 5, 59
6 BY MR. KARLIN 57
8 EXHIBITS
9 EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION PAGE
10 Exhibit 1 Notice of Deposition of William Gersten 6
11 Exhibit 2 Email to William Gersten from City of 7
12 San Diego Public Records, March 15,
13 2019
14 - - -
15 QUESTIONS NOT ANSWERED
16 PAGE LINE
17 15 17
18 25 24
19 26 22
20 41 5
21 60 14
22 61 17
23
24
25

1 THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2019,
2 1:01 P.M., SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
3 - - -
4 WILLIAM J. GERSTEN, DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY,
5 having been administered an oath, testified as follows:
7 EXAMINATION
8 BY MR. BRIGGS:
9 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Gersten. Would you please
10 state and spell your name for the record?
11 A. Sure. William Gersten. W-I-L-L-I-A-M,
12 G-E-R-S-T-E-N.
13 Q. Mr. Gersten, have you ever had your deposition
14 taken before?
15 A. I have.
16 Q. Have you ever taken a deposition?
17 A. I have.
18 Q. Do you need me to go over the admonitions or can
19 we --
20 A. I do not --
21 (Reporter instruction.)
22 (Record read as follows:
23 "Question: Do you need me to go over the
24 admonitions or can we -- ")
25 /////

1 BY MR. BRIGGS:
2 Q. -- dispense with those?
3 A. We can dispense with them.
4 Q. Okay. Good.
5 (Exhibit 1 marked for identification.)
6 BY MR. BRIGGS:
7 Q. I'm going to show you an exhibit we marked as
8 Exhibit 1. Have you seen Exhibit 1 before today?
9 A. I have.
10 Q. Did you read it when you got it?
11 A. I did.
12 Q. Did you notice that there are a couple of
13 document categories on the second page?
14 A. I did.
15 Q. Did you bring any documents responsive?
16 A. I did.
17 Q. Did you bring all the responsive documents?
18 A. I brought all the responsive documents that are
19 not privileged.
20 Q. Okay. Did you bring a privilege log?
21 A. I did not.
22 Q. Okay. Can we get a privilege log?
23 Not -- I don't mean pull it out this second, but
24 I assume you can get one at some reasonable period of
25 time after today. Is that a fair assumption?

1 A. I can.
2 Q. Yes?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Okay. Why don't you show me what you brought?
5 Can you describe for me what you just handed me?
6 A. Yes. It is a print -- an automatic printout
7 from the City's NextRequest system that generates pending
8 PRA requests within the City's NextRequest system and
9 gives various statuses as to various requests.
10 Q. Is this like the NextRequest equivalent of my
11 deadline Tickler?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. Okay. And the only other responsive records you
14 have, meaning responsive to Exhibit 1, today, are those
15 that you'll cover in the privilege log, correct?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. I'm going to mark the
18 records that you gave us today as Exhibit 2.
19 (Exhibit 2 marked for identification.)
20 BY MR. BRIGGS:
21 Q. Mr. Gersten, you are a California licensed
22 attorney; is that right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. How long have you been licensed?
25 A. Since 1990.

1 Q. And where do you work?
2 A. I work for the City of San Diego.
3 Q. In the City Attorney's Office?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. How long have you worked there?
6 A. Since April of 2005.
7 Q. Where did you work before that?
8 A. I worked for the State of California.
9 Q. Have you worked in private practice, ever?
10 A. I have.
11 Q. When was that?
12 A. From 1992 to 1994.
13 Q. Okay. And then you went to work for the State?
14 A. Initially, I went to work for the San Diego
15 Superior Court in the county of San Diego.
16 Q. Okay. Were you a research attorney?
17 A. I was initially a research attorney and went
18 into private practice for two years and then back to the
19 court, when I went into a calendar -- calendaring model
20 and became a staff attorney.
21 Q. Got you.
22 Can you tell me what your general job duties are
23 in the City Attorney's Office?
24 A. Now, presently, in the Administration Division,
25 and more specifically, in the Labor and Employment unit.

1 Q. And how long have you been in that role?
2 A. In the Labor and Employment unit, I left that
3 unit for approximately three years and went into the
4 Government Affairs unit, and now recently, I've been
5 reassigned to the Labor and Employment unit, and that
6 reassignment has only been about a month.
7 Q. Okay. So when you were in governmental affairs,
8 how long were you in that role?
9 A. Approximately three years.
10 Q. Okay. And can you tell me what your job duties
11 were in Government Affairs?
12 A. Sure. I should preface it by saying, some of
13 the job duties have transcended various assignments that
14 have stayed with me consistently. So would you like to
15 know of the specific government affairs or would you like
16 to know the duty -- the assignments or duties I had while
17 in Government Affairs?
18 Q. Well, I'm just looking for general description
19 for now.
20 A. Sure. One of the aspects is responsibility for
21 providing advice to my office, as well as other City
22 departments on a California Public Records Act. I have
23 various client departments; one being Risk Management. I
24 advise on public liability claims and other issues with
25 Risk Management.

1 Obviously, now, I'm advising the City's
2 management team and outside negotiator on meet-and-confer
3 obligations with the Recognized Employee Organizations.
4 I have varied duties, very -- very wide-ranging.
5 I file workplace violence restraining orders on behalf of
6 the City. I advise minimum wage enforcement, office of
7 the Treasure -- unit of the Treasurer's Office in the
8 agent administrative litigation, for enforcement of that.
9 I handle administrative litigation defense; i.e.,
10 Cal-OSHA.
11 There are varying -- wide-varying duties.
12 Q. Are you a deputy city attorney or an assistant
13 city attorney?
14 A. I'm a deputy city attorney.
15 Q. Okay. But you also do labor negotiations; is
16 that right?
17 A. I don't do them. We -- the City hires a
18 negotiator.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. We provide legal advice to the City
21 management --
22 Q. Are you --
23 A. -- departments.
24 Q. I understand that some deputy city attorneys are
25 considered confidential deputy city attorneys. Do you

1 have an understanding of that?
2 A. I do.
3 Q. What is the meaning of being a confidential
4 deputy city attorney?
5 A. I think the term is probably misused. It's
6 really unclassified, unrepresented deputy city attorneys
7 who are not represented by the DCA -- the Deputy City
8 Attorneys Association, and they're exempted out for
9 purposes of advising management on management issues that
10 may or may not impact represented employees.
11 Q. Have you ever been one of those exempted?
12 A. I have.
13 Q. Okay.
14 A. And I am.
15 Q. Are you currently one of the exempted?
16 A. I am.
17 Q. Okay. How many exempted deputy city attorneys
18 are there?
19 A. There's approximately, including chief deputy
20 city attorneys and assistants of the attorneys,
21 collectively, I would say approximately eight people in
22 general. As far as deputy city attorneys, I would
23 estimate about five.
24 Q. Okay. Are you familiar with the California

1 A. I am.
2 Q. Okay. Are you familiar with some proposed
3 legislation earlier this year known as Senate Bill 615?
4 A. I am.
5 Q. If I refer to SB615, will you understand that
6 means --
7 A. I will.
8 Q. You've got to let me finish.
9 A. I'm sorry.
10 Q. That's okay.
11 Who assigned you to work on SB615?
12 MR. KARLIN: I'm going to object as beyond the
13 scope of permissible discovery for the purposes of this
14 California Public Records Act litigation, but I am not
15 instructing the witness not to answer.
16 THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question?
17 BY MR. BRIGGS:
18 Q. Sure. Who assigned you to work on the SB615
19 matter?
20 A. And when you say "assigned," what do you mean by
21 that?
22 Q. How did you come to be working on SB615?
23 A. I proposed -- in 2017, I proposed -- drafted a
24 proposed legislative amendment to the California Public
25 Records Act.

1 Q. Did you do that on your own or did somebody
2 instruct you to do that?
3 A. I can't recall.
4 Q. Okay. Who is your supervisor?
5 A. Presently?
6 Q. Yeah.
7 A. Presently, it's Jim McNeil, M-C-N-E-I-A --
8 E-I-L.
9 Q. At the time you drafted this amendment to the
10 CPRA, who was your supervisor?
11 A. I believe it to be Perci Dugard. D-U-G- --
12 P-E-R-C-I, D-U-G-A-R-D.
13 Q. That's Prescilla?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. Okay. What prompted you to write a proposed
16 amendment to the CPRA?
17 MR. KARLIN: Same objection. Beyond the scope
19 THE WITNESS: I can't recall the specifics in
20 2017, why I drafted it, other than somebody may have
21 asked me to, but I don't recall, or if I just generated
22 it as an idea that would be beneficial.
23 BY MR. BRIGGS:
24 Q. Have you had any discussions with Mara Elliott
25 about SB615?

3 THE WITNESS: And when you -- when you use this
4 word "discussions," do you mean inclusive of emails or
5 verbal discussions?
6 BY MR. BRIGGS:
7 Q. Let's do verbal discussion -- let's do oral
8 discussions first. Emails are verbal, too.
9 A. I don't recall.
10 Q. Okay. Have you had any email communications
11 with Mara Elliott concerning SB615?
12 A. I have.
13 Q. Okay. On how many occasions?
15 Q. Did you bring any of those email communications
16 with you today?
17 A. I did not.
18 Q. Why not?
19 A. Because they're -- I believe them to be
20 privileged.
21 Q. Okay. What privilege?
22 A. Work product and attorney-client.
23 Q. Okay. Have you had any oral conversations with
24 Mara Elliott about your proposed legislation to the CPRA?
25 A. I believe so, but I could not quantify that.

1 Q. Do you recall when that occurred or when they
2 occurred?
4 Q. Okay. Have you had any email communications
5 with Mara Elliott concerning your proposed legislation?
7 THE WITNESS: Yes.
8 BY MR. BRIGGS:
9 Q. Did you bring any of those with you today?
10 A. I did not.
11 Q. Why not?
12 A. I believe them to be privileged.
13 Q. Okay. When -- going back to SB615 -- well, let
14 me ask you this: You don't recall anybody asking you to
15 write proposed legislation for the CPRA; is that correct?
16 A. That's correct, nobody asked me to.
17 Q. Okay. So why did you do it?
18 A. I'm going to object on the grounds that it's
19 attorney work product.
20 Q. You don't get to object.
21 MR. KARLIN: Well, I think he can, but I'll
22 object as well. But I think he is the attorney who
23 rendered this opinion, and as the attorney, he is the
24 holder of that privilege. So if it needs to be for the
25 record, I will also object on attorney work product

1 grounds. But he's the attorney who actually created and
2 the holder of that privilege.
3 BY MR. BRIGGS:
4 Q. But you can't recall anybody asking you to do
5 that work?
6 A. I cannot recall.
7 Q. So is it your view that any work that you do on
8 your own "sua sponte" is protected by the work product
9 privilege?
10 A. Well, I'm not going to offer my legal viewpoint
11 of what a privilege encompasses. I believe it to be work
12 product. And it is my thoughts, my legal thoughts and
13 impressions and ideas in relation to legislation in the
14 conjunction -- in conjunction with my position as deputy
15 city attorney.
16 Q. But you can't remember if anybody asked you to
17 write that legislation; is that correct?
18 A. That is correct. I am not saying nobody did. I
19 can't recall if somebody did --
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. -- or if I just generated it on my own.
22 Q. Who do you think your client is?
23 A. Well, I don't know how it's relevant to this
24 deposition. I don't want to engage in legal arguments.
25 Q. We get to ask the questions.

1 A. Okay. Well, I'm going to object. I think it's
2 beyond the scope of this deposition.
3 MR. KARLIN: Well, I won't make that objection
4 as the attorney for the City of San Diego. Putting that
5 objection on the record still doesn't prohibit you from
6 answering his question.
7 THE WITNESS: I believe my client to be the City
8 of San Diego.
9 BY MR. BRIGGS:
10 Q. Okay. Did -- did anyone at the mayor's office
11 ask you to write proposed legislation for the CPRA?
12 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Beyond the scope of
13 permissible discovery.
14 THE WITNESS: I don't recall that anybody at the
15 mayor's office asked me to do that.
16 BY MR. BRIGGS:
17 Q. Did anybody in any of the city council offices
18 ask you to write proposed legislation for the CPRA?
20 THE WITNESS: I don't recall that anybody in the
21 city council asked me to write legislation.
22 BY MR. BRIGGS:
23 Q. And if you had anything in writing where
24 somebody was asking you to write the legislation, you
25 would have brought that with you today, right?

1 A. I would have brought it, but I probably would
2 have asserted a privilege to it. But I don't have any of
3 those communications, so I guess it's a moot point.
4 Q. Okay. You don't have anything in writing from
5 anyone asking you to write proposed legislation
6 pertaining to the CPRA; is that correct?
7 MR. KARLIN: Broad; may be ambiguous.
8 Do you understand the question?
9 THE WITNESS: I do, but maybe you can articulate
10 it again just to make sure I understand.
11 BY MR. BRIGGS:
12 Q. Well, I just -- I want to know whether there are
13 any written documents in which somebody asked you to
14 write proposed legislation affecting the CPRA?
15 A. There is no document, to my knowledge, where
16 somebody asked me to write legislation.
17 Q. Okay. Did you ever tell anyone in writing that
18 you were writing proposed legislation pertaining to the
19 CPRA?
23 BY MR. BRIGGS:
24 Q. Whom?
25 A. I believe I am -- I don't recall, but I believe

1 I might -- I might have written -- told Jan Goldsmith
2 when he was in --
3 (Reporter clarification.)
4 THE WITNESS: I might have informed Jan
5 Goldsmith that I had written something.
6 BY MR. BRIGGS:
7 Q. Okay. Anyone else?
8 A. I told -- I did inform Mara Elliott and Gerry
9 Braun.
10 Q. When did you inform Mara Elliott?
11 A. When?
12 Q. When?
14 MR. KARLIN: Belated objection. Again, beyond
15 the scope of permissible discovery.
16 THE WITNESS: I don't recall the exact date.
17 BY MR. BRIGGS:
18 Q. How about approximately?
19 A. It's speculative, but if I had to approximate,
20 it would be 2017.
21 Q. Okay. And when did you tell Gerry Braun that
22 you were working on proposed legislation to the CPRA?
23 A. I don't -- I don't know that I told him. I
24 was -- I don't recall telling him I was working on it.
25 Q. Well, did you ever communicate that to him in

1 any manner?
2 A. I did.
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. But not that I was working on it.
5 Q. Well, what did you communicate to him?
6 A. Well, I'm going to -- I'm not going to tell you
7 the content of that communication because I believe that
8 to be work product privilege, but I did communicate the
9 fact -- that fact to him. And I believe it was at the
10 beginning of this year.
11 Q. Was that communicated to Mr. Braun in writing or
12 orally?
14 Q. If your communications to Mara Elliott or Gerry
15 Braun were in writing, you would have either produced
16 them or put them on the privilege log you're going to
17 provide, correct?
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. Okay. So can you tell me what was your role in
20 preparing the proposed legislation that is known as
21 SB615?
24 BY MR. BRIGGS:
25 Q. You can answer.

1 THE WITNESS: Can I answer?
2 MR. KARLIN: Yeah. Without disclosing attorney
3 work product --
4 THE WITNESS: Yes.
5 MR. KARLIN: -- or attorney-client
6 communications, yes.
7 THE WITNESS: And I'm sorry. I was so focused
8 on looking over here. Can you just repeat your question?
9 BY MR. BRIGGS:
10 Q. What was your role in preparing SB615?
11 A. I prepared proposed amendments to the California
12 Public Records Act, which became known as SB615.
13 Q. You were the physical scribe of those
14 amendments, correct?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Okay. Who proposed taking what you had written
17 up and giving it to the California Legislature?
20 THE WITNESS: I do not know.
21 BY MR. BRIGGS:
22 Q. Was it your idea to try to find somebody in the
23 Legislature to carry the legislation?
24 A. It was not my idea as far as physically doing --
25 moving it to the Legislature at this time. It was always

1 my idea that it was a good idea to propose.
2 Q. Did you ever do anything in furtherance of what
3 you thought was a good idea, other than writing -- other
4 than drafting the legislation?
5 A. Other than drafting it, no.
6 Q. Okay. How would anybody have known that you
7 actually had drafted proposed legislation?
8 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Calls for speculation;
9 overly broad; ambiguous. I think --
10 BY MR. BRIGGS:
11 Q. Well, let me try and ask it this way: Who was
12 the first person to find out that you had drafted
13 proposed legislation of SB615?
14 A. I can't answer that question. I've had this
15 idea for many years. I can't remember who was the first
16 person I mentioned it to.
17 Q. Did you ever have any conversations with Mara
18 Elliott concerning SB615?
21 THE WITNESS: I -- I did.
22 BY MR. BRIGGS:
23 Q. How many?
24 A. I can't quantify. I would say very few.
25 Q. Less than five?

1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Okay. Is it safe to say that those
3 conversations were all in the first three months of
4 2017 -- sorry, 2019?
5 A. No. It's not safe to say all of them were.
6 Q. Okay. So when was the most recent conversation
7 with Mara Elliott concerning SB615?
8 MR. KARLIN: I'll have a standing objection to
9 this line of questioning as beyond the scope of
10 permissible discovery in this particular lawsuit.
12 THE WITNESS: And I can't tell you the day
13 because -- what I can say is I've had discussion or
14 mention of SB615 with many people even to this date.
15 BY MR. BRIGGS:
16 Q. Okay. Well, let's just focus on Mara Elliott.
17 A. Okay.
18 Q. Okay?
19 What is your best recollection of the last time
20 you discussed SB615 with her?
21 A. The beginning of -- the beginning of 2019, to
22 the best of my recollection.
23 Q. Was the last time you had a conversation with
24 her about it?
25 A. I don't know when the last conversation I had

1 with her about it.
2 Q. Do you recall speaking with her about SB615
3 since April 1st of 2019?
4 A. I don't.
5 Q. Okay. Your best recollection is your
6 conversations with her concerning SB615 were in the first
7 quarter of this year; is that right?
8 A. I would say the majority, if not all.
9 Q. Okay. Let me ask you the same thing concerning
10 Gerry Braun. How many --
11 MR. KARLIN: Same -- I'm sorry.
12 BY MR. BRIGGS:
13 Q. How many conversations have you had with
14 Mr. Braun concerning SB615?
18 THE WITNESS: Again, quantify communications to
19 include both emails as well as oral conversations.
20 BY MR. BRIGGS:
21 Q. Yeah, let's do that.
22 A. It's a speculative number, but I would
23 approximate eight times.
24 Q. Okay. And when was the last time you had any
25 communication with Mr. Braun concerning SB615?

1 A. I would say -- any conversation pertaining to
2 it, I would say in the last two months.
3 Q. Okay. What was your conversation with Mr. Braun
4 in the last two months? What did you discuss?
5 A. It was in passing, likely related to this
6 lawsuit.
7 Q. What did he say?
9 Q. What did you say?
10 A. I don't recall specifically, but probably asking
11 the status of the lawsuit.
12 Q. Okay. Prior to that conversation, what is the
13 next conversation you recall with Mr. Braun concerning
14 SB615?
15 A. I don't recall specific dates of specific
16 conversations. I recall from the beginning of the year,
17 first quarter of the year, having several conversations
18 with him about SB615.
19 Q. Tell me about that first conversation you can
20 recall with Mr. Braun concerning SB615.
21 A. I don't recall the chronology of the
22 conversations, so when would be -- what would be the
23 first or the second.
24 Q. Tell me about the first one that comes to
25 mind.

1 A. Well, I'm going to object on the grounds of
2 attorney work product and the conversations with
3 Mr. Braun would be privileged.
4 Q. Mr. Braun is not a lawyer, right?
6 Q. And you haven't told me which client directed
7 you to do this work, right?
8 I mean, your testimony is that you're the one
9 that had the idea to amend the Public Records Act.
11 Q. So how -- how does your disclosure to Mr. Braun
12 fall under the work product privilege?
13 A. Well --
14 MR. KARLIN: Again, I think this is now going
15 far afield. Objection. It calls for a legal conclusion.
16 He stated his objection. He's the holder of that
17 privilege.
18 BY MR. BRIGGS:
19 Q. I'm looking for the -- I'm looking for the
20 factual basis for it. You've already told me that you
21 wrote the legislation all on your own.
22 Gerry Braun is not a lawyer. Gerry Braun is
23 not your supervisor, so what is the factual basis for the
24 work product privilege; just that you're a lawyer or is
25 there more to it?

1 MR. KARLIN: Again, same objection in terms of
2 relevancy or scope of permissible discovery.
3 If you can understand the question without
4 divulging your thoughts or impressions or conclusions or
5 analysis, can you answer that question?
6 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I'm not going to -- I'm not
7 going to engage in a legal argument with you. I'm
8 asserting the work product privilege to my -- my
9 communications --
10 BY MR. BRIGGS:
11 Q. What is the factual --
12 A. -- with the chief of staff of my office and my
13 capacity as a deputy city attorney.
14 Q. What is your factual basis for the work product
15 privilege that you're asserting, sir?
16 A. I just told you. I'm engaged in legal
17 conversations in my office of the city attorney, as a
18 deputy city attorney for the City of San Diego on
19 pending -- pending legal issues in our office.
20 Q. With the chief of staff who is not a lawyer,
21 correct?
22 I'm only talking about your conversations --
24 Q. -- with Mr. Braun.
25 A. No, that's correct.

1 Q. So your factual basis is that you are a lawyer
2 and that he's the chief of staff. That's the extent of
3 the factual basis?
4 MR. KARLIN: I think that misstates his
5 testimony.
6 MR. BRIGGS: Well, this is his opportunity to --
7 THE WITNESS: It absolutely does. I am not
8 engaging in an oral argument. I've asserted my
9 objection. I'm not going to answer as to the nature and
10 content of my communications with Mr. Braun.
11 BY MR. BRIGGS:
12 Q. I didn't --
13 A. I've made that clear. I'm not going to -- I
14 hear you want me to lay out the legal foundation for the
15 conclusion that this is attorney work product. I'm not
16 going to do that.
17 Q. I want the factual foundation.
18 A. You were provided that already.
19 Q. Let me make sure I understand it because when I
20 tried to pin you down, you then pivot and talk about your
21 objection, so let's not do that.
22 Is the factual basis that you are an attorney,
23 that you "sua sponte" wrote the proposed legislation, and
24 that Gerry Braun is the chief of staff in your office?
25 Have I missed anything --

1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- as a factual basis?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. What have I missed?
5 A. You said I "sua sponte" written a legislation.
6 In response to your question before, I said in
7 approximately 2017, I drafted the legislation. I think I
8 came up with it as my own idea, but I may have been asked
9 to do -- to look at possible legislative amendments to
10 the PRA. So I can't say "sua sponte," I just came into
11 work one day and I said, "Boom, here's a great idea."
12 So I want to correct that for the record. I
13 believe that to be the case, but I'm not a
14 hundred percent sure because I can't recall back to
15 2017.
16 Q. Where would we go to find facts to pin down what
17 actually happened? Would we look at emails?
18 A. I can't answer that question, other than I can't
19 recall circumstances from 2017, which was two years ago.
20 Q. Well, so tell me this: In your office, what is
21 the procedure for somebody to ask you to do work?
22 And the reason I'm asking you this is because I
23 want to know where would we -- where would we look to get
24 documentation that somebody asked you to write that
25 proposed legislation as opposed to you willy-nilly doing

1 it yourself?
2 So help me understand, what is the process by
3 which you would be asked to do work?
4 A. It's a difficult question to answer because work
5 assigned to somebody can come from a multitude of
6 sources. It can come from a client department. It can
7 come from the mayor's office. We have things called LSR,
8 which are Legal Services Requests. It really depends.
9 One of your supervisors can ask you to do work.
10 One of your compadres can ask you to help out or take
11 something off their plate. So there are multiple
12 different sources of work generation.
13 Q. Did anybody -- did any of your compadres ask you
14 to do work proposing legislation to the CPRA?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Did anybody provide you with an LSR to draft
17 proposed legislation for the CPRA?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Are you aware of any record whatsoever
20 indicating in any way that the mayor's office asked you
21 to draft legislation concerning the CPRA?
22 A. Limited to -- your question is limited to the
23 mayor's office?
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. And in writing? So your question is --

1 Q. Whatever LSR is.
2 A. I'm not aware of any writing from the mayor's
3 office requesting me to do that.
4 Q. Are you aware of any LSR from any source asking
5 the City Attorney's Office to write proposed legislation
6 for the CPRA?
7 A. I'm not aware of any LSR.
8 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any other writing that
9 asks the City Attorney's Office to draft proposed
10 legislation to the CPRA?
11 A. I am not aware of any other writing, but I
12 cannot say that none exists.
13 Q. You're not -- but you're not aware of them,
14 right?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. And who was the principal person, say in the
17 last three years, in the City Attorney's Office who would
18 be involved in the drafting of proposed legislation
19 affecting the CPRA?
20 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Again, beyond the scope
23 THE WITNESS: I would be.
24 BY MR. BRIGGS:
25 Q. Okay. So there's a pretty good chance that if

1 anybody had asked the City Attorney's Office to write
2 proposed legislation concerning the CPRA, that you would
3 have been in the loop at some point, correct?
4 A. At some point, but I can't say necessarily
5 initially.
6 Q. Okay. But at some point, right?
7 A. I would assume so.
8 Q. Well, I don't want you to assume, but I want you
9 to tell me based on your experience since, I think, April
10 of 2005, given your role handling government affairs and
11 given your role on the CPRA as an advisor in the City
12 Attorney's Office, what are the chances that you would
13 not have been in the loop if somebody wanted an amendment
14 to the CPRA drafted?
15 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Calls for speculation;
16 lacks foundation.
17 But you can answer if you can understand the
18 question.
19 THE WITNESS: I can't say in the entirety of my
20 career with the City because I didn't handle PRAs for the
21 entirety of that 15 years.
22 BY MR. BRIGGS:
23 Q. I just want to know what are the chances that
24 you would not be aware of somebody asking the City
25 Attorney's Office to draft proposed legislation affecting

1 the CPRA during the three years that you were in the
2 governmental affairs division of the office?
6 THE WITNESS: I would say unlikely.
7 BY MR. BRIGGS:
8 Q. Okay. Are you aware of anybody else in the
9 office who worked on proposed legislation concerning the
10 CPRA in the last three years?
11 A. I'm not aware of anybody else.
12 Q. Okay. So how many conversations in writing or
13 oral -- in writing or -- yeah -- I'll just withdraw that.
14 How many communications can you recall with
15 Gerry Braun concerning SB615 you don't think are subject
16 to the work product privilege?
17 A. I don't recall every communication I've had with
18 Mr. Braun pertaining to SB615, but I would say the ones I
19 do recall, I am asserting that privilege.
20 There may have been conversations that were more
21 factual in nature or chronological or procedural as
22 opposed to the provision of my legal thoughts and
23 productions.
24 Q. Okay. Is Gerry Braun your supervisor?
25 A. He is not.

1 Q. Does he have any authority over you whatsoever
2 in the City Attorney's Office?
3 A. He's --
4 MR. KARLIN: Objection. I think that lacks
5 foundation; calls for speculation --
6 MR. BRIGGS: Let me withdraw it.
7 MR. KARLIN: -- beyond the scope.
8 BY MR. BRIGGS:
9 Q. Let me withdraw it and ask it this way: As a --
10 as a factual matter. I'm not asking for a legal
11 conclusion, but authority. But as a factual matter, do
12 you take any instruction or direction from Gerry Braun?
13 MR. KARLIN: Same objections. Beyond the scope
16 THE WITNESS: I know what you're asking,
17 Mr. Briggs, and the answer would be no. But there are
18 occasions where he may ask for assistance, either legal
19 review of something or legal input that I do -- would
20 respond to him, so the answer is really yes.
21 Can he assign or ask me to do some work, it's --
22 if you want to use the word "direction" as a
23 supervisorial -- supervisory power, the answer would be
24 no.
25 I'm sorry for giving you a confusing answer.

1 BY MR. BRIGGS:
2 Q. Okay. I think what I hear you saying is that on
3 a colleague-to-colleague basis, if he asked you for help,
4 you're happy to help?
6 Q. I think you're also saying that he can't
7 discipline you, reassign you, reprimand you, anything
8 that normally would happen in the hierarchy of a
9 workplace?
11 Q. Okay. Do you know who Aaron Brieno is?
12 A. I do.
13 Q. Who is Mr. Brieno, as you understand it?
14 A. I believe he is a legislative staffer for
15 Mr. Hueso's office, although I've recently heard he may
16 work for the legislative office that assists various
17 assembly members.
18 Q. Okay. Do you -- is it your understanding that
19 while SB615 was pending, that Mr. Brieno worked for
20 Senator Ben Hueso?
21 A. It was my understanding. But more recently, I
22 found out that he maybe -- he may work for the
23 Legislature itself and not just Mr. Hueso.
24 Q. Is what you -- when you say you recently found
25 out, do you mean you recently found out that he wasn't

1 working only for Senator Hueso back when SB615 was
2 pending or do you mean that he now may have a different
3 job?
4 A. No. Somebody in passing said he may work for
5 the Office of Legislative Affairs who lends its people to
6 various assembly people. I'm just saying what I heard in
7 passing. I don't know the accurate nature of his
8 position.
9 Q. Okay. But with regard to SB615, is it fair to
10 say your understanding is that he was a representative of
11 Senator Hueso?
12 A. That's my understanding.
13 Q. Okay. Have you ever spoken to Mr. Brieno?
14 A. I believe I was on one telephone conversation
15 with Mr. Braun and Mr. Brieno.
16 Q. Okay. And when was that telephone conversation?
17 A. I only recall it was at the beginning of the
18 year at some point in time. I don't recall the specific
19 time.
20 Q. January of 2019?
21 A. I would say it was January or February.
22 Q. Was it before the proposed legislation had been
23 assigned the number SB615?
24 A. I believe it was after.
25 Q. Okay. Was it before or after Senator Hueso

1 withdrew SB615?
2 A. It was before.
3 Q. Okay. So sometime after the legislation
4 received a bill number and before it was withdrawn by
5 Senator Hueso is when you were on this three-way phone
6 call; is that correct?
7 A. That's my recollection.
8 Q. Okay. What do you recall about the phone call?
9 What was the nature of it?
10 A. I don't recall. I don't recall the specific
11 nature of the phone call. I do recall that I did not
12 speak on that conversation. And I believe it was as to
13 the status of the bill, the legislative status, is my
14 best recollection.
15 Q. So that sounds like a short phone call; is that
16 right?
18 Q. Okay. So you were listening in on a
19 conversation between Mr. Braun and Mr. Brieno about the
20 status of the legislation making its way through the
21 Legislature. Is that a fair statement?
22 A. It's a fair statement. I would just change the
23 terminology. I wasn't listening in; it has a connotation
24 of eavesdropping. I was a participant. I was an
25 announced participant.

1 Q. I assume you were on the speaker?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. You were on the speakerphone. You were in the
4 room with Mr. Braun. He was doing the talking. You were
5 just there to be a passive participant?
6 A. That's my recollection.
7 Q. Everybody knew you were there?
9 Q. Yeah. This isn't eavesdropping. This is you
10 not needing to speak?
11 A. I'm fastidious on the --
13 THE WITNESS: I'm fastidious on the accuracy of
14 the record. I just wanted to make that clear.
15 BY MR. BRIGGS:
16 Q. That's okay.
17 Okay. Do you recall any other telephone
18 conversations that you were involved in with Mr. Brieno?
19 A. I don't.
20 Q. Are you aware of any email conversation --
21 sorry.
22 Are you aware of any email communications
23 between Mr. Braun and Mr. Brieno?
24 A. I am.
25 Q. How many?

1 A. A small amount; maybe two or three.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. But I don't have an exact number.
4 Q. Let's take the first one that you recall. What
5 is the subject matter of that email communication?
6 A. As I recall, it was seeking information from
7 Mr. Brieno's -- Brieno to Mr. Braun.
8 Q. So the first email communication that you can
9 recall between Mr. Brieno and Mr. Braun was Mr. Brieno
10 asking Mr. Braun for information; is that right?
12 Q. And all of this concerns SB615, right?
14 Q. And what is the next email communication that
15 you can recall between those two gentlemen?
16 A. I think it's a similar topic -- a similar
17 subject matter.
18 Q. So the second conversation you can recall is,
19 again, Mr. Brieno asking Mr. Braun for information
20 concerning the subject matter of SB615; is that right?
21 A. I can't recall if it was exactly question -- new
22 questions, as opposed to the first communication, as
23 opposed to follow-up on the initial questions, but it was
24 conversation about the request for --
25 Q. Is it --

1 A. -- information.
2 Q. Is it fair to say that these two email
3 communications with Mr. -- involved Mr. Brieno asking
4 Mr. Braun for basic support information concerning SB615?
5 A. I think that's a fair statement.
6 Q. Okay. What is the third conversation you can
7 recall between those two gentlemen?
8 A. Again, in that same vein, either asking for new
9 information or following up on the prior request. It was
10 part of a continual email conversation.
11 Q. Okay. Any other email communications you can
12 recall with -- that you can recall between Mr. Brieno and
13 Mr. Braun?
14 A. No others that I recall.
15 Q. Okay. Are you familiar with something that CPRA
16 lawyers refer to as the Sukumar decision?
17 A. Yes, I am.
18 MR. BRIGGS: For the court reporter's benefit,
19 that's S-U-K-U-M-A-R.
20 BY MR. BRIGGS:
21 Q. Sir, what is your understanding of the Sukumar
22 decision? What do you understand it to be, in very
23 general terms?
24 A. So it's an appellate court decision -- published
25 appellate court decision by our appellate district on a

1 repetition on a dec relief action filed against the City
2 of San Diego by Mr. -- Mr. Sukumar.
3 Q. Under the California Public Records Act, right?
5 Q. Okay. Do you know whether your proposed
6 legislation was intended to address the Sukumar decision?
7 MR. KARLIN: I'll object in terms of a work
8 product privilege.
9 But if you can answer that question without
10 divulging any kind of analysis, impressions, and so
11 forth.
12 THE WITNESS: I can't respond to that question
13 without divulging attorney work product.
14 BY MR. BRIGGS:
15 Q. Let me just ask you factually, were you -- were
16 you aware of any communications between the City
17 Attorney's Office and Senator Hueso's office that make
18 reference to the Sukumar decision?
19 A. I'm not aware of any communications that
20 specifically use that word, that name, "Sukumar."
21 Q. Are you aware of any communications between
22 anyone in the City Attorney's Office and anyone in
23 Senator Hueso's office concerning me?
24 A. Regarding SB615, or generally?
25 Q. Let's stick with SB615.

1 A. I am not -- I don't recall any written
2 communications referencing you.
3 Q. Okay. Since you brought it up, are you aware of
4 any communications between the City Attorney's Office and
5 Senator Hueso's office concerning me generally?
6 A. I'm not aware of any communications.
7 Q. You're not aware of any communications between
8 the two offices concerning me, period, right?
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. I guess I shouldn't have brought that up.
12 Q. Have you ever been involved in what -- any
13 lawyer, whether lawyers in your office or in an outside
14 office, claim to have been an inadvertent disclosure of
15 privileged information?
20 BY MR. BRIGGS:
21 Q. Have you -- you've been involved in that
22 scenario before?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. How many times?
25 A. Approximately three to four times.

1 Q. When is the last time that happened, that you
2 were involved in something like that?
3 A. Other than knowing about the scenario in this
4 matter?
5 Q. No.
6 A. Oh.
7 Q. Measured from today, when is the last time
8 you --
9 A. The last -- go ahead.
10 Q. Measured from today, when is the last time you
11 were involved in any alleged inadvertent disclosure
12 matter?
13 A. I would say the last time would be this matter.
14 Q. Okay. So what happened in this matter that you
15 understand to be an inadvertent disclosure?
16 A. I want to preface it by saying I don't have
17 firsthand knowledge of what occurred. It's just what
18 people have told me. Do you want to know that?
19 Q. Yeah.
20 A. Okay. I was informed that a document was
21 submitted from Mr. Braun to Hueso's office that should
22 not have been and requested that -- our office requested
23 that it be returned, and it was, and promised not to give
24 out. But despite that, apparently, pursuant to a
25 subpoena issued by you, it was released to you. Again,

1 this is what was told to me.
2 Q. Okay. Who told you what you just told me?
3 A. Mr. Braun.
4 Q. When did he tell you that?
5 A. I don't recall specifically. Approximately two
6 to three months ago.
7 Q. Okay. And that was the first you had heard
8 about this inadvertent disclosure, correct?
9 A. It's not the first I heard of the inadvertent
10 disclosure. It's -- can I just add?
11 Q. Yeah, of course.
12 A. It's the first -- it's the first I had heard
13 about the issue in this litigation. I had heard about
14 the inadvertent disclosure when it first happened.
15 Q. Okay. When it first happened, from whom did you
16 hear about it?
17 A. Mr. Braun.
18 Q. What did Mr. Braun tell you?
19 A. That he sent Mr. Hueso's office, Mr. Brieno, a
20 document that perhaps he shouldn't have and that he would
21 make attempts to get it back.
22 Q. And when did he tell you that?
23 A. I don't recall specifically, but I would -- I
24 can't even approximate. In the last -- in the last five
25 months, I know that, but I can't give you a more

1 definitive time frame.
2 Q. Okay. Did Mr. Braun tell you anything else
3 about that alleged inadvertent disclosure?
4 A. Other than -- yeah, just to -- just repeating,
5 that he was seeking it back from Mr. Hueso's office and
6 that it was being returned, but nothing beyond that.
7 Q. Did Mr. Braun tell you what it was that he
8 thought was inadvertently disclosed?
9 A. Which document?
10 Q. Yeah.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. What did he tell you?
13 A. He told me it was an email.
14 Q. From whom to whom?
15 A. It was from Cathy Richardson to myself, and I
16 believe it was either to myself or to myself and Gerry --
17 Mr. Braun.
18 Q. Okay. Do you know how Mr. Braun got that email?
19 A. I don't.
20 Q. Okay. You didn't give it to him, did you?
21 A. I did not give it to him because the search
22 for -- well, let me rephrase. Let me think about this
23 for a second.
24 I can't recall if I gave it to him or not. I
25 may -- I may have forwarded it to him.

1 Q. But he was the one who came to you and said that
2 he thought he shouldn't have given it to Mr. Brieno; is
3 that correct?
5 Q. Okay. And has -- to your knowledge, has
6 Mr. Braun ever snuck into your email and taken any emails
7 without your permission?
8 A. Not to my knowledge.
9 Q. Okay. Has Mr. -- has Ms. Richardson ever snuck
10 into your email and taken anything without your
11 knowledge?
12 A. Not to my knowledge.
13 Q. I meant without your permission, not without
14 your knowledge. Sorry.
15 A. The answer is no.
16 Q. Okay. Did Mr. Braun tell you why he believed
17 that the email should not have been disclosed?
18 A. Well, perhaps I -- maybe I need to correct the
19 word, believed it to not be disclosed. Inquired about
20 whether it should have been disclosed is probably a more
21 accurate statement.
22 Q. So Mr. Braun came to you and asked whether it
23 was appropriate or not for him to have disclosed the
24 email that he had already sent to Mr. Brieno, correct?

1 Q. So he was looking at this after the fact,
2 correct?
4 Q. And the email in question was one that he either
5 got from you or from Ms. Richardson, right?
6 A. Or Nancy Shapiro.
7 Q. Okay. Were you aware during the time that you
8 were working on SB615 that Senator Hueso's office was
9 asking for information to support the legislation?
10 A. I was aware.
11 Q. Were you cooperative in providing information
12 that they needed?
13 A. Yes, I was.
14 Q. Did anybody instruct you to be cooperative or
15 are you just cooperative by nature?
16 A. I don't know if I were to classify myself
17 as cooperative by nature, but in this case, I was
18 cooperative.
19 Q. What did you tell Mr. Braun when he asked you
20 about whether that email should have been disclosed?
21 A. I made the determination that it should not be
22 disclosed.
23 Q. On what basis?
24 A. Attorney work product.
25 Q. Did you know why you were giving Mr. Braun the

1 email in the first place?
2 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Misstates his
3 testimony.
4 But if you understand the question, you can
5 answer it.
6 THE WITNESS: Yeah. I believe it misstates my
7 testimony because I'm not sure that I may have given it
8 to him and, again, it may have been Nancy Shapiro; it may
9 have been Cathy Richardson.
10 BY MR. BRIGGS:
11 Q. Well, if Mr. Braun testified that you gave him
12 the email, would you have given it to him for any reason
13 other than to support SB615?
14 A. Not at this point in time. Not at the relevant
15 point in time.
16 Q. Okay. So when you gave him the email, you knew
17 that he was asking for information to help him in his
18 work with Senator Hueso's office to get SB615 through the
19 legislative process, correct?
20 MR. KARLIN: Objection. Assumes facts.
21 But you can answer if you understand.
22 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I mean, it does assume
23 facts, but I think the first half of that is an accurate
24 statement.
25 /////

1 BY MR. BRIGGS:
2 Q. Is inaccurate or an accurate?
3 A. Is accurate.
4 Q. Okay. Mr. Braun came into possession of that
5 email for the purpose of helping to move SB615 through
6 the Legislature, correct?
7 A. I believe that to be the case, yes.
8 Q. Okay. Did anybody force you -- withdrawn.
9 If it turns out that you did give the email to
10 Mr. Braun, did anybody force you to give it to him?
11 A. Nobody forced me to.
12 Q. Okay. So if, in fact, you gave it to Mr. Braun,
13 you voluntarily gave it to him knowing that he would be
14 using the information to support the SB615 process,
15 correct?
16 A. I -- if you're asking me if I submitted the
17 information to him in conjunction with SB615, that's --
18 yeah, the answer would be yes. What he was doing it --
19 doing with it is speculation on my part.
20 Q. You don't -- do you recall Mr. Braun telling you
21 why he wanted the information?
23 Q. But you knew at the time he was asking you that
24 he was working on SB615, correct?
25 A. Well, I certainly provided or facilitated the

1 provision of that email to Mr. Braun for purposes of
2 SB615, yes.
3 Q. Okay. So you knew that if he had the email from
4 you, that he would be using it to help Mr. Hueso move
5 SB615 along, right?
6 A. I'm assuming that, but I can't answer what he
7 was going to be doing with information that I'm
8 providing, but yes, it was my assumption.
9 Q. That was your belief, right?
11 Q. If I asked you this, I apologize. Whose work
12 product do you think was in this email that Mr. Braun
13 gave Mr. Brieno?
14 A. I believe it to be the work product of myself
15 and Cathy Richardson.
16 Q. Is the whole email thread work product? Is that
17 your testimony?
18 A. I don't have the email thread in front of me to
19 attest to the entire thread. What I can tell you is what
20 I recall from that email, yes.
21 Q. Okay. When is the last time you looked at the
22 email?
23 A. Three weeks ago. Two weeks ago.
24 Q. Does the email make any reference to me?
25 A. I don't recall. But I think it probably speaks

1 for itself, the document.
2 Q. Well, your office claims I can't look at it.
3 A. But you have it, correct?
4 Q. So I can't -- it can't speak to me.
5 A. Okay. I don't recall. Semantics.
6 Q. Are you familiar with the procedures that --
7 that courts have laid out for attempting to claw back a
8 document that is allegedly disclosed inadvertently?
9 A. In response to a PRA or discovery, or both?
10 Q. Either.
11 A. Yes, I am.
12 Q. You are.
13 What is your understanding of the process?
14 What -- what should a competent lawyer who
15 thinks he or she inadvertently disclosed a privileged
16 communication do in order to get that communication back?
17 MR. KARLIN: I'll object that it calls for a
18 legal conclusion.
20 BY MR. BRIGGS:
21 Q. Let me just say, I mean, as you understand the
22 rules.
23 A. I guess I'm confused. I mean, am I being
24 deposed as a percipient witness or an expert witness?
25 You're asking me what the legal duty is to do when

1 something is inadvertently disclosed?
2 Q. I asked what your understanding is. You told me
3 that you're familiar with the process. I just want to
4 know what your understanding is.
5 A. Well, my understanding is to, upon discovery of
6 that inadvertent disclosure, immediately inform the
7 recipient of that inadvertent disclosure and ask for the
8 immediate return of that inadvertently disclosed
9 document.
10 Q. So you would notify the recipient in writing?
11 A. I would.
12 Q. Okay. And then what happens if the recipient
13 doesn't return the document; then what?
14 A. I would instruct the recipient to the
15 ramifications of nonreturn and request that the document
16 at least be, if not returned, short of me compelling its
17 return, to not use the document for -- or read it for any
18 purpose, and I would --
19 Q. Okay. And what --
20 A. -- I'm sorry.
21 Q. Sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt.
22 A. No. I was just going to say, if refusing to
23 return, to hold it in a sealed manner until the Court can
24 decide the issue.
25 Q. Okay. And then assuming that there is no

1 cooperation or capitulation from the receiving side, what
2 is the next step in the process?
3 I think you hinted at it in your answer, but I
4 just want to make sure.
5 A. I would move to compel the return before a
6 judicial officer.
7 Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that that is the
8 process that applies to discovery as well as to Public
9 Records Act cases?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Have you ever been involved in such a process?
12 A. Judicially?
13 Q. Yeah.
14 A. I have been involved in the process, but not
15 where it's reached judicial -- judicial proportions.
16 It's been worked out informally via written
17 communication.
18 Q. Okay. On how many occasions have you been
19 involved in that situation?
20 A. Twice. Two to three times.
21 Q. When is the last time?
22 A. Other than this matter?
23 Q. Yeah.
24 A. A year to a year and a half ago.
25 Q. Okay. Was that in a Public Records Act case?

