report no.

4/07

Performance of European crosscountry oil pipelines
Statistical summary of reported spillages in 2005 and since 1971
Prepared by the CONCAWE Oil Pipelines Management Group’s Special Task Force on oil pipeline spillages (OP/STF-1) P.M. Davis J. Dubois A. Olcese F. Uhlig J-F. Larivé (Technical Coordinator) D.E. Martin (Consultant)

Reproduction permitted with due acknowledgement © CONCAWE Brussels May 2007

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report no. 4/07

ABSTRACT
CONCAWE has collected 35 years of performance data on Western European cross-country oil pipelines, which currently comprise 34.8 thousand km transporting 789 million m3 per year of crude oil and oil products through a pipeline inventory which was very similar to that in 2004. This report covers the performance of these pipelines in 2005 and also shows how the pipeline system reported on has developed. Incidents are analysed by cause and the effectiveness, cost and time for clean-up are recorded. The 2005 performance was better than average for the last 35 years. As in 2004, fewer accidents were caused by third party activities than previous years with mechanical failures the most common cause. The performance over the whole 35 years is analysed and comparisons made of the different causes of failure. The data on safety-related incidents are reported and the levels and trends of spillage incidence, gross and net spillage volumes and the significant features of individual cause categories: mechanical failure, operational, corrosion, natural hazard and third party. Most European pipeline spillages are shown to have been small and effects were generally localised and temporary. Moreover, integrity is shown to be on an improving trend with spillage frequency over the period reduced from 1.2 to 0.32 spillages per 1000 km of pipeline. The 2005 usage of intelligence pigs is also reported and compared to previous years.

KEYWORDS
Clean-up, CONCAWE, intelligence pig, oil spill, performance, pipeline, safety, soil pollution, spillage, statistics, trends, water pollution

INTERNET
This report is available as an Adobe pdf file on the CONCAWE website (www.concawe.org).

NOTE Considerable efforts have been made to assure the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in this publication. However, neither CONCAWE nor any company participating in CONCAWE can accept liability for any loss, damage or injury whatsoever resulting from the use of this information. This report does not necessarily represent the views of any company participating in CONCAWE.

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report no. 4/07

CONTENTS
SUMMARY 1. 2. INTRODUCTION PIPELINE INVENTORY, THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC 2.1. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE SURVEY 2.2. REPORTING COMPANIES 2.3. INVENTORY DEVELOPMENTS 1971-2005 2.3.1. Pipeline service, length and diameter 2.3.2. Age distribution 2.4. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC PIPELINE SAFETY 3.1. FATALITIES AND INJURIES 3.2. FIRES SPILLAGE PERFORMANCE IN THE LAST 5 YEARS 4.1. 2005 SPILLAGE INCIDENTS 4.1.1. Mechanical Failure 4.1.1.1. Construction Fault 4.1.1.2. Materials Fault 4.1.2. Operational 4.1.2.1. Systems Malfunction 4.1.2.2. Human Factors 4.1.3. Corrosion 4.1.3.1. External Corrosion 4.1.3.2. Internal Corrosion 4.1.4. Third party activity 4.1.4.1. Direct Damage - Accidental 4.1.4.2. Direct Damage - Malicious 4.1.4.3. Direct Damage - Incidental 4.2. 2001-2005 SPILLAGE OVERVIEW HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGES 1971-2005 5.1. NUMBERS AND FREQUENCY 5.2. SPILLAGE VOLUMES 5.2.1. Aggregated annual spilled volumes 5.2.2. Spillage volume per event 5.3. HOLE SIZE 5.4. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 5.4.1. Location of spillages 5.4.2. Ground area affected 5.4.3. Impact on water bodies 5.5. SPILLAGE DISCOVERY DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGE CAUSES 6.1. MECHANICAL FAILURE 6.2. OPERATIONAL 6.3. CORROSION AND IMPACT OF AGEING 6.4. NATURAL HAZARD 6.5. THIRD PARTY 6.5.1. Accidental damage

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6.5.2. 6.5.3. 7.

Intentional damage Incidental damage

35 36 37 37 37 37 39 41 42 43

INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTIONS 7.1. INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTION ACTIVITY 7.2. ACTIVITY IN 2005 7.3. ACTIVITY SINCE 1971 7.4. REPEAT INSPECTIONS REFERENCES DEFINITIONS SPILLAGE SUMMARY

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APPENDIX 1 APPENDIX 2

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report no. 4/07

SUMMARY
CONCAWE has collected data over a 35-year period on the performance of crosscountry oil pipelines in Western Europe with particular regard to spillages of 1 m3 or more, the clean-up carried out and the environmental consequences. The results have been published in annual reports since 1971. This report covers both the results for the year 2005 and the analysis of the accumulated results for the whole 35 year period from 1971 to 2005. Approximately seventy companies and other bodies operating oil pipelines in Europe currently provide statistics for the CONCAWE annual report on the performance of cross-country oil pipelines. These organisations operate some 250 different service pipelines, which, at the end of 2005, had a combined length of 34,826 km, slightly shorter than that for 2004 although the difference is mainly due to corrections to the reported data. The volume transported in 2005 was 789 Mm3 of crude oil and refined products, which is 7% less than in 2004. Total traffic volume in 2005 amounted to 127 x 109 m3 x km, 10.6% less than in 2004. There were 11 reported oil spillages from pipelines during 2005. There were no associated fires, fatalities or injuries. The gross spillage was 511 m3, equivalent to 0.65 parts per million (ppm) of the total volume transported. A total of 407 m3, i.e. 80% of the spillage was recovered or safely disposed of. The net oil loss into the environment amounted therefore to 105 m3, or 0.13 ppm. Of the spillages, five resulted from mechanical failure, two from operational causes, two from corrosion and the last two resulting from third party activities. This report also provides comparative data for the five-year period between 2001 and 2005 and for all reported incidents since 1971. In terms of numbers of spillages, the 2005 performance was slightly better than average with eleven spillages compared to the long-term average of 12.5 and 11.2 for the period 2001 to 2005. Moreover, the system length is now much longer than in earlier years (reported length in 1971 of 12,800 km). This means that the spillage frequency of 0.32 spillages per 1000 km per year was the same as the average over the last five years but less than the long term average frequency of 0.52. The performance was also good in terms of volume spilled. The gross spillage volume per 1000 km of pipeline was 14.7 m3 per 1000 km compared to the long-term average of 89 m3 per 1000 km. Also included is the record of intelligence pig inspection activity in 2005 and the records since the technique was first used. In 2005, 109 inspections were reported using some sort of intelligence pigs, covering over 6000 km of pipeline, the greatest length of reported inspections in any year. Pipelines constitute one of the main means of oil transport in Europe and are considered to be one of the safest. Whereas major and sometimes repeated accidents with large media exposure have occurred with road, rail and sea transportation, nothing similar has happened with oil pipelines. Almost inevitably though, with such a massive undertaking operating for 35 years, a handful of incidents has occurred that have resulted in a small number of fatal injuries and fires. The system is ageing. Whereas in 1971 70% of it was 10 years old or less, by 2005 only 7% was 10 years old or less and 35% was over 40 years old. However, this so far does not appear to have led to any increase in spillages.

V

Many have been shut down or switched to cold service. such as internal inspection using intelligence pigs. Pipelines carrying hot oils such as fuel oil have in the past suffered very severely from external corrosion due to design and construction problems. after having made great progress reducing mechanical failure frequencies during the first 20 years. However. by the mid ‘90s it appeared that something of an upward trend could be setting in. The two most important causes of spillages have been third party incidents and mechanical failure. VI . 4/07 Most pipeline spillages are very small and just over 5% of the spillages are responsible for 50% of the gross volume spilled. The great majority of pipelines now carry unheated petroleum products and crude oil. hold out the prospect that pipelines can continue reliable operations for the foreseeable future. Third party accident frequency has been significantly reduced progressively over the years. with corrosion well back in third place and operational and natural hazards making minor contributions.report no. Overall there is no evidence to show that the ageing of the pipeline system poses any greater level of risk. Future monitoring of CONCAWE pipeline performance statistics will be necessary to confirm the position. The development and institution of new techniques.

4] covering the years 1971 to 1995 and 1971 to 2000 respectively. Link to map of Refineries and Oil Pipelines in Western Europe. Throughput and traffic data is also included. diameter. From this year on. Section 5 analyses spillage incidents for the whole reporting period since 1971 while section 6 provides a more detailed analysis of the causes of spillage.2] and in two summary reports [3. spillage incidents and intelligent pig inspection activities are gathered yearly by CONCAWE via questionnaires sent out to the pipeline operating companies early in the year following the reporting year. These seminars have included reviews of spillage and clean-up performances to cross communicate experiences so that all can learn from each other’s incidents. As usual. type of product transported) and how this has developed over the years. 4/07 1. Direct comparison of different spillage data sets therefore need to include careful consideration of the spill cut-off size. CONCAWE has also held a number of seminars to disseminate information throughout the oil pipeline industry on the developments in techniques available to pipeline companies to help improve the safety. the format will be kept the same and each yearly report will supersede the previous one.e. 1 . Information on annual throughput and traffic. Section 2 gives details of the pipeline inventory covered by the survey (length. the number of fatalities and injuries associated with pipeline failure incidents. The format and content of this report has been altered to include not only the 2005 performance. Aggregation and statistical analysis of the performance data provides objective evidence of the trends and focuses attention on existing or potential problem areas which helps operators to set priorities for future efforts. but also a full statistical analysis of the last 5 years and of the whole 35 years period from 1971 as well as essential information on all spillage incidents in the database. The results have been analysed and published annually in a series of annual reports [1. a general map of European landbased oil pipelines is attached to this report. INTRODUCTION The CONCAWE Oil Pipelines Management Group (OPMG) has collected data on the safety and environmental performance of oil pipelines in Europe since 1971. CONCAWE has set a minimum spillage size at 1 m3 for reporting purposes (unless there are exceptionally serious safety or environmental consequences to be reported for a < 1 m3 spill).report no. Finally section 7 gives an account of intelligence pig inspections. Section 4 gives a detailed analysis of the spillage incidents in 2005 and of all incidents over the last 5 years. Section 3 focuses on safety performance i. reliability and integrity of their operations.

