G.R. No.

147550             January 26, 2005 1-B-

153 Felix Victoria 883
ISIDRA VDA. DE VICTORIA Substituted by MARIO -B
VICTORIA, petitioner,
vs. 1-B-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUANITA T. GUERRERO, 153 Guillermo Becina 3,900
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, -C
Calamba, Laguna; HON. FLORENCIO P. BUESER, Presiding
1-B-
Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Calauan, Laguna; EX-
153 Juan Becina 2,019
OFFICIO SHERIFF – Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna
-D
and/or his Deputies; SPOUSES LUIS GIBE and ZENAIDA
GIBE and All Persons Acting on their Behalf, respondents. 1-B-
153 Felix Victoria 624
DECISION -E

1-B-
CARPIO MORALES, J.: 153 Eusebio Arida 224
-F
Through his appeal by certiorari,1 petitioner Mario Victoria
seeks to set aside the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals 1-B-
promulgated on May 25, 2000 and July 12, 2000, which (1) 153 Gregorio Lantin 115
dismissed petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari2 and -G
(2) denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, 34,82
respectively.   Total Area
9

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

On October 27, 1993, respondent spouses Luis and
Zenaida Gibe filed a Complaint for "Ejectment and
Damages with a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction" 3 against Isidra Vda. de Victoria (the mother of
herein petitioner Mario Victoria), Eusebio Arida, Juan
Becina and Guillermo Becina with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Calauan, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 261
(the Ejectment Case). In their Complaint, the Gibe spouses
alleged, among other things, the following:
1. In 1992 they acquired a parcel of land (the
property) from the heirs of the late Judge
Gregorio Lantin, designated as Lot 1-B-153-A
with an area of approximately 27,064 square
meters (sq. m.).
2. The property was originally part of Lot 1-B-153
with an area of approximately 34,829 sq. m.,
which was subdivided into seven parcels in 1989
among Judge Lantin and four of his tenants as
follows:
Area
Lot Tenant/Owner/Claiman
(in sq.
No. t
m.)
1-B-
27,06
153 Gregorio Lantin
4
-A
Felix Victoria, now deceased, was the
husband of Isidra Victoria. All the
defendants in the Ejectment Case, as
former tenants, were given home lots,
while Lot 1-B-153-A which was allotted
to Gregorio Lantin was sold to the
spouses Gibe.
3. In the course of fencing Lot 1-B-153-A, it was
discovered that the Victoria house was standing
on the northwestern portion of the property;
that Mrs. Victoria was harvesting and picking
fruits from the citrus trees planted in that area
without the knowledge and permission of the
Gibe spouses; and that Eusebio Arida, Juan
Becina and Guillermo Becina were also
surreptitiously planting palay on the
northwestern portion.
4. The fencing was discontinued after the
children of Mrs. Victoria threatened to shoot at
the workers of the Gibe spouses with an armalite
rifle, leaving approximately 8,000 sq. m. of the
northwestern portion of Lot 1-B-153-A open and
unfenced.
In her Answer (With Motion to Dismiss), 4 Mrs. Victoria
denied having entered Judge Lantin’s lot alleged to have
been purchased by the spouses Gibe, claiming that her
farmhouse was constructed on the very lot awarded to her
family by the DAR. Moving thus for the dismissal of the
Ejectment Case for lack of cause of action, she interposed

1
a counterclaim praying that, as a tenant of Judge Lantin,
she be maintained in the peaceful possession and
cultivation of her lot or, in the alternative, awarded
disturbance compensation; and, in either event,
reimbursed for the expenses she incurred as a result of the
Ejectment Case.
At the Preliminary Conference of the Ejectment Case, the
parties mutually agreed to a relocation survey of the
property to be conducted by a geodetic engineer.
After the court-appointed geodetic engineer had
submitted the results of the relocation survey, Mrs.
Victoria and her co-defendants in the Ejectment Case filed
a Manifestation with Motion 5 requesting the trial court to
allow them to engage the services of an independent
surveyor, at their expense, to conduct another survey.
Although the motion was granted, no resulting survey plan
was, however, submitted by them.
By Decision of May 21, 1998, the MTC, finding in favor of
the plaintiffs-spouses Gibe, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing, this Court on the
basis of the evidences [sic], the [sic] mutually submitted
before it by both the plaintiffs and the defendants, this
Court has to rule as follows:
1. That since it clearly appeared that the
plaintiffs are the real owners of the real property
with an area of 27,064 square meters, including
the real property with an area of 5,825 square
meters which is in possession of all the
defendants, they have the absolute right to
obtain the proper possession thereof and to
eject all of them thru legal means;
2. That in as much as all the defendants are at
present and also the real owners of the real
properties and also in the possession thereof as
evidence[d] by their respective emancipation
patents, each of them is hereby ordered by this
Court to properly and absolutely
abandoned [sic] the portions of the real
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-140417 and immediately delivered its
possession to the plaintiffs;
3. That considering the possession of the
defendant Isidra Vda. de Victoria of the real
properties with a total area of 1,508 square
meters which she did not own, [she] is ordered
by this Court to pay and remit to the above
plaintiffs the sum of P45,000.00 as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the
portion above mentioned as it belong[s] to the
plaintiffs and the defendant Becina together
2
with two other defendants Juan and Arida are in
possession of the real property owned by the
plaintiffs with an area of 4,327 square meters,
they are hereby ordered [to] jointly pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 jointly as
reasonable compensation.
4. That all the defendants are hereby ordered to
pay the counsel for the plaintiffs the sum of
P20,000.00 jointly as attorney’s fees;
5. That in view of failure of the plaintiffs to prove
their entitlement to preliminary mandatory
injunction and to the set the same for hearing as
required by law, the same is hereby denied.
6. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6 (Underscoring supplied)
On May 22, the spouses Gibe, without notice to the
defendants in the Ejectment Case, filed a Motion for
Immediate Execution and Demolition7 praying that "a writ
of execution be issued to enforce and satisfy the
judgment, for the ejectment and demolition of the house
of the Defendants."
Eight days after promulgation and receipt of the MTC
decision or on May 29, 1998, the defendants in the
Ejectment Case filed a Notice of Appeal8 without, however,
filing a supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution
of the decision and depositing monthly rentals.
By Order of June 1, 1998,9 the MTC granted the Motion for
Immediate Execution and Demolition and accordingly
issued a Writ of Execution.10
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction)11 was filed on July 13, 1998
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2625-98-C (the Petition
for Certiorari).
The Petition assailed the MTC Decision, its Order of June 1,
1998, and the Writ of Execution, contending that the MTC
had no jurisdiction over the Ejectment Case and
committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case
in favor of the spouses Gibe and in issuing the said Order
and Writ of Execution pending appeal.12
Mrs. Victoria, it turned out, had passed away shortly
before the MTC promulgated its May 21, 1998 Decision.
Her son, petitioner Mario Victoria, thus substituted for
her.13
Branch 37 of the RTC Calauan, to which the Petition
for Certiorari was raffled, issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.14
In the meantime, the appeal filed by the defendants in the
Ejectment Case before the RTC of Calauan, Laguna was
dismissed by Branch 92 thereof by Order of October 7,
199815 for failure to file their appeal memorandum.16
By its Decision dated August 13, 1999,17 the RTC dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari in light of the following
ratiocination:
The petitioner contends that the lower court has no
jurisdiction to try the case and to issue the questioned
decision because the subject parcels of land have been
subjected and covered by P.D. 27 known as Operation
Land Transfer and any dispute involving said lands must be
referred to the Honorable Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for proper disposition.
Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in
the complaint. The complaint filed by the private
respondents was for Ejectment and Damages With a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Ejectment
proceedings are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court.
xxx
The Answer and the Position Paper of the petitioner
Victoria in the case below show that she claimed
ownership over the portion of the lot, by virtue of the
Operation Land Transfer, which the private respondents
Gibe alleged to have been occupied by the farm house of
the petitioner. Petitioner Victoria did not question the
jurisdiction of the Court but prayed for the dismissal of the
case below for lack of cause of action. So much so, that
when the respondent Court took into consideration the
issue of ownership over the portion of the property
allegedly transgressed, it did so only to determine who is
better entitled to possession over said portion. And when
it ordered the resurvey of the property to determine its
actual boundaries and the admission of the Engineer’s
report to aid it in the issuance of the questioned decision.
It did not determine the question of ownership, i.e. as to
who the real owner is which the petitioner may do so in a
separate complaint before the proper forum.
xxx
The Decision of the Court below is therefore not an error
of jurisdiction but an error of judgment which is not
reviewable by certiorari proceedings. In other
words, certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
3
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment as its
function is to keep and inferior court within its jurisdiction.
Having found [the MTC] to have jurisdiction to issue the
decision dated May 28, 1998, the respondent judge
likewise has jurisdiction to direct the execution of the
same pending appeal pursuant to Section 19, Rule 70 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 (Underscoring
supplied)
Herein petitioner, Mario Victoria, received a copy of the
foregoing Decision of the RTC on September 18, 1999 and
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the same on
September 28, 1999.19 In due course, the RTC denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration by Order dated
December 7, 1999.20
On March 28, 2000, petitioner instituted another special
civil action for certiorari, this time with the Court of
Appeals (CA), questioning both the August 13, 1999
Decision of the RTC and the May 21, 1998 Decision of the
MTC with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.21 This case was docketed as C.A.
G.R. S.P. No. 47964 (the CA Certiorari Petition).
By Resolution of May 25, 2000,22 the CA dismissed the
CA Certiorari Petition in this wise:
The petition is flawed for the following reasons viz:
1. The correct remedy from a decision of a Regional Trial
Court in a petition for certiorari is an ordinary
appeal pursuant to Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure and section 5, Rule 6 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals;
2. The instant petition is filed out of time. The assailed RTC
decision was received on September 18, 1999 while the
Motion for Reconsideration was filed on September 28,
1999. (Rollo P. 152). Thus a period of nine (9) days had
elapsed. The Order dated December 7, 1999 was received
by petitioner on January 29, 2000 while the instant
petition was filed only on March 28, 2000. Thus a period of
fifty eight (58) days had passed. Hence, petitioner had
consumed a period of 67 days, well beyond the 60-day
period allowed by the rules as amended by Supreme
Court En Banc resolution dated July 21, 1998.23 Plainly, the
petition was filed out of time.
3. The statement of material dates as to timeliness of the
filing of the petition is incomplete as it failed to state when
the motion for reconsideration was filed in violation of
Section 3, Rule 46.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.24
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration25 having been
denied by the CA by Resolution of July 12, 2000 26 for being
filed 2 days beyond the reglementary period, he filed the
petition at bar after he was granted, on his motion, an
extension of thirty days to file the petition, conditioned
upon the timeliness of the motion for extension.27
Petitioner anchored his petition on the following grounds:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
OR IN [sic]  EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY NOT GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITIONER’S PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI ON GROUND OF TECHNICALITY INSTEAD
OF RESOLVING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CALAMBA, LAGUNA, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN [sic] EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION BY RULING THAT THIS CASE FALLS
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, AND THAT THE DECISION OF THE COURT A
QUO WAS NOT AN ERROR [OF] JURISDICTION BUT AN
ERROR OF JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOT REVIEWABLE
IN CERTIORARI [P]ROCEEDINGS.28
The appeal must be denied.
As earlier noted, this Court granted petitioner an extended
period to file the petition, conditioned, however, on the
timeliness of the filing of the Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review on Certiorari. It is a basic rule of
remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be
filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended.29 Where a motion for extension of time is filed
beyond the period for appeal, the same is of no effect
since there would no longer be any period to extend, and
the judgment or order to be appealed from will have
become final and executory.30
In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals
that
the reglementary period to appeal had in fact expired alm
ost 10 months prior to the filing of petitioner’s motion for  not a game of technicalities, that every case must be
extension of time on April 10, 2001. The Registry Return
Receipt31 of the Resolution of the CA dismissing the
CA Certiorari Petition shows that the same was received by
counsel for petitioner’s agent on June 5, 2000. Hence,
petitioner had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file
an appeal or a motion for new trial or reconsideration. 32
Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for having
4
been filed two days after the expiration of the
reglementary period on June 22, 2000.
Similarly, the instant petition for review must likewise be
denied for having been filed on May 12, 2001, almost 11
months after the expiration of the period to appeal on
June 20, 2000.33
In fact, a closer inspection of the records indicates that this
case should have been terminated as early as January 4,
2000 with the lapse of the period within which petitioner
could have appealed from the RTC Decision.
By his own account, petitioner received a copy of the
Decision of the RTC dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari on September 18, 1999 and filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the same on September 28, 1999.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, by that time a period of
9 days had already elapsed.34 Thus, upon receipt of the
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration,
which was admitted to be on December 29,
1999,35 petitioner only had 6 days or until January 4,
200036 within which to file a notice of appeal.
However, petitioner failed to do so, and he instead, on
March 28, 2000, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with the Court of Appeals. As the Court of Appeals
again correctly pointed out, "[t]he correct remedy from a
decision of a Regional Trial Court in a petition
for certiorari is an ordinary appeal pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure xxx." It is well
settled that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory,
but also jurisdictional.37 Certiorari is not and cannot be
made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is
available but was lost through fault or negligence.38
To be sure, petitioner has regularly invoked, before this
Court and the lower courts, the policy in favor of a liberal
interpretation of the Rules of Procedure.
Apropos on this point are this Court’s observations
in Duremdes v. Duremdes :39
Although it has been said time and again that litigation is
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
so that issues may be properly presented and justly
resolved, this does not mean that procedural rules may
altogether be disregarded. Rules of procedure must be
faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal
application of the rules of procedure should be an effort
on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately
explain his failure to abide by the rules.40 (Emphasis
supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)
In the case at bar, petitioner has not provided any cogent
explanation that would absolve him of the consequences
of his repeated failure to abide by the rules.
Moreover, petitioner’s principal substantive argument that
the Ejectment Case properly falls within the jurisdiction of
the DARAB and not of the MTC is without merit.
The MTC does not automatically lose its exclusive original
jurisdiction over ejectment cases by the mere allegation of
a tenancy relationship. As thoroughly discussed in Rivera
v. Santiago ,41 the party alleging tenancy must prove the
existence of all the essential requisites of tenancy in order
to oust the MTC of its jurisdiction over the case:
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. That is basic. Unquestionably, petitioner lodged
an action for ejectment before the MTC. Under BP 129,
the allegations in the complaint conferred initiatory
jurisdiction on that first level court.
xxx
However, when tenancy is averred as a defense and is
shown prima facie to be the real issue, the MTC must
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under RA 6657, it
is the DAR that has authority to hear and decide when
tenancy is legitimately involved.
In the instant case, respondents averred tenancy as an
affirmative and/or special defense in their Answer with
Counterclaim. Under the RSP [Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure], the MTC was supposed to conduct a
preliminary conference to determine if such relationship
was indeed the real issue. We emphasize that the MTC
did not automatically lose its jurisdiction simply because
respondents raised tenancy as a defense. It continued to
have the authority to hear the case precisely to
determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the
ejectment suit on its merits.
xxx
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating
to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. To
determine whether the CA was correct in its reversal of
the trial court, it is necessary to keep in mind the essential
requisites of tenancy which are as follows:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee;
5
(2) The subject of the relationship is agricultural
land;
(3) There is mutual consent to the tenancy
between the parties;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is
agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and
(6) There is a sharing of harvests between the
parties.
All these elements must concur. It is not enough that
they are alleged; to divest the MTC of jurisdiction, they
must all be shown to be present. x x x42 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations
omitted)
In Duremdes v. Duremdes,43 where a similar argument was
raised under factual circumstances analogous to the case
at bar, this Court held:
First. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over
the case, there must be a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy
agreement to take hold over a dispute it is
essential to establish all its indispensable
elements, to wit:
1) [T]hat the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural
land; 3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) that there is personal cultivation
on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.l^vvphi1.net
Second. The trial court found that no such
tenancy agreement existed between the
respondent and Herminio Tara, and that such
allegation was a mere ploy to prevent the
respondent from exercising dominion and
ownership over the subject property. This was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We find no
cogent reason to reverse such finding.
Third. The petitioner is barred from raising the
issue of jurisdiction. The petitioner actively
participated in all stages of the instant case,
 setting up a counterclaim and asking for
affirmative relief in his answer. He failed,
however, to question the court’s jurisdiction
over the suit. After relying on the jurisdiction of
the regular courts, he cannot be permitted to
turn around and question it. It is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction.44 (Emphasis supplied;
italics in the original; citations omitted)
In the present case, neither petitioner nor his predecessor-
in-interest submitted evidence to substantiate the
existence of the essential requisites of tenancy. Thus,
there is no basis at all to support petitioner’s claim that
the MTC was without jurisdiction to render the questioned
Decision.
What is more, as in Duremdes and unlike in Rivera,
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest never questioned the
jurisdiction of the MTC. Instead, she based her prayer for
the dismissal of the Ejectment Case on respondents’
alleged lack of cause of action; with a counterclaim praying
that she be maintained in the peaceful possession and
cultivation of the subject property or, in the alternative,
awarded disturbance compensation; and, in either event,
reimbursed for the expenses she incurred. Considering
that petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest actively
participated in the proceedings before the MTC and
invoked its jurisdiction to secure an affirmative relief,
petitioner cannot now turn around and question that
court’s jurisdiction.
Finally, this Court notes with consternation petitioner’s
attempts, with the aid of his counsel, Atty. Abdul A. Basar,
to deliberately mislead this Court as to the material dates
and status of the decision appealed from, thereby
impeding if not frustrating the ends of justice.
In his Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review on Certiorari, petitioner declared under oath that:
(1) he had "filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration" of
the CA Resolution dismissing his petition for certiorari, and
(2) the notice of the denial by the CA of his Motion for
Reconsideration "was received by petitioner only [on]
March 28, 2001," thus making it appear that he had until
April 12, 2001 within which to perfect his
appeal.1a\^/phi1.net
Significantly, petitioner did not disclose, either in his
motion for extension of time or in his subsequent petition,
the date on which he received the Resolution of the CA
denying his petition for certiorari, thereby concealing the
actual period for appeal from the Court processor.
6
As already noted, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
failed to suspend the running of the reglementary period
since it was filed two days too late. Worse, the Registry
Return Receipt45 of the CA Resolution denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration shows that it was received by
counsel for petitioner’s agent on September 20, 2000, and
not March 28, 2001 as claimed by
petitioner.1awphi1.nét In fact, by Resolution dated May 7,
2001,46 the CA had ordered the issuance of an Entry of
Judgment in this case, which was later withdrawn by
Resolution of October 23, 200147 following receipt by it of
the instant Petition on May 15, 2001.
It cannot be overemphasized that parties and their
counsel are duty-bound to observe honesty and
truthfulness in all their pleadings, motions and
statements before the courts. Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states, "A lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court;" while Rules 10.01
and 10.03 of the same provide:
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.
xxx
Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Petitioner and his counsel, Atty. Abdul A. Basar, are thus
hereby directed TO SHOW CAUSE, within 10 days from
receipt of a copy of this Decision, why they should not be
held in contempt of court and disciplinarily dealt with for
violation of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Petitioner MARIO VICTORIA and his counsel, Atty. Abdul A.
Basar, are hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, within ten
(10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, why they
should not be held in contempt of court and disciplinarily
dealt with for violation of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respectively.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 144412               November 18, 2003
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and POTENCIANO L.
GALANIDA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 of 27 April 2000 and the Resolution of 8 August
2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451. The
Court of Appeals upheld the Decision3 of 18 September
1998 and the Resolution of 24 December 1998 of the
National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in NLRC
Case No. V-000180-98. The NLRC modified the Decision
dated 23 December 1997 of Labor Arbiter Dominador A.
Almirante ("Labor Arbiter") in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-05-
0545-94 holding that Allied Banking Corporation ("Allied
Bank") illegally dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida
("Galanida"). The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay,
backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and other
amounts totaling ₱ 1,264,933.33.
Antecedent Facts
For a background of this case, we quote in part from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by
petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on 11 January 1978
and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant
manager in 1991. His appointment was covered by a
"Notice of Personnel Action" which provides as one of the
conditions of employment the provision on petitioner’s
right to transfer employees:
"REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the
bank reserves the right to transfer or assign you to other
departments or branches of the bank as the need arises
and in the interest of maintaining smooth and
uninterrupted service to the public."
Private respondent was promoted several times and was
transferred to several branches as follows:
"a) January, 1978 to March, 1982 – Tagbilaran
City Branch
"b) April, 1982 to May, 1984 – Lapulapu City
Branch
7
"c) June, 1984 – Mandaue City Branch
"d) July, 1984 to April, 1986 – Tagbilaran City
Branch
"e) May, 1986 to May, 1987 – Dumaguete City
Branch
"f) June, 1987 to August, 1987 – Carbon Branch,
Cebu City
"g) September, 1987 to Sept. 1989 – Lapulapu
City Branch, Cebu
"h) October, 1989 to Sept. 1992 – Carbon
Branch, Cebu City
"i) October 1992 to Sept. 1994 – Jakosalem
Regional Branch, Cebu City" (Rollo, p. 47)
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the
Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent as second in
the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned
outside of Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu for
seven years already. Private respondent manifested his
refusal to be transferred to Bacolod City in a letter dated
19 April 1994 citing as reason parental obligations,
expenses, and the anguish that would result if he is away
from his family. He then filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private
respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to report to the
Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May 1994. Private
respondent refused. In a letter dated 13 June 1994,
petitioner warned and required of private respondent as
follows:
"There is no discrimination in your transfer. In fact, among
the officers mentioned, only you have refused the new
assignment citing difficulty of working away from your
family as if the other officers concerned do not suffer the
same predicament. To exempt you from the officer
transfer would result in favoritism in your favor and
discrimination as against the other officers concerned.
"In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and
uninterrupted service to the public, and in accordance
with the Bank’s order of priority of rotating its
accountants’ places of assignments, you are well aware
that Roberto Isla, AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for
more than ten (10) years, was, on February 14, 1994,
reassigned to Iligan City Branch and then to Cagayan de
Oro City Branch on June 8, 1994. Hence, your objection on
the ground of your length of service is without merit.
xxx
"As discussed, your refusal to follow instruction
concerning your transfer and reassignment to Bacolod City
and to Tagbilaran City is penalized under Article XII of the
Bank’s Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure [which]
provides:
‘XII Transfer and Reassignment
Refusal to follow instruction concerning transfers and
reassignments.
First and subsequent offenses –
The penalty may range from suspension to dismissal as
determined by management. The employee shall be
required to comply with the order of transfer and
reassignment, if the penalty is not termination of
employment.’
"In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing within
three (3) days from receipt hereof why no disciplinary
action should be meted against you for your having
refused to follow instructions concerning the foregoing
transfer and reassignment." xxx4
On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that "(w)hether the
bank’s penalty for my refusal be Suspension or Dismissal
xxx it will all the more establish and fortify my complaint
now pending at NLRC, RAB 7."5 In the same letter, he
charged Allied Bank with discrimination and favoritism in
ordering his transfer, thus:
xxx What I cannot decipher now under the headship of Mr.
Olveda is management’s discriminatory act of transferring
only the long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of
its exercise of management prerogative when in truth and
in fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some new
officers who happen to enjoy favorable connection with
management. How can the bank ever justify the transfer
of Melinda T. Co, a new officer who had experienced being
assigned outside of Cebu for more than a year only to
Tabunok Branch? If the purpose is for check and balance,
is management implying that Melinda Co can better carry
out such function over Mr. Larry Sabelino, who is a
seasoned and experienced accountant or any of the Metro
Cebu accountants for that matter? Isn’t this act of
management an obvious display of favoritism? xxx6
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-office
communication7 ("Memo") dated 8 September 1994 from
Allied Bank’s Vice-President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C.
Pe. The Memo informed Galanida that Allied Bank had
terminated his services effective 1 September 1994. The
reasons given for the dismissal were: (1) Galanida’s
8
continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem,
Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work
despite the denial of his application for additional vacation
leave. The salient portion of the Memo reads:
Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction concerning
your transfer and reassignment to Bacolod City and to
Tagbilaran City is without any justifiable reason and
constituted violations of Article XII of the Bank’s EDPP xxx
In view of the foregoing, please be informed that the
Bank has terminated your services effective September 1,
1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are
entitled as forfeited in accordance with 04, V
Administrative Penalties, page 6 of the Bank’s EDPP which
provides as follows:
"04. Dismissal.
Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause xxx
Notice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation
Committee subject to the confirmation of the President or
his authorized representative as officer/employee who is
terminated for cause shall not be eligible to receive any
benefit arising from her/his employment with the Bank or
to termination pay."
It is understood that the termination of your service shall
be without prejudice to whatever legal remedies which
the Bank may have already undertaken and/or will
undertake against you.
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)8
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied
Bank had abused its management prerogative in ordering
the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran
branches. In ruling that Galanida’s refusal to transfer did
not amount to insubordination, the Labor
Arbiter misquoted this Court’s decision in Dosch v.
NLRC,9 thus:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an
employee is recognized as an employer’s exclusive right
and the prerogative of management (Abbott Laboratories
vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).
The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute. It has
certain limitations. Thus, in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al.
123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:
"While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign
an employee is an employer’s exclusive right and the
prerogative of management, such right is not absolute.
The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his
employee is limited by the paramount police power xxx for
the relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual but impressed with public interest. xxx And
neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against each
other.
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered
insubordination where employee cited reason for said
refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from the
family."10 (Underscoring supplied by the Labor Arbiter)
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanida’s transfer was
inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida would have
to incur additional expenses for board, lodging and travel.
On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank
failed to show any business urgency that would justify the
transfer.
The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to Galanida’s claim
that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment. The Labor
Arbiter stated that Allied Bank deliberately left out Ms.
Co’s name from the list of accountants transferred to Cebu
as contained in Allied Bank’s letter dated 13 June 1994.
However, Mr. Regidor Olveda, Allied Bank’s Vice President
for Operations Accounting, testified that the bank
transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok, Cebu branch within
the first half of 1994.
Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award Galanida back
wages because he was not entirely free from blame. Since
another bank had already employed Galanida, the Labor
Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision of 23 December 1997 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering respondent Allied Banking Corporation
to pay complainant the aggregate total amount of Three
Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (₱ 324,000.00)
representing the following awards:
a) Separation pay for ₱ 272,000.00;
b) Quarter bonus for 1994 – ₱ 16,000.00;
c) 13th month pay for 1994 – ₱ 16,000.00;
d) Refund of contribution to Provident Fund - ₱
20,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 11
9
The Ruling of the NLRC
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank
terminated Galanida without just cause. The NLRC agreed
that the transfer order was unreasonable and unjustified,
considering the family considerations mentioned by
Galanida. The NLRC characterized the transfer as a
demotion since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches were
smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a regional office, and
because the bank wanted Galanida, an assistant manager,
to replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran
branch. The NLRC found unlawful discrimination since
Allied Bank did not transfer several junior accountants in
Cebu. The NLRC also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co
special treatment by assigning her to Cebu even though
she had worked for the bank for less than two years.
The NLRC ruled that Galanida’s termination was illegal for
lack of due process. The NLRC stated that Allied Bank did
not conduct any hearing. The NLRC declared that Allied
Bank failed to send a termination notice, as required by
law for a valid termination. The Memo merely stated that
Allied Bank would issue a notice of termination, but the
bank did not issue any notice.
The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in
bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the
dismissal undermined Galanida’s right to security of tenure
and equal protection of the laws. On these grounds, the
NLRC promulgated its Decision of 18 September 1998, the
relevant portion of which states:
In this particular case, We view as impractical, unrealistic
and no longer advantageous to both parties to order
reinstatement of the complainant. xxx For lack of sufficient
basis, We deny the claim for 1994 quarter bonus. Likewise,
no attorney’s fees is awarded as counsels for complainant-
appellee are from the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cebu.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated December 23, 1997 is hereby
MODIFIED by increasing the award of separation pay and
granting in addition thereto backwages, moral and
exemplary damages. The respondent-appellant, ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION, is thus ordered to pay to herein
complainant-appellee, POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the
following amounts:
representing
a) ₱ 336,000.00,
separation pay
representing
b> ₱ 833,600.00,
backwages
representing
c> ₱ 5,333.23 proportional 1994 13th
month pay
 representing refund of injunction ex parte to restrain the implementation or
d> ₱ 20,000.00 Provident Fund execution of the questioned Decision and Resolution; (2)
Contribution declare Galanida’s termination as valid and legal; (3) set
aside the Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution; (4)
representing moral make permanent the restraining order or preliminary
e> ₱ 50,000.00
damages injunction; (5) order Galanida to pay the costs; and (6)
order other equitable reliefs.
representing exemplary
f> ₱ 20,000.00
damages
The Issues

===========₱ Allied Bank raises the following issues:

1,264,933.33 TOTAL AWARD
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED
All other claims are dismissed for lack of basis. The other THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONER’S EXERCISE
respondents are dropped for lack of sufficient basis that OF ITS MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.
they acted in excess of their corporate powers.
2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
SO ORDERED.12 VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES CONSTITUTE A
GROUND TO WARRANT THE PENALTY OF
DISMISSAL.
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the
NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24 December 1998.13
3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED,
THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED
Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review
BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE
questioning the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC
REQUIRED DUE PROCESS.
before the Court of Appeals.

4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS LEGAL

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CANNOT RECOVER ANY MONETARY AWARD.17
Citing Dosch v. NLRC,14 the Court of Appeals held that
Galanida’s refusal to comply with the transfer orders did
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida
not warrant his dismissal. The appellate court ruled that
was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Allied
the transfer from a regional office to the smaller Bacolod
Bank contends that Galanida’s continued refusal to obey
or Tagbilaran branches was effectively a demotion. The
the transfer orders constituted willful disobedience or
appellate court agreed that Allied Bank did not afford
insubordination, which is a just cause for termination
Galanida procedural due process because there was no
under the Labor Code.
hearing and no notice of termination. The Memo merely
stated that the bank would issue a notice of termination
but there was no such notice. On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse
the transfer order. The memorandum for Galanida filed
with this Court, prepared by Atty. Loreto M. Durano,
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in its
again misquoted the Court’s ruling in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:
Decision of 27 April 2000, thus:

xxx His [Galanida’s] refusal to transfer falls well within the

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED
ruling of the Supreme Court in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et.
and the assailed Decision of public respondent NLRC is
al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983) quoted as follows:
AFFIRMED.

xxx
SO ORDERED. 15

Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered

Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the
insubordination where employee cited reason for said
appellate court denied in its Resolution of 8 August 2000.16
refusal, such as that of being away from the family."18

On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the appellate

The Ruling of the Court
court’s decision and resolution to the Supreme Court.
Allied Bank prayed that the Supreme Court: (1) issue a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary The petition is partly meritorious.

10
Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of the Supreme
Court
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse,
the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
both misquoted the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dosch v.
NLRC. The Court held in Dosch:
We cannot agree to Northwest’s submission that
petitioner was guilty of disobedience and insubordination
which respondent Commission sustained. The only piece
of evidence on which Northwest bases the charge of
contumacious refusal is petitioner’s letter dated August
28, 1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner acknowledged
receipt of the former’s memorandum dated August 18,
1975, appreciated his promotion to Director of
International Sales but at the same time regretted "that at
this time for personal reasons and reasons of my family, I
am unable to accept the transfer from the Philippines" and
thereafter expressed his preference to remain in his
position, saying: "I would, therefore, prefer to remain in
my position of Manager-Philippines until such time that
my services in that capacity are no longer required by
Northwest Airlines." From this evidence, We cannot
discern even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply
insubordination on the part of petitioner.19
The phrase "[r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
considered insubordination where employee cited reason
for said refusal, such as that of being away from the
family" does not appear anywhere in the Dosch  decision.
Galanida’s counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of
the italicized lines in the syllabus of Dosch found in the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated ("SCRA").
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of
Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work of
the Court, nor does it state this Court’s decision. The
syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his
understanding of the decision. The reporter writes the
syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in reading the
reports. A syllabus is not a part of the court’s decision. 20 A
counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully
considered text in the decision of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty.
Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but substituted a
portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA
syllabus, which they even underscored. In short, they
deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus
appear as the words of the Supreme Court. We admonish
them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if not an
outright attempt to mislead the parties and the courts
taking cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a
lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
text of a decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers
11
of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the
Supreme Court accurately.21
Whether Galanida was dismissed for just cause
We accord great weight and even finality to the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, particularly when they
affirm the findings of the NLRC or the lower courts.
However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule.
These exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded
on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual findings of
the trial and appellate courts are conflicting; (5) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond
the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the
judgment of the appellate court is premised on a
misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; and (8) when the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on
record.22 After a scrutiny of the records, we find that some
of these exceptions obtain in the present case.
The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies
within the ambit of the employer’s prerogatives.23 The
employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an
employee for valid reasons and according to the
requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not
result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employee’s
salary, benefits and other privileges.24 In illegal dismissal
cases, the employer has the burden of showing that the
transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial
to the displaced employee.25
The constant transfer of bank officers and personnel with
accounting responsibilities from one branch to another is a
standard practice of Allied Bank, which has more than a
hundred branches throughout the country.26 Allied Bank
does this primarily for internal control. It also enables bank
employees to gain the necessary experience for eventual
promotion. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual
of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial
Intermediaries,27 requires the rotation of these personnel.
The Manual directs that the "duties of personnel handling
cash, securities and bookkeeping records should be
rotated" and that such rotation "should be irregular,
unannounced and long enough to permit disclosure of any
irregularities or manipulations."28
Galanida was well aware of Allied Bank’s policy of
periodically transferring personnel to different branches.
As the Court of Appeals found, assignment to the different
branches of Allied Bank was a condition of Galanida’s
employment. Galanida consented to this condition when
he signed the Notice of Personnel Action.29
The evidence on record contradicts the charge that Allied
Bank discriminated against Galanida and was in bad faith
when it ordered his transfer. Allied Bank’s letter of 13 June
199430 showed that at least 14 accounting officers and
personnel from various branches, including Galanida, were
transferred to other branches. Allied Bank did not single
out Galanida. The same letter explained that Galanida was
second in line for assignment outside Cebu because he had
been in Cebu for seven years already. The person first in
line, Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been in
Cebu for more than ten years, had already transferred to a
branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note that none of the
other transferees joined Galanida in his complaint or
corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination
and favoritism.
As regards Ms. Co, Galanida’s letter of 16 June 1994 itself
showed that her assignment to Cebu was not in any way
related to Galanida’s transfer. Ms. Co was supposed to
replace a certain Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok branch.
The employer has the prerogative, based on its
assessment of the employees’ qualifications and
competence, to rotate them in the various areas of its
business operations to ascertain where they will function
with maximum benefit to the company.31
Neither was Galanida’s transfer in the nature of a
demotion. Galanida did not present evidence showing that
the transfer would diminish his salary, benefits or other
privileges. Instead, Allied Bank’s letter of 13 June 1994
assured Galanida that he would not suffer any reduction in
rank or grade, and that the transfer would involve the
same rank, duties and obligations. Mr. Olveda explained
this further in the affidavit he submitted to the Labor
Arbiter, thus:
19. There is no demotion in position/rank or diminution of
complainant’s salary, benefits and other privileges as the
transfer/assignment of branch officers is premised on the
role/functions that they will assume in the management
and operations of the branch, as shown below:
(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of the branch is
responsible for the proper discharge of the functions of
the accounting section of the branch, review of
documentation/proper accounting and control of
transaction. As such, the accounting functions in the
branch can be assumed by any of the following officers
with the rank of: Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/ Acctg.;
Senior Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Asst. Manager/Acctg.;
Accountant or Asst. Accountant.
12
xxx
20. The transfer/assignment of branch officer from one
branch, to another branch/office is lateral in nature and
carries with it the same position/rank, salary, benefits and
other privileges. The assignment/transfer is for the officer
to assume the functions relative to his job and NOT the
position/rank of the officer to be replaced.
There is also no basis for the finding that Allied Bank was
guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing Galanida. Unfair
labor practices relate only to violations of "the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-
organization"32 and are limited to the acts enumerated in
Article 248 of the Labor Code, none of which applies to the
present case. There is no evidence that Galanida took part
in forming a union, or even that a union existed in Allied
Bank.
This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could validly
refuse the transfer orders on the ground of parental
obligations, additional expenses, and the anguish he would
suffer if assigned away from his family.
The Court has ruled on this issue before. In the case
of Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v.
NLRC,33 we held:
The acceptability of the proposition that transfer made by
an employer for an illicit or underhanded purpose – i.e., to
defeat an employee’s right to self-organization, to rid
himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize an
employee for union activities – cannot be upheld is self-
evident and cannot be gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the
situation where no such illicit, improper or underhanded
purpose can be ascribed to the employer, the objection to
the transfer being grounded solely upon the personal
inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the
employee by reason of the transfer. What then?
This was the very same situation we faced in Phil.
Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana. In that case,
the employee, Alicia Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio
City Branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer to the
company’s branch office at Laoag City. In refusing the
transfer, the employee averred that she had established
Baguio City as her permanent residence and that such
transfer will involve additional expenses on her part, plus
the fact that an assignment to a far place will be a big
sacrifice for her as she will be kept away from her family
which might adversely affect her efficiency. In ruling for
the employer, the Court upheld the transfer from one city
to another within the country as valid as long as there is
no bad faith on the part of the employer. We held then:
"Certainly the Court cannot accept the proposition that
when an employee opposes his employer’s decision to
transfer him to another work place, there being no bad
faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party,
it is the employee’s wishes that should be made to
prevail."
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Court’s ruling
in Dosch v. NLRC.34 Dosch, however, is not applicable to
the present case. Helmut Dosch refused a transfer
consequential to a promotion. We upheld the refusal
because no law compels an employee to accept a
promotion, and because the position Dosch was supposed
to be promoted to did not even exist at that time.35 This
left as the only basis for the charge of insubordination a
letter from Dosch in which the Court found "not even the
slightest hint of defiance, much less xxx insubordination."36
Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an overseas
post, as in the Dosch  case, cannot be likened to a transfer
from one city to another within the country, 37 which is the
situation in the present case. The distance from Cebu City
to Bacolod City or from Cebu City to Tagbilaran City does
not exceed the distance from Baguio City to Laoag City or
from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court considered a
reasonable distance in PT&T v. Laplana.38
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes
willful disobedience of a lawful order of an
employer.39 Employees may object to, negotiate and seek
redress against employers for rules or orders that they
regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and unless these
rules or orders are declared illegal or improper by
competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey
them at their peril.40 For Galanida’s continued refusal to
obey Allied Bank’s transfer orders, we hold that the bank
dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with
Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code.41 Galanida is thus not
entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay.
Whether Galanida’s dismissal violated the
requirement of notice and hearing
To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d),
Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code ("Omnibus Rules"), which provides:
For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds of termination,
and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to
13
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or
rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration
of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.
The first written notice was embodied in Allied Bank’s
letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice required Galanida
to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for his refusal to comply with the transfer
orders.
On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that
the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard.42 An actual hearing is not necessary. The exchange
of several letters, in which Galanida’s wife, a lawyer with
the City Prosecutor’s Office, assisted him, gave Galanida an
opportunity to respond to the charges against him.
The remaining issue is whether the Memo dated 8
September 1994 sent to Galanida constitutes the written
notice of termination required by the Omnibus Rules. In
finding that it did not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC
cited Allied Bank’s rule on dismissals, quoted in the Memo,
that, "Notice of termination shall be issued by the
Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the
President or his authorized representative."43 The
appellate court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not
send any notice of termination to Galanida. The Memo,
with the heading "Transfer and Reassignment," was not
the termination notice required by law.
We do not agree.
Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show that it
unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied Bank’s decision
to dismiss him. The statement, "please be informed
that the Bank has terminated your services effective
September 1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if
any, that you are entitled [to] as forfeited xxx"44 is plainly
worded and needs no interpretation. The Memo also
discussed the findings of the Investigation Committee that
served as grounds for Galanida’s dismissal. The Memo
referred to Galanida’s "open defiance and refusal" to
transfer first to the Bacolod City branch and then to the
Tagbilaran City branch. The Memo also mentioned his
continued refusal to report for work despite the denial of
his application for additional vacation leave.45 The Memo
also refuted Galanida’s charges of discrimination and
demotion, and concluded that he had violated Article XII of
the bank’s Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure.
The Memo, although captioned "Transfer and
Reassignment," did not preclude it from being a notice of
termination. The Court has held that the nature of an
instrument is characterized not by the title given to it but
by its body and contents.46 Moreover, it appears that
Galanida himself regarded the Memo as a notice of
termination. We quote from the Memorandum for Private
Respondent-Appellee, as follows:
The proceedings may be capsulized as follows:
1. On March 13, 199447 Private Respondent-
Appellee filed before the Region VII Arbitration
Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal. A
copy of the Complaint is attached to the Petition
as Annex "H";
xxx
5. On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-Appellant
issued him a Letter of Termination. A copy of
said letter is attached to the Petition as Annex
"N";
6. Private Respondent-Appellee filed an
Amended/ Supplemental Complaint wherein he
alleged illegal dismissal. A copy of the
Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached
to the Petition as Annex "O"; xxx 48 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee refers
to the Memo as a "Letter of Termination." Further,
Galanida amended his complaint for constructive
dismissal49 to one for illegal dismissal50 after he received
the Memo. Clearly, Galanida had understood the Memo to
mean that Allied Bank had terminated his services.
The Memo complied with Allied Bank’s internal rules
which required the bank’s President or his authorized
representative to confirm the notice of termination. The
bank’s Vice-President for Personnel, as the head of the
department that handles the movement of personnel
within Allied Bank, can certainly represent the bank
president in cases involving the dismissal of employees.
Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered from
certain errors.1âwphi1 Although the Memo stated that
Allied Bank terminated Galanida’s services as of 1
September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8 September
1994. More importantly, Galanida only received a copy of
the Memo on 5 October 1994, or more than a month after
the supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a
written notice of termination must be served on the
employee.51 Allied Bank could not terminate Galanida on 1
September 1994 because he had not received as of that
date the notice of Allied Bank’s decision to dismiss him.
Galanida’s dismissal could only take effect on 5 October
1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. For this reason,
14
Galanida is entitled to backwages for the period from 1
September 1994 to 4 October 1994.
Under the circumstances, we also find an award of ₱
10,000 in nominal damages proper. Courts award nominal
damages to recognize or vindicate the right of a person
that another has violated.52 The law entitles Galanida to
receive timely notice of Allied Bank’s decision to dismiss
him. Allied Bank should have exercised more care in
issuing the notice of termination.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451 upholding the Decision of
18 September 1998 of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-
000180-98 is AFFIRMED, with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1) The awards of separation pay, moral damages
and exemplary damages are hereby deleted for
lack of basis;
2) Reducing the award of backwages to cover
only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4
October 1994; and
3) Awarding nominal damages to private
respondent for ₱ 10,000.
This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the
computation, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Decision, of the backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits, due to Potenciano L. Galanida for the time
his dismissal was ineffectual from 1 September 1994 until
4 October 1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M.
Durano are ADMONISHED to be more careful in citing the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the future.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22304           July 30, 1968
SAMAR MINING CO., INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPEYO V. TAN and RUFINO
ABUYEN, respondents-appellees.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, dismissing this case, with costs against the
petitioner, and lifting the writ of preliminary injunction
therein issued.
Acting upon a claim for compensation, under Act No. 3428,
filed by Rufino Abuyen, on June 18, 1956, for a disease
allegedly contracted in the course of his employment, as
foreman of the Samar Mining Co., Inc. — hereinafter
referred to as the petitioner — and docketed as WC Case
No. R-VI-217, decision was rendered, on October 14, 1958,
by Pompeyo V. Tan — an officer of Regional Office No. VI
of the Department of Labor — sentencing petitioner
herein:
1. To provide continued medical treatment and
hospitalization to the claimant in accordance
with Section 13 of the Act until his tuberculosis is
cured or arrested;
2. To pay to the claimant a lump sum of TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE
(P2,523.00) PESOS and a weekly compensation
of P17.40 from date hereof until he is cured or
his pulmonary tuberculosis is arrested as
certified by a competent physician but the total
compensation should not exceed P4,000.00;
payment to be made, thru the Regional Office
No. VI of the Department of Labor;
3. To pay to the workmen's compensation fund
the amount of P26.00 as administrative costs
pursuant to Section of 55 of Act 3428, as
amended.
A reconsideration of said decision having been denied, on
March 24, 1960, petitioner commenced Civil Case No.
42836 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for a writ of
certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction,
against Francisco P. Arnado, as Regional Administrator of
said office, Pompeyo V. Tan, as the writer of said decision,
and claimant Abuyen, upon the ground that Tan had acted
without jurisdiction in hearing said claim and rendering
decision thereon, and that Arnado had committed a grave
abuse of discretion in sustaining and upholding said acts of
Tan. Sustaining respondents' objection, upon the ground
of wrong venue, the case was, however, dismissed by said
court, the decision of which was, on June 30, 1961,
affirmed by Us.
On July 21, 1961, petitioner commenced, against the same
respondents in said Case No. 42836, the present action
for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction,
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the filing of
the case, said court issued a restraining order, which was,
15
later, followed by a writ of preliminary injunction, upon
the filing and approval of the requisite bond. After
appropriate proceedings, said court subsequently
rendered the decision mentioned in the opening
paragraph hereof, dismissing the petition, upon the
ground that respondent Tan had authority to hear and
pass upon the aforementioned claim of Abuyen, and
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued
meanwhile. Hence, this appeal by petitioner herein, who
insists: 1) that, being merely a labor attorney, respondent
Tan had no authority to make the award complained of; 2)
that as Regional Administrator, respondent Arnado could
not delegate said authority to respondent Tan; and 3) that
no such delegation of authority to him has been made.
It is not disputed that respondent Tan is a labor attorney,
assigned to Regional Office No. VI of the Department of
Labor, and that, as such, he has no authority to hear claims
for compensation under Act No. 3428 and to render
decisions thereon. Based, however, upon Plan No. 20-A,
submitted to the President of the Philippines by the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, and
Executive Order No. 218, dated December 10, 1956,
particularly section 32 thereof 1 as well as on Rule 21,
section 1, of the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 pursuant to
section 12, of Article III of said Plan No. 20-A, and section
45 of Act No. 3428, as amended by Republic Act No.
772,3 we have held, as early as August 21, 1961 —
... that a regional office of the Department of
Labor has original jurisdiction to hear and
determine claims for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. If a claim is
controverted, it shall be heard and decided only
by a regularly appointed hearing officer or any
other employee duly designated by the Regional
Administrator to act as hearing officer. But when
the claim is uncontroverted and there is no
necessity of requiring the claimant to present
further evidence, the Regional Administrator
may enter an award or deny the claim.
Furthermore, an employer is duty bound to
controvert a claim within 14 days from the date
of the accident or illness of the laborer or within
10 days after he or his representative first
acquired knowledge of the said accident or
sickness. Failure to do so within the period
provided will result in the renunciation of his
right to controvert the claim. But an employer
may reinstate his right to controvert the claim by
filing a petition under oath specifying the
reasons for his failure to do so. 4 .
We have repeatedly reiterated this view,5 which is now
well settled. In the case at bar, respondents-appellees
contend and have introduced evidence to the effect that
Regional Administrator Arnado had — by virtue of an
office order, dated November 29, 1957, and marked as
Exhibit 1 — designated respondent Tan — who is a duly
qualified Member of the Philippine Bar — "as Hearing
Officer in the case of Rufino Abuyen vs. Samar Mining
Co., WCC Case No. 44238 (R-VI-217)." As a consequence,
the only issue for determination is whether or not there
has been such designation in his favor.
Petitioner assails the evidence thereon upon the theory:
1) that the lower court erred in reopening the case, after
its submission for decision, for the reception of said
evidence; and 2) that the same is insufficient to establish
the designation aforementioned.
As regards the first alleged error, it appears that petitioner
had asked the lower court to render judgment on the
pleadings; that, thereafter, both parties submitted their
respective memoranda; that, in order to bolster up their
contention, respondents attached to their Memorandum,
as Annex 1, the alleged designation of respondent Tan by
Regional Administrator Arnado that petitioner, however,
objected to the consideration of said Annex 1; that,
accordingly, the lower court deemed it best to reopen the
case for the introduction of additional evidence and the
determination of the admissibility in evidence of said
Annex 1; and that the same was identified, marked and
admitted as Exhibit 1 at the rehearing.
In this connection, it should be noted that trial courts have
discretionary power to reopen a case either before or after
rendition of judgment, for the introduction of additional
evidence, so as to dispel doubts on material points. Such
power is controlled by no other rule than that of the
paramount interest of justice, and its exercise will not be
reviewed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse
thereof.6 No such abuse has been committed in the case at
bar. On the contrary, the exercise of said power by his
Honor, the trial Judge, served to promote the interest of
justice, by clarifying the question whether or not
respondent Tan had been given the aforementioned
designation.
As a matter of fact, said Exhibit 1 merely confirmed the
allegation in respondents' answer to the effect that
respondent Tan had acted "not as Labor Attorney but as
Hearing Officer designated pursuant to the
authority granted him by the previous Regional Labor
Administrator to try and hear the merits of the
compensation case ... WCC Case No. R-VI-217, Rufino
Abuyen vs. Samar Mining Co., Inc." Moreover, pursuant to
the very cases cited by petitioner, 7 the truth of this
allegation had been deemed impliedly admitted by the
petitioner, when it submitted the case for judgment on the
pleadings.8
16
Independently of the foregoing, the second alleged error is
obviously devoid of merit, the signature of Regional
Administrator Arnado on said Exhibit 1 having been
identified by one of his subordinates, who, as such, as
familiar therewith.
One other point must be stressed. The illness on which
Abuyen's claim is based took place in 1956. Yet, — through
the present case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila — petitioner has succeeded in
prolonging the litigation, for the compensation involved
therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more, petitioner's
contention was based upon a theory that had been
rejected by this Court as early as August, 1961. Then again,
the compensability of Abuyen's disability had never been
questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that
the purpose of this case, like the previous one, has been
merely to delay, a policy "Often resorted to" — in the
language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) — "as a means of
draining the resources of the poorer party" — in this case
a tuberculosis patient — "and of compelling it to submit
out of sheer exhaustion."9 Thus, the conduct of petitioner's
counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar
to assist in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or
defeat the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with treble costs, jointly and severally, against
the petitioner and its counsel, Attorney Benedicto G.
Arcinas and let certified copy of this decision be attached
to the personal record of the latter, as a Member of the
Bar. It is so ordered.
A.C. No. 8638, October 10, 2016
DATU BUDENCIO E. DUMANLAG, Complainant, v. ATTY.
WINSTON B. INTONG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint1 dated March 19, 2010
filed by complainant Datu Budencio E. Dumanlag
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Winston B. Intong
(respondent) for gross misconduct and negligence.
The Facts
Complainant claims to be a leader of the Indigenous
People of Bangcud, Malaybalay and the President of the
Philippine Datus Cultural Minorities Assistance, Inc. and
the Frontier's Mining Prospectors and Location
Corporation.2 On March 12, 2010, complainant received a
letter3 from respondent,4 which is reproduced in full
hereunder:
 and privileges available to every member of the society.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Accordingly, the State shall likewise ensure that the
February 08, 2010 employment of any form of force or coercion against
ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.
TO: DATU BUDENCIO DUMANLAG
Infront Mac Feedmill, San Jose xxxx
P-1, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon
He likewise quoted an Evaluation Report 7 of the Office of
Sir: the Ombudsman dated October 11, 2001 where he, as
complainant, stressed that "[n]o court in the Philippines,
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPlease consider this as a letter
request for your presence on 12 therefore, should punish any member of a cultural
community but shall extend to them courtesies in
February 2010 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon located at accordance with [the aforesaid] law."8 Complainant
Purok 11, Poblacion, Valencia City, Bukidnon. averred further that the incorporation papers of the
This is for the settlement and pre-litigation conference Philippine Datus Cultural Minorities Assistance, Inc. and
prior to any legal action against you as complainant by my the Frontier's Mining Prospectors and Location
client JAIME AJOC & ENCARNACION DUMANLAG-AJOC
Corporation were supposed to be notarized at
ofLapu-lapu St., Valencia City.
respondent's law office, but the charge for notarization
Hoping for your preferential and positive action on this amounting to P10,000.00 was "very dear, very expensive,"
matter. Thank you very much. My highest esteem. and complainant could not afford the same.9 He then
accused respondent of soliciting cases for purposes of
                                                                                                         gain, which act constitutes malpractice, citing Section 27,
Very truly yours, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, 10 to wit:
                                                                        (SGD) ATTY.
WINSTON B. INTONG chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
                                                                          For and in behalf
of Mr. & Mrs. Ajoc Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
Complainant took offense with the aforequoted letter as it by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
was allegedly intended "to FORCE, COMPULSORY (sic), to gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
investigate, or fiscalize, in the moment (sic) [complainant] or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
in his LAW OFFICE at Purok 11 Poblacion Valencia City, turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
Bukidnon. [Respondent] intend (sic) for particular purpose required to take before admission to practice, or for a
that HIS LAW OFFICE in Valencia City is one of the COURTS willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
in the Philippines as to investigate [complainant] court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
thereat."5 To bolster his indignation, complainant cited for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
Republic Act No. (RA) 8371,6 otherwise known as "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997," specifically either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
Section 21 which accords equal protection and non constitutes malpractice.
discrimination of Indigenous Cultural Communities and
Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs), as follows:
In a Resolution11 dated July 19,2010, the Court required
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary respondent to file his comment on the complaint, which
Section 21. Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of he failed to do. Consequently, in a Resolution 12 dated
ICCs/IPs. Consistent with the equal protection clause of March 9, 2011, the Court issued a show cause order
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the against respondent reiterating compliance with Resolution
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of dated July 19, 2010. On September 28, 2011, the Court
Human Rights including the Convention on the Elimination imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon respondent for his
of Discrimination Against Women and International
continued failure to comply with the directive to file
Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due recognition of
their distinct characteristics and identity, accord to the comment.13 However, respondent still failed to pay said
members of the ICCs/IPs the rights, protections and fine,14 or to file his comment. Thus, in a Resolution 15 dated
privileges enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry. It shall July 1, 2013, the Court dispensed with the filing of
extend to them the same employment rights, respondent's comment, and referred the case to the
opportunities, basic services, educational and other rights Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,

17
report and recommendation. On January 21, 2014, the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) issued a Notice
of Mandatory Conference/Hearing16 directing the parties
to submit their respective mandatory conference briefs. In
compliance therewith, respondent filed his brief17 on
March 11, 2014 claiming that the letter dated February 8,
2010 merely invited complainant "for his presence and to
confront, if not, sit and resolve any issue/s that he x x x
may have against JAIME AJOC and his wife
ENCARNACION";18 and that such effort at conflict
resolution in the hope of avoiding costly and cumbersome
litigations is not an act of malpractice, and does not
constitute gross misconduct.19chanrobleslaw
The IBP's Findings
In his Report and Recommendation20 dated May 27, 2014,
the IBP CBD Investigating Commissioner Cecilia A. C.
Villanueva (Commissioner Villanueva) proposed
the dismissal of the complaint for failure of the
complainant to substantiate his accusations against
respondent. Commissioner Villanueva found no force,
threat or intimidation in the tenor of the letter sent by
respondent, and described the same as a "mere request"
that was "carefully worded, done in a respectful
manner."21 He pointed out, however, the demeanor of the
complainant at the mandatory conference as that of a
senior citizen who was "very sensitive and demanding of
his reputation as a leader of cultural group. People should
be careful of things to say to him lest he gets offended or
even get mad." Commissioner Villanueva almost cited
complainant in contempt when the latter threatened him
and the stenographer with a lawsuit before the
Commission on Human Rights, this Court, and the United
Nations.22chanrobleslaw
Be that as it may, Commissioner Villanueva
recommended23 that respondent be reprimanded for his
disrespectful actuations before the Court and the IBP-CBD
committed as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent's propensity to ignore the lawful orders of the
[Court] as well as those of the IBP[-CBD] is manifest from
the record. The [Court] issued three resolutions requiring
respondent to comment on the complaint filed by
complainant, but he simply ignored the Court's orders and
did not file his comment. Consequently, the [Court]
resolved to dispense with the filing of the comment but
referred the matter to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation so as not to deprive respondent of his
right to due process.
Again, respondent was given several opportunities to
18
express his side on the charge during the investigation
thereof by the IBP. Neither did he file a position paper as
required by the Commission on Bar Discipline. Again, he
merely ignored the Commission's directives.24
On April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution25cralawred which adopted and approved with
modification the aforesaid Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villanueva. In view of respondent's
propensity to ignore the lawful orders of the Court, as well
as the IBP-CBD, which was found to be unbecoming of him
as officer of the court, respondent was suspended from
the practice of law for six (6) months. 26chanrobleslaw
Thereafter, the IBP forwarded the case to the Court as
provided under Rule 139-B, Section 12 (b) 27 of the Rules
ofCourt.28chanrobleslaw
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors, except as to the penalty.
It has been consistently held that an attorney enjoys the
legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an
officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his
duties in accordance with his oath.29 Thus, in disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.30 However, in this case, complainant failed to
discharge the burden of proving his accusations of gross
misconduct on the part of the respondent.
Complainant's allegation of force and compulsion
accompanying the letter dated February 8, 2010 is negated
by the very words used therein.  Respondent described
said letter in the opening paragraph as a "letter request for
[complainant's] presence."31 He then went on to close the
letter with "[h]oping for your [(complainant's)] preferential
and positive action on this matter" and "[m]y highest
esteem."32 As aptly pointed out by Commissioner
Villanueva in his Report and Recommendation, the letter
was "carefully worded, done in a respectful
manner."33 There was absolutely nothing on the face of
the letter that would justify complainant's indignation
against any discourtesy or discrimination against him. The
letter was a mere invitation for complainant to attend a
settlement and pre-litigation conference, which
respondent, as a lawyer, is obligated to pursue. Under Rule
1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), "[a] lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end
or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
There was nothing wrong, therefore, with respondent's
efforts to set up a conference between complainant and
his clients. With respect to the claim of exorbitant
notarization fees, the same deserves scant consideration
in view of complainant's failure to offer corroborative
proof to support his bare allegations. While a lawyer is
mandated under Canon 20 of the CPR to charge only fair
and reasonable fees, and that he may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in
the CPR,34 such violation must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof, which was not done in
this case.
Respondent cannot, however, escape accountability for his
repetitive disregard of the resolutions of the Court
requiring him to file his comment to the complaint and to
pay the fine imposed upon him for his failure to do so. As
correctly pointed out by Commissioner Villanueva, the
Court issued three resolutions dated July 19, 2010, March
9, 2011, and September 28, 2011, requiring respondent to
file his comment, to show cause for his failure to file, and
to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for such failure. But all three
were left unheeded. Respondent ought to know that
orders of the court are "not mere requests but directives
which should have been complied with promptly and
completely." "He disregarded the oath he took when he
was accepted to the legal profession 'to obey the laws and
the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities.' x
x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called
upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected
to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an
officer of the court,"35 pursuant to Canon 11 of the CPR,
which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers x x x."
It has been stressed that the determination of whether an
attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a
period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
The penalties for a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other
pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension, and, in grave cases, disbarment.36 In the
present case, the Court finds too harsh the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six months. After all, respondent did file his
mandatory conference brief before the IBP where he cited
the Resolution dated July 19, 2010 of the Court, requiring
him to file his comment to the complaint. He also attended
the mandatory conference/hearing scheduled by the IBP,
although he failed to file his position paper despite the
directive to do so. Under the circumstances, and
considering that this appears to be respondent's first
infraction, the Court finds it proper to reprimand him with
warning that commission of the same or similar infraction
will be dealt with more severely. This is consistent with the
19
ruling in the recent case of Andres v. Nambi,37 where
respondent therein was found to have ignored the Court's
resolution directing him to file comment, and to have
failed to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice, as well as to
file his position paper. Since it was also his first infraction,
respondent therein was merely reprimanded by the Court,
as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty.
Winston B. Intong (respondent) for refusing to obey lawful
orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC. January 16, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT
OF SANDIGANBAYAN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANACLETO D.
BADOY, JR., TAKING AN AMBULANCE BUT PROCEEDING
TO THE GMA TV STATION FOR AN INTERVIEW INSTEAD
OF PROCEEDING FORTHWITH TO THE HOSPITAL.
[A.M. No. SB-02-10-J. January 16, 2003
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, JOSE JINGGOY ESTRADA, SERAFIN R.
CUEVAS, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, JOSE B. FLAMINIANO,
PACIFICO A. AGABIN, FELIX D. CARAO, JR., CLEOFE V.
VERZOLA, DELIA H. HERMOSO AND RAYMUND P.
FORTUN, complainants, vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
ANACLETO D. BADOY, JR., AND TERESITA LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
Judges, like ordinary mortals, are subject to human
limitations. At times, the great tides of perturbing and
overwhelming emotions engulf them. Notwithstanding so,
they are expected to be cerebral men[1 who can control
their confounding emotions and idiosyncratic inclinations.
Otherwise, they will be held answerable for their conduct.
Haled in these two consolidated administrative
cases, A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC and A.M No. SB-02-10-J, are
Sandiganbayan Justices Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Ret.) and
Teresita Leonardo-De Castro.
The facts of A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC may be synthesized as
follows:
On November 29, 2001, Justice Badoy, aboard an
ambulance, whisked himself to the GMA Broadcast Station
in Quezon City for a live interview in the news
program Saksi. There, he announced the loss of a
Resolution he penned in connection with the plunder case
against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and
others.
The media sarcastically referred to the event as a staged
comedy[2 or a television tryst.[3 Leading newspapers
contained facetious headlines, such as Ambulance rushes
Badoyto TV Station,[4  Whats with Justice Badoy?,
[5 and  Unorthodox Behavior Analyze Badoy, Erap Lawyers
ask SC.[6
Acting on the media reports, this Court directed Justice
Badoy to show cause why he should not be
administratively charged with conduct unbecoming a
Justice of the Sandiganbayan.7cräläwvirtualibräry
In his compliance,8 Justice Badoy alleged that three days
prior to the incident, he could not find his Resolution
ordering that former President Estrada be detained at Fort
Sto. Domingo. So he requested the National Bureau of
Investigation to conduct an investigation, but to no avail.
Thus, on November 29, 2001, agitated that someone
might have stolen the Resolution and claimed that he
(Justice Badoy) sold it for a fee, he decided to go to the
GMA-7 Broadcast Station and report its loss, in order that
the public may know he is honest. In going there, he chose
to ride in an ambulance because he felt very sick and cold,
intending to proceed to a hospital after the interview.
A.M No. SB-02-10-J  is set on a different factual milieu, to
wit:
Subsequent to the descent of former President Estrada
from power, the Office of the Ombudsman filed several
criminal cases against him, his family, and friends. One of
them is Criminal Case No. 26558 wherein he, his son
Jose Jinggoy and Atty. Edward Serapio stand accused for
violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan composed of Justice Badoy, as Chairman,
and Justices Teresita Leonardo-De Castro and Ricardo M.
Ilarde, now retired, as members.
On September 13, 2001, after the termination of a series
of pre-trial conference between the parties, the
Sandiganbayan furnished them and their counsel with a
copy of the Pre-trial Order for their signatures. The
defense panel composed of Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag (lead
counsel), Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, Attys. Jose B.
Flaminiano, Felix D. Carao, Jr., Cleofe V. Verzola, and Delia
20
H. Hermoso, refused to sign it on the grounds that: 1)
there is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requiring them to sign a Pre-trial Order;9 2) they
were not given ample time to read it;10 and 3) it
incorporates a statement that they admitted the existence
of certain exhibits although there was no such
admission.11cräläwvirtualibräry
In the course of an argument between Sandiganbayan
Justice De Castro and Justice Cuevas, Atty. Saguisag
intervened. In the process, he argued simultaneously with
Justice Cuevas.12 Despite Justice De Castros request to wait
for his turn, Atty. Saguisag persisted, prompting her to
bang the gavel twice and order him to stop arguing.13 This
led Justice Badoy to order four Sheriffs to take Atty.
Saguisag out of the courtroom.14
Thereafter, Justice De Castro ruled in open court that the
assailed portion of the Pre-trial Order could be
deleted.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The prosecution manifested its acquiescence. However,
Atty. Flaminiano objected, insisting that the defense needs
more time to study the Pre-trial Order.16 Notwithstanding
the objection, Justice Badoy terminated the pre-trial and
set the trial proper on October 1, 3 and 4, 2001 and
thereafter, every Monday, Wednesday and Thursday of
the week, all at 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon.17cräläwvirtualibräry
On October 1, 2001, the defense lawyers did not appear.
Determined to proceed with the trial, Justice Badoy
appointed Atty. Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty. Martin Pison,
counsel for accused Atty. Serapio, to represent the
Estradas. Former President Estrada objected, insisting that
he has the right to choose his counsel. Atty. Acut and Atty.
Pison declined because of a possible conflict between their
clients interest and that of the Estradas. As a last recourse,
Justice Badoy appointed lawyers from the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) as counsel de officio  for the
Estradas.18cräläwvirtualibräry
Feeling aggrieved, former President Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and all their counsel of record in Criminal Case No.
26558 filed the instant administrative complaint charging
Justices Badoy and De Castro with:
1) dishonesty and misrepresentation for incorporating in
the Pre-trial Order a statement that the defense admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit A up to Exhibit C-45 and its submarkings
as to its existence notwithstanding the fact that they did
not admit the same;19cräläwvirtualibräry
2)  oppression and gross misconduct for throwing Atty.
Saguisag out of the courtroom;20cräläwvirtualibräry
3) violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars for setting the hearing of the plunder case three
times a week, at one oclock in the afternoon, without prior
consultation with the defense counsel;21cräläwvirtualibräry
4) denial of the accuseds right to counsel for appointing
PAO lawyers as counsel de officio of the Estradas during
the hearing of October 1, 2001;22 and
5) penchant for late rulings 23  as shown in the following
instances:
1. The release of the Resolution denying complainant
Jinggoy Estradas Motion to Quash (filed as early as April
2001) after office hours and on the eve of the July 10, 2001
arraignment.
2. The release of the Resolution denying complainant
Estradas Petition to Recuse on the scheduled date of the
pre-trial or on September 3, 2001.
3. Respondents failure to resolve complainants Motion to
Cancel the October 1, 2001 hearing filed as early as
September 19, 2001.
4. The release of the Resolution denying complainant
Jinggoy Estradas Motion to be Allowed to Administer the
Oath of Office to Senator Luisa Loi Estrada, on June 29,
2001, past beyond the scheduled hour of oath-taking,
thus, prompting Justice Ricardo M. Ilarde (Ret.) to write
the following annotations on the Resolution: What is
there to deny? This resolution was brought to us only at
4:45 p.m. The matter has been rendered moot and
academic.
Respondents filed their separate comments.
Justice De Castro explains as follows:
First, in issuing the Pre-trial Order, the court merely relied
on the parties Joint Stipulations of Facts and on the notes
of the five (5) stenographers recording the pre-trial
conferences held before the Division Clerk of Court.
Nonetheless, when complainants called the courts
attention regarding the assailed statement in the Pre-trial
Order, she ordered its deletion.[24 Second, it was Atty.
Saguisags contumacious conduct of loudly speaking
simultaneously with Atty. Cuevas that prompted
respondent Justices to order him to leave the courtroom.
[25 Third, they consulted the complainants before they set
the hearing of the plunder case three times a week,
resulting in the revision of the trial settings embodied in
the courts Order dated September 14, 2001.[26 Fourth,
the appointment of three (3) PAO lawyers was intended to
provide the accused with adequate legal assistance during
the hearing. And fifth, they resolved the accuseds three
21
motions to quash only on July 9, 2001 because the parties
last pleading was filed only on July 5, 2001.
[27cräläwvirtualibräry
For his part, Justice Badoy maintains that the Pre-trial
Order has not prejudiced the accused since they were not
obliged to sign it and that they are free to object to the
presentation of any evidence during trial.[28 He ordered
Atty. Saguisag to leave the courtroom because he ignored
Justice De Castros repeated order to stop arguing.[29 On
the setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times a
week, he stressed that the court was merely complying
with the Speedy Trial Act.[30 And lastly, on the alleged late
rulings, he explains:
Regarding the release of the Resolution of the undersigned
on the Motion for Recusation of the Estradas on the
recusation issue. At the time, the undersigned had no
intention of releasing it yet in order to fine-tune the same
further. However, he was informed just before going out
for the hearing that the Estradas were going to use the
pendency of their Motion for Recusation as a reason,
again, to ask for the postponement of the setting for that
day, one of their several motions for postponement.
As regards the delay in the Resolution of the undersigned
on the permission to have Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada go
to San Juan City to administer the oath to both his
mother as Senator and his brother as the new Mayor of
San Juan City, the reason was because the undersigned
was looking hard for a justification to grant the request
since the undersigned sympathized with the same. The
undersigned went to the extent of requesting a copy of
the Rules and Regulations from both the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) as well as the Bureau
of Corrections (BOC). Hence, the delay in the Resolution
of the ponencia. But, even late, there was still a chance
for then Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada to administer the
oaths of office.
xxxxxx
The undersigned stated that, with every Justice having
100% load and 100% staff, with the plunder case
(equivalent easily to 500%), the undersigned now had a
load of 600% but with his support staff remaining in the
same level. That is why he asked for additional
staff.31 (Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be stressed that the retirement[32 of
Justice Badoy from the Judiciary does not divest this Court
of its jurisdiction over these cases. In Perez vs. Abiera,
[33 this Court ruled:
X x x. In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the
time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not
lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official
had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his
case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent official innocent of the
charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule
would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy
would the people have against a judge or any other public
official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during
his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt
and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and
other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would
soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all
administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public
policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction
over members of the judiciary and other officials under
its supervision and control for acts performed in office
which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the
interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent,
respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he served
well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and
imposable under the situation.
We shall resolve A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC  first.
An introspective appraisal of the ambulance incident yields
reasons for this Court to adjudge Justice Badoy guilty of
conduct unbecoming a Justice.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. He should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity of
the Judiciary.[34 Concomitant with this is the express
mandate of the Canons of Judicial Ethics that justice
should not be bounded by the individual idiosyncrasies of
those who administer it. A judge should adopt the usual
and expected method of doing justice, and not seek to be
spectacular or sensational in the conduct of his court.
Justice Badoy tramples upon the foregoing judicial norms.
We see no reason why he should rush to the GMA-7
Broadcast Station just to inform the public about the loss
of a Resolution. This is an internal office incident which
should not be reported to the whole nation. His claim
that the Resolution might have been stolen and sold by
someone (using his name) for a fee is a wild
conjecture. Not only did his conduct give an image that
he could not manage his work effectively, but it also
indicated that he had corrupt personnel. Moreover, it
dragged innocent parties as possible culprits.
Justice Badoys aberrant behavior deserves administrative
sanction. As the Chairman of the Division hearing the
plunder case against the former President of the
Philippines, he should have been more circumspect in his
22
actuation. A short pause for reflection might have yielded
a better judgment. The loss of the Resolution, being an
internal matter, could have been addressed inside his own
chamber. That he brought it to the arena of public opinion
is pure vanity. It cannot be countenanced. If lawyers are
prohibited from making public statements in the media
regarding a pending case to arouse public opinion for or
against a party,[35] with more reason should judges be
prohibited from seeking publicity. Judges are not actors
or politicians who thrive by publicity. Publicity
undermines the dignity and impartiality of a judge.
[36] Thus, at no time should he be moved by a desire to
cater to public opinion to the detriment of the
administration of justice.[37cräläwvirtualibräry
The fact that Justice Badoy, just three (3) weeks prior to
the ambulance incident, was strictly ordered by Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., to cease and desist from
holding press conferences, issuing press statements, or
giving interviews to the media on any matter or incident
related to the issues subject of the controversy[38 all the
more punctuates his indiscretion.
As we mentioned earlier, judges are subject to human
limitations. Imbedded in their consciousness is the
complex of emotions, habits and convictions. Aware of this
actuality, it behooves them to regulate these deflecting
forces and not to let them loose, either to their own
detriment or to that of the courts they serve. This is the
high price they have to pay as occupants of their exalted
positions.
We now resolve A.M No. SB-02-10-J.
At this juncture, let it be stressed that the administration
of justice is primarily a joint responsibility of the judge and
the lawyer. The judge expects a lawyer to properly
perform his role in this task in the same manner that the
lawyer expects a judge to do his part.[39 Their relation
should be based on mutual respect and on a deep
appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Only in
this manner can each minimize occasions for delinquency
and help attain effectively the ends of justice.
[40cräläwvirtualibräry
The conflict between the herein parties could have been
avoided if only they heeded the foregoing clarion call.
I
Respondents are not guilty of the charges of dishonesty
and misrepresentation. Dishonesty connotes a disposition
to deceive,[41 while misrepresentation means a statement
made to deceive or mislead.[42 Obviously, both imply an
intention to deceive. Complainants failed to prove that
respondents acted with deceit or with malice or bad faith
in stating in the Pre-trial Order that the defense admitted
the existence of certain exhibits. Other than their bare
allegation, no sufficient evidence was adduced to support
the charge.[43 That respondents did not intend to deceive
complainants is clear from the fact that the Pre-trial Order
states verbatim  the Joint Stipulations of Facts submitted
by both parties. Furthermore, when complainants
expressed their objection to the inclusion of the assailed
statement, respondents immediately ordered its deletion.
The transcript of stenographic notes is revealing, thus:
AJ BADOY:
The Court would appreciate if you can point out some
grammatical errors.
Atty. Flaminiano:
Yes, Your Honor. I am going to do that.
On page 20, the last paragraph states: The defense
admitted exhibit A up to exhibit C-45 and its sub
markings as to its existence but not as to the truth of the
content. In the very first place there never was any
admission made by the defense as even to the existence
of the document. And the sentence also we believe not
grammatically appropriate. It should be their sub
markings or as to their existence because this involved
several documents, Your Honors.
AJ DE CASTRO:
That portion may be deleted.
Atty. Flaminiano:
Well, Im not sure about it. Your Honor. I only pointed that
there is a need for us to go over page by page because we
got a copy only after there was an incident
xxxxxx
OMB Desierto:
We can have this deleted.
Atty. Flaminiano:
But there are several others.
AJ DE CASTRO:
What are those?
OMB Desierto:
23
After one (1) hour they should be able to determine that.
After all Your Honor, I would like to emphasize the fact
that the Joint Stipulation of Facts were signedstipulations
which we had a week ago were signed by the parties, by
the counsels for the accused. And now, the things that are
reflected here, are found in this Pre-trial Order. If there is
any delineation from what stipulated then and were
signed by the counsels for the defense and also the
prosecution, then we can correct that, but it cannot be
possible major changes will have to be made in the Pre-
trial Order since this is only copied anyway from the Joint
Stipulation of Facts. If there are such thing as that
particular sentence which should be objectionable to the
defense, the prosecution is ready to agree to its deletion.
xxxxxx
AJ DE CASTRO:
You know what we did here is simply copy verbatim every
document that we found on record pertaining to the Pre-
trial conference. We did not add. We did not subtract. So,
anything that you will state now will simply be corrections
of some clerical errors, that is all. Giving you enough time
to go over.44 (Emphasis supplied)
On complainants refusal to sign the Pre-trial Order, Section
2, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that All agreements or admissions made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced
in writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. Considering that the Pre-trial Order contains the
recital of the actions taken by the parties, agreements and
admissions, the facts stipulated, and the evidence marked,
[45 the parties must sign it. A party who participates in the
pre-trial conference and who signs the Joint Stipulation of
Facts is expected to sign the Pre-trial Order. If a party
believes that the Pre-trial Order is not an honest
representation of what transpired in the pre-trial
conference, then he must specify his objections thereto
and the court may modify it to prevent injustice. This was
what respondents exactly did when complainants pointed
out the assailed statement in the Pre-trial Order.
II
We now come to complainants allegation of oppression
and gross misconduct. Oppression is a misdemeanor
committed by a public officer, who under color of his
office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty,
severity, or excessive use of authority.[46 Upon the other
hand, the word misconduct implies wrongful intention. For
gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of
should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.
[47 We find no evidence to prove complainants charges of
oppression and misconduct.
Records show that Atty. Saguisag was asking the court for
a copy of the Pre-trial Order so that he could follow up the
courts discussion. He did not utter any disrespectful
remark against respondents nor attack their integrity or
authority. However, he kept on speaking simultaneously
with Justice Cuevas and refused to yield to the courts
repeated order to stop. Such actuation must have
constrained respondents to lose their cool and order the
sheriffs to take him out of the courtroom. At that point,
what respondents should have done was to cite him in
direct contempt of court pursuant to Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[48 In Romero vs.
Valle, Jr.,[49  this Court ruled:
Precisely, judicial officers are given contempt powers in
order that without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust,
they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent
judge could very well have cited complainant in
contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by
banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and
unceremoniously walking out of the courtroom.
It has been consistently stressed that the role of a judge in
relation to those who appear before his court must be one
of temperance, patience and courtesy. In this regard, Rule
3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should
be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers,
especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and
others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the
litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for
the litigants.
In Echano vs. Sunga,[50 respondent judge, during the
course of an argument in his sala, lost his cool and called
the sheriff to take away the arguing attorney. And when
the attorney kept on talking, respondent judge
countered, Submitted, Buntalin kita dian. This Court
admonished him to be more prudent and restrained in his
behavior.
For his part, pursuant to Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Saguisag should have
observed the respect due to respondent magistrates for
the maintenance of the courts supreme importance. Upon
being ordered to stop arguing simultaneously with Justice
Cuevas, he should have complied and behaved
accordingly. Had he done so, he would not have been
ordered to leave the courtroom. Indeed, he failed to
comport himself in a manner required of an officer of the
court.
III
24
The setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times
a week is in order, not only because the case is of national
concern, but more importantly, because the accused are
presently detained.[51 Contrary to complainants
assertions, the continuous trial is in accordance with the
mandate of the law. This Court, in Administrative Circular
No. 3-90 dated January 31, 1990, ordered all trial courts to
adopt the mandatory continuous trial system in
accordance with Administrative Circular No. 4 dated
September 22, 1988 and Circular No. 1-89 dated January
19, 1989. It was adopted precisely to minimize delay in the
processing of cases. This delay was attributed to the
common practice of piecemeal trial wherein cases are set
for trial one day at a time and thereafter the hearing is
postponed to another date or dates until all the parties
have finished their presentation of evidence.[52 Section 2
of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 2 Continuous trial until terminated;
postponements.  Trial once commenced shall continue
from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It
may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for
good cause.
The court shall, after consultations with the prosecutor
and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on
weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall
the entire period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days
from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized
by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Corolarilly, the consultations referred to in the foregoing
provisions does not necessarily mean that the court has
to secure first from the prosecution and defense their
approval before it can set the date of hearing. To rule
otherwise is to subject our trial system to the control of
the parties and their counsel.
Complainants also assail respondents act of setting the
hearing at one oclock in the afternoon. Again, there is
nothing irregular in it. The schedule of hearing is regarded
as a matter necessarily at the discretion of the trial judge.
As a matter of fact, a court may even hold night sessions,
and a court of review will not interfere unless it clearly
appears that there has been an abuse of the power of the
judge and that injustice has been done.[53 This is because
the good of the service demands more toil and less
idleness, and the limitations imposed by law are aimed to
cut indolence and not the other way around.[54
IV
Our minds cannot sit easy with regard to the charge of
violation of the accuseds right to counsel. A PAO lawyer is
considered as independent counsel within the
contemplation of the Constitution considering that he is
not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel
of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to that of the accused. In People vs.
Bacor,[55 we ruled that the assistance of a PAO lawyer
satisfies the constitutional requirement of a competent
and independent counsel for the accused.
V ought to be reminded that the people expect from them a
Finally, we find that Justice Badoy incurred delay in
resolving Jinggoy Estradas motion to be allowed to
administer the oath of his mother, a newly elected
Senator. Every judge is required, at all times, to be alert
in his rulings and in the conduct of the business of the
court, so far as he can make it useful to litigants and to
the community. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that A judge shall dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. A judge must cultivate a capacity for quick
decision and habits of indecision must be sedulously
overcome.
While we commend Justice Badoys persistence in
searching for precedents that would help him resolve
Jinggoy Estradas motion to be allowed to administer the
oath of office of his mother, nonetheless, he should not
have delayed resolving the same. As a result, the members
of his Division failed to vote on his Resolution. He knew
very well that the oath taking was to be held at 2:00 P.M.
of June 29, 2001. Even if he had to deny the motion, he
should have consulted his members before 2:00 P.M. so as
to give them the opportunity to consider Jinggoy Estradas
arguments. When he submitted the Resolution to his
members at 4:45 P.M., he rendered their votes
inconsequential. Even Justices De Castro and Ilarde made
notes in the same Resolution to the effect that the matter
subject of the Resolution had become moot before it
reached them. Justice De Castro stated: The matter is now
moot and academic; while Justice Ilarde wrote: What is
there to deny? This resolution was brought to us only on
4:45 P.M. The matter has been rendered moot and
academic. Clearly, Justice Badoy should be held liable for
such delay.
In sum, we find Justice Badoy guilty of the following
administrative offenses:
1) conduct unbecoming a Justice for going to GMA-7
Broadcast Station aboard an ambulance and reporting the
loss of a Resolution, classified as a light charge under
Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended;56 and
2) undue delay in resolving Jinggoy Estradas motion to be
allowed to administer his mothers oath of office, a less
25
serious charge under Section 9 of the same
Rule.57cräläwvirtualibräry
Likewise, we find that both Justice Badoy and Justice De
Castro failed to exhibit judicial temperament. Such
conduct deserves admonition.
One last word. The members of the bench and the bar
sense of shared responsibility in the administration of
justice a crucial factor in the speedy and fair disposition of
cases. Each of them must do his share for in the last
analysis the quality of justice meted out by the courts
cannot be higher than the quality of the lawyers practicing
in the courts and of the judges who have been selected
from among them.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr.
(Retired), is hereby FINED in the sum of P13,000.00
for conduct unbecoming a Justice and for delay in issuing
an Order, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro is hereby
ADMONISHED to be more tolerant of counsels demeanors
which do not detract from the dignity and solemnity of the
court proceedings.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents
records with this Court.
G.R. No. 159486-88               November 25, 2003
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION],
HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO
SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in
the above-numbered case; it read:
"The case for consideration has been brought to this Court
via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his
counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the
Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition prays –
"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the
members of the Honorable Court disqualify
themselves from hearing and deciding this
petition;
"2. That the assailed resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and
 "3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565
and No. 26905 pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts
that the inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court
from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges
from participating in any partisan political activity which
proscription, according to him, the justices have violated
by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the
assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to
the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby
prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act
taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the
Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA
108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and
due process.
"Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner
when he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before
the Sandiganbayan, asking that ‘the appointment of
counsels de officio (sic) be declared functus officio’ and
that, being the now counsel de parte, he be notified of all
subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No.
26565 and No. 26905 pending therein. Finally, Attorney
Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against
his client be dismissed.
"During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May
2003, petitioner presented to the court several portions of
the book, entitled ‘Reforming the Judiciary,’ written by
Justice Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for
the defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion
pleading, among other things, that –
"a) x x x President Estrada be granted the
opportunity to prove the ‘truth’ of the
statements contained in Justice Artemio
Panganiban’s book, ‘REFORMING THE
JUDICIARY,’ in relation to the prejudgment
committed by the Supreme Court justices against
President Estrada in the subject case/s of Estrada
v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,
"b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces
tecum be issued to Justice Artemio Panganiban,
Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona,
Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of
National Defense, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them
to testify and bring whatever supporting
documents they may have in relation to their
direct and indirect participation in the
26
proclamation of Vice President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book
of Justice Panganiban, including the material
events that led to that proclamation and the
ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo, supra.’ (Rollo,
pp. 6-7.)
"The ‘truth’ referred to in paragraph a) of the
relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains
to what he claims should have been included in
the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:
‘The request of the movant is simply for the Court to
include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of
Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
‘a) going to EDSA 2;
‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-
President Arroyo as President on the ground of
‘permanent disability’ even without proof of
compliance with the corresponding
constitutional conditions, e.g., written
declaration by either the President or majority of
his cabinet; and
‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on
that same ground of permanent disability.
‘It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to
include these material facts which are obviously
undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President
Estrada.’ (Petition, Rollo, pp. 13-14.)
"On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
denying the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to
dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a
‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of the foregoing order.
According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his
‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the
three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan
made manifest their bias and partiality against his client.
Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language
when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman kaming
gago,’ (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even
before the prosecution could file its comments or
opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court
that to grant Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and
disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial
attitude’ of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia
filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification.
On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed
resolutions, i.e., the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July
2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant
Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’
(Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated
July 6, 2003 is DENIED for lack of merit.’ (Rollo, p. 37.)
"and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25
July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for disqualification
of 14 July 2003; viz:
‘WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the
Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for
Disqualification.’ (Rollo, p. 48.)
"The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must
be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for
utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to
warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the
authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal
and, on the other hand, he would elevate the petition now
before it to challenge the two resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a
patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney
Pagula went on to state that-
‘The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the
public office.1awp++i1 But the act of the public officer, if
UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office.
Consequently, the act of the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act
of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if
UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is
submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being
patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court
but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual
Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the name of the
Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]).
Furthermore, it would seem absurd to allow the Justices to
use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their
UNLAWFUL act.’ (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
"Criticism or comment made in good faith on the
correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a
decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-
founded, such reaction can enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In
Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)
"The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment,
has long put to end any question pertaining to the legality
of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving
the issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is
vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long
dead issue.
27
"Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the
merits of his client’s case within the judicial forum; indeed,
he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast
and print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making
such public statements on any pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his acts,
Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public
dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the
administration of justice.
"It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited
similar conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter,
dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum
shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters
pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated
08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan
Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from
further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions
to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-
meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia
appears to persist on end.
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders Attorney Alan
Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to
SHOW CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof, why he
should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a
lawyer and an officer of the Court."
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his
compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page
pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance,
repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against
the members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty.
Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of
validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its
members, provides -
"Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views
on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan political
activities."
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the
term "partisan political activities;" the law states:
"The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’
refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office
which shall include:
 "(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs,
committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign for or against a candidate;
"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences,
meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda
for or against a candidate.
"(3) Making speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public
office;
"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign
literature or materials designed to support or
oppose the election of any candidate; or
"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges
or support for or against a candidate."
It should be clear that the phrase "partisan political
activities," in its statutory context, relates to acts designed
to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate
or candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a
public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office
by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief
Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of
the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other
justices of the Court at such an event could be no different
from their appearance in such other official functions as
attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the
President of the Philippines before the Legislative
Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not
denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for,
if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the
task of the Court, but it will not countenance any
wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in
the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.1âwphi1
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and,
indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In
liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and
questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in
seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation
of justice.
28
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the
mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from
making such public statements on a case that may tend to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably,
Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Court’s well-
meant admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune,
Atty. Paguia wrote to say -
"What is the legal effect of that violation of President
Estrada’s right to due process of law? It renders the
decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void.
The rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was
no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada
filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow
justices had already committed to the other party - GMA -
with a judgment already made and waiting to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had
authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can
they be expected to voluntarily admit the
unconstitutionality of their own act?"
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public
statements of like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of
disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.
Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an
officer of the Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts of the land through the Office of the Court
Administrator.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80390. March 27, 1998
CITY SHERIFF, ILIGAN CITY and SPOUSES ANGEL L.
BAUTISTA and ANGELICA M.
BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. ALFARO FORTUNADO, EDITHA
FORTUNADO, & NESTOR FORTUNADO, Respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the
Order1 dated January 24,1986 of the Regional Trial Court
of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 262, which
reversed its earlier Decision2 dated July 31,1985 dismissing
the complaint filed by Respondents.
96 of said Register of
Deeds.
II. With Respect to the Cross-Claim and the Third-Party
Complaint of Defendant Traders Commercial Bank:

The facts are not disputed: 1. Ordering the spouses

Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and
Respondents Alfaro, Editha and Nestor, all surnamed Ofelia Lopez to pay the
Fortunado, are the registered owners of two parcels of Traders Commercial
land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-3041 Bank jointly and
and T-1929, both registered with the Register of Deeds of severally the amount
Iligan City. Said properties were mortgaged by Arsenio of P578,025.23,
Lopez, Jr. on July 24,1968 to the Traders Commercial Bank inclusive of interest and
(now Traders Royal Bank) to secure a loan obligation in the other bank charges as of
amount of P 370,000.00. April 30,1971, and,
thereafter, plus all
On January 6, 1971, respondents instituted an action interest and bank
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch charges until full
XVIII, against Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Traders Royal Bank, payment is made and, to
among others, for annulment of mortgage. In said pay to the bank the
complaint, Traders Royal Bank interposed a counterclaim amount of P20,000.00
for foreclosure of the mortgage. as attorney's fees and
the costs.
On August 24,1973, the trial court rendered a decision 3,
the dispositive portion of which reads: The bank 's counterclaim against the plaintiffs is hereby
dismissed.
"WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
Likewise, the counterclaim of Mariano Pascual against the
plaintiffs is also dismissed.
I. As Regards the Plaintiff's Complaint:

SO ORDERED."
1. Ordering the
defendant Mariano
Pascual to pay to the On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's
plaintiffs the amount decision, in this manner:
of P24,550.00 plus legal
interest from the filing "WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
of the complaint until modified by eliminating paragraph 2 of the dispositive
fully paid and attorney's portion of the decision of the lower court declaring the
fees in the amount real estate mortgage in favor of the Traders Commercial
of P2,000.00 and to pay Bank null and void. The decision is affirmed in all other
the costs. respects."4cräläwvirtualibräry

2. Ordering the deed of

real estate mortgage On December 28, 1983, Traders Royal Bank assigned 5 its
which is attached as rights to the mortgage to petitioner Angel L. Bautista. By
Annex 'B' of the virtue of the said assignment, petitioner on March 19,1984
complaint to be wrote the City Sheriff of Iligan City requesting that the
declared null and void mortgaged properties be foreclosed for non-payment of
and, ordering the the loan obligation. To thwart the pending foreclosure,
Register of Deeds of respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
Iligan City to cancel the del Norte, Branch V, a complaint for cancellation of lien
said mortgage at the with preliminary injunction against petitioner, which was
back of TCT No. T-1929, docketed as Civil Case No. 262.
Book I, Page 8 and TCT
No. T-3040, Book I, Page After petitioner filed his answer, respondents moved for a
summary judgment which was granted by the court.