1 A. It was.
2 Q. Do you recall which lawsuit that was?
3 A. It was not a lawsuit. It was an inadvertent
4 disclosure in response to a PRA request --
6 THE WITNESS: -- to a PRA -- Public Records Act
7 request.
8 BY MR. BRIGGS:
9 Q. It hadn't gotten to the lawsuit stage, but in
10 the course of responding to the request, the City turned
11 over something that it thinks it shouldn't have turned
12 over. Is that a fair statement?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Do you have an understanding of what the term
15 "legislative history" refers to?
16 A. I do.
17 Q. What is your understanding of it?
18 A. Again --
19 Q. You know what? And I mean this in a "you and I
20 having a beer" sense.
21 A. Okay. I don't see the beer, but that's okay.
22 Q. I mean, one beer, not ten. I don't want your
23 speech slurred.
24 A. Yeah. We don't allow that in City employment.
25 Surprisingly, it used to be allowed many years ago.

1 Q. It's not surprising.
2 A. My understanding of legislative history is
3 exactly what it says; it's the history of a legislative
4 enactment that lawyers will typically research when there
5 is issue about its application, inferential activity, or
6 its meaning.
7 Q. Have you ever looked up legislative history on a
8 statute?
9 A. I have.
10 Q. Okay. Have you ever -- have you ever submitted
11 materials to be included in a statute's legislative
12 history?
13 A. Have I submitted materials?
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. To the Legislature?
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. In advancement of proposed legislative changes?
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. I have not.
20 Q. Okay. Do you know whether anyone in your office
21 ever has?
22 A. I don't.
23 Q. Do you understand that that is typically the
24 process with proposed legislation, that people who
25 support it will submit materials that go to the

1 legislative body to be included in the history?
2 A. That's how I understand the process. At least
3 for individuals. Obviously, with the City, I believe
4 there are legislative affairs people and lobbyists that
5 materials are provided to.
6 Q. But I'm talking about State legislation.
7 A. Okay.
8 Q. At the State level, essentially, people submit
9 stuff to their legislators and the legislators put it
10 into the record, correct?
12 Q. And that record becomes what we lawyers call the
13 legislative history, correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. And is it your understanding that in the
16 Legislature, when it comes to proposed legislation, there
17 are no secrets; it's a public process and everybody gets
18 to see what is in the record, correct?
19 MR. KARLIN: Calls for speculation.
20 But you can answer, if you know.
21 THE WITNESS: I believe so. But I also know
22 that the Legislature is not subject to the PRA. So if
23 there are background materials that are not in the
24 legislative materials, who knows.
25 /////

1 BY MR. BRIGGS:
2 Q. But you're -- as far as you're concerned, what
3 gets submitted to the Legislature is public information
4 for purposes of the legislative history, right?
5 A. I -- that's my understanding.
6 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. Fair enough.
7 Let's go off record real quickly.
8 MR. KARLIN: Yes.
9 (Recess taken.)
10 MR. KARLIN: Back on the record.
11
12 EXAMINATION
13 BY MR. KARLIN:
14 Q. So, Mr. Gersten, earlier this afternoon,
15 Mr. Briggs was asking you about your efforts or your
16 drafting of proposed legislation to the California Public
17 Records Act. Do you recall that?
18 A. I do.
19 Q. Who, in your mind, was going to be the
20 beneficiary of your efforts in drafting amendments to the
22 A. The draft of the amendments that I proposed --
23 that I actually drafted and were suggesting was for the
24 benefit of the City. In the context of my legal work
25 assigned to providing legal advice on PRAs city-wide, I

1 believe that the legislative amendments would make the
2 City's ability to expeditiously and most fruitfully
3 respond to PRA requests and to avoid unnecessary
4 litigation that the City would have to defend. That was
5 the motivation or my thought process of why this should
6 be done or why this would -- this is needed or a good
7 idea.
8 Q. And you did that without being directed to do so
9 by anyone; is that correct?
10 A. That's correct. I don't recall anybody
11 specifically telling me, "Go look through the PRA and
12 come up with ideas."
13 Having dealt with it on a constant basis, much
14 more than I ever wanted to with the PRA, having quite a
15 lot of experience with both responding to requests and
16 dealing with requesters, I felt that these proposed
17 amendments were a reasonable solution to avoid litigation
18 and avoid expensive public agencies.
19 Q. But did you do those acts as a private citizen
20 or in some other capacity?
21 A. No. In my capacity as deputy city attorney
22 assigned -- assigned primarily from my office in
23 providing legal advice city-wide on Public Records Act
24 requests. I believe it was in the benefit of the City,
25 was done in my capacity -- in the capacity of my position

1 as a deputy city attorney.
2 MR. KARLIN: I have no further questions.
4 FURTHER EXAMINATION
5 BY MR. BRIGGS:
6 Q. Is there anything else that goes into your
7 thought process for proposing this legislation?
8 A. Other than what I just stated?
9 Q. Correct.
10 A. No.
11 Q. So is it your -- am I correct that you are the
12 human being asserting a work product privilege over this
13 email that Mr. Braun thinks was inadvertently disclosed?
14 A. I am the one -- I'm sorry. Can you rephrase the
15 question? I just want to make sure I understand.
16 Q. Who is the human being who made the
17 determination to assert the work product privilege
18 belatedly over the email that Mr. Braun thinks was
19 inadvertently disclosed?
20 MR. KARLIN: When you say, just for
21 clarification, the assertion of work product privilege,
22 is that in responding to your Public Records Act request?
23 BY MR. BRIGGS:
24 Q. Well, you're here claiming that it's subject to
25 the work product privilege. I want to know who made the

1 determination.
2 A. I made the determination, but I think you,
3 correct me if I'm wrong, you just used the word
4 "belabored" or "later" in terms of --
5 Q. I said "belatedly."
6 A. Belatedly, it's your exact word. I did not make
7 that determination belatedly. I made that -- I made that
8 determination when it was brought to my attention.
9 Q. Which was after Mr. Braun had given it to
10 Mr. Brieno, correct?
12 Q. Okay. So tell me your thought processes for
13 believing that -- withdrawn.
14 What thought processes of yours are reflected
15 in that email?
16 MR. KARLIN: I'm going to assert the work
17 product privilege. I think that that gets in -- you're
18 asking him, if I understand your question correctly, what
19 are his impressions or analyses that led him to that
20 conclusion, which is, by definition, work product.
21 MR. BRIGGS: Well, I'm sorry, but you just
22 spoon-fed him questions, and he gave his thought
23 processes on why he was proposing legislation. You just
24 opened the door.
25 MR. KARLIN: Not to this. I asked him in terms

1 of your line of questioning regarding why he proposed or
2 drafted proposed resolutions to the California Public
3 Records Act, nothing to do with work product. Now you're
4 coming around, back around because it was ambiguous in
5 terms of my understanding of the transcript as to why he
6 had done that work. That is it.
7 MR. BRIGGS: You asked him why he drafted the
8 legislation, and his testimony is that there's an email
9 that everybody knew was going to go to Mr. Brieno to
10 support legislation, that he didn't even think was
11 privileged until a nonlawyer brought it to his
12 attention.
13 MR. KARLIN: I think that misstates his
14 testimony.
15 THE WITNESS: Totally misstates testimony.
16 BY MR. BRIGGS:
17 Q. So I am going to ask you again. Why -- what
18 is it about that email that you think is privileged?
19 MR. KARLIN: Same objection. I don't believe
20 that the witness -- and you can bring a motion to compel.
21 We'll let the judge take a look at the email, but that's
22 what I understand our lawsuit is about, anyway.
23 So with that, you know, he can either follow my
24 instruction or assert the privilege himself.
25 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm going to do both. I'm

1 going to follow your instruction and assert the
2 privilege.
3 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. So I don't have any more
4 questions. Do you?
5 MR. KARLIN: No more questions.
6 MR. BRIGGS: I'm not going to terminate the
7 deposition, however, because I believe that we have a
8 live dispute over this issue, and in addition, you didn't
9 provide a privilege log.
10 So subject to those caveats, we'll have to sort
11 them out, David, you and I, with the judge. We may be
12 back in here, Mr. Gersten, at some point in time.
13 But with that understanding, I will at least
14 conclude today's session.
15 Do we want to -- do you want to do this by Code
16 or do you want to do the stip that you and I usually do?
17 MR. KARLIN: Stip is fine.
18 MR. BRIGGS: Okay. So are you okay if we do a
19 stip?
20 THE REPORTER: Yes.
21 MR. BRIGGS: I'm learning that things are
22 changing right now.
23 So I propose to relieve the court reporter of
24 her duties under the Code; that the original of the
25 transcript be sent to Mr. Karlin. He will make sure that

1 the witness has a chance to review it, make any
2 corrections, sign it under penalty of perjury within 30
3 days of Mr. Karlin's receipt.
4 Mr. Karlin will promptly apprise me of the fact
5 of signing, as well as any changes made to the
6 transcript.
7 A certified copy of the transcript may be used
8 in lieu of an original for any purpose as supplemented by
9 any timely changes that my office is notified of.
10 MR. KARLIN: So stipulated.
11 THE REPORTER: Do you need a copy of the
12 transcript?
13 MR. KARLIN: Yes, please.
14 THE REPORTER: We are now off the record. Thank
15 you.
16 - - -
17 (TIME NOTED: 2:12 P.M.)
18 - - -
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
3 I, WILLIAM J. GERSTEN, DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY,
4 the witness herein, declare under penalty of perjury that
5 I have read the foregoing in its entirety; and that the
6 testimony contained herein is a true and accurate
7 transcription of my testimony elicited at said time and
8 place.
10 Executed this ____ day of ____________, ______,

(Month) (Year)
11
at ________________, ______________________.
12 (City) (State)
13
14
15
16 __________________________________
17 WILLIAM J. GERSTEN, DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 I, Antonia Sueoka, Certified Shorthand Reporter
2 licensed in the State of California, License No. 9007,
3 hereby certify that the deponent was by me first duly
4 sworn and the foregoing testimony was reported by me and
5 was thereafter transcribed with Computer-Aided
6 Transcription; that the foregoing is a full, complete,
7 and true record of said proceeding.
8 I further certify that I am not of counsel or
9 attorney for either or any of the parties in the
10 foregoing proceeding and caption named or in any way
11 interested in the outcome of the cause in said caption.
12 The dismantling, unsealing, or unbinding of the
13 original transcript will render the reporter's
14 certificates null and void.
15 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
16 this 5th day of November, 2019.
17 __X__ Reading and Signing was requested.
18 _____ Reading and Signing was waived.
19 _____ Reading and Signing was not requested.
20
21 _____________________________________
22 Antonia Sueoka, CSR NO. 9007, RPR
23
24
25

WORD INDEX <6> Administration 22:9 61:4 19:18 29:7

6 4:10 8:24 amend 26:9 42:25 44:5
<1> 60 4:21 administrative amendment April 8:6 24:3
1 1:7, 12 2:7 61 4:22 10:8, 9 12:24 13:9, 16 32:9
4:10 6:5, 8, 8 615 12:3 admonitions 32:13 argument 27:7
7:14 619.533.5800 5:18, 24 amendments 28:8
1:01 2:17 5:2 3:11 advancement 21:11, 14 29:9 arguments 16:24
100 1:7 2:7 65 1:12 55:17 57:20, 22 58:1, articulate 18:9
1100 3:10 advice 9:21 17 asked 13:21
111 3:5 <7> 10:20 57:25 amount 39:1 15:16 16:16
1200 3:10 7 4:11 58:23 analyses 60:19 17:15, 21 18:13,
14 4:21 advise 9:24 10:6 analysis 27:5 16 29:8, 24 30:3,
15 4:12, 17 <9> advising 10:1 41:10 20 32:1 35:3
32:21 9007 1:21 2:20 11:9 announced 37:25 46:22 47:19
17 4:17, 22 65:2, 22 advisor 32:11 answer 12:15 50:11 52:2
1990 7:25 909.949.7115 3:6 Affairs 9:4, 7, 11, 20:25 21:1 60:25 61:7
1992 8:12 91786 3:5 15, 17 32:10 22:14 23:11 asking 15:14
1994 8:12 92101 3:10 33:2 36:5 56:4 24:17 27:5 28:9 16:4 17:24 18:5
1st 24:3 99 3:5 affecting 18:14 29:18 30:4 25:10 29:22
31:19 32:25 31:22 32:17 31:4 32:24
<2> <A> afield 26:15 33:5 34:15, 17, 34:10, 16 39:10,
2 4:11 7:18, 19 Aaron 35:11 after 6:25 36:24, 20, 23, 25 41:9 19 40:3, 8 47:9
2:12 63:17 ability 58:2 25 37:3 47:1 42:18 46:15 48:17 49:16, 23
2005 8:6 32:10 about 9:6 11:23 60:9 48:5, 21 49:18 51:25 57:15
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Exhibit 4
Performance Audit of
Balboa Park Celebration, Inc.
RESPONSES TO KEY QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO

BALBOA PARK CELEBRATION, INC.
OCTOBER 2014
Audit Report
Office of the City Auditor

City of San Diego
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
October 1, 2014
Honorable Mayor, City Council, and Audit Committee Members

City of San Diego, California
Transmitted herewith is a performance audit report on the Balboa Park Celebration, Inc. This report
was conducted in accordance with the City Auditor’s Fiscal Year 2014 Audit Work Plan, and the report
is presented in accordance with City Charter Section 39.2. The Results in Brief are presented on page 1.
Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology are presented in Appendix A.
We would like to thank staff from the Department of Economic Development, Office of Special Events,
Office of the City Attorney, and Balboa Park Celebration, Inc. for their assistance and cooperation
during this audit. All of their valuable time and efforts spent on providing us information is greatly
appreciated. The audit staff members responsible for this audit report are Kevin Christensen, Megan
Garth, Matthew Helm, and Kyle Elser.
Respectfully submitted,
Eduardo Luna
City Auditor
cc: Scott Chadwick, Chief Operating Officer

Stacey LoMedico, Assistant Chief Operating Officer
David Graham, Deputy Chief Operating Officer, Neighborhood Services
Herman Parker, Director, Park & Recreation
Gerry Braun, Transition Director, Balboa Park Celebration, Inc.
Jan Goldsmith, City Attorney
Andrea Tevlin, Independent Budget Analyst
Brian Pepin, Director of Council Affairs
OFFICE OF THE CITY AUDITOR

1010 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 555, WEST TOWER ● SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
PHONE (619) 533-3165 ● FAX (619) 533-3036
TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE, CALL OUR FRAUD HOTLINE (866) 809-3500
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
Table of Contents
Results in Brief 1
Background 5
Audit Results 11
Question 1: Did BPCI Misuse City Funds? 11
Question 2: Did BPCI Fully Comply with the MOU and
Funding Agreement? 14
Question 3: Did Any Third-Party Vendors or Consultants
Receive Payments from BPCI, but Did Not Provide Agreed-
Upon Services or Deliverables? 22
Question 4: Did the City Provide Adequate Oversight
Regarding BPCI? 26
Question 5: What Other Factors May Have Adversely
Affected BPCI’s Ability to Fulfill Its Mission? 30
Appendix A: Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 37
Appendix B: BPCI Procurement Practices for Highest Paid

Consultants 40
Appendix C: BPCI Procurement Practices for Executive Hiring 47

Performance Audit of Balboa Park Celebration, Inc.
Results in Brief
The Centennial Celebration (Celebration) of the 1915 Panama-
California Exposition held in Balboa Park was intended to be an event
of immense scale that would increase civic pride, increase tourism,
and provide a significant economic benefit to the City of San Diego
(City). In November 2011, the City executed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) and Funding Agreement with Balboa Park
Celebration, Inc. (BPCI), a newly-formed non-profit organization, to
carry out all aspects of the celebration on behalf of the City. However,
BPCI was unable to fulfill its intended mission and the City terminated
the contractual relationship with BPCI in May 2014.
In an April 8, 2014 memorandum, the Chairman of City Council’s

Committee on the Environment requested that we undertake an
audit of BPCI. 1 The memorandum cited concerns regarding BPCI’s use
of public funds. The committee chairman requested that we ascertain
whether: 1) BPCI misused public funds; 2) BPCI fully complied with
the MOU and Funding Agreement; and 3) any third-party vendors or
consultants received payments from BPCI, but did not provide
agreed-upon services or deliverables.
In addition, we examined the adequacy of City oversight regarding

BPCI, and assessed other factors that may have adversely affected
BPCI’s ability to fulfill its mission. Our results are summarized below
and discussed in greater detail in the body of our report.
To address these questions we reviewed BPCI’s report submissions to

the City, extensive documentation regarding BPCI’s planning and
operations, all BPCI third-party contracts and available deliverables,
BPCI’s financial information, and conducted numerous interviews
with City staff and BPCI consultants and executives. We had full
access to BPCI’s documents and data files, and had complete
cooperation from all interviewees.
1
At the April 7, 2014 Audit Committee meeting, the Committee unanimously voted that we perform an audit
and performance review of BPCI.
OCA-15-008 Page 1
1. Did BPCI Misuse Public The Funding Agreement between the City and BPCI set forth how
Funds? BPCI was to expend public funds for planning, organizing, and
implementing the Celebration. In our analysis of BPCI’s expenditures,
we found that BPCI complied with the Funding Agreement’s use of
funds requirements. Between FY 2012 and FY 2014, BPCI received
total funding of about $3 million, of which approximately $1.6 million
was provided through various City funding sources. The allowable
expenditures set forth in the Funding Agreement were very broad.
Some of the allowable expenses outlined in the Funding Agreement
included planning, development, general administration,
programming, special event production, operations, marketing,
contractors, service providers, and employees. The Funding
Agreement also required BPCI to provide quarterly financial reports
to the City’s Economic Development Department (Economic
Development) detailing BPCI’s use of funds so that Economic
Development could ensure BPCI’s compliance with the Agreement.
As noted above, BPCI’s expenditures and reporting complied with
these portions of the agreements.
2: Did BPCI Fully Comply The Funding Agreement between the City and BPCI was made with
with the MOU and Funding reference to and reliance upon the MOU. Our analysis focused on
Agreement? both interrelated documents. We found that BPCI did not
consistently comply with the section of the Funding Agreement
governing procedures for procurement of goods and services in its
relations with several contractors hired to assist in the planning and
execution of the Celebration. The City Charter, Municipal Code,
Council Policies, and Administrative Regulations set forth general
requirements for competitive bidding to ensure fair practices in the
awarding of City Contracts. BPCI’s specific obligation to abide by
certain City requirements are set forth in the Funding Agreement,
which outlines specific procedural requirements when procuring
goods and services. Specifically, contracts with a value of less than
$5,000, between $5,000 and $25,000, and more than $25,000, had
increasingly stringent procedural requirements prior to execution
based on the value. We found several instances where BPCI awarded
contracts without going through the required procurement
processes.
Additionally, we found some other areas where BPCI did not fully
comply with certain portions of the MOU. Specifically, BPCI was late
in providing certain deliverables required by the MOU, although
most required deliverables were provided on time. Further, we found
that the MOU requirement pertaining to presentations to City
OCA-15-008 Page 2
Council’s Natural Resources and Culture Committee was not fully

met.
3: Did Any Third-Party We found that, based on the sometimes broad scopes of work set
Vendors or Consultants forth in the contracts, BPCI vendors and consultants delivered on the
Receive Payments from agreed-upon goods and services. We reviewed the deliverables
BPCI, but Did Not Provide received from BPCI’s highest paid consultants and executives.
Agreed-Upon Services or Payments to the top 10 highest paid consultants and executives
Deliverables? comprised about two-thirds of BPCI’s total expenditures.
4: Did the City Provide We found that City staff had limited oversight over BPCI regarding
Adequate Oversight the MOU and Funding Agreements. The Funding Agreement
Regarding BPCI? designates the Director of Special Events and the Deputy Director of
Economic Development as the contract administrators for the MOU
and Funding Agreement, respectively. The Funding Agreement
contract administrator’s review was limited to ensuring that the
amount on the submitted invoice matched payments and
disbursement from BPCI accounts. City staff charged with overseeing
the reimbursement process indicated that the broad scope of the
agreements and lack of detailed invoicing may have also impeded
contract oversight. However, we found provisions in the MOU and
Funding Agreement which potentially could have enabled City
contract administrators to perform more stringent oversight and be
alerted to impending problems. The City Attorney’s Office noted that
the MOU and Funding Agreement contained sufficient language to
enforce deadlines for deliverables, and required presentations to
public committees and meetings with public officials.
5: What Other Factors May Several political and regulatory/legal issues impeded BPCI’s planning
Have Adversely Affected and operational efforts. First, the City’s series of mayoral transitions
BPCI’s Ability to Fulfill its adversely affected BPCI’s ability to obtain funding and contributed to
Mission? delays in the organization’s event planning process. Second,
according to BPCI executives and contractors, Mayor Filner’s role in
BPCI’s celebration planning contributed to further delays in the
planning process. Third, BPCI encountered difficulty in complying
with certain legal restrictions on BPCI’s use of San Diego Tourism
Marketing District funds. Fourth, BPCI was uncertain of the extent to
which the event planning would be affected by certain
environmental regulatory requirements. Lastly, we found that BPCI
encountered significant areas of difficulty in obtaining both
corporate and philanthropic sponsorships.
OCA-15-008 Page 3
Issues for Future While we did not make recommendations in the audit, we provide
Consideration issues for future consideration regarding Citywide contracting
practices. Although there were external factors that led to the
dissolution of BPCI prior to completing its mission that were in many
ways outside of the control of BPCI and the City, there are some key
lessons to be learned from the City‘s perspective. Going forward, the
City should ensure that contracts with vendors include sufficiently
detailed scopes of work that include performance milestones to
facilitate contract oversight. Additionally, when contractor invoices
are not sufficiently detailed and contract deliverables are not met, the
City’s contract administrators should be more proactive in
questioning contractor submissions and taking action to hold the
contractor accountable for deliverables. Based on our approved FY
2015 Annual Audit Workplan, 2 we have recently initiated an audit on
Citywide Contract Oversight that will review the City’s contract
monitoring procedures, and we will make recommendations to
improve the City’s contract oversight practices as needed.
City Management and BPCI We provided a draft version of this report to City Management, the
Response Office of the City Attorney, and the BPCI Transition Director for review
and comment. All parties provided technical comments, which have
been incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate. Both the
City and BPCI generally agreed with our findings.
2
City Council’s Audit Committee approved the Office of the City Auditor’s Annual Audit Workplan on July 14,
2014.
OCA-15-008 Page 4
Background
Balboa Park (Park), located in the City of San Diego (City) and
comprising over 1,000 acres, is the nation’s largest urban cultural
park. Designated as a park in 1868 by San Diego civic leaders and re-
named in 1910 to honor Spanish-born explorer, Vasco Nuñez de
Balboa, the Park is home to 15 major museums, renowned
performing arts venues, beautiful gardens, and the San Diego Zoo.
With an ever-changing calendar of museum exhibitions, plays,
concerts, classes, and major celebrations held annually, the Park
brings an estimated 14 million visitors per year. The Park is
maintained by the Developed Regional Parks Division of the City of
San Diego Park and Recreation Department.
In 1915-16, the Park hosted the Panama-California Exposition

(Exposition) to commemorate the opening of the Panama Canal and
San Diego’s designation as the first U.S. port-of-call for northbound
maritime trade. The Exposition, with a theme of celebration of
progress, prosperity, and opportunity, is widely credited with
attracting the first international attention to San Diego, which at the
time had fewer than 40,000 residents. In fact, the Exposition is
responsible for the creation of many of the current structures in place
at the Park today, such as the California Tower and dome, Spreckels
Organ Pavilion, and the historic Botanical Building, one of the largest
lath structures in the world. The Exposition left as its legacy an
invigorated economy and an enhanced civic reputation, while setting
the tone for the development of the Park as a cultural center.
2015 Centennial Celebration The desire for a 100-year anniversary celebration in 2015
Planning Began in Mid- (Celebration) – intended to expand on the Exposition’s success and
1990s promote Balboa Park’s history, culture, and educational and
recreational resources to the world – began as an ongoing
conversation within the local hospitality industry and Balboa Park
institutions in the mid-1990s. Over time, the scale of what was
envisioned for the Celebration was immense. The City and
community leaders envisioned that this Celebration would increase
civic pride and tourism, and provide an economic benefit to the City.
By some estimates, the Celebration was projected to bring nearly
$700 million to the region, and to double annual visits to the Park
from 10 million in 2010 to 20 million – with nearly 75 percent of
Celebration attendees coming from outside of San Diego.
OCA-15-008 Page 5
San Diego’s Tourism The tourism industry is the third largest revenue generator for the
Industry Took a Major City of San Diego economy and a key employment sector. Future
Interest in Celebration growth of the industry is dependent on additional marketing of San
Planning Diego, especially as more hotel rooms come on-line. In mid-2005,
hotel industry representatives interested in developing a new source
of revenue for marketing and expanding the tourism industry in San
Diego approached City officials about implementing a tourism
marketing district (district), whereby lodging businesses within this
district would be assessed a tax to pay for tourism marketing and
promotion within the City. In December 2007, the City Council of San
Diego approved the establishment of the district for five years,
covering the period from 2008 through 2012. In April 2008, the City
entered into agreement with the San Diego Tourism Marketing
District Corporation (SDTMD), a California non-profit mutual benefit
corporation, for the administration of the district.
SDTMD Played a Significant Building off the belief that a year-long Celebration would significantly
Role in Early Celebration increase hotel stays, the SDTMD and City Mayor Jerry Sanders
Planning assembled the SDTMD Steering Committee (Steering Committee) in
March 2010 to develop a framing vision for the Celebration. The
SDTMD, which provided a $50,000 grant in seed money for this
purpose, hired a consultant to complete the planning framework
report which was issued in November 2010. The planning framework
document consolidated nearly a decade of ideas, opinions, and
documents addressing the Celebration’s year-long anticipated event.
At a November 2010 SDTMD board of directors meeting, after review

of a proposed scope of work and budget for the Celebration, the
SDTMD board elected to allocate $300,000 to the Celebration. The
funding was contingent upon the City allocating $400,000 and
private donors allocating $300,000.
Balboa Park Celebration, Inc. In March 2011, members of the Steering Committee presented the
(BPCI) Formed to Be City’s Celebration concept to the City’s Natural Resources and Culture
Official Celebration Committee and outlined a plan for the City to enter into a
Organizer Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a non-profit entity,
Balboa Park Celebration, Inc. (BPCI), to carry out the planning of the
Celebration. The Steering Committee members projected the year-
long event would attract about 600,000 hotel room nights and have a
total economic impact to the region of nearly $700 million. Exhibit 1
shows the projections that were presented at the meeting.
OCA-15-008 Page 6
Exhibit 1
Estimated Economic Impact of Celebration on San Diego’s Tourism Industry, Calendar Year 2015
Source: San Diego Convention and Visitors Bureau.
In November 2011, following the legal formation of BPCI in June, the

Council approved the MOU and a Funding Agreement with BPCI and
allocated $450,000 to the organization. 3 The MOU established the
Celebration period from July 1, 2014 through March 31, 2016, and
provided the authority to plan, oversee, manage and conduct the
Celebration on behalf of the City, including the scheduling of
Celebration events, and the timely issuance of necessary City permits.
Additionally, the MOU laid out specific responsibilities for BPCI to
meet, including a timeline of deliverables due to City officials,
permitting for Celebration events, event planning, and fundraising,
among other responsibilities. The Funding Agreement, which refers
to and relies upon the MOU, included provisions that described the
allowable uses of funds established, procurement requirements for
BPCI to follow, and designated the Office of Special Events (Special
Events) and the Economic Development Department (Economic
Development) as contract administrators over the MOU and Funding
Agreement, respectively. As part of their duties, the contract
administrators were required to provide feedback to BPCI on
deliverables and other matters. Contract oversight issues are
discussed in greater detail in the body of the report.
3
The City provided $450,000 to BPCI in Transient Occupancy Tax revenue that was previously set aside in the
City’s Major Events Revolving Fund.
OCA-15-008 Page 7
BPCI Received a Total of To provide BPCI with sufficient funding with which to begin its
Nearly $3 Million to Plan operations, BPCI received approximately $850,000 in FY 2012. 4 In the
Celebration ensuing fiscal years through FY 2014, BPCI received additional funds
for a combined three-year total of approximately $3 million. Exhibit 2
below shows BPCI’s funding sources from July 2011 to June 2014 (FY
2012 - FY 2014).
Exhibit 2
Amount of Funding BPCI Received from Public and Private Sources, FY 2012 - FY 2014
Funding Sources Date Amount Received Amount

City of San Diego Major Event Revolving Fund FY 2012 - FY 2014 $1,255,916
City of San Diego Commission for Arts and Culture FY 2014 $375,000
City of San Diego Festivals Fund FY 2014 $15,000
San Diego Tourism Marketing District FY 2012 - FY 2014 $909,636
County of San Diego FY 2013 $40,000
San Diego Gas & Electric Company FY 2013 $100,000
Private Donors FY 2012 $388,909
TOTAL $3,084,461
Source: OCA, based on BPCI’s financial information.
BPCI Started Work amid From late fall of 2011 through March 2013, as BPCI established its
Early Internal and External administrative structure, it experienced several early internal
Setbacks setbacks. These setbacks, against a transitional political environment,
affected the organization’s attempts to begin the Celebration
planning process in earnest.
In BPCI’s first four months as a non-profit, its first Chief Executive

Officer (CEO) Mark Germyn, abruptly resigned in February 2012,
which left the organization without a leader. Mike McDowell, an
original member of the Steering Committee that spearheaded the
Celebration idea, was appointed by BPCI’s board of directors (Board)
as the organization’s new CEO. During McDowell’s term as CEO, the
City approved its first amendment to the Funding Agreement in
November 2012, which provided the organization with an allocation
of nearly $446,000.
Soon after the amendment was finalized, the City sought to keep
afloat a project to redesign the Plaza de Panama in Balboa Park after
a local organization sued the City in the San Diego County Superior
4
The City’s Fiscal Year begins on July 1st of the current year and ends on June 30th of the following year.
OCA-15-008 Page 8
Court (Superior Court) challenging the project. The project, launched

by local philanthropist Irwin Jacobs’ Plaza de Panama Committee and
approved by the City, involved installing a bypass bridge from the
Cabrillo Bridge by closing the area to traffic and returning it to its
original state as a walking pavilion. The lawsuit asserted that the City
violated its own Municipal Code, as well as California State law, with
its approval. The impending outcome of the Superior Court’s decision
delayed construction in the Plaza De Panama, which if approved by
the Superior Court, would have to be completed by the time of the
start of the Celebration.
Additionally, in late December 2012 through March 2013, BPCI

experienced another series of major setbacks, both internally and
externally. Specifically, McDowell submitted his resignation as CEO in
February 2013, which left the organization without a leader again.
This came at a time of political transition when Bob Filner became
San Diego’s new Mayor in December 2012. Mayor Filner’s immediate
contention surrounding the signing of a new agreement with the
SDTMD caused cessation in funding to the SDTMD and to BPCI. Gerry
Braun, working as the organization’s communications project
manager prior to McDowell’s departure, became BPCI’s interim CEO
in March 2013.
New CEO Took Control of In the spring of 2013, Julie Dubick, an attorney and former Chief of
BPCI amid Planning Delays Staff under Mayor Sanders, became BPCI’s fourth CEO in nearly two
and Political Turmoil years. Immediately subsequent to her appointment, the City
provided an additional $360,000 to BPCI with the approval of a
second amendment to the Funding Agreement. Mayor Filner
resigned from office later that summer.
Under Dubick’s leadership and about a year away from the start of
the Celebration, the organization increased its fundraising efforts by
hiring Marketing Partnership Solutions and Utopia Entertainment to
gain sponsorship for the Celebration. Additionally, the organization
made a major change by terminating Autonomy, the original
production company hired in December 2012, and hired Utopia for
production in December 2013.
OCA-15-008 Page 9
SDTMD Questioned BPCI In early 2014, members of SDTMD’s board of directors expressed to
Planning Efforts BPCI on multiple occasions that the organization must provide an
account of its specific progress against its FY 2014 contract
commitment and demonstrate an associated rate of return to
participating hotels within the district. In a February 2014 letter to the
SDTMD executive director, BPCI stated that it was not yet able to
measure targets and outcomes or track a return on investment to
participating district hotels because the event was scheduled to run
through 2015.
BPCI CEO Resigned and BPCI BPCI’s fourth and final CEO Julie Dubick resigned on February 13,
Signaled Intent to Cease 2014, after 10 months on the job. Shortly after Dubick’s departure,
Planning Efforts BPCI informed the SDTMD that it was postponing any action on an
application for additional funds.
On February 26, 2014, the Office of the Mayor requested that BPCI
return control of the Celebration planning to the City. Subsequently,
BPCI’s Board approved a plan to transfer all remaining funds, records,
and authority back to the City. On March 1, 2014, Gerry Braun,
formerly the City’s Director of Special Projects under Mayor Sanders,
became BPCI’s Transition Director and on March 3rd, he notified the
City that BPCI intended to return the responsibility of planning the
Celebration back to Special Events. BPCI’s Board voted to terminate
the MOU with the City by mutual agreement, terminate outstanding
contracts, pay all debts, and establish a transition team to assist with
winding down the BPCI’s business.
Subsequently, BPCI returned $257,6625 of unused City funds to the

City as required by the MOU and termination agreement.
5
The termination agreement stated that unused City funds should be returned within 90 days of the execution
of the agreement. BPCI returned the funds within about 160 days of the execution of the agreement.
OCA-15-008 Page 10
Audit Results
Question 1: Did BPCI Misuse City Funds?
BPCI Complied with the The Funding Agreement sets forth that Balboa Park Celebration, Inc.
Funding Agreement’s Use of (BPCI) should use public funds for planning, organizing and
Funds Requirements implementing the 2015 Centennial Celebration (Celebration). In our
analysis of BPCI’s expenditures, we found that BPCI complied with the
Funding Agreement’s use of funds requirements. Between FY 2012
and FY 2014, BPCI received a total funding of about $3 million, of
which approximately $1.6 million came from various City funding
sources. BPCI expended about $2.84 million over the course of its
operating period. The allowable expenses set forth in the Funding
Agreement were very broad. Some of the allowable expenses
identified in the Funding Agreement included planning,
development, general administration, programming, special event
production, operations, marketing, contractors, service providers,
and employees. The Funding Agreement also required BPCI to
provide quarterly financial reports to the City’s Economic
Development Department (Economic Development) detailing BPCI’s
use of funds so that the department could ensure BPCI’s compliance
with the agreement.
In our evaluation, we grouped all expenditures, including those using

funds from other sources, into categories closely mirroring the
Funding Agreement’s use of funds requirements. Exhibit 3 below
shows a breakdown of these categories and a brief description of the
services provided within each category.
OCA-15-008 Page 11
Exhibit 3
BPCI Spending Analysis by Category, FY 2012 - FY 2014
Total Expenditures = $2.8 Million
SPONSORSHIP ADMINISTRATIVE
$231,568 SUPPORT
9% $328,595
12%
PROGRAMMING
$314,816 BRANDING
12% $64,881
2%
PRODUCTION COMMUNICATIONS
$536,218 $541,766
20% 20%
EXECUTIVE
SERVICES
$635,913
22%
MISCELLANEOUS
$95,220
3%
Notes: Administrative Support: Includes payments to vendors for legal and financial services and internal
administrative support.
Branding: Includes payments to vendors for branding services for the Celebration.
Communications: Includes payments to vendors for communication services such as public relations,
marketing, website design, and advertising.
Executive Services: Includes payments to BPCI's Chief Executive Officers, Chief Operating Officer, and
employees (Julie Dubick and Victor Avina).
Miscellaneous: Includes payments to vendors for items such as publication of Request for Proposals
(RFPs), printing services, and janitorial services.
Production: Includes payments to vendors for traffic and parking studies and location designation of
Celebration events in Balboa Park.
Programming: Includes payments to vendors for the planning and designing of Celebration events and
Balboa Park institutional planning grants.
Sponsorship: Includes payments to vendors responsible for raising money for the Celebration.
Source: OCA analysis, based on AKT financials received from BPCI.
OCA-15-008 Page 12
BPCI’s Spending Pattern The relative amounts that comprised the various expenditure
Demonstrates Difficulty in categories illustrate some of the key areas that were problematic for
Moving from Celebration BPCI. For example, in contrast to the nine percent of total
Planning to Execution expenditures for sponsorship efforts, about half of all BPCI
expenditures were for executive services, communications, and
administrative support. In our view, this pattern of spending
illustrates the difficulty BPCI had in moving from planning to
execution. As an additional example, BPCI spent 20 percent of funds
on production services, 88 percent of which was paid to Autonomy
but did not result in a finalized production plan. Because production
is tied to the physical layout of the Park and BPCI did not produce a
finalized layout of event activities, this effectively made the
programming that had been developed by several contractors of
little use. The delay in the creation of a finalized production layout
may have also hindered BPCI’s ability to create an environmental
review package in the summer of 2013 to submit to the Office of
Special Events should the event be required to undergo a state
environmental review.
OCA-15-008 Page 13
Question 2: Did BPCI Fully Comply with the

MOU and Funding Agreement?
BPCI Did Not Consistently The Funding Agreement between the City and BPCI was made with
Comply with All Provisions reference to and reliance upon the Memorandum of Understanding
of the MOU and Funding (MOU). Our analysis focused on both interrelated documents. We
Agreement found that BPCI did not consistently comply with the section of the
Funding Agreement governing procedures for procurement of goods
and services in its relations with several contractors hired to assist in
the planning and execution of the Celebration. The City Charter,
Municipal Code, Council Policies, and Administrative Regulations set
forth general requirements for competitive bidding to ensure fair
practices in the awarding of City Contracts. BPCI’s specific obligation
to abide by certain City requirements are set forth in the Funding
Agreement, which outlines specific procedural requirements when
procuring goods and services. Specifically, contracts with a value of
less than $5,000, between $5,000 and $25,000, and more than
$25,000, had increasingly stringent procedural requirements prior to
execution based on the value.
Additionally, we found some other areas where BPCI did not fully
comply with certain portions of the MOU. Specifically, BPCI was late
in providing certain deliverables required by the MOU, although
most required deliverables were provided on time. Further, we found
that the MOU requirement pertaining to presentations to City
Council’s Natural Resources and Culture Committee was not fully
met.
BPCI Inconsistently Adhered We found that BPCI inconsistently complied with the section of the
to Contracting Funding Agreement governing procedures for procurement of goods
Requirements and services from contractors who were engaged to assist in the
planning and execution of the Celebration. The City Charter,
Municipal Code, Council Policies, and Administrative Regulations set
forth general requirements for competitive bidding to ensure fair
practices and avoid appearances of impropriety or conflicts of
interest in the awarding of City contracts. BPCI’s specific obligation to
abide by certain City requirements when procuring goods and
services is set forth in Exhibit C of the Funding Agreement. Contracts
with a value of less than $5,000, between $5,000 and $25,000, and
more than $25,000, had increasingly stringent procedural
requirements prior to execution, based on the contract amount.
Additionally, just as the City’s contracting requirements do not apply
to the hiring of City employees, the procurement requirements set
OCA-15-008 Page 14
forth in Exhibit C of the Funding Agreement did not apply to the

hiring of BPCI employees. Notably, only two individuals were hired as
BPCI employees. 6
BPCI executed some initial contracts that adhered to the procedural

requirements for an initial contract. However, during the course of
planning, BPCI leaders renegotiated scopes of work and payment
terms that were not subjected to the procedures mandated by the
Funding Agreement. In other cases, we found that the Funding
Agreement’s procedural requirements were not followed at all. Based
on our review of documentation and interviews with BPCI executives,
it is evident that there was a lack of clarity as to whether and what
extent the organization was required to follow the procurement
provisions set forth in the Funding Agreement.
BPCI’s adherence to procurement procedures set forth in Exhibit C of

the Funding Agreement can be separated into the following
categories:
1. BPCI adhered to the procurement procedures.
2. BPCI adhered to the procurement procedures when
initially contracting with a consultant. However, BPCI did
not follow the procedures when the contracts were
expanded and subsequent contracts with the same
consultant were negotiated and signed.
3. BPCI did not adhere to the procurement procedures at all.
See Exhibit 4 for details on BPCI’s procurement practices regarding

selected key contracts.
6
BPCI’s final CEO, Julie Dubick, was hired under an employment contract. Additionally, BPCI hired a Marketing
and Communications Manager as an employee in 2013.
OCA-15-008 Page 15
Exhibit 4
BPCI Compliance with Required Procurement Procedures for Selected Contracts
Vendor Followed Followed Did Not Follow

Procurement Procurement Procurement
Process Process Initially Process
But Not
Subsequently
Autonomy x
Loma Media Partners x
Michael H. McDowell x
J&S Silverman Consulting x
Mark Germyn x
Gerry Braun and Associates x
Blegs, Inc. dba Marketing Partnership x
Utopia Entertainment, Inc. x
Departure Agency, Inc. x
Batten Accountancy x
Fehr & Peers x
AV Concepts, Inc. x
Goodman Experiences x
Blue Horizon Insurance Services x
Lisa G. DeFino Enterprises x
Grant Leisure, Inc. x
Balboa Park Online Collaborative x
Christy White Accountancy Corporation x
Hiroko Kusano x
Brown Law Group, ALC x
Source: OCA, based on an analysis of BPCI vendor contracts.
OCA-15-008 Page 16
BPCI Adhered to the BPCI followed the procurement procedures set forth in the Funding
Procurement Procedures Set Agreement for some of the contracts entered into with consultants.
Forth in the Funding For example, BPCI issued a total of 11 requests for proposals (RFPs),
Agreement in Some Cases for which 10 consultants responded and were selected and the City.
Although an RFP was issued for Julie Dubick’s position as CEO, we
excluded her from the total number of vendors selected because
BPCI was not required to hire employees through the procurement
process. However, we found that in at least five other instances
where consultants paid more than $25,000, no RFP was issued. One
BPCI CEO stressed that, in certain instances, the procurement
procedures were not followed due to time constraints in planning
the Celebration.
In Some Cases, BPCI Initially During the course of operations, BPCI entered into a series of
Adhered to Procurement contracts with consultants that were subsequently either modified or
Procedures Required in the expanded to include enhanced scopes of works which resulted in
Funding Agreement but Did new contracts. In many cases, the BPCI Board did not route the new
Not Follow the Procedures contracts with expanded scopes of work through the procurement
when Contracts Were process specified in the RFP.
Expanded or Renegotiated
One example is the series of contracts BPCI entered into with Loma
Media. The BPCI Board adhered to the procurement procedures
required in the Funding Agreement for the initial hiring of Loma
Media. The Board approved the creation and proliferation of an RFP,
assembled a hiring committee which interviewed candidates, and
approved the initial contract for an annual budget of $90,000. BPCI
entered into a contract with Loma Media with an estimated fee of
$188,000 to complete a specific scope of work between from April
2012 through April 2013.
In March 2013, BPCI staff told the Board that a decision had been
made to rebrand, discontinue work with a separate contractor, and
contract with Loma Media to take over those duties and lead the
rebranding effort. The Board did not initiate the RFP procedures
specified in the Funding Agreement. Rather, the BPCI Board
approved entering a contract with Loma Media. BPCI staff later
explained that Loma Media was being paid on an $8,000/month
retainer “with additional job components added to that retainer.”
More specifically, BPCI staff explained that “BPCI has reengineered
the scope of work under the Loma Media contract to include a larger
website development.”
Finally, in September 2013, the BPCI Board approved another new

contract with Loma Media without initiating the RFP procedures
OCA-15-008 Page 17
specified in the Funding Agreement. BPCI staff executed a contract

which included a new scope of work and specified a fee between
$373,468 and $1,867,433.
The BPCI Board did not initiate the procurement procedure specified
in Exhibit C of the Funding Agreement for either of the scope of
modifications and new contract signings between BPCI and Loma
Media.
A comprehensive examination of the procurement practices for the

six consultants receiving the largest payments from BPCI is included
in Appendix B.
BPCI Did Not Adhere to Of the 20 highest paid consultants hired by BPCI shown in Exhibit 4 –
Funding Agreement in each receiving more than $10,000 from BPCI – more than 50 percent
Contracting with Consultants (11 of 20) were not contracted through the procurement process
in Some Cases established in the Funding Agreement. As a result, BPCI was
potentially in noncompliance with the procurement procedures
established in the Funding Agreement between BPCI and the City.
One BPCI CEO stressed that, in certain instances, these procedures
were not followed due to time constraints in planning an event of
this magnitude.
BPCI Inconsistently Adhered We found that BPCI did not consistently follow the procurement
to Funding Agreement in procedures required by the Funding Agreement in the hiring of
Contracting with BPCI several executives during its Celebration planning efforts.
Executives
Specifically, BPCI did not follow procurement procedures when
entering into contracts with former-CEO Mike McDowell and Interim-
CEO/Transition Director Gerry Braun. Finally, BPCI did follow the
procurement procedure specified in the Funding Agreement when
Executive Director, Mark Germyn was hired under a consulting
contract as CEO. A comprehensive description of the procurement
practices for the four BPCI executives is included in Appendix C. BPCI
was required to follow the contracting procurement procedures
established in Exhibit C of the Funding Agreement for the
organization’s CEOs and executive directors hired on a consulting
basis.
In contrast, BPCI was not required to follow the procurement process

for individuals hired as employees of the organization. BPCI’s final
CEO, Julie Dubick, was hired under an employment contract. BPCI
followed the procurement process when it hired Ms. Dubick, which
was not required by Exhibit C of the Funding Agreement.
OCA-15-008 Page 18
BPCI Was Unclear Regarding In March 2013, BPCI’s Interim CEO sent an email to the City Attorney’s
the Applicability of the office to confirm a telephone conversation regarding whether BPCI
Procedures for Procurement needed to follow an RFP process to hire an executive director. This
of Goods and Services email from BPCI stated in pertinent part, “Per our discussion today,
Balboa Park Celebration, Inc. is not required as a term of its
Memorandum of Understanding with the City to advertise or to issue
RFPs in order to fill positions or engage with consultants.” A Deputy
City Attorney responded, “That is correct. There is nothing in the
MOU that speaks to a process for hiring by BPC. Rather, the MOU
acknowledges that BPC is a separate corporate entity that operates
independently of the City.” The Deputy City Attorney noted the
requirement may “exist elsewhere, e.g., in BPC’s Bylaws or in the laws
that apply to nonprofits, but it is not a term of the MOU.” The City
Attorney’s Office stated that this response was provided in the
context of hiring employees, specifically an executive director.
Nevertheless, based on the dialogue and emails, which referenced
both hiring of employees and consultants, BPCI has stated that they
construed the exchange to mean that BPCI was not required to
advertise or issue RFPs for the hiring of both employees and
consultants. Nevertheless, as noted above, BPCI went through an
advertising and RFP process in the hiring of a CEO as an employee
later that year.
It is important to note that the contractual requirement to follow

certain procurement policies for the hiring of contractors and
vendors was set forth in the Funding Agreement and not the MOU.
As noted, the Funding Agreement was made with reference to and
reliance upon the MOU. Therefore, the requirements in both
documents applied to BPCI.
BPCI Provided Most The MOU and the Funding Agreements between the City and BPCI, as
Deliverables Required by described above, established deadlines for BPCI to submit
the MOU, but Some Were deliverables and established a specific number of meetings and
Delivered on an Extended presentations – both to provide the City and the public with
Timeframe confidence that event planning was successful. As described in detail
below, some contractual requirements were not fulfilled.
OCA-15-008 Page 19
We found that BPCI missed some deliverable deadlines established in

the MOU, as shown in Exhibit 5. Specifically, BPCI turned in the
following deliverables late: 1) the Comprehensive Implementation
Plan; and 2) and the Comprehensive Access, Transportation and
Parking Management Plan. Notably, internal communications show
that prior to missing the deliverable deadlines, BPCI leaders and the
City’s Director of Special Events discussed the deadline and agreed to
an extension, which BPCI met.
It is unclear whether a Department Director has the authority to

extend deadlines under a contract without the approval of the
contracting authority – in this case the City Council.
Exhibit 5
BPCI’s Delayed Deliverables to the City
Deliverable Contents of Deliverable Due Date

