LARCENY

A person who “steals” is guilty of Larceny under the Larceny Act Chapter 11:12 (TT).   Stealing is defined
at Section 3 of the Act as follows:

“a person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a claim of right made
in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen, with intent, at the time of the
taking permanently to deprive the owner thereof;”

A. ACTUS REUS 

1. TAKING

s. 3 (b) of the Act

(b) the expression “takes” includes obtaining the possession—

(i) by any trick;

(ii) by intimidation;

(iii) under a mistake on the part of the owner with knowledge on the part of the taker that possession
has been so obtained;

(iv) by finding, where at the time of the finding the finder believes that the owner can be discovered by
taking reasonable steps;

NB: A person is deemed to “take” the goods of another even where he finds the goods.

s. 3 (b) (iv) of the Trinidad and Tobago Act

Singh v Quintyne (1961) 12 WIR 378

The appellant was alleged to have stolen $101.49 in cash, two identification cards and a pocket diary.
The owner missed the diary containing the other property some time after he alighted from a taxi.
When first seen the appellant was holding what appeared to be a purse and was overheard to say that
he was taking it to the police station. He went in the direction of the police station but never reached it.
He was later arrested and the sum of $101.49 was found on him but the identification cards were never
found. The appellant claimed the money and denied ever having had the purse. He was convicted of
larceny.

Held: that if at the time of the taking of any goods found there was an absence of an intention to steal
either because they were retained in the honest belief that their owner could not be found or because
the finder believing that their owner could be found formed the intention to return them to their owner,
any decision thereafter dishonestly to appropriate the goods, notwithstanding that the finder had
reason subsequently to believe that their owner could be found or because of a change of mind about
returning them to their owner, will not suffice to convict him of larceny.

Appeal allowed. Conviction quashed.

Chee Awai v Quintyne (1968) 13 WIR 474

The appellants took possession of a half Alsatian pup about three months old which they rescued from
an attack by two dogs and which they alleged had followed them and voluntarily jumped into their car
when the door was opened by Beharry. Neither of the appellants enquired from any of the several
persons in the area at the time as to who was the owner of the pup nor did they take other steps to
ascertain its ownership.

Held: that the evidence, was such as to raise a reasonable inference not only that the owner of the dog
could have been found if the appellants had taken reasonable steps, but also that the appellants must
have believed that the owner could have been found if they had taken reasonable steps.

MEANING OF POSSESSION

Hibbert v Mckiernan [1948] 1 All ER 860

Appellant trespassed on the private links of a golf club and there, animo furandi, took eight golf balls,
which, it was found, had been abandoned by their former owners. A police officer was on special duty
on the links to detect and apprehend persons taking golf balls and to warn off trespassers. He arrested
appellant who was charged with and convicted of stealing the balls, the property of the secretary and
members of the golf club.

Held appellant was rightly convicted on that charge. Per Lord Goddard, CJ & Humphreys, J: The question
of the title to chattels discovered by an honest finder on the land of a person, who was not the actual
owner of the chattels, did not arise in the case. Per Lord Goddard, CJ: Every householder or occupier of
land means or intends to exclude thieves and wrongdoers from the property of which he is in possession
and this confers on him a special property in goods found on his land sufficient to support an indictment,
if the goods are taken therefrom, not under a claim of right, but with a felonious intent. Per Humphrey,
J: Were it material, the intention of the members of the club to exercise control over the balls was
proved by the steps taken by them to prevent other persons from interfering with them. It was not
essential to name any person as the owner of the goods in an indictment for larceny. Per Pritchard,
J: Before it could be said that the members of the club had acquired a possession of the golf balls of such
a nature that interference with it was capable of becoming the basis of a charge of larceny, it must
appear that the members intended to exclude others from interference with the balls and that they had
over them a degree of power which was sufficient to give effect to such intent. On the facts found, the
members did so intend and had such power.

ABANDONMENT

Hibbert v. McKiernan (supra)

Edwards & Stacey (1877) 13 Cox C.C. 384.

 A mad dog having bitten three pigs, the owner ordered the latter to be killed and buried on his own
land, not intending ever to disturb them. E dug up the bodies by night and sold them. The jury found
that the owner did not intend to abandon the property in the pigs.

Held E was properly convicted of larceny of the dead bodies of the pigs.

Williams v Phillips (1957) 41 Crim. App. Rep.

DD Dustmen were convicted of stealing goods from dustbins collected in the course of their duties, and
selling the goods to dealers and sharing the proceeds.

