report no.

4/07

Performance of
European cross-
country oil pipelines
Statistical summary of
reported spillages in 2005
and since 1971
Prepared by the CONCAWE Oil Pipelines Management Group’s Special Task Force
on oil pipeline spillages (OP/STF-1)

P.M. Davis
J. Dubois
A. Olcese
F. Uhlig

J-F. Larivé (Technical Coordinator)

D.E. Martin (Consultant)

Reproduction permitted with due acknowledgement

© CONCAWE
Brussels
May 2007

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 report no. 4/07

ABSTRACT

CONCAWE has collected 35 years of performance data on Western European

cross-country oil pipelines, which currently comprise 34.8 thousand km transporting
789 million m3 per year of crude oil and oil products through a pipeline inventory
which was very similar to that in 2004. This report covers the performance of these
pipelines in 2005 and also shows how the pipeline system reported on has
developed. Incidents are analysed by cause and the effectiveness, cost and time for
clean-up are recorded. The 2005 performance was better than average for the last
35 years. As in 2004, fewer accidents were caused by third party activities than
previous years with mechanical failures the most common cause. The performance
over the whole 35 years is analysed and comparisons made of the different causes
of failure. The data on safety-related incidents are reported and the levels and
trends of spillage incidence, gross and net spillage volumes and the significant
features of individual cause categories: mechanical failure, operational, corrosion,
natural hazard and third party. Most European pipeline spillages are shown to have
been small and effects were generally localised and temporary. Moreover, integrity
is shown to be on an improving trend with spillage frequency over the period
reduced from 1.2 to 0.32 spillages per 1000 km of pipeline. The 2005 usage of
intelligence pigs is also reported and compared to previous years.

KEYWORDS

Clean-up, CONCAWE, intelligence pig, oil spill, performance, pipeline, safety, soil
pollution, spillage, statistics, trends, water pollution

INTERNET

This report is available as an Adobe pdf file on the CONCAWE website

(www.concawe.org).

NOTE
Considerable efforts have been made to assure the accuracy and reliability of the information
contained in this publication. However, neither CONCAWE nor any company participating in
CONCAWE can accept liability for any loss, damage or injury whatsoever resulting from the use
of this information.

This report does not necessarily represent the views of any company participating in
CONCAWE.

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 report no. 4/07

CONTENTS Page

SUMMARY V

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. PIPELINE INVENTORY, THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC 2

2.1. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE SURVEY 2
2.2. REPORTING COMPANIES 2
2.3. INVENTORY DEVELOPMENTS 1971-2005 3
2.3.1. Pipeline service, length and diameter 3
2.3.2. Age distribution 4
2.4. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC 5

3. PIPELINE SAFETY 7
3.1. FATALITIES AND INJURIES 7
3.2. FIRES 8

4. SPILLAGE PERFORMANCE IN THE LAST 5 YEARS 9

4.1. 2005 SPILLAGE INCIDENTS 9
4.1.1. Mechanical Failure 9
4.1.1.1. Construction Fault 9
4.1.1.2. Materials Fault 10
4.1.2. Operational 11
4.1.2.1. Systems Malfunction 11
4.1.2.2. Human Factors 11
4.1.3. Corrosion 11
4.1.3.1. External Corrosion 11
4.1.3.2. Internal Corrosion 12
4.1.4. Third party activity 12
4.1.4.1. Direct Damage - Accidental 12
4.1.4.2. Direct Damage - Malicious 13
4.1.4.3. Direct Damage - Incidental 13
4.2. 2001-2005 SPILLAGE OVERVIEW 13

5. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGES 1971-2005 15

5.1. NUMBERS AND FREQUENCY 15
5.2. SPILLAGE VOLUMES 18
5.2.1. Aggregated annual spilled volumes 18
5.2.2. Spillage volume per event 21
5.3. HOLE SIZE 23
5.4. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 25
5.4.1. Location of spillages 25
5.4.2. Ground area affected 25
5.4.3. Impact on water bodies 26
5.5. SPILLAGE DISCOVERY 26

6. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGE CAUSES 28

6.1. MECHANICAL FAILURE 28
6.2. OPERATIONAL 29
6.3. CORROSION AND IMPACT OF AGEING 29
6.4. NATURAL HAZARD 31
6.5. THIRD PARTY 31
6.5.1. Accidental damage 32

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 report no. 4/07

6.5.2. Intentional damage 35

6.5.3. Incidental damage 36

7. INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTIONS 37

7.1. INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTION ACTIVITY 37
7.2. ACTIVITY IN 2005 37
7.3. ACTIVITY SINCE 1971 37
7.4. REPEAT INSPECTIONS 39

8. REFERENCES 41

APPENDIX 1 DEFINITIONS 42

APPENDIX 2 SPILLAGE SUMMARY 43

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 report no. 4/07

SUMMARY

CONCAWE has collected data over a 35-year period on the performance of cross-
country oil pipelines in Western Europe with particular regard to spillages of 1 m3 or
more, the clean-up carried out and the environmental consequences. The results
have been published in annual reports since 1971. This report covers both the
results for the year 2005 and the analysis of the accumulated results for the whole
35 year period from 1971 to 2005.

Approximately seventy companies and other bodies operating oil pipelines in

Europe currently provide statistics for the CONCAWE annual report on the
performance of cross-country oil pipelines. These organisations operate some 250
different service pipelines, which, at the end of 2005, had a combined length of
34,826 km, slightly shorter than that for 2004 although the difference is mainly due
to corrections to the reported data. The volume transported in 2005 was 789 Mm3 of
crude oil and refined products, which is 7% less than in 2004. Total traffic volume in
2005 amounted to 127 x 109 m3 x km, 10.6% less than in 2004.

There were 11 reported oil spillages from pipelines during 2005. There were no
associated fires, fatalities or injuries. The gross spillage was 511 m3, equivalent to
0.65 parts per million (ppm) of the total volume transported. A total of 407 m3, i.e.
80% of the spillage was recovered or safely disposed of. The net oil loss into the
environment amounted therefore to 105 m3, or 0.13 ppm. Of the spillages, five
resulted from mechanical failure, two from operational causes, two from corrosion
and the last two resulting from third party activities.

This report also provides comparative data for the five-year period between 2001
and 2005 and for all reported incidents since 1971. In terms of numbers of spillages,
the 2005 performance was slightly better than average with eleven spillages
compared to the long-term average of 12.5 and 11.2 for the period 2001 to 2005.
Moreover, the system length is now much longer than in earlier years (reported
length in 1971 of 12,800 km). This means that the spillage frequency of 0.32
spillages per 1000 km per year was the same as the average over the last five
years but less than the long term average frequency of 0.52. The performance was
also good in terms of volume spilled. The gross spillage volume per 1000 km of
pipeline was 14.7 m3 per 1000 km compared to the long-term average of 89 m3 per
1000 km. Also included is the record of intelligence pig inspection activity in 2005
and the records since the technique was first used. In 2005, 109 inspections were
reported using some sort of intelligence pigs, covering over 6000 km of pipeline, the
greatest length of reported inspections in any year.

Pipelines constitute one of the main means of oil transport in Europe and are
considered to be one of the safest. Whereas major and sometimes repeated
accidents with large media exposure have occurred with road, rail and sea
transportation, nothing similar has happened with oil pipelines. Almost inevitably
though, with such a massive undertaking operating for 35 years, a handful of
incidents has occurred that have resulted in a small number of fatal injuries and
fires.

The system is ageing. Whereas in 1971 70% of it was 10 years old or less, by 2005
only 7% was 10 years old or less and 35% was over 40 years old. However, this so
far does not appear to have led to any increase in spillages.

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 report no. 4/07

Most pipeline spillages are very small and just over 5% of the spillages are
responsible for 50% of the gross volume spilled. Pipelines carrying hot oils such as
fuel oil have in the past suffered very severely from external corrosion due to design
and construction problems. Many have been shut down or switched to cold service.
The great majority of pipelines now carry unheated petroleum products and crude
oil.

The two most important causes of spillages have been third party incidents and
mechanical failure, with corrosion well back in third place and operational and
natural hazards making minor contributions. Third party accident frequency has
been significantly reduced progressively over the years. However, after having
made great progress reducing mechanical failure frequencies during the first 20
years, by the mid ‘90s it appeared that something of an upward trend could be
setting in.

Overall there is no evidence to show that the ageing of the pipeline system poses
any greater level of risk. The development and institution of new techniques, such
as internal inspection using intelligence pigs, hold out the prospect that pipelines
can continue reliable operations for the foreseeable future. Future monitoring of
CONCAWE pipeline performance statistics will be necessary to confirm the position.

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 report no. 4/07

1. INTRODUCTION

The CONCAWE Oil Pipelines Management Group (OPMG) has collected data on
the safety and environmental performance of oil pipelines in Europe since 1971.
Information on annual throughput and traffic, spillage incidents and intelligent pig
inspection activities are gathered yearly by CONCAWE via questionnaires sent out
to the pipeline operating companies early in the year following the reporting year.

CONCAWE has set a minimum spillage size at 1 m3 for reporting purposes (unless
there are exceptionally serious safety or environmental consequences to be reported
for a < 1 m3 spill). Direct comparison of different spillage data sets therefore need to
include careful consideration of the spill cut-off size.

The results have been analysed and published annually in a series of annual reports
[1,2] and in two summary reports [3,4] covering the years 1971 to 1995 and 1971 to
2000 respectively. CONCAWE has also held a number of seminars to disseminate
information throughout the oil pipeline industry on the developments in techniques
available to pipeline companies to help improve the safety, reliability and integrity of
their operations. These seminars have included reviews of spillage and clean-up
performances to cross communicate experiences so that all can learn from each
other’s incidents.

Aggregation and statistical analysis of the performance data provides objective

evidence of the trends and focuses attention on existing or potential problem areas
which helps operators to set priorities for future efforts.

The format and content of this report has been altered to include not only the 2005
performance, but also a full statistical analysis of the last 5 years and of the whole
35 years period from 1971 as well as essential information on all spillage incidents in
the database. From this year on, the format will be kept the same and each yearly
report will supersede the previous one. As usual, a general map of European land-
based oil pipelines is attached to this report. Link to map of Refineries and Oil
Pipelines in Western Europe.

Section 2 gives details of the pipeline inventory covered by the survey (length,
diameter, type of product transported) and how this has developed over the years.
Throughput and traffic data is also included.

Section 3 focuses on safety performance i.e. the number of fatalities and injuries
associated with pipeline failure incidents.

Section 4 gives a detailed analysis of the spillage incidents in 2005 and of all
incidents over the last 5 years. Section 5 analyses spillage incidents for the whole
reporting period since 1971 while section 6 provides a more detailed analysis of the
causes of spillage.

Finally section 7 gives an account of intelligence pig inspections.

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 report no. 4/07

2. PIPELINE INVENTORY, THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC

2.1. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE SURVEY

The definition of pipelines to be included in the CONCAWE inventory has remained

unchanged since 1971. These are pipelines

• Used for transporting crude oil or petroleum products,

• With a length of 2 km or more in the public domain,

• Running cross-country, including short estuary or river crossings but excluding

under-sea pipeline systems. In particular, lines serving offshore crude oil
production facilities and offshore tanker loading/discharge facilities are excluded.

• Pump station and intermediate storage facilities are included but origin and
destination terminal facilities and tank farms are excluded.

The geographical region covered was originally consistent with CONCAWE’s original
terms of reference i.e. OECD Western Europe, which then included 19 member
countries. However, Turkey was never covered. From 1971 to 1987, only pipelines
owned by oil industry companies were included but from 1988, non-commercially
owned pipeline systems (essentially NATO) were brought into the inventory.
Following the reunification of Germany, the pipelines in the former East Germany
(DDR) were added to the database from 1991. This was followed by crude and
product lines in the Czech Republic and Hungary and crude lines in Slovakia in 2001
and finally Slovakian product lines in 2003.

Although CONCAWE cannot guarantee that every single line meeting the above
criteria is actually covered, it is believed that most such lines operated in the
reporting countries are included.

