Pale Cases pp6-7

1 PALE (pages 6 and 7 of the syllabus)
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran
Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our
attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar,
with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate
attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation"
(Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of
the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to
pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of
the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano
Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the
petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can
be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is
thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par.
7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and
allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion
charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect
prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before
the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments.
The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent
wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief
that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a
favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous
cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was
and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay
respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be
avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to
correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any
or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the
said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the
Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed
out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments
legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney
could not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to
"Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion,
which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God
in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the
Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen
could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent
absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious
or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in
judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such
mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our
government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated
that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He
further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted
from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr.
Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the
dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as
one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he
present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of
context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context
would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction
over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance
under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as
required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27,
1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates;
that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him
whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another
lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement;
that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our
November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for
MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he
was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a
special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous
grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was
outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. — ... . only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..."
This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very
member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the
Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of
May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government, either its executive or
judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government
without either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all
aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of
notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request
twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in
said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same;
that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the
case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads
to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton
Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the
contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced
Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer
nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to
Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth
motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the
first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he
could recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time
handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He
signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to
the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and
Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for
reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete
quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring
the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second
contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of
an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by
innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He
there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an
issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government
by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply
to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no
reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or
prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza,
which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the
appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our
country, "although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has
been made. He explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only
because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was
belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with
derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no
matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or
an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty?
Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism"
for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph
9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received
favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the
President", should also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received
favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the
president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that
sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the
Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this
Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But
why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of
justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon
to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court
have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.'
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a
corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath
solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts
can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." 1 His duty is to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." 2 Faith in the courts a lawyer
should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of
the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." 4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit
an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are
administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to
this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 5 As rightly
observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is
the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. 6 From this, Mr.
Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the
court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It may
also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of
the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a
style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct
tending to degrade the administration of justice 8 — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted.
Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur."
He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and
arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it
offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines
surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a]
lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." 9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from
all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the
following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never
owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job.
Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor
ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a
disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu
proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances.
For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in
the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty.
Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that
he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel
in this case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy
was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. — ... only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision
in its entire thought should be read thus —
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be
deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the
court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not
present at the date of submission; however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will
take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with
the clerk at the date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which
is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and
fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it
does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that
qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were
injected. More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been
embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision
presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court
is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is
an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at
the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge
against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not
even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was
Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling
says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read
the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself,
he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the
fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has
control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which
the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client
persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The
people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of
justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading
a cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case
against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the
invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the
bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid
unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same
have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum
of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises
against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the
disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran
Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. — Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities
between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY. — Whether directed at the person of
complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to
interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a
fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a
member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive
language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to
be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper
decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.
RESOLUTION
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of
judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while
complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter
looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with his
offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo",
referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making
an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this
representation called up this representation at his house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and
immediately, this representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school and confronted Atty.
Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there l would
sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which
he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities
between counsel. (Canon 17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled
for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited
lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of
conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has
employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive
personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-
7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent’s actuation was triggered by complainant’s own manifest hostility and provocative
remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a
repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002.]
ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive language and
threatening and attempting to assault complainant.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney of the Public Attorney’s Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged
that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San
Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested that Atty. Salvani
talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room. At this point, respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood
up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying, "Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na anang sala."
("Why do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake.")
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefianco’s outburst and asked him to cool off, but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty.
Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent that it was the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could be settled
because she was no longer interested in prosecuting the same. Respondent refused to listen and instead continued to scold Atty. Salvani and the
latter’s client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at
first listened, but shortly after he again started shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with respondent, complainant went inside
his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in the Public Attorney’s Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he heard respondent Pefianco saying: "Nagsiling si Atty.
Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa PAO, buyon nga klase ka tawo." ("Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what an
idiot.") Then, upon seeing complainant, respondent pointed his finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear. At
this point, according to complainant, he confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to leave the office if he had no
business there. Complainant said respondent resented this and started hurling invectives at him. According to complainant, respondent even took a
menacing stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent
Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take respondent out of the office, but before they could do so, respondent tried to attack
complainant and even shouted at him, "Gago ka!" ("You’re stupid!") Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off respondent’s blow and complainant
was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat
and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved
him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee, Napoleon Labonete, to
put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys" from hanging round in the Public Attorney’s Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the woman’s case, complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him
to get out of the Public Attorney’s Office. He claimed that two security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to take respondent out of
the office. Contrary to complainant’s claims, however, respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punch him and shout at him, "Gago
ka!" ("You’re stupid!")
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal
complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed by the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that
he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to deny the accusations against
him but also to give any explanation for his actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that repetition of
the same act will be dealt with more severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco who provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of several disinterested
persons confirm complainant’s allegation that respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even attempted to lay
hands on him (complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 1 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their
fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other
and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times. 2chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In this case, respondent’s meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an
explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to
respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her case
because she needed the money. Be that as it may, respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to
demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was being
pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and
Robert Minguez, who went to the Public Attorney’s Office because they heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been
summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring
down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the
way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be
his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned
more severely.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor
(formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2
May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions for making certain public statements.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the
Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as
respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of
the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and
(2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash
the criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and
under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal
cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and
12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be
and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the
Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days
from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos.
12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the
Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304
recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again,
petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the
same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit
a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578,
the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of
Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following
Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General
for respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within which to file comment on the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider
IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary Restraining
Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP
Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez
and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, " People of the Philippines
vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as
bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect
of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue
of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him from investigating graft cases
involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable actions
from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily
Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially
because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan
from investigating graft cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to help promote the political
fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from
instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme
Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two "very powerful" officials of the
Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil
I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the
order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while she symphatizes with local officials
who are charged in court during election time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled
to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time could be mere harassment suits, the
Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny.
(Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion
within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive
portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him
in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having
argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his
own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not
to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme
Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and
was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court,
interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said
notes to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports
on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated
Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to
REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the media which not only deal with
matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly
or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice,
the Court Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should
not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such public statements reported in
the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila
Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim
immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating cases
against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of persons with pending cases before the
Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on him and to refrain from
investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and circumstances attendant upon the notes written to
said public respondent by three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now form part of its official
records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements
and the annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same period of ten
(10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered
and therefore not served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the
respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other
things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and
that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this
Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer
that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to
Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per
curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an
anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to
respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with
Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending
before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation
called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as
regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the
Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power
incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all
other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection
against an improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline
attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt.
Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the
contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the
respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with
which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share
in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him,
and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar,
the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought
to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in
effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become
incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the
members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal
with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it
appear, the members of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance . This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the property and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic
nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it
can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof—as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in
the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said
practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it . So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are
in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because
public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present
is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and
judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them
from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit
themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against
attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the
present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any case,
respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that
those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be
resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied
making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its
per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act
of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some
Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution
dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and
anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and
Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent
against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent
has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial
process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is
very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is
also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or
Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court
rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately
ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez.
Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934.
Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8)
months, could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render
decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable
charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed
to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated
Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all
to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the
mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with
respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made by
respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme
Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in
effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful"
accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be
regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is
also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due
process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture
that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by
way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the
purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent
undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered
that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would
have also found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the
continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as
a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to
administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and
to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and administrative charges against the
respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the
resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow
fairness and due process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no china man's chance to get
fair hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to
believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a specified Member of the Court "has
been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court,
accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only
capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect
as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to
understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most
solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily
demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise
of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which
have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the
Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment
rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of
court by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty.
del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time
later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for
Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the
justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of
the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I
would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of
Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to
the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination. (60
SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty.
del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all
human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already
decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the
government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous
utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government,
We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a
complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We
do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember
that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on
only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We
found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this
Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent
del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that
spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of the land when on the flimsy ground of
alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered
unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to
this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of
justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company
were required by this Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-representation and obfuscation of the
petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can
be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is
thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par.
7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and
resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous
and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the
latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion
states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The appointment
referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial
ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968
decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial
prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a
favored party directly benefited by the said decision

(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which
Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was
outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part—... . Only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ."
This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very
member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the
Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of
May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either its executive or
judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government
without either compensation or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid
and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not
to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized,
democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a
presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and
predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being
interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a
short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme
Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro would be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this
at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He
makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety
but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all
times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in
our country, 'although the process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court . For, inhibition is also asked if, we
repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members
of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once
apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have
each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration
crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this
Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is
presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's
attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the
dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of
distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in the language of
Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of
contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government . It must
be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In
doing so, unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise
the graft and corruption of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would
invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the
sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World
Court has even been embodied in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider
the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision.
And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this
Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather
than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor
amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we
prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice . (31 SCRA at 13-23;
emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great injustice committed against his client by the
Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so
that "the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed
[may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published
statements attributed to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the tribunal's 'unconstitutional and obnoxious'
practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why
he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our Supreme Court is composed of men who
are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme
Court 'will become responsible to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We have added
only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We
refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer
was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31
SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding,
through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court, made the following statements in his Motion for
Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground
that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and
on the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the
Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means, because the rule of law creates and
preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are
violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes
repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people
should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of
Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required counsel to show cause why administrative action
should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to
express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the
above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to
the recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful
language contained in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What
makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 580-
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer
of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy
of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)'
(1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which
carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following
item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo,
reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in
his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the
coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly,
so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory
of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free
speech and in requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is
to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not
on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower
and degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which contained the following paragraph (in
translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery
of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our
power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some
citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right
to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the
prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish
to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. (61
Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt
to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above, the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt
of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of
the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used
therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the
Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a member of the
Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way
to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said
motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly
improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are
annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of
a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the
court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails
in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his
client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the
reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that
decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public
knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and
disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid
of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be
proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its
dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice ( In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669),
but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon
which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728;
emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the
Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in the
cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco , 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting
application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed
their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements
very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That
respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a
complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a
repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related
doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between
free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has
primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent
judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their
independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent.
The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to
its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is
the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court
adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the
part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic.
The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice 53 is
heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which
are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in
the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or
comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as
characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and
acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no
repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied
his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988.
In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application
of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27
April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by
the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and
undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at
stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such
institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not
effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily
measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this
Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against
respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the
Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court
and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of
Appeals for their information and guidance.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5148 July 1, 2003
ATTY. RAMON P. REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG JR., respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. The bickering and the hostility of their clients should not affect their conduct and
rapport with each other as professionals and members of the bar.
The Case
Before us is a Sworn Complaint1 filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyer’s oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to suspend him as follows:
"x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him to the obligation that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil Case No. 4884, when it
was apparent that there was no legal ground to do so, respondent violated his oath of office as well as the above-quoted Canon of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, [r]espondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years." 2
The Facts
In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu, 3 a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a
business venture that went awry. Xu invested P300,000 on a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood products factory being set up by a certain
Chia Hsien Pan, another Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. Eventually, the former discovered that the latter had not established a
fishball factory. When Xu asked for his money back, Pan became hostile, making it necessary for the former to seek legal assistance.
Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against Pan, who was represented by respondent. The Complaint, docketed as IS 98J-
51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor Pedro B. Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary
investigation on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Hence,
Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint4 for estafa against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. 5 On April 8, 1999, the Manila
RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest6 against Pan.
Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest. 7 He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint for
the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a business venture against complainant, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga.
When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was Pan who had decided to institute the civil action against Atty. Reyes. Respondent
claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil case, if complainant would move for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two
lawyers failed to reach a settlement.
In his Comment8 dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in Civil
Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to conclude that the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exact
vengeance. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in
conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically, Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case despite the pendency of Pan’s Motion for
an Opportunity to Submit Counter-Affidavits and Evidence, 9 of the appeal10 to the justice secretary, and of the Motion to Defer/Suspend
Proceedings.11
On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa case, which the former knew
fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the irregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainant’s
connivance therein were discovered only after the institution of the collection suit.
The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. 12 Thereafter, the Board of Governors of
the IBP passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution.13
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In her Report and Recommendation,14 Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigation and report,
averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had been impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa
they had filed against respondent’s client. In his Comment, respondent himself claimed that "the reason x x x was x x x the irregularities of the
criminal investigation/connivance and consequent damages."
Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with damages had been filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa case, in
which respondent’s client was the defendant. There was no need to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never participated
in the business transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and highly questionable was the inclusion of the prosecutor and complainant in the civil
case instituted by respondent on the alleged prodding of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.
Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and complainant in Civil Case No. 4884. In so doing,
respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the investigating commissioner’s
recommendation for his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.
This Court’s Ruling
We agree with the IBP’s recommendation.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities
and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.15 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the
dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "[a] lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel."
Respondent’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the "collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of
an unregistered business venture." It had originally been filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor
Salanga.
The Amended and Supplemental Complaints16 alleged the following:
"27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and deliberately refused and failed to perform his duty enjoined by
the law and the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process by violating his rights under the Rules on preliminary
investigations; he also falsely made a Certification under oath that preliminary investigation was duly conducted and plaintiff [was] duly
informed of the charges against him but did not answer; he maliciously and x x x partially ruled that there was probable cause and filed a
Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully [well] that the proceedings were fatally defective and null and
void; x x x;
"28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed said appeal and motion to defer for the valid grounds stated
therein deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to the arrest of said plaintiff under an invalid information and warrant of
arrest.
"29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant Zongoi Xu is baseless connived with the latter to harass and extort
money from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the manner contrary to law, morals and public policy, resulting to the
arrest of said plaintiff and causing plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.]" 17
We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper remedies strengthen complainant’s allegation
that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against the estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga’s
resolution, they should have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice secretary and filed
a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga’s decision to file an information for estafa.
In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could show that the estafa case was filed without basis. Moreover, he could have
instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a
lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no justification.
The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there was no
reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return
the inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice
to the parties according to law, not to harass them. 18
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their
success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one
another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.
Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession, 19 but also
constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, the Lawyer’s Oath exhorts law practitioners not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid nor consent to the same."
Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy and unacceptable.
While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of their clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery.20 Their rendition of improper service invites stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, they advance the honor of their profession and
the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law. 21
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily
created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates solely from integrity,
character, brains and skill in the honorable performance of professional duty. 22
WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
ADM. CASE NO. 5737 October 25, 2004
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he
appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14,
2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:

"Your Honor, I’m not xxx xxx."
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was
intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a
party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor,
with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words
"appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!" were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and
discredit complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondent’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a
lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their
dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the
Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further complainant’s illegal practice of law;
complainant’s complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing
in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating "[i]n today’s hearing both lawyers appeared;" because of
which, respondent stated: "Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is
not a lawyer," to which complainant replied: "The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer;" the reason he informed the court that
complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the
presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: "for the plaintiff your honor;" he stated "pumasa ka muna" out of indignation because of
complainant’s temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral
defamation against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: "It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements
made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540);" in another malicious
prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City,
they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which
allegedly stated among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruz’s motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not having satisfied the
requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open
court "Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK?" the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court’s Third Division which stated among
others: "That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainant’s actuations and taking into
account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer
arrogance on the part of the complainant." Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period
of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondent’s averment that the utterances he made in
open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the case in question
under trial before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of
Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45,
Pasay City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainant’s allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven
years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his
fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not
refuted by him "that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on
the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose relative to complainant’s appearance in court;
although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules
of Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other
party as in this case.
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner
and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on
review and decision by the Board of Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. – (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review
shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator’s report. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava,1 the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and
the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings with which
they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of
Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning. 2
In this case, the Board of Governors’ resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it
based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been
pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to
resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases. 3 This case falls within the exception.
We hold that respondent’s outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct
the judge’s impression of complainant’s appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a
lawyer.4 Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of
impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an
account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language.5
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation
personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea,6 this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:

This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its
termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those
qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute
and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by
acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself."
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by
acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges
and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was
she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law. 7
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon
them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. 8 Though a
lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 9
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15742 January 31, 1961
MIGUEL TOLENTINO, plaintiff,
vs.
CIRILO P. BAYLOSIS, defendant-appellee.
Miguel Tolentino in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.

Cirilo P. Baylosis in his own behalf as defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
By resolution dated April 8, 1959, Court of Appeals certified to us Case No. CA-G.R. No. 19432-R, an appeal taken to it from the decision of April 19,
1956 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in its Civil Case No. 67, dismissing plaintiff's complaint for damages, with costs, on the ground that
the whole issue therein involved is one of law.
Devoid of unessentials, records disclose that in Civil Case No. 79 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, entitled Jose Ruiz, et al. vs. Cirilo
Baylosis, et al., for the annulment of certain certificates of title and recovery of damages, herein appellant Miguel Tolentino appeared as counsel for
the plaintiffs, while appellee was the attorney of record for the defendants. In a pleading captioned "Reply to Answer on Counterclaim" and filed in
that case, appellee made the following allegations:
"Paragraph 2 —
subpar. (b)—That for the death of the said five plaintiffs, defendant has nothing to do nor to answer or account for, but would rather state
that the cause of their death may be due to the will of God, or due to the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their leader
and counsel, ....
subpar. (c)—That on the basis of Atty. Miguel Tolentino (sic), a deceased plaintiff is claiming from defendant an amount of P28,591 and
giving allowance of another 2 who may die, so he must be a wealth to anyone who has it; that when Atty. Tolentino made this allegation,
he must be certainly not of his usual mind, otherwise with his old age, and long practice of law, he would not have dared to make such
fictitious and malicious claim, and knowingly that this Honorable Court is not the place for every exagerrated and unreasonable demand in
order to give trouble and worries to defendant;
subpar. (d), sub-sec.—That the defendant for being the victorious party in the said case and Atty. Miguel Tolentino, one of the losing
counsels in said case, must be the one who is still liable for the damages sustained by defendant;
"Paragraph 4 —
subpar. (c)—Before the public, Attorney Tolentino cannot be judged as a prominent attorney or a bright attorney for his several failures in
the bar and his several losses of his cases are not in his favor.
subpar. (d)—Defendant had seen Atty. Tolentino appeared before the Honorable Supreme Court on January 24, 1955 in a certain
argument on certiorari case, entitled Luis Baylosis, et al., petitioners vs. Agapito Alejar, et al., respondents, and in that argument Atty.
Tolentino was badly humiliated because of his lack of knowledge of law and unpreparedness. On that same moment he perspired much
despite the fact that the chamber was cool because of air conditioning. Again in the hearing of a certain injunction case at Batangas,
Batangas, before the Honorable Judge E. Soriano, Atty. Tolentino lost against the fiscal and other lawyers. It is therefore the contention of
the defendant, that the caliber and standing of Atty. Miguel Tolentino is not the type of attorney who can demand a professional service of
ten thousand pesos, and in the honest belief of defendant, Atty. Tolentino is a counsel for just five hundred pesos in the event that plaintiff
wins this case, and that damages is allowed by the Honorable Court, which of course is believed to be remote to happen before the Court.
Urging that the statements aforequoted are libelous and derogatory to his character and reputation as a known lawyer, as a former high government
official and employee, and as a citizen of good standing in the community appellant initiated these proceedings and seeks to recover from the
appellee the sum of P100,000.00 as actual and moral damages.
Appellee does not deny having made the allegations complained of, but advances the defense that said remarks were not libelous, and granting that
they were, the same were privileged communications. In fact, appelle asserts a counterclaim for P105,000.00, representing actual damages and
attorney's fees allegedly caused to him by appellant's own defamatory statements levelled against his (appellee's) person.
Both complaint and counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court. However, only the plaintiff appealed.
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the decisive issue calls only for a determination of whether or not appellee's statements as above
reproduced constitute a valid cause of action for damages. This question was not, in our opinion, properly solved in the negative by the trial court.
It is the generally accepted rule that counsel, parties, or witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory
published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided that the statements are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in
hand or subject of inquiry (see 53 C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas vs. Parrenño, et al., G.R. No. L-12545, April 30, 1959, and authorities cited therein). For, as
aptly observed in one case,1 "while the doctrine of priveleged communications is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet
to give legal sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships."
And the test relevancy has been stated thus:
... As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The
matter to which the priveleged does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in pleading may be priveleged, it need not be in
every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the
subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.... (Ruling Case Law, vol. 17, p. 336, quoted
with approval in Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Ellis, 48 Phil. 475, 481-482).
In the earliest of the leading cases on the subject the words used in determining the extent of matter that may be absolutely privileged
were "relevant" or "pertinent", but these words have in a measure a technical meaning, and perhaps they are not the best words that could
be used. So some courts have preferred the use of the words "have in reference", "having relation to the cause or subject matter", or
"made with reference"; and strict legal materiality or relevancy is not required to confer the privilege. There is difficulty in determining in
some cases what is relevant or pertinent and in deciding the question the courts are liberal, and the privilege embraces anything that may
possibly be pertinent, or which has enough appearance in connection with the case so that a reasonable man might think it relevant. All
doubts should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or pertinency, and for the purposes of relevancy the court will assume the alleged
slanderous charges to be true, however false they may have been in fact. (53 C.J.S., pp. 171-172).
Applying the above rule to the case at bar, there is little doubt but that the alleged defamatory remarks of counsel herein complained of, in paragraph
4 of his reply(already quoted), can not be the basis of an action for damages. It appears that, among the issues involved in Civil Case No. 79 of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, was the propriety of recovering damages allegedly cause by herein appellee, among others to the plaintiffs
therein, including, but not limited to, herein appellant's claim for attorney's fees. Thus, appellant himself had laid open the pertinency not only of the
amount of damages supposedly due to the plaintiffs, but, likewise, appellant's own standing as a lawyer by reason of his claim for attorney's fees in
the amount of P10,000.00. Although the language used by the appellee in the paragraph referred to was undoubtedly strong, it was made in
legitimate defense of his own and his client's interests, and we cannot say that the statements in his pleadings concerning appellant's standing and
ability as counsel were irrelevant or impertinent. Hence, such remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged.
However, the relevancy (and, therefore, the privileged character) of appellee's statements made in paragraph 3, subparagraphs (b) and (c), of his
"Reply to Answer on Counterclaim" is not as apparent as those made by him in paragraph 4, heretofore discussed. The averments in subparagraph
(b) that the cause of death of plaintiffs' decedents —
may be due to the will of God or due to the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their leader and counsel
were evidently a conjecture that had no place in a pleading, which is well understood to be limited to statements of fact.
Equally irrelevant are the allegations complained of in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the reply of appellee, in response to the counterclaim for
damages. The averment that Attorney Tolentino (appellant) was "not of his usual mind" in making the claim, "otherwise with his old age and long
practice of law, he would have not dared to make such fictitious and malicious claim" is certainly not relevant or pertinent to the issue whether the
damages asked were true or untrue. These damages were asked for, not by the appellant, but by his clients; hence their counsel's state of mind is
not, and could not be a proper subject of inquiry.
As pointed out by the Court in Anonymous vs. Trenkman, et al., 48 Fed. (2d) 571, 574 —
The pleadings should contain but the plain and concise statements of the material facts and not the evidence by which they are to be
proved.... If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his
privilege.
Without this limitation to the immunity enjoyed by pleadings, the same could be easily diverted from their original aim to succinctly inform the court of
the issues in litigation, and perverted into a vehicle for airing charges motivated by personal rancor. That such misuse of judicial proceedings must
be firmly and resolutely discouraged and curbed by Courts needs no demonstration.
It appears, however, that the appellant herein was libeled by way of retaliation, because three days previously, appellant Tolentino, in a counterclaim
filed against appellee Baylosis, had personally attacked the latter in the following passage (Rec. App., p. 46-57) —
Defendant Baylosis has been the Vice-President of the "Samahang Magbubukid." The prevailing and tempting "motto" of this organization
is that the tenant must not leave the lands tilled by them because the same belong to them in their own right. It is highly inconceivable now
how could the defendant trample upon the only chance of the plaintiffs to own the lands in question, in gross violation of the "motto" of his
own organization on which a Huk or PKM organization at that, according to this Honorable Court in Crim. Case No. 10898, People vs.
Ceferino Inciong, Cirilo P. Baylosis, et al., for inciting to sedition and in Criminal Case No. 510, People vs. F. Buhay for libel.
Considering that it was appellant here who first libeled appellee, although the latter did not appeal the dismissal of his own claim for damages; that
appellant, therefore, did not really come to court with clean hands; that no adequate evidence exists that appellant suffered material damage; and
that indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action,
even if the publication thereof be privileged, we find no reversible error in the dismissal of appellant's damage claim by the Court below.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14277 April 30, 1960
MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.
Manuel L. Fernandez in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.
LABRADOR, J.:
Petition for certiorari with injunction filed by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to annul two orders dated June 16 and July 29, 1958, of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Hon. Eloy B. Bello, presiding. The first order reprimands petitioner for his improper conduct as counsel in Special
Proceedings No. 3931, entitled "Guardianship of the Minors Federico and Pedro both surnamed Perreyras, Timotea Perreyras, petitioner-guardian,"
orders him to return to the guardian within 15 days the sum of P200.00 collected by him, and causes a copy of the order to be sent to the Supreme
Court for corresponding disciplinary action on the petitioner (Annex J). The second order denies petitioner's motion for reconsideration and warns
him not to use improper terms in his pleadings. (Annex L.)
The circumstances leading to the issuance of the above orders may be briefly stated as follows: Timotea Perreyras, through Atty. Manuel L.
Fernandez as her counsel, instituted Special Proceedings No. 3931, for her appointment as guardian over the persons and properties of her
brothers, the minors Federico and Pedro Perreyras. Upon her appointment and upon her qualifying as such, she petitioned the court for authority to
sell a nipa land owned in common with the wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to Maximiano Umañgay. The request was
granted by Judge Villamor, and on August 24, 1951, a deed of sale, prepared and notarized by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, was executed by the
guardian in favor of Maximiano Umañgay for the sum of P1,000. This sale was approved by Judge Pasicolan on December 17, 1952 (Annex C).
The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with right to repurchase to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay by Florentino
Perreyras, father (now deceased) of the guardian and the wards. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay were, in
turn, sold for P200.00 to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Of the purchase price of P1,000, P200.00 was paid to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, redemption
price of the nipa land and as assignee of the credit in favor of Maximiano Umañgay and Ricardo Perreyras. The other P200.00 was given to said
attorney, in payment of his legal fees for services rendered by him as counsel of the father of the wards in a civil case. However, the record does not
show that these payments were authorized by the court.
On January 21, 1958, Judge Eloy Bello, who took over the court from Judge Pasicolan, issued an order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show cause
why she should not be punished for contempt for failing to account for the property and money of the wards. After hearing the guardian Timotea
Perreyras, the court issued another order date January 20, 1958, exonerating her of the contempt charges, disapproving all payments made by her,
including that made to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, and requiring Attys. Manuel L. Fernandez and Braulio Fernandez to show cause why they should
not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt of court. In the same order, the court charged said attorneys of having abused
their relationship with the guardian and having taken money from her without previous approval of the court (Annex D). Atty. Braulio Fernandez
submitted a written explanation, and the court, considering it satisfactory, exonerated him of the preferred charges. On January 30, 1958, the court
again issued another order directing Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to submit in ten days a written answer to the charges stated in the order of January
27, 1958 (Annex G). On February 1, 1958, he submitted an explanation (Annex H.), admitting receipt of the sum of P400.00 from the guardian, but
alleging that when he received the amount he was no longer the attorney of the guardian as their relation had terminated when the guardian secured
the services of Atty. Braulio Fernandez; that he acted in good faith and the guardianship proceedings were instituted by him only to help the minors
the action being less expensive than an intestate proceeding, and that he was paid only P50.00 for his services to the guardian. So he asked that the
charges be dismissed and that the guardian be warned not to make unjustifiable complaints against him.
On February 10, 1953, Timotea Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay were summoned to appear for further examination on the proceeds of the sale
of the nipa land. After hearing their testimonies, the court on June 16, 1958, found Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez guilty of contempt of court because he
had taken the amount of P400.00 from the proceeds of the sale without previous approval from the court. The court also found the conduct of
counsel to be anomalous for the reason that he instituted the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect unpaid attorney's fees due him
from the father of the wards (Annex J). This is the first order sought to be annulled in this appeal. The second order is that denying the motion for
reconsideration of respondent attorney.
It is claimed by petitioner in this appeal that the proceedings conducted in the court below are irregular because no formal charge was filed against
him. There is no merit in this contention. The court motu proprio preferred the charges in its order dated January 20, 1958, and in another order
dated January 27, 1958, the petitioner was duly advised thereof and was given an opportunity to file a written answer thereto. It has been held in the
following case that there has been sufficient compliance with the requirements of law:
The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold person guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and
punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person
charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. The above
requirements were complied with by the filing of the order on September 30, and the giving of full opportunity to the respondent to appear
and defendant himself. The contention that a formal information filed by a prosecuting officer is necessary to begin proceedings must be
overruled. (People vs. B. M. Venturanza, et al., defendants, Jose Y. Torres, appellant, 98 Phil., 211; 52 Off. Gaz. [2] 769.).
The court below found petitioner guilty of contempt court on two grounds, the first is that he instituted the guardianship proceedings for the sole
purpose of facilitating payment to him of the debts of the wards. The facts do not, however, bear out this finding. Before the guardianship
proceedings were instituted, the wards were indebted in the sum of P200.00 to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay, and as the wards had
no money with which to pay the debt, the only way to settle it is by selling the nipa land. But the land could not have been sold by the minors without
intervention of a guardian. So the petitioner must have believed that guardianship proceedings was the proper remedy. The judges of the court
below, from whom Judge Bello took over, must have been satisfied that the procedure taken by the petitioner was more beneficial to the wards when
they appointed a guardian and approved the sale of the land. As there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of petitioner, the finding on this point of
the court below should be reversed.
However, the finding of the court that the purchase price of the land is P1,000 was in custodia legis and could not be taken and used in payment of
debts without its previous authority is correct. As a lawyer the petitioner is charged with the knowledge that the property and effects of the wards are
under the control and supervision of the court, and that they could not be and expended without the latter's permission, more especially so when the
money taken was to pay the debt of the father of the wards. The reprimand is, therefore, fully justified. But the order for the refund of the P200.00
and the closing of the guardianship proceedings after such return, would deprive petitioner of the fees that he was entitled to receive from the father
of the guardian and the wards, for services rendered in a civil case, which services are admitted to have been due from their father. While the
reprimand is in order for petitioner's mistake, the mistake is no sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned and which his
client could not pay before his death. The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see
that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly the court can not deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so.
In his answer before this Court respondent judge justifies his order for the return of the P200.00 on the ground that petitioner is "below average
standard of a lawyer." The opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer's fee. It is the contract between the
lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered. Petitioner claims that he won a civil case for his client, the deceased father of the guardian
and the wards. That P200.00 is the amount of the fee of petitioner is admitted by the guardian. We find that the court's order directing petitioner to
return the P200.00, and in effect denying him the right to collect the same, is not justified, to say the least. This portion of the final order is hereby
modified in the sense that the return of the P200.00 is without prejudice to petitioner's right to demand payment for the services rendered the
deceased out of the proceeds of the property left by him (deceased).
In this Court the judge below desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration be stricken out for employing strong language. We
believe the said strong language must have been impelled by the same language used by the judge below in characterizing the act of the petitioner
as "anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner." If
any one is to blame for the language used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have
provoked petitioner, and the judge below has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate
language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.
Wherefore, the orders are modified as above indicated. Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., reserves his vote.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5768 March 26, 2010
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit 1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff’s counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that
contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the
document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a
lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk,
threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na
abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of
Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until
proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for
sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and
criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify
the daily time record of his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty.
Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against
him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer’s clients filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was
improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he
degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the
latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and
grave threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit,2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty.
Ferrer was on board his son’s taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycle’s passengers. 3 But neither Atty.
Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle
driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities. 4
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received.
On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1,5 the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes,
Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have "the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge" and that he was
facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the
suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of
Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of
the plaintiff’s affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The
Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court
personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, 6 adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s
recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already
endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrer’s
motion for reconsideration.8 On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation 9 of the
Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer’s motion for reconsideration. 10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors’ IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008. 11 On August 12, 2009 the
Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer’s comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his
comment,12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte that
warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the
charges against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
The Court’s Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and
the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their
fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay
Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and
that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a
fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and "FALSIFICATION" of documents, committed to mislead this Honorable
Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a
grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his oath of office as a government employee and as member of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff,
IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the "SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY
the same including the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the same, from pars. (1) to
par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for "DISBARMENT" of the one responsible for said falsification and distortions." 15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. 16
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the
legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer
did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter
for the day did not report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded
his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines
Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently, he uttered these with
intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of
hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 17 Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this
sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral
righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation. 1avvphi1
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer’s allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. 18 So long as the parties are given the
opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. 19 Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave
Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they
must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. 20 Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that
lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the
suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer’s personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be
served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10565, September 07, 2016
PROSECUTOR RHODNA A. BACATAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. MERARI D. DADULA, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
In a Complaint1 dated June 16, 2008 submitted to the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Rhodna A. Bacatan, Assistant
Cebu City Prosecutor (complainant) charged Atty. Merari D. Dadula (respondent) with violation of: a) Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; b) the disregard of the duties of attorneys, particularly under paragraph (d) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court; and
c) her lawyer's oath not to do falsehood nor consent to the doing of any. 2
Facts
Between September and October 2007, the following cases were raffled to complainant for preliminary investigation: (1) a complaint for libel (I.S. No.
4760) filed by Rev. Jose Bailey Bernaldez against Dr. Carlito Impas, Sr.; and (2) a complaint for falsification (I.S. No. 4999-J) filed by Dr. Carlito
Impas, Jr. against Rev. Jose Bailey Bernaldez. Respondent was the counsel of Carlito Impas, Jr. 3 Complainant found probable cause for libel and
recommended its filing in court, while the complaint for falsification was recommended for dismissal for lack of probable cause. 4 Both
recommendations were approved by the City Prosecutor. 5
Respondent filed a Motion to Determine Probable Cause With Motion to Hold in Abeyance Trial With Motion to Defer Issuance of Warrant and
Motion to Defer Posting of Reduced Bail Bond6 in the libel case. In her pleadings, respondent accused complainant of manifest partiality and bias
against her client when complainant: 1) summarily ruled that the publication of the letter was libelous but miserably failed to point out, in her
Resolution, which portion constituted libel; 2) denied the motion for reconsideration with dispatch in an undated Order; 3) "sat" on the falsification
case for she did not resolve it with dispatch unlike what she did in this libel case; 7 4) did not send a copy of the resolution in the libel case to the
accused; 5) dismissed the falsification case even if mere was clear admission from the accused in the case that it was his signature; and 6) lodged
the information in the libel case within the period to appeal the undated Order. 8 Respondent perceived an obvious disparity in her treatment of these
two cases and further noticing the swiftness of her (Prosecutor Bacatan) Resolution and Order in this libel case which is utterly adverse against the
accused despite the glaring fact that no probable cause exists to hold him for libel. 9 Respondent then concluded that "[a]ll these adverse actions of
prosecutor Bacatan against herein accused impels him to one inevitable conclusion: the prosecutor must have been bribed." 10
In her Comment,11 complainant denied the charges of undue haste on the libel case and undue delay on the falsification case. According to her, the
two cases were raffled on different dates and received by her office on separate dates. Adopting a first-in-first-out policy, the libel case, which was
raffled first was resolved earlier than the falsification case. 12 Moreover, she did not sit on the falsification case or act with undue haste in the libel
case, but merely followed the procedure in resolving cases at the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office. 13 In her Rejoinder,14 respondent claimed that
complainant's undue haste and grave irregularity in handling the case is evident from the Resolution and Information which she prepared and signed
on the same day, November 20, 2007.15
On October 13, 2008,16 the IBP required respondent to file her Answer.17
In her Answer, respondent insisted that complainant follow the regular procedure. She reiterated the arguments raised in her motion to determine
probable cause and in her Rejoinder. She also invoked as an affirmative defense the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23 of Cebu City
(RTC), granting the motion to determine probable cause for the libel case, dated August 26, 2008. 18 She also presented as evidence the RTC
Decision19 dated June 29, 2012 acquitting Dr. Impas, Jr. from the charge of libel. 20
Pending the results of the investigation of this Complaint, respondent also filed on December 20, 2010, a Complaint for Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and a Petition for Disbarment and Imposition of Appropriate Disciplinary Actions 21 before the Office of the Ombudsman for the
Visayas and the IBP, respectively. The petition contained the same allegations made on the motion to determine probable cause and in the
Rejoinder, but no new issues were raised against the complainant.
IBP Investigating Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Commissioner Almeyda), in his Report and Recommendation, 22 stated that it is the practice of
the National Prosecution Service that where the resolution is one finding probable cause for the filing of a case, the investigating prosecutor already
prepares the corresponding information to facilitate the movement of the case, should the reviewing officers affirm the finding of probable cause. The
similarity of dates of the resolution that has yet to be affirmed with the information is inconsequential and hardly gives room to question the regularity
of the process.23
Commissioner Almeyda found that respondent failed to abide by the bounds of courtesy, fairness and candor as provided in Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. She "had overstepped the bounds of fair play and have drawn herself to the maelstrom of misconduct by dangerously
and recklessly including in her pleadings a completely and irrelevant allegation concerning complainant's character that did not enter into the
equation as a factor in the determination of whether probable cause existed in the matter tasked by the processes to be resolved by
complainant."24 Commissioner Almeyda observed however, that respondent was, "a comparatively new member of the profession," and reminded
her "to be a bit more circumspect in her choice of words in championing the cause of her client." 25cralawred The Commissioner recommended that
respondent be "strongly reprimanded, with warning that a similar or any other future infraction of the Code of Professional Responsibility shall be
dealt with more severely."26
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-216, 27 adopting and approving Commissioner Almeyda's Report
and Recommendation.
Ruling
The Court concurs with the finding of the IBP but takes exception to the recommended penalty to be imposed, which is light in relation to the
circumstances presented in this case.
Membership in the bar imposes upon lawyers certain obligations to one another, including the observance of honourable, candid and courteous
dealings with other lawyers,28 as well as maintaining fidelity to known and recognized customs and practices of the bar that make the practice of law
a profession.29
The unfavourable resolutions against her client prompted respondent to hurl accusations of irregularity and bribery against complainant. Strongly
worded statements by a lawyer against opposing counsel, if justified by the records, may not justify disciplinary actions against the former. 30 But such
is not the case here. Respondent's tirades against complainant have proven to be baseless.
As found by the IBP, that the dates of the finding of probable cause and that of the filing of the information are the same, is explained by the
prevailing practice in the National Prosecution Service: an information is prepared together with the resolution finding probable cause to facilitate the
movement of the case.31 Respondent could have easily verified this practice before she resorted to condemning complainant and her actions.
Respondent failed to substantiate her bare allegations and sweeping conclusion of irregularity and charge of bribery, basing her charges purely on
her flimsy gut feeling. It is unethical for a lawyer to accuse another lawyer wantonly and maliciously of a serious misconduct in the absence of a
reasonable cause.32
Further, the attack on the character of the complainant is also completely unnecessary in the motion for determination of probable cause on the libel
case. Contrary to respondent's contention, her misconduct is not cured nor justified by the eventual acquittal of her client.
We note the IBP's observation that during the times material to the case, respondent was considerably new to the profession, 33 and must have been
overzealous in protecting the cause of her client, even akin to overenthusiasm. Members of the Bar must be reminded that "enthusiasm, or even
excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed
within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government." 34
In earlier cases, we meted the penalty of fine for a lawyer's use of intemperate language. Saberon v. Larong35 declared a lawyer guilty of simple
misconduct and imposed upon him a P2,000.00 fine for referring to a party's pleadings as "a series of blackmail suits" even if the latter were well
within their rights to file cases against the clients of the lawyer. 36 We ruled that while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. 37 Although lawyers are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, they should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and
propriety in making such remark or comment.38 In Ng v. Alar,39 we modified the IBP's recommended penalty of reprimand to a fine of P5,000.00, after
finding that "[s]ubmitting pleadings containing countless insults and diatribes against the [National Labor Relations Commission] and attacking both
its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer." 40 The lawyer also filed disbarment cases
against his opposing counsels for the latter's alleged filing of multiple actions based on the same cause of action, interference in the normal course
of judicial proceeding, and instigating the filing of the disbarment complaint against him. Notably, the IBP dismissed the disbarment charges against
opposing counsels. We ruled that the lawyer clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for "his actions erode the
public's perception of the legal profession."41
We find that respondent violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's cause is
desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming from such zeal or enthusiasm is disfavoured. When without proof nor enough basis on record,
respondent swiftly concluded, based only on gut feeling, that the complainant has been bribed or had acted for a valuable consideration, her conduct
has overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness and candor.
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Merari D. Dadula GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is
imposed a FINE of P2,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J., On official leave.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016
SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V. VILLAGARCIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for disbarment filed by complainants Spouses Manolo and Milinia Nuezca
(complainants) against respondent Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia (respondent) for grave misconduct, consisting of alleged unethical conduct in dealings
with other persons.
The Facts
In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter 2 dated February 15, 2009, copy furnished to various
offices and persons, which contained not only threatening but also libelous utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed
complainants to its recipients. Complainants likewise posited that several news clippings 3 that were attached to the demand letter were intended to
sow tear in them, and claimed that the circulation thereof caused them sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and besmirched reputation. 4 Thus, they
maintained that respondent should be held administratively liable therefor.
In a Resolution5 dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the verified complaint. However, for failure to serve the
aforesaid Resolution at respondent's address given by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complainants were then ordered 6 to furnish the
Court the complete and correct address of respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply with the Court's directive; thus, the Court
resolved,7 among others, to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, which set the case for a mandatory
conference/hearing.8chanrobleslaw
Unfortunately, despite notices,9 complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings. Likewise, the notices sent to respondent were
returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and "RTS Unknown." Thus, in an Order 10 dated October 24, 2014, the IBP directed the
parties to submit their respective verified position papers together with documentary exhibits, if any.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation11 dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Honesto A.
Villamor, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that respondent be declared in
contempt of court and fined the amount of PI,000.00, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.12chanrobleslaw
The IBP found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in their verified complaint. Moreover, despite repeated notices and directives
from the IBP to appear for the mandatory hearings, as well as to file his pleadings, respondent failed to do so, which was tantamount to defiance of
the lawful orders of the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Finding that respondent did not intend to file any comment and in the
process, purposely delayed the resolution of the instant case, the IBP recommended that respondent be held in contempt of court. 13chanrobleslaw
In a Resolution14 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the May 29, 2015 Report and
Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed
on him.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the verified
complaint.
The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and partially concurs with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.15 Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a demand for them to settle their monetary obligations to
respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their character. It also imputed crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for
worthless or bum checks and estafa. The relevant portion of the demand letter states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An early check on the records of some courts, credit-reporting agencies and law enforcement offices revealed that the names 'MANOLO NUEZCA'
and/or 'MANUELO NUEZCA' and 'MILINIA NUEZCA' responded to our search being involved, then and now, in some 'credit-related' cases and
litigations. Other record check outcomes and results use we however opt to defer disclosure in the meantime and shall be put in issue in the proper
forum as the need for them arise, [sic]
All such accumulated derogatory records shall in due time be reported to all the appropriate entities, for the necessary disposition and "blacklisting"
pursuant to the newly-enacted law known as the "Credit Information Systems Act of 2008."
x x x x
II. Your several issued BDO checks in 2003 and thereabouts were all unencashed as they proved to be "worthless and unfounded." By law, you
are liable under BP 22 (Boun[c]ing Checks Law) and Art. 315, Par. 2 (d) SWINDLING/ESTAFA, RPC.
III. For all your deceit, fraud, schemes and other manipulations to defraud Mrs. Arcilla, taking advantage of her helplessness, age and handicaps to
her grave and serious damage, you are also criminally liable under ART. 318, OTHER DECEITS. RPC. 16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of complainants to his client, made the demand
for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of criminal offenses against them, especially considering that there is a proper forum
therefor and they have yet to be found criminally liable by a court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and immoderate language
put complainants in shame and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that several other persons had been copy furnished with the demand
letter. As such, respondent could have besmirched complainants' reputation to its recipients.
At this juncture, it bears noting that respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and attend the mandatory hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the
claims and allegations of the complainants remain uncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade, 17 the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer the
complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate
his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, ifules of Court." 18chanrobleslaw
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 19 Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. 20 In this regard, all lawyers should take heed
that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly.21 Thus, respondent ought to temper his words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the court.
Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into consideration the case of Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino v. Jose
Concepcion Javier22 where respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month for employing offensive and
improper language in his pleadings. In light thereof, and considering that the IBP's recommended penalty is not commensurate to respondent's
misdeed in this case, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension for one (1) month from the practice of law should be meted upon respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Caguioa, JJ., concur

EN BANC
A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009

[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and
grocery products under the brand name "CDO," filed a Verified Complaint 1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of
tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS
telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s
oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO
Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and
soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of
parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which
the spouses Cordero demanded ₱150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in
contravention of company policy and, in any event, "outrageous."
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts,
but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant
via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 2 which complainant
found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles
unless complainant gave in to the ₱150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the
Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for ₱50,000, ₱15,000 of which would go to the Corderos and ₱35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And
respondent directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the
complaint.4 Respondent, who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he
prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for
its next 24 weekly issues at ₱15,000 per issue or a total amount of ₱360,000, and a Program Profile 6 of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at ₱4,000; (b) spot buy 30-
second TVC at ₱7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for ₱130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid amounting to ₱45,000 at ₱15,000 per advertisement,
and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program at ₱7,700 each or a total of ₱23,100. Acting on complainant’s offer, respondent relayed
to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns. 7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed
contest sponsored by said program, which announcement was transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest,
hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o,
‘aling liver spread ang may uod?’ Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread
ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating
tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and
italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue
of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA PANG PRODUKTO
NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-
20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO." 10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the
following articles:11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread," Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276); 12 (b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); 14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); 16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284); 18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);19 (i) "CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); 20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver spread sa
Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288); 21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO," Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); 22 (l) "Atty. Rufus
Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291); 23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon
7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293). 25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver
Spread."26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained
of what complainant claimed to be the "same baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it. 27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and
356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time
of the filing of the present administrative complaint. 28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent
filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice, 29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of
his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela
City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the
past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing
products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare
complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and
relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and
insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here; 30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction 31 which respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the
newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office
has no jurisdiction over this action.32 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-
04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against
complainant34 and to malign complainant through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the
following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation: 35
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the
Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
"Anent the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the instant plaintiff’s motion, this Court, inasmuch as the
defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiff’s prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to
maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby
restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically
the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not
denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing,
televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on
plaintiff and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty.
Batas", 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan –Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: "A lawyer shall not
make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with
Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the
Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it
and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his
pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain
[t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and
signed by herein respondent. …
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said "Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant,
respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous
articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-
stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order issued
against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the
tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the defects of complainant’s products to the consuming
public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainant’s
failure to give in to respondent’s "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainant’s
explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract
from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the
BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste
complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as
it could have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media
personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, 37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage
of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the
tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:

A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and
broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the
same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a
member of the legal profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate
language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession." 401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein complainant engaged
therein-herein respondent’s services as "she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality," 42 only to
later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him.
Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that
the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by
vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant. 43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 6290 July 14, 2004
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000,
complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit,
grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a
prior and subsisting marriage with another woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to
obtain a false marriage contract,1 which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of
Manila2 and the National Statistics Office (NSO)3 prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date and place of marriage
between the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio 4 and Felicisimo Tenorio III.5 But in the birth certificates of
their two other children, Oliver Tenorio6 and John Cedric Tenorio,7 another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory
to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her co-
employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her
husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa
case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement " Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from
divulging respondent's illegal activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of
Quezon City.8 Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against
Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and her
cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondent's good
name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office is registered with the Department of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business
Name.9 Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June
1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 10 The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with
the words "Isang bala ka lang" on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to get even with her. She terminated complainant's
employment after receiving numerous complaints that the complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of processing their
passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated: some politicians
offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The
respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She
then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit a Reply to respondent's Answer, while the respondent
would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the
respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants. 11
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office12 where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication
Radio Group identification card13 signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She
added that respondent's husband even appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her
behalf. If there was an instance that her husband appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the
complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted with the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain
Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have investments in her law office. 14
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that
their marriage contract was not registered she applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the
marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of
her children as to the place and date of her marriage were merely an oversight. 15
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on
13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is
no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the
complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of
cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior
partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3)
and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 – 20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private complainants to appear and
for lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice
of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the
IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac
vs. Rayos,16 we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A
case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on
the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance
of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant
has the burden of proving his case by convincing evidence. 17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based
on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal
case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-
member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or
in consideration of his services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. 19 Such acts
constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the
unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and
Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law
office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office. 20 That is a blatant misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in
misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears the signature
of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred
on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law
by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.21
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-
Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's record as attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar
Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of
Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them
to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them
by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint 1 dated 31 August 2004 was
allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia
showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus,
Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his
supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison.
Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s
signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of
Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo.
Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary
per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and
dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and
Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-
05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper
complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September
2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint 5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder,
Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that
was forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other
letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures
in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants
maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary
Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by
Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned
to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the
necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be
signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them
since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence.
Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to
attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were
present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear
despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents
submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties
were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006
and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report.
Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure
to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E.
Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the
various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that
respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just
one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and
ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain
responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x
x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds
himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary
diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he
done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform
this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is
hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit. 8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007.
Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by
Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to
hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of
his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 9 where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice
of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him.
Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court,
counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good
ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. 1âwphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of
manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any
steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006.
Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he
did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without
seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and
Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful
practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty.
Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case
against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7269 November 23, 2011
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso’s
deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification
was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela
Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the
court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court
orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s
employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb
(Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she
represented Ulaso as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no
longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan,
as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmente’s designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente’s only excuse was
that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente’s staff, alleging Macasieb’s failure to endorse pleadings and
notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso’s case in her affidavit and that there was
no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was still
working at Busmente’s office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However,
even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmente’s allegation that Dela
Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosa’s connivance with Macasieb. As
regards Busmente’s allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four
months from the time he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No.
XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of
Busmente’s suspension to six months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4 from the NBI stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared with
standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution
No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmente’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his
suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a
source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.5 The Court further ruled that holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts
indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner
of a law office for the general practice of law. 6
The Court explained:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
unauthorized practice of law.7
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in
Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law
through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmente’s staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned
from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmente’s office until
2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004 Order 8 of Judge Elvira DC.
Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that
Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to
continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente’s claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in
Busmente’s office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the
Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The
report shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there
were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22
November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003
addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his
office to inquire about its status. Busmente’s allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit 9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with
address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in
representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was
our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court records as our legal counsel the same could
not be taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred
her to us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases
at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or
hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that
the following elements of the offense are not present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in the instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to
practice law in the Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she
has legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our
hearings in short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal
assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente
should be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. 1âwphi1 Let a copy of this Decision be
also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions 1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s
motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a
government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year
term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. 2 On September 4, 2000,
petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. 4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to
the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the
President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. 5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. 6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. 7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and
JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the
Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently
representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be
renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President,
and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check
No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently
encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite
repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her
person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II,
Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against
Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that
amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. 10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she
merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple
student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a
whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in
connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly
contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath,
the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial. 13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of
administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a public office, petitioner’s stance that she was not
compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has
been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated. 14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. 15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this
provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his
office.
Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a public officer since she never
received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the
officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these
officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and
appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its
own government and to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are
consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and
conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any
other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been
had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of
non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board
of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly
falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she
does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not
from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case. 16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 17 The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004. 18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION." 19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a
public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in
question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a
criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
invoked in their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. 22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order
is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that
instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is
not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following
are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the
case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court
granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition
for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the
criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of
authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite
corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486,
promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of
public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. 29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on
March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and
may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review
filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action
shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all
prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. 32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public
official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract
with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or
affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections,
and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3
hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in
hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said
provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum . Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as
will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at
katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. 35 In
other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the
best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. 36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng
kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or
sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies.
The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section
4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of
the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development
of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia
were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest
Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830,
dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the President and
allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling
in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not
have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases
and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged,
as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00,
committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the
cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first
or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin
down the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are
found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise
by him for the benefit of the public ( [Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political
system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating
and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer." 42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of
merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she
is placed there by express provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. 45 By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. 46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. 47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. 48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by
providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training. 49 Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit. 50
The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense
because it was not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the
BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state university.
Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. 51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. 52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. 53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of
her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her
brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x."
(Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge
has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to
said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during
the trial on the merits of the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section
4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge
petitioner’s counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall
not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection
with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with which he was authorized. We
severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment. 56
We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the court should be characterized by
candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts. 58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona *, Nachura, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5379 May 9, 2003

WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant,
vs.
CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q. SUSA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer's oath. 1
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled " People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.",
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused,
filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the "accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under
detention."2 Upon personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly surrendered, complainant
learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of
the Security Management Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing
irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and the
failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the Motion as Annex "1".
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their
client, they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to
the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention
indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject
pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that
complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion
with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court. 3
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when his co-respondents filed the Manifestation with Motion for
Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Peña, Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and the Certificate of
Detention was not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of
Detention before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in the court's calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the presiding judge
and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance of his ministerial duty.
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,4 the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision.
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and recommendation as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6) months from
receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby recommended dismissed for lack of merit. 5
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to
wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondents' commission of deliberate
falsehood, Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The complaint against
Atty. Susa is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. 6
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate
falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.7 He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court"
and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his
clients."8 He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 9 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them.10 While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. 11
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 12
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion
for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that
accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the
court and thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly
condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the accused's detention was merely a statement of an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by
evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they were able to show that their client was already under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held on
December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13,
2000 was false.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same date "tentatively" scheduled for the
hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent
judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of
persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court. 13
In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at
least, he must be asked for his recommendation.14
In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion
may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as
lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. 15
Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for including
the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative
functions, although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. 16 Thus, he should
not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing
deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5624 January 20, 2004

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of
Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution/Order."1
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido,
but that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children – namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and
James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old – both of whom are in complainant’s custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her
marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another
case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235
entitled, "James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the
custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of
Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. 2 Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had
not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her.
Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something
amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent,
accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take
them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the
police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a
statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate court’s resolution/order. 3 In order to diffuse the
tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay
City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among
others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were
staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the
morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition 4 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals’ resolution. In the meantime, complainant
verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 5 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such
resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney’s oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious
Court of Appeals’ Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that
another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. 6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious
Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed
to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ
of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, 7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he
sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was
respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.1âwphi1 The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value
what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined.
Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it must never be at the expense
of the truth.8 Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel,
or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s
language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.9 The lawyer’s arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as
may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. 10 By calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital
prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance
is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended
from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years,
which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 144412 November 18, 2003
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of 27 April 2000 and the Resolution of 8 August 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 51451. The Court of Appeals upheld the Decision 3 of 18 September 1998 and the Resolution of 24 December 1998 of the National
Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98. The NLRC modified the Decision dated 23 December 1997 of Labor Arbiter
Dominador A. Almirante ("Labor Arbiter") in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-05-0545-94 holding that Allied Banking Corporation ("Allied Bank") illegally
dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida ("Galanida"). The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and
other amounts totaling ₱ 1,264,933.33.
Antecedent Facts
For a background of this case, we quote in part from the Decision of the Court of Appeals:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on 11 January 1978 and rose from accountant-
book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991. His appointment was covered by a "Notice of Personnel Action" which provides as one of the conditions
of employment the provision on petitioner’s right to transfer employees:
"REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the bank reserves the right to transfer or assign you to other departments or branches of the
bank as the need arises and in the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service to the public."
Private respondent was promoted several times and was transferred to several branches as follows:
"a) January, 1978 to March, 1982 – Tagbilaran City Branch
"b) April, 1982 to May, 1984 – Lapulapu City Branch
"c) June, 1984 – Mandaue City Branch
"d) July, 1984 to April, 1986 – Tagbilaran City Branch
"e) May, 1986 to May, 1987 – Dumaguete City Branch
"f) June, 1987 to August, 1987 – Carbon Branch, Cebu City
"g) September, 1987 to Sept. 1989 – Lapulapu City Branch, Cebu
"h) October, 1989 to Sept. 1992 – Carbon Branch, Cebu City
"i) October 1992 to Sept. 1994 – Jakosalem Regional Branch, Cebu City" (Rollo, p. 47)
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant
managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu for seven years already. Private respondent manifested his refusal to
be transferred to Bacolod City in a letter dated 19 April 1994 citing as reason parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that would result if he
is away from his family. He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May 1994.
Private respondent refused. In a letter dated 13 June 1994, petitioner warned and required of private respondent as follows:
"There is no discrimination in your transfer. In fact, among the officers mentioned, only you have refused the new assignment citing difficulty of
working away from your family as if the other officers concerned do not suffer the same predicament. To exempt you from the officer transfer would
result in favoritism in your favor and discrimination as against the other officers concerned.
"In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and uninterrupted service to the public, and in accordance with the Bank’s order of priority of rotating its
accountants’ places of assignments, you are well aware that Roberto Isla, AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for more than ten (10) years, was, on
February 14, 1994, reassigned to Iligan City Branch and then to Cagayan de Oro City Branch on June 8, 1994. Hence, your objection on the ground
of your length of service is without merit.
xxx
"As discussed, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and reassignment to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized under
Article XII of the Bank’s Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure [which] provides:
‘XII Transfer and Reassignment
Refusal to follow instruction concerning transfers and reassignments.
First and subsequent offenses –
The penalty may range from suspension to dismissal as determined by management. The employee shall be required to comply with the order of
transfer and reassignment, if the penalty is not termination of employment.’
"In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt hereof why no disciplinary action should be meted against you
for your having refused to follow instructions concerning the foregoing transfer and reassignment." xxx 4
On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that "(w)hether the bank’s penalty for my refusal be Suspension or Dismissal xxx it will all the more establish and
fortify my complaint now pending at NLRC, RAB 7."5 In the same letter, he charged Allied Bank with discrimination and favoritism in ordering his
transfer, thus:
xxx What I cannot decipher now under the headship of Mr. Olveda is management’s discriminatory act of transferring only the long staying
accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of management prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some
new officers who happen to enjoy favorable connection with management. How can the bank ever justify the transfer of Melinda T. Co, a new officer
who had experienced being assigned outside of Cebu for more than a year only to Tabunok Branch? If the purpose is for check and balance, is
management implying that Melinda Co can better carry out such function over Mr. Larry Sabelino, who is a seasoned and experienced accountant or
any of the Metro Cebu accountants for that matter? Isn’t this act of management an obvious display of favoritism? xxx 6
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-office communication 7 ("Memo") dated 8 September 1994 from Allied Bank’s Vice-President for
Personnel, Mr. Leonso C. Pe. The Memo informed Galanida that Allied Bank had terminated his services effective 1 September 1994. The reasons
given for the dismissal were: (1) Galanida’s continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report
for work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave. The salient portion of the Memo reads:
Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and reassignment to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is without any
justifiable reason and constituted violations of Article XII of the Bank’s EDPP xxx
In view of the foregoing, please be informed that the Bank has terminated your services effective September 1, 1994 and considered whatever
benefit, if any, that you are entitled as forfeited in accordance with 04, V Administrative Penalties, page 6 of the Bank’s EDPP which provides as
follows:
"04. Dismissal.
Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause xxx

Notice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the President or his authorized representative as
officer/employee who is terminated for cause shall not be eligible to receive any benefit arising from her/his employment with the Bank or to
termination pay."
It is understood that the termination of your service shall be without prejudice to whatever legal remedies which the Bank may have already
undertaken and/or will undertake against you.
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)8
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank had abused its management prerogative in ordering the transfer of Galanida to its
Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In ruling that Galanida’s refusal to transfer did not amount to insubordination, the Labor Arbiter misquoted this
Court’s decision in Dosch v. NLRC,9 thus:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as an employer’s exclusive right and the prerogative of management
(Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).
The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the
Supreme Court, ruled:
"While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an employer’s exclusive right and the prerogative of management, such
right is not absolute. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employee is limited by the paramount police power xxx for the relations
between capital and labor are not merely contractual but impressed with public interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively
against each other.
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of being away
from the family."10 (Underscoring supplied by the Labor Arbiter)
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanida’s transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida would have to incur additional expenses for
board, lodging and travel. On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to show any business urgency that would justify the
transfer.
The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to Galanida’s claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment. The Labor Arbiter stated that Allied Bank
deliberately left out Ms. Co’s name from the list of accountants transferred to Cebu as contained in Allied Bank’s letter dated 13 June 1994.
However, Mr. Regidor Olveda, Allied Bank’s Vice President for Operations Accounting, testified that the bank transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok,
Cebu branch within the first half of 1994.
Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award Galanida back wages because he was not entirely free from blame. Since another bank had already
employed Galanida, the Labor Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision of 23 December 1997 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Allied Banking Corporation to pay complainant the
aggregate total amount of Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (₱ 324,000.00) representing the following awards:
a) Separation pay for ₱ 272,000.00;
b) Quarter bonus for 1994 – ₱ 16,000.00;
c) 13th month pay for 1994 – ₱ 16,000.00;
d) Refund of contribution to Provident Fund - ₱ 20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.11
The Ruling of the NLRC

On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause. The NLRC agreed that the transfer order was
unreasonable and unjustified, considering the family considerations mentioned by Galanida. The NLRC characterized the transfer as a demotion
since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a regional office, and because the bank wanted Galanida, an
assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran branch. The NLRC found unlawful discrimination since Allied Bank did not
transfer several junior accountants in Cebu. The NLRC also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment by assigning her to Cebu even
though she had worked for the bank for less than two years.
The NLRC ruled that Galanida’s termination was illegal for lack of due process. The NLRC stated that Allied Bank did not conduct any hearing. The
NLRC declared that Allied Bank failed to send a termination notice, as required by law for a valid termination. The Memo merely stated that Allied
Bank would issue a notice of termination, but the bank did not issue any notice.
The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal undermined
Galanida’s right to security of tenure and equal protection of the laws. On these grounds, the NLRC promulgated its Decision of 18 September 1998,
the relevant portion of which states:
In this particular case, We view as impractical, unrealistic and no longer advantageous to both parties to order reinstatement of the complainant. xxx
For lack of sufficient basis, We deny the claim for 1994 quarter bonus. Likewise, no attorney’s fees is awarded as counsels for complainant-appellee
are from the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cebu.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December 23, 1997 is hereby MODIFIED by increasing the award of
separation pay and granting in addition thereto backwages, moral and exemplary damages. The respondent-appellant, ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, is thus ordered to pay to herein complainant-appellee, POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the following amounts:
a) ₱ 336,000.00, representing separation pay

b> ₱ 833,600.00, representing backwages
c> ₱ 5,333.23 representing proportional 1994 13th month pay
d> ₱ 20,000.00 representing refund of Provident Fund Contribution
e> ₱ 50,000.00 representing moral damages
f> ₱ 20,000.00 representing exemplary damages
===========₱ 1,264,933.33 TOTAL AWARD
All other claims are dismissed for lack of basis. The other respondents are dropped for lack of sufficient basis that they acted in excess of their
corporate powers.
SO ORDERED.12
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24 December 1998. 13
Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review questioning the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Dosch v. NLRC,14 the Court of Appeals held that Galanida’s refusal to comply with the transfer orders did not warrant his dismissal. The
appellate court ruled that the transfer from a regional office to the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was effectively a demotion. The appellate
court agreed that Allied Bank did not afford Galanida procedural due process because there was no hearing and no notice of termination. The Memo
merely stated that the bank would issue a notice of termination but there was no such notice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in its Decision of 27 April 2000, thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision of public respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its Resolution of 8 August 2000. 16
On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the appellate court’s decision and resolution to the Supreme Court. Allied Bank prayed that the Supreme
Court: (1) issue a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction ex parte to restrain the implementation or execution of the questioned
Decision and Resolution; (2) declare Galanida’s termination as valid and legal; (3) set aside the Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution; (4) make
permanent the restraining order or preliminary injunction; (5) order Galanida to pay the costs; and (6) order other equitable reliefs.
The Issues
Allied Bank raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONER’S EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE.
2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO WARRANT THE
PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE
RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED DUE PROCESS.
4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT RECOVER ANY
MONETARY AWARD.17
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Allied Bank contends that Galanida’s
continued refusal to obey the transfer orders constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which is a just cause for termination under the Labor
Code.
On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse the transfer order. The memorandum for Galanida filed with this Court, prepared by Atty.
Loreto M. Durano, again misquoted the Court’s ruling in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:
xxx His [Galanida’s] refusal to transfer falls well within the ruling of the Supreme Court in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983)
quoted as follows:
xxx
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from
the family."18
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of the Supreme Court
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter, both misquoted the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held in Dosch:
We cannot agree to Northwest’s submission that petitioner was guilty of disobedience and insubordination which respondent Commission sustained.
The only piece of evidence on which Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal is petitioner’s letter dated August 28, 1975 to R.C. Jenkins
wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the former’s memorandum dated August 18, 1975, appreciated his promotion to Director of International
Sales but at the same time regretted "that at this time for personal reasons and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept the transfer from the
Philippines" and thereafter expressed his preference to remain in his position, saying: "I would, therefore, prefer to remain in my position of Manager-
Philippines until such time that my services in that capacity are no longer required by Northwest Airlines." From this evidence, We cannot discern
even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply insubordination on the part of petitioner. 19
The phrase "[r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of
being away from the family" does not appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. Galanida’s counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the
italicized lines in the syllabus of Dosch found in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated ("SCRA").
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor does it state this
Court’s decision. The syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the
convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the court’s decision. 20 A counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the
carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but substituted a portion of the decision with a headnote
from the SCRA syllabus, which they even underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of
the Supreme Court. We admonish them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if not an outright attempt to mislead the parties and the courts
taking cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme
Court accurately.21
Whether Galanida was dismissed for just cause
We accord great weight and even finality to the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, particularly when they affirm the findings of the NLRC or the
lower courts. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule. These exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, has gone beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the
judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on
record.22 After a scrutiny of the records, we find that some of these exceptions obtain in the present case.
The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employer’s prerogatives. 23 The employer exercises the prerogative
to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion in rank
or diminution of the employee’s salary, benefits and other privileges. 24 In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of showing that the
transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee. 25
The constant transfer of bank officers and personnel with accounting responsibilities from one branch to another is a standard practice of Allied
Bank, which has more than a hundred branches throughout the country. 26 Allied Bank does this primarily for internal control. It also enables bank
employees to gain the necessary experience for eventual promotion. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Other Financial Intermediaries,27 requires the rotation of these personnel. The Manual directs that the "duties of personnel handling cash, securities
and bookkeeping records should be rotated" and that such rotation "should be irregular, unannounced and long enough to permit disclosure of any
irregularities or manipulations."28
Galanida was well aware of Allied Bank’s policy of periodically transferring personnel to different branches. As the Court of Appeals found,
assignment to the different branches of Allied Bank was a condition of Galanida’s employment. Galanida consented to this condition when he signed
the Notice of Personnel Action.29
The evidence on record contradicts the charge that Allied Bank discriminated against Galanida and was in bad faith when it ordered his transfer.
Allied Bank’s letter of 13 June 199430 showed that at least 14 accounting officers and personnel from various branches, including Galanida, were
transferred to other branches. Allied Bank did not single out Galanida. The same letter explained that Galanida was second in line for assignment
outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for seven years already. The person first in line, Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been in Cebu
for more than ten years, had already transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note that none of the other transferees joined Galanida in
his complaint or corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination and favoritism.
As regards Ms. Co, Galanida’s letter of 16 June 1994 itself showed that her assignment to Cebu was not in any way related to Galanida’s transfer.
Ms. Co was supposed to replace a certain Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok branch. The employer has the prerogative, based on its assessment of the
employees’ qualifications and competence, to rotate them in the various areas of its business operations to ascertain where they will function with
maximum benefit to the company.31
Neither was Galanida’s transfer in the nature of a demotion. Galanida did not present evidence showing that the transfer would diminish his salary,
benefits or other privileges. Instead, Allied Bank’s letter of 13 June 1994 assured Galanida that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade,
and that the transfer would involve the same rank, duties and obligations. Mr. Olveda explained this further in the affidavit he submitted to the Labor
Arbiter, thus:
19. There is no demotion in position/rank or diminution of complainant’s salary, benefits and other privileges as the transfer/assignment of branch
officers is premised on the role/functions that they will assume in the management and operations of the branch, as shown below:
(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of the branch is responsible for the proper discharge of the functions of the accounting section of the
branch, review of documentation/proper accounting and control of transaction. As such, the accounting functions in the branch can be assumed by
any of the following officers with the rank of: Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/ Acctg.; Senior Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Asst. Manager/Acctg.;
Accountant or Asst. Accountant.
xxx
20. The transfer/assignment of branch officer from one branch, to another branch/office is lateral in nature and carries with it the same position/rank,
salary, benefits and other privileges. The assignment/transfer is for the officer to assume the functions relative to his job and NOT the position/rank
of the officer to be replaced.
There is also no basis for the finding that Allied Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices relate only to
violations of "the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization" 32 and are limited to the acts enumerated in Article 248 of the
Labor Code, none of which applies to the present case. There is no evidence that Galanida took part in forming a union, or even that a union existed
in Allied Bank.
This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could validly refuse the transfer orders on the ground of parental obligations, additional expenses, and the
anguish he would suffer if assigned away from his family.
The Court has ruled on this issue before. In the case of Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC,33 we held:
The acceptability of the proposition that transfer made by an employer for an illicit or underhanded purpose – i.e., to defeat an employee’s right to
self-organization, to rid himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize an employee for union activities – cannot be upheld is self-evident and
cannot be gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the situation where no such illicit, improper or underhanded purpose can be ascribed to the employer, the
objection to the transfer being grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the
transfer. What then?
This was the very same situation we faced in Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana. In that case, the employee, Alicia Laplana, was a
cashier at the Baguio City Branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer to the company’s branch office at Laoag City. In refusing the transfer, the
employee averred that she had established Baguio City as her permanent residence and that such transfer will involve additional expenses on her
part, plus the fact that an assignment to a far place will be a big sacrifice for her as she will be kept away from her family which might adversely
affect her efficiency. In ruling for the employer, the Court upheld the transfer from one city to another within the country as valid as long as there is no
bad faith on the part of the employer. We held then:
"Certainly the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his employer’s decision to transfer him to another work place,
there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is the employee’s wishes that should be made to prevail."
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Court’s ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.34 Dosch, however, is not applicable to the present case. Helmut
Dosch refused a transfer consequential to a promotion. We upheld the refusal because no law compels an employee to accept a promotion, and
because the position Dosch was supposed to be promoted to did not even exist at that time. 35 This left as the only basis for the charge of
insubordination a letter from Dosch in which the Court found "not even the slightest hint of defiance, much less xxx insubordination." 36
Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an overseas post, as in the Dosch case, cannot be likened to a transfer from one city to another within the
country,37 which is the situation in the present case. The distance from Cebu City to Bacolod City or from Cebu City to Tagbilaran City does not
exceed the distance from Baguio City to Laoag City or from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court considered a reasonable distance in PT&T v.
Laplana.38
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order of an employer. 39 Employees may object to, negotiate and
seek redress against employers for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and unless these rules or orders are declared
illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. 40 For Galanida’s continued refusal to obey Allied
Bank’s transfer orders, we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code. 41 Galanida is
thus not entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay.
Whether Galanida’s dismissal violated the

requirement of notice and hearing
To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code ("Omnibus Rules"),
which provides:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds of termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify his termination.
The first written notice was embodied in Allied Bank’s letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice required Galanida to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him for his refusal to comply with the transfer orders.
On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. 42 An actual hearing is not
necessary. The exchange of several letters, in which Galanida’s wife, a lawyer with the City Prosecutor’s Office, assisted him, gave Galanida an
opportunity to respond to the charges against him.
The remaining issue is whether the Memo dated 8 September 1994 sent to Galanida constitutes the written notice of termination required by the
Omnibus Rules. In finding that it did not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited Allied Bank’s rule on dismissals, quoted in the Memo, that, "Notice
of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the President or his authorized representative." 43 The
appellate court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not send any notice of termination to Galanida. The Memo, with the heading "Transfer and
Reassignment," was not the termination notice required by law.
We do not agree.
Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show that it unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied Bank’s decision to dismiss him. The statement,
"please be informed that the Bank has terminated your services effective September 1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are
entitled [to] as forfeited xxx"44 is plainly worded and needs no interpretation. The Memo also discussed the findings of the Investigation Committee
that served as grounds for Galanida’s dismissal. The Memo referred to Galanida’s "open defiance and refusal" to transfer first to the Bacolod City
branch and then to the Tagbilaran City branch. The Memo also mentioned his continued refusal to report for work despite the denial of his
application for additional vacation leave.45 The Memo also refuted Galanida’s charges of discrimination and demotion, and concluded that he had
violated Article XII of the bank’s Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure.
The Memo, although captioned "Transfer and Reassignment," did not preclude it from being a notice of termination. The Court has held that the
nature of an instrument is characterized not by the title given to it but by its body and contents. 46 Moreover, it appears that Galanida himself regarded
the Memo as a notice of termination. We quote from the Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee, as follows:
The proceedings may be capsulized as follows:
1. On March 13, 199447 Private Respondent-Appellee filed before the Region VII Arbitration Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal.
A copy of the Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex "H";
xxx
5. On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-Appellant issued him a Letter of Termination. A copy of said letter is attached to the Petition as Annex
"N";
6. Private Respondent-Appellee filed an Amended/ Supplemental Complaint wherein he alleged illegal dismissal. A copy of the
Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex "O"; xxx 48 (Emphasis supplied)
The Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee refers to the Memo as a "Letter of Termination." Further, Galanida amended his complaint for
constructive dismissal49 to one for illegal dismissal50 after he received the Memo. Clearly, Galanida had understood the Memo to mean that Allied
Bank had terminated his services.
The Memo complied with Allied Bank’s internal rules which required the bank’s President or his authorized representative to confirm the notice of
termination. The bank’s Vice-President for Personnel, as the head of the department that handles the movement of personnel within Allied Bank, can
certainly represent the bank president in cases involving the dismissal of employees.
Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered from certain errors. 1âwphi1 Although the Memo stated that Allied Bank terminated Galanida’s
services as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8 September 1994. More importantly, Galanida only received a copy of the Memo on 5
October 1994, or more than a month after the supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a written notice of termination must be served on the
employee.51 Allied Bank could not terminate Galanida on 1 September 1994 because he had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Bank’s
decision to dismiss him. Galanida’s dismissal could only take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. For this reason, Galanida is
entitled to backwages for the period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994.
Under the circumstances, we also find an award of ₱ 10,000 in nominal damages proper. Courts award nominal damages to recognize or vindicate
the right of a person that another has violated. 52 The law entitles Galanida to receive timely notice of Allied Bank’s decision to dismiss him. Allied
Bank should have exercised more care in issuing the notice of termination.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451 upholding the Decision of 18 September 1998 of the
NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98 is AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) The awards of separation pay, moral damages and exemplary damages are hereby deleted for lack of basis;
2) Reducing the award of backwages to cover only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994; and
3) Awarding nominal damages to private respondent for ₱ 10,000.
This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision, of the backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits, due to Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his dismissal was ineffectual from 1 September 1994 until 4 October 1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be more careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court
in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 6323 April 13, 2007
PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment and suspension2 against respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty
Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondent’s client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly sued him for violations of the lease contract
which they executed over a commercial apartment in Olivares Building in Parañaque. 3
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.4 The case was dismissed for improper venue.5
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch
274. 6 The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0233, was dismissed for failure to prosecute. 7 Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a
review of the order dismissing Civil Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal. 8 The subsequent petition for
review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied. 9
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274 10 where it was docketed as Civil Case
No. 0J-04-009.11 It was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and prescription.12
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of his
client.13 He denied that he was forum shopping as his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping, 14 disclosed the two previous cases involving the
same cause of action which had been filed and dismissed. 15 Respondent further claims he could not refuse his client’s request to file a new case
because Al-Rasheed was the "oppressed party" in the transaction. 16
This Court referred the complaint, together with respondent’s comment, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.17
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of
action and subject matter.18 It opined that respondent should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. 19 Under
Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. 20 The CBD recommended the suspension of
respondent for six months with a warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. 21
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as
well as the proscription on forum shopping. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to reprimand. 22
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the penalty. 1a\^/phi1.net
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate
their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. 23 As the first Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes."24 Moreover, according to the lawyer’s oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same." 25
With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous
dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of
procedural law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed the second complaint. Respondent appealed the 1999 case to the Court of Appeals
and subsequently to this Court. Both actions were dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The certificate of non-forum shopping
attached to the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease contract. As if such disclosure was a
sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced his 1999 26 arguments and assertions in the 200427 complaint. Respondent obviously
knew the law and tried to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 which provides that:
A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
A lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice. 28 Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Court’s processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede,
obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful
violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent
with truth and honor.29
Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that CBD’s recommendation for a six-month suspension
from the practice of law to be more commensurate to the violation committed. However, in view of respondent’s death on September 27, 2006, 30 the
penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4947 February 14, 2005
ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this verified Petition1 filed by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for the disbarment of her estranged husband Atty. Justo Paras on alleged acts of
deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment2 to the Petition.
In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999,3 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The background facts are summarized in a Report and Recommendation dated 13 January 2004 4 of Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, which Report reads in part, as follows:
"Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong namely Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen
and Cataluna all surnamed Paras executed a Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of land located in Matobato,
Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority to their mother to sell the subject real properties previously registered in the name of the heirs of Vicente
Paras wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein.
Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was with the respondent’s full
knowledge since he was residing at the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family had been in possession of the
subject real property up to the present.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to the fact that a free patent title to the aforesaid property was issued in
respondent’s name and upon verification with the DENR, Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was able to get copies of the documents
for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining to the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by the respondent; over the aforesaid
lots previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over Real Property executed by
Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized
officer to administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order of Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by
District Land Officer Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras.
Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the respondent without her knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit,
machinations and falsification of documents were deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation
to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. 1ªvvphi1.nét
Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a free patent title over real properties which had been previously sold by his own
mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the control and possession of complainant’s natural family, a fact respondent allegedly withheld from the
Bureau of Lands which he had full knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free patent in his name and unjustly and unlawfully deprived
the rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in betrayal of the court to pervert the administration of justice in gross violation of his
oath of office.
xxx xxx xxx
In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was obviously not the owner of the properties and considering that the properties were applied
for free patent titling during their marital union prior to its breakage, complainant was likewise a communal owner thereof and as such was also
complaining against herself.
Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public lands classified as forested zone in Matobato were declared and reclassified into
public agricultural lands, then publicly surveyed and parcelized by lots identified in the survey map based on actual or known occupants; then the
Bureau of Lands allegedly made a public announcement that the lands were available for private ownership thru Free Patent Application available
only to native settlers or natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant being native or natural born Filipinos muchless Aurora D. Yap who in 1985 was
said to be already an American citizen; complainant and her family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to apply for free patent over said questioned
properties for the reason that respondent had already occupied the properties; introduced improvements thereon; acted as owner thereof; and could
easily align his right to the property which had been identified in the public survey as "Heirs of Vicente Paras", otherwise the questioned properties
allegedly according to the Yaps will be applied for and awarded to other qualified natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was filed by him over the communal property of him and the complainant as well as those
purchased by him including the portion whose occupancy of a public land was purchased by Aurora D. Yap from Ledesma Vda de Paras upon the
prodding of the Yaps for all of them were not qualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural public land via free patent; none of them being a
natural born Filipino or native settler and were disqualified from a gratuitous grant of public land from the government.
Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the complainant the properties was hatched and executed by the Yaps, most particularly
Atty. Francisco D. Yap to circumvent the law and prevent the properties from being given by the government to some other qualified persons. He
allegedly applied for issuance of free patent in good faith and thereafter took dominion and control of the properties in the concept of a legitimate
owner under authority of a gratuitous grant of the government.
Respondent alleged that complainant or any member of her family much less American citizen Aurora Dy Yap had not made any prior demand for
the return of the questioned properties; nor filed a complaint under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law; nor filed an administrative remedy before
the DENR for the cancellation and reversion/transfer of the Free Patent and Title to them; nor brought any action in any civil court for either quieting
of title, or cancellation of free patent title or recovery of ownership or whatever.
Respondent alleged that even without such civil court determination on whether or not complainant or her family were qualified to become grantee of
a government gratuitous grant of public agricultural land, if the Honorable Supreme Court will decide that complainant, her mother, brothers and
sisters were within the ambit of the term natural born citizen or native citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to them rightfully belong the
ownership of the questioned titled public agricultural lands; and that he can never be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law consequent to such cession,
respondent alleged that he will gladly deliver and transfer title to them.
Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of possession of all conjugal/communal properties including the herein questioned
properties for after he left the conjugal home in 1988 possession of all these properties, real and personal were until now with the complainant and
her biological family.1ªvvphi1.nét
Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of merit."
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply5 to respondent’s Comment, therein refuting respondent’s claims that he was used as a "dummy" since
complainant and her siblings had previously acquired Free Patents in their names. Complainant further alleged that respondent is morally unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court because of his falsely declaring under oath that he had been occupying the subject real property since 1985
when in fact he did not and was never in occupation/possession thereof.
On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order 6 noting the filing of the last pleading and setting the instant case for
hearing. Several hearings7 were conducted wherein complainant presented all her witnesses together with their respective affidavits and supporting
documents8 , which were all subjected to cross-examination by the respondent. Likewise, respondent presented his Counter-Affidavit 9 and supporting
documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded her Report and made a recommendation, as follows:
"From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for free patent over lands owned by another over which he
had no actual physical possession being aware of the fact that the same was previously transferred in the name of Aurora Yap; an act which
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law in violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
"It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility which partakes the
nature of proper disciplinary action pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys.
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends for the suspension of Atty. Justo Paras from the practice of his law
profession for a period of three (3) months from receipt hereof.
"It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter wherein respondent Paras is a registered member be furnished a copy of the Order and
notified of the said suspension for proper enforcement."
Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February 2004,10 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of the Investigating Commissioner but
modified the latter’s recommended penalty by recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation
of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The case is now before us for confirmation.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. We find, however, that the recommended penalty is not
commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession 11 as the bar should always
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing among its members. By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 12 To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession.13
In Marcelo v. Javier14 , we held:
"It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good
behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or
disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood
that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.
"An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counsellor which include the statutory
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as to cover practically any misconduct of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity. It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for disciplinary action is not exclusive
and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other than those specifically provided in the law. Generally a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of
others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the
public."
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor.
And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera16 , we ruled:
"Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner’s honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the
highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other
counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. x x x"
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his lawyer’s oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor consent
to the doing of any in court. Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court
in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by his
mother to complainant’s sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed before this Court when he alleged that the said
properties were public land under the Forestal Zone "when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of entire occupancy of
the Parases"17 . Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when he manifested
under oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the fact that these were continuously in the
possession and occupation of complainant’s family, as evidenced no less by respondent’s own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and her family as "natural born citizens", this Court holds that the instant case is not the
proper forum to address such issue. Furthermore, as correctly held by the Investigating Commissioner, "[i]t is immaterial as to who instituted the
complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility". Likewise, any other action which the parties may make
against each other has no material bearing in this case. For, it must be remembered that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen,18 held:
"Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not – and does not involve – a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. xxx"
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably reveal respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.
At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our Decision in A.C. No. 5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371, entitled Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty.
Justo de Jesus Paras, respondent was previously meted with suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months on the charge of falsifying his
wife’s signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of respondent’s prior misdemeanors for which he was penalized with a six (6) month
and one (1) year suspension from the practice of law, his deplorable behavior in the present case which grossly degrades the legal profession
warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.1ªvvphi1.nét
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a WARNING that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of respondent as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174759 September 7, 2011

DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA, Petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA First Division), and sanctioned with imprisonment for a period
of ten days and a fine of ₱2,000.00, the petitioners have come to the Court for relief through certiorari, claiming that the CTA First Division’s finding
and sentence were made in grave abuse of its discretion because the language they used in their motion for reconsideration as the attorneys for a
party was contumacious. Specifically, they assail the resolution dated May 16, 2006, 1 whereby the CTA First Division disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina of the Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas
Law Offices guilty of DIRECT CONTEMPT. Each counsel is
hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.
SO ORDERED.2
and the resolution dated July 26, 2006,3 whereby the CTA First Division denied their motion for reconsideration and reiterated the penalties.
Antecedents
The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield), which sought from the Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong
City the refund of excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until 2000. 4 After the City Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim for refund, 5 Surfield
initiated a special civil action for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142
entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City, and Hon. City Assessor of Mandaluyong City, and assigned
to Branch 214.6 Surfield later amended its petition to include its claim for refund of the excess taxes paid from 2001 until 2003. 7
On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the period to file the claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC ruled that the grant of a tax refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus. 8
Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the CTA via petition for review (CTA AC No. 5 entitled Surfield Development
Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City Assessor, Mandaluyong City). 9 The appeal was assigned to the First Division, composed of
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista and Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova.
In its decision dated January 5, 2006,10 the CTA First Division denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust the remedies
provided under Section 25311 and Section 22612 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield, 13 insisting that the CTA had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 7(a)(3) of
Republic Act No. 9282;14 and arguing that the CTA First Division manifested its "lack of understanding or respect" for the doctrine of stare decisis in
not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe (G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995, 250 SCRA 500), to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal
before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160.
On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfield’s motion for reconsideration. On the issue of jurisdiction, the CTA First Division explained
that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals from the
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and did not include the real property tax, an ad valorem tax, the refund of excess
payment of which Surfield was claiming. Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the jurisdiction of the CTA concerning real property tax cases
fell under a different section of Republic Act No. 9282 and under a separate book of Republic Act No. 7160.
In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners employed in the motion for reconsideration, required them to explain
within five days from receipt why they should not be liable for indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. And insofar as the merits of the case are
concerned let this Resolution be considered as the final decision on the matter.
However, this Court finds the statements of petitioner’s counsel that "it is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has
no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable Court’s ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression
of this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case" and "this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine of "stare decisis" as
derogatory, offensive and disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers;" they vow solemnly to conduct themselves "with all good fidelity…to the courts." As a matter of fact, the first canon of legal
ethics enjoins them "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its superior importance." Therefore, petitioner’s counsel is hereby ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this
Resolution why he should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.15
The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006, 16 in which they appeared to apologize but nonetheless justified their language as,
among others, "necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Court’s attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade." 17
In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners’ apology wanting in sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words
that were "so strong, which brings disrepute the Court’s honor and integrity" for brazenly pointing to "the Court’s alleged ignorance and grave abuse
of discretion," to wit:
In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the
counsels brazenly pointed the Court’s alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the
Court’s honor and integrity. We quote:
a) "Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to
bluntly call the Honorable Court’s attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong
articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient
of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the
Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based" (par. 3 of the Compliance; docket, p.
349);
b) "Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that "(U)ndoubtedly,
appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of
the CTA," the undersigned counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision,
Section 7(a)(3). Hence, the statements that it was gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has not [sic]
jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Court’s ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsel’s perception that was
influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction" (par. 10 of
the Compliance; docket, p. 353);18
Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the
integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to suffer imprisonment of ten days and to pay ₱2,000.00 as fine.
Seeking reconsideration,19 the petitioners submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct contempt because: (a) the phrase gross ignorance of
the law was used in its legal sense to describe the error of judgment and was not directed to the character or competence of the decision makers; (b)
there was no "unfounded accusation or allegation," or "scandalous, offensive or menacing," "intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening," or "vile,
rude and repulsive" statements or words contained in their motion for reconsideration; (c) there was no statement in their motion for reconsideration
that brought the authority of the CTA and the administration of the law into disrepute; and (d) they had repeatedly offered their apology in their
compliance.20
Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to reconsider, which declared through its second assailed resolution that:
The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the phrases used. The scurrilous attacks made in the guise of pointing out
errors of judgment almost always result to the destruction of the high esteem and regard towards the Court. 21
and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Each counsel is hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two
Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.
SO, ORDERED.22
Issues
Arguing that they were merely prompted by their "(z)ealous advocacy and an appalling error" committed by the CTA First Division to frankly describe
such error as gross ignorance of the law, the petitioners now attribute grave abuse of discretion to the CTA First Division in finding that:
THE PETITIONERS’ LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND COMPLIANCE WAS CONTUMACIOUS;
II
THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY AND WERE ARROGANT;
III
THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY THE SUPREME COURT; AND
IV
THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF DIRECT CONTEMPT.
The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict legal sense to emphasize the gravity of the error of
law committed by the CTA First Division; and that the statements described by the CTA First Division as "abrasive, offensive, derogatory, offensive
and disrespectful" should be viewed within the context of the general tone and language of their motion for reconsideration; that their overall
language was "tempered, restrained and respectful" and should not be construed as a display of contumacious attitude or as "a flouting or arrogant
belligerence in defiance of the court" to be penalized as direct contempt; that the CTA First Division did not appreciate the sincerity of their apology;
and that they merely pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.
For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for reconsideration and the character of the words used therein by the
petitioners indicated that their statements reflected no humility, nor were they "expressive of a contrite heart;" and that their submissions instead
"reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the opportunity to again deride the public respondent on the manner of how it wrote the
decision."23
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements to the same
court or judge in which the proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt; and that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion in finding
the petitioners liable for direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 24
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in finding that the
petitioners committed direct contempt of court.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:
Rule 11.03. – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms
and through legitimate channels. In that regard, we have long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re:
Almacen:25
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism
is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation, because then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right.
No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him
to legal animadversion as a citizen." xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism
is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied) 26
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety.
Here, the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a) "[i]t is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable
Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over the instant petition;" 27 (b) "[t]he grossness of the Honorable Court’s ignorance of the law is matched
only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction;" 28 and (c) the "Honorable Court’s lack of understanding or respect for the
doctrine of stare decisis."29
The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of court meriting prompt penalty.
We agree.
By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to
respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious
allegation,30 and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written
submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent
to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. 31 This is true, even if the
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not read in open court. 32 Indeed, in Dantes v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa,33 where the petitioner’s
motion for clarification stated that the respondent judge’s decision constituted gross negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was pure chicanery
and sophistry, the Court held that "a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements when submitted before a court or judge in
which the proceedings are pending is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the administration of justice."34
In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners’ statements were "strong, tactless and hurtful," 35 regards the statements
not contemptuous, or not necessarily assuming the level of contempt for being explanations of their position "in a case under consideration" and
because "an unfavorable decision usually incites bitter feelings." 36
Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however, for the characterization that the statements were "strong,
tactless and hurtful," although obviously correct, provides no ground to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such "strong, tactless
and hurtful" statements were used to explain their client’s position in the case. 37 The statements manifested a disrespect towards the CTA and the
members of its First Division approaching disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of their "strong, tactless and hurtful" language minimized on the basis
that "snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by counsels are not considered contemptuous considering that unfavorable decision usually incite
bitter feelings."38 By branding the CTA and the members of its First Division as "totally unaware or ignorant" of Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No.
9282, and making the other equally harsh statements, the petitioners plainly assailed the legal learning of the members of the CTA First Division. To
hold such language as reflective of a very deliberate move on the part of the petitioners to denigrate the CTA and the members of its First Division is
not altogether unwarranted.
The petitioners’ disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division for ruling against their side found firm confirmation in their compliance, in
which they unrepentantly emphasized such disdain in the following telling words:
3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly
call the Honorable Court’s attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of the
gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for
alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based.
xxx
10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that "(U)ndoubtedly, appeals
of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA," the
undersigned counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the
statements that it was gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the
Honorable Court’s ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case
were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsel’s perception that was influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court
totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied) 39
We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the petitioners made the statements had they convinced us that the CTA First
Division truly erred in holding itself bereft of jurisdiction over the appeal of their client. But our review of the text of the legal provisions involved
reveals that the error was committed by them, not by the CTA First Division. This result became immediately evident from a reading of Section 7(a)
(3) and Section 7(a)(5) of Republic Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their claim that the CTA really had jurisdiction, to wit:
Section 7. Jurisdiction. – The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
xxx
(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and
taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the "(d)ecisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction." The provision is clearly limited to local tax disputes
decided by the Regional Trial Courts. In contrast, Section 7(a)(5) grants the CTA cognizance of appeals of the "(d)ecisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided
by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals." In its resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the CTA First Division forthrightly explained
why, contrary to the petitioners’ urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by clarifying that a real property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be
treated as a local tax.40
It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated and simply admitted their blatant error upon being so informed by the
CTA First Division about the untenability of their legal position on the matter, but they still persisted by going on in their compliance dated March 27,
2006 to also blame the CTA First Division for their "perception" about the CTA First Division’s "being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3)" due to "the
terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006," viz:
12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable Court was grossly ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) because from the terseness
of the Decision dated 05 January 2006, the undersigned counsel perceived the Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3). Had the
reasons discussed in the Resolution dated 15 March 2006 been articulated in the 05 January 2006 decision, there would have been no basis for
undersigned counsels to have formed the above-mentioned perception. 41 (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the petitioners’ contemptuous and offensive language. No attorney, no matter
his great fame or high prestige, should ever brand a court or judge as grossly ignorant of the law, especially if there was no sincere or legitimate
reason for doing so. Every attorney must use only fair and temperate language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and must eschew harsh and
intemperate language that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession. Truly, the Bar should strive to win arguments through civility
and fairness, not by "heated and acrimonious tone," as the Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v. Perkins, 42 to wit:
The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of the remarks of the counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking of
the action of the trial judge. We desire to express our opinion that excessive language weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive force of legal
reasoning. We have noticed a growing tendency to use language that experience has shown not to be conducive to the orderly and proper
administration of justice. We therefore bespeak the attorneys of this court to desist from such practices, and to treat their opposing attorneys, and the
judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to their contentions with that courtesy all have a right to expect. (emphasis
supplied)
We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of court. 1âwphi1 They threw out self-restraint and courtesy, traits that in the most
trying occasions equate to rare virtues that all members of the Legal Profession should possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility of their
profession. They wittingly banished the ideal that even the highest degree of zealousness in defending the causes of clients did not permit them to
cross the line between liberty and license.43 Indeed, the Court has not lacked in frequently reminding the Bar that language, though forceful, must still
be dignified; and though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the Legal Profession. 44 It is
always worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions that were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet
not derogatory; and illuminating, yet not offensive. 45 No attorney worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the
Court calls upon him to be respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or its judge. Clearly, the petitioners’ criticism of the CTA First Division
was not bona fide or done in good faith, and spilled over the walls of propriety.
The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court
invoke its inherent power to punish contempt of court in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. 46 We
reiterate that the sanction the CTA First Division has visited upon the petitioners was preservative, for the sanction maintained and promoted the
proper respect that attorneys and their clients should bear towards the courts of justice.
Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners’ tone of apology was probably feigned, for they did not relent but continued to justify their
contemptuous language, they do not merit any leniency. Nonetheless, the penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine of ₱2,000.00 is excessive
punishment of the direct contempt of court for using contemptuous and offensive language and verges on the vindictive. The Court foregoes the
imprisonment.
The Court’s treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in pleadings and other written submissions to the courts of law,
including this Court, has not been uniform. The treatment has dealt with contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court or
administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both. The sanction has ranged from a warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning
against a repetition of the misconduct, a fine of ₱2,000.00, a fine of ₱5,000.00, and even indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive language is viewed as contempt of court or as ethical misconduct. In Re:
Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 47 the errant lawyer who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters and
compliance to this Court was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Although he was further declared guilty of contempt of court, the Court
prescribed no separate penalty on him, notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and did not apologize for his actions that resulted from cases
that were decided against his clients for valid reasons. In Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, 48 the complaining State Prosecutor, despite
his strong statements to support his position not being considered as direct contempt of court, was warned to be more circumspect in language. In
contrast, Judge Angeles was reprimanded and handed a stern warning for the disrespectful language she used in her pleadings filed in this Court,
which declared such language to be below the standard expected of a judicial officer. In Nuñez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, 49 Atty. Astorga was meted
a ₱2,000.00 fine for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for hurling insulting language against the opposing counsel. Obviously, the language was dealt
with administratively, not as contempt of court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar, 50 the Court prescribed a higher fine of ₱5,000.00 coupled with a stern
warning against Atty. Alar who, in his motion for reconsideration and to inhibit, cast insults and diatribes against the NLRC First Division and its
members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary sanction.
Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of March 15, 2006 that they should "explain within five (5) days from receipt of
this Resolution why (they) should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action," 51 the CTA First Division was content with
punishing them for direct contempt under Section 1, 52 Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, and did not anymore pursue the disciplinary aspect. The Court
concurs with the offended court’s treatment of the offensive language as direct contempt. Thus, we impose on each of them a fine of ₱2,000.00, the
maximum imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into consideration the fact that the CTA is a superior court of the same level as the Court
of Appeals, the second highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier clarified, is deleted. Yet, they are warned against using
offensive or intemperate language towards a court or its judge in the future, for they may not be as lightly treated as they now are.
ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the resolutions dated May 16, 2006 and July 26, 2006; and MODIFY the penalty
imposed on Attorney Denis B. Habawel and Attorney Alexis F. Medina by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and sentencing them only to pay the
fine of ₱2,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5653 February 27, 2006
JOHN SIY LIM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 entitled Spouses Tomas See
Tuazon and Natividad See Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. 1
It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil Case No. C-14542 for reformation of contract, quieting of title, with damages,
then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131. 2 The subject of the dispute was a 650-square meter conjugal lot
along A. del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue, Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 860. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of
defendant (complainant herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties executed on July 15, 1987 was an absolute and unconditional
conveyance of subject property by the plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court reversed itself and
declared that the sale was in fact an equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the reinstatement of the previous
title on the subject property.
The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40167. In its Decision dated March 31, 1995, the
appellate court reversed the ruling of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the original Decision of the trial court,
dated December 2, 1991, hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay defendant-appellant the sum of Five
Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos a month as reasonable rental for the use and occupation of Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988 until the premises
shall have been vacated and possession thereof peacefully turned over to defendant-appellant.
The counterclaim for attorney’s fees of defendant-appellant is DENIED. There is no clear showing that the action taken by plaintiff-appellee was
done in bad faith. There should be no penalty on the right to litigate. 3
The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the petition was docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed
the ruling of the CA and denied the petition. 4 Entry of judgment was made of record on October 3, 2000. 5
On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance 6 as counsel of Tomas See Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of Caloocan City,
Branch 131 in Civil Case No. C-14542. On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a "Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without
Writ,"7 worded as follows:
1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision on
the present case had already become final and executory.
2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein defendant, plaintiff shall voluntarily settle the money judgment as stated in
the decision sought to be enforced.
3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand (₱810,000.00) Pesos, equivalent to 162 months of rent as per decision and the
same to be covered by supersedeas bond issued by a reliable insurance company to answer for said obligation.
4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the court the amount of ₱5,000.00 as monthly rent.8
On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses Tomas See Tuazon) filed the Complaint 9 for nullity of TCT and other documents,
reconveyance, maintenance of physical possession before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch 121 thereof (Civil Case No. C-
19928).
Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 126 10 issued an Order11 in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the Motion for
Execution with Manifestation earlier filed by the prevailing party (complainant herein), and denying for lack of merit, the "Motion to Comply to [sic]
Decision without Writ" filed by respondent counsel.
This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent. In his Complaint-Affidavit 12 dated March 20, 2002,
complainant alleged that respondent filed the complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928 out of malice, pointing out that it involves "the same parties, the
same causes of action and relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542." Thus, the complainant prayed that the respondent be "disbarred
and/or suspended from the practice of law for his gross misconduct," on the following allegation:
6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the respondent in filing a recycled case docketed as Civil Case No. C-19928 on
January 07, 2002. Respondent is guilty in abetting the conduct of his clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly violated his lawyer’s oath not to promote or
sue groundless, false or unlawful suits among others. Instead of counseling his clients to abide and obey the decision of our Supreme Court, the final
arbiter of all controversies and disputes, he is showing disrespect to a final and executory decision of our court. 13
In his Comment,14 respondent denied the allegations against him. While he admitted that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel for the plaintiff
therein, he claimed that it was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new case involved the same party, it was for a different cause of
action and relief, and, as such, the principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for
declaratory relief or reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of title. He accepted the case based on "his
professional appreciation that his client had a good case."
In his Reply,15 the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the
old complaint; and "the lame excuse of the respondent that the present case is an action in rem while the other case is an action in personam" did
not merit consideration.
On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.16
On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the case to Commissioner Salvador L. Peña. Only the counsel for the
respondent appeared at the mandatory conference held on September 30, 2003. Finding that there were no factual issues in the case,
Commissioner Peña terminated the mandatory conference and ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers, and,
thereafter, considered the case submitted for resolution.
The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his Report and Recommendation dated May 9, 2005, finding the
respondent guilty of misconduct. It was recommended that respondent be meted a two months’ suspension from the practice of law.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res judicata are present in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 since
(a) the judgment in Civil Case No. C-14542, upholding the validity of the absolute deed of sale, had attained finality; (b) the court which rendered the
decision had the required jurisdiction; and (c) the disposition of the case was a judgment on the merits.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-108, adopting said Report
and Recommendation with the modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable. lavvph!1.net
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already
final and executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he "was not the original counsel of his clients" and
that "when he filed the subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly
addressed in the prior case for reformation and quieting of title," deserves scant consideration. As a responsible member of the bar, he should have
explained the effect of such final and executory decision on his clients’ rights, instead of encouraging them to file another case involving the same
property and asserting the same rights.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of
obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the
filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. 17 Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. 18 Thus, the following requisites should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. x x x 19
The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical will not prevent the application of the principle of res judicata. Mere substantial
identity of parties, or a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not
impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.20 Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his
case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their
privies.21 This was what respondent resorted to in order to give some semblance of merit to the complaint for annulment of title. He should have
realized that the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals 22 effectively determined with finality the rights and obligations of the parties under
the questioned deed of sale.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. 23 The filing of multiple petitions
constitutes abuse of the Court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be
punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of
a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his
duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with
truth and honor. 24
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 25 and Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for
money or malice."27
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede
or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty. Indeed, the Court has time and again warned not to resort to forum shopping
for this practice clogs the court dockets.28
While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution,
to be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a
member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. 29
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months. He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more
severely. This Decision is immediately executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133625 September 6, 2000
REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR., MARYLENE EDRIAL, ILDEFONSO EDRIAL, ROSALIND EDRIAL, MARY JEAN EDRIAL, and
SUSAN EDRIAL-VALENZUELA, petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO QUILAT-QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-QUILAT, ISIDRA QUILAT-QUILAT, and ESTANISLAO QUILAT-QUILAT, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and caused repeated delays cannot ask for the reopening of the trial for the
purpose of presenting additional evidence. After squandering several opportunities given them to ventilate their claims, they can no longer complain
of alleged violation of their right to due process.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the October 17, 1997 Decision1 and the March 19, 1998 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA)3 in CA-GR SP No. 42660. The CA affirmed the Order of the trial court, which had denied their Motion to Reopen the Case and to allow them to
complete the presentation of their evidence. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: 4
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED."
The Resolution denied reconsideration of the challenged Decision.
The Facts
Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed Quilat-Quilat -- filed an action for recovery of a parcel of land against Petitioners
Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso, Rosalind, Mary Jean -- all surnamed Edrial -- and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 6315 and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. 5 The Court of Appeals presented the facts of this
case as follows:
"Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, a lawyer of the LAPIL (IBP) Negros Oriental, who was also an [e]lection [r]egistrar of the COMELEC, filed the complaint in
1975;
Atty. Lituanas was able to present evidence on the following dates:
July 10, 1981
First plaintiffs' witness Atilano Ramirez, 73 years old, was presented;
July 16, 1981
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
August 24, 1982
November 20, 1984
February 28, 1984
Direct Examination of 2ndPlaintiffs' witness Ignacio Tomias. Cross-examination was waived.
August 21, 1985
Plaintiff Pedro Quilat-Quilat was presented on direct examination.
"On December 16, 1986, the Citizen Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) entered its appearance as new [private respondents'] counsel after Atty.
Gerardo Lituanas has filed his withdrawal. The subsequent events are as follows:
February 23, 1987