Thus. However. only pipelines owned by oil industry companies were included but from 1988. These are pipelines • • • Used for transporting crude oil or petroleum products.report no. 70 operating companies reported results. In particular. 2. 2. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE SURVEY The definition of pipelines to be included in the CONCAWE inventory has remained unchanged since 1971. Although CONCAWE cannot guarantee that every single line meeting the above criteria is actually covered. but others have closed down or amalgamated with others. Running cross-country. Turkey was never covered. With a length of 2 km or more in the public domain.g.1. REPORTING COMPANIES In 2005. which then included 19 member countries.2. Some affiliates and other operating entities of certain large companies are counted individually in these numbers. From 1971 to 1987. It should be noted that all data recorded in this report and used for comparisons or statistical analysis relate to the inventory reported on in each particular year and not to the actual total inventory in operation at the time. The number of companies / non-industry bodies reporting data to CONCAWE in 1971 was unrecorded but by 1980 approximately 70 companies participated in the CONCAWE survey. This was followed by crude and product lines in the Czech Republic and Hungary and crude lines in Slovakia in 2001 and finally Slovakian product lines in 2003. the pipelines in the former East Germany (DDR) were added to the database from 1991. year on year performance comparisons must be approached with caution and relative numbers (e. PIPELINE INVENTORY. Pump station and intermediate storage facilities are included but origin and destination terminal facilities and tank farms are excluded. 4/07 2. non-commercially owned pipeline systems (essentially NATO) were brought into the inventory. including short estuary or river crossings but excluding under-sea pipeline systems.e. 2 . per 1000 km of line) are more meaningful than absolute ones. it is believed that most such lines operated in the reporting countries are included. OECD Western Europe. • The geographical region covered was originally consistent with CONCAWE’s original terms of reference i. Following the reunification of Germany. This number has remained more or less constant although several new companies have taken over pipelines. lines serving offshore crude oil production facilities and offshore tanker loading/discharge facilities are excluded.

e.841 km in 2005. this figure has been fairly stable in recent years.0 25. black products transported in heated lines and other products. there are some 250 pipeline systems recorded in the CONCAWE database.1. 2. In the late 80s the majority of the NATO pipelines were included and in the early part of this decade a number of former Eastern bloc systems joined the survey.0 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 3 .0 15. Although these are categorised separately in the database they are considered to be in the crude oil category for aggregation purposes.3. INVENTORY DEVELOPMENTS 1971-2005 Pipeline service. 4/07 2.3. The sections are further classified according to their service i. As shown in Figure 1.report no. A few pipelines transport both crude oil and products.0 '000 km 20. The two historical step increases in the "CONCAWE" inventory occurred when systems previously not accounted for in the survey were added. the type of product transported.0 0.0 CONCAWE pipeline inventory and main service categories Total 35. Finally some lines may be out of service in a certain year without being permanently retired.0 Crude White products HOTx10 30. length and diameter Currently. The CONCAWE survey covered 34. reported in terms of some 664 discrete sections. Most of the major pipelines were built in the 60s and 70s.0 5. for which we distinguish crude oil.0 10. the main addition in the crude oil category being the Friendship or "Druzba" system that feeds Russian crude into Eastern European refineries Figure 1 40. The increase was mostly in the "products" category. white products.

<30 16 .2. Figure 2 shows the diameter distribution in 2005 for each category of use. In general.1). the crude pipelines are significantly larger than the other two categories. Figure 2 100% Pipeline diameter distribution and service in 2005 80% 60% >=30 24 . This is a much larger proportion of the hot inventory than for the other services and reflects the decline in the heavy fuel oil business since the mid 1970s as well as specific action taken by operating companies because of the corrosion problems and generally poor reliability experienced with several of these pipelines (see section 5. Although the age distribution was quite wide. These three populations are referred to as crude.<16 8 . Of these. both transported at ambient temperature and oils transported at elevated temperature comprising hot crude oil. product and "hot" in this report.report no. 4/07 There are three pipeline service populations: crude oil. Some 88% of the crude pipelines are 16” (400 mm) or greater up to a maximum of 48” (1200 mm) whereas around 85% of the product and some 98% of the hot pipelines are less than 16”.<12 >8 40% 20% 0% Crude White products HOT 2. petroleum products (white oils). Figure 1 shows that the first two categories represent the bulk of the total inventory. the pipeline system was comparatively new with some 70% being 10 years old or less. 4 . The smallest diameter product pipelines are typically 6” (150 mm) although a very small number go down to 3” (75 mm). lubricating oils and heavy fuel oils (black oils). Age distribution When the CONCAWE survey was first performed in 1971.<24 12 . 24 sections totalling 360 km were in hot service.3. Between 1971 and 2005 some 166 pipeline sections totalling 7150 km were permanently shutdown. the oldest pipelines in the 26-30 year age bracket represented only a tiny fraction of the inventory.

7.4. By 2005.0 20.6% decrease from 2004. a 7% decrease from 2004. i.0 10.0 0% 0. The system has clearly been progressively ageing.6 x 109 m3 x km. This is not affected by how many different pipelines each parcel of oil is pumped through. It should be realised however. there are a few pipelines where the flow can be in either direction. The development of the overall age profile is shown in Figure 3. there has been no large scale replacement of existing lines. a number of new pipelines have been commissioned while older ones were taken out of service. Although some short sections may have been renewed.0 Pipeline age distribution 40. 5 . As mentioned above existing lines were also added to the inventory at various stages.0 35. The impact of age on spillage performance is discussed in section 6.0 40% 15.300 km (36%) was over 40 years old. the throughput was 260 Mm3 and the traffic volume 37. A more meaningful figure is the traffic volume which is the flowrate times the distance travelled. that this figure is only indicative. was 10 years old or less and some 12. contributing their specific age profile. the total traffic volume was 127 x 109 m3 x km. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC In total. the complexity of some pipeline systems is such that it is often difficult to estimate what went where. both of which are very similar to the 2004 figures of 257 Mm3 and 37. Indeed. Figure 3 100% 1-10 11-20 21-30 80% 31-40 41-50 51-60 60+ 60% 25.e.2% of the total.0 '000 km 30.0 20% 5. For products alone however. Large volumes of both crude and products pass through more than one pipeline. 789 Mm3 of crude oil and refined products was transported through the pipeline system in 2005. only some 2500 km.report no.0 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2.4 x 109 m3 x km. and whilst every effort is made to only count the flow once. In 2005. 4/07 Over the years. a 10.3.

Although higher flow rates may lead to higher pressure. as a fraction of throughput. 6 . These figures are. line deterioration through metal fatigue is more directly related to pressure cycles than to the absolute pressure level (as long as it remains within design limits). providing figures that can be compared with the performance of other modes of oil transportation.g. 4/07 Throughput and traffic are not significant factors for pipeline failures or spillages.report no. however. useful as a divider to express spillage volumes in relative terms (e. see section 4).

during the subsequent incident management and reinstatement period. 96 and 99. Stronger management of spillage area security and working procedures might well have prevented the fires and fatalities. 4/07 3. The repairers escaped but the spread of the fire caught 4 people who had entered inside the marked spillage boundary some distance away. having themselves probably been the cause of ignition. All but one of the fatalities occurred when people were caught up in a fire following a spillage. injuries and fires related to spillages. A truck driver engaged in the works received fatal injuries. Two spillage reports recorded a single non-fatal injury.1. 89. 79. The third incident also involved a maintenance crew (5 people) carrying out repair activities following a crude oil spill. There were no such occurrences in 2005. This caused a leak that filled the pit with product in which the person drowned. fire ensued almost immediately when a bulldozer doing construction work hit and ruptured a gasoline pipeline. These fatalities all occurred after the spillage flows had been stemmed. neither were there any incidents involving intentional damage. PIPELINE SAFETY The CONCAWE database includes records of fatalities. In another incident ignition of spilled crude oil occurred during attempts to repair the damaged pipeline. In three of these four fire cases the ignition was a delayed event hours or days after the detection and demarcation of the spillage area had taken place. 3.report no. It is apparent that the casualties were not members of the general public going about their normal activities in locations where they should have been allowed to be at the time. 7 . Both resulted from inhalation / ingestion of oil spray/aerosol. In just one case. none of whom escaped. There has been no reported fatality or injury since 1999. The single non-fire fatality was a person engaged in a theft attempt who was unable to escape from a pit which he had dug to expose and drill into the pipeline. Thus these occurrences should not be used out of context for any assessment of societal risk inherent to oil pipeline operations. It appears that the spillages themselves did not cause the fatalities. In one incident involving a spillage of chemical feedstock naphtha 3 bystanders were engulfed in fire. FATALITIES AND INJURIES Over the 35 reporting years there have been a total of 14 fatalities in five separate incidents in 1975.

FIRES Apart from those mentioned above. • • There were no casualties reported in any of these incidents.report no. five other fires are on record: • • • A large crude oil spill near a motorway probably ignited by the traffic. 4/07 3. A gasoline theft attempt in an untypical section of pipeline located on a pipe bridge.2. The thieves may have deliberately ignited it. which ignited the spill. A mechanical digger damaged a gasoline pipeline and also an electricity cable. 8 . A tractor and plough that had caused a gasoline spill caught fire. It could have been ignited purposely to limit the pollution. A slow leak in a crude production line in a remote country area found to be burning when discovered. which also damaged a house and a railway line.

0 0. Further details are available in Appendix 2 which covers all spillage events recorded since 1971. For definition of categories of causes and gross/net spilled volume.0 30.2 0. The leak was detected almost immediately by the pipeline operator and the pipeline shut in. F = Fatality (3) S = Surface water.0 15.7 NA 10. 4. 4/07 4. G = Groundwater.1.1. Mechanical Failure There were five incidents resulting from mechanical failure.report no.0 3.1.0 0. 9 .1. The spilled oil was absorbed using sepiolite so that the final state of the ground was similar to that before the failure. The fracture was caused by vibration in a section of pipe which was not adequately supported.0 104. P = Potable water The circumstances of each spill including information on consequences remediation and cost are described in the next section according to cause. SPILLAGE PERFORMANCE IN THE LAST 5 YEARS 2005 SPILLAGE INCIDENTS A total of 11 spillage incidents were recorded in 2005. Some 1500 € damage was caused to nearby vines.7 m3 of diesel fuel was spilled in an area of vines and orchards.1.6 63.0 20.5 NA NA 15000 58 42 1000 1000 50 150 1000 3000 (1) (2) Mechanical failure 426 Pump station 427 Line 428 Line 429 Line 430 Line Operational 431 Line 432 Line Corrosion 433 Line 434 Line Third party activity 435 Line 436 Line Total 12 12 20 6 6 10 8 10 24 8 24 Diesel fuel Jet fuel Crude oil Jet fuel Jet fuel Crude oil Jet fuel Jet fuel Crude oil Jet fuel White prod.5 554.0 0. see Appendix 1.1. Construction Fault Event 426: A branch leading to a pressure relief valve on a 12” diesel fuel pipeline in a pump station fractured although this piece of pipe was only one and a half years old. The costs of repairs and clean-up were minimal at only 2000 €. 4.0 4.2 18. - - G G S S G S G G SG Spillage events are numbered from the beginning of the survey in 1971 I = Injury. two caused by a construction fault and three resulting from materials faults.0 64.0 8. Table 1 Event (1) Summary of causes and spilled volumes for 2005 incidents Location Line size (") Product spilled Injury Fatality (2) Fire Spilled volume Contamination Gross Net loss Ground area Water 2 3 (3) m (m ) 18.0 0.0 0.0 15. Some 18. Table 1 gives a summary of the main causes and spilled volumes and environmental impact.0 38.7 NA 350. 4.

