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System Technical Note

How can I...


90

Increase the Availability of a


Collaborative Control System

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Table of Contents

Introduction to High Availability .............................................5

High Availability Theoretical Basics.......................................9

High Availability with Collaborative Control System..........31

Conclusion ..............................................................................73

Appendix .................................................................................76

Reliability & Availability Calculation Examples...................83

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Introduction to High Availability

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Introduction to High Availability

Introduction to High Availability

Purpose

The intent of this System Technical Note (STN) is to describe the capabilities of the
different Schneider Electric solutions that answer most critical applications
requirements, and consequently increase the availability of a Collaborative Control
System. It provides a description of a common, readily understandable reference
point for end users, system integrators, OEMs, sales people, business support and
other parties.

Introduction

Increasingly, process applications require a high availability automation system.

Before deciding to install a high availability automation system in your installation, you
need to consider the following key questions:

• What is the security level needed? This regards security concerning of both
persons and hardware. For instance, the complete start/stop sequences that
manage the kiln in a cement plant includes a key condition: the most powerful
equipment must be the last to start and stop.

• What is the criticality of the process? This point concerns all the processes that
involve a reaction (mechanical, chemical, etc.). Consider the example of the kiln
again. To avoid its destruction, the complete stop sequence needs a slow cooling
of the constituent material. Another typical example is the biological treatment in
a wastewater plant, which cannot be stopped every day.

• What is the environmental criticality?. Consider the example of an automation


system in a tunnel. If a fire starts on a side, thereof the PLCs (the default and the
redundant one) will be installed on each side of the tunnel. More, does the
system will face to harsh environment; in terms of vibration, temperature, shock…?

• Which other particular circumstances does the system have to address? This last
topic includes additional questions, for example: does the system really need
redundancy if the electrical network becomes inoperative in the concerned layer
of the installation, what is the criticality of the data in the event of a loss of
communication, etc.

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Introduction to High Availability

Availability is a term that increasingly used to qualify a process asset or system. In


addition, Reliability and Maintainability are terms now often used for analyses
considered of major usefulness in design improvement, and in production diagnostic
issues. Accordingly, the design of automation system architectures must consider
these types of questions.

The Collaborative Control System provided by Schneider Electric offers different


levels of redundancy, allowing you to design an effective high availability system.

Document Overview

This document contains the following chapters:

• The High Availability Theoretical Basics chapter describes the fundamentals in


High Availability. In one hand it presents theory and basics, in another hand
explains a method to conceptualize series/parallel architectures. Calculation
examples illustrate this approach.

• The Collaborative Control System Availability chapter provides different solutions


in High Availability, especially for Collaborative Control System; from the
information management to the I/O modules level.

• The final Conclusion chapter summarizes customer benefits provided by


Schneider Electric High Availability solutions, as well as additional information
and references.

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Introduction to High Availability

The following drawing represents various levels of an automation system architecture:

As shown in the following chapters, redundancy is a convenient means of elevating


global system reliability, and so far its availability. The Collaborative Control System
Hi-Availability, that is redundancy, can be addressed at the different levels of the
architecture:

 Single or redundant I/O Modules (depending on sensors/actuators redundancy).

 Depending on the I/O handling philosophy (for example conventional Remote I/O
stations, or I/Os Islands distributed on Ethernet) different scenarios can be
applied: dual communication medium I/O Bus or Self healing Ring, single or dual.

 Programmable Controller CPU redundancy (HotStandby PAC Station).

 Communication network and ports redundancy.

 SCADA System dedicated approaches with multiple operator station location


scenarios and resource redundancy capabilities.

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Guide Scope

The realization of an automation project includes five main phases: Selection, Design,
Configuration, Implementation and Operation. To help you develop a whole project
based on these previous phases, Schneider Electric created the System Technical
book concept: Guide (STG) and Notes (STN).

A System Technical Guide provides you technical guidelines and recommendations


to implement technologies regarding to your needs and requirements. This guide
covers the entire project life cycle scope, from the selection to the operation phase
providing design methodology and even source code examples of all components
part of a sub-system.

A System Technical Notes gives a more theoretical approach by focusing specially on


a system technology. This book describes what is our complete solution offer
regarding a system and therefore supports you in the selection phase of a project.

STG and STN are obviously linked and complementary. To sum up, you will figure out
the technologies fundamentals in a STN, and their corresponding tested and
validated applications in one or several STGs.

STN Scope
STG Scope

Automation Project
Life Cycle

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

High Availability Theoretical Basics


This section describes basic high availability terms, concepts and formulas, and
includes examples for typical applications.

Fault Tolerant System

A Fault Tolerant System usually refers to a system that can operate even though a
hardware component becomes inoperative. The Redundancy principle is often used
to implement a Fault Tolerant Systems, because an alternate component takes over
the task transparently.

Lifetime and Failure Rate

Considering a given system or device, its Lifetime corresponds to the number of


hours it can function under normal operating conditions. This number is the result of
the individual life expectancy of the components used in its assembly.

Lifetime is generally seen as a sequence of three subsequent phases: the “early life”
(or “infant mortality”), the "useful life,” and the "wear out period.”

Failure Rate (λ) is defined as the average (mean) rate probability at which a system
will become inoperative.

When considering events occurring on a series of systems, for example a group of


light bulbs, the units to be used should normally be “failures-per-unit-of- system-time.”
Examples include failures per machine-hour or failures per system-year. Because the
scope of this document is limited to single repairable entities, we will usually discuss
failures-per-unit-of-time.

Failure Rate Example: For a human being, Failure Rate (λ) measures the
probability of death occurring in the next hour. Stating λ (20 years) = 10 per
-6

hour would mean that the probability for someone age 20 to die in the next
-6
hour is 10 .