Held: Refuse put in a dustbin was not abandoned; it was the householders' property until it was taken
away, when it became the corporation's property; the men knew that they were not allowed to take
anything from the refuse and there was abundant evidence on which the justices could convict;
therefore, the appeals must be dismissed

Guilty

2.CARRYING AWAY

Definition- para. 3 (c ) of the Act

(c) the expression “carries away” includes any removal of anything from the place which it

occupies, but, in the case of a thing attached, only if it has been completely detached;

Thompson (1825) 1 Mod. C.C. 80

Attempting illegally to arrest a man is sufficient to reduce killing the person making the attempt to
manslaughter, though the arrest was not actually made, and though the person had armed himself with
a deadly weapon to resist such attempt; if prisoner was in such a situation that he could not have
escaped from the arrest; and it is not necessary that he should have given warning to the person
attempting to arrest him before he struck the blow.

Walsh (1824) 1 Mod. C.C. 14

Prisoner had lifted up a bag from the bottom of a boot of a coach, but was detected before he had got it
out. It did not appear that it was entirely removed from the space it at first occupied in the boot, but the
raising it from the bottom had completely removed each part of it from the space that specific part
occupied: Held this was a complete asportation.

Cherry (1781) 1 Leach 236

The prisoner was indicted at the Oxford assizes for larceny of a wrapper and four pieces of linen cloth.
However, he was discovered by the wagoner and apprehended before he had taken anything out.

It was held by the twelve judges that it was not such a removal of the property as was necessary to
constitute the offence of larceny. For the carrying away must be a removal of the goods from the place
where they were…

Etwaroo v Jaggarran (1972) 18 WIR 211

he appellant was an employee of a supermarket where various items of food as well as articles such as
Brylcreem and Vaseline hair dressing were sold. Employees were permitted by the management to
make purchases in the same manner as members of the public, that is, to remove the articles from the
shelves where they were displayed, and pay for them at the cashier's desk. The appellant took a parcel
of sugar and one of flour to the cashier and offered to pay for those items only. Concealed at the bottom
of the two parcels were four jars of Brylcreem and two bottles of Vaseline. When challenged by the
cashier, the appellant said that the parcels of sugar and flour with the cashier were not the ones he had
placed there. He was charged with the larceny of the Brylcreem and Vaseline before a magistrate who
convicted him of that offence.

Held: that the offence of larceny, and not an attempt was disclosed, and that the Court of Appeal,
following Peters v Gordon ((1969), 14 WIR 345), would make the order which the Full Court ought to
have made, that is, order that the appellant be convicted of larceny, and impose the penalty that had
been imposed by the magistrate.

Lapier (1784) 1 Leach 320

To force an ear–ring from the ear of a lady with a felonious intent to steal it, is a sufficient degree of
violence to constitute robbery; and to remove it from the ear to the curls of the hair, a sufficient carrying
away.

3. A THING CAPABLE OF BEING STOLEN

Definition- s. 3 (e ) of the Act

(e) everything which has value and is the property of any person, and if adhering to the realty then

after severance therefrom, is capable of being stolen except that—

(i) save as expressly provided below with respect to fixtures, growing things, ore from mines and mineral
oils, anything attached to or forming part of the realty is not capable of being stolen by the person who
severs the same from the realty, unless after severance he has abandoned possession thereof; and

(ii) the carcase of a creature wild by nature and not reduced into possession while living is

not capable of being stolen by the person who has killed the creature, unless after killing it he has
abandoned possession of the carcase.

Brathwaite v Daniel (1964) 7 WIR 366

The respondents’ L D and L H were charged summarily with the larceny of two fowls contrary to s 9 of
the Summary Offences Ordinance, Cap 4, No 17 [T] which provides:

“Any person who is guilty of the larceny … of any chattel, money, or valuable security … shall be liable to
imprisonment for six months or to a fine of two hundred and forty dollars.”

The magistrate was satisfied from the evidence led in support of the charge that L D and L H were each
seen with a fowl in his hand and that the two fowls were stolen from the owner. At the close of the case
for the prosecution, however, he accepted a submission that the charge was laid under the wrong
section as fowls were not chattels within the meaning of s 9 of the Ordinance, and acquitted the
respondents. On appeal

Held: “Chattels” was a word of wide import and included within its ambit any goods which were the
subject of larceny at common law. Domestic animals and therefore poultry were accordingly within the
meaning of that word in s 9.
Tideswell [1905] 2 K.B. 273

Prisoner was in the habit of buying from time to time from a manufacturing company portions of the
accumulated ashes of the company’s works. The only agreement made between the managing director
of the company and prisoner with respect to such purchases was as to the price per ton, prisoner being
at liberty to take from the accumulation as much as he required, upon the understanding that the
amount of his purchase in each case should be determined by the weight as ascertained by the
company’s weigher. It was the duty of the company’s weigher to enter in a book a record of the weights
of the ashes purchased to enable the company to charge the purchasers with the proper amounts. The
company’s weigher fraudulently and in collusion with prisoner weighed and delivered to the prisoner 32
tons 13 cwt of the ashes and entered the weight in the book as being 31 tons 3 cwt only: Held on these
facts prisoner was rightly indicted for larceny of 1 ton 10 cwt.