000 €.500 €. In the second incident. 7 km apart. Repairs to the pipeline cost 6.000 €. most of which (2. Repairs to the pipeline cost a further 7.1. a sudden pressure drop was observed.000 € and took 6 days. They reported that the pipeline was leaking and it was immediately shut in.000 €) was for the disposal of contaminated soil. Both incidents were caused by cracks forming in the defective pipe. some 350 m3 of oil had been spilled in a corn field. This had revealed a large number of anomalies and a programme to remediate these is under way. Materials Fault Event 428: During normal operation of a 20” pipeline transporting crude oil. On investigation. 10 . By the time the system had de-pressured.report no.2. diesel oil was reported by a third party to be leaking into a meadow. a crack 7 mm long was found and it was estimated that 38 m3 had leaked out and contaminated some 42 m2 of land. Subsequent investigation revealed a crack of 36 mm by 1 mm caused by a hidden metallurgical defect from the pipe manufacture. some 15.500. Clean-up took one year and a cost of 2. In the first. There was slight contamination of surface water.800. pits were dug down to the groundwater table and crude oil collected from the water surface. 4.000 m2 of ground was affected. To clean up the site.000 €.1. The automatic leak detection system reacted within three minutes and a full manual shutdown was performed 22 minutes later. The clean up involved the removal and disposal of 2200 tonne of soil. 4/07 Event 427: A 12” pipeline transporting jet fuel was exposed by a third party for them to carry out construction work in an industrial area. The leak was found to be in a welded joint and was caused by a defective weld. The length of time that the pipeline had been leaking is unknown as is the volume of oil spilled although it is believed to be more than 1 m3. a ditch and two ponds. In all.000 €. The pipeline was shut in for 2 days while repairs were carried out and discussions are ongoing as to the best way to clean up the pollution caused including to groundwater. The clean up involved the removal of nearly 4000 tonne of soil and took 75 days at a cost of 420. The repairs to the pipeline cost 200. the leak was detected by routine monitoring by the operator and the line rapidly shutdown. within 3 months of each other. A crack 12 mm long was found and it was estimated that 20 m3 of diesel had leaked into arable land and contaminated about 60 m2 of land. 220 m3 of oil was collected as liquid and it is estimated that a further 120 m3 of oil was removed with contaminated soil leaving about 10 m3 net loss. removed and replaced. Events 429/430: Two leaks occurred in the same pipeline. took 21 days at a cost of 160. The pipeline had been inspected by a metal loss pig a month before the first incident. The failed section of pipe was excavated.

1. Around 1000 m2 of ground was affected.000 € for the bore hole pumping and 940.2.8 m3 in contaminated soil. Costs so far have been 10. The position and depth of the pipeline had been identified and the equipment operator had also been made aware of these and measures had been agreed to protect the pipe.e.000 € for disposal of contaminated soil.report no.000 € with a further 400.1. 4. Corrosion There were two incidents resulting from corrosion. Operational There were two incidents caused by operational factors. It was estimated that approximately 3 m3 of oil was spilt. So as to make the excavation safe. The pipeline was not completely emptied of crude oil so that when work was being carried out on a valve. This came out of the valve pit through the concrete walls surrounding the valve. Repairs to the pipeline were not necessary.1.2.5” pipeline transporting jet fuel for maintenance purposes. The site was near a road crossing where the pipeline was at 5 m below ground. This impacted groundwater but not surface or drinking water supplies and some 1000 m2 of soil was contaminated. The incident occurred in agricultural land and the piling made a 350 mm x 2 mm gash in the pipe. Around 15 m3 of oil was spilled of which 10 m3 was recovered as liquid.1. As well as removal of contaminated soil. the pipeline was holed by the sheet piling. Event 432: A trench was being dug to access an 8. Human Factors Event 431: A 10” crude oil pipeline was shut in for maintenance operations.1.3. This process was still in operation after 6 months. one each from internal and external corrosion. oil spilled out.000. External Corrosion Event 433: While pressure testing a 10” pipeline with jet fuel. i. 4.1. Nevertheless.3.2.1.2 m3. 4. wells have been drilled and pumping undertaken to depress the groundwater surface so that oil can be recovered. the remaining 5 m3 being removed with contaminated soil for disposal. 4/07 4. a flange blew out in a depot and this was presumed to be the cause of the pressure drop. 4.000 € for disposal of contaminated soil making a total cost of 1. a third party reported oil coming to the surface in a derelict oil depot.000 € for repairs to the pipeline. The incident was detected by the automatic detection system but by the time the pipeline had been shut in.000 €. sheet steel piling was being driven to support the trench. 50. The 11 . The line was depressured to repair the flange but 10 days later.2. and 0. Systems Malfunction There were no incidents in this category in 2005. The net loss is thus some 4. Clean-up took nearly four months at a cost of 150. both attributable to human factors. by which time the majority of the oil had been recovered. some 30 m3 of oil had been spilled. 25 m3 by pumping.

The automatic oil spill protection system immediately shut down the pipeline thus limiting the spillage to 15 m3 of jet fuel.1.000 €.Accidental Event 436: An excavator operating without authority over the route of an 8” pipeline. The temporary repair cost 100.456. It is proposed that this will include a skimmer system and “bio-sparging” to recover pollution from the water table and further removal of contaminated soil. About 150 m2 of ground was affected.000 € giving a total cost of 2. A clamp has been fitted to the pipeline as a temporary repair but full replacement of the defective section is planned. The pipeline was repaired and returned to service within one day. The leak was on a length of 24” pipe connecting two main pipelines. 4. By these means.5 m3 was disposed of with contaminated soil leaving perhaps only 1 m3 lost to the ground. 7 m3 was recovered giving a net loss of 8 m3 to soil and groundwater. Excavation revealed a 3mm by 3mm hole caused by external corrosion under the coal tar coating.1. Ten days after the spill.6 m3. 4. Third party activity There were two incidents resulting from third party activity. 12 . The routine annual pressure testing of the whole system the day before the leak was detected presumably caused the failure of a corrosion defect which had been forming for some time. Repairs to the pipeline cost 120. almost all of the 64 m3 spilled could be recovered by pumping and 62.000 € and took three and a half months. one in the accidental damage category and the other in the incidental damage category. but fortunately.000 € giving a total cost of 225. Absorbents were used in the ditch and drainage sumps were dug between the pipeline and ditch and oil was collected from these by vacuum tanker. the oil could not soak down into the ground. all within the confines of the terminal. the clean-up cost 120.5 m3 was collected in this way. However. Internal Corrosion Event 434: A leak of crude oil from a pipeline in a terminal was discovered by the pipeline staff when oil appeared on the surface of the ground. As a result. However. the final clean-up remains to be done and the plans for this have to be approved by the Authorities. Therefore. However. The pipeline immediately ruptured.3.4.000 € and took one day.4 m3 was recovered as liquid leaving a net loss of 0.1. The clean-up cost 50. disposal of contaminated soil cost 406. Total costs were 370. In the area of the leak.4. dug a trench just over the pipeline. The area of ground affected was 1000 m2.850.000 €. the point of impact was only 100 m upstream of a nonreturn valve. 4/07 area of ground affected by oil was about 50 m2 and some 15 m3 of oily soil was removed for disposal. the spillage was in a very sensitive area inside a National Park. it had been out of service since 1986 when one of the main pipelines had been mothballed.000 € for disposal of contaminated soil. disposal of contaminated soil cost 5. the pipeline is actually lying in the water table.1. and despite near-by pipeline markers. about 2.000 €. It is estimated that a further 0.report no.000 €. The blade carved a gouge 10 cm long by 1 cm wide in the top of the pipe. oil was observed on the surface of water in a ditch adjacent to the pipeline and this was reported to the authorities. Direct Damage . the initial clean-up cost 1.000 € with a further 200. 4.000 €. Of the spilled oil. This cost 200.000 €.2.

2005 had more spillages caused by mechanical failures and operational failures but less caused by third parties. 1600 tonnes of soil were removed and 300 tonnes of water removed and a further 4400 m3 of water treated in an oil water separator. topography. The pipeline was shut in and the pipeline exposed when it was found that there was a drain which had been installed crossing over the pipeline.Malicious There were no incidents in this category in 2005. confidentiality of legal reasons. 54 caused some temporary environmental pollution. all traces of oil were removed.4. 13 .000 €. Repairs to the pipeline took 35 hours and cost 120. The gross spillage volume was 14. Table 2 shows the spillage performance for the 2001-2005 5-year period. Although some cost data is included for most spill events.Incidental Event 437: A landowner observed oil in a meadow and reported this to the pipeline operator. Because of the high water table. As a result.g. Direct Damage .2.5 over the five year period 2001 to 2005. particularly remediation costs. Compared to the average for these five years.45 m3 of product had escaped.5 per year and 11. The drain laying machine had cut a notch in the pipe and this had developed into a crack some 800 mm long. They are not always fully reported for e. The clean-up cost 170. 4.1. are very case-specific depending on local circumstances. 10 spillages affected surface waters and 9 affected groundwater but only one of these had any impact on potable water supplies. Attempting to draw statistical conclusions from such data would be futile and possibly misleading. geo/hydro-logy as well as local legislation. 2001-2005 SPILLAGE OVERVIEW 2005 was only slightly better than average for spillages with eleven spillages reported compared to the average since CONCAWE records began of 12. In terms of spillage volumes.65 ppm of the annual throughput.2.7 m3 per 1000 km (long term average 89 m3 per 1000 km) and represents 0. both ground and surface water were affected and some 3000 m2 of ground contaminated. It was estimated that only 0. This would normally not be included in the CONCAWE statistics but in this case.report no. Direct Damage . 4.000 € and took 80 days.3. 4/07 4. 2005 was much better than the average for 2001 to 2005 with a total of 511 m3 gross spillage (2001-2005 average 1363 m3) and a net loss of 105 m3 (2001-2005 average 457 m3) although volumes for one spillage were not known.1. there were significant environmental impacts. Also remediation costs can occur over long periods of time and are not always fully known for recent spills.4. we do not feel it is appropriate to try and compare such figures. Cost data. Of the 57 spillages recorded for the period.

6 847 142 2005 34. 4/07 Table 2 Five-year comparison by cause.9 Spillage incidents MECHANICAL FAILURE Construction Material OPERATIONAL System Human CORROSION External Internal Stress corrosion cracking NATURAL HAZARD Subsidence Flooding Other THIRD PARTY ACTIVITY Accidental Malicious Incidental 15 2 3 14 1 12 1 5 2 1 11 2 3 2 57 7 8 2 2 1 5 1 1 1 1 9 2 1 1 3 4 m 3 1 4 4 2 2834 1309 236 109 80 37 30 0 2 0 2802 2 1 1 * 554 105 55 10 16 3 427 45 67 0 15 14 9 4 Average 1372 388 120 34 ` 11 273 9 135 50 905 4 1 1 2185 318 156 23 63 9 10 0 493 250 1432 Volume spilled Gross spillage Net loss Average gross loss / incident Average net loss / incident Average gross loss/1000 km Average net loss/1000 km 1150 180 77 12 33 5 853 0 113 0 184 * 138 26 34 7 4 1 48 0 0 0 90 Gross spillage per cause Mechanical failure Operational Corrosion Natural hazard Third party activity Net loss distribution (No of incidents) < 10 11 -100 101.9 708 131 2002 34.8 724 125 2003 35.1000 3 > 1000 m 11 4 7 6 1 4 7 1 3 1 2 7 1 27 25 2 1 3 34 20 10 9 2 Environmental impact NONE SOIL 2 < 1000 m 2 > 1000 m WATER BODIES Surface Water Groundwater POTABLE WATER * Volume from one spillage incident not reported 2 13 2 5 7 3 1 1 10 2 4 1 1 1 4 1 5 5 3 6 1 14 .4 817 143 2004 34.9 789 127 2001‑ 2005 34.report no. volume and impact: 2001 – 2005 3 Combined Length Combined Throughput Combined traffic volume km x 10 3 6 m x 10 3 m x km x 10 9 2001 34.