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Bathtub Curve

The following figure shows the Bathtub Curve, which represents the Failure Rate (λ)
according to the Lifetime (t):

Consider the
relation between
Failure Rate and
Lifetime for a
device consisting of
assembled
electronic parts.
This relationship is
represented by the
The Bathtub Curve "bathtub curve". As
shown in the previous diagram. In "early life," this system, exhibits a high Failure
Rate, which gradually reduces until it approaches a constant value, maintained during
its "useful life.” The system finally enters the “wear-out” stage of its life, where Failure
Rate increases exponentially.

Note: Useful Life normally starts at the beginning of system use and ends at the
beginning of its wear-out phase. Assuming that "early life" corresponds to the ”burn-
in” period indicated by the manufacturer, we generally consider that Useful Life starts
with the beginning of system use by the end user.

RAMS (Reliability Availability Maintainability Safety)

The following text, from the MIL-HDBK-338B standard, defines the RAM criteria and
their probability aspect:
"For the engineering specialties of reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM),
the theories are stated in the mathematics of probability and statistics. The underlying
reason for the use of these concepts is the inherent uncertainty in predicting a failure.
Even given a failure model based on physical or chemical reactions, the results will
not be the time a part will fail, but rather the time a given percentage of the parts will
fail or the probability that a given part will fail in a specified time."

Along with Reliability, Availability and Maintainability, Safety is the fourth metric of a
meta-domain that specialists have named RAMS (also sometimes referred to as
dependability).

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Metrics

RAMS metrics relate to time allocation and depend on the operational state of a given
system.

The following curve defines the state linked to each term:

• MUT: Mean Up Time

MUT qualifies the average duration of the system being in operational state.

• MDT: Mean Down Time

MDT qualifies the average duration of the system not being in operational state. It
comprises the different portions of time required to subsequently detect the error, fix it,
and restore the system to its operational state.

• MTBF: Mean Time between Failure

MTBF is defined by the MIL-HDBK-338 standard as follows: "A basic measure of


reliability for repairable items. The mean number of life units during which all parts of
the item perform within their specified limits, during a particular measurement interval
under stated conditions."

Thus for repairable systems, MTBF is a metric commonly used to appraise Reliability,
and corresponds to the average time interval (normally specified in hours) between
two consecutive occurrences of inoperative states.

Put simply: MTBF = MUT + MDT

MTBF can be calculated (provisional reliability) based on data books such as UTE
C80-810 (RDF2000), MIL HDBK-217F, FIDES, RDF 93, and BELLCORE. Other
inputs include field feedback, laboratory testing, or demonstrated MTBF (Operational
Reliability), or a combination of these. Remember that MTBF only applies for
repairable systems

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

• MTTF (or MTTFF): Mean Time to First Failure

MTTF is the mean time before the occurrence of the first failure.

MTTF (and MTBF by extension) is often confused with Useful Life, even though
these two concepts are not related in any way. For example, a battery may have
a Useful Life of 4 hours and have a MTTF of 100,000 hours. These figures
indicate that for a population of 100,000 batteries, there will be approximately
one battery failure every hour (defective batteries being replaced).

Considering a repairable system with an exponential distribution Reliability and a


constant Failure Rate (λ), MTTF = 1 / λ.

Mean Down Time is usually very low compared to Mean Up Time. This equivalence
is extended to MTBF, and assimilated to MTTF, resulting in the following relationship:
MTBF = 1 / λ.

This relationship is widely used in additional calculations.

Example:

Given the MTBF of a communication adapter, 618,191 hours, what is the


probability for that module to operate without failure for 5 years?

Calculate the module Reliability over a 5-year time period:


-λt -t / MTBF
R(t) = e =e

a) Divide by 5 years, that is 8,760 * 5 = 43,800 hours, by the given MTBF:


43,800 / 618,191 = 0.07085

b) Then raise e to the power of the negative value of that number:


-.07085
e = .9316

Thus there is a 93.16% probability that the communication module will not fail
on a 5-year period.

• FIT: Failures in Time

Typically used as the Failure Rate measurement for non- repairable electronic
components, FIT is the number of failures in one billion hours.
9 9
FIT= 10 / MTBF or MTBF= 10 / FIT

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Safety

Definition

Safety refers to the protection of people, assets and the environment. For example, if
an installation has a tank with an internal pressure that exceeds a given threshold,
there is a high chance of explosion, and eventual destruction of the installation (with
injury or death of people and damage to the environment). In this example, the Safety
System put in place is to open a valve to the atmosphere, to prevent the pressure
threshold from being crossed.

Maintainability

Definition

Maintainability refers to the ability of a system to be maintained in an operational


state. This once again relates to probability. Maintainability corresponds to the
probability for an inoperative system to be repaired in a given time interval.

If design considerations may at a certain level impact the maintainability of a system,


then the maintenance organization will also have a major impact on its maintainability.
Having the right number of people trained to observe and react with the proper
methods, tools, and spare parts are considerations that usually depend more on the
customer organization than on the automation system architecture.

Mathematics Basics

Equipment shall be maintainable on-site by trained personnel according to the


maintenance strategy. A common metric named Maintainability, M(t), gives the
probability that a required given active maintenance operation can be accomplished
in a given time interval.

The relationship between Maintainability and repair is similar to the relationship


between reliability and failure, with the repair rate µ(t) defined in a way analogous to
the Failure Rate. When this repair rate is considered as a constant, it implies an
-µt
exponential distribution for Maintainability: M(t) = e .

The maintainability of equipment is reflected in MTTR, which is usually considered as


the sum of the individual times required for administrative, transport, and repair times.

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Availability

Definition

The term High Availability is often used when discussing Fault Tolerant Systems. For
example, your telephone line is supposed to offer you a high level of availability: the
service you are paying for has to be effectively accessible and dependable. Your line
availability is compared related to the continuity of the service which you are
provided. As an example, assume you are living in a remote area with occasional
violent storms. Because of your loacation and the damage these storms can cause,
long delays are required to fix your line once it is out of order. In these conditions, if
on average your line appears to be usable only 50% of the time, you have poor
availability. By contrast, if on average each of your attempts is 100% satisfied, then
your line has high availability.