. . . Suppose the owner of a flock of sheep were to offer to sell, and a purchaser agreed to buy, the
whole flock at so much a head, the owner leaving it to his bailiff to count the sheep and ascertain the
exact number of the flock . . . the property would have passed to the purchaser (Lord Alverstone CJ).

Billing v Pill [1953] 2 All ER 1061

Appellant was convicted of stealing a wooden army hut from a war-time gun emplacement. It was
comprised of seven sections and rested on a concrete foundation, the floor being secured to the base by
bolts let into the concrete. Appellant did not abandon possession of the hut after he had demolished it
in order to remove it.

 Held the hut had been built for a temporary purpose, and while there was no question that the
concrete base had become part of the realty, the hut itself was not, merely by reason of the bolts
securing the floor to the concrete, ‘attached to or forming part of the realty’ within Larceny Act 1916 s
1(3), proviso (a) (repealed) and, therefore, it was a chattel capable of being stolen, and appellant was
rightly convicted.

Foley (1889) 26 L.R. Ir. 299

A trespasser entered the close of another and cut growing grass, and three days subsequently returned
and carried it away for his own use. For these acts he was indicted for larceny at common law, tried, and
convicted: Held the conviction was good.

4. WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OWNER

THE MEANING OF OWNER

Definition – s. 3 (d) of the Act

(d) the expression “owner” includes any part owner, or person having possession or control of, or a
special property in, anything capable of being stolen;

THE MEANING OF CONSENT

Eggington (1801) 2 Bos. & P 508

Lawrence (1850) 4 Cox C.C. 438

Turvey [1946] 2 All ER 60

R v McLean (1967) 12 WIR 515

Money from hotel went missing

Gardener suspected

Set trap for him since on pay days he usually collected 8 envelopes of pay (his and his colleagues),
however, on this particular day they gave him 9 envelopes the 9 th being a fictional person to see if he
would do the honourable thing and return the money. In the 9 th envelope, they marked the dollars given
to him. He spent the money and it was discovered through a 5-pound note. The owner of the hotel tried
to take him to court due to the meaning of taking without consent.

The principle: The money must be taken without consent of the owner, however, where the owner was
willing, D could not have carried away the money against the will of the owner and therefore would not
be convicted of larceny.

Reasoning: Where the owner simply facilitates the commission of an offence, the appellant takes and its
consent was against the will of the owner and this equates to larceny and Appeal Dismissed. S 3 (d) of
Larceny Act.

s. 3 (a) of the Act

3. For the purposes of this Act— (a) a person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently
and without a claim of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen,
with intent, at the time of the taking permanently to deprive the owner thereof; but a person may be
guilty of stealing any such thing notwithstanding that he has lawful possession thereof if, being a bailee
or part owner thereof, he fraudulently converts the same to his own use or the use of any person other
than the owners;

CONSENT OBTAINED BY TRICK

Pear (1779) 1 Leach 212

Obtaining a horse under the pretence of hiring it for a day, and immediately selling it, is felony, if the
jury find the hiring was animo furandi (The intention to steal)

CONSENT OBTAINED BY INTIMIDATION

McGrath (1869) LR 1 C.C.R. 205

A acted as an auctioneer at a mock auction. He knocked down some cloth for 26s to B, who had not bid
for it, as A knew. B refused to take the cloth or to pay for it: A refused to allow her to leave the room
unless she paid. Ultimately, she paid the 26s to A and took the cloth. She paid the 26s because she was
afraid. A was indicted for, and convicted of, feloniously stealing the 26s:
 Held the conviction was right, because if the force used to B made the taking a robbery, larceny was
included in that crime; if the force was not sufficient to constitute a robbery, the taking of the money
nevertheless amounted to larceny, as B paid the money to A against her will, and because she was
afraid.

Lovell (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 185

Prosecutrix gave L, a travelling grinder, six knives to grind for her, the ordinary charge for grinding which
would be 1s 3d. L ground the knives, and then demanded with threats 5s 6d as his charge from
prosecutrix. Prosecutrix, being thus frightened, in consequence of her fears paid L the sum demanded.
The jury found that the money was obtained by menaces, and convicted L of larceny: Held: the
conviction was right.