5 per year.1. 67 of these spillages occurred in "hot" pipelines. an average of 12. number of spills per unit length of pipeline is therefore a better metric. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGES 1971-2005 NUMBERS AND FREQUENCY Over the 35 year survey period there have been 436 spillage incidents i.report no.e. The moving average increases in the late ‘80s to early ‘90s and again in the early 2000 are partly linked to the additions to the pipeline inventory monitored. Figure 5 shows the same data as figure 4. Figure 4 shows the number of spillages per year.3 spills per year and per 1000 km of pipeline today. a disproportionately large proportion in regard of the share of such pipelines in the total inventory.1 in the mid 70s to around 0. moving average and 5-year average trends over the 35 years since 1971 and for all pipelines. now expressed in spillages per 1000 km of pipeline and the steady downward trend appears much more clearly. 5. 15 . There is a clear long-term downward trend which bears witness to the industry improved control of pipeline integrity. 4/07 5.e. The largest number of spillages recorded in any one year was 21 in 1972 and the smallest number was 5 in 2004. The spillage frequency i.5 by 2005. The 5-year frequency moving average has been reduced from around 1. The overall moving average has reduced about 18 spillages per year in the early 1970s to 12. Figure 4 25 35-year trend of the annual number of spillages (all pipelines) Yearly Running average 20 5-year moving average Spillages per year 15 10 5 0 19 99 19 87 19 93 19 95 20 01 19 81 19 83 19 75 19 77 19 71 19 73 19 79 19 85 19 89 19 91 19 97 20 03 20 05 The large changes in the inventory monitored by CONCAWE over the year clearly make the absolute numbers difficult to interpret.

0 0.report no.0 19 71 19 87 19 79 19 81 19 95 19 73 19 89 19 97 20 03 19 75 19 77 19 85 19 91 19 93 20 05 19 83 19 99 20 01 16 .8 0.4 35-year trend of the spillage frequency (all pipelines) 1.0 0. This is illustrated in Figure 6 which compares the spillage frequency for hot and cold pipelines. 4/07 Figure 5 1.0 4. Figure 6 14.2 0.0 Spillages per year per '000 km 8. see section 5. particularly in the early part of the period.2 Yearly Running average 5-year moving average Spillages per year per '000 km 1.0 5-year moving average of spillage frequency (hot and cold pipelines) 12.0 2.0 19 71 19 79 19 89 19 97 19 73 20 03 20 05 19 87 19 81 19 91 19 75 19 85 19 93 19 99 19 77 19 83 19 95 20 01 These overall figures mask the poor performance of hot pipelines (related to corrosion issues.4 0.6 0.0 HOT Cold x 10 10.1).0 6.

0 Albeit with fluctuations. The hot pipeline spillage frequency starts from a much higher base than is the case for the cold pipelines.0 20% 2.0 4.0 12.0 0% 1971 1975 1976 1980 1981 1985 1986 1990 1991 1995 1996 2000 2001 2005 Spills per year per '000 km 3rd party Natural Corrosion Operational Mechanical All causes 40% 0. due to design and construction deficiencies several hot pipelines suffered repeated external corrosion failures and they were shutdown or switched to clean (cold) product service. 4/07 Clearly. now broken down into main cause.0 80% 10. There is a slight relative decrease of all causes except third party activities which has been somewhat increasing and is the most important cause of spillage. When the hot pipeline data are excluded. This statistic best represents the performance improvement achieved by the operators of the bulk of the pipeline system. The recent hot pipelines spillage frequency is still about on a par with what the product pipelines achieved back in 1971-75. the cold pipelines show a somewhat slower improvement trend than the all pipelines data.0 60% 8. the cold and the hot pipelines have demonstrated entirely different behaviours. Still the incidence of spillages has been reduced by two thirds over the last 35 years. A more complete analysis of causes is given in section 6. the analysis by cause (Figure 8) shows that corrosion is a much less prevalent cause of failure for cold pipelines. These actions have greatly contributed to the performance improvement which has been remarkable. In the 1970s and early ‘80s.report no. It has to be noted that the statistical data have become less significant in recent years as the inventory of hot pipelines has steadily decreased. 17 . with a very large proportion of failures due to corrosion.0 6. Figure 7 100% Hot pipelines spillage frequencies by cause 14. Figures 7 & 8 show the evolution over 5-year periods of the spillage frequency for hot and cold pipelines respectively. There was just one hot corrosion spillage in 2001-2005 from a now low total length of hot pipelines.

1.0 80% 0. 5. the long-term trend is clearly downwards.2. 18 . or 0.2 0% 1971 1975 1976 1980 1981 1985 1986 1990 1991 1995 1996 2000 2001 2005 0.0002%.8 Spills per year per '000 km 60% 0. The same data is shown per 1000 km of pipeline in Figure 10 and as a proportion of throughput in Figure 11.2. 4/07 Figure 8 100% Cold pipelines spillage frequencies by cause 1. year by year and in terms of running and 5-year moving average.6 3rd party Natural Corrosion Operational Mechanical All causes 40% 0. SPILLAGE VOLUMES Aggregated annual spilled volumes Figure 9 shows the total gross spillage volume over the complete period. Although there are fairly large year-to-year variations mostly due to a few very large spills that have occurred randomly over the years.0 5. Over the last 5 years. of the oil transported. the gross pipeline spillage has averaged about 2 parts per million (ppm).4 20% 0.report no.

4/07 Figure 9 7000 6000 5000 4000 m 3 Gross spillage volume Yearly Running average 5-year moving average 3000 2000 1000 0 19 95 20 01 19 89 19 97 20 03 20 03 19 91 19 79 19 85 19 73 19 75 19 81 Figure 10 350 300 250 200 m 3 19 71 Gross spillage volume per 1000 km 19 77 19 83 19 87 19 93 Yearly Running average 5-year moving average 150 100 50 0 19 71 19 73 19 75 19 77 19 79 19 81 19 83 19 85 19 87 19 89 19 91 19 93 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 05 19 99 20 05 19 .report no.

would indicate the degree of success in improving clean-up performance. For one thing. maximum removal by excavation of spilled oil. The development of annual recovery percentages (gross-minus-net / gross) shown in Figure 12 indicates no significant trend. is not necessarily the correct response to minimise environmental damage and this is now better understood than it once was. the average recovery of the spilled oil is 56% leaving an average net loss of oil to the environment of 73 m3 per spill. Over the whole period. 20 .report no.e. the recovered spillage. 4/07 Figure 11 12 Gross yearly spillage volume as a proportion of throughput Yearly total 5-year moving average 10 8 ppm 6 4 2 0 19 97 19 95 20 01 19 83 19 91 19 93 19 73 19 87 19 71 19 77 19 79 19 81 19 75 19 85 19 89 19 99 20 03 20 05 It might be expected that the trend in the differences between the annual gross volume spillage and the net volume spillage. Another compounding factor is that the growth in the pipeline inventory has been predominantly for refined product pipelines and it can be assumed that less invasive recovery techniques are justified for white oil products than for fuel oil or crude oil to achieve a given visual and environmental standard of clean-up. which is biodegradable. i. In practice this is not a very sound proposition.

It remains to be seen whether this improvement will continue but it can be expected that improved monitoring of pipelines and the generalised use of automated leak detection systems should lead to a reduction in spill sizes. e. 21 . As a rule of thumb.g. The largest spillages on average have resulted from mechanical failure. Spillage volume per event The gross volume released is a measure of the severity of a spillage incident. the proportion of corrosion spillages. The average annual figure in the last 5 years has consistently been around 100 m3 per spill compared to the long term average of 166 m3 per spill. 4/07 Figure 12 Spilled oil recovery 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 01 83 79 85 91 87 97 93 99 77 73 71 75 81 89 95 03 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 05 5.2. the gradual reduction of the annual total spilled volume is related to the reduction of the number of spillage incidents rather than their severity. third party activities and natural hazards whereas operational problems and corrosion have caused smaller spills.2. Figure 14 shows the average spill size for each cause category. This is partly due to the mix of spillage causes changing over the years. have decreased relative to third party spillages which are among the largest (see Figure 14). Figure 13 shows that. In other words. which on average are smaller ones. There is insufficient data on record to establish any trend in the speed of detection or the response time to stem leakages. beyond the large year-by-year variations.report no. on average the three ‘largest spills’ categories result in spillages that are twice the size of the two ‘smallest spills' categories. there is no clear long term trend in the average spill size by incident.

report no. 4/07 Figure 13 Yearly average gross spillage volume per event 350 300 250 200 m 150 100 50 0 73 77 81 85 87 89 91 95 99 71 75 79 83 93 97 01 03 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 05 3 Figure 14 250 35-year average gross spillage volume per event by cause 200 150 m 100 50 0 Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party 3 22 .

report no.3. Clearly a majority of the spillages recorded in the CONCAWE database were so small that they have only had a very limited and localised impact. Out of the 436 pipeline spillages. = 2 to 75 mm long x 10% max wide. hole size data is only available for 176 (40%). = 2 to 75 mm long x 10% min wide. This also highlights the importance of considering the cut-off spillage size before comparing data sets taken from different sources. = >75 mm long x 10% min wide. = 75 to 1000 mm long x 10% max wide. HOLE SIZE The following arbitrary definitions have been adopted for classifying hole size: • • • • • Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture = less than 2 mm x 2 mm. 4/07 Figure 15 shows the distribution of spillage sizes. demonstrating that less than 20% of all spillages account for 80% of the cumulative volume spilled. Figure 15 100% Distribution of Gross and net spillage sizes (over 35 years) % of cumulative volume spilled/lost 80% 60% Gross spillage volume Net loss 40% 20% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% % of spillage events 5. The corresponding statistics are shown in Table 3. 23 .

