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,+ +

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': • ''We want to establish an independent, non-aligned and !

! stable Islamic government in Afghanistan. !

,+ +

+ +

+ +

! • "The future government of free Afgh'anistan wi II main- :

+ +

! tain friendly relations with all States except those acting !

+ +

: against the faith, independence and territorial integrity :

: of our homeland. !

+ +

+ +

+ +

+ +

! • "We will make independent judgements on all intern- :

: ational issues, supporting the rights and condemning !

+ +

: the wrong. :

+ +

+ +

, ,+ +

, : • "Our internal and external policies wi II be based on :.

+ +

+ the Quran and Sunnah. +

+ +

+ +

+ +

·.i • "The rights of all Afghan nationals would be duly pro- !

!, tected by the Islamic State of Afghanistan. !

+ +

+ +

+ +

! • "The Islamic State will take all possible measures for the !

: promotion of science and technology and for the recon- !

+ +

! struction and development of Afghanistan in order to !

+ +

+ make it a self-reliant and selfsufficient State." +

+ +

+ +

+ +

+ +

!. Eng. Gulbudin Hekmatyar !

+ +

+ Amir of Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan +

+ +

+ +

+ +

+ +

+ +

+ +

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+ ...

+ +

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, ++++++++++++++++++++++,+++.+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

,The Mujahideen Monthly

Dear Editor:

The efforts of Engineer Hekmatvar as the spokesman of Ittehadi-Islami Mujahideen Afghanistan at the United Nations for the del iverance of the Afghan seat to the sole- representative of the Afghan nation and his declaration of a General Amnesty are major steps in the present stage of the Afghan Jehad.

As a result of this general amnesty four army !:Jenerals, scores

of soldiers from different parts of the country, and more than 650 armed Afghan soldiers in Ghazni province have joined the ranks of the Mujahideen.

I am sure such steps will fill the gap which exists between the military and political aspects of the Afghan Jehad.

Your brother Abu Mansoor Islamabad

Dear Readers:

Dear Editor:

I was very happy to receive your monthly magazine, in my"opinion, it is of a high level. Contentwise I appreciate your efforts and wish you success in the continued publication of the magazine.

Sincerely, M.l. Nairn Islamabad.

The Editorial Board of The Mujahideen Monthly appreciates your comments, views,

suggestions

and

criticism about the maga-

\

zine and considers them assjgnificant con-

. ' , .

tribution to the further improvement of our

_ work both in term of appearance and that of the text.

Thank you.-

The Mujahideen Montnly G.P. O. Box 255 Peshawar, Pakistan

4

The Mujahideen Monthlv

····················~DITORIA· L .,-.- ........•.•• iiiiiiiiiii •• .- ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• .- ••••••••••.••••••••• .-.- ••.•••••••• .- •••.••.••.•••••••• .- ••••• ~

•• , ,E.,. • ••••• _ ••••••••. 11 ••••••••••••••.• __ ...........................•••• •• • ._ ••• '_.II ,.~.- ••••••......................

The organization of the tslsmtc Conference in its 16th session held in the ancient Moroccan city of Fez considered more than one hundred issues, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan being among those at the top of the agenda.

The OIC's stand on Russia's brutal and naked aggression on Afghanistan was made clear at an extraordinary session held in Islamabad in Jenuerv 1980.

At the session the OIC adopted a weI/known 11 point policy on the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Among other things it called for the restoration of the Islamic character of. Afghanistan, its nonaligned status and ensuring the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their country with dignity and honoar.

The conference also demanded that the Afghan nation must have the right to self-

determination and suggested that a three member standing committee be formed to follow up the issue to itsjust solution.

Since then the OIC stands with regards to A fghariistan is by and large commendable, however its resolutions seem to be stronger in rhetoric than in action.

The Russians are, aware of the soft approach of the OIC. Particularly of those member countries who continue" to' 'develop their economic, cultural, military and political

. ties with Moscow.

The result of the Sovie~' over-all strategies in the region is clear now for all to see and the Russians are no longer hiding their ambitions in the region.

While the Russians are fqrcingthe people of A fghanistan to leave their land- using murderous techniques' including massacr.· chemical agents and the destruction 'of crops ..:.. they are tryingt!esperately to tighten their grip on the country by building barracks

The Mujahideen Monthly

::_::::::::_::::_:~::::::::::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::_:,;::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::<::_:::::::_::::::::::::::::;:::::'::::';:;:.:::::.:_::'::::::::::l:::::::::

increasing their troops and expandmg airbases.

The bases are so located that Russian warplanes could easily reach the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf within a few minutes. It is plain that this expansionism threatens many OIC and countries of the free world. - a threat which can only shatter the dreams of friendship with Moscow that are entertained by some Muslim countries.

Whether the OIC plays a defensive role or none at a/l, it is now clearcut that Moscow has not responded positively to the resolutions of the OIC, NAM, the UN and other international fora.

The Kremlin has been trying to create an optimistic atmosphere about the Afghanistan crisis by promoting the idea of a so-called peace full settlement under the auspices of the UN special envoy Mr. Diego Cordoviz.

If members of the international community are going to allow themselves to be deluded by sucb : a masquerade then it will only further isolate the Mujahideen in their continuing struggle against an evil oppressor

and will encourage the Russians to take similar imperialistic action against other small countries all over the world.

The attitudes of certain Muslim Countries like Syria, Libya, South Yemelt Algeria and Iraq, and the representative of the PLO, who have expressed reservations about the resolution on Afghanistan, passed at Fez, are deplorable.

Syria's attitude is perttcutertv sbemetutl as its representative impudently said that the vacant Afghanistan seat at the OIC should be given to the quisling government in Kabul.

The truth is if the above mentioned governments are taking a servile attitude towards Moscow in return for the Russian arms, what makes the PLO to evince antagonism towards the Mujahideen of Afghanistan. Whereas the people of Afghanistan have a/ways supported the Palestinian cause.

It is als() regrettable that the vacant A fghanistan seat has not been given to the Mujahideen despite of the fact that all the parties of Mujahideen are united. In the past members' of the OIC refused to give the seat to the Mujahideen on the grounds that the Parties were disunited.

The Islamic unity of the Afghan Mujahideen for the first time sent a delegation to the OIC representing all parties but due to the reluctancy of some friends of the Mujahideen even the question of allocating the vacant seat was not included in the agenda. Had, at least, the OIC recognized the mujahideen as the sole representative of their nation, it would have ~ilitated their recognition by the world community and other fora.

It is certain that the Russians would not change. their intransigent posture by mere resolutions. However, there is only one alterf1Qrive by the adoption of which effective poiitical pressure could be exerted on the Russians to withdraw their forces from A fghanistan. This effective tool would be the recognition of the Afghan Mujahideen by the coming OIC summit this year.

Since the Jihad in Afghanistan is a unique example of the liberation of the Muslim Ummllh if not propped up by the Muslims in the world, its long ron repereussions would prove catastrophic for the vei-y existence and independence of the MUslim countries.

6

The Mujahideen Monthlv

BY SUR GUL SPEEN

RUSSIANS' MACHIAVELLIS·M

IN AFGHANISTAN

Moscow is now on the move, trying to Sovietize many nations throughout the world. In attempting to impose its will on millions of people it has developed the stratagem of divide and rule to a fine art, not just applying it to non-communists but also to other communists so that al/ power is vested in Moscow. If the divisions' within the Communist parties in "the world are examined it becomes obvious that they do not have different

'approaches to social problems but the divisions flrise because of intrigue by Moscow so that it alone holds the reins of power. This policy can be readily seen today in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Vietnam, Kampuchea, East Germany, South Yemen and Afghanistan. In the following article' I look at the attempted Sovietization of Afghanistan, Moscow's intrigues and terrorism.

For the last seven decades the Soviet Union has been supporting Kabul's rulers rBNrdless of whether they belonged to a monsrcv, Daoud's left-wing eristucretic republic, or were- the Kremlin's favourites, Taraki and Amin, who came to power in the April coup of 1978.

No doubt the Kremlin has been sincere with all these governments until it realised that the. natio'! was fed up with them and the people

• might revolt and throw off their tyrannical, quisling leaders.

As such, whenever, tne Kremlin's old v . guarqs foresaw such. a danger; tt'tey would pre-empt any attempt by the people to shake off their puppets and replace them

with another puppet.

The Kremlin s role has .been that of a protector for Kabul's rulers and rather than being afraid of Moscow the latter regarded

them as comrades.

Moscow's role with Kabul's governments has been that ofa seemingly good friend - even jhouqh it 'was plainly an enemy of the Afghan people - but in reality behind the masquerade of good· will the're have been machiavellian minds. The Russians have been winding the Afghan rulers around their I ittle fingers.

Since Afghani'!;tan's independence in 1919 all of Kabul's rulers have enjoyed' strong support from Moscow and as such the Kremlin

The Muiabieeen Monthly

7

has been well served by them. DUring the days of Ki ng Arnanullah and King Nadir Shah the Russians were able to persuade both kings not to help th~ Muslim leaders of Central Asia who Were fighting for their independence against the Russians.

The old friendship between the Kremlin and Kabul's rulers has reduced the Afghan nation to poverty, step by step, until it now faces destruction, the loss of its independence" and even genocide.

King Zahir Shah. served the Russians for 40 years and provided them with the best opportun itv to communize the Afghan nation through so-called educational programs, and military, development and trade treaties.

Big brother's aid was not-qiven unconditionally, but instead the Kremlin expected King Zahir Shah to let it propagate Communism.

By 1965 the Russians had succeeded in persuading the then prime minister, Mohammad Daoud, to accept changes in Zahir Shah's National Constitution and promised him that one day they would make him the ruler of Afghanistan. Some of the changes in the' National Constitution were that the prime minister should not be from the royal family and that political parties had to be permitted

Under

Moscow's

plan

Mohammed Daoud was given the task of communizing Afghanistan by his Russian puppeteers: A week after Daoud's removal as prime minister, one of the graduates of the Faculty of Politics at Kabul University, whom I cannot name for security reasons, visited him at his summer house near Paghman valley. The young politici.;n quoted Daoud as saying: "Now it is time to work for Socialism, we have formed a political party and soon many intellectuals w"1I1 join us."

In 1965 the fir~ Communist

paper, Khalq, was published with the permission of Zahir Shah's government. The paper' was launched to advertise ,the off.icial announcement of the formation of the Communist party, Hezb-iDemocratic Khalq Afghanistan (People s Democratic Pal ty of A[·

qhanistan},

Apparently

Noar

unitinq all the parties.

In July 1973, in keeping with the Krelmin's policy of taking ste ps after 10 years and its pro mise to Mohammad Daoud, Moscow asked Zahir Shah to leave Afghanistan on the pretext of seeking medical treatment overseas, Three days later, on a quiet and sunny morning, Kabul Radio announced that Mohammad Daoud was the president of Afghanistan. In Daoud's bloodless coup, well engineered by Moscow, more than five serving army officers from the Khalq faction and at least 14 officers from the Parcham faction played leading roles.

Moscow. the.Khalq and Parch am factions of PDPA, Afghan· Millat' and other small secular parties praised Mohammad Daoud as a hero and great leader. Both the Khalq and Parcham factions bowed down to him but old hatreds and differences between them everuually led Daoud to squeeze the Khalqis out of the government.