Date Delivered
Comprehensive BPCI shall provide to City staff a Comprehensive Nov-13 Feb-14
Implementation Plan Implementation Plan which shall set forth the
Committee’s plan for implementation of the
Celebration, including timelines representing all
activities necessary to implement the Celebration.
Comprehensive Access, BPCI shall provide to City staff a final plan to address Nov-13 Feb-14
Transportation and transportation and parking during the Celebration,
Parking Management Plan including access and circulation within the Park.
The Plan may include user fee based access,
transportation and parking management programs
and facilities.
Informational Reports at BPCI shall make quarterly informational progress Quarterly Requirement
Public Hearings of the reports to the San Diego City Council Natural Not Fully Met
Natural Resources and Resources and Culture Committee at its regularly
Culture Committee scheduled meetings.
Source: OCA, based on Memorandum of Understanding, Funding Agreement, and BPCI report submissions to
the City.
OCA-15-008 Page 20
MOU Requirement for The MOU between the City and BPCI required that BPCI provide
Progress Reports Was Not informational updates to the City Council’s Natural Resources and
Fully Met Culture Committee. The relevant provision of the MOU reads as
follows:
Natural Resources and Culture Committee. During the Term
of this MOU, the 2015 Committee shall make quarterly (or
monthly if requested by the Natural Resources and Culture
Committee) informational progress reports to the San Diego
City Council Natural Resource and Culture Committee at its
regularly scheduled meetings.
Notwithstanding the reporting and information provisions in the
MOU, BCPI did not make all of the contractually required quarterly
informational meetings to the Committee on Natural Resources and
Culture. In fact, since BPCI’s inception in June 2011 through its
dissolution in May 2014, BPCI provided information presentations to
the Committee five times while the MOU required these
presentations to occur on a quarterly basis.
During these presentations, representatives of BPCI stated that

elements of the programming and planning had not been completed
(even as late as November 2013) and that no sponsorship program
was ready to be discussed. Despite the close proximity to the event,
members of the Natural Resources and Culture Committee did not
ask any substantive questions that pressed BPCI on progress issues.
OCA-15-008 Page 21
Question 3: Did Any Third-Party Vendors or

Consultants Receive Payments from BPCI, but
Did Not Provide Agreed-Upon Services or
Deliverables?
BPCI Consultants and We reviewed the deliverables received from BPCI’s highest paid
Executives Provided the consultants and executives. Payments to the top 10 highest paid
Agreed-Upon Services and consultants and executives comprised about two-thirds of BPCI total
Deliverables Set Forth in expenditures. We found that, based on the sometimes broad scopes
Their Respective Statements of work set forth in the contracts, BPCI vendors and consultants
of Work delivered agreed-upon goods and services. For example, Steve
Silverman of J&S Silverman played a role in drafting consultant RFPs
for a variety of services. Silverman also liaised with contractors and
BPCI’s board of directors, and curated relationships with the Park’s
institutions. As another example, Departure, the first company hired
to create the Celebration’s brand, created EDGE2015 and all requisite
material such as the logo and taglines. Exhibit 6 provides a summary
of these key contractors, the scopes of work, and a high-level
summary of the deliverables.
OCA-15-008 Page 22
Exhibit 6
BPCI’s Top Paid Consultants and Employees by Category and Dollar Amount,
June 2011-June 2014
Name Category Scope of Work Deliverable Total

Amount Paid
Autonomy, LLC PRODUCTION Develop three Developed Celebration $473,398
programming programming,
components of the commenced forum
Celebration: 1) structure development,
Develop and define a researched permitting
program to fulfill the for various Balboa Park
Celebration's thematic events, prepared and
goals, 2) Implement a delivered presentations
strategy and timeline to BPCI staff, Balboa Park
to execute this museum officials, City
program, and 3) staff, and made
Develop a budget and sponsorship
time estimate for the recommendations.
execution of this
program.
Marketing SPONSORSHIP Design and administer Presented sponsorship $81,072
Partnership a sponsorship briefs and sponsorship
Solutions campaign, media packages to BPCI,
(BLEGS, INC.) partnership campaign, delivered sponsorship
and sponsorship sales presentations in "ready
effort. to market" electronic
format, researched
sponsorship target list,
and set meetings with
key target sponsors.
Departure BRANDING Prepare branding Designed EDGE2015 $64,881
Agency, Inc. assignment that brand representing the
strategically defines Celebration, logo,
the Celebration event tagline, creative
theme, brands year- campaign, and event
long celebration and naming.
positions it for success.
OCA-15-008 Page 23

Amount Paid
Gerry Braun and EXECUTIVE External External $144,044
Associates SERVICES Communications Communications
Director: Develop Director: Developed
external external
communications with communications with
stakeholders; Interim stakeholders; Interim
CEO: Handle general CEO: Handled general
internal operations of internal operations of
BPCI and managed BPCI and managed
vendor contracts and vendor contracts and
contacts; Transition contacts; Transition
Director: Direct BPCI's Director: Directed BPCI's
dissolution after BPCI's dissolution after BPCI's
contract termination contract termination
with the City of San with the City of San
Diego. Diego.
J&S Silverman ADMINISTRATIVE Prepare master event Liaised between BPCI $137,858
Consulting SUPPORT calendar, design venue and BPCI's vendors,
allocation plan, draft administered RFP
RFP for a vendor to process under Mike
conduct a traffic study, McDowell, maintained
administer written relations with Balboa
communication, Park institutions and
facilitate meetings BPCI’s grantees, and
with stakeholders, act acted as a conduit
as liaison with between BPCI's vendors
organizations and and BPCI's board of
institutions within directors.
Balboa Park.
Julie Dubick EXECUTIVE Oversee various Oversaw BPCI's internal $136,500
SERVICES operations, including operations, managed
fundraising efforts, vendors and their
fiscal management, contract deliverables,
programming content, managed sponsorship
and development of efforts, and attempted
comprehensive site to ensure that all MOU
plan. Ensure that all deliverables were met.
MOU deliverables are
met, report to the
board of directors,
ensure retention of all
high-performing and
key staff, and work
collaboratively with
Balboa Park
organizations and
institutions.
OCA-15-008 Page 24

Amount Paid
Loma Media COMMUNICATIONS Devise various plans Provided community $519,458
for BPCI, including: outreach plan to meet
community outreach, BPCI's MOU deliverable.
external Created various
communications, strategies, including
media management, media, digital marketing,
website/digital public relations, social
strategy, retainer, media. Re-designed the
promotional Celebration brand.
opportunities, internal
communications,
speakers bureau, and
diversity outreach.
Mark Germyn EXECUTIVE Devise and manage Managed BPCI's internal $123,523
SERVICES BPCI's internal operations, began the
operations, begin the process of planning the
process of planning 2015 Celebration, and
the 2015 Celebration, assisted with the
delegate tasks to creation of BPCI's
vendors and staff, and policies.
oversee other duties as
assigned by the board
of directors.
Michael H EXECUTIVE Consult and advise Acted as conduit $181,861
McDowell SERVICES BPCI's board of between board of
directors, provide directors and vendors,
services in connection assisted Balboa Park
with projects related to institutions with grantee
planning and staffing programming process,
for the Celebration, engaged potential
manage BPCI's internal sponsors and
operations, oversee stakeholders,
relations with Balboa administered RFP
Park institutions and process for vendor
organizations, and selection in connection
manage fundraising with Steve Silverman,
efforts. managed BPCI's internal
operations.
Utopia SPONSORSHIP Create sponsorship Designed a production $111,250
Entertainment* presentations, identify schedule for the
potential sponsorship Centennial Celebration
targets, and manage events, prepared light-
sponsorships once the-park site plan,
obtained. prepared business plan
presentations.
TOTAL $1,973,845
* BPCI also contracted with Utopia for production work. The amount shown in Exhibit 5 reflects the total
amount Utopia received for all contracts.
Source: OCA, based on analysis of vendor contracts, AKT financials, and vendor deliverables to BPCI.
OCA-15-008 Page 25
Question 4: Did the City Provide Adequate

Oversight Regarding BPCI?
City Staff Had Limited We found that City staff had limited oversight over BPCI regarding
Oversight Over BPCI the MOU and Funding Agreements. The City’s contract
Regarding the MOU and administrator’s review was limited to ensuring that the amount on
Funding Agreement the submitted invoice matched payments and disbursement from
BPCI accounts. City staff charged with overseeing the reimbursement
process indicated that that the broad scope of the agreements and
lack of detailed invoicing may have also impeded contract oversight.
However, we found provisions in the MOU and Funding Agreements
which potentially could have enabled City contract administrators to
perform more stringent oversight and, perhaps, warn of upcoming
problems. The City Attorney’s Office noted that the MOU and
Funding Agreement contained sufficient language to enforce
deadlines for deliverables, and required presentations to public
committees and meetings with public officials.
MOU and Funding The City of San Diego’s relationship with BPCI was memorialized in
Agreements between the two separate documents that established the duties and
City of San Diego and BPCI requirements: a MOU, and a Funding Agreement.
Memorandum of The MOU included a sweeping list of responsibilities for BPCI to

Understanding complete to fulfill its contractual duties. The list of responsibilities
contemplated planning, organizing and providing comprehensive
project management including fundraising, promotion of the event,
and event planning.
The MOU required the delivery and set deadlines for a series of
comprehensive reports essential to executing the Celebration
including:
 Comprehensive Outreach Plan;
 Master Calendar of events;
 Venue Allocation Plan;
 Activities and Programming Schedule;
 Implementation Plan;
 Process for the Sanctioning of Official Events and
Partnerships;
 Business Plan, Strategic Plan, and Budget;
 External Communications Plan; and
 Access, Transportation and Management Plan.
OCA-15-008 Page 26
The MOU required that representatives from BPCI make public

presentations quarterly to the Balboa Park Committee and the City
Council’s Natural Resources and Culture Committee.
Funding Agreement The Funding Agreement entered into by the City and BPCI described
how City funds could be used for “activities in planning, organizing,
and implementing the Celebration.” The Funding Agreement
references and relies upon the Memorandum of Understanding,
which provides the scope of uses for City-allocated funds.
Contract Administration The agreements also set forth contract administration responsibilities
for City staff. Specifically, the City’s Deputy Director of Economic
Development was designated as the administrator for the Funding
Agreement and was tasked with receiving Quarterly Expenditure
Reports, copies of the Annual Final Reports, and was to review such
reports and documentation of expenditures for compliance with the
agreement. The City’s Director of Special Events was designated as
the contract administrator for the MOU and was responsible for
receiving, reviewing, and providing feedback on MOU-mandated
deliverables.
City of San Diego’s Contract The City’s Department of Economic Development received and
Oversight Was Limited to a reviewed Quarterly Economic Reports submitted to the City by BPCI.
Cursory Review of Records These reports included invoices, checks and other documents
supporting expenditures and collections of funds. We found that City
staff had limited interaction with BPCI regarding deliverables. City
staff charged with overseeing the reimbursement process indicated
that the broad scope of the agreements and lack of detailed invoicing
requirements may have also impeded contract oversight.
City Staff Had Limited City staff was tasked with the receipt, review and the provision of
Interaction with BPCI feedback to BPCI concerning deliverables specified in the MOU. We
Regarding the Completeness found that there was little to no comment or feedback provided by
and Accuracy of the City staff on any of the reports provided by BPCI. City staff tasked
Deliverables with receiving the deliverables stated these documents were
delivered by BPCI and no substantive discussion took place
concerning the contents of the documents.
It is important to note that, although the MOU and Funding

Agreement contract administrators provided limited oversight, some
City staff did have frequent contact with BPCI and its contractors on
logistical and operational planning. For example, staff from Park and
Recreation met frequently with BPCI and its vendors regarding
Balboa Park layout and use issues.
OCA-15-008 Page 27
Expansive Scope of Allowable The language in the Funding Agreement was broad and permitted a
Expenditures wide range of allowable expenses. Economic Development staff
reviewed reports and documentation of expenditures for compliance
with this Agreement and stated that the MOU and Funding
Agreement included scopes of work that were so broad that most
any expenditure fit within the scope.
Economic Development staff were tasked with ensuring that invoice

expenditures fell within the contractually defined scope of work. In
the BPCI contracts, representatives of Economic Development stated
that because the MOU contained such a broad scope of work, any
expenditure was considered appropriate and the invoice review was
limited to checking whether amounts on payment checks matched
the invoice number.
Deputy City Attorneys stated the contracts with BPCI had sufficient
detail, which was present in the deliverable deadlines, the required
meetings with City staff, and the presentations before the City
Council’s Natural Resources and Culture Committee and the Balboa
Park Committee. Representatives of the City Attorney stated these
deadlines coupled with a clause in the contract detailing termination
procedures when contractually required deliverables were not met,
were sufficient enforcement measures, if the City chose to use them
fully.
OCA-15-008 Page 28
Lack of Detailed Invoicing We found that many invoices submitted by BPCI to the City included
very little detail of work being completed and time spent on task.
Representatives from Economic Development stated that detailed
invoices were not a requirement spelled out in the contracts. Section
2.04 of the Funding Agreement, however, required “supporting
documents” that could have allowed for the City to determine
whether expenditures were appropriately documented. Many
invoices included sparse detail such as “Consulting Services/Contract
Management,” “For services provided in support of Balboa Park
Celebration, Inc.,” “Professional Services,” and “Professional Services
Rendered.” In contrast, invoices submitted by certain consultants
included very detailed descriptions of the work completed.
As a result, City staff stated the oversight or administration of the

expenditures was limited to ensuring that the invoices added up to
expenditures from bank accounts. While invoicing is not the
equivalent of oversight, vague billing makes it extremely difficult to
track the work and ensure that billable hours were actually spent on
fulfilling the terms of the MOU. Further, as noted above, there was
little interaction or follow-up from City staff as part of their review,
even though more thorough follow-up on the invoices would have
allowed for greater City oversight.
OCA-15-008 Page 29
Question 5: What Other Factors May Have

Adversely Affected BPCI’s Ability to Fulfill Its
Mission?
Political, Regulatory, and Several political, regulatory and legal issues impeded BPCI’s planning
Fundraising Challenges and operational efforts. First, the City’s series of mayoral transitions
Adversely Affected BPCI’s adversely affected BPCI’s ability to obtain funding and contributed to
Ability to Fulfill its Mission delays in the organization’s event planning process. Second,
according to BPCI executives, Mayor Filner’s role in BPCI’s Centennial
Celebration planning contributed to further delays in the planning
process. Third, planning by BPCI was hindered by certain legal
restrictions on BPCI’s use of SDTMD funds. Finally, ongoing litigation
against the City led to uncertainty by City staff and BPCI as to the
extent to the which the event would have to comply with state
environmental regulatory requirements.
Mayoral Transition Limited Near the end of Mayor Sanders’ term in December 2012, the City
and Delayed BPCI’s Access Council, in November 2012, approved and forwarded him a new
to SDTMD’s Funding agreement with the SDTMD for the continued administration of the
City’s tourism marketing district. The taxes assessed on certain
lodging businesses within the district, previously established in
January 2008, are collected by the City and managed by the SDTMD
to be used for marketing and tourism promotion of San Diego. The
City’s agreement with the SDTMD, set to expire on March 31, 2013,
needed to be renewed in order to ensure the continuation of funding
to the SDTMD. Mayor Sanders did not sign the new agreement prior
to leaving office.
When Mayor Bob Filner took office in December 2012, he questioned

the agreement, which caused a delay in funding to the SDTMD, and
subsequently to BPCI. As a result, BPCI ceased work with some of its
vendors, which likely impeded BPCI’s planning process.
Mayor Filner’s Influence Mayor Filner envisioned a large-scale, international event for the
Delayed BPCI’s Planning and Celebration, as exemplified by his public statements on the issue.
Event Development Efforts According to BPCI’s executives and City staff, Mayor Filner’s grand
vision and strong influence interrupted and delayed the
organization’s Celebration planning development efforts by dictating
the selection of certain contractors and dismissing BPCI’s first
branding concept. For example, in January 2013 Mayor Filner
attended a BPCI board of directors meeting where David Gillig, a BPCI
contractor and fundraising professional, gave a presentation of a
potential fundraising strategy for BPCI. The presentation focused on a
OCA-15-008 Page 30
proposed strategy for BPCI to raise what has been stated to be

approximately $30 million from corporate sponsorships to fund the
Celebration. According to a former BPCI executive who attended the
meeting, Mayor Filner expressed strong dislike for the strategy and
stated that he was not going to allow corporatization of the park.
Gillig subsequently ended his contract with BPCI, and BPCI was still
without a well-formed fundraising strategy. Furthermore, Mayor
Filner made pledges to help BPCI raise millions of dollars. According
to a former BPCI executive, Mayor Filner’s pledged and anticipated
involvement in fundraising put BPCI’s own fundraising efforts in
neutral.
Similarly, BPCI executives stated that Mayor Filner exerted a profound

influence on Autonomy, BPCI’s production company, after he saw
their presentation at a BPCI Board retreat in January 2013. According
to BPCI’s former CEOs, Autonomy allegedly had private meetings and
communications with Mayor Filner which inflated the plans for the
Celebration without input from BPCI itself. Moreover, BPCI’s former
CEOs expressed that Mayor Filner’s perceived favoritism for
Autonomy disallowed for the expression of real concern among
Board members regarding Filner-directed changes in Autonomy’s
scope of work. Additionally, even as BPCI’s CEOs came to desire a
change in production companies, they felt that they could not
terminate Autonomy’s contract while Mayor Filner remained in office.
As a result, the former CEOs felt that Mayor Filner’s influence lead to
the creation of such a large scale event plan that only increased the
need for large sponsorships to come through even as the time period
for executing the event plan shortened.
Lastly, BPCI’s former CEOs and City officials cite Mayor Filner’s
dismissal of the organization’s Celebration brand as a major setback
in the Celebration planning process. Departure, hired by BPCI in June
2012, created the Celebration’s brand, EDGE2015, to capture the
Celebration’s event theme, logo, tagline, vision, and creative
campaign. In BPCI’s Board meeting minutes from January 2013,
Mayor Filner stated that he did not feel that the EDGE2015 brand was
sufficiently expressive of a celebration of Balboa Park’s 100-year
history. While former CEO McDowell acknowledged that not
everyone was enthusiastic about the EDGE2015 brand, he stated that
potential donors felt they could support it. When McDowell left the
organization on March 1, 2013 and without his support for the brand
to oppose Mayor Filner’s dislike for it, Departure quit and BPCI hired
Loma Media to re-brand the Celebration. The re-branding effort
meant a loss of time for BPCI which was now left to test a new brand
OCA-15-008 Page 31
with potential sponsors in a narrowing time period before the

Celebration was to begin.
Passage of Proposition 26 The passage of Proposition 26 in November 2010 by California voters

Tightened Restrictions on brought about new restrictions on the definition of a tax imposed by
SDTMD’s Funding a local government and required the district, once renewed by the
City in November 2012, to comply with these requirements.
Specifically, Proposition 26 required the district assessments to be
spent on activities that confer a specific benefit of incremental room
night generation directly and only to businesses paying the
assessments. As a result, contracts between the SDTMD and BPCI,
executed in April and July of 2013 required BPCI to demonstrate that
each planned event have actual dollars committed from sponsors
and to show a return on investment to participating district hotels.
In late summer of 2013, BPCI representatives had increased difficulty

in meeting the SDTMD’s new requirements. Beginning in August
2013, shortly after BPCI’s execution of a second agreement with the
SDTMD which approved $2.3 million in funding for BPCI, the
organization failed to meet a series of requests from the SDTMD to
submit a new scope of work and budget for the SDTMD Board
approval. In January 2014, the SDTMD escalated its pressure on BPCI
to provide an account of the organization’s specific progress against
its FY2014 contract commitment. The SDTMD stated that until this
account is provided, it would no longer be able to approve
reimbursements for BPCI. In response, BPCI acknowledged that its
original scope of work and resulting estimated SDTMD room night
projections required substantial revisions and that it was not yet able
to measure targets and outcomes or track a return on investment to
participating district hotels.
BPCI Was Uncertain During the time of BPCI’s Celebration planning, November 2011 to
Regarding California April 2014, there was uncertainty among BPCI and City officials over
Environmental Quality Act the extent to which the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)
Requirements (CEQA) would impact the Celebration. CEQA requires that all discretionary
projects undertaken by agencies in California provide major
consideration to preventing environmental damage. However, in
December 2011, a lawsuit against the City contested recent 2011
amendments to the City’s Municipal Code Park Use Ordinance, which
attempted to designate the City’s Park Use Permitting process as
ministerial, thus exempting City projects from environmental review
under CEQA. As a result of the lawsuit’s unresolved nature during this
time, City officials were unsure how to advise BPCI regarding
timelines for when Celebration plans would be need to be
OCA-15-008 Page 32
completed. This uncertainty added confusion to BPCI’s planning

process by presenting the organization with two separate timelines.
First, if the outcome of the lawsuit determined that the City’s Park
Use Permitting Process is discretionary, BPCI it would need to
complete an environmental impact report for the Celebration that
could take six to 12 months to complete. This would require
Celebration plans to be finalized nearly a year in advance of the
Celebration, beginning on July 1, 2014. Second, if BPCI hoped to
receive an exemption from CEQA by declaring that the event would
not have a significant impact on the environment, that process could
take approximately 180 days, thus lengthening the amount of time
the organization had to finalize plans for the event. According to
BPCI’s board of directors meeting minutes, the organization
repeatedly received conflicting information from City officials, often
vacillating in position from month to month as to whether the event
had to meet CEQA requirements. While BPCI and the City awaited the
final outcome of the lawsuit, the organization continued to use
valuable time with no deadline in place to plan its Celebration.
BPCI Encountered Difficulty We found that BPCI’s leadership and planning team was slow to
in Obtaining Corporate and foresee and adjust to a shrinking fundraising climate. As a result, the
Philanthropic Sponsorships potential revenue was not available to execute an event of the
magnitude envisioned. Primarily, we found that fundraising markets
– both the philanthropic and corporate – suffered from contraction
caused by unrelated issues within both City politics and the national
economy.
First, BPCI and City leaders discovered during fundraising strategizing

that the philanthropic market may not produce the amount of
money needed to fund an event of this magnitude. According to
former BCPI officials that we spoke to, what potential philanthropic
donor funds were available was considerably diminished when the
plan to redesign the Plaza de Panama in Balboa Park was rejected by
local courts.
OCA-15-008 Page 33
Second, BPCI and City leaders also found early in the planning
process that the corporate sponsorship market was not yielding the
kind of “civic commitment” that many involved in the planning
process had expected. BPCI leaders found that many corporate
executives favored other forms of marketing. Other potential
corporate sponsors could not find a nexus between the themes of
the Centennial Celebration and their business model. Many corporate
sponsors did not see the benefit of investing in the event when the
City was embroiled in the political turmoil surrounding former Mayor
Filner.
Third, according to former BCPI officials, BPCI did not adequately

integrate the experience and corporate connections of its Board of
Directors into its fundraising networks for the benefit of the
Centennial Celebration.
Finally, we found that, despite the harsh fundraising climate,

consultants and event planners remained optimistic and insisted to
BPCI executives that landing one large sponsorship would unlock the
door to both the philanthropic and corporate markets, and the
Centennial would be adequately funded. Despite the fact that,
according to BPCI officials, only one major sponsor committed, the
expectation of a cascade of sponsors never materialized.
Corporate Sponsorship BPCI and community leaders involved early in the Celebration
Market Lacked “Civic planning process sought to engage members of the local corporate
Commitment” Early in community to sign on as sponsors of the event. According to a
Celebration Planning former BPCI executive, these efforts were focused on meeting with
corporate executives and gauging their interest in being involved in
the Celebration.
According to City and BPCI staff, the early meetings did not garner
the kind of enthusiastic responses that BPCI planners had envisioned.
Specifically, as former BPCI CEO Mike McDowell stated, the “civic
commitment” that was discussed early in planning never
materialized. BPCI leaders stated in interviews that corporations were
approached, all were cordial, and none made funding commitments.
Regarding targeting corporate sponsors, some interviewees

questioned the strategy of front-loading the development of the
concept, rather than front-loading the targeting strategy for
corporate sponsors, approaching sponsors with a broader concept,
and allowing the sponsors to play a more significant role in the
development of the final concept and programming.
OCA-15-008 Page 34
Fundraising Specialists Despite the early discouraging signals from the corporate market,
Concerned that Philanthropic BPCI’s fundraising expert determined that the magnitude of the
Market Not Sufficient Believed Celebration concept could not be solely supported by the
that BPCI Should Focus on philanthropic sponsorship market and municipal funding. As a result,
Corporate Sponsorships BPCI contracted with corporate fundraising specialists to determine
creative ways in which corporate sponsors would be enticed into
making funding pledges.
As noted earlier, in January 2013, newly elected Mayor Filner

attended a BPCI Board meeting and disparaged the strategies of
focusing on these kinds of the corporate sponsorships. One BPCI
executive stated that a key factor that inhibited BPCI’s ability to get
large corporate sponsorships was the fact that the MOU prohibited
BPCI, and by extension, corporate sponsors from making any
permanent changes to Balboa Park. The executive surmised that this
inability for sponsors to leave “legacy projects” was a key factor in
sponsors declining to make large donations to the park.
Mayor Filner stated to the BPCI Board that he would take over the
fund raising efforts and would raise sufficient funds to expand the
scope of the event. As a result, one BPCI executive stated, fundraising
strategies and planning were put on hold as BPCI did not want to
work at cross purposes with Mayor Filner.
Contentious Political Mayor Filner’s public battles with the SDTMD during early 2013,
Atmosphere Stunted combined with BPCI’s rapidly changing production plan and re-
Planning Efforts and branding efforts, purportedly at Mayor Filner’s direction, inhibited
Sponsorship Pitch BPCI’s ability to create a cohesive, fluid plan in which to present to
Development both corporate and philanthropic sponsors. Furthermore, due to all
of BPCI’s personnel and contractor changes in the summer of 2013
which resulted in a vague event plan, corporate and philanthropic
sponsors alike were unable to discern the nexus between their
organizations and the Celebration. As a result, BPCI was unable to
guarantee a return on investment tied to sponsorship deal, which
contributed to an in increased corporate reluctance to sponsor the
Celebration.
Plaza de Panama Project Was In February 2013, BPCI lost a potential patron in the philanthropic
Rejected by Courts, which community when the San Diego Superior Court ruled against the
Diminished Philanthropic Jacobs’ Plan to remove a parking lot in Balboa Park’s Plaza de Panama
Fundraising Potential to restore it to pedestrian uses. This ruling came at a time when
Mayor Filner pushed for BPCI to gain the financial backing from the
philanthropic community. Former BPCI CEOs stated that the demise
of the Jacobs’ Plan, along with the media’s poor treatment of Jacobs,
OCA-15-008 Page 35
created a cooling effect among many in the philanthropic

community who became disillusioned with the City and Balboa Park.
Although BPCI continued to seek potential philanthropic sponsors
under Julie Dubick’s direction as BPCI’s CEO, BPCI was unable to
access the necessary philanthropic sponsorship.
Composition of BPCI Board One BPCI official expressed concern that the composition of the BPCI
May Not Have Been Well- Board may not have been well-suited to fundraising for the
Suited for Fundraising Efforts Celebration. Additionally, although the Board members were, by all
reports, well-intentioned and enthusiastic volunteers, it is, in our
view, unlikely that any group composed of part-time volunteers
would be up to the task of planning an event of the magnitude
envisioned.
Contentious Political Beginning in July 2013, civic leaders in San Diego began publicly
Atmosphere Surrounding calling for the resignation of Mayor Filner related to a series of
Mayor Filner’s Misconduct allegations of sexual misconduct. Over the ensuing months, as Mayor
Turned Away Corporate Filner resisted calls for his resignation, more women engaged in
Sponsors business affairs with the City and Mayor’s Office publicly announced
they had been victimized. Media coverage of these events appeared
both in national and local media. BPCI officials stated that Mayor
Filner’s increasingly embattled public persona caused sponsors to be
reluctant to provide funding for the Celebration.
Despite the Harsh Fundraising Despite the late start to fundraising efforts, the Board, BPCI staff, and
Climate, Consultants and BPCI contractors remained optimistic regarding BPCI’s ability to get
Event Planning Remained the necessary funding. Two examples of late fundraising efforts were
Optimistic led by BPCI executives with the enlisted assistance of interim Mayor
Todd Gloria.
The first was a series of meetings with a prominent local

philanthropist. In the fallout of the Jacobs plan, some believed that a
donation from this key individual could be the gateway to further
donations from a philanthropic community that was unsettled by Mr.
Jacobs’ treatment.
The second was a meeting with executives at Qualcomm. Attendees

of the meeting stated that Qualcomm executives were apprehensive
about committing to the $20 million request.
OCA-15-008 Page 36
Appendix A: Audit Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology
Objectives At the request of City Councilmember David Alvarez in his capacity as
Chair of the Committee on the Environment, we conducted an audit
of the relationship between the City of San Diego (City) and Balboa
Park Celebration, Inc. (BPCI). Specifically, Councilmember Alvarez
requested that we determine if:
1. BPCI misused any public funds;
2. BPCI fully complied with the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between BPCI and the City; and
3. whether BPCI’s hired consultants failed to provide
deliverables for which they were paid.
In addition, we examined City oversight and other issues that may

have affected BPCI’s ability to fulfill its mission. To answer
Councilmember Alvarez’s request, we answered the following key
questions:
Scope and Methodology 1. Did BPCI misuse public funds?
To determine whether BPCI appropriately used funds received from

the City to fulfill its contractual obligations, we reviewed the MOU
and Funding Agreement for the scope of allowable expenses.
Additionally, we reviewed BPCI’s vendor contracts, vendor
deliverables, vendor invoices, and quarterly financial reports to
ensure compliance with the scope of allowable expenses in the
Funding Agreement. Moreover, we met with BPCI’s contract
administrators, including City management staff from the Office of
Special Events (Special Events), Department of Economic
Development (Economic Development), the City Attorney’s Office,
and staff from the office of former interim Mayor Todd Gloria’s office
to ascertain their understanding of BPCI’s use of public funds per the
MOU and Funding Agreement and their process for determining
allowable expenses. Furthermore, we met with executive staff at BPCI
and some of BPCI’s contractors to learn how public funds were spent.
Finally, we reviewed financial statements and supplemental
information from BPCI’s accounting firms, matched certain revenues
and expenditures reported to the amounts in the BPCI general ledger
and cross-referenced disbursements reported in the financial
statements to the BPCI general ledger.
OCA-15-008 Page 37
2. Did BPCI fully comply with the MOU and Funding Agreement?
To determine whether there was sufficient oversight by

representatives of BPCI over contractual duties between BPCI and
consultants/vendors, we interviewed staff from the entities
mentioned above. Additionally, we reviewed contracts, invoices,
quarterly economic reports, and contractually specified deliverables
to verify compliance. Finally, we reviewed the procurement practices
of BPCI to determine whether they conformed to the procedures set
forth in the Funding Agreement.
3. Did any third-party vendors or consultants receive payments

from BPCI, but did not provide agreed-upon services or
deliverables?
To determine whether third-party vendors or consultants provided

agreed-upon services or deliverables for which they were paid, we
interviewed several of BPCI’s highest paid consultants, reviewed
contract scopes of work and specified deliverables or services,
examined contractors’ deliverables submitted to BPCI, and reviewed
BPCI Board minutes.
4. Did the City provide adequate oversight regarding BPCI?
To determine whether there was sufficient oversight by City officials,

we reviewed the MOU and Funding Agreement for City officials’
oversight responsibilities. Furthermore, we interviewed City
management staff from Special Events and Economic Development,
staff from the Mayor’s Office, and the City Attorney’s Office to gain
their perspectives on the level of responsibility for oversight of BPCI’s
MOU and Funding Agreement. Moreover, in our interviews, we
examined staff processes and procedures for reviewing and
monitoring of BPCI’s deliverables to the City, such as quarterly
financial reports and informational reports. Lastly, we interviewed
BPCI executives and staff regarding coordination and communication
with City staff.
OCA-15-008 Page 38
5. What other factors may have adversely affected BPCI’s ability

to fulfill its mission?
To answer this question, we interviewed City management staff from

Special Events and Economic Development, BPCI’s executives and
employees, San Diego Tourism Marketing District management, and
representatives from the Mayor’s Office to determine the extent to
which outside political factors in the City played a role in the
Celebration’s planning process. We reviewed information regarding
how the City’s multiple mayoral transitions from December 2012 to
March 2014 adversely affected BPCI’s ability to effectively plan the
Celebration. Additionally, we reviewed state and local laws to
determine how new restrictions placed on the use of assessments
collected from lodging businesses within San Diego’s Tourism
Marketing District impacted BPCI’s ability to access these funds.
Lastly, we interviewed the previously noted individuals, and
evaluated how the mayoral transitions combined with the outcome
of a major legal case against the City may have tempered the
receptivity of local philanthropic and corporate sponsorship
organizations toward funding the Celebration.
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require
that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
OCA-15-008 Page 39
Appendix B: BPCI Procurement Practices for

Highest Paid Consultants
BPCI’s obligation to abide by certain City requirements when
procuring goods and services is set forth in Exhibit C of the Funding
Agreement. Contracts with a value of less than $5,000, between
$5,000 and $25,000, and more than $25,000, had increasingly
stringent procedural requirements prior to execution, based on the
contract amount. We found that BPCI inconsistently complied with
the section of the Funding Agreement governing procedures for
procurement of goods and services from contractors who were
engaged to assist in the planning and execution of the Celebration.
Autonomy BPCI may not have complied with the section of the Funding
Agreement governing procedures for procurement of goods and
services in its relations with Autonomy. An increase in the scope of
services negotiated between Autonomy and BPCI in May 2013 may
have triggered the RFP process.
In its initial execution of a contract with Autonomy, BPCI complied

with the contractual requirement to prepare and distribute an RFP,
receive and discuss different proposals, and enter into a contract.
While the meeting minutes reflected that three proposal responses
to the RFP were received and reviewed by BPCI Board committees
consistent with the Funding Agreement, we were not able to locate
the proposals in our review. BPCI executives formalized the contract
in January 2013 with an $80,000 limit for work on programming,
implementation strategy, and budget.
In May 2013, the Board approved a motion to allow the BPCI CEO to
enter in negotiations with Autonomy for an addendum to the
contract to increase its scope to cover the development phase of the
Centennial. At the July 13 meeting of the BPCI Board, the BPCI CEO
stated that she would “review working Agreement” and pay
Autonomy “$60,000 per month until January 2014, at which time
they will receive $100,000 per month until the end of the fiscal year.”
However, BPCI may have violated the procedural requirements of the

Funding Agreement when an increase in the scope of services was
negotiated between Autonomy and BPCI in May 2013 that should
have triggered the RFP process.
OCA-15-008 Page 40
In total, Autonomy was paid $473,398 by BPCI, more than $387,000

more than the BPCI’s initial contract approval in conformance with
the Funding Agreement.
Loma Media BPCI initially adhered to the procurement procedures required in the
Funding Agreement for the initial hiring of Loma Media. The Board
approved the creation and proliferation of an RFP, assembled a
selection committee which interviewed candidates, and approved
the initial contract for an annual budget of $90,000.
Despite a more limited funding approval by the Board, BPCI staff

entered into a contract with Loma Media with a estimated fee of
$188,000 to complete a specific scope of work between from April
2012 through April 2013.
In January 2013, BPCI and Loma Media entered into an agreement

with an estimated fee of up to $46,000 for the services for a
Marketing Communications Coordinator. Despite the dollar amount
being sufficient to trigger the Funding Agreement’s procurement
procedures, it is unclear whether BPCI was required to engage in the
RFP procedures because the contract specified the coordinator’s
work was part of the original scope of work.
In February 2013, BPCI directed that any additional work for Loma
Media is “on hold, pending a new contract that is in negotiations.” In
March 2013, BPCI staff told the Board that a decision had been made
to rebrand, discontinue work with Departure, and contract with Loma
Media to head up the rebranding effort. The BPCI Board approved
entering a contract with Loma Media. BPCI staff later explained that
Loma Media was being paid on an $8,000/month retainer “with
additional job components added to that retainer.” More specifically,
BPCI staff explained that “BPCI has reengineered the scope of work
under the Loma Media contract to include a larger website
development.” At this meeting, the Board approved “conceptual
approval of the contract with Loma Media” and requested that the
BPCI CEO “return to the Board of Directors with the final contract.”
BPCI may have violated the procedural requirements of the Funding
Agreement when an increase in the scope of services was negotiated
and the RFP process was not triggered.
Finally, in September 2013, the BPCI Board approved another new

contract with Loma Media. The new September 2013 executed
contract between BPCI and Loma Media specified a fee of $373,468
and included a new scope of work. Additionally, unlike any other
OCA-15-008 Page 41
contract entered into by BPCI, the amount of fees paid by BPCI to

Loma Media was based on the amount of funds the TMD allocated to
BPCI. Should BPCI have received the full 100 percent of TMD funding,
BPCI would pay Loma Media $1,867,433. BPCI may have violated the
procedural requirements of the Funding Agreement a second time
when a new scope of was negotiated and the RFP process was not
triggered.
In total, Loma Media Partners were paid $519,458 by BPCI, more than
$331,500 more than the BPCI’s initial contract approval in
conformance with the Funding Agreement.
J&S Silverman Consulting BPCI did not adhere to the procurement requirements of the Funding
Agreement when it entered into a contract with Steve Silverman of
J&S Silverman Consulting.
In the April 2012 meeting, the BPCI CEO notified the Board “he would
be hiring Mr. Steve Silverman on a contract basis to assist with day-
to-day operations.” The Board approved the hiring Mr. Silverman on a
contract basis. In an April 2012 letter, with the subject line
“Consulting Arrangement for Balboa Park Celebration, Inc.,” Steve
Silverman memorialized “our discussion” during which “it was agreed
I would consult with you on the Balboa Park 2015 Celebration on a
time and materials basis at the rate of $95/hour.” The letter also
contained an attachment that specified the scope of work he would
perform for BPCI. Additionally, BPCI records indicate that Mr.
Silverman received a series of payments totaling more than $10,000
for services provided through June 2012.

Agreement when BPCI entered into the original April 2012
agreement with J&S Silverman Consulting. Notably, the payments of
more than $10,000 triggered the Funding Agreement’s procurement
process which requires that for contracts with expenditures between
$5,000 and $25,000 from a single contractor in a 12-month period,
BPCI is required to: (1) obtain three written price proposals or
demonstrate why three bids could not be obtained; (2) present price
proposal information to full board for approval of contract or
transaction, and record the action taken in the meeting minutes; and
(3) and keep written price proposals on file.
Despite the requirement to “keep written price proposals on file,” we

were unable to locate any of these proposals and the remaining two
requirements were not reflected as completed in the BPCI meeting
minutes.
OCA-15-008 Page 42
According to BPCI representatives, an advertisement for BPCI

Planning Director ran in the San Diego Business Journal in July 2012
and Mr. Silverman sent a copy of his application to BPCI in July 2012.
However, OCA was not able to locate a new or updated agreement
between Mr. Silverman and BPCI reflecting a contractual relationship
for a “BPCI Planning Director.” In total, J&S Silverman Consulting was
paid a total of $137,858 for work for BPCI.