This example demonstrates that Availability is the key metric to measuring a system’s
tolerance level, that it is typically expressed in percent (for example 99.999%), and
that it belongs to the domain of probability.

Mathematics Basics

The Instantaneous Availability of a device is the probability that this device will be in
the functional state for which it was designed, under given conditions and at a given
time (t), with the assumption that the required external conditions are met.

Besides Instantaneous Availability, different variants have been specified, each


corresponding to a specific definition, including Asymptotic Availability, Intrinsic
Availability and Operational Availability.

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Asymptotic (or Steady State) Availability: A∞

Asymptotic Availability is the limit of the instantaneous availability function as time


approaches infinity,

MDT MUT MUT


A = 1− = =
∞ MUT + MDT MUT+MDT MTBF

where Downtime includes all repair time (corrective and preventive maintenance
time), administrative time and logistic time.

The following curve shows an example of asymptotic behavior:

Intrinsic (or Inherent) Availability: Ai

Intrinsic Availability does not include administrative time and logistic time, and usually
does not include preventive maintenance time. This is primarily a function of the basic
equipment/system design.

MTBF
Ai =
MTBF + MTTR

We will consider Intrinsic Availability in our Availability calculations.

Operational Availability

Operational Availability corresponds to the probability that an item will operate


satisfactorily at a given point in time when used in an actual or realistic operating and
support environment.

Uptime
A0 =
Operating ⋅ Cycle

Operational Availability includes logistics time, ready time, and waiting or


administrative downtime, and both preventive and corrective maintenance downtime.

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

This is the availability that the customer actually experiences. It is essentially the a
posteriori availability based on actual events that happened to the system.

Classification

A quite common way used to classify a system in terms of Availability consists of


listing the number of 9s of its availability figure.

The following table defines types of availability:

Class Type of Availability Downtime Number of


Availability (%) per Year Nines

1 Unmanaged 90 36.5 days 1-nine

2 Managed 99 3.65 days 2-nines

3 Well Managed 99.9 8.76 hours 3-nines

4 Tolerant 99.99 52.6 minutes 4-nines

5 High Availability 99.999 5.26 minutes 4-nines

6 Very High 99.9999 30.00 seconds 6-nines

7 Ultra High 99.99999 3 seconds 7-nines

For example, a system that has a five-nine availability rating means that the system is
99.999 % available; with a system downtime of approximately 5.26 minutes per year.

Reliability

Definition

A fundamental associated metric is Reliability. Return to the example of your


telephone line. If the wired network is a very old one, having suffered from many
years of lack of maintenance, it may frequently be out of order. Even if the current
maintenance personnel are doing their best to repair it in a minimum time, it can be
said to have poor reliability if, for example, it has experienced ten losses of
communication during the last year. Notice that Reliability necessarily refers to a
given time interval, typically one year. Therefore, Reliability will account for the
absence of shutdown of a considered system in operation, on a given time interval.
As with Availability, we consider Reliability in terms of perspective (a prediction), and
within the domain of probability.

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Mathematics Basics

In many situations a detected disruption fortunately does not mean the end of a
device’s life. This is usually the case for the automation and control systems being
discussed, which are repairable entities. As a result, the ability to predict the number
of shutdowns, due to a detected disruption over a specified period of time, is useful to
estimate the budget required for the replacement of inoperative parts.

In addition, knowing this figure can help you maintain an adequate inventory of spare
parts. Put simply, the question "Will a device work for a particular period" can only be
answered as a probability; hence the concept of Reliability.

According to the MIL-STD-721C standard, the definition of reliability R(t) of a given


system is the probability of that system to perform its intended function under stated
conditions for a stated period of time. As an example, a system featured by 0.9999
reliability over a year has a 99.99% probability of functioning properly throughout an
entire year.

Note: The reliability is systematically indicated for a given period of time, for example
one year.

Referring to the system model we considered with the "bathtub curve,” one
characteristic is its constant Failure Rate, during the useful life. In that portion of its
lifetime, the Reliability of the considered system will follow an exponential law, given
, where λ stands for the Failure Rate.
-λt
by the following formula: R(t) = e

, where λ stands for the


-λt
The following figure illustrates the exponential law, R(t) = e
Failure Rate:

As shown in the diagram,


Reliability starts with a value of
1 at time zero, which
represents the moment the
system is put into operation.
Reliability then falls graduallly
down to zero, following the
exponential law. Therefore,
Reliability is about 37% at
t=1/λ. As an example, assume the given system experiences an average number of
0.5 inoperative states per a 1-year time unit. The exponential law indicates that such
a system would have about a 37% chance of remaining in operation, reaching 1 / 0.5
= 2 years of service.

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Note: Considering the flat portion of the bathtub curve model, where the Failure Rate
is constant over time and remains the same for a unit regardless of this unit’s age, the
system is said to be "memoryless.”

Reliability versus Availability

Reliability one of the factors influencing Availability, but must not be confused with
Availabilty: 99.99% Reliability does not mean 99.99% Availability. Reliability
measures the ability of a system to function without interruptions, while Availability
measures the ability of this system to provide a specified application service level.

Although Availability is a function of Reliability, it is possible for a system with


poor Reliability to achieve high Availability. For example, consider that a system
averages 4 failures a year, and for each failure, this system can be restored with
an average outage time of 1 minute. Over the specified period of time, MTBF is
131,400 minutes (4 minutes of downtime out of 525,600 minutes per year).

In that one year period:


-λt -4
 Reliability R(t) = e =e = 1.83%, very poor Reliability

MTBF 131⋅ 400


 (Inherent) Availability A i = = = 99,99924% ,
MTBF + MTTR 131400 + 1

very good Availability

Higher reliability reduces the frequency of inoperative states, while increasing overall
Availability.

There is a difference between Hardware MTBF and System MTBF. The mean time
between hardware component failures occurring on an I/O Module, for example, is
referred to as the Hardware MTBF. Mean time between failures occurring on a
system considered as a whole, a PLC configuration for example, is referred to as the
System MTBF.