At Moscow's request Mohammed Daoud planned to have a two party government, witH the Parcham Party, headed by himself, in government, and the Khalq Party, headed by Noor Mohammed

Taraki, in opposition. '

Moscow's scheme to establish such a government was set aside when in 1975 Daoud's special envoy attended an Islamic conference in Lahore and later himself visited the Gulf states. However, when he visited Raza Shah of Iran the Kremlin scotched the plan completely. Some people believe that Raza Shah was comissioned by the CIA to convince Mohammed Daoud to keep away from the Russians but this is doubtful because if the CIA had briefed Raza Shah why did it not hel p Daoud when' the Russians initiated the April coup of 1978:

When Daoud founded his own party, MilJ.i Ghourzang '(Nati,onal Uprising), the Russians maintained

8

The Mujahideen Monthly

Mohammed Tarak: was appointed leader for political reasons but in reality Mohammed Daoud held the reins of power' and c~ntrol

of the PDPA.

After a short time the Kremlin realised that it would help its plans to Communize Afghanistan by playing off various groups within the Afghan rnarxists against one another. It divided ihe PDPA into two groups:

(a) The Khalq faction -, ural dwellers, landlords, tribal leaders, and the majority of Push too speakers.

(b) The Parcham faction - urbanites; aristrocrats, landlords, trio bal leaders, and the majority of Persian speakers. ,

The Russians, in makil1!) the move, skilfully created schisms and hatred among thier Afghan comrades. The Krem lin also masterfully played upon the conflicts between the rich and the poor and linguistic prejudice. This ended in the creation 6f two other nationalist parties, Situm Milli (Persian speakers) and Afghan Millat (Pushtoo speakers),

The Kremlin manipulated the two parties to fan the flames of difference already eXfsting bet·. ween Pushtoo and Persian speakers.

More importantly, the move also helped the Kremlin to advance the so-called Pushtunistan issue - the creation of an independent state far people speaking Pushtoo.

'Pushtunistan was promoted not just by Moscow but also by King Zahir Shah, Khalq, Parcham, and Afghan Millat. It was the only issue in which Moscow was successful in

qood 'and sympathetic relations with him and did not leave him alone, At the same, time Moscow ordered the Parcharnis vto ' 'Infil-

trate Daoud's party. "

The RUSSians still hoped 't~t Daoud was a reliable tservanr but their' concern deepened when a group of Arab delegates -tried to bring Afghanistan and Pakistan closer toqethen.

The- move was leaked to the Russians by Mohammed Khan Jalalar., Daoud's' Minister of Trade and now Minister of Trade find acti'ng Minister of Planning, 'who has served 'the ~GBsince he'il1'mi. qrated to Afghanistan from Soviet Central Asia.

In May 1977 the }\Kreml in ordered Khalq , Parcham and Situm Mil!i to merge. into one party, the People's Dernocsatic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Feeling, threatened Daoud reacted- by inviting

w .. v

the exiled leader of the Islamic

Movement to return, home and join the government. The lslamic Movement said there could be no reconcil iatron with the gOvJrnment unless Daoud agreed -to the following conditions:

(al That lslamic v.lsw (Ouran and Sunnah) should be reo cognised as the law of the . land.

(b) That the Islamic Movement should be recognised as a political party.

(c) To release' political prisoners, (d) To remove all Marxist Ministers from his cabinet.

(e) To conduct fair elections. Daoud flatly refused to agree to the, cond iti:->ns and at a meeti ng in Jalalabad, 'capital of Nangarha~ province, accused th~ Muslim Move· ment of being an enemy .of Af· qhanistan,

Daoud's reply to the.' Muslim Movement, gave hope tothe Hussians that he wasstil.i, at; h~arti their man but they were also fearful . that the' nation would

react against ,his .reiection of. the Muslim Movement's proposals.

As such in keeping with. the Kremlin's policy, of pre-ernptinq any attempt by the Afghan people' to remove unacceptable leaders the Kremlin ordered Daoud's, - execution. With almost 30 years of direct and indirect service .to

. -

Moscow president Daoud WaS brut-

ally slain orr 27 Apri I 1978,by his Atghancomrades, His de~th ll\ia~ typical of how the lives ot Russian puppets end - slam' by thei r masters when they no longer benefit the Kremlin's cause.

The April coup, w_hich'was engineered .totallv bv the Russians. soon faced resistance, from the MlJjahideen and the Russians realised that it would _. take time' to crush the Muslims,

Atter about four months the Russians realised it had made a rnistake. in backing Amin and Taraki and decided, to send some of their quislinqs abroad as part of the qround work for futu~~

, .

, plans.

At the time relations between the Parcharn and~' khalqfactions were deteriorating and the Russians

'suggested' that senior Par(lbamites should be sent abroad as ambassadors. People such as Babrak. ,Ka:I'mal, ' Mahmo'Gld" Bafy~lay, Nom Ahmad Noor, Abdul Wakil~ Abdul

Majid Sarbiland, Dr'. Najib .. Anaita Hatibzad and Faiz Mohammed were removed from the scene:

T-he 'ploy served two purposes for the Russians. Fi:rstly it reduced the tension between the two groups and secondly strengthened the hand of the Khalqis. However, if the Khalqis failed to satisfy Moscow the latter planned to replace them just as they had done with previous puppets.

Witt-tin a few weeks of the departure of many of. Parcham's leaders for overseas the Kremlin planned i coup against the Khalq faotion for severa I reasons:

(al To win the trust of the Khalqis by inform ing them of the CEJUP before it took place.

(b) To blame the coup on the remaining senior Parchamites ,50 "creari ng an excuse for them to be removed.

The Russian's planned the/coup partly to save the Par~hamls from the terror that' had arisen between the two factions but also to make -the Parcharnis appear to be more respectable in th~eyes of the people. The Kremlin hoped that the

J<halqis "would, be· blamed for ;tlie 'killin!'ls, torturinq and looting that was taking place 'and the people WQ1Jld support the Parcharnis. However" the plan was to' no 'avail and people still rsjected the

The~Mujab1deen Month'¥!

9

Khalqis.

The announcement of a socalled attempted coup was broadcast both from Kabul and the Soviet Union on, different radio stations and the Parchamites, particularfv ... the ambassadors were accused of being CIA agents. Senior Parchamites, including SUltan Ali Kishtmand, General Mohamm~ Rafi and General Abdul Qadir,' were imprisoned.

The Russians wanted the antigov~rnment Mujahideen to be wiped out even if meant that they had to' invade Afghanistan.

. They persuaded ·their comrades to. use any tactics they could, including torture. The Russians besides using the Khalqis as mob forces were worried that close relations between the Khalqis might eAd in disobedience.

When the Russians found that the Khalqis had failed to shake off the Mujahideen, they remained in a quandary and launched a plot to divide the Khalq faction into two groups for the following purpose:

(a) Once the Russians had removed one group then they

. could blame them for

crimes.

(b) They would make the remain- 109 Khalqis to merge with the Parchamis.

The Khalq party was divided into the groups of Tarak: and Amin. The Russians in a very knavish way promoted the hatred within the party, which was once describing itself as united.

At the beginning of 1979, according to Amin's close associates, the Russian ambassador, Puza nOli allusively told Amin that Taraki had been accusing him of being a CIA aqent. Amin , asked Puzanov, how. he could. prove that he was not.' Puzanov then talked about the dangerousness of American ambassador, Adolph Dubs, and suggested a way of getting rid of the American am

bassador.

In the second week of February 1979, a group of four commandos wearing traffic uniforms provided by Mohammad Naim Khaliqi Dost, nephew of Amin and Director General of kabul Traffic, kidnapped Mr Dubs near the American Cultural Center while

he Was on his "way to the Embassv, The ambassador was taken to Kabul Hotel on the south side of the presidential palace. Dubs was neither arrested nor killed by any anti-government. groups, as was widely believed at the time.

According to an eyewitness, Akbar Jan Tani, nephew of Arnin's Minister of lnterior, Faqir Mohammad Faqir, who lived in the hotel, about three days before the incident the hotel was reserved by a group of Russian visitors. Ak~r Jan disclosed that when Dubs was brought in he was guided by the Russians to the second floor and thoroughly interrogated nearly up to noon.

Akbar Jan recalled that during Dubs interrogation four political prisoners were brouqht from the Pul-i-Charkhi J_ail and were shot by the police in the hotel while at the same time the Russians kflled Adolph Dubs. However the Kabul Government claimed the four prisoners were kidnappers who were killed by the police.

In kidnapping Dubs the Russians had three motives: first, it would keep the Khalqis away from the Western countries; secondly the Russians were afraid of Dubs's presence in Kabul because he was a ieadingSoviet specialist; thirdly Taraki was convinced by the Hussians that Amin wasinten-' tionally trying to disgrace his government in the eyes of the. world.

In Sept. 1979 when Taraki went to Havana, the Russian' advisors to the Kabul government initiated a plan to get rid of Amin before Taraki returned home. Tarakl was

still in Havana when Amm back in Kabul neutralized the possibility of all sort of action against himself Taraki even remained for one day in the Soviet Union at the request of Moscow, thinking that his followers, with the help of Russian advisors, would put Amin out of the way.

On Friday, 16 September 1979 the. Russian ambassador. Puzanov, with General Garilov, Soviet advisor of the Afghan ground forces General G. Pavlavskiy and Colonel Arif Shatyanov Soviet Advisor of the Afghan. Ai rforces were sitting with Taraki in the Presidential palace, where Taraki's men were taking action against Amin. Amin knew about the plot in' advance because one of hiS men, Sayed [)aoud Taroon had infiltrated the to Taraki. Durirtg the shooting Sayed Daoud Taroon and Amin's bodyguard were killed and Mohammad Oasim Waziri, another of Amin sbodyguards, was seriously wounded.

. Amin, taking his wounded guard on his shoulder, escaped with the help of his driver, Mohammad Shahrif, and reached the Defence Ministry, located east of the presidential palace.

. Taraki's Moscow-appr~ved coup bact<fired and Amin telephoned Taraki and asked him to surrender. Taraki was arrested and Puzanov was expelled from Afghanistan within a week. ·On 4 October Tarakt was killed by one of Amin's men, Captain Rozi Khan. Kabul and Moscow both announced that Taraki died because . of illness.

The Russialf's assured Amin of' political financial <Inri mifitary support . but in less than a month the Russians found out that Amin too was unable to crush the Mujahideen.

In the last week of October another plot was hatched against Amin by the ~ussians and at the same time they informed him that Taraki's supporters were trying to

10

The Mujahi~n Monthly

topple him. The Kremlin had the follwoing motives:

(a)To assure Amin that they were on his side by informing him about the coup. (b) Not to lose the trust of Taraki's group that the Russians might betray them.

(c) To get rid of those communist who were unhappy with the Kremlin because they believed Moscow interfered too much in Afghan affairs.

By launching October's plot the Russian's were able to get rid of disgruntled communists such as: Lal Badshah, chairman of the Interior Trade Directorate and member of the Central Committee of Khalq; retired General Majid Spinghar; Dr Zarghoon, an advisor to the Children s Hospital, counter part of Dr Najib in political life; and Suliman Bayadagh . member of the Central Committee. Ghulam Mohammad Farhad leader

of the Afghan Millat Party was arrested by Amin. Farhad's role was to enlist the anti-Kremlin marxist's in the PDP A.

On December 17, 1979 Asadullah Amin, nephew of Hafizullah .Arnin, head of Kargari Astakhibarati Mosisah (KAM), Central Intelligence, and second Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was killed by the Kremlin in 'a well organised plot. It was carried out by Amin's family doctor a plump woman, and a male cook, both of whom were Russian nationals. They poisoned Asadullah Amin's meal and even though' he was taken to Tashkent for medical treatment he died the same evening. The Russians were able to convey to Amin that the plot was carried out by Taraki's group.

The Kremlin did not escalate its strategy to take over Afghanistan because of its minor differences with Amin as some people believe.