Agreement when BPCI entered into a contract with J&S Silverman
Consulting that exceeded the $25,000 threshold set forth in the
Funding Agreement thereby triggering the RFP and advertisement
procedures. OCA was not able to locate an RFP, the BPCI Board
minutes do not indicate an action taken to contract with Mr.
Silverman as a “Program Director”, and OCA was not able to locate
any proposals for the position.
Blegs, Inc. [dba Marketing BPCI potentially adhered to the procurement requirements of the
Partnership Solutions] Funding Agreement when it entered into a contract with Blegs, Inc.
However, we noted inconsistencies with the time of BPCI payments
to Blegs, Inc. that may not have been in accordance with
procurement requirements.
In January 2013, an RFP was issued by BPCI seeking a consultant for

sponsorship value analysis. In June 2013, BPCI’s CEO “assured the
Board of Directors that efforts are being focused on sponsorships and
stated that several sponsorship teams have been interviewed and a
decision will be made shortly. At the next Board meeting, in July
2013, the BPCI CEO notified the board that meetings had taken place
with Barry Siegel and Ferris Thompson, representatives of Utopia
Worldwide, and that that “a contract for Utopia Worldwide would be
presented to the Board for the August Board meeting.” On August 1,
2013, BPCI issued a payment to Blegs for $8,000.
On August 6 2013, the BPCI Board was notified that the CEO had
been negotiating and finalizing a contract with Blegs. At the meeting
one Board member inquired as to whether the payment terms of the
contract – a percentage of funds raised – was unethical, BPCI officials
responded that MPS “gave [BPCI] a significantly better deal that [sic]
other companies interviewed.” The BPCI Board approved the contract
pending a 72-hour review period. Meanwhile, BPCI issued a second
$8,000 payment to Blegs on August 7, 2013.
OCA-15-008 Page 43
The City and Blegs, Inc. executed a contract on August 29, 2013 for
the provision of “solicitation, procurement and/or management of
Sponsorship, Media Partnerships and/or other similar opportunities
for the Project.” The contract specified that Blegs would be paid a
total of $126,000, plus 20 percent of the gross cash value of any
sponsor agreement procured.
Despite the meeting notes that indicate other companies were

interviewed, OCA was not provided any materials pertaining to the
interviews. BPCI may have violated the procedural requirements of
the Funding Agreement when BPCI entered into a contract with
Blegs, Inc. that exceeded the $25,000 threshold set forth in the
Funding Agreement thereby triggering the RFP and advertisement
procedures. Blegs, Inc. was paid a total of $81,072 for its work of BPCI.
Utopia BPCI potentially adhered initially to the procurement requirements of

the Funding Agreement when it entered into a contract with Utopia.
In January 2013, an RFP was issued by BPCI seeking a consultant for
sponsorship analysis. Utopia executed a letter of engagement with
BPCI in June 2013 for sponsorship sales.
On November 12, 2013, a proposal was submitted to BPCI by Utopia

to undertake all design and production for the event. On November
2013, BPCI paid Utopia $22,500.
The BPCI CEO notified the Board in December 2013 that a decision
was made to shift production from Autonomy to Utopia
Entertainment, Inc. The Board approved entering a contract with
Utopia for a three-month term to include a deliverables, timelines,
and a budget. The contract between BPCI and Utopia specified
payment of $67,500 for the first phase of event design and
production. BPCI may have violated the procedural requirements of
the Funding Agreement when BPCI entered into a contract with
Utopia that exceeded the $25,000 threshold set forth in the Funding
Agreement thereby triggering the RFP process.
Additionally, BPCI expanded the scope of services for Utopia in

February 2014 to include sponsorship sales services. BPCI may have
violated the Funding Agreement when BPCI expanded the scope of
services.
Utopia was paid a total of $111,250 for its work on the Celebration
planning.
OCA-15-008 Page 44
Departure BPCI did not adhere to the procurement requirements of the Funding
Agreement when it entered into a contract with Departure. First, BPCI
appeared to have pre-selected and accepted work from Departure
prior to company’s selection through a subsequent RFP process.
Second, BPCI did not conform to the Funding Agreement when it
expanded Departure’s scope of work.
BPCI executed a contract with Departure in June 2012 which set

payment at $24,750 to produce vision and creative campaign and
separate $2,750 for stationary. However, Departure’s work for BPCI
began far before this.
In October 2011, BPCI CEO Mark Germyn notified the BPCI Board that
he held a meeting with Emily Rex, president of Departure
Advertising. Mr. Germyn recommended that Ms. Rex make a full
presentation to the Board. In April 2012, the Board was notified that
Departure would host a “visioning workshop” on April 25 with the
BPCI Marketing Committee. In May 2012, BPCI officials notified the
Board that the workshop had been held.
It was not until May 2012 that the Board was notified that proposals
to the “identity and branding RFP” were received and BPCI officials
would review and select finalists. At the June 2012 Board meeting,
BPCI staff notified the Board that four finalists were selected from 12
proposals to the logo and branding RFP. Five members of the Board
reviewed the applications and selected Departure. The Marketing
Committee sent the offer letter to Departure. As stated above, the
final contract between Departure and BPCI was executed in June
2012.
Notably, it is unclear whether the $24,750 to produce vision and

creative campaign and separate $2,750 for stationary would have
triggered the procurement procedures set forth in the Funding
Agreement. Additionally, OCA was unable to determine whether BPCI
advertised the logo and branding RFP.
In December 2012, the BPCI Board approved an estimate of between

$15,000 and $20,000 for Departure “to undertake the creative portion
of the web design.” This increase was sufficient to trigger the Funding
Agreement’s requirement to obtain three price quotes or
demonstrate why three bids could not be obtained. Additionally the
new work was not consistent with Departure’s original statement of
work which specifically stated: “This statement of work does not
include the following: … Website development: copywriting, sub-
OCA-15-008 Page 45
page design and programming.” Finally, between December 2012

and January 2013, BPCI paid Departure an additional $40,131.25 for
the expanded scope of work which was sufficient to trigger the
procurement process requirement to advertise.
Departure was paid a total of $64,881 by BPCI.
OCA-15-008 Page 46
Appendix C: BPCI Procurement Practices for

Executive Hiring
BPCI was required to follow the contracting procurement procedures
established in Exhibit C of the Funding Agreement for the
organization’s CEOs and executive directors hired on a consulting
basis. In contrast, BPCI was not required to follow the procurement
process for executives or other staff hired as employees of the
organization.
As discussed in greater detail below, BPCI failed to follow

procurement procedures for CEOs and executives directors hired on a
consulting basis. Meanwhile, BPCI followed the procurement process
when it hired a CEO as an employee of the organization, which was
not required by Exhibit C of the Funding Agreement.
Mark Germyn The BPCI Board followed the procurement procedures set forth in the
Funding Agreement in the hiring of Mark Germyn as executive
director because, based on the evidence available to OCA, the BPCI
Board did create and advertise and RFP, interview qualified
candidates and make a recommendation for the Board to consider.
At the June 2011 meeting of the BPCI Board, a search committee was
formed for a chief operating officer. The Board set out timelines for
search and hiring which included review of short list of candidates,
interviews, and recommendation to Board. In August, the Board
approved a short-term agreement with Mr. Gerymn. The contract
entered into between Mark Germyn and BPCI was effective
September 2011 and specified the monthly salary of $25,000.
Despite the month-to-month nature of the contract, the provision of

the Funding Agreement’s procurement procedure covering
“[e]xpenditures of between $5,000 and $25,000 from a single
contractor in a 12-month period” may have applied to this
engagement. However, Mr. Germyn resigned after four months.
During the course of Mr. Germyn’s contractual relationship with BPCI,

he received a total of $123,523.
OCA-15-008 Page 47
Mike McDowell BPCI potentially did not follow the procurement procedures set forth
in the Funding Agreement in the hiring of Mike McDowell as CEO
because, based on the evidence available to OCA, the BPCI Board did
not create and advertise and RFP, interview qualified candidates and
make a recommendation for the Board to consider.
At the January 2012 meeting, the BPCI Board approved contracting

an interim executive director to oversee BPCI. At the meeting, the
Board voted to have three of its members – Mr. Clay, Mr. Urtasun, and
Ms. McQuater – “identify a candidate and bring the candidate before
the Board for approval.”
In February 2013, BPCI Board member Mike McDowell resigned his

position as Board member. Also at this meeting, Board members Mr.
Clay, Mr. Urtasun, and Ms. McQuater recommended and the Board
approved McDowell’s appointment as “CEO at a salary of $12,000 per
month.” Mr. McDowell was paid a $12,000 bonus. Additionally, Mr.
McDowell was able to negotiate “a verbal agreement” to increase his
month salary to $15,000.
During the course of Mr. McDowell’s contractual relationship with

BPCI, he received a total of $181,862.
Julie Dubick The BPCI Board followed the procurement procedures set forth in the
Funding Agreement in the hiring of Julie Dubick as CEO by creating
and advertising an RFQ, emplaning a selection committee to review
candidates to recommend a candidate, the Board approved.
However, BPCI was not required to follow the procurement process
for Julie Dubick as she was hired as employee of the organization.
At the meeting during which Mr. McDowell’s resignation was

accepted, the Board formed a selection Committee to lead a search
for a new CEO. In March 2013, the Board was notified that a final set
of qualification for the CEO position was created by the Selection
Committee and a timeline was set for applications, interviews, and
hiring. In April 2013, a representative of the BPCI CEO selection
committee informed the Board that advertisements were placed and
the RFQ was posted on BPCI’s website. At the May 2013 meeting, the
selection committee notified the board that 26 responses to the RFQ
were received, interviews completed, and Julie Dubick was
recommended. The Board approved negotiating and entering a
contract with Mr. Dubick. Ms. Dubick resigned in February 2014.
BPCI paid Julie Dubick a total of $136,300 for her work on managing
the planning of the Celebration.
OCA-15-008 Page 48
Gerry Braun The BPCI Board potentially did not follow the procurement
procedures set forth in the Funding Agreement in the hiring of Gerry
Braun as consulting project manager and interim CEO positions
because, based on the evidence available to OCA, the BPCI Board did
not create and advertise an RFP, interview qualified candidates and
make a recommendation for the Board to consider.
Finally, OCA was not provided with sufficient documentation from

meetings of the BPCI Board of Directors to determine whether the
procurement procedures set forth in the Funding Agreement in the
hiring of Gerry Braun as CEO were followed.
Consulting Project Manager The BPCI Board potentially did not follow the procurement
for Communications procedures set forth in the Funding Agreement in the hiring of Gerry
Braun as consulting project manager. Based on the evidence
available to OCA, the BPCI Board did not create and advertise an RFP,
interview qualified candidates and make a recommendation for the
Board to consider.
In December 2012, Gerry Braun entered into a contract with BPCI

with an effective date of January 2013 to serve as “Consulting Project
Manager for Communications & Community Relations” for a monthly
retainer fee of $8,000 on a month-to-month term as an independent
contractor.
According to BPCI Board minutes, the contract for Gerry Braun was
neither discussed not approved by the Board.
Interim CEO In March 2013, Gerry Braun entered into a contract with BPCI to serve
as “Interim CEO” for a monthly retainer fee of $15,000 on a month-to-
month term as an independent contractor.
According to BPCI Board minutes, the contract for Gerry Braun was
neither discussed nor approved by the Board.
OCA-15-008 Page 49
Transition Director The BPCI Board potentially did not follow the procurement
procedures set forth in the Funding Agreement in the hiring of Gerry
Braun as Transition Director because, based on the evidence available
to OCA, the BPCI Board did create and advertise and RFP, interview
qualified candidates and make a recommendation for the Board to
consider.
In March 2014, Gerry Braun entered into another contract with BPCI
to serve as “BPCI Transition Director” as an independent contractor
for a monthly retainer fee of $13,000 for the period between March 1
through May 31, 2014.
OCA was not provided with sufficient documentation from meetings

of the BPCI Board of Directors to determine whether the
procurement procedures set forth in the Funding Agreement in the
hiring of Gerry Braun as CEO were followed.
OCA-15-008 Page 50
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The Convention Center Battle

Sparks an Unlikely Goldsmith-
Briggs Bromance
The Convention Center expansion’s demise brought on some congratulatory banter
from two unusual suspects: City Attorney Jan Goldsmith and attorney Cory Briggs.
Catherine Green
August 28, 2014
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Cory Briggs (left); Jan Goldsmith / Photo by Sam Hodgson
The city might’ve wasted six years and $10 million along the
TRENDING STORIES
way, but some good came of the drawn-out battle over
expanding San Diego’s Convention Center: City Attorney Jan Week Month Year
Goldsmith and attorney Cory Briggs are BFFs.

Encinitas
Parking Lot for
the Homeless
The two have frequently faced o in major lawsuits, but Continues to
they exchanged a series of congratulatory messages in the Stir Fears and
Anger
comments section of Scott Lewis’s post on the demise of the
expansion’s funding plan, which Briggs had challenged in Grossmont
High
court.
Basketball
Coach Is
Cashing in on
READ MORE: Five Big Briggs Lawsuits Tournaments
Teachers at
We learned in May that Goldsmith’s o ce had compiled a San Diego
secret memo about Briggs at the behest of the City Council. Charter
Schools Are
The memo, titled “Cory Briggs Matters,” detailed the lawsuits Far Less
Briggs had led over the years, broken down to those he Experienced
Than
had lost, won, settled or were still pending. Briggs was Traditional
School Peers
something of a thorn in the city’s side; Goldsmith said as
much in a recent U-T’ pro le: A Year in,
Gompers
San Diego City Attorney Jan Goldsmith said Briggs Teachers
operates on an “unfair playingUNVEILING THE UNSEEN

 Facebook
eld” that allows lawyers
 Union Has
Twitter  No
Contract and a
who sue public agencies to recover attorney fees when New Challenge
they win but that doesn’t require them to pay up when Fact Check: Is
they lose. Most
Homelessness
“He’s a smart guy, so I respect him, but our lawyers nd Tied to Drugs
him very di cult to work with,” said Goldsmith, who’s the and Alcohol?
target of a Briggs suit over his refusal to release emails

about city business, sent or received on his private email
account. “He les a large number of suits that are
nuisance (suits) or frivolous, others are arguable, and a
part of them I agree with him.”
The years-long battle over expanding the Convention Center

was an especially high-pro le case. Goldsmith said he’d
always thought the tax at the heart of the plan was
questionable. So he essentially invited people to sue the city
to validate it before allowing it to go forward. Briggs took
him up on the o er. In fact, Briggs had two lawsuits against
the project: the rst claiming the proposed hotel-room tax
hike needed to go to a public vote instead of being
approved by the hotel industry, and the second saying the
project violated California’s environmental quality laws. The
expansion imploded this week when City Council voted not
to pursue the tax hike.
When one commenter criticized Goldsmith’s handling of the

ordeal, Briggs came to his defense.
Cory Briggs: For those who want to blame Jan, please

don’t. He was very honest with the city council and
mayor about the serious risks of this gamble. He did an
excellent job in the disclosures. Only David Alvarez
bothered to listen.
To which Goldsmith replied:
Jan Goldsmith Congratulations on your win, Cory

Cory Briggs Thanks, Jan. Mike and Dan at Orrick did a
heck of a job for the city given what they had to work
with. They were consummate professionals throughout
the process and just all-around nice guys.
Briggs further defended Goldsmith’s honor – and their

noble pursuit of the public good – later on in the comments.
Cory Briggs Thanks, Phillip. The real heroes are Mel

Shapiro and SanDOG’s board, including the late Ian
Trowbridge (who I hope is smiling down on the city and
toasting the Court of Appeal). We lawyers (on both sides)
are just doing our jobs. My o ce got by with moral
support from the client’s board, and they in turn got by
with moral support from the many (ignored-at-city-hall)
voices around the city who could read the constitution
and charter, knew this special tax was illegal, and urged
the board to keep ghting. So if anyone is victorious
tonight, it’s those of us who still have faith in the rule of
law and our courts, slow and imperfect they may
sometimes be.
The appellate court’s rebuke was not directed at the city’s
lawyers; they were dealt the worst possible hand by the
mayor and city council in 2012. The rebuke was directed
at the politicians who approved this. The court noted
that there is ZERO law on the city’s side, which the city’s
lawyers pointed out well in advance. The mayor and city
council made a conscious decision to risk public money
to bene t private hoteliers. The voters should remember
that at the ballot box–especially when they hear a
politician claim to be scally conservative and in support
of Prop 13. No true scal conservative would have taken
this wager … UNVEILING THE UNSEEN
It’s unclear how long these two can keep the peace. But at
least we still have this to look forward to.
Cory Briggs
@corybriggs
This just in: Donna Frye has agreed to pour the opening ice
buckets over @JanIGoldsmith and me for
#ALSIceBucketChallenge.
1 7:52 AM - Aug 18, 2014
See Cory Briggs's other Tweets
Show Comments
Written By
Catherine Green
Catherine Green was formerly the deputy
editor at Voice of San Diego. She handled
daily operations while helping to plan new
long-term projects.
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Exhibit 6
§ 500. Requirements for confidential marriages, CA FAM § 500
West's Annotated California Codes Family Code (Refs & Annos) Division 3. Marriage (Refs & Annos) Part 4.
Confidential Marriage (Refs & Annos) Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos)
This section has been updated. Click here for the updated version.
West's Ann.Cal.Fam.Code § 500
§ 500. Requirements for confidential marriages
Effective: [See Text Amendments] to December 31, 2014
When an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, not minors, have been living together as husband and wife, they may be
married pursuant to this chapter by a person authorized to solemnize a marriage under Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 400)
of Part 3, without the necessity of first obtaining health certificates.
Credits
(Stats.1992, c. 162 (A.B.2650), § 10, operative Jan. 1, 1994.)
West's Ann. Cal. Fam. Code § 500, CA FAM § 500

Current with all laws through Ch. 870 of 2019 Reg.Sess.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

Exhibit 7
TypesofMarriageLicenses https://web.archive.org/web/20070702000347/http://www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/birthde...
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/birthdeathmar/Pages/TypesofMarriageLicenses.aspx
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Home > Certificates & Licenses > Birth, Death and Marriage Certificates > TypesofMarriageLicenses
Types of Marriage Licenses

There are two types of marriage licenses commonly issued in California. The public marriage license and confidential
marriage license. In addition to the general requirements listed above, there are additional requirements for each of
the licenses listed below.
Public Marriage License:

You must be at least 18 years old. Persons under 18 with written consent from at least one parent (or legal
guardian) AND permission from a California Superior Court Judge may marry. Emancipated minors are NOT
exempt from this process. Contact the County Clerk’s Office in your county for further information regarding
these requirements.
The marriage license may be obtained from any county in California. You are not required to get married in the
county where you purchase the public marriage license; however, you must be married in California. You must
file the license in the county where it was purchased.
You must have at least one witness present at your ceremony. The license contains a place for two witnesses
if you prefer. You may NOT have more than two witnesses sign the official marriage license. Licenses received
with more than two witnesses signatures will be returned to the officiant and a duplicate marriage license will
need to be purchased.
There is no age requirement in California for witnesses, however, they must be old enough to know that they
are witnessing a marriage ceremony, AND be able to sign their name on the official marriage license.
The marriage license is registered at the County Recorder’s Office in the county where the license was
purchased, and is a public record. Anyone may request copies of the marriage license by submitting the
required fee to the County Recorder. Download a copy of the Application for Certified Copy of Marriage or
Divorce Record (VS 113A). Only one officiant may sign the marriage certificate as solemnized.
Confidential Marriage License:

The bride and groom must be at least 18 years old to apply for a confidential marriage license. Minors may
NOT purchase a confidential marriage license.
The bride and groom must be living together as husband and wife at the time they apply for the marriage
license, and must sign an affidavit on the license attesting to those facts.
The couple MUST be married in the county where the license is issued.
No witnesses are required to be at the ceremony, AND no witnesses sign on the marriage license.
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The marriage license is a confidential record and is registered at the County Clerk’s OfficeJUN inJUL
the county
AUG where
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it was purchased. Only the bride or groom may purchase copies of the marriage license and must present
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valid picture identification together with the required fee to the County Clerk in order to do so. Persons other
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2 Jul 07 - 4 Jan 15 than the bride or groom requesting copies of a confidential marriage license may only2006 do so2007 2008
by presenting a
court order to the County Clerk in the county where the license is registered.
Copies of confidential marriages are not available from the state office.
Important Information Obtaining Vital Records From County Offices

Certified Copies of Birth and Death Records Directory of County Vital Record Offices
Authorized Copy vs. Informational Copy Vital Record Fees
Certified Copies of Marriage and Divorce Records Processing Times
Correcting or Amending Vital Records Sworn Statement
Adoptions or Changes in Paternity Data & Statistics
Marriage License, Registration, and Ceremony Contact Us
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Copyright © 2007 State of California
2 of 2 4/3/15, 9:19 AM
Exhibit 8
Recorded at the request of
Commonwealth Lar.~:l Title Company
Subdivision Department
Rt:eording Requested By: DOC# 2005-086361 2
111111111 Ill IIIII 111111111111111111111111111111 1111111111 IIIII 11111111
Return To:
Homel23 Corporatio~ OCT 05, 2005 4:00 PM
13100 Northwest Freeway, Suite 200 OFFICIAL RECORDS
Houston, TX 77040 SAN DIEGO COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE
GREGORY J. SMITH. COUNTY RECORDER
FEES 75.00
PAGES: 23 DA:
•
Prepared By: 16053 1111111 IIIII 111111111111111 IIIII IIIII IIIII 1111111111 1111111111 111111111111111111
Home123 Corporation
13100 Northwest Freeway, Suite 200 ?_00§-0_!!63612
Houston, TX 77040
\,J (;, 0 .(;, ( , ,6 '_s- /spa" Abov• This Uno For R"ording D a t a l - - - - - - - - - - - -
DEED OF TRUST
MIN 100431900103274765
DEFINITIONS
Words used in multiple sections of this document are defined below and other words are defined in
Sections 3, II, 13, 18, 20 and 21. Certain rules regarding the usage of words used in this document are
also provided in Section 16.
(A) ''Security Instrument" means this document, which is dated September 30, 2005
together with all Riders to this document.
(B)"Borrower" is KARIN E. WINNER, A Single Woman and LORETTA A. HEARN, an
Unmarried Woman.
Borrower's address is 3970 UTAH STREET #8, SAN DIEGO, CA 92104. Borrower is the trustor under
this Security Instrument.
(C)"Lender"is HOM£123 CORPORATION, a Cal1fornia Corporation.
Lender is a Corporation
organized and existing under the laws of Ca 1 i for n i a
115-10376133
CAUFORNIA·Single Family-Fannlo Mao/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT WITH MERS Form 3005 1/01
G .,.SA(CA) (0207)
Page 1 of 15
VMP MORT~GE FORMS· (800)521-7291

16054
Lender's address is 3351 Michelson Drive, Suite 400, Irvine, CA 92612
(D) "frustee"is F1rst Amer1can T1tle Insurance Company
(E) "MERS" is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. MERS is a separate corporation that is
acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. MERS is the beneficiary
under this Security Instrument. MERS is organized and existing under the laws of Delaware, and has an
address and telephone number of P.O. Box 2026, Flint, Ml48501-2026, tel. (888) 679-MERS.
(F) "Note" means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated September 30, 2005
TheNotestatesthatBorrowerowesLenderOne Hundred Th1rty-n1ne Thousand N1ne
Hundred And 00/100 Dollars
(U.S. $139,900.00 ) plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular Periodic
Payments and to pay the debt in full not later than October 1, 2020
(G) ''Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer of Rights in the
Property."
(H) ''Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late charges
due under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest.
(I) ''Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument that are executed by Borrower. The following
Riders are to be executed by Borrower [check box as applicable]:
D Adjustable Rate Rider W Condominium Rider D Second Home Rider

D Balloon Rider D Planned Unit Development Rider W 1-4 Family Rider
OVA Rider D Biweekly Payment Rider D Other(s) [specifY]:
(J) "Applicable Law" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations,
ordinances and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final,
non-appealable judicial opinions.
(K) "Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments" means all dues, fees, assessments and other
charges that are imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condominium association, homeowners
association or similar organization.
(L) ''Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by
check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic
instrument, computer, or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit
or credit an account. Such term includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller
machine transactions, transfers initiated by telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse
transfers.
(M) ''Escrow Items" means those items that are described in Section 3.
(N) "Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damages, or proceeds paid
by any third party (other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages described in Section 5) for: (i)
damage to, or destruction of, the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taking of all or any part of the
Property; (iii) conveyance in lieu of condemnation; or (iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the
value and/or condition of the Property.
(0) ''Mortgage Insurance" means insurance protecting Lender against the nonpayment of, or default on,
the Loan.
(P) ''Periodic Payment" means the regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under the
Note, plus (ii) any amounts under Section 3 of this Security Instrument.
115-10376133
G.SA(CA) (0207) Page2of15
lniliaJs:ki~#r- Fonn 3005 1/01
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(Q) ''RESPA" means the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act {12 U.S. C. Section 2601 et seq.) and its
implementing regulation, Regulation X {24 C.F.R. Part 3500), as they might be amended from time to
time, or any additional or successor legislation or regulation that governs the same subject marter. As used
in this Security Instrument, "RESPA" refers to all requirements and restrictions that are imposed in regard
to a "federally related mortgage loan" even if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage
loan" under RESPA.
{R) ''Successor in Interest of Borrower" means any party that has taken title to the Property, whether or
not that party has assumed Borrower's obligations under the Note and/or this Security Instrument.
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY

The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's
successors and assigns) and the successors and assigns of MERS. This Security Instrument
secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications
of the Note; and (ii) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this
Security Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to
Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following described property located in the
County of SAN DIEGO
[Type of Recording Jurisdiction] [Name of Recording Jurisdiction]
See Exhibit ''A'' attached hereto and Incorporated herein by reference for
all purposes.
445-712-20-00
Parcel IDNumber: which currently has the address of
3970 UTAH STREET #8 (Street]
SAN DIEGO (City], California 92104 (Zip Code]
("Property Address"):
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all
easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and
additions shall also be covered by this Security Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in this
Security Instrument as the "Property." Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title
to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or
custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any
or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to
take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security
Instrument.
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has
the right to grant and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances
115-10376133 ~
G-&A(CA)(0207) Page3of15 Initials: Form3005 1101
®
16056
of record. Borrower warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and
demands, subject to any encumbrances of record.
THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform
covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real
property.
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows:
I. Payment of Principal, Interest, Escrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges.
Borrower shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any
prepayment charj!eS and late charges due under the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for Escrow Items
pursuant to SectiOn 3. Payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument shall be made in U.S.
currency. However, if any check or other instrument received by Lender as payment under the Note or this
Security Instrument is returned to Lender unpaid, Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments
due under the Note and this Security Instrument be made in one or more of the following forms, as
selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's check or
cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a
federal agency, instrumentality, or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer.
Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at
such other location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15.
Lender may return any payment or partial payment if the payment or partial payments are insufficient to
bring the Loan current. Lender may accept any payment or partial 12ayment insufficient to bring the Loan
current, without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its nghts to refuse such payment or partial
payments in the future, but Lender is not obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are
accepted. If each Periodic Payment is applied as of its scheduled due date, then Lender need not 12ay
interest on unapplied funds. Lender may hold such unapplied funds until Borrower makes payment to brmg
the Loan current. If Borrower does not do so within a reasonable period of time, Lender shall either apply
such funds or return them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds will be applied to the outstandmg
principal balance under the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or claim which Borrower
might have now or in the future against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments due under
the Note and this Security Instrument or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this Security
Instrument.
2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in this Section 2, all
payments accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest
due under the Note; (b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due under Section 3. Such payments
shall be applied to each Periodic Payment in the order m which it became due. Any remaining amounts
shall be applied first to late charges, second to any other amounts due under this Security Instrument, and
then to reduce the principal balance of the Note.
If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for a delinquent Periodic Payment which includes a
sufficient amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may be applied to the delinquent payment and
the late charge. If more than one Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment received
from Borrower to the repayment of the Periodic Payments if, and to the extent that, each payment can be
paid in full. To the extent that any excess exists after the payment is applied to the full payment of one or
more Periodic Payments, such excess may be applied to any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments shall
be applied first to any prepayment charges and then as described in the Note.
Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principal due under
the Note shall not extend or postpone the due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments.
3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due
under the Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum (the "Funds") to provide for payment of amounts due
for: (a) taxes and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a
lien or encumbrance on the Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c)
premiums for any and all insurance required by Lender under Section 5; and (d) Mortgage Insurance
premiums, if any, or any sums payable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage
Insurance premiums in accordance with the provisions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow
Items." At origination or at any time during the term of the Loan, Lender may require that Community
Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any, be escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and
assessments shall be an Escrow Item. Borrower shall promptly furmsh to Lender all notices of amounts to
be paid under this Section. Borrower shall pay Lender the Funds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives
Borrower's obligation to pay the Funds for any or all Escrow Items. Lender may waive Borrower's
obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any or all Escrow Items at any time. Any such waiver may only be
115-10376133
G -6A(CA) (0207) Page4of15
'""'""~ Fonn 3005 1/01
"'
16057
in writing. In the event of such waiver, Borrower shall pay directly, when and where payable, the amounts
due for any Escrow Items for which payment of Funds has been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires,
shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payment within such time period as Lender may require.
Borrower's obligation to make such payments and to provide receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to
be a covenant and agreement contained in this Security Instrument, as the phrase "covenant and agreement"
is used in Section 9. If Borrower is obligated to pay Escrow Items directly, pursuant to a waiver, and
Borrower fails to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item, Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9
and pay such amount and Borrower shall then be obligated under Section 9 to repay to Lender any such
amount. Lender may revoke the waiver as to any or all Escrow Items at any time by a notice given .in
accordance with Section I 5 and, upon such revocation, Borrower shall pay to Lender all Funds, and in
such amounts, that are then required under this Section 3.
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to apply
the Funds at the time specified under RESPA, and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can
require under RESPA. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds due on the basis of current data and
reasonable estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with Applicable
Law.
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency,
instrumentality, or entity (including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so insured) or in
any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items no later than the time
specified under RESPA. Lender shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually
analyzing the escrow account, or verifYing the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the
Funds and Applicable Law permits Lender to make such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing
or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on the Funds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower
any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and Lender can agree in writing, however, that interest
shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the
Funds as required by RESPA.
If there is a surplus of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall account to
Borrower for the excess funds in accordance with RESP A. If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow,
as defined under RESPA, Lender shall notifY Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to
Lender the amount necessary to make up the shortage in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 12
monthly payments. If there is a deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall
notifY Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make
up the deficiency in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 12 monthly payments.
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund
to Borrower any Funds held by Lender.
4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions
attributable to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, leasehold payments or
ground rents on the Property, if any, and Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any. To
the extent that these items are Escrow Items, Borrower shall pay them in the manner provided in Section 3.
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless
Borrower: (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable
to Lender, but only so long as Borrower is performing such agreement; (b) contests the lien in good faith
by, or defends against enforcement of the lien in, legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to
prevent the enforcement of the lien while those proceedings are pending, but only until such proceedings
are concluded; or (c) secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating
the lien to this Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien
which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifYing the
"'"··~
115-10376133
G ®-6A(CA) (02071 Page 5 of 15 Fonn 3005 1/01
16058
lien. Within 10 days of the date on which that notice is given, Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or
more of the actions set forth above in this Section 4.
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for a real estate tax verification and/or
reporting service used by Lender in connection with this Loan.
5. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on
the Property insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage," and any
other hazards including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance.
This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts (including deductible levels) and for the periods that
Lender requires. What Lender requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during the term of
the Loan. The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's
right to disapprove Borrower's choice, which right shall not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may
require Borrower to pay, in connection with this Loan, either: (a) a one-time charge for flood zone
determination, certification and tracking services; or (b) a one-time charge for flood zone determination
and certification services and subsequent charges each time remappings or similar changes occur which
reasonably might affect such determination or certification. Borrower shall also be responsible for the
payment of any fees imposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in connection with the
review of any flood zone determination resulting from an objection by Borrower.
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may obtain insurance
coverage, at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any
particular type or amount of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might
not protect Borrower, Borrower's equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk,
hazard or liability and might provide greater or lesser coverage than was previously in effect. Borrower
acknowledges that the cost of the insurance coverage so obtained might significantly exceed the cost of
insurance that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 shall
become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest
at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from
Lender to Borrower requesting payment.
All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender's
right to disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as
mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee and Borrower further agrees to generally assign rights to
insurance proceeds to the holder of the Note up to the amount of the outstanding loan balance. Lender shall
have the right to hold the policies and renewal certificates. If Lender requires, Borrower shall promptly
give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and renewal notices. If Borrower obtains any form of
insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to, or destruction of, the Property, such
policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional
loss payee and Borrower further agrees to generally assign rights to insurance proceeds to the holder of the
Note up to the amount of the outstanding loan balance.
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender
may make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree
in writing, any insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall
be applied to restoration or repair of the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and
Lender's security is not lessened. During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to
hold such insurance proceeds until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the
work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that such inspection shall be undertaken
promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series
of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law
requires interest to be paid on such insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any
interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters, or other third parties, retained by
Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. If
the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance
proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with
115-10376133
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®
(0207) Page6of15
'"""'# Form 3005 1/01
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the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in
Section 2.
If Borrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available insurance
claim and related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the
insurance carrier has offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate and settle the claim. The 30-day
period will begin when the notice is given. In either event, or if Lender acquires the Property under
Section 22 or otherwise, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any insurance
proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Insttument, and
(b) any other of Borrower's rights (other than the right to any refund of unearned premiums paid by
Borrower) under all insurance policies covering the Property, insofar as such rights are applicable to the
coverage of the Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the Property or
to pay amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Insttument, whether or not then due.
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal
residence within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the
Property as Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender
otherwise agrees in writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating
circumstances exist which are beyond Borrower's control.
7. Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Inspections. Borrower shall not
destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the
Property. Whether or not Borrower is residing in the Property, Borrower shall maintain the Property in
order to prevent the Property from deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is
determined pursuant to Section 5 that repair or restoration is not economically feasible, Borrower shall
promptly repair the Property if damaged to avoid further deterioration or damage. If insurance or
condemnation proceeds are paid in connection with damage to, or the taking of, the Property, Borrower
shall be responsible for repairing or restoring the Property only if Lender has released proceeds for such
purposes. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of
progress payments as the work is completed. If the insurance or condemnation proceeds are not sufficient
to repair or restore the Property, Borrower is not relieved of Borrower's obligation for the completion of
such repair or restoration.
Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has
reasonable cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shall give
Borrower notice at the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifYing such reasonable cause.
8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application
process, Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or with Borrower's
knowledge or consent gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender
(or failed to provide Lender with material information) in connection with the Loan. Material
representations include, but are not limited to, representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the
Property as Borrower's principal residence.
9. Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property and Rights Under Ibis Security Instrument. If
(a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, (b) there
is a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property and/or rights under
this Security Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture, for
enforcement of a lien which may attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or
regulations), or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is
reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security
Instrument, including protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property, and securing and/or repairing
the Property. Lender's actions can include, but are not limited to: (a) paying any sums secured by a lien
which has priority over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing in court; and (c) paying reasonable
115-10376133
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G-OA(CA) (0207) Paga 7 Of 15 1/01
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attorneys' fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument, including
its secured position in a bankruptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not limited to,
entering the Property to make repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors and windows, drain water
from pipes, eliminate building or other code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities turned
on or off. Although Lender may take action under this Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not
under any duty or obligation to do so. It is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all
actions authorized under this Section 9.
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower
secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of
disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting
paymff'ihis Security Instrument is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the
lease. If Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the leasehold and the fee title shall not merge unless
Lender agrees to the merger in writing.
10. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan,
Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the Mortgage Insurance in effect. If, for any reason,
the Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be available from the mortgage insurer that
previously provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments
toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain
coverage substantially equivalent to the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially
equivalent to the cost to Borrower of the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, from an alternate
mortgage insurer selected by Lender. If substantially equivalent Mortgage Insurance coverage is not
available, Borrower shall continue to pay to Lender the amount of the separately designated payments that
were due when the insurar ·e coverage ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept, use and retain these
payments as a non-refur/ -l0ss reserve in lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such loss reserve shall be
non-refundable, notwit' · \e fact that the Loan is ultimately paid in full, and Lender shall not be
required to pay Borrow,. ;7rest or earnings on such loss reserve. Lender can no longer require loss
reserve payments if Mort~e-Tnsurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires)
provided by an insurer selected by Lender again becomes available, is obtained, and Lender requires
separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage
Insurance as a condition of making the Loan and Borrower was required to make separately designated
payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to
maintain Mortgage Insurance in effect, or to provide a non-refundable loss reserve, until Lender's
requirement for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement between Borrower and
Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable Law. Nothing in this
Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Note.
Mortgage Insurance reimburses Lender (or any entity that purchases the Note) for certain losses it
may incur if Borrower does not repay the Loan as agreed. Borrower is not a party to the Mortgage
Insurance.
Mortgage insurers evaluate their total risk on all such insurance in force from time to time, and may
enter into agreements with other parties that share or modifY their risk, or reduce losses. These agreements
are on terms and conditions that are satisfactory to the mortgage insurer and the other party (or parties) to
these agreements. These agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make payments using any source
of funds that the mortgage insurer may have available (which may include funds obtained from Mortgage
Insurance premiums).
As a result of these agreements, Lender, any purchaser of the Note, another insurer, ·any reinsurer,
any other entity, or any affiliate of any of the foregoing, may receive (directly or indirectly) amounts that
derive from (or might be characterized as) a portion of Borrower's payments for Mortgage Insurance, in
exchange for sharing or modifYing the mortgage insurer's risk, or reducing losses. If such agreement
provides that an affiliate of Lender takes a share of the insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the
premiums paid to the insurer, the arrangement is often termed "captive reinsurance." Further:
(a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower bas agreed to pay for
Mortgage Insurance, or any other terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not increase the amount
Borrower will owe for Mortgage Insurance, and they will not entitle Borrower to any refund.
'"'u"~
115-10376133
G ®-6A(CA) 102011 Page 8 of 15 Fonn 3005 1101
(b) Any such agreements will not affect the rights Borrower bas - if any - with respect to the
Mortgage Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 or any other law. These rights
may include the right to receive certain disclosures, to request and obtain cancellation of tbe
Mortgage Insurance, to have the Mortgage Insurance terminated automatically, and/or to receive a
refund of any Mortgage Insurance premiums that were unearned at the time of such cancellation or
termination.
II. Assignment of Miscellaneous Proceeds; Forfeiture. All Miscellaneous Proceeds are hereby
assigned to and shall be paid to Lender.
If the Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of
the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened.
During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceeds
until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to
Lender's satisfaction, provided that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may pay for the
repairs and restoration in a single disbursement or in a series of progress payments as the work is
completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such
Miscellaneous Proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such
Miscellaneous Proceeds. If the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would
be lessened, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument,
whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. Such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be
applied in the order provided for in Section 2.
In the event of a total taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property, the Miscellaneous
Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with
the excess, if any, paid to Borrower.
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market
value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is equal to or
greater than the amount of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately before the partial
taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the sums
secured by this Security Instrument shall be reduced by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds
multiplied by the following fraction: (a) the total amount of the sums secured immediately before the
partial taking, destruction, or loss in value divided by (b) the fair market value of the Property
immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value. Any balance shall be paid to Borrower.
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in whiCh the fair market
value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is less than the
amount of the sums secured immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless
Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums
secured by this Security Instrument whether or not the sums are then due.
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the
Opposing Party (as defined in the next sentence) offers to make an award to settle a claim for damages,
Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender is authorized
to collect and apply the Miscellaneous Proceeds either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the
sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. "Opposing Party" means the third party
that owes Borrower Miscellaneous Proceeds or the party against whom Borrower has a right of action in
regard to Miscellaneous Proceeds.
Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is begun that, in
Lender's judgment, could result in forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of Lender's
interest in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument. Borrower can cure such a default and, if
acceleration has occurred, reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing the action or proceeding to be
dismissed with a ruling that, in Lender's judgment, precludes forfeiture of the Property or other material
impairment of Lender's interest in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument. The proceeds of
any award or claim for damages that are attributable to the impairment of Lender's interest in the Property
are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender.
All Miscellaneous Proceeds that are not applied to restoration or repair of the Property shall be
applied in the order provided for in Section 2.
12. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for
payment or modification of amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Lender
115-10376133 '"'"··~
.
G-6A(CA) (0207) PBge9ol15 Form 3005 1/01
16061
to Borrower or any Successor in Interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower
or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against
any Successor in Interest of Borrower or to refuse to extend· time for payment or otherwise modifY
amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original
Borrower or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or
remedy including, without limitation, Lender's acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or
Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or
preclude the exercise of any right or remedy.
13. Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers; Successors and Assigns Bound. Borrower covenants
and agrees that Borrower's obligations and liability shall be joint and several. However, any Borrower who
co-signs this Security Instrument but does not execute the Note (a "co-signer"): (a) is co-signing this
Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer's interest in the Property under the
terms of this Security Instrument; (b) is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security
Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any other Borrower can agree to extend, modifY, forbear or
make any accommodations with regard to the terms of this Security Instrument or the Note without the
co·signer' s consent.
Subject to the provisions of Section I 8, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes
Borrower's obligations under this Security Instrument in writing, and is approved by Lender, shall obtain
all of Borrower's rights and benefits under this Security Instrument. Borrower shall not be released from
Borrower's obligations and liability under this Security Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in
writing. The covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind (except as provided in
Section 20) and benefit the successors and assigns of Lender.
14. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connection with
Borrower's default, for the purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this
Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees.
In regard to any other fees, the absence of express authority in this Security Instrument to charge a specific
fee to Borrower shall not be construed as a prohibition on the charging of such fee. Lender may not charge
fees that are expressly prohibited by this Security Instrument or by Applicable Law.
If the Loan is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, and that law is finally interpreted so
that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the Loan exceed the
permitted limits, then: (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the
charge to the permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted
limits will be refunded to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal
owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower. If a refund reduces principal, the
reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment without any prepayment charge (whether or not a
prepayment charge is provided for under the Note). Borrower's acceptance of any such refund made by
direct payment to Borrower will constitute a waiver of any right of action Borrower might have arising out
of such overcharge.
15. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with this Security Instrument
must be in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to
have been given to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Borrower's
notice address if sent by other means. Notice to any one Borrower shall constitute notice to all Borrowers
unless Applicable Law expressly requires otherwise. The notice address shall be the Property Address
unless Borrower has designated a substitute notice address by notice to Lender. Borrower shall promptly
notifY Lender of Borrower's change of address. If Lender specifies a procedure for reporting Borrower's
change of address, then Borrower shall only report a change of address through that specified procedure.
There may be only one designated notice address under this Security Instrument at any one time. Any
notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to Lender's address
stated herein unless Lender has designated another address by notice to Borrower. Any notice in
connection with this Security Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually
received by Lender. If any notice required by this Security Instrument is also required under Applicable
Law, the Applicable Law requirement will satisfY the corresponding requirement under this Security
Instrument.
115-10376133
• .,-6A(CA) 102071 Pago10 of 15
'"'"""~ Form 3005 1/0t
16062
16. Governing Law; Severability; Rules of Construction. This Security Instrument shall be
governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and
obligations contained in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of
Applicable Law. Applicable Law might explicitly or implicitly allow the parties to agree by contract or it
might be silent, but such silence shall not be construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract. In
the event that any provision or clause of this Security Instrument or the Note conflicts with Applicable
Law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security Instrument or the Note which can be
given effect without the conflicting provision.
As used in this Security Instrument: (a) words of the masculine gender shall mean and include
corresponding neuter words or words of the feminine gender; (b) words in the singular shall mean and
include the plural and vice versa; and (c) the word "may" gives sole discretion without any obligation to
take any action.
17. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given one copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument.
18. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18,
"Interest in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited
to, those beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or
escrow agreement, the intent of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser.
!fall or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if Borrower
is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior
written consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security
Instrument. However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by
Applicable Law.
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall
provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15
within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay
these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this
Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower.
19. Borrower's Right to Reinstate After Acceleration. If Borrower meets certain conditions,
Borrower shall have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time
prior to the earliest of: (a) five days before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in
this Security Instrument; (b) such other period as Applicable Law might specify for the termination of
Borrower's right to reinstate; or (c) entry of a judgment enforcing this Security Instrument. Those
conditions are that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which then would be due under this Security
Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any default of any other covenants or
agreements; (c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but not limited
to, reasonable attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees, and other fees incurred for the
purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument; and (d)
takes such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that Lender's interest in the Property and
rights under this Security Instrument, and Borrower's obligation to pay the sums secured by this Security
Instrument, shall continue unchanged. Lender may require that Borrower pay such reinstatement sums and
expenses in one or more of the following forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c)
certified check, bank check, treasurer's check or cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon
an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality or entity; or (d) Electronic
Funds Transfer. Upon reinstatement by Borrower, this Security Instrument and obligations secured hereby
shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred. However, this right to reinstate shall not
apply in the case of acceleration under Section 18.
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer; Notice of Grievance. The Note or a partial interest in
the Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to
Borrower. A sale might result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects
Periodic Payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument and performs other mortgage loan
servicing obligations under the Note, this Security Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be
one or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note. If there is a change of the Loan
Servicer, Borrower will be given written notice of the change which will state the name and address of the
new Loan Servicer, the address to which payments should be made and any other information RESPA
115·10376133 '""'"'~
cG!-6A(CA) (0207) Page11 ol15 Fonn 3005 1/01
"'
16063
requires in connection with a notice of transfer of servicing. If the Note is sold and thereafter the Loan is
serviced by a Loan Servicer other than the purchaser of the Note, the mortgage loan servicing obligations
to Borrower will remain with the Loan Servicer or be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are not
assumed by the Note purchaser unless otherwise provided by the Note purchaser.
Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, join, or be joined to any judicial action (as either an
individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this
Security Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by
reason of, this Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such
notice given in compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded the
other party hereto a reasonable period after the giving of such notice to take corrective action. If
Applicable Law provides a time period which must elapse before certain action can be taken, that time
period will be deemed to be reasonable for purposes of this paragraph. The notice of acceleration and
opportunity to cure given to Borrower pursuant to Section 22 and the notice of acceleration given to
Borrower pursuant to Section 18 shall be deemed to satisfY the notice and opportunity to take corrective
action provisions of this Section 20.
21. Hazardous Substances. As used in this Section 21: (a) "Hazardous Substances" are those
substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances, pollutants, or wastes by Environmental Law and the
following substances: gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides
and herbicides, volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials;
(b) "Environmental Law" means federal laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that
relate to health, safety or environmental protection; (c) "Environmental Cleanup" includes any response
action, remedial action, or removal action, as defined in Environmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental
Condition" means a condition that can cause, contribute to, or otherwise trigger an Environmental
Cleanup.
Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any Hazardous
Substances, or threaten to release any Hazardous Substances, on or in the Property. Borrower shall not do,
nor allow anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property (a) that is in violation of any Environmental
Law, (b) which creates an Environmental Condition, or (c) which, due to the presence, use, or release of a
Hazardous Substance, creates a condition that adversely affects the value of the Property. The preceding
two sentences shall not apply to the presence, use, or storage on the Property of small quantities of
Hazardous Substances that are generally recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to
maintenance of the Property (including, but not limited to, hazardous substances in consumer products).
Borrower shall promptly give Lender written notice of (a) any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit
or other action by any governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any
Hazardous Substance or Environmental Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge, (b) any
Environmental Condition, including but not limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat of
release of any Hazardous Substance, and (c) any condition caused by the presence, use or release of a
Hazardous Substance which adversely affects the value of the Property. If Borrower learns, or is notified
by any governmental or regulatory authority, or any private party, that any removal or other remediation
of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary, Borrower shall promptly take all necessary
remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law. Nothing herein shall create any obligation on
Lender for an Environmental Cleanup.
115-10376133
G-6A(CA) (0207) Page 12 ol 15
lnlti•,'~- Fonn 3005 1/01
®
16064
NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following
Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not prior to
acceleration under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). The notice shall specify: (a)
the default; {b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date
the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the
default on or before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by
this Security Instrument and sale of the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the
right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of
a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the default is not cured on or
before the date specified in the notice, Lender at its option may require immediate payment in full of
all sums secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and may invoke the power of
sale and any other remedies permitted by Applicable Law. Lender shall he entitled to collect all
expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, including, but not limited to,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence.
If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall execute or cause Trustee to execute a written
notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of Lender's election to cause the Property to be
sold. Trustee shall cause this notice to be recorded in each county in which any part of the Property
is located. Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of the notice as prescribed by Applicable Law to
Borrower and to the other persons prescribed by Applicable Law. Trustee shall give public notice of
sale to the persons and in the manner prescribed by Applicable Law. After the time required by
Applicable Law, Trustee, without demand on Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to
the highest bidder at the time and place and under the terms designated in the notice of sale in one or
more parcels and in any order Trustee determines. Trustee may postpone sale of all or any parcel of
the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any previously scheduled sale. Lender
or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale.
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any
covenant or warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie
evidence of the truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale in
the following order: (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable Trustee's
and attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the
person or persons legally entitled to it.
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall
request Trustee to reconvey the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes
evidencing debt secured by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property
without warranty to the person or persons legally entitled to it. Lender may charge such person or persons
a reasonable fee for reconveying the Property, but only if the fee is paid to a third party (such as the
Trustee) for services rendered and the charging of the fee is permitted under Applicable Law. If the fee
charged does not exceed the fee set by Applicable Law, the fee is conclusively presumed to be reasonable.
24. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time appoint a successor trustee to
any Trustee appointed hereunder by an instrument executed and acknowledged by Lender and recorded in
the office of the Recorder of the county in which the Property is located. The instrument shall contain the
name of the original Lender, Trustee and Borrower, the book and page where this Security Instrument is
recorded and the name and address of the successor trustee. Without conveyance of the Property, the
successor trustee shall succeed to all the title, powers and duties conferred upon the Trustee herein and by
Applicable Law. This procedure for substitution of trustee shall govern to the exclusion of all other
provisions for substitution.
25. Statement of Obligation Fee. Lender may collect a fee not to exceed the maximum amount
permitted by Applicable Law for furnishing the statement of obligation as provided by Section 2943 of the
Civil Code of California.
115-10376133
G -6A(CA) (0207) Page 13 of 15
toiHeJsU#- Form 3005 1/01
"'
16065
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this
Security Instrument and in any Rider executed by Borrower and recorded with it.
~~~~,.~~-c~·-~~~~~~~~~--<s~)
KARIN E. WINNER -Borrower
LORETTA A. HEARN -Borrower
_______________________ (S~) _______________________ (S~)
-Borrower -Borrower
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Seal) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Seal)
-Borrower -Borrower
-------------(Seal) -------------(Seal)
-Borrower -Borrower
115-10376133
-~A(CA) (0207) Page 14 of 15 Form 3005 1/01
®
16066
State of California
County of SAN DIEGO
On &±uk.- tf';J60 ~
.. - . - . - . -.
KARIN E. WINNER, A Single Woman and LORETTA A. HEARN, an Unmarried
Woman
, perseRally IERSWfl te me
(or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) whose name(s)..i&~Bsubscribed
to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that lleld~ executed the same in "'iislhen'LEiJT"
authorized capacity(ies), and that by h~h••'l~gnature(s) on the instrument the person(s) or the entity
upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.
=========~~===~~=~
I Q''F'~..
1i •
TERESAM.WAYSON
COMM. # 1330216
I
~ : NOTARY PUBUC-CAUFORNIA ;I
", SAN DIEGO COUNTY !!
I My Comm. Exp. Nov. 13, 2005 I
c::: ======.=======
115-10376133
4G!.,-6A(CA) 102011 Page 15 of 15
lo;tl.~ Fonn 3005 1101
File No: 04606196
16067
EXHIBIT "A"
All that certain real property situated in the County of San Diego, State of
California, described as follows:
A Condominium comprised of:
Parcel 1:
An undivided one-ninth (1/9th) fractional interest as tenant-in-common in and to
Lot 1 of 3970 Utah Street Condominiums, in the City of San Diego, County of
San Diego, State of California according to Map thereof No. 15121 filed in the
Office of the County Recorder of San Diego County, September 20, 2005.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM Living Units U-1 through U-9 , inclusive, as shown

and defined in that certain Condominium Plan entitled "CONDOMINIUM
PLAN FOR 3970 UTAH STREET" ("Plan") recorded in the Office of the San
Diego County Recorder, California on September 23, 2005 as File No. 2005-
0823498 of Official Records, hereafter the "Condominium Plan."
ALSO EXCEPTING THEREFROM the right to possession of all those areas

designated as "Exclusive Use Common Areas" as described in that certain
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions recorded September 23, 2005 as File No.
2005-0823499 of Official Records ("Declaration"), and shown and described
upon the Condominium Plan referred to above.
PARCEL 2:
Living Unit u-s as shown on the Condominium Plan.
PARCEL 3:
The exclusive right to the use, possession and occupancy of those portions of
PARCEL 1 above which are described in the Declaration and shown on the
Condominium Plan as "Exclusive Use Common Areas," bearing the same
numerical designation as the Living Unit described in PARCEL 2 above, which
shall be appurtenant to PARCEL 2 described above.
PARCEL 4:
The exclusive right to the use, possession and occupancy of those portions of
PARCEL 1 described above and designated on the Condominium Plan as:
Page 3
-- ---~-------
File No: 04606196

16068
G-none,CP-none,PS-17,S-none
consisting of "Garage Exclusive Use Common Area," "Carport Exclusive

Use Common Area," "Parking Space Exclusive Use Common Area" and
"Storage Exclusive Use Common Area" as defined and described in that
certain Declaration described hereinafter and subject to the limitations,
covenants, conditions and restrictions also described in said Declaration.
The foregoing Garage, Carport, Parking Space and Storage Exclusive Use area
assignments, as an appurtenance to Parcel 2, shall supersede and take
precedence over any assignment or conveyance of the same that may be
identified and previously assigned to the Condominium Unit described in Parcel 1
above in the Condominium Plan.
Assessor's Parcel Number: 445-712-20-00
Page 4
..
16069
~~~= 100431900103274765
1-4 FAMILY RIDER

(Assignment of Rents)
THIS 1-4 FAMILY RIDER is made this 30th day of September, 2005 ,
and is incorporated into and shall be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed
of Trust, or Security Deed (the "Security Instrument") of the same date given by the
undersigned (the "Borrower'') to secure Borrower's Note to HOME123 CORPORATION. a
Cal1forn1a Corporat1on.
(the
"Lender") of the same date and covering the Property described in the Security Instrument
and located at: 3970 UTAH STREET #8. SAN DIEGO, CA 92104
[Property Address]
1-4 FAMILY COVENANTS. In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the
Security Instrument, Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
A. ADDITIONAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE SECURITY INSTRUMENT. In addition to
the Property described in the Security Instrument, the following items now or hereafter
attached to the Property to the extent they are fixtures are added to the Property description,
and shall also constitute the Property covered by the Security Instrument: building materials,
appliances and goods of every nature whatsoever now or hereafter located in, on, or used, or
intended to be used in connection with the Property, including, but not limited to, those for
the purposes of supplying or distributing heating, cooling, electricity, gas, water, air and light,
fire prevention and extinguishing apparatus, security and access control apparatus, plumbing,
bath tubs, water heaters, water closets, sinks, ranges, stoves, refrigerators, dishwashers,
disposals, washers, dryers, awnings, storm windows, storm doors, screens, blinds, shades,
curtains and curtain rods, attached mirrors, cabinets, paneling and attached floor coverings,
all of which, including replacements and additions thereto, shall be deemed to be and remain
a part of the Property covered by the Security Instrument. All of the foregoing together with
the Property described in the Security Instrument (or the leasehold estate if the Security
Instrument is on a leasehold) are referred to in this 1-4 Family Rider and the Security
Instrument as the" Property."
B. USE OF PROPERTY; COMPUANCE WITH LAW. Borrower shall not seek, agree to or
make a change in the use of the Property or its zoning classification, unless Lender has
agreed in writing to the change. Borrower shall comply with all laws, ordinances, regulations
and requirements of any governmental body applicable to the Property.
C. SUBORDINATE UENS. Except as permitted by federal law, Borrower shall not allow
any lien inferior to the Security Instrument to be perfected against the Property without
Lender's prior written permission.
D. RENT LOSS INSURANCE. Borrower shall maintain insurance against rent loss in
addition to the other hazards for which insurance is required by Section 5.
115-10376133
MULTISTATE 1-4 FAMILY RIDER- Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT
Fonn 3170 1101
S-57R (0401 ).01 /~;,_[)};
Pag~ 1 of 3 lnitiai~../-
VMP Mortgage Solutions
(800)521-7291
16070
E. "BORROWER'S RIGHT TO REINSTATE'' DB.ETED. Section 19 is deleted.