It should be noted that all data recorded in this report and used for comparisons or
statistical analysis relate to the inventory reported on in each particular year and not
to the actual total inventory in operation at the time. Thus, year on year performance
comparisons must be approached with caution and relative numbers (e.g. per
1000 km of line) are more meaningful than absolute ones.

2.2. REPORTING COMPANIES

In 2005, 70 operating companies reported results. Some affiliates and other

operating entities of certain large companies are counted individually in these
numbers. The number of companies / non-industry bodies reporting data to
CONCAWE in 1971 was unrecorded but by 1980 approximately 70 companies
participated in the CONCAWE survey. This number has remained more or less
constant although several new companies have taken over pipelines, but others
have closed down or amalgamated with others.

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 report no. 4/07

2.3. INVENTORY DEVELOPMENTS 1971-2005

2.3.1. Pipeline service, length and diameter

Currently, there are some 250 pipeline systems recorded in the CONCAWE
database, reported in terms of some 664 discrete sections. The sections are further
classified according to their service i.e. the type of product transported, for which we
distinguish crude oil, white products, black products transported in heated lines and
other products. A few pipelines transport both crude oil and products. Although these
are categorised separately in the database they are considered to be in the crude oil
category for aggregation purposes. Finally some lines may be out of service in a
certain year without being permanently retired.

The CONCAWE survey covered 34,841 km in 2005. As shown in Figure 1, this

figure has been fairly stable in recent years. Most of the major pipelines were built in
the 60s and 70s. The two historical step increases in the "CONCAWE" inventory
occurred when systems previously not accounted for in the survey were added. In
the late 80s the majority of the NATO pipelines were included and in the early part of
this decade a number of former Eastern bloc systems joined the survey. The
increase was mostly in the "products" category, the main addition in the crude oil
category being the Friendship or "Druzba" system that feeds Russian crude into
Eastern European refineries

Figure 1 CONCAWE pipeline inventory and main service categories

40.0

Total
35.0 Crude
White products
HOTx10
30.0

25.0
'000 km

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

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 report no. 4/07

There are three pipeline service populations: crude oil, petroleum products (white
oils), both transported at ambient temperature and oils transported at elevated
temperature comprising hot crude oil, lubricating oils and heavy fuel oils (black oils).
These three populations are referred to as crude, product and "hot" in this report.

Figure 1 shows that the first two categories represent the bulk of the total inventory.
Between 1971 and 2005 some 166 pipeline sections totalling 7150 km were
permanently shutdown. Of these, 24 sections totalling 360 km were in hot service.
This is a much larger proportion of the hot inventory than for the other services and
reflects the decline in the heavy fuel oil business since the mid 1970s as well as
specific action taken by operating companies because of the corrosion problems
and generally poor reliability experienced with several of these pipelines (see
section 5.1).

Figure 2 shows the diameter distribution in 2005 for each category of use. In
general, the crude pipelines are significantly larger than the other two categories.
Some 88% of the crude pipelines are 16” (400 mm) or greater up to a maximum of
48” (1200 mm) whereas around 85% of the product and some 98% of the hot
pipelines are less than 16”. The smallest diameter product pipelines are typically 6”
(150 mm) although a very small number go down to 3” (75 mm).

Figure 2 Pipeline diameter distribution and service in 2005

100%

80%

60% >=30
24 - <30
16 - <24
12 - <16
8 - <12
40%
>8

20%

0%
Crude White products HOT

2.3.2. Age distribution

When the CONCAWE survey was first performed in 1971, the pipeline system was
comparatively new with some 70% being 10 years old or less. Although the age
distribution was quite wide, the oldest pipelines in the 26-30 year age bracket
represented only a tiny fraction of the inventory.

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 report no. 4/07

Over the years, a number of new pipelines have been commissioned while older
ones were taken out of service. As mentioned above existing lines were also added
to the inventory at various stages, contributing their specific age profile. Although
some short sections may have been renewed, there has been no large scale
replacement of existing lines. The development of the overall age profile is shown in
Figure 3.

The system has clearly been progressively ageing. By 2005, only some 2500 km,
i.e. 7.2% of the total, was 10 years old or less and some 12,300 km (36%) was over
40 years old. The impact of age on spillage performance is discussed in section 6.3.

Figure 3 Pipeline age distribution

100% 40.0

1-10
11-20 35.0
21-30
80% 31-40
41-50 30.0
51-60
60+
25.0
60%

'000 km
20.0

40%
15.0

10.0
20%

5.0

0% 0.0
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

2.4. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC

In total, 789 Mm3 of crude oil and refined products was transported through the
pipeline system in 2005, a 7% decrease from 2004. It should be realised however,
that this figure is only indicative. Large volumes of both crude and products pass
through more than one pipeline, and whilst every effort is made to only count the
flow once, the complexity of some pipeline systems is such that it is often difficult to
estimate what went where. Indeed, there are a few pipelines where the flow can be
in either direction. A more meaningful figure is the traffic volume which is the flow-
rate times the distance travelled. This is not affected by how many different pipelines
each parcel of oil is pumped through. In 2005, the total traffic volume was
127 x 109 m3 x km, a 10.6% decrease from 2004. For products alone however, the
throughput was 260 Mm3 and the traffic volume 37.4 x 109 m3 x km, both of which
are very similar to the 2004 figures of 257 Mm3 and 37.6 x 109 m3 x km.

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 report no. 4/07

Throughput and traffic are not significant factors for pipeline failures or spillages.
Although higher flow rates may lead to higher pressure, line deterioration through
metal fatigue is more directly related to pressure cycles than to the absolute
pressure level (as long as it remains within design limits). These figures are,
however, useful as a divider to express spillage volumes in relative terms (e.g. as a
fraction of throughput, see section 4), providing figures that can be compared with
the performance of other modes of oil transportation.

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 report no. 4/07

3. PIPELINE SAFETY

The CONCAWE database includes records of fatalities, injuries and fires related to
spillages. There were no such occurrences in 2005, neither were there any incidents
involving intentional damage.

3.1. FATALITIES AND INJURIES

Over the 35 reporting years there have been a total of 14 fatalities in five separate
incidents in 1975, 79, 89, 96 and 99. All but one of the fatalities occurred when
people were caught up in a fire following a spillage.

In three of these four fire cases the ignition was a delayed event hours or days after
the detection and demarcation of the spillage area had taken place. In one incident
involving a spillage of chemical feedstock naphtha 3 bystanders were engulfed in
fire, having themselves probably been the cause of ignition. In another incident
ignition of spilled crude oil occurred during attempts to repair the damaged pipeline.
The repairers escaped but the spread of the fire caught 4 people who had entered
inside the marked spillage boundary some distance away. The third incident also
involved a maintenance crew (5 people) carrying out repair activities following a
crude oil spill, none of whom escaped. These fatalities all occurred after the spillage
flows had been stemmed, during the subsequent incident management and
reinstatement period. It appears that the spillages themselves did not cause the
fatalities. Stronger management of spillage area security and working procedures
might well have prevented the fires and fatalities.

In just one case, fire ensued almost immediately when a bulldozer doing
construction work hit and ruptured a gasoline pipeline. A truck driver engaged in the
works received fatal injuries.

The single non-fire fatality was a person engaged in a theft attempt who was unable
to escape from a pit which he had dug to expose and drill into the pipeline. This
caused a leak that filled the pit with product in which the person drowned.

It is apparent that the casualties were not members of the general public going about
their normal activities in locations where they should have been allowed to be at the
time. Thus these occurrences should not be used out of context for any assessment
of societal risk inherent to oil pipeline operations.

Two spillage reports recorded a single non-fatal injury. Both resulted from inhalation
/ ingestion of oil spray/aerosol.

There has been no reported fatality or injury since 1999.

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3.2. FIRES

Apart from those mentioned above, five other fires are on record:

• A large crude oil spill near a motorway probably ignited by the traffic.

• A gasoline theft attempt in an untypical section of pipeline located on a pipe

bridge. The thieves may have deliberately ignited it.

• A slow leak in a crude production line in a remote country area found to be

burning when discovered. It could have been ignited purposely to limit the
pollution.

• A tractor and plough that had caused a gasoline spill caught fire, which also
damaged a house and a railway line.

• A mechanical digger damaged a gasoline pipeline and also an electricity cable,

which ignited the spill.

There were no casualties reported in any of these incidents.

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4. SPILLAGE PERFORMANCE IN THE LAST 5 YEARS

4.1. 2005 SPILLAGE INCIDENTS

A total of 11 spillage incidents were recorded in 2005. Table 1 gives a summary of

the main causes and spilled volumes and environmental impact. For definition of
categories of causes and gross/net spilled volume, see Appendix 1.

Table 1 Summary of causes and spilled volumes for 2005 incidents

Event Location Line size Product Injury Fire Spilled volume Contamination
(") spilled Fatality Gross Net loss Ground area Water
(1) (2) 3 2 (3)
(m ) m
Mechanical failure
426 Pump station 12 Diesel fuel - - 18.7 18.7 NA
427 Line 12 Jet fuel - - NA NA NA G
428 Line 20 Crude oil - - 350.0 10.0 15000 G
429 Line 6 Jet fuel - - 20.0 0.0 58 S
430 Line 6 Jet fuel - - 38.0 0.0 42 S
Operational
431 Line 10 Crude oil - - 30.0 4.2 1000 G
432 Line 8 Jet fuel - - 15.0 0.0 1000
Corrosion
433 Line 10 Jet fuel - - 3.0 0.6 50 S
434 Line 24 Crude oil - - 64.0 63.0 150 G
Third party activity
435 Line 8 Jet fuel - - 15.0 8.0 1000 G
436 Line 24 White prod. - - 0.5 0.0 3000 SG
Total 554.2 104.5
(1)
Spillage events are numbered from the beginning of the survey in 1971
(2)
I = Injury, F = Fatality
(3)
S = Surface water, G = Groundwater, P = Potable water

The circumstances of each spill including information on consequences remediation

and cost are described in the next section according to cause. Further details are
available in Appendix 2 which covers all spillage events recorded since 1971.

4.1.1. Mechanical Failure

There were five incidents resulting from mechanical failure, two caused by a
construction fault and three resulting from materials faults.

4.1.1.1. Construction Fault

Event 426:
A branch leading to a pressure relief valve on a 12” diesel fuel pipeline in a pump
station fractured although this piece of pipe was only one and a half years old. The
fracture was caused by vibration in a section of pipe which was not adequately
supported. Some 18.7 m3 of diesel fuel was spilled in an area of vines and orchards.
The leak was detected almost immediately by the pipeline operator and the pipeline
shut in. The spilled oil was absorbed using sepiolite so that the final state of the
ground was similar to that before the failure. Some 1500 € damage was caused to
nearby vines. The costs of repairs and clean-up were minimal at only 2000 €.

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 report no. 4/07

Event 427:
A 12” pipeline transporting jet fuel was exposed by a third party for them to carry out
construction work in an industrial area. They reported that the pipeline was leaking
and it was immediately shut in. The leak was found to be in a welded joint and was
caused by a defective weld. The length of time that the pipeline had been leaking is
unknown as is the volume of oil spilled although it is believed to be more than 1 m3.
The pipeline was shut in for 2 days while repairs were carried out and discussions
are ongoing as to the best way to clean up the pollution caused including to
groundwater.

4.1.1.2. Materials Fault

Event 428:
During normal operation of a 20” pipeline transporting crude oil, a sudden pressure
drop was observed. The automatic leak detection system reacted within three
minutes and a full manual shutdown was performed 22 minutes later. By the time the
system had de-pressured, some 350 m3 of oil had been spilled in a corn field. The
failed section of pipe was excavated, removed and replaced. Subsequent
investigation revealed a crack of 36 mm by 1 mm caused by a hidden metallurgical
defect from the pipe manufacture. To clean up the site, pits were dug down to the
groundwater table and crude oil collected from the water surface. In all, some
15,000 m2 of ground was affected. 220 m3 of oil was collected as liquid and it is
estimated that a further 120 m3 of oil was removed with contaminated soil leaving
about 10 m3 net loss. Clean-up took one year and a cost of 2,800,000 €, most of
which (2,500,000 €) was for the disposal of contaminated soil. The repairs to the
pipeline cost 200,000 € and took 6 days.