It stepped up its plan because, firstly the government of Amin

The Mujahideen Monthly

was in danger. from the Mujahideen, secondly, to bring in new faces and fix the crimes on Amin, and thirdly, not to see its 30 years efforts end in vain.

On December 23 the Russian forces wer~ ready for the invasion of Afghanistan .. On December 24 Lt. General Vikor Smenovich Paputin was appointed as. the third Russian advisor to Arnin. On the same day Russian's artillery contingents, under the command of General Garilov - reported to be 1000 men but in reality 5000 - were brought to Afghanistan under the cover of military manoeuvers.

According to a Russian officer, Sergei Nikolayovich Mashikov, 25, now under Mujahideen custody, his officers said that when Amin refused to see the Russian advisors, the Russians forces took action against him on 27 December and got rid of him. Even his food was poisoned on 24 December and he could not leave his house.

While hmin's palace was under Russian fire, the battle-ready Soviet forces, under the command of Marshal Sergei L. Sokolov, the present Soviet Defence Minister General Madyayov, commander of Russian ground forces, General Garilov and Arif Shetyanov, marched to occupy Afghanistan. ~n 28 and 29 December about 60,000 troops by land and 15,000 by air entered Afghanistan", M.S. Khayatov, a senior diplomat at the Soviet Embassy in Kabul, Later told a group of Afghan Briqadiers,

The Russians believed that

changes made during the days of Taraki such as land reforms and alterations to the national flag. made people stand against them. Actually the ideological differences between Islam and Marxism were the main factors in the nation-wide revolt against the Marxist government.

The Russians withdrew the land reform policies to win support for the government. When the

Kabul government announced the "second phase of the land reofrm" in August'1981 they clearly said that all tribal leaders, landlords and government officers could have land as long as they helped the government against the Mujahideen however, the move was to no avail and Muslims throughout the country spurned the Kremlin's overtures.

The Russi ans presence srrenqthened the anti-Soviet and antimarxist feelings of the Afghan nation. The Russians became angered by the Mujahideen's activities and from year to year have stepped up their military brutuality on the political front they have used Marxism, feudalism, tribalism and nationalism to try to defeat the Islamic movement.

They paid much attention to the formation of a Tribal Jirgah (Tribal Council and Loi Jirgah(Supreme Council) to win support for their Marxist government but failed

Because of divisions within the Kremlin over the Marxist parties outside the Soviet Union, the puppet government in Kabul was a mix of Paracham, Situm Milli and Taraki followers of the Khalq faction. The Russians fai led to bring these parties closer to each other and even played the role of fi rebrands among the different Soviet·sponsored groups in Afghanistan.

Recently in November 1985 the Russians launched and foiled another coup, when a group of 56 senior Afghan officers, including s~veral generals, were arrested in Kabul and accused them of trying to overthrow the Karmal regime.

Four of the leading generals were General Khalil, head of the Directorate of Reconnaissance -who led the coup - a former Defence Minister, General Abdul Qadir, Brigadier Gulrung and Briqadier Jaafar Sarti r, both lecturers in Course-A (a short-term course

11

for senior army officers).

The coup involved division 15, a tank division, division 4, also a tank division, and the Directorate of Reconnaissance of the Ministry of Defence. They planned to attack the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council headquarters as well as Kabul Radio. After winning control they were goi ng to oust President Babrak Karmal, but still maintain a Communist style government.

In the past the coups against Zahir Shah.. Mohammad Daoud, Taraki and Amin have all been launched by the Russians with the help of division 15 and division 4.

The Russian advisors to Division 15, division 4 and the Directorate of Reconnaissance supported and guided the coup but it is not known what has happened to them.

Details of the planned coup were leaked by KhalWs wife, who unbeknown to him, was a KGB agent.

The planned coup was supported by one wing of the Kremlin but information about it was passed on to an opposing wing. According to one of the Directors of Army Intelligence [Khad-i-Ni zami ) the Red Army Supreme Commander in Afghanistan was among those kremlinites supporting General Khaiil's coup. Soon after the failure of the coup Moscow ordered the Supreme Commander to return home.

It is believed that General Khalil had a good reputation and record with his supporters in Moscow. He did higher military training in the United States and

his wife was also the daughter of a member of. Moscow's Central Co-

• mmittee. She is believed to have advised either her superiors in the KGB or tier father of Khalil;s plans.

General Khalil and his collea-

Mujahideen preparation for attack on a Russian army base..

gUElS had hoped that after seizing power, by a surprise assassination of members of Afghanistan'S Central Committee, Politburo, Revolutionary Council and a few ministers, they would win support of the Central Committee in Moscow through Khalil's father-in-law.

The planned coup resulted in fundamental changes in the Politburo, Revolutionary Council, Central Committee, cabinet and other important posts, with more Parachmis being promoted to influential positions and many Khalqis being dismissed.

Several of the key changes were announced by Kabul Radio on November 21 .but the radio made no mention of the events leading up to the re-shuffle.

The changes included the appointment of Imamudin Amin as Deputy Prime MI' .ister and Dr Najib as Secretary General of the Party. Yaqoobi was made head of Khad, the Afghan secl'et police (later Khad was made a ministry, so Yaqoobi is now Ministerfor Intelliqence).

Dastgir Pangshiri was dismissed from the Politburo and Guldad W;lS dismissed from 'the Secretariat of the Mi nisterial board.

A reliable source said that the remaining senior officers of the Khalq faction who have kept their jobs, have done so only because of

strong support in the Kremlin It is widely understood that Kremlin is now divided in its support for the PDPA and some Russian leaders back the Parcham faction, while other prefer the ~halq group.

In another development the Russians tried to, press into service retired army officers and experienced civilians to fill the gaps created by the arrests. The Kremlin has also introduced new faces faithful to' Moscow in the Kabul ad: ministrative board and recently the Kabul government announced changes in the central committee as well in the government. The Russians are trvinq to prove the endorsing of 79 people in the government circle meant that the support for Karrnal is inccreasing.

Now I the Russians plan to give the appearance that the Kabul regime is not a Communist government but a nationalist admi nistraation. They have also decided how to get rid of Babrak karmal and replace him with a government which could be a mix of Communists and other secular figures.

According to Noor Mohammad Noor, a member of' Politburo; the leaders of the Kabul regime do not have any sort of power or freedom; 'whatever is done inside the country is done by the Russian

12

''"'-

The Mujahideen Monthly

advisors. On international issue, the Foreign Minister, Shah Mohammad Dost, has been forced to remember by heart any speech written by Foreign Affairs Ministry in Moscow and then recite it in front of people. Noor Mohammad Noor added that none of the Communists were certain about their future arid they did not know what the Russians were planning.

According to Mohammad Zarif, the UN representative of the Kabul puppet regime, they are willing to talk with their opposition but not. with the mujahideen. This raises the possibility that the Russians might be trying to bring the ex-diplomats and senior administrators of King Zahir Shah and Daoud into the-qovernment to protect the Soviet interests in the region. The feeling in Kabul is that the Russians are not afraid of the ex-diplomats and administrators because they are not associateted with the Mujahideen

The Russians tried to win -the co-operation of some of the groups probably through former diplomats and aristocrats who had a good record with Moscow but the understanding between the Mjuahideen groups was an abstacle that could not be overcome. Recently the mujahideen leaders jointly ruled out in a press conference any negotiation, or compromise without the' Mujahideen participation. They oxpressed their commitment to establish an Islamic government in Afghansitan under the Mujahideen leadership.

The Russians are aware of these problems and' are working hard to replace Karmal and in choosing a successor they are tring to at least not repeat previous mistakes. Also some of the Muscovites are accusing registered KGB agents in Afghanistan of providing inaccurate and misguiding information to Moscow. Karmal ranks highly among those aqents and the

Kremlin wants to teach him a lesson. At the moment it is widely believed that Karma! is counting down, waiting for the day that the Russians move against him.

The Russians have taken into their heads to bring fundamental and careful changes in the Kabul government. They are fed up with their Marxist comrades In Afghanistan and they have put their shoulder to the wheel 'once again to put the clock back. They will be using the ex-diplomats and others whose understanding of Islam is almost of a marxist or secular orientation.

The Kremlin at this stage is striving to turn to those who are against the establishing of an Islamic government in Afghanistan. For such support they have been in contact with the Afghans of various school of thougt except for the Mujahideen parties, who dashed the Soviet ambitions of a communist or annexed Afghanistan to ground for ever.

The Kremlin has been contacting people of a secular mind such as Marxist outside the1\'Pl!A" the Afghan Millat, Sitam MiIIi, ShoalaJawid (Maoist) and the aristocrats. The Russians are trying to unite these groups against the Mujahideen by giving them some sort of role in the Kabul government.

The possibility of such a front is easy for the Soviet Union because there are several important issues which the Russians and. each of these groups have in common. For example: a) their opposition to the idea of Islam as the code of life for the Afghan nation.b] All of them have either served the soviet Union or were paid to help spread a particular Soviet program in Afghanistan.

The preparations for such a front started with the attempted coup of last Novermber. The recent changes in different organs in the kabul administration to give

the appearance that it is not a Communist government but a nationalist-marxist regime, are the beginning of a new strategy by the Kremlin in Afghanistan. The moves prove the ideological defeat of the Soviet Union at the hands of the Mujahideen, equipped with their faith in Allah (S.W.1.

The Russians will be trying to unite the different secular parties including • the present Marxists. in tWO or three steps, but they wi II leave no stone unturned to try to crush the present Mujahideen parties and their supporters, both inside and outside Afghanistan. The pause between these steps will be up to the Kremlin but how soon they can bring these secular parties and aristocrats on their side as well as assuring them of the security which will. be for them a matter of urnencv.

The Russians might be proud of being the 20th century's slavehunters, but enslaving the Afghan nation for them will be like crying for the moon. As far as the Mujahideen are concrened they are quite familiar with the Kremlin's fickle tactics and know that the Russians are losing ground. They know that Moscow will not be able to bear the loss of men, military hardware and international disgracefulness for a long time.

Fi nally the Russian s dream of annexing Afghanistan as a new Soviet republic or at least making it a socialist state is drawing to a close. The Russians have been dragging their relations of good neighbourliness, friendship and respect for territorial integrity with the Afghan nation through the mud. They have failed to impose their wishes and policy of exploittion and Sovietization on the Afghan people.

The Mujahidaen Monthlv

'13

I would like to thank the Editor of the Daily' Jang for arranging an International Seminar on the Afghanistan problem which is of great security importance to all the countries of the region.

The previous debaucherous and unrepresentative governments of Afghanistan by declaring war against the Mujahideen of the present Central Asian occupied Republics and forcing the refugees to go back to the Russian occupied land helped the Russians to invade Afghanistan, after more than half

a century. Had they acted

otherwise, Afghanistan today

~~Cl':cPfII1f1JfSi 1 fII0mttl W«!.imttl(flifY«1lfll'Si

Mdd1Pa?ss ~((J) reffila?

would not have been the victim of a sirnilar invasion and aggression.

The Russians have not been able to make an Afghan Army in their six vears of aggression .in Afqhanistan , What they call the Karmaltroops are all those people between the age of 13 to 70, whom they round up from the villages and send forcibly to the barracks. The number of -these prisoner-cum-soldiers is hardly 40000 men.

If you are not able to stop your enemies half-way - when they arrive at your gates - then you will have to fight them inside your house.

-j All those inviduals and governments . who .in a servile manner

indulged in the protection of Russians interests in Afghanistan faced their wicked destiny. ZahirShah was opprobriously deposed, Daoud) Taraki and Amin were butchered at the Russians' hands and Karmal is counting down for the same fate.