F. BORROWER'S OCCUPANCY. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing,
Section 6 concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property is deleted.
G. ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES. Upon Lender's request after default, Borrower shall assign
to Lender all leases of the Property and all security deposits made in connection with leases
of the Property. Upon the assignment, Lender shall have the right to modify, extend or
terminate the existing leases and to execute new leases, in Lender's sole discretion. As used
in this paragraph G, the word "lease" shall mean "sublease" if the Security Instrument is on a
leasehold.
H. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS; APPOINTMENT OF RECBVER; LENDER IN POSSESSION.
Borrower absolutely and unconditionally assigns and transfers to Lender all the rents and
revenues ("Rents") of the Property, regardless of to whom the Rents of the Property are
payable. Borrower authorizes Lender or lender's agents to collect the Rents, and agrees that
each tenant of the Property shall pay the Rents to Lender or Lender's agents. However,
Borrower shall receive the Rents until: (i) Lender has given Borrower notice of default
pursuant to Section 22 of the Security Instrument, and \11) Lender has given notice to the
tenant(s/ that the Rents are to be paid to Lender or Lender s agent. This assignment of Rents
constitu es an absolute assignment and not an assignment for additional security only.
If Lender gives notice of default to Borrower: (i) all Rents received by Borrower shall be
held by Borrower as trustee for the benefit of Lender only, to be applied to the sums secured
by the Security Instrument; (ii) Lender shall be entitled to collect and receive all of the Rents
of the Property; (iii) Borrower agrees that each tenant of the Property shall pay all Rents due
and unpaid to Lender or Lender's agents upon Lender's written demand to the tenant; (iv)
unless applicable law provides otherwise, all Rents collected by Lender or Lender's agents
shall be applied first to the costs of taking control of and managing the Property and
collecting the Rents, including, but not limited to, attorney's fees, receiver's fees, premiums
on receiver's bonds, repair and maintenance costs, insurance premiums, taxes, assessments
and other charges on the Property, and then to the sums secured by the Security Instrument;
(v) Lender, Lender's agents or any judicially appointed receiver shall be liable to account for
only those Rents actually received; and (vi) Lender shall be entitled to have a receiver
appointed to take possession of and manage the Property and collect the Rents and profits
derived from the Property without any showing as to the inadequacy of the Property as
security.
If the Rents of the Property are not sufficient to cover the costs of taking control of and
managing the Property and of collecting the Rents any funds expended by Lender for such
purposes shall become indebtedness of Borrower to Lender secured by the Security
Instrument pursuant to Section 9.
Borrower represents and warrants that Borrower has not executed any prior assignment
of the Rents and has not performed, and will not perform, any act that would prevent Lender
from exercising its rights under this paragraph.
Lender, or Lender's agents or a l"udicially appointed receiver, shall not be required to enter
upon, take control of or maintain he Property before or after giving notice of default to
Borrower. However, Lender, or Lender's agents or a judicially appointed receiver, may do so
at any time when a default occurs. Any application of Rents shall not cure or wa1ve any
default or invalidate any other right or remedy of Lender. This assignment of Rents of the
Property shall terminate when all the sums secured by the Security Instrument are paid in full.
I. CROSS-DEFAULT PROVISION. Borrower's default or breach under any note or
agreement in which Lender has an interest shall be a breach under the Security Instrument
and Lender may invoke any of the remedies permitted by the Security Instrument.
115-10376133
Initials~ .x_;.}Jj./
0-57R (0401 ).01
I!>
Page 2 of 3 ~1/01
16071'
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and provisions contained
in this 1-4 Family Rider. ~~
~;.. £. ~-,.......A.-. (Seal) ~ (Seal)

KA IN E. WINNER -Borrower LORETTA A. HEARN -Borrower
---------'----(Seal) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal)
-Borrower -Borrower
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal)
-Borrower -Borrower
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal)
-Borrower -Borrower
115-10376133
Q-57R (0401 ).01 Page 3 of 3 Fonn 3170 1/01
-, .
"'
16072
~UN: 100431900103274765
CONDOMINIUM RIDER
THIS CONDOMINIUM RIDER is made this 30th day of September, 2005
and is incorporated into and shall be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed
of Trust, or Security Deed (the "Security Instrument") of the same date given by the
undersigned (the "Borrower") to secure Borrower's Note to HOME123 CORPORATION, a
Cal1forn1a Corporat1on.
(the
"Lender") of the same date and covering the Property described in the Security Instrument
and located at:
3970 UTAH STREET #8. SAN DIEGO, CA 92104

[Property Address)
The Property includes a unit in, together with an undivided interest in the common elements
of, a condominium project known as:
UTAH STREET
[Name of Condominium Project]
(the "Condominium Project"). If the owners association or other entity which acts for the
Condominium Project (the "Owners Association") holds title to property for the benefit or use
of its members or shareholders, the Property also includes Borrower's interest in the Owners
Association and the uses, proceeds and benefits of Borrower's interest.
CONDOMINIUM COVENANTS. In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the

Security Instrument, Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
A. Condominium Obligations. Borrower shall perform all of Borrower's obligations under
the Condominium Project's Constituent Documents. The "Constituent Documents" are the: (i)
Declaration or any other document which creates the Condominium Project; (ii) by-laws; (iii)
code of regulations; and (iv) other equivalent documents. Borrower shall promptly pay, when
due, all dues and assessments imposed pursuant to the Constituent Documents.
B. Property Insurance. So long as the Owners Association maintains, with a generally
accepted insurance carrier, a" master'' or" blanket" policy on the Condominium Project which
is satisfactory to Lender and which provides insurance coverage in the amounts (including
deductible levels), for the periods, and against loss by fire, hazards included within the term
"extended coverage," and any other hazards, including, but not limited to, earthquakes and
floods, from which Lender requires insurance, then: (i) Lender waives the provision in
115-10376133
MULTISTATE CONDOMINIUM RIDER - Single Family - Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM

INSTRUMENT
Gi!-SR (0405) Fonn 3140.)(/~..,d'./ _
Pag"il1 of 3 Initial~
VMP Mortgage Solutions, Inc.
(800)521-7291
16073
Section 3 for the Periodic Payment to Lender of the yearly premium installments for property
insurance on the Property; and (ii) Borrower's obligation under Section 5 to maintain property
insurance coverage on the Property is deemed satisfied to the extent that the required
coverage is provided by the Owners Association policy.
What Lender requires as a condition of this waiver can change during the term of the
loan.
Borrower shall give Lender prompt notice of any lapse in required property insurance
coverage provided by the master or blanket policy.
In the event of a distribution of property insurance proceeds in lieu of restoration or
repair following a loss to the Property, whether to the unit or to common elements, any
proceeds payable to Borrower are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender for application
to the sums secured by the Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if
any, paid to Borrower.
C. Public Uability Insurance. Borrower shall take such actions as may be reasonable to
insure that the Owners Association maintains a public liability insurance policy acceptable in
form, amount, and extent of coverage to Lender.
D. Condemnation. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or
consequential, payable to Borrower in connection with any condemnation or other taking of all
or any part of the Property, whether of the unit or of the common elements, or for any
conveyance in lieu of condemnation, are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender. Such
proceeds shall be applied by Lender to the sums secured by the Security Instrument as
provided in Section 11.
E. Lender's Prior Consent. Borrower shall not, except after notice to Lender and with
Lender's prior written consent, either partition or subdivide the Property or consent to: (i) the
termination of the Condominium Project, except for abandonment or termination required by
law in the case of substantial destruction by fire or other casualty or in the case of a taking
by condemnation or eminent domain; (ii) any amendment to any provision of the Constituent
Documents if the provision is for the express benefit of Lender; (iii) termination of professional
management and assumption of self-management of the Owners Association; or (iv) any
action which would have the effect of rendering the public liability insurance coverage
maintained by the Owners Association unacceptable to Lender.
F. Remedies. If Borrower does not pay condominium dues and assessments when due,
then Lender may pay them. Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this paragraph F shall
become additional debt of Borrower secured by the Security Instrument. Unless Borrower and
Lender agree to other terms of payment, these amounts shall bear interest from the date of
disbursement at the Note rate and shall be payable, with interest, upon notice from Lender to
Borrower requesting payment.
Initial~~
115-10376133
.,
G-8R(0405) Page 2 of 3 Form 3140 1/01
16074
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and provisions contained
in this Condominium Rider.
-sar:; B.~~--"-
KARIN E. WINNER
(Seal)
-Borrower
:k&~(Seal)
LORETTA A. HEARN -Borrower
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal)
-Borrower -Borrower
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal)
-Borrower -Borrower
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Seal)
-Borrower -Borrower
115-10376133
.,
Q-8R(0405) Page 3 of 3 Fonn 3140 1/01
Exhibit 9
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TRTHM040 STHHI SECURED TRANSACTION HISTORY PG l 0 53 ASPUB6
PN 453 513 10 00 YR 14 XR LAND 95,233 NET 281,860
TRA 08001 CORTAC IMPS 193,627 RTE 1.179010
3335 33RD ST PP FSA 53.18
Name HEARN LORETTA TRUST 04-25-00 EX 7,000 PEN 168.81
3335 33RD ST CHG 3,545.13
Mail SAN DIEGO CA 92104 amt susp stat deliq dt
Addr lst 1,856.97 ~ PDWP 12/10/14
Mail Dt Vad 2nd 1,688.16 DUE· 04/10/15
TRANS-DTE BATCH-SEQ TRANSACTION-TYPE I TRANS-AMT INSTL-AMT STATUS

09/17/14 37 OPEN CHARGES l 1,688.16 1,688.16 l-DUE
37 OPEN CHARGES 2 1,688.16 1,688.16 2-DUE
12/21/14 61 PENALTY l 168.81 1,856.97 l-DEL
12/31/14 02 15700 0016 PAYMENT l 1,688.16 1,856.97 l-DEL
02 15700 0016 SUSPENSE l 1,688.16
01/12/15 00 15946 0056 SUSPENSE l -1,688.16
00 15946 0056 PAYMENT l 168.81 1,856.97 1-PDWP
ALL DATA IS DISPLAYED.

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' TRTHM040 STHHI SECURED TRANSACTION HISTORY PG 1 0 53 ASPUB6
PN 453 513 10 00 YR 13 XR LAND 94,803 NET 280,555
TRA 08001 CORTAC IMPS 192,752 RTE 1.182770
3335 33RD ST pp FSA 52.80
Name HEARN LORETTA TRUST 04-25-00 EX 7,000 PEN 347.10
3335 33RD ST CHG 3,718.22
Mail SAN.DIEGO CA 92104 amt JSUSp stat deliq dt
Addr 1st 1,854.11 PDWP 12/10/13
Mail Dt Vad 2nd 1,864.11 PDWP 04/10/14
TRANS-DTE BATCH-SEQ TRANSACTION-TYPE I TRANS-AMT INSTL-AMT STATUS

09/12/13 37 OPEN CHARGES 1 1,685.56 1,685.56 1-DUE
37 OPEN CHARGES t. 2 1,685.56 1,685.56 2-DUE
12/31/13 00 04403 0520 PAYMENT 1 1,854.11 1,685.56 1-DUE
00 04403 0520 SUSPENSE 1 1,854.11
01/03/14 61 SUSPENSE 1 -1,854.11
61 PENALTY ' 1 168.55 1,854.11 1-PDWP
04/19/14 61 PENALTY 2 168.55 1,854.11 2-DEL
61 COST 2 10.00 1,864.11 2-DEL
05/20/14 63 REMINDER NOTE MAILED
FIRST PAGE DISPLAYED. PRESS ENTER TO·VIEW NEXT PAGE
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TRANS:.: KEY: 04/01/15 11:02:08

TRTHM041 STHHI SECURED TRANSACTION HISTORY PG 2 0 53 ASPUB6
PN 453 513 10 00 YR 13 XR I TRANS AMT INSTL AMT STATUS
09/12/13 37 OPEN CHARGES' 1 1,685.56 1,685.56 1-DUE
37 OPEN CHARGES 2 1,685.56 1,685.56 2-DUE
12/31/13 DO 04403 0 520 PAYMENT 11 1,854.11 ,
1,685.56 1-DUE
DO 04403 0520 SUSPENSE 1 1,854.11
01/03/14 61 SUSPENSE 1 -1,854.11
61 PENALTY 1 168. 55 1,854.11 1-PDWP
04/19/14 61 PENALTY 2 168. 55 1,854.11 2-DEL
61 COST 2 10.00 1,864.11 2-DEL
05/20/14 63 REMINDER NOTE MAILED
-
06/05/14 00 08809 0075 PAYMENT 2 1,864.11 1,864.11 2-PDWP
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453-513-08-00 GRID: B 10
453-513-08-QO 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2012-13 AS OF 08-13-2013
DOC NO 192602 RECORDING DATE 4/19/10 CORTAC PAGE 184,Q67
MAP 001663 A:...TAO.ENA LND 79541 NET 1.11153 1424.34
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT a !>' v C IMP 48603 SA 5119-11 3.00
WIEGAND F.AMIL Y TRUST 04-13-10* '-"il.oi•dEGANO FOOL Y TRUST. 11-16-06 NET 128144 SA 5119-14 6.20
MAIL ADDR 2619 GRANDVIEW sr•sAN DIEGO CA 92110 l • I 128144 SA 6085-97 30.94
SITUS 3345-4733RO ST 51. 6727-18 11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECCXID INSTAllMENT ' ".A 6754-16 10.00
TRANS HIST: 11/30-29 51D'N1199 1 742.QQ PAID 11/30-29 510791200 1P 742.99 rAID TOT TAX 1485.98
lNST 742.QQ
•
---------------------------------------------------------,-------------------:;----------------------- :;-----------------------------------------
__..,.
453-513-o9-00 06001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROll lN THE COONTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAl YEAR 201~ 13 ASDF 08-13-2013
OOC NO
'
749560 RECORDING DATE 10/23/06 CDRTAC
•
MAP 001~!- Ai. 7ADENA LND 137287 NET 1.11153 2280.52
ASSESSEE DESCR LOT 9 8LK C !MP 74883 SA 5119-11 3.00
CLOANINGER TODD S REVOCABLLE"TRUST DB-17-o6 HOX 7000 SA 5119-14 5.86
MAIL ADDR CLDANINGER TODD S REVOCABLE TRUST"08-11-0 NET 205170 SA 6085-97 22.10
11131 INVIERNO OR"SAN DIEGO CA 92124 L + I 212170 SA 6727-18 11.50
SITUS 3339 33RD ST SA 6754-18 10.00
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECONO INSTALLMENT TOT TAX 2332.98
TRANS HIST: 12/10-12 205250045 1 1166.49 r;.,io 04105-00 126510125 1 1166.49 PAID INST 1166.49
•
453-513-1D-00 08001
-
SECUREO ASSESSME~T ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, ~A FISCAL YEAR 201:-13 AS Of 08-13-2013
DOC t.IO 52Q684 RECORDING DATE 9/23/09 CORTAC

M4P 001663 41. TADENA LND 92945 NET 1.11153 3055.78
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 10 BLX C IMP 188913 SA 5119-11 3.00
HEARN LORETTA TRUST 04-25-00 H<lX 7000 SA 5119-14 5.86
MAIL AOOR 3335 33RD ST*SAN DIEGO CA 92104 NET 274918 SA 6085--97 ;~.10
SITUS 3335 33RO ST ~- l • I 2tl191B SA 6727-18 •1.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT ' SECOND INSTALLMENT SA 6754-18 ·o.oo
TRANS HIST: 12110-12 OQ0110582 1 1554.12 PAlO 04/03-QO 1243702Q9 i 1554.12 PAID ... TOT- TAX 31UL 24
INST 1554.12
0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·
453-3!3-11-QO 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2012-13 AS Of 08-13-2013
DOC NO 536783 ~ RF.:.:QRDING DATE ~. 10/16/91 •

CDRTAC
•
5212
MAP 001~3 ALTADENA LNO 45066 NET 1.11153 1292.48
ASSESSEE DESCR LOT 11 BLK C !MP 71214 SA 5119-11 3.00
CASTELLI VINCENZO&GLD~IA M NET 116280 SA 511Q-14 6.20
MAIL AODR CASTELLI VICENZO&GLDRIA FAMILY 0 TRUST 10-2 L +I 116280 SA 6085-97 30.94
1174 SEA REEF DR*SAN OIEGO CA 92154 SA 6727-18 11.50
SITUS 331'i-2133RO ST ·•
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECOND INSTALLMENT
' SA 6754-18
TOT TAX
10.00
1354.12
TRANS HIST: 12/10-12 379623238 1 677.06 PAlO 04/05-0CI 373093148 1 677.06 PAID INST 677.06
•
IHST 24!5.27
,,"'" ••
SECOIIEO ASSES91ENT I!Oll IN THE Cl;li..NTV Of SAH DIEGO, CA fiSCAL VEAl! 2011•12 08•16·2012
..
.II
DOC NO 21~7 RECORDING DATE 4126/00 COII.TAC "41 '
~-;
JoWl 001663
ASSESSEE
SHAH SHNoH lo&IR*
ALT~EHA.
DESCII LOT 6 aLto( C
t-'i.ll MOR ''~1 3310. ST•SAN DIEGO ~ 92.104

SITUS 33Y 33110 ST .
1 00
I~
HO~
NET
l • I
17"~
7000
2G0332
26/332
NET 1.11260,
~119·11
SA 511\H4
SA 606~·?7
SA 6727•111
....
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5.00
1a. 'lD
11,50 •
"AN!
FIRST INSTAllloEPU
HIST1 12/ot~OO 372a3S71? 1 1473,01 PAID
SEC<Nl INSTAlliENT
0512a·OO 374m19'J 1 1473,01 PAID •• 67~4-111
TOT TAlC
10,00
29~.02
IHST •1473.01
4~5-~13•07·00 08001 SEC\JIED ASSESSW&IT tOll IN THE COUNT'f OF $AN OlfGO, CA fiSCAl YEM 2011·12 AS Of 08·16·2012
OOC NO !!6547~ AECOI!OINQ DATE 10/161119 - COIIToiC &212 PAGE 113,742
tw> 001665
MSESSEE
FAAES MIOW.l E~ A
ALT~ENA '
OESCII LOT 1 ILK C
tr4t.ll JOOR 3551 35'10 ST•SNI' DIEGO CA 92104

SITUS 35~1
U<l
IIENT SA 67~·1a 1D.OO
TA~ HIST! 12/08·00 372!110624 1
.
15?6. ?2 PAID 04/06•00 37~7902?~ 1
.
1~96, 92 PAID TOT TAX
INS!
3193, e4
1S516,?2 '
----··-·········-··-------·-------·-------·--···----···-----·····--·----~----------·-··-----·-----·-······--··-----------------------·····-·····
SECURED ASSES~T ROLL IH THE COUNTV OF SAH DIEGO, CA
"'"•
FISCAl YEAS! 2011•12 Ofl-16·2012
DOC NO 192602 "IIECOIOI~ DA";: 4/1,/10 COIIITAC
tw> 001663 AlTADENA lJ() 71912 NET 1,112ao 13911,02
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT a ILK C
HIEGii() FNolllV Tti.IST D4·13·10•NOIWIE<WC> f.tloiiLV TRUST 11•16·06
II-IP
leT
41650
1~'2
••SA ~11?·11
~11?·14
3.00
6,20,
lo4ot.IL .tOOR 261? GRN()VJ04 Sl-sNI DIEGO CA 92110
SITUS 354~·4735RO ST
L • I " 125632 •••• 601~·91
6727•1!
26.1a
11,50
fi.ST INSTAlUENT SECON> INST~lJIENT SA 67~4·1~ 10.00
HI»>S tOlSTt 12/06•00 ~~174 1 727,4!'i PAID 12/06•00 ~30601715 1 727,45 PAlO TOT T.-,)( 14~.110
INS! 727.4rt
fiSCAL. vtAA 2011•12
....
SEC\JAED ASSES91ENT I!OLL IH THE COUNTY Of SAN DIEGO, CA ~ OF 08•16•2012
DOC NO 749560 RECOI!OING DATE 10123/06 CO!HoiC
~ 00166!'i ~TADfHA. • Ll<> 134~?6 HfT 1,112ao 2256.~4
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 9 liLt< C 1... 7341e SA !S11?•11 5.00
CLOANINGER TOOO S REYOCMLLE•TRUST Ofl·17·06
NAIL Nl011'3S5? "10 ST~ DIEGO CA 92104
SITUS 3'39 331!0 ST ~ L• I
''"
""
7000
l01011
20<011
SA 5119•14
$A 404!·97
SA' 6727•1!
1~.70
11,50
~!- FIRST INSTALU€HT SEC® INSTAL~T SA 6754•1! 10,00
~142,95 PAID 228~. jl()
TIIANS HIST1 11124·2!1 6321005?7 1 D4109•aD 204?80037 1 1142,, PAlO
. TOT TAlC
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INST 1142.96
..
SEct.JIIEO ASSESSioEHT ROLL-IN THE COUNT'f OF 5»1 DIEGO, CA
OOC t.\0 52?084 IIEc;ORDING DATE 9/23/09
FISCAL VEAl: 2011•12
CORTAC
"'" oa-16·2012
"
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ASSESSEE
AlT.tDEHA
DE$CII LOT 10 &LK C
Hf:i.RH LORETTA lti.IST 04·~·00
SUUS SS" SSRO ST .
,_
to¥.IL NlOA 333~ 3310 ST•SN{ DIEGO CA ?2104
~ U<l
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NET
L• I
91123
1~208
7000
269391
2765?1 .
NET 1.112ao
511?-11
SA 5119·14
SA 60e·91
6727•11'
....
29?1,18
5.00
18,70
11.ao
fiRST INSTAL.UENT $EC® !NSTo\LLWENT SA 4754•11 10,00
T!UriiS HIST1 12/0fi·OO 16!i1000U 1 1523,42 PAID D4/10•00 021120023 1 1~23,42 PAID TOT T.UC 3046.84
II'ISJ 1523.42
SECURED ASSESSMENT tOLL IN THE COUNTY Of 5N{ DIEGO, CA FISCAL VE.U: 2011•12 AS OF ~-16·2012
OOC NO 536783 RECOI!OIIo.ir. DA.lE 10/16/91 (DlTAC ~?50 PAGE 113,743
MI.P 001663 AlTADENA U<l 44183 NfT 1,11::ao 1268,60
DESCII LOT 11 5l.K C 5,00
ASSESSEE
CASTELLI VJNCENlO&GLOliA M
to4ot.IL .tOOl 1174 SfA REEf OR;•SAN DIEGO CA ?2154
""
HU
L• I
6?818
114001
114001
SA 511?·11
SA-' 811?·14
SA 601~·91
6,2D
20.11
SITUS 3325·2733110 ST SA 6727•18 11,50
FIRST INSTALLIENT SECCKI lt-tSTAlUoEHT SA 67~·18 10,00
TIIANS HIST1 11/21•00 310711~19 1• 062,74 PAID 03121•00 314302712 1 602,74 P~IO TOT To\ll 1S2!i.lo6
~·
GRID: 02
ASSESSEE DESC.:. LOT 6 BLX C 1.. 86733 SA 5119-11 3.00
SHAW SHA14>1 lof.JRIM
!MIL AODR 3357 331!0 ST"SAN DIEGO CA 92104
SITUS 3357 331!0 ST
""
NET
L<!
7000
258535
265335
Sl,
SA
SA
5119-14
6085-97
6727-18
6.20
18.70
11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT r SECOND INSTALLMENT SA 6754-18 10.00
TRANS HIST: 12/10-20 053990583 1 1447.48 PAID 04/07-00 0859<50289 1 1447.48 PAID TOT TAX 2894.96
INST 1447.48
l.t53-513-07-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SN>J DIEGO, CA

OOC NO 565475 I!ECOI!OING OATE 10(18/89
FISCAL YEAR 2£):0-11
CORTAC 521:?
ASOF 08-23-2011
•
WIP 001663
ASSESSEE
ALTADENA
DESCR LOT 7 BLK C 1,.,
"" 124221
163217
NET
SA
1.10150
5119-11
3009.02
3.00
FARES MICHAEL E&MARV A HOX 7000 SA 5119-14 6.20
MAIL ADDR 3351 33RO ST•SAN DIEGO CA 92104 NET 280438 SA 6085-97 18.70
SITUS 3~1 33RO ST L• I 287438 SA 6727-18 11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT .- SECOND INSTALLMENT SA 6754-18 10.00
TRANS HIST: 12/08-00 373090122 1 1569.21 PAlO 04/09-00 379681420 1 1569.21 PAID TOT TAX 3138.42
• INST 1569.21
453-513-0B-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA Fl~A - YEAR 2010-11 AS OF 08-23-2011
~ DOC NO 157817 RECORDING OATE 3/07/07 CORTAC
MAP 001663 ALTADENA lND 77400 NET 1.10150 1373.50
ASSESSEE DESCR LOT 8 8LK C I~. 47294 SA 5119-11 3.00
WIEGAND FAMILY TRUST 11·16-06*N>I!>#WIEGAND RUSSELL 04.JULIE A NET 124694 SA 5119-14 6.56
MAIL N>DR WIEG.6ND FN-IILY TRUST 04-13-10*ANDIWIE L + I 124694 SA 6085-97 j- 26.18
_ 2619 GRN>JDVIE~ ST"SN>J DIEGO CA 92110 SA 6727-18 11.50
SITUS 3345-4733RD ST SA 6754-18 10.00 •
453-513-09-00 08001
FIRST INSTALLMENT
TRANS HIST, 11115-DD 035160181 1 715.37 PAID
SECOND INSTALLMENT
11/1S-OO 035160182 1 715.37 PAID
SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2010-11 AS OF 08-23-2011
TOT TAX
INST
~
1430.74
715.37
-
OOC NO 749560 RECORDING OATE 10/23/06 . CORTAC PAGE 183,951
MAP 001663
ASSESSEE •
ALTADENA
DESCR LOT 9 8LK C
CLOANINSER TOOO S REVOCABLLE*TRUST 08-17-06
""
1. .
HOX
133591
72867
7000
NET 1.10150
sr. 5119-11
SA 5119-14
2197.02
3.00
6.20
MAIL ADOR 3339 33RD ST*SAN DIEGO CA 92104
SITUS 3339 33RD ST
FIRST INSTALLMENT
TRANS HIST: 11122-23 632700891 ·! 1123.21 PAIO
SECOND INSTALLMENT
03127-28 608720841 1 1123.21 PAID
NET
L • I
199458
206458
SA 6085-97
SA 6727-18
SA 6754-18
TOT TAX
18.70
'11.50
10.DD
2246.42
j
' INST 1123.21
453-513-10-00 08001
MAP 001663 ALTADENA

SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN OIEGO, CA
DOC NO 529684 RECOROING DATE 9123109
FISCAL YEAR 2010-11
CORfAC
LND
AS OF
9G442
.08-23-2011
NET 1.10150 2944.58

3.00
•
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 10 8l.K C
HEARN LORETTA TRUST 04-25-00
MAIL ADOR 333S 33RD ST•SN>J OIEGO CA 92104
""'
HOX
NET
183884
7000
267326
SA
SA
SP_
5119-11
5119-14
6085-97
6.20
18.70
SITUS 3335 33RD ST L• I 274326 SA 6727-18 11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECOND INSTALLMENT ::• 6754-18 10.00
TRANs HIST: 12/10-14 183710028 1 1496,9P PAID 04110-61 000000000 C DEL TOT TAX 2993.98
04/27-00 095130001 1 1656.68 PDI<f> INST 1496.99
PEN2 149.69
• COST -.10.00
453~513-11-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAA 2010-11 ASOF 08-23-2011
DOC NO 536783 R£COROING DATE 10/16/91 CORTAC 5950
MAP 001663 ALTADENA 43853 NET 1.10150 1246.34
ASSESSEE" DESCR LOT 11 BLK C
CASTELLI VINCENZO&GLORIA M
""
IMP
NET
69297
113150
SA
SA
5119-11
5119-14
3.00
6.56 ••
MAIL ADOR 1174 SEA RGEF DR"S.bl>J DIEGO CA 92154 • L + I 113150 SA 6085-97 26.18
SITUS 3325-2733RO ST SA 6727-18 11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECOND INSTALLMENT ' SA 6754-18 10.00
TRANS HlST: 11/19-00 371378716 1 651,79 PAID 03/18-00 375199216 1 651.79 PAID TOT TAX 1303.58
INST 651.79
453-513-12-00 0800o1:...__ _S:E:CoU;RED:::,.cASS;;::EOSSMEN::::::,:TcRCOCLOL_I:N:_:THcE:_:C:;""'6;;T;OY;;O;;F::;;SCAN"'DCI'iEGO;;;;;,-i'A;;;;;;;;';;ICSCAL'i'iTYEAc;;R::;20::::100-C1C1_ ___:AS::.;O:F:..._08;:;:.·"2"3C·20:::;1c1_ _ _ _ _• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _...J

- P-rl'll'ln ..... n hv 'l'h'" P'""""'"t A1 1 1 "'""''"
uu:
DOC NO 76544 RECORDING OAT£ 11/12/04
•
CORT.~C 5212
~ 00166;, AlT.AOEtM 320476 4917,64
ASSESSEE
MACLEOO DAVID S&KATNERINE M
OESCR LOT 5 6LK C ""
n•
NET
125790_
446268
NET 1,10195
SA 5119·11
SA 5119•14
3.00
6.28
~IL .AODR t-w;t,EOO KATHERINE M".At-l>ffOI<t.ER MARY l • I 446268 SA 6005•97 26,16
1825 SLACK CANYON RD"R.AM>NA CA 92065 SA 6727·18 11.50
SITUS ""61•6U5RO ST SA 67~·18 10,00
flltST INSTALL~NT SECOOO INSTALLMENT TDT TAX 4974.60
TR-'NS HIST1 10/19•45 BILl. NOT DELIVERED BY PO 1110000 INST-1 -\, ,00 2487.~
10/19·45 61LL NOT OELI~EREO BY PO 1110000 JNST-2
12/07•00 ::1757911D2 1 2467,30 PAID Ol!/07•00 .,;9861114 1
,00
2467,30 PAID
.' .-.
' INST
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----------
SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA fiSCAL YEAR 2009·10 AS OF 08•20•2010
DOC NO 214507 RECORD!~ DATE 4/26/00 CORTAC PN;£ 183,567
~? 001663
ASSESSEE
SHAH 5!-W+I ~IRMA
AL T,.IDENA
OESCR LOT 6 8LK C ""
1...
179027
86940
7000
NET 1,10195
SA 0119·11
SA 5119·14
2653.66
3,00
5,92
~IL .AODR 3;,s7 33RO ST"~AN DIEGO CA 92104
S nus 3~7 33RO ST '"'
NET
l • I
256967
265967
SA 6085·97
SA 6727•18
16,70
11,50
FIRST INSTALL~N';' SECONl INSTALLMEHT • SA 6754·18 10.00
TR-'HS NJST1 1210?·00 105050067 1 1451,40 PAID 04/10·21 152100093 1 1451.40 PAID TOT TAX 2902.80
INST 11t51,"iD
SECURED ASSESSf.IENT ROLL IN TNE COUNTY OF S.t.'4 DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2009·10 08•20•2010
OOC NO 565475 RECORDING OAT£ 10/16/89 CORTAC 5212 "'"
'
I
JJAP 001663
ASSESSEE
FARES MICHAEL E&MARY A
ALT.AOENA
OESCR LOT 7 81.)( C
,
""
1...
HOX
124517
163605
7000
NET 1,10195
SA 5119-11
SA 5119·14
'~97,62
3,00
5,92
•
~IL .AODR 3351 "'RO ST.,SAN DIEGO CA 92104 NET 281122 SA 6005-97 18,7D
s nus 3351 331W s T l>l 288122 SA 6727•18 11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECONl INST~LMENT SA 6754•18 1D,OO
I TR,tri{S HISTI 12/D7•00 375941365 1 1573.47 PAlO 04/07•00 379991131 1 1573,47 PAlO TOT TAX 3146,94
I INST 15T",47
'
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
453•513-08•00 06001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLl. IN TNE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAl. YEAR 2009•10 oa-20-2010
loW 001663 .Al. TN>ENA
00C NO 157817 RECORDING DATE 3/07/07 CDRTAC
Ltl1 ·-
"'"
77561t NET1,10195 1377."2
ASSESS££" DESCR LDT 8 8LK C
HIEGJ.NO F,.ij.jll.Y TRUST 11·16·06"Nl>IHJEGAN:l RUSSEll. DLJUI.IE A
I""
NET
47407
12"i991
SA
SA
5119-11
5119-14
3.00
6,28
~II. ADOR HIEG»> F»>ILY TRIJST 04•13•1D•,AthHIEGJ.NO C• I 12"iP91 SA 6085-97 26,18
2619 GRANDVIEH ST"S~ OJ£00 Co\ 92110 SA 6727·16 11,50
snus 3345·4735RO sT SA 6754-18 10,00
FIRST INSTALLJ.ENT SEC® INSTALLIEHT TOT TAX 1434,28
TRANS HIST1 11/11•00 090'1101!83 1 717,11t PAID 11/13•00 090910464 1 717,14 PAID INST 717,14
~---------------~-~-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
45NI13•09•00 Da001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAl. YEAA 200P·1D AS OF 06·20·2010
c OOC NO 749:$60 RECORDING DAT£ .10/23/06 CORT.M:
MoU' 001663 AlT.AOEtM 1"'909 NET 1,10195 2203,3/t '
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 9 8LK C
CLD.t.'4INGER 100!) S RE~OCABI.LE•TRUST 08•17•06
"" ,
1... 73041
7000
... SA
SA
5119·11
5119·1"i
3,00
~ll .AODR 3'33? 33RD ST"S~ DIEGO CA 92104
snvs ::1339 33r<O sT ''"
NET
C• I 206950
SA
SA
6085·97
6727•18
5.92
18.70
11,50
FlRST INSl.Al.LMENT S£COOO JNSTALLM(NT SA 6754•18 10,00 •
TIW'S NIST1 12/06·00 104260345 1 1126,23 PAID 04/lle•O'l 609905251 1 1126,23 PAID TDT TioX 2252,46
i •• INST 1126,23
----------------------------------------·-----------------·----------------------------···-------······----------------------·----------·-------
S£CUREO ASSESHHT ROLl. IN lN£ COUNTY OF SAN DlEGQ, CA FISC~ YEAA 2009•10 AS OF 08·20·2010
OOC HQ 776::130 R£COROIHG PAT£ 11)/2!5/01 CORT...C PAGE 183,588
"",,..
~ 001663 "'.Al.T.AOENA 90657 NET 1,10195 2952,P8
ASSESSEE DESCR LOT 10 8t.K C 184321 SA 5119•11 3,00
HEAAN LORETTA A _ • 5,92
~Tl. .AODR HEARN LOR£TTA TRUST 04·25·00
::13::15 :5::1110 ST"~ DIEGO CA 92104
NET
C• I
''" 7000
267976
274978~
SA 5119·14
SA 6085·97
SA 6727·18
18.70 -.
11.50
snus ~3" 33RD ST SA 6751t•18 10,00b
FIRST INSTALLMENT SEC® INSTALLIEHT TOT TAX 3002,10
TRANS HIST1 12/10•00 106730197 1 1501.~ PAID 04/11H:!i 1li8400102 1 1501.05 PAID INST ..;.; 1501.05
l'roduc.ad bv The Pannllnt All1onca
453-513-10-00 GRiu: LOS
1153-513-10-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2008-09 AS OF 08-19-2009
DOC NO 776330 RECORDING DATE 10/25/01 I CORTAC PAGE 184,268

MAP 001663 ,. ALTADENA liD 88880 NET 1. 084311 2847.32
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 10 Bll( C IMP 180707 SA 5119-11 3.00
HEARN LORETTA A HOX 7000 SA 5119-111 : 5.92
Ml\ll POOR 3335 33RO ST"SAN DIEGO CA 9210ll NET 262587 SA. 6085-97 18.70
SITUS 3335 33RD ST L • I 269587 SA 6727-18 11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECOtm INSTAllMENT SA 6754-18 10.00
TRANS HIST: 12/10-11 025750ll56 1 11148.22 PAID 04/09-00 033070456 1 1448.22 PAID • TOT TAX 2896.44
INST 1448.22
~
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~
SECURED ASSESSIENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL ~ 2008-09 AS OF 08-19-2009
OOC NO 536783 RECORDING DATE 10/16/91 CORTAC •

MAP 001663 AlTADENA LND 43097 NET 1.084l4 1205.74
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 11 8U< C IMP 68100 SA 5119-11 3.00
CASTELLI YINCENZO&GLOIHA M NfT 11119?' SA 5119-14 6.28
t-11\IL ADOR 1174 SEA REEF DR"SAN DIEGO CA 92154 l L • I 111197 SA 6085-97 26.18
SITUS 3525<2733RO ST ~ SA", 6727-18 11.50
• FIRST INSTALUoENT SEClH> INSTALLMENT ' ' SA 6754-18 10.00
TRANS HIST: 12/03-00 ;i77623793 1 631.35 PAID 03/25-00 370693974 1 631.35 PAID .... TOT TAX 1262.70
INST 631.35
•
453-513-12-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROU.. IN TH£ COLNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA fiSCAL YEAR 2008-09 AS Of 08-19-2009
MAP 001663 AlTADENA

OOCNO 11762 RECORDING DATE. 1/06/06 CORTAC 5212
...., 4383811 NET 1. 0811311 6790.36
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 12 8U< C IMP 194837 SA 5119-11 3.00
7000
HERR F.GHILY REYOCilSLE TRUST*12-09-05
t-11\IL AODR 3321· 33RO ST"SAN DIEGO CA 92104
SITUS 3321 33RO ST
""'
NET
L • I
626221
633221
SA 5119-14
SA 6085-97
SA 6727-18
5.92
18.70
11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECOHP INSTA!.I.MENT SA (175-11-18 10.00
TRANS HIST: 12/05-00 3781190193 1 3419.74 PAID J4J07-00 372600197 1 3419.74 PAID TOT TAX 6839.48
INST 31119.74
SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN OIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2008-09 AS Of 08-19-2009
DOC NO 301785 RE<:OROING OATE 5/04/99 COIHAC 5212

IMP 001663 ALTADENA l.NO 131284 NET 1. 081134 2573.82
ASSESSEE OESCR LD T 13 BU< C I ... 113079 SA 5119-11 3.00
' STOBBE MICHAEL J&AMY
M' .l AODR 3315 -. • ·t."-' ·""GO CA 92104 ""'
NET
7000
237363
SA 5119-14
SA 6085-97
5.92
18.70
SITUS 3315 33RO ~. L • I 244363 • SA 6727-18 11.50
• r I9~T li'CTALUENT SECOtm INSTALLMENT SA 6754~18 10.00
TR~~ .2/05-00 378849586 1. 1311.47 PAlO 04/07-00 372969607 1 1311.47 PAID TOT TAX 2622.94
INST 1311.47
'
453;-513 10-00. ~-'It
• GRID: H13
SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SN-1 DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2007~08 AS OF 08-24-200&
DOC NO 776330 RECORDING DATE 10125/01 CORTAC PAGE 184,368