29
Consequently, on July 31,1985, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint. In its decision, the trial
court delved on the issue of prescription of a mortgage
action.
Respondents moved for reconsideration arguing that since
the principal loan has already been paid, the mortgage,
which is an accessory contract, should likewise be
extinguished.
On January 24, 1986, the trial court modified its earlier
decision disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, as
amended, of the summary judgment of July 31,1985 is
hereby reconsidered and modified to read:
'Premises considered, the Court
finds that the plaintiffs have made
out a preponderating case against
the defendants.'
And as prayed for in the complaint, the
temporary restraining order of the Court in the
case on April 23,1984 is hereby converted into a
preliminary injunction and by these presents
made permanent. The City Sheriff of Iligan City,
Mr. Angel L. Bautista and Mrs. Angelica M.
Bautista are hereby permanently restrained
from conducting a public auction sale of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-3041 (a.f.). The Register of Deeds of Iligan
City is hereby further ordered to cancel Entry
No. 451 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
3041 (a.f.) on file with his office. No
pronouncement as to damages or attorney's
fees.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered a Resolution6 on August 28,1987, forwarding the
case to this Court for resolution reading thus:
"Considering that opposing counsel left the resolution of
Atty. Ramon Gonzales' motion to the sound discretion of
this Court and considering the unrefuted allegation of the
said motion that there were no documentary or
testimonial evidence which were the basis of the
questioned decision but mere admissions of the parties,
the questions raised on appeal become mere questions of
law, over which the Supreme Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction."
30
On December 29,1987, petitioner filed this present
petition for review contending that the trial court erred in
modifying its earlier decision; in declaring that he has no
right to foreclose the mortgaged property; in declaring the
temporary restraining order into a permanent preliminary
injunction and in ordering the Register of Deeds of Iligan
City to cancel entry No. 451 on TCT No. 3041.
We gave due course to the petition and required the
contending parties to submit their respective Memoranda
on August 31,1988.
On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel
Ramon A. Gonzales, filed a verified Manifestation
informing the Court that the subject real estate mortgage
has already been released by the Traders Royal Bank on
December 22, 1983 as shown in the certified true copy of
the Release of Real Estate Mortgage,7 and that the
petitioner was killed in a robbery in his
house.8 Respondents therefore pray for the dismissal of
the petition .
On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's
counsel Atty. Emilio Abrogena to comment on the said
Manifestation. However, the copy of the resolution of the
Court addressed to Atty. Abrogena was returned
unclaimed after three notices,9 with the postmaster's
remark "moved." In view of this development, the Court
considered the resolution as served.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Acting on the Manifestation of the respondents, we
resolve to dismiss the petition for having been rendered
moot and academic.
The resolution of the basic issue of whether or not the
petitioner has the right to extra-judicially foreclose the
mortgage is no longer necessary in view of the release of
the mortgage as shown in the certified true copy thereof.
No useful purpose would be served by passing on the
merits of the petition. Any ruling in this case could hardly
be of any practical or useful purpose in the premises. It is a
well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot
question or abstract proposition nor express an opinion in
a case in which no practical relief can be
granted.11cräläwvirtualibräry
However, we take notice of the failure of petitioner's
lawyer, Atty. Emilio Abrogena, to inform the trial court of
the death of petitioner, a duty mandated by Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. which provides in
part, to wit:
"SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.- Whenever a
party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform
the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the
fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of the counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary
action.
xxx.
Hence, the proper substitution of the deceased in
accordance with the aforequoted provisions of Rule 3
could not be effected.
We likewise note Atty. Abrogena's failure to inform this
Court of his change of address which accounts for his
failure to comment on the manifestation of respondents
relative to the death of petitioner and the release of the
subject real estate mortgage.
Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first
and foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to the
court are more significant than those which he owes to his
client. His first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is
wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of
the profession.12cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being
moot and academic. Atty. Emilio Abrogena, counsel for
petitioner, is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to
inform this Court of the death of petitioner and to perform
his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. He is further warned that a repetition of such
omission in the future will be dealt with severely. SO
ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph
2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this
Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a
decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice and
recommending that he be suspended from the practice of
law.
I the effect that the judgments in the
31
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained
a favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court,
Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate
the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No.
844). Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the
decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued,
Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid
the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in
toto the decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the
decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of
B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA,
Co should have filed a petition for review and not an
ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on
November 19, 1986.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed
by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404,
arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were
null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity
for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for
an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing
an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed
that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to
respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the
records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987,
the said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No.
11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition
for Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or
Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP
No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in
accordance with existing laws and policies. On December
17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or
novation explaining that —
. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in
these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule
38), there is no other means whereby
the defeated party may procure final
and executory judgment to be set
aside with a view to the renewal of the
litigation, unless (a) the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction or lack of
due process of law, or (b) it has been
obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no
allegation in the present complaint to
former cases were secured through
 fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis
supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for
Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision.
The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested
the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments on April 14,
1988.
In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the
Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated
October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration
of the February 12 Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning
the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of
petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989,
we denied the petition for having been filed and paid late
on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988,
respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such
resolution was likewise denied with finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 11690.
On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a
Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No.
844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Execution on the ground that the case was still pending
review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore
the motion for execution was premature. On August 23,
1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the
writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on
October 18, 1988.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action
(SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and
complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of
execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil
Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting
the writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition
to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still
pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V.
Paredes, deferred the implementation of the writ of
execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624
for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624
32
respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null
and Void the Writ of Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No.
624 denying the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of
Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal
and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP
No. 17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP
Board of Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the
bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his
client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule
19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the
attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or
rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not
allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is
unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute
patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional
Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits
on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions
and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582
[1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following
rules:
Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file
multiple actions arising from the same
cause.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not
unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the
judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions,
repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole
purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a
judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions
Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069
[1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d
539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of
the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were
properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC
to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious
and underhanded means to delay the execution of the
judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The
said decision became executory even pending its appeal
with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a
supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they
fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the
decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA
(CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According
to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts
had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process,
or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured
through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530
(1993):
A judgment can be annulled only on
two grounds: (a) that the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction or for lack
of due process of law, or (b) that it has
been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the
case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the
decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of
Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior
court is remanded to the trial court for
execution, the function of the trial
court is ministerial only; the trial court
is merely obliged with becoming
modesty to enforce that judgment and
has no jurisdiction either to modify in
any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at
p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306
[1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250
[1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or
petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment
in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
33
(1) Civil Case No. 344 — Appeal from
the decision rendered in Civil Case No.
844 of the Municipal Trial Court,
Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial
Court, Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 — Appeal
from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 — An Action
For the Annulment of Decisions
And/Or Reformation or Novation of
Decisions filed with the Court of
Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 — Petition For
Review On Certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 — Appeal
And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed
also with the Court of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 — Petition
For Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory
Order filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to
forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent
is also guilty of forum shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court
explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason of
an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to
another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the
case of Gabriel v.  Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976),
this Court explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions
constitutes abuse of the Court's
processes and improper conduct that
tends to impede, obstruct and degrade
the administration of justice and will
be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to add, the lawyer who filed
such multiple or repetitious petitions
(which obviously delays the execution
of a final and executory judgment)
subjects himself to disciplinary action
for incompetence (for not knowing any
better) or for willful violation of his
duties as an attorney to act with all
 good fidelity to the courts and to
maintain only such actions as appear
to him to be just and are consistent
with truth and honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of
recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which
efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a
member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just
and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly
contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA
512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar
Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and
petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial
processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in
intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose
favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused
procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'"
(Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76549 December 10, 1987
CATALINA, ENRIQUE, ROSARIO, FLORDELIZA, RIZALAIDA
AND SOCORRO, all surnamed ROXAS as heirs of the late
SEGUNDO ROXAS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANDRES ROXAS, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Petitioners seek the review of the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated October 2, 1986 and November 5, 1986
in CA-G.R. CV No. 08119 declaring appellants' Brief filed by
herein petitioners to have been filed out of time and
denying their motion for reconsideration.
It appears that in Civil Case No. 3837-M, Branch 132 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered judgment
dismissing plaintiff Segundo Roxas' complaint for
reconveyance of title against Andres Roxas and others.
On October 21, 1985, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. In
the Resolution of October 25, 1985, the court a quo
directed the ventilation of the proceedings in the Court of
Appeals as the notice of appeal was filed within the
reglementary period. On January 29, 1986, petitioners
were notified by the respondent Court of Appeals to pay
the docket fee and on March 7, 1986, petitioners were
required to file appellants' brief within forty-five (45) days
from receipt thereof, copy of which was received by
petitioners on March 18, 1986.
34
On April 28, 1986, petitioners filed their first motion for
extension of time for thirty (30) days counted from May 2,
1986 within which to file their brief. Said motion was
granted per Resolution of May 7, 1986, counted from
notice thereof copy of which was received by petitioners
counsel on May 14, 1986. On May 29, 1987, petitioners
filed a second motion for extension of time for another
period of thirty (30) days on the ground that petitioners'
counsel is suffering from asthma and hypertension and
that their brief has not yet been completely finished in
draft form. Per Resolution of June 6, 1986, respondent
court granted the motion counted from notice thereof
copy of which was received by petitioners, counsel on June
23, 1986. Then, on July 21, 1986, two (2) days before the
expiration of the 30-day period granted, petitioners filed
their last motion for extension of time praying for fifteen
(15) days counted from notice.
On August 25, 1986, before said motion was resolved,
petitioners filed their brief. On October 2, 1986,
respondent Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion
for last extension in the resolution which reads as follows:
Before Us for resolution is a "Motion
For Last Extension" to file Appellant's
Brief, filed on July 21, 1986 praying for
a 15-day extension from July 23, 1986
within which to file appellant's brief.
It appears, however, that while the
same remained unresolved, appellant
filed his brief only on August 25, 1986,
or 18 days beyond the period of
extension prayed for by appellant. No
other motion for extension was filed
thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the appellant's brief is
hereby considered filed out of time
and is ordered expunged from the
record.
The appeal of plaintiff is ordered
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 1
On October 23, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of October 2, 1986, but it
was denied per Resolution of November 5, 1986.
Hence this petition.
It is the position of the petitioners that respondent court
erred in considering their appellants' brief to have been
filed out of time whereas it was filed before their motion
for last extension of time was resolved. Petitioners argue
further that since their motion which prayed for fifteen
days extension counted from notice is in line with the
previous resolutions of the respondent court, then their
last motion for extension of time should not have been
denied as there was no intention on their part to delay or
prejudice the appellees
Petitioners' argument is predicated upon the theory that
whenever respondent court grants their motion for
extension of time it was always made to begin from
receipt of notice of the resolution despite their prayer that
it be granted counted from the date prayed for.
The argument is unmeritorious. Pursuant to Section 15,
Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, an "extension of
time for the filing of briefs will not be allowed except for
good and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for
extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought
to be extended." Allowance or denial of motions for
extension of time to file briefs is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. 2 There is no question that the
discretion vested in the courts whether to grant or not
motions for extensions must be exercised wisely and
prudently, never capriciously, with a view of substantial
justice. 3
In the case before Us, it is Our considered view and We so
hold that the Resolutions assailed by herein petitioners are
products of respondent court's sound exercise of its
discretion, considering the peculiar circumstances of this
case. Reference is hereby made that from the time of the
rendition of the decision appealed from dated July 19,
1985, up to the time of filing of the appellants' brief on
August 25, 1986, a period of 402 days lapsed or counted
from March 18, 1986, the date of petitioners' receipt of
notice requiring them to file their brief up to the time of
filing 160 days lapsed. Examining the brief filed by herein
petitioners it appears however that it consists of twenty-
six (26) pages only with simple narration of facts and
discussions of the issues. 4 Any practising lawyer knows
that twenty (20) days is more than sufficient to complete
the printing of brief of such length including its proof-
reading. 5 It is known among every practising lawyer that
the policy of the Court of Appeals is to limit the second
extension of time to file briefs to twenty (20) days. Said
policy was relaxed further by the respondent Court by
giving sixty (60) days extension on the basis of the plea of
petitioners' counsel that he was suffering from asthma
even if said plea appears to be self-serving as it was not
even accompanied by a doctor's certificate. Petitioners
abused the laxity extended them by the respondent Court.
They even prayed that the extension of fifteen (15) days be
counted from notice. Lawyers should not presume that the
courts would grant their motion for extension more so to
expect that if ever granted it would always be counted
from notice thereof.
35
Thus, the petition to review the assailed resolutions must
fail: Let this serve as warning among members of the
Philippine bar who take their own sweet time with their
cases if not purposely delay its progress for no cogent
reason. It does no credit to their standing in the
profession. More so when they do not file the required
brief or pleading until their motion is acted upon. Not only
should they not presume that their motion for extension
of time will be granted by the court much less should they
expect that the extension that may be granted shall be
counted from notice. They should file their briefs or
pleadings within the extended period requested. Failing in
this, they have only themselves to blame if their appeal or
case is dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-22320. May 22, 1968.]
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P.
PEREZ, Petitioners, v. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, RICARDO P.
HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF
MANILA, Respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
On January 10, 1964 the spouses Mercedes Ruth Cobb-
Perez and Damaso P. Perez interposed the present petition
for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction
from the order of January 4, 1964 of the respondent Judge
Gregorio T. Lantin of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
which order denied a motion for reconsideration of a
previous order rejecting a motion to quash the writ of
execution herein controverted.
A chronology of the essential antecedent events is
necessary for a clear understanding of the case at bar.
On February 25, 1959 the respondent Ricardo P. Hermoso
commenced civil case 39407 in the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge)
against the petitioner Damaso P. Perez and one Gregorio
Subong, for the recovery of the principal sum of
P17,309.44 representing unpaid purchases of leather
materials used in the shoe manufacturing business of the
said petitioner. Because at the hearing neither the
defendants nor their counsel appeared despite due notice
to the latter, Hermoso was permitted to present his
evidence ex parte. On April 11, 1960 judgment was
rendered ordering Perez and Subong to pay Hermoso
jointly and severally the sum of P17,309.44 with interest,
attorney’s fees and costs.
On June 21, 1960 Perez and Subong appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which dismissed their appeal because it was
filed beyond the reglementary period. Then on February 4,
1961 the defendants elevated the case to this Court on
petition for certiorari, which was denied for lack of merit.
After the case was remanded to the court of origin,
Hermoso moved for execution of judgment, which was
granted on July 1, 1961, and the corresponding writ of
execution was issued on August 15, 1961. Meantime, on
July 11, 1961, Perez and Subong filed a petition for relief
from judgment, alleging excusable negligence. This
petition was denied by the respondent Judge on August 3,
1961. From the order of denial, Perez and Subong on
August 21, 1961 served notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
On August 23, 1961 the respondent Sheriff of Manila
levied upon 3,573 shares of common stock registered in
the name of Damaso P. Perez with the Republic Bank. On
August 30, 1961 Perez interposed an urgent motion to stay
execution, alleging that the levy on said shares was highly
excessive and unjust, considering that said shares have a
total value of more than P357,300 while the judgment
debt was only P117,309.44. On September 2, 1961 the
Sheriff served and published the first notice of sale
scheduling the auction sale of said shares for September 8,
1961. However, by order of September 7, 1961, the
respondent Judge suspended the sale on execution
pending resolution of the abovementioned urgent motion
to stay execution.
On September 29, 1961 the respondent Judge
promulgated two orders: the first denied the appeal of
Perez and Subong from the abovementioned order of
August 3, 1961 rejecting their petition for relief from
judgment, and the second denied Perez’ urgent motion to
stay execution.
Consequently, on October 4, 1961 the respondent Sheriff
served a second notice of sale resetting the auction for
October 10, 1961. This was cancelled by the Court of
Appeals which issued on October 9, 1961 a writ of
preliminary injunction, pending hearing Perez’ petition for
mandamus and certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA-
G.R.-29962-R) filed on October 5, 1961 against the
respondents Judge and Sheriff, in which petition Perez
alleged that (1) the levy upon his 3,573 shares of stock was
manifestly and patently unjust, and (2) the respondent
Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his
statutory right to appeal.
On November 15, 1962 the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment sustaining Perez’ position with respect to the
extent of the levy at the same time that it upheld the
36
denial of his motion to appeal.
The case was remanded for the second time to the court
of origin on January 14, 1963. Subsequently, on January
18, 1963, the Sheriff published the third notice of sale, this
time for only 210 shares of stocks, setting the public sale
for January 24, 1963.
Two days before the scheduled sale on execution, or on
January 22, 1963, a new twist was added to the already
protracted litigation when the petitioner Mercedes Ruth
Cobb-Perez, the wife of Damaso P. Perez, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint for injunction
with ex parte writ of preliminary injunction against
Hermoso, the Republic Bank and the Sheriff of Manila (Civil
Case 7532), wherein she contended that the levied shares
are conjugal assets which are not answerable for the
judgment debt of Damaso Perez, an obligation contracted
not for the benefit or interest of their conjugal
partnership. On the following day, January 23, 1963, Judge
Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
granted the ex parte writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining once more the respondent Sheriff from carrying
out the execution sale. However, on October 4, 1963,
Judge Mencias lifted the writ, in obeisance to the doctrine
enunciated in Acosta v. Alvendia (109 Phil., 1017) to the
effect that courts of first instance have no power to
restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions.
Incidentally, the abovementioned Civil Case 7532 was
dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon motion of the
complainant herself.
A month before the aforementioned writ was lifted, or on
September 3, 1963, Mrs. Perez filed in the basic civil case
39407 an urgent motion to recall or lift the writ of
execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging the same
reasons she advanced in civil case 7532 then pending in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which are the self-same
grounds upon which the herein petitioners anchor the
petition at bar — the conjugal nature of the levied shares
of stock and the personal nature of the obligation of
Damaso Perez. Neither Mrs. Perez nor her counsel
attended the scheduled hearings. On October 19, 1963 the
respondent Judge promulgated an order denying the
motion on the ground that "Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez is
not a party in this case and that this motion to lift
execution is not the remedy prescribed by the Rules of
Court in its Section 15 of Rule 39 for the protection of her
right."
The writ of preliminary injunction having been lifted by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the urgent motion to
lift the writ of execution having been denied by the court a
quo, the respondent Sheriff on October 18, 1963 caused
the publication for the fourth time of a notice of sale
setting the execution sale of 220 shares of stock for
October 29, 1963.
On October 23, 1963 Mrs. Perez filed with the respondent
Sheriff a third-party claim over the aforesaid 220 shares of
stock, but the latter was determined to proceed with the
scheduled auction sale as he was protected by an
indemnity bond filed by the respondent Hermoso. On
October 25, 1963 Mrs. Perez, assisted by her husband,
commenced Civil Case 55292, denominated an action to
vindicate third-party claim with petition for preliminary
injunction, in Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, presided by Judge Federico Alikpala. As a
consequence of the new action, the projected execution
sale was suspended for the fourth time. On November 8,
1963 Judge Alikpala denied the preliminary injunction
prayed for in the aforesaid Civil Case 55292, on the
grounds that (1) he has no power to interfere by injunction
with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction; and (2) the remedy of plaintiff
(Mrs. Perez) is to lodge the third-party claim filed by her
with the court which issued the execution, "as it has the
inherent control of its ministerial officers and to do all
things reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice."cralaw virtua1aw library
The aforesaid Civil Case 55292 was dismissed on March 20,
1964, upon agreement of the parties after the institution
of the petition at bar.
On the same day (November 8, 1963), Damaso Perez filed
in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963 which
denied his wife’s motion to recall the controverted writ of
execution. In this latest motion, Perez adopted his wife’s
previous motion, and at the same time offered in lieu of
the levied stocks his alleged cash dividends in the Republic
Bank in the sum of P19,985. In the same motion he asked
for the suspension of the fifth scheduled auction sale set
for November 11, 1963, which was granted ex parte.
On January 4, 1964, the motion for reconsideration was
denied by the respondent Judge.
After the respondent sheriff had scheduled (for the sixth
time) the execution sale of the levied 240 shares of stock,
the herein petitioners on January 10, 1965 interposed the
present petition, which was given due course on January
15, 1964; the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was
issued upon petitioners posting a bond of P10,000.
The movants-petitioners’ main contention is that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to recall the controverted writ of execution
despite their avowal that the levied 240 shares of stock
belong to their conjugal partnership and as such cannot be
made to answer for a judgment debt which is a personal
obligation only of Damaso Perez.
After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the
respondent Judge acted correctly in refusing to quash the
37
writ in dispute.
It is conceded that courts have jurisdiction to entertain
motions to quash their writs of execution because every
court has the inherent power, for the advancement of
justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to
control its own processes 1 However, the exercise of this
power is well circumscribed. Thus, the proper court may
quash the writ only in certain situations, as when it
appears that (a) it has been improvidently issued, or (b) it
is defective in substance, or (c) it has been issued against
the wrong party, or (d) the judgment debt has been paid,
or (e) the writ has been issued without authority, or (f)
there has been a change in the situation of the parties
which makes such execution inequitable, or (g) the
controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of
the court, and therefore no judgment at all has ever been
rendered thereon. 2 In the instant controversy, not one of
these accepted grounds exists.
Significantly, the spouses have not questioned the intrinsic
validity or regularity of the writ of execution. They have
alleged none of the circumstances earlier enumerated or
other similar grounds which may warrant the quashal of
the writ in dispute.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution,
the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but
the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard,
the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an
independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding
with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal
nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis
for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in
the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course
of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already
availed of this remedy in Civil Cases 7532 and 55292, only
to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often
simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the
judgment debt.
Considering the antecedent facts, particularly CA-G.R.
29962-R, even the remedy indicated above must fail, as
Damaso Perez is now estopped from asserting that the
levied shares are conjugal assets. All along he has nurtured
the impression that the said shares are his exclusive
property, which representation was enhanced by the fact
that the same are registered in his name alone.
It bears emphasis that in CA-G.R. 29962-R, Damaso Perez
practically asserted exclusive ownership of the levied
shares; although he challenged the legality and propriety
of the levy with respect to its excessive coverage, he never
raised the question of the conjugal nature of the levied
shares. Having represented himself before the court a quo
and in the Court of Appeals as the exclusive owner of the
shares in dispute, he is now precluded from asserting that
the levied shares are conjugal assets, an assertion that he
should have advanced with expected alacrity when he first
questioned the legality of the levy.
Coming now to the other petitioner, Mrs. Perez, although
she was not a party in CA-G.R. 29962, the judgment
therein similarly binds her for she stands in privity with her
husband. Moreover, she cannot feign utter ignorance of
the affairs of her husband as to justify her delay in
questioning the legality of the levy on the ground
aforestated in Civil Case 7532, which case was commenced
only on January 22, 1963, 17 months after the original levy
was made on August 23, 1961.
Even granting that the court a quo could properly take
cognizance of the said motion to quash the writ of
execution, the movants- petitioners failed to substantiate
their claim that the levied shares are conjugal assets and
that the judgment debt is a personal obligation only of
Damaso Perez.
Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal
assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a modicum of
evidence, although they repeatedly invoked Article 160 of
the New Civil Code which provides that "All property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife." As interpreted by this
Court, the party who invokes this presumption must first
prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition
during coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes v. Reyes de Ilao, 3 it
was held that "according to law and jurisprudence, it is
sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage in order that the same may be deemed
conjugal property." In the recent case of Maramba v.
Lozano, Et Al., 4 this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal,
reiterated that "the presumption under Article 160 of the
Civil Code refers to property acquired during the
marriage," and then concluded that since "there is no
showing as to when the property in question was
acquired . . . the fact that the title is in the wifes name
alone is determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar, since
there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were
acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of
the husband alone is an indication that the shares belong
exclusively to said spouse.
Conceding, however, that the shares in question are
conjugal assets, they must still prove that their ganancial
partnership is not liable for the payment of the aforesaid
judgment debt. This, they were unable to do. Their
contention that the judgment debt is a personal obligation
of only one of them is devoid of evidentiary foundation. It
is, to say the least, a futile attempt to rebut the
presumption that the husband, as head of the family and
administrator of the conjugal partnership, contracts
38
obligations for the benefit of his family or the partnership.
5 The aforesaid obligation was contracted in the purchase
of leather used in the shoe manufacturing business of the
petitioner husband. Said business is an ordinary
commercial enterprise for gain, in the pursuit of which
Damaso Perez had the right to embark the partnership; 6
It is well-settled that the debts contracted by the husband
for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by
which he contributes to the support of the family cannot
be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. 7
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted
litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of
actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted
by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the
execution of a simple money judgment which has long
become final and executory. Some of the actions were
filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners
and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries
for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to
subvert the very ends of justice.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is dismissed, and the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby
dissolved. Treble costs are assessed against the
petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel.
[G.R. No. L-27072. January 9, 1970.]
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET
AL., Petitioners, v. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, ETC., ET
AL., Respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against
Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto,
Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito
M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION*
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to
respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the
Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of
record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R.
Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of
the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be
taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court
issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers,
are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty.
Jose Beltran Sotto:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. `They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary)
have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately
called `scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for
Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines
from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. `Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare
the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.’
(Respondents’ Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to
Petitioner’s Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p.
16, last two lines on bottom of the page).
c. `The herein petitioners . . . opportunistically change
their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case.’
(Respondents’ Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p. 17,
sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the
page)."cralaw virtua1aw library
MacArthur’s third motion for reconsideration signed by
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for
Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and
Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the
following statements:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"d. `. . .; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the
applicable law due to the misrepresentation and
obfuscation of the petitioners’ counsel.’ (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10,
1968).
e. `. . . Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled
that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any
and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover
up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency
or just plain fraud . . . and it is thus difficult, in the light of
our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court
intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely
that in a most absolute manner.’ (Second sentence, par. 7,
Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10,
1968)."cralaw virtua1aw library
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after
judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L.
Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy,
and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and
resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof
retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges"
[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice
Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the
chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal
decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte
preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case,
the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case
even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice,
39
the motion states" [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to
was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on
judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments
projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness
of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents"
which, according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur’s belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been
caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in
favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a
favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The
"incidents" cited are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) said decision is in violation of the law; which law has
not been declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the
above entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law
and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all
previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the
first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to
dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of
leading to a wholesome development of the law — but
only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the
favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not
maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the
conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a
reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the
said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has
refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided
otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue `right
to reject any or all bids’ is being treated on a double
standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable
Supreme Court knows better and has greater
understanding than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two
hundred million dollars by said decision — without an
effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the
facts through presentation through the trial court, which is
elementary."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for
himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and
Associates, in Writing pointed out to this Court that the
statements specified by the Solicitor General were either
quoted out of context, could be defended, or were
comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he
expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his
clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur’s attorney could
not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of
due process of law. However, counsel sought to change
the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on
line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago
also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion,
which in full reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of
our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen
messengers of God in all matters that come before them,
and that no matter what the circumstances are, their
judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity.
Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering
that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the
product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent
absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a
motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly
totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of
moral principle involved - and also of Judge Geraldez who
refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against
an accused who is also his correspondent in two other
cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of
our government officials are just amoral?"
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further sub-
paragraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
filed his compliance with this Court’s resolution of
November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to
inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his
exclusive making and that he alone should be held
responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his
explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations
by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the
Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft
but that it was still included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for
MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit.
While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice
Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it
left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit,
taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of
the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July
40
31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated
that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in
withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the
lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not
agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two
justices. According to him," [t]he present steps (sic) now
being taken is against counsel’s upbringing and judicial
conscience."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto’s return of November 29, 1968,
he took pains to say that the questioned statements he
made were also taken out of context and were necessary
for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the
admission, though, that those statements lifted out of
context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that
Section 20 (f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by
Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the
Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge
against him because it is one of civil contempt against a
party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court
of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not
signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by
law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could
not stand in the stead of an "offended party or
witness."cralaw virtua1aw library
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his
explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a
supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he
manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in
this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him
or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton
F. Meads, in MacArthur’s behalf, offered to retain his
services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from
him whether he could appear in this case; that he advised
Meads that this case was outside his professional
competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who
later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the
rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their
previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated
in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any
pleading or any other document in connection with this
case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his aide of
the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the
court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order;
claimed that he was on six months’ leave of absence from
July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys
for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his
name included as counsel in all of MacArthur’s pleadings
in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of
absence.

Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 8,
1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14,
1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty.
Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for
the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration
without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated
previous grounds raised, and contained the following
paragraphs:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by
the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in
fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-
entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New
Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote:
`Justices; who may take part. — . . . only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument
will take part in its consideration and adjudication . . .’ This
requirement is especially significant in the present
instance because the member who penned the decision
was the very member who was absent for approximately
four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio
Barredo.
x           x          x
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the
Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably
either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine
Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1960,
required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of
the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court of grounds
of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property
and/or to the United States Government, either its
executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of
confiscation of respondent’s proprietary vested rights by
the Philippine Government without either compensation
or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits
to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually, until restitution or compensation is
made."cralaw virtua1aw library
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18,
1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause
within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he
should not be dealt with for contempt of court."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanito M. Caling filed his return.
He there alleged that the said fourth motion for
41
reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago came to his office and requested him to
accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he
turned down said request twice on the ground that he did
not know anything about the case, much less the truth of
the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations
in said motion were subsequently explained to the
undersigned counsel together with the background of the
case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one
Morton F. Meads" ; that upon assurance that there way
nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good
faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and
the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him
especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling. this
Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing
their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the
same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for
contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and . . .
to direct that the three, Atty. Juanito M. Caling, Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear
before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:80
a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all
of them will be heard by this Court."cralaw virtua1aw
library
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his
explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling’s
statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the
motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day
Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew
of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion
for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty.
Caling; he thereupon accompanied Meads to Caling, told
Caling of Meads’ desire and left Meads with Caling.
Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and
that he never even read it.
On August 15. 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads’
version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty.
Santiago’s office with the fourth motion for
reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago
started to read the motion and in fact began to make
some changes in pencil in the first or second paragraph
when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new
lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked
Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to
Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the
fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the
document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling
gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was
typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to
Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to
the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was
approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with
Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling
for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads
asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set
forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not
been taken out of context because said quotation is
precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
complete quotation and that it is a common practice in
court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads
further contends that the announced plan to bring the
case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer
also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L.
Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral
argument with respect to the second contempt incident.
We shall now discuss the first and second contempt
incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his
third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find
language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives."
He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic
tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our
decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in
a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex
parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case
prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the
joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two
justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of
this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro because his
brother is the vice president of the favored party who is
the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary
of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that
"it would seem that the principles thus established [the
moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial
authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should first
apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and
further removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a
belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief
Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender
favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or
party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could
make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the
motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only
were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did
42
arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their
judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Caesar’s wife, warns that loss of
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should
not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the
process has already begun."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6
which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we
cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained
that he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which
paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court
only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does
not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no
shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also
because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit
which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6
describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities"
who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God
in all matters that come before them, and that no matter
what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly
ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as
seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation
from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial
prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party
or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first
instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for
such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of
intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension?
Or is it that many of our government officials are just
amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated
mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent
MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for
petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party
directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture
on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court
about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a
sweeping statement that "any other justices who have
received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any
of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or
their agents or principals, including the President", should
also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago’s accusations
have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not
limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It
sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For,
inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices
who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-
petitioner or their agents or principals, including the
president." The absurdity of this posture is at once
apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense may be
considered to have each received a favor from the
President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every
time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a
thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery
of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the
tripartite system of government operating in this country.
Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded
charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the
part of a losing litigant’s attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross
disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts
much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not
an expression of faith, counsel’s words are intended to
create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus
called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the
Philippines v. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows:
"By now, a lawyer’s duties to the Court have become
commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid
excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells
out one such duty: `To observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.’ As explicit
is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that `[i]t
is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance.’ That same canon, as a
corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to
support the courts against `unjust criticism and clamor.’
And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be `with all good fidelity . . . to the
courts.’ Worth remembering is that the duty of an
attorney to the courts `can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which he is bound to uphold.’"
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." 1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice." 2 Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine
the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people." 3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that" [a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice." 4 member of the Bar" [t]o abstain from all offensive
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the
statement that it was necessary for the defense of his
client. A client’s cause does not permit an attorney to
cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must
always keep in perspective the thought that" [s]ince
lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants
of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many
suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their
43
clients’ success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct
ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics." 5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his
well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his
position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the
attorney, and no other, who can better or more
appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of
the judicial position. 6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm
continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for
attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful
obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel
possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of
the peace or judge who presides over the court. It may
also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges
may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline
and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under
adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly
administration of justice." 7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited
are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in
the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and
degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice 8
— is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt
of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We
analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor
General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of
having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot
desperation." He describes a proposition of petitioners as
corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant
attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with
opportunity changing their claims and stories not only
from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the
same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is
the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it
offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse
to say that these statements were taken out of context.
We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements.
They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of
offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that"
[a] lawyer’s language should be dignified in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession." 9 It is Sotto’s duty as a
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People v. Young, 83
Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of
murder made use of the following raw language in his
brief: "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son
of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never
owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here
comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in
exchange of a man’s life. A simple job. Perhaps a question
of seconds’ work and that would transform him into a new
man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial
mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise
of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the
forbidden deed." We there held that" [s]uch a plea is a
disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General
or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in
this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings
of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power
of this Court to punish him for contempt under the
circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power" [t]o
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a case before it, in every manner
appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his
official duties; and that he too has committed, under
Section 3(d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to
degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore,
guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C.
Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included
the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter’s
knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist — and
this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents —
that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of
the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his
name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is
exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt
incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the
record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the
preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the
contempt citation. He should be held exempt from
contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt
incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed,
an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No
explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of
context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices;
who may take part. — . . . only those members present
when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take
44
part in its consideration and adjudication . . .." However,
the provision in its entire thought should be read thus —
"SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters
submitted to the court for its consideration and
adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for
consideration and adjudication by any and all of the
Justices who are members of the division of the court at
the time when such matters are taken up for consideration
and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not
present at the date of submission; however, only those
members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a
desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the
date of submission." 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not
attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such
a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out
was anyway marked by "XS", which is a common practice
among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with
candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not
candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote."
While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does
not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is
being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to
the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally
omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the
case to the World Court and/or the United States
government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the
decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically,
the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably . . .
raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine
government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965; . . . to
the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits
to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of
this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal
to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads’
return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal
and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a
decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned
any move to reconsider that decision. And yet. it would
appear that the appeal to the World Court is being
dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of
this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this
Court that he should be exempted from the contempt
charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this
Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for
reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been
dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his
duty to have taken care that his name should not be
attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having
prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot
beg off from the contempt charge against him even
though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence
that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for
reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is
too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against
the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us
that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the
motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations
thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if
not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have
signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that
Santiago began to read the fourth motion for
reconsideration and even started to make changes
thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according
to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some
time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is
highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth
motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent
MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his
position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings.
Whatever steps his client takes should be within his
knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that" [a]
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to
prevent his clients from doing those things which the
lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference
to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors,
witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such
wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their
relation."cralaw virtua1aw library
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be
protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people should
not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a
judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve
its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the
assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to
think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer
pleading a cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that,
45
if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative
but to decide the main case against respondent
MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968,
MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and
conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to
bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid
bonds will be rejected. And We repeat," [a]dmittedly, the
bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted
without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the
admit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied
by a bond, contrary to the instructions to bidders. is not
entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision
herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the
decision on the merits of this case, the result would have
been the same: MacArthur’s cause would just the same
have failed.
For the reason given, this Court hereby finds:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court,
and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty.
Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and
Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of
court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanito M. Caling
guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meals, P1,000,
and Atty. Juanito M. Caling. P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he
may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton
F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may
deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension
of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito
M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy
of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys
Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M.
Caling. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 35252. October 21, 1932.]
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
UY TENG PIAO, Defendant-Appellee.
 DECISION Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for
the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per
annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum
VICKERS, J.: amount for attorney’s fees and costs. The court ordered
the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the
court within three months from the date of the judgment,
and in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the
properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos.
Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant
7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in
from the complaint, without a special finding as to costs.
accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to the
payment of the judgment.
The appellant makes the following assignments of
error:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court,
and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of
"The trial court erred:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on
October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.
"1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to
appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone the balance of the
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank
judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in
secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem
favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No.
the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
26328 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to
Mariano Santos for P8,600.
"2. In finding that merely in selling the property described
in certificate of title No. 11274 situated at Ronquillo
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2),
7264, was subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700,
the appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise
because the account of the defendant was credited with
of condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao.
the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the
defendant with the full amount realized by it when it
"3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1
resold the two parcels of land.
is the condonation of the balance of the judgment
rendered in said civil case No. 26328.
The bank brought the present action to revive the
judgment for the balance of P11,574.38, with interest at 7
"4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter
per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.
has actually given such promise to condone, could bind the
appellant corporation.
In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special
defense that he waived his right to redeem the land
"5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment
described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in
upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for the balance of the said
consideration of an understanding between him and the
judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is
bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance
’una señal inequivoca y una prueba evidente’ of the
of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court
condonation of the balance of the said judgment.
absolved the defendant from the complaint.
"6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to
In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid
Mariano Santos for the sum of P8,600, the said judgment
agreement on the part of the bank not to collect from him
in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even
the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement
discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the
rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the
highest bidder for the said property.
defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on
direct examination was as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as
shown by Exhibits D and D-1, reflects only the desire of the
"P. En este documento aparece que usted, por
said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with the
consideracion de valor recibido del Banco Nacional
appellant bank.
demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho
de recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en
"8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not
pública subasta el catorce de octubre de mil novecientos
sentencing him to pay the amount claimed in the
veinticuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; quiere usted
complaint with costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
explicar al Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion
de valor? — R. Si, señor. Esto desde mil novecientos
On September 9, 1924 the Court of First Instance of Manila
veintitres o mil novecietos veinticuatro, no recuerdo bien,
rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National

46
me habia dicho el señor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo
no podia pagar esos intereses mensuales. Entonces me "Sr. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos
dijo Pecson, ’como puede usted recibir alquileres y no oponemos.
paga usted intereses?’
"Sr. GONZALEZ. Si dice el que se habian vendido todos los
"P. Quien es ese señor Pecson? — R. Era encargado de terrenos.
este asunto.
"JUZGADO. Puede contestar.
"P. Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? — R. Era
encargado de estas transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad "Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.
siempre Ilamaba yo al señor Pecson. Entonces hable al
señor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los "R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no
alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado. pague intereses deje usted esos terrenos de Ronquillo y
terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas. Entonces
"Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta
pregunta. que al fin yo dije que queria yo comprar.

"Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el "P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil
testigo su contestacion. novecientos vienticinco este documento Exhibit 1, recibio
usted algún centimo de dinero del Banco? — R. Nada,
"JUZGADO. Que la termine. absolutamente."cralaw virtua1aw library

"TESTIGO. Me dijo el señor Pecson que es cosa mala para When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in
mi ’¿por que usted cobra alquileres y no paga los Iloilo at the time of the execution of defendant’s waiver of
intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did
cubrir sus deudas.’ not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to him about
the matter, the defendant replied that he did not
"P. El señor Pecson le dijo a usted ’mejor deje usted ya remember.
todos sus bienes,’ a que bienes se referia el? — R. Al
terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco. One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the
defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of
"P. Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the
que se refiere aqui en el Exhibit 1? — R. Paco, defendant was interested in buying it.
primeramente, los dos ambos.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or
"P. Pero este Exhibit 1, a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de his deposition, if he was not residing in Manila at the time
Ronquillo? — R. Parece que Paco. of the trial.

"P. No recuerda usted muy bien? — R. No recuerdo.
"P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el señor Pecson mejor que
dejara todos sus bienes, le dijo a usted a favor de quien iba
usted a dejar sus bienes? — R. Al Banco Nacional.
"P. Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el señor
Pecson con respector al saldo deudor que usted todavia
era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? — R. No
recuerdo mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.
"P. Que le dijo el con respecto al saldo, si el cobraria
todavia o se le condonaria?
"Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo.
With respect to the testimony of the bank’s attorney, we
should like to observe that although the law does not
forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an
attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should
not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they
should withdraw from the active management of the case.
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of
Legal Ethics reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to
merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody
of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of
the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the
ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in
behalf of his client."cralaw virtua1aw library

"JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta. Defendant’s testimony as to the alleged agreement is very

uncertain. There is no mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an
"P. Que le dijo a usted con respecto al saldo, una vez agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only
otorgado este Exhibit 1? to the land in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such

47
agreement as the defendant claims, it is reasonable to
suppose that he would have required the defendant to
waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that
the defendant, a Chinese business man, would have
insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing.
It appears to us that the defendant waived his right to
redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his
wished to purchase it and was willing to pay therefor
P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with
the full amount of the sale.
Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an
understanding between Pecson and the defendant as the
latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to
make any such agreement for the bank. Only the board of
directors or the persons empowered by the board of
directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There
is no merit in the contention that since the bank accepted
the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the
alleged agreement. The fact that the bank after having
bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the instance of the
defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the
full amount of the resale was a sufficient consideration for
the execution of defendant’s waiver of his right to redeem.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is
reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at
the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and
the costs of both instances.
G.R. No. 78569             February 11, 1991
EARTH MINERALS EXPLORATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG,
JR., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MALACAÑANG, MANILA,
BUREAU OF MINES DIRECTOR BENJAMIN A. GONZALES,
AND PHILZEA MINING AND DEV. CORP., respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking the reversal of the decision1
dated June 27, 1986 and resolution2
dated May 5, 1987 of the Deputy Executive Secretary in
O.P. Case No. 3023. The decision and resolution set aside
the orders of the Minister of Natural Resources and
Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences dated November 7,
1985 rendered in MNR Case No. 6353 and July 23, 1985
rendered in Mines Sp. Case No. V-183, respectively, that
upheld petitioner's action to cancel/rescind the mining
contract dated September 11, 1980 between Zambales
Chromite Mining Co., Inc. and private respondent Philzea
Mining and Development Corporation.
48
The antecedent facts and the proceedings that spawned
the instant case, are as follows:
Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. (Zambales Chromite,
for short) is the exclusive owner of ten (10) patentable
chromite mining claims located in the Municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales. On September 11, 1980, Zambales
Chromite, as claim-owner, on one hand, and Philzea
Mining and Development Corporation (Philzea Mining, for
short, herein private respondent) as operator, on the
other, entered into a "Contract of Development,
Exploitation and Productive Operation" on the ten (10)
patentable mining claims (Annex "C", Rollo, p. 120). During
the lifetime of such contract, Earth Minerals Exploration,
Inc. (Earth Minerals, for short, herein petitioner) submitted
a Letter of Intent on June 30, 1984 to Zambales Chromite
whereby the former proposed and the latter agreed to
operate the same mining area subject of the earlier
agreement between Zambales Chromite and Philzea
Mining (Annex "D", Rollo, p. 111). On August 10, 1984,
Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals concretized their
aforementioned Letter of Intent when they entered into
an "Operating Agreement" (Annex "E", Rollo, p. 112) for
the latter to operate the same mining area. Consequently,
the same mining property of Zambales Chromite became
the subject of different agreements with two separate and
distinct operators. On November 29, 1984, petitioner
Earth Minerals filed with the Bureau of Mines and Geo-
Sciences (BMGS, for short) a petition for cancellation of
the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea
Mining, pursuant t Section 7, P.D. 1281 which
provides, inter alia:
Section 7. In addition to its regulatory and
adjudicative functions over companies,
partnerships or persons engaged in mining
exploration, development and exploitation, the
Bureau of Mines shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
(a) a mining property subject of different
agreements entered into by the claim holder
thereof with several mining operators;
(b) . . . .
(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining
contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and
conditions thereof.
In its petition, Earth Minerals alleged, among others, that
Philzea Mining committed grave and serious violations of
the latter's contract with Zambales Chromite among which
are: failure to produce the agreed volume of chromite
ores; failure to pay ad valorem taxes; failure to put up
assay buildings and offices, all resulting in the non-
productivity and non-development of the mining area.
On December 10, 1984, Philzea Mining filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that Earth Minerals is not the
proper party in interest and that the petition lacks cause of
action. The motion to dismiss was, however, denied by the
BMGS in an order dated January 24, 1985 holding that
"there appears some color of right" on Earth Minerals to
initiate the petition for cancellation (Annex "G", Rollo, p.
120). A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same
was denied by the BMGS in an order dated March 4, 1985.
Thereafter, Philzea Mining elevated the case to then
Ministry (now Department) of Natural Resources (MNR,
for short) which in its order of April 23, 1985 dismissed the
appeal for the reason that the order of the BMGS was an
interlocutory order that could not be the proper subject of
an appeal.
On May 2, 1985, Philzea Mining appealed to the Office of
the President the order of MNR dated April 23, 1985.
During the pendency thereof, Earth Minerals filed with the
MNR a motion for execution of the MNR order of April 23,
1985.
On May 30, 1985, the MNR issued an order directing the
BMGS to conduct the necessary investigation in order to
hasten the development of the mining claims in question
(Rollo, p. 93). In compliance therewith, the BMGS on June
7, 1985, ordered the private respondent Philzea Mining to
file its answer to Earth Mineral's petition for rescission.
Philzea Mining moved to reconsider but the motion was
denied.
Philzea Mining did not submit its answer. Accordingly, the
BMGS resolved the petition for rescission on the basis of
documents submitted ex parte by herein petitioner.
Finding that Philzea Mining grossly violated the terms and
conditions of the mining contract between Philzea Mining
and Zambales Chromite, the BMGS rendered a decision on
July 23,1985, cancelling said mining contract, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of all the foregoing, this Office finds and
so holds that the Operating Agreement dated
September 11, 1980 executed by and between
Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining should
be, as is hereby cancelled. Accordingly,
respondent is hereby ordered to immediately
vacate the mining area subject of the instant
case and turn over the possession thereof to the
claimowner and/or herein petitioner. (Annex
"K", Rollo, p. 130).
Aggrieved by the decision of the BMGS, Philzea Mining,
aside from filing a notice of appeal to the MNR on July 29,
1985, also filed a petition for certiorari with the then
49
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) on
July 30,1985, docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715, to annul
or set aside the decision of the BMGS.
On November 4, 1985, the Office of the President
promulgated a decision dismissing the appeal of Philzea
Mining from the decision of the MNR dated April 23, 1985,
on the ground that an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is interlocutory in nature and cannot be
the subject of an appeal (Annex "L", Rollo, p. 137).
On November 7, 1985, the MNR on the other hand, issued
another order this time dismissing the appeal of Philzea
Mining from the decision of the BMGS dated July 23, 1985.
On November 18, 1985 Philzea Mining appealed the
aforementioned November 7, 1985 decision of the MNR to
the Office of the President.
Meanwhile, on December 26,1985, the then Intermediate
Appellate Court dismissed the petition filed by Philzea
Mining in AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715.
Back to the appeal of Philzea Mining to the Office of the
President, the disputed decision dated June 27, 1986 was
issued by the then Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran, Jr., the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the orders of the Minister of Natural
Resources and the Director of Mines and Geo-
Sciences, dated November 7 and July 23, 1985,
respectively, are hereby set aside. (Annex
"A", Rollo, p. 92).
A motion for reconsideration dated July 12,1986 (Annex
"U", Rollo, p. 190) was filed by petitioner Earth Minerals
which, however, was denied by the then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig in his resolution dated May 5,
1987, which reads in part:
Wherefore, the instant motion for
reconsideration by appellee Earth Minerals is
hereby denied for lack of merit and the Decision
of this Office dated June 27, 1986 is hereby
reiterated. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 98).
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of the Court dated July 1989, the Court
resolved: (a) to give due course to the petition and (b) to
require the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 382).
The principal issues in the case at hand are as follows: (a)
whether or not the appeal of the private respondent
Philzea Mining from the decision of the MNR dated
November 7,1985 to the Office of the President was made
out of time and (b) whether or not the petitioner Earth
Minerals is the proper party to seek cancellation of the
operating agreement between Philzea Mining and
Zambales Chromite.
The petitioner contends that the last day to appeal the
decision of the MNR dated November 7, 1985 fell on
November 16, 1985, that is five (5) days from the date of
its receipt by the private respondent on November 11,
1985 and since the notice of appeal dated November
15,1985 was filed on November 18, 1985, the appeal was
taken beyond the five-day reglementary period.
Public respondent counters that the ground invoked by
the petitioner is too technical in view of the fact that
November 16, 1985 was a Saturday and the following day
(November 17, 1985) was a Sunday.
The Court, in the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr. (154 SCRA 49
[1987]) resolved the same issue in this wise:
Saturday was observed as a legal holiday in the
Office of the President pursuant to Sec. 29 of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended.
The same law provides:
Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday — Where the
day or the last day, for doing any act required or
permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may
be done on the next succeeding business day.
Apart from the fact that the law is clear and
needs no interpretation, this Court in accordance
therewith has invariably held that in case the last
day for doing an act is a legal holiday, the last
day for doing the same, the act may be done on
the next succeeding business day (Gonzaga v. De
David, 110 Phil. 463 [1960]; Calano v. Cruz, 91
Phil. 247 [1957]; Austria et al. v. Solicitor
General, 71 Phil. 288 [1941]).
In the case under consideration, as the next working day
after November 16, 1985 was November 18, 1985 — a
Monday, it is evident that the private respondent's appeal
was filed on time.
Be that as it may, the private respondent's appeal within
the reglementary period to the Office of the President
does not help them much in the instant case.
The public respondent argues that the petitioner Earth
Minerals is not the proper party to file the petition for
50
cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite
and Philzea Mining citing Article 1311 of the Civil Code
which provides that a contract takes effect only between
the parties, their assigns and heirs.
The contention is untenable.
Indeed, a contract takes effect only between the parties
who made it, and also their assigns and heirs, except in
cases where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law (Article 1311, New Civil
Code). Since a contract may be violated only by the parties
thereto as against each other, in an action upon that
contract, the real parties in interest, either as plaintiff or as
defendant must be parties to said contract. In relation
thereto, Article 1397 of the Civil Code lays the general rule
that an action for the annulment of contracts can only be
maintained by those who are bound either principally or
subsidiarily by virtue thereof. The rule, however, admits of
an exception. The Court, in Teves v. People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation (23 SCRA 1141 [1968]) held that a
person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a
contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract
if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the
contracting parties, and can show the detriment which
could positively result to him from the contract in which
he had no intervention. This exception to the rule has
been applied in Banez v. CA (59 SCRA 15 [1974];
Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 96 SCRA 342
[1980]; Dilson Enterprises Inc. v. IAC, 170 SCRA 676
[1989]).
Petitioner Earth Minerals seeks the cancellation of the
contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining,
not as a party to the contract but because his rights are
prejudiced by the said contract. The prejudice and
detriment to the rights and interest of petitioner stems
from the continued existence of the contract between
Zambales Chromite and private respondent Philzea
Mining. Unless and until the contract between Zambales
Chromite and Philzea Mining is cancelled, petitioner's
contract with the former involving the same mining area
cannot be in effect and it cannot perform its own
obligations and derive benefits under its contract. The
Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences in his order denying
Philzea Mining's motion to dismiss the petition for
cancellation of the operating agreement between Philzea
Mining and Zambales Chromite stated:
From the documentary evidence submitted by
the petitioner, i.e., the Letter of Intent and
Operating Agreement between Zambales
Chromite and Earth Minerals, it may be gleaned
that, at least, there appears some color of right
on the part of petitioner to request for
cancellation/rescission of the contract dated
 September 11, 1980 between Zambales
Chromite and Philzea Mining.
Moreover, the record amply shows that the decision of the
Director of Mines as affirmed by the Minister of Natural
Resources was supported by substantial evidence. As
found by the Bureau of Mines in its decision dated July 23,
1985, the violations committed by Philzea Mining were not
only violations of its operating agreement with Zambales
Chromite but of mining laws as well.
In affirming the abovementioned decision, the Minister of
Natural Resources made the following statements:
Moreover, the appellant by filing a Manifestation
on October 1, 1985 wherein it prayed that the
decision appealed from be reviewed motu
propio by this Office, is an implied admission that
it has no justification whether in fact or in law,
for its appeal; otherwise, it could have specified
them in the appeal memorandum that it is
bound by law to file. (p. 142, Rollo)
In such cases, the Court has uniformly held that, it is
sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported
by evidence (Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]). Still in
later cases, the Court continued that such finding will not
be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant
(Police Commission v. Lood, 162 SCRA 762 [1984]; Atlas
Consolidated v. Factoran, Jr., supra).
The decision, therefore, of the Deputy Executive Secretary
reversing the decisions of the Minister of Natural
Resources and Director of Mines cannot be sustained. This
is in line with the pronouncement of the Court that the
factual findings of the Secretary should be respected in the
absence of any illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition,
none of which was proved by the public and private
respondents (Heirs of Santiago Pastoral v. Secretary of
Public Works and Highways, 162 SCRA 619 [1988]).
Regarding the issue of forum shopping, the records show
that on July 29, 1985, after Philzea Mining had filed its
notice of appeal to MNR from the July 23, 1985 decision of
the BMGS, it also filed a petition for certiorari with the
Intermediate Appellate Court on July 30, 1985, docketed
as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715 praying for the annulment of the
same July 23, 1985 decision of the BMGS. When the MNR
rendered its November 7, 1985 decision affirming the July
23, 1985 decision of the BMGS, private respondent Philzea
Mining, notwithstanding the pendency of its petition
for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court, filed
its notice of appeal to the Office of the President from the
said decision of the MNR stating therein that its appeal
was "without prejudice to the pending petition with the
51
Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No.
06715" (Rollo, p. 80).
The foregoing facts show a case of forum shopping.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of
an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another. The principle applies
not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
but also in connection with litigations
commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this
case, in order to defeat administrative processes
and in anticipation of an unfavorable court ruling
(Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, G.R. Nos. 89095 and 89555,
November 6, 1989).
One last point, the motion to dismiss filed by Philzea
before this Court on September 5, 1989, on the ground
that the petition has become moot and academic in view
of the expiration on August 10, 1989 of the five (5) year
term contract between Zambales Chromite and Earth
Minerals executed by August 10, 1984 should be denied.
The contract between Zambales Chromite and Earth
Minerals provides, inter alia:
5. Others.
A. During the existence of this agreement, Earth
Minerals is free to look for, and negotiate with,
an interested party who is financially capable of
operating the CLAIMS on a much bigger scale . . .
and in connection therewith, may assign this
agreement in favor of said party; . . . .
In view of such provision, Earth Minerals and Zambales
Chromite jointly entered into a "Mining Agreement",
dated June 16, 1988, with Acoje Mining Co., Inc., the
salient provisions of which reads:
ZCMC and EMEI jointly desire to protect Acoje
from any and all claims (present or future)
against it (Acoje) with respect the title and/or
possession of the PROPERTIES and this
protection against all claims of third parties or
entities during the life of this Mining Agreement
is one of the main considerations why Acoje
agreed to enter into this Agreement.
Sec. 1. . . . provided, however, that EMEI
obligates itself to continue representing its
interest as party in the aforesaid cases pending
 with the Supreme Court. (Annex "1", Rollo, p.
397).
The mining agreement between Zambales Chromite and
Earth Minerals, on one hand, and Acoje Mining, on the
other, expressly recognizes the pendency of the case at
bar, so that herein petitioner Earth Minerals has the right
to pursue the case to its logical conclusion, and during the
effectivity of such Mining Agreement, both Earth Minerals
and Zambales Chromite are under obligation to assure
peaceful possession of the mining properties from the
claims of third parties.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the instant petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby GRANTED; (b) the
decision dated June 27, 1986 and resolution dated May 5,
1987 of the Deputy Executive Secretary are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE; and (c) the orders of the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences dated July 23, 1985 and
Minister of Natural Resources dated November 7, 1985 are
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2352            July 26, 1910
ELADIO ALONSO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an action brought to recover of the defendants the
value of certain articles taken from a Roman Catholic
Church located in the municipality of Placer, and the rental
value of the church and its appurtenances, including the
church cemetery, from the 11th day of December, 1901,
until the month of April, 1904. After hearing the evidence,
the court below gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for
the sum of P1,581, with interest at 6 per cent from the
date of the judgment. The said sum of P1,581 was made
up of two items, one of which, P741, was for the value of
the articles taken from the church, and the other, P840,
the rental value of the premises during the occupations by
defendants. From this judgment the defendants appealed
to this court.
It appears that the defendants were on the 11th day of
December, 1901, members of the municipal board of the
municipality of Placer, and that they on that date
addressed to the plaintiff in this case, who was the priest
in charge of the church, its appurtenances and contents,
the following letter:
          PLACER, 11th December, 1901.
52
R. P. ELADIO ALONSO, Benedicto, Suriago.
ESTEEMED PADRE: After saluting you, we take
the liberty of writing you that in the municipality
of which we have charged we have received an
order from the provincial fiscal, dated the 5th
instant, which says: "The cemeteries, convents,
and the other buildings erected on land
belonging to the town at the expense of the
town and preserved by it belong to the town,
and for this reason the municipality is under the
obligation of administering them and of
collecting the revenues therefrom, and for this
reason we notify you that from this date all of
the revenues and products therefrom must be
turned into the treasury of the municipality in
order that the people may properly preserve
them.
In the same way we notify you that the image of
St. Vicente which is now in the church, as it is an
image donated to the people by its owner, by
virtue of said order is also the property of said
people, and therefore the alms which are given
it by the devotees thereof must be also turned
into the municipal treasury for the proper
preservation of the church and for other
necessary purposes. We hope that you will view
in the proper light and that you will deliver to
the bearer of this letter the key of the alms box
of the said image in order that we may comply
with our obligation in conformity with the
dispositions of said order.
We beg to remain as always by your spiritual
sons. Q. B. S. M.
(Signed) ANDRES OJEDA.
TOMAS VILLAMOR.
ANDRES CALINAUAN.
BERNARDINO TANDOY.
EUSEBIO LIRIO.
ELEUTERIO MONDAYA.
MAXIMO DELOLA.
SEGUNDO BECERRO.
ONOFRE ELIMANCE.
On the 13th of December, 1901, the defendants took
possession of the church and its appurtenances, and also
of all of the personal property contained therein. The
plaintiff, as priest of the church and the person in charge
thereof, protested against the occupation thereof by the
defendants, but his protests received no consideration,
and he was summarily removed from possession of the
church, its appurtenances and contents.
The only defense presented by the defendants, except the
one that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest, was
that the church and other buildings had been erected by
funds voluntarily contributed by the people of that
municipality, and that the articles within the church had
been purchased with funds raised in like manner, and that,
therefore, the municipality was the owner thereof.
The question as to the ownership of the church and its
appurtenances, including the convent and cemetery, was
before this court on the 23rd day of September, 1908, in
an action entitled "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
against the municipality of Placer."1 Substantially the same
facts were presented on the part of the defendants in that
case as are presented by the defendants in this. The
question there litigated was the claim upon the part of the
municipality of ownership of said church and its
appurtenances on the ground that according to Spanish
law the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church was not the
owner of such property, having only the use thereof for
ordinary ecclesiastical and religious purposes, and that the
true owner thereof was the municipality or the State by
reason of the contributions by them, or by the people, of
the land and of the funds with which the buildings were
constructed or repaired. The court decided in that case
that the claim of the defendants was not well founded and
that the property belonged to the Roman Catholic Church.
The same question was discussed and decided in the case
of Barlin vs. Ramirez  (7 Phil. Rep., 41), and the case of The
Municipality of Ponce vs. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
in Porto Rico (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 737, 6 Off. Gaz., 1213).
We have made a careful examination of the record and the
evidence in this case and we have no doubt that the
property sued for was, at the time it was taken by the
defendants, the property of the Roman Catholic Church,
and that the seizure of the same and occupation of the
church and its appurtenances by the defendants were
wrongful and illegal. We are also convinced, from such
examination, that the conclusions of the court below as to
the value of the articles taken by the defendants and of
the rent of the church for the time of its illegal occupation
by the defendants were correct and proper. While some
objection was made on appeal by counsel for the
defendants that the value of the articles taken and of the
rent of the church and its appurtenances had not been
proved by competent evidence, no objection to the
introduction of the evidence of value was made at the trial
53
and we can not consider that question raised for the first
time here.
We have carefully examined the assignments of error
made by counsel for defendants on this appeal. We find
none of them well founded. The only one which deserves
especial attention at our hands is the one wherein the
defendants assert that the court below erred in permitting
the action to be brought and continued in the name of the
plaintiff instead of in the name of the bishop of the
diocese within which the church was located, or in the
name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, as the real
party in interest.
It is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the Roman
Catholic Apostic Church itself is the real party in interest.
The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of
action. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires
that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. The plaintiff is not such party.
Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however,
provides:
SEC. 110. Amendments in general. — The court
shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such
terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to
amend any pleading or proceeding and at any
stage of the action, in either the Court of First
Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or
striking out the name of any party, either
plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a mistake
in the name of a party, or a mistaken or
inadequate allegation or description in any other
respect so that the actual merits of the
controversy may speedily be determined,
without regard to technicalities, and in the most
expeditious, and inexpensive manner. The court
may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or
other pleading to be made after the time limited
by the rules of the court for filing the same.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in
this section shall be made upon motion filed in
court, and after notice to the adverse party, and
an opportunity to be heard.
Section 503 of the same code provides:
SEC. 503. Judgment not to be reversed on
technical grounds. — No judgment shall be
reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for
such error as has not prejudiced the real rights
of the excepting party.
We are confident under these provisions that this court
has full power, apart from that power and authority which
is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings,
and decision in this case by substituting, as party plaintiff,
the real party in interest. Not only are we confident that
we may do so, but we are convinced that we should do so.
Such an amendment does not constitute, really a change
in the identity of the parties. The plaintiff asserts in his
complaint, and maintains that assertion all through the
record, that he is engaged in the prosecution of this case,
not for himself, but for the bishop of the diocese—not by
his own right, but by right of another. He seeks merely to
do for the bishop what the bishop might do for himself.
His own personality is not involved. His own rights are not
presented. He claims no interest whatever in the litigation.
He seeks only the welfare of the great church whose
servant he is. Gladly permits his identity to be wholly
swallowed up in that of his superior. The substitution,
then, of the name of the bishop of the diocese, or the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, for that of Padre Alonso,
as party plaintiff, is not in reality the substitution of one
identity for another, of one party for another, but is simply
to make the form express the substance. The substance is
there. It appears all through the proceedings. No one is
deceived for an instant as to whose interest are at stake.
The form of its expression is alone defective. The
substitution, then, is not substantial but formal. Defect in
mere form can not possibly so long as the substantial is
clearly evident. Form is a method of speech used to
express substance and make it clearly appear. It is the
means by which the substance reveals itself. If the form be
faulty and still the substance shows plainly through no,
harm can come by making the form accurately expressive
of the substance.
No one has been misled by the error in the name of the
party plaintiff. If we should by reason of this error send
this back for amendment and new trial, there would be on
the retrial the same complaint, the same answer, the same
defense, the same interests, the same witnesses, and the
same evidence. The name of the plaintiff would constitute
the only difference between the old trial and the new. In
our judgment there is not enough in a name to justify such
action.
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their
forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to
facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They
do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the
means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words,
they are a means to an end. When they lose the character
of the one and become the other, the administration of
justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in
the performance of their obvious duty.
The error in this case is purely technical. To take
advantage of it for other purposes than to cure it, does not
appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to
54
the plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. A
litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more
deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement
and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a
contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays
before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside
as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form
and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done
upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won
by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it desserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge
a record of a court of these Islands for defect of form
when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced
thereby.
In ordering this substitution, we are in accord with the
best judicial thought. (McKeighan vs. Hopkins, 19 Neb., 33;
Dixon vs. Dixon, 19 Ia., 512; Hodges vs. Kimball, 49 Ia., 577;
Sanger vs. Newton, 134 Mass., 308; George vs. Reed, 101
Mass., 378; Bowden vs. Burnham, 59 Fed. Rep., 752;
Phipps and Co. vs. Hurlburt, 70 Fed. Rep., 202; McDonal vs.
State, 101 Fed. Rep., 171; Morford vs. Diffenbocker, 20 N.
W., 600; Costelo vs. Costelo vs. Crowell, 134 Mass., 280;
Whitaker vs. Pope, 2 Woods, 463, Fed. Cas. no. 17528;
Miller vs. Pollock, 99 Pa. St., 202; Wilson vs. Presbyterian
Church, 56 Ga., 554; Wood vs. Circuit Judge, 84 Mich., 521;
Insurance Co, vs. Mueller, 77 Ill., 22; Farman vs. Doyle, 128
Mich., 696; Union Bank vs. Mott, 19 How. Pr., 114; R. R.
Co. vs. Gibson, 4 Ohio St., 145; Hume vs. Kelly, 28 Oreg.,
398.)
It is therefore, ordered and decreed that the process,
pleadings, proceedings and decision in this action be, and
the same are hereby, amended by substituting the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Eladio
Alonso as party plaintiff, that the complaint be considered
as though originally filed by the Catholic Church, the
answer thereto made, the decision rendered and all
proceedings in this case had, as if the said institution which
Father Eladio Alonso undertook to represent were the
party plaintiff, and that said decision of the court below, so
amended, is affirmed, without special finding as to the
costs.
G.R. No. L-25771 March 29, 1982
URBANO JACA and BONIFACIO JACA, petitioners,
vs.
DAVAO LUMBER COMPANY and HONORABLE MANASES
REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction filed by Urbano Jaca and Bonifacio
Jaca against the Davao Lumber Company and Honorable
Manases Reyes as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao seeking the following relief:
WHEREFORE, petitioners pray —
1. That a writ of Preliminary Injunction
be immediately issued restraining the
respondent Judge from carrying out or
enforcing the Orders (Annexes "Z" and
"FF") complained of pending the
hearing of the merits of the instant
petition;
2. After due hearing, that this
Honorable Court annuls and sets aside
the complained Orders (Annexes "Z"
and "FF");
Petitioners further pray for all other
reliefs which are just and equitable in
the premises.
Davao City, Philippines, February 5,
1966. 1
In November, 1963, Urbano Jaca and Bonifacio Jaca filed
with the Court of First Instance of Davao a complaint for
Accounting, Return of Price Differentials and Damages
against the Davao Lumber Company. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4189.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff Urbano Jaca has
been, and still is, a licensee of a logging concession located
in the City of Davao, and together with his co-plaintiff,
Bonifacio Jaca, engaged in the logging business of
producing timber and logs for export and/or domestic
purposes; that the defendant is a business corporation
with which plaintiffs had business dealings covering the
sale and/or exportation of their logs; that sometime in
1954, the herein parties-litigants entered into an
agreement whereby plaintiffs may secure, by way of
advances, either cash or materials, foodstuffs, and/or
equipment's from the defendant corporation; that the
payment of such account was to be made either in cash
and/or by plaintiff's turning over all the logs that they
produce in the aforesaid concession to the defendant, and
in the latter case, the current prices, either export or
domestic, of the logs at the time of their delivery was to be
considered; that while the aforesaid business relationship
between the parties was subsisting, defendant made
plaintiff Urbano Jaca execute in its favor a chattel
55
mortgage, a copy of which instrument. however, plaintiffs
were never furnished but that as far as they can recollect
the primary conditions of such chattel mortgage were that
plaintiffs would turn over to defendant corporation all the
logs they may produce from the aforesaid concession the
same to be priced either as export or domestic and their
value to be applied by defendant to, and be credited for,
the account of plaintiff's indebtedness, and further that in
case of need, plaintiffs may secure, by way of advances,
either cash, foodstuffs, materials or equipment's, under an
"open credit account"; that under the aforementioned
"open credit account" relationship between the plaintiffs
and defendant, orders were secured by plaintiffs, by way
of advances, from the defendant, this to be paid by them
with plaintiffs' production from their concession,
liquidating those old accounts and keeping all accounts
current; that in pursuance to the agreement, as
aforestated, plaintiff Urbano Jaca executed assignments of
letters of credit in favor of the defendant, in order that the
latter may be able to use, as defendant corporation did in
fact use, the said letters of credit for bank negotiations of
the former in the exportation of logs; that the plaintiffs
and the defendant had this business relationship, as
aforementioned, from 1954 up to sometime in August,
1963; that during this whole period of time, the plaintiffs
had been faithfully delivering all their log production to
the defendant for export or domestic purposes; that
before the filing of this complaint, the plaintiff made
repeated demands on the defendant for a formal
accounting of their business relationship from 1954 up to
August, 1963, but that the defendant failed and refused,
and still fails and refuses, to effect such formal accounting,
asserting that it had no time as yet to examine into all the
details of the accounting; that sometime on October 30,
1963, much to their surprise, plaintiffs received letters of
demand from the defendant in which they were requested
to pay their accounts in favor of defendant, which
according to the latter had long been overdue; (Copies of
such letters are hereto attached marked as Annexes "A"
and "B", and made integral parts of this complaint) that
plaintiffs are no longer indebted to the defendant, and as a
matter of act it is their belief that, if a formal accounting
be made, there would still appear a claim in their favor in
the amount of P250,000.00 more or less, representing the
price differentials of logs which they delivered to the
defendant from 1954 up to August, 1963; and that further,
there was a deliberate fraud practiced by the defendant
on them, especially in defendant's under grading and/or
reclassification of logs delivered to it by plaintiffs; that
further, there were many errors committed in the monthly
statements submitted to the plaintiffs, arising from the
fact that there were charges of cash, equipment's,
materials and foodstuffs in said statements never ordered
and/or received by the plaintiffs; and still further that the
proceeds of the letter of credit were not fully applied
and/or credited to the account of plaintiffs; that defendant
has up to the present denied the plaintiffs the benefits of a
formal accounting and inasmuch as the invoices, receipts,
vouchers, requisition slips and other pertinent papers and
document of their business transactions are in the
possession of defendant, it is difficult for plaintiffs to
ascertain with accuracy the ledger balance between the
parties, unless a detailed examination of the matter is had;
that plaintiffs have thereby been constrained to file this
case in Court in order to compel defendant to have a
formal accounting between them, and that it is the desire
of plaintiffs that pending the formal hearing of this case,
three commissioners, constituting accountants be
judicially appointed for the purpose of examining all the
books, pertinent papers and documents and all other data
in relation with their business transaction; that in order to
protect their interest and to litigate this case, the plaintiffs
were compelled to secure and retain the services of
attorneys, and that they have thereby suffered damages in
the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of
attorney's fees. 2
In December, 1963, the Davao Lumber Company filed its
Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. 3
In its counterclaim, the Davao Lumber Company alleged
that Plaintiffs Urbano Jaca and Bonifacio Jaca are the ones
indebted to the defendant in the sum of P756,236.52 and
P91,651.97, respectively; that on January 24, 1961, the
plaintiff Urbano Jaca executed a chattel mortgage in favor
of the defendant to secure the payment of any and all
obligations contracted by him in favor of the defendant
covering several chattels valued at P532,000.00; that said
obligation of Urbano Jaca totalling P756,236.52 is overdue
and unpaid despite repeated formal demands for
settlement thereof made by defendant; that the action
brought by the plaintiffs is purely baseless and malicious
for which the plaintiffs should be required to pay
defendant damages and attorney's fees amounting to at
least P20.000.00. 4
In June, 1965, the respondent Judge rendered a decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of defendant and against the plaintiff,
ordering that:
1. The complaint for accounting, return
of price differentials and damages filed
by plaintiffs Urbano Jaca and Bonifacio
Jaca versus defendant Davao Lumber
Company is dismissed, as it is hereby
dismissed;
2. Ordering Urbano Jaca to pay
defendant the amount of P756,236.52
with legal interest from the date of the
filing of the counterclaim;
56
3. Ordering plaintiff Bonifacio Jaca to
pay defendant the amount of
P91,651.00 with legal interest;
4. Ordering that the chattel mortgage
executed by Urbano Jaca in favor of
defendant Exhibit "3", be foreclosed as
it is hereby foreclosed;
5. Ordering plaintiffs to pay jointly and
severally P20,000.00 as attorney's fees
in favor of defendant.
6. With cost against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Given at Davao City, on this 11th day
of June, 1965. 5
In September, 1965, the Davao Lumber Company filed a
motion for execution pending appeal on the following
grounds:
3. There are good reasons to authorize
an order of execution pending appeal
pursuant to Rule 39, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Execution pending appeal. —
On motion of the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party the court
may, in its discretion, order execution
to issue before the expiration of the.
time to appeal, upon good reasons to
be stated in a special order. If a record
on appeal is filed thereafter the motion
and the special order shall be included
therein.
(a) In this same civil case,, the court
issued an Order dated November 17,
1964 directing the plaintiffs 'to deliver
to the receiver all the properties,
chattels and equipment covered by the
Chattel Mortgage, the delivery to be
made within thirty (30) days', but
plaintiffs did not, comply with said
Order of November 17, 1964.
(b) Defendant's counsel filed a 'Motion
to Implement Order ordering Urbano
Jaca to deliver Chattels to Receiver'
dated July 28, 1965, but up this date,
plaintiffs have not complied with said
Order.
(c) That there are various reports from
the receiver, one of them dated April
19, 1965, stating that the Receiver has
not taken custody of the mortgaged
chattels due to the refusal or inability
to mortgagor Urbano Jaca to deliver
the same to him.
(d) Despite the long lapse of time from
the Order of November 17, 1964, the
court in its Order of September 1,
1965, directed said mortgagor Urbano
Jaca to comply forthwith with the
Order dated November 17, 1964
'fifteen (15) days upon receipt of this
Order', but up to this date there has
been consistent refusal or failure to
comply with said order of delivery.
(2) Another good reason for execution
pending appeal (Rule 39, Section 2) is
the fact that plaintiff Urbano Jaca the
mortgagor in the deed of chattel
mortgage dated January 24, 1961, has
violated Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code, for he has sold some of
the mortgaged properties to third
persons, particularly, a wrecker, to
Teodoro M. Alagon of Davao City on
February 12, 1962 for P10,000.00. A
copy of the letter-complaint addressed
by defendant's counsel to the City
Fiscal of Davao, dated February 5, 1964
is attached hereto and made an
integral part of this Motion as Annex
"A".
(3) Moreover, plaintiffs have not only
failed to comply with the Order of the
Honorable Court for the delivery of the
properties under receivership to the
Receiver (par. 3 of this Motion) and in
fact has violated the Chattel Mortgage
contract (Par. 4 of this Motion); but
plaintiffs have no properties or assets
with which to satisfy the judgment of
this Honorable Court, which amounts
to principal items of P756,326.52,
P91,651.00 and P20,000.00, or a total
of P867,887.52.
(4) Obviously, the appeal interposed by
the plaintiffs is to delay the
enforcement and/or execution of the
decision rendered by this Honorable
Court, so that when the Decision
correctly rendered by this Honorable
57
Court should be affirmed on appeal the
judgment will become nugatory. 6
The respondent judge granted the motion for execution
pending appeal in an order dated November 29, 1965. 7
Urbano Jaca and Bonifacio Jaca filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting execution pending
appeal in December, 1965, 8 but the same was denied in
an order dated January 10, 1966. 9
Petitioners Urbano Jaca and Bonifacio Jaca contend that
the respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order granting
execution pending appeal and the order denying the
motion for reconsideration of the order granting execution
pending appeal because said orders were issued in
complete disregard of the applicable provisions of the
Rules of Court, the laws, and the settled decisions of the
Honorable Supreme Court.
Petitioners assail the order granting execution pending
appeal and the order denying the motion for execution
pending appeal on the following grounds:
1) granting that execution pending
appeal win issue in a foreclosure
proceedings —
the respondent Judge acted in excess
of jurisdiction when he considered,
over the objection of petitioners, in the
motion for reconsideration of the
Order granting premature execution
(Annex "AA") the alleged sale by
Florentina Perez, wife of petitioner,
Urbano Jaca of the two (2) chevrolet
trucks which were not part of the
mortgaged chattels to Atty. Raul
Nengasca as a reason for execution
pending appeal in his Order (Annex
"FF") denying the motion for
reconsideration, since this matter is
not among the grounds stated in the
motion for execution pending appeal
(Annex "X") neither has it been
brought out during the hearing of said
motion, nor is it one of the reasons
stated in the Order of execution
pending appeal (Annex "Z") which is
the Order sought to be reconsidered
and it is a cardinal rule in pleadings
that a motion should state the grounds
upon which it is based (Section 3, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court) and the order
sought to be obtained and that no
other grounds can be entertained,
passed upon and considered by the
court over the objection of the adverse
party;
2) the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction in finding that there
exists special or good reasons for
execution pending appeal because
discretionary execution under Section
2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court will
only issue if there are superior
circumstances demanding urgency
which outweigh the injury or damage
that the losing party may suffer upon
securing a reversal of the judgment on
appeal considering the merits of his
appeal (Moran, Com. on the Rules of
Court Vol. 2, Part II, 1963 ed., p. 239
and p. 242, citing Aguilos vs. Barrios, et
al. 72 Phil. 285: Ledesma vs. Teodoro,
52 O.G. 784; De Leon, et al. vs. Soriano,
et al., L-7684, Sept. 17, 1954; City of
Bacolod vs. Enriquez, 55 O.G. p.
10545), and in the instant case, the
reasons ultimately relied upon by the
respondent Judge in granting
execution pending appeal as stated in
the Order (Annex "FF"), denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration
of the Order granting execution, are
not such superior circumstances
demanding urgency of execution
because:
(a) the first reason that petitioner
Urbano Jaca sold a wrecker to Teodoro
M. Alagon is alleged to have been
made yet on February 12, 1962, or
about over one and half years prior to
the filing of the instant case on
November 22, 1963, and such sale
would not show a fraudulent design on
the part of petitioner Urbano Jaca to
defeat the judgment against him by
disposing of the mortgaged chattels
and thus would demand urgency of
execution of the judgment;
(b) the second reason regarding the
sale of the two chevrolet trucks (not
alleged to be a part of the mortgaged
chattels to the respondent Davao
Lumber Company) to Atty. Raul
Nengasca does not refer to the
property of either of the petitioners,
neither does it refer to a sale made by
anyone of them; rather, it refers to a
58
sale made by Florentina Perez (wife of
petitioner Urbano Jaca), who is not a
party to the action, regarding her own
property;
(c) the third and last reason that the
orders of the court directing petitioner
Urbano Jaca to deliver all the
mortgaged chattels to the receiver are
valid and must be complied with could
not even be considered any reason at
all for immediate execution, as it does
not supply at all any element of a
superior circumstance requiring
urgency of execution for there is, in
fact, no legal connection whatsoever in
the validity of such Orders and their
compliance with the propriety of an
immediate execution of the judgment
pending appeal;
furthermore, the appeal of petitioners
are based on good grounds and could
never be said to be intended merely
for delay, and that the amount
involved in the judgment is huge;
3) That there are, in fact, good reasons
for not allowing execution pending
appeal considering —
(1) that the amount involved in the
judgment is huge;
(2) that the petitioners have
challenged the Counterclaim, under
which the judgment sought to be
executed is rendered, for lack of cause
of action;
(3) that the petitioners have
challenged the chattel mortgage,
under which the judgment of
foreclosure has been rendered, as null
and void ab initio and that no cause of
action can arise therefrom;
(4) that the petitioners have
challenged the Commissioner's Report
to be null and void which is the
primary, if not in fact the sole,
evidence of said respondent on its
Counterclaim and upon which the
judgment sought to be executed is
based;
 4) no execution pending appeal, in
fact, can issue on foreclosure
proceedings because the ninety-day
period provided in Section 2, Rule 68
of the Rules of Court is a substantive
right granted to the mortgagor-debtor
which may not be omitted and that
upon taking an appeal, said period is
suspended and is not revived until the
judgment is affirmed by the appellate
court and the case returned to the trial
court, and in the instant case, the
respondent judge acted in excess of
jurisdiction in allowing execution
pending appeal when the
Counterclaim under which the
judgment sought to be executed is
rendered, is for a foreclosure of chattel
mortgage and that petitioners have
taken an appeal to the judgment
rendered against them ...;
5) granting arguendo, that the
foreclosure proceedings is only against
petitioner Urbano Jaca as mortgagor,
but the action against petitioner
Bonifacio Jaca is for a collection of a
sum of money, the respondent Judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction in
allowing execution pending appeal as
against said petitioner Bonifacio Jaca
because in so far as said petitioner is
concerned there is no showing of any
special or good reasons, in fact, there
is no showing of any reason at all
anywhere in the records of the case,
including the Orders complained of, as
a basis for which discretionary
execution may be issued against him. 10
The private respondent maintains that the respondent
judge acted in full compliance with the Rules of Court, the
law and applicable decisions of this Honorable Court
because:
1) The present case is an action for accounting and not a
foreclosure proceeding. Therefore, execution pending
appeal can be issued pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 39, Rules
of Court. This provision of the Rules of Court applies in the
present case for there are good and valid reasons for the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal as stated in
respondents' Motion (Annex "X"). Moreover, petitioners
have no properties or assets with which to satisfy the
judgment of P867,887.52 plus other items stated in the
Decision. The respondent Judge, therefore, was correct in
ordering the issuance of a writ of execution (Annex "1").
Furthermore, to stay execution, petitioners should have
59
filed a supersedeas bond in accordance with Sec. 3 of Rule
3.
a) Respondent denies the erroneous
and gratuitous conclusion of alleged
'excess of jurisdiction' as alleged in par.
44(a) of the Petition. It further denies
the other misleading statements
alleged therein, the truth of the matter
being the grounds enumerated in the
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
(Annex "X") and the reasons
mentioned in the Order (Annex "Z")
granting said motion.
b) Respondent denies the erroneous
conclusion that the respondent Judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion,
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction' as
alleged in par. 44(b) of the Petition,
and states that the respondent Judge
correctly acted in accordance with Sec.
2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It
further denies the misleading
statement therein that the reasons
ultimately relied upon by the
respondent Judge are those stated in
the Order (Annex "FF"), which is false,
because the good and valid reasons
relied upon by the respondent Judge
are those stated in his Order (Annex
"Z") granting the Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal (Annex "X").
(1) Respondent admits the allegation
that petitioner Urbano Jaca sold a
wrecker to Teodoro M. Alagon on
February 12, 1962 for P10,000.00; and
denies the statement that such sale
would not show a fraudulent design on
his part to defeat the judgment against
him. It further alleges that it is one of
the good and valid reasons for
execution pending appeal (Rule 39,
Sec. 2), because said petitioner, the
mortgagor in the deed of chattel
mortgage dated January 24, 1961, has
violated Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code in selling the said
mortgaged property;
(2) The misleading allegations
contained in subparagraphs 2 and 3 of
par. 44(b) of the Petition are false, for
they are matters that arose in the
petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order granting
execution pending appeal. Respondent
further states that they are not the
original and valid reasons given by the
respondent Judge in his Order (Annex
"Z");
c) There are goods reasons for allowing
execution pending appeal considering
that —
(1) the amount involved in the
judgment in favor of respondent Davao
Lumber Company is P867,887.52 plus
attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and the
petitioners admitted at the hearing of
the Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal that they are insolvent (See
Order, Annex "Z" );
(2) the petitioners have never
challenged the Counterclaim of
respondent Davao Lumber Company
during the hearing on the merits;
(3) the petitioners failed to present any
evidence challenging the chattel
mortgage under which the
counterclaim for foreclosure has been
rendered;
(4) the petitioners have not disproved
the Commissioner's Report (Annex
"K"). In fact, they failed to present
their own evidence before the
Commissioner which might tend to
controvert the undisputed
documentary evidence of respondent
Davao Lumber Company;
(5.) execution pending appeal was
properly issued in the present case,
which is an ordinary civil action for
accounting and not primarily a
foreclosure of chattel mortgage the
respondent Judge, therefore, acted in
full compliance with the law and
jurisprudence in allowing execution
pending appeal;
(6) the judgment sought to be
executed pending appeal sentences
petitioner Urbano Jaca to pay
respondent Davao Lumber Company
the amount of P756,236.52 with legal
interest; sentences petitioner
Bonifacio Jaca to pay said respondent
the amount of P91,651.00 with legal
60
interest; orders the Chattel Mortgage
executed by Urbano Jaca in favor of
said respondent foreclosed; orders
petitioners to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs; the said
judgment was rendered after hearing
on the merits of its action for
accounting, which is not a proceeding
for foreclosure of chattel mortgage;
the provisions of the Rules of Court on
foreclosure proceeding invoked by
petitioners do not find any application
in the case at bar; the respondent
Judge, therefore, in allowing execution
pending appeal, precisely acted in full
compliance with Sec. 2 of Rule 39;
(7) as above pointed out, the judgment
rendered in this case is joint and
several, and consequently, the
respondent Judge was correct in
ordering the execution thereof as
against both petitioners who have no
properties or assets to satisfy the
judgment in favor of respondent
company. 11
The basic issue in this case is whether or not there are
good reasons justifying the issuance of an order granting
premature execution.
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that on
motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party the court may, in its discretion, order execution to
issue even before the expiration of the time to appeal,
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a
record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and the
special order shall be included therein. The discretionary
power of the Court of First Instance to grant or deny a
motion for execution before the expiration of the time to
appeal will not be interfered with by the appellate court,
unless it be shown that there has been an abuse thereof or
a subsequent change of conditions. 12
As provided in Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court,
the existence of good reasons is what confers
discretionary power on a court of first instance to issue a
writ of execution pending appeal. 13 The reasons allowing
execution must constitute superior circumstances
demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or
damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the
judgment on appeal. 14
The decision in Civil Case No. 4189 requires petitioners to
pay the enormous amount of P867,887.52. Clearly,
premature execution of said decision wig result in
irreparable damage to petitioners as the collection of said
amount may be enforced through the seizure of money
and/or sale of properties used in the logging business of
petitioners. In other words, execution of the decision in
Civil Case No. 4189 may result in the termination of
petitioner's business. Thus, any damage to the petitioners
brought about by the premature execution of the decision
will be justified only upon a finding that the appeal is being
taken only for the purpose of delay and of rendering the
judgment nugatory.
The facts of record show that the petitioner's appeal is not
frivolous and not intended for delay. The findings of the
respondent judge that the petitioners are indebted to the
respondent Davao Lumber Company are based solely on
the report submitted by Estanislao R. Lagman, the
commissioner appointed by the court. This report was
assailed by the petitioners as null and void in a motion to
strike out the report from the records of the case.
According to petitioners, the report is null and void
because:
... the so-called 'findings of the
Commissioner in his report filed before
this Honorable Court is the result of
the exercise of certain highly irregular
function not contemplated by the
Rules of Court and therefore deprived
Plaintiffs' their constitutional right to
their day in court.
ARGUMENTS:
1. That among other things, Section 3, Rule 33 of Rules of
Court, provides:
Section 3: ... Subject to the
specifications and limitations stated in
the order the commissioner has and
shall exercise the power to regulate
the proceedings in every hearing
before him and to do all act and take
measures necessary or proper for the
efficient performance of his duties
under the order, ... The trial or hearing
before him shall proceed in all respect
as though the same had been had
before the Court.
2. That on August 22, 1964, without
the proper notice to their respective
counsels, the Plaintiffs received the
following letter from the
Commissioner, pertinent portions of
which reads as follows: and, copy of
which letter is attached hereto,
forming an integral part in this
61
Opposition, marked Annex "A" — In
compliance to the above order, I am
now to proceed, as ordered by the
Court, to examine your books of
accounts and other records for the
year 1962 and 1963.
I will be dropping at your office on
August 25, 1964. Kindly have our
records ready.
3. That on August 25, 1964, the
Commissioner went to Plaintiff's' office
and asked to see the Books, and if
possible to bring the same with him to
his office; that, the plaintiffs' counsel
refused to have said records examined
in such manner;
4. That the Counsel for the Plaintiffs
reminded the Commissioner on many
occasions that, the examination of
books and records of Accounts should
be done in a manner provided for
under the Rules of Court and, that in
pursuance of said mandate, a hearing
and/or proceedings be conducted in
the presence of all parties, their
witnesses and, their counsels and, the
hearing be conducted as if it were
taken before the court of justice, as
said accounts being one controversial
and contested in issues;
5. That said commissioner refused to
conduct said hearing in accordance to
law;
6. That report is void in law. 15
In an order dated November 17, 1964, the respondent
judge approved the commissioners' report in toto As to
the allegation of the plaintiff that they were denied their
day in court, the respondent judge stated that "plaintiffs
deliberately ignored to comply with the lawful order of the
court directing them to present the pertinent books of
accounts on the 12th day of October, 1964, at 2:00 P.M.
Sala of Branch 11, and therefore, their position that they
are denied their day in court is clearly untenable." 16
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the
order approving the commissioner's report in November,
1964, explaining that their failure to appear was due to the
fact that they received the order requiring them to appear
on October 12, 1964 already after said date when it was
too late for them to comply with the order of
appearance. 17 Notwithstanding the reasonable
explanation of their absence in the hearing of October 12, (a) From Feb. 17, 1961 to Oct. 31,
1964, the respondent judge denied the motion for 1962, Urbano Jaca purchased on
reconsideration in an order dated December 4, 1964. 18 account from the Merchandise Dept.
of Davao Lumber Co. per statement
It is obvious that the refusal of the respondent judge to attached, marked schedule
order a hearing before the commissioner was in clear 1.............................................................
violation of Section 3, Rule 33, Revised Rules of Court, ......................... P190:010.41
which specifically provides "... that the trial or hearing
before a commissioner shall proceed in all respects as (b) From July 2, 1960 to Oct. 31, 1962,
though the same had been had before the court." For this Urbano Jaca purchased on account
purpose Section 5 of the same Rule provides that "upon from the Sawmill Dept. of Davao
receipt of the order of reference, unless otherwise Lumber Co. per statement hereto
provided therein, the commissioner shall forthwith set a attached, marked schedule
time and place for the first meeting of the parties or their 2.............................................................
attorneys to be held within ten (10) days after the date of .......................... P75,075.73
reference ..." Pertinent also is Section 10 of Rule 33 which
provides that "... Objections to the report based upon (c) Old vales or cash advances prior to
grounds which were available to the parties during the July 25, 1963 which Urbano Jaca
proceedings before the commissioner, other than replaced with four (4) BPI Checks Nos.
objections to the findings and conclusions therein set D-236619 to D-236622 P50,000.00
forth, shall not be considered by the court unless they each as alleged by
were made before the commissioner." DLC ........................................................
................................... P200,000.00
The respondent judge's refusal to order the commissioner
to conduct a hearing in accordance with Section 5, Rule 33 (d) From Nov. 3, 1962 to Aug. 30, 1963,
was fatal to the cause of the petitioners. Under Section 10 Urbano Jaca purchased on accounts
of Rule 33, objections to the report based upon grounds from the Sawmill Dept. various goods,
which were available to the parties during the proceedings per attached statement, marked
before the commissioner other than objections to the Schedule
findings and conclusions therein set forth shall not be 3 ............................................................
considered by the court, unless they were made before ....................................... P57,459.27
the commissioner. Objections to the report which were
available to the parties during the proceedings refer to
(e) From Nov. 3, 1962 to Aug. 30, 1963,
objections to the admissibility or non-admissibility of
Urbano Jaca purchased from the Mds.
evidence to be considered by the commissioner. Since no
Dept. of DLC various goods, per
meeting was held before the commissioner, petitioners
attached statement, marked Scheduled
never had the opportunity to object to the admissibility of
4 ............................................................
evidence of cash, equipment, materials and foodstuff,
.................................... P68,857.07
which they alleged in their complaint, were never received
by them. Also, they failed to question the failure of the
commissioner to include in his examination the price (f) From July 25, 1963 to Sept. 16, 1963
quotations of the logs which, as claimed in the complaint, Urbano Jaca obtained cash advances or
were under classified and undergraded. vales per attached statement, marked
schedule 5............ P164,844.45
The records show that respondent Davao Lumber
Company was able to prove its claim against petitioners (g) Purchase of gasoline made by
because respondent judge refused to order the Urbano Jaca from Shell Co., under
commissioner to hold a hearing as required by the rules. Davao Lumber Co.'s
Thus, objections which petitioners may have against the guaranty ................................................
claims of respondent were never considered. In the same ...................... P2,523.60
manner, the claim of petitioner that respondent Davao
Lumber Company is indebted to them was not also Total amount due Davao Lumber Co.
considered. The Commissioner limited his examination to from Urbano Jaca .......... P758,770.53
the following:
The amount of P2,523.60 due Shell Co.
MR. URBANO LACAS ACCOUNTS: may be deducted from the total