Some people claim that the "revolution" was necessitated by the prevalence of a feudal system in Afghanistan. We say all the leaders of the so-called revolution were

aristocrats themselves, Daoud, the founder of the communist movement, owned thousands of acres of land allover the country and Karmal and his colleagues are famous aristocrats:

Those who claim that the Jihad in Afghanistan is a fight between the Americans and Russians, are the people who are biding their time to take over, like Karrnal, by dint of force of th'e Russian tanks and military hardware.

Some are justifying the naked aggression of the Russians in Afghanistan, We believe the worst form of slavery is the inability to cal! a spade a spade before- one's master.

Some people _ are proposing direct talks with the . impotent Karmal regime, a regime which has no mandate or authority. WP. believe the Russians are des-

14

The Mujahideen Monthly

perately trying to get their puppet regime recognized by the world by advocating direct talks with Pakistan.

Some people think that the Hussian military might is invincible, but is not the 51 x year long resistance of the Afghan Mujahideen enough proof to the contrary? This was also said about Great Britain, the empire where the sun never set, but now it is a tiny country where the sun never rises and it is still facing the Irish problem.

Some people are worried about how long the Mujahideen will. be able to fight. We are not only not tired but are prepared fOI a long war and are confident of victory. Why do they not ask how long the Russians will be able to fight?

Some friends are purporting that Pakistan by supporting the Afghan Mujahideen is inviting the enmity of the Russians at the behest of another super power.

We do not know to which country' of the world, no matter how big or small, the war in Af· ghanistan is of vital importance. I do not know whose security and territorial integrity is guaranteed by the Jihad in Afghanistan. I relieve if this war is not fought behind the Hindukush mountains today. it wi II be being fought tomorrow on the Pakistani plains. The Russians did not become the enemies of Pakistan after the Jihad started but they have been the staunchest enemy of this country since its formation. Every knowledqeab!e Pakistani is, I am sure, aware of who is behind all the secessionist movements in this country,

If Pakistanis really want to have secure western borders and are not wi lIing to see the Afghanistan catastrophe repeated here, they should support the JIhad in Afghanistan.

Some people are arguing that

WE SHALL FIGHT TO THE LAST AFGHAN

JANG INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON AFGHANISTAN 1985

tne resistance started because the regime was implementing "progressive" policies. If they call masski Ilings, destruction, bloodshed and holocaust as progressive policy we would surely agree to this contention. If we are to accept bombs as "'food", shrouds arid coffins as "clothes" and graves cis "Shelters", then we have really seen the unmasked face of.communism.

We are not prepared for negotiation I'Is long' as there is a single Russian soldier on Afghanistan soil. We would not settle for losing at' the conference' table what we have gained in the battle. field. Any movement that has gone to the conference table in the

face of occupation of itS territory has lost its gai ns.After the' complete withdrawal of the Russian troops, if there is anvthinq to discuss, it would be considered.

The Russians by proposing peace talks' are intending to mitigate the sharp condernnation by world public opinion . of their brutal invasion .. of Afghanistan and to create pseudo-hopes among our Mujahideen and to pit one Mujahideen group against the other.

If the Russians really want a sot'ution. the key is with them; that is their immediate and total withdrawal from Afghanistan.

We gua~antee. tha! after the

C()ntinued on Page 37

The Mujahideen Monthty

15

THE UN REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN· AFGHANISTAN

The . United Nations Human Rights Commission has strongly condemned the Afghani" stan government for violating human rights and said that among other things it is-guilty of the indiscriminate mass killing of civilians, particularly women and children.

In an interim report the Com mission's Special Rapporteur, .Dr Felix Ermacora, said the government had acted with great severity against, opponents or' suspected opponents without any respect for human rights,

In an obvious reference to' the Russain forces in Afghanistan he said the government had done, 'this with heavy support from foreign troops.

Dr Ermacora said that the

. -

government and the foreign troops

were using all the 'military means at their disposal against the Mujahideen and it appeared that al_! kinds of sophisticated weapons, in particular those that had a heavy destructive and pyschological effect, were being used.

He said the force and brutality exercised by the government had now reacheJ a' critical stage as the _ Kabul regime and the Russians attempted to end -opposition in the regions in any way possible.

The, escalating violence had' affected human rights to a larger extent than before, he said.

"W~i Ie the suppression of political opponents in' the urban area has continued' with the same intensity as before, althouqh there have perhaps been fewer cases, the methods of warfare have worsened duri ng the past months

The victim of Russians bullets.

and disregard. for human rights is more widespread. As a result, not only individuals, but whole groups of persons 'and tribes are endangered in their 'existence and in their lives because, .their living conditions are fundarnentallv affected by the ki nd of warfare being waged:;Dr Errnacora said.'

• He said that even- though the government and the Russians were bound bvfhe Geneva Conventions covering the rules of war they were guilty of the use of anit-

personnel mines and of so-Called toy bombs; the indiscriminate mass ki lIings of civilians, particularly women and children: the growing use of heavy .weapons with most destructive effects ;"-the systematic discrimination against persons not adhering to the People'sDemocratic Party of Afghanistan; and the refusal to 'recognise captured members of the Mujahideen as prisoners of war,

The Special Rapporteur said that many witnesses had testified that

16

The!VIujahideen Monthly

the use of anti-personnel mines and booby traps was now part of a strategy clearly aimed at the civilian population of villages where a large mil itary operation was under way.

He described the use of antipersonnel mines, particularly the booby-trapped toys as "horrible." He said many witnesses tesn tied that been very seriously wounded, having their hands or feet blown off, either by handling boobytrapped toys that they had picked up alonqthe roadway, or by stepping on them.

He said that the toys were usually dropped by helicopter in resistance zones and comprised various types including those resembling pens, harmonicas, radios, matchboxes and little bombs shaped like a bird. The later type consisted of two wings, one flexible and the other rigid in the shape and colours of a bird. The bomb exploded when the flexible wing was touched, he said.

MASSACRES:

As examples of mass killings Dr Ermacora cited two separate massacres of civilians, both in March 1985.

He said in the first which occurred in the Qarghai district of Laghman province from II' to 18 March approximately 1000 civilians were killed by army units assigned to carry out reprisals against 12 villages. In the course of these operations livestock was decimated, houses plundered and set on fire and women raped, some of them then being summarily executed. Several children locked in a house were burned to death.

Witnesses told the Special Rapporteur the massacre took place in the villages of Oarghai, Mi ndrawer, Kats Dehmezang, Haider Khan, Charbagh and Chardehi.

In the second massacre, in late March~ betwe.en 700 and 1200 civilians were killed in a largescale operation which lasted for several days in the Khanabad district of Kunduz province. The villages most affected were Bagh, Amir, Gur Tepeh and Oarai Oasabchar. According to one eye-witness the governor of the province decided to flee after the massacre.

The Special Rapporteur said In his report that the massacre was the most murderous incident since the war be.gan but was only one in a series which according to certain estimates had claimed the lives of about 500,000 Afghans since 1979 most of them civilians.

One of the aspects Of the war that most concerned Dr Ermacora was the growi ng use of highly destructive weapons, particularly in bombardments. He said witnesses old him that during the last three years the bombarments had constituted a deliberate policy designed to drive out the population out in remove months the situation had work ends

The Special rapporteur noted that new elements in the bombardments included the use of FROG 7 surface to surface missiles which wreaked destruction on a larger scale than in the past.

Witnesses from Urozgan province, in the centre of the country, also said that the systematic bornbardment of villages was relatively recent phenomenon, as compared with What has happened in other province.

In addition, several witnesses mentioned what they deccribed as highly powerful explosive devices that caused considerable destruction . and which they referred to as "nopalm" (as dlsr.nqulshed from napalm). -

Dr Ermacora interviewed a nurnbef. of patients severely wounded as a. result. of these explosives; the wounds were said, to be the

effect of certain chemical substances.

According to statistics quoted by him 32,755 civilians were reported to have been ki lied during the first nine months of 1985,1834 houses destroyed, 74 villages wiped out and more than 3000 animals killed.

The statistics were compiled by the Bibliotheca Afghanica Foundation based in Liestal, Switzerland from about 80 different SOurces covering the entire spectrum of opinion on Afghanistan.

The Special Rapporteur's attention was also drawn to the destruc tion of irrigation systems in provi nces as a result of aerial bombard ments which were so heavy that repai rs were impossible. In several regions agriculture .had been completetv obliterated.

As a result there was a risk of famine spreading and cases of malnutrition, especially among children continued to be reported.

According to recent information reaching Dr Ermacora the situation in August· and September was particularyalarming because of

intense fighting in Pakita province. About 30 wounded as a day were reported to be arriving at the ICRC hospital in Peshaw,ar.

In this hospital, which was a normal capacity of 100 beds and in emergencies can. theoretically be expanded to accommodate 150,' there were 140 casualties on 15 August, and 230 wounded from 2-7 September.

As the number of wounded was rising steadily, ICRC decided to set up an emergency unit on a scale unequalled since the 'unit on the Khmer-Thailand border was set up in 1975. In -addition a complete field hospital, with 300 beds end surgical teams consisting of Finns, Swedes, Norwegians, New Zealanders and Danes, was established early in September not far from the ICRC hospital.

Commenting ·on medical tacui-

The Mujahideen Monthly

17

ties available,' in Afghanistan Dr Ermacora said there was apparently no hea Ith care for,' the majo ri tv of the population and as a result, the infant mortality rate had reached 300 and 400 per 1000

, He said the war had particularly affected children, whether they lived in Kabul, in the main cities, or whether- they had crossed the border as refugees. The majority of the children who did not leave the country and' who were 'not in the cities were helpless against the effects of high altitued bombing and shelling, starvation and disease, the disruption of families and the collapse of the traditional structure,

Another problem caused by the war was the numerous orphans and abandoned children and the situation of women, ln the traditional society chi Idren who had lost their parents were always looked after by a relative and orphans did not ex is! as a known category he sa id.

The fact that the traditional system had 'been destroyed, often as. a result of the ioss of the father 'had created, particularly 'among the 'refugess, .-a whole series of pvschosolnatio disturbances, the Special Rapporteur said,

He said the situation in Afghanistan was' aggravated by the hatred which ·seemed to govern the' hostilities. by the most cruel methods of warfare, and by the destruction of large parts of the country which had affected the conditions of life of the population.

'Dr Errnacora said that the ethnic and tribal structure of the nation had been destablised, family units, disrupted, -and the demographic structure of the country changed', .with more. than four million refuqeesfrorn all provinces 'and all classes seeking, shelter outside the country,

He' said thousands-rot internal refuqees had also crowded.inot

18

Afghanistan's cities to trv to escape the. bombardment of rural areas and estimated that the total number of such refugess was between 1.5 million to two million,

The situation of the refugees was such that their right to education, work and good health had been affected, the Special Rappor teur said,

areas the constant fear engendered in people had created unrest

which

was

cou nterp rod ucti ve

for clutrual traditions and rei igious practices.

The Special Rapporteur stressed that since 1979 the internal human rights situation had been at val-iance with international norms and that a l.ova Jirgha (Supreme Council) held in Kabul in April 1985 had not been representative of all political f orcesin the country. Dr, Ermacora said there could be no doubt whatsoever that the refugees were not represented,

In examing the procedures adopted by the government to hold the Loya Ji rgah he said: ,"The importance of the l.ova Jirgah held in April 1985 may best be appreciated by making reference to the tradition al forum in the political and constitutional history

Continued on Page 23

He said that the government was witholding food and medicine from areas outside Kabul and other cities, resulting in starvation, and disease, The situation had also resulted in the, denial and destruction of cultural traditions, including the use of language and rei igious practices and these were now only seen in refugee camps outside Afghanistan or in areas controlled by the Mujahideen.