The case was set for hearing on April 21, 1987.
April 21, 1987
The hearing was reset due to the projected amendment of the complainant to implead Primitiva Torrecampo.
June 19, 1987
The third amended complaint was admitted.
September 9, 1987
Hearing was postponed at the instance of the defendants [herein petitioners].
October 22, 1987
The hearing was suspended for the reason that the Court would require the [private respondents] to submit a certification from the Bureau of Forest
Development that the land involved in this case [was] not a part of the public forest.
December 17, 1987
The hearing was postponed at the request of [private respondents'] counsel for the reason that she [would] be attending [a] conference in Cebu City.
March 18, 1988
The hearing was aborted due to the fact that the Bureau of Forest Development report ha[d] not yet been finished.
July 5, 1988
The hearing [was] reset upon agreement of both counsel.
September 15, 1988
The hearing [was] reset upon the Court's instance.
December 8, 1988
No hearing was held as the certification from the Bureau of Forest Development [was] being awaited.
March 16, 1989
The said certification [was] still being awaited.
May 25, 1989
The testimony of [Private Respondent] Pedro Quilat-Quilat [was] suspended after a question was [propounded] that would require him to use reading
eyeglasses which he did not have at the moment.
December 14, 1989
Hearing [was] reset due to the illness of [private respondents'] counsel.
September 20, 1990

Atty. Eleccion, [petitioners'] counsel did not appear despite due notice. At this time, the [private respondents] rested their case.
October 15, 1990
Atty. Eleccion [private respondents'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to October 16, 1990.
October 16, 1990
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to December 10, 11 and 12.
December 10, 1990
Atty. Eleccion asked for postponement. Hearing [was] reset to December 11, 1990.
December 11, 1990
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. The case [was] submitted for decision as of th[at] day.
August 21, 1992
The transcript of stenographic notes which was taken down by stenographer Alexander Yberley, was missing. He was ordered to produce the
transcript.
October 30, 1992
Witness Atilano Ramirez was recalled for cross-examination since stenographer Yberley manifested that the record was burned. Despite due notice,
nobody appeared for the [petitioners]. So as of this day, the cross-examination of Atilano Ramirez was considered waived and the case was finally
submitted for decision.
December 11, 1992
Court granted the prayer of Atty. Sedillo and the case [was] set for hearing on March 22, 29 and April 5 1993.
March 22, 1993
Atty. Sedillo did not present evidence but instead moved for a resetting of the hearing to April 12, 1993. He [was] advised by the Court to be
prepared on the next scheduled hearing.
June 4, 1993
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to July 2, 1993.
July 2, 1993
Flaviano Umbac was presented as first [petitioners'] witness. Hearing [was] scheduled [for] August 27, 1993.
August 27, 1993
[Petitioners] moved for a resetting to October 7, 1993.
October 7, 1993
Atty. Bongaciso was presented as second witness for the [petitioners]. His testimony [was] terminated and hearing [was] reset to December 13,
1993.
December 13, 1993
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to February 14, 1994.
February 14, 1994
Hearing [was] reset at the instance of Atty. Sedillo who want[ed] to recall his witness Atty. Bonganciso. Hearing [was] reset to March 23, 1994.
March 24, 1994
Hearing [was] postponed to May 6, 1994 to find avenue for settlement.
May 6, 1994
Due to the conflict of schedule by Atty. Sedillo and due to the absence of recalled 2nd [petitioners'] witness Bongaciso, hearing [was] reset to June
17, 1994.
June 17, 1994
Atty. Sedillo asked for postponement. He [would] attend a Kiwanis Training Conference. Hearing [was] reset to July 4, 1994.
July 4, 1994
Atty. Sedillo was present but Atty. Rosalinda Ybanez [was] available at 10:00 a.m. so the case [was] reset to August 15, 1994.
August 15, 1994
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to October 3, 1994.
October 3, 1994
The hearing [was] reset to November 17, 1994 due to non-availability of [petitioners'] witness Atty. Roque Bonganciso who [was] on recall.
November 17, 1994
There [was] talk about [a] proposed settlement, hearing [was] held in abeyance.
January 6, 1995
Since no settlement [was] realized a [private respondents'] motion to set [the] case for hearing was filed and the case was reset to [February] 27,
1995.
February 27, 1995
Earlier, [petitioners'] counsel, Atty. Sedillo filed a motion for postponement as he [would be] appearing in a case in Manila. Atty. Ybanez manifested
that on February 26, 1995 Atty. Sedillo was in Dumaguete and further that this case ha[d] been delayed by the failure of the [petitioners] to complete
the presentation of their evidence. The Court then ordered the case submitted for decision for the THIRD TIME.
March 16, 1995
The Court issued an order reconsidering the February 27, 1995 order upon motion of Atty. Sedillo and set the case for the [petitioners] for June 16,
1995 with a STERN WARNING TO THE [PETITIONERS].
June 16, 1995

The hearing set for [this day] was cancelled as the Judge [was] on leave and reset to September 8, 1995.
September 8, 1995
The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to November 16, 1995.
November 16, 1995
The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Neither did his client. The hearing [was] reset to February 13, 1996.
February 9, 1996
The [petitioners'] counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.
February 12, 1996
The Court issued an order granting the withdrawal of the [petitioners'] counsel. The [petitioners were] directed to immediately engage the services of
a new counsel. This notice was received personally by the wife of [Petitioner] Mauro Edrial, Jr.
February 13, 1996
The Court issued an order setting the case [for] April 26, 1996. This order was received by the wife of the [Petitioner] Mauro Edrial, Jr.
April 26, 1996
There was no appearance from the [petitioners]. Hence, the case was submitted for decision for the FOURTH TIME.
July 8, 1996
Atty. Sedillo filed a motion to reopen the case and in effect reentered his appearance.
August 20, 1996
Private respondents thru counsel filed opposition to the motion of the [petitioners].
September 6, 1996
The Hon. Judge issued an order denying the motion to reopen hereby affirming the April 26, 1996 order submitting the case for decision.
September 11, 1996
[Petitioners] filed a motion for reconsideration.
October 2, 1996
Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
October 23, 1996
Private respondents received a copy of the Petition for Certiorari." 6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal because, in issuing the questioned Orders, the trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. In giving petitioners more than ample time to complete their presentation of evidence and in granting their Motions for
Postponement, the judge was accommodating them more than they actually deserved.
Hence, this Petition.7
Issues
Petitioners submit that the CA erred in affirming the twin Orders of the Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 39. They contend that a reversal thereof would
have allowed them to complete their presentation of evidence. Hence, by affirming those Orders, the CA allegedly violated their right to due
process.8
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is without merit.
Main Issue
Due Process and Reopening of Trial
Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his clients on file in his law firm were incorrect; hence, the notices and other forms of
communication he had sent to them were not received. He allegedly discovered this fact only after he had filed his withdrawal as their counsel. He
also argues that the denial of the Motion to Reopen Trial was "plainly capricious and oppressive" because private respondents were equally guilty of
delay and procrastination. Finally, he maintains that allowing petitioners to present their remaining evidence would be "in the interest of substantial
due process and humane justice."
Respondents disagree, reasoning that the trial court thrice reconsidered its Order to submit the case for decision; that is, petitioners were given
several opportunities to present their evidence, but they squandered them. Petitioners, they further point out, were intentionally seeking to delay the
resolution of the case because they were in physical possession of the land in dispute.
Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA ruled that petitioners were given "more than enough time" to complete their
presentation of evidence. Respondents rested their case as early as September 1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own request, was allowed to start
presenting evidence only on April 12, 1993. From that day until April 26, 1996 or for a period of three years, counsel presented only two witnesses.
The trial judge was in fact liberal in granting petitioners' Motions for Postponement. But enough was enough; when they attempted to delay the trial
some more, the trial judge finally and correctly refused to go along.
True, respondents also asked for continuances, but petitioners were ultimately to blame for the inexcusable delay. The case was submitted for
decision three times -- on December 11, 1990, October 30, 1992, and February 27, 1995 - but petitioners and/or their counsel did not appear in court
each time. After having failed to take advantage of opportunities to ventilate their claims below, parties may no longer be accorded the same
chances, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, as in this case. 9
The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without
submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their failure. 10 The same principle applies more forcefully to motions for
continuance. Postponement is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. Actions thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the
absence of a clear or manifest abuse of discretion, resulting in a denial of substantial justice. 11 We concur with the CA that there is no such denial in
this case.1âwphi1
It is highly suspicious how the counsel for petitioners continued to represent his clients effectively for several years despite allegedly having lost their
correct addresses. It was definitely his duty to know the correct ones. Indeed, it was too late for him to do so after he had withdrawn as their counsel.
According to him, after April 16, 1996, he sent an office employee to verify the whereabouts of Mauro Edrial Jr. The inquiry yielded the information
that Mauro actually resided in San Jose, Negros Oriental, and that Susan Edrial Valenzuela resided in Gomez St., Dumaguete City. 12 He should have
undertaken the search before withdrawing as counsel. Further, notice might not have been received by petitioners themselves, but that did not
excuse counsel's failure to appear during trials.
Counsel for petitioners further avers that he had difficulty in presenting Atty. Roque Bonganciso because of the latter's prior commitments which
conflicted with the scheduled trial dates. The last witness was Mauro Edrial Jr., but counsel had the wrong address on file. He should just have
adjusted the order of presentation of witnesses and called Edrial Jr. later. Such move could have prevented the postponement. Besides, finding an
available date in his calendar would not have taken Atty. Bonganciso three years.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, shall not let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so (Rule 12.03). 13 Moreover, they should avoid any
action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04).
For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is the CA's reminder to petitioners' counsel of his duty to his client and to the court:
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its
ends-the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should
not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization,
charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." 14
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157911 September 19, 2006
SPOUSES MANUEL A. AGUILAR and YOLANDA C. AGUILAR, petitioners,

vs.
THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
The sad and lamentable spectacle that this case presents, that is, the execution of a final and executory decision forestalled by perpetual dilatory
tactics employed by a litigant, makes a blatant mockery of justice. The Court cannot countenance, and in fact, condemns, the outrageous abuse of
the judicial process by Spouses Manuel A. Aguilar and Yolanda C. Aguilar (petitioners) and their counsel.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision 1 dated October 29,
2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71849 which dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari, and the CA Resolution2 dated April
29, 2003 which denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The procedural antecedents and factual background of the case are as follows:
Sometime in 1979, petitioners obtained a P600,000.00 loan from the Manila Banking Corporation (respondent), secured by a real estate mortgage
over their 419-square meter property located at No. 8 Piña St., Valle Verde, Pasig City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 11082.
When petitioners failed to pay their obligation, the mortgaged property was extra-judicially foreclosed. Respondent was the winning bidder at public
auction sale on May 20, 1982. Consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on June 23, 1982.
Subsequently, on May 30, 1983, instead of redeeming the property, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the foreclosure sale of the property
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City (RTC Branch 165), docketed as Civil Case No. 49793. While the case was pending, the
parties entered into a compromise agreement.3
Under the Compromise Agreement dated January 23, 1987, the petitioners admitted the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure and agreed to
purchase the property from respondent for P2,548,000.00. Parties agreed that the amount of P100,000.00 shall be payable upon execution of the
agreement and the balance of P2,448,000.00, which shall earn twenty-six per cent (26%) interest per annum, shall be payable in eighteen
installments from February 23, 1987 to July 27, 1988. They further agreed that in case of default: (a) all outstanding installments and/or interest
thereon shall be immediately due; (b) petitioners shall immediately vacate the property and deliver possession thereof to respondent; (c) respondent
shall be entitled to register all documents needed to transfer title over the property in their favor; and, (d) respondent shall be entitled to ask for the
execution of the judgment or an ancillary remedy necessary to place it in possession of the property. On January 30, 1987, RTC Branch 165 adopted
and approved the Compromise Agreement.4
Petitioners failed to pay the balance of P2,448,000.00 within the eighteen-installment period from February 23, 1987 to July 27, 1988. A year and
three months later, or on October 20, 1989, respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution to enforce the Decision dated January 30,
1987.5
On November 28, 1989, RTC Branch 165 issued an Order granting the motion and issuing a writ of execution: (a) directing petitioners to immediately
vacate the property and surrender possession to the respondent; (b) directing the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District II to register any and all
documents needed to transfer title over the property to respondent and to issue a new certificate of title respondent's favor free from any liens,
adverse claims and/or encumbrances; (c) issuing a writ of possession in respondent's favor to place it in possession of the property. 6
However, on January 22, 1990, petitioners filed a Manifestation praying for deferment of the enforcement of the writ of execution until July 31, 1990
because petitioners have a pending proposal for the settlement of their judgment debt. 7 The manifestation was with the conformity of
respondents.8 On January 24, 1990, RTC Branch 165 issued an Order granting the motion and holding in abeyance the enforcement of the writ of
execution until July 31, 1990.9 However, no settlement was reached by the parties during the period.
One year and four months later, petitioners still failed to settle their judgment debt. Consequently, respondent filed on December 2, 1991 a
Manifestation reiterating its motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. 10 On December 5, 1991, RTC Branch 165 issued an Order granting the
manifestation and directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the Decision dated January 30, 1987. 11
To evade the implementation of the writ, petitioners filed on December 20, 1991 an Ex-Parte Motion to Recall the Court's Order dated December 5,
1991 claiming that their obligation was novated by the Letter dated June 7, 1991 from respondent's Statutory Receiver. 12 In said letter, respondent's
Statutory Receiver approved the purchase of the property on installment basis over a three-year period at an interest rate of twelve per cent (12%)
with P481,265.00 due on September 30, 1991, P481,265.00 due on September 30, 1992, and P724,064.79 due on September 30, 1993.13
On December 2, 1992, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution manifesting that the Letter dated June 7,
1991 did not novate the Decision dated January 30, 1987 but was a mere accommodation of the petitioners' request for a liberal mode of payment of
their account and petitioners still failed to comply with such approved mode of payment. 14
On December 14, 1992, petitioners filed their Comment and Manifestation praying for a humanitarian and liberal judicial dispensation since that they
have been paying their obligations to respondent despite delay due to "financial restraints for family subsistence and their children's educational
expenses".15
On February 1, 2000, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation praying for resolution of the pending incidents. 16 On March 3, 2000,
petitioners filed their Opposition claiming that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court bars execution, by mere motions, of judgment which is more
than five years old. On March 14, 2000, respondent filed its Reply stating that the peculiar circumstances of the case warrant its exclusion from the
scope of said Rule.
On March 20, 2000, RTC Branch 165 issued its Order which resolved the pending motions with the Court. With respect to petitioner's ex-
parte motion to recall, the Court said that for failure to comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court and considering the
nature of petitioners' motion, it treated petitioner's motion as a mere scrap of paper. 17 As to respondent's motion for issuance of a writ of execution, it
granted the same, holding that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court does not apply since the delay in the execution of the judgment was due to
petitioners who made several alternative payment proposals, requested several extensions of time to pay their account, filed dilatory motions and
pleadings and it would be a blatant injustice to allow them to profit from the delays they deliberately caused to escape completely and absolutely the
satisfaction of their admitted and confessed obligation by sheer literal adherence to technicality. 18
On March 30, 2000, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration 19 but RTC Branch 165 denied it in its Order dated May 30, 2000. 20
On June 20, 2000, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal 21 but RTC Branch 165 denied it in its Order dated August 21, 2000 on the ground that an order
of execution is not appealable.22
Thereafter, petitioners filed a six-page Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144719, reiterating that the Decision
dated January 30, 1987 can no longer be executed on mere motion since it is more than five years old. 23
In a Resolution dated October 11, 2000, the First Division of this Court denied the petition for violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts and failure to
show special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify a disregard of the rule. 24 Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Court denied it with finality in its Resolution dated December 11, 2000. 25
Since the Resolution in G.R. No. 144719 became final and executory on January 16, 2001, RTC Branch 165 issued a writ of execution on February
19, 2001 to enforce the Decision dated January 30, 1987. 26 On February 23, 2001, the Sheriff issued a Notice for Compliance of the said writ. 27
Undaunted by their previous setbacks, petitioners filed on March 6, 2001 in RTC Branch 165 an Omnibus Motion to quash the Writ of Execution
insisting anew on their novation and prescription theories. 28 They also moved for consignation of the amount of their obligation under the Letter dated
June 7, 1991 of respondent's Statutory Receiver.
On March 14, 2001, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Order to Divest Plaintiffs' Title and to Direct the Register of Deeds to Transfer Title to
Defendant29 based on Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On March 19, 2001, respondent filed its Opposition (to petitioners'
Omnibus Motion) and Motion to Cite Plaintiffs in Contempt claiming that the Omnibus Motion is nothing but petitioners' desperate attempt to thwart or
delay the payment of their obligations and they should be declared guilty of indirect contempt for their improper conduct calculated to impede,
obstruct and degrade the administration of justice. 30
On May 2, 2001, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Inhibition. 31 While RTC Branch 165 Presiding Judge Marietta A. Legaspi denied the motion for
inhibition in her Order dated June 5, 2001, she voluntarily inhibited herself from further participating in the case to show that she has no interest
therein.32 Respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 33 to no avail.34 The case was re-raffled and was assigned to Branch 268 presided by
Judge Amelia C. Manalastas.
On September 17, 2001 and January 4, 2002, respondent filed two Motions to Resolve Pending Incidents. 35 Despite the fact that Judge Manalastas
has not actively participated in the case since she has not acted on the pending incidents, petitioners filed on February 5, 2002 a Motion for
Inhibition.36 A day later, on February 6, 2002, Judge Manalastas granted the motion for inhibition. 37 Thus, the case was again re-raffled and was
assigned to Branch 167 presided by Judge Jesus G. Bersamira. On February 13, 2002, respondent filed again a Motion to Resolve Pending
Incidents.38
On March 22 and 26, 2002, both parties filed separate Urgent Motions to Resolve the case. 39 Subsequently, petitioners filed a Manifestation and
Motion that the Letter dated June 7, 1991 be marked as their exhibit. 40 RTC Branch 167 in its Order dated April 30, 2002 admitted the exhibit over
the objections of respondent.41
On May 24, 2002, RTC Branch 167 rendered its Omnibus Order denying the Omnibus Motion to quash the writ of execution and for consignation, as
well as the motion to cite petitioners in contempt and the ex parte motion for an order to divest petitioners' title to respondent. It held that there was
no novation because there was no incompatibility between the Letter dated June 7, 1991 and the Decision dated January 30, 1987 with the former
only providing for a more liberal scheme of payment and grant of reduced interest; that petitioners' claim that respondent's receivership and the
Letter dated June 7, 1991 are supervening events which rendered the execution unjust and impossible is unavailing since there is nothing on record
to indicate that such circumstances resulted in unfairness and injustice to petitioners if execution of judgment is carried out; that petitioner's claim
that the judgment could no longer be executed by mere motion after the five-year period had elapsed from its finality is specious since any
interruption or delay occasioned by petitioners will extend the time within which the judgment may be executed by motion. 42
No motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners. Accordingly, RTC Branch 167 issued a Writ of Execution on July 4, 2002. 43 On July 23,
2002, the Sheriff issued the Notice for Compliance of the said writ. 44
Petitioners filed on July 26, 2002 a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71849.45 They reiterated that the Decision dated
January 30, 1987 cannot be executed by mere motion filed on February 1, 2000 since more than five years have elapsed.
On October 29, 2002, the CA denied the petition for certiorari.46 It held that since the delays were occasioned by petitioners' own initiative and for
their own advantage, the five-year period allowed for the enforcement of the judgment by motion have been interrupted or suspended.
On November 13, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 47 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated April 29, 2003. 48
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN IN THIS CASE
CONSIDERING THAT MORE THAN FIVE (5) YEARS, NAY, MORE THAN TEN (10) YEARS, HAD ELAPSED SINCE THE DECISION
BASED ON COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE
HAVE TRANSPIRED AFTER THE DECISION HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY THAT WARRANTS AND CALLS FOR STAY OR
PRECLUSION OF EXECUTION, CONSIDERING THAT THE LETTER-APPROVAL OF THE STATUTORY RECEIVER OF RESPONDENT
PARTAKES OF AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE WHICH HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY UPHELD BY THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE LETTER APPROVAL OF THE STATUTORY
RECEIVER NOVATED THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND DECISION BASED ON COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE EQUITIES OF THE CASE FAVOR HEREIN
PETITIONERS.49
Anent the first ground, petitioners reiterate that under Section 6 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, the execution of the judgment by mere motion was barred
by prescription, given that more than five years had lapsed since the Decision dated January 30, 1987 became final and executory and they cannot
be faulted for the delay as they have done nothing that warrants the conclusion that they employed unscrupulous machinations and dilatory tactics.
As to the second ground, petitioners argue that respondent's receivership is a supervening event that rendered execution of the Decision dated
January 30, 1987 impossible, if not unjust; that since a bank under receivership is relieved of its obligation to pay interest on the deposits of its
depositors, they (petitioners) are also not obliged to pay interest on a loan due it and interest shall commence again only after respondent's
resumption of banking operations.
On the third ground, petitioners maintain that the Letter dated June 7, 1991 of respondent's Statutory Receiver novated the Decision dated January
30, 1987 considering the substantial differences in their principal terms and conditions.
On the fourth ground, petitioners aver that the acceleration clause provision of the Compromise Agreement is iniquitous and void for being violative
of morals and public policy.
In their Comment, respondent contends that the present petition should be dismissed outright because it is barred by res judicata or the final
judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 144719 and petitioners engaged in forum-shopping by deliberately failing to state that they previously filed G.R.
No. 144719 where the issue of prescription was raised. Even if the petition is given due course, respondent argues that execution of the Decision
dated January 30, 1987 is not barred by prescription; that respondent's receivership and the Letter dated June 7, 1991 of respondent's Statutory
Receiver are not circumstances that would render the execution of the judgment unjust, inequitable or even merit a stay of execution; that the Letter
dated June 7, 1991 of respondent's Statutory Receiver did not novate the Decision dated January 30, 1987 since there was no intent to novate
petitioners' judgment obligation.50
In Reply, petitioners argue that res judicata is not applicable since the minute Resolution of the Court in G.R. No. 144719: (a) does not operate as
adjudication on the merits, (b) was not rendered with jurisdiction over the parties; and (c) involved different subject matters and causes of action. 51
In the Resolution dated May 15, 2003, upon motion of petitioner, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders from
this Court.52
The petition is bereft of merit.
Prefatorily, the Court notes that the petition for certiorari before the CA should have been dismissed outright since petitioners failed to file a motion
for reconsideration from the RTC Omnibus Order dated May 24, 2002. Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. … (Emphasis supplied)
The plain and adequate remedy referred to in the rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision or order. The purpose for this
requirement is to grant an opportunity for the court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case53 without the intervention of a higher court.54 Thus, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari.
While jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the rule, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved, 55 none of these exceptions apply here.
In the present case, the petitioners not only failed to explain their failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, they also failed to show
sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement. A motion for reconsideration is not only expected to be but would actually have provided
an adequate and more speedy remedy than the petition for certiorari.56 Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences
of petitioners' own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration. 57
In any case, even if petitioners' procedural faux pas is ignored, their contentions on the substantive aspect of the case fail to invite judgment in their
favor.
Petitioners are barred from raising the issue on the prescription of execution of the decision by mere motion under the principle of the "law of the
case," which is the practice of courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. 58
The law of the case on the issue of prescription of the execution of the decision by mere motion or applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court has been settled in the Order dated March 20, 2000 of RTC Branch 165. Upon denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, they
erroneously sought review with this Court which dismissed their petition for review on certiorari for violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts and for
failure to show special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify a disregard of the rule. 59 This Court's
Resolution became final and executory on January 16, 2001. Thus, petitioners are bound thereby. The question of prescription has been settled with
finality and may no longer be resurrected by petitioners. It is not subject to review or reversal in any court, even this Court.
The CA failed to consider this principle of law of the case, which is totally different from the concept of res judicata. In Padillo v. Court of
Appeals,60 the Court distinguished the two as follows:
x x x Law of the case does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata, and applies only to that one case, whereas res
judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. In the 1975 case of Comilang v. Court of
Appeals (Fifth Division.), a further distinction was made in this manner:
The doctrine of law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its application. It relates entirely to
questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case. The doctrine of res judicata differs
therefrom in that it is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may include questions of law, and
although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same action or general proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect
of an adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding. 61
To elucidate further, res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the
same cause.62 The four requisites for res judicata to apply are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; and (d) there must be, between
the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. 63 The fourth requisite is wanting in the present case.
There is only one case involved. There is no second independent proceeding or subsequent litigation between the parties. The present petition
concerns subsequent proceedings in the same case, with petitioners raising the same issue long settled by a prior appeal.
On the matter of forum shopping, while the Court has held that forum shopping exists only where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another,64 it must be recalled that the doctrines of law of the case and res
judicata are founded on a public policy against reopening that which has previously been decided. 65 Both doctrines share the policy consideration of
putting an end to litigation.66 Thus, the principle of forum shopping should apply by analogy to a case involving the principle of law of the case.
Moreover, although forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion, other than by
appeal or certiorari, in another, or when a party institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask
the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, 67 the peculiar circumstances
attendant in this case bate out a situation akin to forum shopping - there is only one court involved, RTC Pasig City, but the issue of prescription was
ultimately resolved by two different branches thereof – Branches 165 and 167.
Petitioners first raised before RTC Branch 165 the issue of prescription of the execution of the decision by mere motion. Said RTC Branch 165 ruled
against petitioners and the court's order thereon became final and executory. Petitioners raised the issue again in an Omnibus Motion with the same
RTC Branch 165. However, they moved for the inhibition of the presiding judge hearing the issue not only once, but twice, both motions
granted in their favor and the case was successively raffled and assigned to two different branches of RTC Pasig, first to Branch 268 and then to
Branch 167, which ruled against petitioners.
Through the motions for inhibition of the presiding judges and the assignment of the case to different branches of the same court, petitioners sought
to obtain from one branch a ruling more favorable than the ruling of another branch. They deliberately sought a friendly branch of the same court to
grant them the relief that they wanted, despite the finality of the resolution of one branch on the matter. This is a permutation of forum shopping. It
trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court dockets. 68
Be it remembered that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rules against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two
separate, and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party-litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their
luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. This would make a complete mockery of the judicial system. 69
As to petitioners' arguments on the inequity of the acceleration clause of the Compromise Agreement, respondent's receivership as a supervening
event, and novation of the Compromise Agreement by the Letter dated June 7, 1991, the Court holds that these were raised as mere afterthought. If
petitioners sincerely believed in the merits of their arguments, they should have raised them at the earliest opportunity and pursued their ultimate
resolution. However, petitioners did not.
Petitioners are barred from raising arguments concerning the inequity of the acceleration clause of the Compromise Agreement since they only
raised it for the first time before the CA in their Petition for Certiorari 70 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71849. To consider the argument raised belatedly in a
pleading filed in the appellate court, especially in the executory stage of the proceedings, would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair
play, justice and due process.
In addition, after adopting and agreeing to the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement, petitioners cannot be permitted to subsequently
make a complete volte face and attack the validity of the said agreement when they miserably failed to comply with its provisions. Our law and policy
do not sanction such a somersault. What's more, petitioners also failed to comply with the reduced purchase amount and interest rate granted in the
Letter dated June 7, 1991. They can hardly evoke judicial compassion.
On the arguments relating to the effect of respondent's receivership, petitioners brought this matter for the first time in RTC Branch 165 in their
Omnibus Motion dated March 5, 2001, fourteen years after respondent was placed under receivership and was ordered to close operation in 1987.
The belated invocation of such circumstance speaks strongly of the staleness of their claim.
Besides, it would be absurd to adopt petitioners' position that they are not obliged to pay interest on their obligation when respondent was placed
under receivership. When a bank is placed under receivership, it would only not be able to do new business , that is, to grant new loans or to accept
new deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of the
bank.71 Thus, petitioners' obligation to pay interest subsists even when respondent was placed under receivership. The respondent's receivership is
an extraneous circumstance and has no effect on petitioners' obligation.
On the claim of novation, petitioners raised it for the first time before RTC Branch 165 in their Ex-Parte Motion to Recall the Court's Order dated
December 5, 199172 but they did not pursue the matter after their ex-parte motion was denied. They did not raise said issue in their motion for
reconsideration or in their first petition for review on certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 144719. Thus, they are deemed to have abandoned their
claim of novation. They cannot be allowed to revive the issue as it is offensive to basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
Moreover, the Court cannot see how novation can take place considering that the surrounding circumstances negate the same. The established rule
is that novation is never presumed; it must be clearly and unequivocally shown. 73 Novation will not be allowed unless it is clearly shown by express
agreement, or by acts of equal import. Thus, to effect an objective novation it is imperative that the new obligation expressly declares that the old
obligation is thereby extinguished or that the new obligation be on every point incompatible with the new one. 74
In the present case, there is no clear intent of the parties to make the Letter dated June 7, 1991 completely supersede and abolish the Compromise
Agreement adopted and approved by the RTC in its Decision dated January 30, 1987. Petitioners were merely granted a more liberal scheme of
payment and reduced rate of interest but the conditions relating to the consequences of default in payment remained, such that when petitioners'
failed to comply with the approved mode of payment in the Letter dated June 7, 1991, respondents were entitled to call for enforcement of the
Decision dated January 30, 1987 and eject petitioners from the property. The well-settled rule is that, with respect to obligations to pay a sum of
money, the obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, changes only the terms of payment, adds other obligations
not incompatible with the old ones, or the new contract merely supplements the old one. 75 Hence, there is no merit to petitioners' claim of novation.
Without a doubt, the present case is an instance where the due process routine vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut devise meant to
perpetually forestall execution of an otherwise final and executory decision. Aside from clogging court dockets, the strategy is deplorably a common
course resorted to by losing litigants in the hope of evading manifest obligations. The Court condemns this outrageous abuse of the judicial process
by the petitioners and their counsels.
It is an important fundamental principle in the judicial system that every litigation must come to an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there
must be a limit thereto. Once a litigant's rights have been adjudicated in a valid and final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an
unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be
encouraged, then unscrupulous litigants will multiply to the detriment of the administration of justice. 76
The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must see to it that the orderly administration of justice
must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit
or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit,
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 77
There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants and counsels that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to
be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as
shown in the present case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.
Verily, by the undue delay in the execution of a final judgment in their favor, respondents have suffered an injustice. The Court views with disfavor
the unjustified delay in the enforcement of the final decision and orders in the present case. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. 78 Unjustified delay in the enforcement of
a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71849
are AFFIRMED. The status quo order issued by this Court on May 15, 2003 is LIFTED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig City, is directed
to issue the corresponding writ of execution and the Sheriff of the court is ordered to enforce the same to its ultimate conclusion.
Triple costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148991 January 21, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
LEONARDO NUGUID y MAYAO, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision 1 dated 16 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 00-
179698. The trial court found Leonardo Nuguid y Mayao ("appellant") guilty of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape and imposed on him the
death penalty.
The Charge
The Information charging appellant with the crime of serious illegal detention with rape reads:
That on or about January 1, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual and without authority of law,
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally detain (sic) ROWENA RIANZARES Y MIRANDA by then and there taking and locking her inside his room
located at 1932 Firmeza Street, Sampaloc, this City, and preventing her from going out of said room for a period of three (3) hours, more or less,
thereby depriving her of her liberty and during the said period of time, said accused by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by poking a
knife, threatening to kill her should she resist and choking her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal
knowledge of her, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.2
Arraignment and Plea
When arraigned on 14 February 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.3
The Trial
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented four witnesses: (1) complainant Rowena Rianzares ("Rowena"); (2) Dr. Mirasol Pangan of the U.P. Philippine General
Hospital Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, who examined the complainant; (3) Eldee Eusebio; and (4) Dante Magat.
The Solicitor General summarized the prosecution’s version of the incident in the People’s Brief as follows:
On December 31, 1999, about 7 o’clock in the evening, appellant and his companions (names not on record) were having a drinking spree outside
the house of Jun Rianzares xxx. (p. 5, TSN, May 22, 2000).
About 2 o’clock in the morning of the following day or right after the New Year’s eve celebration, Jun Rianzares left their house to see a friend. His
wife, Rowena Rianzares, was left behind sleeping inside the room of their house with their daughter [six (6) years old] and son [three (3) years old]
(pp. 3-4, ibid.).
After a while, Rowena Rianzares heard a knock at the door of their room. Consequently, she rose from the bed and partially opened the door to look
[at] who was knocking. It was appellant. Appellant tried to push open the door, telling Rowena Rianzares that her husband was asking for money to
buy liquor. Rowena Rianzares got suspicious because her husband had money at that time and he would not ask money from her. Rowena
Rianzares thus closed the door (pp. 3-5, ibid.)
Thereafter, Rowena Rianzares went back to sleep. A few minutes later, she heard appellant upstairs repeatedly shouting that her husband was very
mad because he did not have money to buy liquor. When she heard appellant say that her husband was allegedly mad, she opened the door of their
room and went out. She went inside appellant’s room which was located in front of their room to confront him. She told appellant: "Bakit hihingi ng
pera si Kuya Jun mo may pera naman siya?" Immediately thereafter, appellant rushed to her back and placed his left arm around her neck with his
right hand holding a kitchen knife, about twelve (12) inches long (pp. 5-6 and 12, ibid.).
Rowena Rianzares got surprised and, consequently, pushed appellant’s left arm. In the process, Rowena Rianzares got off balance and fell down
xxx the stairway screaming. She asked for help shouting her husband’s name (p. 11, ibid.)
Appellant immediately went after Rowena Rianzares and upon catching up with her, appellant held her hair and left arm. He then dragged her
upstairs towards his (appellant’s) room (pp. 5-6, ibid.)
Inside the room, appellant asked Rowena Rianzares to undress while pointing the knife he was holding at her right rear side of the body. He
threatened to kill Rowena Rianzares if she did not undress herself. Out of fear, she was forced to undress herself.
Then, appellant kissed the different parts of her body. Rowena Rianzares struggled and resisted. She grappled for possession of the knife and
succeeded in holding its bladed portion causing her injury on the right palm. She persisted in grappling for possession of the knife but failed. In the
process, she sustained a further injury on her left arm. Instead of relenting, appellant pulled her and slapped the back of her head. Thereafter,
appellant dragged and forced her to lie down on the lower portion of the double [deck] bed located inside appellant’s room (pp. 6-13, ibid.).
While Rowena Rianzares was xxx lying down xxx with her legs spread apart, appellant placed himself on top of her. He placed his left foot under
Rowena Rianzares’ left leg and his right foot on Rowena Rianzares’ right leg. While in that position, appellant forced his private organ into Rowena
Rianzares’ private part. Rowena Rianzares continued to shout for help but appellant poked the knife at the left side of her body. While appellant was
raping her, he pointed the knife at Rowena Rianzares’ private part and told her that he wanted to get [a] thrill out of it because he could not get a full
erection since he was under the influence of "shabu." Rowena Rianzares pleaded [with] appellant to stop and assured him that she would help him
get out xxx but appellant remained unmoved (pp. 13-17 , ibid.).
About ten (10) minutes after Rowena Rianzares was dragged by appellant to his room, somebody knocked at appellant’s door and shouted: "Bernie
ano ba ang ginagawa mo dyan?" Appellant answered back: "Umalis kayo kundi papatayin ko ito. " (pp. 18-19, ibid.).
Eldee Eusebio, a neighbor of spouses Jun and Rowena Rianzares at Firmeza Street, Sampaloc, Manila (p. 7, TSN, May 30, 2000), testified that on
January 1, 2000, about 2:15 in the morning, he went to the house of his Kuya Jose "Jun" Rianzares because he was summoned by the latter (p. 4,
TSN, May 30, 2000). When he was about to enter the house, Eldee Eusebio heard Rowena Rianzares shout. Immediately, Eldee Eusebio kicked the
entrance gate of the house to open it. He then hurriedly went upstairs and saw Rowena Rianzares using her feet in trying to prevent the door of
appellant’s room from closing. After the door was closed, he immediately knocked at the door. Appellant, however, shouted, telling him to leave and
nobody should go up; otherwise, he would kill Rowena Rianzares (pp. 4-5, ibid.).
Consequently, Eldee Eusebio went outside the house to look for Jun Rianzares because he did not see him inside the house. When he found Jun
Rianzares, he told him that there was a problem in his house (p. 5, ibid.).
About thirty (30) minutes later, Rowena Rianzares’ husband arrived. Jun Rianzares knocked at appellant’s door and asked appellant what was he
doing to his wife. Appellant pounded the floor, using the handle of the knife and shouted. He asked Jun Rianzares to leave him alone; otherwise, he
would kill his wife (pp. 18-19, May 22, 2000).
Thirty (30) minutes thereafter, Barangay Councilor Nida Magat, together with her husband, Dante Magat, arrived. She and her relatives negotiated
for Rowena Rianzares’ release. However, appellant told them to leave; otherwise, he would kill Rowena Rianzares. While they were negotiating for
Rowena Rianzares’ release, appellant was still on top of her (Rowena Rianzares) (pp. 19-20, ibid.).
After more than an hour of failed negotiations by Barangay Councilor Nida Magat, the policemen took over (pp. 2-4, TSN, July 11, 2000).
The policemen (names not on record) forcibly opened the door and immediately, thereafter, they got hold of appellant. Before they could get hold of
appellant, however, he (appellant tried to stab Rowena Rianzares but the latter was able to evade the thrust. Instead, she was hit on her left arm.
Then a certain Colonel Castro pulled Rowena Rianzares and immediately covered her with a blanket (p. 20, TSN, May 22, 2000).
xxx
Dr. Mirasol Pangan testified that she was the one who physically examined Rowena Rianzares. She testified that she examined Rowena Rianzares’
body from head to foot. She found the following injuries on her body:
1. one (1) hematoma on the right neck;
2. two (2) abrasions at the left lower hip approximately 0.5cm.;
3. one (1) abrasion at the left forearm;
4. one (1) abrasion hematoma-circular at the left lower arm;
5. multiple abrasion hematoma at the volar aspect of the second, fourth digits of right hand and under the nose;
6. one (1) hematoma at the back and the anterior tract the largest of which measures 6 x1 cm.;
7. one (1) stab wound at the left forearm; and
8. one (1) hematoma measuring two cm. at the right labia minora of the genitalia. 4
Version of the Defense
Appellant Leonardo Nuguid was the sole witness for the defense. The Public Attorney summarized the defense’s version of what transpired, as
follows:
Leonardo Nuguid testified that he knew the victim because he worked in the latter’s Manila K-9 college as their dog trainer. He had been working
with the Rianzares [spouses] for five (5) years. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 1-4)
On December 31, 1999 at about 10:30 p.m., Rowena Rianzares entered his room. He asked her what she wanted but Rowena did not answer and
instead she kissed him on the lips. He had sex with Rowena and the latter’s husband arrived. Jun called up for Rowena but the latter told her
husband that she was in the accused-appellant’s room talking with the latter. Jun left at around 11:00 pm and Rowena stayed in his room until the
police called by her husband arrived. He told Rowena to go out of the room but the latter refused to do so. The police kept on convincing them to go
out of the room but Rowena told them that they were just talking and they would go out soon. The police kicked the door open and he was arrested.
He was brought to the police station wherein he was mauled and was forced to confess that he raped Rowena. The first time he had sexual
intercourse with Rowena was the middle of 1998 when they went to Bulacan. Rowena told her then that she saw in him what was lacking in her
husband. Rowena’s husband was an alcoholic and a drug user. He does not know why she filed [t]his serious illegal detention with rape [charge]
against him. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 1-15)
He testified that he had worked with Rianzares from 1995-2000. There was a time he had an argument with Jun so he was asked to leave the
Rianzares’ house. (TSN, September 11,2000, pp. 15-16)
The first time he had sexual intercourse with Rowena was when they went to Bulacan to get rice from Rowena’s parents. Prior to January 1, 2000,
he had several sexual intercourse (sic) with Rowena. Rowena gave him several lovenotes but he lost them all. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 15-
16)
On January 1, 2000, he did not notice that Rowena was bleeding when she emerged from the room. He was holding a knife when the police arrested
him because he was forced to fight back at the police who were mauling him inside his room. He had a kitchen knife inside his room because
Rowena’s husband told him to bring the kitchen knife inside him (sic) room so that he could easily open the box of firecrackers in case anybody
came to buy. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 24-30)5
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court considered the testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution witnesses to be straightforward and credible. The physical injuries
Rowena suffered, confirmed by the examining physician and observed by the trial court, corroborated her version of the events.
On the other hand, the trial court found dubious appellant’s story that he and Rowena were sweethearts. The trial court held that:
The accused’s sweetheart defense is of doubtful nature and undeserving of credence. Firstly, the accused’s version of the incident is unnatural and
contrary to common human experience. If it was true that the complainant was in the accused’s room on the second floor at 11:00 p.m., when her
husband called her from the ground floor, she would surely had quickly gotten out of the room, instead of coolly telling her husband that she was with
the accused in the latter’s room. Secondly, the accused’s declaration is contradicted not only by the straightforward, convincing and believable
testimonies of the complainant and prosecution witnesses Eusebio and Magat, but also by the physical evidence of the injuries sustained by the
complainant on the occasion of the commission of the crime, Exhibits "F" and "F-1 ". 6
The trial court ruled that the acts of the appellant in locking up Rowena against her will in his room for three hours, threatening to kill her and then
sexually assaulting her, constituted the crime of serious illegal detention with rape. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision of 16 May 2001
reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Leonardo Nuguid y Mayao, is hereby convicted of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267 of
the Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection and accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is also sentenced to pay the complainant, Rowena Rianzares y Miranda, moral and nominal damages in the
respective sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, this automatic review.
The Issues
Appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction by contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE WHEN THE LATTER’S GUILT WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.8
Appellant, arguing through the Public Attorney, alleged that the trial court erred in rejecting his sweetheart defense, which was not unlikely since he
spent most of his time with Rowena. In the alternative, appellant claims he is liable only for simple rape because the prosecution failed to show that
his primary purpose was to detain Rowena, thus:
xxx It is undeniable that the accused-appellant’s primary purpose was to have carnal knowledge of Rowena Rianzares. The accused-appellant
immediately ordered Rowena Rianzares to undress and raped her. As a matter of fact, even at the time the police forcibly opened the door, Rowena
and the accused-appellant were still both naked and the accused-appellant was still positioned on top of Rowena. 9
The Solicitor General agreed that appellant is only liable for simple rape under Article 335 10 of the Revised Penal Code because: (1) it necessarily
follows from the Court’s ruling in People v. Lactao11 that there is no complex crime of illegal detention with rape; 12 and (2) appellant did not release
Rowena after the rape only because her husband and the police were outside appellant’s room.
In the Reply Brief, the Public Attorney raised as an additional ground for reversal the presiding judge’s alleged lack of impartiality in deciding the
case.
The Court shall first discuss the Solicitor General’s contention that there is no complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape. In People v.
Lactao, the Court ruled as follows:
It may be worth to mention at the outset that there is no complex crime of rape with serious illegal detention. If the purpose is to deprive the offended
party of liberty, the crime committed is illegal detention. And, if during the course of the illegal detention, the offended party is raped, a separate
crime of rape is committed; in this instance, two independent crimes are committed. However, if the objective of the offender is to rape the victim
only, and in the process, the latter had to be illegally detained, only the crime of rape is committed since illegal detention is deemed absorbed in
rape.
Hence, in People v. Ching Suy Sionga, Sionga was found guilty of two independent crimes, i.e., serious illegal detention and acts of lasciviousness,
because the two acts did not come within the purview of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code which applies to complex crimes, for certainly, one
cannot be considered as a means to commit the other. xxx13 (underscoring supplied)
The decision in Lactao, promulgated on 29 October 1993, explained the rules on the treatment of serious illegal detention and rape at that time. Prior
to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 ("RA 7659") on 31 December 1993, 14 when the person kidnapped or illegally detained was raped, two
independent crimes of kidnapping and rape were committed.
RA 7659, however, amended the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on serious illegal detention and kidnapping to read:
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed.
Under this provision, when the person kidnapped or illegally detained is raped, the offense committed is the special complex crime of serious illegal
detention or kidnapping with rape, punishable with the maximum penalty of death. 15 The last paragraph of Article 267 applies only to instances where
the person illegally detained or kidnapped is raped. It does not provide for a complex crime of rape with serious illegal detention. As the Court ruled
in Lactao, there is no complex crime of illegal detention with rape under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. There is also no complex crime of
kidnapping with attempted rape under Article 48 because there is no single act which results in two or more grave or less grave felonies. Neither is
illegal detention a necessary means for committing rape. 16
Nonetheless, the Court concurs with the Public Attorney and the Solicitor General that the crime committed in this case is not serious illegal
detention with rape. Rather, appellant is guilty of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code 17 are: (1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b)
it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill
him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. 18
The essence of illegal detention is the deprivation of the victim’s liberty. The prosecution must prove actual confinement or restriction of the victim,
and that such deprivation was the intention of the appellant. 19 The accused must have acted purposely or knowingly to restrain the victim because
what constitutes the offense is taking coupled with intent to restrain. 20
We agree with the Public Attorney that the facts in the present case indicate that appellant’s principal objective was not to deprive Rowena of her
liberty. We quote from the findings of the trial court:
xxx Caught by surprise, the complainant struggled to free herself from the hold of the accused and ran down the stairway, but in her haste she
stumbled and fell down. The accused followed her down; held her hair and left hand and dragged her upstairs to his room, while she shouted for
help. Once inside the room, the accused forced the complainant to undressed (sic) and then he kissed all the parts of her body. The complainant
tried to resist and in the process, she sustained a wound in her left arm and a knife wound in her right palm, Exhibit "F". The accused forced the
complainant to lie on a bed and placed himself on top of her and at the same time position his knees between her legs and forced them to separate.
After which he proceeded to rape her, and while doing so, he remarked to her, "Weng (complainant’s nickname), pasensiya ka na. Nakabato kasi
ako." (Please forgive me because I am high on drug[s]). He further told her that he would insert the knife he was holding in her vagina to enhance
his excitement. xxx Finally, at around 5:00 a.m., the police officer forced open the door and barged inside the room, and subdued the dumbfounded
accused who was then on top of the complainant. 21 (Emphasis supplied)
From this narration, it is clear that appellant’s real aim was to have carnal knowledge of Rowena. Appellant took Rowena no further than to his room
- which was only across the hall from Rowena’s room - where he immediately forced her to undress. In fact, appellant was so intent on raping her
that he was still naked and on top of her when the police broke into the room. 22 Taken together, these circumstances engender doubt that the
intention of appellant was to detain Rowena. The detention was merely incidental to the real objective of appellant.
It is true that appellant kept Rowena inside his room for more than an hour while the police tried to negotiate with him. However, this does not
constitute illegal detention in light of the fact that appellant was on top of Rowena raping her even while he was shouting at the police and other
people outside. This is borne out by Rowena’s testimony:
Q: Could you tell us what was the position of the accused when the policemen forcibly opened the door?
A: He was on top of me.
Q: For how long [did] the accused stayed (sic) on top of you?
A: Almost two hours from the very start.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant maintained this position until the police barged into the room and subdued him. 24 Given these facts, appellant is not liable for the crime of
serious illegal detention with rape.
However, appellant is still liable for the crime of rape. When the information charges a complex crime and the evidence fails to support one of the
component offenses, the defendant is still liable for the other offense supported by the evidence. 25 Thus, in People v. Oliva,26 the Court found Carlito
Oliva guilty of statutory rape even if the information charged him of kidnapping with rape.
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, provide:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. - Rape is Committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
xxx.
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court held that appellant, with the use of a knife, succeeded in raping Rowena in the early hours of 1 January 2000. The trial court found the
testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution witnesses "straightforward, convincing and believable" and supported by the evidence of the
injuries sustained by Rowena.27
The weighing of the testimonies of witnesses is best left to the trial court since it is in the best position to discharge that function. 28 The trial judge has
the advantage of personally observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses, an opportunity not available to an appellate court.29 Absent
compelling reasons, we will not disturb on appeal the trial court’s findings on the credibility of a witness.
The Public Attorney argues that Judge Laguio was biased against appellant, and that it was clear from the judge’s remarks that he had already
concluded that appellant was lying before appellant had finished presenting his evidence, to wit:
PROS GURAY:
Q: You mean to tell the court that the husband on December 31, 1999 in the evening he left the house?
A: After we have a drinking spree he left the house.
xxx
THE COURT:
Q: What time was that?
A: I cannot remember.
Q: Was it past 11:00?
A: I cannot remember the time.
Q: You do not know what time the husband left the house?
A: I cannot remember.
xxx
Q: But you said that it was around 10:30 when Rowena entered your room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So how did you know the time? [Y]ou h[a]ve a wristwatch?
A: In my room there was a wall clock.
Q: So you know that the husband of Rowena went out or left the house before 10:30?
A: Yes, sir. Before he left we were drinking together.
Q: Yes. And you said that it was after the two of you drank together that he left?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then you, went up in the room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how many minutes after you entered your room did Rowena entered (sic) your room?
A: 10:30 ho.
Q: Ilang minuto ang nakaraan pagpasok mo sa kuwarto mo na pinasok ka ni Rowena. Huwag ka ng magmamaangmaangan eh. Nagtatanga-
tangahan ka pa eh. O Ilang minuto ang lumipas? Hindi ka naman mukhang tanga eh. Mukha ka ngang intelihensiya eh.
A: Hindi ko na ho alam eh.
Q: Kaya nga huwag ka ng magtangatangahan. Pagkapasok mo sa kuwarto ilang minuto ang lumipas bago pumasok sa kuwarto mo si Rowena
A: 10 minutes, sir.
Q: That means that you knew that the husband of Rowena left the house before 10:30 p.m.?
A: (Witness cannot answer)
THE COURT:
Make it on record that the witness cannot answer. Alam mo yung mga taong nagsisinungaling ganyan hindi makasagot pag nakokorner. People who
tell a lie they cannot usually answer when they are cornered. I don’t think there is a need to further cross-examine this witness. 30 (Emphasis supplied)
Aside from these admittedly deplorable comments, the Court finds no other indications of partiality or bias in the records of the case. The subject
remarks were made after appellant was subjected to extensive direct and cross-examination. 31 The examination of appellant was no more rigorous
than that of Rowena’s, in which Judge Laguio also frequently intervened by posing clarificatory questions. The trial court did not prohibit appellant
from presenting additional evidence or witnesses, although appellant chose not to do so. At the request of appellant’s counsel, Judge Laguio ordered
a continuance for the defense to continue its presentation of evidence after appellant’s testimony. 32
Further, contradictions and inconsistencies marred appellant’s testimony. Appellant initially stated that at 1:00 o’clock in the morning on 1 January
2000 he was "helping in the house doing household chores like cleaning the plates and cleaning the house." 33 This conflicts with his narration that
Rowena entered his room at 10:30 o’clock in the evening on 31 December 1999 and stayed with him until the police arrived and kicked his door
open.34 Appellant also stated that he had never gone out with Rowena in the 5 years that he had worked for her husband. 35 However, appellant later
testified that he accompanied Rowena to her parents’ house in Bulacan in 1998, where they had sexual intercourse for the first time. 36 Likewise,
appellant originally claimed that he and Rowena had two sexual encounters in 1998 - once in Bulacan and 3 weeks afterwards in the house of
Rowena and her husband.37 He changed this later to many times, more than 20 times, and then to about 50 times in 1998. 38 Finally, appellant failed
in four instances to answer the questions propounded to him during cross-examination. 39
We stress that this does not excuse the assailed remarks of Judge Laguio. More circumspect conduct is expected from a judge of our courts. It is the
duty of all judges not only to be impartial but also to appear impartial. 40 In the future, Judge Laguio should adhere more closely to the rule that "a
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 41
Nevertheless, after a thorough review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the assailed Decision insofar as it found appellant
to have raped Rowena. The testimony of Rowena, corroborated by the results of the medical examination and the testimonies of other witnesses,
establish beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) appellant forcibly succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Rowena on 1 January 2000; and (2) that
appellant committed the crime with the use of a deadly weapon, a knife.
In contrast to appellant’s erratic testimony, Rowena was candid and steadfast in her claim that appellant raped her, thus:
Q: And what did you [do] after the accused uttered Ate Weng galit na sa iyo si Kuya Jun?
A: I opened the door and went out of our room and I asked Bernie Bakit hihingi ng pera si Kuya Jun mo may pera naman siya.
THE COURT:
Q: At that time where was the accused?
A: When I talked to him he was inside his room and all of the (sic) sudden he was at my back.
THE COURT:
Continue.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: And what did [he] do after that?
A: He placed his left arm around my neck and his right hand which was holding a knife (stop) and I saw his right hand holding a knife.
Q: And how did you react when the accused placed his left hand [on] your neck and you saw him holding a knife?
A: I was surprised. ("Nagulat po ako.")
Q: And what did you do?
A: And at the same time I pushed the left area of the accused and in the process I fell to the stairway all the way down.
Q: And what did the accused do after you fell down?
A: He immediately went down as he held my hair and my left arm and he dragged me upstairs.
Q: And to what place upstairs did the accused drag you?
A: To his room.
Q: By the way, how far is his room [from] your room?
A: The room of the accused is in front of my room.
xxx
Q: When he succeeded in dragging you inside his room what happened next?
A: He asked me to undress.
Q: And did you oblige?
A: He poked the knife he was holding at me and he threatened me. He threatened to kill me.
THE COURT:
Q: So what did you do?
A: I undressed.
Q: While he was poking his knife at you and threatening to kill you. What exactly [were] the words uttered by him?
A: Sige, maghubad ka. Kung hindi papatayin kita.
Q: And what was he doing with his knife while he was uttering those words?
A: He was poking his knife at the right rear side of my body.
Q: And how did you feel at that time?
A: I was very frightened. And I was trembling.
Q: Now, you said that he was poking a knife at your back. Did you sustain injuries?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you still have scars up to the present?
A: Yes, sir.
PROS. GURAY:
May I be allowed, Your Honor to (interrupted)
THE COURT:
We will have a lady staff to look [at] the scars. xxx (At this instance the court interpreter, Ma. Elena Arcenal, accompanied the complainant inside the
chambers of the presiding judge to take a look at the scars sustained by the complainant xxx)
xxx
THE COURT:
Later the court interpreter informed the court that the complainant [had] 2 scars, one is on the middle right side of her body and the other one is on
the upper left side of her back.
PROS. GURAY:
Upper right side.
THE COURT:
Yes, upper right side.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: Now, by the way when you fell on the stairs and you were grabbed by the accused did you shout?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you shout?
A: I shouted Jun, tulungan mo ako.
xxx
Q: xxx Now after you removed your dress what did the accused [do]?
A: He kissed all the parts of my body.
Q: And what did you do after that?
A: I struggled and resisted.
Q: What did the accused do?
A: I grappled with him for the possession of the knife he was holding.
Q: Were you able to grab possession of the knife?
A: I was able to hold it but in the course of our grappling my left arm sustained (stop) the handle of the knife forcefully hit the left portion of my arm.
(Witness showing to the court slight visible scar)
THE COURT:
Will the defense and the prosecution confirm the observation of the court?
ATTY. GARCIA:
Yes, Your Honor.
PROS. GURAY:
It is very apparent.
xxx
Q: You also mentioned that you also sustained injury on your right hand. What cause[d] the injury on your right hand?
A: Because I was able to get hold of the bladed portion of the knife and it sliced my right palm.
Q: By the way, will you please describe to the court the knife that was used by the accused in threatening or intimidating you?
A: The bladed portion of the knife is about 12 inches more or less and the handle is about 6 inches more or less.
xxx
Q: So when you were not successful in grappling the knife from the accused what did the accused do next?
A: He pulled my hair and slapped the back of my head.
Q: And what else did he do?
A: He dragged me and forced me to lie down on the double bed.