As will be demonstrated, hardware component redundancy will provide an increase in


the overall system MTBF, even though the individual component’s MTBF remains the
same.

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD)

Based on basic probability computation rules, RBD are simple, convenient tools to
represent a system and its components, to determine the Reliability of the system.

Series-Parallel Systems

The target system, for example a PLC rack, must first be interpreted in terms of series
and parallel arrangements of elementary parts.

The following figure shows a representation of a serial architecture:

As an example, assume that one of the 5


modules (1 power supply and 4 other
modules) that populate the PLC rack
becomes inoperative. As a consequence,
the entire rack is affected, as it is no longer
100% capable of performing its assigned
mission, regardless of which module is
inoperative. Thus each of the 5 modules
are considered as a participant member of a 5-part series.

Note: When considering Reliability, two components are described as in series if both
are necessary to perform a given function.

The following figure shows a representation of a parallel architecture:

As an example, assume that the PLC rack


now contains redundant Power Supply
modules, in addition to the 4 other
modules. If one Power Supply becomes
inoperative, then the other supplies power
for the entire rack. These 2 power supplies
would be considered as a parallel sub-
system, in turn coupled in series with the
sequence of the 4 other modules.

Note: Two components are in parallel, from a reliability standpoint, when the system
works if at least one of the two components works. In this example, Power Supply 1
and 2 are said to be in active redundancy. The redundancy would be described as
passive if one of the parallel components is turned on only if the other is inoperative
only, for example in the case of auxiliary power generators.

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Serial RBD

Reliability

Serial system Reliability is equal to the product of the individual elements’ reliabilities.

n
R S (t) = R1(t) ∗ R2 (t) ∗ R3 (t) ∗ ... ∗ Rn (t) = ∏ Ri (t)
i=1

where: Rs(t) = System Reliability

Ri(t) = Individual Element Reliability

n = Total number of elements on the serial system

Assuming constant individual Failure Rate:


−λ t −λ t −λ t −λ t − ( λ + λ + λ + ... + λ ) t
R (t) = R (t) ∗ R (t) ∗ R (t) ∗ ... ∗ R (t) = e 1 ∗ e 2 ∗ e 31 ∗ ... ∗ e n = e 1 2 3 n
S 1 2 3 n
n
That is λ = ∑ λ : Equivalent Failure Rate for n serial elements is equal to the sum
S i
i =1
− λ St
of the individual Failure Rate of these elements, with R S (t) = e

Example 1:

Consider a system with 10 elements, each of them required for the proper operation
of the system, for example a 10-module rack. To determine RS(t), the Reliability of
that system over a given time interval t, if each of the considered elements shows an
individual Reliability Ri(t) of 0.99:

10
R S (t) = ∏ Ri (t) = (0.99) x (0.99) x (0.99) . . . (0.99) = (0.99) = 0.9044
10

i=1

Thus the targeted system Reliability is 90.44%

Example 2:

Consider two elements with the following failure rates:

λ1 = 120 x 10-6 h and λ2 = 180 x 10-6 h


-1 -1

Element 1 Element 2
λ2 = 180 x 10 h
-6 -1
λ1 = 120 x 10 h
-6 -1

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

The System Reliability, over a 1,000- hour mission, is:

n
λ S = ∑ λ i = λ1 + λ2 = 120 x 10 + 180 x 10 = 300 x 10 = 0.3 x 10 h-1
-6 -6 -6 -3

i=1

−λS t − 0.3 x 10−3 x 103 − 0.3


R S (1000 h) = e =e =e = 0.7408

Thus the targeted system Reliability is 74.08%

Availability

Serial system Availability is equal to the product of the individual elements’


Availabilities.

n
A S = A1 . A2 . A3 .... .A n = ∏ A i
i=1

where: As= system (asymptotic) availability

Ai = Individual element (asymptotic) availability

n = Total number of elements on the serial system

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Calculation Example

In this example, we calculate the availability of a PAC Station using shared distributed
I/O Islands. The following illustration shows the final configuration:

This calculation applies the equations given by basic probability analysis. To do this
calculation, a spreadsheet was developed. These are the figures applied in the
spreadsheet:

Failure rate: λ = 1/MTBF


-λt
Reliability: R(t) = e

n
Total serial Systems Failure Rate λ = ∑ λ
S i
i =1

Total MTBF serial Systems = 1 / λs

Availability = MTBF/ MTBF+ MTTR

Unavailability = 1 – Availability

Unavailability over years: Unavailability × hours (one year = 8460 hours)

The following table shows the method to perform the calculation:

Step Action

1 Perform the calculation of the Standalone CPU.

2 Perform the calculation of a distributed island.

3 Based on the serial structure, add up the results from Steps 1 and 2.

Note: A common variant of in-rack I/O Module stations are I/O Islands, distributed on
an Ethernet communication network. Schneider Electric offers a versatile family
named Advantys STB, which can be used to define such architectures.

Step 1: Calculation linked to the Standalone CPU Rack.

The following figures represent the Standalone CPU Rack:

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

The following screenshot is the spreadsheet corresponding to this analysis.

Step 2: Calculation linked to the STB Island.

The following figures represent the Distributed I/O on STB Island:

The following screenshot is the spreadsheet corresponding to this analysis:

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Step 3: Calculation of the entire installation. Assume that the communication network
used to link I/O Islands to CPU has no examples of Reliability metrics (these are
explored further in a subsequent chapter).

The following figures represent the final Distributed architecture:

The following screenshot is the spreadsheet corresponding to the entire analysis:

Note: The highlighted values were calculated in the two previous steps

Considering the results of this Serial System (Rack # 1+ Islands # 1 ... #4), Reliability over
one year is approximately 82 % (the probability that this system will encounter one failure
during one year is approximately 18%).