He noted that even in those

Victim of

, b,running aqent

used bv Russian's jets,

The Mujahideen Monthly

l

..

r

Dr. Wali, A Commander Whose . Feats will be Remembered for Good !

Dr Mohammad Wa/i s/o Col v , Mohammad Ibrahim Naseri was born in 1956 in a devout family at Mirwais Maidan, Kabul city.

From his early childhood, Dr Wali was taught religious subjects by his parents. He was admitted to the Kert-iMemoreen Elementary School when he was six years old. Aafter a year he was transferred to the Mirwais Hotaki School and later was admitted in the French speaking Estiqlal High School. After his secondary level he joined the Kabul Cadet School and upon getting his beccel- ~ aureate joined the Military University in Kabul and chose to study medicine. He continued his medical studies up to the fifth.

year at the Nenqerher Medical College.

When Taraki took over, as head of a mal government ina coup in 1978, Dr Wali star organized and systematic struggle against the regi

He quit his education as a medical stude began to work with the secret cells of the Muja of Hezb-i-Istami in Kabul city and who worked with these cells in pursuance of his st against Daoud's .. regi me.

He established relations with Col. Azim in and devotedly worked with him day and until his activities were disclosed to the at government. He had to take refuge in Pakistan after his close associates Col. Azim Khan and Senio. Captain Shir Agha were executed in Dec. 1978.

upon his arrival in Peshawar he was sent to Afgha nistan as medical doctor to the Mangal Front in Paktia province under the command of Ehsanullah Khan.

In the Spring of 1979 OJ" Wali was appointed as the commander of a Mujahideen group in the Doba-ndi and Charkh areas of Logar province and .continued his Jehad and Da'wa work with fervent enthusiasm.

In 1980 he once again went to the Mohammad Agha district as in charge of the Mohammad Agha distric. He conducted his duties with valour and adroitness.

In 1981 he was seriously wounded while commanding the Mujahideen in a battle against the Russians. When recovered he -was appointed as military commander of the Mohammad Agha district of Logar province in 1982.

a.rn on September 22, 1985 in a face to face fighting aqainst the Russians.

Dr Wali took part in more than 100 operations against the Russian and Karmal forces during his seven years armed struggle and inflicted heavy casualties and equipment losses 01"] the enemy.

Dr. Wali's father, Col. Mohammad Ibrahim and his uncle Col. Shah Wali. were imprisoned for a long time because of Dr Wali's activities as an avowed and determined Mujahid Commander in Logar province.

His brother Mohammad Farooq a student at Ghazi High School in Kabul and his cousins senior Capt. Mohammad Alam Khan and Mohammad Ismail were

executed in 1982 by the puppet regime.

Dr Wali had several. other cousins who were martyred Lt. Col. Mohammad Sidiq was martyred in Jehad in Kunar province in 1982 and Toryalai was martyred in 1984 at the Khandaq Fronts of the Logar provi nce.

Two of his maternal uncles, Maulvi Abdul Ghani and Major Manari, were executed at the Pul-i-Charkhi jail in 1982 and 1983 respectively.

powe Russian m automatic mac inegun cal!ed "Aqiz-B!", caliber 28mm. It is usuaily used against group

target. Its magazine holds 28 dum-dum bullets. it spread needle at the distance of ten metres. This "Agiz-81" was captured by Commander Abdul Hadi Roofi in 1982 in Bamvan Province. Mujahideen in the other areas have also captured such machineguns.

Continued from Page 18

of Afghansitan. The last Loya Jirgah had been convened in 1964 for the adoption of the new Constitution. That Loya Jirgah was composed of 455 members, made up of 176 elected members, 176 members of the National Assembly, 34 appointed by the King, 19 appointed "by the Senate (which was also an appointed body), 14 appointed by the Cabinet, five by the Supreme Court,seven from the Constitutional Committee a·nd 24 from the Constitutinal Advisory Commission,

,

I

,

"This Loya Jirgah may be said to have functioned as a deliberating and deciding body, as distinct from mere formal functions to en, dorse faits accomplis,"

The special Rapporteur said that witnesses had expressed serious doubts about the representatives at the 1985 Loya .Iirgah and a number told him the represntatives had been selected by the party not the communities concerned.

"He said concurring information suggested that the Loya Jirgah was composed of 176 elected representatives, 247 members of various tribes, 38 members of the armed forces and militia, and II members of the cl ergy.

According to the witnesses the members were government svrnpathisers and as such the Loya Jirqah could hardly be said to have been representative of the Afghan people

Moreover, in village where meetings appear to have been difficult if not impossible to organise, elderly people were reported to have been taken by force to act as representatives.

The above contrasts dramatically with claims made by the Afghanistan government about the loya Jirgah. The government said that 1796 representatives took part in the assembly far more tban the Special Rapporteur believes took part - and that ". . . meeti ng of the Supreme Council had re-

"

fleeted the complete unity 'of the Afghan people and shown their will to determine their own future"

How could any meeting which excluded representatives of the majority of the people reflect the unity of the people? And how could any meeting which included representatives taken there by force be called democratic? .

The reality is of course that the Jirgah was merely a formality - a sham - called to endorse policies alien to the people and, imposed on them by. a tyrannical government backed by Russian brutality.

If one looks at the 1985 Jirgah one sees in it not just the government's willingness to discriminate against the opposition by excluding its representatives but also its. willingness to pervert the country's institutionts to further its own ends.

REPERCUSSION

Tha; perversion has now permeated all stratas of Afghan society, including the judicial system. In his report Dr Ermacora dwelt at length on the administration of justice since 1979 and how the courts were no longer being used to protect the people's rights but to further the government's repressive policies.

Commenting on the repression the Special Rapporteu r said that it was now appeared that the number of persons who had disappeared up to the period of an amnesty that was announced in 1980 by the government was much higher than previously believed.

. He said it seemed that shortly after the Karmal government took over in 1979 it halted the registration of names of rnissinq persons because of the high number of complaints.

Dr. Ermacora said no list of missing persons had been made public and no investigation into the . whereabouts of those missing

had ever been made.

According to evidence SUbmitted to the Special Rapporteur the Khad (secret police) and members of the armed forces are continuing to torture opponents of the regime. Dr. Ermacora said he had received no information on how many political prisoners were in detention but people were being detained without charge and without trial.

The interim report presented to the Human Rights Commission by Dr Ermacora is his second submission to the Commission. The Special Rapporteur said that the continuing torture of opponents was not consistent with statements made by the Afghan government's representative to the Commission. When the first report was being considered. At the time the government's representative said that under countrv'scrirninal code any person guilty of inflicting cruel, inhuman or degrad ing treatment, torture or corporal punishment was liable to 5-10 years in prison.

'. Instead of conditions improving for political prisoners the situation has deteriorated and Dr Ermacora said that at Pul-e-Charkhi prison in Kabul a new policy 'had . been introduced which among other things requi red that pol itical prisoners should now be confined with common criminals unless they collaborated with the party.

Previously politica I prisoners were kept in conditions different from those of other prisoners, he said.

In looking at the question of trial and detention the SpeCial Rapporteur studied at affidavit sworn by a former judge of the Kabul Supreme Court, Justice Azeem, who now lives in India.

Justice Azeem said that matters normally belonging to the [urisdiction of the civil and criminal courts were being arbitrarily allocated to the regime 5 revolutionary

The Mujahideen Monthly

23

courts, which were composed mainly of members of Khad, who often had created an atmosphere of insecuritv and anguish, the Judge said.

Dr Ermacora said that in several cases, in the Course of searches carried out in villages in various provinces, the mu rder of women, children and old people had been reported

He . said the operations always followed the same pattern and to illustrate the methods used cited an actual search operation that was carried out. in Laghman province early in 1985.

He said the testi mony of witnesses, which was substantially corroborated by other sources, gave a clear picture of the methods employed in the conduct of village and house searches by government troops and foreign forces.

After bombardment, tanks

surround the villages during the evening; in the morning troops enter .the villages -- each village' at the same time. Houses are searched.. money demanded, women and children in particular are questioned, usually about the whereabouts of the menfolk, and during the interrogation people are sometimes killed.

After the troops withdraw they return shortly afterwards and the same procedure begins again.

In this context, the Special Rapporteur obtained information on an incident which took place on February 2 last year in the village of Sandaly in Nangarhar province where soldiers executed 20 people, including eiqht womenn on the village square.

In the course of these attacks, carried out in order to locate Mujahideen, some cases of looting were reported to Dr Ermacora. But, he said, evidence indicated that the purpose of these searches was more to destroy the means of survival of the population assisting the Mujahideen, rather

than to pi llaqe ,

Vicitim of toy bombs.

CONSCRIPTION

The Special Rapporteu I' sa~d that he was told that in 1982 the regulations concerning the age for drafting into the army had been lowered to 15 years. There was forced conscription and the term of military service went up first from two to three years in 1.982 and then to four years in 1984

He said that the conscription was contuning, depriving universities and schools of male .students. In addition the conscription system was governed by severe. discriminatory methods and students belonging to families that adhered to the communist party or svrnpathised with it were exempted from

service at the age of 15, thus having the chance to continue their studies at home or abroad.

The Special Rapporteur also noted not just a discriminatory policy 011 the part of the government but a Iso a sacrilegious one : mosques have been desecrated, religious books destroyed and in some cases even used as toilet paper. Muslims have also been forced to eat pork and drink alcohol

One witness from Oulq. a village in Kandahar province, told. Dr Ermacora that "by destroyi ng religious books and acting in that way, they hoped that Muslims would no longer fight in the name of Allah"

The sacrilegious attitude of the Kabul regime is actually part of a broader policy under which the traditional education system has

24

The Mujahideen Monthly

been del iberately destroyed and replaced by a system laying stress on ideological propaganda.

As well as stressing communist ideology the educational policy has been designed to achieve a double objective : linguistic fragmentation by encouraging the learning of minority languages to the detri· ment ofPushtu, and the promotion of the Russian language.

CONCERN

When Dr Ermacora's first report was submitted to the 4ht session of the Human Rights Commission. the Commission expressed '.'its profound concern at the grave and " massive human rights violations in Afghanistan".

The Commission also "expressed its distress at the widespread violations of the right to life, liberty and security of persons, including the commonplace practice of torture against the regime s opponents, indiscriminate bombardments of the civilian population and the deliberate destruction of crops".

At the session, in March last year, the Commission called on the Afghanistan government to end the violations and in particular the military repression being conducted against the civilian population.' It decided to extend Dr Ermacora's mandate for a year and asked him to further investigate the situation.

As a result Dr Ermacora wrote to Afghanistan's foreig!", minister in June seeking the government's co-operation - only one of several futi Ie requests to" the government asking for assistance in his enquiries.

Dr Ermacora said .: "I wish therefore to make yet another appeal! to Your Excellency's Governrnent to extend its co-operation in the implementation of my rnandate.vprimarilv by facilitating a

visit to Afghanistan ... "

. " The Special Rapporteur received no reply - little wonder when it is remembered how much the government and the Russians have to hide. I n light of the government s refusal to co-operate the Special Rapporteur decided to hear witnesses in the "refugee camps in Baluchistan and in the NorthWest Frontier Province of Pakistan.

In his report Dr Ermacora said he "was once more able to benefit fror,p the particularly valuable assistance of the Pakistani authorities".

During his trip to Pakistan in July and August the Special Rapporteur visited various refugee camps and hospitals and interviewed people from 16 provinces of Afghanistan, In Baluchistan he visited the camps of Piraliazi I, II' and III; Saranan ; Malgagi "II and III; and Katwai. He also visited three hospitals at Quetta :

Ansari Hospital, Alkhidmat Hospital and Ittehad Islami Mujahideen Hospital. There he interviewed a number of Afghan men. women and children who had been wounded either in bombardments of villages or on their way to seek refuge in Pakistan.