xxx
Q: And after he dragged you to the lower bed what else did you do?
A: Yung pong paa ko eh ginanoon niya po sa paa nya. Kinross niya po.
THE COURT:
Q: You mean doon sa pagitan ng ano mo!
A: Yuong d[a]lawa ko pong paa ginanyan nya po yung paa ko.
Q: Sige i-demonstrate mo.
A: Inangkla po.
Q: Kaya nga pinagitan nya yong sa paa niya sa side mo?
A: Hindi po. Ganito po. Yung paa niya ginanyan po niya.
Q: Kaya nga. Di nakabuka yung paa mo.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: Di ba nakabukhang ganyan?
THE COURT:
Oo.
PROS. GURAY:
Tapos yung paa niya nakaganoon.
A: Opo.
PROS. GURAY:
Pareho.
A: Opo.
PROS. GURAY:
I do that myself so I know. (Atty. Garcia laughs)
ATTY. GARCIA:
Very incriminating. (laughs)
THE COURT:
Witness demonstrating by opening her legs and then pointing out that the accused placed his left foot under the left leg of the complainant and then
locked it by raising his left leg of the accused and the same thing was done on her right leg.
THE COURT:
Q: So you were unable to move both your legs when the accused did that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at that juncture at that time you did not have anymore underwear?
A: I did not have anymore underwear.
xxx
PROS. GURAY:
xxx
Q: Now what did the accused do next after placing his two legs in between your legs?
A: He raped me.
Q: When you said he raped you, you mean his private parts were forced into your private part?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did you do when the accused inserted his penis into your private part?
A: I continued struggling and resisting but he poked the knife he was holding at the left side of my body. And I was so frightened.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: He did everything to me. He kissed me, he inserted his fingers in my sex organ. Everything.
THE COURT:
Q: After he satisfied his lust on you what did the accused do?
A: He did not allowed (sic) me to leave the room.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: What else did he do with that knife to you?
A: While he was in the act of raping me the accused at one time pointed the knife he was holding at my private part and he said that he would insert
it in my private part to get [a] thrill out of it because he was high on shabu. Because he could not have a complete or full erection because he was
under the influence of shabu ("Bato").
THE COURT:
Q: But despite the fact that he was not able to have a complete or full erection he succeeded in penetrating you with his sex organ?
A: Yes, sir.42
Rowena’s account of her resistance and struggle with appellant was consistent with the results of the physical examination. Dr. Mirasol Pangan, the
examining physician, testified on the gynecologic emergency sheet 43 of Rowena dated 1 January 2000 and discussed the findings, as follows:
Q: Could you tell us your findings on the victim?
A: There’s the hematoma at the right neck, two abrasions at the left lower lip approximately 0.5cm. There’s abrasion at the left for[e]arm, an abrasion
hematoma circular at the left lower arm, multiple abrasions at the volar aspect of the second ... fourth digits of right hand, under the nose, hematoma
at the back and the anterior tract the largest of which measured 6x1 cm. There’s a stab wound at the left forearm. In the examination of the genitalia,
there’s the two cms. hematoma at the right la[b]ia minora.
Q: How about the organ of the victim, did you ... (interrupted)
A: Yes, the last part I read was the genitalia, that referred to the organ of the victim, the right la[b]ia minora have two cms. abrasions hematoma. In
reference to the vagina, the cervix, the uterus and the ovary which have no significant findings.
xxx
Q: You have a note here at the lower portion of the report "Sexual and Physical abuse on the victim", was this your conclusion based on the physical
examination?
A: Based on the areas involved, the findings that we have, the arm and the trunk aside from the findings on the genital organ.
xxx
Q: Could normal intercourse cause such injuries to the organ of the victim without use of violence?
A: No, sir.
xxx
PROS. GURAY:
Q: xxx you stated, Doctor that the kind of injuries in the genitalia of the victim could not have been caused by a normal sexual intercourse. [M]y
question is, could it be the result of forceful and unwelcome penetration by a firm penis?
A: Yes, sir, it could be caused.
Q: It could be caused by a forceful thrust of a human finger?
A: Yes, sir, it could also be caused.44
Appellant’s claim that he and Rowena had consensual sex was contradicted not only by Rowena but also by neighbor Eldee Eusebio, who testified
that: (1) he heard Rowena scream for help; (2) he saw her trying to sandwich her feet against the door to keep the door to appellant’s room from
closing; and (3) appellant shouted "papatayin niya lahat ng tao sa loob" when he knocked on the door.45 Together with the physical injuries sustained
by Rowena - which appellant said he did not even notice 46 - these statements belie appellant’s assertion of consensual sex.
The sweetheart defense employed by appellant also deserves scant consideration. Aside from being inherently weak, it was uncorroborated by any
evidence other than the self-serving testimony of appellant. Appellant admitted that he had no notes, letters, gifts or any other item to show for an
affair that had allegedly been ongoing since 1998. 47
The Information specifically alleged the use of a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of the rape and the prosecution proved that appellant
used such a weapon. Under Article 266-B, the use of a deadly weapon qualifies the rape and the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since reclusion perpetua to death are two indivisible penalties, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code applies. Article 63 provides:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to
offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the
preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.
In rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the presence of an aggravating circumstance increases the penalty to death. 48 In the present case,
appellant raped Rowena in her dwelling, which is an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. 49 However, the
Information did not specifically allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. In People v. Gallego,50 the Court ruled that where the information did
not allege the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, dwelling could not raise the penalty to death. The Court held:
xxx The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference
between life and death in order for the Court to properly "exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties’ evidence." This, the accused can do only
if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged
in the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to take away life to
hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him. 51
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now require the complaint or information to state the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
attending an offense.52 When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can aggravate an offense, or circumstances that would attach to the
offense a greater penalty than that ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both alleged and proved to justify the imposition of the
increased penalty.53
Further, the circumstance of dwelling could not be considered in the present case even if it were properly alleged in the Information. Where the
offender resided in the same house as the victim when the offense was committed, dwelling could not be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.54 It is undisputed in this case that appellant was a "live-in" dog trainer and that he stayed in the Rianzares’ house in a room across
Rowena’s room. Therefore, the penalty imposable on appellant is reclusion perpetua.
A word on the examination of Rowena. A rape victim is physically, socially, psychologically and emotionally scarred, resulting in trauma which may
last a lifetime.55 It was thus highly inconsiderate for the prosecutor and the defense counsel to trade quips at the precise time Rowena was reliving
her harrowing experience.56 Courts are looked up to by people with high respect and are regarded as places where litigants are heard, rights and
conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.57 Levity has no place in the courtroom during the examination of a victim of rape, and particularly not
at her expense.
The trial court awarded moral and nominal damages but failed to award indemnity ex delicto. An award of indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a
finding of guilt in rape cases.58 We thus award P50,000 to Rowena as civil indemnity. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of moral
damages is reduced to P50,000. The award of nominal damages is deleted for lack of legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 16 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 00-179698, is MODIFIED.
Appellant LEONARDO NUGUID y MAYAO is adjudged guilty of RAPE, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
Rowena Rianzares P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Fourteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand nine.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9999
AN ACT PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to value the dignity of every human person and guarantee the rights of every
individual, particularly those who cannot afford the services of legal counsel.
Furthermore, it is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation
and free the people from poverty through policies and programs that provide adequate social services and improve the quality of life for all.
In addition, the State shall guarantee free legal assistance to the poor and ensure that every person who cannot afford the services of a counsel is
provided with a competent and independent counsel preferably of his/her own choice, if upon determination it appears that the party cannot afford
the services of a counsel, and that services of a counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and protect of the party.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As provided for in this Act, the term legal services to be performed by a lawyer refers to any activity which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experiences which shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of instruments and contracts, including appearance before the administrative and quasi-judicial offices, bodies and tribunals handling
cases in court, and other similar services as may be defined by the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional
partnership shall secure a certification from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the
Supreme Court indicating that the said legal services to be provided are within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and that the agencies
cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private counsel.
For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the
association and/or organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the necessary certification that said legal services were actually
undertaken.
The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other accredited association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing the tax deductions as provided for in this Act and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring.
Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined by
the Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the actual free
legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal profession, whichever is
lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid
services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No.
2012, issued by the Supreme Court.
Section 6. Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Campaign. - The DOJ, in cooperation with the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), is
hereby mandated to conduct an annual IEC campaign in order to inform the lawyers of the procedures and guidelines in availing tax deductions and
inform the general public that a free legal assistance to those who cannot afford counsel is being provided by the State. 1avvph!1
Section 7. Reportorial Requirement. - For purposes of determining the effectiveness and social impact of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall
submit an annual report to both Houses of Congress indicating therewith the number of parties who benefited from this Act.
The report shall state in detail, among others, the geographic location, demographic characteristics and socioeconomic profile of the beneficiaries of
this Act.
Section 8. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). - Within ninety (90) days from the date effectivity of this Act, the BIR shall formulate the
necessary revenue regulations for the proper implementation of the tax component as envisioned in this Act.
The Supreme Court shall formulate the necessary implementing rules and regulations with respect to the legal services covered under this Act and
the process of accreditation of organizations and/or associations which will provide free legal assistance.
Section 9. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other provisions not affected by such
declaration shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 10. Repealing Clause. - Any law, decree, ordinance or administrative circular not consistent with any provision of this Act is hereby
amended, repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 11. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Speaker of the House of Representatives President of the Senate
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2361 and House Bill No. 4301 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of the
Representatives on January 27, 2010 and January 26, 2010, respectively.
(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

Secretary General Secretary of Senate
House of Represenatives
Approved: FEB 23, 2010
(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6424 March 4, 2005
CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latter’s money or other property coming into the former’s possession should be deemed to be held in trust
and should not under any circumstance be commingled with the lawyers’ own; much less, used by them. Failure to observe these ethical principles
constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval, filed by Consorcia S. Rollon with the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on November 29, 2001. The Affidavit 1 submitted by complainant alleges the following:
"Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty. Camilo F. Naraval together with my son, Freddie Rollon, to seek his assistance
in a case filed against me before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6, Davao City entitled ‘Rosita Julaton vs. Consorcia S. Rollon’
for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment;
"After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining to the said case, Atty. Naraval agreed to be my lawyer and I was required to
pay the amount of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial service fee, which amount was paid by me on October
18, 2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’ to form part hereof;
"As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie, returned to his office the following week to make follow-up on said case. However,
I was informed later by my son Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case because the latter was so busy. Even after
several follow-ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still there was no action done on our case;
"Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to Atty. Naraval, because of the latter’s failure to comply with
our mutual agreement that he will assist me in the above-mentioned case;
"My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naraval’s office that same day to inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to withdraw the amount I have
paid and to retrieve my documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite our several follow-ups, Atty. Naraval always said that he
cannot return the documents because they were in their house, and that he could not give us back the amount we paid him (Php 8,000.00)
because he has no money;
"Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP President of Davao City and to
Atty. Pedro Castillo, the Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline;
x x x x x x x x x."
In an Order dated March 12, 2002,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor C. Fernandez, directed respondent to
submit his answer to the Complaint. The same directive was reiterated in the CBD’s May 31, 2002 Order 3 issued through Commissioner Jovy C.
Bernabe. Respondent did not file any answer despite his receipt of the Orders. 4
Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD proceeded with the investigation ex parte. Its Order 5 dated November 11, 2002, issued
through Commissioner Bernabe, required complainant to submit her position paper within ten days from receipt thereof, after which the case was to
be deemed submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainant’s Position Paper 6 on December 10, 2002.
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Report reads in part as follows:
"Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and
diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable x x x.
"In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent in misrepresenting to the complainant that he will render legal services to her,
and after receiving certain amount from the latter as payment for ‘filing fee and service fee’ did nothing in return, has caused unnecessary
dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect of the community to the legal profession, of which he swore to protect, has been
tarnished.
xxx xxx xxx
"In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by the respondent when he failed to properly appraised her of the status of her
case which she later on found to have become final and executory. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and the complainant
have been decided against the latter and which judgment has long become final and executory. However, despite full knowledge by the
respondent of such finality based on the documents furnished to him, respondent withheld such vital information and did not properly
appraise the complainant. Thus, respondent violated the mandate in Canon 15 x x x." 7
IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding the above-quoted Report. The Board
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years for violation of Rules 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the restitution of complainant’s P8,000.
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish to become their client. 8 They may decline
employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively or competently. 9 But once they agree to handle
a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. 10
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. 11 Every case
accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. 12 The Code of Professional Responsibility
clearly states:
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s
request for information.
Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently handle. 13 Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once
lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any less, then they fail their lawyer’s oath. 14
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial service fee, respondent failed to
render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated followups from her reveals his cavalier
attitude and appalling indifference toward his client’s cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated
demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had
likewise entrusted to him.
Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the merits and the status of the case.
Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final
and executory. But he withheld such vital information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as "filing and service fee" and thereby gave
her hope that her case would be acted upon.
Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of
merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of success is not
only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers. 15 If they find that their client’s cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the incontrovertible. 16 The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking
constitutes a violation of his duty to "observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients." 17
Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of complainant despite her repeated demands. His conduct was
clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to something that did not belong to him, and that he absolutely had no
right to keep or use.18
Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client’s money and property that may come into their possession. 19 As respondent obviously did nothing on
the case of complainant, the amount she had given -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by his law office -- was never applied to the filing fee. His
failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust she
had reposed in him.20 His failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.21
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts, 22 but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and
good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. 23 Respondent clearly fell short of the demands
required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this
Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public. 24 Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct
diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the profession. 25
WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he
is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, complainant’s eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest
thereon, at the rate of six percent per annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of
the Bar Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007
MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for
disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.
The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with violation of Article 209 2 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection
(BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant
claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their
conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth
certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It
was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary
actions against the latter. What, per complainant's account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board,
demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT 3 with the Ombudsman
charging her (complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, 4 falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two
charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further
stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information
she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's legal advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to file her answer to the complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,5 respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive
documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that
she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained
any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me legal
documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or
CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to
privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL
MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or
examine or accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the
matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also
filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover … where she has a child ….
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998, are all part of public records ….
Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the
CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC
ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came out with a Report and Recommendation, stating
that the information related by complainant to the respondent is "protected under the attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from this
postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she "[revealed] information given to her during a
legal consultation," and accordingly recommended that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for
revealing the secrets of the complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as follows:
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and , finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the actuation of revealing information given to
respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and
sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent
to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions
circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to
keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to
handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation.
Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v.
Magulta,6 -
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the
former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle
the case for which his service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the
non-payment of the former's fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. 7
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, the documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in
question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the
respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available.
Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score.
At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of
giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect in her handling of
information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act
complained of.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chief Justice), Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez,J., on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5128 March 31, 2005
ELESIO1 C. PORMENTO, SR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALIAS A. PONTEVEDRA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
In a verified Complaint2 dated August 7, 1999, Elesio C. Pormento, Sr. charged Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct, praying
that on the basis of the facts alleged therein, respondent be disbarred.
Complainant alleges that between 1964 and 1994, respondent is his family's legal counsel having represented him and members of his family in all
legal proceedings in which they are involved. Complainant also claims that his family's relationship with respondent extends beyond mere lawyer-
client relations as they gave respondent moral, spiritual, physical and financial support in his different endeavors. 3
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the rift between complainant and respondent began when complainant's counterclaim in Civil Case No.
1648 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City was dismissed. Complainant claims that respondent, who was his lawyer in the said case,
deliberately failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim despite receipt of the order of dismissal by the trial court, as a result of which,
complainant was deprived of his right to appeal said order. Complainant asserts that he only came to know of the existence of the trial court's order
when the adverse party in the said case extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage executed over the parcel of land which is the subject matter of the
suit. In order to recover his ownership over the said parcel of land, complainant was constrained to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to
institute an action for the recovery of the subject property. 4
Complainant also claims that in order to further protect his rights and interests over the said parcel of land, he was forced to initiate a criminal case
for qualified theft against the relatives of the alleged new owner of the said land. Respondent is the counsel of the accused in said case.
Complainant claims that as part of his defense in said criminal case, respondent utilized pieces of confidential information he obtained from
complainant while the latter is still his client.5
In a separate incident, complainant claims that in 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Escalante, Negros Occidental. The Deed of Declaration
of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property,
complainant alleges that he heeded respondent's advice to build a small house on the property and to allow his (complainant's) nephew and his
family to occupy the house in order for complainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently, complainant's nephew refused to
vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental, docketed as Civil
Case No. 528. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant's nephew. 6
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of malpractice and misconduct by representing clients with conflicting interests and should be
disbarred by reason thereof.7
In his Comment,8 respondent contends that he was never a direct recipient of any monetary support coming from the complainant. Respondent
denies complainant's allegation that he (respondent) did not inform complainant of the trial court's order dismissing the latter's counterclaim in Civil
Case No. 1648. Respondent claims that within two days upon his receipt of the trial court's order of dismissal, he delivered to complainant a copy of
the said order, apprising him of its contents. As to his representation of the persons against whom complainant filed criminal cases for
theft,9 respondent argues that he honestly believes that there exists no conflict between his present and former clients' interests as the cases he
handled for these clients are separate and distinct from each other. He further contends that he took up the cause of the accused in the criminal
cases filed by complainant for humanitarian considerations since said accused are poor and needy and because there is a dearth of lawyers in their
community. With respect to the case for ejectment filed by complainant against his nephew, respondent admits that it was he who notarized the deed
of sale of the parcel of land sold to complainant. However, he contends that what is being contested in the said case is not the ownership of the
subject land but the ownership of the house built on the said land. 10
On December 21, 1999, complainant filed a Reply to respondent's Comment. 11
On January 19, 2000, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.12
On February 18, 2002, respondent filed a Rejoinder to complainant's Reply adding that the instant complaint was orchestrated by complainant's son
who wanted political vengeance because he lost the vice-mayoralty post to respondent during the 1988 local elections. 13
On February 20, 2002, complainant filed a Sur-Rejoinder to respondent's Rejoinder. 14
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective Position Papers, 15 after which the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
In his Report and Recommendation dated February 20, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga found respondent guilty of violating
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of suspension for one
month.
In a minute Resolution passed on July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to annul and set aside the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and instead approved the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-387

Adm. Case No. 5128
Elesio C. Pormento, Sr., vs. Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDED [sic], as it is hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commission, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit of the complaint.
We do not agree with the dismissal of the complaint.
At the outset, we reiterate the settled rule that in complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be
dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons. 16 Formal investigations entail notice and hearing. However, the requirements of notice and
hearing in administrative cases do not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only
for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. 17 Due process is fulfilled when
the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments. 18
From the records extant in the present case, it appears that the Investigating Commissioner conducted a hearing on January 16, 2002 where it was
agreed that the complainant and the respondent shall file their respective position papers, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.19 No further hearings were conducted.
It is also disturbing to note that the abovementioned Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, annulling and setting aside the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, is bereft of any findings of facts or explanation as to how and why it resolved to set aside the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and instead dismissed the complaint against respondent.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cruz vs. Cabrera,20 we reiterated the importance of the requirement that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors must state the facts and the
reasons on which such decision is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record. We held therein that:
[A]side from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings with which they
are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors
in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.
Noncompliance with this requirement would normally result in the remand of the case. 21
Moreover, while we may consider the act of the IBP Board of Governors in simply adopting the report of the Investigating Commissioner as
substantial compliance with said Rule, in this case, we cannot countenance the act of the IBP Board of Governors in merely stating that it is annulling
the Commissioner's recommendation and then dismiss the complaint without stating the facts and the reasons for said dismissal.
However, considering that the present controversy has been pending resolution for quite some time, that no further factual determination is required,
and the issues being raised may be determined on the basis of the numerous pleadings filed together with the annexes attached thereto, we resolve
to proceed and decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings on record, in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of the case. 22
Coming to the main issue in the present case, respondent is being accused of malpractice and misconduct on three grounds: first, for representing
interests which conflict with those of his former client, herein complainant; second, for taking advantage of the information and knowledge that he
obtained from complainant; and, third, for not notifying complainant of the dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648.
We shall concurrently discuss the first and second grounds as they are interrelated.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
Corollary to this, Canon 21 of the same Code enjoins a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated. Rule 21.02, Canon 21 specifically requires that:
A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his
own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
In addition, Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest
in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence
has been reposed.
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do
anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. 23 Another test to determine if there is a representation of
conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. 24
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related,
directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. 25 Conversely, he may properly act as
counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there
being in that instance no conflict of interests.26 Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyer's new client and his former
client is in some way connected with that of the former client's action, the lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously
opposed as counsel for the former client or to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel. 27 As we have held in Maturan vs.
Gonzales:28
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A
lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as
the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage
of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by
the loss thereof.29
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general
matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. 30 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the
client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 31
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent represented herein complainant's nephew and other members of his family in
the ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 528, and in the criminal complaint, denominated as I.S. Case No. 99-188, filed by herein
complainant against them. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the parcel of land purchased by complainant, is that he
was the one who notarized the deed of sale of the said land. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent obtained any
information from herein complainant that can be used to the detriment of the latter in the ejectment case he filed.
While complainant alleges that it was respondent who advised him to allow his nephew to temporarily occupy the property in order to establish
complainant's possession of said property as against another claimant, no corroborating evidence was presented to prove this allegation. Defendant,
in his answer to the complaint for ejectment, raised the issue as to the right of the vendor to sell the said land in favor of complainant. 32 However, we
find this immaterial because what is actually in issue in the ejectment case is not the ownership of the subject lot but the ownership of the house built
on the said lot. Furthermore, the subject matter of I.S. Case No. 99-188 filed by complainant against his nephew and other members of his family
involves several parts of trucks owned by herein complainant. 33 This case is not in any way connected with the controversy involving said parcel of
land. In fine, with respect to Civil Case No. 528 and I.S. Case No. 99-188, complainant failed to present substantial evidence to hold respondent
liable for violating the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests.
However, we find conflict of interests in respondent's representation of herein complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 and his subsequent employment
as counsel of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.
The subject matter in Civil Case No. 1648 is Lot 609 located at Escalante, Negros Occidental, the same parcel of land involved in Criminal Case No.
3159 filed by herein complainant against several persons, accusing them of theft for allegedly cutting and stealing coconut trees within the premises
of the said lot. Complainant contends that it is in this criminal case that respondent used confidential information which the latter obtained from the
former in Civil Case No. 1648.
To prove his contention, complainant submitted in evidence portions of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during his cross-examination in
Criminal Case No. 3159. However, after a reading of the said transcript, we find no direct evidence to prove that respondent took advantage of any
information that he may have been acquired from complainant and used the same in the defense of his clients in Criminal Case No. 3159. The
matter discussed by respondent when he cross-examined complainant is the ownership of Lot 609 in its entirety, only a portion of which was
purportedly sold to complainant. Part of the defense raised by his clients is that herein complainant does not have the personality to file the criminal
complaint as he is not the owner of the lot where the supposed theft occurred. It is possible that the information as to the ownership of the disputed
lot used by respondent in bringing up this issue may have been obtained while he still acted as counsel for complainant. It is also probable that such
information may have been taken from other sources, like the Registry of Deeds, the Land Registration Authority or the respondent's clients
themselves.
Nonetheless, be that as it may, it cannot be denied that when respondent was the counsel of complainant in Civil Case No. 1648, he became privy to
the documents and information that complainant possessed with respect to the said parcel of land. Hence, whatever may be said as to whether or
not respondent utilized against complainant any information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship
should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the opposing side. As we have previously held:
The relations of attorney and client is [are] founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the
rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.34
Moreover, we have held in Hilado vs. David35 that:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of
the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause.36
Thus, respondent should have declined employment in Criminal Case No. 3159 so as to avoid suspicion that he used in the criminal action any
information he may have acquired in Civil Case No. 1648.
Moreover, nothing on record would show that respondent fully apprised complainant and his new clients and secured or at least tried to secure their
consent when he took the defense of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.
Respondent contends that he handled the defense of the accused in the subject criminal case for humanitarian reasons and with the honest belief
that there exists no conflict of interests. However, the rule is settled that the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although
the attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith. 37 Moreover, the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely
probable does not make the prohibition inoperative. 38
Respondent also asserts that when he accepted employment in Criminal Case No. 3159, the attorney-client relations between him and complainant
in Civil Case No. 1648 had already been terminated. This defense does not hold water because the termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. 39
Thus, we find respondent guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
As to the third ground, we find that complainant failed to present substantial evidence to prove that respondent did not inform him of the dismissal of
his counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648. On the contrary, we find sufficient evidence to prove that complainant has been properly notified of the trial
court's order of dismissal. The only proof presented by complainant to support his claim is the affidavit of his daughter confirming complainant's
contention that respondent indeed failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim. 40 However, in the same affidavit, complainant's daughter
admits that it was on December 4, 1989 that respondent received the order of the trial court dismissing complainant's counterclaim. Respondent,
presented a "certification" dated December 11, 1989, or one week after his receipt of the trial court's order, where complainant's daughter
acknowledged receipt of the entire records of Civil Case No. 1648 from complainant. 41 The same "certification" relieved respondent of his obligation
as counsel of complainant. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that respondent duly notified complainant of the dismissal of his counterclaim.
Otherwise, complainant could not have ordered his daughter to withdraw the records of his case from respondent at the same time relieving the latter
of responsibility arising from his obligation as complainant's counsel in that particular case.
As to the penalty to be imposed, considering respondent's honest belief that there is no conflict of interests in handling Civil Case No. 1648 and
Criminal Case No. 3159, and it appearing that this is respondent's first infraction of this nature, we find the penalty of suspension to be
disproportionate to the offense committed.42 Moreover, we take into account respondent's undisputed claim that there are only three lawyers who are
actually engaged in private practice in Escalante, Negros Occidental, where both complainant and respondent reside. One of the lawyers is already
handling complainant's case, while the other lawyer is believed by respondent's clients to be a relative of complainant. Hence, respondent's clients
believed that they had no choice but go to him for help. We do not find this situation as an excuse for respondent to accept employment because he
could have referred his clients to the resident lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office or to other lawyers in the neighboring towns. Nonetheless, in view
of respondent's belief that he simply adhered to his sworn duty to defend the poor and the needy, we consider such situation as a circumstance that
mitigates his liability. Considering the foregoing facts and circumstances, we find it proper to impose a fine on respondent. In Sibulo vs.
Cabrera,43 the respondent is fined for having been found guilty of unethical conduct in representing two conflicting interests.
Respondent is further reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety
including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar,
especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 44
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to be heedful of the requirements provided for in Section 12(a), Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court as discussed in the text of herein decision.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[A.C. NO. 6632 : August 2, 2005]
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS, Complainant, v. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Representing conflicting interests is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Unless all the affected clients' written consent is given
after a full disclosure of all relevant facts, attorneys guilty of representing conflicting interests shall as a rule be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a sworn Letter-Complaint 1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) by Ben A. Nicolas, acting for himself and on behalf of Northwestern University, Inc. In that Letter-Complaint, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo was
charged with deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by representing conflicting interests. The material
averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows:
"Herein [c]omplainants, Northwestern University, Inc. and Mr. Ben A. Nicolas, accuses (sic) herein [r]espondent, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, of
engaging in conflicting interest in a case before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando, La
Union.
"Complainant alleges that in a consolidated case, herein [r]espondent appeared and acted as counsels for both complainants (eight out of the
eighteen complainants therein) and respondent (one out of the ten respondents therein).
"In a consolidation of NLRC Cases [Nos.] 1-05-1086-97, 1-05-1087-97, 1-05-1088-97, 1-05-1091-97, 1-05-1092-97, 1-05-1097-97, 1-05-1109-97, 1-
05-1096-97 ("consolidated cases"), herein [r]espondent appeared as counsel for complainants therein, Teresita A. Velasco, Gervacio A. Velasco,
Mariel S. Hernando, Virginio C. Rasos, Bonifacio S. Blas, Ronald A. Daoang, Luzviminda T. Urcio and Araceli Quimoyog. In the very same
consolidated case, [r]espondent was also the counsel of one of the respondents therein, Jose G. Castro.
"Complainants, as their evidence, submitted the Motion to Dismiss dated August 12, 1997 filed by Jose G. Castro, represented by his counsel,
herein [r]espondent filed before the NLRC of San Fernando, La Union. Sixteen (16) days later or on August 28, 1997, [r]espondent filed
a Complainant's Consolidated Position Paper, this time representing some of the complainants in the very same consolidated case."2 (Citations
omitted) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent failed to file his Answer to the Complaint despite a June 24 1998 Order 3 of the IBP-CBD directing him to do so. Even after receiving five
notices, he failed to appear in any of the scheduled hearings. Consequently, he was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the
proceedings. Thereafter, the complainants were ordered to submit their verified position paper with supporting documents, after which the case was
to be deemed submitted for decision.4 In their Manifestation5 dated August 30, 2004, they said that they would no longer file a position paper. They
agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their Letter-Affidavit dated March 16, 1998, together with all the accompanying documents.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his Report,6 Commissioner Dennis B. Funa found respondent guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, the former recommended the latter's suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-415 dated October 7, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Funa, with the modification that the period of suspension was increased to two (2) years.
On December 12, 2004, the Resolution and the records of the case were transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court. On January 20, 2005, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2004-415. The IBP
denied the Motion.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the recommended period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their
clients.7 Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients' written consent, given after a full
disclosure of the facts.8
When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests:
(1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2)
when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a
new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of an attorney's duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance of that duty. 9
In the present case, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, as counsel for Respondent Jose C. Castro in NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1083-97 to I-05-1109-97, filed a
Motion to Dismiss those cases. Shortly thereafter, a position paper was filed by Atty. Arquillo as counsel for several complainants in consolidated
NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1087-97, I-05-1088-97, I-05-1091-97, I-05-1092-97, I-05-1096-97, I-05-1097-97, and I-05-1109-97. All the cases in the second
set were included in the first one, for which he had filed the subject Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, in his position paper for the complainants, Atty.
Arquillo protected his other client, Respondent Jose C. Castro, in these words:
"3. More than lack of valid cause for the dismissal of complainants, respondents, except Atty. Jose C. Castro and Atty. Ernesto B. Asuncion, should
be made accountable for not according complainants their right to due process." 10
In his two-page Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Arquillo claims that there was no conflict of interest in his representation of both the respondent and
the complainants in the same consolidated cases, because all of them were allegedly on the same side. Attaching to the Motion the Decision of
Labor Arbiter Norma C. Olegario on the consolidated NLRC cases, Atty. Arquillo theorizes that her judgment absolved Castro of personal liability for
the illegal dismissal of the complainants; this fact allegedly showed that there was no conflict in the interests of all the parties concerned.
This Court does not agree. Atty. Arquillo's acts cannot be justified by the fact that, in the end, Castro was proven to be not personally liable for the
claims of the dismissed employees. Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that there was an
obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed employees
were the complainants in the same cases in which Castro was one of the respondents. Indeed, Commissioner Funa correctly enounced:
"As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had the duty to oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed by Jose G. Castro. But under the circumstance, it
would be impossible since [r]espondent is also the counsel of Jose G. Castro. And it appears that it was [r]espondent who prepared the Motion to
Dismiss, which he should be opposing [a]s counsel of Jose G. Castro, Respondent had the duty to prove the Complaint wrong. But Respondent
cannot do this because he is the counsel for the complainants. Here lies the inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very clear.
"Thus it has been noted
'The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with vigor and zeal, the client's claim against the other and to properly represent the latter in
the unrelated action, or, if he can do so, he cannot avoid being suspected by the defeated client of disloyalty or partiality in favor of the successful
client. The foregoing considerations will strongly tend to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those special elements which make it one of
trust and confidence[.]' (Legal Ethics, Agpalo, p. 230, 4th ed.; In re De la Rosa, 21 Phil. 258) "11
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyer's representation of both sides of an
issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such
conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith. 12
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. Considering, however, prior rulings
in cases also involving attorneys representing conflicting interests, we reduce the suspension to one (1) year. 13
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5858 December 11, 2003
ROGELIO R. SANTOS, SR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO C. BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment1 filed by Rogelio R. Santos, Sr. against Atty. Rodolfo C. Beltran on the grounds of gross
misconduct and malpractice.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Spouses Filomeno Santiago Santos, Sr. and Benita Roxas Rodriguez had ten children, namely, Romeo, Filomeno, Jr., Arturo, Erlinda, Ma. Alicia,
Arcely, Renato, Alberto and Benito and complainant Rogelio Santos, Sr. After the death of Filomeno, Benita donated their two residential lots
situated at 11 Javier Baritan, Malabon, Metro Manila, consisting of 489 and 333.4 square meters, respectively, and covered by Transfer Certificates
of Titles (TCT) Nos. R-18060 and R-18061, including the ancestral house situated thereon, in favor of the nine children, except complainant.
Respondent lawyer notarized the Deed of Donation.2
Benita Rodriguez died. Complainant and his brother, Alberto, were appointed administrators 3 in the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the
spouses’ estate, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 516-AF, entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Spouses Filomeno Santiago Santos, Sr. and
Benita Roxas Rodriguez, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 thereof.
On November 9, 1999, complainant filed a verified complaint against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), alleging that when respondent notarized the subject Deed of Donation, his siblings did not personally appear before
him.4 Complainant submitted the affidavit executed by Benito and Renato attesting to the fact that they signed the Deed of Donation not in the law
office of the respondent but in their houses at Villa Benita Subdivision. The Deed also showed that his siblings secured their Community Tax
Certificates twenty-two days after the execution of the Deed of Donation, or on September 9, 1994. Complainant contended that respondent
notarized the Deed of Donation in disregard of Article 9045 of the Civil Code. Moreover, he argued that his siblings were American citizens who were
thus disqualified from owning real properties in the Philippines.
Complainant further alleged that respondent appeared as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 73560 for falsification of public document, which
he filed against Renato and Benito, without being engaged by him or authorized by the court; that respondent represented conflicting interest when
he entered his appearance as defense counsel in an ejectment case in which his former client, Erlinda R. Santos-Crawford, was the plaintiff; and that
respondent, through insidious machination acquired the titles of two residential lots at Villa Benita Subdivision owned by Spouses Filomeno and
Benita Santos.
Respondent denied the allegations. He confirmed the due execution of the Deed of Donation and submitted in support thereof the affidavit executed
by Mely Lachica, the secretary of his law office. In her Affidavit, Lachica categorically stated that she caused all parties to sign the Deed. She,
nevertheless admitted that she forgot to change the date of the execution of the Deed from August 18, 1994 to September 9, 1994 when all the
parties had secured their CTCs.6
Respondent argued that complainant’s siblings may still acquire properties in the Philippines through hereditary succession even though they were
already American citizens. The certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation were not conclusive proof of the arrival and
departure of his siblings considering that there were many ports of entry in the country. Respondent also declared that complainant humiliated his
mother when, in his presence and that of his siblings, complainant uttered the unsavory Tagalog words, " Putang ina mo matanda ka, walanghiya ka,
walang pinagkatandaan dapat mamatay ka na."7
Respondent denied having represented complainant in Criminal Case No. 73560 on December 15, 1999 when he appeared as private prosecutor.
He explained that complainant filed a complaint for falsification of public document against him and his nine siblings, docketed as I.S. No. 04-99-
3187, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, relying on the affidavit executed by Benito and Renato that they signed the Deed
of Donation in their houses at Villa Benita and not at respondent’s office. The prosecutor dismissed the complaint. A second action for falsification of
public document was filed by complainant against Renato and Benito, docketed as Criminal Case No. 73560. Respondent appeared at one of the
hearings of the said case to defend himself from the accusation of Benito and Renato. Respondent emphasized that he did not ask for any
compensation from complainant for that isolated appearance.
Respondent denied having acquired any property under litigation. On February 16, 1999, he bought 8 two parcels of land inside Villa Benita
Subdivision, covered by TCT Nos. T-50223 and 50225, from a corporation owned by the Santoses, Fabern’s Inc., and not from Spouses Filomeno
and Benita Santos, as claimed by complainant. He was surprised when sometime in August 2002, complainant caused the annotation on the said
titles of an adverse claim that the properties belonged to the estate of Spouses Filomeno and Benita Santos. Complainant relied on the Contract of
Development dated May 10, 1995 which Fabern’s Inc. executed in favor of Villa Benita Management and Development Corporation where
respondent was one of the directors.
Respondent admitted having represented Erlinda R. Santos-Crawford in Civil Case No. 12105 for ejectment, entitled " Erlinda R. Santos-Crawford v.
Renato R. Santos and Rogelio R. Santos, Sr.,"9 involving a land covered by TCT No. T-10168 at No. 1 F. S. Avenue, Villa Benita Subdivision,
Cabanatuan City and the improvements thereon. He also acted as defense counsel of Evalyn Valino, Norberto Valino and Danilo Agsaway in Civil
Case No. 1482310 for ejectment filed by Rogelio Santos on behalf of Erlinda R. Santos involving the same property. He emphasized that the decision
in Civil Case No. 12105 had long been executed, thus the attorney-client relationship between him and Erlinda Santos-Crawford was also
terminated.
On July 19, 2002, the IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violating his notarial commission and recommended that his commission be suspended
for a period of one year.11
The Board of Governors, in Resolution No. CBD Case No. 99-670, modified the recommendation, thus:
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/ Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondent’s violation of his notarial
obligation, Respondent’s Commission as Notary Public is hereby SUSPENDED, with DISQUALIFICATION from being appointed as Notary Public for
two (2) years from notice of final decision.12
On October 11, 2002, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated Resolution, which was denied by the Board on December 14,
2002 on the ground that it has lost jurisdiction thereof upon its endorsement to this Court. 13
In essence, complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent for allegedly notarizing a Deed of Donation without the affiants personally
appearing before him. Indeed, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar. 14 Corollary thereto, gross
misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction
of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." 15
The rule is that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. 16 In the instant case, complainant failed to controvert the said
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Instead, the quantum of evidence shows that complainant’s siblings appeared before the respondent
as notary public and in fact, signed the deed. The claim of Renato and Benito Santos in their affidavit that they did not sign the document in the law
office of the respondent but in their houses at Villa Benita is admissible only against them. 17 Likewise, we find the allegation of the complainant that it
was physically impossible for his siblings to sign the document untenable. The certifications issued by the BID that the complainant’s siblings were
absent at the time of the execution of the Deed of Donation is not absolute. There are many ports of entry which complainant’s siblings may have
used in coming into the country.1âwphi1 The possibility that complainant’s siblings executed and signed the Deed is not remote. The discrepancy in
the date stamped in the Deed and the date when complainant’s siblings obtained their CTCs had been substantially explained in the affidavit
executed by the secretary of the law office, Mely Lachica.
The allegation that respondent represented complainant in Criminal Case No. 73569 without being retained or authorized by the court is also
untenable. Respondent adequately explained his isolated appearance at one of the hearings. The transcript of stenographic notes shows that
respondent himself was in doubt as to the nature of his appearance in the case. In entering his appearance as private prosecutor, he did not intend
to represent complainant but only to defend himself from the accusation of Benito and Renato that he notarized the Deed of Donation in their
absence. This was patent in the transcript of stenographic notes wherein he admitted that he himself was in doubt as to his position. We are not
persuaded by complainant who tried to insinuate that it was unethical for the respondent to represent him. 1âwphi1
Anent the charge that respondent acquired properties under litigation in violation of Article 1491 18 of the Civil Code, records show that respondent
acquired the property from Fabern’s Inc., and not from Spouses Filemon and Benita Santos. Complainant’s allegation that respondent as director of
Villa Benita Management and Development Corporation fraudulently caused the transfer of titles of properties, specifically parcels of lands owned by
the family corporation, Fabern’s Inc., by executing a management and development contract, lacks basis. Respondent may not be held accountable
based on mere allegation that through insidious machinations he deprived Spouses Filomeno and Benita Santos, now their estate, of the properties.
Surmises, suspicion and conjectures are not bases of culpability.
Lastly, complainant indicted respondent for representing conflicting interest in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. 19
In the case at bar, Civil Case No. 12105 for ejectment was filed by Arcely Y. Santos in behalf of Erlinda Santos-Crawford against complainant and
Renato Santos. Respondent, however appeared as counsel for Evalyn Valino, Norberto Valino and Danilo Agsaway in Civil Case No. 14823 for
ejectment filed by complainant as attorney-in-fact of Erlinda Santos-Crawford. Civil Case No. 14823, although litigated by complainant, was actually
brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of Erlinda Santos-Crawford. Respondent’s act of representing the parties against whom his other
client, Erlinda Santos-Crawford, filed suit constituted conflict of interest. 20
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Beltran is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year effective immediately. Respondent is further STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate
it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the
prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the
former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential
Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-
Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and
control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by
recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the
case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and
threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor.
Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February
1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition
against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which
was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts
that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out
that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and
filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate her from the
charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came
to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims
he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that
respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent
claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-
examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for
representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not
prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent’s asking, intended as token
consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of
interest’. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat
employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed
and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the
case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP
Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding
respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law
while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the
practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240.
A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint ). Herein
Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office,
supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of
Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related
with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid
salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to " maintain inviolate the client’s
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule,
91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten,
however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S.
No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-
related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and
Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and
1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its
management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and
for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those
acts that are characteristic of the legal profession ( In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application
of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience ( PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence
insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition
against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court
finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or
Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus
bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent
conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the
facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the
statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In
essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat
employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly,
respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his
former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect
to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that
respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government
prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a
former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the
Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to
1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as
long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the
term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts
he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated
the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also
constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of
RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law
profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public. 54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for
six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5580, July 31, 2018
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AS REPRESENTED BY REBECCA V. LABRADOR, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO B.

ROMANILLOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the Letter1 dated April 21, 2014, filed by respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos who seeks judicial clemency in order to be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that respondent was administratively charged by complainant San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. for representing conflicting
interests and for using the title "Judge"2 despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct in the consolidated cases of Zarate v.
Judge Romanillos.3
The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:

In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC)
in a case[, docketed as HSRC Case No. REM-021082-0822 (NHA-80-309),] against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer's Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI
submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.
While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAI's conformity to construct a school
building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano.
When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of
Montealegre. Petitioner's Board of Directors terminated respondent's services as counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the association.
Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled " San Jose Homeowners,
Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc." filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against
respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783.
In her Report dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:
... Respondent failed to observe [the] candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the Montealegre case was adverse to the
Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active board member but its corporate secretary having access to all its documents
confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the implementation of the writ of execution against its developer and owner, Durano and Co.[,]
Inc.
Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co.[,] Inc., Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest
between the latter and the Complainant became so revealing and yet Respondent proceeded to represent the former.
...
For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasn't controverted by the Complainant which was his first offense; Respondent
must be given the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject to the condition that should he commit the same in the future; severe penalty will be
imposed upon him.4
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that respondent should observe extra care and
diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold the dignity and integrity beyond reproach.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which [the Court] noted in
[its] [R]esolution dated March 8, 1999.
Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of Appeals 5 and the Court6 and even
moved for the execution of the decision.
Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged
deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge" although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.
Respondent used the title "Judge" in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was erected in several areas within the San Jose
Subdivision sometime in October 2001.
In his Comment and Explanation,7 respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner despite the March
8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the second disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a rehash of the
first disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the title " Judge[,]" respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition, he
had ceased to attach the title to his name.8 (Italics supplied)
In a Decision9 dated June 15, 2005, the Court found merit in the complaint, and thus, held respondent guilty of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as
Rule 1.01, 3.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment from the practice of law:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a
copy of this Decision be entered in respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court En Banc ruled in this wise:
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent's continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of
opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of
violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was
exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondent's continued use of the title " Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal
services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public
into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.
Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where
he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned.
In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. We ruled thus:
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Rornanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity
and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds,
tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case. ... Consequently, we are now precluded from dismissing respondent from the service.
Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before the case could be
resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it was held that the rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an administrative
case renders the case moot and academic, is not a hard and fast rule. ...
ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave and serious misconduct which would have
warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case, and it appearing that respondent has yet to apply for
his retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the penalties imposed in Valenzuela ( supra), hereby orders the
FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE
to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or
corporations.
SO ORDERED.11
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled with
prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies
or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title "Judge" is one of such privileges.
xxxx
This is not respondent's first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal profession. He was stripped of his retirement benefits and
other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.12 In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his previous infractions,
respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue
disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the
trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted. 13 (Additional emphasis and italics
supplied)
Aggrieved, respondent filed on July 16, 2005 a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Plea for Human Compassion, 14 praying that the penalty imposed
be reduced from disbarment to suspension for three (3) to six (6) months. The Court denied the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution15 dated August 23, 2005.
On April 16, 2006, respondent wrote a letter 16 addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court, begging that compassion,
mercy, and understanding be bestowed upon him by the Court and that his disbarment be lifted. The same was, however, denied in a
Resolution17 dated June 20, 2006.
Unperturbed, respondent wrote letters dated June 12, 2007 18 and January 17, 201019 addressed to the Court, praying for the Court's understanding,
kindness and compassion to grant his reinstatement as a lawyer. The aforementioned letters were denied for lack of merit in Resolutions dated
August 14, 200720 and May 31, 201121 respectively.
Almost nine (9) years from his disbarment, or on April 21, 2014, respondent filed the instant Letter once more praying for the Court to reinstate him in
the Roll of Attorneys.
In a Resolution22 dated June 25, 2014, the Court referred the aforementioned letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report
and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation23 dated November 18, 2016 submitted by the OBC, the Court, in a Resolution 24 dated January 10, 2017,
directed respondent to show proof that he is worthy of being reinstated to the Philippine Bar by submitting pieces of documentary and/or testimonial
evidence, including but not limited to letters and attestations from reputable members of the society, all vouching for his good moral character.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated January 10, 2017, respondent submitted forty (40) letters from people, all vouching for his good
moral character:
Date of Relationship to
Name Testimony/ies in favor of respondent
Letter respondent
March 7, Respondent is a person of good moral character
1) Jaime B. Trinidad Friend
201725 since 1990.
2) Teodoro Adriatico Dominguez
(Marketing Director, Philippines & Sea Ayerst Philippines,
Ayerst International; Director, Senior Citizens Assn. of Bgy.
March 9, Respondent is kind, friendly, very approachable,
BF; Past Coordinator, Member of the Lay Ministers Tennis buddy
201726 quick to help with free legal advice/counsel.
Resurrection of Our Lord Parish, BFHP; Past Grand Knight,
F. Navigator, Dist. Deputy Knights of Columbus Council
7147; U.P. Pan Xenia; and UTOPIA, Ateneo)
March 20, Respondent graciously rendered free legal advice to
3) Carolina L. Nielsen Neighbor
201727 her and her family.
After his disbarment, respondent dedicated his life
to taking care of his sick wife, who eventually died a
few years after.
4) Arnaldo C. Cuasay Undated28 Brother-in-law Respondent also provided support to his children's
education and other needs as well as helping
relatives and friends. Respondent also provided
community services in Muntinlupa and his
hometown in Cebu.
5) Atty. Manuel Lasema, Jr.
Respondent served as a former president of the Las
(Founder, Former Chairman and President, Las Piñas City
Piñas City Bar Association.
Bar Association, Inc.; Former Director, Secretary and Vice March 28,
Colleague
President, IBP PPLLM Chapter; Former Professor of Law, 201729
Respondent implemented various seminars,
FEU Institute of Law; Third Placer, 1984 Bar Examinations;
dialogues and other Bar activities.
and Partner, Lasema Cueva-Mercader Law Offices)
Respondent is the adviser of the PBT. Respondent
advised PBT Board members regarding urgent
problems affecting company operations.
6) Patricia C. Sison and Marie Louise Kahn Magsaysay
Undated
(Chairman) and President, Philipine Ballet Theatre, Inc. Clients
Statement30 Respondent also provided PBT with appropriate
(PBT)
guidelines regarding the manner in which they
should conduct their duties affecting PBT's legal
and financial obligations.
7) Francisco C. Cornejo March 24, Friend Respondent is a person of good moral character,
(President, U.P. Alumni Association) 201731 especially in his business dealings.

8) Dr. Artemio I. Panganiban, Jr. March 9, Respondent is a person of good moral character
Friend
(President, Professional Academy of the Philippines) 201732 since 1968.
Respondent and Magpantay served together in the
9) Dean Dionisio G. Magpantay Federation of Homeowners Association Executive
March 20,
(Chairman and President, Asian+ Council of Leaders, Colleague Board in the mid and end of the 1990s, and in their
201733
Administrators, Deans and Educators in Business) Church and community service with the Knights of
Columbus in mid 2000, until the present.
10) Maximo A. Ricohermoso
Respondent is a fellow Rotarian at the Rotary Club
(President, Rotary Club of Mandaue North; and Chairman, March 10,
Colleague of Mandaue North, Mandaue City, Cebu, since the
Seaweed Industry Association of the Philippines, Inc.) 201734
early 1980s.

11) Arsenio M. Bartolome III
March 8, Respondent helps his PWD brother-in-law, Mr.
(First Chairman/President, Bases Conversion Development Colleague
201735 Manuel H. Reyes, in his business transactions.
Authority; and Former President, Philippine National Bank)
Respondent was his co-employee in the Legal
Department of FNCB Finance.
12) Rodigilio M. Oriino March 13,
Co-employee
(Former President, Rotary Club of Uptown Manila) 201736 Respondent has not done any wrong doing that will
affect his good moral character and profession as a
lawyer.
13) Epimaco M. Densing, Jr.
(Former Chapter President, Philippine Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Cagayan de Oro Chapter; Charter
Respondent is a friend for over 20 years, whom he
Chapter President, Government Association of CPAs, Cebu Undated37 Friend
knows as a person of good moral character.
Chapter; and Former Chapter Head, Brotherhood of
Christian Businessmen & Professionals, Paranaque
Chapter)
Respondent was employed as one of the lawyers in
the Collection Department of FNCB Finance, of
which Marcelo was then a Vice President.
14) Mamerto A. Marcelo, Jr. Undated38 Colleague
Later on, Marcelo hired respondent as a legal
consultant in a telecommunications company the
former later worked with.
15) Atty. Eleuterio P. Ong Vaño
March 14, Respondent is known to Atty. Vaño as a respectable
(Former National President, Philippine Association of Real Friend
201739 person of good moral character.
Estate Boards, Inc.)
March 7,
16) Domingo L. Mapa 201740 Respondent is "one with [them]"41 in pursuing their
Colleague
(President, Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc.) advocacies in their scholarship program.

Caringal hired respondent as Vice President for
17) Ernesto M. Caringal March 7, Administration of his company even after he was
Colleague
(President, Abcar International Construction Corporation) 201742 disbarred in 2005 because Caringal believes
respondent is a person of good moral character.
Respondent rendered voluntary service as Adviser-
18) Rolando L. Sianghio March 14, Consultant of the Directors of the Habitat for
Colleague
(President, Lacto Asia Pacific Corporation) 201743 Humanity and i-Homes in their programs for housing
for the poor.
19) PSSupt. Marino Ravelo March 10, Business Respondent is Ravelo's business partner in the
(Retired PDEA Director) 201744 Partner sourcing and supply of nickel and chromite raw ores
from Zambales to their local customers.
Respondent has never been involved in any shady

business deals.
Respondent was the former law firm partner of Atty.
Gale, prior to respondent's appointment as RTC
judge.
20) Atty. Tranquilino R. Gale March 14, Former partner
(Legal Counselor & Consultant) 201745 in law firm
Respondent is honest and of good moral character
in his public and private dealings even after he was
disbarred.
21) Godofredo D. Asunto
March 8, Asunto availed of respondent's legal services in
(President, Waterfun Condominium Bldg. 1 Inc. Colleague
201746 resolving his collection cases.
(Homeowners Association); and Retired Bank Executive)
In view of his good values to the profession,
March 9,
22) Rosalind E. Hagedorn Colleague Respondent was recommended by Hagedorn to act
201747
as legal counsel of her valued clients and friends.
March 9, Respondent was known to Navarro as a person of
23) Antonio A. Navarro III Friend
201748 good moral character since 1988 up to the present.
March 10, Community Respondent was known to Yap as a person of good
24) Peter A. Yap
201749 Friend moral character since 1975 up to the present.
Respondent worked with Ocampo in a power project
25) Teodora S. Ocampo
installation in 2000.
(Professor, De La Salle University) March 12,
Colleague
201750
Sender claims she found respondent to be an

ethical, trustworthy and a person of high integrity.
26) Valentin T. Banda March 12, Respondent's disbarment has turned him into a new
Friend
(Retired Bank Officer, Philippine Veterans Bank) 201751 person.
March 13, Respondent has been active in the community
27) Atty. Samuel A. Nuñez Friend
201752 affairs while staying in Cebu.
Atty. Gonzaga, Jr., stated that he has not heard that
March 18, Former partner respondent was involved in any charge or
28) Atty. Ramon C. Gonzaga, Jr.
201753 in law firm complaint, morally or otherwise, even after he was
disbarred.
Respondent is of good moral character.
29) Efren Z. Palugod March 8,
Friend Respondent stayed in touch with Palugod whenever
(Chairman Plaza Loans Corporation) 201754
respondent would go to Cebu every now and then
for his coal supply business.
Despite being disbarred, respondent involved
30) Rodolfo G. Pelayo March 7, himself in worthwhile activities as senior citizen and
Colleague
(Chairman, Power & Synergy, Inc.) 201755 offered his services as business consultant to their
company, Power & Synergy, Inc. and friends.
Respondent should be reinstated as a lawyer again
56 in order for him to "cotinue his [G]ood Samaritan
31) Sol Owen G. Figues Undated Friend
work to the common people that seeks justice and
guidance in times of trouble and grief."57
32) Col. Jose Ely D. Alberto GSC (INF) March 24, Respondent was known to Navarro as a person of
Acquaintance
(Internal Auditor, Philippine Army) 201758 good moral character since 2000 up to the present.
Respondent has integrity, independence, industry
and diligence.
March 8,
33) Atty. Albert L. Hontanosas Friend
201759 Respondent should be given a second chance to
serve the Filipino masses as a bonafide member of
the Philippine Bar.
34) Antonio E. De Borja Respondent provides free legal assistance to the

March 17,
(Former Councilor, Baliwag, Bulacan; and President, Early Friend poor, who were victims of injustice, through his son
201760
Riser Assembly, Baliwag, Bulacan) who is also a lawyer.
35) Tomas Barba Tan March 9,
Client Respondent is a person of good moral character.
(President, Cebu Adconsultants, Inc.) 201761
Respondent is very dependable, fair and a very
respectable person both on the tennis courts in
Paranaque City where they are both members until
36) Engr. Daniel D. Villacarlos March 11, now and inside the court of law when he was still
Friend
(Operations Manager, Hi-Tri Development Corp.) 201762 active as an excellent and reputable lawyer.
Respondent's conduct of sportsmanship in BF

Homes Tennis Club and as a person is exemplary.
37) Roy Bufi March 9, Respondent is known to Bufi as kind, generous and
Friend
(President, The Bas Corporation) 201763 is very professional when it comes to work.
38) Remigio R. Viola
(Retired Municipal Administrator, Municipality of Baliwag, Respondent is his business consultant because
March 13, Former
Bulacan) respondent is known to Viola for being a community
201764 colleague
leader.

Respondent is a strong supporter of their social and
March 20,
39) Leonardo U. Lindo Friend civic activities to provide free medical services to the
201765
less fortunate members of the society.
In 2003, respondent handled their case against
66 Metrobank and won the case for them.
40) Felipe De Sagun Undated Friend
Respondent is trustworthy, reliable and honest.
The Court's Ruling
The Court denies the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. 67 It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands
it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character.68 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court
should see to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the
doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the
general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice. 69
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct
and character. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar.
The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he
or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application
for reinstatement.70
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court
will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable. 71
The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy
removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. [Thus,] [t]he Court will grant it only if there
is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable." 72
In the case of Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency, 73 the
Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. 74 These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community
with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to
a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty 75 to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving
him a chance to redeem himself.76
4. There must be a showing of promise77 (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 78
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
In the case of Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,79 the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed
from the time he was disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the
fact that Atty. Mejia is already of advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also noted that he had made a significant
contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Joumal containing his religious and social writing; and the religious organization named " El Cristo
Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind ." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions
since he was disbarred.80
In Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA,81 the Court granted the reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer ( found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA
decision) and considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that
case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyer's sincere admission of guilty and repeated pleas for compassion. 82
In Valencia v. Atty. Antiniw,83 the Court rejnstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and
subsequently introducing the document in court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that
during Atty. Antiniw's disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged in humanitarian and civic services,
and retained an unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary. 84
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys' sincere realization and acknowledgment of guilt. 85
Here, while more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on June 15, 2005, respondent's present appeal has failed to show
substantial proof of his reformation as required in the first guideline above.
The Court is not persuaded by respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While he expressly asks for forgiveness for his transgressions in his
letters to the Court, respondent continues to insist on his honest belief that there was no conflict of interest notwithstanding the Court's finding to the
contrary. Respondent asserted in all his letters to the Court that:
I also did not [do] and I do not deny the fact that in the year 1985, I filed ONLY a single motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on behalf
of said San Jose Homeowners Association against the Durano & Co., Inc. before the HLURB in a case for completion of development under P.D.
957, and that later in the year 1996, I handled another HLURB case for the respondents Durano/Rodriguez in the said case filed by the San Jose
Homeowners Association, for the declaration of the school site lot as an open space, on the basis of my firm belief that I was given a prior consent to
do so by the said association, pursuant to its Board Resolution, dated March 14, 1987, a copy of which is attached and made an integral part hereof,
as Annex "A" and also because of my honest belief that there was no conflict of interest situation obtaining under the circumstances, as those cases
are totally unrelated [and] distinct from each other, pursuant to the jurisprudences that I had cited in my ANSWER in this disbarment
case.86 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the testimonials submitted by respondent all claim that respondent is a person of good moral character without explaining why or
submitting proof in support thereof. The only ostensible proof of reformation that respondent has presented are the following:
1. The Letter dated March 7, 2017 signed by Domingo L. Mapa, President of Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., averring that
respondent is "one with [them] in pursuing [their] advocacies in [their] scholarship x x x;"87
2. The Letter dated March 13, 2017 signed by Atty. Samuel A. Nuñez, claiming that respondent has been active in community affairs while
staying in Cebu;88
3. The undated Letter signed by Sol Owen G. Figues, humbly asking that respondent be reinstated again in order for him to " continue
his [G]ood Samaritan work to the common people that seeks justice and guidance in times of trouble and grief ;"89
4. The undated Letter of Arnaldo C. Cuasay, the brother-in-law of respondent, stating that after his disbarment, respondent provided
community services in Muntinlupa and in his hometown in Cebu; 90
5. The Letter dated March 14, 2017 signed by Rolando L. Sianghio, President of Lacto Asia Pacific Corporation, stating that respondent
rendered voluntary service as Adviser-Consultant of the Directors of the Habitat for Humanity in their programs for housing for the poor; 91
6. The Letter dated March 17, 2017 signed by Antonio E. De Borja, a friend of respondent, where Borja claimed that respondent provides free
legal assistance to the poor, who were victims of injustice, through his son who is also a lawyer; 92
7. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Leonardo U. Lindo, a friend of respondent, which stated that respondent is "[ a strong supporter
of their] social [and] civic activities to provide free medical services to the less fortunate members of the society ;"93
8. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Dean Dionisio G. Magpantay, Chairman and President of Asian+ Council of Leaders,
Administrators, Deans and Educators in Business, stating that he personally knows respondent having served together in their church and
community service with the Knights of Columbus in the mid-2000s until the present; 94 and
9. The Letter dated March 20, 2017 signed by Carolina L. Nielsen, a neighbor of respondent, where she claimed that respondent "[ graciously
rendered free legal advice to her and her family .]"95
Still, aside from these bare statements, no other proof was presented to specify the actual engagements or activities by which respondent had
served the members of his community or church, provided free legal assistance to the poor and supported social and civic activities to provide free
medical services to the. less fortunate, hence, insufficient to demonstrate any form of consistency in his supposed desire to reform.
The other testimonials which respondent submitted, particularly that of Ernesto M. Caringal, President of Abcar International Construction
Corporation, who stated that "[he hired respondent as Vice President for Administration of his company even after ] he was disbarred in 2005,"96 and
that of Police Senior Superintendent Marino Ravelo (Ret.), who stated that "[ he is the business partner of respondent] in the sourcing and supply of
nickel and chromite raw ores from Zambales to [their] local customers,"97 all relate to respondent's means of livelihood after he was disbarred; hence,
these are incompetent evidence to prove his reformation which connotes consistent improvement subsequent to his disbarment. If at all, these
testimonials contradict respondent's claim that he and his family were having financial difficulties due to his disbarment, to wit:
Since then up to now, I and my family had been marginally surviving and still continue to survive, from out of the measly funds that I have been able
to borrow from our relatives and my former clients (who, of course I don't expect to continue lending to me indefinitely) to whom I promised to repay
my debts upon the resumption of my law practice.98
To add, no other evidence was presented in his appeal to demonstrate his potential for public service, or that he - now being 71 years of age - still
has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. Thus, the third and fourth guidelines were
neither complied with.99
While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers - may it be financial or reputational in cause - it stands firm in its
commitment to the public to preserve the integrity and esteem of the Bar. As held in a previous case, " in considering [a lawyer's] application for
reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation,
disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity."100
The practice of law is a privilege, and respondent has failed to prove that he has complied with the above-discussed guidelines for reinstatement to
the practice of law. The Court, therefore, denies his petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Senior Associate Justice), Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires,
Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., No part, relation to a party.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 4763 March 20, 2003
DR. GIL Y. GAMILLA, NORMA S. CALAGUAS, IRMA E. POTENCIANO, EDITHA OCAMPO, LUZ DE GUZMAN, GLICERIA BALDRES,
FERDINAND LIMOS, MA. LOURDES C. MEDINA, HIDELITA GABO, CORAZON CUI, REMEDIOS T. GARCIA, RENE ARNEJO, RENE LUIS
TADLE, LAURA ABARA, PHILIP AGUINALDO, BENEDICTA ALAVA, LEONCIO CASAL, CARMELITA ESPINA, ZENAIDA FAMORCA, CELSO
NIERA, CESAR REYES, NATIVIDAD SANTOS and MAFEL YSRAEL, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO J. MARIÑO JR., respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
THIS DISBARMENT CASE EMANATED from an intra-union leadership dispute some seventeen (17) years ago that spilled over to the instant
complaint alleging impropriety and double-dealing in the disbursement of sums of money entrusted by the University of Sto. Tomas to respondent
Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and his core of officers and directors for distribution among faculty members of the
university.1
For a sense of history, sometime in 1986 respondent Atty. Mariño Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and other union officers entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with the management of UST for the provision of economic benefits amounting to P35 million. Instead of creating a
harmonious relationship between the contracting parties, the collective bargaining agreement regrettably engendered disputes arising from the
interpretation and implementation thereof one of which even reached this Court. 2
The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988 but efforts to forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989 the faculty members of UST
went on strike and as a counter-measure UST terminated the employment of sixteen (16) officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union including
respondent. The dismissal precipitated anew bitter legal battles which were resolved by this Court in favor of the dismissed employees by ordering
their reinstatement with back wages.3
In 1990 Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres prescribed the terms and conditions of a five (5)-year collective bargaining agreement between UST
and the UST Faculty Union retroactive to 1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired. In the same year, the administration of UST
and the UST Faculty Union also entered into a compromise agreement for the payment of P7,000,000.00 from which P5,000,000.00 was intended to
settle the back wages and other claims of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union, including herein respondent, who
were earlier ordered reinstated by this Court, and the sum of P2,000,000.00 to satisfy the remaining obligations of UST under the 1986 collective
bargaining agreement. It appears from the record that only P5,000,000.00 for the back wages and other claims of respondent Atty. Mariño and other
concerned union officers and directors was paid immediately by UST while the satisfaction of the balance of P2,000,000.00 was apparently deferred
to some unspecified time.
In 1992 UST and the UST Faculty Union executed a memorandum of agreement to settle the salary increases and other benefits under the collective
bargaining agreement effective 1988 for the period 1 June 1991 to 31 May 1993 for a total of P42,000,000.00. It was agreed that the benefits
accruing from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992 were to be taken from the sum of P42,000,000.00 which UST would release directly to the faculty
members, while the remainder of the P42,000,000.00 package would be ceded by UST to the UST Faculty Union which would then disburse the
balance to cover the benefits from 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993. The memorandum of agreement also charged the amount of P2,000,000.00
agreed upon in the 1990 compromise agreement as well as the attorney's fees of Atty. Mariño worth P4,200,000.00 against the P42,000,000.00
outlay.
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, UST took care of the disbursement of P20,226,221.60 from the total commitment of
P42,000,000.00 to pay for the following expenses: (a) P2,000,000.00 as payment for unpaid obligations to faculty members under the 1986 collective
bargaining agreement; (b) P13,833,597.96 for the salary increases of faculty members from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992; (c) P192,623.64 for
telephone, electricity and water billings; and, (d) P4,200,000.00 paid to the UST Faculty Union as attorney's fees. The expenses left a collectible sum
of P21,773,778.40 from the obligation of P42,000,000.00. The university however relinquished only P18,038,939.37 to the UST Faculty Union which
was P3,734,839.03 short of the balance of P21,773,778.40. In the meantime, the UST Faculty Union placed P9,766,570.01 of the amount received
from UST in the money market to earn as it did make P1,146,381.27 in interest.
For benefits corresponding to 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993, the UST Faculty Union charged against the short-changed amount of
P18,038,939.37 a total of P16,723,638.27 consisting of the following expenses: (a) P10,521,800.64 as the amount paid for salary increases
beginning 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993; (b) P578,296.31 which was refunded to the faculty members whose salaries were reduced as a result
of their participation in the 1989 strike; (c) P2,045,192.97 as amount paid to the faculty members representing their December 1992 bonus; and, (d)
P3,578,348.35 for reimbursements to the University of Santo Tomas. The expenses left a balance of P5,050,140.13, i.e., the remainder of
P1,315,301.10 out of the P18,038,939.37 earlier turned over by UST to the UST Faculty Union, plus the deficit amount of P3,734,839.03 which UST
later turned over to the UST Faculty Union after previously failing to deliver the amount. To the sum of P5,050,140.13, the UST Faculty Union added
the interest earnings of P1,146,381.27 from money market investments as well as the amount of P192,632.64 representing the disallowed amount of
expenses earlier deducted by UST from the P42,000,000.00 package. All in all, the money left in the possession of the UST Faculty Union was
P6,389,154.04 which it distributed among the faculty members in 1994.
Complainants as members of the UST Faculty Union questioned the alleged lack of transparency among the officers and directors of the union in the
management and disbursement of the monetary benefits for the faculty members. They initiated two (2) complaints with the Office of the Regional
Director, National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment, one on 18 October 1995, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022,
and another, on 16 November 1996, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028. In both pleadings, they prayed for the expulsion of the officers
and directors of the union led by respondent Atty. Mariño because of their alleged failure to account for the balance of the P42,000,000.00 ceded to
them by UST and the attorney's fees amounting to P4,200,000.00 which they deducted from the benefits allotted to faculty members. 4
On 2 July 1997 complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mariño accusing him of (a) compromising their entitlements
under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement without the knowledge, consent or ratification of the union members, and worse, for only
P2,000,000.00 when they could have received more than P9,000,000.00; (b) failing to account for the P7,000,000.00 received by him and other
officers and directors in the UST Faculty Union under the 1990 compromise agreement; (c) lack of transparency in the administration and distribution
of the remaining balance of the P42,000,000.00 package under the 1992 memorandum of agreement; (d) refusal to remit and account for the
P4,200,000.00 in favor of the faculty members although the amount was denominated as attorney's fees. Complainants asserted that respondent
violated Rules 1.015 and 1.026 of Canon 1; Rule 15.087 of Canon 15; Rules 16.01,8 16.029 and 16.0310 of Canon 16; and Rule 20.0411 of Canon 20, of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On 4 November 1997, after several extensions Atty. Mariño filed his comment on the complaint. He alleged that the issues raised therein were the
same issues involved in the two (2) complaints before the Bureau of Labor Relations and therefore constituted forum-shopping, and further explained
that he had adequately accounted for the disbursement of the money demanded by complainants.
On 18 March 1998 we referred the disbarment complaint and the comment thereon to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice thereof.
On 18 May 1999 we received the Report of IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro as well as the Resolution of 30 March 1999 of the IBP Board of
Governors adopting and approving the Report which found the complaint meritorious and suspended respondent Atty. Mariño from the practice of
law "until such time that the required detailed accounting of the questioned remittances made by UST to the UST [Faculty Union] during his
incumbency as President and Legal Counsel has been officially submitted and reported to the UST [Faculty Union] and to the IBP ."
On 7 September 1999 respondent filed his comment on the IBP Report and Resolution and alleged the same contentions he previously asserted. On
27 October 1999 we referred the case back to the IBP for a more detailed investigation and submission of report and recommendation within sixty
(60) days from notice.
In the meantime, or on 27 May 1999, the Regional Director found merit in the two (2) complaints docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022 and
Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028 and ordered the expulsion of respondent and the other officers and directors of the union led by respondent Atty.
Mariño because of their failure to account for the balance of the P42,000,000.00 that had been delivered to them by the management of UST, and
their collection of exorbitant and illegal attorney's fees amounting to P4,200,000.00. 12
On 9 March 2000 the Bureau of Labor Relations in the appeal docketed as BLR-A-TR-52-25-10-99 set aside the Order of the Regional Director. It
found that the balance of the P42,000,000.00 which UST delivered to the UST Faculty Union had been fully and adequately accounted for by
respondent and the other officers and directors of the union. 13 Nonetheless, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered respondent and the other officers
and directors of the union to distribute the attorney's fees of P4,200,000.00 among the faculty members and to immediately hold the elections for
union officers and directors in view of the expiration of their respective terms of office.
On 16 March 2001 the Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
60657.14 The Decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to this Court, docketed G.R. No. 149763, where the case is allegedly still pending
resolution.
On 25 September 2002 we received the detailed Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro and the IBP Resolution of 3
August 2002 of the Board of Governors adopting and approving the Report which recommended the lifting of Atty. Mariño's suspension from law
practice since he had sufficiently accounted for the funds in question.
For a start, it appears that complainants did not file a petition with this Court to review the IBP Resolution exonerating respondent from the
accusations against him and lifting his suspension from the practice of law, an action otherwise required under Sec. 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court if the case against respondent could still proceed in this Court. Nevertheless since the IBP Resolution is merely recommendatory, and
considering further the instructional value of this case to members of the Bench, many of whom are engaged simultaneously in other businesses or
professions, we find it prudent and judicious to decide the instant case once and for all.
In fine, there are ethical lapses on the part of respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño Jr. in the manner by which he secured the P7,000,000.00 by virtue
of the compromise agreement and the P4,200,000.00 attorney's fees under the memorandum of agreement. Although the record shows that the
Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as having adequately accounted for the disbursement of the funds which the UST Faculty Union
received through the series of agreements with the management of UST, this Court believes that Atty. Mariño failed to avoid conflict of interests, first,
when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and interested party being
one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attorney's fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior
disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to the members of the UST Faculty Union.
As one of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors seeking compensation from the University of Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal,
respondent was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty
Union in forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is " whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance thereof."15 In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a position where self-interest
tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client.
Thus it has been held that an attorney or any other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons is utterly disabled from
acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his custody for management. 16 This rule is entirely independent of whether fraud has
intervened as in fact no fraud need be shown; no excuse will be heard from an attorney because the rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain
from placing oneself in positions that ordinarily excite conflict between self-interest and integrity.
Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any proceeding against a party even with the client's consent after the
lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments. 17 No
doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the subject matter of the suit brought in behalf of his client. 18
In the instant case, quite apart from the issue of validity of the 1990 compromise agreement, this Court finds fault in respondent's omission of that
basic sense of fidelity to steer clear of situations that put his loyalty and devotion to his client, the faculty members of UST, open to question. Atty.
Mariño both as lawyer and president of the union was duty bound to protect and advance the interest of union members and the bargaining unit
above his own. This obligation was jeopardized when his personal interest as one of the dismissed employees of UST complicated the negotiation
process and eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or wrongly brought money to him and the other dismissed union
officers and directors, seemingly or otherwise at the expense of the faculty members.
The facts would affirm this observation. In brokering the compromise agreement, respondent received P5,000,000.00 as compensation for the
dismissed union officials while only P2,000,000.00 apparently settled UST's obligations in favor of the faculty members under the 1986 collective
bargaining agreement when their original claim amounted to at least P9,000,000.00. Worse, the P2,000,000.00 concession for accountabilities
demandable long ago in 1986 was paid only in 1992 under the memorandum of agreement, or a period of more than two (2) years after the
execution of the compromise agreement, in contrast to the immediate payment of the P5,000,000.00 to Atty. Mariño and the other union officers and
directors.
Respondent Atty. Mariño ought to have disclosed to the members of the UST Faculty Union, if not the entire bargaining unit of faculty members, his
interest in the compromise agreement as one of the dismissed union officers seeking compensation for the claim of back wages and other forms of
damages, and also the reasons for reducing the claim of the faculty members from more than P9,000,000.00 to only P2,000,000.00. As the record
shows, the explanations for respondent's actions were disclosed only years after the consummation of the compromise agreement, particularly only
after the instant complaint for disbarment was filed against him, when the accounting should have been forthcoming either before or during the
settlement of the labor case against the management of UST.
Equally important, since respondent and the other union officers and directors were to get for themselves a lion's share of the compromise as they
ultimately did, Atty. Mariño should have unambiguously divulged and made clear to his client the compelling probability of conflict of interests. He
should have voluntarily turned over the reins of legal representation to another lawyer who could have acted on the matter with a deep sense of
impartiality over the several claims against UST and an unfettered commitment to the cause of the faculty members.
Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in respondent's dual role as lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union when he
obtained P4,200,000.00 as attorney's fees. Without ruling on the validity of the collection of attorney's fees so as not to pre-empt the decision in G.R.
No. 149763 on this issue, the record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear differentiation between his
legal services and his tasks as union president comprising in all probability the same duties for which he had collected a hefty compensation as
attorney for the union.
The situation of Atty. Mariño is not any different from that of an executor or administrator of an estate who may not charge against the estate any
professional fee for legal services rendered by him because his efforts as such are already paid for in his capacity as executor or
administrator.19 Indeed, he could have avoided complaints and perceptions of self-enrichment arising from the levy of attorney's fees by spelling out
the terms and bases for the claim of P4,200,000.00 since the compensation for his services as president of the union should have otherwise covered
his legal services as well.
Regardless of the motivations of respondent in perfecting the compromise agreement or demanding the inexplicable attorney's fees, his actions were
not transparent enough to allow the bargaining unit ample information to decide freely and intelligently. Clearly, he violated Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requiring every lawyer to "observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients ."
Lawyers are vanguards in the bastion of justice so they are without doubt expected to have a bigger dose of service-oriented conscience and a little
less of self-interest.
As indispensable part of the system of administering justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the canons of professional
ethics - a duty more than imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of law. The process of
imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the
ideal that a lawyer's vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of public interest.
The evidence on record proves that Atty. Mariño failed to disclose at crucial moments significant information about the manner by which he secured
the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement and the P4,200,000.00 attorney's fees under the memorandum of agreement. A simple
accounting of the money that he and others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would have
enlightened the faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondent's part and guided them to look for alternative actions to
protect their own interests.
In light of the irrefragable fact of respondent's misdemeanor, a possible mitigation of his actionable conduct was that the attorney's fees and the
compromise agreement were negotiated and finalized under the most strenuous circumstances where his leadership and that of his core officers and
directors were incessantly challenged by complainants allegedly aided by factions within UST itself. He might also have believed that the settlement
achieved immense benefits for his constituents which would not have been otherwise obtained if he had chosen to relinquish the rein of legal
representation to some other lawyer. Finally, it was not improbable for him to suppose though wrongly that he could represent and in some manner
serve the interests of all of them, including his own, by pushing for and seeking the approval of the agreements himself. 20
We reiterate that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by
sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this
type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient
disciplinary action in accordance with our ruling in Sumangil v. Sta. Romana. 21 Hence, Atty. Mariño is admonished to refrain from all appearances
and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting
a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client. 22
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño Jr. is REPRIMANDED for his misconduct with a warning that a more drastic punishment will be
imposed on him upon a repetition of the same act.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
ADM. CASE NO. 6542 September 30, 2005
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1053)
MARIA CIELO B. SUZUKI, represented by her sister Maria Teresa B. Gabuco, Complainant,