21 12% 1% 28% 0% 58% 30% 14% 36% 0% 46% Split 27 14% 8. on the proviso that the pipeline was pumping i. other factors are clearly more important as determinants of the spillage outcome. not static at the time of the incident. and the volume of pipe available to leak after shut in. 4/07 Table 3 Number Distribution of spillages by hole size Pinhole 22 11% mm 2 Fissure 26 13% 43 0.01 1 65 84 9% 0% 77% 5% 9% 7% 0% 29% 20% 2% 164 0.634 Surface area Average min Max Average Gross spillage volume Spillage volume / Hole area Hole cause category Mech.405 1. Failure Operational Corrosion Natural hazard Third party Hole type by cause category Mech.4 27% 4% 27% 4% 38% 23% 14% 12% 20% 11% Hole 74 38% 460 2 3600 97 0. operational and natural hazard incidents cause the largest two types of hole whereas third party is equally divided and the corrosion preponderance is with the smaller hole types. The table above shows that there is indeed a weak relationship between the average gross spillage size and the hole size.419 16 81. there are many other factors involved including the pressure in the pipeline. pinholes result in the smallest spillages and ruptures in the largest.150.005 16% 4% 30% 3% 48% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% As expected.000 284 0.015 26% 11% 33% 7% 22% 23% 43% 16% 40% 6% Rupture 44 23% 128. However. It would be expected that the larger the hole the larger on average the spillage would be. Pinholes are nearly always caused by corrosion.e.8 0.000 130 0. Failure Operational Corrosion Natural hazard Third party m 3 2 m /mm 3 0. the length of time between the start of leakage and the leak being detected and the pipeline shut in. Mechanical incidents often result in ruptures whilst operational and natural hazard incidents tend to cause more than their share of splits. 24 . The two rather obvious reasons for this are that higher leakage rates come out of larger holes and the hole sizes are to an extent related to the pipeline diameter which in turn tends to set the potential flow rate available for leakage.002 11% 5% 10% 2% 74% 17% 29% 7% 20% 34% Overall 193 100% 30. A majority of mechanical. Otherwise hole types follow similar patterns to the cause incidences.report no. For the other three categories.5 350 274 6.600 3.

Before that date.000 m2. particularly those that occur over extended periods of 25 . Not surprisingly. Fine sprays directed upwards can be spread around by winds. The type of location has been reported for a total of 353 spillages.2. The bulk of the spillages from pump stations occur in industrial areas simply because their location is mostly classified as such.4. and for which the gross spillage was relatively modest. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT Location of spillages We differentiate between failures occurring either in a pipeline proper or in pumping stations and also record the type of land use in the area. to some extent fortuitous. Table 4 Location of spillage incidents Commercial/Industrial Residential Agricultural Forest/Mountain Surface water Sub-total Unspecified Total Pipeline Number % 69 24% 15 5% 198 69% 5 0 287 76 363 2% 0% Pump station / manifold Number % 52 78% 2 3% 13 19% 0 0 67 6 73 0% 0% Whereas we do not have statistics of the length of pipeline installed for each land use type it is clear that the number of spillages in commercial and industrial areas is much higher than would be expected from consideration of installed length alone.1. Bigger spillage volumes affect larger areas. 4/07 5. If we exclude the one spillage that affected more than 100. requests reporting of the area of ground (m2) affected by the spillage. 5.4. There are two ways in which small spillage volumes can affect larger areas of ground. area data is available for 232 (53%). Out of the 436 recorded spillages. This factor tends to be more prevalent in the smaller area ranges. Ground area affected The current CONCAWE performance questionnaire. Other smaller spillages can be spread over larger areas by the influence of groundwater or surface water flows.report no.4. For these events. This is the main mechanism by which relatively small spillages can affect very large areas. This relationship is. in use with minor changes since 1983. Evidently. comparatively large spillages. most incidents (86%) occur in the pipeline themselves. area data were reported infrequently. the vulnerability of the pipelines is significantly increased in such areas by a factor of possibly as much as ten compared to other areas. however. there is a direct relationship between spill size and area affected. 5. the percentages that fall within the area ranges are shown in Figure 16 together with the average spill size for each category. Conversely.

of the 57 reported spillages. In the years 2001 to 2005.2% 0. 8 have affected ground water but only 2 have impacted potable water supplies. 16% of the total. have had some effect. It is believed that all of these effects have been temporary. the spills have tended on 26 . Some 14 spillages.999 >=100. Porous ground and hot arid conditions can also lead to the surface consequences being limited. Impact on water bodies The spillage reports record the incidents where oil pollution of the water table and underground aquifers and surface watercourses has had consequences for the abstraction of potable water.4% 9.4% 698 m 3 25 m 3 Size of contaminated 17. can have their main effect underground with relatively little impact on the surface.3. When third party have detected spillages.000-99.6% 42 m 3 area (m ) <10 10-99 100-999 1000-9999 10. representing 3.5% 5.report no. The most common means of detection of pipeline spillages was third party passer-by (45%) who warned of spillages that on average were about 60% of the average size. 5. SPILLAGE DISCOVERY The way in which the occurrence of a spillage was detected is reported in nine categories (Table 5).5. 4/07 time and in the lower quadrants of the pipeline circumference. For the last five years.2% of the total. Pipeline company resources detected some 84% of the pump station spillages.4. Figure 16 Ground area (m2) affected by spillages (% of number reporting) 172 m 3 11. The pattern for spillages from pump stations differs from that from pipelines. impacts on other types of water have been reported.000 2 24.9% 198 m 3 77 m 3 36. 10 have affected surface water. measurement and control systems were involved in detecting only 28% of the spillages. Pipeline instrumentation.

Table 5 Discovery of spillages Number Pipeline % Average gross spillage 9% 19% 5% 6% 9% 51% 1% m 232 364 187 129 167 127 6 187 3 Pump station / manifold Number % Average gross spillage 0 24 21 1 10 17 0 73 0% 33% 29% 1% 14% 23% 0% m 0 3 Right of way survey by p/l staff Routine monitoring by p/l staff Maintenance staff Pressure testing Automatic detection system Third party Pipeline internal inspection survey Total 32 69 17 23 34 185 3 363 111 33 30 49 36 0 62 27 . 4/07 average to be the smaller ones. presumably those that are below the warning capabilities of the instrumentation.report no.

themselves divided into subcategories. This is an average of about 3 spillages per year. corrosion. Figure 17 Distribution of major spillage causes Hot pipelines Cold pipelines 4% 7% 6% 1% 28% Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party 42% Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party 8% 82% Total: 67 incidents 3% 19% Total: 369 incidents 6. As already discussed in section 5.report no. MECHANICAL FAILURE There have been 106 mechanical failures. Whereas 82% of hot pipeline failures are related to corrosion. Dents made subsequently that eventually lead to spillages are categorised as third party. The most common causes of mechanical failures are illustrated in Figure 18.1. It should be noted that by definition the dents that cause mechanical failure have to have been made during the pipeline’s construction. 4/07 6. The survey returns provide more details information on the actual cause and circumstances of failure and these are analysed in this section. Definitions are given in Appendix 1. 28 . the figure is only 19% for cold pipelines for which mechanical and mostly third party related failures are the most prevalent. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGE CAUSES CONCAWE classifies spill causes into five major categories: mechanical failure. 40 failures were due to construction faults and 66 to material faults. natural hazard and third party. operational. 24% of the total of 436 spillage events. the main causes of failure are very different for hot and cold pipelines and this further illustrated in Figure 17.

instrument connections.2. 10 29 . OPERATIONAL There have been 31 spillages in this category (21 human errors and 10 system failures). such as metal fatigue failures of pipelines under cycling pressure conditions. flanges and other fittings and the pump stations.3.6 per year and 29% of the total. just under 1 per year or 7% of the total.e. they are only a very small part of the inventory and the zero spillage record shows that no pipeline has reached an age where repeat failures are being experienced. 6. For cold pipelines corrosion causes represent only 19% of the total. by far the greatest part of the material in place in the pipeline system is the underground pipe itself. Except for their propensity to cause smallish sized spillages. of Spillages 40 Gasket / Gland Other Faulty Material Weld Faults Dents Other Above Ground 30 20 10 0 Pipeline Line Valves Flanges / Fittings Pump Station Although there is no available figure on it. 4/07 Figure 18 60 Causes of mechanical failures 50 No.e.report no. There is no evidence of any increase in those mechanical failures that are potentially age-related. 3. there is no general trend apparent. 54 of these occurred in the more vulnerable hot pipelines and in the early years. As noted earlier though. The events have been subdivided into external and internal corrosion and. these more vulnerable features should be designed out of the pipeline system. If any such pipelines exist. i. Adding seemingly useful features such as more section block valves. CORROSION AND IMPACT OF AGEING There have been 125 spillages in this category i. The fact that only 53 out of the 106 spillages occurred in these underground sections indicates that the most vulnerable features from a mechanical standpoint are pipeline valves. sampling systems can therefore potentially have a negative impact on spillage frequency. 6. Wherever possible.

As already mentioned in section 5. Out of all the possible combinations of pipeline service and corrosion categories three are particularly useful to highlight specific aspects: cold pipelines external and internal corrosion. and all pipelines internal corrosion. they have been relatively large spillages. The figure is higher for internal corrosion but it is heavily weighted by a single event where 2000 m3 were spilled. It is anticipated that inspections using intelligence pigs should improve this situation. has fallen dramatically over the years. increased occurrence of corrosion is a concern which is addressed by pipeline operators through the use of increasingly sophisticated inspections techniques. In a gradually ageing pipeline inventory.report no. If anything. there is the strong prospect of further reducing corrosion spillage incidents by catching the corrosion before it gets too far advanced. Table 6 Hot Corrosion-related spillages Cold Number 46 21 4 All Average spilled volume Gross Net loss m 3 External Internal SCC 53 1 0 99 22 4 76 179 546 179 546 151 Internal corrosion is much less prevalent than external corrosion. External corrosion resulted in smaller sized spills than any of the other causes except for operational. The number of spillages in each sub-category and the resulting average spilled volumes are shown in Table 6. sleeves. Figure 19 shows no evidence of any increasing trend in corrosion failures of cold pipelines. 30 . Thus crude pipelines appear to be much more vulnerable to internal corrosion than product pipelines. etc. This should prevent any occurrence of ‘end of life takeoff’ in spillage numbers. Out of the 71 corrosion-related failures in cold pipelines. mostly related to corrosion. Although there have only been four SCC-related spillages so far (including one recategorised from external corrosion). hot pipelines external corrosion. 24 were related to special features such as road crossings. anchor points. Indeed. the rate has decreased.1 the failure frequency of hot pipelines. one did not report and the other 20 did not use inhibitors. stress corrosion cracking (SCC) was introduced as an extra category. 4/07 years ago. Only one of the pipelines suffering a spill reported that inhibitor was used. Some 73% of the cold pipeline internal corrosion incidents occurred in crude oil service although crude pipelines only account for less than a third of the cold pipeline inventory. possibly as a result of the more severe failures resulting from this type of corrosion. which therefore appear particularly vulnerable.

3. NATURAL HAZARD Natural hazards have caused only 15 spillages.08 0. 4/07 Figure 19 Corrosion-related spillage frequency (all types) for cold pipelines (5-year moving average) 0. This appears to be a direct consequence of the difficult terrain and hydrological conditions that apply to a significant part of that country’s pipeline network. 68 m3 net per spill.14 Spillages per year per '000 km 0.00 19 71 19 73 19 75 19 77 19 79 19 81 19 83 19 85 19 87 19 89 19 91 19 93 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05 There is therefore no evidence as yet to suggest that generalised corrosion is becoming a problem. The resulting spillage volume was 2921 m3 gross.caused spill sizes are 195 m3 gross.44% of the total number of spillages. i.4% of the gross spillage and 3. 6.06 0. Inspection methods involving intelligence pigs are now available to monitor pipeline condition and early identification of the onset of corrosion. very close to the overall average spill sizes. No less than 10 of the natural hazards spills have occurred in the same country.04 0.16 0. These techniques together with the general adoption of integrity management systems by all EU pipeline companies should ensure that any upturn in age-related spillages is prevented or delayed for many years.02 0.5. The natural hazard. This category contributes 3. an average of 4. 104 m3 net.report no. 6. THIRD PARTY Third parties have caused the largest number of spillages with 159 events.12 0.5 per year and over 36% of the total.4.e.2% of the net spillage totals from all causes. 2 to flooding and 3 to other hazards.10 0. of course no guarantee that this will not start to happen at some point and thus there is a need for continued monitoring of performance on this basis. 19 31 . There is. 10 of which were due to landslides or subsidence. 114 events were accidental.