CONSENT OBTAINED THROUGH MISTAKE

Middleton (1873) LR 2 C.C.R. 38

Prisoner was a depositor in the Post Office Savings Bank, in which 11s stood to his credit. He gave notice
in the ordinary form to withdraw 10s, stating in his notice the number of his depositor's book and the
amount to be withdrawn. A warrant for 10s was duly issued to prisoner, and a letter of advice was duly
sent to the post office at N to pay him 10s. He went to that office, and handed his depositor's book and
the warrant to the clerk, who, instead of referring to the proper letter of advice for 10s, referred by
mistake to another letter of advice for £8 16s 10d, and placed the latter amount upon the counter. The
clerk entered the amount paid, £8 16s 10d, in prisoner's deposit book and stamped it. Prisoner took up
the money and went away, having at the moment of taking it up an animus furandi, and knowing the
money to be the money of the Postmaster-General:

 Held prisoner was guilty of larceny on the grounds, (1) even assuming the clerk to have the same
authority to part with the possession of and property in the money which the Postmaster-General would
have had, the mere delivery under a mistake, though with the intention of passing the property, did not
pass the property; and the possession being obtained animo furandi, there was both a taking and a
stealing within the definition of larceny; (2) the clerk had only a limited authority to part with the money
to the person named in the letter of advice, and no property passed to prisoner, and the possession was
obtained animo furandi.

LARCENY BY THE OWNER

Rose v Matt [1951] 1 All ER 361.

An owner of goods who entrusts them to another person in such circumstances that the latter has a
special property in them, is guilty of larceny if he fraudulently takes them away again; and it is
immaterial that the owner in so removing them did not intend to charge the other person as a bailee
with their loss.

B. MENS REA

1. FRAUDULENTLY
Williams [1953] 1 All ER 1068

Appellants, who were husband and wife, were convicted of stealing money from a sub-post office, of
which the wife was postmistress, the post office being carried on in conjunction with a general shop
managed by the husband, and the evidence being that they took coins and notes from the post office till
and put them into the shop till or into their own pockets. The jury found that in respect of two counts
for larceny appellants intended to repay the money and honestly believed they could repay it, and in
respect of three counts that they intended to repay the money, but had no honest belief that they
would be able to do so:

 Held (1) appellants knew they had no right to take the money, which they knew was not theirs; the fact
that they had a hope or expectation of replacing the money in the future was a matter which could go,
at the most, to mitigation and did not amount to a defence; and, therefore, they were guilty of larceny;
(2) one of the counts for larceny would be quashed for duplicity in that it charged the larceny of a sum
which was the aggregate of sums charged in other counts.

2.WITHOUT A CLAIM OF RIGHT MADE IN GOOD FAITH

Bernhard [1938] 2 All ER 140

The appellant had been the mistress of A. After immoral relations had ceased, she represented to him
that she had lost most of her money, and asked for his help. He agreed to pay £20 per month for one
year, and paid £80 down to cover the first four months. According to the appellant's evidence she
believed that she was to receive the balance of £160 at the expiration of the four months, and when
that time arrived she came to A, and upon his refusal to pay, threatened to expose him to his wife, and
to the public by an announcement in a newspaper. The appellant was charged with demanding money
with menaces with intent to steal the same.

Held:

(i) the agreement between the parties was not founded upon an illegal consideration though, not being
under seal, it was void for want of consideration.

(ii) it was not necessary that the appellant should be right in law or in fact in her claim of right. It was
sufficient for her defence that she honestly thought she had a claim.

3.INTENTION TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE OWNER

Cabbage (1815)

To make a taking felonious it is not necessary that it should be done lucri causâ; taking with an intent to
destroy will be sufficient to constitute this offence, if done to serve prisoner or another person, though
not in a pecuniary way.

Holloway (1849)

A, who was in the employ of B, a tanner, took skins from a warehouse of B to C, the foreman of B, at
another part of the premises, pretending that he had done work on them for which he was to be paid.
An intended to return the skins to his master when he had been paid for his pretended work on them:
 Held no larceny, but an attempt to commit the misdemeanour of obtaining money by false pretence.

C. COINCIDENCE OF ACTUS REUS AND MENS REA

Intention must exist at the time of taking according to the rule in Thurborn (1849)

Facts: Df found a bank note 5lb dropped on the road.  There was no mark, or indication who the owner
was. The next day someone claimed to have dropped it.  The df changed the note and kept the change
appropriating the value for himself.

Issue: Whether the original taking of the bank note found by the df was innocent?

Holding: yes

Rule: If a man finds goods that have been actually lost and appropriates them with intent to take
dominion over them, believing the owner cannot be found it is not larceny.

Ct. Rationale: The first taking did not amount to larceny b/c the note was really lost and there was no
mark on it or circumstance to indicate the owner.  Although the possession afterward was accompanied
by dishonest intent, it was still lawful possession, and not larceny.

This has been modified by the DEFINITION OF TAKING IN S. 3(b) OF THE ACT PARTICULARLY RELATING
TO CASES OF “FINDING”.