vs.
vs.
ATTY. ERWIN L. TIAMSON, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
In an Administrative Complaint1 dated January 7, 2003 filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Maria Cielo B. Suzuki, represented by her sister, Maria Teresa B. Gabuco, charged Atty. Erwin L. Tiamson with fraud, dishonesty and
misrepresentation and for violation of Canons 1 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Praying for the disbarment of herein respondent, complainant alleges that on August 31, 2002, she entered into contracts of sale and real estate
mortgage with several persons, namely Arthur Tumilty, Benjamin Commandante, Jr., Mark S. Commandante, and Mary Jane S. Commandante,
wherein she bought from them a house and lot located at No. 2002, Purple Road, Camella Homes II, Talon 2, Las Piñas City, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-83217, issued by the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City, and subsequently mortgaged the same property
in favor of the sellers as security for the payment of the said property; the sale and mortgage transactions were facilitated by respondent who is the
counsel of Mr. Tumilty; the sellers executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing respondent as their attorney-in-fact and empowering him to
receive payments from complainant; respondent received in behalf of the sellers the amount of ₱500,000.00 as partial consideration for the contract
of sale; respondent committed to register the documents of sale and mortgage with the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City but asked from and was
given by complainant ₱80,000.00 as the latter’s share in the expenses for registration; with the end in view of having the subject documents
registered and the title to the property transferred in the name of complainant, respondent retained in his possession the subject deeds of absolute
sale and mortgage as well as the owner’s copy of the title; however, respondent never registered the said documents and did not cause the transfer
of the title over the subject property in the name of complainant; respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and estafa which are
grounds for his disbarment.2
In his Answer dated February 18, 2003, respondent denied the allegations of complainant. He put up affirmative defenses contending that sometime
in August 2002, he was engaged by Mr. Tumilty, his friend and neighbor, to help him in the documentation of the sale of his house and lot to
complainant; Mr. Tumilty informed respondent that he and the complainant agreed that the payment of the purchase price for the property shall be
made through installment; respondent was also informed that complainant, at that time, was residing in Japan and that she was being represented
by her agent, a certain Jenny Matira; when respondent communicated with Ms. Matira to discuss the documentation of the contract, the latter
referred him to their lawyer, Atty. Lorenzo Tejada; respondent and Atty. Tejada met and subsequently arrived at a compromise wherein it was
agreed that complainant will execute a promissory note in favor of Mr. Tumilty covering her obligation under the contract of sale; thereafter, Mr.
Tumilty will execute a deed of sale in favor of complainant; complainant, in turn, will execute a real estate mortgage contract in favor of Mr. Tumilty
as security for the payment of her obligation; it was further agreed that after the new TCT in the name of complainant is released, the latter shall
execute another contract of real estate mortgage covering the same property; subsequently, the above-mentioned documents were executed with
the exception of the second real estate mortgage contract; respondent admits having received ₱250,000.00 in cash and ₱250,000.00 in check from
the representatives of complainant but he does not admit that this is part of the partial payment for the real property sold; instead, he contends that
the said amount was part of an internal agreement between complainant and a certain Ms. Suzuki, who is her agent’s mother-in-law residing in
Japan; respondent also admits receipt of ₱80,000.00 as complainant’s share in the expenses for registration; respondent contends that immediately
after the sale, he submitted the sale documents to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and paid the capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax and
other taxes which enabled him to get from the BIR a Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR); sometime in September 2002, representatives of
complainant approached respondent asking him to give them the new TCT covering the subject property in the name of complainant; respondent
informed them that the transfer of the property in complainant’s name is still being processed and even if respondent secures a new TCT in the
name of complainant, he cannot give complainant the owner’s duplicate copy until and unless the purchase price for the subject property has been
fully paid and the real estate mortgage cancelled; several days after, the same persons returned to respondent’s office and insisted on getting the
owner’s duplicate copy of the new TCT but respondent refused for the same reasons mentioned above; nonetheless, respondent handed to herein
complainant’s representative Gabuco the documents evidencing the sale, real estate mortgage, a special power of attorney dated August 31, 2002
as well as the keys to the house subject of the sale; respondent was later informed by complainant’s agent, Jenny Matira that she is now unsure if
complainant will execute a new real estate mortgage contract much less pay the remaining balance of the purchase price; sometime in October
2002, respondent received a letter from a certain Atty. Federico Ricafort demanding rescission of the sale with damages on the ground that he
defrauded complainant; respondent was also asked to release the owner’s copy of the new TCT; as a consequence, respondent deferred the
processing of a new title over the subject property in the name of complainant because he has no longer any assurance that complainant will comply
with her obligation to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price; respondent contends that he is merely performing his duty to protect the
interest of his client by refusing to register the contract of sale with the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas. 3
Complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment contending that she was not, in fact, represented by a lawyer during the transaction and
documentation of the subject contracts of sale and real estate mortgage; the partial payments she made in the amount of ₱1,352,500.00 were not
deducted and reflected in the deeds of sale and mortgage; respondent does not acknowledge these payments and insists on the payment of the
original purchase price of ₱2,150,000.00.4
In an order dated February 10, 2004, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP-CBD required the parties to submit their respective verified position
papers attaching thereto documentary evidence and duly verified affidavits of witnesses, if any, after which the case shall be submitted for
resolution.5
Complainant and respondent submitted their Position Papers, respectively. 6 Both parties also submitted their Reply to the opposing party’s Position
Paper.7
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 18, 2004, Commissioner Navarro found that respondent has no intention of defrauding
complainant; instead, he is only performing his duty of protecting his client’s interest when he held in abeyance the processing of the papers for the
transfer of the title over the property in complainant’s name. Consequently, Commissioner Navarro recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent.8
On June 26, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-260 finding the recommendation of Commissioner Navarro
fully supported by evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and, considering that the complaint lacks merit, resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Navarro. 9
On October 6, 2004, this Court issued a Resolution which noted Resolution No. XVI-2004-260 of the Board of Governors of the IBP and considered
the instant case closed and terminated.10
On September 8, 2004, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-260.
In its Resolution dated October 7, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors denied complainant’s motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Board
has no more jurisdiction to consider and resolve said motion as it has already endorsed the case to this Court. 11
On March 30, 2005, this Court issued another Resolution requiring respondent to file his Comment on complainant’s motion for
reconsideration.12 Respondent filed his comment on May 3, 2005.13
The issue in the present case is whether respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation and dishonesty or of any improper act or conduct which
violates his sworn duty as a lawyer in connection with his dealings with herein complainant or with any of the latter’s representatives relative to the
sale of the subject properties.
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and misconduct for two main reasons. First, despite having received the amount of
₱80,000.00 from complainant as the latter’s share in the registration of the deed of sale of the subject property, respondent failed to register the
same; worse, he did not pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax and all other taxes or fees due thereon. Second, respondent does not
want to recognize and deduct from the original purchase price the advance payments made by complainant amounting to more than ₱1,000,000.00.
As to the first charge, this Court notes that respondent has submitted a photocopy of a CAR issued by the BIR to prove that he already paid the
capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax due on the sale of the subject property, amounting to a total sum of ₱177,980.83; and that the BIR had
already authorized the concerned Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the said property. 14
However, despite such authority, respondent did not register the deed of sale over the subject property. Respondent asserts that his only motive in
refusing to register the deed of sale is to protect the interest of his client. Nonetheless, this Court notes that his client’s interest is amply protected by
the real estate mortgage executed by complainant. In fact, contrary to what respondent insists, we see no need to execute anew a different
mortgage contract after the title over the property has been transferred in the name of complainant since the original contract of mortgage contains
provisions stating that said contract shall be annotated at the back of the new TCT covering the subject property which shall be issued in the name of
complainant.15 The same mortgage contract also states that it shall not be affected by the cancellation of the existing TCT in the name of Mr. Tumilty
and the other co-owners.16 We find these provisions as sufficient security to protect the interest of respondent’s client.
Besides, respondent himself admitted that based on their agreement with complainant, the condition for the transfer of title over the subject property
in the name of complainant is for the latter to execute a real estate mortgage and a promissory note. 17 Complainant had already complied with these
conditions.18 Hence, it is only fair and just that respondent register the deed of sale over the subject property and have the title to this property
transferred in the name of complainant.
As to the second charge, complainant presented documents to prove her contention that respondent’s client received certain amounts from
complainant which have been considered as partial payments for the subject properties sold. Except for the payment made in September 5,
2003,19 all the other payments were given prior to the execution of the deed of sale on August 31, 2002. 20 Complainant contends that all the advance
payments she made should have been credited in her favor by deducting the same from the purchase price agreed upon as appearing in the deeds
of sale and mortgage.
In his Comment to complainant’s motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVI-2004-260 of the IBP-CBD, respondent claims that the amount of
₱500,000.00 he received from complainant, as evidenced by Annex "D" 21 of the complaint, does not form part of the agreed purchase price for the
subject properties and, therefore, should not be deducted therefrom. 22 Respondent contends that this amount (₱500,000.00) was paid by
complainant as part of an internal arrangement or agreement between her and a certain Milet Wakatsuki who appears to be her agent’s mother-in-
law residing in Japan.23 As to the other amounts which complainant claims to have paid, respondent insists that he has no knowledge of these
payments as evidence shows that these sums have been given directly to his client, Mr. Tumilty.
We are not fully convinced by respondent’s explanations.
With respect to the photocopies of receipts for a total amount of ₱724,990.00, representative of the alleged partial payments of the purchase price
for the subject property marked as Annexes "C-1," "C-2," "C-3," "D-1" and "D-2" of the complaint, we find that complainant failed to prove that
respondent intervened or had knowledge of these payments as to render him liable for fraud, dishonesty or misrepresentation for his failure to deduct
these payments from the deeds of sale and mortgage over the subject property. As stated earlier, all these payments, except that evidenced by
Annex "C-1," were made prior to the execution of the deeds of sale and mortgage over the subject property. There is no showing that respondent
had knowledge of these payments at the time of the execution of the deeds of sale and mortgage that could have prompted him to reflect these
payments on the said deed. In addition, respondent was not the one who received these payments. Annexes "C-1," "C-2" and "C-3" show that the
payments were received by Ms. Wakatsuki while Annexes "D-1" and "D-2" show that the sums of money were received by respondent’s client, Mr.
Tumilty. Moreover, Annexes "C-2" and "C-3" did not specifically state if the payments were indeed given as consideration for the subject property.
Hence, respondent cannot be faulted if he refuses to consider the amounts of money evidenced by the above-cited documents as partial payments
for the subject property.
However, as to the amount of ₱500,000.00, it is clear from the acknowledgment receipt marked as Annex "D" of the complaint that the sum of
money was given to respondent as payment for the subject property. As stated earlier, respondent admits having received the money from
complainant but claims that the said amount does not form part of the purchase price; instead, it was paid by complainant in consideration of her
arrangement or agreement with Ms. Wakatsuki. However, respondent did not substantiate his allegation. He did not even explain or elaborate his
assertion. If there is indeed an arrangement, what kind of arrangement was it? And if the arrangement is between complainant and Wakatsuki, why
did respondent receive the money? There is no showing that he is authorized by Wakatsuki to act as her attorney. On the contrary, respondent
received the money and he does not deny that he signed the acknowledgment receipt for and in behalf of his client, Mr. Tumilty. Hence, based on
the evidence presented in the instant case, respondent’s refusal to acknowledge complainant’s payment of ₱500,000.00 as part of the purchase
price for the subject property is simply not warranted.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a
lawyer’s performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others,
that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to
impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and the principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the
protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state – the administration of justice. 24 While lawyers owe their
entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost,
officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 25 Respondent failed to live up to this
expectation.
Complainant prays for the disbarment of respondent. However, it must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction,
and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. 26 Accordingly, disbarment should not be
decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired. 27 Considering that there
is no evidence to prove that respondent misappropriated the sum of ₱500,000.00 he received from complainant as partial payment for the subject
property, as well as the ₱80,000.00 complainant gave him as her share in the expenses for the registration of the subject deed of sale, we find it fit
to reprimand respondent for his acts of unfairly dealing with complainant.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the issues of whether or not complainant had indeed made payments amounting to an aggregate sum of
₱1,352,500.00; if these payments were made, whether they were intended as part of the purchase price for the subject property; and, whether these
payments should be properly deducted from the original purchase price of ₱2,150,000.00, are matters that should be properly resolved in a judicial
proceeding separate and distinct from the present case. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. 28 In this light, we refer to this Court’s ruling
in Berbano vs. Barcelona,29 citing In re Almacen,30 where it was held that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.31
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability and our findings herein should not in any way
be treated as having any material bearing on any other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for violating Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with
a WARNING that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012
HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try
the case and render judgment thereon.1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 20102 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then
mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth,
who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the
titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for
P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that
the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the
amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati
Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed
to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him. 3
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The
Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt
Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the
purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and
abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit
the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health,
and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence
as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned
information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of
Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the
amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.6
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use
the name "Treñas", under which he was accused in the Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008. 8
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC. 9 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010,
the CA rendered a Decision10 affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari 12 before this Court. He asked for a period
of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY
SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA; 13
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and
received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999,
without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed
and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to
him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must
rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time
Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la
Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had
occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the
prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was
actually she – not Elizabeth – who was the offended party. Thus, the latter’s demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the
offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the
amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the
Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioner’s.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latter’s Comment on the Petition. On 27
July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was
granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional
period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the
factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of ₱150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between
him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of
evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth.
However, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the
demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no
proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health.
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence
upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court
has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the
evidence on record.14
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any
citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had
committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted
to him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two
receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied
with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents. 15
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court
denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused Treñas, on the other hand,
never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the
evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to
him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because
it was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the
taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to
consider favorably.16
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment
on the formal offer of prosecution’s evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received
the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hector’s allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect
the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate
tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review. 17
The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People, 18 this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if
the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact
that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the
offense took place within the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business
with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati
for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19,
1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the
above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR
has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu
in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit:
that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter
pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu
agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage.
Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated
when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Parañaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to
induce Yu to part with his money.
xxx
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the
essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within
the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) 20
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by
Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in part:
4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as
agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B",
5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS.
MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY.
HECTOR TREÑAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is
hereto attached as Annex "C",
6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a check for refund of the sum given to him less the
attorney’s fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x
7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by
the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x 21
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements
was committed in Makati City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2)
that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. 22
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution 23 that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A
review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:
Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened next?
A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to… and she will work for the Deed of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended
for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated
December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty.
Treñas issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.

Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treñas by you, what happened next?
A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job. 24
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the
offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements
of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over
the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. 25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. 26
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue. 27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the
defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause
him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place. 28 This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where,
due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against
him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. 29
As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioner’s conduct in handling
the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. 1âwphi1
Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. 30 If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 31
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. 32 His failure to return the client's money
upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in
him by the client.33 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.34
In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case,
should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to
immediately return the amount of ₱ 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City.
Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169079 August 28, 2007
FRANCISCO RAYOS, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration dated 16 March 2007 filed by respondent Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez, seeking a modification of the
Decision dated 12 February 2007.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:
1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney’s oath and of serious professional misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely;
2. Respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to thirty-five percent (35%) of the total amount awarded 1 to petitioner
in Civil Case No. SM-951; and
3. Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One Hundred Nine Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos
(₱290,109.21),2 which he retained in excess of what we herein declared as fair and reasonable attorney’s fees, plus legal interest from
date of finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as member of the Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
IBP, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
Respondent received a copy of the Decision on 5 March 2007. Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period
provided under the Rules.
Respondent begs the compassionate understanding and magnanimity of the Honorable Court for some leniency regarding his unintentional
transgression and prays that the penalty of suspension of six months imposed upon him be reduced to a fine, invoking his almost 15 years of patient,
devoted, complete and successful professional services rendered to petitioner; for the bad faith of the latter in dismissing him as counsel without
justifiable cause; and his good faith in retaining the money "contingently" with the view of winning petitioner’s cause.
In light of respondent’s sincere plea for compassion from the Court, we take a second look at the penalty imposed.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the
respondent’s length of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances,
humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the Court’s
determination of the imposable penalty.31avvphi1
Applying the rationale in the aforesaid catena of cases, it is appropriate for this Court, in the case at bar, to consider the following circumstances, to
wit:
a) respondent had spent 15 years in defending petitioner’s cause from the trial court to the Supreme Court;
b) his efforts at defending their cause were palpably real, complete, and total, with utmost devotion and zealousness;
c) respondent’s advanced age;
d) this is the first time that respondent has been found administratively liable per available record; and
e) respondent’s good faith in retaining what he sincerely believed to be his contingent fee. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner and
respondent entered into a contingent fee arrangement whereby the latter, as counsel, will be paid for the legal services only if he secures a
judgment favorable for his client. When respondent retained the amount of ₱557,961.21 and ₱159,120.00 out of the ₱1,219,920.00, he
did so believing in good faith that it was a reasonable payment for the contingent fees which he was entitled to retain. It cannot be ignored
that respondent indeed successfully defended petitioner’s case in Civil Case No. SM-951.
We are persuaded to exhibit a degree of leniency towards the respondent. We, thus, maintain a more compassionate approach.
WHEREFORE, the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration is partly GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 February 2007 is MODIFIED in that the
suspension of six months is DELETED, and in lieu thereof a fine of ₱20,000.00 is IMPOSED, effective from date of receipt of herein Resolution, with
warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. The said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 5020 December 18, 2001
ROSARIO JUNIO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GRUPO, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Salvador M. Grupo for malpractice and gross misconduct.
Complainant Rosario N. Junio alleged that —
3. Sometime in 1995, [she] engaged the services of [respondent], then a private practitioner, for the redemption of a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20394 registered in the name of her parents, spouses Rogelio and Rufina Nietes, and located at
Concepcion, Loay, Bohol.
4. On 21 August 1995, [complainant] entrusted to [respondent] the amount of P25,000.00 in cash to be used in the redemption of the
aforesaid property. Respondent received the said amount as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt, a copy of which is being hereto
attached as Annex "A".
5. Notwithstanding the foregoing and for no valid reason, respondent did not redeem the property; as a result of which the right of
redemption was lost and the property was eventually forfeited.
6. Because of respondent's failure to redeem the property, complainant had demanded [the] return of the money which she entrusted to
the former for the above-stated purpose.
7. Despite repeated demands made by the complainant and without justifiable cause, respondent has continuously refused to refund the
money entrusted to him.1
In his Answer, petitioner admitted receiving the amount in question for the purpose for which it was given. However, he alleged that —
6. The subject land for which the money of complainant was initially intended to be applied could really not be redeemed anymore . .;
7. Complainant knew the mortgage agreement between her parents and the mortgage-owner had already expired, and what respondent
was trying to do was a sort of [a] desperate, last-ditch attempt to persuade the said mortgagee to relent and give back the land to the
mortgagors with the tender of redemption; but at this point, the mortgagee simply would not budge anymore. For one reason or another, he
would no longer accept the sum offered;
8. By the time that complainant was to return to Manila, it was already a foregone matter that respondent's efforts did not succeed. And so,
when transaction failed, respondent requested the complainant that he be allowed, in the meantime, to avail of the money because he had
an urgent need for some money himself to help defray his children's educational expenses. It was really a personal request, a private
matter between respondent and complainant, thus, respondent executed a promissory note for the amount, a copy of which is probably still
in the possession of the complainant.
9. . . . [T]he family of the complainant and that of the respondent were very close and intimate with each other. Complainant, as well as two
of her sisters, had served respondent's family as household helpers for many years when they were still in Manila, and during all those
times they were treated with respect, affection, and equality. They were considered practically part of respondent's own family.
That is why, when complainant requested . . . assistance regarding the problem of the mortgaged property which complainant wanted to
redeem, respondent had no second-thoughts in extending a lending hand . . . .
Respondent did not ask for any fee. His services were purely gratuitous; his acts [were] on his own and by his own. It was more than pro
bono; it was not even for charity; it was simply an act of a friend for a friend. It was just lamentably unfortunate that his efforts failed.
xxx xxx xxx
Of course, respondent accepts his fault, because, indeed, there were occasions when complainant's sisters came to respondent to ask for
the payment in behalf of complainant, and he could not produce the money because the circumstances somehow, did not allow it. [I]t does
not mean that respondent will not pay, or that he is that morally depraved as to wilfully and deliberately re[nege] in his obligation towards
the complainant.2
Complainant filed a reply denying that respondent informed her of his failure to redeem the property and that respondent requested her to instead
lend the money to him.3
The case was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. However, while two
hearings were set for this purpose, both were postponed at the instance of respondent. For this reason, on August 28, 2000, complainant asked the
Investigating Commissioner4 to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings theretofore filed. Respondent was required to
comment on complainant's motion, but he failed to do so. Consequently, the case was considered submitted for resolution.
In his report, dated January 5, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent liable for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter's interests are "protected by the nature of the case or
by independent advice." The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent failed to pay his client's money. However, in view of respondent's
admission of liability and "plea for magnanimity," the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be simply reprimanded and ordered
to pay the amount of P25,000.00 loan plus interest at the legal rate.
In its Resolution No. XIV-2001-183, dated April 29, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's
findings. However, it ordered —
[R]espondent . . . suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for the commission of an act which falls short of the standard of the norm
of conduct required of every attorney and . . . ordered [him] to return to the complainant the amount of P25,000.00 plus interest at the legal
rate from the time the said amount was misappropriated, until full payment; provided that the total suspension shall be at least one (1) year
from the date of said full payment
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that —
(a) there was no actual hearing of the case wherein respondent could have fully ventilated and defended his position;
(b) the subject Resolution gravely modified the Report and Recommendation of the Trial Commissioner, Hon. Pedro Magpayo, Jr., . . .
such that the resultant sanctions that are ordered imposed are too leonine, unjust and cruel;
(c) that the factual circumstances attending the matter which gave rise to the complaint were not rightly or fairly appreciated. 5
He argues that the Court should adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner.
In its resolution of August 15, 2001, the Court resolved to treat respondent's motion for reconsideration as a petition for review of IBP Resolution No.
XIV 2001-183 and required complainant to comment on the petition.
In her comment, complainant states that her primary interest is to recover the amount of P25,000.00 with interest and that she is leaving it to the
Court to decide whether respondent deserves the penalty recommended by the IBP. 6
The Court resolves to partially grant the petition. In his report and recommendation, Investigating Commissioner Magpayo, Jr. made the following
findings:
In his Answer, the respondent ADMITS all the allegations in paragraph 4 of the complaint which avers:
4. On 21 August 1995, complainant entrusted to respondent the amount of P25,000.00 in cash to be used in the redemption of
the aforesaid property (parcel of land covered by TCT No. 20394 registered in the name of complainant's parents located at
Concepcion, Loay, Bohol). Respondent received the said amount as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt (Annex A).
By way of confession and avoidance, the respondent, . . . however, contended that when the mortgagee refused to accept the sum
tendered as the period of redemption had already expired, he requested the complainant to allow him in the meantime to use the money
for his children's educational expenses[,] to which request the complainant allegedly acceded and respondent even executed a promissory
note (please see 4th par. of Annex "B" of complaint).
Respondent takes further refuge in the intimate and close relationship existing between himself and the complainant's family on the basis
of which his legal services were purely gratuitous or "simply an act of a friend for a friend" with "no consideration involved." Unfortunately,
his efforts to redeem the foreclosed property, as already stated, did not produce the desired result because the mortgagee "would not
budge anymore" and "would not accept the sum offered."
Thus, the respondent concluded that there was, strictly speaking, no attorney-client [relationship] existing between them. Rather, right from
the start[,] everything was sort of personal, he added.
Granting to the respondent the benefit of the doubt, we shall assume that there was in reality a loan in the amount of P25,000.00. This is
likewise confirmed by the execution of a promissory note on 12 December 1996 by the respondent who "undertook to pay Mrs. Junio on or
before January 1997" (Annex B of complaint). Moreover, the demand letter of 12 March 1998 (Annex B) mentions of "reimbursement of the
sum received" and interest of "24% per annum until fully paid" giving the impression that the funds previously intended to be used for the
repurchase of a certain property (Annex A of complaint) was converted into a loan with the consent of the complainant who gave way to
the request of the respondent "to help defray his children's educational expenses" (par. 8 of Answer).
Be that as it may, the duty and obligation to repay the loan remains unshaken. Having utilized the sum to fulfill his "urgent need for some
money," it is but just and proper that he return the amount borrowed together with interest.
Five (5) years had already passed since respondent retained the cash for his own personal use. But notwithstanding the same and his firm
promise "to pay Mrs. Junio on or before January 1997" he has not demonstrated any volition to settle his obligation to his creditor[,]
although admittedly "there w[ere] occasions when complainant's sister came to respondent to ask for the payment in behalf of
complainant," worse, "the passage of time made respondent somehow forgot about the obligation."
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice (Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility). This rule is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence
over the client.
This rule is especially significant in the instant case where the respondent enjoys an immense ascendancy over the complainant who, "as
well as two of his sisters, had served respondent's family as household helpers for many years."
Having gained dominance over the complainant by virtue of such long relation of master and servant, the respondent took advantage of his
influence by not returning the money entrusted to him. Instead, he imposed his will on the complainant and borrowed her funds without
giving adequate security therefor and mindless of the interest of the complainant
In the light of the foregoing, . . . respondent has committed an act which falls short of the standard of the norm of conduct required of every
attorney. If an ordinary borrower of money is required by the law to repay the loan failing which he may be subjected to court action, it is
more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct serves as an example. 7
It would indeed appear from the records of the case that respondent was allowed to borrow the money previously entrusted to him by complainant
for the purpose of securing the redemption of the property belonging to complainant's parents. Respondent, however, did not give adequate security
for the loan and subsequently failed to settle his obligation. Although complainant denied having loaned the money to respondent, the fact is that
complainant accepted the promissory note given her by respondent on December 12,1996. In effect, complainant consented to and ratified
respondent's use of the money. It is noteworthy that complainant did not attach this promissory note to her complaint nor explain the circumstances
surrounding its execution. She only mentioned it in her demand letter of March 12, 1998 (Annex B), in which she referred to respondent's
undertaking to pay her the P25,000.00 on or before January 1997. Under the circumstances and in view of complainant's failure to deny the
promissory note, the Court is constrained to give credence to respondent's claims that the money previously entrusted to him by complainant was
later converted into a loan.
Respondent's liability is thus not for misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter's interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. In this case, respondent's liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any security for the payment of the amount loaned
to him but that he has also refused to pay the said amount. His claim that he could not pay the loan "because circumstances . . . did not allow it" and
that, because of the passage of time, "he somehow forgot about his obligation" only underscores his blatant disregard of his obligation which reflects
on his honesty and candor. A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. 8
Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal friend and that in helping redeem the property of complainant's parents, he did not act as a
lawyer but as a friend, hence there is no client-attorney relationship between them. This contention has no merit. As explained in Hilado v. David,9
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid. promised, or charged for ; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and
the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established . . .
Considering the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation to impose on respondent the penalty of reprimand and restitution of
the amount loaned by him is clearly inadequate. On the other hand, the penalty of indefinite suspension with restitution imposed by the IBP Board of
Governors is too harsh in view of respondent's apparent lack of intent to defraud complainant and of the fact that this appears to be his first
administrative transgression. It is the penalty imposed in Igual v. Javier10 which applies to this case. In that case, this Court ordered the respondent
suspended for one month from the practice of law and directed him to pay the amount given him by his clients within 30 days from notice for his
failure to return the money in question notwithstanding his admission that he did not use the money for the filing of the appellee's brief, as agreed by
them, because of an alleged quarrel with his clients.
Anent petitioner's allegation regarding the lack of hearing during the IBP investigation, suffice it to say that he waived such right when he failed to
comment on petitioner's motion to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings theretofore filed despite due notice to him, not to
mention the fact that it was he who had requested the postponement of the two hearings scheduled by the Investigating Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and orders him suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) month and to pay to respondent, within 30 days from notice, the amount of P25,000.00 with interest at the
legal rate, computed from December 12, 1996.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and De Leon Jr., JJ ., concur.