In the other. 32 Pi pe lin R e C on st th er I ai n O th er in g e . 6. Pipeline operators are not always made aware of impending ground working jobs and cannot therefore supply appropriate advice on exact pipeline location and working procedures and exercise adequate supervision of the work. the actual machinery operator may be left partially or completely unaware of a pipeline's existence or fail to apply the requisite care or skill. Even when good communication has been established between the pipeline operator and the third party company.e.5. an electricity pylon fell over and one of the arms punctured a pipeline. Figure 20 40 35 30 No. Damage by machinery occurs as a combination of lack of communication and awareness and lack of care or skill. Accidental damage The most common causes of accidental third party spills are shown in Figure 20 and their sizes are shown in Figure 21. In one case an electrical earthing deficiency had arisen on a pipeline with no previous problem as a consequence of the electrification of an adjacent electric railway line. of Spillages 25 20 15 10 5 0 Causes of accidental third party spills Other Ploughing Digging Bulldozing Drilling in g ry ru ct io n ru ct io n na nc Fa rm Tr en ch nd us t te C on st M O oa d Pi pe lin e Only two events were not caused by direct damage from some form of digging or earth moving machinery. 4/07 were intentional (mostly theft attempts) and 26 were incidental i. As discussed in section 5 third party activities also result in relatively large spills and account for the largest total volume spilled of all causes.report no. resulted from prior damage inflicted to the pipeline by a third party at some point in the past.1.

4/07 Figure 21 Average spillage volumes per spill by type of third party activity causing spillage 300 250 200 m 150 100 50 0 in g ry ru ct io n ru ct io n na nc Fa rm Tr en ch nd us t O th er in g e Recovered Net loss 3 te C on st M O pe lin e Figure 22 shows the awareness data (reported for 79% of the third party-related spillages) as the percentage of cases where each party was aware of either the impending activity (pipeline operator) or the presence of a pipeline (machinery operator).report no. Lack of awareness by pipeline operating companies is an almost universal factor behind spillages caused by farming activities and in 60-80% of all other not pipelinerelated works. Pi Pi pe lin e R oa d C on st th er I ai n 33 . It should be noted that there are no instances where the pipeline operator was aware of the works but the machinery operator was not aware of the pipeline. Overall some 65% of the third party accidental spillages would most probably have been prevented by proper communication to pipeline operators by the third parties. Lack of care or skill by the third party works management or machinery operators is responsible for 35% of the spillages.

e.report no. Although the absolute values vary. These periods have been chosen because of the major change in the reported pipeline inventory between 1987 and 1988 following the inclusion of the non-commercially owned pipelines. Taking the overall average figures. It is also the most amenable to improvement by sharing experiences and comparing operating and work control practices between pipeline operators from different companies and countries. In this figure the frequencies of spillages caused by accidental damage by third parties have been calculated for the average length of each group of diameters for the periods 1971 to 1987. 4/07 Figure 22 100% Awareness of impending works and of pipeline location 80% Awareness 60% 40% 20% 0% Road Construction Both Farming Trenching Pipeline Maintenance Other Industry Neither Pipeline Construction Equipment Operator Pipeline operator An analysis has been made of the relationship between the vulnerability to third party damage and various physical attributes. Neither is there sufficient data on depth below surface to indicate how much the risk is reduced by deeper coverage. It is not recorded if larger pipelines have greater coverage than small ones. A number of possible reasons for this could be postulated but there is no way of determining from the available data what each risk-increasing factor might contribute. the less likely is it to be damaged severely enough by third parties to lead to a spillage. The prevention of third party accidental spillages is of the highest priority due to its place in the spillage cause league. 1988 to 2005 and 1971 to 2005. the relative values are very clear and show that the larger the pipeline. i. with pipeline diameter is shown in Figure 23. The strongest relationship. 34 . the below 8” size range is fourteen times more vulnerable than the 30”+ population.

report no.5. 35 .2 0. Since 1999. However.2.5 Third party accidental damage frequencies against pipeline diameter 0. etc. all the rest were at valves or other fittings at pump stations or road / river crossings.4% of the total number of spillages and has been responsible for about 4% of the total gross spillage loss and 6% of the total net loss. a number of theft attempts have been discovered which fortunately did not lead to spillages. Table 7 Cause Terrorism Vandalism Theft Totals Intentional damage by third party Number of spills 2 5 12 19 Gross spillage m 920 612 1377 2909 3 Net loss 710 568 606 1884 None of the terrorist or vandalism incidents was from underground piping. This category of spillages represents 4. 4/07 Figure 23 0. theft attempts by drilling into pipes have become a regular feature of the spillage statistics although there have been no such incidents in 2004 or 2005. one was from an above ground section of pipeline. Intentional damage There have been 19 spillages caused by intentional damage by third parties.4 Spillage frequency 0.3 1971-1987 1988-2005 1971-2005 0.1 0 >8" 8 to <12" 12 to <16" 16 to <24" 24 to <30" >30" Pipeline diameter 6.

36 . They all started off from dents. There have been 19 incidental damage incidents. 4/07 6. In general they result from unreported damage done after the original construction when a pipeline has been knowingly or unknowingly hit during some or other third party’s groundwork activities.report no. which subsequently suffers deterioration over time resulting eventually in a spill.3. Thus they share the characteristic that they may well be detectable by intelligence pig inspections. Incidental damage This category is somewhat of a catchall and includes those incidents where damage was done at some unknown point in a pipeline’s lifetime. scrapes and such like.5.

the rate of inspections fell to around 10% to 15% of the inventory annually but was up to 18% in 2005. 60 inspections used metal loss and / or crack detection pigs only. In the 28 years of use of the technique the proportion of the pipeline inventory surveyed grew from nothing to peak at 19% of the total system in 1995. including a one-off exercise to collect back data from the time intelligence pigs were first used back in 1977. Inspections were split as follows amongst the individual classes of pig: • • • Metal loss pig 5860 km. There was only one inspection where a geometry pig was used without one or other of metal loss or crack detection pigs. Leak detection pigs are also sometimes used but their function is quite different. They can reduce the consequences from a leak that has already started by helping to catch it earlier. 4/07 7. ACTIVITY SINCE 1971 As shown in Figure 24. 105 sections 34 sections 50 sections From this it can be seen that most inspection programs involved the running of more than one type of pig. INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTIONS INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTION ACTIVITY CONCAWE has been collecting data on intelligent pig inspection activity for the past fifteen years. This can only partly be explained by the increase in the reported length of the pipeline inventory. 37 . ACTIVITY IN 2005 The total length of pipelines inspected by any type of intelligence pig in 2005 was 6226 km or 18% of the total length of the inventory. the growth in intelligence pig use for internal inspection of pipelines was spectacular up to 1994. Crack detection pig 2132 km. crack detection pig and for geometry (calliper) pig inspections. Each inspection may entail one or more passes of a pig along a piggable pipe section. Separate records are kept for metal loss pig.2. 7. There has been a further increase over the last five years. but then reduced to levels that maintained inspection integrity. After many pipelines had been inspected once. 7. 109 sections out of a total of 663 were inspected by one or more pig. while 49 used one or other of these in association with geometry pigs. 7. They do nothing to help prevent the leak occurring in the first place.3. 2005 being the highest ever year in terms of total length. Geometry pig 2643 km.report no.1.

9%) for which CONCAWE has no record of them having been inspected (Figure 25). 4/07 Figure 24 Growth in the use of intelligence pigs 10000 9000 Total annual iinspected length (km) 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 Geometry Cracks Metal loss 19 87 19 85 19 89 19 91 19 79 19 81 19 83 19 99 20 01 20 03 At the end of 2005 there was a total of 5934 km (17.966 km (19.report no. The relatively recent introduction of pigs to inspect 150 mm (6 inch) diameter pipelines means that small diameter is no longer a bar to pig inspections. The length of un-inspected pipelines is therefore certainly less than the above figure and should continue to decrease in future years.2%). 38 20 05 19 93 19 95 19 97 . There are certainly some pipeline sections (mainly very old ones) which were not designed to be pigged and because of small size or tight bends or lack of suitable pig launchers or receivers cannot be intelligence pigged.7%) in 185 sections (28. In addition. a number of pipeline companies in Eastern Europe have joined the survey in recent years and previous pigging records have not on the whole been provided. Less than 150 mm diameter pipelines represent a very small percentage of the pipeline inventory. This is a considerable reduction on the 2004 figures of 6. The main reason for the still significant length of apparently non-inspected pipelines is probably under-reporting particularly as we only started collecting information on intelligence pigging in 1995 and replies to this part of the questionnaire have never been as complete as for other sections. The difference between the percentages of non-inspected km and section number indicates that a majority of the not-inspected sections are short.0%) in 172 sections (25.

4. REPEAT INSPECTIONS Many pipelines have been inspected a number of times. 11 pipelines by crack pigs twice. 39 . Indeed. 4/07 Figure 25 600 Pig-inspected pipelines as per end 2005 Number of sections or total length ('00 km) 500 Geometry only Metal loss & geometry Metal loss & crack only 400 300 200 100 0 Sections Total length 7. for some pipelines. and 98 pipelines by geometry pig twice. The number of repeat inspections is shown in Figure 26 which shows that 2 pipelines have been inspected no fewer than fourteen times. regular intelligence pig inspections are required by the authorities. Some 142 pipelines have been reported as inspected by metal loss pigs twice.report no.

where the trouble might have been discovered by internal inspection before the failure had occurred.6 per year. Table 8 Historical spillages possibly preventable by internal inspections 45 59 22 126 Mechanical failures (line pipe welds. as shown in the table below. some 3. corrosion and other sorts of damage in or on the pipe inner or outer walls. there have been 126 spillages. 40 . pipe material faults) Corrosion (excluding excess historic hot incidents) Third party incidental (non-construction scrapes and dents) Total These categories will all tend to increase with age at some point in the future.report no. 4/07 Figure 26 70 Repeat Inspections 60 50 Number of sections 40 Metal loss Crack Geometry 30 20 10 0 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Number of repeat inspections The intelligence pig inspection technique only finds flaws. Over the past 35 years. Internal inspections should ensure that repairs will be made before they become spillages.