System MTBF itself is approximately 44,000 hours (about 5 years)

Considering the Availability, with a 2-hour Mean Time To Repair (typical of a very good
logistics and maintenance organization), the system would achieve a 4-nines Availability,
an average probability of approximately 24 minutes downtime per year;

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Parallel RBD

Reliability

Theory of Probability provides expression of the Reliability of a Parallel System (for


example, a Redundant System), with Qi(t) (unreliability) being the reverse of Ri(t).

Qi (t) = Ri (t) = 1- Ri (t) :

n n
RRe d (t) = 1− [ Q1 (t) x Q2 (t) x Q3 (t) x .... x Q n ( t) ] = 1− ∏ Q i (t) = 1− ∏1− Ri ( t)
i=1 i=1

with: R Red = Reliability of the Simple Redundancy System

n
∏ Q i = Probability of Failure of the System
i=1

Rj = Probability of Non-Failure of an Individual Parallelized Element

Qj = Probability of Failure of an Individual Parallelized Element

n = Total number of Parallelized Elements

Example:

Considering two elements with the following failure rates:

λ1 = 120 x 10-6 h and λ2 = 180 x 10-6 h


-1 -1

The System Reliability, over a 1,000-hour mission, is:

Element 1
λ1 = 120 x 10 h
-6 -1

Element 2
λ2 = 180 x 10 h
-6 -1

Reliability of elements 1 and 2 over the 1,000-hour period:

−6
R1 (1,000 h) = e −λ1t = e −120 x 10 x 103
= 0,8869
−6
−λ2 t
= e −180 x 10
3
R2 (1,000 h) = e x 10
= 0.8353

Unreliability of elements 1 and 2 over the 1,000 hour-period:

Q 1 (1,000 h) = 1− R1 (1,000 h) = 1− 0.8869 = 0.1130


Q 2 (1,000 h) = 1− R2 (1,000 h) = 1− 0.8353 = 0.1647

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Redundant System Reliability, over the 1,000-hour period:

R12 ( t = 1000 h) = 1− [ Q 1 ( t = 1000 h) . Q 2 (1,000 h) ] = 1− (0.1130 x 0.1647) = 0.9814

Thus with Individual Elements’ Reliability of 88.69% and 83.53% respectively, the
targeted Redundant System Reliability is 98.14%

Availability

Parallel system Unavailability is equal to the product of the individual elements’


Unavailabilities. Thus the Parallel system Availability, given the individual parallelized
elements’ Availabilities, is:

n
A S = 1− [ (1 − A 1) . (1 − A 2 ) . ... . (1− A n ) ] = 1− ∏ (1 − A i )
i =1

where: As= system (asymptotic) availability

Ai = Individual element (asymptotic) availability

n = Total number of elements on the serial system

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High Availability Theoretical Basics

Calculation Example

To illustrate a Parallel system, we perform the calculation of the Availability of a


redundant PLC System using shared distributed I/O Islands.

The following illustration shows the final configuration:

The formulas are the same as used in the previous calculation example, except for
the calculation of the reliability for a parallel system, which is as follows:

n n
RRe d (t) = 1− [ Q1 (t) x Q2 (t) x Q3 (t) x .... x Q n ( t) ] = 1− ∏ Q i (t) = 1− ∏1− Ri ( t)
i=1 i=1

The following table shows the method to perform the calculation:

Step Action

1 Perform the calculation of a standalone CPU

2 Perform the calculation for the redundant structure, here the two CPUs

3 Perform the calculation of a distributed island

4 Concatenate the results from Steps 1,2 and 3

Note: the previous results from the serial analysis, regarding the calculation linked to
the standalone elements, are reused.

27
High Availability Theoretical Basics

Step 1: Calculation linked to the Standalone CPU Rack.

Because the analysis is identical to that for the serial case, the following screenshot
shows the spreadsheet corresponding only to the final results:

Step 2: Calculation of the redundant CPU group.

The following figures show represent the Redundant CPUs:

The following screenshot is the spreadsheet corresponding to this analysis:

Step 3: Calculation linked to the STB Island.

Because the analysis is identical to that for the serial case, the following screenshot
shows the spreadsheet corresponding to the final results only:

28
High Availability Theoretical Basics

Step 4: Calculation of the entire installation.

The following screenshot is the spreadsheet corresponding to the entire analysis:

Note: The only difference between this architecture and the previous one relates to
the CPU Rack: this one is a redundant one (Premium Hot Standby), while the former
one was a standalone one.

Looking at the results of this Parallel System (Premium CPU Rack Redundancy), Reliability
over one year would be approximately 99.9%, compared to 97.4% available with a
Standalone Premium CPU Rack (i.e. the probability for a Premium Rack System to
encounter one failure during one year would have been reduced from 2.6% to 0.1%).

System MTBF itself would increas from 335,000 hours (approximately 38 years) to 503,000
hours (approximately 57 years).

For System Availability, a 2-hour Mean Time To Repair we provide approximately a 9-nines
resulting Availability (almost 100%).

Note: Other calculations examples are available in the Calculation Examples chapter.

Note: The previous examples cover the PAC station only. To extend the calculation
to a whole system, the MTBF of the network components and the SCADA systems
(PC, servers) must be taken in account.

29
High Availability Theoretical Basics

Conclusion

Serial System

The above computations demonstrate that the combined availability of two


components in series is always lower than the availability of its individual components.

The following table gives an example of combined availability in serial system:

Component Availability Downtime

X 99% (2-nines) 3.65 days/year

Y 99.99% (4-nines) 52 minutes/year

X and Y Combined 98.99% 3.69 days/year

This table indicates that even though a very high availability Part Y was used, the
overall availability of the system was reduced by the low availability of Part X. A
common saying indicates that "a chain is as strong as the weakest link", however, in
this instance a chain is actually “weaker than the weakest link.”