S 3 (b) (above)

JUDICIAL MODIFICATIONS TOO:

Riley (1853)

A man, driving a flock of lambs from a field, drove, with the flock, a lamb belonging to another person,
without knowing that he did so, and afterwards, when he discovered the fact, sold the lamb, denied
having done so, and appropriated the proceeds to his own use:

 Held he was rightly convicted of larceny; for having, in the first instance, driven away the lamb, the
property of another, he committed a trespass, which as soon as he resolved to dispose of the animal,
the trespass continuing all along, became a felonious trespass.

If a man rightfully gets possession of an article without any intention at the time of stealing it, and
afterwards misappropriates it, the law holds it not to be a felony. It may reasonably be said not to be a
violation of any social duty for a man who finds a lost article to take it home for the purpose of finding
out the true owner; and if he does this honestly in the first instance, and afterwards, though he may
have discovered the true owner, is seduced into appropriating it to his own use, he is not guilty of
larceny, though he does wrong. If the original possession be rightful, subsequent misappropriation does
not make it a felony; but if the original possession be wrongful, though not felonious, and then a man
disposes of the chattel, animo furandi, it is larceny (Pollock, CB).

 
Ruse v Read [1949] 1 All ER 398

On 30 June 1948, the respondent was staying at his mother's home at S. An amusement fair was being
held at S on that day, and at about 9.30 pm one P rode his bicycle to the fair and left it against the wall
on the side of the entrance to the fair ground, into which he went. On returning at 9.45 pm he found the
bicycle missing. That evening the respondent had visited several public houses, where he had drunk a
quantity of liquor, before he went to the fair ground. He saw the bicycle, took it and rode it for about
two hours. He had by then become sober and, not knowing what to do with the bicycle, he took it home
with him and put it in the lane behind his mother's house. Next morning, being in a “panicky” condition
and not knowing what to do with the bicycle, he took it to S railway station and consigned it by rail,
addressing the label: “Mr R, Y railway station, to be collected.” The respondent, being charged before
justices with the larceny of the bicycle, gave evidence that, when he took the bicycle, he did not realise,
in consequence of his condition, the significance of what he was doing, and that his object in sending it
to Y was to get it out of his possession. He had no intention of going to Y to collect the bicycle.

The justices held that at the time of taking the bicycle the respondent had no intention of permanently
depriving the owner of his property and was incapable of forming such an intention, and, consequently,
that he was Not Guilty of the offence charged. Accordingly, they dismissed the information. On an
appeal by the prosecutor,

Held: Where a person has wrongfully, though not feloniously, taken possession of property belonging to
another and at a later time determines to deprive the owner permanently of his property, he is guilty of
larceny.

Ashwell (1885) 16 Q.B. 190

Prisoner asked prosecutor for the loan of a shilling. Prosecutor gave prisoner a sovereign believing it to
be a shilling, and the prisoner took the coin under the same belief. Sometime afterwards he discovered
that the coin was a sovereign, and then and there fraudulently appropriated it to his own use. Prisoner
was convicted of larceny of the sovereign:

 Held prisoner had not been guilty of larceny as a bailee; but the court being equally divided as to
whether prisoner had been guilty of larceny at common law, the conviction stood.

To constitute a person bailee of a chattel there must be a bailment, and not a mere delivery of the
chattel. There must be a delivery of a chattel upon contract express or implied to return it or obey the
mandate with which the delivery is clogged, or, in other words, a delivery upon condition (Smith, J).

Bailment is not a mere delivery on a contract, but is a contract itself. Sir William Jones speaks of it as
that contract which the lawyers call bailment. ‘Bailment or delivery of goods to another person for a
particular use,’ says Sir William Blackstone. ‘Bailment is a compendious expression to signify a contract
resulting from delivery’ (Story on Bailments). Twice over in Story on Contracts the author speaks of
bailment as itself a contract. ‘Depositum (that is, bailment) is a contract,’ says Grotius in his introduction
to Roman-Dutch law. ‘The contract of bailment’ is not a mere loose and common phrase, but is the
accurate expression of a legal idea (Lord Coleridge, CJ).

 
D. LARCENY BY A BAILEE

Stealing as defined in S. 3 (a) of the Act (see above) is also constituted by a person, being a bailee,
fraudulently converting the same to the use of himself or others.

(i) Meaning of Bailee

Pear’s case (1779)

The prisoner was indicted for stealing a black horse.

Obtaining a horse under the pretence of hiring it for a day, and immediately selling it, is felony, if the
jury find the hiring was animo furandi.