Afterwards he visited the NorthWest Frontier Province where he visited the Munda refugee camp and two hospitals in Peshawar, the Afghan Surgical' Hospital and Mujahideen Afghan Shaheed Mohamed Umar Hospital. To gather further information the Special' Rapport-eur also met non-governmental organisations in consultative Status with Pakistan's Economic and Social Council as well as organisations and associations d ir'ectly concernedwith the' conflict.

During his invesXigation as well as gathering evldence in Pakistan the Special Rapporteur also met representatives of various organiSations in Geneva, Paris and LieStaJ. Switzerland, who were monitoring the war. Notable amol'lg these were, the Bibliotheca Afghanica

Foundation in Liestal.

". He also held consultations with a representative of the Asian Lawyers Legal Enquiries Committee (Asso· ciation of Lawyers for Democracy) who delivered to him Justice Azeem's Deposition.

As such it is clear that Dr Ermacora has taken evidence about the situation in Afghanistan from a broad base, not just members of the Mujahideen, who could conceivably be accused of bias by the Kabul regime, but also from nonMuslims who have no vested interest in the conflict except to see that the internationally accepted norms of justice are upheld.

It is significant that even though the Mujahideen, the Pakistani Government and non-Muslim groups were willing to fully cooperate with the Special Rapporteur the Kabul regime and the Russians were not.

. If they are' not gui Ity of gross violations of human rIghts - as they claim - why are they not willing to co-operate? The truth is of course that they are gUilty and are fearfu I that if they admitted Dr Ermacora to Afghanistan it would only help to s,ubstantiate the serious" charges that have .been brought against them.

This fear is highlighted by the fact that the Afghanistan Government again failed to respond when, after completing his tour of refugee camps and hospitals in Pakistan, Dr Ermacora wrote once more to Afghanistan's foreign minister seeking co-operation.

In his letter the Specral Rapporteur said : "I have received information relating to the situation of human rights in Afghanistan including information communicated to" me personally by a number of Afghan citizens and other persons. I feel it is my duty to let Your Excellency know that the information I, have received includes allegations of violations of human rights, some of which

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25

I am compelled to communicate to Your Excellency:

'These aliegatlons are the following:

1. Indiscriminate mass killing of civilians, particular!y women and children.

2. The use of anti-personnel mines and of so-called toy-bombs.

3. Systematic discrimination against pel-sons not adhering to the People's Democratic Partv of Afghanistan.

4. The non-representative nature of the Loya Jirgah called on April 1985.

5. The non-respect of the provisions of the Geneva Convention retative to the Treatment of Prisoners ot War and the Geneva Convention relative to the Pro teetion of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949.

"111 view of the serious nature of these allegations, the co-operation of your Government would seem to be of major importance. . . : However, I feel com pelled to reiterate. my invitation to Your Excellency s Government to extend its co-operation to ensure that the General Assembly and the Commission are presented with the most complete and accurate information available."

RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclud ing his report the Special Rapporteur made several recommendations and stressed some that he made in his first report to the Human Rights Commission.

He said : "The human rights situation in Afghanista n. far from improving, has deterioratedfurhter and the Special Rapporteur therefore reiterates the recommends'tlons already made in his report to the Commission on HUman Rights".

Among other things he said in his first report: "In-the light of the situation described above, the

26

Special Rapporteur is of the view that as a first step, the Government ought to make every ef tor t to I-eestablish a national consensus. As r equir ed by hIS mandate, the Special Rapporteur is '~equested to formulate proposals to contribute to ensur: ng fui I protection of the human rights of all residents of the country, before. during and after the withdrawal of al!foreign forces'.

. "Therefore, an indispensable reo quirement for this national consensus is the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the elimination of foreign influence ...

+There must be an immediate commitment to, and application of, the norms of human rights and humanitarian law by all parties involved. A fundamental law or constitution should be promulgated in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Internationa I Covenant on Civi I and Political Rights. The rule must be re-establ ished in the country in a manner which is consistent with these international standards.

w'ln the process of con-ection and healing which lies ahead, a

dialogue with the international community will be vital as well as its subsequent support. The Special Happorrsu. thel'efot'e appeals to the Government of Afghanistan to co-operate with the Commission on Human Rights in its efforts to Improve the situation of human r iqhts. Co-operation with the Commission offers the possibility of reconciliation and restitution of human. rights."

Dr Ermacora also recommended that the right of the four million refugees, to return to their homes freely and safely without fear from any persecution should be formally recognised and respected their property should be restored and an effective general amnesty should be proclaimed bylaw for evervone, regardless of their political opinion.

He said the parties directly involved in the conf ict shou Id co-operate fully with the United Nations and with all the humanitarian international organisations and specialised agencies and tak'l urgent measures to restore civil, politicat, economic, social and cultural rights ill Afghanistan.

The Mujahideen Monthly

by M. N. Saleem,

RussiaDsDrive South for the I nd km Oceon

The Russians have been planning to get access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean since the time of the Peter the Great and successive Russian Governments have strictly adhered to the pursuance of this straregy.

The first step the Czars took in realizing this expansionist objective was to forcibly annexe such parts of Afghanistan as Panjdeh in 1895 and soon after theBolshevik revolution of 1917 Len in followed this strategy and bequeathed its total implementation to his successors.

King Amanullah s accession to the throne in Afghanistan in 1919 greatly helped the Soviets to tee off the smooth implementation of this colonisalistic plan King Amanually for one reason or the other tended to have closer relations with Lenin's government and probably thought that his hobnobing with Soviets would help him against the British and streng· then his rule in Afghanistan. He therefore went into hurried and indiscreet treaties what tenin in spite of the colonialistic history of the Russians in the region.

The Soviets in return for their recognition of the independence of Afghanistan in 1919 forced Amanullah to accept the annexation of parts of Afghanistan like Panjdeh and Khiva dismembered by the Czar almost a century ago and further pledged to help Amanullah to have the first ever Afghan airforce - a·project which the British had refused to support.

Upon exchanging ambassadors and diplomats, the Soviets started sending spies.to Afghanistan posing

as emissaries and diplomats and from the very beginning their embassy in Kabul was a centre of intrigue.

Apart from the nine month rule of Habibullah (Bacha Saqua) all regimes in Afghanistan since 1919 up to now have been directly or indirectly installed\' and toppled by the Russians. They have at wi II removed all their puppets one after another when anyone of them . has proven to be of no further worth, incapable of securing their interests in Afghanistan.

The Russians got a free hand in Afghanistan particularly when Richard Nixon': US Vlce-President in the rnld-sixties, reported to his Government after returning form a tri p to Afghansitan that the US must recognise that Afghanistan was in the Russian's sphere of influence. Whatever the reason, the Americans adrift in the Vietnam quicksand, abandoned Afghani· stan to the Russians and right from that time the Soviets knucled down to implementing their Imperialistic strategy 'of exploiting the wealth of Afghanistan and bit by bit turning it into a springboard for their further expansionism in the region.

The Russians' exploitation of Afghanistan reached its apex when Zahir Shah appointed Daoud as his prime minister. Daoud, the founder of the Communits move-

ment and the patron of Taraki, Amin and Babrak swang the gates of Afghanistan open for the Russi. ans influx into the country.

Prince Daoud started playing into the hands of his Russian masters when he raised the Pashtoonistan issue at the behest of the Russians. Had they succeeded in this scheme, Afghanistan and half of Pakistan would have been encroached by the Red Army and the Soviets would have achieved their goals very cheaply.

By pitting the Afghans against their Pakistan i brethren in raising the Pashtoonistan issue, the Hussians wanted to diverge the attention of Afghans from the dismembered parts like "Panjdeh" and Khiva and practically commenced their expansionist policy of fomenting unrest and trouble for ultimately dismembering Pakistan and reaching the Indian Ocean through Makaran.

The Afghan nation at large and the Islamic movement in particular by effective protests and pressure tactics forced the Zahir Shah regime to abandon its belligerent policies towards Pakistan and to desist from attacking Pakistan during the 1971 India Pakistan war when the monarchy in Afghanistan was ser· ously considering such a proposal from the Russian and the Indians.

The Soviets in pursuance of their imperialist designs in Afghanistan were acting upon three objectives:

(a) Enslaving Afghanistan ecomically.

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2J

(b) Making Afghanistan militarily dependent on the USSR alone.

(c) Brooding and supporting their leftist proteges through their embassy in Kabul and their corner cial and cultural missions.

The Hussian's won contracts for all but a few development projects in Afghanistan by Comparatively cheap cost offers and so paved the way for the .advancement of KGB elements working as experts such as engineers and Agronomists.

They used to contract the projects whose raw material could be found in abundance in Afghanistan and they needed the manufactured goods back in the Soviet Union. For instance the citrus fruit farms project was eontracted and financed by the. Russians, but 90 per cent of the fruits were cheaply exported to the Soviet Union, whereas the majority of people in differents parts of Afghanistan did not even know the taste of fruit such as oranges, lemons and grapefruit and thus were deprived of useful nutritious food. The gas and petroleum of northern Afghanistan was totally contracted by the Russians and the governments of Afghanistan were forced to sell the natural gas and oi I to the Soviets for a very cheap price, whereas nobody, even studerits of chem istry in the Kabul u~versitv, had ever seen the practical use of gas. The crude-oil sent to Russia was sold back to Afghanistan at three times the price, The third example is the thermopower plants in Balkh' province which were solely used to power Russian factories.

Likewise, in the_ face of a dozen cement plants, that could have catered for the needs of all the major cities in Afghanistan, even Kabul faced acute cement shortage because all the

A Mujahid during firing on a close target.

cement produced was being sent the USSR.

of higher education, where they were indoctrinated and Sovietized and ultimately used them in the toppling of any qovernmeatwhich they thought was unable to preserve their interests in Atqbanistan anymore.

MILITARY:

The Russians virtually put an end to Turkey s military role with the Afghan army and stopped the Germans training the police and qendarrnari , This made Afghanistan. totally dependent on the USSR militarily.

The Russians were selling AfghanistanWorld War I tanks and military equipment which were no longer of any use as they moderni zed their arsenal in return for gas, petroleum and precious minerals, The Russians in collusion with the lahir Shah 'government used to take tens of students and officers each year in the name

MAKING AGENTS:

The Russian embassy in Kabul became a spy nest and a training center for all those who had a leftist leaning. Particularly in 1965 when the lahir Zhah regime announced a fake democracy and restoration of fundamental rights;

Taraki and Karrrrat more than anyone else hauntd_d' the Russian embassy I ,where thev were translating and printin~ Marxist literature. and reprinting: marterial al-

28

The Mujahideen Monthly

ready published in Iran by the Tudeh party.

The government knew that overt training was being imparted to the Marxist novices but did not stop It because they new it would cost them their throne if they protested; thus' the Russians were training personnel through when they would realize' the dreams of the Czarist regime to get to the warm water ports of the India Ocean.

The invasion of Afghanistan is part of the game and the Russians long-term policy in South Asia is to conquer Pakistan, Iran and India so as to offest the American presence in the Indian Ocean,

to control the jugular veins of the west's oi I supply and to encircle

China. Afghanistan is therefore the first step of the lader to this end.

For the realization of their nefarious expansionist designs, the Russians have undertaken the same methodology of brainwashing and indoctrination of people in different countries of this region either taking them to USSR under the pretext of high education or in their own countries to help pave the way for the colonization of their respective countries.