Events 429/430:
Two leaks occurred in the same pipeline, 7 km apart, within 3 months of each other.
Both incidents were caused by cracks forming in the defective pipe. In the first, the
leak was detected by routine monitoring by the operator and the line rapidly
shutdown. A crack 12 mm long was found and it was estimated that 20 m3 of diesel
had leaked into arable land and contaminated about 60 m2 of land. The clean up
involved the removal of nearly 4000 tonne of soil and took 75 days at a cost of
420,000 €. Repairs to the pipeline cost a further 7,500 €. There was slight
contamination of surface water. In the second incident, diesel oil was reported by a
third party to be leaking into a meadow, a ditch and two ponds. On investigation, a
crack 7 mm long was found and it was estimated that 38 m3 had leaked out and
contaminated some 42 m2 of land. The clean up involved the removal and disposal
of 2200 tonne of soil, took 21 days at a cost of 160,000 €. Repairs to the pipeline
cost 6,000 €. The pipeline had been inspected by a metal loss pig a month before
the first incident. This had revealed a large number of anomalies and a programme
to remediate these is under way.

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4.1.2. Operational

There were two incidents caused by operational factors, both attributable to human
factors.

4.1.2.1. Systems Malfunction

There were no incidents in this category in 2005.

4.1.2.2. Human Factors

Event 431:
A 10” crude oil pipeline was shut in for maintenance operations. The pipeline was
not completely emptied of crude oil so that when work was being carried out on a
valve, oil spilled out. This came out of the valve pit through the concrete walls
surrounding the valve. Around 15 m3 of oil was spilled of which 10 m3 was recovered
as liquid, the remaining 5 m3 being removed with contaminated soil for disposal.
Around 1000 m2 of ground was affected. Repairs to the pipeline were not necessary.
Clean-up took nearly four months at a cost of 150,000 € with a further 400,000 € for
disposal of contaminated soil.

Event 432:
A trench was being dug to access an 8.5” pipeline transporting jet fuel for
maintenance purposes. The site was near a road crossing where the pipeline was at
5 m below ground. So as to make the excavation safe, sheet steel piling was being
driven to support the trench. The position and depth of the pipeline had been
identified and the equipment operator had also been made aware of these and
measures had been agreed to protect the pipe. Nevertheless, the pipeline was holed
by the sheet piling. The incident occurred in agricultural land and the piling made a
350 mm x 2 mm gash in the pipe. The incident was detected by the automatic
detection system but by the time the pipeline had been shut in, some 30 m3 of oil
had been spilled. This impacted groundwater but not surface or drinking water
supplies and some 1000 m2 of soil was contaminated. As well as removal of
contaminated soil, wells have been drilled and pumping undertaken to depress the
groundwater surface so that oil can be recovered. This process was still in operation
after 6 months, by which time the majority of the oil had been recovered, i.e. 25 m3
by pumping, and 0.8 m3 in contaminated soil. The net loss is thus some 4.2 m3.
Costs so far have been 10,000 € for repairs to the pipeline, 50,000 € for the bore
hole pumping and 940,000 € for disposal of contaminated soil making a total cost of
1,000,000 €.

4.1.3. Corrosion

There were two incidents resulting from corrosion, one each from internal and
external corrosion.

4.1.3.1. External Corrosion

Event 433:
While pressure testing a 10” pipeline with jet fuel, a flange blew out in a depot and
this was presumed to be the cause of the pressure drop. The line was depressured
to repair the flange but 10 days later, a third party reported oil coming to the surface
in a derelict oil depot. It was estimated that approximately 3 m3 of oil was spilt. The

11
 report no. 4/07

area of ground affected by oil was about 50 m2 and some 15 m3 of oily soil was
removed for disposal. Ten days after the spill, oil was observed on the surface of
water in a ditch adjacent to the pipeline and this was reported to the authorities.
Absorbents were used in the ditch and drainage sumps were dug between the
pipeline and ditch and oil was collected from these by vacuum tanker. By these
means, about 2.4 m3 was recovered as liquid leaving a net loss of 0.6 m3.
Excavation revealed a 3mm by 3mm hole caused by external corrosion under the
coal tar coating. A clamp has been fitted to the pipeline as a temporary repair but full
replacement of the defective section is planned. The temporary repair cost
100,000 €, the clean-up cost 120,000 € and took three and a half months; disposal
of contaminated soil cost 5,000 € giving a total cost of 225,000 €.

4.1.3.2. Internal Corrosion

Event 434:
A leak of crude oil from a pipeline in a terminal was discovered by the pipeline staff
when oil appeared on the surface of the ground. The leak was on a length of 24”
pipe connecting two main pipelines. However, it had been out of service since 1986
when one of the main pipelines had been mothballed. The routine annual pressure
testing of the whole system the day before the leak was detected presumably
caused the failure of a corrosion defect which had been forming for some time. In
the area of the leak, the pipeline is actually lying in the water table. Therefore, the oil
could not soak down into the ground. As a result, almost all of the 64 m3 spilled
could be recovered by pumping and 62.5 m3 was collected in this way. It is
estimated that a further 0.5 m3 was disposed of with contaminated soil leaving
perhaps only 1 m3 lost to the ground, all within the confines of the terminal. About
150 m2 of ground was affected. Repairs to the pipeline cost 120,000 € and took one
day. The clean-up cost 50,000 € with a further 200,000 € for disposal of
contaminated soil. Total costs were 370,000 €.

4.1.4. Third party activity

There were two incidents resulting from third party activity, one in the accidental
damage category and the other in the incidental damage category.

4.1.4.1. Direct Damage - Accidental

Event 436:
An excavator operating without authority over the route of an 8” pipeline, and despite
near-by pipeline markers, dug a trench just over the pipeline. The blade carved a
gouge 10 cm long by 1 cm wide in the top of the pipe. The pipeline immediately
ruptured, but fortunately, the point of impact was only 100 m upstream of a non-
return valve. The automatic oil spill protection system immediately shut down the
pipeline thus limiting the spillage to 15 m3 of jet fuel. However, the spillage was in a
very sensitive area inside a National Park. Of the spilled oil, 7 m3 was recovered
giving a net loss of 8 m3 to soil and groundwater. The area of ground affected was
1000 m2. The pipeline was repaired and returned to service within one day. This cost
200,000 €, the initial clean-up cost 1,850,000 €, disposal of contaminated soil cost
406,000 € giving a total cost of 2,456,000 €. However, the final clean-up remains to
be done and the plans for this have to be approved by the Authorities. It is proposed
that this will include a skimmer system and “bio-sparging” to recover pollution from
the water table and further removal of contaminated soil.

12
 report no. 4/07

4.1.4.2. Direct Damage - Malicious

There were no incidents in this category in 2005.

4.1.4.3. Direct Damage - Incidental

Event 437:
A landowner observed oil in a meadow and reported this to the pipeline operator.
The pipeline was shut in and the pipeline exposed when it was found that there was
a drain which had been installed crossing over the pipeline. The drain laying
machine had cut a notch in the pipe and this had developed into a crack some
800 mm long. It was estimated that only 0.45 m3 of product had escaped. This would
normally not be included in the CONCAWE statistics but in this case, there were
significant environmental impacts. Because of the high water table, both ground and
surface water were affected and some 3000 m2 of ground contaminated.
1600 tonnes of soil were removed and 300 tonnes of water removed and a further
4400 m3 of water treated in an oil water separator. As a result, all traces of oil were
removed. Repairs to the pipeline took 35 hours and cost 120,000 €. The clean-up
cost 170,000 € and took 80 days.

4.2. 2001-2005 SPILLAGE OVERVIEW

2005 was only slightly better than average for spillages with eleven spillages
reported compared to the average since CONCAWE records began of 12.5 per year
and 11.5 over the five year period 2001 to 2005.

Table 2 shows the spillage performance for the 2001-2005 5-year period. Of the 57
spillages recorded for the period, 54 caused some temporary environmental
pollution. 10 spillages affected surface waters and 9 affected groundwater but only
one of these had any impact on potable water supplies.

In terms of spillage volumes, 2005 was much better than the average for 2001 to
2005 with a total of 511 m3 gross spillage (2001-2005 average 1363 m3) and a net
loss of 105 m3 (2001-2005 average 457 m3) although volumes for one spillage were
not known. The gross spillage volume was 14.7 m3 per 1000 km (long term average
89 m3 per 1000 km) and represents 0.65 ppm of the annual throughput. Compared
to the average for these five years, 2005 had more spillages caused by mechanical
failures and operational failures but less caused by third parties.

Although some cost data is included for most spill events, we do not feel it is
appropriate to try and compare such figures. Cost data, particularly remediation
costs, are very case-specific depending on local circumstances, topography,
geo/hydro-logy as well as local legislation. They are not always fully reported for e.g.
confidentiality of legal reasons. Also remediation costs can occur over long periods
of time and are not always fully known for recent spills. Attempting to draw statistical
conclusions from such data would be futile and possibly misleading.

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 report no. 4/07

Table 2 Five-year comparison by cause, volume and impact: 2001 – 2005

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001‑ 2005

3
Combined Length km x 10 34.9 34.8 35.4 34.6 34.9 34.9
3 6
Combined Throughput m x 10 708 724 817 847 789
3 9
Combined traffic volume m x km x 10 131 125 143 142 127
Spillage incidents 15 14 12 5 11 57
MECHANICAL FAILURE
Construction 2 1 2 2 7
Material 3 1 1 3 8
OPERATIONAL
System 2 2
Human
CORROSION
External 2 5 1 1 9
Internal 1 1 2
Stress corrosion cracking 1 1
NATURAL HAZARD
Subsidence
Flooding
Other 1 1
THIRD PARTY ACTIVITY
Accidental 3 4 4 2 1 14
Malicious 4 1 4 9
Incidental 1 2 1 4
3 * * Average
Volume spilled m
Gross spillage 1150 2185 2834 138 554 1372
Net loss 180 318 1309 26 105 388
Average gross loss / incident 77 156 236 34 55 120
Average net loss / incident 12 23 109 7 10 34
Average gross loss/1000 km 33 63 80 4 16 `
Average net loss/1000 km 5 9 37 1 3 11
Gross spillage per cause
Mechanical failure 853 10 30 48 427 273
Operational 0 0 0 0 45 9
Corrosion 113 493 2 0 67 135
Natural hazard 0 250 0 0 0 50
Third party activity 184 1432 2802 90 15 905
Net loss distribution
(No of incidents)
< 10 11 7 4 3 2 27
11 -100 4 6 7 1 7 25
101- 1000 1 1 2
> 1000 m
3 1 1
Environmental impact
NONE 2 1 3
SOIL
< 1000 m
2 13 5 10 1 5 34
> 1000 m
2 2 7 2 4 5 20
WATER BODIES
Surface Water 3 4 3 10
Groundwater 1 1 1 6 9
POTABLE WATER 1 1 2
* Volume from one spillage incident not reported

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 report no. 4/07

5. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGES 1971-2005

5.1. NUMBERS AND FREQUENCY

Over the 35 year survey period there have been 436 spillage incidents i.e. an
average of 12.5 per year. 67 of these spillages occurred in "hot" pipelines, a
disproportionately large proportion in regard of the share of such pipelines in the
total inventory.

Figure 4 shows the number of spillages per year, moving average and 5-year
average trends over the 35 years since 1971 and for all pipelines. There is a clear
long-term downward trend which bears witness to the industry improved control of
pipeline integrity. The overall moving average has reduced about 18 spillages per
year in the early 1970s to 12.5 by 2005. The moving average increases in the late
‘80s to early ‘90s and again in the early 2000 are partly linked to the additions to the
pipeline inventory monitored. The largest number of spillages recorded in any one
year was 21 in 1972 and the smallest number was 5 in 2004.