(ii) Conversion Meaning

Wakeman (1912) 

A refusal to return to the owner goods bailed may, if the intention be fraudulent, amount to larceny

E. LARCENY BY A CLERK/SERVANT AND EMBEZZLEMENT

S18 (a ) of the Larceny Act (T&T)

18. Any person who-

            (a ) being a clerk or servant or person employed in the capacity of a clerk or servant-

(i) steals any chattel, money or valuable security belonging to or in the possession or power of his
master or employer; or

(ii) fraudulently embezzles the whole or any part of any chattel, money or valuable security delivered to
or received or taken into possession by him for or in the name or on the account of his master or
employer;

Davenport [1954] 1 All ER 602

Appellant, who was the secretary of a company, received cheques signed by two directors which it was
his duty to fill up with the payees’ names, counter-sign, and pay to the company’s creditors. He used a
number of the cheques to pay his own creditors, and he did this by making a cheque payable to the
creditor’s bankers and handing it to the creditor. With regard to four cheques he obtained cash from
one, S, by making out the cheques to S’s bank and getting S to cash them and give him the money. He
was convicted of the larceny of moneys (the proceeds of the cheques), the property of the company, as
a clerk or servant:

 Held the money which appellant was charged with stealing was not the money of the company, but that
of the company’s bankers; there was no asportation of the money by appellant; and, therefore, he was
wrongly convicted of the larceny of the money representing the cheques paid into his creditors’
accounts, but, with regard to the cheques cashed by S, the money was received by appellant for and on
behalf of the company, and, when he applied it for his own use, that amounted to embezzlement.

Gale (1876) 2 QBD 141

Prisoner was a clerk and servant of an insurance company, and head manager at their chief office at L. In
the ordinary course of business, he received several cheques payable to his order from the managers of
branch offices, and it was his duty to indorse these cheques and hand them over to the company’s
cashier. Instead of doing so, he indorsed the cheques and obtained money for them from friends of his
own, who paid the cheques into their own banks. He then took the amount so received to the cashier
and handed it over to him, saying he wished it to go against his salary, which was overdrawn to a like
amount; and he got back from the cashier IOU’s which he had previously given for the amount of the
overdraft. Prisoner having been convicted of embezzling the proceeds of the cheques:

 Held the proceeds of the cheques though received not from the bankers, but from third persons, were
received on account of the company, and prisoner was rightly convicted.

F. Robbery 

S. 24 of the Larceny Act (T&T)

24. (1) Any person who—

(a) being armed with any offensive weapon or instrument, or being together with one other person or
more, robs, or assaults with intent to rob, any person;

(b) robs any person and, at the time of or immediately before or immediately after the robbery, uses any
personal violence to any person, is liable upon summary conviction to imprisonment for ten years, and
upon conviction on indictment to imprisonment for fifteen years.

(2) Any person who robs any person is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for six years, and
upon conviction on indictment to imprisonment for ten years.

(3) Any person who assaults any person with intent to rob is liable upon summary conviction to
imprisonment for three years, and upon conviction on indictment to imprisonment for five years.

(4) The penalty on summary conviction provided in this section shall have effect notwithstanding the
provisions contained in subsection (5) of section 100 of the Summary Courts Act.

TAKING FROM THE PERSON OR IN HIS PRESENCE

Fallows (1832)

Smith v Desmond [1965] 1 All ER 976

VIOLENCE OR FEAR

Harman’s case (1620)

Walls and Hughes (1845)

Edwards (1843)

Gnosil (1824)

Lapier (1784)

Mason (1820)
G. BURGLARY

S 27 of Larceny Act

Any person who in the night—

(a) breaks and enters the dwelling house of another with intent to commit any arrestable offence
therein; or

(b) breaks out of the dwelling house of another, having—

(i) entered the said dwelling house with intent to commit any arrestable offence therein; or

(ii) committed any arrestable offence in the said dwelling house, is guilty of burglary and liable to
imprisonment for fifteen years

NIGHT

S2 of the Act- 8 p.m. to 5 a.m.

“night” means the interval between eight o’clock in the evening and five o’clock in the morning of the
next succeeding day;

BREAKS

Hyams (1836)

The prisoners were indicted for burglary in the dwelling house of Jane Hart. It appeared from the
evidence of the prosecutrix, that she went out, leaving her window shut down, but not fastened, though
she admitted that there was a hasp which could have been fastened to keep it down. The entry was
effected by raising the window.

Raising a window which is shut down close, but not fastened, though it has a hasp which might have
been fastened, is a breaking of the dwelling-house.

Russell (1833)

Lifting the flap of a cellar usually kept down by its own weight, is a sufficient breaking for the purpose of
burglary.

Smith (1827)

If the sash of a window be partly open, but not sufficiently so to admit a person, the raising it so as to
admit a person is not a breaking of the house.