It is very unfortunate to note that serveral Gulf countries which were. immune to such intriques, have now started to get themselves victimized deliberately by establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. They probably have not taken any lesson from theAfghan traumatized ordeal of having close

relation s with the Russian.

Although the Russians southward drive has been effectively checked by the Mujahideen of Afghanistan in the Hindukush mountains and thus have nipped Czars' strategy in the bud. However, we would like to warn other thired world countries to not repeat the m ista kes the Afghan rulers had committed over half a century ago and be aware of the surreptitious Russian penetration in their countries under different pretexts.

The Jihad in Afghanistan has for the first time in centuries proven to have shattered the dreams of the Soviet. of getting a foothold in the· In-dia-n Ocean.

With courtesy to Middle East

A SOLDIER'S TESTIMONY

E'ARL Y LAST YEAR, A TAPE CONTAINING AN INTERVIEW WITH A SOVIET SOLDIER WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM AFGHANISTAN WAS SMUGGLED TO THE WEST FROM THE SOVIET BALTIC REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA. THE INTERVIEW WAS PUBLISHED IN ISEKIRI, AN ESTONIAN-LANGUAGE SAMISDA T (UNDERGROUND) PUBLICA TlON. EXT_RACTS FOLLOW.

HOW OFTEN WERE YOU IN ACTION AGAINST THE AFGHAN GUERR ILLAS?

The situation of our army there was often really terrible and unclear. It was difficult to say who was a partisan fighting against his country's aggressors and who was a bandit torturing our prisoners Of. war. There were places where we did not dare to go because the Afghan rebels (Mujahideen) occupied strong positions and were well equipped. It is not possible for me to assess the general situation there, but I say that our military operations were very often limited because of the Afghan

partisan's fierce fight against us for their freedom.

YOU CALL THEM "FREEDOM FIGHTERS"?

When I was there,. we never called them that. It would have been dangerous, because we didn't trust each other. We couldn't dare to admit that they were freedom fighters, because then, who were we? But now, back home, ,I know they are freedom fighters.

WHAT DO YOU PERSONALLY THINK OF THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN? WHEN YOU

WERE THERE AS A RUSSIAN SOLDIER, HOW DID YOU SEE YOUR POSITION?

This is a difficult question. In Afghanistan we were in a desperate situation and we didn't think about such things. I may be wrong, but I now thinkwe are the occupying force. I think about this more and more.

IS THE SOVIET ARMY THE ONLY FORCE? WHAT ABOUT THE REGULAR AFGHAN ARMY?

Those I saw were old men, illiterate semi-idiots. We were together in the so-called "friendly joint-actions". That meant that

The Mujahideen Monthly

29

some inefficient, inactive remnants of their army joined us in order to learn. They hung around us and were completely useless. during operations. They only. annoyed us. They were very enthusiastic. When we ascorted thei r lorries to some actions we were joined by. their

'people s militia" unit. All of them were old men, even grand-. fathers, all wearing their turbans. We couldn t understand what kind ofan army they were.

WHAT ELSE DID· YOU DO? HOW CLOSE ·WERE YOU TO NORMAL AFGHAN LIFE?

Once iNe escorted a Russian geological expedition. Russian engineers were looking for minerals there. We also protected Afghan vans transporting petrol and food. Civil servants are easily distinguished from other people by thei r dress. The peasants in the village hate them.

They wear a kind of very thick blanket made out of dark-colour cotton. They wear it day and night. They also use these blankets as table-cloths or rugs on which to display thei r goods for

sale in the street. They sleep in them and pray on them. The civi I servants' style of dress puts people off. They are considered strangers and outsiders among their own people.

HOW DID THESE CIVIL SERVANTS TREAT THE SOVIET SOLDIERS?

We had very limited contact with them. I personally had the impression that they saw us as some kind of protective force. They were never hosti Ie towards us because they realised they could not last long without us.

DID YOU SEE THE REBEL FIGHTERS? WHAT KIND, OF ARMS DID THEY·HAVE?

The mujahideen were equipped with old rifles and Russian kalashinkov machine-guns and submachine-guns.

HOW DID THEY, GET THE

KALASHINKOVS?

They attacked our military bases and took them from my dead comrades. Some weapons they sirn ply bought from the peasants.

. Ironically, these were our weapons.' Often, regular Afghan army soldiers exchanged their Russian arms for food and drink from the peasants. So we did the same thing, because in the chaos of war to explain the loss of a wea pan is easy:

WHAT DID YOU GET FROM THE PEASANTS?

They sell apricots, oranges, melons ali kinds of fruit. We used

to buy all kind of food and drink, and even bread, in exchange for our weapons. Sometimes we would stop their carriages on the roads and demand "payment". We would take everything from them by force. They did not resist; the.y knew they COUldn't get away from us-young, strong and armed. Some soldiers got hashish and other drugs. Our Asian soldiers were very often d rug add iets beca use hash and other things grow. on their land.

DID YOU TRY DRUGS?

No, I'm not interested. I was lucky because I don't smoke or dri nk, so I didn't depend on such things.

30

Bones of a dead Russian.

The Mujahideen Monthly

DID YOU IiAVE A PROBLME OVER HOW TO SPEND YOUR FREE TIME?

Evel-y minute of our free time we tried to rest. That su ited OUIcommanding officers more relaxed. Thev+could stop thinking about us and drink vodka - drinking was their relaxation. There was no cinema and was no books to read. Once in Kabul, a concert was organised for us. I attended, but without much enthusiasrn ,

WHO WERE THE PERFORMERS)

The Russian rock band "Blue Guitars". I was expectinq to be discharged in a few months and this made me feel desperate. I was terribly envious of the musicians and angry with them _ The problem was not their music, but the' thought that they would return to Moscow to a peaceful, quiet and wonderful life.

AR E TH ERE ANY PARTICULAR THINGS THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO FORGET?

There were many such things, but one cannot forget them. We were forced to shoot at peaceful peasants in' regions that' were not yet occupied by us and where the new regime has not yet been set up, We were given orders to wipe out everything in our way. This was when we' were stationed in ·the . southern part of the country. That summer was a nightmare for me .. After every new assault by the mujah'ideen on our bases and ~arehouses, we 'were- ordered to carry out punitive operations on anv villages which were suspect.

WERETHERE FEQUENT ATTACKS ON SOVIET BASES?

Yes, not only on our bases, but on our civil administration offices. They blew us up' and attacked us with our own weapons Sometimes they ·kidnapped our administrative. people and took them hostage .

groups of Mujahideen who resisted fiercely so we were pushed back. After such operations we became completely wild and started looting: Some of us became sadists, we lost our minds. We screamed to raise- our morale rto justify ourselves. It was some kind of ecstasy when we could not think' and were just shooting and shooting.

DO YOU THINK THE MUJAHIDEEN CAN WIN?

They are steel-willed. It is very difficult to break their will, l shink they will resist until they are all Niped out. That is why the war in Afghanistan is SO mu rderous,

HOIr{ DO YO.U ESTIMATE THE .3IZE OF OUR ARMS IN AFGHANISTAN?

I've heard. from the officers that the figure is about 150,000, but a part of the army is not

Russian. When we were sent to guard the main road between Kabul and Jalalabad, those who escorted our lorries were Bulgarians.

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31

COULD YOU BE MORE SFECIFIC ABOUT HOW YOU OPERATED AGAINST SUSPECT VI LLAGES?

We were ordered to shoot every suspect.AII men were suspect because thev were all fit and able to fight.' Especially suspect were those who· wore' the vashrnak (vei1). Normally only women wear them, but men are also allowed to, so a covered face was considered a ploy to hide the identity and they were. shot.

If. a suspect village 'was very small and resisted, we were given orders to kill everyone we could find. Afghan villages are v.ery densely populated. The houses are all attached to each other and the whole village is like a labyrinth built of clay. Houses are single-storey with yards inside. You never know what is around the next Corner and you have to shoot first. Before entering a yard or street, you have to deliver a volley of machine-gun fire.

I doubt whether a village can ever recover. The villages which survived were those which had

II NEWS

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P(\ISOf'IEf\S - SI-IO~rVVI·rI-IOU~r BEl f'IG QUES~rIO"IED

Hundreds' of prisoners have been killed without b'eing asked a single question in Kabul's notorious Put .. iChsrkhi jail and some are under unbearable torture for such a long time that staff are not able to interroqete many prisoners for up to three or tour years.

According to information leaked from the Directorate for Prisoners to Mujahideen circles in Kabul many of the staff of Pul-i-Charkhi jail are psychotic - sadists who enjoy torturing human beings.

An informant said that many prisoners had been shot without being questioned by the jail's officers , just to save them the trouble of interrogation.

The i~formant said that under a-special program directed by Soviet advisors almost all jail staff throughout the countrv were being encouraged to take drugs and become addicts. He said that because of the addiction, the jail's officers had no patience to listen to prisoners' answers and often just guided them to a nearby field and summarily executed them.

According to the informant the files on many prisoners' have never been sent to' any court which exists outside the thick, hig-h and stony wails of

Pul-i-Charkhl jail.

Because of the large number of inmates in different jails, particularly in Pul-i-Charkhi, some prisoners have not been questioned after more than three or four year's of detention.

Many a times a prisoner has been held for several years under interrogation, and in spite of no evidence or quift of any crime, is still detained.

There are now more than 85,000 political priseners in different jails throughout the country and this number only includes those who are known by r elatives to be al ive.

There are hundreds of familites who enquire daily at the Directorate of Prisoners, part of .the Ministries of Defence and Interior, about the whereabouts of relatives who have disappeared after irnprisonment.

32

The Mujahideen Monthly

1f IfJIJ!I If A If G IfHf8 Al N II lIE It A1Clill)Y

The Kabul puppet qovemment has decided to form a new army consisting only of Communists especially those who they believe witl remain faithful to the Marxist regime in Afghanistan. The new army will be called the Atahen Red Army.

The government has decided to form such- ~ force, because the 'regular army, security forces and militias have failed to cope with the Mujahid~en's resistance.

The new army will be controlled by the Ministry of Intelligence and, will be mobilized with th€ other forces in Afghanistan.

One of the reasons for promoting the Khad Directorate (the Afghan secret police) to the level of a Ministry was that the PDPA was desperately in need of an army which could help keep Marxist regime in power. Now the government plans to examine the. Biodata of all the members of the PDPA both Khalq and Parcham factions and members of different government organisations such as trade unions, youth groups, women's organisations, student unions and tribal jirgas.

The Ministry of Intelligence wants to find out how active each PDPA member is and will not enlist in the new army those people who have just registered themselves for a cover and are not sincere with the government.

At a meeting on December 26 the Politburo of the PDPA decided that members of their party up to the rank of directorate would have to join the Afghan Red Army.

The government has already started a program to recruite Communists for the new army and is increasing the salary of civilian officers who join by Ats. 2000 (US$ 18.) a month. As a further attraction the government will cal-

culate one month's pay on the basis of 50 days service-van extra 20 days salary.

Initially under this program civil servants could join the army for three months, then the period was increased to six months. However service in the new army, will be on a permanent basis.

To boot as the above program the Russian advisors in different Ministries and government organisation are also conducting enquiries about members of the PDPA_

After completio.n of the reports the Russians will ask all Joval Marxis.ts to serve as army officers in their home provinces. The Russians have realised that the drift of PDPA members to Kabul and other big towns, because of the mujahideen's control over the countrvside.. has hindered the propaganda campaign designed to win support for the Russians presence in Afghanistan.