Figure 4 35-year trend of the annual number of spillages (all pipelines)

25

Yearly
Running average
20 5-year moving average
Spillages per year

15

10

0
71

73

75

77

79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

The large changes in the inventory monitored by CONCAWE over the year clearly
make the absolute numbers difficult to interpret. The spillage frequency i.e. number
of spills per unit length of pipeline is therefore a better metric. Figure 5 shows the
same data as figure 4, now expressed in spillages per 1000 km of pipeline and the
steady downward trend appears much more clearly. The 5-year frequency moving
average has been reduced from around 1.1 in the mid 70s to around 0.3 spills per
year and per 1000 km of pipeline today.

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 report no. 4/07

Figure 5 35-year trend of the spillage frequency (all pipelines)

1.4

Yearly
1.2
Running average
5-year moving average
Spillages per year per '000 km

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
71

73

75

77

79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20
These overall figures mask the poor performance of hot pipelines (related to
corrosion issues, see section 5.1), particularly in the early part of the period. This is
illustrated in Figure 6 which compares the spillage frequency for hot and cold
pipelines.

Figure 6 5-year moving average of spillage frequency (hot and cold pipelines)

14.0

12.0
HOT
Cold x 10
Spillages per year per '000 km

10.0

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

0.0
71

73

75

77

79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05
19

19

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19

19

19

20

20

20

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 report no. 4/07

Clearly, the cold and the hot pipelines have demonstrated entirely different
behaviours. Figures 7 & 8 show the evolution over 5-year periods of the spillage
frequency for hot and cold pipelines respectively, now broken down into main cause.

The hot pipeline spillage frequency starts from a much higher base than is the case
for the cold pipelines, with a very large proportion of failures due to corrosion. In the
1970s and early ‘80s, due to design and construction deficiencies several hot
pipelines suffered repeated external corrosion failures and they were shutdown or
switched to clean (cold) product service. These actions have greatly contributed to
the performance improvement which has been remarkable. The recent hot pipelines
spillage frequency is still about on a par with what the product pipelines achieved
back in 1971-75. It has to be noted that the statistical data have become less
significant in recent years as the inventory of hot pipelines has steadily decreased.
There was just one hot corrosion spillage in 2001-2005 from a now low total length
of hot pipelines.

When the hot pipeline data are excluded, the cold pipelines show a somewhat
slower improvement trend than the all pipelines data. Still the incidence of spillages
has been reduced by two thirds over the last 35 years. This statistic best represents
the performance improvement achieved by the operators of the bulk of the pipeline
system.

Figure 7 Hot pipelines spillage frequencies by cause

100% 14.0

12.0
80%
Spills per year per '000 km

10.0
3rd party
60% Natural
8.0
Corrosion
Operational
6.0 Mechanical
40%
All causes

4.0

20%
2.0

0% 0.0
1971 - 1976 - 1981 - 1986 - 1991 - 1996 - 2001 -
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Albeit with fluctuations, the analysis by cause (Figure 8) shows that corrosion is a
much less prevalent cause of failure for cold pipelines. There is a slight relative
decrease of all causes except third party activities which has been somewhat
increasing and is the most important cause of spillage. A more complete analysis of
causes is given in section 6.

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 report no. 4/07

Figure 8 Cold pipelines spillage frequencies by cause

100% 1.0

80% 0.8

Spills per year per '000 km

3rd party
60% 0.6 Natural
Corrosion
Operational
40% 0.4 Mechanical
All causes

20% 0.2

0% 0.0
1971 - 1976 - 1981 - 1986 - 1991 - 1996 - 2001 -
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

5.2. SPILLAGE VOLUMES

5.2.1. Aggregated annual spilled volumes

Figure 9 shows the total gross spillage volume over the complete period, year by
year and in terms of running and 5-year moving average. The same data is shown
per 1000 km of pipeline in Figure 10 and as a proportion of throughput in Figure 11.
Although there are fairly large year-to-year variations mostly due to a few very large
spills that have occurred randomly over the years, the long-term trend is clearly
downwards. Over the last 5 years, the gross pipeline spillage has averaged about
2 parts per million (ppm), or 0.0002%, of the oil transported.

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 report no. 4/07

Figure 9 Gross spillage volume

7000
Yearly
6000 Running average
5-year moving average

5000

4000
3
m

3000

2000

1000

0
71

73

75

77

79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20
Figure 10 Gross spillage volume per 1000 km

350
Yearly
Running average
300 5-year moving average

250

200
3
m

150

100

50

0
71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20

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 report no. 4/07

Figure 11 Gross yearly spillage volume as a proportion of throughput

12
Yearly total 5-year moving average

10

8
ppm

0
71

73

75

77

79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20
It might be expected that the trend in the differences between the annual gross
volume spillage and the net volume spillage, i.e. the recovered spillage, would
indicate the degree of success in improving clean-up performance. In practice this is
not a very sound proposition. For one thing, maximum removal by excavation of
spilled oil, which is biodegradable, is not necessarily the correct response to
minimise environmental damage and this is now better understood than it once was.
Another compounding factor is that the growth in the pipeline inventory has been
predominantly for refined product pipelines and it can be assumed that less invasive
recovery techniques are justified for white oil products than for fuel oil or crude oil to
achieve a given visual and environmental standard of clean-up. The development of
annual recovery percentages (gross-minus-net / gross) shown in Figure 12
indicates no significant trend. Over the whole period, the average recovery of the
spilled oil is 56% leaving an average net loss of oil to the environment of 73 m3 per
spill.

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 report no. 4/07

Figure 12 Spilled oil recovery

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
71

73

75

77

79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20
5.2.2. Spillage volume per event

The gross volume released is a measure of the severity of a spillage incident.

Figure 13 shows that, beyond the large year-by-year variations, there is no clear
long term trend in the average spill size by incident. In other words, the gradual
reduction of the annual total spilled volume is related to the reduction of the number
of spillage incidents rather than their severity. This is partly due to the mix of spillage
causes changing over the years, e.g. the proportion of corrosion spillages, which on
average are smaller ones, have decreased relative to third party spillages which are
among the largest (see Figure 14).

The average annual figure in the last 5 years has consistently been around 100 m3
per spill compared to the long term average of 166 m3 per spill. It remains to be seen
whether this improvement will continue but it can be expected that improved
monitoring of pipelines and the generalised use of automated leak detection systems
should lead to a reduction in spill sizes. There is insufficient data on record to
establish any trend in the speed of detection or the response time to stem leakages.

Figure 14 shows the average spill size for each cause category. The largest
spillages on average have resulted from mechanical failure, third party activities and
natural hazards whereas operational problems and corrosion have caused smaller
spills. As a rule of thumb, on average the three ‘largest spills’ categories result in
spillages that are twice the size of the two ‘smallest spills' categories.

21
 report no. 4/07

Figure 13 Yearly average gross spillage volume per event

350

300

250

200
3
m

150

100

50

0
71

73

75

77

79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

Figure 14 35-year average gross spillage volume per event by cause 20

250

200

150
3
m

100

50

0
Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party

22
 report no. 4/07

Figure 15 shows the distribution of spillage sizes, demonstrating that less than 20%
of all spillages account for 80% of the cumulative volume spilled. Clearly a majority
of the spillages recorded in the CONCAWE database were so small that they have
only had a very limited and localised impact. This also highlights the importance of
considering the cut-off spillage size before comparing data sets taken from different
sources.

Figure 15 Distribution of Gross and net spillage sizes (over 35 years)

100%
% of cumulative volume spilled/lost

80%

Gross spillage volume

60% Net loss

40%

20%

0%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
% of spillage events

5.3. HOLE SIZE

The following arbitrary definitions have been adopted for classifying hole size:

• Pinhole = less than 2 mm x 2 mm,

• Fissure = 2 to 75 mm long x 10% max wide,
• Hole = 2 to 75 mm long x 10% min wide,
• Split = 75 to 1000 mm long x 10% max wide,
• Rupture = >75 mm long x 10% min wide.

Out of the 436 pipeline spillages, hole size data is only available for 176 (40%). The
corresponding statistics are shown in Table 3.

23
 report no. 4/07

Table 3 Distribution of spillages by hole size

Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture Overall

Number 22 26 74 27 44 193
11% 13% 38% 14% 23% 100%
Surface area mm
2

Average 0.8 43 460 8,419 128,405 30,634

min 0.01 0.5 2 16 1,600
Max 1 350 3600 81,000 3,150,000
Average Gross spillage volume m
3 65 274 97 130 284 164
Spillage volume / Hole area 3
m /mm
2 84 6.4 0.21 0.015 0.002 0.005
Hole cause category
Mech. Failure 9% 27% 12% 26% 11% 16%
Operational 0% 4% 1% 11% 5% 4%
Corrosion 77% 27% 28% 33% 10% 30%
Natural hazard 5% 4% 0% 7% 2% 3%
Third party 9% 38% 58% 22% 74% 48%
Hole type by cause category
Mech. Failure 7% 23% 30% 23% 17% 100%
Operational 0% 14% 14% 43% 29% 100%
Corrosion 29% 12% 36% 16% 7% 100%
Natural hazard 20% 20% 0% 40% 20% 100%
Third party 2% 11% 46% 6% 34% 100%

As expected, pinholes result in the smallest spillages and ruptures in the largest. For
the other three categories, other factors are clearly more important as determinants
of the spillage outcome.

Pinholes are nearly always caused by corrosion. Mechanical incidents often result in
ruptures whilst operational and natural hazard incidents tend to cause more than
their share of splits. Otherwise hole types follow similar patterns to the cause
incidences.

A majority of mechanical, operational and natural hazard incidents cause the largest
two types of hole whereas third party is equally divided and the corrosion
preponderance is with the smaller hole types.

It would be expected that the larger the hole the larger on average the spillage would
be, on the proviso that the pipeline was pumping i.e. not static at the time of the
incident. The two rather obvious reasons for this are that higher leakage rates come
out of larger holes and the hole sizes are to an extent related to the pipeline
diameter which in turn tends to set the potential flow rate available for leakage.
However, there are many other factors involved including the pressure in the
pipeline, the length of time between the start of leakage and the leak being detected
and the pipeline shut in, and the volume of pipe available to leak after shut in. The
table above shows that there is indeed a weak relationship between the average
gross spillage size and the hole size.

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 report no. 4/07

5.4. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

5.4.1. Location of spillages

We differentiate between failures occurring either in a pipeline proper or in pumping

stations and also record the type of land use in the area. Not surprisingly, most
incidents (86%) occur in the pipeline themselves. The type of location has been
reported for a total of 353 spillages.

Table 4 Location of spillage incidents

Pipeline Pump station / manifold

Number % Number %
Commercial/Industrial 69 24% 52 78%
Residential 15 5% 2 3%
Agricultural 198 69% 13 19%
Forest/Mountain 5 2% 0 0%
Surface water 0 0% 0 0%
Sub-total 287 67
Unspecified 76 6
Total 363 73

Whereas we do not have statistics of the length of pipeline installed for each land
use type it is clear that the number of spillages in commercial and industrial areas is
much higher than would be expected from consideration of installed length alone.
Evidently, the vulnerability of the pipelines is significantly increased in such areas by
a factor of possibly as much as ten compared to other areas. The bulk of the
spillages from pump stations occur in industrial areas simply because their location
is mostly classified as such.

5.4.2. Ground area affected

The current CONCAWE performance questionnaire, in use with minor changes

since 1983, requests reporting of the area of ground (m2) affected by the spillage.
Before that date, area data were reported infrequently. Out of the 436 recorded
spillages, area data is available for 232 (53%). For these events, the percentages
that fall within the area ranges are shown in Figure 16 together with the average
spill size for each category.

If we exclude the one spillage that affected more than 100,000 m2, and for which the
gross spillage was relatively modest, there is a direct relationship between spill size
and area affected. Bigger spillage volumes affect larger areas.

This relationship is, however, to some extent fortuitous. There are two ways in which
small spillage volumes can affect larger areas of ground. Fine sprays directed
upwards can be spread around by winds. This factor tends to be more prevalent in
the smaller area ranges. Other smaller spillages can be spread over larger areas by
the influence of groundwater or surface water flows. This is the main mechanism by
which relatively small spillages can affect very large areas. Conversely,
comparatively large spillages, particularly those that occur over extended periods of

25
 report no. 4/07

time and in the lower quadrants of the pipeline circumference, can have their main
effect underground with relatively little impact on the surface. Porous ground and hot
arid conditions can also lead to the surface consequences being limited.