Buena, J., on official business abroad.
[A.C. No. 1526. January 17, 2006]
LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ, JR., COMPLAINANT, vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GO, RESPONDENT
En Banc
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court dated JAN. 17, 2006
A.C. No. 1526 (Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr., complainant, vs. Atty. Jose C. Go, respondent .)
In our Decision promulgated on January 31, 2005, we imposed upon Atty. Jose C. Go, respondent, the supreme penalty of disbarment for gross
misconduct and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In our Resolution of March 29, 2005, we denied the same for lack of merit.
Before us now are: (1) complainant's motion for partial reconsideration dated April 29, 2005, praying that respondent be ordered to return to him all
the properties he (respondent) fraudulently transferred to his name; and (2) respondent's second motion for reconsideration.
In his opposition to complainant's motion, respondent maintains that ordering respondent to return the properties, now registered in his name, to
complainant will disturb the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 23, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27310 which had long acquired finality. In
this case, the Appellate Court ruled that the transfer of complainant's lots to respondent is supported by valuable consideration, except for Lot No.
848-A-1. Moreover, respondent submits that complainant is now estopped from claiming ownership of Lots Nos. 849-P, 849-Q, 2118, 1141-A and
1141-B because on September 12, 1994, the parties entered into a "Compromise Agreement" wherein they stipulated that respondent would retain
ownership of the said lots.
A careful reading of complainant's motion for partial reconsideration shows that it is a thinly-veiled attempt to re-open CA-G.R. CV No. 27310.
Complainant admits that "a review of the findings of fact and law of the CA decision is still in order and may be done by the Honorable Supreme
Court in consideration of the fact that disbarment cases are not bound by strict rules of procedure."
It bears reiterating that we sustained the finding of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that complainant's lots were transferred to
respondent without any valuable consideration, except Lot 849-D. This finding is obviously in conflict with that of the Court of Appeals.
Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the fact that right or wrong, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27310 is already final and
executory. Not even this Court may now disturb the same without running afoul of the doctrine of stability of final judgments. More so, where such
disturbance is sought to be accomplished through a mere motion in a disbarment proceeding.
Moreover, complainant should not lose sight of the true nature of a disbarment case. Disbarment is the act of this Court in withdrawing from an
attorney the right to practice law, with the name of the lawyer being stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. [1]cralaw A disbarment suit is sui generis. It is
a special proceeding peculiar to itself disciplinary in nature, and of summary character resulting from the inherent power of the courts over their
officers.[2]cralaw It is not a criminal proceeding, as it is not intended for punishment. [3]cralaw It is not in any sense a civil action where there is a
plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant, for it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievances.[4]cralaw Thus, complainant
cannot utilize this disbarment suit as a vehicle for reconveyance of his properties transferred to respondent.
WHEREFORE, we DENY complainant's motion for partial reconsideration. Respondent's second motion for reconsideration is likewise DENIED,
being a prohibited pleading.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Clerk of Court
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5687 February 03, 2005
FELIX E. EDQUIBAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In a letter-complaint1 under oath dated January 8, 2002, Felix E. Edquibal, complainant, charged Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., respondent, with
professional misconduct and neglect of duty.
Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to assist his mother Ursula Edquibal in cases she filed against his sister Delia
Edquibal-Garcia involving a certain real property in Masinloc, Zambales. His mother obtained favorable judgments in four (4) out of the five (5) cases
handled by respondent. However, in Civil Case No. RTC-1495-I (filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales), the trial judge
rendered a decision adverse to his mother. Respondent then advised complainant to appeal to the Court of Appeals and that the cost involved is
₱4,000.00. When complainant informed respondent that he does not have enough money, the latter said ₱2,000.00 would be sufficient for the
moment. After receiving the money from complainant, respondent told him just to wait for the result. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
65019.
When complainant failed to hear from respondent in January 2001, he went to the Court of Appeals to follow-up the appealed case. He then learned
that the appeal was dismissed for failure of the appellant to file the required appellant’s brief.
In his comment2 dated June 2, 2003, respondent denied that he filed an appeal, on behalf of complainant’s mother, with the Court of Appeals or
received ₱2,000.00. What happened was that complainant told him that there is someone in the Court of Appeals who can help him regarding his
appeal. Respondent claimed that he "did his best" for complainant’s mother and did not even ask for attorney’s fees.
On July 30, 2003, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated March 19, 2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, IBP Commissioner, made the following findings:
"It is clear from the records of this case that per the records of CA G-R. CV No. 65019, Respondent is the counsel of record of defendants-appellants
therein (including Complainant’s mother). In the Resolution dated 31 August 000, it was explicitly noted that ‘ (N)otice sent to counsel for defendants-
appellants requiring him to file appellant’s brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof was received by him on March 16, 2000.’ If it is true
that Respondent never agreed to handle the appeal, upon receipt of said notice, Respondent should have immediately manifested to the Court of
Appeals that he is not handling the appeal on behalf of said defendants-appellants. Thus, Section 2, Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
states that ‘[T]he counsel and guardians ad litem of the parties in the court of origin shall be respectively considered as their counsel and
guardians ad litem in the Court of Appeals.’ By failing to do so, the Court of Appeals had every reason to assume that he was likewise representing
defendants-appellants in the appeal. Accordingly, his failure to timely file the required appellants’ brief resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
The facts of this case clearly show that Respondent violated Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (‘CPR’).
Undoubtedly, Respondent’s failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of Complainant (Complainant’s mother)
caused the latter material prejudice. It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exert all
effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client’s cause makes him unworthy of
the trust reposed in him by the latter. x x x"
Atty. Villadolid recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be reprimanded "for failure to act with reasonable diligence in
representing the cause of complainant;" and that respondent be directed to "return the amount of ₱2,000.00 as and by way of restitution to
complainant."
In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-383 dated July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
Atty. Villadolid, thus:
"RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of the Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the respondent’s failure to act with reasonable diligence in representing the
cause of complainant, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., is hereby REPRIMANDED and Ordered to Return the amount of ₱2,000,00 by way of Restitution to
complainant."3
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty recommended.
Records show that respondent was the counsel of record for the appellants, complainant’s mother and other relatives in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019. The
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2000 clearly states that the "notice sent to counsel for defendants-appellants requiring him to
file appellant’s brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof, was received by him on March 16, 2000."4 However, respondent failed to file the
appellants’ brief despite receipt of such notice.
Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 2. Counsel and guardians. – The counsel and guardians ad litemof the parties in the court of origin shall be respectively considered as their
counsel and guardians ad litemin the Court of Appeals. When others appear or are appointed, notice thereof shall be served immediately on the
adverse party and filed with the court.
If it were true that respondent did not agree to represent the appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019, why did he not file with the Court of Appeals a
motion to withdraw as their counsel? Obviously, his negligence, which resulted in the dismissal of the appeal, caused prejudice to his clients.
Likewise, respondent’s failure to inform complainant of the status of his mother’s appeal is inexcusable.
It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a need for the client to be adequately and fully
informed about the developments in his case.5 A client should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and
confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.
Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
"Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to his client’s request for
information."
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence." 6 A lawyer serves his client with
diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal
in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or
withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. 7 It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the
cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence ( exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care and caution which persons of
unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights." 8 All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree
of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard, respondent’s failure to attend to his client’s appeal is clearly
wanting.
In People v. Cawili,9 we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary
action. People v. Villar, Jr.10 characterized a lawyer’s failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. Court of Appeals,11 we held
that the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the court. gr_ Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v.
Saquilaban12 reiterated Ford v. Daitol13 and In re: Santiago F. Marcos14 in holding that an attorney’s failure to file brief for his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence.
In cases involving a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading before an appellate court, we did not hesitate to suspend the erring member of the
Bar from the practice of law for three months, 15 six months,16 or even disbarment in severely aggravated cases.17
Accordingly and considering the circumstances of this case, we find a need to scale the recommended penalty upward. Here, we are convinced that
respondent deserves the penalty of suspension for three (3) months.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR. is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct and neglect of duty. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. He is further
DIRECTED to return immediately to the complainant the amount of ₱2,000.00.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 130104 January 31, 2000
ELIZABETH SUBLAY, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EURO-SWISS FOOD INC., WERDENBERG INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION and WERNER
BERGER, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 23 June 1997 1 dismissing
petitioner's appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that it was filed beyond the ten (10)-day reglementary period.
On 16 May 1991 petitioner Elizabeth Sublay was employed by private respondent Euro-Swiss Food Inc. (EURO-SWISS) as its Chief Accountant
until her termination from the service on 31 December 1994. On the first day of December 1994 petitioner received a letter from private respondent
Werner Berger, President of EURO-SWISS, informing her of his decision to abolish the position of Chief Accountant thus terminating her services
effective 31 December 1994. The reason advanced for the abolition of her position and her consequent termination was that the computerization of
the accounting system as well as the burning down of its factory significantly reduced the company's operations hence, according to Werner Berger,
he could perform his functions with "minimal assistance from the encoder and the accounting clerks." 2
Petitioner, in filing a case for illegal dismissal and non-payment of her 13th month pay against EURO-SWISS and/or Werner Berger, maintained that
she was unjustly dismissed as there was no just and valid cause for her dismissal under Arts. 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. The Labor
Arbiter however was of a different opinion —3
The admitted facts and the adduced evidence show that the complainant was justly dismissed for "installation of labor saving devices and
redundancy." Respondent Werner Berger informed the complainant that Euro-Swiss Food, Inc. would abolish the position of chief
accountant that the complainant held for as much as with the computerization of the Accounting system there was for him only minimal
assistance from the encoder and the accounting clerks. Added to this was the burning of the factory building which reduced the respondent
company's operations, and the respondents thus did not feel the need anymore of the complainant's services.
The complainant conceded that with the computer operational systems that she helped set up for the Accounting Department "only a push
of a finger of a knowledgeable employee is needed and the reports needed by management could then be generated" . . . .. It therefore
appears that the complainant's dismissal was an accomplished and admitted fact; she made final arrangement as to the payment of her
last compensation, benefits, and separation pay; and she turned over documents in her custody to her employer . . . ..
The Labor Arbiter ordered private respondent EURO-SWISS to pay petitioner her separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service or a total of P50,400.00.
On 9 December 1996 petitioner appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On the basis of the facts established by the NLRC, petitioner's counsel of record Atty. Gabriel Marquez received the Labor Arbiter's decision on 21
November 1996, hence, she had until 2 December 1996 (1 December 1996 being a Sunday) within which to appeal. However, petitioner through
Atty. Raymond Paolo Alikpala filed her appeal only on 9 December 1996 or seven (7) days late; consequently, the NLRC dismissed her appeal. 4
Petitioner is now before us ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction to the NLRC in denying outright her appeal on a mere
"technicality." In her sole assignment of error, she bewailed the NLRC's egregious error when it summarily dismissed her appeal for having been
filed out of time, thus totally ignoring the facts and circumstances of the case for the sake of expediency. 5 To justify her procedural lapse, petitioner
revealed that she received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision on 2 December 1996 upon which she immediately called up Atty. Alikpala, a
collaborating counsel6 who, she learned, was not sent a copy of the decision. Atty. Alikpala however was horrified to discover that co-counsel Atty.
Marquez had already been furnished a copy of the decision on 21 November 1996 so that by 2 December 1996 the ten (10)-day reglementary period
had already lapsed, the tenth (10th) day from 21 November 1996 being 1 December 1996, a Sunday. 1âwphi1.nêt
While petitioner acknowledges that "procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the
convenience of a party,"7 she contends that efficiency and order should not be the system's primordial values, taking over the places on the pedestal
once occupied by justice and equity. To fortify her stand, she invokes the judicial policy of allowing appeals, although filed late, when the interest of
substantial justice so requires. She cites Firestone and Rubber Co. of the Phils. v. Lariosa 8 where this Court overlooked the late filing of appeal
because the Notice of Decision received by the employee's counsel advised him that the appeal could be filed within ten (10) "working" days which
should properly have been ten (10) "calendar" days. In that case we discarded the stringent rule on the perfection of appeal in view of the sheer
absence of any culpability on the part of respondent's counsel. The procedural lapse was solely attributable to his mistaken reliance on the notice
which wrongly interpreted the ten (10) day reglementary period. Again in City Fair Corporation v. NLRC 9 where the NLRC was brought to task for
allowing the appeal of the employees filed a day late, we ruled that a greater injustice would occur if appeal was not given due course than when the
reglementary period to appeal was to be strictly followed.
Petitioner contends that as in the aforecited cases, the facts and circumstances of her case justify the setting aside of the procedural requirement on
the perfection of appeals. She remains steadfast in her belief that the NLRC erred in sending a notice of the Labor Arbiter's decision only to her lead
counsel, Atty. Marquez, but failed to furnish Atty. Alikpala, her "active" counsel, with a copy thereof and ignoring the latter's request in his Entry of
Appearance filed on 13 May 1996 that they (referring to the law office Saguisag and Associates to which Atty. Alikpala belonged) "be served and
furnished with courtesy copies of all motions, orders, judgment, and other papers in the said case." 10
It is doctrinally well-entrenched that the perfection of appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional
and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court or body of the legal authority to alter the
final judgment, much less to entertain, the appeal. As pointed out by petitioner, this Court has time and again sidestepped the rule on the statutory or
reglementary period for filing an appeal. We have resorted to this extraordinary measure even at the expense of sacrificing order and efficiency if
only to serve the higher ideals of justice and equity. Yet we cannot respond with alacrity to every clamor of injustice and bend the rules to placate a
vociferous protestor crying and claiming to be a victim of a wrong. It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply the
rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done. Such does not obtain in this case.
It is undisputed that petitioner was represented by two (2) lawyers, Atty. Marquez as lead counsel, and Atty. Alikpala as collaborating counsel. She
alleged that Atty. Marquez to whom a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision was given, failed to file the appeal and to notify her of the adverse decision
resulting in its late filing and subsequent dismissal by the NLRC. She reasoned that had Atty. Alikpala been likewise served a copy of the decision
she would not be in this distressing situation.
The rule is that when a party is represented by two (2) or more lawyers, notice to one (1) suffices as a notice to the party represented by him. Hence,
the Labor Arbiter was not in error when he served a copy of the decision only on Atty. Marquez who after all was still the counsel of record when the
decision was rendered. Likewise petitioner cannot claim that although Atty. Marquez was not asked to formally withdraw he has for all intents and
purposes suit withdrawn because, by failing to actively represent petitioner, he virtually relinquished his responsibility over the case to Atty. Alikpala.
The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that clients are bound by the action of their counsel in the conduct of their case. Otherwise, if the lawyer's
mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. Besides, without formally withdrawing his appearance, Atty. Marquez continued to be the counsel of
petitioner. Courts may not presume that the counsel of record has been substituted by a second counsel merely from the filing of a formal
appearance by the latter. In the absence of compliance with the essential requirements for valid substitution of counsel of record, 11 the court can
safely presume that he continuously and actively represents his client.
Lastly, petitioner's claim for judicial relief in view of her counsel's alleged negligence is incongruous, to say the least, considering that she was
represented by more than one (1) lawyer. Although working merely as a collaborating counsel who entered his appearance for petitioner as early as
May 1996, i.e., more or less six (6) months before the termination of the proceedings a quo, Atty. Alikpala had the bounden duty to monitor the
progress of the case. A lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file an appeal. He cannot rely on the
courts to appraise him of the developments in his case and warn him against any possible procedural blunder. Knowing that the lead counsel was no
longer participating actively in the trial of the case several months before its resolution, Atty. Alikpala who alone was left to defend petitioner should
have put himself on guard and thus anticipated the release of the Labor Arbiter's decision. Petitioner's lead counsel might have been negligent but
she was never really deprived of proper representation. This fact alone militates against the grant of this petition.
Once again we remind the members of the legal profession that every case they handle deserves their full and undivided attention, diligence, skill
and competence, regardless of its importance and whether they accept it for a fee or for free keeping in mind that not only the property but also the
life and liberty of their clients may be at stake.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for failure of petitioner Elizabeth Sublay to sufficiently establish that public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, in its assailed Decision committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the appeal of
petitioner for having been filed beyond the ten (10)-day reglementary period. No cost. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8158 February 24, 2010
ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In a verified complaint1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar Discipline), Atty.
Elmer C. Solidon (Atty. Solidon) sought the disbarment of Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) for violations of Rule 16.01, 2 Rule 18.03,3 and
Rule 18.044 of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving negligence in handling a case.
The Facts
Atty. Macalalad is the Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office 8, Tacloban
City. Although he is in public service, the DENR Secretary has given him the authority to engage in the practice of law.
While on official visit to Eastern Samar in October 2005, Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty. Solidon by a mutual acquaintance, Flordeliz Cabo-
Borata (Ms. Cabo-Borata). Atty. Solidon asked Atty. Macalalad to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land located in Borongan, Eastern Samar
and owned by Atty. Solidon’s relatives. For a consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (₱80,000.00), Atty. Macalalad accepted the task to be
completed within a period of eight (8) months. Atty. Macalalad received Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining
balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) was to be paid when Atty. Solidon received the certificate of title to the property.
Atty. Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up to the present time.
In the Complaint, Position Papers5 and documentary evidence submitted, Atty. Solidon claimed that he tried to contact Atty. Macalalad to follow-up
on the status of the case six (6) months after he paid the initial legal fees. He did this through phone calls and text messages to their known
acquaintances and relatives, and, finally, through a letter sent by courier to Atty. Macalalad. However, he did not receive any communication from
Atty. Macalalad.
In the Answer,6 Position Paper,7 and affidavits of witnesses, Atty. Macalalad posited that the delay in the filing of the petition for the titling of the
property was caused by his clients’ failure to communicate with him. He also explained that he had no intention of reneging on his obligation, as he
had already prepared the draft of the petition. He failed to file the petition simply because he still lacked the needed documentary evidence that his
clients should have furnished him. Lastly, Atty. Macalalad denied that Atty. Solidon tried to communicate with him.
The Findings of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 25, 2008, Investigating Commissioner Randall C. Tabayoyong made the following finding of
negligence against Atty. Macalalad:
…complainant submitted in his position paper the affidavit of Flordeliz Cabo-Borata, the mutual acquaintance of both complainant and respondent. In
the said affidavit, Mrs. Cabo-Borata described how she repeatedly followed-up the matter with respondent and how respondent turned a deaf ear
towards the same. There is nothing on record which would prompt this Office to view the allegations therein with caution. In fact, considering that the
allegations corroborate the undisputed facts of the instant case...
As respondent has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for the non-filing of the application despite the lapse of about a year from the time
his services were engaged, it is plain that his negligence in filing the application remains uncontroverted. And such negligence is contrary to the
mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him. In fact, Rule 18.03 even provides that his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Acting on this recommendation, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July
17, 2008, holding that:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution … and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and
Ordered to Return the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) with 12% interest per annum to complainant …
The case is now before this Court for our final action pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, considering that the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline imposed the penalty of suspension on Atty. Macalalad.
We agree with the IBP’s factual findings and legal conclusions.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to
discharge.8 We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainant’s evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies
the required quantum of proof in proving Atty. Macalalad’s negligence.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered
per se a violation.
Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez,9 we held that a lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to protect his client’s interest after receiving his
acceptance fee. In In Re: Atty. Briones,10 we ruled that the failure of the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary period (to the
prejudice of his client who languished in jail for more than a year) is an offense that warrants disciplinary action. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, we
penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the case, among other matters. 11
Subsequently, in Reyes v. Vitan,12 we reiterated that the act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the complainant’s
case and, subsequently, in failing to render the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We made the
same conclusion in Canoy v. Ortiz13 where we emphatically stated that the lawyer’s failure to file the position paper was per se a violation of Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his negligence in handling a case. In Canoy, we
accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyer’s duty to inform
his client of the status of the case.14 Our rulings in Macarilay v. Seriña,15 in Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,16 and in Villaflores v. Limos17 were of the
same tenor. In Villaflores, we opined that even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main responsibility remains
with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to acquire the required information. We held that as between the client and his lawyer, the latter
has more control in handling the case.
All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyer’s duty to his client once an engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so
engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence.18 The lawyer bears the duty to serve his
client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her
client.19 Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate
attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. 201avvphi1
The records in this case tell us that Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he committed when he failed to file the required petition. He cannot now shift the
blame to his clients since it was his duty as a lawyer to communicate with them. At any rate, we reject Atty. Macalalad’s defense that it was his
clients who failed to contact him. Although no previous communication transpired between Atty. Macalalad and his clients, the records nevertheless
show that Atty. Solidon, who contracted Atty. Macalalad’s services in behalf of his relatives, tried his best to reach him prior to the filing of the present
disbarment case. Atty. Solidon even enlisted the aid of Ms. Cabo-Borata to follow-up on the status of the registration application with Atty. Macalalad.
As narrated by Ms. Cabo-Borata in her affidavit,21 she succeeded several times in getting in touch with Atty. Macalalad and on those occasions
asked him about the progress of the case. To use Ms. Cabo-Borata’s own words, she received "no clear-cut answers from him"; he just informed her
that everything was "on process." We give credence to these narrations considering Atty. Macalalad’s failure to contradict them or deny their
veracity, in marked contrast with his vigorous denial of Atty. Solidon’s allegations.
We consider, too, that other motivating factors – specifically, the monetary consideration and the fixed period of performance – should have made it
more imperative for Atty. Macalalad to promptly take action and initiate communication with his clients. He had been given initial payment and should
have at least undertaken initial delivery of his part of the engagement.
We further find that Atty. Macalalad’s conduct refutes his claim of willingness to perform his obligations. If Atty. Macalalad truly wanted to file the
petition, he could have acquired the necessary information from Atty. Solidon to enable him to file the petition even pending the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline investigation. As matters now stand, he did not take any action to initiate communication. These omissions unequivocally point to Atty.
Macalalad’s lack of due care that now warrants disciplinary action.
In addition to the above finding of negligence, we also find Atty. Macalalad guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires a lawyer to account for all the money received from the client. In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not immediately account for and
promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon even after he failed to render any legal service within the contracted time of the
engagement.22
The Penalty
Based on these considerations, we modify the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommended penalty by increasing the period of Atty.
Macalalad’s suspension from the practice of law from three (3) months, to six (6) months. 23 In this regard, we follow the Court’s lead in Pariñas v.
Paguinto24 where we imposed on the respondent lawyer suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.01 and Rule
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17, 2008 of the Board of
Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. We impose on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS SUSPENSION from
the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.03 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, effective upon finality of this Decision. Atty.
Macalalad is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Macalalad is also ORDERED to RETURN to Atty. Elmer C. Solidon the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the date of promulgation of this Decision until the full amount is returned.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Macalalad’s record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5239 November 18, 2013
SPOUSES GEORGE A. WARRINER and AURORA R. WARRINER, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RENI M. DUBLIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the administrative Complaint1 filed on March 14, 2000 by complainant-spouses George Arthur Warriner (Warriner) and Aurora R.
Warriner against respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
In their Complaint filed directly before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, complainants alleged that they secured the services of respondent
in the filing of a Complaint for damages captioned as Aurora M Del Rio-Warriner and her spouse-husband George Arthur Warriner, plaintiffs, versus
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. and docketed as Civil Case No. 23,396-95 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16; that
during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 23,396-95, respondent requested the RTC for a period of 10 days within which to submit his Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence; that despite the lapse of the requested period, respondent did not submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that
respondent did not file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. s motion to declare complainants to have waived their right to file Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent belatedly filed a Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence which the RTC denied; that respondent did
not oppose or file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.’s move to dismiss the Complaint; and that the RTC eventually dismissed Civil
Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants. In a Resolution 2 dated June 26, 2000, we directed respondent to file his Comment to
this administrative Complaint. Upon receipt of the Resolution on August 24, 2000, 3 respondent requested for an extension of 30 days which was
granted.4
However, as of August 5, 2002, or after a lapse of almost two years, respondent had not yet filed his Comment. Thus, we resolved to require
respondent to "show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution
requiring said comment, both within ten (10) days from notice." 5 Respondent received our directive but chose to ignore the same. 6 In another
Resolution7 dated August 4, 2003, we imposed a fine of ₱1,000.00 on respondent and reiterated our directives requiring him to file his Comment and
to submit an explanation on his failure to file the same. However, respondent again ignored this Court’s directive. Thus, on February 15, 2006, we
increased the fine to ₱2,000.00 but respondent continued to ignore our Resolutions. 8 Consequently, on March 10, 2008, we resolved to order
respondent’s arrest and detention until he complies with our Resolutions. 9
This time, respondent heeded our directives by submitting his Compliance 10 and Comment.11 Respondent claimed that he failed to file his Comment
to the instant administrative case because he lost the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 and that he tried to get a copy from the RTC to no avail.
In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period, respondent averred that complainant Warriner is an Australian national who
married his Filipino spouse as a convenient scheme to stay in the country; that he rendered his services in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 free of charge;
that he accepted the case because he was challenged by Warriner’s criticism of the Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the veracity of
Warriner’s claim that the construction being undertaken by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the soil towards his
property; that Warriner was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of other witnesses to testify for Warriner strengthened his suspicion
of the veracity of Warriner’s claim; that upon inquiries, he discovered that the bits of evidence presented by Warriner were fabricated; that the
barangay officials do not wish to participate in the fraudulent scheme of Warriner; that he visited Warriner’s property and saw that Warriner authored
the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.; that he had a heated
argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with a disbarment suit; that based on his discovery, respondent did not wish to submit
his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that complainants no longer saw him or inquired about the status of the case; that he did not withdraw
from the case because complainants no longer visited him at his law office; that if he withdraws, Warriner would only hire another lawyer to
perpetrate his fraudulent scheme; and that he could not be held administratively liable for filing a belated Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence as
he only did the same to protect the legal profession and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.
In a Resolution12 dated July 16, 2008, we found respondent’s explanation for failing to comply with our directives not fully satisfactory hence, we
admonished him to be more circumspect in his dealings with the Court. At the same time, we referred the Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The parties submitted their respective Position Papers before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
In their Position Paper,13 complainants insisted that respondent mishandled their case before the RTC by filing a motion to admit the formal exhibits
almost three months after the prescribed period; that respondent did not present complainants’ Marriage Contract and General Power of Attorney
that would have allowed Warriner to represent his wife while the latter is out of the country; that complainants’ marriage is not for convenience; that
complainants have a son out of said marriage; that respondent was paid for his services; that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) before undertaking the construction; that Warriner was not the sole witness for the prosecution; that the
records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 would show that a representative from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Barangay Captain were likewise presented; and that these witnesses proved that Warriner’s claim was not a fabrication.
In his Position Paper,14 respondent contradicted his earlier assertion in his Comment filed before the Court that Warriner was his only witness in Civil
Case No. 23,396-95 by claiming this time that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a representative
from DENR. He conceded that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed failed to secure an ECC but claimed that this alone would not prove that E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not institute corrective measures to prevent soil erosion and damages to neighboring houses such as Warriner’s. He
insisted that it is the natural topography of the place which caused the soil erosion which again contradicted his earlier allegation in his Comment
before this Court that it was Warriner who caused the soil erosion by destroying the ditches constructed by the developer. Moreover, he alleged that
the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s Garden which he offered as an exhibit in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was a fabrication as there is no
such entity in Laurel St., Davao City.
In their Supplemental Position Paper,15 complainants argued, among others, that since more than eight years have lapsed, it is possible that
Bening’s Garden relocated to another address but it does not mean that it never existed.
In his Report and Recommendation,16 the Investigating Commissioner17 found respondent guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95 in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and thus recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XIX-2010-442 18 dated August 28, 2010, approved with modification the findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case of complainants, respondent also
showed his propensity to defy the orders of the court, thus it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year.
Respondent moved for reconsideration insisting that the IBP’s Resolution is not supported by facts. He maintained that his actuations did not amount
to a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, although belated,
exculpated him from any liability. He asserted that the exhibits were fabricated thus he deliberately belatedly filed the Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence in the hope that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. He denied defying lawful orders of the RTC or this Court. He insisted
that defiance of lawful orders connotes total, complete or absolute refusal and not mere belated filing. He argued that he did not oppose or file
comment to the Motion to Dismiss as he deemed the same proper considering the fabricated allegations of his clients. Respondent argued that the
penalty recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to his infractions. He alleged that the records of this case would show that he did not utterly
disregard the orders or processes of the Court or the IBP. He claimed that this Court should have deemed his failure to timely file a Comment as a
waiver on his part to file the same, and not as defiance of this Court’s orders. Besides, he insisted that the only issue to be resolved by the IBP was
the alleged mishandling of Civil Case No. 23,396-95; the IBP should not have delved on whether he disregarded or was disrespectful of the Court’s
orders because he was not given any opportunity to rebut the same.
Finally, respondent posited that his penalty is oppressive, excessive and disproportionate. He argued that with his suspension, the other cases he is
handling would be affected.
Complainants also filed their Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent should be disbarred or suspended for five years from the practice
of law. To this, respondent filed his Comment asserting that the Investigating Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report
and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with the complainants. He averred that after the filing of the Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence and until the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23,396-95, he had no occasion to meet the complainants. He maintained that he
had nothing to be remorseful about and that there is absolutely no evidence that would justify his suspension. He maintained that "being basic and
elementary in any legal procedure, a failure or refusal to submit comment is but a waiver to so comment and puts the controversy submitted for
resolution based on the evidence available at hand x x x. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not consider respondent’s failure or omission
as having such effects, but such failure cannot be considered as a contemptuous act x x x."
The IBP Board of Governors, however, was not persuaded hence it denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 6, 2013, respondent filed before this Court An Ex Parte Manifestation (Not a Motion for Reconsideration) 19 insisting that his failure to timely
file comment on the administrative case does not constitute defiance of the Court’s directives but is only "a natural human expression of frustration,
distraught and disappointment" when this Court and the IBP entertained a clearly unmeritorious Complaint. In any case, he averred that on April 12,
2013, the IBP Davao City Chapter presented him with a Certificate of Appreciation for his invaluable support to the local chapter. He claims that –
x x x Even a feeble minded average person will find it ridiculously hilarious and comical that the [IBP] National Office condemns undersigned for his
acts allegedly inimical to the profession but will be ‘praised to the heavens’, so to speak, by the local chapter of the same organization for his
invaluable support to that same organization whose object, among others, is to discipline its members to be respectful and [subservient] to the rule of
law by serving justice in an orderly and dignified manner. Weight and credence must be accorded the recognition and appreciation by this local
chapter being logically considered as having the first hand observation and, thus, the personal knowledge of undersigned’s personal character,
integrity, uprightness, reputation and sacrifices in the practice of his legal profession.
As a gesture of meek obedience, respondent will not pray for the reconsideration and setting aside of that resolution adopted by the Honorable
Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for one (1) year, erroneous, disproportionate and harsh as it may be. Undersigned only
prays that, by way of protecting the prestigious image of the [IBP], measures be adopted to prevent it from becoming a laughing stock of professional
organizations in the Philippines worthy for the books of wonders by its inconsistent, ridiculous and contradictory stance of disciplining its members
exemplified by the predicament of respondent in this instant proceeding on the one hand but on the other hand is extolled by its local chapter to high
heavens for his "invaluable support" of the tenets and foundation of that very same organization that condemns him. THIS IS HILARIOUSLY
COMICAL AND ABSURDLY ODD.
Our Ruling
Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-day period given to respondent to submit his formal
offer of documentary evidence pursuant to the RTC Order dated November 11, 1997 lapsed without any compliance from the respondent.
Consequently, the RTC, in its January 23, 1998 Order deemed respondent to have waived the submission of his formal offer of exhibits. Instead of
asking the RTC to set aside the above Order, respondent filed on February 3, 1998 a Motion to Admit the Belated Formal Exhibits in Evidence. As to
be expected, the RTC denied the motion. At the same time, it directed E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. to file its Motion to Dismiss by way of
Demurrer to Evidence. Again, respondent failed to comment or oppose the Motion to Dismiss despite the opportunity given by the RTC. As a result,
Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was dismissed.
Plainly, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 which provide:
Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants. Culled from the
pleadings respondent submitted before this Court and the IBP, respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits
because he believes that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If
respondent truly believes that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he has the option to withdraw from the
case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as "[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct
with the matter he is handling"20 or "[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules." 21 Respondent
adverted to the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s Garden as a fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City. Unfortunately,
respondent anchored his claim that Bening's Garden does not exist merely on the claim of Rudolph C. Lumibao, a "sympathetic client" and a part-
time gardener. Complainants refuted this allegation by claiming that Bening's Garden must have relocated its business considering that more than
eight years have passed since the estimate was secured. Complainants also pointed out that since the filing of this case, respondent has thrice
relocated his office but this does not mean that his practice has ceased to exist.
We also agree with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and disrespect court orders and processes. 1âwphi1 Note that we required
respondent to submit his Comment to this administrative Complaint as early as year 2000. However, he was only able to file his Comment eight
years later, or in 2008 and only after we ordered his arrest. "As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court
is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. 22
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that respondent is also prone to resorting to contradictions in his effort to exculpate himself. In his Comment
filed before this Court, respondent claimed that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95. However, in his Position Paper filed
before the IBP, he admitted that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a representative from DENR.
Next, he claimed in his Comment filed before this Court that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with a
disbarment suit. The Investigating Commissioner took this into account when he submitted his Report and Recommendation. Surprisingly,
respondent claimed in his Comment to complainant's Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP that the Investigating Commissioner erred and was
inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with the complainants. Moreover, respondent
claimed in his Comment before this Court that Warriner authored the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided
by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. However, he again contradicted himself when he claimed in his Position Paper that the natural topography of
the place was the cause of the erosion. At this juncture, respondent must be reminded that as a lawyer and an officer of the Court, he "owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court."23 He "shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice."24
Under the circumstances, and considering that we had already admonished respondent and had him arrested for his adamant refusal to obey our
directives, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner, and as we
similarly imposed in Hernandez v. Padilla25 and Pesto v. Millo,26 commensurate to respondent’s infractions. Besides, we wish to emphasize that
"suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment but a means to protect the public and the legal profession." 27
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Reni M. Dublin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months effective upon receipt of this Resolution with a
WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to
enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar and copies furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5655 January 23, 2006
VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio " Batas" Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of
malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:
On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondent’s services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled " Lucio De
Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent," pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal.
Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal
services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent
refused.
On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
found that "for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent
except his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office." She recommended that respondent be required
to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed.
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner Navarro’s
Report and Recommendation.
On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision.
Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044.
There, he learned of the trial court’s Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that "the tax declarations and title" submitted by complainant "are not
official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed." Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint 1 against complainant
charging her with violations of Article 1712 and 172,3 and/or Article 1824 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered
evidence.
In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments:
First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a
petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree.
Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was "considered submitted for decision" as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13,
2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, "he could not have done anything anymore" about it.
Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from doing his job.
And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her.
In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client
when he filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity
of her documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Court’s directive constitutes
contempt.
We deny respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to
decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client’s cause.5 From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted devotion. 6
Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044.
Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, "there is nothing in the records to show that he
(respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044." Neither is there any evidence nor pleading
submitted to show that he initiated new petitions.
With ingenuity, respondent now claims that "complainant did not engage his services for Civil Case No. 00-044" but, instead, she engaged him for
the filing of two new petitions. This is obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. Respondent knows very well that if he can successfully
disassociate himself as complainant’s counsel in Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of any dereliction of duties.
But respondent’s current assertion came too late in the day. He is already bound by his previous statements. In his Verified Comment on the
Affidavit-Complaint,7 he categorically stated that complainant engaged his services in Civil Case No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty. Oliver
Lozano, thus:
4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano.
4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano is a bright lawyer and is very much capable of handling Civil Case
No. 00-044.
4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano – did not inquire the reason for the referral. But he was made to understand that he was
being referred because Atty. Oliver Lozano believed that Respondent would be in a better position to prosecute and/or defend the Complainant in
Civil Case No. 00-044.
xxxxxx
5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October 13, 2001 and demanded that he provides her with free legal service.
xxxxxx
5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case (Civil Case No. 00-044) would not entitle her to a free legal service and advised her to just
re-engage the services of Atty. Oliver Lozano.
5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case and how she and her lawyer should go prosecuting and/or defending her
position therein.
5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044 at that time, Respondent gave his
professional opinion on the factual and legal matters surrounding the said case.
5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the Respondent, Complainant became even more adamant in asking the former to represent her in
Civil Case No. 00-044.
5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as a regular client is she insists in retaining his services.
5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about his fees.
5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent told Complainant that he will have to charge her with an acceptance fee of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), aside form being charged for papers/pleadings that may have to be prepared and filed in court in connection with
the aforesaid case.
xxxxxx
5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano. The said Atty. Oliver Lozano interceded for and in behalf of Complainant and
asked that the acceptance fee that Respondent was charging the Complainant be reduced.
xxxxxx
5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on October 20, 2001. The latter then informed the former of his conversation with Atty.
Oliver Lozano and his (respondent’s) decision to reduce the acceptance fee.
5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even shedding a tear or two simply because Respondent had agreed to handle her case at a greatly
reduced acceptance fee.
Statements of similar tenor can also be found in respondent’s Memorandum 8 filed with the IBP.
Undoubtedly, respondent’s present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide
early what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application
of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process. 9 The present administrative case was resolved by the
IBP on the basis of respondent’s previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind
himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondent’s inconsistent assertions, it is his
dishonesty to this Court.
At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondent’s services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No.
00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that,
in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Pariñas v. Paguinto,10 we held that "a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file
the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand." Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return
the money.
Neither do we find merit in respondent’s second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already "submitted for decision" does not justify
his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple
task. He should have returned complainant’s money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing.
In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him
with documents vital to the case. He further claims that he would be violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by handling a case without
adequate preparation. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the
requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. 11 As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a
matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainant’s title. It bears reiterating that
respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a
lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.
Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument , respondent accuses her of offering falsified
documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal
services to complainant.
Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We
believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with
its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically
provides:
Rule 19.02 – A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with
the Rules of Court.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her
fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her.
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to
complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain
his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client
relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he
verified the authenticity of complainant’s title only after the "news of his suspension spread in the legal community." To our mind, there is absurdity in
invoking subsequent knowledge of a fact as justification for an act or omission that is fait accompli.
Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by vindictiveness.
In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer. 12 It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a
client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good
faith.13 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 14 Indeed,
law is an exacting goddess demanding of her votaries not only intellectual but also moral discipline.
WHEREFORE, we DENY respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is
directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5239 November 18, 2013
SPOUSES GEORGE A. WARRINER and AURORA R. WARRINER, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RENI M. DUBLIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the administrative Complaint1 filed on March 14, 2000 by complainant-spouses George Arthur Warriner (Warriner) and Aurora R.
Warriner against respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
In their Complaint filed directly before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, complainants alleged that they secured the services of respondent
in the filing of a Complaint for damages captioned as Aurora M Del Rio-Warriner and her spouse-husband George Arthur Warriner, plaintiffs, versus
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. and docketed as Civil Case No. 23,396-95 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16; that
during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 23,396-95, respondent requested the RTC for a period of 10 days within which to submit his Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence; that despite the lapse of the requested period, respondent did not submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that
respondent did not file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. s motion to declare complainants to have waived their right to file Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent belatedly filed a Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence which the RTC denied; that respondent did
not oppose or file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.’s move to dismiss the Complaint; and that the RTC eventually dismissed Civil
Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants. In a Resolution 2 dated June 26, 2000, we directed respondent to file his Comment to
this administrative Complaint. Upon receipt of the Resolution on August 24, 2000, 3 respondent requested for an extension of 30 days which was
granted.4
However, as of August 5, 2002, or after a lapse of almost two years, respondent had not yet filed his Comment. Thus, we resolved to require
respondent to "show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution
requiring said comment, both within ten (10) days from notice." 5 Respondent received our directive but chose to ignore the same. 6 In another
Resolution7 dated August 4, 2003, we imposed a fine of ₱1,000.00 on respondent and reiterated our directives requiring him to file his Comment and
to submit an explanation on his failure to file the same. However, respondent again ignored this Court’s directive. Thus, on February 15, 2006, we
increased the fine to ₱2,000.00 but respondent continued to ignore our Resolutions. 8 Consequently, on March 10, 2008, we resolved to order
respondent’s arrest and detention until he complies with our Resolutions. 9
This time, respondent heeded our directives by submitting his Compliance 10 and Comment.11 Respondent claimed that he failed to file his Comment
to the instant administrative case because he lost the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 and that he tried to get a copy from the RTC to no avail.
In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period, respondent averred that complainant Warriner is an Australian national who
married his Filipino spouse as a convenient scheme to stay in the country; that he rendered his services in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 free of charge;
that he accepted the case because he was challenged by Warriner’s criticism of the Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the veracity of
Warriner’s claim that the construction being undertaken by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the soil towards his
property; that Warriner was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of other witnesses to testify for Warriner strengthened his suspicion
of the veracity of Warriner’s claim; that upon inquiries, he discovered that the bits of evidence presented by Warriner were fabricated; that the
barangay officials do not wish to participate in the fraudulent scheme of Warriner; that he visited Warriner’s property and saw that Warriner authored
the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.; that he had a heated
argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with a disbarment suit; that based on his discovery, respondent did not wish to submit
his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that complainants no longer saw him or inquired about the status of the case; that he did not withdraw
from the case because complainants no longer visited him at his law office; that if he withdraws, Warriner would only hire another lawyer to
perpetrate his fraudulent scheme; and that he could not be held administratively liable for filing a belated Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence as
he only did the same to protect the legal profession and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.
In a Resolution12 dated July 16, 2008, we found respondent’s explanation for failing to comply with our directives not fully satisfactory hence, we
admonished him to be more circumspect in his dealings with the Court. At the same time, we referred the Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The parties submitted their respective Position Papers before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
In their Position Paper,13 complainants insisted that respondent mishandled their case before the RTC by filing a motion to admit the formal exhibits
almost three months after the prescribed period; that respondent did not present complainants’ Marriage Contract and General Power of Attorney
that would have allowed Warriner to represent his wife while the latter is out of the country; that complainants’ marriage is not for convenience; that
complainants have a son out of said marriage; that respondent was paid for his services; that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) before undertaking the construction; that Warriner was not the sole witness for the prosecution; that the
records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 would show that a representative from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Barangay Captain were likewise presented; and that these witnesses proved that Warriner’s claim was not a fabrication.
In his Position Paper,14 respondent contradicted his earlier assertion in his Comment filed before the Court that Warriner was his only witness in Civil
Case No. 23,396-95 by claiming this time that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a representative
from DENR. He conceded that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed failed to secure an ECC but claimed that this alone would not prove that E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not institute corrective measures to prevent soil erosion and damages to neighboring houses such as Warriner’s. He
insisted that it is the natural topography of the place which caused the soil erosion which again contradicted his earlier allegation in his Comment
before this Court that it was Warriner who caused the soil erosion by destroying the ditches constructed by the developer. Moreover, he alleged that
the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s Garden which he offered as an exhibit in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was a fabrication as there is no
such entity in Laurel St., Davao City.
In their Supplemental Position Paper,15 complainants argued, among others, that since more than eight years have lapsed, it is possible that
Bening’s Garden relocated to another address but it does not mean that it never existed.
In his Report and Recommendation,16 the Investigating Commissioner17 found respondent guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95 in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and thus recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XIX-2010-442 18 dated August 28, 2010, approved with modification the findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case of complainants, respondent also
showed his propensity to defy the orders of the court, thus it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year.
Respondent moved for reconsideration insisting that the IBP’s Resolution is not supported by facts. He maintained that his actuations did not amount
to a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, although belated,
exculpated him from any liability. He asserted that the exhibits were fabricated thus he deliberately belatedly filed the Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence in the hope that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. He denied defying lawful orders of the RTC or this Court. He insisted
that defiance of lawful orders connotes total, complete or absolute refusal and not mere belated filing. He argued that he did not oppose or file
comment to the Motion to Dismiss as he deemed the same proper considering the fabricated allegations of his clients. Respondent argued that the
penalty recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to his infractions. He alleged that the records of this case would show that he did not utterly
disregard the orders or processes of the Court or the IBP. He claimed that this Court should have deemed his failure to timely file a Comment as a
waiver on his part to file the same, and not as defiance of this Court’s orders. Besides, he insisted that the only issue to be resolved by the IBP was
the alleged mishandling of Civil Case No. 23,396-95; the IBP should not have delved on whether he disregarded or was disrespectful of the Court’s
orders because he was not given any opportunity to rebut the same.
Finally, respondent posited that his penalty is oppressive, excessive and disproportionate. He argued that with his suspension, the other cases he is
handling would be affected.
Complainants also filed their Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent should be disbarred or suspended for five years from the practice
of law. To this, respondent filed his Comment asserting that the Investigating Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report
and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with the complainants. He averred that after the filing of the Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence and until the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23,396-95, he had no occasion to meet the complainants. He maintained that he
had nothing to be remorseful about and that there is absolutely no evidence that would justify his suspension. He maintained that "being basic and
elementary in any legal procedure, a failure or refusal to submit comment is but a waiver to so comment and puts the controversy submitted for
resolution based on the evidence available at hand x x x. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not consider respondent’s failure or omission
as having such effects, but such failure cannot be considered as a contemptuous act x x x."
The IBP Board of Governors, however, was not persuaded hence it denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 6, 2013, respondent filed before this Court An Ex Parte Manifestation (Not a Motion for Reconsideration) 19 insisting that his failure to timely
file comment on the administrative case does not constitute defiance of the Court’s directives but is only "a natural human expression of frustration,
distraught and disappointment" when this Court and the IBP entertained a clearly unmeritorious Complaint. In any case, he averred that on April 12,
2013, the IBP Davao City Chapter presented him with a Certificate of Appreciation for his invaluable support to the local chapter. He claims that –
x x x Even a feeble minded average person will find it ridiculously hilarious and comical that the [IBP] National Office condemns undersigned for his
acts allegedly inimical to the profession but will be ‘praised to the heavens’, so to speak, by the local chapter of the same organization for his
invaluable support to that same organization whose object, among others, is to discipline its members to be respectful and [subservient] to the rule of
law by serving justice in an orderly and dignified manner. Weight and credence must be accorded the recognition and appreciation by this local
chapter being logically considered as having the first hand observation and, thus, the personal knowledge of undersigned’s personal character,
integrity, uprightness, reputation and sacrifices in the practice of his legal profession.
As a gesture of meek obedience, respondent will not pray for the reconsideration and setting aside of that resolution adopted by the Honorable
Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for one (1) year, erroneous, disproportionate and harsh as it may be. Undersigned only
prays that, by way of protecting the prestigious image of the [IBP], measures be adopted to prevent it from becoming a laughing stock of professional
organizations in the Philippines worthy for the books of wonders by its inconsistent, ridiculous and contradictory stance of disciplining its members
exemplified by the predicament of respondent in this instant proceeding on the one hand but on the other hand is extolled by its local chapter to high
heavens for his "invaluable support" of the tenets and foundation of that very same organization that condemns him. THIS IS HILARIOUSLY
COMICAL AND ABSURDLY ODD.
Our Ruling
Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-day period given to respondent to submit his formal
offer of documentary evidence pursuant to the RTC Order dated November 11, 1997 lapsed without any compliance from the respondent.
Consequently, the RTC, in its January 23, 1998 Order deemed respondent to have waived the submission of his formal offer of exhibits. Instead of
asking the RTC to set aside the above Order, respondent filed on February 3, 1998 a Motion to Admit the Belated Formal Exhibits in Evidence. As to
be expected, the RTC denied the motion. At the same time, it directed E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. to file its Motion to Dismiss by way of
Demurrer to Evidence. Again, respondent failed to comment or oppose the Motion to Dismiss despite the opportunity given by the RTC. As a result,
Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was dismissed.
Plainly, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 which provide:
Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants. Culled from the
pleadings respondent submitted before this Court and the IBP, respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits
because he believes that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If
respondent truly believes that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he has the option to withdraw from the
case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as "[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct
with the matter he is handling"20 or "[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules." 21 Respondent
adverted to the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s Garden as a fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City. Unfortunately,
respondent anchored his claim that Bening's Garden does not exist merely on the claim of Rudolph C. Lumibao, a "sympathetic client" and a part-
time gardener. Complainants refuted this allegation by claiming that Bening's Garden must have relocated its business considering that more than
eight years have passed since the estimate was secured. Complainants also pointed out that since the filing of this case, respondent has thrice
relocated his office but this does not mean that his practice has ceased to exist.
We also agree with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and disrespect court orders and processes. 1âwphi1 Note that we required
respondent to submit his Comment to this administrative Complaint as early as year 2000. However, he was only able to file his Comment eight
years later, or in 2008 and only after we ordered his arrest. "As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court
is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. 22
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that respondent is also prone to resorting to contradictions in his effort to exculpate himself. In his Comment
filed before this Court, respondent claimed that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95. However, in his Position Paper filed
before the IBP, he admitted that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a representative from DENR.
Next, he claimed in his Comment filed before this Court that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with a
disbarment suit. The Investigating Commissioner took this into account when he submitted his Report and Recommendation. Surprisingly,
respondent claimed in his Comment to complainant's Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP that the Investigating Commissioner erred and was
inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with the complainants. Moreover, respondent
claimed in his Comment before this Court that Warriner authored the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided
by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. However, he again contradicted himself when he claimed in his Position Paper that the natural topography of
the place was the cause of the erosion. At this juncture, respondent must be reminded that as a lawyer and an officer of the Court, he "owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court."23 He "shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice."24
Under the circumstances, and considering that we had already admonished respondent and had him arrested for his adamant refusal to obey our
directives, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner, and as we
similarly imposed in Hernandez v. Padilla25 and Pesto v. Millo,26 commensurate to respondent’s infractions. Besides, we wish to emphasize that
"suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment but a means to protect the public and the legal profession." 27
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Reni M. Dublin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months effective upon receipt of this Resolution with a
WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to
enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar and copies furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8158 February 24, 2010
ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In a verified complaint1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar Discipline), Atty.
Elmer C. Solidon (Atty. Solidon) sought the disbarment of Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) for violations of Rule 16.01, 2 Rule 18.03,3 and
Rule 18.044 of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving negligence in handling a case.
The Facts
Atty. Macalalad is the Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office 8, Tacloban
City. Although he is in public service, the DENR Secretary has given him the authority to engage in the practice of law.
While on official visit to Eastern Samar in October 2005, Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty. Solidon by a mutual acquaintance, Flordeliz Cabo-
Borata (Ms. Cabo-Borata). Atty. Solidon asked Atty. Macalalad to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land located in Borongan, Eastern Samar
and owned by Atty. Solidon’s relatives. For a consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (₱80,000.00), Atty. Macalalad accepted the task to be
completed within a period of eight (8) months. Atty. Macalalad received Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining
balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) was to be paid when Atty. Solidon received the certificate of title to the property.
Atty. Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up to the present time.
In the Complaint, Position Papers5 and documentary evidence submitted, Atty. Solidon claimed that he tried to contact Atty. Macalalad to follow-up
on the status of the case six (6) months after he paid the initial legal fees. He did this through phone calls and text messages to their known
acquaintances and relatives, and, finally, through a letter sent by courier to Atty. Macalalad. However, he did not receive any communication from
Atty. Macalalad.
In the Answer,6 Position Paper,7 and affidavits of witnesses, Atty. Macalalad posited that the delay in the filing of the petition for the titling of the
property was caused by his clients’ failure to communicate with him. He also explained that he had no intention of reneging on his obligation, as he
had already prepared the draft of the petition. He failed to file the petition simply because he still lacked the needed documentary evidence that his
clients should have furnished him. Lastly, Atty. Macalalad denied that Atty. Solidon tried to communicate with him.
The Findings of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 25, 2008, Investigating Commissioner Randall C. Tabayoyong made the following finding of
negligence against Atty. Macalalad:
…complainant submitted in his position paper the affidavit of Flordeliz Cabo-Borata, the mutual acquaintance of both complainant and respondent. In
the said affidavit, Mrs. Cabo-Borata described how she repeatedly followed-up the matter with respondent and how respondent turned a deaf ear
towards the same. There is nothing on record which would prompt this Office to view the allegations therein with caution. In fact, considering that the
allegations corroborate the undisputed facts of the instant case...
As respondent has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for the non-filing of the application despite the lapse of about a year from the time
his services were engaged, it is plain that his negligence in filing the application remains uncontroverted. And such negligence is contrary to the
mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him. In fact, Rule 18.03 even provides that his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Acting on this recommendation, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July
17, 2008, holding that:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution … and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and
Ordered to Return the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) with 12% interest per annum to complainant …
The case is now before this Court for our final action pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, considering that the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline imposed the penalty of suspension on Atty. Macalalad.

We agree with the IBP’s factual findings and legal conclusions.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to
discharge.8 We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainant’s evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies
the required quantum of proof in proving Atty. Macalalad’s negligence.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered
per se a violation.
Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez,9 we held that a lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to protect his client’s interest after receiving his
acceptance fee. In In Re: Atty. Briones,10 we ruled that the failure of the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary period (to the
prejudice of his client who languished in jail for more than a year) is an offense that warrants disciplinary action. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, we
penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the case, among other matters. 11
Subsequently, in Reyes v. Vitan,12 we reiterated that the act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the complainant’s
case and, subsequently, in failing to render the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We made the
same conclusion in Canoy v. Ortiz13 where we emphatically stated that the lawyer’s failure to file the position paper was per se a violation of Rule
The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his negligence in handling a case. In Canoy, we
accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyer’s duty to inform
his client of the status of the case.14 Our rulings in Macarilay v. Seriña,15 in Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,16 and in Villaflores v. Limos17 were of the
same tenor. In Villaflores, we opined that even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main responsibility remains
with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to acquire the required information. We held that as between the client and his lawyer, the latter
has more control in handling the case.
All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyer’s duty to his client once an engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so
engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence.18 The lawyer bears the duty to serve his
client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her
client.19 Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate
attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. 201avvphi1
The records in this case tell us that Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he committed when he failed to file the required petition. He cannot now shift the
blame to his clients since it was his duty as a lawyer to communicate with them. At any rate, we reject Atty. Macalalad’s defense that it was his
clients who failed to contact him. Although no previous communication transpired between Atty. Macalalad and his clients, the records nevertheless
show that Atty. Solidon, who contracted Atty. Macalalad’s services in behalf of his relatives, tried his best to reach him prior to the filing of the present
disbarment case. Atty. Solidon even enlisted the aid of Ms. Cabo-Borata to follow-up on the status of the registration application with Atty. Macalalad.
As narrated by Ms. Cabo-Borata in her affidavit,21 she succeeded several times in getting in touch with Atty. Macalalad and on those occasions
asked him about the progress of the case. To use Ms. Cabo-Borata’s own words, she received "no clear-cut answers from him"; he just informed her
that everything was "on process." We give credence to these narrations considering Atty. Macalalad’s failure to contradict them or deny their
veracity, in marked contrast with his vigorous denial of Atty. Solidon’s allegations.
We consider, too, that other motivating factors – specifically, the monetary consideration and the fixed period of performance – should have made it
more imperative for Atty. Macalalad to promptly take action and initiate communication with his clients. He had been given initial payment and should
have at least undertaken initial delivery of his part of the engagement.
We further find that Atty. Macalalad’s conduct refutes his claim of willingness to perform his obligations. If Atty. Macalalad truly wanted to file the
petition, he could have acquired the necessary information from Atty. Solidon to enable him to file the petition even pending the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline investigation. As matters now stand, he did not take any action to initiate communication. These omissions unequivocally point to Atty.
Macalalad’s lack of due care that now warrants disciplinary action.
In addition to the above finding of negligence, we also find Atty. Macalalad guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires a lawyer to account for all the money received from the client. In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not immediately account for and
promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon even after he failed to render any legal service within the contracted time of the
engagement.22
The Penalty
Based on these considerations, we modify the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommended penalty by increasing the period of Atty.
Macalalad’s suspension from the practice of law from three (3) months, to six (6) months. 23 In this regard, we follow the Court’s lead in Pariñas v.
Paguinto24 where we imposed on the respondent lawyer suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.01 and Rule
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17, 2008 of the Board of
Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. We impose on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS SUSPENSION from
the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.03 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, effective upon finality of this Decision. Atty.
Macalalad is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Macalalad is also ORDERED to RETURN to Atty. Elmer C. Solidon the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the date of promulgation of this Decision until the full amount is returned.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Macalalad’s record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 7771 April 6, 2011
PATRICIO GONE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MACARIO GA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This case stemmed from the complaint for disciplinary action dated 23 October 1989 filed by Patricio Gone against Atty. Macario Ga before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint was due to Atty. Ga’s failure to reconstitute or turn over
the records of the case in his possession. Complainant Gone reported that Atty. Ga is his counsel in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2Q281-78 entitled
"Patricio Gone v. Solid Mills, Inc." The case was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter and was elevated to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
Complainant alleged that on 13 December 1983, the NLRC building in Intramuros, Manila was burned and among the records destroyed was his
appealed case.
Complainant Gone further reported that as early as 8 March 1984, Atty. Ga had obtained a certification from the NLRC that the records of NLRC
Case No. RB-IV-2Q281-78 were burned. Despite knowledge of the destruction of the records, Atty. Ga allegedly did not do anything to reconstitute
the records of the appealed case.
On 9 September 1989, complainant allegedly sent a letter to Atty. Ga requesting him to return the records of the case in his possession. As of date
of complaint, Atty. Ga has yet to turn over the records. Complainant submits that his counsel’s continued refusal has caused great injustice to him
and his family.1
On 16 February 1999, Commissioner Gonzales-delos Reyes, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, issued an Order directing respondent Ga to file his
answer on the complaint.2
In a letter dated 22 November 1999, Atty. Ga explained that as far as he could recall, during the pendency of their motion for reconsideration, the
NLRC Office in Manila caught fire. Although worried of the records of their case, he was relieved when he received summons from the NLRC setting
the case for hearing. It was unfortunate, however, that in the two scheduled hearings set by the NLRC herein complainant failed to appear. For such
absence, the NLRC allegedly shelved their case.3
Atty. Ga averred that had it not been for the instant complaint, he would not have, as he never, heard from complainant Gone since 1984. What he
was aware of was the latter’s abandonment of his family way back in 1978. Complainant’s wife is the relative of Atty. Ga, being the daughter of his
first cousin.4
The instant case was set for presentation of evidence on 17 January 2000. On said date, complainant appeared without counsel while respondent
failed to appear.5 Several hearings were set for the case but these were reset for failure of one or both of the parties to appear. 6
In the hearing held on 19 June 2000, complainant appeared with counsel but respondent failed to appear despite notice. During that hearing, the
Commissioner asked complainant if there was a possibility for the case to be settled amicably considering that respondent is a relative of his wife.
The complainant answered in the affirmative and the case was reset to 24 July 2000. The two succeeding hearings scheduled by the Commissioner
were again reset. On 10 November 2000, a hearing was conducted wherein respondent Ga appeared while complainant was absent despite notice.
In view of the latter’s absence, respondent Ga prayed for time to file a Motion to Dismiss. 7
In his Motion to Dismiss dated 8 December 2000,8 respondent Ga alleged that he had a heart to heart talk with complainant about his labor case and
the latter may have already understood that it was not respondent’s fault that the case was shelved by the NLRC. He averred that complainant may
have already been dissuaded from pursuing the case, thus his absence in the hearing held on 10 November 2000. Nevertheless, if there is still hope
for the case, he commits to help complainant by whatever means he can.
On 14 February 2007, Commissioner Marilyn S. Guzman, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, submitted her report recommending that respondent
Atty. Ga be censured for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 9
On 19 September 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved with modification, the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.10 Respondent Atty. Ga was censured for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and was directed to reconstitute and turn over the records of the case to complainant, with stern warning that failure to do so would merit a stiffer
penalty.
In a resolution dated 2 June 2008, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the IBP were directed to inform the Court if any motion for reconsideration was
filed in the case. The IBP was further directed to confirm if respondent has complied with Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94 dated 19 September 2007
directing him to reconstitute and turn over the records of the case to complainant. 11
In compliance with the resolution, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either
party.12
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, for its part, reported that no motion for reconsideration was filed by either party and that respondent failed to
comply with IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94 dated 19 September 2007. 13
Thus, on 2 September 2009, the Court issued a resolution requiring Atty. Ga to explain his failure to comply with IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
94.14 Record of the instant case reveals that the resolution dated 2 September 2009 was received by Atty. Ga on 15 October 2009. To date, Atty. Ga
has yet to comply with the resolution.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state:
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.
Respondent Atty. Ga breached these duties when he failed to reconstitute or turn over the records of the case to his client, herein complainant Gone.
His negligence manifests lack of competence and diligence required of every lawyer. His failure to comply with the request of his client was a gross
betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust reposed upon him by his client. In the case of Navarro v. Meneses, 15 the Court held:
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment
subject however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation
to inform his client of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his client’s request for information. Respondent’s failure to
communicate with his client deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully
informed of the developments in and the status of its case.
Respondent’s sentiments against complainant Gone is not a valid reason for him to renege on his obligation as a lawyer. The moment he agreed to
handle the case, he was bound to give it his utmost attention, skill and competence. Public interest requires that he exerts his best efforts and all his
learning and ability in defense of his client’s cause. Those who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only safeguard the interests of the
client, but also serve the ends of justice.16 They do honor to the bar and help maintain the community’s respect for the legal profession. 17
If respondent believed that he will not be able to represent complainant effectively because of what the latter has done to his family, then he should
have withdrawn his services as a lawyer. Had it not been for complainant’s insistence, his labor case would have forever remained dormant. The fact
that respondent is retained as the lawyer of the complainant, he was duty bound to give his best service. His failure to do so constitutes an
infringement of his oath.1avvphi1
In addition, We note respondent’s disregard of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline’s directive for him to reconstitute and turn over the records of
the case to complainant. Likewise, respondent unjustifiably ignored the directive of the Court for him to explain his failure to comply with IBP
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94.
Respondent’s unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the
Judiciary and his fellow lawyers.18 His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and
processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with Court directives being themselves officers of the Court. 19
As an officer of the Court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied
with promptly and completely.20 This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against
lawyers.21
Respondent should strive harder to live up to his duties of observing and maintaining the respect due to the Courts, 22 respect for law and for legal
processes,23 and of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession 24 in order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer effectively.
All told, We could suspend respondent for his transgressions. Considering, however, that he is already in the twilight of his career and considering
further that he was not entirely to be blamed for the archiving of the labor case, complainant’s absence during the hearings being contributory
therein, We deem the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱5,000.00 sufficient sanction under the circumstances. Such consideration would be more in
line with the very purpose of administrative cases against lawyers, that is, not so much to punish but to instill discipline in them, as well as, protect
the integrity of the Court and shelter the public from the misconduct and inefficiency of lawyers.
Wherefore, respondent Macario Ga is hereby fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for his failure to comply with the directive in
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94 dated 19 September 2007 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Ga is given a final
warning that a more drastic punishment shall be imposed upon him should he fail to comply with the directive for him to reconstitute and turn over
the records of the case to complainant.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 141484 November 11, 2005
GCP-MANNY TRANSPORT SERVICES,* INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ABRAHAM Y. PRINCIPE**, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, CAGAYAN PROVINCIAL SHERIFF or
his deputies, and NELSON RECOLIZADO, Respondents.
DECISION
GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. is now before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 43441 promulgated on May 26, 1999 and the Resolution 2 dated December 29, 1999.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
On April 18, 1990, private respondent filed the herein complaint for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 4142 for physical injuries sustained by him
as a passenger of petitioner’s bus.
On November 2, 1995, respondent court3 rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent ordering the petitioner to pay the former the amount
of P58,207.35 as actual and compensatory damages; P150,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, and costs. Copy of the decision sent to petitioner was returned for the reason that it had "moved" (residence), while copy sent to
Atty. Arnold M. Aquino, then petitioner’s counsel, was returned "unserved" being unclaimed. Petitioner states that a copy of the decision was
personally delivered by the Civil Docket Clerk of the trial court on Atty. Aquino who had refused to receive the same saying he was no longer counsel
for the petitioner, although no notice of withdrawal as counsel was filed by him in court.
On April 11, 1996, private respondent filed a motion for execution of the judgment, copy furnished to Atty. Arnold M. Aquino and petitioner which the
court granted on October 9, 1996. The assailed writ of execution was correspondingly issued, which petitioner received on October 30, 1996.
On November 5, 1996, Atty. Jose de Luna entered his appearance as new counsel for the petitioner with motion for reconsideration of the order
dated October 9, 1996 granting the motion for execution or the quashal of the writ of execution on the ground that petitioner had not been duly
notified of the decision.
On November 9, 1996, petitioner received a Notice of Demand for Payment from the deputies of the Ex-officio Sheriff of the RTC of Cagayan
attaching thereto copies of the writ of execution and the decision. On November 14, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Two(2) months later, on
January 23, 1997, the respondent court issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration or to quash writ of
execution.4 (citations omitted)
Petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari claiming that the denial of the respondent Judge of its motion for reconsideration was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion since he was not duly notified of the decision and there is no legal and factual basis for the issuance of the writ of
execution.5 The appellate court found no such abuse of discretion and dismissed the petition. 6 It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.7
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF IT
IN FINDING THAT THE UNJUSTIFIABLE REFUSAL OF PETITIONER’S COUNSEL ON RECORD TO RECEIVE IN OPEN COURT A COPY OF
THE SUBJECT DECISION IS ONLY A MERE NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL AND THEREFORE, BINDS PETITIONER, HENCE, THE DECISION
HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE, BY
CITING JURISPRUDENCE ON "NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL BINDS HIS CLIENT" WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
BECAUSE THEY HAVE DIFFERENT FACTS.8
Petitioner argues that: when a copy of the decision which the court sent to Atty. Aquino was returned to sender, respondent Judge resorted in
causing the service of the decision to said counsel in open court, as petitioner’s counsel on record, when said lawyer appeared in the sala of
respondent Judge for another case; petitioner should be deemed as having no notice of the trial court decision since its counsel, who had not
withdrawn as such, refused to receive a copy of the same; such act of its counsel constitutes gross negligence which does not bind petitioner; there
was also no valid service to Atty. Aquino because when he refused to receive a copy of the decision, what the civil docket clerk of the trial court
should have done under the premises was to resort to substituted service; since there was no notice to petitioner regarding the trial court decision,
the issuance of the writ of execution and the denial of petitioner’s notice of appeal by respondent Judge are null and void; and the case of People’s
Homesite and Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco9 held that when the lawyer failed to notify his client about the receipt of the decision, such lawyer is
irresponsible and notice to him is not notice to client, such as in the case at bar. 10
Petitioner prays that the decision and the resolution promulgated by the CA be reversed; that an order be issued nullifying the writ of execution
issued by respondent Judge; and that the notice of appeal of petitioner be granted as it has a very meritorious defense based on fortuitous event. 11
Respondent in his Comment contends that: since Atty. Aquino is the counsel of petitioner from the trial up to its termination and there is nothing in
the record to show that he withdrew as counsel of petitioner, the copy of the decision mailed to him by registered mail although returned unserved is
sufficient to serve as notice to him and to his client following Sec. 5 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court; it was the duty of petitioner to notify the court
that Atty. Aquino was no longer its lawyer; petitioner was negligent in hiring a new counsel more than a year from July 1995 when Atty. Aquino was
no longer its lawyer; the implication is that Atty. Aquino was still its counsel when the decision was rendered and when a copy of the decision was
sent to him by registered mail since it is elementary that if a lawyer is going to withdraw as counsel for his client, he should file a motion to withdraw
as such with the conformity of the client; in this case, Atty. Aquino did not file any motion to withdraw as counsel for the petitioner thus he remained
to be counsel of record of petitioner especially since it was only on October 26, 1996 when the services of Atty. Jose de Luna was engaged by
petitioner; and the writ of execution issued is valid and proper considering that the decision of the court has already become final and executory. 12
Before going to the merits, this Court reiterates the distinction between petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. It should be recalled that a petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment while a petition under Rule 65 concerns errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule
45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the
respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions. 13 Such is the case at bar.
It is petitioner’s position that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that the unjustifiable refusal of its counsel on record to receive in
open court a copy of the subject decision is only mere negligence of counsel which binds it. It then contends that the writ of execution should be
quashed because the decision of the trial court had not become final and executory due to non-service of the decision upon its counsel.
The Court does not agree.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case. 14 If it were otherwise,
and a lawyer’s mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had
not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. 15
The only exception to the general rule is when the counsel’s actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious injustice to client, that courts
should accord relief to the party.16 Indeed, if the error or negligence of the counsel did not result in the deprivation of due process to the client,
nullification of the decision grounded on grave abuse of discretion is not warranted. 17
In this case, while Atty. Aquino, counsel of petitioner, was far from being vigilant in protecting the interest of his client, his infractions cannot be said
to have deprived petitioner of due process that would justify deviation from the general rule that clients are bound by the actions of their counsel.
As may be gleaned from the records, petitioner was able to actively participate in the proceedings a quo. It was duly represented by counsel during
the trial. While it may have lost its right to appeal, it was not denied its day in court. As enunciated by this Court, the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process but only a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. 18 As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend its interests in due course, it would have no reason to complain, for it is the opportunity to
be heard that makes up the essence of due process. 19
The Court has also held that when petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to overturn well-settled jurisprudence or to
interpret the rules liberally in its favor.20 Where petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, its plea that it was not accorded the right to due
process cannot elicit this Court’s approval or even sympathy. 21 It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly
posted about the case.22 It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that
all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. 23 It is also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the
receipt of mail intended for them.24
Petitioner was wanting in all these areas. Not only did it fail to regularly check on the status of the case, it also failed to ensure that it could be
notified of the decision as soon as it was promulgated. Petitioner did not inform the court that it has severed its relationship with Atty. Aquino, its
counsel of record.25 Thus, insofar as the trial court was concerned, Atty. Aquino was still its counsel. Neither did it hire a new lawyer soon after Atty.
Aquino allegedly ceased to be its counsel. Atty. Jose de Luna, its subsequent lawyer, stated that his services were engaged by petitioner only on
October 26, 1996 or a year after the decision was rendered by the trial court, while Atty. Aquino is supposed to have resigned as petitioner’s counsel
in July of 1995 or three months before the questioned decision was promulgated. 26 Insofar as petitioner is concerned, it knew that it did not have any
counsel when the decision of the trial court was due for promulgation yet it did not engage the services of a new one to safeguard its interests.
Petitioner also claims that it had no valid notice of the trial court decision therefore the writ of execution subsequently issued by the respondent
Judge is null and void; and claims that the trial court should have resorted to substituted service when its counsel on record refused to receive a
copy of the decision.
Such claims have no merit.
The fact that Atty. Aquino refused to receive a copy of the decision and no substituted service was effected does not erase the fact that a copy of the
trial court decision had earlier been sent by registered mail to Atty. Aquino which was returned for the reason that he has moved. 27 This is sufficient
service of the decision on petitioner since service upon counsel of record at his given address is service to petitioner. 28 As explained in Macondray &
Co., Inc. vs. Provident Insurance Corp.:29
If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the finality
of the decision. "The court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own
whether or not the counsel of record has been changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds office." 30
The rule is that when a party is represented by counsel in an action in court, notices of all kinds including motions, pleadings and orders must be
served on the counsel. And notice to such counsel is notice to the client. 31 Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect
or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid
and regular on its face.32
While the rule admits of exceptions, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, 33 no such circumstance is here present as petitioner was duly
accorded due process.
This Court has also held that in cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his given address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not
even necessary.34 Even then, in the present case, the trial court had sent a copy of the decision to petitioner’s known address which was returned
however for the reason that it has moved.35
Petitioner also claims that the ruling of the Court in People’s Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco36 should be applied in the present case.
The Court disagrees. The differences in People’s Homesite with the case at bar are apparent.
In People’s Homesite, the counsel failed to inform the petitioners of the scheduled hearing and the case was heard in their absence. The counsel
also did not inform the petitioners that he had received a copy of the decision neither did he file a motion for reconsideration or a petition to set aside
judgment to protect the interests of his clients. As soon as petitioners learned of the decision they contacted their counsel and failing to do so, hired
the services of a new one. When asked to explain, the counsel merely said that he did not inform the petitioners because the case escaped his
attention. Because of these actions, the Court found that there was "something fishy and suspicious." Indeed, there was nothing which could have
prevented the petitioners from attending the trial of the case themselves or moved for a reconsideration of the decision or took the necessary appeal
from the judgment if only their counsel had informed them of the court’s processes. 37
In this case, petitioner was able to actively defend its case in court. It also knew that Atty. Aquino was no longer its counsel months before the
decision was rendered, unlike in People’s Homesite, yet it did not take steps to hire a new one to protect its interests.
The trial court was therefore correct when it denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the writ of execution. As ably
discussed by respondent Judge in his resolution:
The sole issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not there was a valid service of the court’s decision to defendants herein and their
former counsel.
Defendants’ main theory is that there was no valid service of the decision to them by registered mail, and that, neither was there a valid service of
the decision to their former counsel, Atty. Arnold Aquino, who refused to receive it when the Civil Docket Clerk of this court personally handed a copy
of the decision to him.
Section 7, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Section 7 – Service of Final orders of Judgments.