MAP 001663 ALTM>ENA ~ lM) 87138 NET 1.09816 2825.58
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 10 8U< C I .. 177164 SA 5119-11 3.00
HEARH LORETTA A HOX 7000 SA 5119-14 5.92
!MIL AOOR 3335 33RO ST"SNf DIEGO CA 92104 NET 257302 SA 6085-97 18.70
SITUS 3335 33RO ST l • I 2611302 SA 6727-18 11.50
FIRST INSTAllMENT SEC(Jt{) INSTAlu.ENT SA 6754-18 10.00
TRANS HlST: 1211Q-11 0697B0161 1 1437.35 PAID 04/08-00 122660505 1 1437,36 PAID TOT TAX 2874.70
• INST 1437.35
•
------------------------------· ·----------------------------------------------------------------------·--------------------------------------------
453-513-11-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSIENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2007-QS ASOF oa~24-2008
•
.. OOC NO 536783 RECORDING DATE 10/16191 .., CORTAC 5950
MAP 001663 AlTADENA U.0 42252 NET 1.09816 1197.18
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 11 6LK C IMP 66765 SA 5119-11 3.00
CASTELLI VINCEHZO&GL~lA M • NET 109017 SA 5119-14 6.28
!MIL ADDR 1174 SEA REEF OR"SN-1 DIEGO CA 92154 L + I 109017 SA 6085-97 26.18
SITUS 3325~2733RO ST SA 6727-16 11.50
FIRST INSTAlLIENT SEcoti> INSTALLMENT SA 6754-16 10.00
TRANS HIST: 12106-00 370231195 1 627.07 PAlO 04103~00 374030867 1 627.07 PAID IDT TAX 1254.14
INST 627.07
'
. -
.
----------------------~------~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~----------------------
SECURED ASSESSMEMT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2007-06 AS OF OB-21r2008
453-513-12-oD 08001 I
11762 RECORDI.:._, DATE 1/06106 CORTAC I
ooc "' LN> 1!29789 NET 1.09816 6740.56
MAP 001663
ASSESSEE
ALTADENA
OESCR LOT 12 6LK C •· IMP 191017 SA 5119-11 3.00
HERR FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST•12-09-05 HOX 7000 SA 5119-14 5.92
!MIL ADDR 3321 33RO ST•SN{ DIEGO CA 92101!
SITUS 3321 33RO ST
FIRST INSTALL..IENT SECOND INSTAlLMENT
. NET
l • I
613806
620806
SA 6085-97
SA 6727~18
SA 6754-18
16.70
11.50
10.00 •
TRANS HJST: 12110-11 634501251 1 3394. 81! PAID 04108-09 610007894 1 3391!. 611 PAID TOT TAX 6769.68
INST 3391!.64
453-513-13-00 08001
•
SECURED ASSESSIENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2()07-0S
OOC"' 301785 RECORDING OAT_~..) 5104199 CORTAC 5950

loW' 001663 AlTM>ENA 00 128710 NET 1.09616 2554.00
SA 5119-11 .. 3.00 '
ASSESSEE
STOB8E MICHAEL J&MIV
OESCR LOT 13 BLK C
• '""
HOX
NET
110862
7000 SA 5119-14
SA 6085-97
5.92
IAAIL ADOR 3315 33RD ST•SAN OIEGO CA 92104
SITUS 3315 33RD ST
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECOND INSTALLMENT
l • I "'"'
2395n SA 6n7-1B
SA 6751!-16
18.70
11.50
10.00
TRANS HIST; 10/31-00 065900477 1 1301.56 PAlO 04/07-00 :575208:575 1 1301.56 PAID TOT TAX 2603.12 •
INST 1301.56
1
f--
• 453-513-09-00 • .
GRID: 112
453-513-09-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSI>ENT ROLL IN THE CQUIITV OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2006-07 AS OF 08-18-2007
DOC NO 282092 RECORDING DATE 4/28/99 CORTAC PAGE 181,872

MAP 001663 '
ALTADENA LNO 120187 NET 1.10025 2008.04
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 9 BLK C IMP 08829 SA 5119-11 3.00
CLOANINGER TODD S HOK 7000 SA 5119-14 6.36
~ll ADOR CLOANJNGER TODD S REVOCABLLE"TRUST 0&-17- NET 188010 SA 0085-97 18.70
3339 33Rf) ST"SN>l DIEGO CA 92104 L • I 195010 SA 0127-18 11.50
SITUS 3339 33RO ST SA 0754-18 10.00
FIRST If.ISTALLMENT SECON!> INS'TALLMENT TOT TAX 2118.20
TRN>IS HIST: 11/15-00 135880133 1 1059.10 PAID 03/15-00 177620057 1 1059.10 PAID INST 1059.10
•
• 453-513-10·00 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL' IN~ THE CC'v."'T~' OF SAN DIEGO, CA
•
FISCAL VEAR 2006-07 AS OF 08-18-2007'
DOC NO 770330 RECORDING DATE 10/25/01 CDRTAC

• MAP 001003 ALTADENA LND 85430 NET 1.10025 2773.90
ASSESSEE DESCR LOT 10 8LK C IMP 173091 SA ~119-11 3.00
HEARN LORETTA A HOX 7000 SA 5119-14 6.36
Mo\Il ADDR 3335 331!0 ST*SAN DIEGO CA 92104 NET 252121 SA 0085-97 18.70
SITUS 3335 33RD S T L• I 259121 SA 0727-18 11.50
·~ ·~· FIRST INSTALLIEHT SECONJ INSTALU£NT. SA 0754-18 10.00
TRANS HIST: 12/08-00 150370049 1 1411.70 PAID 04/10-11 021530054 1 1411.70 PAID TOT TAK 2823.52
INST 1411.76
'
"
453-513-11-00 08001 . SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE ~TV OF SAN DIEGO, CA AS OF 08-18-2007
DOC ND 536783 RECORDING DATE 10/10/91 CDRTAC 5950

.,.
MAP 001003 Al T.ADENA LNO 41424 NET 1.10025 1175.94
ASSESSEE DESCR LD T 11 8LK C IMP 05456 SA 5119-11 3.00
CASTELLI VINCENZOUilDRIA M NET 106880 SA 5119-14 o.74
~IL ADDR 1174 SEA REEF DR*SAN DIEGO CA 92154 L• I 106880 SA 0085-97 20.18
5Iru5 3325-2733RO ST SA 0727-18 11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECOND INSTALLMENT SA 0754-18 10.00
TRANS HIST: 12101-00 370189801 1 016.68 PAID 03128-02 375219494 1 010.68 PAID TOT TAK 1233.36
INST 010.68
•
453-513-12-00 08001 SEOJRED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL VEAA 2006-07 AS OF 08·18-2007
DOC NO 72496
'RECORDING DATE 1/29/04 CORTAC
MAP 001663 ALTADENA lNO 421362 NET 1.10025 6619.40
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 12 BLK C SA 5119-11
HERR CHRISTOPHERBKIRBV SARAH '· IMP
HIJK
187272
7000 SA 5119-14
3.00
6.36
t.'AIL ADOII HERR FAMILY REVDCAalE TRUST 11 12-D9-05 NET 6016311 SA 6085-97 18.70
' 3321 33RO ST"SAN DIEGO CA 92104 L • I 608634 SA 0727-18 11.50
SITUS 3321 331!0 ST SA 6754-18 10.00
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECOND JNSTALU>£NT TOT TAK 6669.02
TRANS HIST: 12/08-QD 150750033 1 3334.51 PAID 04/03-01! 6091!021!65 1 3334.51 PAID INST 3334.51
•
Prod.uoed ))y The Pennant Alliance
453-513-07-DD
<'
GRID: Jl6
453-513-07-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2005~06 AS OF 08-24-2006
DOC NO 565475 RECORDING DATE 10/18/89 CORTAC 5212 PAGE 180,088

MAP 001663 AL TAOENA LNO 115037 NET 1.11250 2883.42
ASSESSC:f OESCR LDT 7 BLK C IMP 151148 SA 5119-11 3.00
FAAES MICHAEL E&MARY A 7000 SA 5119-14
MAIL AODR 3351 33RO
SITUS 3351 33RO ST-
ST~SAN DIEGO CA 92104
• ""
NET
L• I
259185
266 18>:'>
SA 6085-97
SA 6727-18
8.54
18.70
11.50
TRANS HIST: 12/08-00 374830776 1 1467.58 PAlO 04/05-00 377956610 1 1467.58 PAID TOT TA" 2935.16
INST_. 1467.58
453-513-08-DD 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2005-06 AS OF 08-24-2006
'
DOC NO 117161 RECOROitffi DATE 3/27/86 CORTAC
MAP 001663 ALTADENA Ll<l 71677 NET 1.11250 1284.66
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 8 8LK C IMP 43799 SA 5119-11 3.00
WIEGAND WILLIAM H&LEE A*ANG#WlEGAND RUSSELL D&JUUE A NEt 115476 SA 5119-14 9,06
MAIL ADDR 2619 GRANDVIEW 5T*5AN DIEGO CA 92110 L • I 115476 SA 6085-97 f 26.18
SITUS 3345-4733RD ST
• SA 6727-18 11.50
TRANS HIST: 12/01-00 036520220 1 672.20 PAID 12/01-DO 036520221 1 672.20 PAlO TOT TAX 1344. 40
INST 672.20
453-513-09-DO 08001 SECURED ASSE55MENT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF ~ DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2005-06 AS OF 08-24-2006
OOC NO 282092 RECORDING OATE 4/::!B/99 CDRTAC

MAP 001663 ALTADENA LNO 123713 NET 1.11250 2049.14
ASSESSEE DESCR LOT P BLK C IMP 67480 SA 5119-11 3.00
CLOANINGER TODD S HOX 7000 SA 5119-14 8.54 ~
MAIL ADDR 3339 33RD ST*SAN DIEGO CA 92104 NET 184193 SA 6085-97 18.70
SITUS 3339 33RD ST L + I 191193 SA 0727-18 11.50
FIRST INSTALLMENT SECOND INSTALLMENT SA 6754-18 10.DD
TR.AJ.!S HIST: 12/01-00 036380243 1 1050.44 PAID 03/16-DO 069390051 1 1050.44 PAID TOT TAX 2100.88
~ lNST 1050.44
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
< '
"
453-513-10-00 08001 SECURED "
ASSES5MENT ROLL IN IHE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL YEAR 2005-06 ASOF 08-24-2006
776330 • RECORDING OATE 10/25/01 CORTAC

MAP 001663 ALTADENA LND 83755 NET 1.11250 2748.32
ASSESSEE DESCR LOT 10 BLK C IMP 170286 SA !'>119-11 3.00
SA S119-14
HEARN LORETTA A
MAIL ~DR 3335 33RO ST*SAN DIEGO CA 92104
SITUS 3335 33RD ST
""
NET
L • I
7000
247041
254041
SA 6085-97
SA 6727-18
8.54
18.70
11.50
FIRST INSTALLt-IENT SECOND INSTALLMENT SA 6754-18 • 10.00
TRANS HIST: 12/07-00 043010219 1 1400.03 PAID 03/28-0~ J73240267 1 1400.03 PAID ,TOT TAX 2800.06
' INST 1400.03
'
'
453 513-08-00 GRID: JOB
453-513-08-00 08001 SECURED ASSESS!o£NT ROLL IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL VEAR 2004-05 AS OF 08-19-2005
•
DOC NO 117161 RECORDING DATE 3/27/86 COIHAC PAGE 170,048
MAP 001663 ALTADENA LNO 70272 NET 1.11827 1266.02
ASSESSEE OESCR lOT 8 BLK C IMP 42941 SA 5119-11 3.00
WIE6ANJ WILLIAM H&LEE A*MmWIEGMD RUSSELL O&JULIE A NET 113213 SA 6085-97 25.24
MAIL ADOR 2619 GRN>IOVIEW ST"SAN DIEGO CA 92110 L • I 113213 SA 6727-18 11.50
SITUS 3345-4733RO ST ..- SA 6754-18 10.00
FIRST INSTALLNENT SECOND INSTALlMENT TOT TAX 1315.76
TRANS HIST: 11/30-00 112890157 1 657.88 PAID 11/30-00 112890158 1 657.88 PAID INST 657.88
453-513-09-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSr.ENT ROLL IN THE CDUNTV OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL VEAR 2004-05 AS OF 08-19-2005 •
DOC NO 282092 RECDROINS DATE 4/28/99 CDRTAC
MAP 001063 ALTADENA LND 121288 NET 1.11827 2017.86
ASSESSEE OESCR LOT 9 BLK C IMP 66157 SA 5119-11 3.00
CLDANINGER TODD 5 HDX 7000 SA 6085-97 18.04
MAIL AllOR 3339 3~ ST*SAN DIEGO CA 92104 NET 180445 SA 6727-18 11.50
SITUS 3339 33RD ST L + I 1874<5 SA 6754-18 10.00
FIRST. INSTALLMENT SECOt.D INSTALLMENT TOT TAX 2060.40 -~
TRANS HIST: 11/16-00 107110267 1 1030.20 PAID 02/17-DD 140870163 1 1030.20 PAID INS! 1030.20
'
453-513-10-00 08001
MAP 001663 ALTADENA

SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COLtiTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA
DOC NO 776330 RECORDING DATE 10/25/01 CORTAC

,.
LNO
AS OF
82113
08-19-2005
NET 1.11827 2706:88

ASSESSEE 1:' OESCR LOT 10 8LK C: IMP 166948 SA 5119-11 3.00
HEARN LORETTA A • HOX 7000 SA 6085-97 18.04
MAIL ADDR 3335 33RD ST*SAN DIEGO CA 92104 NET 242061 SA 6727-18 11.50
SITUS 3335 33RD ST
FIRST INSTALLMENT
TRPHS HIST: 12/09-00 123460051 1
•
»t
1374.71 PAID
SECOND INSTALLMENT
04/10-12 161700099 1
~
1374.71 PAID
L • I 249061 SA 6754-18
TOT TAX
INS!
10.00
2749.42
1374.71
•
•
SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE CQll.lTY OF SAN DIEGO, CA FISCAL VEAR 2004-05
DOC t() 536783 RECDRDINS DATE 10/16/91 CORTAC 5950

MAP 001663 ALT.6DENA LND 39816 NET 1.11827 1148.80
ASSESSEE,- OESCR LOT 11 BLK C IMP 62915 SA 5119-11 3.00
CASTELLI VlNCENZo&GLORIA M NET 102731 SA.,.. 6085-97 .... 25.24
MAIL ADDR 1174 SEA REEF OR"SAN DIEGO CA 92154 L• I 102731 SA 6727-18 11.50
~-·
SITUS 3325-2733RO ST SA. 6754-18 10.00
FIRST INSTALu.ENT SECON> INSTALLMENT TOT TAX 1198.54
TRANS HI5T: 12/02-00 370036710 1 599,27 PAID 03/29-00 370707545 1 599.27 PAID INS! 599.27
"
453-513-12-00 08001 SECURED ASSESSMENT ROLL IN THE COVHTV OF SMI DIESD. CA FISCAL VEAR 2004-05 AS OF 08-19-2005
~
DOC NO 9547 RECORDING DATE 8/19/03 CORTAC
MAP 001663 ALT.6DENA CROSS-REF 99999-999-999-99-99
ASSESSEE OESCR LDT 12 8LK C lNO 260000 NET 1.11827 4919.26
KICK BRIAN L&.Jftt.IIFER A ~ 114> 179900 SA 5119-11 3.00
MAll .6DOR HERR CHRISTOPH£RliKIRSY SARAH NET 439900 SA 6085-97 18.04
•
•
•
Produced by The. Pennant Alliance .•
Exhibit 10
County of San Diego Treasurer - Tax Collector Page 1 of 2
FAQs Español
1 4 FOR FISCAL YEAR BEGINNING JULY 1, 2014 AND ENDING JUNE 30, 2015
PAY ONLINE WWW.SDTREASTAX.COM TAX BILL YEAR
5
PROPERTY ADDRESS - DESCRIPTION - SUBDIVISION
2
PAY BY PHONE (855) 829-3773 2014-2015
PROPERTY ADDRESS CANNOT BE SHOWN IN COMPLIANCE TO GOVERNMENT
CODE SECTION 6254.21.
3
QUESTIONS (877) 829-4732
6 7
CURRENT MAP NO. DESCRIPTIONS VALUES & EXEMPTIONS
WINNER KARIN E TRUST 09-28-04
OWNER
002061 LAND $198,826
IMPROVEMENTS $372,979
8
SPECIAL DOCUMENT NO. TOTAL L&I $571,805
MESSAGES
PERSONAL PROPERTY $0
960036
OWNER EXEMPTIONS
MESSAGES 9
DOCUMENT DATE HOMEOWNERS -$7,000
OTHER $0
10/8/2004
NET TAXABLE VALUE $564,805
10
OWNER OF
RECORD ON WINNER KARIN E TRUST 09-28-04
JANUARY 1, 2014
11 12 13 14 15 16
PARCEL/BILL NO. TAX RATE AREA CORTAC NO. 1ST INSTALLMENT 2ND INSTALLMENT TOTAL DUE
346-231-20-00 08001 $0.00 + $3,357.52 = $3,357.52
17 18
YOUR TAX DISTRIBUTION YOUR TAX DISTRIBUTION
AGENCY RATE AMOUNT AGENCY RATE AMOUNT
1% TAX ON NET VALUE 1.00000 5648.04 UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/1998,2014REF R-3 NET 0.01214 $68.57
VOTER APPROVED BONDS: SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-PROP S 11/05/2002, SER 2003A NET 0.00000 $0.00
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/1998, SER 1999A NET 0.01093 $61.73 SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-PROP S 11/05/2002, SER 2003B NET 0.00296 $16.72
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/1998, SER 2000B NET 0.00616 $34.79 SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-PROP N 11/07/2006, SER 2006A NET 0.00734 $41.46
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/1998, SER 2001C NET 0.00663 $37.45 SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-PROP S 11/05/2002, SER 2009C NET 0.00341 $19.26
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/1998, SER 2002D NET 0.01038 $58.63 SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-PROP S 11/05/2002, 2011 REF NET 0.00155 $8.75
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/1998, SER 2003E NET 0.00181 $10.22 SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-PROP N 11/07/2006, SER 2011 NET 0.00787 $44.45
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/1998, 1998F REF NET 0.00000 $0.00 SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-PROP S 11/05/2002, SER 2011 NET 0.00320 $18.07
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/1998, 1998G REF NET 0.00273 $15.42 SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-ELECTIONS 2002&2006, 2012 REF NET 0.01213 $68.51
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/98, 2006F-1 REF NET 0.00422 $23.83 SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-PROP N 11/07/2006, SER 2013 NET 0.00535 $30.22
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/98, 2005G-1 REF NET 0.00350 $19.77 SAN DIEGO COMM COLL-PROP S 11/05/2002, SER 2013 NET 0.00000 $0.00
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP S 11/04/08, SERIES 2009A NET 0.00084 $4.74 SAN DIEGO CITY OPEN SPACE FACILITY DIST NO. 1 D/S NET 0.00000 $0.00
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP S 11/04/08, SERIES 2009B NET 0.00000 $0.00 SAN DIEGO CITY ZOOLOGICAL EXHIBITS - MAINTENANCE NET 0.00500 $28.24
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP S 11/04/08, SERIES 2010C NET 0.00000 $0.00 MWD D/S REMAINDER OF SDCWA 15019999 NET 0.00350 $19.77
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP S 11/04/08, 2010D QSCB NET 0.00000 $0.00 TOTAL ON NET VALUE 1.17901 $6,659.10
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP S 11/04/08, SER 2012E NET 0.00736 $41.57 FIXED CHARGED ASSMTS: PHONE #
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP MM 11/03/1998,2012REF R-1 NET 0.00000 $0.00 STREET LTG MAINT #1 619-685-1326 $25.58
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP S 11/04/08, 2012 REF R-2 NET 0.00000 $0.00 VECTOR DISEASE CTRL 800-273-5167 $5.86
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP Z 11/06/12, SER 2013A, A1 NET 0.00000 $0.00 MWD WTR STANDBY CHRG 866-807-6864 $11.50
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP Z 11/06/12, SER 2013B NET 0.04394 $248.18 MOSQUITO SURVEILLANC 800-273-5167 $3.00
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP Z 11/06/12, SER 2013C NET 0.01606 $90.71 CWA WTR AVAILABILITY 858-522-6900 $10.00
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP S 11/04/08,SER 2014F NET 0.00000 $0.00 TOTAL AMOUNT $7,050.79
UNIF BOND SAN DIEGO-PROP S 11/04/08,SER 2014G NET 0.00000 $0.00
Secured
Installment Delinquent Amount Total
Parcel Number Installment Status Action
Amount After Due Due
PAID W/PENALTY ON
1st $3,357.52 12/10/2014 $0.00
12/15
346-231-20-00 $3,357.52
2nd $3,357.52 4/10/2015 DUE $3,357.52 Add 2nd to Cart
View Back of Bill Search Results
Secured property tax payment stubs are not available online. You can submit a payment without a stub. Please include your 10 digit parcel
or tax bill number in the memo portion of your check. You can mail a payment to:
San Diego County Treasurer-Tax Collector
https://iwr.sdtreastax.com/SanDiegoTTCPaymentApplication/SecuredDetails.aspx?parcel... 3/25/2015
County of San Diego Treasurer - Tax Collector Page 2 of 2
1600 Pacific Highway, Room 162

San Diego, CA 92101
DAN McALLISTER | County of San Diego Treasurer-Tax Collector

San Diego County Administration Center | 1600 Pacific Highway - Room 162 | San Diego, CA 92101
Questions: 877.829.4732 | Pay by Phone: 855.829.3773
https://iwr.sdtreastax.com/SanDiegoTTCPaymentApplication/SecuredDetails.aspx?parcel... 3/25/2015
Exhibit 11
OFFICE OF CIVIL LITIGATION DIVISION
· DANlEL F. BAMBERG 1200 THIRD AVENUE, SUlTE 1100
ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY THE CITY ATTORNEY SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-4100
JOE CORDILEONE
LEAD DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY CITY OF SAN DIEGO TELEPHONE (619) 533-5800
FAX (619) 533-5856
JAN I. GOLDSMITH
CITY ATTORNEY
May29, 2015
Sent via Personal delivery (to San Diego office), U.S. mail, facsimile, and email
Cory J. Briggs, Esq. Cory J. Briggs, Esq.

Briggs Law Corporation Briggs Law Corporation
99 East "C" Street, Suite 111 814 Morena Blvd., Ste. 107
Upland, CA 91786 San Diego, CA 92110
Re: Multiple cases against the City ofSan Diego and related entities
Mr. Briggs:
It was recently brought to our attention that many declarations you filed with the court do
not contain your signature. These declarations, of course, contain the following language: "I
declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct."
In fact, although these declarations state your name as the declarant and purport to
contain your signature, it is apparent that you did not sign the declarations.
Our office spot checked 64 declarations retrieved from various court files involving the
City and found 30 that do not appear to be your signature. Included among them is the
verification to the First Amended Complaint falsely accusing the City Attorney of illegal
conduct. Our spot check covered several years but was limited to declarations. However, there
are many other documents in the court's files purportedly signed by you that also appear to be
signed by someone other than yourself.
Our judicial system is founded upon the fundamental principle that one's solemn oath
binds the declarant to the truth of his allegation. It is not a mere fonnality. Yet it appears that,
even though you are an Officer of the Court, you engage in a business practice of allowing
declarations to be filed, in your name, without bearing your true signature. Although you get the
legal benefit of filing a declaration purportedly under penalty of perjury (thereby establishing
evidence and requiring opposing pmiies to submit their own declarations in opposition), the
absence of your genuine signature means these documents are not truly submitted to the Comi
"under penalty of petjury."
1031353
• Cory J. Briggs, Esq. -2- May29, 2015
This letter is not intended to threaten legal action or solicit a settlement. Nor is it a waiver
of any claim or right. Whether legal action is taken and whether settlements are appropriate are
separate decisions. One purpose is to give you an oppmiunity to respond. The other purpose is to
see whether we can work out a process to correct the official court records with the proper
signatures or expunge those documents where you cannot attest to the facts alleged.
Notwithstanding your extremely antagonistic attitude toward this office, our office
believes that the best approach to a prompt resolution is to communicate with you about what we
have discovered and work together to correct the court records.
I ask that you provide your written response no later than the close of business, Tuesday,
June 2, 2015, and advise whether you are willing to try and work out a process to correct the
official court records. Communication direct to me by email or facsimile is satisfactory.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
JAN!. GOLD&;M~
Joe Cordileone
Lead Deputy City Attorney
JC:ctm
c: Facsimile (909) 949-7121
Facsimile (619) 515-6410
Email cory@briggslawcorp.com
1 JAN I. GOLDSMITH, City Attorney
DANIEL F. BAMBERG, Assistant City Attorney
2 JOE CORDILEONE, Deputy City Attorney
California State Bar No. 73606
3 Office of the City Attorney, Civil Division
1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1100
4 San Diego, California 92101
(619) 533-5800; Fax (619) 533-5856
5
Attorneys for CITY OF SAN DIEGO
6
DECLARATION OF Re: Multiple cases against the
7 SERVICE City of San Diego and related entities
8
9 I, Chela Madere, declare that I am, and was at the time of service of the papers herein referred
to, over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the action; and I am employed in the County of
10 San Diego, California, in which county the within-mentioned service occurred. My business address is
1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1100, San Diego, California, 92101.
11
I served the following document(s):
12
LETTER TO CORY BRIGGS DATED MAY 29, 2015
13
I further declare that I am readily familiar with the business' practice for collection and
14 processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service; and that the
correspondence shall be deposited with the United States Postal Service this same day in the ordinary
15 course of business. I served the above document(s) in this action in the manner indicated
16 Cory J. Briggs, Esq. Cory J. Briggs, Esq.

Briggs Law Corporation Briggs Law Corporation
17 99 East “C” Street, Suite 111 814 Morena Blvd., Ste. 107
Upland, CA 91786 San Diego, CA 92110
18 Telephone: (619) 221-9280
Telephone: (909) 949-7115
Facsimile: (909) 949-7121 Facsimile: (619) 515-6410
19 VIA PERSONAL SERVICE
VIA U.S. MAIL
20
[X ] (BY MAIL) I served the individual named by placing the documents in a sealed envelope. I
21 then placed it for collection and mailing with the United States Postal Service this same day, at
my address shown above, following ordinary business practices.
22
[ ] (BY EMAIL) Pursuant to agreement between the parties, I served the above listed documents
23 by transmitting via email to the internet address listed above. I did not receive within a
reasonable period of time after the transmission any electronic message or other indication that
24 the transmission was unsuccessful.
25 [ ] (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE VIA LEXISNEXIS FILE & SERVE) On _____________,

I caused such document(s) to be electronically served through LexisNexis File & Serve for the
26 above-entitled case on designated recipients. Upon completion of said transmission of said
documents, a certified receipt is issued to filing party acknowledging receipt by LexisNexis
27 File & Serve. Once LexisNexis File & Serve has served all designated recipients, proof of
electronic service is returned to the filing party. This service complies with California Code of
28 Civil Procedure section 1010.6. The file transmission was reported as complete and a copy of
PROOF OF SERVICE
1 the "LexisNexis File & Serve Transaction Receipt" page will be maintained with the original
document(s) in our office.
2
l')(l (BY FAX) On 1\lfn.!lP/2015, I transmitted the above-described document by facsimile machine
3 to the listed fa:~~Je~s. The transmission miginated from facsimile phone number (619) 533-
5856 and was reported as complete and without error. The facsimile machine properly issued a
4 transmission report, a copy of which is attached hereto. (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code§ 1013(e); Cal.
Rules of Ct., Rule 2008.)
5
[ ] (BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY) I caused the envelope(s) to be delivered ovemight via an
6 ovemight delivery service in lieu of delivery by mail to the addressee(s). (Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code§ 1013.)
7
8 [X ] (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) By delivering copies of the above-referenced
documents to Diversified Legal to effect personal service on the offices of the
9 addressees as indicated above.
10
nL
I declare under penalty of p~ry under the laws of t.he State. of Califomia that the foregoing is
11
12 true and correct. Executed on Maw--f.> 2015, at San~ ~
13 Chela Madere Z
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
Exhibit 12
1 Daniel M. Gilleon (SBN 195200) ELECTROtUCAll Y FILED
James C. Mitchell (SBN 87151) Superior Court of California.
2 Samuel A. Clemens (SBN 285919) County of San Diego
The Gilleon Law Firm 0110312011 at 02:54:35 PM
3 1320 Columbia Street, Suite 200
Cleric of the Superior Court
San Diego, CA 9210 1 By Patrick Gonzaga ,Deputy Cleric
4 Tel: 619.702.8623/Fax: 619.702.6337
dan@gi Ileon.com
5
6 Attorneys for PlaintiffMarlea Dell'Anno
7
8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
(Central Division)
9
10
11 MARLEA DELL'ANNO, CASE NO.: 37-2017-00000118-CU-OE-CTL
12 Plaintiff, COMPLAINT FOR:
13 vs. 1. Retaliation
[Labor Code § 1102.5]; and
14
JAN GOLDSMITH, CITY OF SAN 2. Penalties- Labor Code § 2699
15 DIEGO, a municipal corporation, and (Private Attorney General Act)
Does I to 20,
16
Defendants.
17
18 Plaintiff Marlea Dell' Anno ("Dell'Anno") alleges:
19 1. Dell'Anno is an adult resident of San Diego County, California. At all material times,
20 she was a licensed California attorney in good standing with the State Bar of California, and was the
21 Assistant City Attorney for the City of San Diego, an appointed (non-elected) position. At all
22 material times, in addition to other laws, Dell'Anno was bound by ethical rules, such as California
23 Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-110, not to file criminal charges against someone unless
24 probable cause existed to obtain a unanimous (12-0) verdict, at the highest level of proof, "beyond
25 a reasonable doubt."
26 2. Defendant Jan Goldsmith ("Goldsmith") is an adult resident of San Diego County,
27 California. At all material times, he was a licensed California attorney in good standing with the
28 State Bar of California, and as the City Attorney of San Diego, Goldsmith was Dell'Anno's only
Complaint For Damages

1
1 supervisor. Like Dell'Anno, Goldsmith was ethically prohibited from initiating criminal charges
2 unless he reasonably believed his office could prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. However,
3 at all material times, Goldsmith was also a politician, and Goldsmith prioritized his political
4 ambitions and interests over his ethical obligations. In furtherance ofhis political advancement, as
5 will be explained in this complaint, Goldsmith intentionally caused harm to Dell'Anno. Under
6 Government Code § 815.3, as an "elected official," Goldsmith's intentional conduct nonetheless
7 "arose from and was directly related to [his] official duties."
8 3. Defendant City of San Diego ("the City") is a municipal corporation in San Diego
9 County, California. At all material times, the City was Dell'Anno's employer, and Goldsmith was
10 a managing agent for the City acting in the course and scope of his capacity as an elected official.
11 4. The true names and capacities, whether individual or otherwise, of defendants Does
12 I to 20 are unknown to Dell' Anno who, therefore, sues them by such fictitious names under CCP
13 §474. She is informed and believes that each of the defendants is responsible in some manner for
14 the acts or omissions alleged in this complaint or caused her damages.
15 5. At all material times, all ofthe defendants were agents and employees of the other
16 defendants and when doing the acts alleged in this complaint, they acted within the course and scope
17 of such agency and employment.
18 6. Dell'Anno is a career prosecutor with a documented history of exemplary
19 performance while maintaining the highest of ethical standards. She began her career as a prosecutor
20 in 2005 as a Deputy District Attorney with the Fresno County District Attorney's Office where she
21 quickly developed a reputation among her peers on both sides of the bar and the judiciary for being
22 a tenacious and ethical trial attorney. During her tenure with the office, Dell'Anno was selected as
23 the District Attorney coordinator for the countywide, multi-agency S.A.F.E. Team to address
24 management of the county's sex offender population and seek strategies to enhance community
25 safety. She was also peer-elected as the Vice President of the Fresno County Deputy District
26 Attorney's Association.
27 7. In September 2009, Dell'Anno relocated to San Diego and joined the San Diego City
28 Attorney's Office as a Deputy City Attorney. Based upon her exemplary performance and strong
Complamt For Damages

2
I managerial and project management skills, Goldsmith quickly promoted her to the position of Chief
2 Deputy City Attorney in charge of the nationally-recognized Domestic Violence/Sexual Assault
3 Unit. By promoting Dell'Anno to that position, Goldsmith recognized she was best suited to restore
4 the unit to its previous success. Dell'Anno succeded. She quickly and effectively lead the
5 reorganization of the unit by implementing revised strategies that dramatically increased the number
6 of domestic violence, elder abuse, child abuse and sexual assault cases prosecuted while maintaining
7 an overall conviction rate of 94 percent, an increase of nearly 20 percent from when she assumed
8 that leadership role. Dell'Anno also worked closely with justice partners to revitalize and enhance
9 the office's relationships with the Family Justice Center and other community stakeholders.
10 8. Again, in recognition ofDell'Anno's outstanding performance and managerial skills,
II Goldsmith promoted her to the position of Assistant City Attorney, the position she held from 2012
12 until her wrongful termination on November 20, 2015. In that role, Dell'Anno was charged with
13 overseeing the review of nearly 20,000 criminal cases per year, leading a team of approximately 60
14 prosecutors and I 00 investigators, paralegals, clerks and support staff. Dell'Anno's restructuring of
15 the Criminal Division resulted in increased efficiency, improved case outcomes and integrated
16 community-based prosecution practices. Throughout her tenure in the office, Dell'Anno received
17 outstanding performance reviews.
18 9. In her role as Assistant City Attorney, Dell'Anno expanded and obtained highly-
19 competitive federal funding for the nationally recognized San Diego Community Court Program.
20 The program focused on using risk assessment tools and procedural justice concepts to address
21 criminal recidivism as early and effectively as possible. In recognition of her outstanding
22 performance, she was an invited participant in the national White House LEAD Conference focused
23 on implementing strategic alternatives to inequalities in the criminal justice system. Dell'Anno was
24 also charged with regularly making presentations to the City Council and addressing the media as
25 required.
26 10. Almost immediately in her role as second in command, however, Dell'Anno
27 recognized that Goldsmith's primary interest was his personal, political advancement, which she
28 quickly realized was on a collision course with her own professional and ethical obligations as a

3
I criminal prosecutor, Rule 5-110. A central figure in the inevitable collision was Goldsmith's public
2 relations official, a City employee, Gerry Braun, who was inextricably involved in Goldsmith's day-
3 to-day decision-making, strategy and tactics as the City Attorney of San Diego.
4 11. Just as quickly, Goldsmith (and Mr. Braun) learned that Dell'Anno would not bend
5 her ethics to accommodate his political ambitions. For example, with other incidents to be proven
6 at trial, in 2013, Tanya Tomlinson, a member of Goldsmith's management team, asked Dell'Anno
7 to attend a public City Council budget meeting to address any questions the Council might have had
8 about the budget for the Criminal Division. Ultimately, the Council directed their questions to
9 Dell'Anno who, consistent with her previous positions, truthfully answered each oftheir questions,
I0 even though her answers did not align with Goldsmith's agenda. Goldsmith was watching the live
ll feed of the meeting and heard and saw Dell'Anno's responses to the Council's questions. Goldsmith
12 became irate and denigrated her in front of the City Attorney's entire management team. When
13 Goldsmith intimated that her conduct could jeopardize her position with the office, Dell'Anno told
14 Goldsmith that if telling the truth to the City Council, an elected body, were an issue, he might as
15 well fire her because she would continue to tell the truth. Thereafter, and in retaliation for her
16 conduct before the City Council, Goldsmith increasingly limited her contact with the City Council
17 and forbade her at various stretches of time from speaking to councilmembers.
18 12. Dell'Anno sought the counsel ofMr. Braun, also known as "the Jan whisperer," about
19 how she could get back in Goldsmith's good graces so that she could participate in meetings that
20 directly affected her and the operation of her division, Mr. Braun told her Goldsmith "wants you to
21 get your hands dirty. If you would just get your hands dirty, they would let you in the room."
22 Dell'Anno insisted that her integrity was not negotiable, but as time would tell, her refusal to "get
23 her hands dirty" for Goldsmith would lead to her humiliating and wrongful discharge from the City
24 Attorney's Office.
25 13. The beginning of the end was an incident in late 2014, when Goldsmith saw a
26 political advantage in filing criminal charges against a person, i.e., to help him promote an image
27 that he supported the San Diego Police Department. However, Dell'Anno reviewed the case- as
28 any ethical prosecutor was required to- and thought the case lacked probable cause, and as was

4
1 also her duty as a prosecutor under Rule 5-110, she refused to file any charges. During this same
2 time frame, Dell'Anno continued to push back against Goldsmith's attempted use of the criminal
3 justice system to advance his political ambitions. There were several other cases where this
4 occurred. One was when Dell'Anno refused, as Rule 5-110 required her to do, Goldsmith's demand
5 to file criminal charges against a political rival, Cory Briggs, because she believed there was an
6 absence of any evidence Briggs had committed a crime. Dell'Anno also refused Goldsmith's demand
7 that she use a civil case subpoena to obtain evidence for potential criminal charges against a local
8 newspaper. This angered Goldsmith.
9 14. The final straw for Goldsmith came in October 2015, when, faced with a political
I0 problem with the Deputy City Attorneys Association of San Diego, Goldsmith ordered Dell'Anno
11 to illegally remove a negative evaluation that had been placed in the file of a Deputy City Attorney.
12 Dell'Anno refused, and documented her reasons in a memorandum dated October 6, 2015, a
13 (redacted) copy ofwhich is attached as Exhibit 1. Dell'Anno's stated reason for refusing Goldsmith's
14 order was unambiguous: "I cannot retract the negative evaluation .... I would be acting in violation
15 of the Government Code to do so."
16 15. Goldsmith had had his fill ofDell'Anno's ethics and insistence on following the law.
17 Within a few weeks, on October 27,2015, he retaliated against Dell'Anno with an unwanted and
18 punitive transfer from her position in charge of the criminal division to one in charge of"homeless
19 issues," with nobody reporting to her. This was a demotion. She was removed from her large corner
20 office and ordered to a smaller, filthy office with a sign on the door stating, "Do Not Enter." In
21 response, Dell'Anno emailed Goldsmith, stating in part:
22 Your adverse action today is the most professionally and personally

devastating event of my twenty year career. I cannot express how
23 unbelievable your actions today are in light of the work I do and the
measurable success I have brought to your Criminal Division. Your
24 decision is clearly the result of my continued and documented refusal
to engage in an on-going pattern of illegal, unethical and fraudulent
25 conduct by you and other members of your administration.
26 (Ex. 2.)
27 16. But Goldsmith did not stop there. He knew Dell' Anno's refusing to violate Rule 5-
28 110 by filing the unfounded criminal cases described in paragraph 13 and the October 6, 2015

5
1 memorandum would create substantial evidence of his retaliatory motives, Goldsmith decided to
2 hit first by targeting Dell'Anno's reputation and then terminating her, such that, if she sued, he could
3 label her as a "disgruntled ex-employee who was fired for cause."
4 I 7. To accomplish this, Goldsmith exploited a known issue in the City Attorney's office,
5 which was that some Domestic Violence ("DV") cases previously rejected by attorneys in the office
6 had not been filed within the statute of limitations. Goldsmith decided to use this as a pretext to
7 · retaliate against Dell'Anno and wrongfully terminate her employment. On November I 3, 2015, he
8 and Paul Cooper, the Executive Assistant City Attorney, conducted a "fact finding" interview of
9 Dell' Anno about these DV cases, which was recorded by a court reporter. The same day, Goldsmith
10 placed Dell'Anno on administrative leave.
11 I 8. A week later, on November 20,2015, Goldsmith terminated Dell'Anno's employment
12 with the City in a letter full of false hyperbole. He simultaneously blamed Dell'Anno for failing to
13 supervise an attorney, which resulted in what he implied were meritorious DV cases being time-
!4 barred because they were not filed within the statute of limitations while at the same time he
15 attempted to exculpate himself and other supervisors from any responsibility. (Ex. 3). Goldsmith
16 wrote, "[y]ou did not inform me of this matter, the cases, the circumstances or the problems with the
17 particular attorney." Goldsmith knew full well that Dell'Anno had followed protocol by informing
18 members of his management team with whom he regularly met. He also knew that no DV case
19 deadlines for filing had been missed.
20 19. In his pretext letter, Goldsmith also chided Dell'Anno for giving the "particular
21 attorney," who Goldsmith had fired too as a sacrificial Iamb, a recommendation for a job with the
22 District Attorney's office. This angered Goldsmith because he knew the attorney Dell'Anno had
23 recommended (and he had fired) had been an excellent, hard-working Deputy City Attorney.
24 Goldsmith knew this other attorney had not done anything worthy of termination (like missing
25 deadlines on the DV cases). This was confirmed when the District Attorney's office conducted an
26 independent investigation of the allegations made againstthe other attorney by Goldsmith, and hired
27 her anyway.
28 20. Goldsmith's pretext letter harkened back to Dell'Anno's October 6, 2015

6
I memorandum- the "final straw" that had angered him so deeply. Knowing he needed more to
2 show Deii'Anno's termination was justified, Goldsmith falsely accused Deii'Anno of"unprofessional
3 behavior as ACA toward Deputy City Attorneys and staff." Quite clearly, Goldsmith was
4 referencing the allegations made by the Deputy City Attorney whose negative evaluation Goldsmith
5 had illegally demanded Deii'Anno remove from her file.
6 21. Deii'Anno complied with the Tort Claims Act (Govenment Code§ 810 et seq.) and
7 filed a claim against the City on May 19,2016. The City rejected the claim in a letter dated July 6,
8 2016. (Ex. 4.)
9
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
10 (Retaliation, Violation Of Labor Code§ 1102.5, Against All Defendants)
11 22. Deii'Anno realleges paragraphs 1 through 21.
12 23. Labor Code § 1102.5(b)(c) provides:
13 (b) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer,

shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or
14 because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may
disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to
15 a person with authority over the employee or another employee who
has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or
16 noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifYing before,
any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if
17 the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information
discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or
18 noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation,
regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the
19 employee's job duties.
20 (c) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer,

shall not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in
21 an activity that would result in a violation of state or federal statute,
or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule
22 or regulation.
23 24. As alleged in paragraphs I 3 and 14, Dell' Anno engaged in protected activity under
24 Labor Code § 11 02.5(b )(c), the City and Goldsmith retaliated against Dell' Anno as alleged in
25 paragraphs 15 through 20.
26 25. As a legal result of defendants' retaliation against Deii'Anno, she has suffered, and
27 will continue to suffer, special and general damages according to proof.
28 26. Goldsmith and Does 1 to 20 acted with malice, oppression and fraud, in conscious

7
1 disregard of Dell' Anno's rights and well-being, entitling her to recover punitive damages against
2 them pursuant to Civil Code § 3294.
3
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
4 (Penalties- Labor Code§ 2699, Against All Defendants)
5 27. Dell'Anno realleges paragraphs I through 25.
6 28. Dell'Anno is an aggrieved employee as defined by Labor Code§ 2699(a). She brings
7 this cause of action on behalf of herself and other current or former employees of the City based
8 upon the Labor Code violations alleged in this Complaint.
9 29. Pursuant to Labor Code §§ 2699 and II 02.5(f), Dell'Anno is entitled to be awarded
10 25% of all such penalties, plus interest and attorney's fees and costs; 75% of all penalties should be
11 awarded to the State of California.
12 30. Dell'Anno did not have time to comply with the new administrative requirements for
13 PAGAclaims beforethedeadlineforfilingthis lawsuitunderGovernmentCode § 945.6. Dell' Anno
14 will amend this Complaint to allege compliance once completed.
15 REQUEST FOR RELIEF
16 THEREFORE, plaintiff Marlea Dell'Anno requests a judgment against defendants Jan
17 Goldsmith, the City of San Diego and Does 1 to 20 for:
18 a. General and special damages according to proof;
19 b. Costs of suit;
20 c. Reasonable attorneys' fees and expert witness costs allowable by law;
21 d. Punitive damages allowable by law;
22 e. Civil penalties allowable by law;
23 f. Any other proper relief.
24
25
26
27
Dated: January 3, 2017
~"\ Th;<JC
(J(
Daniel M. Gill eon, Attorneys----......___
for Plaintiff Marlea Dell'Anno
28

8
October 6, 20 15
Via Hand Delivery
Dear Jan,
I understand that you would like an immediate decision regarding whether or not I would be
willing to have a discussion with both . r thank them for
their work in the Criminal Division, and retract their negat1ve evamations. 1 have given
considerable thought 1111d reflection to your request.
Following our meeting yesterday, I called and asked her if she could send me a
copy of , EEOC complaint because I had never actually seen the complaint. •
then forwru·ded me a copy of the complaint and some attached documentation.
One item was a letter dated July 13, 2015, which stated it was a notice of the :filing of a
discrimination complaint. I read that letter for the first time last night. The letter is written by
Sarah Wong from the State of California Depmiment of Fah Employment & Housing. One
paragraph immediately caught my attention:
California Government Code section 12946 requires that all employment records (or
union membership and refenal records) be retained for a minimum of two (2) years.
When a discrimination complaint has been served, the record~ must be kept until the
DFEH closes its inquiry and until anj' resulting law suit or appeal has been tenninated.
In sum, this paragraph provides the answer to your question. I cannot retract the negative
evaluation tor I would be acting in violation of the Govenm1ent Code to do so.
As such. 1 will neither remove nor modify the evaluation that was prepared for and reviewed
with ·. The evaluation and the supplemental remain a factuarrepresentaiion of the
substandard work that she performed in the last rating period.
As for I remain troubled by the fact that no action has been taken, even
thongh there is speciiic and credible infonnation that us )larassed a clerk in the
Appellate Unit. During an interview with confirmed that
,l regularly harassed her, called her a "traitor" for helping toe acting chief, and
generally menaced and bullied he1·. To my !mow!edge, and despite my repeated requests, no fact
finding was ever commenced. Rather. a division-wide review of the Criminal Division staff and
deputies was commenced. 1 was tasked with performing that review. Instead of a
division-wide review, it is my understanding that the focus was on the Appellate Unit only. I
have also heen told that during thi~ •1rocess, it was confirmed that .ns had
repeatedly harassed - yet no fact finding or disciplinru-y measures have been
0 ,
undertalcen to this day.
By contrast, , . is the subject of a curr<Jnt tact finding effort

following a complaint that he had made a co-worker uncmnfortable by speaking to her in a file
EXillBITl
-2-
room and grabbing her files in an effort to prevent her from leaving. This allegation pales in
comparison to the description of harassment that provided, which has been
confumed and conoborated by other sources.
There is one fmal comment that I wmrt to niake regarding evaluations. The (waluation process is
a time to reflect on the past performance of the employee and provide positive feedback and
pragmatic tools for improving future performance. 1s are
not the first two deputies to receive a neg~tive evaluation during my tenure as Assistant City
Attomey.
In 2012, l signed off on an evaluation for .. . • . hat said slle did not meet
performance standards during the period from January to June. I outlined that she had fallen
behind in her issuing and needed to improve her time management skills. I personally met with
to review the evaluation, provide mentorship and encouragement, and discuss strategies
to improve her perfmmance as a deputy city attomey in light of her transfer from the Domestic
Violence Unit to the Neighborhood Prosecution Unit. In the evaluation, l predicted as follows:
"If is able to address these issues in her new assignment, I am confident she will see a
positive change in her professional interactions and outcomes."
~ did apply the lessons she had !eamed and l'e-conunitted herself to the hard work and
protoosional standards that we demand in the Crhninal Division. work product
improved, her confidence grew, and she developed into one of the most trusted deputies in the
divi;,ion. is now a senior deputy .in the General Trial Unit and works hard to see that cases
are handled professionally and young deputes are trained properly.
The point of the story is this: I have never uttered a negative word towards
· fo the contrary, I have told them what is expected of them and always tied
to provide any resources necessary for them to succeed. To. tins day, I remain committed to
helping their professional development and teaching them how to be better prosecutors. J1wt as I
did with , I will work with any deputy in the division to help them succeed, but the deputy
must reciprocate the effort.
I do not think an EEOC complaint that lacks any merit, nor the negative energy summoned by
two disgruntled employees, can sidetrack the positive momentum of the Cl'inrinal Division. We
are moving forward with Community Courts. We continue to have high conviction rates and
outstanding trial results. We will be a nationwide model for successful diversion programs tl1at
reduce harm to the community we serve. These results flow fmm my leadership and
implementation of yout vision. I intend to continue this ltajectory despite challenges with
budgets, ballot measures, and bureaucracies. I certainly will not let the great work and dedication
oft11e 190 deputies, secretaries, paralegals, investigators, and support staff under my supervision
be disrupted by the unfounded complaints of two deputies.
I appreciate your stated recognition of my leadership abilities and positive changes that I have
implemented in the Criminal Division. I run grateful that we had a11 OJlportunity to disc!JSS your
thoughts on my possible future cmeer opportunities as a deputy city attorney, judge, ot even
·3·
deputy district attorney. I am grateful for your private acknowledgment of my contributions to

the office, even if I have not been the reoipiimt of any public praise.
I would welcome an opportunity to discuss this matter with you further. I believe there are oilrer
options to resolve these issues and I am confident that if there is mutual cooperation, trust, effort
and on-going communication among all of the parties, we will move forward in a manner that is
in the best interests of our employees and the office as a whole. Also if your schedule permits, I
would like very much to schedule bi-weekly meetings with you to update you on the status of the
Criminal Division and have the bene.fit of your experience and counsel when issues arise Ol' even
just to discuss implementation strategy as we move forward with Community Coutt and other
exciting projects that may be on the horizon.
~inc·
~arlea
From: mdellanno@yahoo.com
Date: October27, 2015 at 11:39:17 PM PDT
To: Marlea Deii'Anno <mdellanno@yahoo.com>
Jan,
I am in receipt of the "reassignment" memo you directed Tanya to deliver to me today. This
reassignment is clearly retaliatory in nature and a demotion in both the scope of my duties
and my status in the office, which I advised both Gina and Tanya upon receipt. Your adverse
action today is the most professionally and personally devastating event of my entire career.
I cannot express how unbelievable your actions today are in light of the work I do and the
measurable success I have brought to your Criminal Division. Your decision is clearly the
result of my continued and documented refusal to engage in an on-going pattern of illegal,
unethical and fraudulent conduct by you and other members of your administration. Your
actions have had a direct and profound impact on my health and as a result, I have been
placed on leave by my doctor until November 9, 2015. I will forward the documentation from
my doctor in a separate email to follow.
I have commenced a DFEH claim based on harassment, discrimination and retaliation.