Parallel System

The above computations indicate that the combined availability of two components in
parallel is always higher than the availability of its individual components.
The following table gives an example of combined availability in a parallel system:

Component Availability Downtime

X 99% (2-nines) 3.65 days/year

Two X components 99.99% (4-nines) 52 minutes/year


operating in parallel

Three X components 99.9999% (6-nines) 31 seconds /year !


operating in parallel

This indicates that even though a very low availability Part X was used, the overall
availability of the system is much higher. Thus redundancy provides a very powerful
mechanism for making a highly reliable system from low reliability components.

30
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

High Availability with Collaborative Control System


In an automation system, how can you reach the level of availability required to keep
the plant in operation? By what means should you enforce the system architecture,
providing and maintaining access to the information required to monitor and control
the process?

This chapter provides answers to these questions, and reviews the system
architecture from top to bottom, that is, from operator stations and data servers
(Information Management) to Controllers and Devices (Control System Level), via
communication networks (Communication Infrastructure Level).

The following figure illustrates the Collaborative Control System:

Ethernet

Profibus
Ethernet
Ethernet

This previous system architecture drawing above shows various redundancy


capabilities that can be proposed:

• Dual SCADA Vijeo Citect server

• Dual Ethernet control network managed by ConneXium switches

• Premium Hot Standby with Ethernet device bus

• Quantum Hot Standby with Remote I/O, Profibus and Ethernet.

• Quantum safety controller HotStandby with remote I/O

31
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Information Management Level

This section explains how to implement various technological means to address


architecture challenges, with examples using a current client/server paradigm. The
section describes:

• A method to define a redundancy level

• The most appropriate system architecture for the defined level

Redundancy Level

Key Features

The key features a Vijeo Citect SCADA software has to handle relate to:

• Data acquisition

• Events and Alarms (including time stamping)

• Measurements and trends

• Recipes

• Report

• Graphics ( displays and user interfaces)

In addition, any current SCADA package provides access to a treatment/calculation


module (openness module), allowing users to edit program code (IML/CML, Cicode,
Script VB, etc.).

Note: This model is applicable for a single station (PC), including for small
applications. The synthesis between the stakes and the key features will help to
determine the most appropriate redundant solution.

32
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Stakes

Considering the previously defined key features, stakes when designing a SCADA
system include:

• Is a changeover possible?

• Does a time limit exist?

• What are the critical data?

• Has cost reduction been considered?

Risk analysis

Linked to the previous stakes, the risk analysis is essential to defining the redundancy
level. Consider the events the SCADA system will face, i.e. the risk, in terms of the
following:

• Inoperative hardware

• Inoperative power supply

• Environmental events (natural disaster, fire, etc.)

That can imply loss of data, operator screen, connection with devices and so on.

Level Definition

Finally, the redundancy level is defined as the compilation of the key features, the
stakes, and the risk analysis with the customer expectations related to the data
criticality level. The following table illustrates the flow from the process analysis to the
redundancy level:

33
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

The following table explains the redundancy levels:

Redundancy Level State of the standby system Switchover performance

No redundancy No standby system Not applicable

Cold Standby The Standby system is only powered on Several minutes


if the default system becomes
Large amount of lost data
inoperative.

Warm Standby The Standby system switches from Several seconds


normal to backup mode.
Small amount of lost data

Hot Standby The Standby system runs together with Transparent


the default system one.
No lost data

Architecture Redundancy Solutions Overview

This section examines various redundancy solutions. A Vijeo Citect SCADA system
can be redundant at the following levels:

• Clients, i.e. operator stations

• Data servers

• Control and information network

• Targets, i.e. PAC station, controller, devices

34
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

The Vijeo Citect functional organization corresponds directly


to a Client/Server philosophy. An example of a Client/Server
topology is shown in the diagram to the left: a single Display
Client Operator Station with a single I/O Server, in charge of
device data (PLC) communication.

Vijeo Citect architecture is a combination of several operational entities that handles


A
l
a
r
m
s
,
T
r
e
n
d
s

a
Alarms, Trends and Reports, respectively. In addition, this functional architecture
includes at least one I/O Server. The I/O Server acts as a Client to the peripheral
devices (PAC) and as a Server to Alarms, Trends and Reports (ATR) entities.

As shown in the figure above, ATR and I/O Server(s) act either as a Client or as a
Server, depending on the designated relationship. The default mechanism linking
these Clients and Servers is based on a Publisher / Subscriber relation.

As shown in the following screenshot, because of its client server model, Vijeo Citect
can create a dedicated server, depending on the application requirements: for
example for ATR, or for I/O server:

35
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Clients: Operator Workstations

Vijeo Citect is able to manage the redundancy at the operator station level with
several client workstations. These stations can be located in the control room or
distributed in the plant close to the critical part of the process. A web client interface
can also be used to monitor and control the plant using a standard web browser.

If an operator station becomes inoperative, the plant can still be monitored and
controlled using additional operator screen.

Servers: Resource Duplication Solution

This example assumes a Field Devices Communication Server, providing Services to


several types of Clients, such as Alarm Handling, Graphic Display, etc.

A first example of Redundancy is a complete duplication of the first Server. Basically,


if a system becomes inoperative, for example Server A, Server B would retain the job
and respond to the service requests presented by the Clients.

36
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
Vijeo Citect can define Primary and Standby servers within a project, with each
element of a pair being held by different hardware.
The first level of redundancy duplicates the I/O
server or the ATR server, as shown in the
illustration. In this case, a Standby server is
maintained in parallel to the Primary server. In the
event of a detected interruption on the hardware,
the Standby server will assume control of the
communication with the devices.

Based on data criticality, the second level


duplicates all the servers, ATR and I/O. Identical data is maintained on both servers.

In the diagram to the left,


Primary and Standby I/O
servers are deployed
independently, while Alarms,
Trends and Reports servers
are run as separate
processes on common
Primary and Standby
computers.

Network: Data Path Redundancy

Data path redundancy involves not alternative


device(s), but alternative data paths between
the I/O Server and connected I/O Devices.
Thus if one data path becomes inoperative,
the other is used.