Final orders of Judgments shall be served either personally or by registered mail xxx
For the Rule to apply, service must have been made on the counsel de parte (FOJAS VS. NAVARRO, L-26365, April 30, 1970) and if it was sent to
his address on record and he fails to receive it for causes imputable to him it is not necessary to effect further service upon the party he represent
(MAGNO, ET AL VS. C.A., et al. G.R. No. 58781, July 31, 1987).
As borne by the records itself, a copy of this court’s decision was sent thru registered mail on December 6, 1995 to Atty. Arnold Aquino, who was at
that time defendant’s counsel of record, at his given address on record but the same was returned with the annotation on the envelope that said
counsel had "moved". A separate copy of the decision was later sent thru registered mail to the defendant GCP Manny Transport Service, Inc. at its
given address on record but was also returned to the Court with the same annotation that said defendant had "moved". It is not disputed that the
address on record of Atty. Arnold Aquino and GCP Manny Transport Service Inc. is 1310 España Corner Galicia St., Sampaloc, Manila. It was there
where copies of the decision were sent.
In the case of Magno, et al. vs. C.A., et al., (G.R. No. 58781, July 31, 1978 [sic]) it was held that:
"(But) where a copy of the decision was sent to counsel at his address of record but the same was not received because he moved to another
address without informing the court thereof, such omission or neglect will not stay the finality of the decision."
Neither Atty. Arnold Aquino or defendant GCP Manny Transport Service, Inc. informed the court of their change of address. Naturally, copies of the
decision in this case were sent at their address of record. It is not incumbent upon the court to determine the new address of party-litigants. On the
contrary, it is the duty of the parties to inform the court of such change address. Moreover, notices of the court processes are ordinarily taken cared
of by clerks who are naturally guided by addresses of record. To require the court and its personnel before sending out the notices to be
continuously checking the records and the various addresses from which a counsel may have filed his pleadings and sending them to such
addresses instead of his address of record is to show (sic) confusion and add an intolerable burden which is not permitted by the Rules of Court
(INANA VS. GARCIA 25 SCRA 801, see Rule 7, Sec. 5, Rule 13, Sec.5).
Notwithstanding separate service of copy of decision to herein defendant GCP Manny Transport Inc., and its counsel de parte thru registered mail,
the Court, likewise, available of personal service of decision pursuant to Section 7 of said Rule 13.
Be it noted that the Civil Docket Clerk personally handed a copy of the decision to Atty. Arnold Aquino who was in court but who refused to receive it
alleging that he is no longer the counsel for the defendant. However, at the time of such service, Atty. Aquino remained to be defendants’ counsel of
record since he did not formally withdraw as counsel for the GCP Manny Transport Inc. It has been held time and again that personal service of
decision cannot be avoided by counsel’s declining to accept it and service is deemed complete regardlessof such refusal to accept. And notice to
counsel operates as notice to clients.
It is now too late for herein defendants to advance the theory that they have not received a copy of the decision in this case, especially if the records
thereof, would show otherwise. The Court was not amiss in seeing to it that its final orders and judgment were duly served or furnished the party-
litigants and their respective counsels and if they refuse to receive the same, they must suffer the consequences thereof. The decision rendered by
this Court has already attained finality, hence, may no longer be set aside not even reconsidered without militating against the provisions of our
procedural laws.38
As a final note, let it be emphasized that before a counsel of record may be considered relieved of his responsibility as such counsel on account of
withdrawal, it is necessary that Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 26 – Change of Attorneys – An attorney may retire at anytime from an action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed
in court. He may also retire at anytime from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client
and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall
be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and the written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
should be observed. Unless said procedure is complied with, the counsel of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies of
the judgments, orders and pleadings and who should be held responsible for the case. 39 Indeed, a lawyer’s withdrawal as counsel must be made in a
formal petition filed in the case, without which, notice of judgment rendered in the case served on the counsel of record, is, for all legal purposes,
notice to the client, the date of receipt of which is considered the starting point from which the period of appeal prescribed by law shall begin to
run.40 Petitioner having failed to appeal in due time, the trial court did not commit any error or grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for
execution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6504 August 9, 2005
GEORGE C. SOLATAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
The present case focuses on a critical aspect of the lawyer-client relationship¾the duty of loyalty. The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is traditionally
characterized as "undivided." This means that lawyers must represent their clients and serve their needs without interference or impairment from any
conflicting interest.
This administrative case traces its roots from the manner by which Attys. Jose C. Camano and Oscar A. Inocentes responded to the efforts of
complainant, George C. Solatan, to lease a certain Quezon City apartment belonging to the attorneys’ clients. On the basis of acts branded by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as "bordering on technical extortion," accepting funds and giving unsolicited advice to an adverse party, and
casting doubts as to the procedure of levy, the IBP resolved 1 to recommend the suspension of Atty. Camano from the practice of law for one (1) year.
It likewise recommended the reprimand of Atty. Inocentes, whom it held liable for the aforementioned acts of his associate, under the principle of
command responsibility.
Only Atty. Inocentes has elected to contest the resolution of the IBP, as he questions the propriety of his being held administratively liable for acts
done by Atty. Camano.2 However, the recommendation to suspend Atty. Camano shall also be passed upon by virtue of Section 12, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.3
Attys. Inocentes and Camano were both engaged in the practice of law under the firm name of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office. Atty.
Inocentes held office in his home located at No. 19 Marunong St., Central District, Quezon City, while Atty. Camano was stationed at an "extension
office" of the firm located in 3rd/F, 956 Aurora Blvd., Quirino Dist., Quezon City.
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Andres and Ludivina Genito (spouses Genito), owners of an apartment
complex (the Genito Apartments) located at 259 Tandang Sora cor. Visayas Avenue, Quezon City, when the Genito Apartments were placed under
sequestration by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on 9 July 1986. 4 The law office represented the spouses Genito before
the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan, and subsequently, with authority from the PCGG. 5 in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying the
Genito Apartments.6
Complainant’s sister, Gliceria Solatan, was a tenant in Door 10, Phase B of the Genito Apartments. It appears from the records that Gliceria Solatan
left for the United States in 1986, and since then, the apartment was either intermittently used by members of her family or placed under the charge
of caretakers.7 In August 1987, a complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against Gliceria Solatan. 8 On 3 March 1988, in a
judgment by default, a Decision9 was rendered ordering Gliceria Solatan to vacate the premises of the apartment, pay the spouses Genito the
amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (₱30,600.00) as unpaid rentals from February 1986 to July 1987 with interest at 24% per annum
from 20 August 1987 until the premises are vacated, Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.10
Complainant was occupying the subject apartment when he learned of the judgment rendered against his sister. On 10 May 1988, prior to the
implementation of a writ to execute the judgment, complainant and his mother, Elvira Solatan, approached Atty. Inocentes at his home office.
Complainant informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a lease contract by virtue of which complainant would be the new
lessee of the apartment and thus make possible his continued stay therein. Atty. Inocentes referred complainant and his mother to his associate,
Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of the ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito apartments. After the exchange, complainant went to Atty.
Camano at the satellite office of Atty. Inocentes’s firm. From here on out, events quickly turned sour. Different versions of subsequent events were
presented. The facts reproduced hereunder are by and large culled from the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Siegfred B. Mison.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made in which complainant and his mother agreed to pay the entire judgment debt
of Gliceria Solatan, including fifty percent of the awarded attorney’s fees and One Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (₱1,600.00) as costs of suit
provided that Atty. Camano would allow complainant’s continued stay at Door 10, Phase B of the Genito Apartments. As partial compliance with the
agreement, complainant issued in the name Atty. Camano a check for Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) representing half of the ₱10,000.00
attorney’s fees adjudged against complainant’s sister.
Complainant and his mother failed to make any other payment. Thus, the sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano and some policemen, enforced
the writ of execution on 22 June 1988 and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. An attempt at renegotiation took place at the
insistence of complainant, resulting in Atty. Camano’s acquiescence to release the levied properties and allowing complainant to remain at the
apartment, subject to the latter’s payment of costs incurred in enforcing the writ of execution and issuance of postdated checks representing
installment rental payments. Complainant, thus, issued four (4) checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company dated the fifteenth (15th) of July,
August, September, and October 1988 each in the amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (₱3,400.00).11 Half of the amount represented
complainant’s monthly rental, while the other half, a monthly installment for the payment of Gliceria Solatan’s judgment debt.
On 28 June 1988, acting on the advice of Atty. Camano, complainant presented an Affidavit of Ownership to the sheriff who then released the levied
items to complainant. However, a Northern Hill 3-burner gas stove was not retuned to complainant. The stove was in fact kept by Atty. Camano in
the unit of the Genito Apartments wherein he temporarily stayed 12 and, thereafter, turned over the same to a certain Recto Esberto, caretaker of the
Genito Apartments.13
On 1 August 1988, complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Inocentes and Atty. Camano. 14 After formal
investigation, and despite conflicting testimonies on the tenor and content of agreements and conversations, several disturbing facts were revealed
to have been uncontroverted—Atty. Camano’s acceptance from complainant of attorney’s fees and the costs of implementing the writ of execution,
possession of complainant’s levied Northern Hill oven, and advice to complainant on how to recover the latter’s levied items. Thus, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Siegfred B. Mison, made the following recommendations, viz:
Based on the facts revealed in their respective Memoranda, the penalty of six (6) months suspension is therefore recommended to be imposed on
Respondent Camano for committing the following acts that adversely reflects (sic) on his moral fitness to continue to practice law[:]
1. He received money (₱5,000 then ₱1,000) from the adverse party purportedly for attorneys fees and for reimbursement of sheriff’s expenses.
Such act of accepting funds from the adverse party in the process of implementing a writ, borders on technical extortion particularly in light of the
factual circumstances as discussed.
2. He gave unsolicited advice to the adverse party in suggesting the filing of an Affidavit of Ownership over the levied properties, a suggestion
evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his own client, supposedly, the Genitos.
3. He failed to turn over the gas stove to either party thereby casting doubt as to the procedure of the levy.
Based on the facts revealed, the penalty of Reprimand is therefore recommended to be imposed on Respondent Inocentes for committing the
following acts that adversely reflects (sic) in his fitness to continue to practice law[:]
1. He allowed Camano to perform all the aforementioned acts, either by negligence or inadvertence which are inimical to the legal profession. He
cannot claim ignorance or feign innocence in this particular transaction considering that the Complainants themselves went to his office on different
occasions regarding this transaction. Ultimately, he exercised command responsibility over the case and had supervisory control over Respondent
Camano inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in person from the latter.
2. The letter disclaimer executed by Mr. Genito filed by Respondent Inocentes does not mitigate any liability whatsoever since the wrongdoing done
against the profession cannot be undone by a mere letter from a third party. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The IBP Board of Governors approved the aforequoted recommendation, with the modification of an increase in Atty. Camano’s period of
suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year, in a resolution stating, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the of the Investigating
Commissioner…finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and for
accepting funds from adverse party in the process of implementing a writ borders on technical extortion, for giving unsolicited advice to the adverse
party a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his own client and for casting doubts to the procedure of the levy, Atty. Jose C. Camano
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, likewise, Atty. Oscar Inocentes is hereby REPRIMANDED for he exercised
command responsibility over the case inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in person. 16
The IBP held that Atty. Camano’s act of giving unsolicited advice to complainant is a culpable act because the advice conflicted with the interest of
his clients, the spouses Genito. The rule on conflicting interests, established in Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, deals with
conflicts in the interests of an attorney’s actual clients among themselves, of existing and prospective clients, and of the attorney and his clients. It
states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained. 17 An attorney has no power to act as counsel or legal representative
for a person without being retained.18 To establish the professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought
and received in any manner pertinent to his profession. 19 At the time the questioned statement was made, Atty. Camano had called the police to
restrain complainant from surreptitiously pulling out the levied properties from the apartment complex by virtue of which the latter was brought to the
police station for questioning. The statement was made in response to complainant’s insistence at the police station that the levied properties were
owned by him and not by the judgment debtor.20 No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case.
More fitting, albeit, to the mind of this Court, inapplicable to the case, is Canon 15 of the same Code which encompasses the aforementioned rule. In
general terms, Canon 15 requires lawyers to observe loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with their clients.21 Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his
client resulting in detriment to the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be it that every utterance of an attorney which may have
afforded an individual some relief adverse to the former’s client may be labeled as a culpable act of disloyalty. As in every case, the acts alleged to
be culpable must be assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances.
While the levy was made on chattel found in the apartment of the judgment debtor, Gliceria Solatan, the complainant was the true owner of the
properties. Consequently, the latter had a right to recover the same. In fact, considering the circumstances, the questioned statement is in
consonance with complainant’s foremost duty to uphold the law as an officer of the court. The statement of Atty. Camano in such a context should
not be construed by this Court as giving advice in conflict against the interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest over the
incorrectly levied properties.
We, thus, note that the act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be returned to him upon showing proof of his ownership thereof
may hint at infidelity to the interest of the spouses Genito, but, in this circumstance, lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal of the latter’s
confidence so as to deserve outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his clients’ cause. Nonetheless, after having noted the foregoing, we
remain convinced with the propriety of meting the one (1) year suspension from the practice of law on Atty. Camano, as recommended by the IBP,
based on his other culpable acts which tend to degrade the profession and foment distrust in the integrity of court processes.
On the other hand, Atty. Inocentes seeks to distance himself from the events that transpired and the reprimand resulting therefrom by asserting that
he was incorrectly punished for Atty. Camano’s acts when his mere participation in the fiasco was to refer complainant and his mother to Atty.
Camano.
However, it is precisely because of such participation, consisting as it did of referring the complainant to his associate lawyer, that Atty. Inocentes
may be held administratively liable by virtue of his associate’s unethical acts. His failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the
charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. The term "command responsibility," as Atty. Inocentes suggests, has special meaning within
the circle of men in uniform in the military; however, the principle does not abide solely therein. It controls the very circumstance in which Atty.
Inocentes found himself.
We are not unaware of the custom of practitioners in a law firm of assigning cases and even entire client accounts to associates or other partners
with limited supervision, if at all. This is especially true in the case of Attys. Inocentes and Camano who, from the records, both appear to be
seasoned enough to be left alone in their work without requiring close supervision over each other’s conduct and work output. However, let it not be
said that law firm practitioners are given a free hand to assign cases to seasoned attorneys and thereafter conveniently forget about the case. To do
so would be a disservice to the profession, the integrity and advancement of which this Court must jealously protect.
That the firm name under which the two attorneys labored was that of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office does not automatically make Atty.
Inocentes the default lawyer acting in a supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano. It did, however, behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert ordinary diligence
to find out what was going on in his law firm. It placed in Atty. Inocentes the active responsibility to inquire further into the circumstances affecting the
levy of complainant’s properties, irrespective of whether the same were in fact events which could possibly lead to administrative liability. Moreover,
as name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm
should act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. 22 It is not without reason or consequence that Atty. Inocentes’s name is that
which was used as the official designation of their law office.
With regard to the actual existence of Atty. Inocentes’s supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano’s activities, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
based the same on his finding that Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latter’s dealings with complainant. This finding
is the linchpin of Atty. Inocentes’s supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof.
Law practitioners are acutely aware of the responsibilities that are naturally taken on by partners and supervisory lawyers over the lawyers and non-
lawyers of the law office. We have held that lawyers are administratively liable for the conduct of their employees in failing to timely file
pleadings.23 In Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et al. ,24 partners in a law office were admonished for the contemptuous
language in a pleading submitted to court despite, and even due to, the fact that the pleading was not passed upon by any of the partners of the
office. We held therein that partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious control of court pleadings and other court papers that carry their names
or the name of the law firm.25
We now hold further that partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising
themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by the persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting
necessary efforts to foreclose the occurrence of violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge. Nonetheless,
the liability of the supervising lawyer in this regard is by no means equivalent to that of the recalcitrant lawyer. The actual degree of control and
supervision exercised by said supervising lawyer varies, inter alia, according to office practice, or the length of experience and competence of the
lawyer supervised. Such factors can be taken into account in ascertaining the proper penalty. Certainly, a lawyer charged with the supervision of a
fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes should bear greater responsibility for the culpable acts of the underling than one satisfied enough with the
work and professional ethic of the associate so as to leave the latter mostly to his/her own devises.
While Atty. Camano’s irregular acts perhaps evince a need for greater supervision of his legal practice, there is no question that it has been Atty.
Inocentes’ practice to allow wide discretion for Atty. Camano to practice on his own. It does constitute indifference and neglect for Atty. Inocentes to
fail to accord even a token attention to Atty. Camano’s conduct which could have brought the then impending problem to light. But such is not
equivalent to the proximate responsibility for Atty. Camano’s acts. Moreover, it appears from the records that Atty. Inocentes is a former judge and a
lawyer who, as of yet, is in good standing and it is the first time in which Atty. Inocentes has been made to answer vicariously for the misconduct of a
person under his charge. An admonition is appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated 16 April 2004 is AFFIRMED in respect of the
sanction meted out on Atty. Camano. Atty. Inocentes is hereby ADMONISHED to monitor more closely the activities of his associates to make sure
that the same are in consonance with the Code of Professional Responsibility with the WARNING that repetition of the same or similar omission will
be dealt with more severely.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 3548 July 4, 2002
JOSE A. RIVERA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
On September 1, 1990,1 Jose A. Rivera instituted a Complaint for Disbarment2 charging Atty. Napoleon Corral with Malpractice and Conduct
Unbecoming a Member of the Philippine Bar. The complaint alleges, inter alia -
(1) That on February 12, 1990, a Decision was penned by the Honorable Presiding Judge Gorgonio Y. Ybañez on (sic) Civil Case No.
17473 for Ejectment.3
(2) That such decision was received by Annaliza Superio, Secretary of Atty. Napoleon Corral, on February 23, 1990. 4
(3) That on March 13, 1990, a "NOTICE OF APPEAL" was filed in court by Atty. Napoleon Corral, a copy of which was served on plaintiff’s
counsel.5
(4) That on March 14, 1990, [at] about 1:50 p.m. Atty. Napoleon Corral came to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Branch 7, Bacolod City and
changed the date February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing later that there is no 29th in February 1990, he filed a "REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF’S MANIFESTATION" claiming therein that he received the Decision not on the 29th in (sic) February 1990 but on the 28th of
February 1990.6
(5) That Atty. Napoleon Corral violated the proper norms/ethics as a lawyer by tampering with particularly by personally and manually
changing entries in the court’s record without the Court’s prior knowledge and permission, conduct unbecoming of a member of the
Philippine Bar much more so because in so doing he was found to have been motivated by the desire of suppressing the truth.
(6) That on July 13, 1990 Atty. Napoleon Corral filed a "MOTION TO DISMISS", among other things he stated that the court is without
jurisdiction to try and decide the case at issue.
In his defense, respondent claimed that the correction of the date was done on the paper prepared by him. He also alleged that the correction was
initiated and done in the presence and with the approval of the Clerk of Court and the other court employees. According to respondent, the correction
was made because of typographical error he committed. He denied that Annaliza Superio, who received the decision in his behalf, is his secretary.
In a Resolution dated January 20, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.7 Thereafter, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez submitted his report on August 21, 1997 finding respondent guilty as
charged and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On October 25, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board’s decision. The Board, however, subsequently issued a Resolution on
March 28, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration and further pointed out that the pleading is improper because his remedy was to file the same
with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Thus, on May, 19, 1999, respondent filed with the Court a Motion for Reconsideration alleging -
1. THAT THERE WAS NO DUE PROCESS OR HEARING WHICH HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT FROM THE
BEGINNING;
2. COMPLAINANT RIVERA COMMITTED PERJURY WHEN HE CLAIMED THAT RESPONDENT ALTERED THE COURT RECORDS;
3. THAT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN BACOLOD CITY UNDER JUDGE IBAÑEZ COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION OF
FACTS.
Respondent’s claim that he was not afforded due process deserves scant consideration. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 8 In fact –
. . . a respondent in an administrative proceeding is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and
a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committee. 9
Respondent can not feign he was denied an opportunity to be heard in this case because as borne out by the records, hearings had to be re-
scheduled several times by the investigating commissioner to afford him the chance to present his evidence. The records disclose that when the
case was referred to the IBP by Resolution of the Court dated January 30, 1993, 10 Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued a Notice
of Hearing dated July 12, 1993 ordering complainant and respondent to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline on August 19, 1993.
In response, complainant, who is based in Sta. Fe, Bacolod City, sent a letter dated August 10, 1993 informing the Commission that owing to his
limited finances as a Baptist Pastor he could not afford the expenses involved in attending the hearings and in view thereof, he requested that the
hearings be held without his presence and that the case be decided based on the evidence submitted. Nothing was heard from respondent, although
the records show that he was furnished a copy of the notice.
On the scheduled hearing of August 19, 1993, both complainant and respondent did not appear. The investigator, however, noted the letter of
complainant dated August 10, 1993. As there was no showing that respondent received the notice of hearing, the investigator reset the hearing of
the case for reception of respondent’s evidence to September 30, 1993. Both parties, who were duly furnished copies of the order, again did not
appear on said date. The hearing was again reset to November 8, 1993. Both parties likewise failed to appear on November 8, 1993 hearing, which
was re-scheduled on January 6, 1994. However, complainant sent a letter dated November 4, 1993 addressed to the investigator requesting that the
hearings be continued even in his absence for the reasons he stated in his previous letter of August 10, 1993. Again nothing was heard from
respondent although he and complainant were furnished copies by registered mail.
Neither complainant nor respondent appeared on the January 6, 1994 hearing, for which reason the investigator issued an order re-scheduling the
hearing for the last time to February 24, 1994 giving respondent "a last chance to present his evidence" with the warning that respondent’s failure to
do so will compel the Commission to render a ruling based on the evidence submitted by the complainant. The investigator, however, noted the
complainant’s letter of November 4, 1993 wherein the latter manifested that he was resting his case based on the evidence submitted by him
together with the complaint.
On February 15, 1994, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: 1.] the complaint filed is not verified; 2.] in the hearings set by the
Commission, complainant failed to appear; 3.] unless complainant appears personally, be sworn to and questioned personally under oath, the
complaint is defective; 4.] the complaint which could be filed by anybody is a form of harassment; 5.] in view of the repeated failure of complainant to
appear and be sworn to, the letter-complaint is merely hearsay.
On March 3, 1994, the investigator denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set for the last time the hearing on April 21, 1994 for the
reception of respondent’s evidence.
On April 4, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Postponement praying that the hearing be reset on the last week of July 1994. Accompanying said
motion was an "Answer To The Order Of The Commission Dated March 3, 1994" where he averred, among others, that: 1.] it was his right to cross-
examine complainant with respect to the allegations in the complaint; 2.] the allegations in the complaint are not true and complainant’s use of the
name "Reverend" was made to deceive the Commission; 3.] what respondent actually did was to correct the date of his pleading which was
erroneously typed by his secretary and this was done in the presence of the court employees with their knowledge and consent; complainant made it
appear that respondent falsified the records; 4.] the correction of the date in the pleading was done in good faith; 5.] this is not the first time
complainant filed complaints to harass people and to misrepresent himself as a "Reverend"; 6.] in fact, complainant was nearly stabbed to death by
families whom he ejected from their lands using donations of the church to buy the properties in his name; 7.] respondent intended to file a complaint
with the Bible Baptist Association of America and the Philippines to investigate complainant’s activities.
To accommodate respondent, the Investigating Commissioner reset the hearing on July 28, 1994 with the warning that said setting is intransferable
and that the Commission will proceed with its investigation on said date with or without respondent’s presence. For failure of respondent to appear
on said date, the investigator issued an order considering the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
Given the foregoing factual backdrop, respondent can not now complain that he was denied due process. On the contrary, the Commission was
lenient to a fault in accommodating his numerous requests for continuance. Indeed, the chronology of events shows that the prolonged silence of
respondent and the belated filing of his motion to dismiss followed by the "Answer" to the investigator’s March 3, 1994 Order, were deliberately
resorted to hinder the proceedings.
The quintessence of due process is simply that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side and to adduce any evidence he may have in support of his defense. 11 Entrenched is the rule that
due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings and opportunity to explain one’s side. 12 Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process.13
In his report, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the correction introduced by respondent was made not to reflect the truth but to
mislead the trial court into believing that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period. The Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 17473
was duly received by a certain Annaliza Superio, the secretary of respondent, on February 22, 1990. Respondent filed the Notice of Appeal on
March 13, 1990 which was clearly out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, respondent altered the date when he allegedly received
the Decision from February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing that there was no February 29, 1990 in the calendar, he sought to change the
date again to February 28, 1990 by means of a "reply to Plaintiff’s Manifestation".
The Investigating Commissioner further pointed out that respondent’s claim that the correction was made in the presence of the Clerk of Court and
other court employees was denied by Nilda P. Tronco, the Branch Clerk of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City, who declared that the alteration
was surreptitiously made and would have been left unnoticed were it not for the timely discovery thereof. 14
The Court finds the facts as summarized by the investigator fully supported by the evidence. 1âwphi1 However, the recommended penalty is not
commensurate to the misdeed of respondent.
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons
whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 15 A
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 16
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended form his office as attorney on
the following grounds, to wit: 1.] deceit; 2.] malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; 3.] grossly immoral conduct; 4.] conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; 5.] violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6.] willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7.] willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party without authority.
While the prevailing facts of the case do not warrant so severe a penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of the Court to discipline an errant
member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be exercised because it can not be denied that respondent has violated his solemn oath as a lawyer not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct. 17
The relevant rules to the case at bar are Rules 1.01 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.01 states in no uncertain
terms that: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." More specifically, Rule 19.01 mandates that "a lawyer
shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain improper advantage in any case or proceeding."
The Court "can not overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients." 18 Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,19 the Court ruled
that "The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his
practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity. 20 Public confidence in
the law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport
himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession." 21
By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, respondent committed an act of dishonesty. Under
pertinent rules,22 dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct upon which the Court, in a recent case, 23 imposed a one-year suspension on respondent
therein for inserting in the records of the case a certification of non-forum shopping and making it appear that the same was already part of such
records at the time the complaint was filed. A one-year suspension was similarly imposed on respondent in Reyes v. Atty. Rolando Javier24 for
deceiving his client into believing that he filed the petition on time when in fact it was filed on a much later date. It should be stressed that brazenly
resorting to such a legal subterfuge to mislead the court and to cover up for his failings toward his client is not only a disgraceful indictment on
respondent’s moral fiber and personal fitness to his calling as a lawyer. It is also an embarrassment to his brethren in the Bar. Such misconduct
warrants a similar penalty for the Court can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5113 October 7, 2004
DOLORES SILVA Vda. DE FAJARDO, complainant,

vs.
Atty. REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers must be completely truthful, more so when they plead their own causes against former clients. In the present case, the lawyer
misrepresented facts in his claim for attorney’s fees; hence, he must be sanctioned.
The Case
The administrative case before the Court stems from a Complaint 1 filed by Dolores Silva vda. de Fajardo, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Rexie
Efren A. Bugaring for untruthful statements in allegedly trying to fleece her of ₱3,532,170 in attorney’s fees. The Complaint and respondent’s
Comment2 thereon were referred3 by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala’s Report 4 recommending the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for one year was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its June 21, 2003 Resolution No. XV-2003-348. On June 30, 2003, the Notice of the IBP
Resolution5 and the records of the case -- including the Commissioner’s Report -- were forwarded to this Court by Atty. Julio C. Elamparo, director
for bar discipline of the IBP.6
The Facts
The facts are narrated by the investigating commissioner in her Report as follows:
"Complainant alleged that she had known respondent since 1989 when she, together with her co-heirs, were trying to sell [the] properties
which they inherited from their predecessors, Jose and Buenaventura Silva x x x. [They] were encountering disputes with the heirs of
Alfredo Silva Cruz (‘Cruz Family’), then represented by one Atty. Ricardo Dantes, and with their tenants, over x x x Lots 2434 and 2454
located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, [which they were trying to sell] to Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation.
"Atty. Bugaring was recommended by Atty. Dantes to complainant to assist her and her co-heirs with the legal aspects of the disputes they
were encountering. Atty. Bugaring and Atty. Dantes were close associates and they hold and belong to the same law office of Bugaring,
Tugonon and Associates Law Offices. Whenever complainant and her companion Maria Luisa Tamondong would go to the office of Atty.
Bugaring to see him, they also see Atty. Dantes at the same office. Thinking that Atty. Bugaring was an honest and honorable man,
complainant accepted the recommendation. At that time, complainant thought that there was nothing wrong or anomalous in she being
represented by Atty. Bugaring, who belong to the same law office as that of Atty. Dantes, counsel of the Cruz family with which
complainant and her co-heirs were then having disputes over Lots 2434 and 2454. She did not know that it was improper and unethical for
lawyers of the same firm to handle conflicting interests of clients.
"Initially, Atty. Bugaring assisted complainant with their problems with the tenants of Lots 2434 and 2454. The tenants then had the
preferential right to purchase the said properties they were occupying x x x. [T]hey [had] verbally expressed their non-interest in purchasing
the same but refused to vacate the premises [and] demanded that they be given 1/3 of the total land area of the two lots before they agree
to vacate. Atty. Bugaring wrote, on behalf of the complainant and her co-heirs, the said tenants and the Agrarian Reform Office.
Meanwhile, the dispute of complainant and her co-heirs with the Cruz family later led to the filing of the case entitled ‘Alicia Cruz, et al., vs.
Dolores Fajardo, et al.’ with the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3472 (hereinafter the ‘Mother Case’).
The Cruz family was asserting an alleged right over Lots 2434 and 2454. Atty. Bugaring represented the complainant and her co-heirs for
purposes of this case.
"Every time there was a hearing in the ‘Mother Case’ in Laguna, the driver of complainant would fetch Atty. Bugaring at 5:00 o’clock in the
morning from his residence/office in Quezon City, and would likewise drive him back after the hearing. Complainant paid Atty. Bugaring
every hearing an appearance fee of ₱1,000.00, whether hearings were postponed or not, treated him to lunch and used to send him off
with vegetables, candies and other goodies.
"Complainant had always asked Atty. Bugaring how much [he would] charge for his professional fees, but Atty. Bugaring would just
answer: ‘Huwag na ninyo alalahanin iyon. Para ko na kayong nanay o lola.’ All along, complainant was swayed to believe that Atty.
Bugaring was nice and courteous.
"Later, the dispute of complainant and her co-heirs with the Cruz family got worse. The ‘Mother Case’ soon branched out to more and more
cases, about eleven (11) cases in all, which were but the offshoots of the ‘Mother Case,’ (Civil Case No. 3472). Atty. Bugaring continued to
represent the complaint and her co-heirs in the foregoing cases and as in the ‘Mother Case,’ whenever there were hearings, Atty. Bugaring
was fetched back and forth by complainant’s driver x x x, [was paid] an appearance fee of ₱1,000.00 per hearing, [was] treated to lunch
and sent x x x off [with] some goodies. In all these cases, complainant had asked Atty. Bugaring of his professional fees, but the
complainant would get the usual reply of: ‘Huwag na ninyo alalahanin iyon. Para ko na kayong nanay o lola.’ With the rate things were
going on then, Atty. Bugaring all the more earned the trust and respect of the complainant more than anybody else.
"In November 1992, complainant had a meeting with her co-heirs and the latter expressed their discontent with the way Atty. Bugaring was
handling the ‘Mother Case’ and the offshoot cases because the cases were derailing their intended sale of Lots 2434 and 2454 to Golden
Bay Realty and Development Corporation. Complainant was hounded by questions regarding her arrangement with Atty. Bugaring to
which complainant could not give any answer because there really was no contract or agreement between her and Atty. Bugaring, who
refused to discuss any arrangement with complainant. After their meeting, complainant told Atty. Bugaring of the discontent of her co-heirs,
and Atty. Bugaring told complainant that he can draw a fictitious ‘Contract’ for his services which complainant can show to her co-heirs.
Indeed, Atty. Bugaring drew up two (2) fictitious ‘Contract of Services’ both dated 11 December 1992. One specifically states that it was for
the ‘Mother Case’ and the other was for the case of ‘Catalina Roberto, et al. v. Dolores Fajardo, et al.’ Each of said fictitious contracts
stipulate[d] x x x an acceptance fee of ₱50,000.00, per appearance fee of ₱1,000.00 and upon the termination of the case, an additional
attorney’s fee ‘equivalent to 25% of the value of the subject property in litigation.’ When the fictitious contracts were shown to complainant,
she was assured by Atty. Bugaring that the contracts were not valid and binding and told her ‘Ito ho ay para lamang may maipakita kayo sa
kanila, pero hindi ito totoo.’ With that assurance, complainant signed the contract and was given a copy of the same.
"Around 1992, complainant and her co-heirs entered into separate compromise agreements with the tenants of Lots 2434 and 2454 and
with the Cruz family. The agreement with the Cruz family was later put into writing with the execution of a Compromise Agreement dated 7
June 1992, which was submitted to the court before which the ‘Mother Case’ was pending. [I]t became the basis of the Judgment dated 22
November 1993 x x x [and the dismissal of] all the offshoot cases x x x. [On the other hand,] the Compromise Agreement reached with the
tenants of Lots 2434 and [2454] consisted of an agreement totally ceding Lot 2454 to the tenants as [d]isturbance [c]ompensation.
Complainant and her co-heirs decided not to reveal these agreements [to Atty. Bugaring] until they were finalized because they knew that
[he] did not want such settlement for reasons known [only] to him.
"With the settlement of the disputes over Lots 2434 and 2454, the sale of the remaining property (Lot 2434) to Golden Bay [R]ealty and
Development Corporation materialized on 2 March 1994. Complainant was accompanied by Atty. Bugaring and Maria Luisa Tam[o]ndong
to the office of Golden Bay Realty when the sale was finalized. When complainant received the proceeds of the sale, they went to see Atty.
Bugaring to settle their account with him. They tendered to Atty. Bugaring the amount of ₱100,000.00 which they believed was
commensurate for his services considering [that] the cases ended x x x by compromise agreement. However, Atty. Bugaring rejected the
amount. On said occasion, Atty. Bugaring requested the companions of complainant to step out of the room first and said he wanted to talk
to complainant alone. Atty. Bugaring proposed to complainant a deal to the effect that only ₱85,000.00 will be paid to him by complainant
and he will charge the estate or the complainant’s co-heirs the amount of ₱1,200,000.00. [C]omplainant vehemently objected to [this]
because the estate or her co-heirs did not have that amount of money. The co-heirs of complainant maintained that they would only pay
Atty. Bugaring ₱100,000.00, which [amount] the latter rejected.
"x x x [C]omplainant did not hear x x x from Atty. Bugaring [since April 1994]. [However, almost three years later], she learned that her
property in Tandang Sora was already attached by Atty. Bugaring. Unknown to complainant, Atty. Bugaring had filed the case entitled
‘Rexie Efren A. Bugaring vs. Dolores Fajardo’ docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-29422 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
78, for Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment for x x x collection of his legal x x x fees. Atty. Bugaring
specifically prayed for the attachment of complainant’s properties and other assets to answer for his claim of ₱3,532,170.00 plus 12%
interest per annum for x x x unpaid attorney’s fees, ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages, ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages and such
amount equivalent to 25% from the total claim as attorney’s fees plus ₱2,000.00 per court attendance as appearance fee plus other
proven litigation expenses.
xxx xxx xxx
"Atty. Bugaring, by way of comment, avers that from 1991 to May 1994, complainant retained his services as her personal legal consultant
and x x x lawyer in nineteen (19) court cases. Considering that Civil Case Nos. B-3472 and 3[8]96 before the RTC, Biñan, Laguna,
involved various real estate properties, complainant asked Atty. Bugaring to prepare a written contract for his attorney’s fees, which was
thereafter signed by the complainant x x x. [The] Contract of Services dated 11 December 1992 x x x provide[d] that complainant will pay
Atty. Bugaring an (1) acceptance fee of ₱50,000.00; (2) appearance fee for every court appearance of ₱1,000.00 and (3) attorney’s fee
equivalent to 25% of the value of the properties in litigation. [As to] all the other cases [he] handled, [Atty. Bugaring charged] a minimum
amount of ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and ₱1,000.00 appearance fee [for] every court attendance. Under these conditions, considering
the complexities of the cases, Atty. Bugaring laboriously and painstakingly represented the rights and interest of the complainant, and
thereby successfully terminated all cases, except Civil Cases Nos. B-3971 and 3[8]96, which were still under litigation.
"Due to the failure and adamant refusal of complainant to settle and pay Atty. Bugaring x x x his accumulated professional fees, he was
constrained to make verbal, and finally, written demands on 30 April 1994 and 6 May 1994. Notwithstanding the receipts of the demand
letters, which explicitly indicated to her the computation of the amount of professional fees demanded, complainant simply remained silent
about the matter, thereby signifying her adamant refusal to settle and pay her legitimately contracted obligations to Atty. Bugaring. With no
other extra-judicial recourse, and after Atty. Bugaring was able to save an amount for payment of filing fees, attachment bond and other
initial expenses (₱100,000.00 more or less) for a collection case on the matter, x x x Atty. Bugaring instituted an action for sum of money
with damages against complainant before RTC Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-29442 [on 11 November 1996].
After receiving complainant’s Answer to the Complaint, the trial court set the case for [p]re-trial conference on 3 June 1997. However, due
to the failure of complainant and her counsel to appear, the court declared complainant in default and Atty. Bugaring was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte x x x on 6 June 1997. On 15 October 1997, the court rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Bugaring. As no appeal
was undertaken by complainant, Atty. Bugaring on 14 July 1998 filed his Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution thereto which was
granted by the court on 28 September 1998. When the Writ of Execution was issued on 24 December 1998, complainant filed [a] Petition
for Certiorari with Temporary Restraining Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R.
SP No. 49866, questioning the trial court’s orders dated 3 and 13 February 1998, as well as the resolution dated 28 September 1998. The
Court of Appeals, finding no merit in the petition, dismissed the same and affirmed the trial court’s Resolution on 4 February 1999.
Complainant, finding the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals, filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 26 April 1999. Complainant also
filed a Motion dated 15 July 1999 asking for the issuance of a Cease, Desist and Refrain Order against the [p]ublic [a]uction sale
[scheduled] on 30 July 1999 [by] the deputy sheriff of the trial court. Acting on complainant’s motion, the Court of Appeals issued a
Temporary Restraining Order dated 29 July 1999. [H]owever, on 30 September 1999, the appellate court finally issued its resolution
denying complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration." 7
Evaluation and Recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner Maala found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for making untruthful statements and for misleading the trial courts on several
occasions in Civil Case No. Q-96-29422 and Civil Case No. B-3896. Respondent allegedly lied to and misled these courts in the following instances:
1. When he included in his claim for attorney’s fees in Civil Case Q-96-29422 25 percent of the value of two lots (at ₱3,670,000 and
₱750,000), which were not among the properties in litigation in the "Mother Case" and had already been sold in 1987 and 1968,
respectively
2. When he concealed the fact that Lot 2454 had been given to complainant’s tenants as disturbance compensation
3. When he failed to disclose that the Contract of Service for the "Mother Case" was executed six months after it had already been settled
by a Compromise Agreement on June 7, 1992
4. When he led the RTC of San Pedro Laguna (Branch 93), to believe in his Petition for Recording and Enforcement of Attorney’s Lien in
Civil Case No. B-3896 that no other action or claim was pending except his case for collection
5. When he made two inconsistent statements regarding the date when his professional services had actually been engaged by
complainant
Commissioner Maala also found that respondent had not completely been honest with the Commission. According to his Comment, 8 he decided to
forego his professional fees amounting to ₱2 million in Civil Case No. B-3896; actually, those fees were included in his collection case. It was also in
the said case that he filed a Petition for the Recording and Enforcement of Attorney’s Lien.
Commissioner Maala held that respondent had violated his sworn duty to tell no falsehood in court. Hence, she recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for one year.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of IBP.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts. Accordingly, Rule
10.01 requires a member of the bar "not [to tell] any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice."
Moreover, Section 20(d) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer must employ "such means only as are consistent with truth and
honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement of fact or law."
In his September 28, 2003 Comment/Opposition9 to the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, respondent points out alleged distortions
in the findings of fact. Upon a review of the records, however, the Court finds the investigating commissioner’s conclusions to be in order.
Falsehood
Indeed, respondent has not completely been honest when he claimed that the entire estate of Adela Silva was the subject of litigation in the case for
partition. First, it is clear that Lots 2434 and 2454 were the only properties mentioned in the Complaint 10 for partition, which we quote:
"x x x. The late Adela Silva died intestate, single and without surviving heirs except the herein plaintiffs and defendants. She died x x x
leaving as her estate the two (2) parcels of land located at Bgy. Platero, Biñan, Laguna. The first known as Lot 2434 of the Biñan Estate is
covered by TCT No. RT-1702 (N.A.) while the second known as Lot 2454 of the same Biñan Estate is embraced by TCT No. Rt-1703
(N.A.) issued by the Register of Deeds (Calamba branch) of Laguna;" 11
Second, the Compromise Agreement and the Judgment in the "Mother Case" for partition did not indicate that the subject of partition was the late
Adela Silva’s estate, but they did refer to the other properties belonging to her, including the 73,404 square-meter agricultural land in Puting Kahoy,
Silang, Cavite; and the 150 square-meter residential lot in Sampaloc, Manila. What appears from the Compromise Agreement and the Judgment is
that these properties were enumerated merely to show that Lots 2434 and 2454 were part of the said estate. That only these lots were referred to is
plain from the terms and conditions of the Judgment:
"1. That the parties herein hereby agree to refrain from discussing whether their claims and counter claims over Lot 2434 (TCT 12702) and
Lot 2454 (TCT 1703) are meritorious or not, and further agree to put an end to all their litigations x x x. Thus to this effect, all their claims
are hereby waived and abandoned subject to the following terms and conditions:
a. That the defendant Dolores Silva Fajardo hereby agree[s] to pay the plaintiffs’ representative Alicia Cruz, the sum of four
hundred thousand (₱400,000.00) pesos Philippine currency upon signing of this Agreement.
b. That the defendant Dolores Silva Fajardo be authorized to consummate the sale of Lot No. 2434, and Lot 2454, covered by
TCT No. 1702 and 1703, respectively of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba branch, and to execute all the necessary
documents in favor of the Vendee, Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation." 12
Third, it was adequately established that the Cavite and the Sampaloc lots mentioned in the Compromise Agreement and the Judgment had already
been sold long before the advent of Civil Case B-3472. There is no reason to doubt that respondent, as complainant’s counsel, knew this fact.
Lastly, we note that the failure of respondent to include all the properties of the estate in his claim for attorney’s fees runs counter to his other claim
that complainant’s entire estate was in litigation. If it were so, should he not then have also asked for 25 percent of the value of all such properties
enumerated in the Judgment?
As regards his professional fees, we stress that the proper time to deal with this delicate issue is upon the commencement of the lawyer-client
relationship. In this case, respondent should have determined and entered into an agreement regarding his fees in 1991 at the latest, when he was
first retained by complainant as her counsel in the partition case. Such prudence would have spared the Court this controversy over a lawyer’s
compensation, a suit that should be avoided except to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. 13
To be sure, a lawyer is entitled to the protection of the courts against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of legitimate attorney’s
fees.14 However, such protection must not be sought at the expense of truth. Complete candor or honesty is expected from lawyers, particularly
when they appear and plead before the courts for their own causes against former clients, as in this case. With his armada of legal knowledge and
skills, respondent clearly enjoyed the upper hand. More important, he had the sole opportunity to present evidence in the collection case after
complainant was declared in default, and after he was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
Respondent is thus reminded that he is first and foremost an officer of the court. His bounden duty is to assist it in rendering justice to all. 15 Lest he
has forgotten, lawyers must always be disciples of truth. 16 It is highly reprehensible when they themselves make a travesty of the truth and mangle
the ends of justice. Such behavior runs counter to the standards of honesty and fair dealing expected from court officers.
Equally without merit are respondent’s other arguments that the real issue herein is his claim for attorney’s fees, whose merit has already been
adjudicated in court, as well as of his allegation that complainant has engaged in forum shopping to delay the execution of the judgment against her
for attorney’s fees.
To start with, this proceeding is not about the merits of respondent’s fees, but about his conduct as an officer of the court. It has been emphasized in
a number of cases that disbarment proceedings belong to a class of their own, distinct from that of a civil or a criminal action. 17 In Re
Almacen18 explained this basic principle:
"x x x [D]isciplinary proceedings x x x are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not -- and does not involve
-- a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x." 19 (Italics supplied)
Clearly then, this disbarment case may proceed independently of the civil action for collection, without running afoul of the prohibition against forum
shopping. Moreover, the elements of forum shopping 20 are conspicuously absent. Between these two cases, there is no identity of parties, as the
complainant is in no sense a party to the administrative proceeding. Obviously, there is neither identity of rights asserted nor reliefs prayed for.
Lastly, the judgment in the disbarment proceeding would not bar the collection case.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Rexie Efren A. Bugaring is found LIABLE for gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or of a similar misconduct will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales*, JJ., concur.

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1 PALE (pages 6 and 7 of the syllabus)

G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,

Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.

xxx xxx xxx

For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]

JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.

Jose M. Castillo for complainant.

Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

[A.C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002.]

ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, Respondent.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;

(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition and

5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;

6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and

7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx. 38

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

favored party directly benefited by the said decision

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);

6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);

8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);

9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

xxx xxx xxx 54

A.C. No. 5148 July 1, 2003

ATTY. RAMON P. REYES, complainant,

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

This Court’s Ruling

We agree with the IBP’s recommendation.

The Amended and Supplemental Complaints16 alleged the following:

ADM. CASE NO. 5737 October 25, 2004

xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?