62
 amount if Urbano Jaca can show proof
that the account has been paid.
MR. BONIFACIO JACAS ACCOUNTS:
(a) From Nov. 3, 1962 to Aug. 8, 1963
Bonifacio Jaca purchased on account
various goods from the Sawmill Dept.
of DLC per attached statement,.
marked
6.............................................................
..................................... P39,999.69
(b) From Feb. 4, 1963 to Aug. 8, 1963
Bonifacio Jaca purchased on account
from the Mdse. Dept. various goods,
per attached statement marked
schedule
7.............................................................
......................................................
P48,319.08
(c) Purchases of gasoline from Shell Co.
guaranteed by Davao
Co. .........................................................
.......................................................
P5,252.12.
(d) From Aug. 6, 1963 to Aug. 23, 1963,
Bonifacio Jaca obtained cash advances
or vales, per attached statement
marked schedule 8........... P3,333.20
Total amount due Davao Lumber Co.
from Mr. Bonifacio Jaca P96,904.09. 19
Clearly, the examination was only made on advances made
to petitioners. There was not even an attempt to examine
receipts of payments made by petitioners. It is hard to
believe that the petitioners had not paid any amount for
the advances made to them. In fact, the respondents
stated in paragraph 4 of its answer to the complaint that
the plaintiffs stopped delivering logs in August,
1963, 20 indicating that from 1962 to 1963, the years
included in the report of the commissioner, the petitioners
had delivered logs to the Davao Lumber Company.
There is doubt that petitioners are really indebted to
respondent Davao Lumber Company in such a big amount
as found by the trial court. The appeal of the petitioner
appears to be meritorious. The fear of respondent that the
judgment of the trial court might not be satisfied if not
executed at once is not well founded. If the judgment is
executed now, and on appeal the same is reversed,
although there are provisions for restitution, damages
incurred by petitioners can not be fully compensated. 21
The reasons stated in the order of execution pending
appeal are not well founded.
The first reason stated in the order was the consistent
refusal of petitioner to deliver the mortgaged chattels to
the receiver. 22 The records disclose that respondent
Davao Lumber Company is not even entitled to the
appointment of a receiver. It is an established rule that the
applicant for receivership must have an actual and existing
schedule interest in the property for which a receiver is sought to be
appointed. 23 The Davao Lumber Company's proof of
interest in the property is the deed of chattel mortgage
executed by Urbano Jaca in favor of the Davao Lumber
Company on January 24, 1961. This deed of chattel
mortgage is void because it provides that the security
stated therein is for the payment of any and all obligations
herein before contracted and which may hereafter be
contracted by the Mortgagor in favor of the
Mortgagee. 24 In the case of Belgian Catholic Missionaries
vs. Magallanes Press this Court held:
A mortgage that contains a stipulation
in regard to future advances in the
credit will take effect only from the
Lumber
date the same are made and not from
the date of the mortgage (11 CJ, 448; 5
RCL 420-421). ... Where the statute
provides that the parties to a chattel
mortgage must make oath that the
debt is a just debt, honestly due and
owing from the mortgagor to the
mortgagee, it is obvious that a valid
mortgage cannot be made to secure a
debt to be thereafter contracted. (11
CJ. 448) 25
The second reason stated was the fact that petitioner
Urbano Jaca violated Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code
by selling to a certain Teodoro Alagon some of the
mortgaged properties. 26 As already discussed, the deed of
chattel mortgage executed by Urbano Jaca in favor of the
Davao Lumber Company is void. Hence, petitioner Urbano
Jaca could not have violated Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code. Moreover, the respondent Davao Lumber
Company has not successfully refuted the allegation of the
petitioners that the sale of the wrecker to Teodoro Alagon
was exclusively negotiated by the lumber company's
managing partner, Tian Se, and that the latter caused
Urbano Jaca to sign the deed of sale because he was the
owner of the wrecker.
The third reason stated is the fact that petitioners have no
properties and assets to satisfy the judgment. 27 The basis
of respondent judge's conclusion that petitioners do not
have sufficient assets is an unsubstantiated allegation in
the motion for execution pending appeal of respondent
lumber company. 28 To rectify this omission, respondent
63
lumber company, in its opposition to the motion for
reconsideration of the order of execution pending appeal,
tried to point out that the sale of two chevrolet trucks by
Urbano Jaca and their failure to file a counterbond indicate
that they are without sufficient assets. 29 This later attempt
to substantiate a baseless allegation in the motion for
execution pending appeal is futile. The trucks alleged to be
sold are not properties of petitioner Urbano Jaca They are
paraphernalia properties of his wife, Florentina Perez, and
the same trucks were in fact sold by her. And even if said
trucks were owned by Urbano Jaca their sale to Atty. Raul
Nengasca does not totally indicate insolvency. As has been
repeatedly observed, petitioner Urbano Jaca is engaged in
business. Sale of property used in business does not
establish insolvency. The sale may have been prompted by
the need for more modern equipment on account of
obsolescence, or the need of to be directed to more
profitable endeavor. The same reason applies to their
failure to file a counterbound. The cash needed for the
counterbound may be utilized for the continuance of the
business or to increase business profits. In short, the acts
of petitioner can not be always be interpreted as signs of
insolvency but may also indicate sound business judgment
prompted by the need to have liquid reserve of cash.
In its answer to the petition, 30 respondent lumber
company contends that petitioners, having availed of the
remedy of appeal are barred form filling a petition
for certiorari. Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may
only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law," this
rule is not without exception. The availability of the
ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient
ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not
an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and
sufficient. 31 It is the inadequacy — not the mere absence
— of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari.
In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is inadequate. It
will not immediately relieve petitioners from the injurious
effect of the order granting execution. The slow and
inexpensive remedy of appeal will not prevent respondent
judge from executing his decision requiring petitioners to
pay the huge amount of P867,887.52. Moreover, to
dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner has
already availed of the remedy of appeal will only aggravate
the patent injustice already inflicted on petitioners.
The reasons stated in the order granting execution
pending appeal are not sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted
and the orders granting execution pending appeal dated
64
November 29, 1965 and the order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order granting execution pending
appeal dated January 10, 1966 are nullified and set aside,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5108             May 26, 2005
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint
against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from
the practice of law. The complainant alleged that
respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for
falsification of public document against her, a former
client, based on confidential information gained from their
attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of
the Standards Development Division, Office of Programs
and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive
Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED).1
Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled
"Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco," for annulment of
their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial
court, and the dismissal became final and executory on
July 15, 1992.2
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of
complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent
entered his appearance before the trial court as
collaborating counsel for complainant.3
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of
Substitution of Counsel,4 informing the RTC of Pasig City
that he has been appointed as counsel for the
complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a
criminal action against complainant before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito
Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado," and docketed
as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and
172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal
Code.5 Respondent alleged that complainant made false
entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children,
Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant
allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she
is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their
marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth,
she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their
marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against
her. She denied using any other name than "Rosa F.
Mercado." She also insisted that she has gotten married
only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges
against respondent that are pending before or decided
upon by other tribunals – (1) libel suit before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;6 (2) administrative case for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, pursuit of private business,
vocation or profession without the permission required by
Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the then
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;7 (3)
complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the
Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month
suspension without pay;8 and, (4) the Information for
violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as
amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before
the Sandiganbayan.9
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint
for falsification of public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823)
disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the
civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent
Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant
Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She
claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification,
respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and
confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be
disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on
November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the complaint for
disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant
because all the allegations leveled against him are subject
of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that
the pending cases against him are not grounds for
disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until
proven otherwise.10 He also states that the decision of the
Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and
imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one
month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
65
He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple
misconduct, which he committed in good faith.11
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the
criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client because the
bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live
birth which are public documents and in no way
connected with the confidence taken during the
engagement of respondent as counsel. According to
respondent, the complainant confided to him as then
counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment
case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of
the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters.
The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of
CHED and are accessible to anyone.12
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred
the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.13
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for
hearing but complainant failed to appear in both.
Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus
granted respondent's motion to file his memorandum, and
the case was submitted for resolution based on the
pleadings submitted by the parties.14
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved
the report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding
the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, and
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of
the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that
after the passage of so many years, she has now found
forgiveness for those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the
merits of the various criminal and administrative cases
filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals
where these cases are pending to determine the guilt or
innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any
withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the
complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice
imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential
in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client
when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public
document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship
between attorney and client and the rule on attorney-
client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is
in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes
on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their
relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and
confidential nature that is required by necessity and public
interest.15 Only by such confidentiality and protection will
a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an
attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking
legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.16 Thus, the preservation and
protection of that relation will encourage a client to
entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of
paramount importance to the administration of
justice.17 One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the
attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate
his client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse
them.18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's
secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the
attorney-client relationship,19 and continues even after the
client's death.20 It is the glory of the legal profession that
its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man
may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his
rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute
assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever
disclosing it.21 With full disclosure of the facts of the case
by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation
will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights
or the prosecution or defense of the client's cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean
Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the
existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2)
from a professional legal adviser in his capacity
as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.22
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason
of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
66
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are
protected by the rule on privileged communication even if
the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment. 23 The reason
for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against
him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain
information from the prospective client.24
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective)
client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account
of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not
privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v.
Palanca,25 where the client and his wife leased to their
attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of
ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among
others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would
be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be
delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The
client alleged that the list of creditors which he had
"confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose of
carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease
contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their
lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are
adverse to those of the client. As the client himself,
however, states, in the execution of the terms of the
aforesaid lease contract between the parties, he furnished
counsel with the "confidential" list of his creditors. We
ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his
creditors to counsel not because of the professional
relation then existing between them, but on account of
the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the
confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list
would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a
breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality.26 The client must intend
the communication to be confidential.27
A confidential communication refers to information
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between
attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so
far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no
third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of
the purpose for which it was given.28
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent
ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a
lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and
delivered to the opposing party,29 an offer and counter-
offer for settlement,30 or a document given by a client to
his counsel not in his professional capacity,31 are not
privileged communications, the element of confidentiality
not being present.32
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in
his professional capacity.33
The communication made by a client to his attorney must
not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose
of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been
transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of
seeking legal advice.34
If the client seeks an accounting service,35 or business or
personal assistance,36 and not legal advice, the privilege
does not attach to a communication disclosed for such
purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the
evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's
allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify
the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by
respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms
and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent
violated the rule on privileged communication when he
instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of
public documents because the criminal complaint
disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then
handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out
these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing
game as to the existence of facts which the complainant
must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the
IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to
the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by
respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not
impossible to determine if there was any violation of the
rule on privileged communication. Such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the
rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client
privilege.37 The burden of proving that the privilege applies
is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.38
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent
Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9537               June 10, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2489)
67
DR. TERESITA LEE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment 1 dated July 21, 2009
filed by Dr. Teresita Lee (Dr. Lee) against respondent Atty.
Amador L. Simando (Atty. Simando) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2489, now A.C. No.
9537, for violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics of
Lawyers.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr.
Lee from November 2004 until January 8, 2008, with a
monthly retainer fee of Three Thousand Pesos
(Php3,000.00).2
Sometime during the above-mentioned period, Atty.
Simando went to see Dr. Lee and asked if the latter could
help a certain Felicito M. Mejorado (Mejorado) for his
needed funds. He claimed that Mejorado was then
awaiting the release of his claim for informer's reward
from the Bureau of Customs. Because Dr. Lee did not know
Mejorado personally and she claimed to be not in the
business of lending money, the former initially refused to
lend money. But Atty. Simando allegedly persisted and
assured her that Mejorado will pay his obligation and will
issue postdated checks and sign promissory notes. He
allegedly even offered to be the co-maker of Mejorado
and assured her that Mejorado's obligation will be paid
when due. Atty. Simando was quoted saying: "Ipapahamak
ba kita, kliyente kita"; "Sigurado ito, kung gusto mo,
gagarantiyahan ko pa ito, at pipirma din ako"; "Isang
buwan lang, at hindi hihigit sa dalawang buwan ito, bayad
ka na."3
Due to Atty. Simando's persistence, his daily calls and
frequent visits to convince Dr. Lee, the latter gave in to her
lawyer's demands, and finally agreed to give Mejorado
sizeable amounts of money. Respondent acted as co-
maker with Mejorado in various cash loans, to wit:4
Date: Amount
November 11, 2006 Php 400,000.00
November 24, 2006 200,000.00
November 27, 2006 400,000.00
 December 7, 2006 200,000.00
December 13, 2006 200,000.00
Total: Php1,400,000.00
When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's
repeated demands, Mejorado failed and refused to comply
with his obligation. Since Atty. Simando was still her lawyer
then, Dr. Lee instructed him to initiate legal action against
Mejorado. Atty. Simando said he would get in touch with
Mejorado and ask him to pay his obligation without having
to resort to legal action. However, even after several
months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr. Lee, so she again
asked Atty. Simando why no payment has been made yet.
Dr. Lee then reminded Atty. Simando that he was
supposed to be the co-maker of the obligation of
Mejorado, to which he replied: "Di kasuhan din ninyo
ako!"5
Despite complainant's repeated requests, respondent
ignored her and failed to bring legal actions against
Mejorado. Thus, in January 2008, complainant was forced
to terminate her contract with Atty. Simando.
Subsequently, complainant's new lawyer, Atty. Gilbert
Morandarte, sent a demand letter dated June 13, 2008 to
Atty. Simando in his capacity as the co-maker of some of
the loans of Mejorado.
In his Letter dated June 30, 2008, respondent denied his
liability as a co-maker and claimed that novation had
occurred because complainant had allegedly given
additional loans to Mejorado without his knowledge.6
Dr. Lee then accused Atty. Simando of violating the trust
and confidence which she gave upon him as her lawyer,
and even took advantage of their professional relationship
in order to get a loan for his client. Worse, when the said
obligation became due, respondent was unwilling to help
her to favor Mejorado. Thus, the instant petition for
disbarment against Atty. Simando.
On August 12, 2009, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to
submit his Answer on the complaint against him.7
In his Answer8 dated September 17, 2009, Atty. Simando
claimed that complainant, who is engaged in lending
money at a high interest rate, was the one who initiated
the financial transaction between her and Mejorado. He
narrated that complainant asked him if it is true that
Mejorado is his client as she found out that Mejorado has
a pending claim for informer's reward with the Bureau of
Customs. When he affirmed that Mejorado is his client,
complainant signified that she is willing to give money for
Mejorado's financial needs while awaiting for the release
68
of the informer's reward. Eventually, parties agreed that
Mejorado will pay double the amount and that payment
shall be made upon receipt by Mejorado of the payment
of his claim for informer's reward.9
Meanwhile, Atty. Simando stressed that Dr. Lee gave
Mejorado a total of Php700,000.00 as an investment but
he signed as co-maker in all the receipts showing double
the amount or Php1,400,000.00.10
Respondent claimed that complainant is a money-lender
exacting high interest rates from borrowers.11 He narrated
several instances and civil cases where complainant was
engaged in money-lending where he divulged that even
after defendants had already paid their loan, complainant
still persists in collecting from them.12 Respondent
asserted that he knew of these transactions, because he
was among the four lawyers who handled complainant's
case.13
Respondent averred that from the time that Mejorado and
Dr. Lee had become close to each other, the latter had
given Mejorado additional investments and one (1)
Silverado Pick-up at the price of ₱500,000.00 and fifty (50)
sacks of old clothings. He claimed that the additional
investments made by Dr. Lee to Mejorado were given
without his knowledge.
Atty. Simando further alleged that with Dr. Lee's
investment of around ₱2 Million which included the
Silverado Pick-up and the fifty (50) sacks of old clothings,
the latter required Mejorado to issue five (5) checks with a
total value of ₱7,033,500.00, an amount more than the
actual value which Mejorado received.14
Atty. Simando added that while Dr. Lee and Mejorado
agreed that the issued checks shall be presented to the
bank only upon payment of his informer's reward, Dr. Lee
presented the checks to the bank despite being aware that
Mejorado's account had no funds for said checks. Atty.
Simando further denied that he refused to take legal
action against Mejorado. He claimed that complainant
never instructed him to file legal action, since the latter
knew that Mejorado is obligated to pay only upon receipt
of his informer's reward.
Finally, Atty. Simando insisted that he did not violate their
lawyerclient relationship, since Dr. Lee voluntarily made
the financial investment with Mejorado and that he
merely introduced complainant to Mejorado. He further
claimed that there is no conflict of interest because he is
Mejorado's lawyer relative to the latter's claim for
informer's reward, and not Mejorado's lawyer against Dr.
Lee. He reiterated that there is no conflicting interest as
there was no case between Mejorado and Dr. Lee that he
is handling for both of them.15
In her Reply dated October 30, 2009, Dr. Lee denied that
what she entered into was a mere investment. She insisted
that she lent the money to Mejorado and respondent, in
his capacity as co-maker and the transaction was actually a
loan.16 To prove her claim, Dr. Lee submitted the written
loan agreements/receipts which categorically stated that
the money received was a loan with due dates, signed by
Mejorado and respondent as co-maker.17 She further
claimed that she did not know Mejorado and it was
respondent who brought him to her and requested her to
assist Mejorado by lending him money as, in fact,
respondent even vouched for Mejorado and agreed to sign
as co-maker.
Complainant further emphasized that what she was
collecting is the payment only of the loan amounting to
One Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php1,400,000.00) which respondent had signed as co-
maker. Thus, respondent's claim that his obligation was
already extinguished by novation holds no water, since
what was being collected is merely his obligation
pertaining to the loan amounting to Php1,400,000.00 only,
and nothing more.
Finally, complainant lamented that respondent, in his
comments, even divulged confidential informations he had
acquired while he was still her lawyer and even used it
against her in the present case, thus, committing another
unethical conduct. She, therefore, maintained that
respondent is guilty of violating the lawyer-client
confidentiality rule.
Both parties failed to appear during the mandatory
conference on January 15, 2010. Both parties requested
for resetting of the mandatory conference, however, both
failed to agree on a certain date. Hence, the IBP, so as not
to delay the disposition of the complaint, terminated the
mandatory conference and instead required the parties to
submit their respective position papers.18
On March 18, 2010, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Simando
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
On December 29, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
of the IBP-CBD to suspend Atty. Simando from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months.
Respondent moved for reconsideration.
On March 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted
respondent's motion for reconsideration for lack of
sufficient evidence to warrant the penalty of suspension.
The Resolution dated December 29, 2010 was reversed
and the case against respondent was dismissed.
69
RULING
We reverse the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors.
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining
whether a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting
interest:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an
issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time,
to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of
the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in
the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.19
In the instant case, we find substantial evidence to support
respondent's violation of the above parameters, as
established by the following circumstances on record:
First, it is undisputed that there was a lawyer-client
relationship between complainant and Atty. Simando as
evidenced by the retainer fees received by respondent and
the latter's representation in certain legal matters
pertaining to complainant's business;
Second, Atty. Simando admitted that Mejorado is another
client of him albeit in a case claiming rewards against the
Bureau of Customs;
Third, Atty. Simando admitted that he was the one who
introduced complainant and Mejorado to each other for
the purpose of entering into a financial transaction while
having knowledge that complainant's interests could
possibly run in conflict with Mejorado's interests which
ironically such client's interests, he is duty-bound to
protect;
Fourth, despite the knowledge of the conflicting interests
between his two clients, respondent consented in the
parties' agreement and even signed as co-maker to the
loan agreement;
Fifth, respondent's knowledge of the conflicting interests
between his two clients was demonstrated further by his
own actions, when he:
 (a) failed to act on Mejorado's failure to pay his
obligation to complainant despite the latter's
instruction to do so;
(b) denied liability despite signing as co-maker in
the receipts/promissory notes arising from the
loan agreement between his two clients;
(c) rebutted complainant's allegations against
Mejorado and him, and even divulged
informations he acquired while he was still
complainant's lawyer.
Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel
for one party (complainant as creditor) against the adverse
party (Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a
lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting
interests. He may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflict with that of his present or former client.
Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict of interest
because complainant and respondent are his clients in
unrelated cases fails to convince. His representation of
opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated,
obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least,
invites suspicion of double-dealing.20 Moreover, with the
subject loan agreement entered into by the complainant
and Mejorado, who are both his clients, readily shows an
apparent conflict of interest, moreso when he signed as
co-maker.
Likewise, respondent's argument that the money received
was an investment and not a loan is difficult to accept,
considering that he signed as co-maker. Respondent is a
lawyer and it is objectionable that he would sign as co-
maker if he knew all along that the intention of the parties
was to engage in a mere investment. Also, as a lawyer,
signing as a co-maker, it can be presupposed that he is
aware of the nature of suretyship and the consequences of
signing as co-maker. Therefore, he cannot escape liability
without exposing himself from administrative liability, if
not civil liability. Moreover, we noted that while
complainant was able to show proof of receipts of various
amounts of money loaned and received by Mejorado, and
signed by the respondent as co-maker, the latter,
however, other than his bare denials, failed to show proof
that the money given was an investment and not a loan.
It must be stressed that the proscription against
representation of conflicting interests finds application
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the
same general matter however slight the adverse interest
may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the
lawyer’s private activity or in the performance of a
function in a non-professional capacity. In the process of
determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an
70
important criterion is probability, not certainty, of
conflict.21
We likewise note that respondent offered several excuses
in order to avoid payment of his liability.1âwphi1 First, in
his Answer to complainant's demand letter, he claimed
there was novation which extinguished his liability;
Secondly, he claimed that the amount received by
Mejorado for which he signed as co-maker was merely an
investment and not a loan. Finally, he alleged that it was
agreed that the investment with profits will be paid only
after Mejorado receives the payment for his claim for
reward which complainant violated when she presented
the checks for payment prematurely. These actuations of
Atty. Simando do not speak well of his reputation as a
lawyer.22
Finally, we likewise find respondent guilty of violating Rule
21.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.23 In his
last-ditch effort to impeach the credibility of complainant,
he divulged informations24 which he acquired in
confidence during the existence of their lawyer-client
relationship.
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 25 that the termination
of the relation of attorney and client provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse
to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason
for the rule is that the client’s confidence once reposed
cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional
employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not, even
after the severance of the relation with his client, do
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in
any matter in which he previously represented him nor
should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences
acquired in the previous relation.
Accordingly, we reiterate that lawyers are enjoined to look
at any representation situation from "the point of view
that there are possible conflicts," and further, "to think in
terms of impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his
representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client.26
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to
ADOPT the findings and recommendation of the IBP in
Resolution No. XIX-20 10-733 suspending respondent Atty.
Amador L. Simando for six ( 6) months from the practice of
law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office
of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this
Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date
of his receipt of this Decision so that we can determine the
reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 1372. June 27, 2002.]
SPOUSES LIRIO U. RABANAL AND CAYETANO D.
RABANAL, Complainants, v. ATTY. FAUSTINO F.
TUGADE, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant
spouses Cayetano and Lirio Rabanal against Atty. Faustino
F. Tugade. It is alleged that respondent, as counsel for
complainant Cayetano Rabanal, did not file the appellant’s
brief in the Court of Appeals, as a result of which the
appeal filed by Cayetano was dismissed and the decision of
the then Circuit Criminal Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan
became final and executory.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
It appears that complainant Cayetano Rabanal was one of
the accused-appellants in Criminal Case No. CCC-I-150,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Rabanal y
Ibanez, Et Al.," of the Criminal Circuit Court of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. 1 He was found guilty of homicide and the case
was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Complainant
terminated the services of his previous counsel and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Faustino F.
Tugade as new counsel to prosecute the appeal. 2
However, despite the extension of time granted to him
totalling 60 days, Atty. Tugade failed to file the appellant’s
brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. 3 Cayetano
filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was
denied. 4 Complainants alleged that they paid P1,000.00
to respondent as attorney’s fees and, in addition, the
amount of P1,400.00 for the preparation of the appellant’s
brief. 5 Complainants sought the suspension from the
practice of law or the disbarment of respondent attorney.
6chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In his comment dated October 24, 1974, respondent said
he did not want to accept complainant’s case due to his
busy schedule, but that he was nonetheless prevailed
upon by the latter, who is his "kababayan," to sign the
appellant’s brief to be filed in the case. 7 Cayetano gave
the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) pertaining to
the case to respondent, and the sum of P600.00 as
71
litigation expenses, after which respondent asked another
lawyer to prepare the appellant’s brief. However, on May
11, 1974, Cayetano informed respondent that the Court of
Appeals had dismissed his appeal for failure of counsel to
file an appellant’s brief. Respondent alleged he then
entered his appearance as counsel for Cayetano and filed a
motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, for
which he was paid P800.00. 8 The motion was, however,
denied and Cayetano served sentence from 1974 to 1979,
when he was released on conditional pardon. 9chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In a resolution, dated November 4, 1974, the Court
referred the administrative case against respondent to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation,
report, and recommendation. 10 The OSG conducted
hearings on February 5, 1976 and November 27, 1976,
during which the spouses Rabanal testified in support of
their complaint. 11 On January 24, 1979, Cayetano was
released from the New Bilibid Prisons on conditional
pardon. 12 A few years later, the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case. 13 After
each of the complainants had testified, the IBP
Commissioner set the hearing for reception of
respondent’s evidence on June 26, 1992 with warning that
the case would be considered submitted for resolution if
respondent failed to present his evidence. 14 Three
notices of the hearing sent by registered mail to
respondent were, however, returned unclaimed. 15
Accordingly, the IBP Hearing Commissioner, upon motion
of complainant Lirio Rabanal, considered the case
submitted for resolution. 16 On May 8, 1993, the IBP
Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for at
least one (1) year. 17
On July 15, 1993, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC). Later, however, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSN) were lost. 18 In any case, on May
20, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) adopted
the findings of the IBP and recommended the suspension
of respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year. 19
After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds
no basis for reversing the findings and recommendation of
the IBP and the OBC. Their recommendation is affirmed
with the modification that the penalty imposed is reduced
from one (1) year to six (6) months.
Respondent claims that he was not the counsel of
complainant Cayetano Rabanal prior to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals
and he could not be held responsible for the dismissal of
complainant’s appeal for failure of counsel to file the
appellant’s brief. We disagree.
The absence of a written contract does not preclude a
finding that there was a professional relationship which
merits attorney’s fees for professional services rendered. A
written contract is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express
or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession. 20
Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez, 21 the Court held that the
admission of respondent lawyer that he received payment
from complainant is sufficient evidence to establish a
lawyer-client relationship. In this case, complainant sought
and received legal advice from respondent Tugade, who
admitted that he agreed to sign the appellant’s brief to be
filed and that he received P600.00 from complainant
spouses. It is therefore clear that a lawyer-client
relationship existed between the two.
It is immaterial that respondent Tugade assisted Cayetano
in the case as a mere friend or "kababayan" of the latter.
In Junio v. Grupo, 22 respondent also denied the existence
of a lawyer-client relationship, stating that complainant
was a close personal friend whom he helped in a personal
capacity. Nonetheless, it was held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
To constitute professional employment it is not essential
that the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. . . It is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
promised, or charged for neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case
about which the consultation was had. If a person, in
respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with
the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance,
and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established. . . . his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
In this case, Cayetano consulted respondent Tugade in his
professional capacity in order to obtain advice concerning
his appeal. Respondent agreed, as shown by his
acceptance of the payment to him, his receipt of the TSNs
of the case, and the fact that he signed the appellant’s
brief. His claim that he merely accepted payment but that
he asked another lawyer to prepare the brief is an obvious
subterfuge. He has not even named the lawyer assuming
that the latter is real. It is hard to see why respondent
should personally accept payment and the transcripts of
stenographic notes from complainant if he did not intend
to prepare the appellant’s brief. Moreover, the fact that
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after the
dismissal of the appeal only confirms that he was indeed
Cayetano’s lawyer.
The records clearly show that respondent Atty. Faustino F.
Tugade was remiss in the performance of his duties as
72
counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal. He was given
by the Court of Appeals an extension of time totalling 60
days within which to file the appellant’s brief, but he failed
to file the same. He thus violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
RULE 12.03. — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs,
let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
RULE 18.03. — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
What this Court said in another case is fitting:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve
the client with competence and diligence, and champion
the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community
to the legal profession. 23
Indeed, a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. He
should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him, remembering always that his actions or omissions are
binding on his clients. In this case, the failure of
respondent to file the appellant’s brief resulted in the
dismissal of the appeal. As a consequence, the decision in
the trial court finding complainant guilty of homicide
became final and executory and he was sentenced to ten
years of imprisonment. As has been held:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the
best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario v.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for
his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on
his part. (People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent
has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by
him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay
litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.
(People v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43
SCRA 515). 24
It should likewise be noted that respondent failed to notify
the IBP of his change of address, thus delaying the
resolution of this case. Service of notice and other
pleadings, which must be furnished to the parties, must be
made at the last address on record. If the parties are
represented by counsel, such notices shall be sent instead
to the counsel’s last given address on record in the
absence of a proper and adequate notice of a change of
address, unless service upon the party himself is
ordered.25cralaw:red
In Resurreccion v. Sayson, 26 the Court attributed the
delay in the resolution of an administrative case to
respondent lawyer, after finding that "The 27-year delay in
the resolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused by
his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor
General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a
failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very
serious charges brought against him." Similarly,
respondent Tugade likewise showed a disregard of the
charge against him, and the IBP properly made its
recommendation solely on the basis of complainants’
testimonies and the documentary evidence.
In Galen v. Paguirigan, 27 the Court, taking into account
that it was a first offense, suspended for a period of six (6)
months a lawyer who failed to file a brief. Atty. Faustino
Tugade showed lack of due care for his client’s interest
and willful neglect of his duties as an officer of the court,
thus warranting the imposition of the same penalty on
him.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Faustino F. Tugade is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months effective upon finality hereof with
WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act
charged in this complaint will be dealt with even more
severely.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
A.C. No. 5808             May 4, 2005
OSCAR M. ESPIRITU, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAIME C. ULEP, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
73
In a letter1 addressed to the president of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter,
complainant Oscar M. Espiritu sought assistance to enable
him to talk to respondent Atty. Jaime C. Ulep who had
allegedly been avoiding him for more than a year. He
wanted a meeting with respondent lawyer for the
following reasons:
(1) respondent failed to turn-over to his client,
Mr. Ricardo Maon, the amount of P50,000 given
to him by complainant on December 22, 1997 as
settlement of Civil Case No. 1028, Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and
(2) respondent refused to give complainant the
amount of P30,000 plus interest and expenses as
balance for a deed of absolute sale dated
December 22, 1997 which the respondent
brokered and notarized.
On April 5, 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), through Commissioner J.V. Bautista invited
respondent to a meeting at IBP Cabanatuan to determine
whether an amicable settlement of the impending
complaint could be reached.2
Due to respondent's failure to appear in the meeting, the
IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter formally endorsed the verified
letter-complaint to the IBP - CBD on April 19, 1999.
In an order3 dated May 28, 1999, the IBP-CBD ordered
respondent to file his answer to the complaint pursuant to
Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.4
Respondent complied with the order by filing an affidavit
which turned out to be the same affidavit he submitted to
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office for the preliminary
investigation of the estafa case filed against him involving
the same subject matter. We quote:
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, Atty. Jaime C. Ulep, of legal age, married, and a
resident of and with postal address at Rizal,
Nueva Ecija, after having been duly sworn, in
accordance with law, depose and state:
1. The case should be dismissed
because the same has no elements of
estafa;
2. The truth of the matter is that, at
the time the Deed of Sale of that
agricultural land was prepared, Mr.
ESPIRITU admitted for the first time
that the owner's copy of the Title was
 lost but the petition for the issuance of
the owner's copy was being prepared;
3. In order to please Mr. ESPIRITU and
not to hamper the transaction and, at
the same time protect the interest of
the clients (Buyers), Mr. ESPIRITU
agreed to hold the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in trust
to be given to him after giving to me
the Owner's Copy;
4. Afterwards, his niece kept coming to
my office to ask for money in order,
according to her, to facilitate the
issuance of the Title. On November 3,
1998, his niece demanded and
received the amount of five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) from me. In other
words, the total amount demanded
and received from me (out of
the P50,000.00) was twenty five
thousand (P25,000.00), as of
November 3, 1998. (A copy of the
receipt with a note "Balance Twenty
Five Thousand only (P25,000.00) was
written.);
5. After that date, no word was
received by the undersigned from Mr.
ESPIRITU whether the owner's copy
was issued;
6. I am obligated to give the amount of
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00), provided that he will give
to me the genuine owner's copy of the
Title;
7. In view thereof, the case should be
dismissed because this is a clear case
of specific performance and not Estafa.
Atty. Jaime C. Ulep
Affiant5
In the cover letter6 of the counter-affidavit, respondent
lawyer sought a formal hearing on the administrative case.
Consequently, notice of hearing7 was served upon the
parties to appear before the Commission on August 13,
1999.
Both parties failed to appear on the scheduled hearing. On
record, however, is a letter request8 earlier filed by
74
respondent to cancel the scheduled hearing due to a prior
engagement. He also asked for a transfer of venue from
Pasig City to Cabanatuan City. The Commission did not
immediately act on this request pending complainant's
conformity.
In the next scheduled hearing, only complainant appeared
although respondent had been duly notified of the hearing
as evidenced by the registry receipt card. In the
order9 dated September 17, 1999 the Commission denied
the request for transfer of venue because of complainant's
protestation.
Over the vehement objection of the complainant,
respondent was given a last chance by the Commission to
appear in a hearing reset to October 29, 1999. It warned
that a motion for postponement would no longer be
entertained. In case respondent still failed to appear, the
Commission was going to receive the complainant's
evidence ex-parte and deem the case submitted for
resolution.
In a letter10 dated October 28, 1999, respondent once
again requested a cancellation of the hearing, alleging that
he was undergoing "eye treatment."
The hearing was reset to November 19, 1999; again
respondent failed to appear. The Commission, once again
exercising leniency, afforded respondent "one last chance"
to appear before it on January 21, 2000, with another
warning of an ex-parte reception of evidence.11
In a letter12 dated January 18, 2000, respondent again
requested a cancellation. He explained that he had to
appear before the MTC of Talavera, Nueva Ecija on the
same date "in connection with a criminal case."
Considering that respondent failed to appear successively
in all the scheduled hearings of the case, the Commission
proceeded to conduct a hearing on January 21, 2000.
Complainant was allowed to submit and offer his evidence
against the respondent ex-parte, consisting of the
following:
Exhibit "A" – Complainant's verified letter-
request dated March 15, 1999;
Exhibit "B" – Certification by Atty. Jaime C. Ulep
dated December 22, 1997 that he had in his
possession the amount of P50,000 as
consideration for the settlement of Civil Case No.
1028;
Exhibit "C" – Promissory note issued by Atty.
Jaime C. Ulep dated December 22, 1997 for the
amount of P30,000;
 Exhibit "D" – Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Oscar M. Espiritu dated December 22, 1997;
Exhibit "E" – Letter of Ricardo Maon dated
March 9, 1999 addressed to the Tanggapan ng
Punong Barangay of Barangay Bicos, Rizal, Nueva
Ecija that he has not received any amount from
Atty. Jaime C. Ulep for the settlement of Civil
Case No. 1028; and
Exhibit "F" – Decision of the MTC of Rizal, Nueva
Ecija in Civil Case No. 1028 incorporating the
compromise agreement between Oscar Espiritu
and Ricardo Maon.
After the pieces of evidence were marked, the case was
submitted for decision.13
On December 29, 2000 Investigating Commissioner J.V.
Bautista submitted his report and recommendation14 to
the IBP Board of Governors. He found respondent lawyer
guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he misappropriated the money
received by him for his client. A six-month suspension
from the practice of law was recommended for his
transgression.
In a notice of resolution15 dated June 29, 2002, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It
found that the recommendation was fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.
By failing to deliver the amount of P50,000 to his client
Ricardo Maon despite demand — which constituted
misappropriation of the client's money — it found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It ordered the immediate
delivery to Ricardo Maon of the amount of P50,000 plus
interest computed at the legal rate from December 22,
1997 to the date of delivery and suspended respondent
from the practice of law for six months.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent was guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary
in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith,
loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection
of the client.16
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every
lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. 17 Accordingly, he
shall account for all money or property collected or
75
received for or from the client.18 Even more specific is the
Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action
whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantage of the confidence
reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or
other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted
for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or
be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand
the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation
of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.19
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them
are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty
of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.20 Those who are guilty of such infraction may
be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of
law.
Here, it was established that respondent lawyer received
for his client Ricardo Maon the amount of P50,000 as
settlement of Civil Case No. 1028 and that he did not
deliver the same upon demand. As summarized by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner:
First, Exhibit "F"21 proved that there was an
obligation on the part of complainant Espiritu to
deliver to Ricardo Maon, who was respondent's
client, the amount of P50,000 as full settlement
of Civil Case No. 1028. Second, Exhibit
"B"22 proved that complainant Espiritu gave to
respondent lawyer who acknowledged receipt
thereof the amount of P50,000 as settlement of
Civil Case No. 1028. And finally, Exhibit
"E"23 proved that Ricardo Maon, respondent's
client, did not receive any amount of P50,000
from his lawyer as settlement of Civil Case No.
1028.24
His failure to appear on five consecutive, scheduled
hearing dates — requesting the cancellation and resetting
of three and absolutely ignoring two — showed an evasive
attitude towards the resolution of the administrative case
filed against him and of which he himself sought a formal
hearing. Aside from his patent lack of respect for the
Commission and its proceedings, his repeated and
obviously deliberate failure to appear in the scheduled
hearings revealed an attempt to wiggle away from having
to explain and ventilate his side. Worse, he did not file an
answer to controvert the allegations in the complaint.
Instead, he filed a counter-affidavit he had earlier
submitted in a criminal case which, upon scrutiny, referred
only to a transaction involving what appeared to be a sale
of real property documented in exhibit "D"25 of the
complainant.
Respondent has no one else to blame but himself. Had he
taken the time to appear before the Commission and
present his defenses, he could have explained why he kept
the money delivered to him by the complainant as
settlement of the civil case. As things stand therefore,
complainant's allegations against respondent remain
completely uncontroverted.
For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and
deliver money received on behalf of their clients, some
lawyers have been disbarred while others have been
suspended for six months.26 Since this appears to be the
first case of respondent in the IBP-CBD, we impose the
lighter penalty on him.
As to complainant's other claim for P30,000 which
respondent lawyer allegedly promised him, we rule the
evidence to be lacking and therefore find it premature to
grant the award.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jaime C. Ulep is hereby
found GUILTY of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six months from notice,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is further ordered to restitute to his client
Ricardo Maon, in cash within 30 days from notice, the
amount of P50,000 with interest at the legal rate,
computed from December 22, 1997 to the date of
delivery.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the
land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's record in
this Court.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10443, August 08, 2016
WILLIAM G. CAMPOS, JR., REPRESENTED BY ROSARIO B.
CAMPOS, RITA C. BATAC AND DORINA D.
76
CARPIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ALEXANDER C.
ESTEBAL, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Complaint1 for Disbarment instituted by William
G. Campos, Jr, (Campos), represented by his wife, Rosario
B. Campos, and by Rita C. Batac (Batac) and Doriha D.
Carpio (Carpio) against respondent Atty. Alexander C,
Estebal (Atty. Estebal). The Complaint was docketed as
CBD Case No. 07-2075 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
The facts of the case are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIn the early part of 2006,
complainants engaged the services of Atty. Estebal to
assist each of them in securing tourist visas to the United
States (U.S.). Toward this end, on January 24, 2006,
Campos and Atty. Estebal entered into a Service
Contract2stipulating an acceptance/service fee of
P200,000.00 exclusive of out-of-pocket expenses such as
tickets, filing fees, and application fees; and that in case no
visa is issued, Campos is entitled to a refund of what has
been actually paid less 7% thereof. Campos paid Atty.
Estebal the sum of P150,000.00. For their part, Batac and
Carpio gave Atty. Estebal the amounts of P75,000.00 and
P120,000.00, respectively. Unlike Campos, their
agreement with Atty. Estebal was not put in writing.
Complainants claimed that despite receipt of their monies,
Atty. Estebal failed to apply or secure for them the U.S.
tourist visas that he promised. Thus, they demanded for
the return of their monies. Atty, Estebal, however, failed
to return the amount despite repeated demands. Hence,
they filed this Complaint praying that Atty. Estebal be
suspended or disbarred from the practice of law, and that
he be directed to return their monies.
In his Answer,3 Atty. Estebal averred: (1) that he is a
practicing lawyer specializing in imniigration, international
law and illegal arrest cases, including the procurement of
tourist visas; (2) that like any other professional, he is paid
not only for the resultjs he delivered, but also for the time,
talent, industry and other items of professional services he
rendered, irrespective of the result/s thereof; (3) that his
professional services were engaged by complainants for
the purpose of enabling them to secure or obtain tourist
visas from the U.S, Embassy in Manila; (4) that after
interviewing complainants individually, he suggested that
complainants file {a collective application, meaning that
the complainants, along with other applicants for a U.S.
tourist visa, should constitute themselves into a tour
group, so that their overall chances of obtaining visas for
all members of the group would be enhanced; (5) that he
made this suggestion because he believed that the more
applicants join the group, the lesser the fees that would be
charged; (6) that it was agreed that a group of 10
applicants would comprise a tour group; (7) that although
some applicants paid the proper fees and submitted the
required documents, others neither paid the proper fees
nor submitted the necessary documents; (8) and that
because of this lack of cohesive action, the plan did not
push through at all
Atty. Estebal posited that complainants' demand for the
return or refund of their money has no factual or legal
basis at all, especially because he had invested
considerable time, talent and energy in the processing of
complainants' tourist visa applications with the U.S.
Embassy.
Report, and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner
In his Commissioner's Report,4 Investigating Commissioner
Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), noted
that Atty. Estebal received a total of P345,000.00 from
complainants; that notwithstanding receipt thereof, Atty.
Estebal did not make any attempt to process or submit
their visa applications; that even if the amount collected is
considered as attorney's fees, the same is excessive; and
that even if Atty. Estebal is entitled to attorney's fees, the
amount of PI 5,000.00 would be considered appropriate
under the circumstances. Thus, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Estebal be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for
violating Canons 15, 16 and 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; moreover, it was recommended that Atty,
Estebal be directed to refund the amount of P330,000.00
and to retain the amount of P15,000.00 as his attorney's
fees, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and after evaluation of
the evidence presented by both parties, the undersigned
believes that ATTY. ALEXANDER ESTEBAL, SR. should be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months. In addition thereto, he is being ordered to
immediately return the following amounts to the
complainants, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) William Campos, Jr. - the
amount of P145,000.00
(2) Rita Batac - the amount of P70,000.00
(3) Dorina Carpio - the amount of PI 15,000.005
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XX-2012-665, affirming with modification
the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
77
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules Respondent is
hereby Ordered to Return the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos only with legal interest to
complainant[s] within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice with a Warning to be more circumspect in his
dealings and repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.6
In fine, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to delete the
recommended penalty of suspension and reduce the
amount refunded from P330,000.00 to P300,000.00.
On April 2, 2013, Atty. Estebal filed an Urgent
Manifestation with Motion for Extension to file Motion for
Reconsideration,7 This was followed by an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Second Extension of Time to
File Motion for Reconsideration8 on April 19, 2013. Atty,
Estebal eventually filed his Motion for Reconsideration9 on
April 28,2013.
On February 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XX-2014-
29,towit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Commission and it being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Furthermore,
the Board RESOLVED to AFFIRM, with modification,
Resolution No. XX-2012-665 dated December 29, 2012,
and accordingly ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
SUSPENDING Respondent from the practice of law for six
(6) months.10
In short, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to reinstate
and adopt the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner to suspend Atty. Estebal from the practice
of law f0r a period of six (6) months.
On April 25, 2014, Director for Bar Discipline Dominic CM.
Solis transmitted the entire records of this case to this
Court for final resolution. Per records of the Office of the
Bar Confidant, no motion for reconsideration or petition
for review has been filed by either party.
Issue
Is Atty. Estetjal guilty of professional misconduct for
violating the pertinent provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
Our Ruling
We have gone over the records of this case with utmost
care and we fully agree with the following pertinent
findings and well-thought-out assessment of the personally before this Commission in order to confront the
Investigating Commissioner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary complainants face to face.
Obviously, the complainants failed to get the US visa There
Respondent clearly violated Canons 15, 16 and 20 of the
was even no attempt on the part of the respondent to
Code of Professional Responsibility
submit the application form for US Visa before the US
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
Embassy. Respondent failed to attach any record that will
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
show that he made an! attempt to submit the same either
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
individually or collectively.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
What is clear is that the amount individually paid by the
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO
complainants went to the pocket of the respondent. It is
HIS POSSESSION.
not even clear if it is for the payment of his attorney's fees
or for the payment of the application for the US visa, as
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or
above stated, an applicant has to spend only P6,157.00.
property collected or received for or from the client,
Thus, by mere mathematical computation, the amount of
P200,000.00 contract with complainant William Campos is
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
excessive. If it is for the payment of attorney's fees, the
REASONABLE FEES.
same is also considered excessive and unreasonable.
While lawyers are entitled to the payment of attorney's
Rule 2Q-01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following
fees, the same should be reasonable under the
factors in determining his fees.
circumstances. Even if we base the attorney's fees of the
Respondent violated Canon 15 for the reason that he was
respondent on x x x quantum meruit, still, the amount
not candid enough to tell the complainants their chance[s]
collected by the respondent is still excessive. The Supreme
of getting [a] US visa. Instead, the respondent made the
Court, in justifying quantum meruit, has laid down the
complainants believe that they will have a good chance of
following requisites:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
getting the US visa if they will be joined with other groups.
Recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum
It turned out to be false. Complainants waited for so long
meruit is authorized (1) when there is no express contract
before the respondent could find other members of the
for payment of attorney's fees (2) when although there is a
group. In the end, nothing happened.
formal contract for attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are
found unconscionable or unreasonable by the Court (3)
He also violated Canon 16, Rule 16.01 because he did not
when the contract for attorney's fees is void due to purely
account [for] the money he received from the
formal defects of execution (4) when the lawyer for
complainants. It is not clear to the complainants how
justifiable cause was not able to finish the case for its
much is trip amount due to the respondent.
conclusion (5) when the lawyer and the client disregard
the contract for attorney's fees and (6) when the client
Lastly, it appears that the attorney's fees that he collected
dismissed his client before the termination of the case or
from the complainants ajre excessive and unreasonable.
the latter withdrew therefrom for valid reason (Rillaroza
Considering the degree of work and number of hours
Africa de Ocampo and Africa vs. Eastern
spent, Hie amount he collected from the complainants is
telecommunications Phils., Inc., 128 SCRA 475).
not commensurate to the degree of services rendered.
Undersigned believes that since the amount received by
Obviously, respondent took advantage of tf|e weakness of
the respondent either as payment for attorneys' fees or
the complainants in their desire to go the United States.
either as payment for visa application is excessive,
respondent should return the money to the complainant.
After evaluating the evidence presented by both parties,
The attorney's fees is excessive in a sense that in the
the undersigned believes that the complainants have
Service contract (Annex "B" attached to the Position Paper
satisfactorily shown the degree of the required evidence
of the complainant), the scope of work are as
to convince this Commission that indeed, Atty. Estebal, Sr.
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
should be held administratively liable.
SCOPE OF WORK. Initial interview of client and collation of
all x x x information relevant to the case; assessment of
That in!fairness to the respondent, he is also entitled to his
case; evaluation of documents; formulation of the theory
attorney's fees. Having performed the scope of work he
of the case; filing up of forms, DS-156 & 157; general
mentioned in his contract, the amount of P5,000.00 per
briefing, specific briefing including mock interview.
Complainant would be reasonable payment for his
If this is only the scope of work done by the respondent,
attorney's fee. It is but proper to deduct the P5,000.00
the amount of P200,000.00 that he received from
from each complainant as reasonable attorney's fees.11
complainant William Campos is really excessive.
There is hardly any doubt that Atty. Estebal's act of
It is unfortunate that respondent failed to appear receiving such substantial sums from complainants
without in the least intending to honor his word to secure
the U.S. tourist visas that he promised to get for them

78
constitutes a breach of his professional responsibility. It
was both a refusal and a failure to give complainants their
cjlue; it was also both a refusal and a failure to observe
honesty and good faith in his dealings with them. Indeed,
Atty. Estebal acted unjustly; he denied complainantjs their
due; and he displayed unmitigated dishonesty and bad
faith in his professional and personal relations with
complainants.
In Nery v. Sampana,12 the Court declared
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client's cause. Every case accepted by a
lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes
it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid
and fair. Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility
clearly states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x
x x x A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client and of the public
confidence in the legal profession.13
Similarly, the Court is Jinon v. Atty. Jiz,14 pronounced
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[M]oney entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such
as for the processing of transfer of land title but not used
for the purpose, should be immediately returned. A
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act
is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.15
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that the
recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months must be upgraded to
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. In all
other respects, the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors as contained in Resolution No. XX-SO14-29 is
hereby adopted.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander C. Estebal is
hereby found GUILTY of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED frorn the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon receipt
of this Decision. He is also ORDERED to return the
amounts of P135,000.00 to William G. Campos, Jr.,
P60,000.00 to Rita C. Batac; and P105,000.00 to Dorina D.
Carpio. Atty. Alexander C. Estebal is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ADM. CASE NO. 5691               March 13, 2009
AVITO YU, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CESAR R. TAJANLANGIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Avito Yu against respondent Atty. Cesar R.
Tajanlangit for violation of Rules 18.03 and 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code).1
x
Complainant alleged that he had engaged the services of
respondent as defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 96-
150393 that resulted in a judgment of conviction against
him and a sentence of thirty (30) years of
imprisonment.2 After the motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial was denied by the trial court, instead of
filing an appeal, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari3 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure imputing grave abuse of discretion on the trial
court’s part in denying the motion. This petition was
subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals. Due to
respondent’s alleged error in the choice of remedy, the
period to appeal lapsed and complainant was made to
suffer imprisonment resulting from his conviction. In
depriving complainant of his right to an appeal,
respondent allegedly violated Rule 18.034 of the Code.
Moreover, complainant averred that respondent had
violated Rule 16.015 of the Code for failing to return the
bailbond to him in the amount ₱195,000.00 after having
withdrawn the same.6 Further, complainant stated that
respondent had failed to pay the telephone bill he had
incurred during his stay at complainant’s house.7
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred and be
ordered to pay him the amount of ₱211,106.97 plus
interest.8
For his part, respondent clarified that his legal services
were engaged only after the denial of the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial and the supplement
thereto. His legal services were limited to filing the
petition for certiorari. Complainant, at the time, had
already been convicted by the trial court. Respondent also
explained that he had discussed with complainant the
merits of filing a petition for certiorari and that
complainant gave his conformity to the filing of the same.9
79
Moreover, respondent averred that complainant had
authorized and instructed him to withdraw the cash bond
in order to apply the amount as payment for legal fees and
reimbursement for expenses. With regard to the unpaid
telephone bill, respondent alleged that he was not
presented a copy of the billing statement despite his
previous requests. He also contended that he had been
allowed to use the telephone to facilitate coordination
between him and complainant as he was then residing in
Bacolod City.10
The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) by Resolution of 16 July 2003.11
In his Report and Recommendation dated 2 December
2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, Jr., IBP Commissioner,
made the following findings:
On the charge of violating Rule 18.03
xxx
x x x Considering that Respondent was only hired after the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,
Complainant is silent whether an appeal was still available
to him at that time. Complainant failed to state the
material dates when his first lawyer, Atty. Lacsamana
received the Decision dated 6 February 1998, when she
filed the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, and
when his second lawyer, Atty. Espiritu, received the Order
dated 23 April 1999.
While all of the lawyers who protected Complainant’s
cause were of the view that there was a need to present
additional evidence and/or hold trial anew, it is obvious
that Complainant singled out Respondent and blamed him
solely for his conviction.
At any rate, Respondent exhaustively explained his legal
basis for elevating the Order dated 23 April 1999 to the
Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari.
Considering that the Order dated 23 April 1999, which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,
Respondent’s argument that the said order is not the
proper subject of appeal is tenable. This is supported by
Section 1(a), Rule 43 and Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court. For another, a perusal of grounds Respondent
raised in the Petition is acceptable grounds that warrant a
new trial. At least two of the grounds Respondent raised
were: the negligence of former counsel in failing to
present evidence and new discovered evidence. It is well-
settled that these grounds usually warrant the re-opening
of evidence. Thus, it cannot be said that Respondent acted
negligently in advocating Complainant’s cause.1avvphi1
xxx
80
On the charge of violating Rule 16.01
x x x In the absence of evidence controverting
Respondent’s claim that a verbal agreement exists or an
amount different from what was agreed upon, it is
believable that indeed, Complainant knew of the fee
arrangement entered into with the Respondent, through
Ms. Javier, who acted in his behalf. It is also indisputable
that Complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney
dated 23 March 1999 authorizing the Respondent to
withdraw the cash bonds in several criminal cases on his
behalf. Thus, it was not all improper for Respondent to
withdraw the same.
xxx
While Respondent is entitled to be paid for the legal
services he rendered and expenses he incurred, it is still
Respondent’s obligation to render an accounting of the
money received.
xxx
Further, Respondent did not substantiate his claim that he
had paid for or tendered payment for the unpaid
telephone bill. While he contends that he previously asked
for the billing statement, it was allegedly not shown to
him. However, there is no showing that from the time the
instant disbarment complaint was filed, which in itself
constitutes the demand for its payment, any payment
(was) made by the Respondent.12
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that
respondent be directed to: (1) render an accounting of the
money he had received and to itemize the nature of the
legal services he had rendered, inclusive of the expenses
he had incurred in compliance with Rule 16.01 of the
Code; and (2) to pay the amount of the unpaid telephone
bill. It was further recommended that respondent be
sternly warned that a similar offense in the future would
be dealt with more severely.13
On 12 March 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2005-83 adopting and approving the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner.14
The Court is in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.1avvphi1.zw+
Records show that respondent did not serve as
complainant’s lawyer at the inception of or during the trial
of Criminal Case No. 96-150393 which resulted to the
conviction of the latter. In fact, respondent was only
engaged as counsel after the withdrawal of appearance of
complainant’s lawyers and denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial and the supplement
thereto. At that time, complainant had already been
incarcerated. Significantly, complainant made no mention
of the availability of the remedy of appeal at the time of
respondent’s employment.
More importantly, the Court finds adequate respondent’s
justification for filing the petition for certiorari instead of
an appeal. Indeed, there is no showing that respondent
was negligent in handling the legal matter entrusted to
him by complainant.
The Court also agrees with the IBP that it was not at all
improper for respondent to have withdrawn the cash
bonds as there was evidence showing that complainant
and respondent had entered into a special fee
arrangement. But, however justified respondent was in
applying the cash bonds to the payment of his services and
reimbursement of the expenses he had incurred, the Court
agrees with
the IBP that he is not excused from rendering an
accounting of the same. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,15 the
Court held that "(t)he highly fiduciary and confidential
relation of attorney and client requires that the lawyer
should promptly account for all the funds received from,
or held by him for, the client."16 The fact that a lawyer has
a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in his hands
collected for his client does not relieve him from the
obligation to make a prompt accounting.17
Finally, the Court concurs with the IBP that while it is true
that respondent was not presented a copy of the unpaid
telephone bill, the instant complaint itself constitutes the
demand for its payment. Considering that there is no
manifestation to the effect that the same has been paid,
respondent should accordingly be required to settle it.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Cesar R. Tajanlangit is ordered to render, within thirty (30)
days from notice of this Resolution, an accounting of all
monies he received from complainant and to itemize the
nature of the legal services he had rendered, inclusive of
the expenses he had incurred, in compliance with Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent is further ADMONISHED that commission of
the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9091               December 11, 2013
CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA
EULALIO-RAMOS, SOLEDAD A. FAJARDO AND
ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
81
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land
located in Dinalupihan, Bataan.1 n 4 September 2002, they
entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid
₱35,000.000 for all the lots that would be sold in the
subdivision.2 For that purpose, they executed a Pecial
Power of Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into all
agreements concerning the parcels of land and to sign
those agreements on their behalf.3
Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of
the subdivision project and failed to accout for the titles to
the subdivided land.4 Complainants also found that he had
sold a number of parcels to third parties, but that he did
not turn the proceeds over to them. Neither were
complainants invited to the ceremonial opening of the
subdivision project.5
Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power
of Attorney they had previously executed in his favor.6
Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal
for the amount of ₱10,000,000, but the latter again failed
to pay them.7
Complainants engaged the professional services of
respondent for the purpose of assisting them in the
preparation of a settlement agreement.8
Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent
encouraged them to institute actions against Fevidal in
order to recover their properties. Complainants then
signed a contract of legal services,9 in which it was agreed
that they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees
to respondent, but that the docket fees would instead be
shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants
would pay respondent 50% of whatever would be
recovered of the properties. In preparation for the filing of
an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and
notarized an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to
annotate the claim of complainants to at least 195 titles in
the possession of Fevidal.10
A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to
submit the Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the Register of
Deeds of Bataan.11
The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were
paid by respondent. Unknown to him, the adverse claim
was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and
convinced complainants to agree to another settlement.12
Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending
Fevidal a demand letter dated 10 July 2006, respondent
filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and
revalidation of titles, and damages against Fevidal before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan on 13 October
2006.13
Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the
action. Thus, they terminated the services of respondent
on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint against Fevidal
on 9 June 2007, and finalized their amicable settlement
with him on 5 July 2007.14
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition 15 dated
20 July 2007 before the RTC, alleging that the termination
of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been
done with the intent of defrauding counsel. On the same
date, he filed a Motion for Recording of Attorney’s
Charging Lien in the Records of the Above-Captioned
Cases.16
When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the
complaint,17 he filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration. 18
After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and
Fevidal, with the latter denying the former’s allegation of
collusion,19 complainants sought the
suspension/disbarment of respondent through a
Complaint20 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on 14 November 2007. Complainants
alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged,
and could not taste the fruits of their properties because
the disposition thereof was "now clothed with legal
problems" brought about by respondent.21
In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had
violated Canons
1.01,22 1.03,23 1.04,24 12.02,25 15.05,26 18.04,27 and
20.0428 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On 14
August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation29 of the investigating commissioner. It
suspended respondent from the practice of law for a
period of one year for entering into a champertous
agreement.30
On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration.
On 26 November 2012, this Court noted the Indorsement
of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as
respondent’s second motion for reconsideration. We find
that respondent did not violate any of the canons cited by
complainants. In fact, we have reason to believe that
82
complainants only filed the instant complaint against him
at the prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants
to file an action against Fevidal to recover their properties,
instead of agreeing to a settlement of ₱10,000,000 – a
measly amount compared to that in the original
agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay
complainants the amount of ₱35,000,000. Lawyers have a
sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of
any prospective client and pursue the ends of justice.31
Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants
against the abuses of Fevidal under the circumstances, and
we cannot countenance an administrative complaint
against a lawyer only because he performed a duty
imposed on him by his oath. The claim of complainants
that they were not informed of the status of the case is
more appropriately laid at their door rather than at that of
respondent. He was never informed that they had held in
abeyance the filing of the adverse claim. Neither was he
informed of the brewing amicable settlement between
complainants and Fevidal. We also find it very hard to
believe that while complainants received various amounts
as loans from respondent from August 2006 to June
2007,32 they could not spare even a few minutes to ask
about the status of the case. We shall discuss this more
below. As regards the claim that respondent refused to
"patch up" with Fevidal despite the pleas of complainants,
we note the latter’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 24
September 2007, in which they admitted that they could
not convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to
a settlement.33
Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of
respondent for the recording of his attorney’s charging lien
as the "legal problem" preventing them from enjoying the
fruits of their property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect
his rights concerning the payment of his compensation.
According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall
have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money
rendered in a case in which his services have been
retained by the client. We recently upheld the right of
counsel to intervene in proceedings for the recording of
their charging lien. In Malvar v. KFPI, 34 we granted
counsel’s motion to intervene in the case after petitioner
therein terminated his services without justifiable cause.
Furthermore, after finding that petitioner and respondent
had colluded in order to deprive counsel of his fees, we
ordered the parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the
stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the determination of
whether respondent is entitled to the charging lien is
based on the discretion of the court before which the lien
is presented. The compensation of lawyers for professional
services rendered is subject to the supervision of the
court, not only to guarantee that the fees they charge
remain reasonable and commensurate with the services
they have actually rendered, but to maintain the dignity
and integrity of the legal profession as well.35
In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable
compensation for his services.36
That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue
does not make him liable for disciplinary
action.1âwphi1 Notwithstanding the foregoing,
respondent is not without fault. Indeed, we find that the
contract for legal services he has executed with
complainants is in the nature of a champertous contract –
an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the
expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights
in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in
dispute.37
Such contracts are contrary to public policy38 and are thus
void or inexistent.39
They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall
not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of
justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter they are handling for the client. A reading of the
contract for legal services40 shows that respondent agreed
to pay for at least half of the expense for the docket fees.
He also paid for the whole amount needed for the
recording of complainants’ adverse claim. While lawyers
may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they
are handling in order to safeguard their client’s rights, it is
imperative that the advances be subject to
reimbrusement.41 The purpose is to avoid a situation in
which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in the clients
cause. Regrettably, nowhere in the contract for legal
services is it stated that the expenses of litigation
advanced by respondents shall be subject to
reimbursement by complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash
advances (bali), gasoline and transportation allowance to
them for the duration of their attorney-client relationship.
In fact, he admits that the cash advances were in the
nature of personal loans that he extended to
complainants.42
Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a
lawyer in balancing the clients interests with the ethical
standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding
circumstances in this case, an admonition shall suffice to
remind him that however dire the needs of the clients, a
lawyer must always avoid any appearance of impropriety
to preserve the integrity of the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby
ADMONISHED for advancing the litigation expenses in a
legal matter her handled for a client without providing for
83
terms of reimbursement and lending money to his client,
in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He us sternly warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severly.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal
record of Atty. Bañez, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 146357 & 148170              August 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MATIAS LAGRAMADA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the
test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a
conviction.
The Case
Matias Lagramada appeals the August 23, 2000
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Morong, Rizal
(Branch 79) in Criminal Case Nos. 3158-M and 3159-M,
finding him guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding the
accused MATIAS LAGRAMADA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape for two (2) counts committed upon the
minor JOSEPHINE LAGRAMADA, [this Court sentences him]
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, for each
count of rape and to pay civil indemnity to [the] offended
party in accordance with recent jurisprudence, the amount
of ₱75,000.00 also for each count."2
Two similarly worded Informations, both dated November
11, 1998,3 charged him as follows:
"That in or about the month of April, 1996, in the
Municipality of Morong, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did, then and [there] willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Josephine
Lagramada, a twelve (12) year old girl, against the latter’s
will and consent."4
With the assistance of counsel,5 appellant pleaded not
guilty when arraigned on March 16, 1999.6 After trial on
the merits, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
summarized the prosecution’s version of the facts as
follows:7
"In April 1996, about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, the
victim Josephine Lagramada, 11 years of age, was sitting
inside the sala of her parents’ one-storey house located at
San Guillermo, Morong, Rizal, when she was pulled inside
a 3 x 4 meter room by appellant Matias Lagramada
(second cousin of the victim’s father) who threatened her
with bodily harm. The victim saw that appellant had a
‘balisong’ tucked [in] his pants. Appellant pushed her on
the bamboo bed (‘papag’), removed her shorts and
thereupon lay on top of her as he removed his own
clothes. The victim felt pain when appellant inserted his
penis into her vagina. Appellant gained carnal satisfaction
in a matter of three (3) minutes and left the room
thereafter. The victim kept the incident to herself because
she was afraid of appellant who threatened her not to tell
anyone about the incident. On September 15, 1996, about
nighttime, appellant approached the victim who was
sleeping on the lighted floor of their house beside her
younger sister, Anita Lagramada. Appellant took off her
shorts and had sexual congress with her for about three
(3) minutes. Appellant left the scene, leaving the victim
crying in despair.
"On January 3, 1998, the victim’s father, Apolonio
Lagramada, knew of another attempt by appellant to rape
his daughter, which prompted him to report to the police
authorities. The victim, on the same day, underwent
medical examination by Inspector Dennis G. Bellin,
Medico-Legal Officer, Camp Crame Crime Laboratory
Group, Quezon City, and she was found to have sustained
a ‘shallow healed laceration at 9:00 o’clock position’ and
that the ‘[s]ubject is in [a] non-virgin state physically.’"
(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
In his Brief, appellant gave his version of the facts thus: 8
"Sometime in the morning of January 3, 1998 when
accused was residing with his uncle, Apolonio Lagramada
and his daughter[s], Josephine and Anita[,] in their new
residence at El Dorado, Antipolo City as said accused was
helping his uncle, Apolonio Lagramada in repairing their
new residence at the said El Dorado, Antipolo City, the
84
latter requested the accused, to help him get a refrigerator
he would repair for the chief of [police] of Baras, Rizal. As
requested, accused helped his uncle, Apolonio and went
directly to the Municipal Hall of Baras, Rizal. Upon
[r]eaching Baras, accused was told by Apolonio to stay
downstairs, but already being guarded by a policeman
right near the [d]esk [s]ergeant while he, Apolonio
proceeded directly upstairs where the Office of the Chief
of Police is situated.
"It did not take long[.] Apolonio went down with the chief
of [p]olice and told accused that he would go home while
he (accused) shall stay with the [p]oliceman on duty,
whose name is ‘Pat. Jerry Fuliente, as he heard the chief of
[p]olice telling the [p]oliceman ‘[to] take him inside the
jail.’
"At about 8[:]30 [a.m.] the next day, January 4, 1998,
Apolonio, with his daughters, Josephine and Anita
appeared and went directly to the Office of the Chief of
Police and moments later, accused saw a policeman taking
the written statements of the two, Josephine and Anita.
Likewise, accused saw his uncle, Apolonio handing the two
(2) documents, saying that the first one is a Request for
Medico Legal and the other is an Initial Laboratory Report
on the medical examination of Josephine, and [b]oth
dated January 3, 1998 of three (3) years after the alleged
rapes were committed.
"While being interviewed by the investigators, Pat. Jerry
Fuliente, who is his guard, used to tell him that he
(accused) must not worry about his situation, as he was
allegedly requested by Apolonio to explain to him hi[s]
situation, in that he (accused) must not worry [about] his
problem as for the amount of ₱35,000.00 his cases would
be dismissed as Apolonio told him to relay to him. Not only
four times that Pat. Fuliente opened this matter to the
accused, so that, when his relatives like Francisco
Lagramada visited him and gave him money for his
expenses while in jail, he relayed the same to him as he
(accused) won’t enter into such a ‘stupid payment’ as he
did not commit any such rapes against his cousin when it
was he who took care of her when she, Josephine
Lagramada got involved in an accident and hospitalized for
about three (3) weeks at the Orthopedic Hospital."
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimony of
complainant. Noting that she was young and unmarried, it
held that she would never fabricate a story of defloration,
allow the examination of her private parts, and thereafter
permit herself to be the subject of a public trial, if she was
not motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit
brought to justice. The court a quo  also held that her
delayed reporting of the rape incidents did not undermine
her credibility, since the delay was supposedly grounded
on appellant’s threats to her life. Furthermore, it ruled
that the "minor inconsistencies" in her testimony even
bolstered her credibility and the truthfulness of her story.9
The RTC did not give credence to the defense of denial
interposed by the accused and ruled that it could not
prevail over the positive testimony of complainant. As
between his denial and her positive identification of him,
the latter was given greater weight, especially because she
had no motive to testify falsely against him.10
Hence, this appeal.11
Issues
In his Brief appellant alleged in a rather jumbled manner
that, in convicting him, the court a quo had erred on the
following grounds:
"1. No evidence was presented that it was accused who
deflowered or virginized Josephine Lagramada, the alleged
victim or complainant in these cases.
x x x           x x x          x x x
2. The evidence presented by the prosecution calls for the
dismissal of the two (2) cases on grounds that the
testimony of the complainant, Josephine Lagramada was
said to be false and untrue by her witnesses, her father
and sister.
x x x           x x x          x x x
3. On records now, undoubtedly, Josephine, the
complainant has been lying since the beginning, from the
time the accused-appellant helped her when she met an
accident up to this time.
x x x           x x x          x x x
[4]. The very purpose of the father of Josephine, Apolonio
Lagramada, who is a first cousin of the father (already
dead) of herein accused-appellant [was] to improve his
living with his daughter, Anita and others as his earnings
[were] not enough."12
In short, he argues that the RTC erred in giving full faith
and credence to complainant’s testimony despite its
inherent contradictions and implausibility.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has merit. The guilt of appellant was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, this Court
cannot sustain his conviction.
85
Main Issue:
Complainant’s Credibility
In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided
by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can
be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more
difficult for the person accused -- though innocent -- to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
where usually only two persons are involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.13
Moreover, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses
and of their testimonies, the trial court is generally
deemed to have been in a better position to observe their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
Thus, appellate courts will not disturb its findings, unless it
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.14
After poring over the records of this case, especially the
transcripts of stenographic notes, this Court is convinced
that the prosecution has not been able to prove
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Alleged First
Incident of Rape
In her testimony, complainant narrated the supposed first
rape in this manner:
"FISCAL RAMIREZ:
Now, when Matias Lagramada was pulling you, what did
he say if any?
A Not to tell anyone.
Q And what was your reaction when he was pulling you?
A I was afraid, sir.
Q Now, where did he bring you?
A In the room, sir.
Q Now, this house of yours, how many rooms are there?
A Two (2), sir.
Q Is that a bungalow or a 2-storey house? Q What did you notice from his face when you attem[p]ted
to pull up your shorts?
A 1-storey building, sir.
A His eyes were red.
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
You mentioned that you were brought in a room[;] whose
room [was] that? And you mentioned that you were afraid, why were you
afraid?
A Our room, sir.
A Because of what he [would] do to me, sir.
Q When you said our room, to whom are you referring x x
x? Q Did he already threaten you at that time?

A I, together with my sister, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q What is the name of your sister? Q What did he say to you?

A Anita, sir. A Not to tell anyone, sir.

Q Now, how far is the sala from your room. Using as a Q And was he in possession of anything?
point of your reference your seat?
A A ‘balisong’ was tucked in his hips.
A Two (2) meters, sir.
Q When you said hips, will you kindly demonstrate to us?
Q Now, that room wherein Matias Lagramada brought
you, is there a door in it? A (Witness pointing to the hips).

A There is no door, sir, but there is a curtain. Q So Matias Lagramada was able to remove your shorts?

Q Now, when Matias Lagramada [pulled] you and brought A Yes, sir.
you inside your room, did you have a premonition on what
will happen to you?
Q And what happened after that?

A None, sir.
A He [lay] on top of me, sir.

Q Now, you mentioned that Matias Lagramada undressed

Q So, he made you x x x lie down?
you[;] what clothes were you wearing at that time?

A Yes, sir.
A A white t-shirt, sir.

Q Where?
Q What did you do, if any, when Matias Lagramada started
to undress you?
A [O]n our ‘papag’, sir.
A When he was trying to remove my shorts I was pulling it
up and I was frightened, sir. Q By the way, how big is your room?

Q Now, when Matias Lagramada was pulling your shorts A Three by four (3x4).
down, you were facing each other, is that correct?
Q Now, is there a window in your room?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.

86
Q Was the window opened at that time? A He stood up where [sic] his brief and shorts, and left me
inside the room.
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
What did he say or do while he [was] putting on his
By the way, how did it happen that you [lay] down? clothes?

A He pushed me, sir. A That not to tell anyone.

Q And after he pushed you to the bed, what did he do Q Will you describe his expression when he was making
next? [these] things to you?

A He [lay] on top of me as he removed my clothes. A His face was reddish, sir.