Lackey [1954] Crim. L.R. 57

The lifting of a latch or loosening of any other fastening my constitute a “breaking” at common law

CONSTRUCTIVE BREAKING
Boyle [1954] 2 All ER 721

Appellant was charged on an indictment containing four counts, viz (i) house-breaking with intent to
steal and stealing in the house, (ii) forging a valuable security with intent to defraud, (iii) uttering a
valuable security, and (iv) obtaining a motor car by virtue of a forged cheque. After all four counts were
read to him, he was asked to plead to the whole indictment. He made one plea to the whole indictment.
He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. On the charge of house-breaking it
was proved that he had falsely represented himself as a servant of BBC employed to locate disturbances
caused on the wireless, and that, as a result of the trick, he gained admittance to a dwelling-house and
stole a handbag therein. On appeal against conviction:

Held as appellant obtained admission to the house by means of an article or trick, there was a
constructive breaking, and, as it was to be presumed on the facts that he went to the house with intent
to commit a felony, he was rightly convicted of house-breaking.

Johnson and Jones (1841)

A servant pretended to concur with two persons, who proposed to him to unite with them in robbing his
master's house. The master being out of town, the servant communicated with the police, and acted
under their instructions. He let in one of the persons, but before that person had taken away property
he was seized by the police, and a crowbar being found upon him, was immediately placed in
confinement. After this the servant went out again and fetched the second person, and let him in in the
same manner. This person was seized with a basket of plate in his hand, which he had carried from the
kitchen part of the way upstairs

: Held (1) neither of the persons could be convicted of burglary, but the one who was seized with the
plate might be convicted of stealing in a dwelling house; (2) the other might be indicted as an accessory
before the fact to such stealing.

Chandler (1913) 1 K.B. 125

Appellant suggested to a servant of prosecutrix a plan for the commission of a robbery by appellant at
the shop of prosecutrix. The servant, pretending to agree to his suggestion, lent the keys of the shop to
appellant, who made duplicate keys, with one of which, on a day arranged with the servant, he unlocked
a padlock attached to the outer door and entered the shop, where he was arrested. Prosecutrix had
been informed by the servant of appellant’s plan and knew that he intended to enter the shop on the
day in question. He was convicted on an indictment which charged him with having broken and entered
the shop with intent to steal therein

 Held the conviction was right, notwithstanding that prosecutrix knew he had been supplied with the
means of breaking and entering by her servant.

ENTRY

Davis (1823)

Where, in breaking a window in order to steal property in the house, prisoner’s finger went within the
house: Held there was a sufficient entry to constitute burglary.
Rust (1828)

Throwing up a window, and introducing an instrument between such window and an inside shutter to
force open the shutter, if the hand or some part of it is not within the window, is not a sufficient entry to
constitute burglary.

DWELLING HOUSE

Hallard (1796)

A tenant moved out of a house and a new tenant prepared to arrive.  The new tenant placed all his
furniture there and frequently visited the house, although he did not sleep there.  The court held the
house was not a dwelling

INTENTION

There must be a specific intention to commit an arrestable offence

H. OBTAINING BY FALSE PRETENCES

S 34 (1) of Larceny Act (T&T)

34. (1) Any person who, by any false pretence, with intent to defraud, obtains from any other person
any chattel, money, or valuable security, or causes or procures any money to be paid, or any chattel or
valuable security to be delivered, to himself or to any other person for the use or benefit or on account
of himself or any other person, is liable to imprisonment for five years.

THE PRETENCE

Dent [1955] 2 All ER 806

Appellant and his father carried on a business as pest destructors. Appellant had entered into contracts
with farmers to destroy the vermin on their land over a period of a year and had asked for and obtained
payment in advance of half the annual charge. In some cases, he did no work at all in fulfilment of the
contract. He was convicted at quarter sessions for obtaining cheques by false pretences. The jury were
directed that the prosecution had to prove that appellant entered into the contracts without any
genuine intention of carrying them out and that he falsely pretended that he had such an intention:

 Held the direction was wrong in law and the conviction must be quashed. A statement of intention
about future conduct, whether or not it be a statement of existing fact, is not such a statement as will
amount to a false pretence in criminal law.

Jones [1898] 1 Q.B. 119

Defendant ordered a meal in a restaurant; he made no verbal representation at the time as to his ability
to pay, nor was any question asked him with regard to it. After the meal he said that he was unable to
pay, and that he had, as was the fact, only one half penny in his possession:

 Held he could not be convicted of the offence of obtaining goods by false pretences, but he was liable
to be convicted of obtaining credit by means of fraud.Misrepresentation, either by word or by conduct,
is a necessary element in the offence of obtaining goods by false pretences. Evidence for this offence,
obtained goods from an intending vendor, being without the means of paying for such goods, and with
the intention of defrauding the owner, but without making any representation either as to his ability to
pay or his intentions, was not sufficient to support a conviction for obtaining such goods by false
pretences. Nor, since the owner intended to part with the property in the goods, was it sufficient to
support a conviction for larceny. But such evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for obtaining
credit by fraud on an indictment