Figure 16 Ground area (m2) affected by spillages (% of number reporting)

3
172 m
0.4% 9.4%
11.2%

3 3
698 m 25 m Size of contaminated
2
area (m )
17.6%
<10
3
42 m 10-99
3
100-999
24.9% 198 m 1000-9999
10,000-99,999
>=100,000

3
77 m

36.5%

5.4.3. Impact on water bodies

The spillage reports record the incidents where oil pollution of the water table and
underground aquifers and surface watercourses has had consequences for the
abstraction of potable water. Some 14 spillages, representing 3.2% of the total, have
had some effect. It is believed that all of these effects have been temporary. For the
last five years, impacts on other types of water have been reported. In the years
2001 to 2005, of the 57 reported spillages, 10 have affected surface water, 8 have
affected ground water but only 2 have impacted potable water supplies.

5.5. SPILLAGE DISCOVERY

The way in which the occurrence of a spillage was detected is reported in nine
categories (Table 5). The pattern for spillages from pump stations differs from that
from pipelines.

The most common means of detection of pipeline spillages was third party passer-by
(45%) who warned of spillages that on average were about 60% of the average size.
Pipeline instrumentation, measurement and control systems were involved in
detecting only 28% of the spillages.

Pipeline company resources detected some 84% of the pump station spillages.
When third party have detected spillages, 16% of the total, the spills have tended on

26
 report no. 4/07

average to be the smaller ones; presumably those that are below the warning
capabilities of the instrumentation.

Table 5 Discovery of spillages

Pipeline Pump station / manifold

Number % Average Number % Average
gross spillage gross spillage
3 3
m m
Right of way survey by p/l staff 32 9% 232 0 0% 0
Routine monitoring by p/l staff 69 19% 364 24 33% 111
Maintenance staff 17 5% 187 21 29% 33
Pressure testing 23 6% 129 1 1% 30
Automatic detection system 34 9% 167 10 14% 49
Third party 185 51% 127 17 23% 36
Pipeline internal inspection survey 3 1% 6 0 0% 0
Total 363 187 73 62

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 report no. 4/07

6. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGE CAUSES

CONCAWE classifies spill causes into five major categories: mechanical failure,
operational, corrosion, natural hazard and third party, themselves divided into sub-
categories. Definitions are given in Appendix 1. The survey returns provide more
details information on the actual cause and circumstances of failure and these are
analysed in this section.

As already discussed in section 5, the main causes of failure are very different for
hot and cold pipelines and this further illustrated in Figure 17. Whereas 82% of hot
pipeline failures are related to corrosion, the figure is only 19% for cold pipelines for
which mechanical and mostly third party related failures are the most prevalent.

Figure 17 Distribution of major spillage causes

Hot pipelines Cold pipelines

7% 6% 1%
4%
28%
Mechanical Mechanical
Operational 42% Operational
Corrosion Corrosion
Natural Natural
3rd party 3rd party
8%

3% 19%
82%

Total: 67 incidents Total: 369 incidents

6.1. MECHANICAL FAILURE

There have been 106 mechanical failures, 24% of the total of 436 spillage events.
This is an average of about 3 spillages per year. 40 failures were due to construction
faults and 66 to material faults.

The most common causes of mechanical failures are illustrated in Figure 18.

It should be noted that by definition the dents that cause mechanical failure have to
have been made during the pipeline’s construction. Dents made subsequently that
eventually lead to spillages are categorised as third party.

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 report no. 4/07

Figure 18 Causes of mechanical failures

60

50

40
Gasket / Gland
No. of Spillages

Other
Faulty Material
30
Weld Faults
Dents

20 Other
Above Ground

10

0
Pipeline Line Valves Flanges / Fittings Pump Station

Although there is no available figure on it, by far the greatest part of the material in
place in the pipeline system is the underground pipe itself. The fact that only 53 out
of the 106 spillages occurred in these underground sections indicates that the most
vulnerable features from a mechanical standpoint are pipeline valves, flanges and
other fittings and the pump stations. Adding seemingly useful features such as more
section block valves, instrument connections, sampling systems can therefore
potentially have a negative impact on spillage frequency. Wherever possible, these
more vulnerable features should be designed out of the pipeline system.

There is no evidence of any increase in those mechanical failures that are potentially
age-related, such as metal fatigue failures of pipelines under cycling pressure
conditions. If any such pipelines exist, they are only a very small part of the inventory
and the zero spillage record shows that no pipeline has reached an age where
repeat failures are being experienced.

6.2. OPERATIONAL

There have been 31 spillages in this category (21 human errors and 10 system
failures), i.e. just under 1 per year or 7% of the total. Except for their propensity to
cause smallish sized spillages, there is no general trend apparent.

6.3. CORROSION AND IMPACT OF AGEING

There have been 125 spillages in this category i.e. 3.6 per year and 29% of the total.
As noted earlier though, 54 of these occurred in the more vulnerable hot pipelines
and in the early years. For cold pipelines corrosion causes represent only 19% of the
total. The events have been subdivided into external and internal corrosion and, 10

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 report no. 4/07

years ago, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) was introduced as an extra category.
The number of spillages in each sub-category and the resulting average spilled
volumes are shown in Table 6.

Table 6 Corrosion-related spillages

Hot Cold All Average spilled volume

Number Gross Net loss
3
m
External 53 46 99 76 179
Internal 1 21 22 179 546
SCC 0 4 4 546 151

Internal corrosion is much less prevalent than external corrosion. Some 73% of the
cold pipeline internal corrosion incidents occurred in crude oil service although crude
pipelines only account for less than a third of the cold pipeline inventory. Thus crude
pipelines appear to be much more vulnerable to internal corrosion than product
pipelines. Only one of the pipelines suffering a spill reported that inhibitor was used,
one did not report and the other 20 did not use inhibitors.

External corrosion resulted in smaller sized spills than any of the other causes
except for operational. The figure is higher for internal corrosion but it is heavily
weighted by a single event where 2000 m3 were spilled.

Although there have only been four SCC-related spillages so far (including one re-
categorised from external corrosion), they have been relatively large spillages,
possibly as a result of the more severe failures resulting from this type of corrosion.

Out of all the possible combinations of pipeline service and corrosion categories
three are particularly useful to highlight specific aspects: cold pipelines external and
internal corrosion, hot pipelines external corrosion; and all pipelines internal
corrosion.

In a gradually ageing pipeline inventory, increased occurrence of corrosion is a

concern which is addressed by pipeline operators through the use of increasingly
sophisticated inspections techniques. As already mentioned in section 5.1 the
failure frequency of hot pipelines, mostly related to corrosion, has fallen dramatically
over the years. Figure 19 shows no evidence of any increasing trend in corrosion
failures of cold pipelines. If anything, the rate has decreased.

Out of the 71 corrosion-related failures in cold pipelines, 24 were related to special

features such as road crossings, anchor points, sleeves, etc. which therefore appear
particularly vulnerable.

It is anticipated that inspections using intelligence pigs should improve this situation.
This should prevent any occurrence of ‘end of life takeoff’ in spillage numbers.
Indeed, there is the strong prospect of further reducing corrosion spillage incidents
by catching the corrosion before it gets too far advanced.

30
 report no. 4/07

Figure 19 Corrosion-related spillage frequency (all types) for cold pipelines

(5-year moving average)

0.16

0.14
Spillages per year per '000 km

0.12

0.10

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02

0.00
71

73

75

77

79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20
There is therefore no evidence as yet to suggest that generalised corrosion is
becoming a problem. There is, of course no guarantee that this will not start to
happen at some point and thus there is a need for continued monitoring of
performance on this basis. Inspection methods involving intelligence pigs are now
available to monitor pipeline condition and early identification of the onset of
corrosion. These techniques together with the general adoption of integrity
management systems by all EU pipeline companies should ensure that any upturn in
age-related spillages is prevented or delayed for many years.

6.4. NATURAL HAZARD

Natural hazards have caused only 15 spillages, 10 of which were due to landslides
or subsidence, 2 to flooding and 3 to other hazards. This category contributes 3.44%
of the total number of spillages. The resulting spillage volume was 2921 m3 gross,
104 m3 net, 3.4% of the gross spillage and 3.2% of the net spillage totals from all
causes. The natural hazard- caused spill sizes are 195 m3 gross, 68 m3 net per spill,
i.e. very close to the overall average spill sizes.

No less than 10 of the natural hazards spills have occurred in the same country. This
appears to be a direct consequence of the difficult terrain and hydrological
conditions that apply to a significant part of that country’s pipeline network.

6.5. THIRD PARTY

Third parties have caused the largest number of spillages with 159 events, an
average of 4.5 per year and over 36% of the total. 114 events were accidental, 19

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 report no. 4/07

were intentional (mostly theft attempts) and 26 were incidental i.e. resulted from prior
damage inflicted to the pipeline by a third party at some point in the past. As
discussed in section 5 third party activities also result in relatively large spills and
account for the largest total volume spilled of all causes.

6.5.1. Accidental damage

The most common causes of accidental third party spills are shown in Figure 20 and
their sizes are shown in Figure 21.

Figure 20 Causes of accidental third party spills

40

35

30
No. of Spillages

25 Other
Ploughing
20 Digging
Bulldozing
15 Drilling

10

0
g

ry

er
e
n

g
in

io
nc
io

in

th
us
rm

ct
ct

ch

na

O
ru
nd
ru

Fa

en

te

st
st

I
n
Tr

on
er
on

ai

th

C
M
C

e
d

lin
oa

lin

pe
pe
R

Pi
Pi

Only two events were not caused by direct damage from some form of digging or
earth moving machinery. In one case an electrical earthing deficiency had arisen on
a pipeline with no previous problem as a consequence of the electrification of an
adjacent electric railway line. In the other, an electricity pylon fell over and one of the
arms punctured a pipeline.

Damage by machinery occurs as a combination of lack of communication and

awareness and lack of care or skill. Pipeline operators are not always made aware
of impending ground working jobs and cannot therefore supply appropriate advice
on exact pipeline location and working procedures and exercise adequate
supervision of the work. Even when good communication has been established
between the pipeline operator and the third party company, the actual machinery
operator may be left partially or completely unaware of a pipeline's existence or fail
to apply the requisite care or skill.

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 report no. 4/07

Figure 21 Average spillage volumes per spill by type of third party activity causing
spillage

300

250

200

Recovered
3

150
m

Net loss

100

50

0
g

ry

er
e
n

g
in

io
nc
io

in

th
us
rm

ct
ct

ch

na

O
ru
nd
ru

Fa

en

te

st
st

I
n
Tr

on
er
on

ai

th

C
M
C

e
d

lin
oa

lin

pe
pe
R

Pi
Pi

Figure 22 shows the awareness data (reported for 79% of the third party-related
spillages) as the percentage of cases where each party was aware of either the
impending activity (pipeline operator) or the presence of a pipeline (machinery
operator). It should be noted that there are no instances where the pipeline operator
was aware of the works but the machinery operator was not aware of the pipeline.

Lack of awareness by pipeline operating companies is an almost universal factor

behind spillages caused by farming activities and in 60-80% of all other not pipeline-
related works. Overall some 65% of the third party accidental spillages would most
probably have been prevented by proper communication to pipeline operators by the
third parties. Lack of care or skill by the third party works management or machinery
operators is responsible for 35% of the spillages.