Note: Vijeo Citect reconnects through the primary data path when it is returned into
service.

On a larger Vijeo Citect system, you can


also use data path redundancy to
maintain device communications through
multiple I/O Server redundancy, as shown
in the following diagram.

37
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Redundant LAN

As previously indicated, redundancy of Alarms, Reports, Trends, and I/O Servers is


achieved by adding standby servers. Vijeo Citect can also use the dual end point (or
multiple network interfaces) potentially available on each server, enabling the
specification of a complete and unique network connection between a Client and a
Server.

Target: I/O Device

A given I/O Server is able to


handle designated pairs of
Devices, Primary and Standby.
This Device Redundancy does
not rely on a PLC Hot Standby
mechanism: Primary and
Standby devices are assumed
to be concurrently acting on the
same process, but no
assumption is made
concerning the relationship
between the two devices. Seen from I/O Server, this redundancy offers access only to
an alternate device, in case the first device becomes inoperative.

The I/O device is an extension of I/O Device Redundancy, providing for more than
one Standby I/O Device. Depending on the user configuration, a given order of
priority applies when an I/O Server (potentially a redundant one) needs to switch to a
Standby I/O Device. For example, in the figure above I/O Device 3 would be allotted
the highest priority, then I/O Device 2, then finally I/O Device 4.

38
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
In those conditions, in case of a detected interruption occurring on Primary I/O Device
1, a switchover would take place, with I/O Server 2 handling communications, and
with Standby I/O Device 3. If an interruption is now detected on I/O Device 3, a new
switchover would take place, with I/O Server 1 handling communications, with
Standby I/O Device 2. Finally, if there is an interruption on I/O Device 2, another
switchover would take place, with I/O Server 2 handling communications, with
Standby I/O Device 4

Clustering

Refer again to the


diagram on the left,
explaining
Redundancy basics,
and examine the
functional
representation as a
cluster.

A cluster may
contain several
possibly
redundant I/O
Servers
(maximum of
one per
machine), and
standalone or
redundant
ATR servers; these latter servers being implemented either on a common or on
separate machines.

39
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

The cluster concept


offers a response to a
typical scenario of a
system separated into
several sites, with
each of these sites
being controlled by
local operators, and
supported by local
redundant servers.
The clustering model
can concurrently address an additional level of management that requires all sites
across the system to be monitored simultaneously from a central control room.

With this scenario, each site is represented with a separate cluster, grouping its
primary and standby servers. Clients on each site are interested only in the local
cluster, whereas clients at the central control room are able to view all clusters.

B
a
s
e
d

o
n

c
l
u
s
t
e
Based on cluster design, each site can then be addressed independently within its
own cluster. As a result, deployment of a control room scenario is fairly
straightforward, with the control room itself only needing display clients.

The cluster concept does not actually provide an additional level of redundancy.
Regarding data criticality, clustering organizes servers, and consequently provides
additional flexibility.

40
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
Each cluster contains only one pair each of ATR servers. Those pairs of servers,
redundant to each other, must be on different machines.

Each cluster can contain an unlimited number of I/O servers; those servers must also
be on different machines that increase the level of system availability.

Conclusion

The following illustration shows a complete installation. Redundant solutions


previously discussed can be identified:

Scada Clients

Data Servers

Control Network

Targeted Devices

Communication Infrastructure Level

The previous section reviewed various aspects of enhanced availability at the


Information Management level, focusing on SCADA architecture, represented by
Vijeo Citect. This section covers High Availability concerns between the Information
level and the Control Level.

A proper design at the communication infrastructure level must include:

• Analysis of the plant topology

• Localization of the critical process steps

• The definition of network topologies

• The appropriate use of communication protocols

41
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
Plant Topology

The first step of the communication infrastructure level definition is the plant topology
analysis. From this survey, the goal is to gather information to develop a networking
system diagram, prior to defining the network topologies.

This plant topology analysis must be done as a top-down process:

• Break-down of the plant in selected areas

• Localization of the areas to be connected

• Localization of the hazardous areas

• Localization of the station and the nodes included in these areas to be connected

• Localization of the existing networks & cabling paths, in the event of expansion or
redesign

Before defining the network topologies, the following project requirements must be
considered:

• Availability expectation, according to the criticality of the process or data.

• Cost constraints

• Operator skill level

From the project and the plant analyses, identify the most critical areas:

Project Process

<- Valves

<- Pumps

<- Motors (Conveyor)

<- Measure-
ments

Criticality analysis

Identification of the most critical areas

42
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Network Topology

Topologies

Following the criticality analysis, the networking diagram can be defined by selecting
the relevant Network topology.

The following table describes the four main topologies from which to choose:

Architecture Limitations Advantages Disadvantages

Bus The traffic must flow serially, Cost-effective solution If a switch becomes
therefore the bandwidth is not inoperative, the
used efficiently communication is lost.

Star Cable ways and distances Efficient use of the If the main switch
bandwidth, as the becomes inoperative,
traffic is spread across the communication is
the star lost

Preferred topology
when there is no need
of redundancy

Ring Behavior quite similar to Bus Auto-configuration if The Auto-configuration


used with self-healing depends on the
protocol protocol used

Possible to couple
others rings for
increasing redundancy

Note: These different topologies can be mixed to define the plant network diagram.

43
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

The following diagram shows the level of availability based on topology:

In automation architecture, Ring (and Dual ring) topologies are the most commonly
used to increase the availability of a system.

Mesh architecture is not used in process applications; therefore we will not discuss it
in detail. All these topologies are allowed using Schneider Electric ConneXium
switches.

Ring Topology

In a ring topology four events can occur, leading to a loss of communication:

1)Broken ring line

2)Inoperative ring switch

3)Inoperative ended-line devices

4)Inoperative ended-line devices switch

44
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

The following diagram illustrates these four occurrences:

2 3 4

To protect the network architecture from these events, several communication


protocols are proposed and described in the following section.