Q And after he [lay] on top of you, what did he do? Q What was your feeling at the time when he told you not
to tell this matter to anybody?
A He removed my clothes and he also told me not to tell
anyone about it. A I [was] afraid, sir."15

Q And what did he do on top of you?
A [He placed] his organ to my organ, sir.
Q What did you feel, if any, when he was inserting his
organ to your organ?
Anita Lagramada, complainant’s sister, gave her own
version of the incident as follows:
"PROSECUTOR RAMIREZ:
x x x           x x x          x x x

A I was hurt, sir. Q You mentioned that your Ate was pulled, where was she
pulled?
Q While he was inserting his organ to your organ, what
else did he do to you? A In a room, Sir.

A No more, sir. Q Why do you know that she was brought in a room?

Q How long did he stay on top of you? A I saw it.

A Three (3) minutes, sir. Q How did you [see] it?

Q What did you notice if anything unusual on your body at A When we were looking for her we saw that she was
that time? being pulled in a room.

A I [felt] pain on my organ and when I looked at my panty Q You mentioned that Matias Lagramada removed the
there [was] blood. shorts of your Ate, what else did he do?

Q Did you see if something was expelled from the penis of A After removing the shorts of my Ate my uncle [lay] on
Matias Lagramada? top of my Ate.

A No, sir. PROSECUTOR RAMIREZ:

Q Now, after three minutes, what did Matias Lagramada While he was on top of your Ate what did he do?
do?
A He was inserting his organ to the organ of my Ate.

87
Q [Did] you notice if he ha[d] x x x pants or shorts below
his knees when on top of your Ate?
A None, Sir.
Q What else happened?
A While on top of my Ate he kissed my Ate.
Q Where did he kiss her?
A On her lips.
Q What [was] your Ate doing while Matias Lagramada was
doing this?
A She was pushing him.
Q What else happened?
A No more, Sir."16
Substantial Inconsistencies
Between the Affidavits
and the Testimonies
This Court carefully perused complainant’s account of her
alleged defilement and other records of the case. It notes
that both complainant and her sister drastically changed
their stories on when, where and how the first rape had
occurred. Their versions, as related in their affidavits,
substantially differed from those in their testimonies.
It is true that minor variations between the affidavit and
the testimony of the complainant are normally not enough
to cast doubt upon her credibility and truthfulness. 17 After
all, errorless statements and testimonies cannot be
expected, especially when she is recounting details of a
harrowing experience.18 In accordance with human nature
and experience, there can be honest inconsistencies on
minor and trivial matters, but these serve to strengthen
rather than destroy her credibility, especially when the
crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the
senses.19 Hence, she is ordinarily not deemed discredited
by such discrepancies -- for example, whether or not she
was able to buy ice before the rape, or whether the
accused held both of her hands or only one of them.20
However, the inconsistencies in the case at bar are neither
minor nor immaterial. In fact, they refer to relevant and
critical matters.
88
1. Substantial Discrepancy on Time
More often than not, it is the first incident of rape that is
most remembered by a victim. Hence, this Court finds it
strange that when first questioned as to the alleged first
rape, complainant related that she had been attacked by
the accused at night. But when questioned in open court,
she alleged that the first rape had occurred at seven
o’clock in the morning.
In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 4, 1998,21 she
related that appellant committed the rape in the following
manner:
"05. T-: Kailan at saan naganap ang unang panghahalay sa
iyo ng iyong tiyuhin na si Mateo Lagramada?
S-: Noon pong taong 1996 sa unang inuupahang bahay ng
aking magulang sa Brgy. San Guillermo, Morong, Rizal sa
ganap ng ika 9:00 ng gabi.22
Also executed on January 4, 1998, the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Anita gave a very similar story:
"04. T-: Kailan at saan naganap ang ginawang pang
gagahasa sa iyong kapatid na si Josephine Lagramada
nitong si Mateo Lagramada[?]
S-: Noon pong taong 1996 sa ganap na ika-9:00 ng gabi
humigit kumulang[;] habang kami po ng aking kapatid na si
Josephine ay natutulog na ay bigla po akong nagising dahil
po sa may pumatong sa aking ate (Josephine) at pilit
hinuhubad ang kanyang damit at ito po ay nagsalita pa na
hu[w]ag kayong sisigaw, papatayin ko kayo [a]t nakita ko
rin pong hinubad ang short ng aking ate sabay patong
po."23
The above narrations of when the rapes were committed
substantially changed during the testimonies of the two
sisters. In open court, complainant related that the first
rape happened one morning in April 1996, after the
accused had pulled her into the house while she was just
sitting alone. We quote from her testimony:
"FISCAL RAMIREZ:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q At around what time did this Matias Lagramada pull
you?
A 7:00 o’clock in the morning, sir.
Q Aside from you and Matias Lagramada, who were inside
the house at that time?
A None, sir.
Q What were you doing before Matias Lagramada pulled
you?
24
A None, sir. I was just sitting.
Like her sister, Anita substantially changed her narration of
when the first rape allegedly occurred. This time the latter
said the two of them were playing hide and seek when the
former was pulled by appellant. Anita testified thus:
"PROSECUTOR RAMIREZ:
You mentioned that your sister was raped by Matias
Lagramada. Do you recall when and where that incident
happened?
A April 4, 1995.
Q Where did that happen?
A San Guillermo, Sir.
Q In what town and province is that San Guillermo?
located?
A Morong, Rizal, Sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Will you tell us how did that rape incident [happen]?
A We were playing hide and seek when my uncle arrived
dr[u]nk. My Ate was inside the house and my uncle pulled
her.25
Aside from the radical change in the time -- from
the Sinumpaang Salaysay to the court testimony -- there
was also an inconsistency regarding the date of the first
rape. While complainant said that it occurred in April
1996, her sister said it happened a year earlier -- on April
4, 1995. These two dates were never reconciled by the
prosecution. Thus, the testimonies were notably
discrepant, not only with the affidavits, but also with each
other.
2. Substantial Discrepancies on Place and Circumstances
It is true that the exact time when the rape was committed
is normally irrelevant. However, the testimonies of both
complainant and her witness were inconsistent with
respect not only to the time, but also to the place and the
manner in which the first rape allegedly occurred. There is
89
indeed a vast difference between being raped while
sleeping at night and being raped after being pulled into
one’s house in the morning.
In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, complainant said:
06. T-: Sa ikalilinaw ng aking pagsisiyasat maari mo bang
isalaysay sa akin ang buong mga pangyayari?
S-: Noong pong taong 1996 sa Brgy. San Guillermo,
Morong, Rizal sa bahay na inuupahan namin ako po ay
limang beses niyang ginahasa at ito po ay nagaganap
tuwing kami ng aking kapatid na si Anita ay natutulog na.
At nito pong Disyembre 1996 kami po ay lumipat ng aking
magulang kasama ang aking tiyuhin sa aming bahay sa EL
DORADO, Antipolo, Rizal at doon po ay limang beses din
niyang hinalay/ ginahasa na nasaksihan po ng aking
kapatid na si Anita Lagramada. At ang huli po niyang pang-
gagahasa sa akin ay noong pong ika 24 ng Disyembre sa
Boundary po ng Teresa at Baras, sa Sitio Aduas, Brgy. San
Salvador, Baras, Rizal."26
In court, however, she testified as follows:
"FISCAL RAMIREZ:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Now, do you recall if there was an unusual incident that
happened between you and Matias Lagramada in your
house in April, 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A He pulled me inside a room and removed my clothes. He
also removed his shorts and brief and [lay] on top of me,
inserted his organ into mine and after that I again [wore]
my shorts and my panty which I noticed [had blood stain].
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Where, inside your house or outside?
A Inside, sir.
Q Where in your house?
A At the sala, sir.
Q Now, you mentioned that Matias Lagramada pulled you,
what did you do when Matias Lagramada pulled you?
A I was crying because I [felt] pain."27
Anita also substantially changed her narration, not only of
when, but also of where and how, the alleged first rape
occurred. Again, we quote this relevant portion of
her Sinumpaang Salaysay:
"04. T-: Kailan at saan naganap ang ginawang pang
gagahasa sa iyong kapatid na si Josephine Lagramada
nitong si Mateo Lagramada[?]
S-: Noon pong taong 1996 sa ganap na ika-9:00 ng gabi
humigit kumulang[;] habang kami po ng aking kapatid na si
Josephine ay natutulog na ay bigla po akong nagising dahil
po sa may pumatong sa aking ate (Josephine) at pilit
hinuhubad ang kanyang damit at ito po ay nagsalita pa na
hu[w]ag kayong sisigaw, papatayin ko kayo [a]t nakita ko
rin pong hinubad ang short ng aking ate sabay patong
po."28
But in her testimony, she said that she and her sister were
playing hide and seek when the latter was pulled into their
house by the accused. When she peeped inside, she
allegedly saw him raping complainant. Anita testified thus:
"PROSECUTOR RAMIREZ:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q You mentioned [that] you were playing hide and seek[;]
with whom were you playing this game?
A I cannot remember the name but we ha[d] a playmate.
Q You mentioned that you two ha[d] a playmate. To whom
are you referring [by] you two?
A Me and my Ate, Sir.
Q You are referring to Josephine Lagramada?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened after this Matias Lagramada pulled your
sister Josephine Lagramada?
A After pulling my Ate he removed the shorts of my Ate.29
We note that while complainant said she was just sitting
alone in their house when the accused pulled her, Anita
pointed out that she and complainant were playing hide
and seek when the accused did so. Again, we find the
testimonies of the two sisters to be inconsistent not only
with their affidavits, but with each other as well. As will be
90
discussed shortly, no credible explanation was given for
such inconsistencies, giving way to serious doubts about
the credibility of the two girls.
This Court finds it disturbing that complainant gave in her
affidavit a version that was vastly different from that in her
testimony as to the time and place as well as the attendant
circumstances of the supposed first rape. It is indeed
disturbing that her sister who was also her witness also
drastically changed her story, as if to make it fit snugly into
that of complainant.
Specific or piecemeal variations in narrations of the same
event is normal and to be expected. In the present case,
however, the apparently synchronized shift from one set
of facts (in the affidavits) to another set of facts (in the
testimonies) engenders the thought that the sworn
statements and court testimonies of complainant and her
witness were probably coached in a vain attempt to make
them seem fully consistent with each other.
3. Implausible Explanation
of Discrepancies
The prosecution attempted to explain the gaps in the
testimony of complainant by alleging that she was severely
injured in a vehicular accident when she was seven years
old. This far-fetched explanation was perhaps one of the
most damaging arguments against the prosecution’s case,
because it was an implicit admission that there had indeed
been gaping loopholes in the testimony of complainant,
and not mere confusion in her juvenile mind.
Further reinforcing the view that there was an implicit
admission of the gross inconsistencies on the part of the
prosecution was not just the attempt to give an
explanation for them, but even the attempt to present
evidence for such explanation which, however, remained
implausible and unsubstantiated. The Temporary Medical
Certificate30 presented by the prosecution as evidence did
not prove that the past injuries of complainant had indeed
caused her to be forgetful or absent-minded. It merely
proved that, several years ago, she had sustained injuries
and was thereafter treated at the Philippine Orthopedic
Center. It reads as follows:
"REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
PHILIPPINE ORTHOPEDIC CENTER
MARIA CLARA ST., QUEZON CITY
TEMPORARY MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
Case No. 93327645
Name: JOSEPHINE LAGRAMADA Age: 7 Date: 1-27-93
Diagnosis: (1) CEREBRAL CONTUSION, MODERATE; (2)
BASAL SKULL FRACTURE (L); (3) FRACTURE, CLOSED,
VISTAL 1/3, (L) TIBIA; (4) (L) CLAVICULAR FRACTURE
Remarks: The patient’s above-mentioned injuries are
being managed at our institution. They were sustained
from a vehicular accident (1-26-93)
SGD.
A. REBOLLIDO M.D.
Physician"
It is not proper to torture the minds of the members of
this Court by placing them in the trying position of running
the risk of convicting an innocent man, all because of the
prosecution’s failure to do its duty of gathering evidence
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.31
4. Long and Unexplained
Delay in Reporting
The silence of complainant -- specifically her failure to
promptly disclose her defilement to the authorities or to
persons close to her – would not normally warrant the
conclusion that her charges are baseless, untrue or
fabricated.32 However, the delay must be adequately and
satisfactorily explained; otherwise, it would generate
doubt as to her credibility.33 According to the present
complainant’s version, the first rape allegedly occurred in
April 1996; and the second, on September 15, 1996. These
were reported only on January 3, 1998 -- 21 months after
the alleged first rape, and 16 months after the
second.1âwphi1
Complainant tried to explain that appellant had
threatened to kill her if she reported the alleged rapes to
anybody. The prosecution, however, failed to explain why
she nevertheless ignored those threats and later reported
the incidents to her aunt. At the time the father of
complainant came to know of these allegations, appellant
was still living with her family.34 Hence, the threat of death,
if true, still hung upon her on the day when she and her
sister supposedly confided the mater to their aunt. The
prosecution was not able to explain what prompted
complainant to finally report the crime after a period of
more than a year and to disregard the supposed death
threats upon her and her family.
Duty of the Prosecution to
Establish Guilt Beyond
Reasonable Doubt
In a criminal prosecution, the law always presumes that
the defendant is not guilty of any crime whatsoever, and
91
this presumption stands until it is overcome by competent
and credible proof.35 Where two conflicting probabilities
arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the
presumption of innocence will be adopted.36 It is therefore
incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of
the accused with moral certainty or beyond reasonable
doubt as demanded by law.
When a person cries rape, society reacts with sympathy
for the victim, admiration for her bravery in seeking
retribution for the crime committed against her, and
condemnation for the accused. However, being
interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges
must look at each rape charge sans the above proclivities
and deal with it with caution and circumspection. Judges
must free themselves of the natural tendency to be
overprotective of every girl or woman decrying her
defilement and demanding punishment for the abuser.
While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and
humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands
justice, they should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice in accordance with law.37
Hence, accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.38 Before the accused in a criminal case
may be convicted, the evidence must be strong enough to
overcome the presumption of innocence and to exclude
every hypothesis except that of the guilt of the
defendant.39 If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to
support a conviction.40
Duty of Defense Counsel to
Safeguard His Client’s Rights
This Court notes that appellant was incarcerated on
January 3, 1998 without a valid warrant.1âwphi1 He was
merely invited by complainant’s father to accompany him
to the police station, supposedly to pick up a refrigerator
they were to repair. Upon their arrival there, appellant
was immediately taken in and locked behind bars. The two
Informations were filed against him only on November 11,
1998, ten months after the first day of his incarceration.
Appellant’s counsel, in the spirit of safeguarding his
client’s rights, should have taken the necessary steps to
correct this situation. However, he allowed his client to
enter a plea during the latter’s arraignment on March 16,
1999 without raising this matter. Thus, the former
effectively waived his client’s right to question the validity
of the arrest.
Lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and must
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them.41 They must also serve their clients with competence
and utmost diligence.42 More particularly, defense counsels
are expected to spare no effort to save the accused from
unrighteous incarcerations.43 They must present, by all fair
and reasonable means, every defense and mitigating
circumstance that the law permits. This they must do so
that their clients would not be deprived of life or liberty
except by due process of law duly applied. 44 Appellant’s
counsel should have not only perfunctorily represented his
client during the pendency of the case, but should have
kept in mind his duty to render effective legal assistance
and true service by protecting the latter’s rights at all
times.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision SET ASIDE. Appellant Matias Lagramada
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to
release him from custody immediately, unless he is being
held for some other lawful cause, and to INFORM this
Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof of the date
appellant was actually released from confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180836               August 8, 2010
GILBERT URMA, TEOFILO URMA, DANTE URMA, and
JERRY URMA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ORLANDO BELTRAN, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, RTC Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan, LOLITA URMA,
MELBA R. MAMUAD, MARCELA URMA CAINGAT,
HIPOLITO MARTIN, EDMUND URMA, ALBINA URMA
MAMUAD, CIANITA AGUSTIN FAUSTO MADAMBA, and
LAUREANO ANTONIO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing 1] the September 18, 2007 Judgment1 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan (RTC),
in Civil Case No. 354-T, deciding the case in favor of the
private respondents; and 2] its December 10, 2007
Order2 denying petitioners’ Motion For New Trial.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the
respondents against the petitioners for partition, quieting
92
of title, recovery of ownership, and damages over two
parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-1812 and No. P-1630.
The petitioners and respondents are blood relatives being
the nearest of kin of the deceased spouses Laureano Urma
(Laureano) and Rosa Labrador-Urma (Rosa). They are the
children of Laureano’s brother who predeceased him.
The petitioners claim ownership of the lot they are
occupying by virtue of a deed of sale allegedly executed by
Laureano on April 10, 1985 in favor of petitioner Teofilo
Urma, and in agreement with respondent Marcela Urma-
Caingat. On the other hand, six (6) of the respondents
claim ownership over portions of the subject property by
virtue of a deed of donation executed in their favor by
Rosa in February 1996.
During the pre-trial proceedings of the case, both parties
agreed that the only matter to be resolved was the validity
of the absolute deed of sale, which as claimed by the
petitioners was executed by Laureano in 1985 over one-
half of the property covered by OCT No. P-1630. If the said
deed of sale was valid, the subsequent deeds of donation
executed by Rosa in favor of the respondents would be
without force and effect.
The parties also agreed that the thumb mark of Laureano
affixed on the notarized deed of sale be subjected to a
dactylascopic examination by an expert from the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Said examination would
entail comparison of the thumb mark on the questioned
absolute deed of sale with the genuine specimen thumb
mark of Laureano in his Voter’s Registration Record on file
with the Office of the Election Registrar.
Upon orders of the trial court, the NBI performed the
examination and found that the questioned fingerprint
was not identical with the genuine specimen thumbmark.
Hence, the NBI concluded that the absolute deed of sale
supposedly executed by Laureano was a spurious
document.
In its decision dated September 18, 2007, the RTC ruled in
favor of the respondents by declaring them the absolute
owners of portions of the disputed land and ordering the
petitioners to vacate said portions. In the same ruling, the
RTC also ordered the partition of the remaining portions of
the subject property among all the parties in equal shares.
Specifically, the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring plaintiff Lolita Urma, Melba
Mamuad, Marcela Urma-Caingat, Hipolito
Martin, Edmund Urma and Albina Urma-
 Mamuad to be the absolute owners of one-eight
(1/8) of each of the property covered by O.C.T.
No. P-1630 equivalent to Ten Thousand Seven
Hundred Seventy-seven (10, 777 sq. m.) square
meters;
2. Ordering defendant Teofilo Urma to vacate
the property which he is occupying equivalent to
one-half (1/2) of the property covered by O.C.T.
No. P-1630 and surrender possession thereof to
the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the other defendants, namely Gilbert
Urma, Dante Urma and Jerry Urma to vacate the
portions of the property covered by O.C.T. No.
1630 which they have occupied and are still
occupying and surrender possession thereof to
the plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the partition of the remaining 21,559
square meters covered by O.C.T. No. 1630 as
well as the entire property covered by O.C.T. No.
1812 in favor of all the parties in equal shares.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.3
In the belief that their counsel committed gross negligence
in handling their case, the defendants filed a Motion For
New Trial.4 They argued that their counsel should not have
joined the motion for a judgment on the pleadings
because their answer contained specific denials and
defenses which tendered an issue. They likewise claimed
that they were uneducated and "not too familiar with the
niceties of the law and legal procedures." Hence, they
should not be bound by the mistakes and omissions of
their counsel.5
On December 10, 2007, the RTC issued the questioned
Order6 denying petitioners’ Motion For New Trial on the
ground that the same was without factual or legal basis
and that there were no irregularities committed during the
trial.
The RTC reasoned out that the parties, through their
respective counsels, agreed during the pre-trial that the
only issue of fact around which the whole case revolved
was the genuineness of the deed of absolute sale dated
April 10, 1985 allegedly executed by Laureano in favor of
Teofilo Urma; that said document be examined by the NBI;
that both parties would accept the result of the
dactyloscopic examination to be conducted; and that said
result would be the basis of the judgment to be rendered.
It was further stipulated that if the NBI report would state
that Laureano indeed executed the deed of sale, the
93
judgment would be in favor of the petitioners. Otherwise,
the decision should favor the respondents.
Aggrieved, petitioners came straight to this Court, through
a petition for review under Rule 45, anchored on the
following
ARGUMENTS:
IT WAS CLEAR ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
ON THE PART OF THE COURT A QUO TO HAVE RENDERED
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS MOTU PROPIO7
IN DENYING THEIR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, THE COURT A
QUO HAS LIKEWISE ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION8
PETITIONER TEOFILO URMA IS THE OWNER IN FEE SIMPLE
OF ONE-HALF PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN
VIEW OF THE ISSUANCE OF A TCT FOR SAID PORTION.9
In the Resolution of April 13, 2009, the petition was given
due course and the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda.10
In advocacy of their position, the petitioners in their
memorandum argue that the Rules of Court provides that
a judgment on the pleadings is proper only when the
answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material
allegations in the complaint. According to the petitioners,
the answer filed by their former counsel raised specific
denials/affirmative defenses thereby tendering an issue on
litigable matters. Hence, judgment on the pleadings was
not proper.
Petitioners further argue that the judgment of the RTC was
merely based on the result of the dactylascopic
examination conducted by the NBI forensic expert who
was not even presented in open court. Thus, they were
not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Moreover, since the NBI handwriting examiner was not
qualified as an expert witness, the NBI report is
inadmissible in evidence and cannot be used against them.
The petitioners also lament that the RTC denied their
Motion For New Trial without conducting any hearing on
said motion. They claim that, in fact, with the execution of
the deed of sale by Laureano in favor of Teofilo Urma, OCT
No. P-1630 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) Nos. T-5950 and T-5951 were issued in the names of
Laureano Urma and Teofilo Urma, respectively. The RTC,
however, was not apprised of the cancellation of OCT No.
P-1630 because their former counsel did not present any
evidence.
RESPONDENTS’ POSITION
The respondents counter that the petition should be
dismissed since under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised. They claim that the
petition on its face does not state any special or important
reason that merits the discretionary jurisdiction of the
Court to review this case. Petitioners’ issues refer to 1) the
actions of their former counsel, and 2) the reliance by the
RTC in the result of the dactylascopic examination, which
obviously are not questions of law.
Respondents also assert that during the pre-trial stage, the
Rules of Court allows stipulation or admission of facts and
documents to avoid unnecessary proof. Thus, the RTC has
the discretion to put evidentiary value on the report of the
NBI expert who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties.
For the respondents, it would be pointless to go to trial or
to conduct a new trial because it was already ascertained
that the deed of sale was a product of forgery.
THE COURT’S RULING
The petition fails.
As correctly argued by the respondents, the petitioners are
questioning the procedural decisions of their former
counsel and the reliance by the RTC on the result of the
dactylascopic examination. The petitioners claim that their
substantive and procedural rights were violated due to
their former counsel’s mistake or negligence in handling
their case.
Thus, the petitioners pray for the reopening of Civil Case
No. 354-T so that the evidence pertaining to the
authenticity of the subject deed of sale would be
evaluated again. This is obviously a question of fact which
was already ruled upon by the RTC with the holding that it
was not executed by Laureano Urma. In other words, it
would entail another review of the evidence.
It has always been held that it is not the function of this
Court to re-examine or weigh the evidence submitted by
the parties all over again. This Court is definitely not the
proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier
of facts.
At any rate, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts
and agreed to abide by its terms and the results thereof.
The trial court also acted on the basis of their stipulations
and rendered judgment accordingly. Considering that the
stipulation of facts has not been set aside, the Court
agrees that it would be pointless to hold a new trial. It
would only prolong the litigation and unnecessarily delay
the final disposition of the case. The situation at hand is
not substantially different from the case of Jesus D.
94
Morales & Carolina Nuqui v. Court of Appeals, 11 where it
was written:
Ostensibly, the heart of the matter lies in whether or not
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale  is valid. And
on this score, there is little doubt that its legitimacy had
been duly established. The burden was on the private
respondents to impugn the genuineness of their signatures
on the document which having been notarized is imbued
with the character of a public document; yet they were
unable to present a single shred of countervailing
evidence. Moreover, the validity of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale  has been strengthened
by the findings of the NBI that the signatures of the private
respondents were genuine, findings with which the private
respondents themselves agreed to abide pursuant to
the Stipulation of Facts.
x x x           x x x          x x x
For another, since private respondents undertook in
the Stipulation of Facts to recognize the ownership of the
petitioners and immediately vacate the subject property,
together with the tenants, should the genuineness of the
signatures in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement With
Sale be upheld, which has become the case, and since
the Stipulation of Facts has not been set aside, it is
perfectly appropriate for the Court to affirm the
petitioners’ ownership and to order the private
respondents’ eviction from the subject property. The
appellate court’s suggestion that the petitioners institute a
new, separate action to recover possession of the subject
property is inconsistent with the foregoing considerations
and contravenes the avowed policy to achieve just, speedy
and inexpensive resolution of cases.
The Court has stated on several occasions that the pre-trial
forms part of the proceedings, and matters dealt with
therein may not be brushed aside in the process of
decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of
compulsory pre-trial would be inconsequential and
worthless.12
With regard to the petitioners’ argument that they should
be excused from the procedural blunder committed by
their former counsel, the Court finds it bereft of merit. The
petitioners were not denied due process and their rights
were not violated when their counsel, Atty. Raul Morales,
agreed that the only issue that needed to be resolved was
the authenticity of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner
Teofilo Urma.
There was nothing amiss in entering into such stipulations.
The petitioners only cried foul when the examination
result turned out to be unfavorable to them. It was clearly
stipulated that the parties would abide by the results of
the NBI dactylascopic examination. Both parties agreed to
submit the questioned document to the NBI where one of
its examiners would be assigned to conduct the
examination. Thus, the parties did not reserve any right to
question the expertise of the NBI examiner. Apparently,
there was no stipulation either that he would be cross-
examined on the result.
Granting that their counsel made a mistake in entering
into such stipulations, such procedural error unfortunately
bound them. The Court has consistently held that the
mistake or negligence of a counsel in the area of
procedural technique binds the client unless such mistake
or negligence of counsel is so gross or palpable that would
require the courts to step in and accord relief to the client
who suffered thereby. Without this doctrinal rule, there
would never be an end to a suit so long as a new counsel
could be employed to allege and show that the prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or
learned.131avvphi1
Finally, the Court finds the judgment of the RTC correct,
fair and judicious considering that both parties, being the
nearest of kin of the deceased spouses Laureano and Rosa,
were given their rightful shares in the subject property. As
mentioned earlier, the judgment declared each of the
respondents the absolute owner of one-eight (1/8) of the
property covered by OCT No. P-1630 equivalent to 10,777
square meters by virtue of the notarized deeds of
donations14 executed in their favor by Rosa on February 22
and 23, 1996. The remaining 21,559 square meters
covered by OCT No. P-1630 as well as the entire property
covered by OCT No. P-1812 was ordered partitioned in
favor of all the parties in equal shares.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
September 18, 2007 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 165767 November 29, 2005]
SPS. WILLIAM G. FRIEND, MARIA RENEE FRIEND and
JOHN DOE, Petitioners, v. UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to nullify the
June 1, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74499 which affirmed with modification the
November 29, 2001 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 115; and the October 21, 2004
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration:
95
The facts are as follows:
Spouses William G. Friend and Maria Renee Friend
(hereafter appellants) incurred a loan from Union Bank of
the Philippines (hereafter appellee) in the original amount
of Eight Hundred Eighteen Thousand One Hundred Thirty
Six Pesos (P818,136.00). The money was used to purchase
a Hyundai Starex Van in January 1999. A Promissory Note
was executed by appellants promising to pay to the order
of appellee.
In order to secure the obligation, a chattel mortgage,
embodied in the same promissory note, was constituted
on said Hyundai Starex Van.
Appellants defaulted in the payment of their obligation.
Despite repeated demands to pay the obligation or, in the
alternative, to turn over the subject vehicle for
foreclosure, appellants did not comply. Due to such non-
compliance, appellee instituted an action for collection of
sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin.
The writ of replevin was issued on September 11, 2000
ordering the sheriff of the RTC, Branch 115 to take custody
of the Hyundai Starex Van. Unfortunately, the sheriff was
not able to implement said writ because the vehicle could
not be found at the residence of appellants. Appellant
William G. Friend admitted to the sheriff that he returned
the vehicle to the dealer, Drive Motors, Inc.
Appellants failed to file their answer within the
reglementary period. On May 18, 2001, appellee filed a
motion to declare appellants in default. In its Order dated
July 11, 2001, the RTC granted appellee's motion and
declared appellants in default. Appellee presented its
evidence ex parte.4
On November 29, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 115, issued an Order disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Union Bank of the Philippines, and against defendants
Spouses William G. Friend and Maria Renee Friend who
are ordered to:
1. Pay Union Bank of the Philippines the sum of PESOS: SIX
HUNDRED FORTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO PESOS & 04/100 (P643,472.04);
2. Reimburse Union Bank the sum equal to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the total amount due from defendants as
attorney's fees;
3. The equal sum to twenty-five percent (25%) of the total
amount due from defendants as liquidated damages;
4. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5
Thereafter, Atty. Simon D. Victa representing petitioners
filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals. After the
appeal was filed, petitioners changed their counsel. Their
appeal was anchored on the alleged error of the trial court
in declaring them in default and in finding them liable
under the loan-mortgage agreement.
On June 1, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision upholding the findings of the trial court and ruling
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order
dated November 9, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
(1) The award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.
(2) The award of liquidated damages is hereby REDUCED
to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in a
resolution dated October 21, 2004. Hence, this petition
raising the following issues:
I.
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in ruling that petitioners were not denied due
process for being declared as in default and for being
denied the opportunity to present evidence. Corollarily,
whether or not petitioners are bound by the negligence of
their counsel.
II.
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in ruling that petitioners Sps. Friend are liable under
the loan-agreement.7
Petitioners seek the reversal of the trial court's and Court
of Appeals' decision invoking counsel's negligence in failing
to file an answer in the trial court. Petitioners insist that
their case is an exception to the general rule that the
negligence of counsel binds the client. They aver that they
were not able to present evidence in their behalf and were
thus deprived of their constitutional right to be heard.
The petition lacks merit.
96
The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds
the client.8 Otherwise, there would be no end to a suit so
long as a new counsel could be employed who would
allege and show that the prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.9
However, this rule admits certain exceptions, such as: (1)
where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when its application will
result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or
property; or (3) where the interests of justice so
require.10 Indeed, there have been instances when this
court had accorded relief to the client who suffered by
reason of their lawyer's gross or palpable mistake or
negligence.11 The instant case does not fall under any of
the exceptions.
The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense.
Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can
"present its side" or defend its "interest in due course",
there is no denial of procedural due process.12
In the case at bar, while petitioners' former counsel failed
to file an answer to the complaint filed by Union Bank,
however, he seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the
decision of the trial court. Under the Rules of Court, in
ordinary appealed cases to the Court of Appeals, the
appellant may include in his assignment of errors any
question of law and fact that has been raised in the court
below and which is within the issues framed by the
parties.13 Petitioners were thus afforded the chance to
raise their defenses as the case is opened for
comprehensive review by the appellate court.
In Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad,14 we held that:
... [T]o sustain petitioner's arguments that it was denied
due process of law due to negligence of its counsel would
set a dangerous precedent. It would enable every party to
render inutile any adverse order or decision through the
simple expedient of alleging gross negligence on the part
of its counsel. The Court will not countenance such a farce
which contradicts long-settled doctrines of trial and
procedure.15
We find no reason to depart from this ruling. Besides,
there is no compelling reason to relax the rules in favor of
petitioners, who are not entirely blameless. Petitioners
should have taken a more active role in the proceedings of
the case against them. Litigants represented by counsel
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax
and await the outcome of their case.16
Anent the second issue raised by petitioners, suffice it to
say that the factual findings and conclusion of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight
and respect and will not generally be disturbed on appeal
in the absence of a clear showing that the trial court
overlooked certain facts or circumstances that would
warrant a different disposition of the case.17
In this case, it is not disputed that petitioners executed a
Promissory Note with a Chattel Mortgage in favor of Union
Bank. The action sought by the bank in the trial court was
the payment of the amount loaned to petitioners. As aptly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the trial court's decision
did not even mention the vehicle but rather, ordered the
payment of petitioners' existing obligation, damages and
cost of suit. Thus, it matters not that the subject vehicle
was already sold to a third party because the suit was
grounded on the promissory note executed by the
petitioners.
Petitioners' argument that it was Drive Motors
Incorporated (Drive Motors), through its owner and
general manager, Aimee Dumaran, which facilitated their
monthly payments to Union Bank and that Union Bank was
informed about the transfer of the vehicle, deserves no
consideration. The obligation to pay the bank rests
primarily on petitioners and not on Drive Motors or
Dumaran who merely acted as an intermediary. Their
unqualified reliance on Dumaran could not exculpate them
from their predicament.
By their own admission, in late 1999, petitioners had been
informed that the checks issued by Drive Motors in
payment for the van bounced.18 Prudence dictates that
petitioners should have talked directly with a
representative of Union Bank to check on the status of
their car loan. Instead, petitioners chose to take
Dumaran's word that she will settle the problem. As
signatories to a valid and subsisting promissory note,
petitioners are directly liable to Union Bank for the
amount of the loan, regardless of their possession or
ownership of the subject vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 1, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
74499 and its Resolution dated October 21, 2004,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143783. December 9, 2002
DANTE SARRAGA, SR. and MARIA TERESA
SARRAGA, petitioners, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, respondent.
97
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses Dante Sarraga, Sr. and Maria Teresa Sarraga,
petitioners, were the absolute owners of three (3) parcels
of land, one of which is Lot 416-B, situated in Poblacion,
Cagayan de Oro City, and the other two, Lots 1053-A and
1053-B, in Lapasan, same city.
Sometime in the early 1980s, petitioners mortgaged their
lots to Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco
Filipino), respondent, as security for a loan in the amount
of P3,618,714.59.
Petitioners defaulted in the payment of their loan.
Consequently, Banco Filipino foreclosed the mortgage.
On June 29, 1984, Banco Filipino was placed in
conservatorship by the Central Bank of the Philippines. On
January 25, 1985, it was ordered closed and placed under
receivership and liquidation.
On April 9, 1985, or before the expiration of the period for
the redemption of the lots, petitioner Dante P. Sarraga
sent a letter to Banco Filipinos receiver-liquidator offering
to redeem the same.
On July 2, 1985, Deputy Receiver Arnulfo B. Aurellano
wrote petitioners that at this stage of the liquidation of the
bank, we are not yet selling the aforesaid properties.
Since petitioners were not allowed to redeem their lots
within the period prescribed by law, titles thereto were
consolidated in the name of Banco Filipino.
On October 10, 1986, petitioners received a letter from
Banco Filipino recognizing their intention to redeem their
lots. Later, Banco Filipino, through its liquidators, started
negotiating with petitioners on the terms of redemption.
Finally, on October 30, 1990, Mr. Renan Santos, then
Banco Filipinos liquidator, wrote petitioners allowing them
to repurchase the lots for P8,506,597.73, with 12%
interest per annum, under the terms stipulated
therein.1 The terms include, among others, that petitioners
may pay by installments and that upon full payment of the
repurchase price, Banco Filipino shall execute
the corresponding deed of sale for the three (3) lots in
their favor.2 They were likewise granted the power to
manage and administer the building located in Lot 416-B.
The terms were later embodied in a Memorandum of
Agreement3 (MOA) signed by the parties.
On May 16, 1991, Banco Filipino formally conveyed to
petitioners the two (2) lots (Lots 1053-A and 1053-
B) located in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
On October 30, 1992, petitioners paid in full the total
repurchase price for the three (3) lots. However, Banco
Filipino refused to execute the corresponding deed of sale
and turn over Lot 416-B to petitioners.
Instead, Banco Filipino, on April 5, 1993, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, a
complaint4 against petitioners for quieting of title,
recovery of ownership and possession, accounting and
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-186.
On April 27, 1993, petitioners filed their answer with
counterclaim.5 They were represented by Atty. Florentino
G. Dumlao, Jr. who formally entered his appearance as
their counsel of record.
However, prior to the pre-trial, Atty. Dumlao suffered a
mild stroke, incapacitating him from participating actively
in the proceedings, prompting petitioners to hire the
services of another counsel, Atty. Rogelio Bagabuyo. While
the latter appeared for the petitioners during the hearing
and signed pleadings for them, Atty. Dumlao remained
petitioners counsel of record. As such, the trial court
continued to serve pleadings, motions, processes, and
other documents upon Atty. Dumlao.
On June 1, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, 6 the
dispositive portion of which states:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Declaring the sale and conveyance of the two (2) parcels
of land (denominated as Lots 1035-A and 1053-B) situated
in Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, as valid and title
thereto shall pertain to defendant spouses Sarraga;
2. Declaring plaintiff Banco Filipino to be the true and
lawful owners of Lot 416-B and the building therein
(formerly known as the Lucar Building but now as
Executive Centrum) situated along J.R. Borja Street,
Cagayan de Oro City;
3. Ordering defendant spouses Sarraga to immediately
relinquish and surrender possession of Lot No. 416-B and
the building thereon to plaintiff Bank; and
4. All other claims of plaintiff Bank as well as counterclaims
by the defendants are dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
98
SO ORDERED.7cräläwvirtualibräry
On July 1, 1998. petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,8 signed by both Attys. Dumlao and
Bagabuyo.
On September 3, 1998, the trial court issued an
order9 denying petitioners motion. On September 10,
1998, the order was received by Ms. Llerna Guligado, a
newly-hired clerk at the office of Atty. Bagabuyo. Owing to
her lack of work experience in a law office, she merely left
the court order on her desk and eventually it was
misplaced. She failed to bring the matter to the attention
of Atty. Bagabuyo when she resigned on September 15,
1998. The day before, or on September 14, 1998, Atty.
Bagabuyo was appointed Senior State Prosecutor in the
Department of Justice. Due to his excitement and
relocation to Manila, he failed to apprise Atty. Dumlao on
the status of the case.
Concerned that no action had been taken on their motion
for reconsideration of the Decision, petitioners, on
December 7, 1998, verified its status. In the trial court,
they found that the records of the case were already
transmitted to the Court of Appeals due to a partial appeal
interposed by Banco Filipino.
This prompted petitioners to file with the trial court a
notice of appeal which was denied for being late.
Eventually, they filed a petition for relief from
judgment.10 During the hearing, they came to know that
the order dated September 3, 1998 denying their motion
for reconsideration was served upon Atty. Bagabuyo only.
On February 12, 1999, the trial court issued an
order11 dismissing the petition for relief on the ground that
it was filed out of time. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.12cräläwvirtualibräry
They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA GR-SP No. 53765, ascribing to the
trial court grave abuse of discretion for dismissing their
petition for relief from judgment.
On June 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a
Decision13 dismissing the petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we hold that
public respondent did not err much less act with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the disputed orders, for which
reason, the herein petition has to be, as it is hereby
DISMISSSED.
SO ORDERED.14cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issues for our resolution are: 1) whether
there was a valid service of the trial courts order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration upon Atty.
Bagabuyo; 2) whether Atty. Bagabuyo was negligent which
prevented petitioners from filing a timely notice of appeal;
and 3) if so, whether such negligence is binding upon
petitioners.
Petitioners maintain that Atty. Bagabuyo is not their
counsel of record since he did not file with the trial court a
formal appearance. Consequently, the service upon him of
the trial courts order denying their motion for
reconsideration is not valid.
Such posture is untenable. It is undisputed that petitioners
were represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Dumlao and
Bagabuyo. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended,15 service of the trial courts
order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration may
be made upon either counsel.16cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court of Appeals correctly found that indeed
petitioners counsel was Atty. Bagabuyo, thus:
We find no merit in the first ground invoked by petitioners.
As explained by the court a quo  in its May 24, 1999 order-
The records of this case show that Atty. Rogelio Zosa B.
Bagabuyo did not merely enter his appearance orally at
every hearing which he attended. He filed several
pleadings in this case as counsel for the defendants in
which he indicated his address. The first pleading that he
filed x x x was a MOTION TO HEAR SPECIAL AND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AS IF A MOTION TO DISMISS HAD
BEEN FILED, dated November 28, 1994, which he signed
alone as counsel for Defendants and in which he indicated
his address as Suite 201, Travellers Life Building, corners
Tiano & J.R. Borja Streets, City of Cagayan de Oro. Atty.
Bagabuyo, since he started appearing in this case, acted
alone, signed pleadings alone, made decisions alone,
without in any way indicating to the court and the adverse
party that he had to defer to the judgment of Atty. Dumlao
on any matter pertaining to the instant case. He presented
the defendant Dante Sarraga and the latters witness, Mr.
Gaudencio Beduya, at the trial of this case and terminated
the presentation of the defendants evidence without
consulting, or intimating to the court and the adverse
party that he had to consult Atty. Dumlao on the matter.
The MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENDANTS dated April 8,
1996 was signed by him alone as counsel for the
defendants. Atty. Rogelio Zosa Bagabuyo signed as lead
counsel the defendants Motion for Reconsideration dated
26 June 1998 and the Urgent Rejoinder to Plaintiffs
Opposition To Our Motion for Reconsideration dated 03
August 1998, in which he indicated his address as 14th-
99
10th Streets, Macasandig, City of Cagayan de Oro. He
signed alone as counsel for the defendants an URGENT
MOTION TO CANCEL SCHEDULED HEARING ON 31 July
1998 dated 28 July 1998 in which he indicated his address
as 72 corners 14th-10thStreets, Macasandig, City of
Cagayan de Oro. (Annex F, Petition, pp. 196-197, rollo).
Given the foregoing circumstances and the court a quos
further observation that Atty. Bagabuyo had been the one
actively handling the case for the defendants since the
pre-trial stage, x x x it is simply absurd for petitioners to
even suggest that service upon Atty. Bagabuyo of a copy of
the Order dated September 3, 1998 which denied their
Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment was
ineffective or did not bind them. To be sure, Section 2,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
provides that (i)f any party has appeared by counsel,
service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of
them x x x. The obvious meaning of said rule is that if a
party is represented by more than one lawyer, service of
pleadings, judgments and other papers may be made on
any one of them.
Obviously, Atty. Bagabuyo was negligent which prevented
petitioners from filing a timely notice of appeal. Atty.
Bagabuyo knew that his clerk has no work experience in a
law firm. He should have supervised her office
performance very closely considering the importance of
his legal calling. Time and again this Court has admonished
law offices to adopt a system of distributing and receiving
pleadings and notices, so that the lawyers will be promptly
informed of the status of their cases. Thus, the negligence
of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by
lawyers is binding upon the latter.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence
of counsel binds the client. However, the application of the
general rule to a given case should be looked into and
adopted according to the surrounding
circumstances.18 Thus, exceptions to the said rule have
been recognized by this Court: (1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law; (2) when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where
the interests of justice so require.19 In such cases, courts
must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered
thereby.
Here, we find that the negligence of Atty. Bagabuyo falls
under the said exceptions. Indeed, he committed gross
negligence. Petitioners were deprived of their right to
appeal when he failed to inform them immediately of the
denial of their motion for reconsideration of the trial
courts decision. Ultimately, this will result in the
deprivation of their property, specifically Lot 416-B.
In Apex Mining, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,20 this Court ruled:
If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel
is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is
so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause,
is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may
be reopened to give the client another chance to present
his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been
prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as a
result of his lawyers professional delinquency or infidelity
the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to
present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross
ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which
resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in a
damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and
the judgment may be set aside on such ground.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, higher interests of
justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to
present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be
made suffer for the lawyers mistakes and should be
afforded another opportunity, at least, to introduce
evidence on their behalf. To cling to the general rule in this
case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious
injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith
and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.
Petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to verify the status
of their case with the trial court since a client has the right
to expect that his lawyer will protect his interest during
the hearing of his case.
A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make
good his representations and has the right to expect that
his lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his
case. For the general employment of an attorney to
prosecute or defend a case or proceeding ordinarily vests
in a plaintiffs attorney the implied authority to take all
steps or do all acts necessary or incidental to the regular
and orderly prosecution and management of the suit, and
in a defendants attorney, the power to take such steps as
he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the
interests of the defendant.21cräläwvirtualibräry
Undoubtedly, the trial court gravely abused its discretion
when it denied the petition for relief. Considering the
circumstances obtaining here, petitioners should not be
made to suffer the consequences of their counsels
negligence. Hence, the period within which to file their
petition for relief should be reckoned from their actual
receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration, which is December 7, 1998. Accordingly,
the petition for relief filed on December 16, 1998 was well
within the sixty-day period prescribed in Section 3, Rule
38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Both lower courts actually sacrificed justice for
technicality. This Court has consistently ruled that it is a far
better and more prudent course of action for a court to
100
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of
the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice rather
than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if
not a miscarriage of justice.22 Hence, it would be more in
accord with justice and equity to allow the appeal by
petitioners to enable the Court of Appeals to review the
trial courts decision.
The fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford
each litigant every opportunity to present evidence in their
behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved. Court
litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a
liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are
given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best
way to ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice
and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities.23cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, in cases where a party was denied this right, we
have relaxed the stringent application of procedural rules
in order to allow a party the chance to be heard. This
policy applies with equal force in case of appeals. It has
been consistently held that the dismissal of appeal on
purely technical grounds is frowned upon.24
x x x, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice,
and thereby defeat their very aims. Verily, this Court, in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may even stay the
dismissal of appeals grounded merely on technicalities,
especially in this case where petitioners appeal appears
prima facie worthy of the CAs full consideration on the
merits.25cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 2000 in
CA-GR SP No. 53765 is SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City is DIRECTED to grant the
petition for relief filed by petitioners and to GIVE DUE
COURSE to their notice of appeal in Civil Case No. 93-186.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. NO. 5092 : August 11, 2004]
LUCILA S. BARBUCO, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAYMUNDO
N. BELTRAN, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.1 While a lawyer may decline to render services
for a person for valid reasons, once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, he begins to owe fidelity to that
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve his client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.2
On July 9, 1999, Lucila S. Barbuco filed a Sworn
Complaint3 against Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran for
malpractice of law, negligence and dishonesty.
It appears that on March 31, 1998, complainant, through
her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent
for the purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of
Appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 21, in the case entitled, "Alexander
Bermido, Plaintiff v. Lucila Barbuco, Defendant." On August
6, 1998, complainant, through Benito B. Sy, gave
respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the
docket fees.
Complainant's appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58180,
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution4 dated September 25, 1998 for failure to file
Appellant's Brief, pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Complainant found out that her appeal had been
dismissed only on June 4, 1999, when her son went to the
Court of Appeals to verify the status of the case.
When asked to comment on the charges filed against
him,5 respondent Beltran averred that the docket fees
were paid on time and that on September 22, 1998, he
filed the Appellant's Brief6 with the Court of Appeals.
However, the appeal was dismissed. On October 19, 1998,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 on the
ground that he received the notice to file brief on June 25,
1998; however, on June 26, 1998, he met a vehicular
accident which physically incapacitated him for several
days; and that as a result of the accident, he suffered head
injuries which caused him to lose track of deadlines for the
filing of pleadings.
On March 9, 1999, the Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on the ground that the brief for defendant-
appellant was filed forty-three (43) days late.8
On November 22, 1999, the complaint against respondent
Beltran was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 9
After hearing, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, submitted on
101
October 6, 2003 her findings and recommendation that
respondent Beltran be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of five (5) years.
On October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2003-234 affirming the
recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala but
modified the recommended period of suspension from
five (5) years to six (6) months only.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find
no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent's conduct relative to the belated filing of the
Appellant's Brief falls below the standards exacted upon
lawyers on dedication and commitment to their client's
cause.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers states:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the
best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file
brief within the reglementary period certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY
THREE (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular
accident and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof
cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on
time considering that he was a member of a law firm
composed of not just one lawyer. This is shown by the
receipt he issued to complainant and the pleadings which
he signed for and on behalf of the Beltran, Beltran and
Beltran Law Office. As such, respondent could have asked
any of his partners in the law office to file the Appellant's
Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of
Time to file the said pleading.
In B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,10 we
ruled that the confusion in the office of the law firm
following the death of one of its partners is not a valid
justification for failing to file the brief. We further ruled in
the said case that upon receipt of the notice to file the
brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to
another associate.
The failure to timely file a pleading is by itself inexcusable
negligence on the part of respondent. Complainant's
liability is further compounded by his failure to maintain
an open line of communication with his client, in violation
of the provisions of Rule 18.04, which reads:
A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
Clearly, respondent's series of inadvertence prejudiced the
case of the complainant. We can not overstress the duty of
a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients.11
Every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that
every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to
be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be
expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts
to protect the interest of his client within the bounds of
the law. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates
that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him.12
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran is found guilty of
negligence and malpractice and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective
immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to
all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. NO. 5302 : February 18, 2005]
MARCIAL L. ABIERO, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERNARDO G.
JUANINO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client at all times,
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must always serve with competence and diligence, and
never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. An attorney
should endeavor to keep his client informed of the status
of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the
latter's request for information. Failure to comply with
these abiding precepts of ethical conduct renders counsel
liable for violating the canons of his profession.
On July 20, 2000, an administrative complaint1 was filed by
Marcial L. Abiero charging respondent Atty. Bernardo G.
102
Juanino with negligence in connection with a legal matter
entrusted to him.
It appears that complainant engaged the services of
respondent of the law firm P.C. Nolasco and Associates as
counsel de parte in NLRC NCR OCW Case No. 00-12-00904-
95.2 On January 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio
ruled in favor of complainant by ordering the respondents
to pay complainant his unpaid wages and unpaid vacation
leave pay, to refund his plane fare and to pay moral
damages and attorney's fees.3 Ï‚ηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υ
αl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
reversed the arbiter's decision and dismissed the case for
lack of basis.4
For several times, complainant, either personally or
through his designated agents, tried to follow up the
status of the case. Each time, respondent would advise
him to call on a later date at which time he may have some
news of any development with the case.5
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of time to file a Petition for Review and paid the
corresponding docket fee.
When complainant verified with the Court of Appeals the
status of the case, he found out that respondent never
filed a Petition for Review of his labor case. Consequently,
the NLRC decision became final and executory. Thus,
complainant filed this administrative complaint against
respondent.
On August 30, 2000, respondent was required to file his
comment within 10 days from notice.6 On September 25,
2000, respondent requested for additional time to file
comment.7 Subsequently, respondent filed a series of
motions for extension to file comment. On February 28,
2001, respondent was warned that no further extension
shall be granted.8 Notwithstanding, and despite 11
extensions, respondent still failed to file his comment.
Consequently, on July 29, 2002, respondent was required
to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for failure to comply with our
directives.9
On September 2, 2002, respondent filed his Compliance
with Motion for Final Twelve (12) Day Extension With No
Further Extension.10
Finally, on September 17, 2002, respondent filed his
comment11 together with a Motion to Admit Comment
Filed One Day Late.
In a Resolution dated October 21, 2002,
respondent's Motion to Admit Comment Filed One Day
Late was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.12
As summarized, respondent alleged by way of defense, the
following:
(1) that complainant became respondent's client after
respondent handled these cases for complainant's uncle
Aniceto Encio and his family namely Criminal Case No. F-
10088, POEA Case No. M-91-06-602, I.S. No. 93 E-17909
and POEA Case No. L-93-04-610; that respondent
successfully handled these cases which led to the dismissal
of the criminal case against Aniceto Encio and recovery of
monetary awards in the other cases; (2) that NLRC NCR
OCW Case No. 00-12-00904-95 was referred by Aniceto
Encio to respondent for handling; that herein complainant
and Aniceto Encio requested respondent not to charge
them an acceptance fee for said case and instead offered
to pay respondent 30% of any monetary award recovered
in said case; - that on appeal to the National Labor
Relations Commission, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Carpio
was reversed and NLRC OCW Case No. 00-12-00904-95
was dismissed by the NLRC for lack of merit; - (4) that at
the time respondent advanced the docket fees,
complainant and respondent did not have any agreement
that a Petition for Certiorari would be filed with the Court
of Appeals; - (5) that weeks later, when complainant
reimbursed respondent for the docket fees he had
advanced, respondent advised complainant and his uncle
that respondent intended to appeal the Decision of the
NLRC to the Court of Appeals and so he filed a Petition for
Extension of Time to File Petition '; (7) that there was an
error in judgment on respondent's part when instead of
filing a Petition for Certiorari as originally intended,
respondent chose to pursue another course of action, that
of entertaining the idea of filing a Motion for Execution to
enforce the Labor Arbiter's Decision against the other
respondents who did not appeal said Decision; (8) that
respondent pleads good faith in the subsequent course of
action taken; that respondent entertained the idea that he
could enforce the original Decision through a Motion for
Execution; - (9) that respondent tried his best to win
complainant's labor case and in fact, he won it at the Labor
Arbiter's level; (10) that respondent appeals to the sense
of fairness of complainant; that in the 4 cases respondent
handled for complainant and his uncle, respondent won 3
cases for them especially the criminal complaint for
Homicide against complainant's uncle; that in said criminal
case, respondent did not charge a single centavo for
attorney's fees.13
In his letter-reply filed on February 7, 2003, complainant
averred the following statements originally in the
vernacular:
103
'it is not true that there was no acceptance fee because
complainant paid respondent the amount of P1,500 plus
the amount of P500 per hearing but no receipts were
issued for these payments; that there is no truth to
respondent's allegation that complainant was in the
province because complainant's uncle called respondent 3
times a week to follow-up the Petition for Review; that it
was actually complainant who paid for the docket fees but
respondent who physically paid the same to the Court of
Appeals; and that respondent made several promises to
complainant's uncle regarding the status of the Petition for
Review but nothing came out of said promises.14
The lone issue for resolution is whether respondent
violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In its Report and Recommendation, the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP),15 held that there was no sufficient justification for
respondent's failure to file the Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals. It found that respondent was aware of
the period for filing said petition because he himself paid
the docket fees and filed the Motion for Extension of Time
to File the Petition for Review. His claim that he was
pursuing another legal remedy in the labor case did not
justify his failure to file the Petition for Review within the
prescribed period. Complainant had placed his trust in
respondent to handle his claims against his previous
employer. Failure to comply with his legal duty as counsel
of complainant in NLRC NCR OCW Case No. 00-12-00904-
95 has caused damage and prejudice to the latter. Thus, in
failing to file the Petition for Review , respondent was held
to have breached Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Commission on Bar
Discipline of IBP recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.16
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, adopted the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondent's violation of Canons 17 & 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by failing to file the Petition for
Certiorari, Atty. Bernardo G. Juanino is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months.17
We agree with the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner.
The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the
prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to
exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the
pursuit or defense of the case.18 By his own admission,
respondent entertained the idea of filing a motion for
execution, thus:
I honestly believed then that since the other respondents
did not appeal the Decision to the Commission of the
NLRC, I could enforce the Decision (See THIRD REASON)
against these other respondents who did not appeal. So
undersigned went to Honorable Labor Arbiter Eduardo J.
Carpio and explained to him about my plan to file a
Motion for Execution against the other respondents who
did not appeal the Decision to the Commission of the
NLRC. I was not able to see him the first two times that I
went as I was informed he was assigned to certain task
force and when I saw him the third time, Honorable Labor
Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio informed me that since decision
was reversed on appeal and the complaint dismissed,
there would be no basis for filing a Motion for Execution to
enforce Decision. I was dumbfounded as the period to file
a Petition for Certiorari already expired.19
As a lawyer, respondent should know that he is not
required to seek prior approval from the labor arbiter
before he could file a motion for execution.
Notwithstanding, he presented himself, not once, but
thrice, before the office of the arbiter to discuss his plan to
file a motion for execution, only to discover that such
recourse was not feasible. Worse, while respondent was
waiting for the arbiter's opinion, the period to file the
petition before the Court of Appeals continued to run, as
in fact, it eventually expired.
Failure to appeal to the Court of Appeals despite
instructions by the client to do so constitutes inexcusable
negligence on the part of counsel. Once a lawyer consents
to defend the cause of his client, he owes fidelity to such
cause and must at all times be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He is bound to protect his
client's interest to the best of his ability and perform his
duties to his client with utmost diligence. Nothing less can
be expected from a member of the Philippine Bar. For
having neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his
client, respondent did not serve his client with diligence
and competence. His inexcusable negligence on such
matter renders him liable for violation of Canons 17 and 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.20
As we held in the recent case of Barbuco v. Atty.
Beltran,21 an attorney is bound to protect his client's
interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
Thus, failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence on his part, especially if such
failure took the form of filing a pleading after the deadline
for filing the same has passed. Respondent has indeed
104
committed a serious lapse in judgment in failing to
perform his professional duty to his client under the
canons of his profession.
The failure to timely file a pleading is by itself a sin of
omission on the part of the respondent. However,
complainant's travails were further compounded by the
failure of the respondent to maintain an open line of
communication with his client in direct contravention of
Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires a lawyer to keep his client
informed of the status of his case and respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.22
In Legarda v. Court of Appeals,23 counsel's failure to
exercise due diligence in protecting the interest of his
client caused the latter material prejudice. The moment
counsel takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will
exert all effort for its prosecution until its final
resolution.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandon's
his client's cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed
on him by the latter; he owes fealty, not only to his client,
but also to the Court of which he is an officer.24
We observed in Pariñas v. Atty. Paguinto25 that a lawyer
should give adequate attention, care and time to his
client's case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should
undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in
this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a
lawyer should accept only as much cases as he can
efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients'
interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the
qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give
adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is
demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his
client's cause.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
In Barbuco v. Atty. Beltran, Guiang v. Atty.
Antonio,26 and Sps. Villaluz v. Judge Armenta,27 the Court
suspended counsel for six months upon a finding that their
failure to perfect an appeal was inexcusable and
persuasively demonstrative of negligence and malpractice,
a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which declares that "a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable."
We cannot overstate the duty of a lawyer to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. He
can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients.28
Incidentally, we note that respondent delayed the filing of
the comment for more than two (2) years. Despite
numerous extensions, which were all granted, still, he filed
the comment one (1) day late. By neglecting his duties to
his client and to this Court, respondent transgressed the
canons of legal ethics enshrined in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Such misconduct should not be
countenanced.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Bernardo G. Juanino is found guilty of negligence and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts in the Philippines, for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Resolution             March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of
Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so
much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972,
popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under
the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in
order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."
(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,
considering the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of
strictness with which the examination papers were graded,
this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946,
69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in
1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per
cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as
those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against (See
Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than
those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which,
among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
105
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court
subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it.
Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved
Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions
of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the
President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21,
1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally
was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS
FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX
UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of
section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after
July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar
examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below
fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to
take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any
exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the
next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade
of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred
and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in
such subject or subjects and such grade or
grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may
 obtain in any subsequent examinations that he (2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are
may take. to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These
candidates had each taken from two to five different
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any
approval. of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in
different subjects in previous examinations, with their
latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive
average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
approval.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking
filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in
its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision
1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for
of their examination papers were still pending also invoked
reconsideration which were denied, while 125
the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.
unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had
There are also others who have sought simply the
presented similar motions, which are still pending because
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking
they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972,
the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
— although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had
invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has
found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act
No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching
to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, administration of justice, and because some doubts have
affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing
account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
realize more readily the effects of the law, the following constitutional.
statistical data are set forth:
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who
benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various
classified as follows: aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The
valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J.
Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in
1946     (August) 206 121 18
favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's
1946     (November) 477 228 43 Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A.
1947 749 340 0 Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos
A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor,
1948 899 409 11 Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside
1949 1,218 532 164 from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and
1950 1,316 893 26
Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet
1951 2,068 879 196 and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task.
1952 2,738 1,033 426 The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost
all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter.
1953   2,555     968    The question has been the object of intense deliberation
               TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168 for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting,
the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a
new member in order to place it as humanly as possible
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either
motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic
Act, or mere motions for reconsideration. Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of

106
the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo
Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent
passing grade is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as
the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who
took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from
1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total
1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public
interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of
the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the
aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of
legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times
become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To
the legal profession is entrusted the protection of
property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially
of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious
social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of
this court alone in mimeographed copies were made
available to the public during those years and private
enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines
and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many
law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions
have been printed locally during those periods. A new set
of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of
new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it
has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from
the point of view of applicable principles, but the
resolution of the question would have been easier had an
identical case of similar background been picked out from
the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent
in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial system established here with
its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
107
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in
our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a
century? From the citations of those defending the law,
we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law
had been sustained, while those against its validity cite,
among others, the cases of Day (In re  Day, 54 NE 646), of
Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR
1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of
the President which is expressed in his vote of the original
bill and which the postponement of the contested law
respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in
other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is
not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the
disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have
examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a
favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY,
81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the
decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law
under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of
law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860,
which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time
provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other
office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that of the Court of
Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people,
shall be void. They shall not exercise any power
of appointment to public office. Any male citizen
of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral
character, and who possesses the requisite
qualifications of learning and ability, shall be
entitled to admission to practice in all the courts
of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the
constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers;
the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal
appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the
manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had
imposed upon admission to practice before
them. The prohibitory clause in the section
 quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the
insertion of the provision" expecting the
admission of attorneys, in this particular section
of the Constitution, evidently arose from its
connection with the object of this prohibitory
clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence
in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any
portion of their power over this subject, unless
the Supreme Court is right in the inference it
draws from the use of the word `admission' in
the action referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the court; that
to admit means to grant leave, and that the
power of granting necessarily implies the power
of refusing, and of course the right of
determining whether the applicant possesses
the requisite qualifications to entitle him to
admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without
affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision
seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a
diploma of the school of law of Columbia College
conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of
the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not
however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find
in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent
with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals
said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is
apparent. Columbia College being an institution
of established reputation, and having a law
department under the charge of able professors,
the students in which department were not only
subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain
definite period of study before being entitled to
a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary
study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a
test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the
latter examination, to which no definite period
of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary
and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to
the learning and ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting the
examination by the law committee of the college
108
for that of the court. It could have had no other
object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that
the Legislature designed entirely to dispense
with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing
whatever to indicate an intention that the
authorities of the college should inquire as to the
age, citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it
was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments
of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent
alone it operates as a modification of pre-
existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the
present condition of the law on the subject.
(p.89)
xxx     xxx     xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent
evidence in certain cases upon that question.
(p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the
case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please
note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any
candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of
Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over
the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it
does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of
the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved,
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and
their supervision have been disputably a judicial function
and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous
and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power
have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether
these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in
effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same
individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours
has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice
of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive
and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW
441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment
providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the
courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative
power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been
able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the
Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been
expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial
function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it
stands alone as an assertion of legislative power.
(p. 444)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends
thus:
Under the Constitution all legislative power is
vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art.
4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications
for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its
constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those
qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the
power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and
legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the
109
powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to
its department. Neither department should so
act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of
its respective functions. That was the scheme
and thought of the people setting upon the form
of government under which we exist. State vs.
Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel.
Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is
responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our
state government, under 42a scheme which it
was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other
department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the
powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar
and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache
of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by
the courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily
bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into
disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct
and severe supervision over their bars, at least in
the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows:
For more than six centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution, the courts of England,
concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of
determining who should be admitted to the
practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of
the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases
235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If
the courts and judicial power be regarded as an
entity, the power to determine who should be
admitted to practice law is a constituent element
of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that
element and say with assurance that it is either a
part of the inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power exercised
by the court, but that it is a power belonging to
the judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a separate
independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along
with the power traditionally exercise to
determine who should constitute its attorney at
law. There is no express provision in the
Constitution which indicates an intent that this
traditional power of the judicial department
should in any manner be subject to legislative
control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the
framers of our constitution was to make the
three great departments of government
separate and independent of one another. The
idea that the Legislature might embarrass the
judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
with the dominant purpose of making the
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate
judicial independent of the legislative
of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
department, and such a purpose should not be
inferred in the absence of express constitutional
provisions. While the legislature may legislate
with respect to the qualifications of attorneys,
but is incidental merely to its general and
unquestioned power to protect the public
interest. When it does legislate a fixing a
standard of qualifications required of attorneys
at law in order that public interests may be
protected, such qualifications do not constitute
only a minimum standard and limit the class
from which the court must make its selection.
Such legislative qualifications do not constitute
the ultimate qualifications beyond which the
court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to
their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law.
(p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to
exercise the power of appointment. It is quite
likely true that the legislature may exercise the
power of appointment when it is in pursuance of
a legislative functions. However, the authorities
are well-nigh unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial
function. In all of the states, except New Jersey
(In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as
our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission
as members of the bar of the court so admitting.
Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L.
Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed.
366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed.
285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646,
34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119
110
N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas.
413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice
having been perpetually exercised by the courts,
it having been so generally held that the act of
the court in admitting an attorney to practice is
the judgment of the court, and an attempt as
this on the part of the Legislature to confer such
right upon any one being most exceedingly
uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of
an attorney is and always has been a purely
judicial function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
It is indispensible to the administration of justice
and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability,
adequate learning and sound moral character.
This arises from the need of enlightened
assistance to the honest, and restraining
authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly
important, also that the public be protected
from incompetent and vicious practitioners,
whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It
was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel.
Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E.
487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar
is a privilege burden with conditions." One is
admitted to the bar "for something more than
private gain." He becomes an "officer of the
court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever
justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the
judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That
has been the history of attorneys under the
common law, both in this country and England.
Admission to practice as an attorney at law is
almost without exception conceded to be a
judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial
action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and
made open and notorious by a decision of the
court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the
exercise of its powers as a coordinate
department of government. It is an inherent
power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of
those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for
 assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this
respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly
and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9,
13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the
rules and practice of common-law courts, that it
rests exclusively with the court to determine
who is qualified to become one of its officers, as
an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a
petition to secure license to practice the legal profession
by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court
said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the
nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its
order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private
character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence
by an examination of the parties. In this court
the fact of the admission of such officers in the
highest court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong for, three years preceding
their application, is regarded as sufficient
evidence of the possession of the requisite legal
learning, and the statement of counsel moving
their admission sufficient evidence that their
private and professional character is fair. The
order of admission is the judgment of the court
that the parties possess the requisite
qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and
are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties
become officers of the court, and are responsible
to it for professional misconduct. They hold their
office during good behavior, and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is
not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is
the exercise of judicial power, and has been so
held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of the
application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper
22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said
that court, "are not only officers of the court, but
officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to
proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted
to the court, and the latter, in performing his
111
duty, may very justly considered as engaged in
the exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent
portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without
exception conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion
need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held
to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers
of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172
Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise
of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of
the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of
California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to
bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the
legislative and the judicial departments is that it
is the province of the legislature to establish
rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the
legislative action, while the judiciary determines
rights and obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or conditions that exist
at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and
the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action
or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province
shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control
the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own
views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them
to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall
be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. —
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is
not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking
those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although
this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now,
for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department,
that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions,
as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated
by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice
of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the
power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and
modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines,
Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on
Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. the
primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the
matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the
power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or
take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary
power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or
reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group
of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to
repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better
112
service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit,
suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and
supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to
promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter
and supplement them may and should be exercised with
the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of
each department requires. These powers have existed
together for centuries without diminution on each part;
the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on
the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which
public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature
may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental
rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial
power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good
and efficient administration of justice and the supervision
of the practice of the legal profession, should consider
these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation
of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the
lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits,
are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each
other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our
criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a few
points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted
law provided that one who had been appointed to the
position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law
without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal
in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his
license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act
No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the
prescribed examination, on the ground that he
holds the office of provincial fiscal for the
Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28,
1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act
Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An
Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine
Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the
laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and
are in good and regular standing as members of
the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this act, or
at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court
of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of
the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for
the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the
Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law
in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the Supreme
Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a
former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of
the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per
cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four
points short of the required percentage of 75.
We would be delinquent in the performance of
our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the
face of this affirmative indication of the
deficiency of the applicant in the required
qualifications of learning in the law at the time
when he presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him
license to practice law in the courts of these
Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that
despite his failure to pass the examination on
that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of
the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
as of right to be admitted to the bar without
taking the prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied by
satisfactory proof that he has held and now
holds the office of provincial fiscal of the
Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in
mind the object which the legislator apparently
113
sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of
the context generally and especially of the fact
that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in
that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates
without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required
in order to give effect to the apparent intention
of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de
jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the
Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act
No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court
continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon
this court by the commission and confirmed to it
by the Act of Congress would be limited and
restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the
word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of
Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were
appointed to the positions enumerated, and with
particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the
admission to the bar under the provisions of this
statute have been considered heretofore, we
have accepted the fact that such appointments
had been made as satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those
cases we had reason to believe that the
applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to
the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or
any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further
affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last
applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his
defieciency on that occasion, we do not think
that his appointment to the office of provincial
fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his
possession of the necessary qualifications of
 learning and ability. We conclude therefore that
this application for license to practice in the
courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took
the examination he fell only four points short of
the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to
practice; and in view also of the fact that since
that time he has held the responsible office of
the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability
in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by
appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal,
we think we would be justified under the above-
cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his
case the ordinary examination prescribed by
general rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a
committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of the
ordinary examinations prescribed by general
rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to
fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and
Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal
defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has
intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899
required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that
year, to grant license for the practice of law to those
students who began studying before November 4, 1897,
and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a
law office and would pass an examination, or to those who
had studied for three years if they commenced their
studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court
declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among
others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission
to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The
act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled
114
"An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An
act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and
counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force
July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it
appears in the enacting clause, consists in the
addition to the section of the following: "And
every application for a license who shall comply
with the rules of the supreme court in regard to
admission to the bar in force at the time such
applicant commend the study of law, either in a
law or office or a law school or college, shall be
granted a license under this act notwithstanding
any subsequent changes in said rules". — In
re  Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso,
one branch of which is that up to December 31,
1899, this court shall grant a license of
admittance to the bar to the holder of every
diploma regularly issued by any law school
regularly organized under the laws of this state,
whose regular course of law studies is two years,
and requiring an attendance by the student of at
least 36 weeks in each of such years, and
showing that the student began the study of law
prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied
with the usual proofs of good moral character.
The other branch of the proviso is that any
student who has studied law for two years in a
law office, or part of such time in a law office,
"and part in the aforesaid law school," and
whose course of study began prior to November
4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the
branches now required by the rules of this court.
If the right to admission exists at all, it is by
virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers
substantial rights and privileges upon the
persons named therein, and establishes rules of
legislative creation for their admission to the
bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an
enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as
such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part
in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should
be received by the court as conclusive of the
requisite learning and ability of persons to
practice law, it could only be done by a general
law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4,
section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege,
and a license for that purpose makes the holder
an officer of the court, and confers upon him the
right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and
to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court. The
law conferring such privileges must be general in
its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may
classify persons so long as the law establishing
classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some
difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for
different one, having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs.
People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People,
155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and
the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121
Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his
profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an
arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment
based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E.
113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes
to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any
classification must have some reference to
learning, character, or ability to engage in such
practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of
persons who began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into
two classes — First, those presenting diplomas
issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who
studied law for the period of two years in a law
office, or part of the time in a law school and
part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the
present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for
making application for admission. As to both
classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed
with, and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course
of study is prescribed for the law school, but a
diploma granted upon the completion of any
sort of course its managers may prescribe is
made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with
relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons
to practice law resting upon the mere date of
November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the
study of law November 4th could qualify
themselves to practice in two years as well as
those who began on the 3rd. The classes named
in the proviso need spend only two years in
study, while those who commenced the next day
must spend three years, although they would
115
complete two years before the time limit. The
one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of
a diploma, is to be admitted without
examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while as
to the other the prescribed course must be
pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such
classification cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to the subject
sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for
the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon
certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240
N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to
reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held
with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it
be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that
power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised
through general laws which will apply to all alike
and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of
the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications
of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr.
Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32
L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of
every citizen of the United States to follow any
lawful calling, business or profession he may
choose, subject only to such restrictions as are
imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all
open to every one on like conditions. All may be
pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their
successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is
sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in
them — that is, the right to continue their
prosecution — is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal
property can be thus taken. It is fundamental
under our system of government that all
similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities.
Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications to establish the
possession on the part of the application of his
proper qualifications before he may be licensed
to practice, have been challenged, and courts
have seriously considered whether the
 exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon
this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121
N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel.
Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W.
345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W.
468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to
confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere
matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to
practice law and that one time he possessed the
requisite learning and other qualifications to
entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from
the great body of the public an individual upon
whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929,
c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit
to the practice of law without examination, all
who had served in the military or naval forces of
the United States during the World War and
received a honorable discharge therefrom and
who (were disabled therein or thereby within
the purview of the Act of Congress approved
June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's
Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least
ten per cent thereunder at the time of the
passage of this Act." This Act was held |
unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly
violated the quality clauses of the constitution of
that state. In re Application of George W.
Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally
acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of
the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the
person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be founded
upon pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones.
Therefore, any law that is made applicable to
one class of citizens only must be based on some
substantial difference between the situation of
that class and other individuals to which it does
not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there
116
must be such a difference between the situation
and circumstances of all the members of the
class and the situation and circumstances of all
other members of the state in relation to the
subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural cause for the
difference made in their liabilities and burdens
and in their rights and privileges. A law is not
general because it operates on all within a clause
unless there is a substantial reason why it is
made to operate on that class only, and not
generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a
general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in
1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953,
and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per
cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general
average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed
since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by
the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If
there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the
years before, with the general average indicated, were not
included because the Tribunal has no record of the
unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954,
1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before
said years under the same conditions justified. The fact
that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946
does not signify that no one concerned may prove by
some other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued
that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional.
What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946
to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who
obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had
69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74
per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per
cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to
75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These
changes in the passing averages during those years were
all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired
to undo what had been done — cancel the license that
was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75
per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not
propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been
done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the
Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those
candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or
defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954
and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one
per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted
to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the
best proof that what the law attempts to amend and
correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or
judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place.
This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of Congress.
In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force.
What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this
power is not included in what the Constitution has granted
to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the
rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which
such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of
examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of
this system is that it does not take into account that the
laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a
candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen
that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already
different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness.
The system that the said law prescribes was used in the
first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned
for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the
fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title
will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the
text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI
of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2
completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it
is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first,
because they are not within the legislative powers of
Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers;
second, because they create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles;
and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been
seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare
that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and
therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the
following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates
who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who,
117
it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice
law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid
years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to
become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to
perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary
manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that this
Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise
and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act
No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory
rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts
subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal
shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that
end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good
bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of
justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the
practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of
candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts
which are of general knowledge and does not justify the
admission to the Bar of law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is
undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the
title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the
entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part
of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the
examinations in those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and
availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of
the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and Passing grade (
close of the debate among the members of the Court, and
after hearing the judicious observations of two of our November, 1946
beloved colleagues who since the beginning have Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Ho
announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this
Number of candidates
decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for
the Court, and under the authority of the same: Number of candidates whose grades were raised
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 Minutes of March 31, 1947)
referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all Number of candidates who passed
of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore,
void and without force and effect. Number of candidates who failed
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part Percentage of success (
of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to
the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 Percentage of failure (
inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in Passing grade (
conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.          (By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the
candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo
inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jam
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per Number of candidates
cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
Number of candidates whose grades were raised
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not.
After this decision has become final, they shall be          70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of          69 per cent 4
office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the
chief Justice may set. So ordered.          68 per cent 2
Number of candidates who passed
ANNEX I Number of candidates who failed
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Percentage of success (
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar Percentage of failure (
examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows: Passing grade (
         (by resolution of the Court).
August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Note.--In
Atty. Bernardino
passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per
Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. respectively,
Federico Agrava,
the Court found out that they were not bene
Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members. 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.
Number of candidates August, 1948
Number of candidates whose grades were raised Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon
          73'S Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Mac
G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Member
          72'S
Number of candidates
Number of candidates who passed
Number of candidates whose grades were raised
Number of candidates who failed
         71's 2
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
         70's 3
Percentage of success
Number of candidates who passed
Percentage of failure

118
Number of candidates who failed Percentage of failure (
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 Passing grade (
Percentage of success August, 1952
Percentage of failure Board of Examiners:  Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Vira
Passing grade
Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
         (by resolution of the Court).
Number of candidates
August, 1949
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor,
Number of candidates
Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H.who
de passed
Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members. Number of candidates who failed
Number of candidates Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) Percentage of success (
Number of candidates who passed Percentage of failure (
Number of candidates who failed Passing grade (
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 August, 1953
Percentage of success Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor
Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de
Percentage of failure
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Passing grade
Number of candidates
         (by resolution of the Court).
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)
August, 1950
Number of candidates who passed
Board of Examiners:  Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique
Number of candidates who failed
Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique
V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
Number of candidates Percentage of success (
Number of candidates whose grades were raised Percentage of failure (
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation
Passing gradeand authority (
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under
Number of candidates who failed Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they
took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 presented motions for reconsideration which were denied
Percentage of success (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration
without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:
Percentage of failure
Passing grade
PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW
August, 1951
Civ. Land Mer
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique
Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61
Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74
Number of candidates
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)
1948
Number of candidates who passed
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66
Number of candidates who failed
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71
Percentage of success
1949

119
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71
21. Blanco, Jose 75 62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67
24. Canon, Guillermo 77 65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 1948
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82
29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68 69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69
MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69

120
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 MRD-131. Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 MRD-132. Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72
94. Viado, Jose 67 133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 134. Cabangbang, Santiago B. 77 67 61
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62
1950 137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 MRD-138. Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63
99. Española, Pablo S. 71 139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 MRD-140. Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75
MRD-102. Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66
MRD-104. Torre, Catalino P. 75 144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73
1951 146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 MRD-148. Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75
MRD-110. Añosa, Pablo S. 76 MRD-151. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63
MRD-115. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65
MRD-117. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60
MRD-118. Benitez, Tomas P. 67 159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78
MRD-120. Briñas, Isagani A. 71 MRD-161. Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 MRD-162. Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.   MRD-165. Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63
MRD-126. Calimlim, Jose B. 64 MRD-167. Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75

121
MRD-168. Montero, Leodegario C. 73 208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 MRP-210. Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80
MRD-171. Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78
MRD-173. Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 MRP-213. Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78
MRD-175. Perez, Cesario Z. 75 215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 MRP-218. Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75
MRD-179. Redor, Francisco K. 62 219. Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad 73 71 72
MRD-180. Regis, Deogracias A. 76 MRP-220. Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 MRP-221. Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81
MRD-182. Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 MRP-222. Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 MRP-226. Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 MRP-227. Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 MRP-230. Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79
192. Suico, Samuel 73 232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 MRP-233. Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78
MRD-196. Tiausas, Miguel V. 67 236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 MRP-239. Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 MRP-240. Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 MRP-241. Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 MRP-242. Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77
1952 MRP-243. Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 MRP-244. Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65
MRP-204. Abad, Agapito 73 MRP-245. Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78
MRP-205. Abella, Ludovico B. 70 MRP-246. Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76
MRP-206. Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75
MRP-207. Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71

122
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 MRP-290. Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86
MRP-250. Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64
MRP-251. Cabello, Melecio F. 72 MRP-292. Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71
MRP-252. Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 MRP-293. Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 MRP-294. Delgado, Abner 75 84 63
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 MRP-295. Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81
MRP-255. Calzada, Cesar de la 76 296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 MRP-297. Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78
MRP-257. Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 MRP-302. Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 MRP-303. Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73
MRP-263. Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58
MRP-264. Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74
MRP-265. Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 MRP-306. Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80
MRP-266. Campos, Juan A. 66 MRP-307. Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77
268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72
MRP-269. Castro, Daniel T. 65 310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 MRP-313. Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 MRP-314. Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 MRP-315. Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70
MRP-276. Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 MRP-317. Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 MRP-319. Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74
MRP-279. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82
MRP-280. Cruz, Raymundo 75 321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84
MRP-281. Cunanan, Jose C. 78 322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 MRP-325. Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84
MRP-285. Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87
MRP-286. Datu, Alfredo J. 70 327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81
MRP-288. Degamo, Pedro R. 73 329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75

123
MRP-331. Garcia, Matias N. 67 371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73
MRP-332. Ganete, Carmelo 75 372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 MRP-374. Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 MRP-375. Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76
MRP-336. Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 MRP-376. Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75
MRP-337. Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 MRP-377. Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72
MRP-338. Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 MRP-379. Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 MRP-380. Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73
MRP-341. Guzman, Mateo de 76 381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 MRP-382. Monponbanua, Antonio D. 79 79 68
343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 MRP-383. Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67
345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 MRP-386. Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75
1952 387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 MRP-389. Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 MRP-390. Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71
MRP-350. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77
MRP-351. Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 MRP-392. Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81
MRP-352. Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 MRP-393. Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78
MRP-354. Javier, Aquilino M. 75 MRP-395. Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77
MRP-356. Jose, Nestor L. 78 397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 MRP-400. Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 MRP-403. Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76
363. Luna, Lucito 70 404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69
MRP-364. Luz, Lauro L. 76 MRP-405. Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72
MRP-365. Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76
366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78
MRP-368. Makabenta, Eduardo 75 MRP-409. Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80
MRP-369. Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 MRP-410. Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 MRP-411. Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74

124
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 MRP-453. Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70
MRP-413. Pasion, Anastacio 63 MRP-454. Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84
MRP-415. Paulin, Jose O. 70 456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83
MRP-416. Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 MRP-457. Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78
417. Peña, Jesus 75 MRP-458. Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 MRP-459. Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73
419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 MRP-460. Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79
MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C. 77 461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 MRP-462. Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82
MRP-423. Piza, Luz 68 464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 MRP-466. Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70
MRP-426. Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77
MRP-427. Quietson, Bayani R. 73 MRP-468. Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 MRP-469. Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75
MRP-430. Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72
MRP-431. Ramos, Patricio S. 75 MRP-472. Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76
MRP-432. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 MRP-473. Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63
MRP-433. Raro, Celso 75 474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67
MRP-434. Rayos, Victor S. 75 MRP-475. Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 MRP-476. Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 MRP-477. Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 MRP-479. Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81
MRP-440. Reyes, Oscar R. 75 481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 MRP-482. Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80
MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81
MRP-444. Robles, Enrique 75 485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79
445. Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano 76 MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 MRP-488. Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74
MRP-449. Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 MRP-490. Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 MRP-491. Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 MRP-492. Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70

125
MRP-494. Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 1952 70 75 6
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 8. Maraña, Arsenio s.      
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70
1949 72 68 6
MRP-497. Yasay, Mariano R. 75
1952 65 79 6
MRP-498. Ygay, Venancio M. 73
9. Montano, Manuel M.      
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73
1951 61 60 5
500. Zamora, Alberto 70
1952 70 77 6
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70
1953 78 64 6
A list of those who petitioned for the 10. Peña, Jesus S.      
consolidation of their grades in subjects passed
in previous examinations, showing the years in 1950 25 75 4
which they took the examinations together with 1951 70 77 6
their grades and averages, and those who had
filed motions for reconsideration which were 1952 75 75 7
denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows: 11. Placido, Sr., Isidro      

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72 1950 68 78 7

1951 65 62 7
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.      
1949 65 75 7
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1951 68 57 4
1946
1952 68 53 6
1950
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.      
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1952 67 80 5
1951
1953 65 67 7
1952
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.      
1953
1951 67 60 7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
1952 70 71 6
MRD-1949
15. Sanchez, Juan J.      
1951
1948 39 69 8
4. Condeno, Mateo
MRD-1949 67 56 6
1950
1951 70 59 5
1951
16. Santos, Constantino      
5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
1952 62 76 5
MRD-1949
1953 73 71 7
1950
17. Santos, Salvador H.      
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
1951 60 64 5
MRD-1949
1952 75 64 7
1950
1953 70 71 7
7. Luna, Lucito A.
18. Sevilla, Macario C.      
1946

126
 MRD-1948 27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78

MRD-1949 28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67

29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68
1950
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60
MRD-1951
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70
1953
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while
some candidates--85 in all--presented motions for 34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70
reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the 35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86
provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those
candidates separating those who filed mere motions for 36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65
reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid 37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67
Republic act, is as follows:
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION 39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71

40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54
Civ. 41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66
42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47
13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56
15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 Civ. Land Mer

19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65

20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66

127
 7. Enriquez, Pelagio y Concepcion 84 examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 70 per cent
8. Estonina, Severino 80 without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 In determining the average, the foregoing
subjects shall be given the following relative
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70
weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law,
10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent;
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation,
5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72
candidates shall not be required to take another
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 examination in any subject in which they have
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and
such rating shall be taken into account in
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 determining their general average in any
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 subsequent examinations: Provided, however,
That if the candidate fails to get a general
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73
average of 70 per cent in his third examination,
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 he shall lose the benefit of having already passed
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 some subjects and shall be required to the
examination in all the subjects.
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 without falling below 50 per cent in any
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
or who has been otherwise found to be entitled
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78
to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8,
No. 12).
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly
affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who
have not presented any petition, they reach a total of With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion
1,094. pertinent to the matter before us being:

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72
per cent the passing general average in the bar
examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent
in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but
raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent
since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the
Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended
to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-
law to the practice of the profession. The amendments
embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to
sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed
amendment is as follows:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful
candidates at bar examinations should be
compelled to repeat even those subjects which
they have previously passed. This is not the case
in any other government examination. The Rules
of Court have therefore been amended in this
measure to give a candidate due credit for any
subject which he has previously passed with a
rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on
May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of
this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was
signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from
making any and one took no part. With regards to the
matter that interests us, the Court said:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule
candidate may be deemed to have passed the 127. One part of this amendment provides that if

128
a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in
any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said
subject in his next examination. This is a sort of
passing the Bar Examination on the installment
plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The
trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more convenient
for the candidate because he may in an
examination prepare himself on only one or two
subjects so as to insure passing them, by the
time that he has passed the last required
subjects, which may be several years away from
the time that he reviewed and passed the firs
subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles
and theories contained in those subjects and
remembers only those of the one or two
subjects that he had last reviewed and passed.
This is highly possible because there is nothing in
the law which requires a candidate to continue
taking the Bar examinations every year in
succession. The only condition imposed is that a
candidate, on this plan, must pass the
examination in no more that three installments;
but there is no limitation as to the time or
number of years intervening between each
examination taken. This would defeat the object
and the requirements of the law and the Court in
admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and
presupposed that he possesses the knowledge
and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of
all law subjects required in bar examinations, so
as presently to be able to practice the legal
profession and adequately render the legal
service required by prospective clients. But this
would not hold true of the candidates who may
have obtained a passing grade on any five
subjects eight years ago, another three subjects
one year later, and the last two subjects the
present year. We believe that the present
system of requiring a candidate to obtain a
passing general average with no grade in any
subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and
satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and
prepared in all required legal subjects at the time
of admission to the practice of law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of
section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any application who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject
in any examination held after the 4th day of July,
1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar
129
candidates who obtained not less than 70 per
cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject,
despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a
passing general average in any of those years,
will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not
only prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the
next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general
average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of
making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of
the fact that after every bar examinations, the
Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who have obtained a passing general average
grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have
failed. The present amendment would have the
effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the
Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have
obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but
less than the general passing average fixed for
that year. It is clear that this question involves
legal implications, and this phase of the
amendment if finally enacted into law might
have to go thru a legal test. As one member of
the Court remarked during the discussion, when
a court renders a decision or promulgate a
resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in
force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final
decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered
is the fact that members of the bar are officers
of the courts, including the Supreme Court.
When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the
Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person
fit, competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied
admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any
year since 1946 may have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent but less than that
required for that year in order to pass, the
Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered
and declared that he was not prepared, ready,
competent and qualified to be its officer. The
present amendment giving retroactivity to the
reduction of the passing general average runs
 counter to all these acts and resolutions of the
Supreme Court and practically and in effect says
that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected
by the Court to be its officer because he was
unprepared, undeserving and unqualified,
nevertheless and in spite of all, must be
admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as
its officer. We repeat, that this is another
important aspect of the question to be carefully
and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the
following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of
the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the
legal profession and maintain it on a high level.
This is not achieved, however, by admitting to
practice precisely a special class who have failed
in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill
contains provisions to which I find serious
fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any
subject in any examination held after the 4th day
of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This
provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting
as it does specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946,
1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set
aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It
should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who
have failed. The provision under consideration
would have the effect of revoking the Supreme
Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have failed to obtain
the passing average fixed for that year. Said
provision also sets a bad precedent in that the
Government would be morally obliged to grant a
similar privilege to those who have failed in the
examinations for admission to other professions
such as medicine, engineering, architecture and
certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the
Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each
130
House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the
Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the
Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND
INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any
bar candidate who obtained a general average of
70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations;
71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in
the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining
a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing
general average shall be restored in all
succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally,
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-
half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade
of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed
to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its
approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of
the President and to afford another opportunity
to those who feel themselves discriminated by
the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when
those who would otherwise have passed the bar
examination but were arbitrarily not so
considered by altering its previous decisions of
the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been
altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74
in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary
fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction
to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill
a gradual increase in the general averages for
passing the bar examinations as follows; For
1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for
1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar
examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the
passing mark will be restored with the condition
that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject
a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for
relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade,
is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese
occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who
took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our
students as well as the available reading
materials will be under normal conditions, if not
improved from those years preceding the last
world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of
having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the
study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year
stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who
failed in the bar examination". He considered the
bill a class legislation. This contention, however,
is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the
Supreme Court have already established as
precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the
passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for
who this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar
examination on the strength of the established
precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully
aware of the insurmountable difficulties and
handicaps which they were unavoidably placed.
We believe that such precedent cannot or could
not have been altered, constitutionally, by the
Supreme Court, without giving due consideration
to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar
candidates who took the examination when the
precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was
still enforced and without being inconsistent
with the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be
considered as a simple curative act or corrective
131
statute which Congress has the power to enact.
The requirement of a "valid classification" as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the
following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who
naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification,
and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the
class and those it leaves untouched. When a
class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it
cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit
designated with different rules established for
each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95,
N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time
with its tides brings new conditions which must
be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new
conditions affect the members of a class. If so,
the correcting statute must apply to all alike.
Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so,
the correcting statute may be as narrow as the
mischief. The constitution does not prohibit
special laws inflexibly and always. It permits
them when there are special evils with which the
general laws are incompetent to cope. The
special public purpose will sustain the special
form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one
of legislative policy, with a wide margin of
discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in
the case of plain abuse will there be revision by
the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup.
Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective
statute which always retroacts to the extent of
the care of correction only as in this case from
1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of
Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this
bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by
Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked
the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
 Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the
Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No.
371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12
passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in
the first indorsement of the undersigned dated
June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive
Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill
should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of
which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI,
Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously
cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election
year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill
were candidates for re-election, together, however, they
lost in the polls.
A.M. No. P-05-1950 August 30, 2006
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1898-P)
JUDGE CRISPIN B. BRAVO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MIGUEL C. MORALES, Branch Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 17 (now detailedwith
OCC), Manila, Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------x
A.M. No. MTJ-1612
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1571-MTJ)
ATTY. MIGUEL C. MORALES, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CRISPIN B. BRAVO, AZCUNA, and
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 16,
Manila, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA,  J.:
These consolidated administrative cases which are in the
nature of a charge and countercharge sprang from the
same incident. In A.M. No. P-05-1950, Judge Crispin B.
Bravo, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila, Branch 16, charges his former branch clerk of
court, Atty. Miguel C. Morales, now detailed with the
132
Office of the Clerk of Court, MeTC, Manila, with grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer. In
A.M. No. MTJ-1612, on the other hand, Atty. Morales
charges Judge Bravo with grave abuse of authority,
slander, harassment, grave ignorance of the law,
inefficiency and grave/serious misconduct.
In his complaint in A.M. No. P-05-1950, Judge Bravo
alleged, in gist, the following:
1. That while serving as the Acting Presiding Judge of
MeTC, Manila, Branch 17, he requested the detail of his
branch clerk of court, Atty. Morales, to the OCC, MeTC,
Manila. Later, he recommended to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) the immediate dismissal of Atty.
Morales from the service for corrupt practices;
2. That since he made the recommendation, he observed
Atty. Morales to have acted discourteously and
disrespectful toward him. He relates that whenever he
greets court employees with a "good morning ladies and
gentlemen" after every flag raising ceremony, as was his
usual practice, he noticed Atty. Morales mimicking him in a
squeaky comical voice, obviously to make fun of him;
3. That in the morning of March 22, 2004, before the start
of the flag raising rite at the old MWSS Building in
Arroceros, Manila he caught Atty. Morales about to do his
mocking imitating act, prompting him to tell the latter
"tumigil ka"; that he then ordered one of the security
guards to arrest Atty. Morales preparatory to charging him
with unjust vexation;
4. That so as not to exacerbate an embarrassing situation,
he waited for the flag raising ceremony to end before
apologizing to the crowd for the incident, only to witness
Atty. Morales responding with a shout: "sa akin hindi ka
mag-aapology"(sic) 1
5. That he ignored Atty. Morales’ outburst and instead
instructed the Officer-in-Charge of the security guards to
call the Manila City Hall Police Detachment, which
immediately dispatched PO3 Pacifico Wong and PO2 Jose
Rancho; that he briefed both police officers regarding the
flag-raising ceremony incident and about the preceding
exchange of charges and counter-charges filed with the
OCA
6. That no arrest was effected on that day owing to the
intervention of MeTC Executive Judge Myra G. Fernandez
and 2nd Vice Executive Judge Tingaraan Guiling who
instructed the police officers to maintain the status quo;
and
7. That Atty. Morales’ sympathizers circulated a
manifesto 2 on that same day denouncing his act as a judge
and soliciting support for Atty. Morales from the Union of
the Clerks of Court of the MeTC, Manila; that of the
twenty-nine union members, only three supported Atty.
Morales, one of the three, Atty. Eusebio Yarra, even
pointing to the provocative act of Atty. Morales as the root
cause of the incident adverted to.
At his end, Atty. Morales avers in his counter-complaint
that Judge Bravo failed to behave with due restraint when
the judge ordered his arrest. As Atty. Morales argued,
unjust vexation is covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, adding that unjust vexation is not a continuing
offense and, ergo, a warrantless arrest could not be
effected therefor, let alone by the responding police
officers who have no personal knowledge, as it were, of
the alleged crime.
Upon the Office of the Court Administrator’s (OCA’s)
recommendation, both cases were re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter.
Pursuant to a Resolution of the Court dated December 6,
2004, both parties submitted separate manifestations in
which they indicated their willingness to submit their
respective charges for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings thus filed. Pursuant too to another Resolution of
September 28, 2005, the Court, upon due motion, ordered
the consolidation of A.M. No. MTJ-1612 with A.M. No. P-
05-1950.
In its report, the OCA recommended that Judge Bravo be
reprimanded for abuse of authority and Atty. Morales be
fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for conduct unbecoming
a government officer.
We find the recommendations of the OCA and the
premises holding them together to be well-taken.
At bottom is the sad spectacle of two officials of the
judiciary wasting the precious hours of the Court, including
theirs, that could have otherwise been devoted to a more
salutary productive judicial pursuit rather than on petty
wrangling that has no place in the judicial system. They
ought to be reminded that the nature and responsibilities
of the men and women in the judiciary, as defined in
different canons of conduct, are neither mere rhetorical
words nor idealistic sentiments but working standards and
attainable goals to be matched with actual deeds. 3 The
Court has repeatedly stressed that court employees, from
the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public
servants charged with dispensing justice, should always act
with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, if
not maturity. Their conduct must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be
in accordance with law and court regulations. They should
avoid any act or conduct that would or tend to diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those
133
connected with the dispensation of justice bear a heavy
burden of responsibility. 4
An examination of the records of these consolidated cases
reveals an undeniable pervasive atmosphere of animosity
between Judge Bravo and Atty. Morales as evidenced by a
number of administrative cases filed by one against the
other. In fact, there are six additional administrative cases
filed by Atty. Morales against Judge Bravo, 5 while there
are three more administrative cases filed by the latter
against the former. 6 With the strained relations between
the two, it was not inconceivable for Atty. Morales to
make fun of Judge Bravo in front of court employees by
mimicking the latter, making the greeting in a squeaky
comical voice, and for Judge Bravo to retaliate
instantaneously by ordering the arrest of his erring
subordinate even before a criminal suit is instituted.
On the charge that Judge Bravo abused his authority, the
Court agrees with the inculpatory findings of the OCA.
Judge Bravo indeed overstepped the bounds of his
authority when he ordered the arrest of Atty. Morales on
the basis of a mere intent to sue the latter later for unjust
vexation. Being a dispenser of justice, it behooves Judge
Bravo to observe the same rules of due process in dealing
with his subordinates. He should have confined himself to
filing an administrative complaint or a criminal one and let
the wheels of justice run its course. To be sure, Judge
Bravo's actuation was unbecoming a judge who, needless
to stress, is expected to exercise proper restraint and
civility in dealing even with insolent subordinates.
We feel, however, that Judge Bravo’s actuation in the
premises does not amount to grave abuse of authority, as
urged by Atty. Morales. Provoked as the judge was by Atty.
Morales’ insulting conduct, the judge, like any other
normal person, must have been carried away by his
emotion. Even then, his conduct as a judge is not totally
excusable. To paraphrase what we said earlier, a judge,
even in the face of boorish behavior from those he deals
with, ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a
gentleman and a high officer of the court.
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of the fact that all
but three members of the MeTC Clerk of Court circle
refused to rally behind Atty. Morales in his tiff with Judge
Bravo, indicating doubtless that the cumulative effect of
his provocative remarks and actions against the judge
were what triggered the unfortunate March 22, 2004
incident.
The foregoing notwithstanding, some form of sanction
should still be imposed on Judge Bravo, reacting as he did
in a manner disproportionate to what Atty. Morales had
done, however wrong they might have been. There being
no showing, however, that Judge Bravo had been
previously charged with and found guilty of the same or
similar administrative offense, a reprimand with a warning
appears proper.
We likewise agree with the OCA’s finding on Atty. Morales’
guilt for conduct unbecoming a government employee. His
insulting act of mimicking the judge, in the presence of
other court employees, a gesture calculated to ridicule, is
a behavior unexpected of one in the judicial service. The
ideal is for a court employee to be well-mannered, civil,
and considerate in his actuations, more particularly with
respect to his relation to the presiding judge he is assigned
under. Here, Atty. Morales' acts went against the
principles of public service and such unpleasant kind of
behavior must not be tolerated if we are to demand the
highest degree of excellence and professionalism among
public employees and to preserve the integrity and dignity
of our courts of justice. He failed to live up to the norms of
conduct demanded of his position.
We take this opportunity to remind both Judge Bravo and
Atty. Morales that government service is people-oriented.
Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice; civility is
never a sign of weakness and courtesy is a mark of culture
and good breeding. Impatience and rudeness have no
place in the government service in which personnel are
enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times. 7
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court
resolves to:
(a) REPRIMAND Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, for abuse
of authority;
(b) Impose a FINE on Atty. Miguel C. Morales of the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, in
the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for
conduct unbecoming a public officer.
Both are hereby STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9920
[Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant
vs.
FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
134
A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a
solemnizing officer.
This disbarment complaint is an offshoot of our Decision
in  Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et
al.1 Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
(Tormis), together with other judges and employees of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed for
turning the solemnization of marriages into a
business.2 Tormis was dismissed from the service for the
second time, and this Court directed the Office of the Bar
Confidant to initiate disbarment proceedings against her.
On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial
Supervisor, led the judicial audit.team created by the
Office of the Court Administrator to investigate Branches
2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu
City for alleged misdeeds in the solemnization of
marriages.3
Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team,
posing as a couple, went to the Palace of Justice to ask
about the marriage application process.4 They were told by
the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain
"Meloy."5
Fearing that the male undercover would be recognized by
the court employees in Branch 4, the two agreed that only
the female undercover would go inside the court. 6 She
was then assisted by a woman named
Helen.1âwphi1 Helen assured the female undercover that
their marriage process could be hurried. 7 She also
claimed that it was possible for the marriage to be
solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate
would only be dated when the marriage license became
available. 8
The Office of the Court Administrator found that the
respondent judges in that case connived with the court
personnel, who acted as "fixers" in solemnizing
marriages.9 The judges heedlessly kept solemnizing
marriages despite irregularities in the requirements
provided under the law.10
In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this Court treated
the judicial audit team's memorandum as an
administrative complaint against the respondent judges,
including Tormis.11 The judges were directed to file their
comments on the charges against them. 12 They were also
suspended pending resolution of the case.13
On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepafio of the Office of the Court
Administrator submitted a Memorandum dated August 29,
2007 and Supplemental Report. 14 The Report stated that:
Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were
examined by the judicial audit team. The team reported
that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280
marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a
higher number of solemnized marriages than the number
of marriage certificates in the courts' custody. There is also
an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the
local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu.
There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with
marriage licenses obtained on the same day. The town of
Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from
Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours.
Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10)
kilometers away from Cebu City. 15 (Citations omitted)
The Report included the court employees' admissions of
their participation in the alleged misdeeds. The following
personnel substantiated the charges against Tormis:
(1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the Municipal
Trial Court in.Cities, Cebu City, confirmed that she would
personally assist couples who wished to be married by
checking that their documents were complete before
referring them to the judges, including Tormis;16
(2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer of Branch 6 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, "narrated
several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their
acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil
registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were
not residents of Barili." 17 These marriages were
solemnized by Tormis; 18
(3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City, would aid couples in the solemnization of their
marriages by referring them to the judges;19
(4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III of Branch 18
of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, "admitted that she
assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of
the marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil
registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in
those towns were not strict about couples' attendance in
the family planning seminar";20
(5) Marilou Cabafiez, Court Stenographer of Branch 4 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted that
she would assist couples and refer them to the judges,
including Tormis.21 She added that "during the 8th, 18th,
and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples
would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a
fifteen-minute marriage Solemnization";22
(6) Rebecca L. Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted that
135
"she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or
Tormis. Couples who wanted to get married under Article
34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma
affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (₱10)";23 and
(7) Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu,
admitted that she did not examine marriage
applications.24 Couples who were not Barili residents
could obtain a marriage license from her, provided that
they had relatives residing in Barili;25
Affidavits of private individuals were also attached to the
records.26 Among these individuals was Jacqui Lou Baguio-
Manera (Baguio-Manera), a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo,
Cebu. Baguio-Manera claimed that her marriage was
solemnized by Tormis with the aid of "Meloy," who asked
for a fee of ₱l,500.00.27 She and her then fiance were not
required to present a marriage license; they were only
directed to bring their birth certificates.28 She averred that
while Article 3429 did not apply to them, their marriage
certificate was marked with the annotation, "No marriage
license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized
under Article 34 of Executive Order No. 209."30
On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the
Resolution requiring all the judges involved, including
Tormis, to comment on the Supplemental Report. 31 The
Resolution also directed the Process Servicing Unit to
furnish all the judges with a copy of the Report. 32 Further,
all the court personnel involved were asked to show cause
why they should not be disciplined for their misconduct. 33
In her comm~nt, Tormis denied the charges against
her.34 She claimed that the action of the Office of the Court
Administrator was an "entrapment."35 According to her,
there was nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on
the same date the marriage license was issued.36 In view of
the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she relied on the
presumption of regularity.37 Tormis asserted that she
should not be blamed for assuming that the affidavits were
true since judges are not handwriting experts.38
Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was
hearsay.39 She averred that when Baguio-Manera and her
husband was asked about the affidavit, they confirmed the
truthfulness of their statements, particularly that they had
been living together for five (5) years.40 Lastly, Tormis
blamed the filing clerks for the irregularities in the number
of marriages solemnized in her sala.41
On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge
Edgemelo C. Rosales, filed a Memorandum of Law with
Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and
Dismissal of the Case.42 This Court lifted the suspension of
the judges but forbade them from solemnizing
marriages.43 On December 7, 2007, both judges moved for
early resolution with a waiver of formal and/or further
investigation and to dismiss.44 This Court noted their
Motion and affirmed the relief they sought, thus allowing
the payment of the judges' unpaid salaries and benefits
from July 9, 2007.45
The Office of the Court Administrator, through a
memorandum dated June 15, 2010, found Tormis guilty of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing
marriages with questionable documents, for failure to
make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for
solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting
parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from
the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an
expired license.46
This Court upheld the findings of the Office of the Court
Administrator and noted the individual liability of the
judges:
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-
one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the
marriage certificates actually examined. However, the
monthly report of cases showed that she solemnized three
hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to
2007. The OCA report also noted that it was only in July
2007 that her court started to use a logbook to keep track
of marriages.
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages
with incomplete or missing documents such as the
marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and
the joint affidavit of cohabitation. In several instances, only
affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of
the certificate of legal capacity to marry.
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite
the questionable character of the validity of the required
documents particularly the marriage license. The judicial
audit team found numerous erasures and
superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties'
place of residence. In one instance, the judge solemnized
the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B.
Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license
containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE
EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06"
under it.
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages
under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage
requirements' authenticity was doubtful due to the
circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the
given address of the parties.1âwphi1 These irregularities
136
were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan
and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on 25 May 2007.
The residential address of the couple in the marriage
certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However,
there was an application for marriage license attached to
the marriage certificate showing that Secuya's address is
"F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."47
This Court ruled that:
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of
the law and that she would have been DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits,
except leave credits, if any, and disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation,
had she not been previously dismissed from service in
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-
MTCC);
....
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the
sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela
Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment
proceedings against the judge.48 (Emphasis in the original)
The affidavits of Celerina Plaza (Plaza) and Crisanto Dela
Cerna (Dela Cerna) resulted from Marilou Cabanes'
(Cabanes) and Helen Mongaya's (Mongaya) separate
supplemental comments on the charges against them. 49
Cabanes, then Court Stenographer of Branch 4, named
Plaza as Tormis' assistant, in charge of meeting couples at
their lobby.so On the other hand, Mongaya, then Court
Interpreter of Branch 4, attached Dela Cerna's affidavit to
her comment.51
Plaza claimed to be Tormis' personal aide since 2002.52 She
alleged that after Tormis' suspension in 2006, she was
directed to find couples who wanted to get married.53 She
was also told to direct the parties to Branch 4 and find
Cabanes or "Meloy."54
In his affidavit, Dela Cerna stated that he was employed as
Tormis' personal aide.55 He claimed that during the
investigation, Tormis directed him and Tormis' children to
bring all the marriage certificates from her office to her
house. 56
In view of Judge Necessario, et al., the Office of the Bar
Confidant recommended that the case be docketed as A.C.
No. 9920 (Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691) and entitled
Office of the Court Administrator v. Former Judge
Rosabella M Tormis.57
On June 18, 2013, this Court approved the docketing of
the case and directed respondent Former Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis to comment on the disbarment charge against
her.58
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Clarification59 dated August 12, 2013 asking the Office of
the Court Administrator to state the particular Canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility that she had
violated as basis for her disbarment.
In the Resolution60 dated September 10, 2013, this Court
noted the Urgent Motion for Clarification and directed the
Office of the Bar Confidant to inform respondent of the
particular Canons that she had violated.
On November 29, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant
sent respondent a letter informing her that the charges in
her administrative cases as a judge were the grounds for
her disbarment.61 It cited A.M. No. 02-9-02- SC, 62 which
provides that administrative cases against judges shall also
be considered as disciplinary charges against them as
members of the bar.63 Some administrative cases against
judges stand on grounds that similarly violate the Lawyer's
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or on other breaches long
recognized as grounds for discipline of lawyers. The Office
of the Bar Confident reiterated that, in those cases the
respondent judge may be directed to comment on the
complaint and explain why he or she should not be
punished as a member of the bar.64
The letter cited the previous administrative charges
against respondent, thus:
(a) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, 65 where respondent was
dismissed from service, had she not been previously
dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 66 for gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the
law by turning solemnization of marriage into a business;67
(b) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692,68 where respondent was
suspended for six (6) months without salary for gross
misconduct for repeatedly disregarding the directives of
this Court to furnish the complainant with her comment;69
(c) A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC70 and A.M. No. 04-7-374-
RTC,71 where respondent was fined ₱5,000.00 for gross
violation of Rule 114, Section 1772 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure by inappropriately approving the bail
posted by an accuse m a criminal case;73
137
(d) A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609,74 where respondent was
severely reprimanded for her "unauthorized receipt of
cash bond and keeping the same in her house";75
(e) A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817,76 where respondent was
dismissed from service for gross inefficiency, violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross
ignorance of the law;77 and
(f) A.M. No. MTJ-001337,78 where respondent was
reprimanded after being found "guilty of improper
conduct for trying to influence the course of litigation in
Criminal Case No. 99796- 12."79 She, together with another
judge, was admonished for her "unbecoming conduct as
dispensers of justice."80
Respondent filed her one-page Comment81 on January 10,
2014, asking this Court to grant her peace of mind.82 She
states that she is adopting her Motion for
Reconsideration83 in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 as her
Comment on the disbarment case against her.84 In this
Motion, respondent enumerates her previous
administrative cases with her justifications.
For A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692, respondent claims that she
had furnished the complainant with a copy of her
comment three (3) times.85 She avers that the complainant
even acknowledged the receipt of her comment through
her manifestation, as noted in this Court's July 30, 2003
Resolution.86 Despite this, she was still fined ₱2,000.00 for
her repeated defiance to this Court's directive to furnish
the complainant with a copy of her comment.87 She
believed that the case ended upon resolution and upon
this Court's noting her payment of the fine. However, she
claims that:
[The Supreme Court] made an underground evaluation of
the case and made it appear that when she complied with
their Resolution in 2 March 2005 to impose a fine of
₱2,000.00, it was already an admission that "[s]he
(respondent) refused to present proof of service to
complainant of her Comment or she did not furnish
complainant with said document[.]"88
For A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC,
respondent claims that this Court "obviously ignored" her
explanation.89 She asserts that she was the only available
judge at that time since she was working from Mondays
through Saturdays and even Sundays due to her load of
cases. 90
For A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, respondent questions why this
Court ruled that she deliberately made untruthful
statements in her Comment with the intent to deceive this
Court.91
For A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, respondent claims that the
audit was conducted one (1) day after she had served a
prior suspension.92 She argues that since she was not in
her court for a long time, she cannot be faulted for
knowing nothing about what has been happening in her
sala during her absence.93 She alleges that the Clerk of
Court, her co-respondent in the case, "could have
manipulated it so that even if the cases had already been
disposed of some years back he made it appear that this
had remained unacted upon."94
For A.M. No. MTJ-001337, respondent claims that the
dismissal of the judges was based on an alleged
"entrapment." She argues that it was impossible for her to
act on the marriage of the undercover agents because she
was in Tacloban City for her high school reunion.95 She was
merely indicted based on the statements of Plaza and Dela
Cerna, who had been intimidated by Atty. Rullyn Garcia,
Office of the Court Administrator judicial audit team
head.96 On March 18, 2014, this Court noted respondent's
Comment and resolved to refer the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant for investigation, report, and
recommendation. 97
In its Report and Recommendation 98 dated August 24,
2015, the Office of the Bar Confidant noted that the Office
of the Court Administrator, represented by Atty. Miguel
Mergal, presented Plaza and Dela Cerna as their
witnesses.99 Respondent also requested Atty. Rullyn
Garcia's presence in the proceedings.100
However, none of the witnesses participated in the
proceedings. Hence, the parties were required to just
submit their respective memoranda for evaluation.101
The Office of the Court Administrator filed a
memorandum102 dated February 27, 2015 quoting the facts
and ruling in Judge Necessario, et al. It avers that Plaza's
and Dela Cema's testimonies "are beside the point and
these have been rendered moot because of their failure to
appear at the hearings scheduled by the Office of the Bar
Confidant." 103
The Office of the Court Administrator argues that
respondent should be disbarred due to gross misconduct
for her participation in the solemnization of
marriages. 104 It points out that the various administrative
charges against respondent "clearly shows that she does
not possess high standards of competence and reliability
required of a practicing lawyer." 105
On the other hand, respondent's memorandum106 dated
February 26, 2015 mainly anchored on the claim that Atty.
Rullyn Garcia's report submitted was
falsified. 107 Respondent claims that Atty. Rullyn Garcia
intimidated the court employees and caused them to
"admit whatever allegations he brought up during the
138
investigation."108 She prays that the case be dismissed for
lack of substantial evidence since Plaza's and Dela Cema's
affidavits were not personally attested to by the affiants.109
The Office of the Bar Confidant, after conducting the
proceedings and considering the memoranda of the
parties, recommended that the disbarment case against
respondent be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.110 It
emphasized that formal investigation is indispensable in
disbarment proceedings:
For the charge of gross misconduct for the irregularities
in the solemnization of marriages as the basis for this
disbarment proceedings.
This case was set for hearing. During the scheduled
hearing, the representative from OCA manifested that
they are presenting two (2) witnesses in the persons of
Celerina Plaza and Crisanto Dela Cerna. The purposes of
their testimonies are for them to substantiate the
allegations against former Judge Tormis, identify and
authenticate the existence and veracity of their respective
affidavits submitted to the Court. However, the two
witnesses failed to appear during the proceedings of this
case. Thus, their affidavits are considered hearsay and
inadmissible in evidence ... in this proceeding. The affidavit
are [sic] not entirely reliable evidence in court due to their
incompleteness and inaccuracies that may have attended
in their formulation. The affidavit does not purport to
contain a complete narration of facts and that court
testimonies are generally viewed as more reliable as they
are subjected to cross examination from the opposing
party .... Likewise, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, the OCA audit team
head, failed to appear. The purpose of his testimony would
be to shed light more on whether the alleged affidavits
executed by Celerina Plaza and Crisanto Dela Cerna were
actually and voluntarily submitted to the Court and, if so,
who required them to execute and submit the same to the
Court.
....
The determination of the merit of th[ ese] disbarment
proceedings may not be relied upon solely on the premise
of the dismissal from the service of former Judge Tormis.
As earlier discussed, the grounds for dismissal from the
service of former Judge Tormis, in her capacity as presiding
judge, in administrative matter is different from this
disbarment proceedings against her. Otherwise, the Court
would have ruled on the disbarment aspect, which shall be
incorporated in the decision of dismissal from the service
of former Judge Tormis in one decision only. As provided
for under the constitutional right to due process, former
Judge Tormis should be given full opportunity to be heard
and confront witnesses against her in th[ ese] disbarment
proceedings. This constitutional right should not be denied
to former Judge Tormis, who cried for due process since
her dismissal from the service.
....
For the dismissal from the service, in her capacity as
judge, for gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of
gross ignorance of the law in performance of her duties
as presiding judge.
Former Judge Tormis cried for justice in dismissing her
from service, as presiding judge, without according her
due process. She was not given the opportunity to be
heard but the only basis of her dismissal from the service
was the testimonies/allegations against her of some courts
[sic] personnel, who were allegedly intimidated by the
judicial audit team, during the judicial audit. She was not
given the chance to confront nor furnished copies of the
said court personnel's testimonies. She was denied her
constitutional right against searches and seizures of
documents from her sala when the audit team obtained
documents and records, as evidence against her, when
they conducted the investigation in her sala, since she was
not informed of the said audit.
In A.M. No. P-08-2520, the Court held that he rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures as provided
under Section 2, Article III in the Constitution may be
invoked even in administrative proceedings. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Art. III of the
Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained
in violation of such "right. The fact that the present case is
administrative in nature, does not render the above
principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta vs C.A., any
violation of the aforestated constitutional right renders
the evidence inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceedings.
Records show that all the administrative sanctions against
former Judge Tormis were all for simple gross inefficiency
or neglect of duties and gross ignorance of the law in the
discharge of her duties and responsibilities as the presiding
judge of the MTCC, Br. 4, Cebu City. Neither of these
findings held her for gross misconduct, which constitute
immoral conduct, that would tend to affect her standing
and moral character as an officer of the court and as a
member of the Bar. Further, she has never been found
guilty for graft and corruption during her entire service in
the judiciary as a member of the bench in the lower court
that would cause her automatically disbarred from the
practice of law.
Finally, the counter-charges of former Judge Tormis
against Atty. Rullyn Garcia may not be given due course in
th[ese] proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.
139
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is
respectfully recommended that the disbarment case
against former JUDGE ROSABELLA M.
TORMIS be DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence.111 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
The issues for resolution are as follows:
First, whether the alleged irregularities committed by
respondent in the solemnization of marriages, where she
was found guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty
and of gross ignorance of the law, constitute gross
misconduct warranting her disbarment;
Second, whether Plaza's and Dela Cema's affidavits are
indispensable in finding that respondent's acts constitute
gross misconduct and merit the penalty of disbarment;
and
Lastly, whether respondent's long line of administrative
sanctions should affect her standing as a member of the
bar.
Although this Court recognizes the indispensability of the
appearance of Plaza and Dela Cerna in the proceedings
before the Office of the Bar Confidant, the disbarment
case cannot be dismissed solely based on this.
An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay
evidence.112 Since it is often prepared not by the affiant
but by another person who makes use of his or her own
language in writing the statements, it is generally rejected
unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to
testify.113 "Courts take judicial notice of the fact that an
affidavit does not purport to contain a complete narration
of facts."114 Court testimonies, therefore, are favored
because these can be subjected to cross exammation.115
Plaza and Dela Cerna failed to appear in the proceedings
before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The Office of the
Bar Confidant noted that their testimonies would have
supposedly confirmed the charge against respondent
regarding the alleged irregularities in the solemnization of
marriages.116 Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies would
have likewise verified the existence and veracity of their
affidavits.117
Similarly, Atty. Rullyn Garcia failed to appear in the
proceedings. His purported testimony would have
disproved the accusation that Plaza's and Dela Cema's
testimonies were executed with his intimidation.118 Due to
their absence, Plaza's and Dela Cema's allegations in their
affidavits were rendered inadmissible.119 Nevertheless,
despite the inadmissibility of the affidavits, this Court
in Judge Necessario, et al. upheld the finding of the judicial
audit team that respondent committed irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages. This Court ruled that these
findings had sufficient basis and were supported by
evidence, pertinent laws, and
jurisprudence.120 Respondent was held guilty of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the
law warranting her dismissal, had she not been previously
dismissed from service in another case.121
The administrative case against respondent in Judge
Necessario, et al. Should likewise be considered as a
disciplinary proceeding against her under A.M. No. 02-9-
02-SC, which provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices od the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are
based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of
the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case
shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause
why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar.
Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of
Judicial Ethics with her participation in the alleged
marriage scam, she similarly breached the following
Canons on the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession ....
....
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law[.]
140
Membership in the bar is an essential requirement for
membership in the bench.122 "[T]he moral fitness of a
judge also reflects his [or her] moral fitness as a
lawyer.".123 Consequently, a judge who violates the code of
judicial conduct similarly violates his or her lawyer's
oath. 124
Respondent's act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in
utter disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly
constitutes gross misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act
shows her clear intent to violate the law. She disregarded
the lawyer's oath, which mandates lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. In view of this, either the
penalty of suspension or disbarment is warranted. Rule
138, Section 27 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Gross misconduct is an "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere
error in judgment."125 To consider gross misconduct "the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule must be
manifest[.]" 126
The Supplemental Report of the Office of the Court
Administrator made the following findings:
III On Judge Rosabella M Tormis
1. Based on the documents, i.e., marriage certificates and
other supporting documents, actually examined, she
solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181)
marriages from 2003 to 2007, while the monthly reports of
cases reflected a total of three hundred and five (305)
marriages she solemnized from 2004 to 2007.
2. It was only last July that her court started using a
logbook to record the marriages she solemnized, which, as
of the date of the judicial audit and investigation, reflected
a total of sixty-three (63) marriages for that month.
3. Of the 181 marriages she solemnized, one hundred
thirty-one (131), or 72.38% were solemnized under Article
34 of the Family Code, while fifty (50), or 27.62% were
with marriage licenses.
4. Of the 50 marriages with marriage license, forty (40), or
80% marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil
registrar of Barili, Cebu, while the remaining ten (10), or
20%, were obtained from other local civil registrars.
5. The following marriages were solemnized by her with no
or incomplete supporting documents:
....
6. The following marriages were solemnized by her even if
the
validity of the supporting documents, especially the
marriage licenses
presented, appear to be questionable[.]
7. The authenticity of the requirements for the following
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code, by reason
of the (a) circumstances of the cohabitation, (b) minority
during the period of cohabitation, and (c) given address of
the contracting parties, appears to be questionable:
8. In almost all of the marriages solemnized by her, there
was no proof that the solemnization fee of ₱300.000, as
required under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, was paid by
the contacting parties. 127
The act of solemnizing marriages without the required
marriage license constitutes misconduct. 128 The positive
testimonies substantiate that respondent solemnized
marriages without previously issued licenses; hence,
respondent's act deviates from the established
rule.129 In Aranes v. Occiano:130
[A] marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity
to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. 131
Tupal v. Rojo132 explained the role of a judge as a
solemnizing officer:
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge
must personally interview the contracting parties and
examine the requirements they submitted. The parties
must have complied with all the essential and formal
141
requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a
marriage license.
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to
parties who have all the qualifications and none of the
legal disqualifications to contract marriage. Before
performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally examine the marriage license presented.
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and
wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment
to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Instead, the parties must present an affidavit
of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer,
must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to
the parties having lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and the absence of any legal
impediment to marry each other. The judge must also
execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained
the parties' qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage. Article 34 of the Family Code
of the Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the
marriage. 133 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of the
Family Code merit exemption from a marriage license,
respondent should have complied with the mandate of
personally ascertaining the circumstances of cohabitation
of the parties. Records reveal that the declarations
embodied in the required joint affidavit of cohabitation of
the parties do not actually represent the accurate
circumstances of their alleged cohabitation.134
In addition, there were marriages solemnized by
respondent involving foreigners who only submitted
affidavits in lieu of a certificate of legal capacity to
marry.135 In cases where one or both of the contracting
parties are foreigners, Article 21136 of the Family Code
provides that a certificate of legal capacity to marry is
necessary before the acquisition of a marriage license. As
the solemnizing officer, respondent should have ensured
that pertinent requirements were secured before the
issuance of the marriage license. Thus, the absence of a
certificate of legal capacity to marry should have
prompted her to question the propriety of the issuance.
The connivance between respondent and the court
employees is settled. The court employees acted as
"'fixers' and 'facilitators" 137 that mediated between the
judges and the contacting parties. Apparent are the
superimpositions and erasures in the addresses of the
contracting parties so they would appear to be residents
of either Barili or Liloan, Cebu.138 For the contracting
parties to easily obtain their marriage license,
discrepancies between their true addresses as declared in
their marriage certificates and their addresses in their
marriage licenses were made. The contracting parties
were able to get married despite incomplete
requirements. Thus, the handwritten marginal notes of
monetary figures attached to the marriage certificates
show the presence of consideration.139
Marriage is recognized under the law as an inviolable
social institution, which is the foundation of the
family.140 In Beso v. Daguman.141
[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the
community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded
it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are
largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of
each and every member of the community to prevent the
bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. 142
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a
mockery of marriage. As a judicial officer, she is expected
to know the law on solemnization of marriages. 143 "A judge
is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he [or she]
must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.
Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their
office[,] should be more circumspect in the performance of
their duties."144
Similarly, as a lawyer who is an officer of the court,
respondent should have not permitted herself to be an
instrument of any violation of law. Her careless attention
in dispensing with the necessary requirements of marriage
and in conniving with court employees to further
monetary interests underscores her utter disregard of the
sanctity of marriage.
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her
professional dealings or in a private capacity, is basis for
suspension or disbarment.145 Possession of good character
is a fundamental requirement not only for admission to
the bar but also for the continuance of exercising the
privilege to practice law.146 However, as a rule, disbarment
is only warranted in cases of misconduct that "seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court."147
142
Respondent's undue haste in repeatedly solemnizing
marriages despite incomplete and irregular requirements
shows indifference to her role as an officer of the court.
The repetitiveness of her acts shows her proclivity in
transgressing the law and protecting these violations with
her authority. A lawyer, as an officer and an essential
partner of the court in the solemn task of giving justice, is
given the grave obligation of maintaining the integrity of
the courts. 148 This is especially so with judges. A judge is
"the visible representation of law and justice from whom
the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law.
For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the
first to abide by the law and weave an example for the
others to follow."149 In Samson v. Caballero:150
The first step towards the successful implementation of
the Court's relentless drive to purge the judiciary of
morally unfit members, officials and personnel
necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of
conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with
judges because, being the visible representation of the
law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and
students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on
them is - and should be - higher than that of the average
person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to
judge.151
Respondent was involved in infractions that warranted her
prior administrative sanctions. Her long line of cases shows
her depravity of character, in that she remained
undeterred by the past penalties she had incurred.
Considering that she was repeatedly involved in
administrative charges, the severe penalty of disbarment
should be meted against her. Disbarment does not equate
to a sanction stripping a lawyer of his or her source of
living.152 It is intended to "protect the administration of
justice that those who exercise this function should be
competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in them."153 As
held in Foronda v. Guerrero: 154
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and
faithful compliance with the rules of legal profession are
the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.155
Respondent's conduct has fallen short of the strict
standards required by the legal profession. Hence, her
repeated failure to live up to the values expected of her as
an officer of the court renders her unfit to be a member of
the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis is DISBARRED from the practice of law and her B-5926 01-10-02
name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

B-3827 12-04-02
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be attached to respondent's personal
records, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for B-5075 06-22-02
dissemination to its chapters and members and all
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, and to the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all B-5801 09-07-02
courts in the Philippines.

SO ORDERED. B-6087 06-24-04

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1924 : October 13, 2010 B-6448 06-15-04

(Formerly A.M. No. 04-10-568-RTC)

RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BEFORE JUDGE B-6449 06-15-04

DAMASO A. HERRERA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
24, BIAN, LAGUNA.
B-6450 06-15-04

RESOLUTION
B-6465 06-11-04
BERSAMIN, J.:
B-6115 12-13-02
Judge Damaso A. Herrera, the former Presiding Judge of
Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court in Biñan, Laguna,
B-5215 02-05-01
filed an application for optional retirement effective April
5, 2004. The Court approved his application through the B-5761 02-05-03
resolution issued on July 5, 2004 in Administrative Matter
No. 11570-Ret. B-2738 02-08-03

B-5056 03-19-03
Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now a
Member of the Court, initiated an administrative matter B-6139 05-06-03
for agenda dated October 1, 2004 to report on the cases
submitted for decision before newly-retired Judge Herrera, B-5489 06-21-03
citing 55 of such cases mentioned in the March 2004 B-3082 09-20-03
monthly report of Judge Herreras branch, some of which
were already beyond the reglementary period to B-3181 10-18-03
decide, 1cra1aw to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
B-6287 09-06-03

B-5411 10-25-03
CIVIL CASE NO. DUE DATES
B-6334 10-28-03

B-1304 07-24-84 B-5316 11-29-03

B-2974 12-05-03
B-4958 10-22-97 B-6377 12-26-03

B-2035 12-30-03
B-5632 Appealed
B-5763 01-15-04

B-4010 10-07-02 B-6041 01-30-04

B-5651 02-02-04

143
 B-5321 02-17-04 (a) DIRECT Judge Damaso A. Herrera to explain within ten
(10) days from notice his failure to decide the subject
B-6032 03-04-04 cases;

B-6381 03-04-04
(b) DIRECT Judge Damaso A. Herrera and Acting Clerk of
B-2648 04-04-04 Court Julian R. Orfiano, Jr. to EXPLAIN within ten (10) days
from notice their failure to submit their monthly reports of
B-2939 04-13-04 cases on time and why the actual number of cases
submitted for decision are not reflected in said reports and
B-5893 04-29-04
why they should not be held administratively liable for the
B-6244 06-20-03 delay incurred in the submission of the monthly reports of
cases.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
B-6432 03-24-04

B-2957 05-23-04 In his explanation dated January 21, 2005, 4cra1aw Acting

Clerk of Court Orfiano, Jr. stated that he was serving as
B-2425 05-09-04 both OIC/Acting Branch Clerk of Court and Legal
Researcher; that he did not submit the monthly reports of
B-4565 05-26-04 cases on time because of: (a) the heavy case load that
B-6505 06-29-04 already totaled 1076 cases as of January 2003; and (b) the
late submission by the criminal and civil docket clerks of
CRIMINAL CASE NO. DUE DATES the required data for the preparation of the monthly
reports despite his constant reminders to them.
7051-B 02-04-02

6074-B 05-11-03 For his part, Judge Herrera submitted his explanation
dated February 2, 2005,5cra1aw essentially praying for the
11114-B 05-23-03 Courts kind understanding and consideration. He alleged
that prior to his retirement on April 4, 2004 he had
9812-B 09-08-03
decided four of the cases included in the list of undecided
7006-B 11-29-03 cases (i.e., Civil Case No. B-6287, Criminal Case No. 6074-B,
Criminal Case No. 11114-B and Criminal Case No. 9812-B);
4337-B 06-27-02 and that he could not act on two other cases (i.e., Criminal
Case No. 11941-B and Criminal Case No. 10195-B) whose
10355-B 01-15-04
due dates for decision fell on April 14, 2004 and May 17,
8777-B 02-03-04 2004, respectively, because of the prohibition for him to
act under Supreme Court Circular No. 16 dated December
7658-B 03-27-04 2, 1986, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
11941-B 04-14-04
4. When the specified date of retirement is reached
10195-B 05-17-04 without the applicant receiving any notice of approval or
denial of his application, he shall cease working and
discharging his functions, unless directed otherwise.
The report further indicated that the cases submitted for
decision as reported in the December 2003 monthly report
totaling 26 increased to 55 in the March 2004 monthly Denying any intention not to decide the cases or to delay
report due to the addition of 29 cases; that Judge Herrera the submission of the reports, Judge Herrera cited his
failed to request the extension of his time to decide the heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, health reasons,
cases; that Branch 24 did not submit the monthly reports and the physical impossibility of complying with the
of cases within the period required under Administrative requirements in his explanation. He mentioned that his
Circular No. 4-2004; and that most of the cases submitted court had inherited about 1,000 cases, many of which
for decision had not been reflected in the submitted included voluminous records and some of which required
reports. the retaking of testimonies due to unavailability of the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs). He claimed that
his regular Branch Clerk of Court had been appointed an
Acting on the recommendation of the Court
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, leaving him to do his work
Administrator,2cra1aw the Court resolved
without any assistance by a Branch Clerk of Court; and that
to:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the stenographers had lacked ample time to prepare the
TSNs in view of his court having him and another judge
assigned to assist him.

144
Judge Herrera contended that he had requested
extensions of time to decide cases; that he had exerted
earnest efforts to decide the cases; that his heavy
workload and hectic court schedules had prevented him
from deciding his cases within the prescribed period; that
that his delay in the submission of monthly reports and the
inaccuracy of the data reflected thereon were caused by
his branchs heavy workload and by the fact that his Acting
Branch Clerk of Court had also functioned as Legal
Researcher.
In its memorandum dated April 21, 2005,6cra1aw the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCAd) reported on the
administrative matter and recommended that: (a) the
administrative matter be re-docketed as a regular
administrative complaint against Judge Herrera for gross
inefficiency; and (b) a fine of P11,000.00 be imposed upon
him, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
By his letter dated May 16, 2005,7cra1aw Judge Herrera
informed the Court that his application for early
retirement had been approved effective April 4, 2004; and
prayed for the release of his retirement benefits after
withholding P40,000.00 from the total amount to which he
was entitled pending the resolution of the instant
administrative matter.
In a memorandum dated May 31, 2005,8cra1aw the OCAd
considered the letter of Judge Herrera as a motion for the
early resolution of the administrative matter.
Thus, on June 20, 2005, the Court directed the re-
docketing of the case as a regular administrative
matter.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In another letter dated June 8, 2009,10cra1aw Judge
Herrera prayed for the early resolution of the
administrative matter, and reminded that he had been
retired for already five years and was already entitled to
receive his monthly pension and other benefits as a retired
RTC Judge. He cited his lack of income due to his not
having engaged in the private practice of law since his
retirement due to poor health requiring his continuous
medication.
It appears that on September 21, 2005, through a
resolution issued in Administrative Matter No. 12086-Ret.
entitled Re: Application for Optional Retirement under R.A.
910, as amended, of Judge Damaso A. Herrera, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 24, Binan, Laguna, the Court ordered
the release of Judge Herreras retirement benefits but
withheld the amount of P40,000.00 subject to the
outcome of this administrative
matter.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After considering the circumstances of the administrative
matter concerning Judge Herrera, the Court adopts the
145
recommendation of the OCAd embodied in its
memorandum dated April 21, 2005.
Section 15(1), Article VIII, of the Constitution requires a
trial judge to dispose of all cases or matters within three
months from the time of their submission for decision.
Conformably with the constitutional prescription, Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes
all judges to dispose of their courts business promptly and
to decide cases within the required period. Unless every
trial judge earnestly, painstakingly, and faithfully complies
with this mandate of efficiency, the present clogged
dockets in our judicial system cannot be
cleared.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br.
22, Kabacan, North Cotabato,13cra1aw the Court has
impressed upon trial judges the need to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously to accord with the time
honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied,
viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should
be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of
his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes
the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary,
lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Indeed, a
judge must display that "interest in his office which stops
not at the minimum of the days labor fixed by law, and
which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but
which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light
and even into vacation periods. Only thus can he do his
part in the great work of speeding up the administration of
justice and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the estimation
of the people.
Judge Herrera was guilty of undue delay in the disposition
of the cases pending him his court. Prior to his early
retirement, he had not decided 49 cases already due for
decision, which total did not include the four cases that
Judge Herrera claimed to have by then decided and the
two that had supposedly become due for decision already
within the period of prohibition for him to act in view of
his application for early retirement.
Judge Herreras failure to decide his cases with dispatch
constituted gross inefficiency and warranted the
imposition of administrative sanctions upon
him.14cra1aw As the Court has pointed out in Re: Judicial
Audit of the RTC, Br. 14, Zamboanga City, Presided over by
Hon. Ernesto R. Gutierrez:15cra1aw
We cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or
resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major
culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the
judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to
decide cases within the reglementary period, without
strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on
the defaulting judge.
Judge Herreras plea of heavy workload, lack of sufficient
time, poor health, and physical impossibility could not
excuse him. Such circumstances were not justifications for
the delay or non-performance, given that he could have
easily requested the Court for the extension of his time to
resolve the cases. Our awareness of the heavy caseload of
the trial courts has often moved us to allow reasonable
extensions of the time for trial judges to decide their
cases. But we have to remind Judge Herrera and other trial
judges that no judge can choose to prolong, on his own,
the period for deciding cases beyond the period
authorized by the law. Without an order of extension
granted by the Court, a failure to decide even a single case
within the required period rightly constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative
sanction.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Judge Herrera should have sought additional time by
simply filing a request for extension if, to him, rendering a
decision or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary
period became unavoidable. That he did not so seek
additional time reflected his indifference to the
prescription to decide within the time limits of the law.
Thus, we choose not to consider seriously his excuses as
exempting him from the due observance of the time limits
of the law or as exonerating him from administrative
liability. The excuses, assuming they were true, could only
be treated as mitigating circumstances vis-à-vis the
properly imposable penalty.17cra1aw In this regard, the
fact that the more than 1,000 inherited cases added to
Judge Herreras workload can be treated as a mitigating
circumstance.
Under Section 9(1), in relation to Section 11 (B), of Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, undue delay in
rendering a decision is a less serious charge that merits the
penalty of either (a) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one nor more than
three months; or (b) a fine more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.
Anent the penalty, the OCAd recommended a fine
of P11,000.00. We approve of the recommendation, for his
offense is equivalent to gross inefficiency, but we take into
account the mitigating circumstance earlier mentioned.
Acting Branch Clerk of Court Orfiano, Jr.s explanation of
the late submission of the monthly reports is accepted, but
he is reminded to comply faithfully with the period
prescribed for the submission of the reports. He is warned
that the same infraction will be dealt with more severely.
146
WHEREFORE, retired Judge Damaso A. Herrera is ordered
to pay a fine of P11,000.00 to be deducted from the
amount of P40,000.00 withheld from his retirement
benefit. The Court directs the immediate payment of the
balance to him, unless lawful grounds warrant the
continued retention of the balance in relation to other
cases involving him.
SO ORDERED.
I.P.I. No. 16-244-CA-J, September 06, 2016
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF CATALINA Z. ALILING
AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MA. LUISA C. QUIJANO-
PADILLA, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA RELATIVE TO CA-
G.R. CV NO. 103042
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This resolves the verified complaint1 filed by Catalina Z.
Aliling (Complainant) against Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-
Padilla (Justice Padilla) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of
Manila for gross ignorance of the law or procedure and
gross misconduct constituting violations of Rules 1.01 and
3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint
stemmed from the Decision2 of Justice Padilla in CA-G.R.
CV No. 103042.
Antecedent Facts
On 28 October 1997, Asuncion Zamora Jurado (Jurado)
and Catalina Zamora Aliling (Aliling) filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Santiago City,
Isabela for the determination of the true origin and
ownership of a 7,086-square meter parcel of land,
described as Lot No. 4900. Jurado and Aliling alleged that
they, together with their deceased brother Fernando M.
Zamora, are the registered owners of Lot No. 4900
covered by TCT No. T-65150 of the Registry of Deeds of
Isabela. They claimed to have inherited the subject land
from their father, Dominador Zamora, who holds the
property under the previous title, TCT No. T-2291, after
having acquired this from the previous owners, spouses
Antonio Pariñas and Maura Balbin. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 36-2438.
Jurado and Aliling alleged that sometime in 1997, they
learned that defendants in the case were able to cause the
subdivision of Lot No. 4900 into several titles in the names
of: Vicente Chai, married to Carmen Chai; Eduardo
Sarmiento, married to Josefina M. Sarmiento; Anastacio
Pallermo; and Leonora Pariñas and Margarita Pariñas,
married to Melecio Pinto. Claiming absolute and lawful
ownership over the subject property, plaintiffs prayed for
the nullification of the aforesaid titles.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment
holding, among others, that there was an irregularity in
the reconstitution proceedings relative to OCT No. 3429
from which defendants' titles were derived and that
defendants, particularly appellants Spouses Chai, could not
be considered as purchasers in good faith.
The plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration
while the defendants filed their Motion for
Reconsideration of the 25 February 2014 decision. The
trial court denied both of their motions.
On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed and set
aside the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 36-2438. It
held that while it affirms the trial court's ruling on the
irregularity of the reconstitution of OCT No. 3429, it
cannot sustain the finding that appellants are not
purchasers in good faith. The CA concluded that defendant
Spouses Chai exercised the due diligence required of them
to be rightfully adjudged as buyers in good faith. The
decision was penned by Justice Padilla and concurred in by
Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H.
Gaerlan.
On 7 June 2016, plaintiffs-appellees Jurado, Aliling and the
heirs of their brother Fernando M. Zamora, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration assailing the CA decision.
Pending resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration,
Aliling on 27 June 2016 filed the instant administrative
complaint against Justice Padilla.
Our Ruling
Although complainant asserted that she is not assailing the
CA decision in the administrative complaint, it is evident
that the error she is attributing to respondent Justice
Padilla pertains to the latter's ruling in CA-G.R. CV No.
103042. This Court has maintained that errors committed
by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions
cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings,
but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies.3chanrobleslaw
The assailed ruling of Justice Padilla was issued in the
proper exercise of her judicial functions, and as such,
should not be subject to administrative disciplinary action.
Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be
administratively sanctioned from mere errors of judgment
in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice,
gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to
do an injustice on his or her part.4 Judicial officers cannot
be subjected to administrative disciplinary actions for their
performance of duty in good faith.5 As a matter of public
policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of
his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he
acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render
147
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment.6chanrobleslaw
To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge
must be shown to have committed an error that was gross
or patent, deliberate or malicious. 7 In her ponencia, Justice
Padilla explained, citing evidence and jurisprudence, why
she arrived at her conclusion that defendants were
purchasers in good faith. Even assuming that she erred in
her ruling, still complainant failed to establish that she was
moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate the law
or jurisprudence. Moreover, it should be noted that it was
arrived at after deliberation by a collegial body, thus, not
solely the ruling of the respondent justice.
Complainant should be reminded that unfavorable rulings
are not necessarily erroneous. If she disagrees with the
ruling, there are judicial remedies to be exhausted under
existing rules. As in fact, it was noted that complainant,
together with the other plaintiffs-appellees, had already
filed their motion for reconsideration of the CA decision.
The CA has yet to rule on the motion when complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint.
This Court has settled the rule that administrative
complaints against judges cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to
parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of
the former. Administrative remedies are neither
alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate
thereto, where such review is still available to the
aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been resolved with
finality.8 It is only after the available judicial remedies have
been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal,
civil, or administrative liability may be said to have
opened, or closed.9 Clearly, the subject civil case has not
yet reached its finality and the instant administrative
complaint has no leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the
instant administrative complaint filed by Catalina Z. Aliling
against Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, Court of
Appeals, Manila for ignorance of the law or procedure and
gross misconduct constituting violations of Rules 1.01 and
3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
I.P.I. No. 16-243-CA-J, October 11, 2016
ARTHUR F. MORALES I, Complainant, v. LEONCIA REAL-
DIMAGIBA, JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, AND RAMON R. GARCIA,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, FIFTEENTH DIVISION, COURT OF
APPEALS, MANILA, Respondents.
 RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This case stemmed from the complaint filed by Arthur F.
Morales I (complainant) charging Associate Justices
Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, Jhosep Y. Lopez, and Ramon R.
Garcia, all of the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals
(CA), with gross ignorance of the law, procedure and
jurisprudence, rendering them unfit to perform their
judicial functions.
Culled from the records are the following antecedent
facts:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn 13 May 2015, a fire razed
the warehouse of Kentex Marketing Corporation (Kentex)
located at 6159 Tatalon St., Ugong, Valenzuela City. The
incident caused the death of not less than seventy-four
(74) employees of Kentex.
Investigation conducted after the incident revealed that
Valenzuela City Mayor Rexlon T. Gatchalian (Mayor
Gatchalian) issued a mayor's permit to Kentex without
requiring the latter to submit a Fire Safety Inspection
Certificate (FSIC), in violation of the Revised Fire Code of
the Philippines (R.A. No. 9514).
Criminal and Administrative complaints were thereafter
filed by the Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau-Military and
Other Law Enforcement Officers (FFIB-MOLEO) against
Mayor Gatchalian and other officials of Valenzuela City
before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB).
In a Joint Resolution dated 11 February 2016, the OMB
found Mayor Gatchalian, among others, guilty of grave
misconduct and gross neglect of duty and were meted the
penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory
penalties of forfeiture of benefits and privileges and
perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Mayor Gatchalian assailed the OMB ruling before the CA
through a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 144428 entitled "Rexlon T. Gatchalian v.
Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al." and raffled to the
Fifteenth Division. of the CA. In support of his application
for injunctive relief, Mayor Gatchalian contended that the
immediate implementation of the assailed Joint Resolution
would cause him undue and irreversible damage
considering that he would be precluded from seeking a
second term as mayor of Valenzuela City as he was, at that
time, vying for reelection.
On 4 March 2016, the Fifteenth Division of the CA issued a
resolution the dispositive portion of which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
148
ACCORDINGLY, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
be issued, good for 60 clays from notice, enjoining
respondents or any persons and all persons acting on their
behalf from executing, or implementing the assailed Joint
Resolution of the Ombudsman dated 11 February 2016 in
OMB-P-A-10581 as against the petitioner. x x
x"1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Fearing that a Writ of Preliminary Injunction would follow,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint
against respondent associate justices of the Fifteenth
Division of the CA.
Complainant cited as his basis the case of Villaseñor, et al.
v. Ombudsman2 wherein this Court ruled that Section 7,
Rule III of the Rules of the Ombudsman, as amended by
A.O. No. 17 dated 15 September 2003, is "categorical in
providing that an appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory, and that such shall be executed as a
matter of course" and hence, "(a)n appeal shall not stop
the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal."3chanrobleslaw
Complainant thus maintained that the Joint Resolution
dated 11 February 2016 of the OMB involving the dismissal
from the service of Mayor Gatchalian cannot be enjoined
by a TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction of the CA. He
averred that the TRO issued by the respondent associate
justices on 4 March 2016 was a direct contravention of the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Facura v.
CA4 and Villaseñor, et al. v. Ombudsman.5 Further,
complainant argued that the Carpio-Morales v. Binay6 case
cited by the respondent associate justices is not applicable
considering that what was assailed therein was the OMB's
order preventively suspending then Mayor Jejomar Erwin
Binay of Makati City. In contrast, what was assailed in the
case of Mayor Gatchalian is the penalty of dismissal from
the service for grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty.
Complainant contended that the respondent associate
justices' ratiocination in the issuance of the TRO that the
"execution of the Joint Resolution (of the OMB) will be
hard to undo" clearly showed their lack of awareness of
the existing jurisprudence that in case the removed official
wins his appeal, then he shall be considered only to have
been preventively suspended and as a consequence
thereof, said official may still run for public
office.7chanrobleslaw
Complainant implores this Court to dismiss the respondent
associate justices from the judiciary for grave ignorance of
the law and jurisprudence.
In a Resolution8 dated 9 August 2016, this Court required
the respondent associate justices to comment on the
verified complaint of Arthur F. Morales I.
In their respective comments, respondents averred that
the administrative complaint against them is without basis
in fact and in law. They maintained that the resolution
they issued granting the application for TRO is supported
by existing law and jurisprudence. They claimed that they
were guided by the Supreme Court's ruling in Carpio-
Morales v. Binay9 which struck down the second paragraph
of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 as unconstitutional. Moreover,
they insist that they cannot be held liable for ignorance of
the law because the complaint did not ascribe any
improper motive or bad faith in any of them in their
issuance of the TRO enjoining the OMB from implementing
the imposed penalty of dismissal from the service of
Mayor Gatchalian. They argued that even assuming that
they erred in issuing the TRO, they cannot be held liable
for it was an official act done in good faith, guided only by
the dictate of their conscience, in accord with applicable
laws and jurisprudence.
Our Ruling
The instant administrative complaint was filed by Arthur F.
Morales I allegedly in his capacity as a resident, taxpayer
and registered voter of Valenzuela City. He claimed that he
shall be directly affected by the continuance of the
incompetent work of Mayor Gatchalian, who, as found by
the OMB, was responsible for the death of not less than 74
workers of Kentex. He further claimed that he filed the
case because he does not want the same incident to
happen again in Valenzuela City which would be possible
in view of the continuance of the administration of Mayor
Gatchalian.
As correctly noted by respondent Justice Leoncia Real-
Dimagiba in her comment,10 complainant is not a party in
CA-G.R. SP No. 144428, which is still in its initial stage.
Neither is he one of the private complainants who
commenced the administrative case against Mayor
Gatchalian before the OMB. Strictly speaking, complainant
has no legal interest to contest the propriety of the CA
Fifteenth Division's issuance of the TRO.
Even assuming that complainant is a proper party to the
case, still the administrative complaint is not the remedy
to assail the TRO. The complaint was intended as a judicial
remedy. It was aimed at halting the subsequent issuance
by respondent associate justices of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. It is evident that complainant was aware that
the instant administrative complaint would have been
dismissed outright had it been filed by one of the parties in
the OMB case. We have previously explained that
administrative complaints against magistrates cannot be
pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies
accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or
judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are
neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate
149
thereto, where such review is still available to the
aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been resolved with
finality.11 The parties in interest in the OMB case should
have availed of judicial remedies instead of complainant
herein filing an administrative case against respondent
associate justices. Since the issuance of a TRO is judicial in
nature, the parties could have opted to file a motion to lift
the TRO or a motion for reconsideration or could have
sought recourse from this Court.
At the outset, it is clear that the assailed resolutions were
issued by respondent justices in the proper exercise of
their judicial functions. As such, these are not subject to
administrative disciplinary action. Other than
complainant's bare allegations, there were no evidence
presented to show any wrong-doings or bad faith on the
part of respondent justices. We have settled the rule that a
judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere
errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad
faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a
deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her
part.12 Judicial officers cannot be subjected to
administrative disciplinary actions for their performance of
duty in good faith.13chanrobleslaw
The complaint was anchored on the provisions of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. It should be
noted that the issuances of the OMB, particularly A.O. No.
7, otherwise known as, the "Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure" emanated from R.A. No. 6770, otherwise
known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989". Section 14
thereof provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued
by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation
is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of
law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Fifteenth Division of the CA is not without basis in
acting on the petition of Mayor Gatchalian. In the decision
in Carpio-Morales v. Binay, Jr.,14 this Court declared the
second paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No.
6770 UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the
issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other
than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first
paragraph of the said provision was DECLARED ineffective
until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor.
Although the case of Erwin Binay, Jr. pertains to a
preventive suspension, the pronouncement therein may
arguably apply to any other OMB case since this Court did
not make any distinction. The doctrine laid down in the
case is that the CA has the authority to issue TRO and
injunctive writs in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction
conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of Batas
Pambansa 129, as amended. In arriving at the decision in
the Binay, Jr.15 case, the Court cited in part the case
of Smothers v. Lewis, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary
in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the
litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its
judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary
injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this
particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the
constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is not within
the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power
nor is it within the purview of the legislature to shape or
fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial
power may be or may not be granted or denied.
x x x x
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a
court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of
action, has, as incidental to its general jurisdiction,
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to
the administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This
includes the inherent power to issue
injunctions. (Emphasis in the original)
The determination, therefore, on whether there was error
on the part of the respondent associate justices in issuing
the TRO or whether the CA justices can now enjoin all
decisions of the OMB would have to be squarely
addressed by this Court the moment the issue is raised
before it in a proper judicial proceeding. It should be
consequentially clear that we are not making a ruling in
this administrative case on the correctness of the issuance
of a TRO. We are merely saying that under the facts of the
matter at hand and cognizant of our ruling in Carpio
Morales v. Binay, Jr.16 we are not prepared to conclude
that respondent associate justices are administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law in issuing a TRO in CA-
G.R. SP No. 144428.
In order to be held administratively liable it must be shown
that the respondent associate justices have been
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in
ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.17 No such ill motivation was shown, nay
alleged, to have caused the issuance of the TRO.
Further on the issue, the Court has ruled that when the
inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
150
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his
functions, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority.18 Justices are presumed to be conversant with
the law and the rules. When the law or procedure is so
elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court,
not to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.19 Such ignorance of
a basic rule in court procedure would be tantamount to
gross ignorance and would render them administratively
liable. In view of the unreconciled pronouncements in the
cases of Facura and Villaseñor, on one hand, and
the Carpio-Morales v. Binay, Jr. case, on the other, the
subject matter here involved is not one which can be
considered elementary.
To press the point, the present Resolution should not be
read as an allowance carte blanche for the issuance of
TROs against the OMB's decision in criminal and
administrative complaints against officials and employees
of the government. Foremost, we did not rule on the
validity of the issuance of the TRO by he respondent
associate justices. What we said is that there is a relevant
ruling in the Binay, Jr. case which removes the issuance by
respondent associate justices from the ambit of gross
ignorance of the law. Just as important, the validity of the
issuance of a TRO, owing to the fact that a TRO is merely a
provisional remedy which is an adjunct to a main
suit,20 which in this case is the main petition of Mayor
Gatchalian pending before the CA, is a judicial issue that
cannot be categorically resolved in the instant
administrative matter.
The administrative case against respondents is mere
veneer to the objective of outlawing the TRO issued by
respondents. That aim is beyond the range of this case.
We cannot review the actions taken by the CA unless
these are brought before us through the proper judicial
process.
The remedy against the issuance of the TRO is unarguably
and by its very nature, resolvable only thru judicial
procedures which are, a motion for reconsideration and, if
such motion is denied, a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65.21 It is the ruling granting the
prayer for the writ of certiorari that a basis for an
administrative action against the judge issuing the TRO
may arise. Such happens when, from the decision on the
validity of the issuance, there is a pronouncement that
indicates gross ignorance of the law of the issuing  
judge.22 The instant administrative complaint cannot be a
substitute for the aforesaid judicial remedies. x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

In fine, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the  

presumption is that respondent associate justices issued
the TRO in good faith. As a matter of public policy, a judge  
cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts,
no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. RESOLUTION
To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or  
interpret the law in the process of administering justice
can be infallible in his judgment.23chanrobleslaw TINGA, J.:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant  

administrative complaint filed by Arthur F. Morales I
against Associate Justices Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, Jhosep Y. This is an administrative complaint charging respondent
Lopez and Ramon R. Garcia, all of the Fifteenth Division, Judge Mariano S. Macias, Executive Judge of the Regional
Court of Appeals, Manila is hereby DISMISSED for lack of Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, with
merit. immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape,
and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law. [1]
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 
JUVELYN D. KILAT, 'A.M. No. RTJ-05-1960
According to complainant, she was a sixteen (16) year-old
Complainant,(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 02-1547-RTJ)
working high school student in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur
when she met respondent in November 1999. One time,
Present:
respondent fetched her from her school and had dinner
  with her in a local restaurant. After dinner, respondent
brought her to his vehicle where he kissed and fondled
PUNO, J., her, assuring her that he will take care of her, her studies,
her expenses and her future. Later, she was brought to a
- versus' -  ' Chairman, hotel. Despite her plea to be driven home, respondent
refused, telling her that he just wanted her company while
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, he was resting. Complainant tried to go out of the room
but respondent caught up with her and threatened her
CALLEJO, SR., with a gun. Respondent removed her clothes and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
TINGA, and
Respondent asked complainant to be his live-in partner,
but she did not reply. Respondent threw at
JUDGE MARIANO S. MACIAS, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
complainant P1,500.00 worth of bills and warned her not
RTC, Branch 28, Liloy, to tell any person what had transpired. [2]

Zamboanga del Norte,  

Respondent.Promulgated: Because of the incident, complainant was forced to quit

her job and stop with her schooling. She went back to the
October 25, 2005 house of her parents in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent still managed to find out her whereabouts and

151
offered her a job in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
which she accepted. However, while in Sindangan,
respondent brought her to his house where he again
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
Afterwards, he gave her money and threatened to have
her killed should she tell anyone what happened. From
that time onwards, complainant became respondent's
kept woman, spending Saturday nights with him and he
gave her money every time they had sexual intercourse.
Complainant claims that she left respondent when she
found out that he was having another affair. She went
back to her parents and told them what respondent did to
her. They sought the help of Salug officials to seek justice
for what respondent had done. [3]
 
For his part, respondent claims that complainant was just
being used by his ex-wife, Margie Corpus Macias, and
several other personalities who he believed had 'selfish
and personal axes to grind [4] against him. He denies the
accusation of raping and having illicit relations with
complainant whom he knew only as a passing
acquaintance. He claims that he had been in contact with
complainant only once, when he bought her cellular
phone, and only because he pitied her. Respondent asserts
that complainant informed him that she was kidnapped
and merely forced to sign the documents used in the
instant administrative complaint. To find out the veracity
of complainant's story, respondent and his counsel asked
her to narrate her plight in the presence of a pastor of the
Adventist Church, a lawyer, and a public prosecutorall
respected members of the community. [5] In support of
his defense, respondent annexed the following
documents: (i) letter addressed to the Chief Justice signed
by complainant withdrawing the instant administrative
complaint; (ii) letter to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
signed by complainant, filing administrative charges
against those who conspired to kidnap her;
(iii) Sinumpaang Pamamahayag [6] executed by
complainant dated 21 August 2001; (iv) Apas-Sumpay Nga
Pamamahayag, [7] dated 23 August 2001among others.
Complainant confessed [8] that she was approached by
Vice Mayor Edgar Saldia and Mayor Jesus 'Siote Lim of
152
Salug, Zamboanga del Norte and offered to help her
prepare a case for rape against respondent. She refused
because respondent did not do anything wrong to her.
Later that day, Mrs. Margie Macias talked to complainant,
telling her that she was 'heaven-sent, because Mrs. Macias
wanted respondent to be dismissed from his work. Two
days later, Vice Mayor Saldia promised her mother that he
will give complainant's father a job in the municipal hall if
they agree to the filing of a rape case against respondent.
When complainant's mother refused, Vice Mayor Saldia
threatened her with a lawsuit. Reluctantly, complainant
was' left in the vice mayor's house where she was locked
in one of the rooms. After two or three days, she was
brought to the house of Atty. Selda, where she was forced
to sign the affidavit-complaint against respondent.
Afterwards, accompanied by the vice mayor's daughter
known to her as 'Blanca, they had the affidavit notarized
by a public prosecutor. Complainant claims that she
attempted to tell the public prosecutor about the
untruthfulness of the affidavit, but she was afraid of
Blanca who was then glowering at her. [9]
 
After a few days, complainant was brought to Manila and
made to stay in the house of Atty. Reynaldo Llego in
Cubao, Quezon City. She was locked up in the house for
almost three weeks and was provided with a guard.
However, she was able to escape through the help of her
cousin, Carmen Manlangit, who was then working in
Quezon City. [10]
 
 
On 5 August 2002, respondent filed
a Manifestation [11] informing the Court of
the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
which dismissed the criminal complaint for rape filed by
the complainant.
Meanwhile, complainant filed charges against those
accused of kidnapping her, which complaint was endorsed
by the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte. The  
Provincial Prosecutor initially suspended the resolution of
the complaint, but the Department of Justice reversed the The OCA required respondent to file his comment on the
resolution and ordered the filing of informations for grave matter, [17] and on 20 April 2004, respondent complied
coercion and serious illegal detention against Mayor Jesus with the directive, denying any administrative culpability
Lim, Vice Mayor Edgar Saldia, Atty. Alanixon Selda, Margie or guilt for acts of coercion, harassment, or unlawful
Corpus-Macias, Ma. Blanca Urongan, Sidney Sy, Dolbert detention of complainant. [18] He claimed that he was
Panangitan, Victonie Panangitan, Salque Bulado, Robert merely performing a ministerial function when he issued
Abella, Atty. Reynaldo Llego, Tony Gallara, Rick 'Doe', and the subject arrest warrants. Besides, said warrant had not
Gingging Enriquez. [12] On 1 December 2003, the been implemented and accused could still resort to
Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding information procedural remedies. [19]
and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. L-00727,
raffled to RTC Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte  
presided by respondent judge. On 2 December 2003,
respondent issued an order for the arrest of the persons On 14 May, 2004, the OCA submitted its findings and
named in the information. [13] The next day, accused recommendation, to wit:
moved for the inhibition of respondent from the criminal
case on the ground that respondent is directly involved in  
the said case. Respondent thus issued an order inhibiting
himself from the criminal proceedings and recommended 1.                       This matter be
to the Court that another judge be designated in his RE-DOCKETED as a
regular
place. [14]
administrative
complaint against
  respondent Judge;
2.                    The charge of
immorality,
The accused in Criminal Case No. L-00727 filed a special
conduct
civil action for certiorari and prohibition (docketed as CA- unbecoming of a
G.R. SP No. 80984) with the Court of Appeals, questioning: judicial officer,
(i) the DOJ resolution ordering the filing of informations rape and violation
against them; (ii) the information filed; and (iii) the of the Anti-Child
Abuse Law against
warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge. The Court of the respondent be
Appeals granted the petition, nullifying the information DISMISSED for lack
and quashing the warrant of arrest earlier issued. It also of sufficient
recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator evidence;
3.                    Respondent
(OCA) a separate investigation into respondent judge's
Judge be found
administrative culpability for his acts of coercion and GUILTY of bias and
harassment and in precipitously issuing the arrest warrant abuse of authority
despite being intimately involved in the criminal case. [15] for issuing the
warrant of arrest in
Criminal Case No.
  L-00727 and that
he be meted with
Meanwhile, on 8 March 2004, this Court granted the penalty of FINE
in the sum of Two
respondent's application for disability retirement under
Thousand Pesos
Republic Act No. 910, as amended. However, payment of (P2,000.000) pesos
disability benefits was held in abeyance pending resolution to be deducted
of the administrative complaints against him. [16] from his disability
retirement
benefits. [20]

153
  propensity to use his office to get back at those
responsible for filing the administrative charges against
  him. The Investigating Justice recommended the penalty of
fine in the amount of P20,000.00 in accordance with Secs.
The case was referred to Court of Appeals Associate 9 and 11 (B), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. [23]
Justice Jose Mendoza for investigation, report and
recommendation. However, Justice Mendoza prayed to be  
excused from conducting the investigation since he was a
member of the division which decided CA-G.R. SP No.
We express our concurrence with the findings and
80984. The case was then referred to Associate Justice
recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
Remedios Salazar-Fernando, likewise asked that she be
allowed to recuse herself since she was the ponente in a
 
case related to CA-G.R. SP No. 80984. The case was thus
referred to Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
Administrative charges against members of the judiciary
must be supported at least by substantial evidence, [24] or
 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. In the present case,
In his Report and Recommendation [21] dated 4 August
save for the Affidavit-Complaint dated 24 July 2001, no
2005, Justice Villarama found that
other document or evidence was submitted to
complainant's Sinumpaang Pamamahayag and Apas-
substantiate the charges of immorality, conduct
Sumpay Nga Pamamahayag created serious doubts as to
unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape, and violation of the
whether respondent committed the acts complained of.
Anti-Child Abuse Law against respondent judge. More
There was no evidence of compulsion or duress in the
importantly, complainant herself executed sworn
execution of her affidavits of recantation. Her affidavits of
statements recanting her charges against respondent. As
retraction were executed in the presence of respected
observed by the Investigating Justice, while the Complaint-
members of the community, with corroborating sworn
Affidavit may have been executed with great detail, the
statements from other persons. On the other hand,
affidavits of retraction are equally detailed and impressed
complainant's counsel of record failed to present any
with greater coherence and spontaneity, and supported by
satisfactory explanation to support the charges. He was
affidavits from people who had knowledge of the events
also unable to comment on complainant's affidavits of
which actually transpired. Interestingly also, even as
retraction. There being no substantial evidence to
complainant had already retracted her charges, her
establish the commission of the acts complained of, the
counsel of record, Atty. Alexander Versoza, merely stated
Investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of the
that 'when there is smoke, there is fire. [25] Considering
administrative complaint for immorality. [22]
these, the complaint for immorality has no leg to stand on
and should be dismissed.
 

 
On the charge of abuse of authority, the Investigating
Justice opined that respondent should be held
Now on the issue of abuse of authority. Rule 137 of the
administratively liable for issuing the warrant of arrest in
Rules of Court mandatorily disqualifies a judge or judicial
Criminal Case No. L-00727. According to him, respondent
officer to sit in any case in which: (a) he, or his wife or
should have voluntarily inhibited himself from the case, as
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
per Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, his wife being
otherwise; (b) he is related to either party within the sixth
one of the accused therein. Moreover, the rest of the
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
accused were the very same persons implicated by herein
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil
complainant as those who instigated the present
law; (c) he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
administrative complaint. His belated inhibition, after he
trustee or counsel; or (d) he has presided in any inferior
had issued the arrest warrant, is indicative of the

154
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, judiciary for his personal concerns. In order to avoid
without the written consent of all parties in interest,
suspicions of wrongdoing, a respect for traditional and
signed by them and entered upon the record. [26]
prevailing rules must be observed and kept constantly in

  mind. A judge should, in fine, administer his office with

There is no dispute that Mrs. Margie Corpus-Macias,
accused in Criminal Case No. L-00727, is the estranged
wife of respondent judge. This circumstance makes it
mandatory for respondent to inhibit himself from the case,
but this he unfortunately did not do. He cannot exercise
his discretion whether to inhibit himself or not. It was a
clear case of violation of the Rules of Court.
due regard to the integrity of the judicial system. He must
not be perceived as being a repository of arbitrary power
but as one dispensing justice under the sanction of the
rule of law. [29] That he inhibited himself after they moved
for his inhibition cannot extenuate his culpability. At the
outset, he should have inhibited himself from the case if
only to avoid any doubt or suspicion of bias and partiality
against the accused.

As properly observed both by the OCA and the  

Investigating Justice, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
not ministerial in nature, but rather requires the exercise Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court [30] provides
of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing that a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives' or
magistrate. [27] The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
circulars' is' a less' serious' charge which
requires the judge's personal evaluation of the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
Only when he finds probable cause should he issue a
warrant of arrest or a commitment order. [28] In Criminal
Case No. L-00727, however, respondent judge issued the  
warrant of arrest a mere day after the filing of the
information charging accused therein with grave coercion
merits the penalty of either suspension from office
and serious illegal detention. Such undue alacrity casts
doubt on the motive of respondent, especially since the without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
accused were known to him to be the same people who month not more than three (3) months; or a fine of more
instigated the present administrative case against him, and than P10,000.00 but not
against whom he filed a civil suit for damages. Moreover,
exceeding P20,000.00. [31] Because of the clear violation
these were the same people whom respondent claims to
by respondent of the rule on mandatory inhibition, as well
have 'axes to grind against him. Respondent's swift
issuance of the arrest warrant suspiciously smells of as the bias and abuse of authority, the recommended fine
vengeance and vindication. He might have been of P20,000.00 is proper.
prejudiced by the malicious acts of the accused, but he
should not use his position in the  

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for immorality

against respondent Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias is
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, he is
 
hereby held administratively liable for abuse of authority
in issuing the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. L-

155

00727 and for violation of Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court, and FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), to be deducted from his disability benefits.
 