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 report no. 4/07

Figure 22 Awareness of impending works and of pipeline location

100%

80%

60%
Awareness

40%

20%

0%
Road Farming Trenching Pipeline Other Pipeline
Construction Maintenance Industry Construction

Both Equipment Operator Pipeline operator Neither

An analysis has been made of the relationship between the vulnerability to third
party damage and various physical attributes. The strongest relationship, i.e. with
pipeline diameter is shown in Figure 23. In this figure the frequencies of spillages
caused by accidental damage by third parties have been calculated for the average
length of each group of diameters for the periods 1971 to 1987, 1988 to 2005 and
1971 to 2005. These periods have been chosen because of the major change in the
reported pipeline inventory between 1987 and 1988 following the inclusion of the
non-commercially owned pipelines. Although the absolute values vary, the relative
values are very clear and show that the larger the pipeline, the less likely is it to be
damaged severely enough by third parties to lead to a spillage. Taking the overall
average figures, the below 8” size range is fourteen times more vulnerable than the
30”+ population. A number of possible reasons for this could be postulated but there
is no way of determining from the available data what each risk-increasing factor
might contribute. Neither is there sufficient data on depth below surface to indicate
how much the risk is reduced by deeper coverage. It is not recorded if larger
pipelines have greater coverage than small ones.

The prevention of third party accidental spillages is of the highest priority due to its
place in the spillage cause league. It is also the most amenable to improvement by
sharing experiences and comparing operating and work control practices between
pipeline operators from different companies and countries.

34
 report no. 4/07

Figure 23 Third party accidental damage frequencies against pipeline diameter

0.5

0.4
Spillage frequency

0.3
1971-1987
1988-2005
1971-2005
0.2

0.1

0
>8" 8 to <12" 12 to <16" 16 to <24" 24 to <30" >30"
Pipeline diameter

6.5.2. Intentional damage

There have been 19 spillages caused by intentional damage by third parties.

Table 7 Intentional damage by third party

Cause Number Gross spillage Net loss

of spills m
3

Terrorism 2 920 710

Vandalism 5 612 568
Theft 12 1377 606
Totals 19 2909 1884

None of the terrorist or vandalism incidents was from underground piping; one was
from an above ground section of pipeline, all the rest were at valves or other fittings
at pump stations or road / river crossings, etc. Since 1999, theft attempts by drilling
into pipes have become a regular feature of the spillage statistics although there
have been no such incidents in 2004 or 2005. However, a number of theft attempts
have been discovered which fortunately did not lead to spillages.

This category of spillages represents 4.4% of the total number of spillages and has
been responsible for about 4% of the total gross spillage loss and 6% of the total net
loss.

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 report no. 4/07

6.5.3. Incidental damage

This category is somewhat of a catchall and includes those incidents where damage
was done at some unknown point in a pipeline’s lifetime, which subsequently suffers
deterioration over time resulting eventually in a spill. In general they result from
unreported damage done after the original construction when a pipeline has been
knowingly or unknowingly hit during some or other third party’s groundwork
activities.

There have been 19 incidental damage incidents. They all started off from dents,
scrapes and such like. Thus they share the characteristic that they may well be
detectable by intelligence pig inspections.

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 report no. 4/07

7. INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTIONS

7.1. INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTION ACTIVITY

CONCAWE has been collecting data on intelligent pig inspection activity for the past
fifteen years, including a one-off exercise to collect back data from the time
intelligence pigs were first used back in 1977. Separate records are kept for metal
loss pig, crack detection pig and for geometry (calliper) pig inspections. Each
inspection may entail one or more passes of a pig along a piggable pipe section.

Leak detection pigs are also sometimes used but their function is quite different.
They can reduce the consequences from a leak that has already started by helping
to catch it earlier. They do nothing to help prevent the leak occurring in the first
place.

7.2. ACTIVITY IN 2005

The total length of pipelines inspected by any type of intelligence pig in 2005 was
6226 km or 18% of the total length of the inventory. 109 sections out of a total of 663
were inspected by one or more pig. Inspections were split as follows amongst the
individual classes of pig:

• Metal loss pig 5860 km, 105 sections

• Crack detection pig 2132 km, 34 sections
• Geometry pig 2643 km, 50 sections

From this it can be seen that most inspection programs involved the running of more
than one type of pig.

60 inspections used metal loss and / or crack detection pigs only, while 49 used one
or other of these in association with geometry pigs. There was only one inspection
where a geometry pig was used without one or other of metal loss or crack detection
pigs.

7.3. ACTIVITY SINCE 1971

As shown in Figure 24, the growth in intelligence pig use for internal inspection of
pipelines was spectacular up to 1994, but then reduced to levels that maintained
inspection integrity. There has been a further increase over the last five years, 2005
being the highest ever year in terms of total length. This can only partly be explained
by the increase in the reported length of the pipeline inventory.

In the 28 years of use of the technique the proportion of the pipeline inventory
surveyed grew from nothing to peak at 19% of the total system in 1995. After many
pipelines had been inspected once, the rate of inspections fell to around 10% to 15%
of the inventory annually but was up to 18% in 2005.

37
 report no. 4/07

Figure 24 Growth in the use of intelligence pigs

10000

9000
Geometry
Total annual iinspected length (km)

8000
Cracks
7000 Metal loss

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

At the end of 2005 there was a total of 5934 km (17.0%) in 172 sections (25.9%) for
which CONCAWE has no record of them having been inspected (Figure 25). This is
a considerable reduction on the 2004 figures of 6,966 km (19.7%) in 185 sections
(28.2%). The difference between the percentages of non-inspected km and section
number indicates that a majority of the not-inspected sections are short. There are
certainly some pipeline sections (mainly very old ones) which were not designed to
be pigged and because of small size or tight bends or lack of suitable pig launchers
or receivers cannot be intelligence pigged. The relatively recent introduction of pigs
to inspect 150 mm (6 inch) diameter pipelines means that small diameter is no
longer a bar to pig inspections. Less than 150 mm diameter pipelines represent a
very small percentage of the pipeline inventory.

The main reason for the still significant length of apparently non-inspected pipelines
is probably under-reporting particularly as we only started collecting information on
intelligence pigging in 1995 and replies to this part of the questionnaire have never
been as complete as for other sections. In addition, a number of pipeline companies
in Eastern Europe have joined the survey in recent years and previous pigging
records have not on the whole been provided. The length of un-inspected pipelines
is therefore certainly less than the above figure and should continue to decrease in
future years.

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 report no. 4/07

Figure 25 Pig-inspected pipelines as per end 2005

600

Geometry only
Metal loss & geometry
Number of sections or total length ('00 km)

500
Metal loss & crack only

400

300

200

100

0
Sections Total length

7.4. REPEAT INSPECTIONS

Many pipelines have been inspected a number of times. Indeed, for some pipelines,
regular intelligence pig inspections are required by the authorities. Some 142
pipelines have been reported as inspected by metal loss pigs twice, 11 pipelines by
crack pigs twice, and 98 pipelines by geometry pig twice. The number of repeat
inspections is shown in Figure 26 which shows that 2 pipelines have been inspected
no fewer than fourteen times.

39
 report no. 4/07

Figure 26 Repeat Inspections

70

60

50
Number of sections

40 Metal loss
Crack
30 Geometry

20

10

0
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Number of repeat inspections

The intelligence pig inspection technique only finds flaws, corrosion and other sorts
of damage in or on the pipe inner or outer walls. Over the past 35 years, as shown in
the table below, there have been 126 spillages, some 3.6 per year, where the
trouble might have been discovered by internal inspection before the failure had
occurred.

Table 8 Historical spillages possibly preventable by internal inspections

Mechanical failures 45
(line pipe welds, pipe material faults)
Corrosion 59
(excluding excess historic hot incidents)
Third party incidental 22
(non-construction scrapes and dents)
Total 126

These categories will all tend to increase with age at some point in the future.
Internal inspections should ensure that repairs will be made before they become
spillages.

40
 report no. 4/07

8. REFERENCES

1. CONCAWE (1972) Spillages from oil industry cross-country pipelines in Western

Europe. Statistical summary of reported incidents 1966 - 1970. Report No. 2/72.
Brussels: CONCAWE

2. CONCAWE Performance of oil industry cross-country pipelines in Western Europe.

Statistical summary of reported spillages. Reports No. 2/73, 1/74, 5/74, 7/75, 7/76,
9/77, 3/78, 6/79, 10/80, 2/82, 11/82, 9/83, 12/84, 9/85, 7/86, 8/87, 8/88, 9/89, 6/90,
4/91, 4/92, 2/93, 5/94, 4/95, 4/96, 7/97, 6/98, 3/99, 3/00, 4/01, 1/03, 7/04, 3/05, 3/06.
Brussels: CONCAWE

3. CONCAWE (1998) Western European cross-country oil pipelines – 25-year

performance statistics. Report No. 2/98. Brussels: CONCAWE

4. CONCAWE (2002) Western European cross-country oil pipelines – 30-year

performance statistics. Report No. 1/02. Brussels: CONCAWE

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 report no. 4/07

APPENDIX 1 DEFINITIONS

Spillage volume

Gross spilled volume: the estimated total quantity, expressed in m3, of hydrocarbons released
from the pipeline system as a result of the incident

Recovered oil: the estimated quantity, expressed in m3, recovered during the clean-up operation,
either as oil or as part of the contaminated soil removed

Net loss: the difference between gross spilled volume and recovered oil.

Categories of spillage causes

CONCAWE classifies spill causes into five major categories: mechanical failure, operational,
corrosion, natural hazard and third party.

Mechanical: a failure resulting from either a material fault (e.g. metallurgical defect) or a
construction fault (e.g. defective weld, inadequate support etc). This also includes failure of
sealing system (gasket, pump seal etc).

Operational: a failure resulting from operational upsets, malfunction or inadequacy of

safeguarding systems (e.g. instrumentation, mechanical pressure relief system) or from operator
errors.

Corrosion: a failure resulting from corrosion either internal or external of either a pipeline or a
fitting.

Natural hazard: a failure resulting from a natural occurrence such as flooding, land movements,
lightning strike etc.

Third party: a failure resulting from an action by a third party either accidental or intentional. This
also includes "incidental" damage, undetected when it occurred and resulting in a failure at some
later point in time.

These main categories are subdivided to give a total of 13 subsets shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Categories of spillage causes

Main Secondary
A B C
A Mechanical Failure Construction Fault Material Fault
B Operational System Malfunction Human Error
C Corrosion External Internal Stress Corrosion
D Natural Hazard Landslide / Subsidence Flooding Other
E Third Party Activity Accidental Intentional Incidental

Detailed reporting in Appendix 2 further identifies, within each category a primary cause.

42
 report no. 4/07

APPENDIX 2 SPILLAGE SUMMARY

Key to table

Service Discovery
1 Crude oil 1 Right of way survey
2 White product 2 Routine monitoring
3 Fuel oil 3 Maintenance
4 Crude/white pro. 4 Pressure testing
5 Others 5 Automatic detection system
6 Third party
7 Pipeline internal inspection survey

System part Land use

1 Underground pipe 1 Commercial
2 Above ground pipe 2 Industrial
3 Road/rail crossing 3 Residential
4 River crossing 4 Agricultural
5 Line valve 5 Forest
6 Line fitting 6 Mountains
7 Manifold 7 Barren land
8 Terminal 8 Surface water
9 Pump station
10 Fitting (other)

Primary cause
1 Dent
2 Faulty weld (undetected)
3 Faulty weld (repaired)
4 Faulty heat treatment
5 Pipe fitting
6 Gasket
7 Lamination
8 Faulty material
9 Temperature compensation
10 Gland
11 Traffic
12 Mining
13 Overpressrue
14 Vibration
15 Temperature variations
16 Bolt/screw/plug
17 Design
18 Bypass/deadleg
19 Electric current
20 Burner/welder damage

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 report no. 4/07

Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Discovery System Age Land Cause Impact
ID diameter Gross Net loss part Years use Category Primary Water Contaminated
bodies land area
" m
3
m
2