Additionally, I have retained counsel and all further communications regarding this matter
should be directed to my attorney, Leah Peer. She can be reached at 619-773-6386.
Marlea
Sent from my iPhone
Sent from my iPhone
EXHIBIT2
-------------· · - -
JAN L GoLDSMITH
SAN DIEGO CITY A/TORNEY
November 20, 2015
Via Electronic Transmission

!J.S. Mail and Certified Mail
Marlea. Dell' Anno
11645 Caminito Magnifica
San Diego, CA 92131
MDellam1o@vahoo.com
Dear Mrn:lea:
This letter is to infonn you that your at-will appointment as Assistant City Attomey
"ACA" in the Office of the City Attorney ends on November 20,2015.
Recently, I learned of numerous Domestic Violence Unit cases assigned to a panicular

attorney, who was under your supervision that were not filed in time and, thus, were barred
under the statute of limitations. I conducted a review of the circumst1nces surrounding those
case :files. My review leads me to conclude that you became awaie of those cases in PebiUary
2015, and received a report about the cases in May that disclosed, among other things, the statute
of limitations problem. TI1ereafter, you took the case files home tor five mouths only to be
returned upon your recent reassignment. You did not inform me of this matter, the cases, the
circumstances or the problems with !he particular attorney. Meanwhile, you provided a
recommendation to the District Attorney's office for this attorney in your capacity as my ACA.
Despite knowing tills iuforn1ation, you failed to take meaningful action. The lack of
meaningful action was illustrated by the fact that just last week additional files that had been
assigned to that same attorney were found in her current office, many of which had the same
statute of limitations problem. f eventually learned of these cases only after you were reassigned
from your position as head of the Criminal Division.
In addition, these circumstances and other information lead me to conclude that you
failed to exercise proper oversight over the Domestic Violence Unit as its Chief which helped
contribute to those mishandled cases. In the course of my review of this matter, I also learned
that you engaged in what I consider to be unprofessional behavior as ACA toward Deputy City
Attorneys rn1d staff.
Although I recognize your other positive contributions to this office, f cannot allow you
to remain as my ACA in light of what I learned as I have lost confidence in yon to represent this
office and my management team.
OS::FICE OF !HE OilY AT'fORNEY

1200 THIRD AVt:.., SUITE 1620, SAN DIEGO, CA 9?-101-4178
Telephone: (01 9 ) 236..S220 Fax: (619} 236-7215 E-Mail: asandov&l@sandlego.gov EXHIBIT3
Marlea Dell' Anno -2- November 20, 2015
-At your earliest opportunity, please inake mrangements with Tanya Tomlinson, Deputy
Director of Administrative Services, to retmn any items or equipment belonging to the City of
Sm1 Diego. At that time, we will also make atTangements for you to pick up your personal items
that are in your office.
Enclosed with this letter is a packet ofmatarials that will assist you in making decisions
related to your benefits. You will receive your final paycheck on December 18, 2015.
Thank you for your service to the Office of the City Attomey. l wish you success in your
future endeavors.
JIG:cs
Enclosures: Separation Package

20:16MAY 19 PM~: t5
CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO

{FOR DAMA{?ES TO PERSONS OR PERSONAL PROPERTY)
Present claim by personal delivery or mail to the City of San Diego, Risk Management Dept.,
1200 Third Ave., Suite 1000, San Diego, CA 92101. .
Received via:
TIMESTAMP
0 U.S. Mail
0 ¥Jter-Office Mail . b))\
·&:Vover-the-Counter \IJ
FILE No. _ _ _ __
TO THE HONORABLE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL, the Oty of San Diego; California
r, Marlea Deii'Anno hereby make a claim against the City of San Diego and make the
following statements in support of the claim:
1. CLAIMANT INFORMATION
a. Claimant's Name: Marlea Delf'Anno

b. Post Office Address of Claimant: 11645 Caminito Magnifica
san Diego, CA 92131
(CITY) (STATE) (ZIP)
c. Claimant's Home Phone N o . : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
d. Claimant's Business Phone No.: ' - - - - -
e. Post Office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent,
if different than a b o v e : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
f. Social Security No.: __ _

g. 9 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date of Birth: _5_17_!_6_
h. Driver's License No.: _c_A_B_30_5_7_3_0_1_ _ _ _ __
2. CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIM
a. Date of the oa:urrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim: On or about 11/20115
b. Time of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim: On or about 4:0o pm
c. Place of occurrence or transaction (please be specific): 1200 Third Ave. san Diego, CA92101
RM~9 (Rev. 12~ 10) 7hls information Is available in alternative formats upon request
EXHIBIT4
d. Other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the claim: _ __
I was terminated after advising City Attorney Jan Goldsmith in writing that Jintended to file a claim for workplace retaliation
as a result of my refusal to engage In unethical and lllegal conduct at his direction. I wa:;. subJected to harassment,
unlawful retaliation, Improper disclosure of<:Onfidential information and interference with prospective economic advantage.
3. _DESCRIPTION OF CLAIM
a. General description ofthe indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred:

loss ofwages,lostearning capacity, medical expenses and emotional distress.
b. The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the claimant's injury,
damage, or !0551 if knOwn1 are: Jan Goldsmith, Carmen S-andoval, Mlke Glorgino. Paul Cooper
c. Damages [please choose one]:

0 The amount claimed is less than $10,000.
The amount of the claim as of the date of this claim is $._ _ _ _ • This figure is
based on the following:-~------------------
0 The amount claimed is more than $10,000.

Please state if the claim would be a limited civil case'. .cN-=o=---u=n-=lim=lte:.:d_:__
_ _ _ _ __
d. Please provide any additional infonnation that might be helpful in considering your
claim, including names of witnesses, treating physicians, and hospitals: ""'=ffi""""'""'
are not limited to Tanya Tomlinson, Gina Coburn, Veda Johnson, Gerry Braun, Mark Skeels and Jamie Ledezma,
e. Please attach and/or provide any additional infonnation that may be helpful in considering
your claim including proof of damages such as invoices, receipts, and estimates.
WARNING: It is a criminal offense to file a false claim (cal. Penal Code§ 72).
I have read the matters and statements made in the above claim and I know the same to be true of my
own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information or belief and as to such matters, I
believe the same to be true. I certify und enalty ~ that the for - g is true and correct.
Dated: 05/19116
1
Umited c!Vll cases are discussed in California Code of Civil Procedure§ 85.
RM~9 (Rev. 12-10) This Information Is available In alternative formats upon request
THE Crrv oF SAN DIEGo
july 6, 2016
Marlea Deii'Anno
11645 Caminito Magnifica
San Diego, CA 92131
Reference: City F1le #: 13044

Dare· of tncidem: 11/20/2015
Claimant: Marlea Deii'Anno
Dear Ms. Deii'Anr.o:
Your claim against rhe Cicy of San Diego was referred to this office for investigation and a
determination of the City's iegai liability.
Please be advised that. pursuant to Ca'.ifornia Government Code section 912.4, your cla',m is
deemed to be denied by operation of law.
Subject to certain exceptions, you have only 6 months from the date that this notice
was personally delivered to you or deposited in the mall to file a court action on this
claim. See Governmer.r Code secf1on 945.6.
You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice, and at your own expense, in
connection with this matter. If you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so
immediately.
Sincerely,
Kris Griffin
Supervising Claims Representative
Risk Management
1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1000•San Diego. CA 92101-4107
Tel (619) 236-6670 Fax (619) 236-6106
Exhibit 13
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
CENTRAL
MINUTE ORDER
DATE: 01/29/2016 TIME: 03:35:00 PM DEPT: C-73
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Joel R. Wohlfeil
CLERK: Juanita Cerda
REPORTERIERM: Not Reported
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT:
CASE NO: 37-2012-00088065-CU-MC-CTL CASE INIT.DATE: 12/19/2012

CASE TITLE: San Diegans for Open Government v City of San Diego [Imaged]
CASE CATEGORY: Civil- Unlimited CASE TYPE: Mise Complaints- Other
APPEARANCES
Please see attached Statement of Decision issued by the Court.
DATE: 01/29/2016 MINUTE ORDER Page 1

DEPT: C-73 Calendar No.
2
3
F I L E D
4 ~!Com
5 JAN 2 7 2016
6
7
8
9 SUPERIOR COURT OF TilE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 FOR THE COU TY OF SAN DIEGO
11 SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN Case No. 37-2012-00088065-CU-MC-CTL
GOVERNMENT,
12 STATEMENT Of DECISION
Plaintiff,
13
v.
14
CITY OF SAN DIEGO; and ALL PERSONS
15
TNTERESTED IN THE MATTER OF TIIE
RENEWAL OF THE SAN DIEGO
16
TOURISM MARKETING DISTRICT, THE
17 LEVYING OF ASSESSMENTS UPON THE
ASSESSED BUSINESSES FOR A PERIOD
18 OF THIRTY-NINE AND ONE-IIALF
YEARS, AND TilE PRESCRIBTNG OF A
19 METHOD FOR COLLECTION OF
ASSESSMENTS,
20
Defendants.
21
22
23 This case came on regular) y for trial on November 9 - 11, 16 and I 7, 2015, and January 2 7,
24 20 16, before the Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge presiding. Plaintiff SAN DIEGANS FOR
25 OPEN GOVERNMENT ("Plaintiff'') was represented by Cory J. Briggs Esq. and Kelly E.
26 Mourning Esq. of Briggs Law Corporation; Defendant CITY OF SAN DIEGO ("City") was
27 represented by Carmen!\. Brock, Deputy City Attorney; and Defendant SAN DIEGO TOURISM
28 MARKETING DISTRICT CORPORATION ("TMD") was represented by Michael G. Colantuono
•
1 Esq., Jennifer L. Pancake Esq. and Ryan T. Dunn Esq. of Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC
2 ("City" and "TMD" are collectively referred to as "Defendants"). The Court, after hearing
3 testimony of witnesses (Pedro Quiroz, Dell Cunamay, Richard Lawrence, Samuel Rubin, Karen
4 Langwasser, Frank Hicks, Linda Perine through her depositions taken on November 24, 2014 and
5 July 13, 2015, Joanne Speers, Tricia Mendenhall and Theresa Quiroz), receiving exhibits into
6 evidence(Exhibits"19(page 1792only), 101-103,111,112,114-116,118-120,122,128,
7 130, 131, 134, 143, 145, 147, 149, 157, 159, 160, 162, 167-176, 178-182, 185, 192-194,201,
8 205, 206, 209-211, 213-215,219, 220,241 (page 4 only), 245 (pages 3 and 4 redacted), 273,
9 274, 276, 277, 280 and 283"), taking judicial notice of items (including but not limited to Exhibits
10 "107-110, 138,149,156,158, 162,224,227,228,230,275,279and281")receivingpre-trial,
11 trial and post-trial briefs (ROA # 768, 772 -774), hearing arguments of counsel, and good cause
12 appearing therefore, hereby issues this Statement of Decision ("SOD").
13 Introduction
14 The first phase of this trial is about the transparency, credibility and, ultimately, the
15 capacity of Plaintiff to challenge the propriety of" ... Resolution R-307843, pursuant to which
16 CITY renewed the San Diego Tourism Marketing District, levied assessments upon certain
17 businesses for a term of 39.5 years, and prescribed a method for collecting the assessments
18 (collectively, "TMD Approval")." Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), par. 5. Exh.
19 "110."
20 The question of transparency is whether Plaintiff has projected itse1fas openly as
21 Defendants are obligated to govern the tourism marketing district ("TMD"). Exh. "111," pages 6,
22 28.
23 The question of credibility is whether Plaintiff, through Linda Perine- its putative member
24 -and Cory J. Briggs - its attorney, have conducted themselves with the same candor to which
25 Plaintiff argues Defendants must comply. CACI 107. City's trial brief signed November 5, 2015,
26 pages 8, 9; TMD's trial brief signed November 9, 2015, pages 1, 2. (The Court notes that, though
27 counsel provided the Court with a hard copy of these briefs, they do not appear to have been filed
28 and imaged as part of the Court's register of actions ("ROA").) ROA # 768, pages 7- 16.
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STATEMENT OF DECISION
The question of capacity is whether Plaintiff can reconcile its challenge of the TMD
2 Approval with its purpose to promote "social welfare through advocacy for and education
3 regarding responsible and equitable environmental development." Exhs. "112, 130, 131."
4 Ultimately, Plaintiff has proven, under Defendants' microscopic examination, to be 1)
5 transparent and credible enough; and 2) a real party in interest I interested person whose challenge
6 of the TMD Approval is consistent with its purpose. CCP 367, 860, 863.
7 Operative Pleadings
8 As reflected in Plaintiff's TAC (ROA # 112), Plaintiff's first (and only remaining) cause of
9 action is Violation of California Constitution against Defendants.
10 Plaintiff's TAC alleges, in part:
11 "In November 2010, the voters of California

approved Proposition 26. Proposition 26 amended
12
several provisions of Article XIII C and Article
13 XIII D of the California Constitution in order to
close a variety ofloopholes that government
14 agencies, including local governments like
Defendants, had been using to increase tax
15 revenues without having to use the word "tax" and
16 thereby escape the requirement for voter approval
of tax increases ... Under Section 1(e) of Article
17 XIII C, "tax" means any "levy, charge, or exaction
of any kind by a local government, except... The
18 government bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a levy, charge,
19
or other exaction is not a tax, that the amount is no
20 more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs
of the governmental activity, and that the manner
21 in which those costs are allocated to a payor bear a
fair or reasonable relationship to the payor's
22 burdens on, or benefits received from, the
governmental activity." (Par. 3 A.)
23
24 "On or around November 27, 2012, CITY's city

council adopted that certain Resolution R-307843,
25 pursuant to which CITY renewed the San Diego
Tourism Marketing District, levied assessments
26
upon certain businesses for a term of39.5 years,
27 and prescribed a method for collecting the
assessments (collectively, "TMD Approval")."
28 (Par. 5.)
-3-
TMD Approval, were not given the
1 opportunity to vote on the TMD Approval,
2 and are not required to pay the assessment
imposed under the TMD Approval.
3
G. Residents of the City of San Diego who
4 book rooms at lodging businesses within
the City without being influenced directly
5
or indirectly by any of the marketing that is
6 made possible as a result of the TMD
Approval (e. g., residents who book rooms
7 for out-of-town family and friends on
holidays or other special occasions because
8 the residents do not have enough room in
9 their own homes to accommodate the
visitors)." (Par. 8.)
10
"Supplementing the allegations in Paragraph 8,
11 Plaintiff alleges that:
12
A. It has at least one member who (i) was
13 identified by the CITY as being eligible to
vote on the TMD tax, was not provided
14 with the ballot materials, and thus was not
given the opportunity to vote on the TMD
IS tax, and (ii) was a member of Plaintiff
before this lawsuit was filed and continues
16
to be a member of Plaintiff.
17
B. It has at least one member who (i) will be
18 liable for the TMD tax but was not given
the opportunity to vote on the TMD tax,
19 and (ii) was a member of Plaintiff before
20 this lawsuit was filed and continues to be a
member of Plaintiff." (Par. 9.)
21
"The levies and collections authorized by
22 the TMD Approval constitute a "tax" within the
meaning of Section 1(e) of Article XIII C of the
23
California Constitution and should have been
24 subjected to a vote by the electorate (i.e.,
registered, natural-person voters in the
25 jurisdiction)." (Par. 14.)
26 "The levies and collections authorized by the TMD
27 Approval do not qualify for any of the exceptions
to the "tax" definition under Section 1(e) of Article
28 XIIIC of the California Constitution, such as
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assessments and property-related fees imposed in
1 accordance with the provisions of Article XIII D of
2 the California Constitution. Therefore, the levies
and collections authorized by the TMD Approval
3 should have been subjected to a vote by the
electorate (i.e., registered natural-person voters in
4 the City of San Diego)." (Par. 15.)
5
On January 6, 2014, Defendant TMD filed an Answer (ROA # 177) to Plaintiff's TAC, the
6
second affirmative defense (Lack of Standing or Status as Real Party in Interest) states: "The
7
Third Amended Complaint and each and every purported cause of action therein are barred
8
because Plaintiff is not a real party in interest and lacks standing and capacity to sue."
9
On January 8, 2014, Defendant City filed an Answer (ROA # 180) to Plaintiff's TAC, the
10
third affirmative defense (Standing) states: "SDOG does not have a beneficial interest in the
11
outcome of the proceeding at issue and, therefore, lacks standing to pursue the requested relief at
12
all in this action, and more particularly, lacks standing to pursue any relief as against the City."
13
Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate
14
On September 4, 2015, TMD filed a Motion for Bifurcation (ROA # 603) in which TMD
15
sought, in pertinent part:
16
"... 1) An order bifurcating the affirmative
17 defenses pled by Defendants TMD Corp. and the
City for a court trial to occur prior to the Court's
18 determination of Plaintiff and Petitioner San
19 Diegans for Open Government's ("SDOG") three
reverse validation causes of action, with the
20 affirmative defenses being tried first, pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure sections 597 and 598; 2)
21 An order that the bifurcated trial on TMD's and the
City's affirmative defenses shall proceed with live
22 witnesses and shall occur on the existing trial date
23 ofNovember 6, 2015 ... "
24 In support of the Motion, TMD argued, at pages 3- 5:

'
25 "A trial on the Defendants' affirmative defenses,
including the defense that SDOG lacks standing to
26 pursue this action, fits both the language and the
objective of the bifurcation statutes. (See Citv of
27
Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th
28 43, 66 ["Even validation actions are not exempt
from the traditional principle that a justiciable
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action must satisfY the requirements of both
1
ripeness and standing."].) If, after trial of
2 Defendants' affirmative defenses, the Court finds
that SDOG did not have a member giving it
3 standing when it filed this lawsuit, or that SDOG
lacks the ability to sue on behalf of its "members"-
4 issues which do not go to the merits of this case,
but merely SDOG's standing -the Court would
5
have to fmd SDOG lacks standing to proceed to
6 trial on the merits, and thus would have to enter
judgment for Defendants. Standing is a
7 jurisdictional requirement and the Court must
assure itself of jurisdiction before reaching the
8 merits. (Chiatello v. City and County of San
9 Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.)
10 ... Trying the affirmative defenses first gives the

further advantage to the Court and parties in that if
11 Defendants are successful at trial on their
affirmative defenses, the Court's resources can be
12
preserved and the City's taxpayers would also be
13 spared the need to fund an unnecessary
determinationofthe merits ofSDOG's causes of
14 action by the Court.
15 TMD Corp. does not contend that the issue of

whether Perine was a member of SDOG at the time
16
it filed this case is determinative of the pending
17 MSJ on the City and TMD Corp.'s standing
defenses. TMD Corp. asserts that SDOG fails to
18 satisfY the associational standing test set forth in
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com.
19 (1977) 432 U.S. 333 (Hunt) and Amalgamated
20 Transit Union, Local1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior
Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, assuming that
21 Perine's membership in SDOG was timely and
legitimate as of the time SDOG filed this suit."
22
23 On September 21, 2015, the City filed a Joinder to TMD' s Motion to Bifilrcate Trial).
24 ROA#685.
25 On October 9, 2015, the Court, after hearing arguments of counsel, granted TMD and the
26 City's Motion. ROA # 662.

27 At the trial readiness conference on October 30, 2015, the Court re-affirmed that "the issue
28 of Standing will be adjudicated at the first phase of the trial." ROA # 708.
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I Joint Trial Readiness Conference Report ("TRC Report")
2 In their Joint Trial Readiness Conference Report filed on October 30, 2015 (ROA # 709),
3 the parties identified the disputed legal issues as follows:
4 Whether Plaintiff has standing to pursue this lawsuit?
5 Whether Plaintiff is an interested party or has a member who meets the criteria of indicia of
6 membership that is required by Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)
7 432 u.s. 333?
8 Whether this suit is germane to SDOG's corporate purpose?
9 Whether SDOG properly revived its suspended corporate status?
10 Whether SDOG is the alter ego of Cory Briggs and/or the Briggs Law Corporation which is
11 not an "interested person" and lacks standing?
12 Whether SDOG has sufficiently acted with unclean hands to prevent it from seeking equity
13 in this Court? The Court, on its own motion, deferred the trial of Defendants' "unclean hands"
14 defense to a subsequent phase in this case.
15 Witnesses and Exhibits at Trial
16 Pedro Quiroz, Dell Cunamay, Richard Lawrence, Karen Langwasser, Linda Perine through
17 her depositions taken on November 24,2014 and July 13,2015, Tricia Mendenhall and Theresa
18 Quiroz testified to their recollection of events which took place years ago. The recollection of
19 these witnesses have been influenced by their bias, prejudice or personal relationship with the
20 parties involved in this case. If for no reason other than the passage of time -much less the
21 absence of reliable corroboration-- the Court questions the capacity of the witnesses to accurately
22 recollect and communicate his I her perception of the events. The witnesses have "testified
23 untruthfully about some things but told the truth about others" and, accordingly, the Court has
24 accepted the part it perceives to be true and has ignored the rest. CACI 107, 212. Mr. Quiroz and
25 Perine (Exh. "175") asserted his I her right not to incriminate himself I herself (Evidence Code
26 section 913). The Court, as emphasized at trial, does not "draw any conclusions from (Mr. Quiroz
27 and Perine's) exercise of this right or let it affect any of (its) decisions in this case." CACI 216.
28 Further, one or more of the witnesses exercised his I her right not to disclose what he I she told his
-8-
I I her attorney in confidence. The Court has not considered the exercise of the attorney client
2 privilege for any reason and this has not influenced its decision in any way. CACI 215.
3 Pedro Quiroz: He is Plaintiffs board chairperson, most knowledgeable person ("PMK")
4 and has been a member of Plaintiffs board since 2010. He did not fill out a membership
5 application. He replaced his spouse- Theresa Quiroz- as a director on Plaintiff's board. In 2013,
6 he replaced Ian Trowbridge as Plaintiff's board chairperson following Trowbridge's death on
7 February 6, 2013. Exh. "145." Plaintiff is a grass roots, informal organization. He does not have a
8 membership card in Plaintiff. Plaintiffs members do not pay dues. Plaintiff does not advertise its
9 membership to the public. Plaintiff does not issue membership cards. Plaintiff does not keep
I0 attendance records of its meetings. He has not donated money to Plaintiff. He has not spent
11 money on Plaintiff. Langwasser is Plaintiff's PMK on the subject of its revenues, expenses and
12 accounting. He has signed settlement agreements on behalf of Plaintiff, after the agreements were
13 approved by Plaintiff's board. Plaintiff does not have any bank accounts. Plaintiff has a verbal
14 agreement with Briggs to use his legal services. Plaintiff does not keep corporate minutes. Briggs
15 keeps Plaintiffs corporate records at his office. Briggs completes Plaintiff's filings for state and
16 federal regulators. Briggs signs Plaintiffs filings for the regulators. Briggs has always been
17 Plaintiffs attorney. He recognized parties Plaintiff has sued in Exh. "150" (which was marked for
I8 identification but not admitted into evidence). Plaintiffs board does not meet without Briggs
19 present. Plaintiff was once known as "All People's Breakfast Organizing Committee"
20 ("APBOC"). Exh. "112." He recognizes Plaintiffs bylaws. Exh. "115." In 2013, he was
21 Plaintiffs secretary, Lawrence was Plaintiffs CEO and Langwasser was Plaintiffs CFO. Exh.
22 "119." Langwasser files Plaintiff's tax returns. Although believable, he was generally unfamiliar
23 with the suspension of Plaintiffs ability to do business in California. He is familiar with
24 Plaintiffs corporate purpose from board meetings. A person can become a member of Plaintiff
25 through a written application or a verbal agreement. Briggs is not a member of Plaintiff. He
26 recognizes Plaintiff's membership application. Exh. "101." He recognizes Perine's membership
27 application. Exh. "I 02." Briggs notifies the board of meetings. He recognizes the open letter from
28 Plaintiff (Exh. "160") which states, in part: "We cannot afford to hire lawyers, and so are very
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1 happy when someone with Mr. Briggs' abilities and convictions agrees to take the organizations'
2 cases ... When we win a case- and always after persuading a judge we are right-Mr. Briggs is
3 reimbursed for appropriate legal fees ... More importantly, our settlements require actions to
4 protect the environment or correct open-government violations ... " He has not seen annual reports
5 to Plaintiff's members. Briggs created and upgraded Plaintiff's website. He has not operated a
6 lodging business and has not paid a transient occupancy tax ("TOT') (as defined by the TMD
7 Approval). Plaintiffs board approved the revival of Plaintiffs license. He verified Plaintiffs
8 discovery responses. He and Lawrence are Plaintiffs only board members. He is a registered
9 voter in the City. Sariccia Cacciatore is Briggs' spouse. Plaintiff identified Cacciatore as one of
10 Plaintiff's members for "standing purposes." Exh. "245" pages 3 and 4 redacted. Ian Trowbridge
11 and Briggs created Plaintiff's membership application, which was scanned into Briggs' computer.
12 At redistricting meetings in 2010, Perine said she was a member of Plaintiff. Before December
13 2012, Plaintiff's members included a member "who was not only registered to vote in and resided
14 in the City, but also owned or managed real property that was subject to the City's transient
15 occupancy tax and this member was opposed to the then proposed TMD tax." He recognizes
16 Trowbridge's signature in the FTB's exempt determination letter to Plaintiff. Exh. "134" bate
17 stamp page 41. Plaintiff uses Briggs as its contingency attorney. Plaintiff files a lot of lawsuits to
18 redress "illegal activity" by politicians. After Trowbridge's death, Plaintiff discovered some
19 mistakes and hired Briggs to correct the mistakes. Plaintiff revived its suspended license before it
20 filed the current lawsuit in December 2012. On behalf of Plaintiff, he conducted a diligent search
21 for records requested by Defendants and produced the records he could find. Plaintiff has no more
22 records to produce.
23 Dell Cunamay: He does not have Perine's membership application. He does not have
24 Plaintiffs electronic membership application. He inherited Trowbridge's Mac computer. He has
25 been a member of Plaintiff for a few years. He filled out a membership application. He does not
26 have a membership card. He has not attended any of Plaintiffs meetings. He was in a personal
27 relationship with Trowbridge for twenty one years. Exh. "179." He did not sign documents for
28 Trowbridge. He does not know who was in charge of Plaintiff. Trowbridge was able to
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1 participate in Plaintiffs activities. He did not remove any data from Trowbridge's computer. He
2 did not dispose of Trowbridge's computer. Trowbridge's computer crashed at least once.
3 Trowbridge upgraded his computer but he does not know how frequently. In October 2012,
4 Trowbridge's health began to deteriorate. He recognizes the affidavit- death of trustee. Exh.
5 "182." He does not know Perine. He has not operated a lodging business and has not paid a TOT
6 (as defined by the TMD Approval). He is registered to vote in the City. In 2012, Trowbridge
7 hurt himself in a bicycle accident. Although generally believable, his description of Trowbridge's
8 accident and his injuries was not credible.
9 Richard Lawrence: He is a member of both Plaintiff and Citizens for Equitable
10 Development ("CREED"). Briggs is Plaintiff and CREED's lawyer. Briggs notices Plaintiff's
II board meetings through email. He has not attended a meeting with Langwasser. Plaintiff's
12 purpose is to "tackle legal issues." Briggs advances the costs and his time to file Plaintiff's
13 lawsuits. He takes personal notes at meetings but does not provide them to Plaintiff. He has not
14 read Plaintiff's articles or bylaws and defers to Briggs to maintain Plaintiffs "corporate health."
15 He was not aware that Plaintiff's corporate status was suspended until after Briggs had "fixed it."
16 He did not fill out a membership form, he does not have a membership card, and he does not know
17 how many people are members of Plaintiff. He recognizes Plaintiffs membership form. Exh.
18 "1 01." He has not seen Perine's membership application. Exh. "102." He met Perine at
19 Trowbridge's memorial service. He has not operated a lodging business and has not paid a TOT
20 (as defined by the TMD Approval). Plaintiff maintains its office at Briggs' law offices. He has
21 not complied with his duties as Plaintiffs secretary. He did not produce any documents at trial.
22 Plaintiffs members are not entitled to be a member of Plaintiffs board or compel Plaintiff to
23 pursue a policy, action, corrective measure or remedy.
24 Samuel Rubin: He is TMD's digital forensics expert. His qualifications are adequate.
25 Though challenged by Plaintiff, the evidentiary foundation on which he based his opinions are
26 adequate. In Exh. "181 ", Briggs represented in part: " ... Ian's only computer crashed before this
27 lawsuit was filed. The computer was repaired and returned to him but without his data on the hard
28 drive because the memory had failed and had to be replaced. At that point he was beginning to ail
-11-
1 and could no longer use the computer." From Defendants' perspective, Briggs' representations are
2 inconsistent with Cunamay's testimony and Rubin's analysis. Inspection ofTrowbridge's
3 computer was necessary for him to investigate the authenticity of the creation or alteration of
4 Plaintiff (Exh. "1 0 I") and Perine's (Exh. "I 02'') membership applications. In his opinion, the
5 embedded metadata and the creation dates of Plaintiff's membership application are different.
6 Exh. "209." In his opinion, the PDF Producer was created using word perfect, which is
7 inconsistent with the creation of Plaintiff's membership application on a Mac computer. In his
8 opinion, Plaintiff's membership application was created on a windows computer. Briggs' law
9 office uses word perfect on a windows computer. Exh. "211." Though not separately admitted into
10 evidence, he filed two declarations (Exhs. "207, 208") in support ofTMD's request to inspect
11 Trowbridge's computer. The Court was generally impressed with Rubin's analysis.
12 Karen Langwasscr: She is, and has been since 2008, Plaintiffs treasurer. She is not a
13 resident of the City. She is, and has been since 1992, a certified public accountant ("CPA") licensed
14 to practice in California. She has not operated a lodging business and has not paid a TOT (as defined
15 by the TMD Approval). She has not attended any of Plaintiffs meetings. She is a board member
16 but has not voted on Plaintiff's board resolutions. She is unfamiliar with Plaintiff's bylaws. Plaintiff
17 does not have any bank accounts. Plaintiff does not have any books and records of Plaintiff's
18 finances. She does not know the criteria for membership in Plaintiff. She was not aware that
19 Plaintiffs ability to do business in California was suspended. She has prepared tax returns for
20 Plaintiff. Exhs. "192- 194." She does not possess any records as Plaintiff's board member. She
21 recognizes her signature on Plaintiffs statement of infonnation filed with the Secretary of State.
22 Exh. "119." She is equivocally familiar with Trowbridge's signature. Exhs. "130, 134." She
23 maintains an office in the same building in Upland as Briggs. Exh. "273." She is Briggs' cousin.
24 She did not produce documents at trial. She volunteers her services to Plaintiff. She has not received
25 any funds for or on behalf of Plaintiff and has not deposited any checks for Plaintiff. Though
26 generally believable, her unfamiliarity with checks, which reflected her name, from the City, was
27 not credible. Exh. "185." She is Plaintiffs agent to accept service of process. She only corresponds
28 with Briggs and Keri Taylor from Briggs' law office. She is Plaintiffs secretary. Exhs. "114, 115."
-12-
1 She volunteers her services for other non-profit organizations. She authorized Briggs to receive
2 funds from checks which reflected her name. She is the treasurer of CREED. She filed tax returns
3 for Plaintiff after her deposition was taken in November 2014. She recognized the allocation of the
4 $87,176.32 judgment to attorney fees and costs, which may not necessarily constitute receipt of
5 income. Exh. "274."
6 Frank Hicks: He is TMD's forensics document expert. His qualifications are adequate.
7 The purpose of his engagement was to evaluate the genuineness of a series of questioned
8 signatures attributed to Trowbridge with a series of documents of known signatures attributed to
9 Trowbridge. Exh. "219." Plaintiff challenged, successfully from the Court's perspective, the
I0 evidentiary foundation on which he based his opinions. The Court has carefully reviewed the
II known signatures attributed to Trowbridge (as reflected on this expert's summary chart) and notes
12 multiple discrepancies among the thirteen known signatures attributed to Trowbridge. The Court
13 has put little, if any, weight, on this expert's opinion testimony.

14 Linda Perine (through her depositions taken on November 24, 2014 and July 13,
15 2015): At the beginning of trial, the Court deemed Perine to be "unavailable as a witness"
16 (Evidence Code 240) and allowed the parties to present testimony through her depositions taken on
17 November 24,2014 and July 13,2015. CACI 208. The parties presented video-taped excerpts
18 from her depositions and were directed to lodge the excerpts from the transcripts with the clerk.
19 Preliminarily, the Court notes that her attitude, demeanor and the overall quality of her testimony
20 were not trustworthy. She was, at times, vague, evasive and hostile. She is a sophisticated real
21 estate investor with a law school education. Defendants assert that, given her tenure as director of
22 community outreach under former Mayor Filner (Exh. "167"), she had a conflict of interest and
23 her testimony should be discounted if not discarded altogether. Her recollection of the
24 circumstances under which she became a member of Plaintiff is suspicious; however, given the
25 totality of the evidence (including the testimony of Mr. and Ms. Quiroz who the Court perceives to
26 be credible), the Court finds that, at all relevant times, Perine has been a member of Plaintiff. Her
27 testimony that she doesn't "recall receiving ballot materials, and thus I don't believe I was given
28 an opportunity to vote on the TMD approval (Perine November 24,2014 deposition, page 78lines
-13-
1 19 through 24) is equivocal; however, in view ofTMD acknowledgement that Perine didn't
2 receive the ballot materials (TMD's November 9, 2015 trial brief, page 10 which states: "Ms.
3 Perine admitted she did not update her address after a recent move, and this may explain why she
4 did not receive a ballot for the 2012 renewal of the Assessment."), Perine's non-receipt of the
5 ballot materials is not a controverted issue .. Her testimony, and the documents she produced to
6 corroborate, her lodging business at 811 San Gabriel Place, San Diego, California 92109 ("San
7 Gabriel") are underwhelming. Exhs. "168- 174." However, in mitigation of the Court's
8 reservations about the trustworthiness of Perine's testimony, the Court also notes, with
9 significance, the following undisputed facts: 1) On July 10, 2007, the City issued Perine a
10 transient occupancy registration certificate (Exhs. "19" page 1792 only, and "176"; 2) Defendants'
11 district management plan- Exh. "111" - identifies Perine as a "business owner" who owned or
12 operated a "lodging business" between July 1, 2011 and June 30,2012 ("relevant time period")
13 (Exh. "111" bate stamp pages 3, 50 and 57); and 3) Mendenhall, one of the City's accounting staff,
14 testified that Perine paid the assessment I tax due for the relevant time period (Exh. "103" and
15 referring to Exh. "282"- marked for identification but not admitted into evidence). The City's
16 argument that Perine's payment should be discounted, if not discarded, because she made the
17 payment late is not persuasive. On this point, Perine's testimony resonates with the Court: "I did
18 my best to pay the taxes that I owed, nothing more and nothing less." Perine November 24, 2014
19 deposition, page 155, lines 4-5.
20 Joanne Speers: She is TMD's non-profit management expert. Her qualifications are
21 adequate and the evidentiary foundation on which she based her opinions are adequate; however,
22 the upshot of her opinion testimony- that Plaintiffs purpose is as stated in Plaintiffs articles of
23 incorporation as amended (Exhs. "112, 114") - is of little assistance to the Court. Evidence Code
24 801 states, in pertinent part: "If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an
25 opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: (a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond
26 common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact. .. " Speers' opinion
27 is not, from the Court's perspective, "sufficiently beyond common experience that (her) opinion ...
28 would assist the (Court)." However, the Court credits Speers' testimony on focusing the Court's
-14-
1 attention on whether Plaintiffs purpose- both as stated in its articles and as represented to the
2 Franchise Tax Board ("FTB") (Exh. "134" bate stamp page 37) is reasonably susceptible to more
3 than one interpretation. The Court finds that "it is." Defendants' argument is that "The interests
4 SDOG seeks to represent here are not germane to its stated purpose ... When it filed this suit,
5 SDOG's stated purpose was 'advocacy for and education regarding equitable environmental
6 development.' This lawsuit challenges an assessment on hoteliers- and has no relationship to
7 'equitable environmental development.' Hunt bars this suit." TMD's trial brief(ROA # 747),
8 page 21. The definition of "germane" is not nearly as limited as urged by Defendants. From the
9 Court's perspective, 'germane" is more broadly interpreted to be related or relevant to the topic
10 being considered. As developed on cross-examination of Speers, the lawsuits filed by Plaintiff,
11 including the lawsuit at issue herein, reflect a reasonable interpretation of transparency, openness,
12 access and accountability of governmental "decision-makers" through the California
13 Environmental Quality Act and "other land-use laws." Exh. "134" bate stamp page 57. If good
14 enough for the FTB in granting Plaintiffs exemption application under Section 2370ld of the
15 Revenue and Taxation Code, Plaintiffs interpretation, as amplified on by Mr. and Ms. Quiroz, is
16 good enough for the Court. (The Court notes that, at the end of Speers' testimony, Defendants
17 stipulated that one or more of the persons connected to Plaintiff are registered voters in the City,
18 without stipulating that these same persons are members of Plaintiff.)
19 Tricia Mendenhall: She is employed with the City as an accountant in the treasurer's
20 office. She is responsible for TOT remittances. She reviewed the City's records of Perine's
21 payments for the lodging business Perine operated on San Gabriel. She created a timeline which
22 reflects Perine's payment history "for periods subsequent to purchase of property by L. Perine in
23 2005." Exh. "103." She acknowledged that, even if the business owner doesn't collect the
24 assessment (as characterized by Defendants) I tax (as characterized by Plaintiff), the business
25 owner still owes the assessment I tax to the City. The City questions whether Perine conducted an
26 "active" lodging business during the relevant time period but, given Perine's payment history, as
27 reflected in the City's own records, the Court is satisfied that Perine's lodging business was
28
-15-
I satisfactorily "active." The Court also notes that the City has not refunded to Perine the 2012
2 remittances she paid on the San Gabriel lodging business.
3 Theresa Quiroz: She is a former board member of Plaintiff. She satisfactorily
4 explained, from the Court's perspective, why the current lawsuit is consistent with Plaintiffs
5 corporate purpose. She knows Perine through a mutual friend and, since 2012, believed Perine to
6 be a member of Plaintiff. Before June 2012, she stopped being a member of Plaintiff's board. She
7 serves on the City's Planning Commission and has not disclosed that she is a member of Plaintiff.
8 Whether Plaintiff has standing to pursue this lawsuit? I Whether Plaintiff is an interested
9 party or has a member who meets the criteria of indicia of membership that is regnired by
10 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977) 432 U. S. 333?
11 A. Burden of Proof
12 Preliminarily, the Court addresses the threshold issue of who bears the burden of proof to
13 establish Plaintiff's standing to pursue this lawsuit.
14 This is, understandably, a weighty issue; however, it has become, from the Court's
15 perspective, a more challenging issue because of the manner in which the Court was persuaded to
16 bifurcate the trial. Ultimately, the Court granted TMD's Motion for Bifurcation (ROA # 603) with
17 Defendants' "affirmative defenses being tried first, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections
18 597 and 598 ... prior to the Court's determination of Plaintiffs reverse validation cause of action
19 "
20 As TMD argued, at page 3:
21 "Code of Civil Procedure section 597 authorizes a

court to try the affirmative defenses alleged by a
22
defendant first: "When the answer ... sets up any
23 other defense not involving the merits of the
plaintiffs cause of action but constituting a bar or
24 ground of abatement to the prosecution thereof, the
court may, either upon its own motion or upon the
25 motion of any party, proceed to the trial of the
26 special defense or defenses before the trial of any
other issue in the case." (Ibid. § 597; see also
27 Sahadi v. Scheaffer (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 704,
721 ["A separate trial is authorized under [Code
28 Civ. Proc., § 597] when the defendant alleges as an
-16-
affirmative defense that the action is time-barred or
1 alleges another affirmative defense that is
2 potentially dispositive and that is one 'not
involving the merits of the plaintiff's cause of
3 action[,]"' [citations omitted].) Similar to the
reasons for bifurcation pursuant to Code of Civil
4 Procedure section 598, the purpose of bifurcation
pursuant to section 597 "is avoidance of waste of
5
time and money caused by the trial of issues which
6 may be rendered moot[.]" (Bedolla v. Logan &
Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 135.) If a trial
7 on a defendant's affirmative defense disposes of
the case, a court should enter judgment for the
8 defendant and dispense with the trial on the merits.
9 (Code Civ. Proc., § 597. )"
10 Evidence Code Section 500 states: "Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the
11 burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for
12 relief or defense that he is asserting."
13 " ... ordinarily the burden of proving an issue raised by an affirmative defense rests upon the
14 defendant ... " Donovan v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles (1945) 67 Cal. App. 2nd 845,
15 853.
16 However, as set forth in Heesy v. Vaughn (1948) 31 Cal. 2nd 701, 708, 709:
17
"The rule is that the burden of proof lies upon the
18 party presenting 'the affirmative of the issue,' the
one 'who would be defeated if no evidence were
19 given on either side.' . . . Plaintiff's third cause of
action alleged defendants' violation of the law by
20
reason of their demand upon plaintifffor an
21 amount in excess of the OPA price listing for the
automobile in question, and defendants' answer
22 thereto was in the form of a general denial. Such
pleadings put directly in issue the matter of
23 defendants' violation of the law as charged, and the
burden was on plaintiff to produce the evidence
24
material to the proof of this essential element of
25 her cause of action. Plaintiff proved the OPA
ceiling price for a cash sale of the automobile
26 mobile and the price stipulated under her
conditional sales contract with defendants, but she
27 did not establish that the financing charges which
28 made the latter price higher that the former price
were more 'than they customarily (had) been.' In
-17-
the absence of proof on this latter point, plaintiff
I did not make out a violation of the law incident to
2 defendants' negotiation of the sale on a time basis.
The fact that defendants offered evidence on the
3 matter of their customary financing charges
over the years did not shift the burden of proof
4 to them on an issue raised by plaintiffs pleading
and simply traversed in defendants' answer."
5
(Emphasis added by the Court.)
6
As made clear by the Court in Valentine v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia
7
8 (1936) 12 Cal. App. 2"d 616, 618: "It is not contended by either litigant that the burden of proof to
9 establish the affirmative of an issue ever shifts. This is, of course, the law. Asadoorian v.
10 Kludjian 210 Cal. 564, 565,292 P. 644; Scarborough v. Urgo 191 Cal. 341, 346, 347, 216 P. 584;
II Manufacturers' Finance Comoration v. Pacific Wholesale Radio, Inc. 130 Cal.App. 239,244, 19 P.
12 (2d) 1013."
13 The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff bears the burden to prove its standing to
14 pursue this lawsuit. TMD's trial brief (ROA # 74 7) pages 11 - 13.
15 B. Associational Standing
16 In its November 5, 2015 trial brief, the City, after referring to CCP 863, 367, argues, at
17 page 6, that " ... SDOG lacks standing unless it can prove at least one of its members on December
18 2012 was subject to the TMD assessment SDOG challenges. See, e.g., Torres v. Citv of Yorba
19 Linda 13 Cal. App. 4th 1035, 1042 (1993) (Torres) [non-residents of Yorba Linda lacked standing
20 to challenge redevelopment project even though they paid sales taxes there]."
21
In its trial brief (ROA # 747), TMD argues, at page 14:
22
"Under Hunt -and the California case law
23 adopting it-an association may only sue as a
representative only if it can prove:
24
25 (1) its members have standing in their own rights;
26 (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to

its purpose; and
27
28
-18-
(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires individual members to
2 participate in the suit.
1
3 (Amalgamated Transit Union. Local 1756. AFL

CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 993,
4 1003-1004, citing Hunt, supra, 432 U.S. at p.
343; Brotherhood of Teamsters, supra, 190
5
Cal.App.3d atpp. 1521-1524 [applying Hunt and
6 other U.S. Supreme Court cases to associational
standing issue].) If an association has no
7 "members," those it would represent in court must
have "indicia of membership" akin to that of true
8 membership organizations. (Hunt, supra, 432 U.S.
9 at pp. 344---345.)"
In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL CIO v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
10
County (2009) 46 Ca1.4th 993, the Court stated, at page 998:
I1
12 "This case presents two issues. First, may a
plaintiff labor union that has not suffered actual
13 injury under the unfair competition law, and that is
not an "aggrieved employee" under the Labor
14 Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004,
IS nevertheless bring a representative action under
those laws (1) as the assignee of employees who
16 have suffered an actual injury and who are
aggrieved employees, or (2) as an association
17 whose members have suffered actual injury and are
aggrieved employees? The answer is "no."
18
Second, must a representative action under the
19 unfair competition law be brought as a class
action? The answer is "yes," for the reasons stated
20 in the companion case of Arias v. Superior Court
(2009) 46 Cal. 4th 969, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 209
21 P. 3d 928."
22 The Court further stated, at pages I 003 - 1004:
23
"Under the doctrine of associational standing, an
24 association that does not have standing in its own
right may nevertheless have standing to bring a
25 lawsuit on behalf of its members. The doctrine
was developed in the federal courts under the "case
26 or controversy" requirement of Article III of the
United States Constitution. The United States
27
Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts
28 to "cases" or "controversies." (U.S. Canst., art. III,
§ 2; I Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on
-19-
Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure (4th
I
ed.2007) § 2.13, p. 246.) In construing the scope
2 of this constitutional provision, the United States
Supreme Court has held that an association, such
3 as a labor union, may bring an action on behalf of
its members when the association itself would not
4 otherwise have standing. Associational standing
exists when: "(a) [the association's] members
5
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
6 right; (b) the interests [the association] seeks to
protect are germane to the organization's ptirpose;
7 and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual
8 members in the lawsuit." (Hunt v. Washington
9 Apple Advertising Comm'n (1977) 432 U.S. 333,
343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (Hunt).)
10
In Brotherhood of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 v. Unemployment
11
Insurance Appeals Board, Dalziel Supply Company (1987) 190 Cai.App.3d 1515, 1521, 1522, the
12
Court stated:
13
"Whether a voluntary membership organization
14 such as a union has standing to bring an action as
the representative of its constituents has been
15 addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
16 Warth v. Seldin (1975) 422 U.S. 490 [45 L.Ed.2d
343,95 S.Ct. 2197]. "Even in the absence of
17 injury to itself, an association may have standing
solely as the representative of its members.
18 [Citation.] ... The association must allege that its
members, or any one of them, are suffering
19
immediate or threatened injury as a result of the
20 challenged action of the sort that would make out a
justiciable case had the members themselves
21 brought suit. [Citation.] So long as this can be
established, and so long as the nature of the claim
22 and of the relief sought does not make the
individual participation of each injured party
23
indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the
24 association may be an appropriate representative of
its members, entitled to invoke the court's
25 jurisdiction." @.at p. 511 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 362].)
26 Summarizing the Warth decision, the high court
subsequently recognized that "an association has
27
standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
28 when: (a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
-20-
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's
1 purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
2 relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit." (Hunt v.
3 Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n (1977) 432
U.S. 333, 343 [53 L.Ed.2d 383, 394, 97 S.Ct.
4 2434].)"
5
In Gil bane Building Company v. The Superior Court of San Diego County (2014) 223
6
Cal.App.4th 1527, 1529, 1530, the Court stated:
7
"Gil bane Building Company (Gil bane) petitions
8
for writ of mandate challenging the trial court's
9 overruling of its demurrer to San Diegans for Open
Government's (SanDOG) first amended complaint.
10 In that complaint, SanDOG asserted claims against
Gi1bane and other construction companies seeking
11 disgorgement of all monies those companies
12 allegedly illegally received from contracts with the
Sweetwater Union High School District (the
13 District). Gil bane contends the trial court erred in
overruling its demurrer because (1) SanDOG does
14 not have standing on its own and cannot rely on the
standing of its members and (2) SanDOG cannot
15
pursue its action because it failed to allege it made
16 a demand on the District to sue and the District
refused. We reject Gilbane's arguments and deny
17 the petition."
18
The Court further stated, at page 15 31 :
19
"The issue presented in this case was recently
20 decided by this court in Taxpayers for Accountable
School Bond Spending v. San Diego Unified
21
School District (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1013,
22 1031-1033, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 (Taxpayers). In
that case, an organization brought an action arising
23 out of a school district's approval of new stadium
field lighting and other improvements. (Id. at p.
24 1021, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 449.) As in this case, the
25 school district challenged the action on the basis of
the organization's standing because the
26 organization"[did] not pay taxes as an
organization." @. at p. 1031, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d
27 449.) The court rejected the school district's
argument, reasoning: "we are not aware of, any
28
case that holds a representative organization cannot
-21-
bring a taxpayer action under ... section 526a or a
1 citizen action if that organization represents
2 members who, as individuals, would have standing
to personally bring that cause of action. On the
3 contrary, it has been held a representative
organization or association may have standing to
4 bring an action if its members would have had
standing to bring that action as individuals. (Ibid.)
5
Accordingly, the court concluded even though the
6 organization itself did not pay taxes, it had
standing because its members were taxpayers and
7 residents within the school district. @. at p. 1032,
156 Cai.Rptr.3d 449.)"
8
In Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond Spending v. San Diego Unified School District
9
(2013) 215 Cai.App.4th 1013, 1031, 1032, the Court stated:
10
"District does not argue Taxpayers' members
11
would not have standing as individuals to assert the
12 instant cause of action, but rather that Taxpayers,
as a representative organization, does not have
13 standing because it does not pay taxes as an
organization. However, District does not cite, and
14 we are not aware of, any case that holds a
representative organization cannot bring a taxpayer
15
action under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a
16 or a citizen action if that organization represents
members who, as individuals, would have standing
17 to personally bring that cause of action. On the
contrary, it has been held a representative
18
organization or association may have standing to
19 bring an action if its members would have had
standing to bring that action as individuals.
20 (Driving Sch. Assn. of Cal. v. San Mateo Union
High Sch. Dist. (1992) 11 Cai.App.4th 1513, 1517,
21 14 Cai.Rptr.2d 908.) Connerly v. State Personnel
Bd. (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 29, 112 Cal. Rptr.
22
2d 5, stated:
23
"Code of Civil Procedure section 526a permits a
24 taxpayer to bring an action to restrain or prevent an
illegal expenditure of public money. No showing
25 of special damage to a particular taxpayer is
26 required as a requisite for bringing a taxpayer suit.
[Citation.] Rather, taxpayer suits provide a general
27 citizen remedy for controlling illegal governmental
activity. [Citation.]
28
-22-
Citizen suits may be brought without the
1 necessity of showing a legal or special interest in
2 the result where the issue is one of public right and
the object is to procure the enforcement of a public
3 duty. [Citation.] Citizen suits promote the policy
of guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to ensure
4 that governmental bodies do not impair or defeat
public rights. [Citation.]
5
6 Taxpayer suits and citizen suits are closely

related concepts of standing. [Citation.] The chief
7 difference is a taxpayer suit seeks preventative
relief, to restrain an illegal expenditure, while a
8 citizen suit seeks affirmative relief, to compel the
9 performance of a public duty. [Citation.] Where
standing appears under either rule, the action may
10 proceed regardless of the label applied by the
plaintiff." (Italics added.)
11
Furthermore, "[t]he primary purpose of [Code of
12
Civil Procedure section 526a], originally enacted in
13 1909, is to 'enable a large body of the citizenry to
challenge governmental action which would
14 otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of
the standing requirement.' [Citation.] California
15 courts have consistently construed [Code of Civil
16 Procedure] section 526a liberally to achieve this
remedial purpose." (Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.
17 3d 258,267-268, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242.)
Liberally construing Code of Civil Procedure
18 section 526a, we conclude Taxpayers has standing
to bring the instant cause of action on behalf of its
19
members who are residents of City and District and
20 are taxpayers. (Cf. Los Altos Property Owners
Assn. v. Hutcheon (1977) 69 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24,
21 137 Cal. Rptr. 775 [unincorporated association of
property owners brought Code of Civil Procedure
22 section 526a taxpayer action against school
district]; Hermosa, supra, 142 Cal. App. 4th at pp.
23
1181, 1186,48 Cal.Rptr.3d 705 [taxpayers'
24 committee, apparently an unincorporated
association, brought Education Code section 15284
25 action against school district to enjoin spending
Proposition 39 bond proceeds on school
26 gymnasium]; Common Cause v. Board of
27 Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 432,439-440, 261
Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610 [plaintiffs had
28
-23-
sufficient interest as citizens to bring action for
1 injunction).)"
2
See also Gowens v. City of Bakersfield 179 Cal. App. 2d 282 (1960), in which, as argued
3
by Plaintiff (ROA # 645 at page 14) "a hotel owner who did not pay the challenged tax
4
nevertheless challenged the ordinance imposing the tax on transients. I d. at 283. The appellate
5
court found that the hotel owner, despite not paying the tax, had standing to sue because a hotel
6
owner is vitally interested in the validity of the ordinance. Id. at 285. For example, the tax might
7
drive customers away from his business. Id. Under the logic of Gowens, if a hotel owner not
8
liable for the tax had standing to challenge a tax on his guests, lodging-business guests and anyone
9
else who pays for their stays, as well as other people affected by the increased cost of lodging on
10
account of the TMD levy (which is passed on to hotel guests), have standing to challenge the San
11
Diego TMD tax." Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal. 4th
12
155, 165-170.
13
1. Perine, as one of Plaintiff's members, would otherwise have standing to sue in her
14
own right.
15
In its trial brief (ROA # 747), TMD argues, at page 17, TMD argues that "SDOG claims
16
only Linda Perine as a "member" who could give it standing here. The preponderance of the
17
evidence will show she was not a member when SDOG filed this. Thus, it had no standing. (See
18
Hunt, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 343.)"
19
Though the Court, as noted above, has reservations about the trustworthiness of Perine's
20
testimony, the Court is persuaded that, given the totality of the evidence (including the testimony
21
of Mr. and Ms. Quiroz who the Court perceives to be credible), Perine has been, at all relevant
22
times, a member of Plaintiff. The Court notes again that, in mitigation of the Court's reservations
23
about the trustworthiness of Perine's testimony, the following undisputed facts: 1) On July 10,
24
2007, the City issued Perine a transient occupancy registration certificate (Exhs. "19" page 1792
25
only, and "176"; 2) Defendants' district management plan- Exh. "Ill"- identifies Perine as a
26
"business owner" who owned or operated a "lodging business" between July 1, 2011 and June 30,
27
2012 ("relevant time period") (Exh. "111" bate stamp pages 3, 50 and 57); and 3) Mendenhall, one
28
-24-
1 of the City's accounting staff, testified that Perine paid the assessment I tax due for the relevant
2 time period (Exh. "103" and referring to Exh. "282"- marked for identification but not admitted
3 into evidence). The City's argument that Perine's payment should be discounted, if not discarded,
4 because she made the payment late is not persuasive. On this point, Perine's testimony resonates
5 with the Court: "I did my best to pay the taxes that I owed, nothing more and nothing less."
6 Perine November 24,2014 deposition, page 155, lines 4-5.
7 The Court finds that Perine, as one of Plaintiffs members, would otherwise have standing
8 to sue in her own right.
9 2. The interests Plaintiff seeks to protect in this lawsuit are germane to Plaintiffs
10 organization's purpose.
11
In its trial brief(ROA # 747), TMD argues, at pages 21, 22:
12
"The interests SDOG seeks to represent here are
13 not germane to its stated purpose. (See Hunt,
supra, 432 U.S. at p. 343.) Courts look to the
14 purposes stated in a group's organizing documents
- not to self-serving declarations that conflict with
15
those documents. (California Parents for
16 Equalization of Educational Materials v. Noonan
(E. D. Cal. 2009) 600 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1107 [self-
17 serving statements of organization member could
not satisfy Hunt, citing Animal Lovers Volunteer
18 Assn., Inc. v. Weinberger (9th Cir. 1985) 765 F.2d
19 937, 939].)
20 When it filed this suit, SDOG's stated purpose was

"advocacy for and education regarding equitable
21 environmental development." This lawsuit
challenges an assessment on hoteliers - and has no
22
relationship to "equitable environmental
23 development." Hunt bars this suit. The Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Association may not challenge
24 what the Sierra Club may challenge, and vice
versa. SDOG may challenge EIRs for Wai-Mart
25 stores, but not levies on hotels.
26
Even SDOG's restated articles enacted long after
27 this case was filed state a purpose too broad to
serve a "well-defined" segment of the community,
28 as Hunt requires. SDOG's new purposes would
-25-
allow it to challenge any action by any government
1 anywhere if it believes that action is "illegal." It is
2 a mere license to sue for its sole counsel, for BLC,
it is not a real association of people with
3 discernible common interests. If SDOG's new
purposes satisfied Hunt, its second prong would be
4 meaningless. Associations could simply state all-
encompassing purposes in corporate documents
5
and never need to show that they serve a well-
6 defined community within the general public. This
is not the law."
7
The Court, as noted above, disagrees with Defendants that the definition of "germane" is as
8
limited as urged by Defendants. From the Court's perspective, "germane" is more broadly
9
interpreted to be related or relevant to the topic being considered. As developed on cross-
10
examination of Speers, the lawsuits filed by Plaintiff, including this lawsuit, reflect a reasonable
11
interpretation of transparency, openness, access and accountability of governmental "decision-
12
makers" through the California Environmental Quality Act and "other land-use laws." Exh. "134"
13
bate stamp page 57. If good enough for the FTB in granting Plaintiff's exemption application
14
under Section 2370 I d of the Revenue and Taxation Code, Plaintiffs interpretation, as amplified
15
on by Mr. and Ms. Quiroz, is good enough for the Court.
16
The Court finds that the interests Plaintiff seeks to protect in this lawsuit are germane to
17
Plaintiffs organization's purpose.
18
3. Neither the claim asserted nor the relief reguested by Plaintiff reguires the
19
participation of Perine, as one of Plaintiff's members, in this lawsuit.
20
In its trial brief (ROA # 747), TMD argues, at page 22:
21
"Only if an association asserts on behalf of its
22 members a claim that "does not make the
23 individual participation of each injured party
indispensable to proper resolution of the cause"
24 does it have standing. (Warth v. Seldin (1975) 422
U.S. 490, 511.) Stated differently, if individual
25 participation from members is required for suit,
they must sue; under Hunt, the association may
26
not. (See Hunt, supra, 432 U.S. atp. 343.)
27
Nobody affiliated with SDOG could speak to Ms.
28 Perine's status as an interested person - her
-26-
business interests or when she became an SDOG
1 member. Ms. Perine alone provided this
2 information. Accordingly, her participation was
required here - in fact, the participation of all nine
3 ofSDOG's putative "members" was required here,
to determine if they owned hotels and thus had
4 standing - and SDOG thus cannot have
associational standing under Hunt.
5
6 The participation of SDOG's members here has
been plain ever since this Court compelled SDOG
7 to identify them. That they Were deposed and
some will be called to testify makes the point all
8 the plainer."
9 The Court, as noted above, finds that Perine has been, at all relevant times, a member of
10 Plaintiff. She has participated, albeit reluctantly, in this lawsuit in her capacity as a member of
11 Plaintiff. She appears to have been represented by Plaintiff's counsel throughout this lawsuit. In a
12 declaration filed with the Court (Exh. "175"), she expressed apprehension, if not fear, of retaliation
13 from "1MD, its counsel, and possibly others ... " Under the circumstances, Perine's election to
14 participate in this lawsuit in an indirect, representative capacity, as opposed to filing a direct claim
15 as an individual Plaintiff, is understandable.
16 The Court finds that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested by Plaintiff requires
17 the participation of Perine, as one of Plaintiffs members, in this lawsuit.
18 Whether SDOG properly revived its suspended corporate status?
19 In support of its Motion for summary judgment (ROA # 580), TMD argued, at pages 21,
20 22:
21
"A suspended corporation cannot prosecute or
22 defend an action. (See Center for Self
Improvement and Communi tv Development v.
23 Lennar Com. (2009) 173 Cal. App. 4th 1543,
1552.) On or about January 9, 2012, the Secretary
24 of State revoked SDOG's corporate status... On or
25 about May 20, 2012, SDOG applied to the
Franchise Tax Board to revive its suspended
26 status... That application requires signature by
"[a]ny stockholder, creditor, member, general
27 partner, or officer" or "[a]ny person having an
interest in relief from suspension or forfeiture."
28 At the time of the revivor, Trowbridge was listed
-27-
as the only officer or director... On or about
I November 21, 2012, the Franchise Tax Board
2 issued an entity status letter, apparently reviving
SDOG's corporate status ...
3
Because Ian Trowbridge did not sign SDOG's
4 corporate revivor, it was ineffective.
5
Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305
6 provides that only a member of the corporation
may sign an application for revivor."
7
Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305 states, in pertinent part:
8
"Application for the certificate on behalf of any
9 taxpayer which has suffered suspension or
forfeiture may be made by any stockholder or
10
creditor, by a majority of the surviving trustees or
11 directors thereof, by an officer, or by any other
person who has interest in the relief from
12 suspension or forfeiture."
13 See also ROA # 768, pages 29- 33.
14 The Court, notwithstanding Defendants' vigorous challenge, finds that the signature
15 attributed to Trowbridge on Plaintiffs reviver application (Exh. "128") is authenticate and that
16 Trowbridge was authorized to execute same on behalf of Plaintiff.
17 The Court finds that Plaintiff properly revived its suspended corporate status prior to the
18 commencement of this lawsuit.
19 Whether SDOG is the alter ego of Cory Briggs and I or the Briggs Law Corporation which is
20 not an "interested person" and lacks standing?
21 In support of its Motion for summary judgment (ROA # 580), TMD argued, at pages 23,
22 24:
"The evidence demonstrates that BLC controls
23 SDOG, not its purported "members." BLC is not an
"interested person" under the validation statutes
24
because it does not pay the Assessment. Thus BLC
25 and its alter ego, SDOG, both lack standing."
26
Courts pierce pleadings to conclude a sham
27 plaintiffs actions are those of its counsel. In Say &
Say v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 1759,
28
1761, an attorney filed a lawsuit against hundreds of
-28-
defendants, was declared a vexatious litigant and
I then added a corporate entity as a fellow plaintiff.
2 The Court of Appeal concluded the corporate
plaintiff- the attorney's alter ego - should also be
3 declared a vexatious litigant and its corporate form
disregarded because it was used to "avoid the effect
4 of a lawsuit." (Id. at p. 1768)"
5
See also ROA # 768, pages 33-38.
6
The Court has read and considered Say & Say v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 1759.
7
Therein, the Court noted, at pages 1762, 1763, "On several occasions, Mr. Shieh has been declared
8
to be a vexatious litigant" after which he "continued to file lawsuits almost exclusively naming
9
lawyers as defendants."
10
"Mr. Shieh's misconduct and his use of Say & Say, Inc., to continue his persistent misuse
11
of the litigation system," as characterized by the Court at page 1766, bears no relationship to the
12
facts and circumstances of this lawsuit. There is no evidence that Briggs has used Plaintiff"to
13
perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or to accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable
14
purpose" such that the Court should "disregard (Plaintiff) and treat the acts as if they were done by
15
(Briggs)." I d. at 1769; Jack P. Meyers, Inc. v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1965) 238
16
Cal.App.2d 869, 873-874.
17
In its opposition to TMD's Motion for Summary Judgment (ROA # 645), Plaintiff asserted,
18
at pages 7, 8:
19
"Before turning to the particulars, however, SDOG
20
wants to address the preliminary legal claim that it
21 has no "members" on whose behalf it may
advocate. The Nonprofit Public Benefit Law
22 authorizes SDOG to include a provision in its
bylaws stating that it has no "members." CORP.
23 CODE § 531 0( a). By law, of course, the definition
of "member" is very narrow, limited to someone
24
identified in a corporation's articles or bylaws as
25 having the right to vote on directors, the
disposition of corporate assets, on a proposed
26 merger, or on changes to the articles or bylaws.
CORP. CODE§ 5056(a). SDOG has adopted such
27
a provision.
28
-29-
That provision does not mean SDOG may have no
I "members" in the sense of persons on whose
2 behalf it advocates. Indeed, the law authorizes
SDOG to "refer to persons associated with it as
3 'members' even though such persons are not
members within the meaning of Section 5056."
4 CORP. CODE§ 5332(a).
5
SDOG is further authorized to do so without
6 charge- that is, to "benefit, serve, or assist persons
who are not members within the meaning of
7 Section 5056 for such consideration, if any, as the
board may determine or as is authorized or
8 provided for in the articles or bylaws." Id., §
9 5332(b)"
Plaintiff argued further, at pages 20, 21:
10
11 "The alter ego doctrine is not used by defendants to

conflate a non-profit, non-shareholder corporate
12 plaintiff with its attorney. It is used by plaintiffs to
pierce the corporate veil in order to hold
13 shareholders liable. See Mesler v. Bragg
14 Management Co. 39 Cal. 3d 290, 300 (1985)
(explaining that in "certain circumstances the court
15 will disregard the corporate entity and will hold the
individual shareholders liable for the actions of the
16 corporation"). However, even "when a court
disregards the corporate entity, it does not dissolve
17
the entity." Id. at 300. The Supreme Court
18 explained the impacts of applying the alter ego
doctrine like this: "under certain circumstances a
19 hole will be drilled in the wall of limited liability
erected by the corporate form; for all purposes other
20 than that for which the hole was drilled, the wall
still stands." Id. at 301. In other words, even if
21
Defendants could successfully argue that SDOG is
22 the alter ego of Briggs Law Corporation and I or
Mr. Briggs, all that would mean is that Briggs Law
23 Corporation and I or Mr. Briggs could be liable in
some way for actions taken by SDOG. However,
24 SDOG would not be dissolved and would still stand
25 as an organization. SDOG is the plaintiff in this
action, there is no tort at issue, and Defendants do
26 not stand to obtain damages from SDOG even if it
is unsuccessful in this action. The alter ego doctrine
27 is not a valid defense in this action and Defendants'
attempt to rely on it is misguided."
28
-30-
I See also ROA # 772, pages 10-13.
2 As is clear from the trial evidence, Briggs is integrally involved in Plaintiff's activities and
3 the pursuit of its corporate purpose. Indeed, based on the witness testimony as well as the letter
4 issued by Mr. Quiroz, Lawrence and Ms. Quiroz (Exh. "160"), it is an open question as to how
5 much, if any, of its objectives Plaintiff could accomplish without Briggs' "abilities and
6 convictions." That acknowledged, there is no persuasive reason, based on the totality of the
7 evidence including the autonomy exercised by and the credibility of Lawrence and Mr. Quiroz as
8 Plaintiff's directors, for the Court to conclude that Plaintiff's TAC is a "sham" or "ultra vires," or
9 that Plaintiff should be deprived of standing to pursue this lawsuit because its alleged status as
I0 Briggs' alter ego.
II Defendant TMD and City's Motions to quash the trial subpoenas served upon TMD Board
12 of Directors Richard Bartell and William L. Evans and Mayor Kevin Faulconer
13 At the first phase of the trial, the Court deferred from ruling on Defendant TMD and City's
14 Motions to quash the trial subpoenas served upon TMD Board of Directors Richard Bartell and
15 William L. Evans and Mayor Kevin Faulconer (ROA # 724). In anticipation of the trial's next
16 phase, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant TMD and City's Motions to quash.
17 The City's Motion is granted and the subpoena served upon Mayor Faulconer is quashed. TMD's
18 Motion is denied and the subpoenas served upon Directors Richard Bartell and William L. Evans
19 are not quashed.
20 Defendants' Motion to strike portions of Petitioner's sur-reply brief
21 Defendant's Motion (ROA # 775) to strike portions of Petitioner's sur-reply brief in
22 support of Petitioner's closing argument, is DENIED.
23 Conclusion
24 The Court finds that, as set forth above, Plaintiff has standing to pursue this lawsuit. The
25 balance of Plaintiffs claim and Defendants' affirmative defenses will be tried together in the next
26 phase oft he trial. The Court sets a Status Conference on March 4, 2016 at 3:00 pm for the purpose
27 of establishing a trial and briefing schedule.
28
-31-
lT IS SO ORDERED.
;~2:1~/6
3
4 Dated:
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-32-
Exhibit 14
MARA W. ELLIOTT
City Attorney
Gerry Braun
Chief of Staff
Paul Cooper Tanya Tomlinson

Assistant City Attorney Deputy Director
Special Projects Administration Division
CIVIL CRIMINAL
DIVISIONS DIVISION
George Schaefer Mary Nuesca

John Hemmerling
Assistant City Attorney Assistant City Attorney
Assistant City Attorney
Civil Litigation Division Civil Advisory Division
Criminal Community Justice

Civil Prosecution Government Affairs Consumer &
General Trial
Unit and Finance Section Environmental
Unit
Protection Unit
General Litigation Public Safety, Labor, Domestic Violence & Code Enforcement
Unit Employment & Training Sex Crimes Unit Unit
Section
Land Use Neighborhood Justice

Case Issuance
Litigation Unit & Collaborative
Public Works Unit
Section Courts Unit
Worker’s Appellate
Compensation Unit
Unit
Public Services
Section
Special Litigation
Special
Unit Prosecutions Unit
Real Property &

Land Use Section
Economic Development
Section
Dept Internal Org Chart

Rev. 02/13/17
Exhibit 15
   
Sponsor Message
Opinion
City Attorney's Chief of Staff Has

a Political Role, Not a Legal One
By insisting Gerry Braun’s communications are protected from public disclosure, City
Attorney Mara Elliott is essentially weaponizing attorney-client privilege.
Steven Moore
November 28, 2017
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City Attorney Mara Elliott discusses vacation rentals at an Ocean Beach Town
Council meeting. / Photo by Jamie Scott Lytle
City Attorney Mara Elliott has decided that her chief of sta
Gerry Braun’s communications are protected by attorney- TRENDING STORIES
client privilege, which means that anyone who releases Week Month Year
Braun’s communications could be subject to criminal
Encinitas
prosecution. Parking Lot for
the Homeless
Continues to
One problem with that theory is that Braun is not a member Stir Fears and
Anger
of the California State Bar.
Grossmont
High
Braun’s quali cations Basketball
for the city attorney Coach Is
Cashing in on
chief of sta job are a Tournaments
career in journalism
and communications Teachers at
San Diego
consulting, and a stint as former City Attorney Jan Charter
Goldsmith’s spokesman. He is Elliott’s political chief of sta , Schools Are
Far Less
whose job it is to forward Elliott’s career. He certainly is not Experienced
managing lawyers. Braun is the rst political chief of sta to Than
Traditional
serve a San Diego city attorney, and the rst senior manager School Peers
in recent memory not to be a lawyer himself.
A Year in,
Every political chief of sta looks at their email, text or tweet Gompers
Teachers
before they press send with the New York Times Rule in Union Has No
mind: How would you like to see what you have written in Contract and a
New Challenge
this email on the front page of the Times? The New York
Times Rule is one of the few things that keep politics from When Police
Can — and
devolving even more deeply into mayhem, and every chief Can't — Pull
of sta in America is subject to it. You Over
That is, every chief of sta in America except for Braun.
For Elliott, who has been mentioned as a candidate for

mayor in 2020, Braun’s exemption from the New York Times
Rule is a real boon. She is essentially weaponizing attorney-
client privilege. Braun can be as threatening, as bullying, as
sexist or as profane as he would like to be, and his victims
have no recourse. If they release the communications, they
could be prosecuted. A chief of sta who can say anything
he wants with no threat of scrutiny or recrimination can be
very e ective in forwarding his boss’s career.
Everyone else in the business has to sweat over every public

communication he or she sends out. Having been a chief of
sta in Congress, every day of my seven and a half years on
Capitol Hill, I spent a big chunk of my day thinking, before
hitting send, about how my texts and emails could be
twisted to portray me or my boss in an unfavorable light.
Being able to skip that part of the job, Braun can probably
go home early most days, something I was never able to do.
Elliott’s attempts to portray her chief of sta ’s political

communications as conducting legal business are almost
comical. Almost.
We are living through an era of unprecedented political
transparency. In 2016, Democrats and Republicans in
Congress came together to make improvements to the
Freedom of Information Act. Locally, Democrats and
Republicans on the City Council are collaborating to create a
new level of transparency in city government transactions.
Elliott is one of the few politicians in America trying to walk

back transparency in government. Worse, her e orts are
dangerous. With a decrease in transparency comes a
corresponding increase in the potential for intimidating or
unethical communications.
Like Braun, I am not a lawyer. Having talked to several

lawyers about Elliott’s assertion of privilege, the common
reaction is disbelief. They then try to explain that attorney-
client privilege is meant to protect the client, not the
attorney. As far as I can tell, Elliott is the only attorney who
sees attorney-client privilege as protecting the attorney. If
Goldsmith made the same assertion while Braun was in his
employ, it is not evident.
Unfortunately, Elliot’s opinion matters at City Hall, and the

threat of prosecution has had a chilling e ect on
communication there.
If Elliott can’t quite get the legal interpretation right, she is

an ambitious politician, and may be more adept at
interpreting public opinion. If she is eying the bigger prize
and considering a mayoral run, she probably doesn’t want
to be on the wrong side of an historical, bipartisan,
nationwide push for transparency in government.
Steven Moore is a public a airs consultant in San Diego and
was a chief of sta in the House of Representatives from
2006 to 2013. Moore’s commentary has been edited for
style and clarity. See anything in there we should fact check?
Tell us what to check out here.
Tags:
City Attorney Gerry Braun Mara Elliott
Show Comments
Written By
Steven Moore
Steven Moore is a public a airs consultant
in San Diego and was a chief of sta in the
House of Representatives from 2006 to
2013.
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Exhibit 16
   
Sponsor Message
GOVERNMENT
City Attorney’s Top Aide Claims

Privilege as He Pushes for Her
The city attorney’s chief of staff, Gerry Braun, is claiming messages he sent to a City
Council of ce are not public records, citing attorney-client privilege. Braun is not an
attorney. If that reasoning holds up, he’d be the rst political chief of staff who can
also claim to his counterparts that if you share the messages he sends to you, you are
committing a crime.
Scott Lewis
November 10, 2017
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Gerry Braun, the chief of sta for City Attorney Mara Elliott / Photo by Sam
Hodgson
Last year, Mara Elliott surpassed two other Democrats, who TRENDING STORIES
had more money and endorsements, to advance to the
Week Month Year
runo election for San Diego city attorney.
Encinitas
Parking Lot for
In an instant, she leaped from underdog to favorite. the Homeless
Continues to
Stir Fears and
That’s when Gerry Braun became an important adviser. Anger
Braun earned a job when Elliott won the position in Grossmont

November. High
Basketball
Coach Is
Cashing in on
Braun is an exceptional writer. He was a longtime reporter,
Tournaments
writing coach and later metro columnist for the Union-
Tribune. When he left that job in 2008 to work for former Teachers at
San Diego
Mayor Jerry Sanders, he became special projects director. Charter
He spent years trying to organize the doomed 2015 Balboa Schools Are
Far Less
Park celebration. Experienced
Than
Traditional
When that fell apart, Braun became former City Attorney Jan School Peers
Goldsmith’s spokesman. He has been a lot of things.

A Year in,
Gompers
But one thing Braun has never been is an attorney. Teachers

 Facebook  Union Has
Twitter  No
Contract and a
New Challenge
So I was especially confused when, after requesting
messages between Braun and two City Council o ces When Police
Can — and
following Elliott’s explosive memo blowing up the vacation
Can't — Pull
rental debate, the city attorney’s o ce rejected releasing You Over
the records.
Why?
They claimed the communications were protected under

attorney-client privilege.
♦♦♦
Braun’s position in Elliott’s o ce has always been a bit

awkward. Elliott named him chief of sta .
But chief of what sta ? Does he supervise working

attorneys? No recent city attorney had a chief of sta , let
alone a top manager who was not an attorney.
Braun did not respond to a request to discuss his role with

the city attorney.
The awkwardness has been a subject of discussion in City

Hall since Elliott took o ce. He not only carefully manages
Elliott’s press releases and communications and her public
appearances, but also her relationship with other city
leaders.
And it’s a curious time in city politics. The mayor is obsessed

with the hepatitis A crisis and reluctant to take signi cant
positions or outline much in the way of vision. The City
 president, Myrtle Cole, is by far the least vocal or
Council
prominent of the politicians to hold that role since it was
created in 2006.
In that vacuum of political leadership, Elliott has soared,

proudly wielding the levers of power her o ce has. Braun
has managed it the whole way.
One example of that power is the memo she dropped just

hours before a deadline to advise the City Council on two
policies that had been proposed to regulate short-term
vacation rentals.
Elliott says she didn’t intend to scuttle the proposals.

Immediately, though, Cole canceled a long-anticipated
hearing on them. Once again, the city would punt on a
dilemma that has bedeviled it.
The delay frustrated the City Council, and I heard that Braun
had some interesting interactions with Council sta
members.
I requested messages between Braun and two City Council

o ces under the California Public Records Act.
The city attorney’s o ce acknowledged that messages from

Braun existed but said it would not release them.
I replied that there must be a mistake. Braun is not an

attorney. I contacted our own attorney, Felix Tinkov, who
pressed the case.
Bill Gersten, a deputy city attorney, explained it like this.
“The attorney-client privilege extends not only to attorneys,

but also to third parties employed by attorneys in the
furtherance of providing legal representation to their
clients,” Gersten wrote.
There seems to be a consensus among attorneys I spoke

with that, yes, if Braun was acting as a vessel for a
communication from the city attorney to her client, then his
work is within the bubble of attorney-client privilege.
But this brings up all sorts of questions. Councilwoman

Barbara Bry’s o ce responded to my inquiry that they had
no other records that t my request except a benign email.
Thus, the only messages that t my request must be

between Braun and either Councilman Chris Ward or his
chief of sta , Molly Chase.
If it’s Chase, that’s interesting. Are all messages between

Braun and any city employee, like Chase, privileged? If she
shares any of them, has she broken the law?
That may seem ludicrous, but Elliott and Braun have

pressed the case that Councilman Chris Cate did something
“more than commit a crime” when he broke attorney-client
privilege by passing a con dential memo on to the
developers of SoccerCity. He had no right to unilaterally
break the attorney-client privilege, Elliott claims.
She referred the alleged crime to the district attorney, who

referred the case to the state attorney general for
investigation and possible prosecution.
It has left people in City Hall understandably wary of

messing with attorney-client privilege. Could Elliott argue
they’re breaking the law merely by making public or sharing
messages from Braun, who’s not an attorney?
“It appears the city attorney has decided that, Mr. Braun, a
former reporter with no legal training I am aware of, is to be
treated as if he only, and always, conveys con dential legal
advice to her clients,” said Tinkov.
Elliott’s regular foe, attorney Cory Briggs, made the case that
attorney-client privilege could protect Braun’s messages.
“Anytime Gerry is a conduit for communication of a

con dential nature, then Gerry’s messages are privileged,”
Briggs said.
But when I asked who the client in the attorney-client

relationship was if the recipient of the messages was Chase,
Briggs chortled.
“The client is whomever the people who want secrecy want

it to be at any given time,” he said.
I’m not sure what Braun sent to Ward or Chase. But he sent
something. Something Elliott and Braun do not want us to
see.
We might have just entered a strange new world where

Braun is an enormously powerful actor.
Braun’s job, after all, is to press the political position of his
politician boss. That’s what a chief of sta does. City Hall is
full of them.
But he’d be the rst political chief of sta who can also claim
to his counterparts that if you share the messages he sends
to you, you are committing a crime.
Tags:
City Attorney Gerry Braun San Diego City Attorney's O ce
Show Comments
Written By
Scott Lewis
Scott Lewis oversees Voice of San Diego’s
operations, website and daily functions as
Editor in Chief. He also writes about local
politics, where he frequently breaks news
and goes back and forth with local political
gures. Contact Scott at
scott.lewis@voiceofsandiego.org or
619.325.0527, and follow him on Twitter at
@vosdscott.
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Steven Moore November 28, 2017


JOURNALISM
Voice of San Diego is a 501(c)(3) nonpro t
organization. We rely on people like you to support this service. Please
donate or sponsor VOSD today.
About Us Contact Us

   Podcasts available
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NOW
110 West A St. Suite 650, San Diego, CA 92101
Phone: 619-325-0525
PROOF OF SERVICE
I. My name is Ashley Engelm.ru!..-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . I am over the age of eighteen. I am employed in the

State of California, County of _San DieiDL. _ _ _ _ _ .
2. My __L_ business _ _ residence address is Briggs Law Corporation, 4891 Pacific Highway, Suite 104,
San Diego, CA 92110
3. On January 27 , 2020 , I served _ _ an original copy ....L__a true and correct copy of the
following documents: Points and Authoritiefi in Qpoosition to Motion for Protective Order:
Declarations of Steve Peace and Cory J. Briggs; Supporting Exhibits
4. I served the documents on the person(s) identified on the attached mailing/service list as follows:
_ by personal service. I personally delivered the documents to the person(s) at the address(es) indicated on the
list.
_ by U.S. mail. I sealed the documents in an envelope or package addressed to the person(s) at the address(es)
indicated on the list, with frrst-class postage fully prepaid, and then I
_deposited the envelope/package with the U.S. Postal Service
_placed the envelope/package in a box for outgoing mail in accordance with my office's ordinary
practices for collecting and processing outgoing mail, with which I am readily familiar. On the same
day that mail is placed in the box for outgoing mail, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business
with the U.S. Postal Service.
I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The mailing occurred in the city of
__________,S,.,a..,n._.D~ie..,g.,..o, California.
_by overnight delivery. I sealed the documents in an envelope/package provided by an overnight-delivery

service and addressed to the person(s) at the address(es) indicated on the list, and then I placed the
envelope/package for collection and ovemightdeliveryin the service's box regularly utilized for receiving items
for overnight delivery or at the service's office where such items are accepted for overnight delivery.
_ by facsim i/e transmission. Based on an agreement of the parties or a court order, I sent the documents to the
person(s) at the fax number(s) shown on the list. Afterward, the fax machine from which the documents were
sent reported that they were sent successfully.
~ by e-m ail delivery. Based on the parties' agreement or a court order or rule, I sent the documents to the person(s)
at the e-mail address(es) shown on the list. I did not receive, within a reasonable period oftime afterward, any
electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws _ _ of the United States _.f.__ of the State of California
that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: January 27 , ...,2""02...,0'---- Signature: --=e..:...,;;·~~~~~---------

/
SERVICE LIST
San Diegans For Open Government v. City ofSan Diego, et al.

San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2019-00015139-CU-MC-CTL
Mara W. Elliott, George Schaefer Attorneys for Defendant City ofSan Diego
David J. Karlin
Office of the City Attorney
1200 Third A venue, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101-4100
Telephone: (619) 533-5800
Facsimile: (619) 533-5856
Dkarlin@sandiego.gov
Paul J. Pfmgst, John Morris Attorneys for Plaintiff San Diegans for Open
Rachel E. Moffitt Government
Higgs Fletcher & Mack LLP
401 West "A" Street, Suite 2600
San Diego, CA 92101-7913
pfingst@higgslaw .com
jmmorris@higgslaw .com
Moffittr@higgslaw .com

Protective Order Motion - SDOG Opposition

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Protective Order Motion - SDOG Opposition

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1 JOHN MORRIS, ESQ.

Opposition to Motion for Protective Order

5 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 5

5 GT, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984)

12 Code of Civil Procedure

13 Section 2025.420, subdivisions (a) and (b) 7

3 filed by Defendant, the CITY OF SAN DIEGO (the “City”):

12 unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression by being involuntarily

19 SDOG responds that the City’s motion is unwarranted, unsubstantiated, and

20 unjustified. It is unwarranted because there is nothing in the history of this case—or in

24 such “bad conduct” in support of its motion. It is unsubstantiated because there is

19 essence, be a preemptive “gag order”—a constitutionally disfavored “prior restraint”—

28 evidence to suggest that discovery revealed anything of a confidential or privileged

6 Background”—indulges in a three-page digression, reciting that Briggs has declared

9 characterized Braun as a “kneecap breaker,” that Briggs vilified Braun as someone

11 of confidential information). (Motion, pp. 2:16-3:20.) From those already misleading

15 “political pawns” to “heap unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression”

17 reference to any specific misconduct, of having “demonstrated a willingness to

23 opposition an extensive declaration from Briggs (and a corroborating declaration from

7 THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

10 respect to deposition testimony. (Motion, pp. 4:12-5:16.)

14 party [or] deponent . . . from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.”

19 dissemination of any given information should be preemptively restricted. (Nativi v.

24 281-282 [ruling that a declaration containing mere conclusions—like the declarations of

25 Karlin and Gersten here—was not sufficient to establish good cause].)

3 A. No Case Law Supports Issuance of a Protective Order in a Case Like This.

5 have issued protective orders to prevent pre-trial disclosure of information gathered

8 Cal.App.3d 888 (“Coalition”).) Those cases, however, involve extreme circums-tances

11 To explain, GT involved two newspaper publishers in litigation over the issue of

17 of Appeal affirmed, explaining that, otherwise, it “would invite misuse of antitrust

18 proceedings to obtain information about competitors or other legal proceedings to obtain

19 trade secrets or other confidential information.” (Id. at p. 755.) In less extreme

22 discovery,” and “to treat each in the appropriate manner.” (Ibid.)

26 300,000 pages of highly confidential documents relating to police procedures and, at

6 disseminate, all documents . . . which were disclosed or disseminated to the public

7 before the date of [the petition for writ of mandate].”

15 good cause and its request should thus be denied.

18 come close to satisfying that burden here.

19 B. The City’s Declarations Establish No Basis for a Protective Order.

3 Attorney.” (Gersten Dec., ¶¶ 3 and 4.)

14 conflicts of interests” or “deputies ordered to fabricate criminal charges against political

15 opponents.” (Karlin Dec. ¶¶ 1-16.) As with Gersten, Karlin makes no reference to

16 confidential information elicited at his deposition.

17 In sum, nothing in those declarations—or in the exhibits attached to Karlin’s

19 City’s—whether confidential or sensitive information is truly at stake, and whether there

28 an order in this case. There is no confidential information at stake, and there is no

6 motion seeking a protective order must be denied.

8 Dated: January 27, 2020 HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK LLP

3 I, STEVE PEACE, declare as follows:

5 A. Introduction and Summary.

6 1. I, Steve Peace, am over the age of eighteen. I have personal knowledge

8 matters if called as a witness.

9 2. I provide this declaration to corroborate the fact of Bill Evans’s apology

11 Briggs’s reputation, presumably in retaliation for Briggs’s legal challenge to City

12 and City-supported projects.

14 B. Evans Apologizes to Briggs

15 3. I was one of the representatives of John Moores when he was working

21 attorney Cory Briggs.

22 4. In late 2015, Bill Evans (accompanied by his hotel’s corporate lawyer)

Declaration of Steve Peace in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order

13 we’ve put you through.”

20 then got back into talking about Measure D.

23 the foregoing is true and correct.

Declaration of Steve Peace in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order