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197               April 13, 2011
[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ]
ANTONINO MONTICALBO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CRESCENTE F. MARAYA, JR., Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a verified
Complaint dated September 24, 2008 filed by complainant
Antonino Monticalbo charging respondent Judge
Crescente F. Maraya, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, Calubian, Leyte, with gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence and grave abuse of authority thru false
representation.1
Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil
case for collection of a sum of money filed by Fatima
Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before the 6th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro,
Leyte (MCTC).2
The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1,
2008 Order on the ground that the representative of
Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to prosecute
the case.3 The MCTC, however, did not rule on the
counterclaim of complainant Monticalbo for attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses. For said reason, he filed a
motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by
the court.4
Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte (RTC), where his
appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. CN-89. 5 He then
filed a motion for extension of time to file a memorandum
on appeal, which was granted by respondent judge in his
Order dated June 25, 2008.6
In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed
the appeal for having been filed out of time. He stated
that:
156
Under the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied
to govern the proceedings of this case, a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Being a
prohibited pleading, it will not suspend the period of
appeal. (Jaravata vs. CA G.R. No. 85467, April 25, 1990, 3rd
Division). Since the appealed Order was received by
counsel for the defendants-appellants on February 13,
2008, the notice of appeal, not a motion for
reconsideration, should have been filed within a period of
15 days which lapsed on February 29, 2008. As the Notice
of Appeal was filed on March 31, 2008, the appeal was,
therefore, filed out of time and the appealed Order has
become final and executory. The lapse of the appeal
period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment (Delgado vs. Republic, 164 SCRA 347).7
Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on
the part of respondent judge: (1) respondent erred in
ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, considering that the total claim of
the plaintiff in the said case exceeded ₱10,000.00; (2)
respondent, motivated by bad faith and corruption, cited
the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his
questioned Order; and (3) respondent accepted bribes in
the form of food from plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case
No. CN-89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then Sheriff of
the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and
Chairman of the Board and President of the said
cooperative.8 Complainant further avers that he personally
witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree
with Costelo and his other male staff members in a nipa
hut annexed to the building of the trial court during office
hours in the afternoons of July 9, 2008, August 6, 2008 and
September 10, 2008.9
In his Comment and Manifestations dated December 29,
2008, respondent judge refutes all the accusations hurled
by complainant against him. He explains that he decided
to dismiss complainant’s appeal because it was filed out of
time under the Rules on Summary Procedure. This decision
was made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of
the MCTC and of his sound discretion.10 Secondly, he
argues that complainant’s accusation of bad faith and
corruption is baseless and that the complaint was filed
upon the urging of Atty. Alexander Lacaba, his counsel, in
an attempt to get even with him (respondent judge) for
having lost the appeal in the case.11 Lastly, respondent
denies having participated in any drinking spree with his
staff members or Costelo, who has been prohibited by his
doctor from drinking alcoholic beverages. He claims that
he only eats his meals in the nipa hut because he has to
refrain from eating in public eateries for security reasons.12
The administrative complaint was re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and referred to the Executive Justice
of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station, for raffle among
the justices thereat for investigation, report and
recommendation.13
On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon
issued his Report and Recommendation, the pertinent
portion of which reads as follows:
In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be
ABSOLVED from the charge of grave misconduct and
corruption. However, the citation of a non-existent case by
the respondent Judge in his assailed order of dismissal is
tantamount to a misrepresentation and therefore reflect
poorly on his esteemed position as a public officer in a
court of justice, it is therefore recommended that he be
ADMONISHED AND STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition
thereof will be more severely dealt with.14
The Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating
Justice.
Grave Misconduct and Bribery
In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established
that respondent’s actions were motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty or hatred or were attended by fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.15 In the absence of such proof,
the decision or order in question is presumed to have been
issued in good faith by respondent judge.16 This was
emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan, 17 where
the Court explained:
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the
latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and
partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge
commits in the performance of his duties renders him
liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.181avvphi1
In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave
misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither
can bad faith or malice be inferred just because the
judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to
complainant.19 What constitutes bad faith has been
expounded on in the case of Sampiano v. Judge Indar:20
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some
motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on
the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.21
157
Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering
an unjust judgment or order, one must be able to show
that such judgment or order is unjust and that it was
issued with malicious intent to cause injustice to the
aggrieved party.22 Well-established is the rule in
administrative proceedings that the burden of proof rests
on the complainant, who must be able to support and
prove by substantial evidence his accusations against
respondent.23 Substantial evidence, the quantum of proof
required in administrative cases, is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.24 Failure of the
complainant to substantiate his claims will lead to the
dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit
because, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption that a judge has regularly performed his
duties will prevail.25
In this case, complainant has nothing but mere assertions
and conjectures to buttress his allegations of grave
misconduct and bribery on the part of respondent who, if
complainant is to be believed, accepted bribes of food and
engaged in drinking sprees with court employees during
office hours. Contrary to complainant’s statement, the
Investigating Justice found that respondent was attending
to his cases during the dates when he allegedly had those
drinking sessions.
Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence.26 Complainant miserably failed to substantiate
his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery. He merely
alleged hollow suppositions to shore up his Complaint.
Consequently, this Court has no other option except to
dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit.
Although the Court will never tolerate or condone any
conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of
public accountability or diminish the people’s faith in the
judiciary, it will not hesitate to protect an innocent court
employee against any groundless accusation or
administrative charge which has no basis in fact or
law.27 As succinctly put by Justice Quisumbing in the case
of Francisco v. Leyva,28
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing
discipline upon employees of the Judiciary. At the same
time, however, neither will we hesitate to shield the same
employees from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.29
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Respondent judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of
the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so
gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad
faith.30 In addition to this, the acts complained of must not
only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but
should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
and corruption.31
Complainant Monticalbo insists that respondent judge
erred in ruling that his counterclaim for attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses was covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure which provides that a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and will not toll
the running of the period to appeal. To support his
argument, complainant points out that his claim exceeds
the ₱10,000.00 limit set in the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Complainant is mistaken.
A cursory reading of Section 1 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure clearly shows that complainant’s
claim is covered by the said rule which reads:
Section 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases
xxx
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the
total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) or Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila,
exclusive of interest and costs.
Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old books.
The rule now, as amended by A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC,
effective November 25, 2002, has placed the ceiling at
₱100,000.00. As such, the complainant has no basis in
charging that respondent’s "knowledge of law fell so
short" and that he was remiss in his obligation to be
familiar with the law which "even law students these days
know such x x x."32
For this reason, counsel for complainant is reminded to
choose his words carefully and refrain from hurling insults
at respondent judge especially if, as in this instance, he is
obviously mistaken in his reading of the law. His use of
insulting language and unfair criticism is a violation of his
duty as a lawyer to accord due respect to the courts.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires that "a lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others."
158
Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that
respondent judge erred in issuing the questioned order, he
cannot be held liable for his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith. 33 A judge
is not required to be faultless because to demand
otherwise would make the judicial office untenable for no
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
administration of justice can be infallible. 34 As a matter of
policy, a judge cannot be subject to disciplinary action for
his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that they
were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives,
or improper considerations.35
The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the
higher courts. The filing of an administrative case against
the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial
remedies provided by law, neither is it complementary or
supplementary to such actions.36 With regard to this
matter, the case of Flores v. Abesamis37 is instructive:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being committed
by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which
may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in
appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction
or application of procedural or substantive law or legal
principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after
rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new
trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against
error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary
in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise
of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special
civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a
motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as
the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against
Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary
or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for
the taking of other measures against the persons of the
judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or
criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals
have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into
his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed.38
Citation of non-existent case
The Court now deals with the charge that respondent
judge cited a non-existent case – Jaravata v. Court of
Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly
promulgated on April 25, 1990 – in his questioned Order.
A search of available legal resources reveals that no such
decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the
initials, "CA G.R." And, it cannot be considered a CA case
because the respondent is the "Court of Appeals." This
undoubtedly runs counter to the standard of competence
and integrity expected of those occupying respondent’s
judicial position. A judge must be "the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence."39 The Code of
Judicial Conduct also demands that he "be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence."40
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment
without proof that it was made with a deliberate intent to
cause an injustice, still he is required to observe propriety,
discreetness and due care in the performance of his official
duties.41 As such, he should always strive to live up to the
strict standards of competence, integrity and diligence in
public service necessary for one in his position. 42 The case
of Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete appropriately states that: "A
judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and
propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise
no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Integrity, in a
judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity."43
It is important to note that respondent did not offer any
explanation for the incorrect citation of the said case in his
Comment to the complaint against him. He should be
admonished for his failure to address this issue, especially
as it pertains to the proper execution of his office.
Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that
respondent has been reported to have committed such
carelessness, the Court will accord him leniency.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for Grave Misconduct and
Corruption is hereby DISMISSED. For citing a non-existent
case, however, respondent judge is ADMONISHED to
observe due care in the performance of his functions and
duties and WARNED that a repetition thereof would be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1781               October 16, 2009
GEORGE P. MERCADO (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE,
REBECCA ROYO-MERCADO, AND CHILDREN, NAMELY,
REBECCA GAY, KRISTINA EVITA, CRIS OLIVER AND
MARIAN RICA, ALL SURNAMED
MERCADO), Complainants,
vs.
159
HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.) PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM CITY, DAVAO DEL
NORTE, BRANCH 31, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1782
STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y.
VELASCO, Complainant,
vs.
HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.) PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM CITY, DAVAO DEL
NORTE, BRANCH 31, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
These are consolidated administrative cases filed against
Judge Erasto D. Salcedo (respondent judge), Regional Trial
Court, Branch 31, Tagum City, charging him with violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.1
Administrative Matter No. RTJ-03-1781
In a series of letters-complaints dated January 2,
2001,2 July 16, 2001,3 August 28, 20014 and November 23,
20015 filed before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), George P. Mercado (complainant) charged
respondent judge as summarized below.
In the letter dated January 2, 2001, the respondent judge
was accused of bias and gross partiality in handling the
investigation of the administrative case filed against Judge
Napy Agayan (Judge Agayan) of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao del Norte. The
complainant alleged that the respondent judge
mishandled the investigation and based his "findings of
facts" on "gossip and rumors"6 to aid a fellow judge.
On January 16, 2001, the complainant formally charged
the respondent judge of committing these unethical
infractions:
(1) Mishandling of, or rendering a false report to
the Supreme Court on, his investigation of Judge
Agayan;
(2) Grave misconduct and impropriety in
possessing and using a stolen Pajero vehicle with
knowledge, actually and constructively, that it
was a subject of an Anti-Fencing Law case,
 docketed as Criminal Case No. 11728, which he
had earlier dismissed; and
(3) Serious irregularities, dishonesty or grave
misconduct relating to the handling and
improper execution of the final decision in
Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99, entitled
Soriano Fruits Corporation and Others versus
Department of Agrarian Reform and/or Land
Bank of the Philippines, where the respondent
judge modified the final judgment on the
amount of just compensation from which the
respondent judge benefited in the amount of
Three Million Pesos (₱3,000,000.00).
The letter-complaint dated August 28, 2001 was filed by
the complainant to supplement his earlier allegations. The
complainant alleged that in connection with the stolen
Pajero, the respondent judge was one of the respondents
in a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6539) and/or the Anti-Fencing Law of
1973 (Presidential Decree [P.D.] 1612) filed by the
Philippine National Police. In Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to
51-99, the respondent judge showed partiality in hastily
resolving the motions filed by the plaintiff, but not the
motions filed by the defendant.
Finally, the letter-complaint dated November 23, 2001 was
a reinforcement of the allegations in the earlier letters-
complaints. The complainant additionally related that the
use by the respondent judge of the stolen Pajero became a
subject of media coverage.
The Office of the Chief Justice referred the letters-
complaints dated January 2, 2001 and July 16, 2001 to
Hon. Zenaida N. Elepaño as Acting Court
Administrator.7 Subsequently, then Court Administrator
(now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., in an Indorsement dated January 21, 2002,
required the respondent judge to file his comment on the
letter-complaint dated November 23, 2001.8
The respondent judge duly filed his Comment (dated
February 22, 20029), which the OCA received on February
27, 2002. The OCA summarized the respondent judge’s
position as follows:
Re: Investigation of Judge Napy Agayan.
Judge Salcedo contends that he has already submitted his
recommendation to this Office and Mr. Mercado, through
his complaint, would like to interfere and dictate what his
recommendation would be. x x x
Re: Stolen Pajero found in his possession.
160
Judge Salcedo contends that Criminal Case No. 11728
against Leopoldo Gonzaga was dismissed in 1999 on
motion of the prosecution because during the
reinvestigation, the witness of the prosecution did not
appear. He adds that from this dismissal the Traffic
Management Group did not file any motion for
reconsideration. Worse, the TMG authorized the change of
color of the vehicle and allowed the buyer to use it for
years.
Judge Salcedo avers that in June 2001, the owner lent him
the vehicle and he did not know that it was the same
vehicle subject of Criminal Case No. 11728, otherwise, he
would not have used it for reason of delicadeza. According
to him, there was no way of identifying the vehicle
because the TMG authorized the change of color. The
vehicle was green during the pendency of the criminal
case while it was dirty white.
Re: Irregularities in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99.
Judge Salcedo claims that he was designated as Acting
Presiding Judge of the Special Agrarian Court in July 2000.
He maintains that when he took over the said cases, the
decision therein were already final and executory. Judge
Salcedo asserts that he issued an order for the execution
of the judgment which function is purely ministerial. He
adds that if there was something wrong with the valuation
of the land then the counsel for Land Bank should have
questioned the same. As for the accusation that he
received ₱3,000,000.00 for which he was able to construct
a house in Tagum City, Judge Salcedo contends that the
said house was constructed through a bank loan and the
proceeds from the sale of a prime lot in Cagayan de Oro
City.10
The complainant filed a Reply dated March 12, 2002.11 He
argued that the handling of the reinvestigation of the Anti-
Fencing case against Leopoldo Gonzaga was hastily
concluded and resolved by Prosecutor Matias Aquiatan,
who conducted the reinvestigation merely two days after
the order to reinvestigate was issued by the respondent
judge. The complainant further advanced the view that the
respondent judge merely relied on the prosecutor’s
findings and dismissed the case with undue haste.
According to the complainant, Leopoldo Gonzaga also had
three (3) pending cases in the respondent judge’s sala at
that time.
The complainant also pointed out that two (2) checks for
₱800,000.00 were drawn from the payments made by
Land Bank in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99. The
proceeds of one of these checks were given to the wife of
the respondent judge.
Administrative Case No. RTJ-03-1782
On December 18, 2001, State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y.
Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco) brought to the
attention of then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the
indictment of the respondent judge for violation of P.D.
No. 1612 and recommended that appropriate
administrative charges be initiated by the Supreme Court
against him for violations of the provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.12 State Prosecutor Velasco stated:
…undersigned finds no cogent reason why Respondent
JUDGE SALCEDO chose to use a vehicle which was the
subject of a criminal case before his very own sala. There is
no proof or evidence whatsoever that the Respondent
Judge forgot that the alleged owner of the subject vehicle
(Respondent LEOPOLDO GONZAGA) previously appeared
before him as respondent in a criminal case. He could
never forget it because the authorities apprehended him,
Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO even showed them a copy of
his very own July 7, 1999 Decision "exonerating"
GONZAGA from the crime of Anti-Fencing. His contention
that he did not know that he was using the very same
vehicle (subject of the previous criminal complaint before
his court) because its color has been changed is fallacious x
x x Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO to be more cautious, out
of delicadeza, in his dealing with GONZAGA, assuming for
the sake of argument that he acted in good faith.13
In a Resolution dated April 10, 2002, we referred this
administrative matter to the OCA and the respondent
judge filed his Answer on August 30, 2002. 14 In addition to
the arguments he had already raised, the respondent
judge posited that the whole incident was a smear
campaign engineered against him by a carnapping
syndicate operating in Manila-Mindanao. The respondent
judge also posited that there was no impropriety in using
the subject vehicle since it was no longer in custodia legis
as Criminal Case No. 11728 had already been dismissed.
Thereafter, we referred the administrative cases to Justice
Noel G. Tijam15 (Justice Tijam) of the Court of Appeals (CA)
for investigation, report and recommendation. The
referred cases involved:
(a) The respondent judge’s investigation of Judge
Agayan, his possession of a stolen Pajero and the
alleged irregularities he committed in Agrarian
Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99;
(b) The suspension of Judge Salcedo pending the
outcome of the instant case;
(c) The dismissal of the complaint of George
Mercado dated April 22, 2002 for grave abuse of
authority for being subjudice;16 and
161
(d) The referral of the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 11728 to the Department of Justice for it’s
appropriate action on the possible
administrative liability of Prosecutor Matias
Aquitan.
Pending investigation of these administrative cases before
the CA, several significant developments took place. First,
the respondent judge retired from the Judiciary on
November 25, 2003. Second, the complainant was killed by
unidentified men on April 14, 2004 and was substituted in
the case by his wife and children. 17 Lastly, the respondent
judge himself was killed on July 26, 2009.
CA Report and Recommendation
Justice Tijam found the respondent judge guilty of
dishonesty, inefficiency, incompetency and violation of
Rules 1.01, 2.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Justice
Tijam reported:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION18
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED BY RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST THE LATE MTC JUDGE
NAPY AGAYAN AND HIS COURT PERSONNEL
The 1st Indorsement dated June 6, 2000 referring the
complaint against Judge Agayan and his staff to the
Respondent Judge expressly directed the Respondent
Judge to investigate therein respondents’ irregular
attendance in court. Hence, even if Minda Amar was not
specifically named by Complainant Mercado in his first
letter-complaint, the fact that the charges involved the
alleged repeated absence not only of Judge Agayan, but
also of the personnel assigned in Judge Agayan’s court,
Respondent Judge’s investigation should have also
included the court attendance of Minda Amar, the Clerk of
Court.
xxx
. . . In the course of his investigation, the Respondent
Judge would have discovered the fact of Minda Amar’s
prolonged absences. However, Respondent Judge failed to
make any findings in this regard. Neither was there a
statement that Clerk of Court Minda Amar was absent
during said period of investigation and/or that her
absences were authorized and approved by Judge Agayan.
Instead, the Respondent Judge made a sweeping
declaration that Complainant Mercado’s charges of
absenteeism against Judge Agayan’s court personnel were
unfounded.
There is no evidence that Respondent Judge examined the
Court personnel’s daily time records . . .
Indubitably, Respondent Judge was negligent and
inefficient, if not dishonest, in his investigation of the
administrative complaint filed against Judge Agayan and
his court personnel. For this reason, the Respondent Judge
must be held liable.
xxx
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
IN THE MATTER OF THE STOLEN PAJERO VEHICLE19
xxx
. . . although the criminal case against the Respondent
Judge for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was dismissed,
the Respondent Judge could still be held liable for his
improper conduct pursuant to Rules 1.0120 and 2.0121 of
the Code Judicial Conduct . . . and Canon 3 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics22 [Emphasis theirs]
xxx
In this case, Respondent Judge displayed conduct that fell
short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law.
Respondent Judge failed to be more circumspect in his
dealings with Leopoldo Gonzaga.
Leopoldo Gonzaga was once an accused before
Respondent Judge’s sala in a criminal case for violation of
the anti-fencing law which was later dismissed by the
Respondent Judge. From this fact alone, any association
which Respondent Judge may have with Leopoldo
Gonzaga would be a cause for suspicion. When
Respondent Judge borrowed the subject vehicle from the
accused, he already displayed improper and reproachable
conduct.
The fact that the vehicle lent to Respondent Judge was the
same Pajero vehicle which was the subject of the
dismissed criminal case makes the act more unethical.
Respondent tried to justify that it was only after Gonzaga
assured him that the Pajero was not a carnapped vehicle
that he allowed himself to use it. This is inexcusable.
Respondent Judge was wrong when he borrowed from the
accused the same vehicle subject matter of the criminal
case which was dismissed and decided in the accused’s
favor. Respondent Judge failed to comport himself in such
a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear
the most searching scrutiny of the public. x x x
162
xxx
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION23
IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSOLIDATED AGRARIAN CASES
xxx
Complainant Mercado suggested that the Respondent
Judge benefited from the awarded commissioner’s fee.
Complainant Mercado presented copies of the 3 cashier’s
checks and the deposit purportedly showing how
Respondent Judge profited from said fees.
However, this claim is completely without factual basis.
The complainant failed to adduce any substantial, direct
and convincing evidence to substantiate his allegation that
Respondent Judge materially benefited from the
transaction. At most, such allegation is a mere suspicion or
conjecture.
xxx
. . . unless there is direct and convincing evidence which
will prove Respondent Judge materially benefited from the
transaction, the Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of
said charge.
However, . . . Respondent Judge is liable for gross
ignorance of the law in according and/or modifying a final
and executory decision.
As settled, when the judge’s inefficiency springs from a
failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or
a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either
too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title
he holds, or is too vicious that the oversight or omission
was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority.1avvphi1
xxx
Respondent Judge had clearly exhibited gross ignorance of
the law when he amended the already final decision… He
is therefore guilty of violating Rule 3.01 24 of the Code of
Judicial Ethics.
Justice Tijam recommended the imposition of the
following penalties:
(a) First cause of action – a fine of ₱40,000.00;
(b) Second cause of action – a fine of
₱20,000.00;
 (c) Third cause of action – a fine in the amount of
₱20,000.00.
The Court’s Ruling
After considering the CA Report and the entire records, we
find the Report to be substantially supported by the
evidence on record, and by applicable law and
jurisprudence. We therefore adopt the findings and
recommendations of the CA Report, subject to the
modifications indicated below.
Administrative cases against judges stem from the time-
honored constitutional principle that a public office is a
public trust. This principle requires a judge, like any other
public servant and more so because of the sensitivity of his
position, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of
honesty and integrity;25 his high and exalted position in the
Judiciary requires him to observe exacting standards of
morality, decency and competence. As the visible
representation of the law and given his task of dispensing
justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a
manner that would merit the respect and confidence of
the people.26 He must conduct himself in a manner
characterized by propriety and decorum; like Ceasar’s
wife, he must be above suspicion.27 As we held in Padua v.
Paz:28
Court personnel charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, bear a heavy
responsibility in insuring that their conduct is always
beyond reproach. The preservation of the integrity of the
judicial process is of paramount importance. All those
occupying offices in the judiciary should at all times be
aware that they are accountable to the people. They must
serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest
lives.
The records show that respondent judge failed to live up
to these exacting standards.
Investigation of Judge Agayan and his court personnel
In his report dated August 2, 2002 (in compliance with the
OCA directive to investigate Judge Agayan), the
respondent judge stated that the complaint against Judge
Agayan and his court staff for absenteeism and irregular
attendance had no merit. The respondent judge related
that he went twice to the office of Judge Agayan to
ascertain the veracity of the complaint and found that
Judge Agayan was really sickly because of a heart
condition that compelled him to take leaves of
absence.29 The respondent judge claimed that since the
complainant failed to specify the particular dates when
Judge Agayan failed to report to work, he could not
ascertain whether his absences had been authorized. The
163
respondent judge also stated that he personally inquired
from other offices in the Municipality of Kapalong, Davao
del Norte, from lawyers, and from party-litigants with
pending cases in the sala of Judge Agayan; he found that
no complaint from party-litigants in the Municipality of
Kapalong had been made involving the failure to attend to
official transactions due to the absence of Court
personnel. Neither was there any complaint from lawyers
about proceedings "grinding to a halt." Like party-litigants,
local officials are more concerned in the speedy
disposition of cases when their constituents are involved.
Yet, not a single local official made a complaint.30
The respondent judge, in his Comment dated February 22,
2002, emphasized that the present complaint was simply
an undue interference by the complainant in his
recommendation in Judge Agayan’s case.
In its investigation, the CA found evidence refuting the
statements made by the respondent judge in his report to
the OCA. One of these was the Certification dated
February 6, 2003 issued by Jaime Mondejar, Clerk of Court
II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao
del Norte, attesting that one Minda Amar, the Clerk of
Court in Judge Agayan’s sala, had not reported for work
prior to and during the dates the respondent judge
reportedly conducted his investigation. 31 The CA
investigation also found no evidence that the respondent
judge ever examined the daily time records of Minda Amar
and the court personnel assigned to Judge Agayan’s sala.
Justice Tijam noted that since the act complained of was
absenteeism, the investigator’s first course of action
should have been to check and verify the daily time
records of the concerned personnel; from such
examination the respondent judge would have known of
the prolonged absences of Minda Amar and others.
Likewise, the respondent judge would have noticed Minda
Amar’s absence when he went to the sala of Judge Agayan
on two occasions. These incidents, however, were not
mentioned in the respondent judge’s report.
In addition to these findings, we note that the respondent
judge was similarly remiss in ascertaining Judge Agayan’s
absences. The respondent judge merely relied on the leave
of absence filed by Judge Agayan for October 8, 1997, and
did not at all consider the latter’s absences, subject of the
complaint, and the fact that the respondent judge
conducted his investigation only in February 2000. At the
very least, the gap of more than two (2) years between the
leave of absence on record and the investigation of Judge
Agayan’s absences should have alerted the respondent
judge to examine the former’s records in the intervening
period, particularly the period immediately prior to the
complaint. The respondent judge failed to do this. We
observe, too, that in the "course of his investigation," he
did not appear to have asked Judge Agayan about his
absences in any formal inquiry or, at the very least, in an
interview. No record appears in the respondent judge’s
report on Judge Agayan’s position on the matter under
investigation. A close scrutiny of the report in fact shows
that the respondent judge, instead of making an objective
report on the results of his investigation, tried to downplay
and deflect the issue of absenteeism and irregular
attendance by stating that nobody complained of the
delay in the disposition of cases due to the absence and
irregular attendance of Judge Agayan and his staff.32
From all these, what appears clear to us is that the
respondent judge conducted a very superficial
investigation, if what he did can be labelled as an
investigation at all. Based on this shallow effort, he
prepared a slanted report that could not but lead to the
exoneration of Judge Agayan. These actions tell us that the
respondent judge deliberately covered up Judge Agayan’s
absences and irregular attendance. The motivation for all
these is not hard to discern as it can be read between the
lines in the respondent judge’s report, considered in light
of the attendant facts. He did all these under the mistaken
notion of aiding a fellow judge, who was allegedly too
sickly to fully perform his judicial duties. In rendering this
assistance, the respondent judge also overlooked the
absences and irregular attendance of the court staff of
Judge Agayan.
The respondent judge apparently forgot that his first and
foremost duty was to conduct a thorough and objective
investigation and to make a complete report of his findings
regardless of his personal sentiments and beliefs. The task
assigned to him was an assignment involving trust and the
exercise of his functions as a judge. An administrative
investigation is an essential component in the judicial
machinery for the administrative supervision of courts and
court personnel; it is a key process in determining
violations of the norms of conduct and standards of
service in the judiciary. The respondent judge, therefore,
not only failed to do his duty, but violated as well the trust
reposed in him as a judge.
The absenteeism of judges or court employees and/or
their irregular attendance at work is a serious charge that,
if proven, may warrant the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal or suspension from service.33 Unauthorized
absence and irregular attendance are detrimental to the
dispensation of justice and, more often than not, result in
undue delay in the disposition of cases; they also translate
to waste of public funds when the absent officials and
employees are nevertheless paid despite their absence. As
heretofore mentioned, the Supreme Court regulates the
conduct of court officials and employees and it acts
through its subordinates, among them in this case, the
respondent judge. His responsibility in this administrative
supervision is direct by virtue of the delegation made by
this Court. By conducting a superficial investigation and by
his slanted findings that caused the OCA to recommend
164
the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge
Agayan and his court personnel, the Court’s administrative
machinery failed; the respondent judge’s intent to shield
another judge, resulting in the lack of objectivity of his
report, deprived the Court of the opportunity to act
properly on the reported violations of the norms of
conduct of judges and court employees.
For failing to faithfully perform the tasks assigned to him,
the respondent committed dishonesty, inefficiency, and
serious misconduct in violation of Canon 3 and Rule 3.08
of Canon 3, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
state:
Canon 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES
HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 3.08 – A judge should diligently discharge
administrative responsibilities, maintain professional
competence in court management, and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions of other
judges and court personnel.
We also find that the respondent judge violated Rule 2.01,
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that
"[a] judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary," in relation to Canon 31 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, which requires that a judge’s conduct be above
reproach and that he administer justice according to law.
This means that a judge, in dispensing justice, "should
apply the law impartially, independently, honestly, and in
a manner perceived by the public to be impartial,
independent and honest."34
Serious misconduct, as defined, refers to weighty and
serious transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer.35 It warrants dismissal
from the service when the judicial act is corrupt and
inspired by an intention to violate the law, and when it
translates to wrongful intention rather than mere error of
judgment.36
In this case, by giving premium to personal relations and
personal feelings rather than to the faithful discharge of
his duty as investigating judge, the respondent judge acted
dishonestly and inefficiently, coupled with a deliberate and
wrongful intent to perform his duties unfaithfully. This is
no less a serious misconduct than a corrupt act
undertaken for monetary gains; one as well as the other
eroded public confidence in a judge’s ability to render
justice.37
The Possession and Use of a Stolen Vehicle
In his defense on this issue, the respondent judge claimed
that the case was filed by the complainant merely to
harass him. He also claimed good faith and lack of
knowledge that the vehicle he had borrowed from
Leopoldo Gonzaga was the same vehicle involved in the
Anti-Fencing case that he dismissed in 1999.
The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court
employee is not per se a violation of judicial norms and
standards established for court personnel, as borrowing is
a legitimate and neutral act that can happen in everyday
life. However, judges and court employees – by the nature
of their functions and of the norms and standards peculiar
to their positions – live their lives under restrictions not
otherwise imposed on others; specifically, they cannot
simply borrow in situations when this act may or can affect
the performance of their duties because of the nature of
the thing borrowed or the identity of the borrower, or in
situations when borrowing would involve ethical questions
under express rules. In this case, the complaint alleged
that what the respondent judge borrowed was in fact a
vehicle that was the subject of a previous litigation before
his sala; the respondent judge borrowed, too, from a
lender who still had cases before his sala.
We hold, based on our examination and analysis of the
records, that the respondent judge went over the dividing
line that separates permissible from impermissible
borrowing.
First, during his cross-examination before the CA, the
respondent judge admitted that he knew that the vehicle
he borrowed was owned by Leopoldo Gonzaga, who was
the accused in the Anti-Fencing case previously before
him.38 The respondent judge could not have avoided this
admission given the surrounding circumstances of the
case; the vehicle in the Anti-Fencing case was a Pajero,
while the vehicle he borrowed from Leopoldo Gonzaga
was also a Pajero;39 while the color of the vehicle had been
changed from green to dirty white, it was shown that the
vehicle consistently carried the same plate number – "UTN
571";40 the respondent judge could not have missed the
identity of the vehicle considering his admission that the
Pajero was under the court’s custody for several
months.411avvphi1
Second, the records show that the respondent judge’s
initial claim of lack of knowledge is not true. In the
preliminary investigation conducted by State Prosecutor
Velasco in the Anti-Fencing case involving the Pajero, the
respondent judge, when apprehended by policemen,
exhibited a court decision he penned in 1999 dismissing
the Anti-Fencing case against Leopoldo Gonzaga for the
same vehicle.42 This incident, which the respondent judge
never refuted, clearly indicated that he knew that the
vehicle he possessed and used, despite its change of color,
165
was the same vehicle involved in the 1999 Anti-Fencing
case that came before him.
Third, the unrefuted statement of the complainant in his
Affidavit (Direct Examination)43 filed before the CA states:
I know for a fact that Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga had several
cases pending in the two (2) salas presided by Executive
Judge Salcedo . . . Also, I know for a fact that before the
Criminal Case No. 11728 . . . was dismissed by Executive
Judge Erasto D. Salcedo, several cases of Mr. Leopoldo
Gonzaga had been pending in the sala of Judge Salcedo. I
also know for a fact that Executive Judge Erasto D. Salcedo
inhibited himself from the cases of Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga
when there was a question raised on the propriety of his
borrowing the Pajero from Mr. Gonzaga, a court litigant in
his sala, during the pendency of this Administrative case.
[Emphasis theirs]
Thus, the respondent judge not only borrowed a vehicle
that was the subject of an Anti-Fencing case before him;
he also borrowed it from a lender who had other pending
cases before him. In fact, he had to inhibit himself from
hearing these cases because of the pendency of the
present administrative cases.
Under the circumstances, the respondent judge is liable
for serious misconduct, given his repeated and deliberate
intention to disregard and violate the legal norms of
conduct governing his behavior and action as a judge. He
committed serious misconduct, first, in using and
possessing a vehicle with the knowledge that it was the
subject of an anti-fencing case previously before him;
and second, he borrowed this vehicle from a litigant who
had pending cases before his sala. Both the character of
the vehicle borrowed and the identity of the lender
precluded him from borrowing and using Leopoldo
Gonzaga’s Pajero. While the criminal case filed against the
respondent judge by State Prosecutor Velasco was
dismissed by the Department of Justice, we agree with
Justice Tijam that the respondent judge’s acts at least
constitute irresponsible and improper conduct whose
effect is to erode public confidence in the judiciary. 44 As
aptly stated by Justice Tijam, the respondent judge’s act
compromised the image, integrity and uprightness of the
courts of law;45 it cast suspicion not only in his own
impartiality, but also in the impartiality and integrity of his
judicial office, thereby impairing public trust in the
exercise of his judicial functions.
In several cases of the same import, the Court penalized a
judge for highly improper conduct.
In Cabreana v. Avelino,46 the Court castigated the
respondent judge who hitched a ride in the car of a party-
litigant in going to and from the place of the ocular
inspection. We ruled that the respondent judge’s act
exposed him and his office to suspicion and impaired the
trust and faith of the people in the administration of
justice.
In Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana,47 we admonished the
judge to be circumspect in his conduct and dealings with
lawyers who had pending cases before him. It was
established that the judge displayed before the public his
close familiarity with one of the lawyers who appeared
before him and whose car the judge sometimes borrowed.
We explained in Yu-Asensi v. Villanueva that the duty to
avoid improper conduct or the appearance of impropriety
becomes more crucial when one is a trial judge who has
constant dealings with the public:48
…[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an
important and visible symbol of government especially
considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial
judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their
counsel and the communities which the judiciary is bound
to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the
administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for
the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must
comport himself at all times in such manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome
of integrity and justice. x x x it is essential that judges,
like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.
The evidence adduced in this charge showed that the
respondent judge violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule
2.01, Canon 2, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in
failing to maintain the appearance of integrity and in
failing to engage in conduct to promote public confidence
in the judiciary. Likewise, he violated Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics relating to the avoidance of impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all the judge’s activities,
official or otherwise.
The Execution of a Final Judgment in
the Consolidated Agrarian Cases
The pertinent portion of the joint decision dated February
7, 2000 rendered by the Special Agrarian Court in Agrarian
Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99 reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises duly considered,
the Court hereby renders its judgment fixing, as it has
judiciously determined, the just compensation for the
landholdings and the improvements of all the herein
petitioners in all these above-captioned docketed agrarian
cases, as follows:
166
First – Hereby fixing, as determined, the just compensation
of herein petitioners’ aggregate landholdings of 123.4629
hectares hereby fixed and determined at ₱25,405,553.55,
plus the fixed and determined just compensation for the
existing improvements thereon of ₱32,800,000.00, or a
total of ₱58,205,553.55; and proper-computed adjustment
to make such valuation at par with current true value of
the Philippine Peso vis-à-vis the US Dollar, said upgraded
amount in its upgraded value totals ₱89,547,005.46; and
further adding thereto the computed interests pegged at
6% per annum, which amounted to ₱21,986,680.68, the
total amount of just compensation which Respondent-DAR
through LBP must pay, jointly and severally, to petitioners
for their landholdings and improvements would be, as it is
hereby fixed in the aggregate amount of ₱111,533,686.14;
xxx
The respondent judge contends that he merely acted on
the motion filed by the landowners who requested
adjustments in enforcing the final judgment considering
the statement in the dispositive portion of the judgment
that allowed adjustments based on the current true value
of the Philippine Peso vis-à-vis the US Dollar.
In his findings, Justice Tijam observed that the adjustment
contemplated in the joint decision was already included in
the dispositive portion, making it unnecessary for the
respondent judge to make any additional adjustment. We
also note that this joint decision, after having become final
and executory, was entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment of the Special Agrarian Court on May 3,
2000.49 It was not until October 26, 2000 that the
respondent judge made further "adjustment" of the
judgment amount when he acted on the motion filed by
the landowners.50
The respondent judge ought to have known that the joint
decision was already final and executory and could no
longer be disturbed when he made his adjustments. This
legal reality, known as the rule of immutability of
judgment, is an elementary principle of law and
procedure. Once a judgment becomes final, it may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the Highest Court of the land.51 The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors,
or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which
cause no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment
is void.52 To be sure, the respondent judge’s ground for
modifying the joint decision is not among these recognized
exceptions.
For modifying a final and executory decision in the course
of its execution, we find the respondent judge guilty of
gross ignorance of the law. Where the law is
straightforward and its application to the facts plainly
evident, not to know the law or to act as if one does not
know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.53 The
respondent judge violated Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which mandates professional
competence on the part of a judge. A judge owes the
public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law
and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence;54 otherwise, he erodes the confidence of
the public in the courts. 55 Ignorance of the law by a judge
can easily be the mainspring of injustice.56
The Penalty
The retirement of the respondent judge and death of both
the complainant and the respondent judge pending the
investigation of these administrative cases are not
deterrents to the resolution on the merits of the
complaints and to the imposition of the sanctions
demanded by the circumstances. Jurisprudence holds that
the death of the complainant does not warrant the
withdrawal of the charges against the respondent nor
does this development render the complaint moot; the
complainant is treated only as a witness in this type of
proceedings.57 On the other hand, the death of the
respondent in an administrative case, as a rule, does not
preclude a finding of administrative liability. The
recognized exceptions to this rule are: first, when the
respondent has not been heard and continuation of the
proceedings would deny him of his right to due process;
second, where exceptional circumstances exist in the case
leading to equitable and humanitarian considerations; and
third, when the kind of penalty imposed or imposable
would render the proceedings useless.58 None of these
exceptional circumstances are present in the case.
Thus, despite the above supervening events, we can still
impose the penalty of fine against the respondent judge
deductible from his retirement benefits. In this case, we
find that the infractions he committed all constitute
serious charges warranting the imposition of fine in the
amount of ₱20,000.00 to ₱40,000.00 range.59 Considering
the several violations he committed and the gravity and
circumstances of these infractions, we find that the
maximum amount of fine should be imposed on each
charge. In so ruling, we note that this is not the first
administrative infraction committed by the respondent
judge; he had previously been fined ₱10,000.00 for undue
delay in rendering decisions or orders.60
On the first charge (false investigation report on Judge
Agayan), we find the respondent judge guilty of
dishonesty, inefficiency, and serious misconduct. He
violated the provisions of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2, Canon 3
and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
and Canons 3 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
167
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, classifies
dishonesty and gross misconduct constituting violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. We
impose a fine of ₱40,000.00 on the respondent judge on
this charge.61
On the second charge (use and possession of the vehicle of
a litigant before his sala), the respondent judge is guilty of
serious misconduct and impropriety as provided in Rule
1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, and Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. Considering the compounded
administrative offenses, he is meted the maximum fine of
₱40,000.00.62
For violation of Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct (in the execution of the decision of an agrarian
case), the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of
the law for which the maximum fine of ₱40,000.00 is
imposed. Gross ignorance of law is considered a serious
charge that warrants the imposition of the penalties
provided under Section 11 (A), Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Erasto D.
Salcedo GUILTY of the following administrative offenses:
1. Dishonesty, inefficiency and serious
misconduct and violation of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2
and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct; and Canons 3 and 31 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. We impose a FINE of ₱40,000.00.
2. Serious misconduct and impropriety in
violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 2.01of
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well
as Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is
meted a FINE of ₱40,000.00.
3. Gross ignorance of the law under Rule 3.01,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, for
which a FINE of ₱40,000.00 is imposed.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby ordered to
deduct the amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand
Pesos (₱120,000.00) from the retirement benefits due to
Judge Erasto D. Salcedo, and to proceed with the
processing and release of these benefits, unless there are
other lawful causes for withholding them.
Finally, we refer to the Department of Justice for
appropriate action the possible administrative liability of
Prosecutor Matias Aquiatan arising from the imputations
made by the complainant that he committed a hasty
reinvestigation of Leopoldo Gonzaga in Criminal Case No.
11728.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650               September 29, 2009
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1195-RTJ)
MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS, Complainant,
vs.
MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS, Presiding Judge, Branch
28, Regional Trial Court, Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This involves an administrative complaint1 filed by
complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband,
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001,
when respondent was still sitting as the presiding judge of
Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte.
Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent
engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship with a
certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her
early 20s. The relationship continued until the time of the
filing of the complaint. Complainant enumerated some of
the abuses committed by respondent, to wit:
(a) [Respondent] has been using court personnel,
namely, Emmanuel "Botiong" Tenefrancia,
process server, as constant escort of his
paramour in going to their appointed trysts or in
escorting back said woman to the place where
she is staying, and as errand boy seeing to their
needs when respondent and his mistress are
together;
(b) Respondent has been using another court
employee in the person of Camilo Bandivas,
court sheriff, as contact person to his young
lover and in summoning and bringing
complainant’s witnesses to respondent to be
harassed and threatened;
(c) Said Judilyn Seranillos, respondent’s lover,
has been brought many times by respondent to
his court in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, thereby
scandalizing court personnel and lawyers, who
sometimes must wait for the session to start
because respondent and his mistress are not yet
through with each other; That the scandalous
relations of respondent with his mistress is an
168
open secret among lawyers, court personnel and
litigants [in] Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte;
(d) Respondent has not been calendaring (sic)
cases nor holding court sessions nor court
hearings on Mondays and Fridays so that he can
have an extended date with his paramour, to the
great prejudice of public service;
(e) Respondent and his paramour had often met
at the house of Zoosima (sic) Ojano Carangan,
aunt of respondent’s paramour, [in] Taway, Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur, and the people of Taway
know that respondent judge, who usually arrives
in his car, has been shamelessly and immorally
carrying on an illicit affair with said Judilyn
Seranillos. Some inquisitive people usually go out
of their houses upon seeing respondent’s car
parked at the house of the aunt of respondent’s
young mistress, and these barrio folks often
watch respondent come and go; [and]
(f) Respondent has one or two other women
lovers whom he shamelessly cavorts even in the
presence of court personnel.2
Complainant attached the affidavits of Shem
Tabotabo,3 Zacarias Cordova,4 Zosima Carangan,5 Danny
Layogue and Consolacion S. Layogue, 6 her son Marictibert
Corpus Macias,7 Ruben Perater,8 Roel Mutia,9 and Aniceto
Zozobrado.10 However, five of them –
Tabotabo,11 Cordova,12 Carangan,13 Danny Layogue,14 and
Marictibert Macias15 – later recanted their affidavits.
On August 20, 2001, this Court issued a
Resolution16 referring the complaint to Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. for investigation,
report and recommendation. On October 29, 2001, Justice
Rosario issued an Order17 setting the initial hearing on
November 27, 28 and 29, 2001 and requiring the parties to
submit a list of their respective witnesses and
documentary evidence. The hearing was, however, reset
to January 28, 29, 30, and 31, 2002 upon motion of
complainant. On January 28, 2002, the parties informed
the Investigating Justice that they were exerting all efforts
for a possible reconciliation. Upon motion by both parties,
the hearing was again reset to March 11, 12, 13, and 14,
2002.
On March 11, 2002, the parties again informed the
Investigating Justice of their desire to confer in a last effort
to settle. The request was again granted with an order that
both parties should be ready the following day if no
settlement was reached. The following day, March 12,
2002, the scheduled hearing proceeded after the parties
failed to reach any amicable settlement.
From a list of seven (7) witnesses, complainant manifested
that only four (4) witnesses shall be presented. The first
witness, Roel Mutia, testified that he was hired by
complainant’s son, Marquinjo Macias, to tail Judge Macias
after suspecting that his father was having an illicit affair.
In summary, Mutia testified that he saw Judge Macias and
Seranillos enter a house in Dipolog City on the afternoon
of October 17, 1999, and that both dined and spent the
night there together inside one bedroom. 18 He said that he
accompanied Marquinjo and complainant the next day to
the said house and that he saw complainant pull Seranillos
outside the house creating a commotion within the
neighborhood.19 On cross-examination, Mutia admitted
that he was not sure if Seranillos did spend the night inside
the said house, or whether she left that night and just
returned the following morning. Counsel for respondent
also pointed to Mutia that the spot where he positioned
himself, while observing Judge Macias, was blocked by
leaves and tall trees.20
The next witness for complainant was Aniceto Zozobrado.
He testified that he was hired by Seranillos to drive a
motorcycle which, according to her, was a gift from Judge
Macias. He said that he saw Judge Macias visit Seranillos
on three (3) occasions; that he ran errands for both Judge
Macias and Seranillos; and that he was slapped once by
Judge Macias for allegedly peeping at Seranillos.21 On
cross-examination, Zozobrado admitted that he was not
really sure if the motorcycle he saw was actually owned by
Seranillos, and that his statement was based merely on
presumption.22 He also admitted that he had been residing
with complainant’s counsel since the date he executed his
affidavit against Judge Macias.23
The third witness, Engracio Dialo, Jr., was not allowed to
testify after respondent’s counsel objected because the
intended testimony would cover an event that took place
after the filing of the complaint, and Dialo’s affidavit
narrated matters that were not covered by the allegations
in the complaint.24 Complainant manifested her intention
to file a motion to amend the complaint. 25 The
Investigating Justice ordered the direct examination of the
fourth witness, complainant Margie Macias, without
prejudice to her presenting Dialo after the motion to
amend the complaint shall have been resolved.
Complainant, however, refused, saying that she would
testify only after Dialo had testified.26 The Investigating
Justice warned complainant that her refusal to testify shall
be taken as a waiver of her right to present further
witnesses and evidence.27 Despite the warning,
complainant refused to proceed with her direct testimony.
The Investigating Justice ordered complainant to rest her
case, but she again refused.
The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He
denied the allegations of Mutia and Zozobrado. He said
that complainant also filed a complaint for concubinage
against him, but the same was dismissed by the Regional
169
State Prosecutor for lack of sufficient evidence. He
believed that complainant’s accusations were brought
about by her psychiatric condition characterized as severe
paranoia.28
On April 25, 2002, the Investigating Justice submitted his
Report and Recommendation29 to this Court. He
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice reasoned that
complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
respondent committed acts of immorality, or that his
conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Investigating Justice, however, recommended that
Judge Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great
care and circumspection in his actions.30
The case now comes before this Court for final resolution.
There are two basic questions that must be resolved. First,
considering the finding of the Investigating Justice, we ask:
is it really necessary that administrative complaints against
members of the judiciary be disposed of only after
adducing evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt? And second, do the acts complained of warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction on respondent judge?
I.
In several cases,31 this Court has ruled that if what is
imputed to a respondent judge connotes a misconduct
that, if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench,
then the quantum of proof necessary to support the
administrative charges or to establish grounds for the
removal of a judicial officer should be more than
substantial.
The first case involving an administrative complaint filed
against a judge in this jurisdiction was decided in 1922 in
In re Impeachment of Horrilleno. 32 There, Justice Malcolm
explained:
The procedure for the impeachment of judges of first
instance has heretofore not been well defined. The
Supreme Court has not yet adopted rules of procedure, as
it is authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the
court to require that charges made against a judge of first
instance shall be presented in due form and sworn to;
thereafter, to give the respondent judge an opportunity to
answer; thereafter, if the explanation of the respondent
be deemed satisfactory, to file (sic) the charges without
further annoyance for the judge; while if the charges
establish a prima facie case, they are referred to the
Attorney-General who acts for the court in conducting an
inquiry into the conduct of the respondent judge. On the
conclusion of the Attorney-General’s investigation, a
hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in
judgment to determine if sufficient cause exists involving
the serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent
judge as warrants the court in recommending his removal
to the Governor-General.
Impeachment proceedings before courts have been said,
in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in
character and to be governed by the rules of law
applicable to criminal cases. The charges must, therefore,
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.33
With Horilleno, it became necessary for every complainant
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite the fact
that the case will only involve an administrative, and not a
criminal, complaint. The reason is explained, albeit
scarcely, in Alcuizar v. Carpio:34
While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to
support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where
the proceedings involve judges charged with grave
offense. Administrative proceedings against judges are, by
nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed
by the rules applicable to criminal cases.351avvphi1
In more recent rulings, however, the Court applied
substantial evidence as the normative quantum of proof
necessary in resolving administrative complaints against
judges. In order to diffuse confusion, a clarification has to
be made. First, the pronouncements in Horilleno and
Alcuizar may be said to have been superseded by the
Court’s recent rulings in Gutierrez v. Belen,36 Reyes v.
Paderanga,37 and Naval v. Panday.38
Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of their
own, sui generis, in the field of public service as to require
a higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed
against them other than, perhaps, the fact that because of
the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are
required to live up to a higher standard of integrity,
probity and morality.
When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his
position or office for the commission of a grave offense in
connection with his office, we merely require that the
complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a
disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely
prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish
liability.39 There appears no compelling reason to require a
higher degree of proof when we deal with cases filed
against judges.
Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this
jurisdiction, the integrity demanded of a judge does not
commence only when he dons the habiliments of a
magistrate or ends when he sheds off his judicial robe. The
nature of the position requires nothing less than a 24-hour
daily obeisance to this mandate of integrity. Any judge
who cannot live up to this exacting requirement has no
170
business sitting on the bench. Considering the proliferation
of complaints of abuses and immorality committed by
judges, it is only proper that the Court be ever vigilant in
requiring impeccable conduct from the members of its
bench.
II.
However, in this case, we are not convinced that
complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence,
that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic
is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant
bears the onus of establishing the averments of her
complaint.40 If complainant fails to discharge this burden,
respondent cannot be held liable for the charge.41
Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
a judge found guilty of immorality can be dismissed from
the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or
part of his retirement benefits, if already retired, and
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.42 We have already ruled that if a judge is to
be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge.43 This quantum of evidence, complainant
failed to satisfy.
The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and
insufficient to convincingly prove that respondent
committed disreputable conduct. This considered,
complainant should not have refused to testify during the
hearing. More than anyone else, it was complainant who
had a direct interest in making sure that the evidence
adduced met the necessary burden of proof, considering
that the allegations in her complaint involved charges that
cannot be lightly dealt with. She should have been more
zealous in prosecuting her complaint.
Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the
Investigating Justice that although the charges of
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service were not satisfactorily proven by complainant,
respondent cannot be completely exonerated.44 Mutia’s
testimony that he saw Judge Macias having dinner with
Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not
satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act
certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, Judge
Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably
constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense
punishable by a fine not less than ₱1,000.00 but not more
than ₱10,000.00.45 In light of the circumstances affecting
not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the
image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we
find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine
of ₱10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative
complaint for immorality and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service against respondent Judge
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias of RTC, Branch 28, of Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence. However, respondent is held administratively
liable for UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the
amount of ₱10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200               April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the administrative
complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant)
against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose
from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to have Steel
Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate
Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the
Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No.
06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge.
The complainant was the Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation
proceedings.
i. Complaint
171
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the
complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-
7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave
Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty,
Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the
Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following
instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T.
Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s
objections and despite serious conflict of interest
in being the duly appointed rehabilitation
receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the
external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors;
he is also a partner of the law firm that he
engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings
(which she termed as "consultative meetings" in
her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside
her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club,
a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila)
and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms,
parameters and features of the rehabilitation
plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also
announced in the meetings that she would
prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by
Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
respondent dictated to him. Thus, the
respondent exceeded the limits of her authority
and effectively usurped and pre-empted the
rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings
of the informal meetings be off-record so that
there would be no record that she had favored
Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and
communications with EPCIB to discuss the case
without the knowledge and presence of SCP and
its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas
(Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser
and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to
guide her in the formulation and development of
the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at
SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law
of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law
firm.
 7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise
complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to
EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a
management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary
meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP
could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the
allegation that there was a need for the creation
of a management committee), the respondent
denied SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance
of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the
respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to
speak; refused to recognize his appearances in
court; and made condescending and snide
remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the
reglementary period prescribed by the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
(Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan
beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules,
without asking for permission to extend the
period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and
applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the
court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan)
to include the power to amend, modify and alter
it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and
commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s
favor and made comments and rulings in the
proceedings that raised concerns regarding her
impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit
herself and showed special interest and personal
involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental
complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the
respondent committed an act of impropriety when she
displayed her photographs in a social networking website
called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an
RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a
compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body
barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that
nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
172
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st
Indorsement4 dated March 18, 2008, referred the
complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against
her. While she admitted that she crafted a workable,
feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she
maintained that she did so only to render fairness and
equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings.
She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying
the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment
that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action.
Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative
complaints were premature because judicial remedies
were still available.5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit
informal meetings and conferences. On the contrary, she
argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in
view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of
rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the
Rules6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet
with the creditors, then there is all the more reason for
the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve
the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She
also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that
informal meetings be called and that she only agreed to
hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties
would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary
period, she contended that she approved the
rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law.
She argued that the matter of granting extension of time
under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules 7 pertains not to the
SC, but to the rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias
and partiality. First, she claimed that her denial of the
complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any
bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis.
Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated
to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself
(as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not
remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver
because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant
raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of
interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the
complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and
corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely
abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as Section 1,
Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of
the Rules specifically states that the court may decide
matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary
evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained
that the allegations were not proven and substantiated by
evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there
was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the
informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the
respondent submitted that the photos she posted in the
social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be
considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-
shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under
contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further
stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies
being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been
aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of
the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala9 should
not be applied to her case since the facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply, 10 insisting
that the respondent’s acts of posting "seductive" pictures
and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of
impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and
2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-
docketed the complaints as regular administrative matters,
and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The CA’s Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison,
the Investigating Justice, conducted a hearing, followed by
the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her
January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,15 Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly
meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial
in nature since these involved the respondent’s
appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the
respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation proceedings, it
was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no
longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial
predicament.
173
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling
the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice Gonzales-Sison
ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and
convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and
deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint
merely relied on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted
that in cases not covered by the rule on mandatory
inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion
of the sitting judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings,
Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular despite the
out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all
the parties, including SCP’s creditors. She also found
satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed
by the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison
noted the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s
legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances
were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words
of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she
instead brushed off the matter with what would appear to
be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a
conduct that falls below the standard of decorum
expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done
recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be
temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this
regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for
which Judge Austria should be held liable.16
On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that
her act of maintaining a personal social networking
account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing
personal details as a magistrate in the account) – even
during these changing times when social networking
websites seem to be the trend – constitutes an act of
impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the
public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained
that propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge
and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16,
2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that the
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the creation of a management committee
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with the procedures prescribed under the
Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure,
and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00. She also
recommended that the respondent be admonished for
failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum
required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA
recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for
the consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of
Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be
NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria,
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City,
Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct
unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section
6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to
refrain from further acts of impropriety with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or
any similar act will be dealt with more severely.19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the
respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as
the complainant failed to prove that her orders were
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality
in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were not
supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s
explanation in the charge of failure to observe the
reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave
abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in
nature, hence, they should not be the subject of
disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of
conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection
and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s
174
observations that the respondent’s act of posting
seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened
the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice
Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on
the respondent but modify the amount as indicated
below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross
ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered
the creation of a management committee without
conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a
hearing was a matter of basic due process that no
magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the
complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of
his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present
case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority,
irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and
partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit
because the complainant failed to establish the
respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant
merely pointed to circumstances based on mere
conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves,
however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations.
"[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent
to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of
the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of
judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases."22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the
exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal
errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by
judicial remedies that are readily available to the
complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order
or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is
available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead
through judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on
the part of the respondent baseless. The truth about the
respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by
simply relying on the complainant’s verified complaint.
Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially
of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to the person, and to
give equal right to the poor and rich. 25 There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere
suspicion of partiality is not enough.26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and
judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the
complainant were grounded on mere opinion and
surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof
indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the
case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would
have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the
complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the
respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus
conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish
with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of
bias and partiality must fail.
On the Charges of Grave Incompetence
and Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error
or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official
duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action even though such acts are erroneous."28
In the present case, what was involved was the
respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules,
which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court
may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the
opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total
liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the
rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition
of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan
submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the modifications
she found necessary to make the plan viable. The
complainant alleged that in modifying the plan, she
exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the
functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however,
that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated
by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed
decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law against
her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to
175
try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough
that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption31 or
had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to
bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that
the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her
decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan.
Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to
substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad
faith cannot be presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude
that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering
the creation of a management committee without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose,
however, we find the error to be so egregious as to
amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross
ignorance of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no
less than the Constitution demands. In rehabilitation
proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity
to prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent
danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the
debtor-company’s assets and properties that are or may
be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders,
parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation
court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof
and conscientiously deliberate, based on their
submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic
requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no judge
or magistrate can disregard.
In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at
all the opportunity to present its evidence, nor to confront
the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16,
2006 decision, found that the respondent’s act of denying
SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the
appointment of a management committee was
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly
observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in
creating a MANCOM without observing the procedures
prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross
ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he
renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe
due care in the performance of his/her official
functions.35 When a basic principle of law is involved and
when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the
respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a
management committee, without the benefit of a hearing
and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to
punishable professional incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observe
the Reglementary Period
On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary
period prescribed by the Rules, we find the respondent’s
explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is
approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred
eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The
court may grant an extension beyond this period only if it
appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the
debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance,
however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a
rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the
date of filing of the petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the
extension beyond the 180-day period carried a good
measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with
particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act by
itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still
required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when
A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall
decide the petition within one (1) year from the date of
filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause
shown, is able to secure an extension of the period from
the Supreme Court.38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009
(long after the respondent’s approval of the rehabilitation
plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the
176
respondent liable for the extension she granted and for
the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge,
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that
would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He
must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should choose his words
and exercise more caution and control in expressing
himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue
of gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v.
Judge Carretas,42 a judge should be considerate, courteous
and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should
always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to
run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-
tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh
words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge
Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although respondent
judge may attribute his intemperate language to human
frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless
demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and
courteous, both in conduct and in language."
Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with
SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over
trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks,
as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that
the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and
air of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that
the respondent failed to observe judicial temperament
and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to
maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use
temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge,
[she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above
reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer.
[She] must never show conceit or even an appearance
thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct
unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6, Canon
6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social
networking sites in the Internet – a new medium through
which more and more Filipinos communicate with each
other.45 While judges are not prohibited from becoming
members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed
off their status as judges. They carry with them in
cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties
that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in
the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in
a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial
Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or
maintaining an account in a social networking site such as
Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the
freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart
information and ideas through any media regardless of
frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise
of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s
act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges:
in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should
always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety
expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in
the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives.
177
In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges
must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of
the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent
disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety
required of her when she posted Friendster photos of
herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and
made this available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing
through social networks, judges must bear in mind that
what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a
personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties –
creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of
the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a
part. This is especially true when the posts the judge
makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close
friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a
picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and
close friends, but when she made this picture available for
public consumption, she placed herself in a situation
where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the
object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of
cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-
scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of
posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive
had this act been done by an ordinary member of the
public. As the visible personification of law and justice,
however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct
and thus must accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the
judicial office and personal matters.1âwphi1 The very
nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting
standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the
performance of their duties and their daily personal lives,
they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily
accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath
of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the
law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under
Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits
any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or
part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations;
provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3), but not
exceeding six (6), months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not
exceeding ₱40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is
classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C)
thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than
₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been
administratively charged or found liable for any
wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the
Court finds it fair and proper to temper the penalty for her
offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria
guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is
FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge
Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from
further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. NO. 09-2-19-SC : February 24, 2009]
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO,
PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V. NOGRALES AND
LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No. 179120.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
178
Before this Court is the Report of the Investigating
Committee created under the Resolution dated December
10, 2008, to investigate the unauthorized release of the
unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the
consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v.
COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras
v. Nograles, docketed as G.R. NOS. 178831-32, 179240-41,
179120 and 179132-33, respectively, to determine who
are responsible for the leakage of a confidential internal
document of the En Banc.
The investigating committee, composed of Mr. Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing as Chairperson and Mme. Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales and Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona
as Members, submitted the following report:
INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE CREATED UNDER THE
EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HON. REYNATO S. PUNO, Chief Justice
HON. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Associate Justice
HON. MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Associate Justice
HON. DANTE O. TINGA, Associate Justice
HON. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, Associate Justice
HON. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, Associate Justice
HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Associate Justice
HON. ARTURO D. BRION, Associate Justice
HON. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA, Associate Justice
RE: Report on the Investigation of the Unauthorized
Release of the Unpromulgated Ponencia of Justice Ruben
T. Reyes in the Consolidated Cases of Limkaichong v.
COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, Docketed as G.R.
NOS. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33,
Respectively, to Determine Who are Responsible for the
Leakage of a Confidential Internal Document of the En
Banc
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the
Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court the following report on the results of the
investigation of the committee created under the En Banc
Resolution dated December 10, 2008.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En
Banc continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice
Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong
v. Comelec, Villando v. Comelec, Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as G.R.
NOS. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33,
respectively, (Limkaichong case) which was used by this
Court as a working basis for its deliberations. Since no one
raised any further objections to the draft, the En Banc
approved it. It having been already printed on Gilbert
paper, albeit a number of Justices manifested that they
were concurring "in the result," Justice Reyes immediately
circulated the ponencia during the same session.
After the session and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno noted that seven of the 13 Justices (excluding Justice
Reyes) concurred "in the result" with the ponencia of
Justice Reyes (hereafter Gilbert copy or Justice
Reyes's ponencia or ponencia or
unpromulgated ponencia). Justices Minita Chico-Nazario
and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro then informed the Chief
Justice that they too wanted to concur only "in the result."
Since nine Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would
concur only "in the result," the Justices unanimously
decided to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy.
It was noted that if a majority concurred only "in the
result," the ponencia would have no doctrinal value. More
importantly, any decision ousting a sitting member of the
House of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal
basis relied upon by the majority for such extreme
measure. Justice Antonio T. Carpio then volunteered to
write his Reflections  on Justice Reyes's ponencia for
discussion in the following week's En Banc session.
During its session on July 22, 2008, the En Banc
deliberated on Justice Carpio's Reflections which had in the
meantime been circulated to the members of the
Court. As a result, the En Banc unanimously decided to
push through and set the date for holding oral arguments
on the Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008.
On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong
case was included in the agenda of July 29, 2008 where it
was listed as Item No. 66. The decision to hold oral
arguments remained, however.
On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner
in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong,  G.R. No. 179120,
held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in
179
Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the
media an undated letter signed by him, together with what
appeared to be a xerox copy of the unpromulgated
ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated that the Court,
at the instance of the Chief Justice and with the implied
consent of the other Justices, unlawfully and with
improper motives withheld the promulgation of the
ponencia.
Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the
unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the confidential
internal deliberations of the Court and constituted
contempt of court, the Court, in a Resolution dated
December 10, 2008, directed
1. The creation of an Investigating Committee, chaired by
Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, with
Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, J.,
Chairperson, Third Division and Associate Justice Antonio
T. Carpio, Working Chairperson, First Division, as Members
to investigate the unauthorized release of the
unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes to determine
who are responsible for this leakage of a confidential
internal document of the En Banc, and to recommend to
the En Banc the appropriate actions thereon;
2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be
punished for contempt for writing the undated letter and
circulating the same together with the unpromulgated
ponencia of Justice Reyes.
As directed, the committee, composed of the
aforementioned three senior Justices, conducted initial
hearings on December 15 and 16, 2008.
In the meantime, in compliance with the Court's above-
quoted Resolution dated December 10, 2008, Biraogo
submitted to the Court his Compliance dated December
22, 2008 to which he attached the following annexes: (1)
an undated photocopy of a 3-page printed letter
addressed to "Dear Mr. Biraogo" which purportedly was
sent by a "Concerned Employee" as Annex "A"; (2) a June
12, 2008 note handwritten on a memo pad of Justice
Reyes reading:
Re: G.R. NOS. 178831-32, etc. [the comma and "etc." are
handwritten]
Dear Colleagues,
I am circulating a revised draft of the ponencia.
(Sgd.)
RUBEN T. REYES,
together with a copy of Justice Reyes's Revised
Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda as Annex "B";
(3) a photocopy of the unpromulgated  ponencia  bearing
the signatures of 14 Justices as Annex "C"; and (4) a
photocopy of Justice Carpio's Reflections as Annex "D".
Justice Ynares-Santiago later inhibited herself upon motion
of Justice Ruben T. Reyes while Justice Carpio voluntarily
inhibited himself. They were respectively replaced by
Justice Renato C. Corona and Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales, by authority of the Chief Justice based on
seniority. Additional hearings were then held by the
reconstituted committee on January 14, 16, 19, 20, 21 and
22, 2009.
The following witnesses/resource persons were heard:
1. Armando A. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office
of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
2. Rodrigo E. Manabat, Jr., PET Judicial Staff Officer II,
Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
3. Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head, Office
of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
4. Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
5. Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
6. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
7. ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief, Public Information
Office
8. Ramon B. Gatdula, Executive Assistant II, Office of the
Chief Justice
9. Atty. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, Clerk of Court En Banc
10. Major Eduardo V. Escala, Chief Judicial Staff Officer,
Security Division, Office of Administrative Services
11. Atty. Felipa B. Anama, Assistant Clerk of Court
12. Willie Desamero, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk
of Court
13. Glorivy Nysa Tolentino, Executive Assistant I, Office of
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
14. Onofre C. Cuento, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of
Court
180
15. Chester George P. Del Castillo, Utility Worker, Office of
Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
16. Conrado B. Bayanin, Jr., Messenger, Office of
Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
17. Fermin L. Segotier, Judicial Staff Assistant II, Office of
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
18. Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes
SUMMARIES OF TESTIMONIES
Below are the summaries of their testimonies:
1. ARMANDO A. DEL ROSARIO, Court Stenographer III,
Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as
follows:
He was in charge of circulating ponencias for the
signatures of the Justices and of forwarding signed (by all
the Associate Justices who are not on leave) ponencias to
the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ).
On July 15, 2008, after the En Banc session, he received
from Justice Reyes the original of the unpromulgated
ponencia (Gilbert copy). Because he was busy at that time,
he instructed his co-employee Rodrigo Manabat, Jr. to
bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for
signature and to wait for it. He instructed Manabat to rush
to Justice Nachura's office because the latter was going out
for lunch. After more than 30 minutes, Manabat returned
with the Gilbert copy already signed by Justice Nachura,
who was the last to sign.1 Del Rosario then transmitted the
Gilbert copy together with the rollo, temporary rollos, and
diskettes to the OCJ pursuant to standard operating
procedures for the promulgation of decisions. The
documents were received by Ramon Gatdula on the same
day at around 3:00 p.m.
The following day, on July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m.,
Justice Reyes instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy
and the accompanying documents and diskettes as he was
told that the promulgation of the ponencia had been
placed on hold. He brought the Gilbert copy to Justice
Reyes who told him to keep it. He then placed the Gilbert
copy in a sealed envelope and placed it inside his unlocked
drawer and wrote a note in his logbook when he retrieved
the Gilbert copy that its promulgation was on hold and
would be called again on July 29, 2008.2
The Gilbert copy was in his sole custody from July 16, 2008
until December 15, 2008 (when the investigating
committee held its first hearing).3 He never opened the
envelope from the day he sealed it on July 16, 2008 until
December 10, 2008, when Justice Reyes told everybody in
their office that the Gilbert copy had been photocopied
and leaked. He did not have any news of any leakage
before then. And he also did not photocopy the Gilbert
copy. The seal placed on the envelope was still intact when
he opened it on December 10, 2008.4 Although the lawyers
in their office knew that he kept original copies of drafts in
his unlocked drawer, he believed that nobody in his office
was interested in photocopying the Gilbert copy. He was
solely responsible for keeping the Gilbert copy. He did not
know any of the parties to the case and none of them ever
called him. And he did not know what Gatdula did after
receiving the Gilbert copy.5
The Limkaichong case was called again on July 29,
2008 as Item No. 66. The Office of Justice Reyes received
the En Banc agenda for the said date on July 25, 2008.
Upon receipt of the said En Banc agenda and the new item
number, their office prepared a new cover page and
attached it to the Gilbert copy. The original cover page of
the Gilbert copy for the agenda of July 15, 2008 showing
the case as item number 52 was thrown away.6
On being recalled on January 20, 2009, Del Rosario further
testified as follows:
On July 15, 2008 when the Justices were about to leave
the En Banc session room after the adjournment of the
session, he entered the room just like the rest of the
aides.7 He carried the folders of Justice Reyes, returned
them to the office, and went back to, and waited for
Justice Reyes until Justice Reyes finished lunch at the En
Banc dining room.8 The Gilbert copy was left with Justice
Reyes.9 Before 1:00 p.m., after the Justices had taken
lunch,10 Justice Reyes, who was then carrying an orange
envelope, handed to him the Gilbert copy and instructed
him to speed up the ponencia's signing by Justice Nachura
(who was not taking part in the oral arguments of a case
scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day) since the latter might be
leaving.11 He heard Justice Reyes say "Ihabol mo ito' Ihabol
na ipapirma kay Justice Nachura" in the presence of
Judicial Staff Head, Atty. Rosendo Evangelista, as the three
of them were going down the stairs to their office from the
session room.12
He was not the one who brought the ponencia to the
Office of Justice Nachura because he gave the task to
Manabat to whom he relayed the instruction.13 There were
already signatures on page 36 of the ponencia when he
gave it to Manabat and only the signature of Justice
Nachura was missing.14 He pointed this to Manabat saying,
"ito na lang ang walang pirma, dalhin mo doon." Manabat
obliged him.15
After a few minutes, Manabat returned to their office
bearing the Gilbert copy. He went to Atty. Evangelista,
showing him that the ponencia had already been signed by
Justice Nachura. Atty. Evangelista then instructed him to
181
have the ponencia promulgated by delivering the same to
the OCJ. He (Del Rosario) complied, personally handing the
Gilbert copy with the rollo, records and diskettes to Ramon
Gatdula of the OCJ at 3:30 p.m., also of July 15, 2008.16 The
ponencia stayed at the OCJ until the afternoon of the
following day, July 16, 2008.17
He was not told that the promulgation of the ponencia
was on hold until the afternoon of July 16, 2008, when
Justice Reyes called him to his chambers and instructed
him to retrieve the ponencia. He also stated that someone
from the OCJ called their office and requested them to
retrieve the ponencia because its promulgation was on
hold.18 At 4:00 p.m. that day, he retrieved the ponencia
etc. from the OCJ19 and gave the ponencia to Justice
Reyes.20
He merely showed the ponencia to Justice Reyes who
ordered him to keep it ("tabi mo muna yan"). 21 He then
placed a note "Hold, reset July 29" in his logbook after
being informed by Atty. Evangelista of such date of
resetting.22 He reiterated that he placed the Gilbert copy in
a brown envelope, sealed it with the officially issued blue
and white seal provided by the Printing Office, and placed
the envelope inside his unlocked drawer. The envelope
was still sealed when he checked it on December 10,
2008.23 He admitted that from the time he kept the Gilbert
copy in his drawer until the Special En Banc meeting on
December 10, 2008, he and no one else was in possession
of the Gilbert copy. But he denied that he ever opened the
envelope or photocopy the Gilbert copy. In fact, he did not
mind it.24 And nobody inquired about it since July 16, 2008
until December 10, 2008.25 He likewise denied that he
knew Congressman Paras or Biraogo or that the two ever
called his office.26
When asked if he could produce the envelope into which
he placed the Gilbert copy, he replied that Justice Reyes
had taken it.27 He also informed that what was placed on
the face of the brown envelope was a computer print-out
containing the title of the case, the names of the ponente
and the other Justices, and the manner they voted.28
When he was asked by Justice Carpio Morales whether it
was possible for him to recognize any tampering if, for
instance, the envelope and the seal were replaced with a
similar envelope and blue and white seal with a similar
print-out information on the face of the envelope, he
answered in the negative.29 (At that point, Justice Carpio
Morales remarked that Del Rosario, therefore, could not
have been certain when he said that the envelope
remained sealed from July 16, 2008 to December 10,
2008.)30
Nobody else knew where he put the Gilbert copy in the
same place as the other drafts. It was possible for
someone to take the Gilbert copy from his drawer and
photocopy it on a weekend or after office hours.31 Nobody
told him to guard the Gilbert copy.32
Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox
machine.33 He drew a sketch of the layout of the desks
inside the office of Justice Reyes, illustrating that his
location was two desks away from the table of April
Candelaria, a secretary in the office, and that the xerox
machine was situated at the back of the long table of the
receiving clerks.34
He stayed in the office as long as Justice Reyes was still
there but he could not say for sure that nobody
photocopied the Gilbert copy after office hours as he also
went out of the office to smoke in the nearby garden area
or repair to the toilet.35
He never reported to office on Saturdays and there was
one time Justice Reyes went to office on a Saturday as he
was also asked to report but he refused. 36 Justice Reyes
sometimes dropped by the office on Sundays after
attending services at the United Methodist Church along
Kalaw Street, as told to him by the driver.37
He also circulated copies of the Revised Draft of the
decision to the other Justices but he never received a copy
of Justice Carpio's Reflections.38 He did not offer an
explanation why the Gilbert copy, which was in his
possession, and the Revised Draft, were leaked.39 No
information was supplied by his officemates, friends or
relatives to help explain the leakage.40 Among his relatives
working in the Court are his mother-in-law, Jasmin P.
Mateo of the OCJ, sister of former Court Administrator
Ernani Pano, and Mrs. Mateo's sibling, who works at the
Hall of Justice Committee.41
He and the driver of Justice Reyes were given keys to the
main door of the Office of Justice Reyes but he could not
say that only the two of them held keys to the main
door.42 April Candelaria and Atty. Ferdinand Juan asked for
and got duplicates of the key, but could not remember
exactly when. Atty. Juan got a duplicate of the key because
the lawyers sometimes went out for dinner and needed to
go back to the office to retrieve their personal
belongings.43
April Candelaria's secretarial functions included recording
of the social activities of Justice Reyes and delivering door-
to-door papers to his chambers.44 Candelaria and the
driver were in the staff of Justice Reyes since the latter's
stint at the Court of Appeals, while Atty. Juan was
employed ahead of him.45
When news of the leakage came out, Justice Reyes called
all his legal staff and him to a meeting. In a tone that was
both angry and sad, Justice Reyes asked them if they knew
anything about the leakage.47 A meeting among Justice
Reyes, Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and him took place on
December 15, 2008, before the initial hearing by the
investigating committee.48 Justice Reyes also talked to him
one-on-one and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpio's
Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and other
documents when they were sent to the OCJ. He replied
that there was none and that he just kept the Gilbert copy
in his drawer and had in fact forgotten all about it until
Justice Reyes inquired about it in December.49 He was not
able to read Jarius Bondoc's column about the leakage of
the Gilbert copy (which came out in the Inquirer in
October 2008 about the Gilbert copy) nor had Justice
Reyes confronted him about said column before
December 2008.50
During the initial hearing in December 15, 2008, nobody
talked to him or knew that he was testifying as he was
even surprised that he was called to testify. 51 When
confronted with the testimony of his officemate, Chester
Del Castillo, who testified that Justice Reyes called only
one meeting, he opined that Del Castillo might not have
known about the meeting with the lawyers since Del
Castillo was frequently absent.52
2. RODRIGO E. MANABAT, JR., PET Judicial Staff Employee
II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as
follows:
He was the personal aide of Justice Reyes. On July 15,
2008, he brought the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice
Nachura for signature upon the instruction of Del Rosario
and Atty. Evangelista.53 He gave the Gilbert copy to the
receptionist and waited outside the said office. After ten
minutes, the document was returned to him.54 He then
immediately gave it to Del Rosario. It took him not more
than 15 minutes to return the document to Del
Rosario.55 He averred that he did not photocopy the
Gilbert copy nor did he notice if anybody from the Office
of Justice Nachura photocopied it.56 He also did not know if
Del Rosario placed the document in a sealed envelope or
photocopied it.57 After returning the Gilbert copy to Del
Rosario, he went back to Justice Reyes who asked him if
Justice Nachura had already signed the ponencia. He
answered yes and told Justice Reyes that the ponencia was
already with Del Rosario.58
3. ATTY. ROSENDO B. EVANGELISTA, Judicial Staff Head,
Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified that as
follows:

Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox

Around 1:00 p.m. on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes
machine because all of them photocopied personal
instructed him to have signature page 36 of the ponencia
documents and were too ashamed to ask other
reprinted and circulated for signing allegedly because
officemates to do it for them.46

182
Justice Minita Chico-Nazario wanted to change her
qualified concurrence thereon' "in the result" to an
unqualified concurrence. He thus instructed Jean Yabut,
the stenographer in charge of finalizing drafts, to reprint
page 36 of the Gilbert copy. Then he ordered the reprinted
page circulated for signatures together with the other
pages of the ponencia. He assumed that the original page
36 was discarded as it was no longer in their files. He
likewise assumed that the signatures were completed on
the reprinted page 36 as the Gilbert copy was forwarded
around 3:00 p.m. to the OCJ per standard operating
procedure.59 He was not informed then by Justice Reyes or
anybody that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy had
been put on hold per agreement of the Justices.60 He came
to know that it was on hold only on July 17, 2008, when
Del Rosario informed him upon his arrival at the office.
Because the information was unusual and because it was
his duty to make sure that signed decisions were
promulgated, he asked Justice Reyes. Justice Reyes then
confirmed that the promulgation of the ponencia was on
hold.61 After that, he just assumed that the Gilbert copy
was in their office with Del Rosario who was assigned to
keep such documents. However, he did not know exactly
where in his work area Del Rosario kept it.62 He did not
make a photocopy of the Gilbert copy nor did he order Del
Rosario and Manabat to make photocopies. Neither did he
know how the Gilbert copy was photocopied. He only
came to know about the leakage last December 10, 2008.63
When, on January 22, 2009, he was recalled by the
committee, he further testified as follows:
He occupied the last cubicle in the lawyers' room and the
xerox machine was located outside the lawyers' room.64 It
was upon the instruction of Justice Reyes that their office
reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy and circulate it for
signature. The instruction to circulate the reprinted page,
which was circulated together with the other pages of the
Gilbert copy, was given by him to either Manabat or Del
Rosario.65 He saw the original page 36 where Justice Chico-
Nazario (supposedly) wrote the phrase "in the result" on
top of her signature.66 Aside from him, Court Attorney VI
Czar Calabazaron, who principally researched on the case,
also saw the qualification in Justice Chico-Nazario's
signature while the Gilbert copy lay on top of Justice
Reyes's coffee table inside his chambers. He recalled
that at about 12:30 p.m. or before 1:00 p.m. right after the
En Banc session on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes called the
him and Atty. Calabazaron to his chambers.67 In that
meeting, Justice Reyes phoned Justice Chico-Nazario after
noticing that Justice Chico-Nazario's signature bore the
notation "in the result."68 He, however, did not hear what
they talked about since the less-than-five-minute phone
conversation was inaudible, even though he was just
approximately one meter away.69 Justice Reyes thereafter
instructed him to reprint the second signature page (page
36). He assumed from the context of the instruction that it
was due to the change in Justice Chico-Nazario's
183
concurrence, without asking Justice Reyes the reason
therefor.70 He then directed the stenographer to, as she
did, reprint the second signature page, page 36, which was
brought in to Justice Reyes in his chambers.71
He attended the oral arguments on a case scheduled at
1:30 p.m. on that day (July 15, 2008) and arrived at the
session hall before that time.72 As far as he could recall, he
went down to the Office of Justice Reyes about 3:00 p.m.
to retrieve a material needed for the oral arguments. He
denied having testified that he went down purposely to
check if the ponencia had been circulated and the second
signature page signed anew and to make sure that the
ponencia had already been transmitted to the OCJ.73 When
confronted with the transcript of stenographic notes, he
maintained that it was part of his duties to see to it that
every ponencia of Justice Reyes was promulgated. 74 He
was sure that he went down to their office at around 3:30
p.m., although he could not recall his purpose for doing so.
It was probably to get some materials related to the oral
arguments, and that it just so happened that Del Rosario
saw him and informed him that the Gilbert copy had
already been transmitted to the OCJ.75
When asked as to the whereabouts of the original
signature page 36, he surmised that it must have been
shredded since it was not made part of the official
documents submitted to the OCJ.76 While he searched for
it in his cubicle, it could no longer be located.77 He did not
inquire from Justice Reyes or from Del Rosario who also
had access to that page, because he assumed that it could
not be located since what was submitted to the OCJ was
the one where Justice Chico-Nazario's concurrence was no
longer qualified by the phrase "in the result."78 As he was
attending the oral arguments, he had no opportunity to
see the reprinted signature page 36 with the affixed
signatures prior to the transmittal to the OCJ.79
He came to know that the Gilbert copy was retrieved on
July 16, 2008.80 It was Del Rosario who informed him on
July 17, 2008 that the promulgation of the ponencia was
on hold and was returned to their office.81 Justice Reyes
did not advise them earlier that the promulgation was on
hold.82 After learning about it, he inquired from Justice
Reyes who confirmed that the promulgation was indeed
on hold. He never asked for the reason even though that
was their first "on hold" incident because he thought that
the case would be called again at another session.83 He
read the newspaper reports about the unpromulgated
ponencia but did not validate them with Justice Reyes.84
He assumed that Del Rosario, being the custodian, kept
the Gilbert copy in their office.85 Their office reprinted the
second signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy.86 When
shown page 36 of the Gilbert copy by the committee,
he assumed that it was the reprinted page since Justice
Chico-Nazario's signature no longer contained any
qualification.87 He stated that it was the practice of their position.100 He denied that he knew Biraogo, Limkaichong,
office to photocopy drafts signed by Justice Reyes and to Jerome Paras, Olive Paras or any party to the case.101
furnish the other Justices with advance copies for their
review before the session. Only such drafts were He winded up his testimony by manifesting that the
photocopied. Ponencias, which had already been signed by investigation was an experience that he hoped would not
the other Justices and printed on Gilbert paper, were happen again and that he would not have to undergo
never photocopied. Del Rosario only logged them in his again.102
logbook and prepared soft copies for submission to the
Division Chair or the Chief Justice.88 He assured the
4. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MINITA V. CHICO-
committee that this practice was 100% complied with
NAZARIO testified as follows:
despite the fact that he was not one of those assigned to
photocopy, but later yielded to given situations by Justice
Carpio Morales.89 She signed the Gilbert copy only once, in the En Banc
conference room before going to the En Banc dining
hall.103 Justice Reyes was beside her, looking on, when she
When directed to compare the front page of the
affixed her signature. Immediately after signing, she
photocopy Biraogo submitted as Annex "C" to his
returned the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who circulated
Compliance to the Show Cause Order with the original
it for the signatures of the other Justices. She remembered
Gilbert copy submitted to the committee by Justice Reyes,
that Justice Reyes was holding the document even when
Atty. Evangelista noticed the difference in the dates of the
the Justices were already at the dining hall. She did not
agenda. He noted that Biraogo's copy, which was the copy
photocopy the ponencia nor was there any opportunity for
allegedly leaked to him, bore the agenda date "July 15,
her to do so as there was only one Gilbert copy and the
2008," while the Gilbert copy submitted by Justice Reyes
only time she held it was when she affixed her signature.
to the committee bore the agenda date "July 29, 2008." He
She added that her concurrence to the ponencia was
also noted that the item numbers were also different
without qualification but when it was noted during lunch
because the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 52 in
that most of the Justices had simply concurred "in the
the photocopy submitted by Biraogo, whereas in the
result," she and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
Gilbert copy, the case was listed as Item No. 66. 90 To him,
signified their intention to qualify their concurrence and
it was probable that Biraogo got his copy from another
concur likewise only "in the result." 104 However, she was
source but it was not probable that Biraogo photocopied a
no longer able to indicate the change on the document as
copy in the office.
she and the other Justices had decided to put on hold the
promulgation of the decision until after holding oral
Only a few persons were authorized to operate the xerox arguments on the Limkaichong case. No reprinted
machine in their office, namely, Conrado Bayanin, Jr., signature page was ever sent to her office for her
Armando Del Rosario, Chester Del Castillo, a certain signature and she did not affix her signature on any other
Leonard and a certain Ramon.91 He could not recall who copy of the ponencia. She was not the last to sign the
among the five had been directed to photocopy the July ponencia.105
15, 2008 draft.92 He ventured a guess that the top page of
the Gilbert copy might have been reprinted but could not
5. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
impute any motive to any person. 93 Even if he was the staff
CASTRO testified as follows:
head, he was not privy to the preparation of the first page
nor of the top cover bearing the date "July 29, 2008"
copy.94 She signed the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session
and Justice Reyes was right beside her when she signed
the ponencia.106 No reprinted signature page 36 was ever
Finally, he manifested that from the time the Gilbert copy
sent to her office for signature and she did not affix her
was signed by 14 Justices until December 15, 2008, he did
signature on any other copy of the ponencia. She did not
not acquire exclusive control or possession of the Gilbert
photocopy the ponencia and there could have been no
copy because Del Rosario was the custodian thereof.95 He
opportunity to do so right after she signed it.107
reiterated that he did not know where, exactly, Del
Rosario kept the documents. He admitted that he was
remiss in his duties as staff head for not knowing. 96 It was 6. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
their practice not to lock drawers. 97 He was aware that NACHURA testified as follows:
Justice Reyes eventually prepared another draft of a
ponencia changing his position in the Limkaichong case He believed that he signed the ponencia in the En Banc
because he helped in the research in November 2008.98 He conference room just before he went to the En Banc
never consulted the Gilbert copy because he had a dining hall for lunch. He believed he was never sent a
softcopy thereof in his computer.99 He did not ask why reprinted signature page. He either returned the ponencia
Justice Reyes was departing from his original to Justice Reyes right after signing it or passed it on to the
other Justices for them to sign. He could not recall if he