1 1971 11 2 1 1 3 1 3 4 AA 6
2 1 4 3 9 AA 16
3 11 2 0 6 4 6 AA 3
4 20 1 40 5 5 9 5 AB 6 60,000
5 1 350 3 9 9 2 BA
6 1 25 3 9 BB
7 5 3 3 6 1 8 CA
8 8 2 6 6 2 1 20 CA
9 20 1 300 50 3 1 5 EA 1,000
10 34 1 2000 3 1 9 EA
11 8 2 2 2 6 1 20 EB
12 1972 16 2 5 3 1 4 AB 5
13 28 1 800 150 2 9 12 2 AB 2
14 12 2 70 39 6 6 5 4 AB 6
15 9 1 10 5 6 3 29 CA
16 9 1 40 35 6 3 29 CA
17 10 1 1 1 3 2 39 2 CA
18 10 1 1 1 3 2 39 2 CA
19 12 3 500 6 1 12 1 CA
20 12 3 5 1 6 1 12 1 CA
21 10 2 150 50 2 1 7 CA
22 4 3 0 6 1 15 2 CA
23 6 3 1 0 6 1 15 CA
24 20 1 200 60 3 1 8 1 EA
25 20 1 250 100 3 1 8 EA
26 28 1 60 12 6 1 16 EA
27 10 1 90 6 1 6 EA
28 8 1 7 6 1 8 4 EA
29 10 2 30 6 1 9 EA
30 8 2 400 350 2 1 2 4 EA
31 10 2 99 96 6 1 6 4 EA
32 12 3 0 6 1 5 EC
33 1973 5 3 4 1 1 8 AA 15
34 20 1 25 3 6 9 1 2 AA 6
35 16 1 0 3 9 3 2 AB 6
36 1 4 3 9 11 2 AB 14
37 24 2 25 3 9 2 2 AB 10
38 18 1 11 1 2 9 13 2 AB 6
39 6 2 12 6 6 1 1 2 AB 14
40 9 1 12 12 1 1 32 CA
41 5 3 15 1 1 8 CA
42 5 3 15 1 1 8 CA
43 12 3 200 2 6 1 13 CA
44 12 3 12 2 3 2 13 CA
45 12 3 250 5 6 2 13 CA
46 12 3 150 2 1 2 13 CA
47 12 3 310 10 6 1 13 1 CA 30,000
48 28 1 100 40 6 1 16 DA
49 10 3 8 6 1 9 4 EA
50 12 3 0 6 1 6 EC 11
51 12 3 1 6 1 6 EC 11
52 12 3 0 1 1 6 EC 11
53 1974 1 1 0 3 9 4 2 AA 11
54 1 3 2 2 9 5 2 AA 14 1,000
55 6 1 20 6 6 15 AA 15
56 9 1 10 1 1 33 CA
57 2 2 2 3 10 6 CA
58 10 3 1 2 1 9 2 CA
59 12 3 5 6 1 8 CA
60 13 3 5 6 1 8 CA
61 4 3 1 6 1 17 2 CA
62 6 3 0 6 1 16 CA
63 16 3 1 6 1 9 4 CB P
64 7 1 1 6 1 8 4 CB
65 16 1 500 6 3 10 EA
66 5 2 1 0 6 1 21 EA
67 8 2 30 4 2 4 22 EA
68 8 2 200 2 6 1 22 EA
69 10 2 668 668 2 1 18 EA
70 10 2 489 405 2 1 18 4 EA

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 report no. 4/07

Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Discovery System Age Land Cause Impact
ID diameter Gross Net loss part Years use Category Primary Water Contaminated
bodies land area
" m
3
m
2

71 1975 20 2 4 30 10 4 10 11 4 AB 2
72 34 1 30 2 6 1 12 AB 2
73 10 3 3 2 10 5 3 AB 6
74 1 10 2 3 9 2 BA
75 2 4 5 9 2 BA
76 8 2 20 10 3 9 4 2 BB
77 1 5 3 9 2 BB
78 10 3 50 2 3 11 CA
79 12 3 3 6 1 9 CA
80 6 3 25 1 1 9 CA
81 10 3 1 0 2 9 6 2 CA
82 4 3 1 6 1 18 CA
83 8 3 0 7 1 6 CA
84 8 3 0 1 1 6 4 CA
85 12 3 0 3 9 6 2 CA
86 6 1 15 0 6 1 23 4 EA
87 18 1 5 0 2 1 12 EA
88 8 1 120 3 2 1 9 EA
89 8 2 60 60 2 1 23 EA
90 6 1 15 6 6 1 4 EA
91 1976 8 2 6 1 9 AA 3
92 8 3 6 5 13 4 AA 8
93 1 9 2 5 13 2 AB 6
94 24 2 17 1 6 10 17 2 AB 8
95 16 1 1322 433 2 1 13 AB 13
96 10 3 80 2 1 11 CA
97 4 2 90 90 6 1 16 CA
98 24 1 200 2 1 10 DA
99 10 3 50 25 2 1 DA
100 10 1 40 2 6 1 13 4 EA
101 8 2 44 14 2 1 24 4 EA
102 18 1 802 606 6 1 7 4 EA
103 8 2 153 153 2 1 4 EA
104 14 2 358 358 6 4 23 4 EC 12
105 1977 2 32 3 9 9 2 AB 6 150
106 2 28 3 9 9 2 AB 6 140
107 20 2 2 6 1 8 4 AB 8
108 36 1 3 5 3 2 AB 10
109 1 50 2 9 19 2 BB
110 1 1 3 9 7 2 BB
111 12 2 350 220 4 1 10 4 CA
112 10 3 315 90 2 1 8 3 CA
113 1 6 3 9 9 2 CB
114 12 2 103 6 1 19 DA
115 20 1 550 500 1 4 13 4 DB
116 24 1 600 25 5 4 11 4 DC
117 10 1 160 2 1 12 4 EA 1,500
118 18 1 80 2 1 5 4 EA 400
119 8 2 3 3 2 1 25 4 EA
120 8 2 3 1 2 1 13 4 EA
121 12 2 191 2 1 19 4 EA
122 8 2 269 6 1 19 4 EA
123 20 2 2530 2500 2 4 9 4 EC 12
124 1978 34 1 2000 300 6 4 16 4 AB 8
125 8 2 235 205 2 5 16 4 AB 7
126 22 1 19 6 1 7 4 AB 8 1,800
127 6 2 12 6 6 1 18 1 CA
128 10 2 100 10 2 4 14 4 CA
129 12 3 2 6 3 14 4 CA
130 8 3 120 60 4 1 7 4 CA
131 8 3 80 40 4 1 7 4 CA
132 12 3 2 1 1 12 2 CA
133 18 3 4 1 6 1 6 2 CA
134 16 4 400 250 2 1 14 4 DA
135 11 2 3 0 6 1 10 4 EA
136 12 2 5 58 40 4 1 10 4 EA
137 24 1 1 6 5 4 EA
138 16 1 255 245 2 1 15 4 EA 5,865
139 1979 22 1 100 40 4 1 8 4 AA 1 16,000
140 24 1 100 1 6 1 5 AA 1 2,700
141 9 2 50 6 1 17 4 CA 350
142 12 2 300 200 1 1 23 4 CA
143 18 3 20 1 1 12 1 CA 500
144 18 3 5 1 1 12 1 CA 100
145 18 1 50 1 6 1 16 4 EA 2,500
146 12 2 90 50 6 1 23 4 EA
147 8 1 245 150 6 1 23 4 EA
148 11 2 950 380 2 2 15 2 EB P 6,400

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 report no. 4/07

Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Discovery System Age Land Cause Impact
ID diameter Gross Net loss part Years use Category Primary Water Contaminated
bodies land area
" m
3
m
2

149 1980 13 2 8 1 2 9 12 2 AB 6
150 40 1 4800 400 6 1 9 4 AB 8 10,000
151 10 3 80 6 3 10 4 CA
152 10 3 10 1 1 10 4 CA
153 7 3 1 1 1 15 4 CA 10
154 12 3 111 12 6 3 15 4 DA P 10,000
155 10 4 762 135 2 1 15 4 EA 10,000
156 12 2 270 6 1 EA
157 8 2 313 2 1 EA
158 1 30 6 9 2 EB
159 1981 34 4 10 2 6 5 6 AB 10
160 40 1 10 6 7 5 2 AB 6 80
161 10 2 600 150 2 1 AB 8
162 20 1 19 1 6 1 17 4 CA
163 8 3 5 4 5 12 4 CA
164 8 3 19 4 5 12 4 CA
165 12 3 5 2 6 1 15 2 CA 50
166 10 2 92 58 2 1 25 4 CA
167 20 1 5 3 6 1 15 2 CA
168 10 2 10 6 3 CA
169 26 2 125 45 6 1 18 4 DA
170 24 3 30 10 4 5 14 2 DC
171 7 1 132 132 2 1 15 4 EA
172 8 2 322 317 2 1 24 4 EA
173 5 1 96 6 1 EA
174 28 1 5 0 1 3 16 2 EC 11
175 1982 8 2 12 12 6 2 20 4 AA 1 P
176 24 1 9 6 1 18 4 AB 8 1,000
177 8 1 2 1 1 20 4 CA
178 12 3 8 6 1 16 2 CA 30
179 10 3 400 16 6 1 19 4 CA
180 5 1 20 6 9 10 2 CB
181 7 1 140 140 6 1 16 4 CB 3,000
182 22 1 15 5 6 3 18 3 CB
183 6 1 31 6 1 20 4 EA
184 8 2 7 1 2 1 30 2 EC 1
185 1983 4 5 10 2 1 22 4 AA 9 100
186 4 5 1 5 1 22 4 AA 9 9
187 4 5 4 6 6 22 4 AB 9 80
188 16 4 442 111 4 1 18 4 BB
189 6 2 12 4 3 15 2 CA 3,600
190 7 1 182 120 2 1 17 4 CB 20,000
191 7 1 148 110 6 1 17 4 EA 18,000
192 10 2 213 171 6 1 29 4 EA
193 14 2 675 470 6 3 3 4 EB
194 12 1 1 0 6 1 20 2 EC 1 15
195 1984 28 1 4363 3928 1 1 10 4 AA 1 6,500
196 24 1 141 6 1 18 4 AA 4 4,500
197 28 1 3 5 10 11 4 AB 8 120
198 8 2 16 3 6 10 17 4 AB 8 720
199 34 1 5 2 2 9 13 2 BA 1,000
200 16 1 10 2 9 18 4 BA 50
201 1 10 10 3 1 21 4 BB 50
202 12 3 2 1 3 17 2 CA
203 6 1 20 16 6 1 24 2 CA 250
204 16 2 5 1 6 9 11 2 CA 10
205 9 2 236 236 6 1 11 4 CB 200
206 10 1 150 1 6 1 23 5 EA 100
207 11 2 244 240 5 1 21 EB
208 1985 24 1 1 1 1 1 14 4 AA 1 18
209 20 1 25 4 6 9 9 2 BA
210 10 2 16 5 9 17 2 BA
211 10 2 7 5 9 17 2 BA
212 6 2 4 5 9 17 2 BA
213 16 1 1100 756 2 1 9 4 CC 2 13,000
214 8 2 211 195 2 1 33 4 EC 1,000
215 1986 16 2 160 6 5 9 17 4 AB 6 200
216 20 1 53 6 2 1 12 4 AB 6 3,000
217 24 2 292 4 3 5 26 4 AB 7 3,000
218 16 3 20 5 6 3 38 3 CA
219 20 2 2 2 6 1 22 3 CA
220 8 3 10 4 1 25 4 CA 20
221 9 1 10 10 6 1 45 4 CB 180
222 34 1 7 7 1 1 14 2 CB 84
223 8 2 192 95 6 1 15 4 EA 1,500
224 14 2 280 56 5 1 18 4 EA 100
225 6 2 52 41 5 1 13 4 EA 10
226 8 2 11 6 5 4 19 4 EB 3

46
 report no. 4/07

Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Discovery System Age Land Cause Impact
ID diameter Gross Net loss part Years use Category Primary Water Contaminated
bodies land area
" m
3
m
2