Hazelton (1874) L.R. 2 C.C.R. 134

Prisoner was indicted for obtaining goods by the false pretence that certain cheques were good and
valid orders for the payment of their amount. It was proved that prisoner ordered goods of prosecutor,
and said he wished to pay ready money for them. He gave cheques on a bank for the price, and took
away the goods. Prisoner had shortly before opened an account at the bank, but had drawn out the
amount deposited except a few shillings. Various cheques of his had been refused payment, and he
would not have been permitted to overdraw. He did not intend when he gave the cheques to prosecutor
to meet them, but intended to defraud

Held there was evidence of the false pretence that the cheques were good and valid orders for the
payment of their amount

INTENT TO DEFRAUD

Naylor (1865) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 4

On indictment against N for obtaining goods by false pretences, the jury found that N made a false
statement, that he intended it to, and that it actually did, induce the prosecutor to part with the goods;
but that N intended, when he could, to pay for the good

 Held this was a verdict of guilty, and the last finding did not qualify the former findings, nor negative the
fraudulent intent.

Potter [1958] 2 All ER 51

Defendants, W and A, were brothers. W was a qualified driver of motor vehicles and A had only a
provisional driving licence. A having made an appointment to take a driving test on 15 July 1957, it was
agreed between defendants that W should take the test in A’s place. A handed his appointment card to
W, and on 15 July W presented himself for the test, producing A’s card, telling the driving examiner that
he was A, and signing the examiner’s journal in the name of A. After W had taken and passed the test,
he signed in A’s name the certificate of competence in which the examiner had certified that A had been
examined and had passed the driving test. After receiving the certificate, W handed it to A. On 11
September 1957, A was issued with a driving licence on presenting a completed application form
together with the driving certificate and the fee.

Defendants were charged on indictment with the following offences: count 1, conspiring together to
procure the issue to W of a driving certificate in the name of A by means of W impersonating A during
the driving test; count 2, procuring a driving certificate by false pretences, contrary to Larceny Act 1916 s
32(1) (repealed) and count 3, procuring a driving licence by false pretences. W was further charged with
count 4, forging an entry in the driving examiners’ journal, and count 5, forging an entry in the driving
certificate; and A was further charged with count 6, uttering the driving certificate knowing it to be
forged and with intent to defraud. Under s 35 of 1916 Act (repealed), A, as an accessory, was charged as
a principal on count 2, and W, as an accessory, was charged as a principal on count 3. Both defendants
admitted the facts and pleaded guilty to count 1, but not guilty to the other counts and it was contended
that these counts were bad in law

 Held (1) (as regards counts 2 and 3) W procured the driving certificate to be delivered to him for the use
or benefit of himself within s 32(1) of 1916 Act, since, having procured it, he could do what he liked with
it, and he procured it with intent to defraud, because he intended to induce a course of conduct (viz, to
induce the county council to grant a driving licence) by the deceit which enabled him to procure the
certificate; similar considerations applied to A’s procuring the driving licence, and accordingly counts 2
and 3 were good in law; (2) (as regards counts 4 and 5) when W signed the driving examiner’s journal,
and also when he signed the driving certificate, he made a false document (within Criminal Justice Act
1925 s 35(1), explaining Forgery Act 1913 s 1) and he did so with intent to defraud; accordingly counts 4
and 5 were good in law; (3) in presenting the forged driving certificate in order to obtain a driving
licence, A uttered a forged document, and accordingly count 6 was good in law.

THE OBTAINING

Lince (1873) 12 Cox. C.C. 451

The evidence was, that prisoner said he was the nephew of a man in prosecutor’s employ, which was
true; and that he lived at the beerhouse; but he did not say he was the landlord of that house;
prosecutor, in parting with his goods, was influenced both by the fact of his being the nephew of his
servant, and the statement that he lived at the beerhouse, and that therefrom he believed him to be the
landlord of the beerhouse

Held (1) it was immaterial that prosecutor was partly influenced by the fact that prisoner was the
nephew of his servant; (2) the allegation that prisoner lived at and was the landlord of the beerhouse
was divisible, and the part, ‘that he lived at the beerhouse,’ being false, he was rightly convicted.

OBTAINING PROPERTY

Ball [1951] 2 K.B. 109

A person may be properly charged with obtaining a thing by false pretences from another named person
notwithstanding that that other was not the owner of the thing, provided that he had authority from the
owner to transfer the property in it. Where, therefore, defendant fraudulently induced a wife to
complete in his favour and hand to him a blank cheque signed by her husband

 Held defendant was properly charged with obtaining the cheque by false pretences from the wife,
because she had the authority of her husband to pass the property in it to defendant and she did so.