184
was the last to sign the ponencia. Asked whether he
leaked the decision, Justice Nachura replied that he did
not. Nor did he order any of his staff to photocopy it. In
fact, there was no opportunity to photocopy the ponencia
as he was not in custody thereof. 108 Although he knew the
husband of one of the petitioners, Olivia Paras, neither she
nor her husband ever asked for a copy of the ponencia.109
7. ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P.
MARQUEZ, Chief, Public Information Office (PIO), testified
as follows:
The copy of Biraogo's undated letter with the attached
copy of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes,
which he furnished the En Banc, came from a member of
the media. Around 3:00 p.m. on December 9, 2008, a
reporter called him on the phone, asking if he would like
to give a statement because Biraogo was going to hold a
press conference about the Limkaichong case later that
day at Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, in front of the Court of
Appeals. He requested the reporter to inform him of what
was going to be taken up during the press conference. The
reporter went to his office around 5:00 p.m. the same day,
and furnished him a copy of Biraogo's undated letter.
Attached to the letter was a copy of the unpromulgated
ponencia. The reporter informed him that Biraogo
distributed to the media during the press conference
copies of the letter and the attachment.110
Sometime in October 2008, months before Biraogo held
the press conference, Jarius Bondoc had published a blind
item column on the Limkaichong case. On November 8,
2008, another column, this time by columnist Fel Maragay,
came out in the Manila Standard. The words used in both
columns were the same so he thought that there was
really an effort to report the story in the media. Knowing
Jarius Bondoc to be a respectable journalist, he met with
him to clarify matters as many of the statements in the
news item were false or inaccurate. He provided Bondoc
with the surrounding circumstances on the matter so that
Bondoc would have the proper context in case he was
again requested to publish the story. Bondoc offered to
write about what he had said, but he told Bondoc that
there was no need because there was no truth to the story
given to the media anyway. He left it to Bondoc whether
he would use the new information if he was again asked to
publish the story.111
The leak could not have come from the PIO as they were
never given a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia
bearing the signatures of 14 Justices. He also did not bring
drafts from the OCJ to the PIO. It is only after a case has
been promulgated that the Clerk of Court gives the PIO
copies. But in this case, the Clerk of Court did not even
have a copy as the decision had not been signed by the
Chief Justice.112
185
8. RAMON B. GATDULA, Executive Assistant III, Office of
the Chief Justice, testified as follows:
On July 15, 2008, at 3:30 p.m., he received from Armando
Del Rosario the Gilbert copy of the ponencia together with
the rollos and two diskettes. He kept the Gilbert copy in his
locked cabinet overnight and gave it to the Chief Justice's
secretary the following day. In the afternoon of July 16,
2008, an employee from the Office of Justice Reyes
retrieved the Gilbert copy. He did not inquire anymore
about the reason why they were retrieving it as it was
common practice for the offices of the ponentes to
retrieve drafts whenever there were corrections. When
asked whether he photocopied the ponencia, Gatdula said
that he does not photocopy the decisions he receives.
Their office also never photocopies decisions. They
forward such decisions straight to the Clerk of Court for
promulgation and they receive copies thereof only after
the Clerk of Court has affixed her signature thereon and
indicated the date of promulgation.113
9. ATTY. MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA, the En Banc Clerk of
Court, testified on the procedure for promulgation of
ponencias.
After the Chief Justice affixes his signature on a decision,
the decision is brought together with the rollo to the En
Banc Clerk of Court to be logged, recorded and checked. If
the necessary requirements for promulgation are present,
she signs the decision. It is at this time that the decision is
considered as promulgated. The Office of the Clerk of
Court distributes copies to the parties to the case. The
date of promulgation is then encoded in the case
monitoring system and a copy of the decision is given to
the PIO.114 Decisions reaching their office usually come
with the rollos except where a particular decision is
considered rush.115
She denied having seen the unpromulgated ponencia of
Justice Reyes and stated that the same never reached their
office during the period from July 16, 2008 to December
10, 2008.116 She and her staff only learned of the draft
decision after it was circulated by the media.117 In her
office, decisions for promulgation are always brought to
Verna Albano for recording, then to her for signature. 118 If
Verna is absent, it is Atty. Felipa Anama, the assistant clerk
of court, who receives the ponencias and rollos.119 She
further stated that in her more than 10 years of work in
the Court, she never heard any incident of a draft
ponencia being leaked except this one.120
10. MAJOR EDUARDO V. ESCALA, Chief Judicial Staff
Officer of the Security Division, Office of Administrative
Services, testified as follows:
Security personnel inspect all offices everyday at 5:00
p.m.121 Security personnel used to inspect even the offices
of the Justices, but they stopped doing so since last
year.122 As far as photocopiers are concerned, security
personnel only make sure that these are unplugged after
office hours.123 His office has nothing to do with the
operation of the machines.124 They always check if
employees bring out papers from the Court. But they
encounter problems especially from the offices of Justices
because employees from these offices always claim that
they have been allowed or instructed by their Justice to
bring papers home with them, and there is no way to
check the veracity of those claims.125 Since he assumed
office on July 14, 2008, he is not aware of any record of a
leak.126 He suggested that the memory cards of the
machines be checked.127
11. ATTY. FELIPA B. ANAMA, Assistant Clerk of Court,
testified as follows:
She acts as Clerk of Court in the absence of Atty.
Villarama.128 Their office never releases unpromulgated
ponencias129 and they ascertain that every decision or
resolution to be promulgated is complete. 130 She
remembered that their office released the Show Cause
Resolution dated December 10, 2008 and had it delivered
personally to Biraogo as it was an urgent
resolution.131 Willie Desamero was the employee who
personally served the resolution on Biraogo.132
She indicated that it was very difficult to serve something
at Biraogo's residence for by the account of Desamero, he
was stopped at the guard house and was made to wait in
the clubhouse until Biraogo was notified of his presence;
and that it took Desamero two hours to serve the
December 10, 2008 resolution on Biraogo.133
She has been with the Supreme Court for 29 years and she
never encountered a leak nor did she ever issue a
resolution or decision without the signature of the Chief
Justice.134
12. WILLIE DESAMERO, Records Officer III, Office of the
Clerk of Court En Banc, testified as follows:
He served the December 10, 2008 Resolution on Biraogo
on December 12, 2008.135 It was difficult to serve the
Resolution. It took him six rides to get to Biraogo's
subdivision in Laguna and when he got there, he was
stopped by the security guards at the entrance of the
subdivision. They asked him to wait at the clubhouse and it
took Biraogo two hours to arrive.136 When Biraogo saw
him, Biraogo commented, "Ang bilis naman"137 and "bakit
ka lang naka-tricycle? Meron naman kayong sasakyan"?
138
 Birago read the Resolution before he signed to receive
the document.139 Biraogo arrived in a car and had a back-
up car.140 Biraogo was in his early 50s, was wearing short
pants, and had a sarcastic smile at that time.141
186
An officemate of his had also been to Biraogo's house to
serve some Resolutions.142 While it was not his usual duty
to serve court processes, Atty. Anama and Atty. Villarama
requested him to serve the resolution on Biraogo since the
regular process servers in their office were not then
available and he is the only one in their office who resides
in Laguna.143 In his years of service with the Court, he knew
of no case which involved leakage of court documents.144
13. GLORIVY NYSA TOLENTINO, Executive Assistant I,
Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,
testified as follows:
She is responsible for communications, drafts and door-to-
door papers that come in at the Office of Justice
Nachura.145 She presented page 267 of her logbook, to
which Justice Reyes had earlier invited the committee's
attention. According to the logbook entry, the Gilbert copy
was brought to their office on July 15, 2008 and that
Justice Nachura signed the copy. However, since it is not
office practice to record the time of receipt or release, she
could not remember what time the Gilbert copy was
brought to their office for signature. 146 Nonetheless, the
Gilbert copy did not stay long in their office because it was
a door-to-door paper and was accordingly given
preferential treatment. Justice Nachura immediately
signed the ponencia when she gave it to him.147 However,
she could not recall if Justice Nachura was the last to sign
the Gilbert copy.148 She added that their office did not have
a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the
signatures of 14 Justices. They only had the advance copies
circulated for concurrence.149
14. ONOFRE C. CUENTO, Process Server, Office of the Clerk
of Court En Banc, testified as follows:
He personally served two resolutions on Biraogo at his
residence last August 6, 2008, together with driver Mateo
Bihag.150 On the day he served the resolutions, they were
stopped at the guardhouse and were escorted by a
barong-clad security officer to Biraogo's house.151 They had
a hard time getting to the residence of Biraogo whom he
does not personally know.152 Biraogo did not mention or
send his regards to any member of the Court.153
15. CHESTER GEORGE P. DEL CASTILLO, Utility Worker,
Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as
follows:
He joined the staff of Justice Reyes in September 2007
upon the recommendation of Court of Appeals Justice
Mariano Del Castillo and Retired Justice Cancio Garcia.154
He was the most proficient in the use of the photocopiers
in the office of Justice Reyes so it was to him that the task
of photocopying documents was usually given by Del
Rosario and the lawyers.155 He, however, never
photocopied any paper bearing the signatures of the
Justices.156 He did not handle ponencias in Gilbert paper
nor ever photocopy any ponencia in Gilbert paper.157
He usually left the office at 4:30 p.m. He sometimes saw
members of the staff photocopying papers even beyond
4:30 p.m. It was Del Rosario who often gave orders to
photocopy drafts and who was the most trusted member
of the staff as demonstrated by the fact that he could go in
and out of Justice Reyes's chambers.158 Del Rosario never
left the office before Justice Reyes and he (Del Rosario)
often left late.159
He had never been to Barangay Malamig although he had
been to Biñan, Laguna.160 He does not know Biraogo or his
wife.161 Neither does he know Paras.162 He did not know
where Gilbert copies were kept.163 When he was asked
who would leave the office first, Justice Reyes or Del
Rosario, he said he did not know. Del Rosario was tasked
to lock the main door of the office.164
The office staff knew of the leaked decision on the
Limkaichong case, but the staff remained apathetic and did
not talk about it.165 The apathy was probably because the
staff thought that the matter had already been settled
since Del Rosario and Atty. Evangelista had already been
interviewed.166 He was not sure if anyone from their office
was involved in the leakage.167 He was not part of the
meeting called by Justice Reyes before the start of the
investigation.168 Only Atty. Evangelista, Del Rosario, and
Manabat were called to the meeting.169 He surmised that
the meeting was about the leakage.170
16. CONRADO B. BAYANIN, JR., Messenger, Office of
Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, who was called by the
committee upon Justice Reyes's suggestion, testified as
follows:
Part of his duties in the Office of Justice Reyes was to
receive and release papers and rollos as he was seated
near the door.171 It was not his duty to handle or receive
ponencias in Gilbert form.172 He could not remember if he
had ever received any paper in connection with the
Limkaichong case.173 While he knew how to operate the
xerox machine, just like all the other utility workers in the
office,174 he had never photocopied anything signed by the
Justices, especially those on Gilbert paper.175
When asked who handled photocopies ordered by Justice
Reyes, he replied that he did not know.176 He did not know
and had no opinion on how the ponencia was leaked.177 He
only knew that his officemates talked about the leak,178 but
he did not know specifically what his officemates talked
about.179 Before Justice Reyes's retirement ceremony,
Justice Reyes called him to his chambers and very calmly
asked him if he knew if anybody had photocopied the
unpromulgated ponencia.180
187
17. FERMIN L. SEGOTIER, Judicial Staff Assistant II and
receptionist at the Office of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura, testified as follows:
His duty is to receive communications, but only Glorivy
Nysa Tolentino keeps a logbook for the door-to-door
papers that come to their office.181 He does not remember
any details pertaining to the July 15, 2008 signing of the
Limkaichong Ponencia, aside from the fact that it was to
Justice Reyes's staff to whom he gave it back.182 He
assumed that it was to Del Rosario to whom he returned
the Gilbert copy because in the Office of Justice Reyes, Del
Rosario was the one in charge of circulating ponencias in
Gilbert form for signature.183 He could not recall handing a
Gilbert paper to Manabat.184 The ponencia stayed only for
a short time (about 5 minutes) in their office because it
was a door-to-door paper. After it was signed by Justice
Nachura, it was handed back to the staff of Justice Reyes,
so there was no chance for them to photocopy the
ponencia.185 It was not their standard operating procedure
to leave any Gilbert paper in their office if it could not be
signed right away.186
18. RETIRED JUSTICE RUBEN T. REYES, for his part,
submitted during the hearing on January 22, 2009, a
written statement entitled "Notes/Observations" (Notes)
consisting of 12 paragraphs. In his Notes, Justice Reyes
stressed the following:
Biraogo did not point to him as the source of the leak of
the unpromulgated ponencia;187 in Biraogo's December 22,
2008 Compliance with the Court's Show Cause Order,
Biraogo stated that his informant was allegedly a "SC
concerned employee" who left a brown envelope with a
letter and some documents in his Biñan, Laguna home; it
could be seen from the attachments to Biraogo's
Compliance that it was not only the unpromulgated
ponencia or Gilbert copy that was leaked but also two
other confidential documents: his Revised
Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda (attached as
Annex "B" to the Compliance) and Justice
Carpio's Reflections (attached as Annex "D"); and since
these other documents were circulated to all Justices, the
investigation should not only focus on the leak of the
unpromulgated ponencia but also on the leak of the two
other confidential and internal documents of the Court.188
Justice Reyes also pointed out in his Notes as follows: the
committee should not only look into his office but also the
offices of Justice Carpio and the other Justices. He,
however, reiterated that he had said in his media
interviews that he believed that none of the Justices
themselves, much less the Chief Justice, leaked the
ponencia or authorized its leakage.
Justice Reyes pointed out that Biraogo's informant
mentioned a certain Atty. Rosel, who was allegedly a close
friend and former partner of Justice Carpio. Justice Reyes
said that Atty. Rosel allegedly asked a favor from Justice
Carpio before the latter wrote his Reflections.189 Thus, he
said, the committee should also question Atty. Rosel and
even Justice Carpio himself.
On why he did not lift a finger when Biraogo got hold of
the decision, despite reports regarding the leak, Justice
Reyes stated that he was on a sabbatical leave with the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education research in four
States in the United States from October 10, 2008 to
November 1, 2008.
He had nothing to do with the leak and he even prepared a
second draft decision (deviating from his prior disposition)
after oral arguments were held on the case.
Thus, in his Notes, he posed: "If he leaked it, why would he
prepare a second different decision?" He willingly obliged
to the holding of oral arguments. He had no commitment
to anybody and had no reason to leak the unpromulgated
ponencia.190 He added, "[I]f he had a hand in the leak, why
would it include Justice Carpio's Reflections which was
contrary to the unpromulgated decision?"
Justice Reyes, still in his Notes, stated that no Justice in his
right mind would leak the unpromulgated ponencia or
other confidential documents, such as the Revised Draft
and Justice Carpio's Reflections.
He went on to refer to Biraogo's Compliance that the
informant was purportedly "an old hand in the Supreme
Court who was accustomed to the practices of the
Justices" and had a "circle" or group in the Supreme Court.
Since all his office staff, except two stenographers, one
utility worker and one messenger, were all new in the
Court, then the "old hand" referred to could not have
come from his office. But if it could be proven by evidence
that one of his staff was the source of the leak, Justice
Reyes argued that only that staff should be made liable,
for he had publicly declared that he did not and would
never allow nor tolerate such leakage.191
More on Justice Reyes's Notes: He suggested
that Newsbreak writers Marites Vitug and Aries Rufo be
cited for contempt of court, for obtaining, without lawful
authority, confidential information and documents from
the Court, officials or employees, and for writing false,
malicious articles which tended to influence the
investigation of the committee and to degrade, impede
and obstruct the administration of justice.192
Aside from submitting his Notes, Justice Reyes also
testified as follows:
188
While he was first heard on January 16, 2009, after he
presented a 9-paragraph written statement, he noticed
that it needed refinement and revision so he requested for
time to edit it. Hence, he submitted his above-mentioned
Notes on January 22, 2009.
Justice Reyes identified the Gilbert copy, which he
submitted earlier to the committee for safekeeping, and
his Notes."193 He clarified that the Compliance he was
referring to in his Notes was Biraogo's December 22, 2008
Compliance with the Court's Show Cause Order.194
His desire to include Justice Carpio in the investigation, per
number 4 of his Notes, came about because it appeared
from Biraogo's Compliance and from the alleged
informant's letter that it was not only the unpromulgated
ponencia signed by 14 Justices that was leaked but also
the Revised Draft ponencia and Justice Carpio's
Reflections.195 He suggested that what should be
investigated was the source of the three
documents.196 Justice Quisumbing replied that the matter
seemed settled because Justice Reyes also mentioned in
Paragraph No. 6 of his Notes that he believed that none of
the Justices, much less the Chief Justice, caused or
authorized the leak.197 Justice Reyes stressed that he
thought it was only fair that the Committee also call Justice
Carpio to shed light on the matter in the same way that he
was asked to shed light thereon.198
Justice Carpio Morales pointed out that Justice Reyes's
ponencia as signed by 14 Justices did not come into the
possession of the other Justices but only of Justice
Reyes.199 She added that if logic were followed, then all of
the Justices should be investigated because copies of
Justice Carpio's Reflections were circulated to all. She
declared that she was willing to be investigated and that
she was volunteering to be investigated. 200 However, she
pointed out that the logic of Justice Reyes was misplaced,
considering that the documents attached to Biraogo's
Compliance were allegedly received at the same time. If
Biraogo received the documents at the same time and one
Justice never took hold of the ponencia as signed, said
Justice could not have made the leak to Biraogo.201
Justice Reyes went on to testify as follows: The Gilbert
copy which he submitted to the committee was given to
him by Del Rosario.202 He did not photocopy the Gilbert
copy nor provide Biraogo a copy thereof or instruct any of
his staff to photocopy the same.203
The xerox copy of the Gilbert copy attached to the
Compliance of Biraogo appeared to be the same as the
committee's copy because he (Justice Reyes) looked at the
initials on each page and found them to be
similar.204 Justice Quisumbing thereupon invited Justice
Reyes's attention to the cover page of the Gilbert copy
which had been submitted to and in custody of the
committee (committee's copy).205 Upon perusal thereof,
Justice Reyes stated that the cover page of the
committee's copy did not appear to be the same as the
cover page of Biraogo's copy. He observed that the cover
page of the committee's copy showed the agenda date
"July 29, 2008," and that the Limkaichong case was listed
as Item No. 66, whereas the cover page of Biraogo's copy
showed the agenda date "July 15, 2008," and that the
same case was listed as Item No. 52.206 Justice Reyes then
qualified his earlier statement and said that he was only
referring to those pages of the decision itself which bore
his initials, when he spoke of similarity, and said that the
cover page did not bear his initials.207
Justice Corona pointed out, and Justice Reyes confirmed,
that page 1 of the committee's copy also differed from
page 1 of Biraogo's copy. Justice Corona pointed that in
the committee's copy, there were asterisks after the
names of Justice Azcuna and Justice Tinga and footnotes
that the two were on official leave, whereas no such
asterisks and footnotes appeared on page 1 of Biraogo's
copy.208 Justice Corona also pointed out and Justice Reyes
once again confirmed that there was a slight variance
between the initials on page 34 of the committee's copy
and the initials on page 34 of Biraogo's copy.209
Justice Quisumbing then posed the question whether
Justice Reyes would admit that there were at least two
sources.210 At this juncture, Justice Reyes brought
out another photocopy (new copy or Justice Reyes's new
copy) of the Gilbert copy to which new copy the left top
corner of the top cover was stapled a 1"x1" piece of thick
paper bearing the initials "RTR" and on the right top corner
of the same cover appeared a handwritten notation
reading "Gilbert copy." Justice Reyes repeatedly stated
that his new copy was a facsimile of the committee's
copy. He pointed out that the initials on page 34 of the
new copy and that of the committee's copy matched. He
concluded, however, that page 34 of Biraogo's copy was
not a faithful reproduction of the committee's
copy.211 Justice Reyes avoided the question of whether he
or his staff kept more than one xerox copy of the Gilbert
copy that had been signed by majority or 14 members of
the Court, saying that he could not say so because he did
not personally attend to photocopying of decisions. 212 He
stressed that his initials on page 34 of the new copy
differed from the initials appearing on page 34 of Biraogo's
copy.213 He also pointed out that in Biraogo's copy,
particularly on page 3, there was a handwritten correction
superimposed over the misspelled name of Jerome Paras
while no such handwritten correction appeared on page 3
of both the committee's copy and the new copy.214 He
added that he did not know who made the handwritten
correction in Biraogo's copy and that the new copy he was
presenting to the committee was furnished to him by the
committee. Said copy was allegedly the xerox copy of the
Gilbert copy.215
189
Justice Reyes professed that he had nothing to do with the
leak as he would not leak, authorize, allow, or tolerate any
leak of his decision or revised draft. He dispelled any
pecuniary profit from such leakage, especially since he was
about to retire when the leak happened. He could not,
however, say the same of his office staff since he did not
want to speculate, so he was giving the committee the
broadest latitude in calling any of his staff.216
Upon Justice Carpio Morales's interrogation, Justice Reyes
stated that he found the new copy in his files just the week
before the January 22, 2009 hearing.217 Justice Carpio
Morales then invited his attention to the fact that page 1
of the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogo's copy, did not
contain the footnotes and asterisks appearing in the
committee's copy. She also noted that the copy of Biraogo
and the new copy presented by Justice Reyes matched to a
T.218 Justice Reyes only replied that he did not pay
particular attention nor personally attend to the
photocopying. 219
Justice Reyes stated that there should only be one copy of
the Gilbert copy,220 but it appeared that he supplied the
committee with two apparently different copies (the
Gilbert copy and the new copy).221 Justice Reyes noted that
the new copy and Biraogo's copy did not match exactly as
regards pages 3 and 34. He stressed that there appeared
on page 3 of Biraogo's copy a handwritten correction over
the misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such
correction was made on the new copy. Additionally, on
page 34 of Biraogo's copy, his initial appeared to have a
smudge while on page 34 of the new copy, there was no
smudge.222
When asked to explain why the new copy, which he
claimed to have been photocopied from the committee's
copy, did not match the committee's copy on page 1 but
matched page 1 of Biraogo's copy, Justice Reyes offered no
explanation.223 Justice Reyes also refused to submit the
new copy to the committee ("Why should I?") and
questioned the committee's request that he initial the
controversial pages of the new copy.224 Thus, the
committee members decided to affix their signatures on
the first five pages of the new copy and then drew a
rectangle around their signatures and the date January 22,
2009.225 The committee then had the new copy
photocopied.226 Justice Corona soon noticed that Justice
Reyes was trying to hide the new copy between his files.
At that point, Justice Corona pulled out the new copy
from Justice Reyes's files. Justice Reyes then repeatedly
said that he was not submitting it to the
committee.227 The committee proceeded to discuss the
other matters contained in Justice Reyes's Notes.
Justice Reyes at that point then stated that he had not
withdrawn his standing motion for inhibition against
Justice Carpio Morales, to which Justice Carpio Morales
replied that she would remain impartial. Justice Carpio
Morales likewise stressed that the committee would
decide according to the evidence.228
Upon being asked by the committee, Justice Reyes said
that he could not recall if he was holding the Gilbert copy
after the En Banc session and while having lunch. 229 He
stated that per standard arrangement, his staff would
usually get his folders and bring them to his office. 230 As
far as he could recall, before the Court adjourned, the
members already knew that many concurred only in the
result.231 He could not recall, however, if the Chief Justice
learned about it only at the dining room.232
Justice Reyes denied having given Atty. Evangelista the
instruction to reprint signature page 36 of the Gilbert
copy and stated that it must have been Atty.
Evangelista's sole decision. What Justice Reyes
remembered telling Atty. Evangelista after the En Banc
session was that many concurred only "in the result" and
that Justice Chico-Nazario wanted to change her
concurrence.233 Justice Carpio Morales confronted him
with certain portions of the December 15, 2008 TSN
where he clearly volunteered the information that he
was the one who instructed Atty. Evangelista to reprint
page 36 which is the second signature page.234 Justice
Reyes replied that maybe Atty. Evangelista was under the
mistaken impression that the change of the said page
pushed through because, as it turned out, there was no
qualification in the concurrence of Justice Chico-
Nazario. He also insisted that he did not volunteer the
information that he was the one who ordered the
reprinting of page 36. He contended that he was in fact
questioning Atty. Evangelista when the latter said that
the instruction came from him.235
With regard to the "re-signing" by Justice
Nachura,236 Justice Reyes declared that it was difficult to
speculate and rely on inaccurate recollection, especially
since several months had passed. Justice Corona replied
that the testimonies could not be inaccurate since there
were entries in the logbook, showing that Justice
Nachura indeed signed in his chambers. 237 Justice Reyes
stated that the changing of the original signature page 36
was not carried out 238 and that Atty. Evangelista's
recollection of the event was inaccurate. Justice Reyes
also stated he could not recall calling Justice Chico-
Nazario on the phone after the En Banc session on July
15, 2008.239
Justice Reyes stated that Del Rosario was assigned to
keep and take care of the circulated drafts and ponencias
printed on Gilbert paper, and from time to time Atty.
Evangelista would have access to them since the latter
was the judicial staff head. 240 Justice Reyes's staff
members in October were the same until he retired on
December 18, 2008.241 Justice Reyes's impression of
190
Biraogo's letter was that somebody who had an axe to
grind against the Chief Justice or who wanted to discredit
him could have done it.242
Justice Reyes said that he never had any personal interest
in the case and argued that the best proof of this was
that he did not stick to his original decision after the case
was heard on oral arguments on August 26, 2008, just to
prove that he was not beholden to any party. 243
Justice Reyes could not offer a straight answer to the
question of what his undue interest was in still trying to
have the signature of all the Justices after he had taken
his lunch and to forward the Gilbert copy  and the rollo
etc. to the OCJ even after the decision to put the
promulgation of the ponencia on hold was arrived at, at
lunchtime of July 15, 2008. He simply dismissed the
recollections of his staff and preferred to believe Del
Rosario's over those of Evangelista's or Manabat's. He
insisted that he never had the chance to talk to Del
Rosario or to Atty. Evangelista right after the En Banc
session, and claimed that he never gave the instruction to
bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura. He
likewise insisted that the testimony of Atty. Evangelista
was incorrect and that he would rather believe Del
Rosario's testimony.244
THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS OF FACT
From the testimonies of the witnesses, the committee
finds the following facts established.
On July 15, 2008, even after the Justices had agreed at
lunchtime to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert
copy in the Limkaichong case, Justice Reyes, under
his misimpression that Justice Nazario had "concurred in
the result" and that she would finally remove such
qualification, instructed his Judicial Staff Head, Atty.
Evangelista, and Del Rosario to have the signature page
36 (where the names of Justices Nazario, Nachura and
three others appeared) reprinted and to bring the Gilbert
copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature as
Justice Nachura, who was not participating in the oral
arguments on the case scheduled at 1:30 that afternoon,
might be going out. Jean Yabut was tasked by Atty.
Evangelista to reprint the second signature page (page
36) on Gilbert paper.
The reprinted signature page 36, together with the rest of
the pages of the Gilbert copy, was then given by Atty.
Evangelista to Del Rosario. Del Rosario, in turn, gave the
Gilbert copy, together with the reprinted signature page
36, to Manabat whom he instructed to go to the Office of
Justice Nachura for him to affix his signature thereon.
Manabat immediately went to the Office of Justice
Nachura and handed the Gilbert copy to Fermin Segotier,
the receptionist at Justice Nachura's office. As the Gilbert
copy was a door-to-door document, Segotier
immediately gave it to Glorivy Nysa Tolentino who
recorded it in her logbook. She then brought the Gilbert
copy to Justice Nachura. When the reprinted page 36 of
the Gilbert copy was brought out from Justice Nachura's
chambers and returned to Tolentino, she recorded it in
her logbook that it was already signed. The whole
process took not more than five minutes. The Gilbert
copy was returned to Manabat, who had waited outside
the office of Justice Nachura.
Manabat then repaired to the chambers of Justice Reyes
who inquired from him if Justice Nachura had signed the
reprinted page 36 to which he answered in the
affirmative. Manabat thereafter handed the Gilbert copy
to Del Rosario.
When Atty. Evangelista, who was attending the oral
arguments on a case scheduled that afternoon, went
down the Office of Justice Reyes at about 3:30 p.m., he
and/or Del Rosario must have eventually noticed that
Justice Nazario did not, after all, qualify her concurrence
on the original signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy with
the words "in the result." Since neither Atty.
Evangelista nor Del Rosario was advised by Justice Reyes
that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold,
Del Rosario brought the Gilbert copy, together with
the rollo, records and diskettes to the OCJ to be
promulgated and gave it at 3:30 p.m. to Ramon Gatdula
of the OCJ. Gatdula later transmitted the Gilbert copy to
the secretary of the Chief Justice.
The following day, July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m.,
Justice Reyes called Del Rosario to his chambers and
instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy, etc. from the
OCJ, informing him for the first time that the
promulgation of the ponencia had been put on hold.
Around that same time, the OCJ phoned the Office of
Justice Reyes and told them to retrieve the ponencia for
the same reason.
Thus, Del Rosario went to the OCJ and asked for the
return of the Gilbert copy. As Gatdula had already
forwarded the same to the Chief Justice's secretary for
the Chief Justice's signature, Gatdula retrieved it from the
secretary. Del Rosario retrieved all that he submitted the
previous day, except the rollo which had, in the
meantime, been borrowed by Justice Carpio.
Del Rosario then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice
Reyes who told him to keep it. Del Rosario informed Atty.
Evangelista the following day, July 17, 2008, that the
promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold. After Atty.
Evangelista verified the matter from Justice Reyes, he
(Atty. Evangelista) told Del Rosario that the case would
191
be called again on July 29, 2008. Del Rosario made a note
in his logbook to that effect.
On July 25, 2008, the Office of Justice Reyes received the
En Banc agenda for July 29, 2008 where the Limkaichong
case was listed as Item No. 66. A new cover page
reflecting the case as Item No. 66 was thus prepared and
attached to the Gilbert copy bearing only 14 signatures.
After the Gilbert copy was retrieved from the OCJ on July
16, 2008, it remained in the sole custody of Del Rosario
until December 15, 2008, the initial hearing conducted by
the investigating committee. The Gilbert copy remained
inside his unlocked drawer, in a brown envelope, which
he had sealed with the blue and white seal used by all
Justices. He opened it only on December 10, 2008, after
Justice Reyes informed his staff that there was a leak of
the ponencia.
When news of Biraogo's conduct of a press conference on
December 9, 2008 bearing on the leakage came out,
Justice Reyes immediately called his legal staff and Del
Rosario to a meeting and asked them if they knew
anything about the leakage. He called for a second
meeting among Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and Del
Rosario on December 15, 2008, before the hearing by the
investigating committee took place in the afternoon of
that day. Justice Reyes likewise had a one-on-one talk
with Del Rosario and asked him if a copy of Justice
Carpio's Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and
related documents when they were sent to the OCJ, to
which he (Del Rosario) answered in the negative.
EVALUATION
The committee finds that the photocopying of the Gilbert
copy occurred between July 15, 2008, before it was
brought to the OCJ or after it was retrieved on July 16,
2008 from the OCJ, and July 25, 2008, when the Office of
Justice Reyes caused the preparation of the new cover
page of the Gilbert copy to reflect that it was agendaed
as Item No. 66 in the July 29, 2008 En Banc session,
because the cover page of the photocopy in the
possession of Biraogo, as well as the cover page of Justice
Reyes's new copy, still bore the agenda date "July 15,
2008" and Item No. 52.
The committee likewise finds that the leakage was
intentionally done. It was not the result of a copy being
misplaced and inadvertently picked up by Biraogo or
someone in his behalf. The committee notes that none of
the offices to which the Gilbert copy was brought (OCJ
and the Office of Justice Nachura) and which acquired
control over it photocopied ponencias in Gilbert form and
released photocopies thereof to party litigants. In any
event, as earlier reflected, page 1 of the Gilbert copy that
was sent to the OCJ and Justice Nachura's Office and page
1 of Biraogo's photocopy differ.
To reiterate, the Gilbert copy bearing the signatures of 14
Justices was photocopied and that a copy thereof was
intentionally leaked directly or indirectly to Biraogo. As
will be discussed below, the committee FINDS that the
leak came from the Office of Justice Reyes.
It bears reiterating that the leak did not come from the
OCJ even if the Gilbert copy stayed therein from 3:30
p.m. on July 15, 2008 up to 4:00 p.m. on July 16, 2008.
This is clear from the fact that page 1 of the copy in
Biraogo's possession differs from page 1 of the Gilbert
copy which was forwarded to the OCJ. Thus, on page 1 of
the Gilbert copy which contains the names of the Justices
of the Court, there appear asterisks after the names of
Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna and Justice Dante O. Tinga.
These asterisks have corresponding footnotes stating
that Justice Azcuna was on official leave per Special Order
No. 510 dated July 15, 2008 and Justice Tinga was
likewise on official leave per Special Order No. 512 dated
July 16, 2008. In contrast, page 1 of Biraogo's
copy and Justice Reyes's new copy, glaringly contain no
such asterisks and footnotes, which indicates that page 1
of Biraogo's copy was photocopied from page 1 of the
draft prepared by Justice Reyes before it was finalized on
Gilbert paper.
The leak also could not have come from the offices of the
other associate justices, contrary to Justice Reyes's
insinuation. Justice Reyes insinuated that because all the
Justices were furnished with advance copies of
the draft ponencia before the session of July 15, 2008,
anyone from those offices could have leaked the
decision. An examination of the copy in Biraogo's
possession readily shows that every page thereof - pages
1 to 36 - contained Justice Reyes's authenticating initials
while none of the advance copies furnished to the
Justices was similarly authenticated.
Advance copies of a draft given to the justices as a
working basis for deliberations are not initialed by the
justice who prepares it. And they do not contain the
signature of any of the Justices, except the one who
prepared the draft, precisely because the Justices have
yet to go over it and deliberate on it. As standard
procedure, it is only after a draft decision has been
adopted by the Court that it is finalized-printed on
Gilbert paper and every page thereof is authenticated by
the ponente, and circulated for signature by the other
Justices.
It need not be underlined that there was no opportunity
for anyone from the offices of the Associate Justices to
photocopy the ponencia as none of said offices acquired
possession of the document, except the Office of Justice
192
Reyes and the Office of Justice Nachura. But based on
testimony, the unpromulgated ponencia stayed in the
Office of Justice Nachura only for less than five minutes,
which did not suffice for it to be signed by Justice
Nachura and to be photocopied. Again, and in any event,
page 1 of the photocopy in Biraogo's possession does not
match the same page of the Gilbert copy.
Furthermore, except for Justice Reyes, the Associate
Justices took hold of the Gilbert copy only briefly when
they signed it at the En Banc conference room. At no
other time did any of them hold the document long
enough to photocopy it. Pursuant to standard procedure,
only the ponente, Justice Reyes in this case, and his staff,
took custody of the ponencia bearing the signatures of 14
Justices before it was sent to the OCJ.
But who from the Office of Justice Reyes leaked the
unpromulgated ponencia? While the evidence shows that
the chain of custody could not rule out the possibility
that the Gilbert copy was photocopied by Del Rosario
who had control and possession of it, and while there is
no direct evidence as to the identity of the perpetrator of
the leakage, the committee FINDS that based on the
circumstantial evidence reflected above, particularly the
evident undue interest of Justice Reyes to circulate a
draft ponencia of the case soonest even before the
memoranda of all the parties fell due, and to withhold
the information to Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that
the promulgation of the ponencia was put on hold and,
instead, allow the immediate promulgation after
lunch despite his admission that the decision to hold the
promulgation was arrived at at lunchtime, it was Justice
Reyes himself who leaked a photocopy thereof.
Recall that the Court gave due course to the petition on
April 8, 2008 and the first memorandum was filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General only on June 16, 2008. The
other parties, namely, Olivia Paras, Speaker Nograles, et
al., and Biraogo subsequently filed their respective
memoranda only on July 1, 2, and 24, 2008. Even before
the En Banc session of June 10, 2008, however, Justice
Reyes had already circulated a draft decision.
Further, still later or on June 12, 2008, Justice Reyes
circulated, via transmittal letter of even date printed on
his memo pad and signed by him, a Revised Draft, copy of
which transmittal letter, as well as the Revised Draft, also
came into the possession of Biraogo (Annex "B" to
Biraogo's Compliance).
Furthermore, even after the Justices had, at lunchtime of
July 15, 2008, unanimously decided that the
promulgation of the Gilbert copy would be put on hold -
-and this was, it bears repeating, admitted by Justice
Reyes - -, Justice Reyes, after partaking lunch at the
dining room and before 1:00 p.m., instead of advising his
Chief of Staff Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the
promulgation was put on hold, still instructed them to
reprint the second signature page (page 36) and to have
the reprinted page immediately brought to the Office of
Justice Nachura for signature; and before Justice Reyes
left for the session hall for the oral arguments of that
case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day, Justice Reyes still
followed up the case by asking Manabat if Justice
Nachura had already signed the Gilbert copy.245
When confronted with the incontrovertible evidence of
his undue interest in the case and haste in having the
Gilbert copy promulgated, Justice Reyes was notably
evasive. On January 16, 2009, Justice Carpio Morales
asked Justice Reyes if he would admit that he prepared a
draft of the decision even before the first memorandum
was submitted on June 16, 2008. Justice Reyes stated
that he could not admit that fact. 246 Such fact is
documented, however, and it would not have escaped
him as the records of the Limkaichong case were with
him and yet he already prepared and caused the
circulation of a draft of the decision on June 12, 2008.
Justice Reyes also gave conflicting accounts on when he
gave the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario after the En Banc
session of July 15, 2008 was adjourned. During the
proceedings of the committee on December 15, 2008,
Justice Reyes categorically stated that pursuant to
standard operating procedures, he gave the signed
Gilbert copy to Del Rosario after the Chief Justice noted
that seven Justices had concurred "in the result." 247 It
bears recalling that the Chief Justice confirmed noting
such fact during lunchtime. However, the following day,
during the December 16, 2008 proceedings, Justice Reyes
implied that pursuant to standard operating procedures,
his staff got his folders including the Gilbert copy right
after the En Banc session. Hence, so he reasoned, as the
agreement to put on hold the promulgation of the Gilbert
copy and to hold oral arguments on the case was arrived
at only after lunch which followed the adjournment of
the En Banc session, his staff did not know about such
agreement.248 But even Del Rosario, whose testimony he
credits more than any of the other members of his staff,
categorically stated that Justice Reyes gave him the
Gilbert copy after he (Justice Reyes) had taken his lunch
and while he (Del Rosario), Justice Reyes and Atty.
Evangelista were, before 1:00 p.m., on their way to
Justice Reyes's office, and that, at that instant, Justice
Reyes instructed Atty. Evangelista to have the signature
page 36 reprinted and have Justice Nachura (who was
not participating in the oral arguments scheduled that
afternoon) sign.
During the January 22, 2009 hearing, when asked to
explain why the top cover of the new copy which he
brought with him and which he claimed to have been
photocopied from the committee's copy, did not match
the top cover of the committee's copy (or the original
193
Gilbert copy) but matched the top cover of Biraogo's
copy, Justice Reyes offered no explanation. Neither did
he account for the other dissimilarities between page 1 of
his new copy and the same page 1 of Biraogo on one
hand, and page 1 of the Gilbert copy, viz: page 1 of the
new copy, like page 1 of Biraogo's copy, does not have
asterisks after the names of Justices Tinga and Azcuna
and the corresponding footnotes, which the Gilbert copy
has.
Justice Reyes, despite his professed desire to bring out
the truth, refused to submit his new copy to the
committee and questioned the committee's request that
he place his initials on the questioned pages of his new
copy. Later, while the committee was discussing other
points in his Notes, Justice Reyes tried to hide his new
copy. Justice Corona had to pry it out of Justice Reyes's
files.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
As Justice Reyes repeatedly said that he was not
submitting his new copy to the committee ("Why should
I"), the committee members were prompted to
photocopy his new copy, but only after they affixed their
signatures and date (January 22, 2009) on the first 5
pages thereof.
To the members of the committee, the foregoing proven
facts and circumstances constitute more than substantial
evidence which reasonably points to Justice Reyes,
despite his protestations of innocence, 249 as THE source of
the leak. He must, therefore, be held liable for GRAVE
MISCONDUCT.
Effect of Justice Reyes's Retirement
The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial
officer from the service does not preclude the finding of
any administrative liability to which he is answerable. 250
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is
no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits
of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic,
despite Justice Reyes's retirement.
Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may
no longer be imposed, there are other penalties which
may be imposed if one is later found guilty of the
administrative offenses charged, including
the disqualification to hold any government office and
the forfeiture of benefits.251
The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce a
respondent official innocent of the charges or declare
him/her guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught
with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications. For, what remedy would the people have
against a civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal
conduct during his/her last days in office? What would
prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government
employee from committing abuses and other
condemnable acts knowing fully well that he/she would
soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune from all
administrative penalties?cralawred
If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert
and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the
judiciary and other officials under its supervision and
control for acts performed in office which are inimical to
the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and
the general public. If innocent, a respondent official
merits vindication of his/her name and integrity as he
leaves the government which he/she served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he/she deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and
imposable under the situation.252
The Court cannot over-emphasize the importance of the
task of preserving the confidentiality and integrity of
court records. A number of rules and internal procedures
are in place to ensure the observance of this task by court
personnel.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct 253 provides that
confidential information acquired by justices and judges
in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for
any other purpose not related to their judicial
duties.254 The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
likewise devotes one whole canon on confidentiality, to
wit:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any
unauthorized person any confidential information
acquired by them while employed in the judiciary,
whether such information came from authorized or
unauthorized sources.
Confidential information means information not yet
made a matter of public record relating to pending cases,
as well as information not yet made public concerning
the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases,
including notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations and similar papers.
The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions,
internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations
and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in
preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain
confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is
made public.
194
SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific
individuals by reason of statute, court rule or
administrative policy shall be disclosed only by persons
authorized to do so.
SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated
authority, court personnel shall not disclose confidential
information given by litigants, witnesses or attorneys to
justices, judges or any other person.
SEC. 4. Former court personnel shall not disclose
confidential information acquired by them during their
employment in the Judiciary when disclosed by current
court personnel of the same information would
constitute a breach of confidentiality. Any disclosure in
violation of this provisions shall constitute indirect
contempt of court.255 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
Ineluctably, any release of a copy to the public, or to the
parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes on the
confidential internal deliberations of the Court. It is
settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are
confidential.256 A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to
exercise judicial power.257
In Mirasol v. De La Torre, Jr.,258 the Court stated that
"[c]ourt documents are confidential documents. They
must not be taken out of the court without proper
authority and without the necessary safeguards to
ensure their confidentiality and integrity." Thus, the
Court found the clerk of court guilty of gross misconduct.
Moreover, the case enunciates that acts of gross
misconduct destroy the good image of the judiciary so
the Court cannot countenance them nor allow the
perpetrators to remain in office. This same
pronouncement was reiterated in Betguen v.
Masangcay.259 Though both cases involve indiscretions of
clerks of court, it is but logical that a higher standard of
care be imposed upon magistrates of the Court.
PAGCOR v. Rilloza, 260 in fact, commands persons who
routinely handle confidential matters to be confidential
employees. They are thus expected to be more careful
than an ordinary employee in their day to day business.
They are reposed such trust and confidence that a breach
of their duty would mean breach of trust. As applied to
the case of Justice Reyes, the breach of duty amounts to
breach of public trust as the committee believes that the
leak was motivated by self-interest.
The fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged is of
no moment. It is settled that under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon
erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would
show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or
misconduct.261
In People v. Valenzuela,262 which deals with the
administrative aspect of a case brought on certiorari, the
Court dispensed with the conduct of further hearings
under the principle of res ipsa loquitur and proceeded to
consider critical factors in deducing malice and bad faith
on the part of the judge, after it did not accept at face
value the judge's mere denial. In that case, the judge
ordered the return of the peso equivalent of the foreign
currency to the accused despite its forfeiture as dutiable
goods and even after the finding that the accused had
nothing to do with the mailing thereof.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr.,263 where the
Court took into account glaring circumstances in the
proceedings of the case in concluding that the judge
acted with bad faith, the judge was similarly found guilty
of grave and serious misconduct when he unjustly
declared the defendant in default and awarded
outrageously exorbitant damages. l
Prudential Bank v. Castro264 was an administrative case
spawned by a party's complaint, wherein the Court, in
light of the surrounding circumstances, found that the
judge committed serious and grave misfeasance because
the issuance of the orders and ill-conceived summary
judgment showed the judge's partiality to, or
confabulation with the plaintiff and its lawyers.
In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v.
Capistrano,265 the Court proceeded in adjudging
the attendant circumstances as tainted with bad faith
and questionable integrity to call for the exercise of the
Court's disciplinary powers over members of the
judiciary. In that case, the Court found the submissions of
the judge unacceptable and clearly inadequate to
overcome the cumulative effect of the highly
questionable actuations' taking cognizance of a claim for
damages arising from an attachment, instead of having it
litigated in the same action where the writ was issued -
as evincing gross ignorance of the law and active bias or
partiality.
The Court, in Cruz v. Yaneza,266 perceived the
judge's persistent pattern of approving bail bonds and
issuing release orders beyond its territorial jurisdiction as
evincing a modus operandi that flagrantly flaunts
fundamental rules.
In De Los Santos v. Magsino, 267 the Court again applied
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when a judge irregularly
approved a bail bond and issued a release order of an
accused whose case was pending in another province, in
195
palpable disregard and gross ignorance of the procedural
law on bail.
The principle was also applied to discipline court
personnel and suspend members of the Bar from the
practice of law.
The Court, in Office of the Court Administrator v.
Pardo,268 found the clerk of court guilty of gross
discourtesy in the course of official duties when he failed
to accord respect for the person and rights of a judge as
can be gleaned from a mere reading of his letter to the
Executive Judge.
In Sy v. Moncupa,269 the Court found the evidence against
the clerk for malversation of public funds eloquently
speaks of her criminal misdeed to justify the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The clerk admitted
the shortage in the court funds in her custody and
pleaded for time to pay the amount she had failed to
account for.
In maintaining an earlier Resolution, 270 the Court, in In re
Wenceslao Laureta,271 also declared that nothing more
was needed to be said or proven and the necessity to
conduct any further evidentiary hearing was obviated. In
that case, the Court found that the letters and charges
leveled against the Justices were, of themselves and by
themselves, malicious and contemptuous, and
undermined the independence of the judiciary.
Meanwhile, in Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners
Association v. Dioneda,272 it was held that it was
reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, the respondent committed an infringement
of ethical standards by his act of receiving money as
acceptance fee for legal services in a case and
subsequently failing to render such service. The Court
found the respondent liable for disloyalty to his client
and inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to
him.
The Court, in Dizon, clarified the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, viz:
In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the
face of the assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave error
bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a
case to bring about an unjust decision, or a manifestly
deliberate intent to wreak an injustice against a hapless
party. The facts themselves, previously proven or
admitted, were of such a character as to give rise to
a strong inference that evil intent was present. Such
intent, in short, was clearly deducible from what was
already of record. The res ipsa loquitur  doctrine does not
except or dispense with the necessity of proving the facts
on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely
expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion apparent pattern and critical factors surrounding the
that when such facts are admitted or are already shown entire scenario.
by the record, and no credible explanation that would
negative the strong inference of evil intent is In Macalintal v. Teh,276 the Court pronounced:
forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to
support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider
is necessary.273 (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.)
so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent
The apparent toning down of the application of the res and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is
ipsa loquitur rule was further amplified in at least two too vicious that the oversight or omission was
cases. In Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Villanueva,274 the Court deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal
to cases of knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust is in order.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
judgment, and even if the doctrine is appreciable,
complainant still has to present proof of malice or bad
After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only
faith.
if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the
bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their
Then came Fernandez v. Verzola,275 where it was held grasp of legal principles.277 (Underscoring supplied.)
that failure to substantiate a claim of corruption and
bribery and mere reliance on conjectures and
The same norm equally applies in the breach of the basic
suppositions cannot sustain an administrative complaint.
and essential rule of confidentiality that, as described in
In dismissing the complaint, the Court rejected as
one case, "[a]ll conclusions and judgments of the Court,
untenable the reasoning that the decision itself is
be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after
evidence of corruption per doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It
deliberation [and c]ourt personnel are not in a position to
upheld the rule that rendering an erroneous or baseless
know the voting in any case because all deliberations are
judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to justify the judge's
held behind closed doors without any one of them being
dismissal from the service.
present.278

The supposed tempering of the principle of res ipsa

As Dizon declared, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does
loquitur in Dizon only bolstered and solidified the
not dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on
application of the doctrine in cases not only of gross
which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely
negligence but of serious misconduct as well, since it
expresses that absent a credible explanation, it is clearly
speaks of "inference of evil intent."
sound and reasonable to conclude a strong inference of
evil intent on the basis of facts duly admitted or shown
As explained in Louis Vuitton, the familiar rule in by the record. In fine, jurisprudence allows the reception
administrative cases is that the acts of a judge in his of circumstantial evidence to prove not only gross
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, and negligence but also serious misconduct.
that he cannot be subjected to civil, criminal or
administrative liability for any of his official acts, no
Justice Reyes is Likewise Liable for Violating his Lawyer's
matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
faith. The rule adds that the proper remedy is via judicial
recourse and not through an administrative
action.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ For leaking a confidential internal document of the En
Banc, the committee likewise finds Justice
Reyes administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for
It must be pointed out that Louis Vuitton involves gross
violating his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an
Responsibility, for which he may be disbarred or
unjust judgment. In cases of leakage or breach of
suspended per Section 27,279 Rule 138 of the Rules of
confidentiality, however, the familiar rule obviously does
Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
not apply. While the injured party is the Court itself,
requires a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the
there is no judicial remedy available to undo the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
disclosure. Moreover, the premature disclosure does not
processes. It is likewise provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of
spring from the four corners of the assailed decision or
the said canon that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
resolution nor can it gleaned on the face of the issuance
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and that a
itself. Indeed, one need not dwell on the substance of the
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
decision since that in itself is inherently insufficient. In
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
unearthing the misdeed, it becomes not only desirable
system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only violated
but also necessary to trace the attendant circumstances,
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine

196
Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, it also infringed on the internal
deliberations of the Court and impeded and degraded the
administration of justice. The act is rendered all the more
pernicious considering that it was committed by no less
than a justice of the Supreme Court who was supposed to
serve as example to the bench and bar.
That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the
investigation started is of no moment. The rule
prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings
against an impeachable officer who is required by the
Constitution to be a member of the bar as a qualification
in office applies only during his or her tenure and does
not create immunity from liability for possibly criminal
acts or for alleged violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct or other supposed violations. 280 Once the said
impeachable officer is no longer in office because of his
removal, resignation, retirement or permanent disability,
the Court may proceed against him or her and impose the
corresponding sanctions for misconduct committed
during his tenure, pursuant to the Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the bar.
Provided that the requirements of due process are met,
the Court may penalize retired members of the Judiciary
for misconduct committed during their incumbency.
Thus, in Cañada v. Suerte,281 this Court ordered the
disbarment of a retired judge for misconduct committed
during his incumbency as a judge.
However, pernicious as Justice Reyes's infractions may
have been, the committee finds the imposition of the
supreme penalty of disbarment unwarranted. In the
determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction
against an erring lawyer, the Court takes into account the
primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence. While the assessment
of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed
to the Court's sound discretion, the sanction should
neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be
controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard
the purity and independence of the bar. Thus, the
supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. Under the circumstances of this case,
the committee finds the penalty of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law sufficient and proper.
Liability of Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista
The Committee finds that Atty. Evangelista, Justice Reyes'
Judicial Staff Head, was remiss in his duties, which
197
includes the supervision of the operations of the office,
particularly with respect to the promulgation of
decisions. While it is incumbent upon him to devise ways
and means to secure the integrity of confidential
documents, his actuations reflected above evinced "a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference."282
Atty. Evangelista was admittedly unmindful of the
responsible safekeeping of draft ponencias in an
unlocked drawer of a member of the staff. He failed to
make sure that the unused portion of confidential
documents like the second signatory page of the
ponencia in Gilbert form had been properly disposed of
or shredded. He was not on top of things that concerned
the promulgation of ponencias, for he failed to ascertain
the status and procedural implication of an "on hold"
order after having been apprised thereof by his
subordinate, Del Rosario, on July 17, 2008. Despite his
awareness that the Limkaichong case would eventually
be called again, he admitted that he was not privy to the
preparation of the copy of the ponencia for the
subsequent session on July 29, 2008.
With these findings, the Court finds him liable for SIMPLE
NEGLECT OF DUTY.
Liability of Armando Del Rosario
The committee likewise finds Del Rosario
administratively liable for failing to exercise the required
degree of care in the custody of the Gilbert copy. Del
Rosario admittedly kept the Gilbert copy in an unlocked
drawer from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008 when he
should have known that, by the nature of the document
in his custody, he should have kept it more securely. His
carelessness renders him administratively liable for
SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY, defined as the failure to give
proper attention to a task expected of an employee
resulting from either carelessness or indifference. 283
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy
burden and responsibility which court officials and
employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly
reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
negligence in the performance of official functions must
be avoided. The Court will never countenance any
conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved
in the administration of justice which would violate the
norm of public accountability and diminish the people's
faith in the judiciary.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations, (simple) neglect of duty is
punishable by suspension of one month and one day to
six months for the first offense. Under Sec. 19, Rule XIV of
the same Rules, the penalty of fine (instead of
suspension) may also be imposed in the charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified
alternative.284 Following the Court's ruling in several cases to hold any office or employment in any branch or
involving (simple) neglect of duty,285 we find the penalty instrumentality of the government including
of fine on Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario in the government-owned or controlled corporations;
amount of P10,000 and P5,000, respectively, just and furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes is directed to SHOW
reasonable. CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member
RECOMMENDATIONS of the Bar in light of the aforementioned findings.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Investigating
Committee respectfully recommends that
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) be found liable for
GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his oath as a member
of the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility
and be meted the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION as
a member of the Bar;
(2) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del
Rosario are held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and
are ordered to pay the FINE in the amount
of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

(2) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) also be found liable for

GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal
document of the Court and be FINED in the amount A.M. No. CA-09-47-J               February 13, 2009
of P500,000, to be charged against his retirement [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-121-CA-J]
benefits; andcralawlibrary
GENARO SANTIAGO III, Complainant,
(3) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del vs.
Rosario be held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and JUSTICE JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR. of the Thirteenth [13th]
be FINED in the amount of P10,000 and P5,000, Division, Court of Appeals, Respondent.
respectively.
DECISION
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
(Sgd.)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
By Ist Indorsement1 dated January 3, 2008, the Court
Chairman
Administrator referred to this Court’s Clerk of Court for
appropriate action the verified Complaint dated December
(Sgd.) 27, 2007,2 with enclosures, of Genaro Santiago III
(Sgd.)
CONCHITA CARPIO (complainant) against Court of Appeals Justice Juan Q.
RENATO C. CORONA
MORALES Enriquez, Jr. (respondent), for gross ignorance of the law
Member
Member and jurisprudence and gross incompetence in connection
with his rendering of alleged unjust judgment in CA-GR CV
The Court finds the above-quoted report well taken. No. 84167, "Genaro C. Santiago III versus Republic of the
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, Philippines," which was promulgated on December 3,
this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation of 2007.3
the Court En Banc by a unanimous decision of all the
members of the Court except for two (2) Justices who are The antecedent facts of the case follow:
on official leave.
Complainant filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, the Quezon City a Petition for Reconstitution of
Court ADOPTS thefindingsand APPROVES WITH Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. 56,
MODIFICATION the Recommendations of the registered in the name of Pantaleona Santiago and Blas
Investigating Committee as follows: Fajardo.

(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE By Decision of September 2, 2004, Branch 220 of the
MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal Quezon City RTC granted the petition.4 The Republic of the
document of the Court and he is FINED P500,000.00,to be Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General

198
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where it
was docketed as CA-GR CV No. 84167.
The case was raffled to Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison
(Justice Gonzales-Sison) of the appellate court’s Thirteenth
Division of which respondent was Chairperson. Completing
the composition of the Division (of three) was Justice
Vicente S.E. Veloso (Justice Veloso).
On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her
Report,5 which was used as basis for the Division’s
consultation and deliberation.6 By letter of July 18, 2007
addressed to Justices Gonzales-Sison and Veloso,
respondent expressed his dissent from the Report.7 Justice
Veloso, who originally concurred in the Report, requested
Justice Gonzales-Sison, by letter of July 19, 2007, to take a
second look at respondent’s Dissenting Opinion,8 as "the
reasons [Justice Enriquez] gave are strong enough to be
ignored by plain technicality."9
In view of his dissent, respondent requested on August 23,
2007 the Raffle Committee of the Court of Appeals to
designate two associate justices to complete the
composition of a Special Division of five.10 The Raffle
Committee, by Special Order dated August 24, 2007,
designated Justices Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz) and
Lucas P. Bersamin (Justice Bersamin) as additional
members of the Special Division.11
Justice Veloso soon expressed his concurrence with
respondent’s Dissenting Opinion.12 Justice Bersamin
expressed his concurrence with the Report of Justice
Gonzales–Sison,13 while Justice Cruz expressed his
concurrence with respondent’s Dissenting
Opinion.14lawphil.net
Respondent’s Dissenting Opinion thus became the
majority opinion of the Special Division and the Report-
opinion of Justice Gonzales-Sison with which Justice
Bersamin concurred became the Dissenting Opinion.
The Decision of the Special Division reversed and set
aside the September 2, 2004 Decision of the Quezon City
RTC. Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was received by the appellate court on December
20, 2007.15 On December 27, 2008, complainant filed the
present complaint.
On January 9, 2008, complainant filed a Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition [of respondent] pursuant
to Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 13716 on the ground that he
(complainant) had filed this administrative complaint
against respondent. The appellate court denied the motion
by Resolution of April 20, 2008.17
199
In the present Complaint, complainant alleges, inter alia,
that:
xxxx
. . . despite the overwhelming evidence of complainant, all
corroborated by several government agencies like the
original duplicate certificate of OCT No. 56, certified copy
of Decree No. 1275, PC Crime Laboratory report, Bureau of
Lands record, tracing cloth of survey plan, blue print plan,
certified technical description – all approved by the Bureau
of Lands, among others and adduced and offered in
evidence during trial, Associate Justice Enriquez
deliberately twisted the law and existing jurisprudence to
grant the appeal, to the extreme prejudice of complainant.
For this reason, this administrative charge of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF LAW/GROSS INCOMPETENCE is now being
filed against respondent Associate Justice Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. No one is above the law. 18 (Emphasis and
italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
In compliance with this Court’s Resolution of January 22,
2008,19 respondent filed his Comment,20 branding the
complaint as "a mere nuisance," a "dirty tactic" in order to
harass him for the purpose of making him inhibit from
handling the case the decision on which was pending
consideration. He denies any irregularities attendant to his
arrival at the Decision which, he maintains, has factual and
legal basis and is not contrary to law and jurisprudence.
At any rate, respondent contends that the administrative
complaint was filed prematurely considering that
complainant’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision
was pending, and that assuming that the Decision was
indeed unjust and contrary to law, then Justices Cruz and
Veloso, who concurred in his ponencia, should also be
charged.
Finally, and at all events, respondent contends that the
administrative complaint is not the proper forum for the
determination of whether the Decision is erroneous or
contrary to law and jurisprudence.
In compliance with the directive of the
Court,21 complainant filed a Reply dated 20, 2008 to
respondent’s Comment22 in which he contends that the
cases cited by respondent to support the Decision are not
applicable.
The complaint is bereft of merit.
That cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable,
and the appreciation of evidence and facts is erroneous,
do not necessarily warrant the filing of an administrative
complaint against a judge, unless the Decision is tainted
with fraud, malice or dishonesty or with deliberate intent
to cause injustice.23
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an
administrative complaint against the judge, but to elevate
the assailed decision or order to the higher court for
review and correction. An administrative complaint is not
an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still
available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal,
or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or
decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty…
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of the arbitrariness or prejudice before
the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and
partial. Thus, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith
or with deliberate intent to do an injustice, not every error
or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his
duties renders him liable…The failure to interpret the law
or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render a judge administratively liable.24 (Italics
in the original; underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that respondent’s citation of cases in
support of the Decision and his appreciation of the facts
and evidence were erroneous, since there is no showing
that the Decision, reconsideration of which was still
pending at the time the present complaint was filed, is
tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or was rendered
with deliberate intent to cause injustice, the complaint
must be dismissed.
The principle of "judicial immunity" insulates judges, and
even Justices of superior courts, from being held to
account criminally, civilly or administratively for an
erroneous decision rendered in good faith.25 To hold
otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice could be infallible in his
judgment.26
. . . A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil
action for acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial
function, however erroneous. In the words of Alzua and
Arnalot v. Johnson, " … it is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in
him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself." This
concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of
public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity
and independence of the judiciary. This principle is of
universal application and applies to all grades of judicial
officers from the highest judge of the nation and to the
lowest officer who sits as a court.27 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
200
It bears particular stress in the present case that the filing
of charges against a single member of a division of the
appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was not
rendered by respondent in his individual capacity. It was a
product of the consultations and deliberations by the
Special Division of five. Consider the following
pronouncement in Bautista v. Abdulwahid:28
It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May
31, 2004 was not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in
his individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate
court whose members reach their conclusions in
consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a
charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust"
cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges against
a single member of a division of the appellate court is
inappropriate. 29 (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, while this Court will not shirk from its responsibility
to discipline members of the bench if they err, it too will
not hesitate to shield them if they are charged with
unmeritorious charges that only serve to disrupt, rather
than promote, the orderly administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ               April 23, 2010
FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263- RTC Re: Initial Report on
the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 144, Makati City)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
 JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 144, Makati City, and COURT STENOGRAPHER
VICTORIA C. JAMORA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144,
Makati City, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093
SYLVIA SANTOS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated cases1 stemmed from the
administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua. A decision has been rendered in
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, entitled Sylvia Santos v. Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, from which the respondent sought
reconsideration. The immediately preceding case was
consolidated with the subsequent administrative
complaints filed against respondent Judge in a Resolution
dated April 14, 2009 of the Court en banc.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case),
Francisco P. Ocampo charged respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
In his letter-complaint dated April 24, 2007 to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), Francisco Ocampo stated
that he was the respondent in Special Proceedings (SP) No.
M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P.
Ocampo, which was pending before the sala of respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua.
On November 27, 2006, Francisco Ocampo's wife, Milan
Arceo Ocampo, filed a petition claiming the sole custody of
their minor daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P. Ocampo
(Francesca), born on June 1, 1994, and Ma. Fatima Patricia
A. Ocampo (Fatima), born on October 13, 1995. Summons
was served upon Francisco Ocampo on December 12, 2006
and the case was set for hearing the following day,
December 13, 2006.
During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties,
respondent Judge issued an Order enjoining Francisco
Ocampo from taking their minor daughters out of the
country without the court's permission and directing him
to allow his wife, Milan, visitation rights over their minor
201
daughters in their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Since then, Milan exercised visitation rights over the
minors and communicated with them through their
cellular phones. Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that
he and Milan were residents and registered voters of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. He then served written
interrogatories to his wife, and presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to prove that his wife was not
really a resident of Makati City.
In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge
denied the motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo
questioned the dismissal of his motion since Milan never
presented any evidence to controvert the evidence which
he submitted in support of his motion to dismiss.
Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was likewise denied by respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007. On
even date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO),  requiring complainant Ocampo to
turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife,
to stay away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala
Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain
from committing acts that would harass, intimidate or
threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the health,
safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife,
and to provide monthly support of ₱50,000.00 to their
minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for
medication and education.
Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
for issuing the TPO  as the period to file his answer had not
yet expired when respondent Judge issued the said Order.
Moreover, he was directed to give monthly support of
₱50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his
wife alleged that he is not the father of the said minors
and in the absence of any factual finding as to the
resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.
In directing the payment of support to his wife,
respondent Judge also ignored the factual circumstances
relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the
pendency of the legal separation case based on his wife's
sexual infidelity and abandonment.
Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge
caused the implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter
of life and death. When her branch sheriff was not
available, respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff to
implement the Order. Around 6:00 a.m. on April 5, 2007, a
Maundy Thursday, the sheriff dispatched by respondent
Judge barged into the home of Francisco Ocampo’s
parents in Baguio City and woke up all the occupants
therein. At that time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor
daughters and family were having their Holy Week
vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and opened
the rooms against the will of the occupants and without
regard to their privacy. When the sheriff learned that
Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded
that they be roused from their sleep, even as Ocampo
assured him that he will peacefully bring his minor
daughters to his wife. The sheriff also insisted that
Francisco Ocampo pay the support of ₱50,000.00 right
there and then, although he was told by Francisco that he
did not have such amount of money. Francesca and Fatima
refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court
order, Francisco Ocampo told them to go with him.
Francisco Ocampo then filed a motion for inhibition, as
well as an urgent ex parte motion to recall or rectify the
Order dated April 3, 2007, but both motions were denied
by respondent Judge in an Order dated April 13, 2007.
The irregular acts attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua are as follows: (1) she denied the motion to dismiss
filed by Francisco Ocampo, respondent therein, despite
overwhelming evidence submitted that therein petitioner
was not a resident of Makati City; (2) she scheduled the
hearing of the case immediately a day after the summons
was served on therein respondent; (3) she issued a TPO
despite the fact that therein respondent's period to file an
Answer had not yet lapsed; (4) she ordered the payment
of support without sufficient basis; and (5) she caused the
implementation of the TPO over-zealously, even
designating a special sheriff to serve it in Baguio City on a
Maundy Thursday. These, coupled with complainant
Ocampo's account that respondent Judge demanded
money from his wife, constitute the first set of charges
filed against her.
In her Comment,2 respondent Judge explained that the
order setting SP No. M-6375 for hearing on the petitioner's
application for a TPO and Hold Departure Order was issued
on December 8, 2006, a Friday, and was received for
service by the Process Server on the same day. Based on
the officer's return, the Order was attempted to be served
twice by the Process Server on December 11, 2006, a
Monday, at complainant Francisco Ocampo's house, but
nobody was there. On December 12, 2006, substituted
service was resorted to by the Process Server.
Respondent Judge stated that the hearing could not have
been set earlier since the court calendar was full, nor later,
because December 13, 2006 was the last hearing date,
before the court went on Christmas recess, for cases
requiring the presence of the public prosecutor. While
Francisco Ocampo may have felt harassed by the
suddenness of the court hearing, respondent Judge
professed that she did not have such intention. The nature
of therein petitioner's prayers required immediate action
by the court and the December 8, 2006 Order could have
been served on him on December 11, 2006, but, as
previously mentioned, was unsuccessful.
202
Respondent Judge pointed out that had complainant
Ocampo really felt harassed by the suddenness of the
hearing, he could have complained during the hearing of
December 13, 2006. Nonetheless, he never brought such
issue to the attention of the court, until the filing of the
administrative complaint, or four (4) months after the fact.
At any rate, the scheduled hearing on December 13, 2006
did not push through because Francisco Ocampo filed a
motion to dismiss on the same day. Francisco Ocampo
himself set the hearing of his motion for reconsideration of
the Order dated March 22, 2007 Order (which denied the
Motion to Dismiss) on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday. For
utter lack of merit, reconsideration was denied and the
TPO was issued on the same day.
Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO was
anchored on the provision of Section 5 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262. The Court also took into account the
provisions of Articles 176 and 220 of the Family Code,
which deal with the right of the mother to exercise
parental authority over illegitimate children and her right
to keep them in her company. Moreover, Francisco
Ocampo’s contention in his Answer that he was not
contesting his wife’s claim that the subject minors were
not his children bolstered the propriety of the award of
custody over the subject minors to his wife, Milan.
Respondent Judge asserted that she was not over-zealous
in causing the implementation of the TPO, as the law itself
mandates that the court order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent. The Order that
directed the implementation of the TPO was dated April 4,
2007, and it was received by Milan's counsel on the same
day. Sheriff Manuel Q. Tangangco was deputized to serve
it since the Branch Sheriff was not available. Milan
Ocampo herself and her counsel coordinated with the
sheriff regarding its service, also on the same day.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua explained that had she
opted to defer action on Milan's prayer for the issuance of
a TPO  as well as its implementation, it would have been
Milan who would have charged her administratively,
considering that the Petition was filed as early as
November 23, 2006, but the proceedings on the merits
were delayed due to the filing by Francisco Ocampo of a
Motion to Dismiss.  In fact, therein petitioner, Milan
Ocampo, filed on February 1, 2007 an Omnibus Motion (To
Resolve Petitioner's Application for a Permanent
Protection Order, etc.), claiming that Francisco Ocampo's
motion to dismiss was purely dilatory.
As regards the date, time and manner the TPO was served
by the sheriff, respondent Judge maintained that she was
not privy to it, since the said TPO would have been served
on April 4, 2007, pursuant to the Order bearing the same
date. The sheriff's arrogance, if any, was his personal
accountability.
Respondent Judge noted that the Sheriff’s Report and
handwritten notation on the lower portion of the Order
dated April 3, 2007, which was also signed by Kagawad
Artemio S. Zaparita of Baguio City and SP04 Arthur A.
Curno of the Baguio City Police, stated that respondent
Francisco Ocampo voluntarily turned over the custody of
subject minors to the petitioner. During the hearing on
May 10, 2007, the subject minors themselves belied the
claims of Francisco Ocampo regarding the alleged arbitrary
manner the TPO  was served by the sheriff. Respondent
Judge also pointed out that the court did not receive any
complaint from Francisco Ocampo or anyone concerned
about the manner the TPO was served. It was only in the
present administrative complaint that the same was
raised, leading to the inference that Francisco Ocampo’s
claims were concocted.
Respondent Judge maintained that it was irrelevant that
the subject minors may not have been in danger, but were
safe in the custody of complainant Francisco Ocampo. The
court arrived at a preliminary determination that Milan,
being the biological mother and the subject minors being
her illegitimate children, was entitled to custody over
them. Moreover, Milan may have been granted and was
exercising visitation rights over subject minors, yet the
duration thereof, as stated in the Order dated December
13, 2006, was only until the court resolved complainant
Ocampo's Motion to Dismiss, which was resolved with
finality on April 3, 2007. Further, there is a whale of a
difference between exercise of visitation rights and
custody. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, subject
minors, who were over seven years old, declared that they
preferred to stay with their mother, Milan Ocampo, and
likewise confirmed the physical violence committed by
complainant Francisco Ocampo against Milan Ocampo.
According to respondent Judge, Milan Ocampo’s prayer for
the issuance of a TPO and a Permanent Protection Order
(PPO) was anchored mainly on R.A. No. 9262. Section 15 of
R.A. No. 9262 is explicit that the TPO should be issued by
the court on the date of the filing of the application
after ex parte  determination that such order should be
issued. Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO,
based on R.A. No. 9262, was incorporated in the
Petition that was filed as early as November 23, 2006.
Thus, it was not necessary for the court to await the filing
of complainant Ocampo's Answer or the expiry of the
period within which to file it before issuing the TPO.
Respondent Judge explained that the award of support
was in favor of Milan alone as the legal wife of
complainant Ocampo. This was clarified in an Order dated
April 16, 2007. Among Milan's prayers in her Petition was
for an award of monthly support of not less than
₱150,000.00, but the court awarded only ₱50,000.00, as
that was the amount found reasonable by it. At any rate,
the support granted by the court was only temporary.
Likewise, although complainant Francisco Ocampo had not
203
yet complied with the directive to give support as alleged
by Milan, the court did not impose a sanction against him
precisely because the court was then completing the
hearing for the issuance of a TPO. Moreover, Francisco
Ocampo had really no reason to complain about the award
of support, because the directive to provide monthly
support was already held in abeyance in the Order dated
May 2, 2007.
Respondent Judge stated that Francisco Ocampo's
allegations regarding Milan's adulterous relationships and
the legal separation case do not have any bearing on SP
No. M-6375.
She further asserted that, as can be gleaned from the
records, the courses of action taken by the counsel of
complainant Francisco Ocampo did not conform to normal
rules of procedure. One,  on April 10, 2007, he filed a
Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, but two days later, or on
April 12, 2007, he still filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to
Recall or Rectify Order dated April 3, 2007. Two,  on April
24, 2007, he filed the instant administrative complaint, but
two days later, or on April 26, 2007, he still filed an
Opposition to Petitioner's Motion dated April 23, 2007
with Ex Parte Motion for Examination of the Minors, and a
day later, on April 24, 2007, filed a Second Motion to
Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua asseverated that
from all appearances, the administrative complaint was
filed for the sole objective of compelling her to inhibit
herself from handling SP No. M-6375. Three, on May 11,
2007, he filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, which
was an indication that complainant Ocampo did not really
have any genuine administrative cause of action against
her. As things turned out, all that complainant Ocampo
wanted to hear from the subject minors was their
declaration that they preferred to stay with their mother.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the
OCA, through then Court Administrator Christopher O.
Lock, informed the Office of the Chief Justice in a
Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the reports about
the rampant selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala
presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
The said reports were thereafter confirmed by Judges
Winlove M. Dumayas, Marissa Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil
P. Salvador and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, particularly
with respect to SP Case No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S.
Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child custody
case.
In a Resolution3 dated June 5, 2007, the Court resolved to
treat the Memorandum of Court Administrator
Christopher O. Lock as a complaint for gross ignorance and
gross misconduct against Judge Arcaya-Chua, directed
respondent Judge to file a Comment on the complaint
within 10 days from receipt of notice, and suspended
respondent Judge pending resolution of the administrative
case.
It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a
TPO in the said case, granting, among others, the custody
of the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein petitioner,
Albert Chang Tan, and directing therein respondent,
Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away from the home and office
of Chang Tan as well as from the school of the subject
minor. Per the sheriff's return dated May 8, 2007, the
Order was not fully implemented insofar as the custody of
the subject minor was directed to be turned over to Chang
Tan. This development irked Chang Tan, resulting in a
heated argument between Chang Tan and the Officer-in-
Charge (OIC) of Branch 144. Chang Tan insisted that a
break open order be issued or that the sheriff be
permitted to enter the premises of Pulliam's house to
search for the child and then bring her to court. On the
same day, May 8, 2007, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
issued an order authorizing the sheriff "to enter the open
premises where subject minor may be found for the
purpose of turning over custody to petitioner, but is
admonished to maintain peace and order in the conduct
thereof."
According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge
Arcaya-Chua received money from Chang Tan in exchange
for the issuance of the TPO, the facts clearly indicate that
she was remiss in issuing the TPO.  Her speedy issuance of
the Orders dated May 7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not only
showed her unusual interest in the case, but it also
appeared that the Order dated May 8, 2007 was tailor-
fitted to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in the
latter's heated argument with the OIC of Branch 144.
OCA also pointed out that it was not the only case wherein
respondent Judge displayed unusual interest. On April 17,
2007, Judge Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles of RTC, Branch
143, Makati City issued an order in Civil Case No. 07-352,
entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) v.
Moreno, setting the application for a writ of preliminary
attachment for hearing on May 9, 2007. In view of the
leave of absence of Judge Galapate-Laguilles, respondent
Judge was later designated as the pairing judge. On April
20, 2007, respondent, as pairing judge, cancelled the
previously scheduled May 9, 2007 hearing and re-
scheduled the hearing to April 23, 2007, where she
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
in favor of RCBC. According to OCA, what was highly
suspicious in respondent’s actuation was that there was
really no urgency in the application for a writ of
preliminary attachment.
204
In her Comment4 dated June 9, 2007,  respondent Judge
explained that SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S. Chang
Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, was originally raffled to
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 60 under Judge Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen. After Judge Macaraig-Guillen recused
from the case, it was re-raffled to her branch on April 30,
2007, and the records of the case were transmitted to her
on the same day.
Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is
justified under Sections 8 and 15 of R.A. No. 9262, as well
as under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC, which specifically
applies to a petition for custody of minors. Contrary to
OCA’s finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang
Tan in SP No. M-6373 did not contain the requisite
allegation of violence committed by therein respondent
Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17 of
the Application was explicit that a complaint for child
abuse was filed against Stephanie Pulliam, based on,
among other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi
wherein she enumerated the many abuses that her
mother had committed upon her. The complaint for child
abuse was attached as an annex to the Application as well
as to the Petition. Other annexes attached to the
Application, mentioning in detail the acts of violence
committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of
the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and Rafi herself, as
well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report of Dr. Sonia
Rodriguez.
Respondent Judge stated that although Article 176 of the
Family Code provides that an illegitimate child shall be
under the parental authority of the mother, an exception
is when the court orders otherwise. The mother may be
divested of her parental authority over her illegitimate
child when the court finds compelling reasons to do so. In
all cases involving a child, his best interest is of paramount
consideration. The court awarded provisional custody over
the subject minor and a TPO in favor of therein petitioner
Chang Tan, but effective for a period of 30 days only, after
a careful consideration of the allegations in the pleadings
and the supporting documentary evidence. Rafi was
already more than seven years old at the time the Order
dated May 7, 2007 was issued, as evidenced by her
Certificate of Live Birth.
Respondent Judge countered that the Order dated May 7,
2007 was not speedily issued. As was her standard
operating procedure with respect to newly raffled and re-
raffled cases, she immediately studied the records of SP
No. M-6373. Even before Chang Tan's Application was filed
on May 4, 2007, she had already arrived at a preliminary
determination that the issuance of a Provisional Order and
a TPO  was warranted. She also studied Chang Tan's
Application on the same day it was filed, a Friday. Her
study thereof continued the following day, a Saturday, also
in her office. She was then planning to avail of her
forfeitable leave of absence of 30 days in June 2007,
inasmuch as she did not avail of the same the previous
year. To expedite the resolution of motions and
preparation of decisions, and to avoid being saddled with
much work on her return from her leave, she had been
reporting to her office on alternate Saturdays beginning
April 2007. SP No. M-6373 was not the only case that she
studied on that Saturday, but other cases as well. Her
study of SP No. M-6373 resumed on Monday, May 7, 2007,
which culminated in the issuance of an Order at almost
lunchtime of the same day. Granting that the one week
period in which she issued the May 7, 2007 Order may be
considered speedy, such circumstance should not be taken
against her as she was really a fast worker. She was
accustomed to speedy preparation of orders and decisions
as a result of her training in the Supreme Court as a Court
Attorney for 13 years.
Respondent Judge maintained that it was necessary to
implement the Order dated May 7, 2007 at once, because
the courts are so mandated to cause the immediate
implementation of the TPO under Section 15, R.A. No.
9262.
As regards the alleged heated argument between Chang
Tan and the OIC of Branch 144, respondent Judge
surmised that the same could be merely concocted, as it
was neither reported to her nor brought to her attention.
Moreover, the doors of her chambers were always wide
open and she could have clearly heard it if it really
transpired.
Respondent Judge averred that during the hearing dated
May 11, 2007, she gave a directive holding in abeyance
further implementation of the May 7, 2007 Order. Thus,
she asserted that if she really received money or anything
from Chang Tan or from anybody in his behalf, she would
have ensured complete implementation of the Order
dated May 7, 2007, instead of holding it in abeyance.
Moreover, she should have declared Pulliam and her
counsel guilty of the indirect contempt charge against
them if it were really true that she received money from
Chang Tan.
Respondent Judge stated that if it were true that she had
been engaged in rampant selling of TPO/PPO or any order
in her branch, she and her family would not have found
themselves in such state of financial drain after she had
been preventively suspended.
As regards her participation in Civil Case No. 07-352,
entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Moreno,
respondent Judge narrated that an Ex Parte Motion for
Immediate Resolution of Prayer for the Issuance of Writs
of Preliminary Attachment was forwarded to her sala
being the Pairing Judge of Branch 143. Immediately after
reading the motion, she inquired from the Clerk of Court
of Branch 143 about the alleged leave of absence of
205
therein Presiding Judge Zenaida Galapate Laguilles. She
learned that Judge Galapate-Laguilles indeed left for the
United States on April 19, 2007 to attend a convention on
Intellectual Property and would be back on May 7, 2007.
She likewise gathered information from the same Branch
Clerk of Court that Judge Galapate-Laguilles's trip abroad
was the reason behind the Application's setting on May 9,
2007, not because the Presiding Judge did not see any
urgency in the Application. The Presiding Judge also lacked
ample time to act thereon since she had a previously
scheduled leave of absence. Thus, she determined from
the allegations in the ex parte Motion and the Complaint
the urgency to act on the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment. She also took into account the
following: (1) the circumstance of prolonged absence of
the Presiding Judge of Branch 143; (2) the reason for the
setting on May 9, 2007; and (3) the mandatory wordings of
Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98, i.e., "the judge of the
paired court shall take cognizance of all cases thereat as
acting judge therein."
Respondent Judge explained that she granted the
Application because the allegations in the complaint were
adequately supported by documentary and testimonial
evidence. She received the records of the RCBC Case  on
April 20, 2007, a Friday, and as was her standard practice,
immediately studied them. She continued her study of the
records, and the records of other cases, on April 21, 2007,
a Saturday, and on April 23, 2007, a Monday, which
culminated in the preparation of the Order on the same
day.
In her Supplemental Comment5 dated June 22, 2007,
respondent Judge added that the manner by which the
incidents in the Chang Tan and RCBC cases were resolved
must not be taken in isolation, but in relation to the
manner all incidents were resolved and all decisions and
orders were rendered in her sala, such that she resolved
all incidents and rendered all her rulings immediately.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the Judicial Audit Case), a judicial
audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, following reports of
alleged irregularities committed by respondent.
In a Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 by the OCA to
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Court Administrator
Christopher O. Lock submitted for the Court’s
consideration the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team,
informing the Court of an incident that happened on May
17, 2007 in Branch 144 of the RTC of Makati City.
The initial audit report stated that as early as May 12,
2007, a Saturday, the Court ordered the padlocking of
Branch 144 and assigned guards thereat on a 24-hour
basis. Before the audit team began its audit on May 15,
2007, the members made it clear to OIC Victoria C. Jamora
and the court personnel present that actions on the
records, including stitching should be held in abeyance and
that no records should be brought outside the court until
after the audit.
At 8:05 a.m. of May 17, 2007, the guards on duty, Joel
Gregorio and Alexander Dayap, noticed Salvador Indicio,
Jr., Utility Worker I of Branch 144, disposing a plastic bag.
The guards followed Indicio, and retrieved the plastic bag
from a trash bin located right outside the court. The plastic
bag was surrendered to the audit team and was found to
contain copies of marriage certificates of marriages
solemnized by Judge Chua numbering to hundreds. When
confronted, Indicio stated that he was disposing the
documents upon respondent Judge's instruction made
several days ago. He could not offer any explanation why
he chose to dispose of the documents that morning
despite the ongoing audit. He, nonetheless, disclosed that
there were other bags for disposal still kept inside the
room where the stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C.
Jamora, held office. The bags, when retrieved, turned out
to contain more copies of marriage certificates. Jamora
explained to the audit team that she was aware of the
copies of marriage certificates being kept inside their
room. However, she alleged that she had no control over
them, because matters pertaining to solemnization of
marriages were personally handled by Judge Arcaya-Chua.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
was charged in connection with the 1,975 copies of
marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized for the
period covering January 2004 to April 2007 for the
following acts: (1) for allegedly ordering Salvador Indicio,
Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose of the said copies of
marriage certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage
solemnization fees of one thousand eight hundred nine
(1,809) marriages as verified from the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Makati
City and the RTC, OCC, Makati City, thereby depriving the
Court of the said fees in the total amount of Five Hundred
Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (₱542,700.00)
at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos (₱300.00) per
marriage; and (3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the
Monthly Report of Cases.6
In a Resolution7 dated September 16, 2008, the Court
resolved to consider the Memorandum dated August 10,
2007 of the OCA as a formal complaint against respondent
Judge; require respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and
Victoria Jamora to comment on the Memorandum within
10 days from notice thereof; and refer A.M. OCA IPI No.
07-2630-RTJ and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 to Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.
206
On February 10, 2009, respondent Judge filed her
Affidavit,8 in lieu of Comment, on the OCA Memorandum
dated August 10, 2007.
Re: Ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr. to dispose of the copies
of marriage certificates
In regard to the disposal of the marriage certificates,
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recounted that in the
second week of April 2007, she, with the help of Noel
Umipig (a City Hall employee detailed to her sala), started
to pack her personal belongings in anticipation of the
impending transfer of her sala from the Gusali ng
Katarungan to the Makati City Hall. She asked Umipig to
discard her piles of yellowish scratch papers. Umipig put
her scratch papers inside big plastic bags and then tied the
bags. They also emptied the steel cabinet in her chambers
which contained, among other things, the files of marriage
certificates, as well as official receipts of the marriage
solemnization fees. She previously bundled the said
marriage certificates according to month and year of
solemnization of the weddings, improvising paper bundles
for the purpose. Umipig then put all the marriage
certificates inside four, more or less, big plastic bags and
placed them in the small room that was between her
chambers and the stenographers' room. They were kept
untied so that it would be easy to add or get a file.
Immediately thereafter, Umipig asked permission to go
home as he was then getting allergic reactions due to the
dust, then took with him the bags of scratch papers out of
her chambers to be thrown away. The following morning,
she noticed that there were red patches on the face and
arms of Umipig so she did not ask him anymore for help.
She removed the official receipts of the marriage
solemnization fees from the worn-out boxes, wrapped
them with approximately six paper bundles then placed
them inside the plastic bags containing the marriage
certificates.
In the first week of May 2007, she was told by the City Hall
Engineer that the transfer to the Makati City Hall would
not push through yet because the furnitures were not
complete and portions of the holding room were still being
painted. She was told to just standby and to wait for an
update about the schedule of transfer. With that advice,
she did not find it necessary to return the files of marriage
certificates and official receipts of the marriage
solemnization fees inside the steel cabinet.
About the second week of May 2007, upon learning that
the bags of garbage had accumulated, she reminded
Salvador Indicio, Jr. to throw them away. On May 15, 2007,
she was placed under preventive suspension. On May 18,
2007, Indicio told her, through telephone, that he was
caught the previous day throwing marriage certificates
that were placed in plastic bags. He explained that he
thought those bags contained the garbage that she asked
him to throw away the previous week. She was then
outraged by the news and scolded Indicio, telling him that
under the law, it is her duty to maintain copies of marriage
certificates being the solemnizing officer. In fact, Indicio
stated in his affidavit that her specific instruction was "to
dispose all the garbage which were stocked" in her sala
and "it just turned out that what the plastic bag contained
were copies of marriage contracts." Thus, Indicio simply
mistook the plastic bags containing the marriage
certificates and official receipts of the marriage
solemnization fees to be the garbage that she instructed
him the previous week to throw away.
Respondent Judge stressed that she did not and would not
have ordered Indicio to dispose of the copies of the
marriage certificates, citing the haphazard manner in
which Indicio disposed of the same, and the fact that she
had nothing to hide and that she would gain nothing by
the disposal thereof.
Re: Unpaid marriage solemnization fees
Respondent Judge averred that the best proofs of
payment of the marriage solemnization fees were the
official receipts. She categorically stated that all the official
receipts of the marriage solemnization fees were inside
the plastic bags, together with the marriage certificates.
She stressed that she could not have allowed non-
payment of the marriage solemnization fees, because it is
of public knowledge that she had been solemnizing a big
number of weddings per day, aside from the fact that she
had solemnized weddings of several celebrities, which also
included celebrities as sponsors; thus, attracting the
attention of many court employees. She was also aware of
the consequences of solemnizing a marriage without the
solemnization fee so she was very meticulous when it
came to checking, among other things, whether there was
an official receipt evidencing payment of said fee. She also
knew that the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City
would not allow the registration of a marriage certificate if
there was no accompanying official receipt of payment of
the marriage solemnization fee. Moreover, considering the
pervading financial crisis everywhere, any person would
not part with his money without demanding an official
receipt. No couple or nobody had ever complained about
the absence of the official receipt of the marriage
solemnization fee. Further, the Audit Team found from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City that all the
marriage certificates of the weddings that she solemnized
were duly registered therein.
Respondent Judge also pointed out that the respective
Clerks of Court of the OCC of the MeTC and RTC adopted a
wrong and unreliable procedure in verifying from their
records whether there was payment of the marriage
solemnization fees, simply because most of the dates of
207
the wedding indicated in the marriage certificates were
not the same as the dates indicated in the official receipts.
She explained that a couple would often pay the
solemnization fee at a certain date, but the solemnization
of the wedding would take place on another date for one
reason or another. Thus, when the Clerks of Court of the
Office of the Clerk of Court checked the dates from the
copies of their official receipts on file, the dates did not
reflect payment of the fees, because payments were made
on dates different from the wedding dates.
Re: Failure to reflect the marriages in the Monthly Report
of Cases
Respondent Judge related that the Monthly Reports of
cases were typed by her staff, namely: Civil-in-Charge
Celedonio Hornachos and Criminal-in-Charge Mary Jane
Rafael. As regards the number of marriages solemnized,
they would inquire from her and she would then give them
the figure as stated in her own logbook. When the Reports
were turned over to her for signature, she would first
verify the entries from her own logbook before affixing her
signature. Thus, she was shocked when she learned that
the Court’s copy of the Reports contained incorrect figures
and was different from that which she signed.
She asserted that she could not have failed to reflect the
correct number of marriages in the Monthly Reports,
because apart from the fact that she was very meticulous
in the accuracy of the entries, she had nothing to gain by
not reflecting the correct figures of solemnized marriages.
She believed that the blank and incorrect figures
appearing in the number of marriages solemnized in the
Monthly Reports from January 2004 to March 2007 were
the handiwork of Umipig, who most probably tampered
the same, because of a serious grudge against her. She
added that it was also Umipig who transferred the plastic
bags of marriage certificates and official receipts from the
small room to the stenographer's room in an attempt to
expose the big number of weddings that she had
solemnized, which, through his machinations, were not
reflected in the Monthly Reports.
Re: Compliance with Article  8 of the Family Code, and
violation of Circular No. 9-989
Respondent Judge claimed that she solemnized the
marriages inside her chambers or courtroom, and as proof
thereof, she pointed to the entry in the marriage
certificates reflecting the place of solemnization. On few
occasions, she had also solemnized weddings in a house or
place designated by both contracting parties, but not
without the required affidavit of request. She explained
that she was able to solemnize many weddings per day,
because the rites took only about 10 minutes and involved
a maximum of eight couples per batch.
She stressed that neither did she demand nor receive
money for solemnization of marriages, and only the official
receipts of the solemnization fees were given to her.
In regard to Victoria Jamora, she explained in her
Amended Comment dated October 2, 2008 that she failed
to reflect in the Monthly Report of Cases the correct
number of marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua for
the following reasons:
1. She was not instructed by Judge Arcaya-Chua
to be present during the marriage ceremony;
2. She had no personal knowledge of the actual
number of marriages solemnized by respondent
Judge;
3. She merely relied on the entries in the
Monthly Report as to the number of marriages
solemnized. The Monthly Report was prepared
by Jane Rafael, who was in charge of criminal
cases. When she asked Rafael why there were
only such number of marriages solemnized from
June 2005 to April 2007, Rafael replied that was
the advice of respondent Judge. Besides, Judge
Arcaya-Chua signed the reports. As a
subordinate designated by respondent Judge as
OIC, she was not in a position to question her
superior, Judge Arcaya-Chua, and signed in good
faith the Monthly Reports in question.
The administrative case was again referred to Associate
Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigation of the Administrative Complaints
On October 9, 2008, Investigator Justice Salazar-Fernando
scheduled the consolidated cases for hearing at 10:00 a.m.
on October 23, 2008.
During the hearing on October 23, 2008 of A.M. OCA IPI
No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), complainant
Francisco Ocampo appeared with his counsel, Atty. Jose
Aliling IV, while Atty. James Navarrete and Atty. Fe C.
Aguila appeared for OCA. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
appeared in her own behalf. During the said hearing,
complainant Ocampo submitted a Supplemental Affidavit
and additional documentary evidence.10 Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua also furnished complainant Ocampo's counsel
with a copy of her Affidavit, which incorporated her
Comments in the two cases, the Supplemental Comment,
the Motion to Recall Preventive Suspension and the
Motion to Resolve. Complainant Ocampo testified on
direct examination, affirming the truth of the contents of
his Complaint and the authenticity of the annexes
208
attached thereto. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cross-
examined him, but reserved further cross-examination as
to the Supplemental Affidavit. Hearing resumed the
following day, October 24, 2008, and respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua cross-examined complainant Ocampo
specifically on his Supplemental Affidavit. Justice Salazar-
Fernando also asked complainant Ocampo questions.
During the hearing on October 29, 2008, complainant
Ocampo submitted his Offer of Documentary Evidence.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua testified on direct
examination, whereby she affirmed the statements in her
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, and identified her
exhibits, after which, she was cross-examined by
complainant Ocampo's counsel. Justice Salazar-Fernando
also asked respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua questions.
Thereafter, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case
and formally offered her documentary evidence, insofar as
OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ was concerned. For the guidance
and information of Justice Salazar-Fernando, the entire
original records of SP No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo
Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo, was ordered brought to
her office.
On November 3, 2008, OCA started presenting evidence in
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case). Judge
Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles testified and submitted her
Affidavit, and was cross-examined, and was asked
questions on redirect-examination. The scheduled hearing
for November 4, 2008 was cancelled due to the
unavailability of two (2) witnesses, namely, Judges Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino.
Hearing on the case resumed on November 10, 2008. OCA
presented Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind
Aldecoa-Delorino, who both submitted their Affidavits,
which were considered as their testimony on direct. They
were questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando and cross-
examined by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. Court
records pertaining to SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K.S.
Chang Tan v. Stephanie N. Estrella Pulliam, were likewise
directed to be brought to the office of Justice Salazar-
Fernando for reference and information.
During the hearing on November 11, 2008, the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Makati City, Judge Winlove Dumayas,
appeared, and questions were propounded to him by
Justice Salazar-Fernando, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
and Atty. James Navarrete from OCA.
In order to expedite the proceedings, respondent Judge
was allowed to present her defense, and marked in
evidence several documents,11 which formed part of her
direct testimony. Since the documents submitted by
respondent Judge were voluminous, Atty. Navarrete was
given until November 20, 2008 to conduct his cross-
examination.
On November 25, 2008, Atty. James Navarrete continued
with the marking of additional documents and submitted
in evidence his exhibits.12 Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
was cross-examined by Atty. Navarrete. Respondent Judge
was also allowed to ask Atty. Navarrete some questions.
Thereafter, respondent Judge submitted her Formal Offer
of Evidence. Atty. Navarrete was given until November 27,
2008 to file his Opposition, while respondent Judge was
given five days to file her Counter-Manifestation.
On November 26, 2008, Atty. Navarrete filed his
Comment, interposing no objection to respondent's
Formal Offer of Exhibits.
On December 2, 2008, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed
a Counter-Manifestation and Motion to Correct Transcript
of Stenographic Notes.
On January 16, 2009, Justice Salazar-Fernando received
the rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Court
Stenographer Victoria Jamora, formerly A.M. No. 07-5-
263-RTC, Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted
at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City),
which he noted to have been consolidated with A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2049 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua) per  Resolution of the Court en
banc  dated January 15, 2008.
Since A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was not included in the earlier
investigation, Justice Salazar-Fernando set A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2141 for hearing on February 8, 2009.
Hearing on A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 started on February 10,
2009, during which the counsels for OCA and respondent
stenographer Victoria Jamora appeared. Respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua also attended the hearing.
OCA proposed several stipulations for admission to
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. She admitted that she
solemnized marriages while she was the Judge of the
MeTC, Branch 63, Makati City and RTC, Branch 144, Makati
City. After going over the certificates of marriage from
January 2004 to August 2004, she admitted that she
solemnized those marriages. She also admitted that she
solemnized marriages in her chambers or inside her
courtroom, except for two other marriages that she could
not remember, but proper documents were presented to
her. She further admitted that payments of solemnizing
fees must be paid before conducting or solemnizing the
marriage, and as part of her regular duties, she signed the
Monthly Reports.
Hearing resumed on February 18, 2009. OCA presented
Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, who testified on the incident that
occurred on May 17, 2007, which led to the inventory of
the certificates of marriage, and the audit conducted on
209
May 15-17, 2007. Atty. Corcelles-Aguila's affidavit13 formed
part of the records of the case.
In the hearing of March 3, 2009, OCA presented Salvador
Indicio, Jr., Arnel Magsombol, Lucia Ticman and Joel
Gregorio as its witnesses. The witnesses were questioned
by OCA, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Justice
Salazar-Fernando. Per request of OCA, notice of hearing
was sent to German Averia, for him to appear on the next
scheduled hearing as the last witness of OCA.
In the hearing of March 23, 2009, German Averia testified
in his capacity as Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the
Statistical Records Division, Court Management Office
(CMO) of the Supreme Court. He confirmed having issued
certifications and inventory on the monthly report of cases
submitted by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua to the CMO
in compliance with Administrative Circular No. 4-2004. In
the same hearing, the counsel for OCA categorically stated
that their evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was limited
only to the alleged irregularities in the solemnization of
marriage as well as the falsification of the monthly
reports.14
With the continuance of the investigation on April 8, 2009,
OCA presented in evidence the originals of the monthly
reports, and the certified true copies of the monthly
reports, whose originals were unavailable. OCA,
thereafter, rested its case. In the same hearing,
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua started presenting her
exhibits.15 She manifested that her Affidavit and
Supplemental Affidavit would serve as her testimony on
direct examination.
On April 21, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
presented additional exhibits.16 Her Affidavit and
Supplemental Affidavit, as well as the Affidavit of her son,
Robert Maurice Chua, formed part of their direct
testimonies. Respondent Judge was, thereafter, cross-
examined by OCA.
During the hearing on May 5, 2009, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua offered in evidence her Second Supplemental
Affidavit. She also presented additional
exhibits.17 Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's daughter,
Beau Mairi Chua testified, with her Affidavit constituting
her direct testimony. No cross-examination was conducted
on her by the opposing counsel. Respondent Jamora also
testified as witness for respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
At the resumption of the hearing on May 18, 2009,
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recalled respondent
Jamora to the stand and propounded additional questions.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case after
respondent Jamora's testimony. Respondent Jamora,
thereafter, testified in her own behalf, with her Amended
Comment constituting her direct testimony. No cross-
examination was conducted on her by OCA. Respondent
Jamora, thereafter, rested her case.
With the conformity of the parties, Justice Salazar-
Fernando directed them to file their respective
memorandum. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed her
memorandum on July 21, 2009, while respondent Jamora
filed her memorandum on August 3, 2009. OCA did not file
a memorandum; hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando deemed
that it waived the filing of its memorandum. Per this
Court's Resolution dated August 24, 2009, the case was
submitted for report and recommendation to the Supreme
Court.
Findings of the Investigating Justice
Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo
Case)
In regard to the denial of the Motion to Dismiss in
the Ocampo Case, without necessarily ruling on the
correctness of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua’s Order,
Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge's
disposition thereof fell within the ambit of discretion
vested upon her as a judge. Not giving credence to the
evidence presented by the movants with respect to the
residence of Milan Ocampo was well within her judicial
discretion. Assuming the same was erroneous, no
administrative liability attached thereon in the absence of
sufficient evidence that she ruled in such manner, because
of a corrupt or dishonest motive, bad faith, fraud or
malice. The evidence presented by complainant Ocampo
as to Milan's residence might constitute proof of her
"domicile," but such evidence was not necessarily
irreconcilable with the fact that Milan might be
maintaining residence elsewhere other than Meycauayan,
Bulacan, considering her estranged relationship with
complainant Ocampo.
As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO
hearing, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's explanation acceptable. The order setting
the case for hearing on December 13, 2006 was issued on
December 8, 2006. Thus, there was an interim of at least
five days from the issuance of the order and the date of
the scheduled hearing. It did not appear that respondent
Judge had any hand in the belated service of the notice to
the complainant. Justice Salazar-Fernando held that
respondent Judge cannot be faulted as to the alleged
suddenness of the said hearing, because a prayer for TPO
requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that respect,
no wrong-doing, fraud, bad faith, malice or even
arbitrariness can be attributed to respondent Judge.
According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged
precipitate issuance of the TPO had no leg to stand on.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua correctly stated that the
210
issuance of the TPO can be made upon the filing of the
application after ex parte determination by the judge that
the same be issued. This is in accordance with Sec. 15 of
R.A. No. 9262, thus:
SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary
Protection Orders (TPOs) refer to the protection order
issued by the court on the date of filing of the application
after ex parte determination that such order should be
issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the
reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for
thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the
issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration
of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff
who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents
for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of
the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.18
Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua even before complainant Ocampo could file
his answer was neither irregular nor improper.
Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons
why respondent Judge issued the TPO. A preliminary
determination of the facts of the case justified the
issuance of the TPO as it appeared that the subject minors
therein were the illegitimate children of the petitioner,
Milan Ocampo, having been conceived through artificial
insemination without the required written authorization or
ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco
Ocampo. The pertinent provision of the Family Code
states:
ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage
of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of
the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor
or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband
and his wife, provided that both of them authorized or
ratified such insemination in a written instrument
executed and signed by them before the birth of the child.
The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
Moreover, Milan Ocampo appended evidence of
complainant Ocampo's alleged perversity and violent
behavior. A sworn affidavit19 of Emelita S. Valentino,
narrating alleged perverse behavior of complainant
Ocampo, as well as the certification20 from the Philippine
National Police of Meycauayan, stating acts of violence
committed by complainant Ocampo on Milan, were
appended to the Petition. The totality of the evidence thus
presented, while not exactly conclusive, justified a prima
facie  determination of the necessity of a TPO.
While Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant
Ocampo's objections to the matter of support apt and
plausible, the same could be merely considered as an error
of judgment or an abuse of discretion, but respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua cannot be held administratively liable
thereon. Considering that the matter of support therein
was merely provisional, respondent Judge could not be
faulted for readily granting the prayer for support without
further evaluating evidence with respect thereto. Justice
Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua's error in that respect was not gross, the same
having been brought about by an innocuous reliance on
the Rule on Provisional Orders, A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC.
Under the said rule, provisional orders for protection and
support may be issued without hearing. However, the said
rule specifically applies to petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage or legal
separation. In this case, the matter of support was among
the principal reliefs sought for in the petition for custody.
Justice Salazar-Fernando found that respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's alleged over-zealousness in causing the
immediate implementation of the TPO was without solid
basis. A TPO, much like a TRO in civil cases, is required to
be served immediately, precisely to serve its purpose as a
protective relief. Respondent Judge issued the TPO on
April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday, right after the hearing on
complainant Ocampo's motion for reconsideration  of the
denial of his motion to dismiss.  She clarified that the date
of the hearing on the motion for reconsideration on April
3, 2007 was set by complainant Ocampo's counsel himself.
The following day, April 4, 2007, a Holy Wednesday, she
directed the implementation of the TPO. Hence, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper or wayward in
the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the case.
There was no evidence that respondent Judge purposely
sought the issuance of the TPO during the Holy Week, as it
was complainant Ocampo's counsel himself who, wittingly
or unwittingly, chose the hearing date. Considering the
urgency and immediacy of a TPO, it was not improper or
illegal that respondent Judge caused its immediate
implementation.
Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge
could not have been privy to the brazen manner in which
the TPO was served by the designated sheriff. In the first
place, it was only the designated sheriff, Sheriff
Tangangco, who was administratively charged by
complainant Ocampo for the allegedly offensive manner
the TPO was served. As correctly argued by respondent
Judge, such was the personal accountability of Sheriff
Tangangco.
Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant
Ocampo's allegation of bribery against respondent Judge
to be hearsay. During the hearing conducted by Justice
Salazar-Fernando on October 24, 2007, complainant
211
Ocampo confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of
the alleged bribery of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that A.M. OCA IPI
No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case) should be dismissed.
She stated that as a matter of policy, in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous. 21 She cited Español v.
Mupas,22 which held thus:
x x x While the Court will never tolerate or condone any
conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of
public accountability or diminish the people's faith in the
judiciary, nonetheless, we have repeatedly stated that the
quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in
administrative cases is substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. In the absence of
contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption
that the respondent has regularly performed his or her
official duties. In administrative proceedings, complainants
have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the
complainant relies mainly on secondhand information to
prove the charges against the respondent, the complaint is
reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. The
Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere
credence or speculation. As we held in a recent case:
Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must
always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its
consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such
that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of
dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial
misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain
the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be
disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him
should be competent.23
Findings in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 ( the Chang Tan/RCBC
Case)
Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that in the Chang Tan
Case, the OCA primarily asserted that the TPO issued by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua could not be legally
justified under R.A. No. 9262, because the said law applies
only if the applicant for TPO is a woman.
The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA on
that score. R.A. No. 9262 is known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. It is
specifically applicable to "women and their children," not
to men. Thus, while the TPO may be justified with respect
to the protection accorded the minor, the same is not
legally tenable with respect to the petitioner, Albert Chang
Tan. Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO cannot be issued in favor
of a man against his wife. Certainly, such a TPO would be
absurd. Hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in this regard to be gross
ignorance of the law. She cited the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. in Officers and Members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Baguio-Benguet Chapter
v. Pamintuan,24 which stated, thus:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so
basic and elementary a rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent
and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is
too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority
(De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26,
2001). When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would
be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law (Rodriguez v.
Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000).
Justice Salazar-Fernando averred that as a family court
judge, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua should be the last
person to err in the application of R.A. No. 9262, and, in
this case, issue a TPO applied for a man, purportedly to
protect the latter against his wife. Such is unthinkable
under R.A. No. 9262. A careful evaluation of the records in
the Chang Tan Case showed that there was not even any
allegation of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam
against her husband, Chang Tan. Thus, Justice Salazar-
Fernando found that the TPO against Stephanie, insofar as
it directed the latter to stay away from the home and
office of petitioner, to cease and desist from harassing,
intimidating or threatening petitioner and to refrain from
acts of commission or omission that create an
unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of
petitioner, was anomalous.
Be that as it may, with respect to the issue of custody,
Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya--
Chua's reasons for granting custody over subject minor to
Albert Chang Tan to be legally tenable. While not exactly
conclusive, the evidence relied upon by respondent Judge
in granting custody in favor of Chang Tan was substantial
enough to warrant a prima facie  determination that a TPO
in favor of the minor was necessary and would serve her
paramount interest. Justice Salazar-Fernando found
nothing improper in respondent Judge's reliance on the
psychological evaluation report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez and
the statements of yaya  Josie Leynes and the subject minor
herself, Rafi Pulliam, which all confirmed that Stephanie
has not been a good influence to her daughter, Rafi. As far
as the latter's paramount interest was concerned,
Stephanie was not the ideal person to whom custody
should be awarded. On this premise, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's award of temporary custody to the father
could be justified. However, Justice Salazar-Fernando
stated that she does not necessarily affirm the correctness
of the custody award to the father, Chang Tan, since
212
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's Order dated May 7, 2007
was annulled and set aside by the Twelfth Division of the
Court of Appeals in a Decision dated October 31, 2007.25
In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua allegedly displayed in the
said case, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no substantial
evidence to support such allegations. The OCA's
Memorandum itself admitted that there was no proof that
respondent Judge received money from Chang Tan.
Moreover, not one of the witnesses of OCA confirmed
having personally witnessed the alleged heated argument
between Chang Tan and the OIC of the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 144, except for their secondhand accounts that
they heard that such incident actually transpired. Justice
Salazar-Fernando found it speculative to attribute the
commission of bribery or wrongdoing to respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua solely on such account. The Investigating
Justice stated that respondent Judge appeared to have no
personal or actual participation in that incident, because
the "heated argument" was allegedly between Chang Tan
and the OIC, Victoria Jamora.
As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment in the RCBC Case, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found no evidence against respondent of
any irregularity or undue interest in the case. Respondent
convincingly elaborated the circumstances surrounding
her issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment,
particularly the manner in which she studied and
evaluated the application for the writ. Justice Salazar-
Fernando was convinced that while the order granting the
writ was indeed speedily issued the ex parte  hearing on
the application having been held on a Friday, followed
immediately by the issuance of the writ on the succeeding
business day, a Monday there was really nothing
impossible or irregular in such feat. Per respondent’s
account, she had been unofficially reporting for work on
Saturdays during that time and she did not have to
evaluate the totality of the evidence for the purpose of
ruling on the propriety of issuing the writ. Further,
considering respondent's habit of immediately disposing
pending motions before her court, Justice Salazar-
Fernando found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister
significance to the speedy issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment. The Investigating Justice also
found respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the writ of
preliminary attachment to be apt.
Justice Salazar-Fernando held that in the absence of
evidence that she was motivated by any dishonest or
corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua is entitled to the presumption that she
regularly performed her duties. She cited, thus:
In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears
the onus  of establishing, by substantial evidence, the
averments of his complaint. Notatu dignum  is the
presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge's
functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest
cannot be presumed, specially weighed against a judge's
sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice
without respect to any person and do equal right to the
poor and to the rich. In a long line of cases decided by this
Court, it was held that bare allegations of bias are not
enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake
his noble role to dispense justice according to law and
evidence and without fear or favor. In Sinnott v. Barte, it
was further held, mere suspicion that a judge is partial is
not enough. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of bias and
partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias,
bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the
palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or
order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous
as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent
extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient
to establish a case against the judge.26
Findings in the Judicial Audit Case (Re: Marriage
Certificates and Monthly Reports)
Justice Salazar-Fernando found that there is substantial
evidence of an anomaly in respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua's solemnization of marriages in her court and failure
to reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly
Reports.
The Investigating Justice stated that at once, the timing of
the disposal of the marriage certificates, which were said
to have been contained in four (4) plastic bags, is highly
suspect, because it occurred during the time the judicial
audit was being conducted. Respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua admitted the fact that she ordered Salvador Indicio,
Jr., her utility worker, to dispose of some garbage
contained in blue plastic bags. However, as regards the
timing of disposal, she explained that she ordered Indicio
to dispose of her garbage on the second week of May,
days before the judicial audit.27 Such fact was confirmed by
Indicio in his testimony.28 He testified that he was ordered
by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua to dispose of the
garbage on May 9, 2007. Indicio stated that the garbage
was due for disposal on May 14, 2007, but since it was
election day, the disposal of the garbage was postponed
until May 17, 2007, at which time, the disposal of the
plastic bags caught the attention of the security detail of
the Supreme Court.
The Investigating Justice stated that based on the
foregoing account, if the order to dispose of the garbage
was indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing why
213
such a simple task of throwing away a garbage of barely
four plastic bags, which would take only a couple of
minutes to accomplish, could tarry for several days. Why
no attempt to dispose of the supposed garbage was made
on May 9, 10, and 11 (May 12 & 13 were Saturday and
Sunday, respectively, while May 14 was Election Day, and
May 15 to 17 was the period of judicial audit) was not
sufficiently explained. The logical implication is that the
order to dispose could not have been made on May 9,
2007, but more likely later when the judicial audit was
already being conducted. Such conclusion jibes with the
account of Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, one of the members
of the judicial audit team, that upon being immediately
confronted why he chose that particular day to dispose of
the supposed garbage despite the ongoing audit, Indicio
"could not offer any explanation."29 Indicio could not
remember the exact date when the order to dispose of the
garbage was made by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. He
testified, thus:
CROSS-EXAMINATION
JUDGE CHUA:
You mentioned in your Affidavit and in your
testimony this morning that you executed an
Affidavit on May 17 and the throwing away of
the garbage was also done at 8:00 o’clock in the
morning of May 17 upon my instruction. When
did I give my instruction to you to throw away
the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
You told me before the audit to throw all your
trash.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you know when that particular day was?
MR. INDICIO:
That was election day, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Election day of May, 2007?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Was that the exact date when Judge Chua told
you to throw the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE CHUA:
May I draw your attention to paragraph 2 of your
Affidavit. This was subscribed to on May 17. So
the last week that you mentioned here was a
week before May 17. You mentioned here that
last week, I was instructed by the Presiding
Judge to dispose of the garbage which were
stocked in her branch. Do you confirm the
statement in paragraph 2 of your Affidavit?
MR. INDICIO:
Judge Chua told me to throw the garbage
because it was election day.
JUDGE CHUA:
I am sorry, Your Honor, but I do not get the fact
straight.
May I draw your attention now to paragraph 5 of
your Affidavit. You said here that the said
garbage was scheduled to be disposed last May
14, 2007. However, since it was election day,
same was not collected.
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, ma’am, it was scheduled on May 14, but the
janitor was busy so it was only on May 17 that he
had an opportunity to throw it.
JUDGE CHUA:
To clarify the matter, Mr. Indicio, when did I give
the instruction to you to throw away the
garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
I was told before the audit.
JUDGE CHUA:
The audit was conducted on May 15 up to May
17. Based on paragraph 2 of your Affidavit, I gave
214
the instruction to you a week before May 17, so I
gave the instruction to you probably on May 10,
is that what you are saying?
MR. INDICIO:
I do not remember the exact date but I was
instructed by Judge Chua.
xxxx
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
When you told us that before the audit was
conducted, Judge Chua already instructed you to
throw those garbage bags placed inside the
stenographer’s room, how many days after that
instruction was given to you did you comply with
her instruction?
MR. INDICIO:
Eight (8) days, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So if you instructed Beldad to throw those
garbage bags on May 17 minus 8 that would be
May 9, is that correct?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, your Honor.30
According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, apart from the
timing of the disposal, the manner of disposing the plastic
bags of marriage certificates was also open to suspicion.
Although there were four plastic bags ready for disposal,
which according to Indicio himself were really not too
heavy,31 only one was taken out by the janitor to be
disposed, leaving three other plastic bags inside the
courtroom. Taking out the plastic bags one by one could
have been purposely sought to surreptitiously remove the
said bags from the courtroom, and avoid detection by the
security personnel detailed by the judicial audit team.
Justice Salazar-Fernando noted that despite repeated
references to the supposed garbage, which were allegedly
contained in similar plastic bags containing the marriage
certificates, the whereabouts of the said plastic bags of
garbage were never accounted for. If what were
mistakenly attempted to be disposed of by Indicio were
the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates, the
plastic bags containing the garbage could have been found
elsewhere in the courtroom. However, as things turned
out, there were really no plastic bags of garbage, but only
more plastic bags of marriage certificates. Respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua's account of the plastic bags of garbage
was unsubstantiated.
The Investigating Justice did not give credence to
respondent Judge’s theory as to why the plastic bags of
marriage certificates were found in the stenographer's
room, causing Indicio to mistake it for the garbage which
she supposedly ordered him to dispose of. Respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua theorized that a certain Noel Umipig, a
casual employee in her staff, who harbored a deep-seated
grudge against her for not being able to borrow money
from her, could have been responsible in transferring the
plastic bags of marriage certificates from the small room in
her chambers to the stenographer's room before her
courtroom was padlocked. According to her, Umipig could
have heard of the impending administrative investigation
on her. Hence, to expose the big number of weddings she
had been solemnizing, which, purportedly, through
Umipig' s machinations had not been reflected in her
monthly reports, Umipig could have taken out the plastic
bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her
chambers and transferred them to the stenographer's
room, so that once the plastic bags were taken out to the
garbage can along the corridor, the documents would be
discovered by the audit team.
Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge’s theory
difficult to swallow. According to her, it was fantastic that
respondent Judge attached too much cunning to Umipig
for the latter to have deviously perpetrated all the acts
being attributed to him. If the intention was only to expose
the big number of weddings, it is hard to understand why
Umipig would have to go the difficult way of trespassing
on her chambers when all he would have to do was spread
rumors about the weddings, as he had been wont to do,
per respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's own account.
In regard to the non-payment of the marriage
solemnization fees, the certifications32 issued by the Clerks
of Court of the MeTC and RTC of Makati City attest to the
fact that out of the 1,975 marriages solemnized by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 166 marriages were
paid the corresponding solemnization fees. Justice Salazar-
Fernando found no reason to doubt the reliability or
integrity of the said certifications, the contents of which
were confirmed by Arnel Magsombol and Lucila Ticman,
the same persons who personally verified from their
records whether or not the solemnization fees of the
marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
were paid.
Respondent Judge assailed the reliability of the procedure
undertaken by Magsombol and Ticman in verifying the
payment of solemnization fees, positing that they could
have merely relied on the dates of the wedding as stated
215
in the marriage certificates, which were often not the
same dates stated in the receipts. She contended that
most parties paid their solemnization fee on a date
different from their wedding; hence, the dates of the
receipts would not be the same date as that of the
wedding. Thus, respondent Judge postulated that when
Magsombol and Ticman verified payment of the
solemnization fees based on the dates of the wedding as
stated in the marriage certificates, they would find no
receipt to show payment of the solemnization fees,
because payment was made on some other date.
Justice Salazar-Fernando did not believe the foregoing
postulation of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in the light
of the categorical declarations of Magsombol and Ticman
that they did not merely based their verification on the
dates of the wedding, but, specifically, they verified the
payment of solemnization fees based on the names of the
contracting parties to the wedding. Pertinent portions of
the testimonies of Magsombol and Ticman state as
follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
xxxx
ATTY. BUGTAS:
So how did you verify these marriages
solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua?
MR. MAGSOMBOL;
I checked the names that were handed to me
one by one.
ATTY. BUGTAS:
Did you check all the records?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, I based on the daily cash collection records
beginning the first day of January 2004 up to the
last day of office of December 2005.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Are your daily cash collection records complete
from January 2004 to December 2005?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO: MS. TICMAN:

How about the other basis which you said, Yes, Your Honor.
receipts?
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
What was the result of your verification?
In our daily collection report, we indicate the OR
number. MS. TICMAN:

JUSTICE FERNANDO: Only 20 parties paid the solemnization fees.

Did you also check those OR numbers and the JUSTICE FERNANDO:
receipts?
Only 20? Twenty out of?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
ATTY. BUGTAS:
Yes, I matched the daily collection to the receipts
which I brought with me, Your Honor.
More than a thousand, Your Honor. 1,300 plus.

xxxx
xxxx

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
JUSTICE FERNANDO:

So in the years 2004 and 2005, marriages

What was the basis of your findings?
solemnized by the MeTC Judge were supposed
to be recorded in your daily cash collection
book? MS. TICMAN:

MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor, the ones that are being paid.
My basis Your Honor is the one coming from the
Supreme Court, and the names supplied us by
the Supreme Court were verified by us if they
were paid or not.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
JUSTICE FERNANDO:

So if they are not paid, they do not appear in

What documents did you check to determine
your book?
whether the fees were paid or not?

MR. MAGSOMBOL:
MS. TICMAN:

Yes, we don’t know if the marriage happened or

The Certificates of Marriage.
not.

xxxx
xxxx

ATTY. BUGTAS:
(Direct Examination of Lucila D. Ticman)

What documents or records did you examine in

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
order to determine the marriages that paid the
corresponding fees?
Did you verify from your records if the
solemnization fees of the marriages that were
MS. TICMAN:
listed in the document were paid?

216
The logbook of the Accounting Section and If a party did not pay, his or her name will not
official receipts. appear in your records?

xxxx MS. TICMAN:

ATTY. BUGTAS: Yes, sir.

Based on your records or receipt that you have, xxxx

you can inform the inquiring party whether that
person or party paid the corresponding fees or ATTY. BUGTAS:
not?
In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, you stated
MS. TICMAN: that after a thorough examination of the records
of this office (referring to your office) has been
Yes, sir. ascertained that only 20 marriages have been
paid in the OCC RTC Makati city, and you
ATTY. BUGTAS: enumerated the 20 marriages that paid the
corresponding fees based on your records.
In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, based on
your records, you enumerated just 20 marriages When you say you thoroughly examined, can you
as appearing to have paid the corresponding tell us whether the examination was thorough
fees. enough so that your Affidavit is accurate as to its
contents?
MS. TICMAN:
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.
We examined our logbook one by one, the
names of the parties given by the Supreme
ATTY. BUGTAS:
Court.33

But based on the records available, the Supreme

Justice Salazar-Fernando was fully convinced by
Court furnished you with a list numbering
the findings of Magsombol and Ticman that the
around 1,344 names of parties for verification
solemnization fees of a substantial number of
but you came out with an Affidavit enumerating
marriages solemnized by respondent Judge
only those parties that paid the corresponding
Arcaya-Chua were unpaid.
fees. Is there a possibility that the contracting
parties paid the fees, but your records would not
reflect their names? As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's failure to
reflect the marriages in her monthly reports, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge’s defense of
MS. TICMAN:
forgery, nay tampering, to be unsubstantiated. She
carefully perused respondent Judge’s signatures in the
No, sir. monthly reports and compared the same to her signatures
in the pleadings, which she submitted during the
ATTY. BUGTAS: investigation, as well as in the orders and decisions
contained in the records, and found no substantial
So only those that paid will appear in your discrepancies therein or any indication that the same had
records. been forged. According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, while
all her signatures did not exactly appear to be 100 percent
similar, there was no reason to suppose that her
MS. TICMAN: signatures in the monthly reports and other signatures
extant in the records were not signed by one and the same
Yes, sir. person. Moreover, Justice Salazar-Fernando failed to see
any tell-tale signs of tampering, and this could be the
ATTY. BUGTAS: reason why respondent Judge herself withdrew such
defense.

217
Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved the argument of
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua that the anomaly
attributed to her was the work of Umipig. The
Investigating Justice found it incredible that since January
2004 up to April 2007 or for a period of more than three
years, Umipig had been silently working on his sinister
scheme, patiently and clandestinely forging respondent
Judge's signatures in her monthly reports as vengeance for
not lending him money. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it
difficult to imagine how Umipig could have harbored such
a deep-seated grudge against respondent Judge just
because the latter refused to loan him money for his
enrolment in law school, which purportedly was the
reason why Umipig failed to become a lawyer.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented text messages
allegedly coming from Umipig to show the latter's extreme
hatred of her. The Investigating Justice stated that apart
from the fact that it could not be established that it was
indeed Umipig who sent the text messages, the tenor of
the text messages did not show that Umipig was the
author of all the anomalies relating to the marriage
certificates and monthly reports. Respondent Judge
quoted Umipig saying, "Hindi bale, may ebidensya naman
ako laban sa inyo," which, according to her, could only
betray the fact that Umipig had indeed been up to
something. According to Justice Salazar-Fernando,
Umipig’s statement could only confirm the existence of
the anomalies in respondent Judge’s court, rather than
attribute authorship to Umipig for the anomalies
pertaining to the marriage certificates and monthly
reports.
Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua’s procedure of signing the monthly reports
ahead of her OIC to be irregular, since it is contrary to
prevailing procedure and protocol. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua admitted that she signed the monthly reports
first before her OIC, Ms. Mabalot, during her stint in the
MeTC, or Ms. Jamora, in the RTC. Respondent Judge
testified, thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Could you repeat the statement?
JUDGE CHUA:
I signed the monthly reports at 4:00 o’clock in
the afternoon, Your Honor, and then the
following morning at around 8:00 o’ clock, I
would see the reports on top of the table of
Ornachos or Rafael still unsigned by Mabalot or
Jamora. My focus was on the typewritten name
of Mabalot or Jamora without their signatures.
218
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
And you expect the reports to be signed on the
same afternoon when you signed?
JUDGE CHUA:
Not necessarily, Your Honor, but my point is I
showed to Ornachos or Rafael that I have signed
the monthly reports.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Do you have to sign first before the clerk of
court?
JUDGE CHUA:
With due respect to Mrs. Jamora, Your Honor,
because the branch clerk of court of MeTC
Branch 63 was not a lawyer because she was
assigned on detail to the OCC a few months ago
and Mrs. Jamora, likewise, is not a lawyer so I
would rather do the checking myself, sign and
then require them to affix their signatures.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Contrary to the usual procedure that the Judge
would sign last?
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
In your case, you sign first before the OIC?
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.34
Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved respondent
Judge’s justification for signing first before her
OIC, reasoning that it does not take a lawyer to
know what to indicate in the monthly reports, let
alone the mechanical task of indicating how
many cases were disposed or how many
marriages were solemnized in a month.
As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's compliance
with Article 8 of the Family Code concerning the place of
solemnization of the marriage, the Investigating Justice
found no evidence that would show that she disregarded JUSTICE FERNANDO:
the strictures of the said provision. There is also no
concrete evidence showing that respondent Judge So, by force of circumstances, you just affixed
demanded and/or received money from the contracting your signature without any question asked,
parties for solemnizing the marriage. However, it can be whether they are correct, inaccurate,
inferred that respondent Judge financially benefited from incomplete, you just affixed your signature. Is
solemnizing the numerous marriages by the fact that these that your job as OIC?
were not correctly reflected in the monthly reports and
insufficient solemnizing fees were paid to the court.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:

Anent respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua’s liability in this

Your Honor, I think she stated her position
case, Justice Salazar-Fernando stated:
already in her Comment.

x x x [T]aken as a whole, the undersigned Investigator

JUSTICE FERNANDO:
respectfully submits that there is convincing and
substantial evidence to support a finding that anomalies
were committed in respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court That is why I am asking her for confirmation.
with respect to the solemnization of marriages. The
circumstances magnificently fit together: plastic bags MS. JAMORA:
containing about 1,975 marriage certificates were
surreptitiously being spirited out of respondent Judge Yes, Your Honor.
Arcaya-Chua's court during the occasion of the judicial
audit; when confronted, the person seen disposing the
plastic bags stated that he was acting upon the order of ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua; when verified, the
solemnization fees of the marriages covered by the said More or less, that is the substance of her
marriage certificates were found to have not been paid; Comment, Your Honor.
despite openly admitting having solemnized all the
weddings covered by the said marriage certificates, the JUSTICE FERNANDO:
monthly reports of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
reflected only a very minimal number of weddings
So without knowing anything about the figures,
solemnized. Taken together, the circumstances lead to no
you just affixed your signature because you saw
other conclusion that irregularities were obviously
already the signature of Rafael and the signature
perpetrated by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in
of Judge Chua?
solemnizing marriages in her court.

In regard to respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's
culpability, Justice Salazar-Fernando found sufficient
reasons to hold her accountable for her signatures in the
monthly reports. She cannot feign ignorance as to the
correct number of weddings solemnized by respondent
Judge. Jamora’s justification that she could not have
questioned respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even if there
were erroneous entries in the monthly reports is in itself
pregnant with admission that something anomalous could
have indeed been taking place. She testified, thus:
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So you affixed your signature without knowing
whether the report is accurate or not?
MS. JAMORA:
Yes, Your Honor.35
Justice Salazar-Fernando found unacceptable respondent
Jamora's pretended ignorance of the incorrectness of the
monthly reports she had been signing, let alone the figures
relating to the number of marriages solemnized by
respondent Judge. He stressed that it does not take a
lawyer to count or at least approximate the number of
weddings that respondent Judge had been solemnizing in
her court, considering the unusually big number of
weddings she had solemnized. Knowing the figures stated
in the monthly reports to be incorrect, Jamora condoned
the wrongdoing, if she was actually not a willing
participant, by affixing her signatures therein.

MS. JAMORA:
Your Honor, to answer honestly, I was not in the
position to question my superior Judge Chua.
Justice Salazar-Fernando held that the reprehensible act or
omission of respondent Jamora constitutes dishonesty
amounting to grave misconduct. Moreover, she stated
that during the investigation, it was revealed that although

219
Jamora was an OIC Clerk of Court, she had no knowledge
of her duties and responsibilities, and had neither control
over the employees under her nor did what was expected
of her.
Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Jamora's
plea for compassion and understanding, citing the fact that
she was not a lawyer and that the position of OIC Clerk of
Court was merely thrust upon her by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua, which she reluctantly accepted, was hollow,
because her transgression did not have any connection
with her status as a non-lawyer or being a reluctant OIC.
Her insistence upon her ignorance or lack of knowledge of
the incorrectness of the figures stated in the monthly
reports, specifically on the number of marriages
solemnized, aggravates her offense as it makes a mockery
of her oath.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Justice
Salazar-Fernando.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the
quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.36
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, there is substantial evidence that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua did not report in her
Monthly Reports37 the actual number of marriages she
solemnized during her stint in the MeTC, Makati City,
Branch 63 and in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144, and
that the solemnization fees that were paid did not
correspond to the number of marriages that were
solemnized by her.
The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge
Arcaya-Chua reported zero or a lesser number of
marriages solemnized by her compared with the marriage
certificates that were seized from her office. Just to
mention a portion of the evidence submitted against her:
In April 2004, she reported38 that she did not solemnized
any marriage, but there were 29 marriage certificates
issued on the said month contained in the plastic bags that
were taken from her office.39 In May 2004, she
reported40 that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 36
marriage certificates issued on the said month were found
in the same plastic bags.41 In June 2004, she likewise
reported42 that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 45
marriage certificates issued on the said month were
contained in the plastic bags.43 From November 2005 to
March 2007, her Monthly Reports44 indicated that she did
not solemnize any marriage, but 1,068 marriage
220
certificates issued by her during the said period are in the
custody of the Court.45
Atty. Neptali D. Abasta, Clerk of Court V, OCC, MeTC,
Makati City, in his Certification46 dated June 8, 2007, stated
that only 146 of the marriages solemnized by Judge
Arcaya-Chua from January 2004 to June 13, 2005 paid the
corresponding marriage fee. Moreover, Atty. Engracio M.
Escasinas, Jr., Clerk of Court VII, OCC, RTC, Makati City,
declared in his Certification47 dated June 8, 2007 that from
the list furnished by this Court of marriages solemnized by
Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 20 marriages were paid to the
said office per RTC official receipts covering the period
from June 14, 2005 to April 2007. Hence, out of the 1,975
marriage certificates discovered in Branch 144, only a total
of 166 marriages were paid.
In the light of the substantial evidence against her, she
cannot shift the blame to Noel Umipig absent any proof of
weight that he forged her signature in the Monthly
Reports.
In regard to respondent Victoria Jamora, her signature on
the Monthly Reports represented that she attested to the
correctness thereof; hence, it is presumed that she verified
or should have verified the facts stated therein. The
Monthly Reports specifically state that the signatories
thereto, including Victoria Jamora, "declare under oath
that the information in this Monthly Report is true and
correct to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to the
provisions of existing rules/administrative circulars."
Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as
OIC of Branch 144 from July 2005 to April 2007. 48 It is
incredible that Victoria Jamora, as OIC, was unaware of the
big number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge
from November 5 to March 2007, which totaled 1,068
marriages per the confiscated marriage certificates, but
she attested in the Monthly Reports for the said period
that no marriage was ever solemnized. Thus, the
Investigating Justice correctly stated that she knew that
the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect,
but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature
therein, if she was not actually a willing participant.
The Court sustains the findings of Justice Salvador-
Fernando in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that respondents Judge
Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty of gross
misconduct.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the
Court upholds the finding of Justice Salvador-Fernando
that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner
Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO
cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under
R.A. No. 9292, known as the Anti–Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family
court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the
correct implementation of R.A. No. 9292.
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the
Court sustains the recommendation of Justice Salvador-
Fernando that the case be dismissed in the absence of
substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is
liable for the charge of "harassment, grave abuse of
authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service."
We now resolve the motion for reconsideration of
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093
In A.M. RTJ-07-2093, Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated
July 14, 2005 against Judge Arcaya-Chua for serious
misconduct and dishonesty.
Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judge’s husband,
alleged that in the first week of September 2002, she
asked respondent’s help regarding the cases of her friend,
Emerita Muñoz, pending before the Supreme Court. At
that time, respondent was the Presiding Judge of the
MeTC of Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent, a former
employee of the Supreme Court, said that she could help
as she had connections with some Justices of the Court;
she just needed ₱100,000.00 which she would give to an
employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of the
said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant
gave respondent ₱100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter’s
chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in
February 2003, respondent told her that there was a
problem, as the other party was offering ₱10 million to the
Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the
₱100,000.00; however, respondent could no longer be
contacted.49
In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent
denied the charges against her and averred that in the
months adverted to by complainant, she (respondent) was
facing protests, damaging newspaper reports and
administrative cases which caused her hypertension; thus,
she could not have agreed to the supposed transaction of
complainant. When she became a judge, complainant
asked a lot of favors from her, and knowing that she
worked as a Court Attorney of the Supreme Court,
complainant asked her to talk to a certain Mario Tolosa of
the Third Division, to whom complainant gave ₱50,000.00
for a favorable resolution of Muñoz’ cases. Respondent
declined. Thereafter, complainant started spreading
malicious imputations against her. On April 23, 2005,
complainant begged respondent to talk to anyone in the
Third Division to recover the money she gave Tolosa.
221
Respondent again refused. Complainant then repeatedly
tried to talk to her until April 25, 2005 when complainant
threatened to file a case against respondent with the
Supreme Court. Complainant sent two demand letters
addressed to respondent's court asking for the return of
the ₱100,000.00 complainant allegedly gave her, which
letters were read by respondent's Clerk of Court.
Complainant also told respondent's husband, outside
respondent's house, that she (respondent) was corrupt, as
she asked for money in order to settle cases in court.
Respondent filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation,
Intriguing Against Honor and Unjust Vexation against
complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case
against her.50
The Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred
this case to Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the preliminary conference held on September 4,
2007, complainant manifested her desire to move for the
dismissal of her complaint against respondent.51 In a
Verified Manifestation52 dated September 6, 2007,
complainant stated that in the latter part of August 2007,
she and respondent had a long and serious discussion
about the dispute and bad feelings between them; that
after a sincere exchange of views, it dawned on
complainant that her accusation against respondent was
brought about by misunderstanding, confusion and
misapprehension of facts concerning the incident subject
of the present administrative case; that for the sake of
unity and harmonious relations in their family, the
complainant and respondent had reconciled and restored
friendly relations with each other; and that in view of the
foregoing, complainant was no longer interested in
pursuing her administrative case against respondent.
In her Report dated October 5, 2007, Justice Buzon
recommended the dismissal of the administrative case in
view of paucity of evidence upon which a conclusion could
be drawn, brought about by the withdrawal by Santos of
her complaint and her failure and refusal to prove the
allegations in her Complaint.
In a Resolution53 dated December 5, 2007, the Court,
adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon, dismissed
the complaint against respondent for lack of evidence. The
Court, in the same Resolution, also ordered complainant
to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of
Court for filing an unfounded verified Complaint dated July
14, 2005 against respondent.
Complainant submitted her Compliance dated January 6,
2008 stating that:
xxxx
 2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable
Court, her administrative complaint against
Judge Evelyn Ar[c]aya-Chua is not unfounded;
3. All the allegations therein are true and based
on respondent’s personal knowledge;
4. The main reason why respondent did not
anymore pursue her complaint was because of
the pressure of her family to forgive Judge Chua,
for the sake of unity and harmony in the family,
given the fact that Judge Chua’s husband is her
nephew;
5. On several occasions in August 2007, Judge
Chua, her husband and their children came to
respondent’s house and pleaded for forgiveness.
Later, respondent’s sister, husband and children,
as well as her close friends persuaded her to
forgive Judge Chua and let bygones be bygones,
for the sake of peace and unity in the family;
6. It is solely due to the foregoing events as well
as for humane reasons that respondent gave up
her complaint against Judge Chua.54
In its Resolution55 dated March 3, 2008, the Court found
that complainant's compliance was not satisfactory, and
that she was trifling with court processes. The Court then
resolved to reprimand complainant with a stern warning
that a more severe penalty would be imposed on her in
the event of a repetition of the same offense; recall the
Resolution of the Court dated December 5, 2007; reopen
the administrative case against respondent; direct Justice
Rebecca D. Salvador56 to conduct an investigation and
submit her report and recommendation; and directed
complainant to attend all hearings scheduled by Justice
Salvador under pain of contempt of court.
In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating
Justice Salvador found sufficient grounds to hold
respondent liable for the offenses charged and
recommended that respondent be administratively
penalized for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
Justice Salvador’s findings, as stated in the Resolution
dated February 13, 2009, are as follows:
Justice Salvador found that: complainant was able to
present substantial evidence in support of her complaint
against respondent; while respondent denied that she
asked for and received from complainant ₱100,000.00 for
the facilitation of a favorable decision on Muñoz' cases,
respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in
her office in September 2002, claiming only a different
reason for such meeting; that is, complainant was there to
222
console her for the protests against respondent at the
time; respondent claims to have incurred complainant's ire
for declining complainant’s request for favors in June
2004; however, it was respondent who asserted that the
complainant asked her to talk to Mario Tolosa of the
Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not
heard of Tolosa before; however, it was respondent's
comment and her husband's affidavit which stated that
complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa
had gone on absence without leave; it was respondent, as
a former employee of the Supreme Court who stood to
know who Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to
believe that respondent knew and associated with Muñoz
prior to the parties' falling out, since the affidavit of Robert
Chua (Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muñoz
was introduced to them by complainant in September
2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004;
Robert claimed, however, that the topic of case-fixing
never cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint
for grave oral defamation, intriguing against honor and
unjust vexation on June 20, 2005 before complainant filed
the instant administrative complaint, it cannot be denied,
however, that respondent at the time had already been
served complainant's demand letters dated April 28, 2005
and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge
and as a lawyer, to reply to complainant’s first demand
letter, was unusual; considering complainant’s advanced
age and illnesses, respondent's claim--that complainant's
motive for filing the administrative case was respondent's
refusal to give in to complainant's request to intercede in
the cases of the latter's friend--was too paltry an
explanation for complainant's willingness to expend the
time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the
administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by
and against her; complainant’s compliance with the
Court's Resolution, which directed her to show cause why
she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded
complaint against respondent, stated that the allegations
in her complaint were true and based on personal
knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and
their family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that
she gave up her complaint against respondent.57
During the hearing conducted on September 3, 2008,
Investigating Justice Salvador observed that although
complainant appeared weary of the demands entailed by
the administrative case, she staunchly stood pat over the
veracity of her complaint and the reasons why she decided
to withdraw the same. According to Justice Salvador,
respondent had no reason to ask forgiveness from
complainant, if indeed complainant falsely instituted the
administrative case against her.
Justice Salvador also gave weight to complainant’s
testimony that the return of the money by respondent, in
addition to familial interests, induced her to withdraw the
complaint.
The Court sustained the findings and recommendation of
Justice Salvador, and rendered decision against
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for
six (6) months without salary and other benefits. She is
WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar act
in the future shall merit a more severe penalty.58
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging
that:
(1) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to
appreciate the failure of Sylvia Santos to present
Emerita Muñoz, from whom Santos procured the
₱100,000.00, in the proceedings before Justice
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador;
(2) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to
appreciate that one of the bases for the
dismissal of the present case of 5 December
2007 was the Affidavit of Retraction filed by
Muñoz on 12 January 2006;
(3) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in
sustaining the finding of Justice Salvador that
[respondent] did not refute Santos’ declaration
during the clarificatory hearing that [respondent]
returned the money to her;
(4) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in
sustaining the other findings of Justice Salvador;
and
(5) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in not
considering [respondent’s] testimonial and
documentary evidence.59
Respondent prayed that Stenographer Diana Tenerife be
directed to submit to this Court the fully transcribed
stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September
17, 2008 and to submit her tape of the proceedings on the
said date, and that her motion for reconsideration be
granted and that the instant case be dismissed.
Respondent’s prayer for submission to this Court of the
fully transcribed stenographic notes of the proceedings
held on September 17, 2008 is an attempt to clarify
alleged inaccuracies in the said transcript of stenographic
notes. The Court notes that respondent Judge had earlier
filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008 on this matter,
which was already resolved in the Resolution of the Court
promulgated on February 13, 2009, thus:
223
Respondent filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008,
claiming that there were significant omissions of
testimonies in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN)
particularly in the statement "Ibinalik naman ho nila ang
pera;" and that such question was also beyond the scope
of clarificatory questions that may be propounded, as
nowhere in the previous testimonies of complainant,
either in the direct or the cross-examination, did she
mention the return of the money, and it was only during
the clarifiactory hearing that it surfaces; thus, she
(respondent) was deprived of her right to cross-examine
complainant. Respondent prayed that corrections on the
TSN be made, or that the testimonies of complainant –
that "the money was returned to me" and "ibinalik naman
ho nila and pera" – be stricken off; and in case the
correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her
manifestation that the said testimony of complainant was
given only during the clarificatory hearing and, in effect,
without an opportunity for her to cross-examine the
complainant.
In the Resolution dated November 26, 2008, the Court
denied respondent’s prayer that the corrections on the
TSN be made, and that the subject testimonies of
complainant be stricken off. The Court, however, granted
her prayer and noted her Manifestation that the subject
testimony was given only during the clarificatory hearing
and in effect without granting her an opportunity to cross-
examine complainant about the same.601avvphi1
Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present
Emerita Muñoz, from whom Santos procured the
₱100,000.00, during the proceedings before Justice
Salvador was fatal to Santos’ claims against her, and, on
that basis alone, provided a reason to dismiss the present
case.
The Court is not persuaded.
Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the
₱100,000.00, and her testimony alone, found credible in
this case, is sufficient to prove the administrative liability
of respondent.
Contrary to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in
sustaining the findings of Investigating Justice Salvador,
took into consideration the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by her.
The Court reiterates its statement in the Resolution dated
February 13, 2009, thus:
x x x [M]ost telling of all the circumstances pointing to
respondent’s guilt is the unwavering stance of
complainant that respondent did solicit and receive
₱100,000.00 from her in order to facilitate a favorable
ruling in Muñoz’ cases.
As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when
repeatedly asked during the hearing, was consistent in her
testimony:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
At the start of this afternoon’s proceedings, you
affirmed the truth of the matters stated in your
verified complaint?
MS. SANTOS:
Opo.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
And according to you they are based on your
personal knowledge?
MS. SANTOS:
My complaint is true. That is all true.
xxxx
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Ano ba ang totoo?
MS. SANTOS:
Ang sabi ko sa kanya, "Evelyn, tulungan mo lang
si Emerita kasi napakatagal na ng kaso niya.
Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi."
Ang sabi niya, "Sige, Tita, tutulungan ko."
Evelyn, sasabihin ko and totoo ha. Huwag kang
magagalit sa akin.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Just tell us what happened.
MS. SANTOS:
Sabi niya, "Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng
₱100,000.00 at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa loob ng
tatlong buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa iyo
ang ₱50,000.00." Which is true ha. Sinabi ko
doon sa humihingi ng pabor sa akin. Okay siya.
Dumating ang panahon. It took already years
walang nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang
ginigipit nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya. Sabi
ko, "Evelyn, kahit konti magbigay ka sa akin para
224
maibigay ko kay Emelita." Unang-una iyang
Emelita may utang sa akin ng ₱20,000.00 sa
alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng alahas.
Bumili sya.
JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:
Your honor, at this point, may I request that the
complainant be told not to continue with her
testimony because she is already through with
her direct examination.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the
record.
Complainant's testimony during the clarificatory
hearing also revealed her true reasons for
withdrawing her complaint. As borne out by the
records and correctly pointed out by Justice
Salvador in her Report:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
I have another question regarding the verified
manifestation counsel.
Alright, we go to the verified manifestation
which you filed on September 7, 2007, and
which had been marked as Exhibits "1," "1-A," "l-
B" and submarkings for respondent. You stated
in the verified complaint that the accusation
against respondent was brought about due to
misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and
confusion. Please clarify what do you mean by
"the accusation against respondent was brought
about due to misunderstanding,
misapprehension of facts and confusion"?
MS. SANTOS:
Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya
nagka-intindihan na kami’t nagkabatian. Sa totoo
lang po Justice, matagal kaming hindi nagkibuan.
Ngayon, dahil nakiusap nga po sila sa akin, kaya
ako naman ho, sige, pinatawad ko na sila dahil
pamilya ko ho sila, ang asawa niya. Kung hindi
lang ho anak ng kapatid ko yan, baka ewan ko,
baka hindi ko tuluyan iyan.
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
 So it is not true that there were facts regarding
the incident which you misunderstood or
misapprehended?
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho,
iyun na nga ho, sa pakiusap po nila na
magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila
ang pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan po
ang buong katotohanan, Justice.61
These testimonies on record are evidence against
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. The Investigating Justice
observed the demeanor of complainant and found her a
credible witness. It is settled rule that the findings of
investigating magistrates are generally given great weight
by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to
see the deportment of the witnesses as they
testified.62 The Court found no reason to depart from such
rule since Justice Salvador’s observations and findings are
supported by the records.
The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2141 is violative of the provisions of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:
Canon 1, Sec. 4. A judge shall not allow family, social, or
other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used
or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Canon 2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer.
Canon 2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must
reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to
be done.
Canon 4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Administrative Sanctions
Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua will be based on the provisions of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court,63 while disciplinary action against
respondent Victoria Jamora will be based on the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
225
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, serious
charges include gross misconduct constituting violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross ignorance of the
law or procedure.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if
the respondent Judge is guilty of a serious charge, any of
the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or
part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations:
Provided, however, That the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱40,000.00.
Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense and
punished with dismissal for the first offense.
The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernando’s finding that
respondent Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141.
The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernando’s finding
that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2049 and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively.
Respondent Judge’s motion for reconsideration is denied
in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
The Court has held:
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in
their minds the exhortation that the administration of
justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest
levels, are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy,
beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what
is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against
injustice and oppression.
Those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial
conduct and integrity have no place in the judiciary. xxx
This Court will not withhold penalty when called for to
uphold the people’s faith in the judiciary.64
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds
that:
1. in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the charges
against Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is
DISMISSED.
2. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
punished with SUSPENSION from office for six (6)
months without salary and other benefits.
3. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, the motion for
reconsideration of Judge Arcaya-Chua is DENIED
for lack of merit. The penalty of SUSPENSION
from office for a period of six (6) months without
salary and other benefits imposed upon her is
RETAINED.
4. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is
found GUILTY of gross misconduct and punished
with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture
of all benefits, excluding accrued leave credits,
with prejudice to re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality.
5. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora,
Court Stenographer of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 144 is found GUILTY of grave
misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from
the service, with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with
prejudice to re-employment in any government
agency or instrumentality.
Immediately upon service on Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua
and Victoria C. Jamora of this decision, they are deemed to
have vacated their respective office, and their authority to
act as Judge and Court Stenographer, respectively, are
considered automatically terminated.
These consolidated administrative cases are referred to
the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report
and recommendation regarding the possible disbarment of
Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua from the practice of the legal
profession.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. NO. MTJ-02-1432 : September 3, 2004]
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR ROBERT M.
VISBAL, Complainant, v. JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Tacloban
City, Respondent.
226
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a sworn complaint,1 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Robert M. Visbal charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC,
Branch 1, Tacloban City with Violation of Rule 3.05,2 Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and/or Failure to Decide
a Case Within the Reglementary Period, Gross Inefficiency,
Misconduct, Bias and Partiality relative to Criminal Cases
Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-07-20.3
Complainant avers that respondent Judge failed to decide
Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-07-20 within the 90-
day period from submission of the parties's memoranda.
Hence, complainant prays that respondent Judge be held
administratively liable as well as criminally liable for
Violation of Article 1744 of the Revised Penal Code for his
failure to disclose in his Certificates of Service from June
1999 that the subject cases were pending decision.
Complainant further alleges that respondent Judge
displayed bias in favor of the accused in the above-
mentioned criminal cases by his tolerance of the defense's
late filing of pleadings and failure to appear in court
despite due notice. He claims that respondent Judge
harbored a grudge against him because his wife filed an
administrative complaint against the latter.
In his Comment,5 respondent Judge denied the allegations
in the complaint. He alleged that the subject cases were
originally pending before the sala of Judge Paulino A.
Cabello but were subsequently transferred to him after
Judge Cabello inhibited himself from hearing the cases. He
explains that his inability to dispose of the cases within the
prescribed period was due to the failure of his staff to
bring the cases to him for proper action. It was only on
December 1, 1999 that his attention was called regarding
these two cases which had been submitted for decision.
However, after going over the memoranda of the parties
and other pleadings, he found that the only way to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused is through
a full-blown trial. Thus, he scheduled the cases for trial. He
admits that he was unable to report the pendency of these
two cases in his Certificate of Service because he was
unaware that the period to decide them had already
lapsed.
Respondent further averred that the administrative
case6 filed by complainant's wife against him was already
dismissed by this Court in a Resolution dated August 11,
1997.7 He notes that complainant has the propensity of
filing administrative cases against judges and fellow
prosecutors, and he even filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Cabello for inhibiting himself from hearing
Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-07-20.
On May 8, 2002, the complaint was docketed as a regular Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of
administrative matter and referred to the Executive Judge Judicial Conduct state:
of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City for
investigation, report and recommendation. Rule 1.02. - A judge should administer justice impartially
and without delay.
Executive Judge Leonardo B. Apita inhibited himself in a
letter dated June 13, 20028 stating that he was related to Rule 3.05. - A judge shall dispose of the court's business
respondent Judge within the 6th degree of affinity. Thus, promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
the case was referred to Vice Executive Judge Salvador Y. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Apurillo.
In this connection, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87
In his Report dated March 24, 2003,9 Judge Apurillo states, inter alia, that:
concluded that respondent Judge indeed failed to resolve
the cases within the reglementary period, but found that
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed
part of the blame was attributable to his staff. Since
by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the
respondent has a caseload of more than 1,000 cases, it
adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters
could really happen that some important matters may be
submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must
overlooked. While many lawyers try to help out judges by
be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of
filing motions for early resolution, this did not happen in
submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other
the subject cases. If respondent Judge was to be faulted at
lower courts are given a period of three months to do
all, it would be for his failure to devise a system to keep
so. . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)
track of the cases pending before him and to efficiently
manage his personnel. For his transgression, Judge
Apurillo recommended that respondent Judge be "sternly We find the penalty recommended by the OCA not
reprimanded." commensurate to the misconduct committed by
respondent.18
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with
the factual findings of Judge Apurillo but recommended Section 7, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
that respondent Judge be fined in the amount of Three amended,19 classifies administrative charges as serious,
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00). less serious or light. Undue delay in rendering a decision or
order is subsumed under less serious charges under
Section 9. Pursuant to Section 11 (B) of the same Rule,
As per Resolution of the Court dated February 11,
such offense is punishable by suspension from office
2004,10 both complainant11 and respondent12 manifested
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
their willingness to submit the case for resolution on the
month nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more
basis of the pleadings filed.
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Therefore,
the imposable penalty warranted in this case is a fine of
The reasons adduced by respondent for his delay in P11,000.00.
rendering judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-19 and
98-07-20 are not novel. A judge cannot take refuge behind
The resolution of this case will not, however, be complete
the mistakes and inefficiency of his court personnel. 13 He is
without passing upon complainant's unusual proclivity of
charged with the administrative responsibility of
filing several administrative cases against respondent. A
organizing and supervising them to secure the prompt and
verification with the Docket and Clearance Division of the
efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the
OCA discloses that complainant prosecutor had so far filed
observance of high standards of public service and
the following administrative complaints against
fidelity.14 Indeed, he is ultimately responsible for ensuring
respondent Judge:
that court personnel perform their tasks and that the
parties are promptly notified of his orders and
decisions.15 It is his duty to devise an efficient recording 1) A.M. OCA-IPI No. 00-944-MTJ for Nepotism. Complaint
and filing system in his court to enable him to monitor the dismissed on 18 February 2002;
flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely
disposition.16 2) A.M. OCA-IPI No. 02-1262-MTJ for Dishonesty and Gross
Misconduct. Complaint dismissed on 9 July 2003;
If respondent Judge could not decide the case within the
reglementary period, all he had to do was to ask from this 3) A.M. OCA-IPI No. 02-1299-MTJ for Grave Misconduct,
Court a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the Malfeasance and Conduct Prejudicial to the Service.
case, which may have been granted.17 Complaint dismissed on 26 March 2003;

227
4) A.M. OCA-IPI No. 97-360-MTJ for Grave Abuse of
Judicial Authority, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Serious
Misconduct filed by Asuncion Baldonaza, wife of
complainant. Complaint dismissed on 11 August 1997;
5) A.M. No. MTJ-03-1471 for Gross Inefficiency.
Respondent was fined Eleven Thousand Pesos
(P11,000.00) on 22 January 2003;
6) A.M. No. 02-1432 for alleged Failure to Decide Cases
Within the Reglementary Period, Misconduct, Bias and
Partiality. This is the case under evaluation.
Complainant's obsessive prosecutorial zeal in filing
administrative charges is not limited to respondent Judge
because a verification with the Docket and Clearance
Division of the OCA reveals that said complainant has, to
date, filed no less than 31 administrative cases, inclusive of
the foregoing complaints against respondent, against MTC
judges, RTC magistrates and other court personnel of
Leyte, to wit:
A. Against RTC Judges of Leyte:
1) OCA-IPI No. 02-1615-RTJ for Grave Misconduct v. Judge
Leonilo C. Apita, Branch 7, Tacloban City. Complaint
Dismissed on 03 September 2003;
2) OCA-IPI No. 99-873-RTJ for Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Acts Prejudicial to the
Service v. Judge Leonilo C. Apita, Branch 7, Tacloban City.
Complaint Dismissed on 01 January 2000;
3) OCA-IPI No. 03-1770-RTJ for Knowingly Rendering
Unjust Judgment v. Judge Salvador Y. Apurillo, Branch 8,
Tacloban City. Pending;
4) OCA-IPI No. 03-1656-RTJ for Knowingly Rendering
Unjust Judgment v. Judge Salvador Y. Apurillo, Branch 8,
Tacloban City. Complaint Dismissed on 06 August 2003;
5) OCA-IPI No. 00-967-RTJ for Failure to Decide Case within
90-day period v. Judge Pepe P. Domael, Branch 37, Naval-
Biliran. Complaint Dismissed on 24 July 2000;
6) A.M. No. RTJ-93-1096 for Irregularity in Granting Bail v.
Judge Getulio Francisco, Branch 6, Tacloban City.
Complaint Dismissed on 11 January 1995;
7) A.M. No. RTJ-99-1490 for Falsification of Certificate of
Service v. Judge Frisco T. Lilagan, Branch 34, Tacloban City.
Fined P1,000.00 27 July 1999;
8) OCA-IPI No. 97-365-RTJ for Grave Misconduct, abuse of
Judicial Authority and Oppression v. Judge Roberto A.
228
Navidad, Branch 9, Tacloban City. Complaint Dismissed 11
March 2002;
9) A.M. No. RTJ-03-1744 for Violation of Canon 3.05, Code
of Judicial Conduct and Failure to Decide Case within the
Reglementary Period v. Judge Rogelio C. Sescon, Branch 9,
Tacloban City. Fined P11,000.00 16 August 2003;
10) OCA-IPI No. 03-1879-RTJ for Undue Delay in Resolving
Civil Case No. 2002-11236 v. Judge Roberto C. Sescon,
Branch 9, Tacloban City. Pending;
B. Against other MTC Judges of Leyte:
11) OCA-IPI No. 98-631-MTJ for Gross Incompetence,
Negligence and Grave Misconduct in Office v. Judge
Paulino A. Cabello, MTCC, Branch 2, Tacloban City.
Complaint Dismissed 23 August 2000.
12) A.M. No. MTJ-00-1306 for Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Judicial Authority and Negligence v. Judge
Rodolfo C. Ramos, MTC, Jaro, Leyte. Fined P3,000.00 20
March 2001;
13) OCA-IPI No. 04-1576-MTJ for Grave Misconduct and
Gross Ignorance of the Law v. Judge Wenceslao C. Vanilla.
Pending;
C. Against Court Personnel:
14) OCA-IPI No. 03-1585-P for Violation of pars. 1 & 2 of
Administrative Circular No. 24-90 and other Guidelines on
Stenographers and Inefficiency v. Gemma Almadden,
Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 9, Tacloban City.
Pending;
15) OCA-IPI No. 02-1262-MTJ for Dishonesty and Gross
Misconduct v. Felicisimo Anota, Clerk of Court, MTCC,
Tacloban City. Reprimanded 09 July 2003;
16) OCA-IPI No. 00-957-P for Violation of Section 5 (a), R.A.
No. 6713 v. Felicisimo Anota, Clerk of Court, Branch 1,
MTCC, Tacloban City. Admonished 15 April 2002;
17) OCA-IPI No. 03-1658-P for Violation of SC Circular No.
24-90 dated 12 July 1990 & other related circulars, Neglect
of Duty v. Teresita Calleja, Clerk of Court V, RTC, Branch 7,
Tacloban City. Complaint Dismissed 18 February 2004;
18) OCA-IPI No. 02-1299-MTJ for Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service v. Joseph Daya, Interpreter,
MTCC, Branch 1, Tacloban City. Complaint Dismissed 26
March 2003;
19) OCA-IPI No. 02-1461-P for Violation of the Manual for
Clerks of Court v. Anne Beth Polo-Igano, Clerk of Court II,
MTC, Pastrana, Leyte. Complaint Dismissed 24 March
2003;
20) OCA-IPI No. 03-1658-P for Violation of SC Circular No.
24-90 dated 12 July 1990 and other related circulars,
Neglect of Duty v. Salome Montezon, Stenographer,
Branch 7, Tacloban City. Complaint Dismissed 18 February
2004;
21) A.M. No. RTJ-93-1096 for Irregularity in Granting Bail v.
Blanche A. Salino, Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 6, Tacloban
City. Complaint Dismissed 11 January 1995;
22) OCA-IPI No. 97-235-P for Violation of R.A. No. 6713,
Section 5 (a) v. Edgardo M. Tutaan, Clerk of Court, MTC,
Palo, Leyte. Admonished 18 June 1997;
23) A.M. No. P-00-1408 for Violation of R.A. No. 6713 v.
Gonzalo Velarde, Clerk of Court, MTC, Alangalang, Leyte.
Complaint Dismissed 25 April 2001;
24) OCA-IPI No. 00-998-P for Failure to Respond to a Letter
v. Flordeliza Villanueva, Cashier, MTCC, OCC, Tacloban
City. Complaint Dismissed 21 January 2002;
25) OCA-IPI No. 02-1262-MTJ for Dishonesty and Gross
Misconduct v. Flordeliza Villanueva, Cashier, MTCC,
Tacloban City. Reprimanded 09 July 2003.
In a Resolution dated July 7, 2004, the Court directed
complainant to show cause why he should not be held
administratively liable for his propensity for filing false
charges against officials and employees of the court within
a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.
Complainant thereafter filed his Compliance stating that
although some of those administrative complaints may not
have merited the judicious evaluation of this Court, it is his
honest belief that the administrative complaints he filed
were well-founded. Furthermore, he had noble intentions
of particularly bringing to the attention of this Court the
abuses and irregularities in the lower court for appropriate
action.
We find complainant's explanation unsatisfactory. His
propensity to litigate raises doubts as to how he could find
the time to perform his duties at all. Such an excessive
tendency to complain even the slightest of administrative
infractions in some of the cases constitutes an oppressive
and gross abuse of legal processes. This imposes on the
precious time of the Court and impedes the speedy and
efficient dispensation of justice. Complainant should be
reminded that it is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the
court not to foment suits among individuals.
229
A lawyer owes to society and to the court the duty not to
stir up litigation. The Code of Professional Responsibility
states that "a lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest encourage any suit or proceeding." 20 Thus, a
lawyer is ordered "not to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator of concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead
of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and justice." 21 In
fact, lawyers are called upon to resist the whims and
caprices of their clients and to temper the latter's
propensity to litigate because the Lawyer's Oath to uphold
the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his clients.22
The foregoing dictum which is embodied in the Canons of
Professional Responsibility applies with equal vigor to
lawyers in the government service like
complainant.23 Indeed, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility explicitly states that '
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.24
Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost
fidelity to the public service because public service is a
public trust.25 A lawyer does not shed his professional
obligations upon assuming public office.26 In fact, his
professional obligations should make him more sensitive
to his official obligations because a lawyer's disreputable
conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.27
It is worthy to note that complainant has already been
cited by this Court in Visbal v. Ramos 28 for wantonly
making baseless charges for malfeasance thus:
We must stress that gross ignorance of the law is a serious
accusation. It therefore behooves complainant to be more
circumspect in hurling this charge. Indeed, a person who
accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure
of the grounds for the accusation, or else be found
ignorant of the law, as in this case. Judges, while expected
to be a cut above the rest in the legal profession, are not
inured to the strain concomitant with baseless and unfair
aspersions on their competence. They certainly deserve a
better treatment, especially from a prosecutor who should
know, at the very least, the basic provisions of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. (Emphasis and italics supplied).
Complainant is therefore guilty of misconduct, defined as
the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character and implies wrongful intent and not mere error
in judgment.29
Given the prevailing facts of this case, a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) should suffice.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1) Ordering respondent Judge Marino S. Buban to PAY a
FINE of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000.00);
andcralawlibrary
2) Ordering Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal to PAY a FINE of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
Ang gumagalang,
Both complainant and respondent are likewise STERNLY
(Sgd.
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
Concern[ed] citizen of Legazpi [City]
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043             September 5, 2007
JUAN DE LA CRUZ (CONCERNED CITIZEN OF LEGAZPI
CITY), complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RUBEN B. CARRETAS, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 9, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case stems from an anonymous
complaint by "Juan de la Cruz," a concerned citizen of
Legazpi City, against respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas,
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi
City, Branch 9. The letter-complaint1 read:
The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court
and The Honorable Court Administrator
Supreme Court, Manila
Sir and Madam,
Kami po ay sumulat sa inyo dahil po sa reklamo
sa masamang ugali at asal ni Judge Ruben
Car[r]etas ng RTC, Branch 9, Legazpi City.
Siya po ay isang mayabang na Judge at mahilig
mang insulto sa pamamagitan ng side comments
sa mga testigo, abogado at fiscal, parang siya na
lang ang may alam sa batas. Bilang Judge siya na
po ang nagdirect, at cross-examine sa mga
testigo.
230
Dahil sa kanyang ginagawa napapahiya ang mga
testigo, abogado at fiscal sa harap ng publiko.
Nawawala din po ang respeto ng publiko sa
justice system.
Kami po ay umaasa at nanalangin sa madaliang
aksyon ng inyong opisina para malutas ang
problemang ito.
Salamat at mabuhay po kayong lahat.
Juan de la Cruz)
In his comment,2 respondent judge surmised that the
complaint was initiated by a lawyer whose petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage was not granted. He
denied the accusation and claimed that he had not
insulted anyone. He then narrated that, in his first few
months in office, he experienced the following
exasperating and somewhat amusing incidents: a lawyer
insisting on further examining a witness he had already
subjected to re-cross examination; a prosecutor
proceeding with the presentation of evidence when the
accused had not yet been arraigned; a lawyer appearing
for an absent counsel de parte and manifesting that he
was appearing "in corroboration" with the latter; lawyers
appearing without observing the proper dress code; a
lawyer offering the testimony of his witness "to
collaborate" the testimony of another witness; a lawyer
manifesting that he was ready for trial but turning out to
be unprepared with his documentary evidence, prompting
the court to call a recess; a case for unjust vexation
committed against a minor being raffled to his sala when
the records showed that the victim was waylaid, boxed
and dragged to a forested area where the accused
touched her private part and mashed her breasts; a case
being filed for kidnapping and serious illegal detention
only despite the fact that the girl was raped while in
captivity. Respondent judge stated that he never
encountered these mistakes "in all his years of law practice
in Manila." Thus, he was shocked because he thought that
these things "happened only in anecdotes."
Respondent judge observed that due to their familiarity
with each other, lawyers appearing in his sala hardly
objected even to obviously objectionable questions. In
such instances, he called the attention of counsels
because, to his mind, they were making a "moro-
moro"3 out of the proceedings.
Respondent judge also stated that, while he may have
used harsh word sometimes, they were made out of
exasperation and with the intention merely to right the
wrong committed in his presence, not to insult anyone. intervene in the presentation of
Nonetheless, he apologized to those who may have been evidence and asked more questions
offended by his remarks. than counsel. Respondent judge
showed apathy to those who were
In connection with the complaint, Judge Romeo S. Dañas, subjected to his insults. He insisted
executive judge of the RTC of Legazpi City, conducted a that others submit to his way of doing
discreet investigation.4 He interviewed lawyers who things. He showed inflexibility to minor
appeared in the sala of respondent judge. He requested mistakes.8
them to submit their respective written comments on the
decorum of respondent judge when holding trial. Among 4. Atty. Ricardo V. de Jesus
these comments were the following:
While he was in the process of
1. Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr. conducting direct examination,
respondent judge instructed him to ask
Respondent judge should avoid making questions which respondent judge
embarrassing, insulting and abrasive thought to be material. When he was
remarks. He should also limit himself through with his direct examination,
to asking clarificatory questions.5 respondent judge asked him in open
court how long he had been in private
practice. He replied that he had been
2. Atty. Expedito P. Nebres
practicing for only a period of one and
a half (1½) years. Respondent judge
If not in open court respondent judge then told him to prepare supposed
is kind, courteous and respectful. direct questions and expected
However, in open court he is arrogant answers. He felt embarrassed.9
and boastful. He has a bad habit in
making embarrassing or insulting
On October 6, 2005, the members of the Provincial
remarks when presiding over cases.
Prosecution Office of Albay held a meeting to discuss the
Most of the time, he was the one
matter of assigning a public prosecutor to the sala of
conducting direct and cross-
respondent judge. During the meeting, the prosecutors
examination of witnesses. He used to
raised their concern about the behavior of respondent
scold, harass and embarrass witnesses,
judge. Provincial prosecutor Benigno L. Tolosa furnished
litigants, lawyers, prosecutors and
Judge Dañas with a copy of the minutes of the
PAO6 lawyers for just a slight mistake
meeting.10 The relevant portions of the minutes11 were:
in procedure.7

II. DISCUSSION
3. Atty. Alexis C. Albao

 The Provincial Prosecutor informed the

In the course of presentation of
group about the purpose of the
evidence for his client, he was insulted
meeting. He said that the prosecutor
and subjected to sarcastic remarks by
assigned in RTC Branch 9, Prosecutor
respondent judge, not once but for
Maria Miranda-Gojar will soon be
several occasions. This traumatized
transferring to the Office of the
him and made him avoid reading the
Regional State Prosecutor. He asked
transcript of stenographic notes of the
suggestions from the group on how to
said hearing until now. In one
go about the matter of assigning a
occasion, respondent judge proceeded
prosecutor in Branch 9 considering
to cut short the proceedings. When he
that all prosecutors have their own
manifested that he would cross-
court assignment and considering
examine the defendant, respondent
further that the Presiding Judge of said
judge stood from his seat and in a
Branch has a behavioral and attitudinal
sarcastic manner looked backward
problem.
manifesting that he was not interested
 Considering that the matter to be
or not listening to the cross-
discussed involves the problem with
examination. Thus, he was discouraged
the Presiding Judge, the Provincial
from proceeding with his cross-
Prosecutor requested those
examination. Most of the time,
prosecutors [present] to share their
respondent judge would unduly

231
 experiences in the court with the of city prosecutor Rubio.15 He concluded that the charges
Presiding Judge. against respondent judge were true. However, he
 Prosecutor [Eduardo B.] Quinzon refrained from recommending any definite action against
remarked that the judge has a sudden him and left the matter to the sound discretion of the
burst of temper and wild moods, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).16
insulting and humiliating lawyers in
front of their clients even in the In its report,17 the OCA adopted the findings of Judge
presence of other people. Dañas and made the following recommendation:
 Prosecutor Gojar added that the
Presiding Judge has a volatile temper
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for
and is fond of insulting and humiliating
the consideration of the Honorable Court is our
witnesses and also lawyers. She also
recommendation that respondent Judge Ruben
said that during arraignment or trial of
B. Carretas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
cases, he would even call her attention
Legazpi City be ADVISED to observe proper
and would insult the prosecutor who
judicial decorum and to conscientiously abide by
made the Information and Resolution
the mandates of the New Code of Judicial
of the case and even the Chief who
Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics in the
approved the same.
exercise of his official functions.18
 Prosecutor [Maria Teresa A.] Mahiwo
added that she observed one hearing
[where] the Presiding Judge [scolded] We disagree. Respondent judge deserves more than mere
the two private lawyers who [were] "advice."
much older than him. She said that
being assigned in Branch 9 will not be Respondent judge should be reminded of Sections 1 and 2,
good for the health of any prosecutor. Canon 2 and Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:19
III. RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT
CANON 2
 Prosecutor [Elmer M.] Lanuzo opined
that because the judge is INTEGRITY
temperamental, he should be given a
fiscal who is not temperamental. Integrity is essential not only in the proper
 It was resolved by the group that no discharge of the judicial office but also to the
prosecutor will be assigned at RTC personal demeanor of judges.
Branch 9 considering that all
prosecutors have their own court
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their
assignment.
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
 It was also agreed that the Presiding
to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
Judge can request from the
Department of Justice a prosecutor
who would attend to the cases in his SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must
sala.12 reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.
Judge Dañas also received a letter13 from city prosecutor
Palmarin E. Rubio of Legazpi City. City prosecutor Rubio
stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala of xxx xxx xxx
respondent judge did not want to comment on the
conduct of respondent judge. He suggested that members CANON 4
of an audit team from this Court be made to observe the
proceedings in Branch 9 to "see and feel the PROPRIETY
tension[-]charged atmosphere in the sala once the trial
started."14
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities
To his report, Judge Dañas attached copies of the of a judge.
comments of the lawyers he interviewed, the letter of
provincial prosecutor Tolosa enclosing the minutes of the
meeting of the public prosecutors in Albay and the letter

232
 SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be
learned in the law, dignified in demeanor, refined in
speech and virtuous in character. Besides having the
requisite learning in the law, he must exhibit that hallmark
judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint.20 In this connection, he should be considerate,
courteous and civil to all persons who come to his
court.21 A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or
uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who appear in his
sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to
reaffirm the people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary which provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum
in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.22 (emphasis
supplied)
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a
lawyer,23 litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint.24 Thus, a judge must at
all times be temperate in his language.25 He must choose
his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and
sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for
his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness.26
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant
marks of a dispenser of justice.27 A judge should always
keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run
loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level
of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he
utters harsh words, snide remarks or sarcastic comments.
As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes
public confidence in the judiciary.
Against this backdrop, respondent judge indeed appears
arrogant and boastful not only in the eyes of the
anonymous complainant but also to the lawyers who
practice in his sala. He revealed a hint of arrogance in his
comment when he professed exasperation over minor
procedural mistakes28 or even negligible lapses (such as
the confusion in the use of "collaborate" and
"corroborate"). He also displayed a condescending attitude
toward lawyers in the provinces when he implied that they
were "inferior" to lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he
should ensure that his conduct is always above reproach
233
and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. He must
never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any
kind of impropriety.
The dispensation of justice is a joint responsibility of the
judge and the lawyer.29 A sense of shared responsibility
which is a crucial factor in the administration of justice is
expected of them.30 They should co-exist in a spirit of
cooperation and mutual respect, not animosity and
derision. Respondent judge antagonized the lawyers
(private practitioners, public attorneys and public
prosecutors alike) appearing in his sala by his perceived
arrogance and insulting remarks. Consequently, he
impaired the administration of justice.
Respondent judge unduly intervened in the presentation
of evidence. He asked more questions than counsel and
conducted direct and cross-examination of witnesses. In so
doing, he contravened Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:31
RULE 3.06 – While a judge may, to promote
justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some
obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation
of evidence during the trial, it should be borne in
mind that undue interference may prevent the
proper presentation of the cause or the
ascertainment of truth.
—∞——∞——∞—
14. Interference in conduct of trial
While a judge may properly intervene in a trial of
a case to promote expedition and prevent
unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some
obscurity, nevertheless, he should bear in mind
that his undue interference, impatience, or
participation in the examination of witnesses, or
a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses,
especially those who are excited or terrified by
the unusual circumstances of trial, may tend to
prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or
the ascertainment of the truth in respect
thereto.
Conversation between the judge and counsel in
court is often necessary, but the judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to
obscure the merits of the dispute between
litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. In
addressing counsel, litigants or witnesses, he
should avoid a controversial tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their
arguments except to clarify his mind as to their
 positions, and he should not be tempted to an 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which
unnecessary display of learning or a premature he is FINED in the amount of P7,500.
judgment.
Judge Carretas is further STERNLY WARNED that the
A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall
evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of be dealt with more severely.
time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in the
course of the testimony of the witness or Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal
thereafter.32 Questions designed to clarify points and to records of respondent judge.
elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.33 But
the judge should limit himself to asking clarificatory
SO ORDERED.
questions and the power should be sparingly and
judiciously used. The rule is that the court should stay out
of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor
intervening in the conduct of the trial.34 A judge must
always maintain cold neutrality and impartiality for he is a
magistrate, not an advocate.35

In fine, the over-all conduct of respondent judge has been

unbecoming of a magistrate. It is classified as a light
charge36 for which a fine of not less than P1,000 but not
exceeding P10,000 may be imposed.37

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,38 this administrative case

against respondent judge shall also be considered as a
disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the
bar.

Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct

embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons
139 and 1140 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the
judicial office tends to diminish the people’s respect for
the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe and
maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial
officers.

Respondent judge also transgressed Canon 841 and Rule

8.0142 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
humiliated, insulted or embarrassed lawyers appearing in
his sala. Instead of establishing a cordial and collaborative
atmosphere with lawyers, respondent judge alienated
them and effectively disregarded their significant role in
the administration of justice.

Accordingly, respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is hereby

found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge. In
particular, he violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2, Section 1,
Canon 4 and Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Rule 3.06 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics. He is FINED in the amount of P7,500.

Respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is also hereby

found GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 8 and 11 and Rule

234