227 1987 20 2 1000 120 4 1 20 2 AA 3

228 26 4 2 1 6 1 25 4 AA 4 1,000
229 9 1 25 2 6 1 46 4 AB 5 200
230 16 3 550 150 2 3 39 4 CA 200
231 9 1 8 1 6 1 46 3 CB 280
232 12 2 12 10 6 1 21 4 DA P 2,000
233 22 2 3 1 3 1 20 2 EA 10
234 16 2 300 115 6 1 18 2 EC 1 P
235 1988 34 1 10 1 6 6 26 2 AB 6 200
236 12 2 90 42 6 1 30 3 AB 8 P 1,500
237 8 2 97 21 2 9 28 4 AB 6 500
238 34 1 81 1 6 3 17 2 CA 5,000
239 11 2 80 80 2 1 35 3 CA
240 28 1 5 1 6 10 31 3 CA 400
241 10 2 305 5 2 4 23 4 DA 5,000
242 20 2 40 10 6 1 24 2 EA 30
243 3 1 2 1 6 1 28 4 EA 100
244 10 1 1 14 1 6 1 23 4 EA 100
245 8 2 3 1 6 3 35 3 EA 20
246 16 2 3 1 6 1 16 4 EA 150
247 16 1 650 650 5 3 23 3 EA 550
248 4 2 2 1 6 1 26 4 EA 9
249 6 2 63 56 6 1 33 4 EA 1,200
250 6 2 18 1 6 1 33 4 EA 1,800
251 1989 26 1 3 2 6 1 26 4 AA 2 100
252 12 3 1 6 6 2 AA 2 6
253 1 2 25 7 6 2 1 4 AA 6 10,000
254 26 1 155 5 6 1 26 4 AB 2 P 2,000
255 10 2 1 66 16 2 1 27 4 BB
256 9 1 25 5 4 1 48 4 CA 50
257 12 3 240 150 2 4 17 2 CA
258 10 2 400 90 5 1 24 4 CB 2,000
259 16 2 253 253 6 1 22 4 EA 500
260 16 2 660 472 5 1 20 4 EA P
261 10 2 82 4 5 2 24 4 EA 200
262 12 2 298 298 2 1 32 4 EA 6,000
263 6 2 52 27 6 1 33 4 EA 2,000
264 8 2 3 3 1 32 4 EA 66
265 8 2 3 186 126 6 1 29 4 EA
266 40 1 40 5 6 1 17 4 EC 1 4,000
267 11 1 2 6 4 26 4 EC 17
268 1990 13 2 105 105 3 5 4 BB 30
269 10 2 252 221 6 9 33 4 BB 1,500
270 8 2 9 3 10 48 4 BB 10
271 11 3 325 11 2 3 22 2 CA
272 11 2 225 194 6 1 11 4 EA 3
273 6 2 3 1 6 1 34 4 EA 324
274 10 2 189 34 6 1 24 4 EA
275 1991 20 2 275 118 5 1 24 4 AA 17 14,000
276 2 50 38 6 5 10 4 AA 16 1,200
277 20 1 20 13 6 1 24 4 AA 1 4,500
278 12 2 25 7 2 9 20 2 AA 16 150
279 12 2 5 2 6 5 21 4 AA 17 320
280 12 2 29 29 6 1 38 4 AB 5 600
281 2 4 1 5 9 31 2 AB 8 250
282 2 172 68 5 9 11 2 AB 8 100,000
283 2 2 6 10 4 AB 6
284 10 2 80 4 6 1 26 4 CA 1,500
285 7 1 20 6 6 30 4 CB 300
286 8 2 100 60 4 3 17 4 CB 10,000
287 8 2 15 10 4 1 17 2 CB 25
288 8 2 4 6 1 49 4 EA 6
289 6 2 21 13 6 1 34 4 EA 500
290 6 2 1 6 1 37 4 EA 2
291 2 84 75 5 9 1 4 EB
292 13 2 485 485 2 9 24 4 EB 7,000
293 8 2 10 1 6 1 24 4 EC 1 30
294 1992 8 2 1000 400 2 1 34 2 AA 1
295 2 128 98 2 5 4 AB 2 5,400
296 2 113 8 3 9 12 2 AB 8
297 8 2 30 15 3 7 33 2 AB 6
298 8 2 5 5 7 1 13 5 AB 8 10
299 2 275 248 2 9 2 BB 1,100
300 2 5 1 2 7 22 2 BB 1,350
301 10 2 2 3 5 30 BB
302 8 3 200 6 1 25 4 CA 300
303 24 2 13 1 6 1 27 2 CA 250
304 6 2 3 3 4 1 49 4 CA 2
305 12 2 75 75 6 1 28 4 DB
306 8 2 50 50 4 1 25 4 EC 1 20
307 8 2 25 25 4 1 25 4 EC 1 60
47
 report no. 4/07

Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Discovery System Age Land Cause Impact
ID diameter Gross Net loss part Years use Category Primary Water Contaminated
bodies land area
" m
3
m
2

308 1993 34 1 248 18 4 1 31 4 AA 8 45,000

309 2 3 6 9 2 2 AB 16 80
310 12 2 2 1 1 5 23 2 AB 6 400
311 18 2 14 13 7 3 27 1 CA 400
312 13 2 580 500 2 4 26 4 CB 800
313 20 1 2000 500 2 3 19 4 CB 25,000
314 26 2 10 7 6 1 31 6 DA P
315 9 2 8 6 6 1 30 4 EA 50
316 24 2 49 39 6 1 33 4 EA 40,000
317 8 2 3 1 6 1 37 4 EA 100
318 12 2 101 19 6 4 31 4 EA
319 20 2 3050 1450 2 1 29 2 EC 1
320 7 2 3 3 6 1 13 3 EC 1 6
321 1994 16 1 200 160 5 1 31 4 AB 8 6,000
322 16 1 1350 1295 2 1 31 4 AB 8 25,000
323 6 2 250 14 2 9 16 2 AB 6 50
324 6 2 1 1 1 1 16 2 AB 8 25
325 11 2 5 5 6 10 9 4 AB 6 100
326 1 2 2 6 9 2 BA 100
327 12 3 90 60 6 1 24 4 CA
328 32 1 10 5 2 8 21 2 CB 18 500
329 10 2 285 285 6 4 26 4 EA
330 9 2 195 170 5 1 37 4 EA P 8,000
331 8 2 46 6 1 36 4 EA 1,150
332 1995 2 280 80 2 7 22 1 AA 8 10,000
333 10 2 30 30 6 3 35 4 AA 2 750
334 2 53 41 6 6 5 4 AB 8
335 6 2 115 1 1 36 4 AB 8 500
336 16 1 132 82 5 1 30 4 BB 6,500
337 10 2 1000 270 1 1 31 2 CA 55,000
338 9 2 48 18 5 1 28 4 EA 1,500
339 9 2 20 20 5 1 39 2 EA 100
340 13 2 139 113 6 1 5 4 EA 300
341 6 2 12 5 1 37 4 EA 30
342 1996 9 2 165 99 2 9 5 2 AB 6 40
343 14 2 292 209 6 1 40 3 BB 300
344 12 3 1 6 1 30 1 CA 16
345 9 2 437 343 2 1 40 2 EA 20
346 7 2 1 19 19 6 1 40 4 EA 350
347 10 2 500 62 6 1 64 2 EC 20 23,000
348 1997 12 2 19 3 1 1 27 4 CA 2,800
349 10 1 2 0 1 1 7 2 CB 20
350 12 2 422 341 2 1 30 4 CC 2
351 12 2 435 267 2 1 30 3 CC 2 P
352 8 2 13 2 2 1 33 4 EA 150
353 12 2 40 1 6 1 24 2 EC
354 1998 1 30 4 3 9 30 2 AB 5 400
355 6 3 0 0 6 1 34 4 BB
356 13 2 486 247 2 1 42 4 BB 100
357 16 2 250 20 6 1 30 2 CA
358 10 2 340 313 5 1 6 3 EA 500
359 10 2 15 14 1 1 4 4 EA 600
360 9 2 176 67 5 1 42 4 EA 160
361 2 30 2 5 6 4 EA 650
362 8 2 0 6 1 25 4 EA 4
363 1999 1 7 2 9 2 BB 200
364 1 3 30 2 3 32 2 CA 300
365 11 2 167 64 2 1 32 4 CA 60
366 6 2 1 1 5 1 25 4 CA 5
367 4 1 1 1 6 9 35 2 CA
368 8 2 80 20 6 1 48 4 EA 500
369 13 2 84 13 5 1 10 2 EA
370 6 2 29 14 6 1 40 4 EA
371 8 2 1 80 30 6 1 35 4 EB 1,000
372 11 2 36 28 5 1 5 4 EB 100
373 12 2 1 2 1 36 2 EC 1
374 2000 2 175 3 6 10 24 2 AB 5 60
375 12 1 10 7 6 1 30 2 CB 150
376 12 2 8 8 6 1 31 4 EA
377 11 2 159 64 5 1 8 4 EA 5,000
378 12 2 7 1 6 3 26 3 EA
379 24 2 1 1 6 1 41 4 EC 1 150

48
 report no. 4/07

Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Discovery System Age Land Cause Impact
ID diameter Gross Net loss part Years use Category Primary Water Contaminated
bodies land area
" m
3
m
2

380 2001 1 800 8 6 2 4 AA 2 10,000

381 10 2 1 1 6 3 39 4 AA 2 10
382 10 2 5 5 6 1 38 4 AB 8 500
383 6 2 37 7 4 1 27 4 AB 8 900
384 12 2 10 2 6 1 15 2 AB 8 120
385 34 1 6 1 5 1 29 2 CA 500
386 12 2 4 4 6 1 26 4 CA 1,000
387 13 1 103 50 2 9 23 2 CB 225
388 11 2 55 51 6 1 9 4 EA
389 10 2 10 1 6 1 11 4 EA
390 6 2 5 5 6 1 47 3 EA 400
391 12 1 10 7 6 1 30 4 EB 250
392 12 1 17 12 6 1 30 4 EB 400
393 16 2 2 2 6 1 18 4 EB 350
394 8 2 85 24 2 1 47 4 EB P 404
395 2002 8 2 10 10 6 1 47 4 AB 5 325
396 20 1 100 2 1 36 2 CA 500
397 10 2 80 20 6 1 38 2 CA 10,000
398 10 3 1 6 1 28 4 CA 14,000
399 6 2 17 2 7 33 2 CA 400
400 8 2 70 2 6 ? 2 CA
401 13 2 225 58 5 1 46 4 CC 2 400
402 24 2 250 20 6 5 39 2 DA 5,000
403 30 1 2 3 10 40 2 EA 40
404 8 2 170 120 4 1 57 4 EA
405 16 1 750 45 1 1 39 4 EA 20,000
406 20 1 280 30 6 1 40 4 EA 12,000
407 12 1 40 15 6 1 33 4 EB 6,000
408 8 2 190 5 1 2 EC 1
409 2003 14 2 30 30 5 1 AA
410 20 4 2 2 1 52 2 CA S 2
411 12 2 2 6 1 32 2 EA S 5
412 11 2 83 74 5 1 46 4 EA 1,800
413 11 2 45 31 6 1 46 1 EA 600
414 6 2 2 5 1 EA
415 11 2 74 49 5 1 46 4 EB 500
416 16 1 5 5 1 1 41 5 EB 120
417 16 2 28 10 6 1 29 4 EB 400
418 16 2 52 3 4 1 29 4 EB 400
419 12 2 11 7 4 1 45 2 EC 20 800
420 20 2 2500 1100 6 1 31 7 EC P 80,000
421 2004 16 2 2 0 1 1 32 4 AA 4,000
422 10 2 26 18 2 10 40 4 AA 1 6,000
423 22 1 20 6 2 9 5 2 AB 200
424 8 2 90 50 6 1 5 4 EA 1,500
425 10 2 5 1 29 2,3 EA 2,000
426 2005 12 2 19 19 2 9 4 AA 14
427 12 2 3 1 2 AA 2 G
428 20 1 350 10 5 1 45 4 AA G 15,000
429 6 2 20 2 1 28 4 AB 7 S 58
430 6 2 38 6 1 28 4 AB 7 S 42
431 9 1 30 4 5 3 14 4 BB G 1,000
432 10 1 15 6 10 22 4 BB 1,000
433 10 2 3 1 6 1 25 2 CA S 50
434 24 1 64 63 2 1 40 2 CB 18 G 150
435 8 2 15 8 6 1 41 4 EA G 1,000
436 24 2 0 6 1 46 EC 1 SG 3,000

49
Lefkosia
Lefkosa