2/72. REFERENCES CONCAWE (1972) Spillages from oil industry cross-country pipelines in Western Europe. Reports No. 6/98. 1. 1/03. 41 . 8/87.report no. 3/00. 2/73. 11/82. Statistical summary of reported spillages. 7/86. Report No. Report No. 10/80. 3/05. 1/74. 9/77. 4/96. Brussels: CONCAWE CONCAWE (1998) Western European cross-country oil pipelines – 25-year performance statistics. 7/75. 4/07 8. 4/01. 5/94. 4. 9/89. 8/88. 4/91. Brussels: CONCAWE CONCAWE Performance of oil industry cross-country pipelines in Western Europe. 5/74.1970. 4/92. 3/06. 6/79. 4/95. Report No. 1/02. 3/78. 7/04. 2/82. 6/90. 2/93. 9/83. 3. Brussels: CONCAWE 2. 12/84. Statistical summary of reported incidents 1966 . 9/85. 7/76. 7/97. Brussels: CONCAWE CONCAWE (2002) Western European cross-country oil pipelines – 30-year performance statistics. 3/99. 2/98.

Categories of spillage causes CONCAWE classifies spill causes into five major categories: mechanical failure.report no. This also includes failure of sealing system (gasket. Corrosion: a failure resulting from corrosion either internal or external of either a pipeline or a fitting. instrumentation. lightning strike etc. mechanical pressure relief system) or from operator errors. Table 1. within each category a primary cause. expressed in m3. defective weld. recovered during the clean-up operation. undetected when it occurred and resulting in a failure at some later point in time. inadequate support etc).g. operational.g. 42 .g. of hydrocarbons released from the pipeline system as a result of the incident Recovered oil: the estimated quantity. Natural hazard: a failure resulting from a natural occurrence such as flooding. pump seal etc). 4/07 APPENDIX 1 Spillage volume DEFINITIONS Gross spilled volume: the estimated total quantity. either as oil or as part of the contaminated soil removed Net loss: the difference between gross spilled volume and recovered oil. metallurgical defect) or a construction fault (e. land movements.1 Main A B C D E Mechanical Failure Operational Corrosion Natural Hazard Third Party Activity A Construction Fault System Malfunction External Landslide / Subsidence Accidental Categories of spillage causes Secondary B Material Fault Human Error Internal Flooding Intentional C Stress Corrosion Other Incidental Detailed reporting in Appendix 2 further identifies. Third party: a failure resulting from an action by a third party either accidental or intentional. This also includes "incidental" damage. malfunction or inadequacy of safeguarding systems (e. expressed in m3. Mechanical: a failure resulting from either a material fault (e.1. natural hazard and third party. corrosion. Operational: a failure resulting from operational upsets. These main categories are subdivided to give a total of 13 subsets shown in Table 1.

Others Discovery 1 Right of way survey 2 Routine monitoring 3 Maintenance 4 Pressure testing 5 Automatic detection system 6 Third party 7 Pipeline internal inspection survey Land use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 System part 1 Underground pipe 2 Above ground pipe 3 Road/rail crossing 4 River crossing 5 Line valve 6 Line fitting 7 Manifold 8 Terminal 9 Pump station 10 Fitting (other) Primary cause 1 Dent 2 Faulty weld (undetected) 3 Faulty weld (repaired) 4 Faulty heat treatment 5 Pipe fitting 6 Gasket 7 Lamination 8 Faulty material 9 Temperature compensation 10 Gland 11 Traffic 12 Mining 13 Overpressrue 14 Vibration 15 Temperature variations 16 Bolt/screw/plug 17 Design 18 Bypass/deadleg 19 Electric current 20 Burner/welder damage Commercial Industrial Residential Agricultural Forest Mountains Barren land Surface water 43 .report no. 4/07 APPENDIX 2 Key to table Service 1 2 3 4 5 SPILLAGE SUMMARY Crude oil White product Fuel oil Crude/white pro.

4/07 Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries ID diameter " 11 11 20 Spillage volume Gross m Net loss 3 Discovery System part Age Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 1971 1972 1973 5 8 20 34 8 16 28 12 9 9 10 10 12 12 10 4 6 20 20 28 10 8 10 8 10 12 5 20 16 24 18 6 9 5 5 12 12 12 12 12 28 10 12 12 12 1974 6 9 10 12 13 4 6 16 7 16 5 8 8 10 10 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 4 0 40 350 25 3 6 300 2000 2 5 800 70 10 40 1 1 500 5 150 0 1 200 250 60 90 7 30 400 99 0 4 25 0 4 25 11 12 12 15 15 200 12 250 150 310 100 8 0 1 0 1 3 20 10 2 1 5 5 1 0 1 1 500 1 30 200 668 489 1 5 6 50 2 150 39 5 35 1 1 1 50 0 60 100 12 350 96 3 1 6 12 2 2 5 2 10 40 0 2 2 0 4 2 668 405 3 3 6 5 3 3 6 2 3 3 6 3 2 6 6 6 3 3 6 6 2 6 6 3 3 6 6 6 6 2 6 6 1 6 3 3 3 2 6 1 1 1 6 3 6 1 6 6 6 6 6 1 3 2 6 1 3 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 6 2 2 1 9 4 9 9 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 6 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 6 1 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 4 1 1 1 3 6 5 9 8 20 5 9 20 4 12 5 29 29 39 39 12 12 7 15 15 8 8 16 6 8 9 2 6 5 8 1 3 11 2 13 1 32 8 8 13 13 13 13 13 16 9 6 6 6 4 5 15 33 6 9 8 8 17 16 9 8 10 21 22 22 18 18 Impact Land Cause use Category Primary Water Contaminated bodies land area 2 m 4 AA 6 AA 16 AA 3 AB 6 60.000 AA 15 CA CA 2 CA CA CA 2 CA CA 4 CB P 4 CB EA EA EA EA EA 4 EA 44 .000 DA 4 EA EC 11 EC 11 EC 11 2 AA 11 2 AA 14 1.000 2 BA BB CA CA EA 1.000 EA EB AB 5 2 AB 2 4 AB 6 CA CA 2 CA 2 CA 1 CA 1 CA CA 2 CA CA 1 EA EA EA EA 4 EA EA 4 EA 4 EA EC AA 15 2 AA 6 2 AB 6 2 AB 14 2 AB 10 2 AB 6 2 AB 14 CA CA CA CA CA CA CA 1 CA 30.report no.

800 1 CA 4 CA 4 CA 4 CA 4 CA 2 CA 2 CA 4 DA 4 EA 4 EA EA 4 EA 5.500 4 EA 400 4 EA 4 EA 4 EA 4 EA 4 EC 12 4 AB 8 4 AB 7 4 AB 8 1.000 AA 1 2.500 4 EA 4 EA 2 EB P 6.report no.400 45 .700 4 CA 350 4 CA 1 CA 500 1 CA 100 4 EA 2.865 4 AA 1 16. 4/07 Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries ID diameter " 20 34 10 Spillage volume Gross m Net loss 3 Discovery System part Age Years 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 1975 8 10 12 6 10 4 8 8 12 6 18 8 8 6 8 8 24 16 10 4 24 10 10 8 18 8 14 1977 20 36 1976 12 10 12 20 24 10 18 8 8 12 8 20 34 8 22 6 10 12 8 8 12 18 16 11 12 24 16 22 24 9 12 18 18 18 12 8 11 1978 1979 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 2 4 30 30 3 10 4 20 5 50 3 25 1 1 0 0 0 15 5 120 60 15 10 2 2 10 0 0 0 3 60 6 9 17 1322 80 90 200 50 40 44 802 153 358 32 28 2 50 1 350 315 6 103 550 600 160 80 3 3 191 269 2530 2000 235 19 12 100 2 120 80 2 4 400 3 58 1 255 100 100 50 300 20 5 50 90 245 950 1 433 90 25 2 14 606 153 358 220 90 500 25 3 1 2500 300 205 6 10 60 40 1 250 0 40 245 40 1 200 5 1 50 150 380 4 6 2 3 5 3 3 2 6 1 2 6 7 1 3 6 2 2 2 6 6 6 2 6 2 2 6 2 2 6 2 6 2 6 3 3 6 3 2 3 4 2 3 6 1 5 2 2 2 2 2 6 2 6 2 6 6 2 6 4 4 1 6 2 6 4 6 2 4 6 6 1 1 1 6 6 6 2 10 1 10 9 9 9 9 3 1 1 9 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 9 9 1 5 9 9 1 1 9 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 5 1 1 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 11 12 5 4 11 9 9 6 18 6 6 6 23 12 9 23 9 13 13 17 13 11 16 10 13 24 7 23 9 9 8 3 19 7 10 8 9 19 13 11 12 5 25 13 19 19 9 16 16 7 18 14 14 7 7 12 6 14 10 10 4 15 8 5 17 23 12 12 16 23 23 15 Impact Land Cause use Category Primary Water Contaminated bodies land area 2 m 4 AB 2 AB 2 3 AB 6 2 BA 2 BA 2 BB 2 BB CA CA CA 2 CA CA CA 4 CA 2 CA 4 EA EA EA EA 4 EA AA 3 4 AA 8 2 AB 6 2 AB 8 AB 13 CA CA DA DA 4 EA 4 EA 4 EA 4 EA 4 EC 12 2 AB 6 150 2 AB 6 140 4 AB 8 2 AB 10 2 BB 2 BB 4 CA 3 CA 2 CB DA 4 DB 4 DC 4 EA 1.

600 4 CB 20.000 4 AB 6 200 4 AB 6 3.000 4 EA 10. 4/07 Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries ID diameter " 13 40 10 10 7 12 10 12 8 34 40 10 20 8 8 12 10 20 10 26 24 7 8 5 28 8 24 8 12 10 5 7 22 6 8 4 4 4 16 6 7 7 10 14 12 28 24 28 8 34 16 12 6 16 9 10 11 24 20 10 10 6 16 8 16 20 24 16 20 8 9 34 8 14 6 8 Spillage volume Gross m Net loss 3 Discovery System part Age Years 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 2 1 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 1 4 1 2 1 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 5 5 5 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 8 4800 80 10 1 111 762 270 313 30 10 10 600 19 5 19 5 92 5 10 125 30 132 322 96 5 12 9 2 8 400 20 140 15 31 7 10 1 4 442 12 182 148 213 675 1 4363 141 3 16 5 10 10 2 20 5 236 150 244 1 25 16 7 4 1100 211 160 53 292 20 2 10 10 7 192 280 52 11 1 400 12 135 2 150 1 2 58 3 45 10 132 317 0 12 16 140 5 1 111 120 110 171 470 0 3928 3 2 10 16 1 236 1 240 1 4 756 195 6 6 4 5 2 10 7 95 56 41 6 2 6 6 1 1 6 2 6 2 6 6 6 2 6 4 4 6 2 6 6 6 4 2 2 6 1 6 6 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 2 5 6 4 4 2 6 6 6 6 1 6 5 6 2 2 3 1 6 6 6 6 5 1 6 5 5 5 2 2 5 2 3 6 6 4 6 1 6 5 5 5 9 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 9 5 7 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 9 1 3 1 1 1 1 6 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 10 10 9 9 1 3 1 9 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 1 1 9 1 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 12 9 10 10 15 15 15 6 5 17 12 12 15 25 15 18 14 15 24 16 20 18 20 16 19 10 16 18 20 30 22 22 22 18 15 17 17 29 3 20 10 18 11 17 13 18 21 17 24 11 11 23 21 14 9 17 17 17 9 33 17 12 26 38 22 25 45 14 15 18 13 19 Impact Land Cause use Category Primary Water Contaminated bodies land area 2 m 2 AB 6 4 AB 8 10.000 4 EC 1.000 4 EA 4 EB 2 EC 1 15 4 AA 1 6.500 4 AB 8 120 4 AB 8 720 2 BA 1.000 4 AB 7 3.000 4 CA 4 CA 4 CA 10 4 DA P 10.500 4 EA 100 4 EA 10 4 EB 3 46 .000 3 CA 3 CA 4 CA 20 4 CB 180 2 CB 84 4 EA 1.report no.000 3 CB 4 EA 2 EC 1 4 AA 9 100 4 AA 9 9 4 AB 9 80 4 BB 2 CA 3.500 4 AA 4 4.000 4 EA 18.000 EA EA 2 EB AB 10 2 AB 6 80 AB 8 4 CA 4 CA 4 CA 2 CA 50 4 CA 2 CA CA 4 DA 2 DC 4 EA 4 EA EA 2 EC 11 4 AA 1 P 4 AB 8 1.000 4 BA 50 4 BB 50 2 CA 2 CA 250 10 2 CA 4 CB 200 5 EA 100 EB 4 AA 1 18 2 BA 2 BA 2 BA 2 BA 4 CC 2 13.000 4 CA 2 CA 30 4 CA 2 CB 4 CB 3.