The Russians have two motives in sending Marxists to the countryside: firstly to assure those nonMarxists who are not Mujahideen that they can also play a role in the protection of the Kabul regime by giving them a chance in the government. The non-Marxists will be used to fill the vacancies created in civi I service by the recruitment of loyal Marxists to the new army. Secondly the army wi II be a hardline- Marxist force which the Russians will be able ttl use to intimidate the coming so-called nationalist government of the marxist regime with.

On January 7 the head of the Directorate No. 1 of the Ministry of Intelligence, Mr Jalal ,said at an official meeting that the Soviet Red Army In ight be unable to bear the heavy casualties being incurred in the fighting against the Mujahideen. He said there was a danger that the Russian army might decide to remain in barracks and refuse to continue fighting. .Once this happened the Mujahideen would definitely take over ,

He stressed that the survival of the Kabul regime depended on members of the PDPA 'joining the . new Afghan Red Army.

Mr Jalal said that those fighting against the government were not rebels but Afghllns who were opposed to Communism and particularly ·the Karmal regime, He said Afghanistan did not need a Marxist regime but a free society.

Mr Jalal 's speech created strong fear among communist circles in Kabul that the Marxist regime is about to collapse and many RDPA members are no longer certain of their future.

PAKIIA PROVINCE

Muj~hideen from the AI-Fateh Frorrts of the Hassan Khil distt, have shot down a jet aircraft killing the pilot instantly. The plane was part ofa squadron of jets which was bombing the Hassan Khil village and fronts.

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33

POWER STATIONS DESTROYED IN RUSSIAN TERRITORY

In a daring raid into Russian territory Mujahideen from the Hezb-iIslami have blown up two hydro-electric power stations and destroyed five tanks at 8aghoshakhak village in the Tajikistan Republic.

The raid was carried out by 35 Mujahideen from Baharak dis~rict, in northern Afghanistan, province of Badakhshan.

During the fighting 18 Muslim soldiers from two Soviet border 'security posts surrendered to the .Mujahideen and joined their brothers in the raid. Ten of those who defected were later martyred in fighting against the Russians in Afghanistan.

The Mujahideen entered Russia on December 20 by crossi ng the Oxus river in rubber boats and within two hours of being on Soviet soil the Communists deployed many helicopter gunships,

jets and paratroopers to try to recapture the 18 defectors.

The Hussians landed- most of their troops at the border town of Sarghilan and a squardon of Mig-- 23 jets and SU-27 fighter-bombers started bombing Mujahideen positions in the Eshkashim and Baharak districts in Afghanistan ..

In the bombing scores of. civilians were killed and many houses destroyed. A Mujahideen Commander, Abdul Jalil, shot down two SU-27s with a Ziguak anti· aircraft machinegun but was later martyred with three other Mujahideen.

In the course of the fighting at

Sarghilan town and .in the districts of Baharak and Eshkashim about 100 Russian soldiers were taken prisoner.

The fighting continued for about two weeks and the Russians incuned hundreds of casualties while 25 Mujahideen were martyred and rnanv wounded.

On January lOin a bid to rescue the Russian soldiers that had been taken prisoner the Russians. dropped hundreds of paratroopers and in the fighting that followed the captives were killed.

During the fighting the Mujahideen captured arms, ammunition and supplies from the enemy, including 350 Kalashlnkovs, 13 Ziguak anti-aircraft machine guns and five G renov heavy machineguns.

Russian Forces Retreated in Herat

different organizations with the MUJahideen of Hezbi-i-Islarn i Afghanistan, particularly from Commander Saifullah of the; Jarniat-ilslami.

Russian forces have attacked the Du-Aeb and Khakari headquarters £?f the Hezb-i-lstemi but have been beaten back after six days of

fierce fighting.

The Russian forces included a huge column of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and army trucks mounted with long range missiles.

The attack started on Jan. 9 and according to a wireless report the fighting raged till 15 January when the Russians were forced to withdraw with heavy casualties and equipment losses.

DUring the fighting 170 socalled Karmal soldiers, 1000f them armed, defected to the Mujahideen. About 45 tanks, APCs and trucks were destroyed and 'about 180 Russian troops were either killed or wounded.

Seven Mujahideen were marty-red and 12 seriously injured. The report adds that during the operation there was complete cooperation and coordination among

NANGA'RHAR PROVINCE

Mujahideen from the Hazrat Umar Farooq. fronts have attacked the Sarhadari and Lalpur districts, destroyi ng the local headquarters and killing a large number of Russain and Karmal .oops.

During the attack, took place last week, the district administration building caught fire, causing explosions in an ~munition depot. One Mujahid ,was martyred and another seriously wounded.

34

The Mujahideen .Monthly

destroyed 12 army vehicles and

armoured personnel carriers (APGs) ) with RPG-7s and mines. About l

Communist celebrations of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan held in New Baghlan city, the provincial capital, have been disrup-

ted by a Mujahideen attack. had been vacated, because they

On December 27 Mujahideen from the AI-Masahaff Front attacked 'the Russian army base, in the city where local communists and Russians were celebrating the inva-

sion dav.

The communists regard the invasion as part of the "Saur Revolution of April 1978" in which Nur Muhammed Taraki killed the country's president, Sardar Daoud, and sei zed power.

The Muj~hideen, using mortars, 82mm cannon and PRG-7s (rocket propelled grenades), destroyed two tanks and one vehicle parked 'nearby to protect the communists .

. Several people were injured and the meeting had to be disbanded.

On the same day another group of Mujahideen attacked the Spinzar post of New 8aghlan city and killed eight civilians and army officers who were members of the Parcharn faction of the People's Democratic Party.

The next day the RussianAfghan army retaliated by attacking the Mujahideen's headquarters in Imam Qattibah in central 8aghIan. The Mujahideen, resisted and fighting continued for about 10 hours. During the operation eight ,tanks and trucks were destroyed by Mujahideen using RPG-7s and a2mm cannons. About 65 RussianAfghan troops were killed and 'dozens of others injured. Russian artillery and airclaft shelled and bombeo nearby villaqes, which

believed the Mujahideen were using them as hideouts. Two Mujahids were injured by the shelling.

The next morning the RussianAfghan army launched another offensive which continued throughout the day. The Mujahideen

50'Russians were ki lied or wounded, One Mujahid was martyred and" another injured.

. On Dec.-"30 the Mujahideen I ambushed Russians patrolling the area, killing five and seizing their rifles and ammunition. The Russians retaliated with heavy shelling which destroyed doznes of vacated houses.

cOmmander A. Hadi Roofi of Bamyan examining an unexploded heavy bomb near his head querters.

The Mujahideen Monthly

35

Over 600 Troops Joined Mujahideen RUSSIAN OFFICERSKILLE.D

About 400 militiamen

and 250 Karma/ troops have defected to the Mujahideen in Ghazni under the terms ot.e general amnesty anna un . ced by the Amir of, Hezbi-Islemi Afghanistan, Engineer Hikmetyer.

The Amir announced the amnesty on December 27, the sixth anniversary of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The defectors surrendered to Commander Sarwar Khan leader of the Pydara Fronts of central Ghazni, on January 10.

In the surrender they handed over heavy. and .Iight weapons and accordi ng to a wi reless report they are now fighting with the Mujahideen against the Russians who are enraged by the enormous defection.

A squadron of Russian jets and helicopters has been shelling and strafing the Mujahideen fronts to . try to capture the defectors. The report said that a large number of civilians from nearby" villages had been rounded up by the -Russians because they believed the villagers were instrumental in the surrender.

All the Mujahideen fronts of Hezb i-Islam have been soreadimq news about the amnesty and it has been enthusiastically received by the enemy's rank and file.

As reportedearJier in the world press, Commander Sarwar Khan and his men last month conquered the Khawaja Amiri district in the north of the province in a daring attack.

, During the fighting the Mujahideen ki lied the district s deputy aovernor and several political and

Mujahideen aiming their arms at Russian helicopters, havering at a distance from their position ..

security officers were serioustv wounded. They later died from their injuries. Two tanks and 715 rifles were also ca'btured by the Mujahideen.

RUSSIAN OFFICERS KILLED

A large number of enemy troops, including two high-ranking Russian officers, have been killed

. v

In an attack by Mujahideen on

Russian Karmal forces in the Numan area of Ghazni province.

According to the Commander of Hezb-i-Islami forces in the area about 55 Afghan soldiers surrendered to the Muj.ahideen and aight tanks. and three jeeps were destroyed in the operation which took place on December 15. One truck laden with food a Dashaka anti-aircraft machineg'urT,' and thousands of rounds of ammo unition were captured.

In a separate incident the Corps Commander of Karmal troops In Ghazniprovince, General Salam Khan, was killed when. hisAPC passed over a mined area on the same day

MUjahideen have captured Sayed Mohammad Saeed, a notorious Khad agent, and 12 of his accomplices in a guerilla raid .in Ghazni city.

The agents were caught about Two weeks ago. and are being tried under Islamic law.

PARWAN PRO,VINCE

Heavy fighting has been reported between the Mujahideen and Russ'ian forces in the Kapisa and Kohistan Districts.

The fighting erupted when the Mujahideen attacked a Russian convey in mid-December and played havoc with the huge column of tanks coming from northern Afghanista~.

36

The Mujahideen MontnlY

The Russians resorted to reprisal operations against the local people of Kohistan and destroyed several villaqes and heavily bombed the whole area. In addition to destroying 12 tanks and trucks and killing the. crew the Mujahideen shot down a Mig. 23 fighter bomber. Dozens of civi I ians we re reported martyred.

TEN AI RCRAFT GUTTED AT BAGRAM AIRBASE

Mujahideen under the command of Ustad Fateh Mohammad have attacked the Bagram airbase, destroying 10 aircraft and badly damaging the terminal building and other installations.

In a letter, Commander Ustad Fateh said that the operation was jointly conducted by the Numan and AI-Badier Fronts and the aircra+ts and terminal building were set ablaze by rocket fires.

He said that during the attack, which took place on December 29 three Mujahideen were injured.

LAGHMAN PROVINCE

Members of the He z b-i-Is lam i Afghanistan have shot down a Hi nd-24 helicopter with anti -ai r-

craft fire during a clash with Russian forces in Qarghai district.

Recently the Mujahideen stepped up operations in the warmer provi nces such as Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar, and in response the Russians mobilised large number of troops.

The fi rst columns of the Russian ground forces arrived in the Qarghai district at the end of December and faced stiff resistance from the Mujahideen.

The Mujahideen, under Com. mander Sana Gul, used rocket propelled grenade launchers, antitank and anti-aircraft weapons 'against the enemy and forced them to withdraw.

During the encounter many Russian troops were killed and wounded and eight tanks were

destroyed or damaged. As a result of retaliatory bombings by the

~"""u

Russian airforce 95 civilians, including women and children were killed.

Continued from Page Russians' withdrawal, (a) Afghanistan will not be a military base of another power.

(b) Afghanistan will be a free, independent, Islamic and non-aligned country havi ng independent judgement on all international issues. (a) Afghanistan will never be used against the Russians by other powers. Ariy misgivings about the above facts are misplaced and baseless, as we would need ages to reconstruct our devastated country and that is only possible in peace and active non-al ignment.

'The refugee problem will be instantly solyed after the with, drawal of the Russi.n troops and all Afghans will go back with dignity and' honour to theirhomes

Pakistan for the first time wi II see a real friend on its western borders after the independence of Afghanistan.

The Mujahideen Monthly

37

Tawba 41

March forth light and heavy and strive

hard with your riches and your lives in the

way of Allah; that is the best for you, if

you have knowledge.

Wherefore faint not, nor cry out for peace;

and you shall be triumphant and Allah is

with you, and He will not defraud you of

your uiorh,

Mohammad 35

I

The Mujahideen Monthly

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