500 4 AB 6 500 2 CA 5.400 2 AB 8 2 AB 6 5 AB 8 10 2 BB 1.000 2 EA 30 4 EA 100 4 EA 100 3 EA 20 4 EA 150 3 EA 550 4 EA 9 4 EA 1.000 4 EA 500 4 EA P 4 EA 200 4 EA 6.000 4 AA 16 1.500 2 AA 16 150 4 AA 17 320 4 AB 5 600 2 AB 8 250 2 AB 8 100. 4/07 Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries ID diameter " 20 26 9 16 9 12 22 16 34 12 8 34 11 28 10 20 3 10 8 16 16 4 6 6 26 12 1 26 10 9 12 10 16 16 10 12 6 8 8 40 11 13 10 8 11 11 6 10 20 20 12 12 12 Spillage volume Gross m Net loss 3 Discovery System part Age Years 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 10 7 8 8 8 6 6 13 8 8 1992 8 8 10 8 24 6 12 8 8 2 4 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 3 1000 2 25 550 8 12 3 300 10 90 97 81 80 5 305 40 2 14 3 3 650 2 63 18 3 1 25 155 66 25 240 400 253 660 82 298 52 3 186 40 2 105 252 9 325 225 3 189 275 50 20 25 5 29 4 172 2 80 20 100 15 4 21 1 84 485 10 1000 128 113 30 5 275 5 2 200 13 3 75 50 25 120 1 2 150 1 10 1 115 1 42 21 1 80 1 5 10 1 1 1 1 650 1 56 1 2 7 5 16 5 150 90 253 472 4 298 27 126 5 105 221 11 194 1 34 118 38 13 7 2 29 1 68 4 60 10 13 75 485 1 400 98 8 15 5 248 1 1 3 75 50 25 4 6 6 2 6 6 3 6 6 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 4 2 5 6 5 5 2 6 3 6 6 6 3 6 3 2 6 6 6 5 6 6 2 6 6 5 5 6 6 6 4 4 6 6 6 5 2 6 2 2 3 3 7 2 2 3 6 6 4 6 4 4 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 6 1 9 3 1 10 4 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 6 2 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 9 10 3 1 1 1 1 5 1 9 5 1 9 9 10 1 6 3 1 1 1 1 9 9 1 1 5 9 7 1 9 7 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 25 46 39 46 21 20 18 26 30 28 17 35 31 23 24 28 23 35 16 23 26 33 33 26 1 26 27 48 17 24 22 20 24 32 33 32 29 17 26 33 48 22 11 34 24 24 10 24 20 21 38 31 11 26 30 17 17 49 34 37 1 24 24 34 12 33 13 22 30 25 27 49 28 25 25 Impact Land Cause use Category Primary Water Contaminated bodies land area 2 m 2 AA 3 4 AA 4 1.000 4 EA 66 4 EA 4 EC 1 4.000 4 AB 6 4 CA 1.100 2 BB 1.report no.000 3 CA 3 CA 400 4 DA 5.000 2 EA 10 2 EC 1 P 2 AB 6 200 3 AB 8 P 1.800 4 AA 2 100 2 AA 2 6 4 AA 6 10.000 4 AB 2 P 2.000 4 BB 4 CA 50 2 CA 4 CB 2.200 4 AA 1 4.200 4 EA 1.000 4 AB 5 200 4 CA 200 3 CB 280 4 DA P 2.000 4 EA 2.000 4 EC 1 30 2 AA 1 4 AB 2 5.000 2 CB 25 4 EA 6 4 EA 500 4 EA 2 4 EB 4 EB 7.350 BB 4 CA 300 250 2 CA 4 CA 2 4 DB 4 EC 1 20 4 EC 1 60 47 .500 4 CB 300 4 CB 10.500 4 BB 10 2 CA 4 EA 3 4 EA 324 4 EA 4 AA 17 14.000 4 EC 17 4 BB 30 4 BB 1.

000 4 EA 1.report no.000 4 AA 2 750 4 AB 8 4 AB 8 500 4 BB 6. 4/07 Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage Year diameter ID " 34 12 18 13 20 26 9 24 8 12 20 7 16 16 6 6 11 12 32 10 9 8 1995 10 6 16 10 9 9 13 6 9 14 12 9 7 10 12 10 12 12 8 12 6 13 16 10 10 9 8 1999 1 11 6 4 8 13 6 8 11 12 2000 12 12 11 12 24 Spillage volume Gross m Net loss 3 Discovery System part Age Years 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 248 3 2 14 580 2000 10 8 49 3 101 3050 3 200 1350 250 1 5 2 90 10 285 195 46 280 30 53 115 132 1000 48 20 139 12 165 292 1 437 19 500 19 2 422 435 13 40 30 0 486 250 340 15 176 30 0 7 30 167 1 1 80 84 29 80 36 1 175 10 8 159 7 1 18 1 13 500 500 7 6 39 1 19 1450 3 160 1295 14 1 5 2 60 5 285 170 80 30 41 82 270 18 20 113 99 209 343 19 62 3 0 341 267 2 1 4 0 247 20 313 14 67 2 64 1 1 20 13 14 30 28 3 7 8 64 1 1 4 6 1 7 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 2 6 5 2 2 1 6 6 6 2 6 5 6 2 6 6 1 5 1 5 5 6 5 2 6 6 2 6 6 1 1 2 2 2 6 3 6 2 6 5 1 5 5 6 2 2 2 5 6 6 5 6 6 5 2 6 6 6 5 6 6 1 9 5 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 9 1 10 9 1 8 4 1 1 7 3 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 9 3 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 3 1 31 2 23 27 26 19 31 30 33 37 31 29 13 31 31 16 16 9 24 21 26 37 36 22 35 5 36 30 31 28 39 5 37 5 40 30 40 40 64 27 7 30 30 33 24 30 34 42 30 6 4 42 25 32 32 25 35 48 10 40 35 5 36 24 30 31 8 26 41 Land Cause Impact use Category Primary Water Contaminated bodies land area 2 m 4 AA 8 45.150 1 AA 8 10.000 4 CA 2.000 3 EA 4 EC 1 150 48 .500 2 CA 55.000 4 EA 100 4 EA 2 EC 1 3 EC 1 6 4 AB 8 6.800 2 CB 20 4 CC 2 3 CC 2 P 4 EA 150 2 EC 2 AB 5 400 4 BB 4 BB 100 2 CA 3 EA 500 4 EA 600 4 EA 160 4 EA 650 4 EA 4 2 BB 200 2 CA 300 60 4 CA 4 CA 5 2 CA 4 EA 500 2 EA 4 EA 4 EB 1.000 6 DA P 4 EA 50 4 EA 40.000 4 EA 1.000 4 AB 8 25.000 2 AB 6 50 2 AB 8 25 4 AB 6 100 2 BA 100 4 CA 2 CB 18 500 4 EA 4 EA P 8.000 4 EB 100 2 EC 1 2 AB 5 60 2 CB 150 4 EA 4 EA 5.000 2 AB 16 80 2 AB 6 400 1 CA 400 4 CB 800 4 CB 25.500 2 EA 100 4 EA 300 4 EA 30 2 AB 6 40 3 BB 300 1 CA 16 2 EA 20 4 EA 350 2 EC 20 23.

000 2 CA S 50 2 CB 18 G 150 4 EA G 1.500 2.report no.000 4 AA 2 10 4 AB 8 500 4 AB 8 900 2 AB 8 120 2 CA 500 1.3 EA 2.000 EC 1 SG 3.000 4 CA 2 CB 225 4 EA 4 EA 3 EA 400 4 EB 250 4 EB 400 4 EB 350 4 EB P 404 4 AB 5 325 2 CA 500 10.000 4 EA 12.000 2 AB 200 4 EA 1.000 2 EC 1 AA 2 CA S 2 2 EA S 5 4 EA 1.000 49 .000 4 AA 14 2 AA 2 G 4 AA G 15.000 400 2 CA 2 CA 4 CC 2 400 2 DA 5.000 4 BB 1.000 4 AA 1 6.000 2 CA 4 CA 14.800 1 EA 600 EA 4 EB 500 5 EB 120 4 EB 400 4 EB 400 2 EC 20 800 7 EC P 80. 4/07 Spillage Year Pipe Service Fatalities Injuries ID diameter " 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 2001 10 10 6 12 34 12 13 11 10 6 12 12 16 8 8 20 10 10 6 8 13 24 30 8 16 20 12 8 14 20 12 11 11 6 11 16 16 16 12 20 16 10 22 8 10 12 12 20 6 6 9 10 10 24 8 24 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 Spillage volume Gross m 800 1 5 37 10 6 4 103 55 10 5 10 17 2 85 10 100 80 1 17 70 225 250 2 170 750 280 40 190 30 2 2 83 45 2 74 5 28 52 11 2500 2 26 20 90 19 350 20 38 30 15 3 64 15 0 Net loss 3 Discovery System part Age Years 2002 8 1 5 7 2 1 4 50 51 1 5 7 12 2 24 10 20 58 20 120 45 30 15 30 2003 74 31 49 5 10 3 7 1100 0 18 6 50 19 10 2004 2005 4 1 63 8 6 6 6 4 6 5 6 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 6 2 6 6 2 2 5 6 3 4 1 6 6 5 5 2 6 5 6 5 5 1 6 4 4 6 1 2 2 6 5 2 3 5 2 6 5 6 6 2 6 6 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 6 1 5 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 9 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 3 10 1 1 1 1 39 38 27 15 29 26 23 9 11 47 30 30 18 47 47 36 38 28 33 ? 46 39 40 57 39 40 33 52 32 46 46 46 41 29 29 45 31 32 40 5 5 29 45 28 28 14 22 25 40 41 46 Impact Land Cause use Category Primary Water Contaminated bodies land area 2 m 4 AA 2 10.000 4 EB 6.000 2 EA 40 4 EA 4 EA 20.000 4 AA 4.000 4 AB 7 S 58 4 AB 7 S 42 4 BB G 1.

Lefkosia Lefkosa .

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