A solution able to enhance networking availability while preserving budget


considerations consists of reducing both limitations of an Ethernet network:
distributed as a bus, but built as a ring. At least one specific active component is
necessary: this is a network switch usually named Redundancy Manager (RM).

Consider an Ethernet loop designed with such a RM switch. In normal conditions, this
RM switch will open the loop: which prevents Ethernet frames from circulating
endlessly in a loop.

If a break occurs, the


Redundancy Manager
switch reacts immediately,
and closes the Ethernet
loop, bringing the network
back to full operating
condition.

Note that the term Self


Healing Ring concerns the
ring management only;
once cut, the cable is not
able to repair itself.

45
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

A mix of Dual Networking and Network Redundancy is possible. Note that in such a
design, a SCADA I/O Server has to be equipped with two communication boards, and
reciprocally, each device (PLC) has to be allotted two Ethernet ports.

Redundant Coupling of a Ring Network or a Network Segment

Topological considerations may lead to consideration of a network layout aggregating


satellite rings or segments around a backbone network (itself designed as a ring or as
a segment).

This may be an effective design, considering the junction between trunk and satellites,
especially if backbone and satellite networks have been designed as ring networks to
provide for High Availability.

With the Connexium product line, Schneider Electric offers switches that may afford a
redundant coupling. Several variations allow connection to the network. Each of these
variations is featured by two “departure” switches on the backbone network. Each
departure switch is crossing through a separate link to access the satellite network.
These variations include:

1. A single pivot ”arrival' switch on the connected network

2. Two different arrival switches on the connected network; this links


synchronization, making good use of backbone and satellite networks

3. Two different switches to access the connected network; this links


synchronization being carried via an additional specific link established
between the two arrival switches on the connected network.

46
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

The following drawing illustrates this architecture:

ETY

ETY
ETY

ETY
Premium

CPU SYNC LINK ETY SYNC LINK


ETY SYNC LINK

Redundant line Ring Coupling


RM
MRP / RSTP

RM

Ring coupling capabilities increase the level of networking availability by allowing


different paths to access to targeted devices.

New generation of Schneider ConneXium switches authorize many architectures


based on dual ring. A unique switch is able now to couple two Ethernet rings
extending the capabilities of Ethernet architecture.

Dual Ring in One Switch

The following illustration shows the architecture, which allows the combination of two
rings managed by a unique switch.

47
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Dual Ring in Two Switches

The following architecture bypasses the single detected interruption.

Dual Ring Extension in Two Switches

The following architecture allows extension of the main network to other segments :

This concept of sub-ring enables to couple segments to existing redundancy rings.


The devices in the main ring (1) are seen as Sub-Ring Managers (SRM) for the new
connected sub-ring (2).

Daisy Chain Loop Topology

Ethernet "daisy chain" refers to the


integration of a switch function inside a
communicating device; as a result, this
“daisy-chainable” device offers two
Ethernet ports, for example one "in" port

48
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
and one "out" port. The advantage of such a daisy-chainable device is that its
installation inside an Ethernet network requires only two cables.

In addition, a daisy-chain layout can


correspond to either a network segment
or a network loop; a managed Connexium
switch4, featuring an RM capability, is
able to handle such a daisy-chained loop.

The First daisy-chainable devices


Schneider Electric plans to offer are:

 Advantys STB dual port Ethernet communication adapter (STB NIP 2311)
 Advantys ETB IP67 dual port Ethernet
 Motor controller TeSys T
 Variable speed drive ATV 61/71 (VW3A3310D)
 PROFIBUS DP V1 Remote Master
 ETG 30xx Factorycast gateway
Note: Assuming no specific redundancy protocol is selected to handle the daisy
chain loop, expected loop reconfiguration time on failover is approximately one
second.

SCADA

SCADA
MRP / RSTP

Primary Standby
ETY

ETY
ETY

ETY

Premium

CPU SYNC LINK ETY SYNC LINK


ETY SYNC LINK

RM

Redundant line Ring Coupling


RM
MRP / RSTP

RM

49
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
Daisy chaining topologies can be coupled to dual Ethernet rings using TCSESM
ConneXium switches.

Redundancy Communication Protocols

The management of Ethernet ring requires dedicated communication protocols as


described in the following table:

MRP Rapid Spanning HIPER-Ring Fast HIPER-Ring


Tree (RSTP)
Mix Switches In Yes No No
Network Part of IEC 62439 ( New features
(Cisco/3Com/Hirs FDIS available only on
chmann) Extended
Connexium
switches)
Recovery Time Less than 200 ms depending on 300 or 500ms 10 ms for 5
number switches
50 switches max of switches 50 switches 160
up to 1 sec max microseconds for
each additional
switch

Each protocol is characterized by different performance criteria in terms of fault


detection and global system recovery time.

Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP)

RSTP stands for Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (IEEE 802.1w standard)1. Based on
STP, RSTP has introduced some additional parameters that must be entered during
the switch configuration. These parameters are used by the RSTP protocol during the
path selection process; because of these, the reconfiguration time is much faster than
with STP (typically less than one second).

1
The new edition of the 802.1D standard, IEEE 802.1D-2004, incorporates IEEE 802.1t-2001 and IEEE
802.1w standards

50
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
The new release of TCSESM ConneXium switches allows better performance of
RSTP management with a detection time of 15 ms and a propagation time of 15 ms
for each switch. Considering a 6 switches configuration, the recovery time is about
105 ms.

HIPER-Ring (Version 1)

Version 1 of the HIPER-Ring networking strategy has been available for


approximately 10 years. It applies to a Self Healing Ring networking layout.

Such a ring structure may include up to 50 switches. It typically features a


2
reconfiguration delay of 150 milliseconds and a maximum time of 500 ms. As a result,
in case of an issue occurring on a link cable or on one of the switches populating the
ring, the network will take about 150 ms to detect this event, and cause the
Redundancy Manager switch to close the loop.

Note: The Redundancy Manager switch is said to be active when it opens the
network.

Note: If recovery time of 500 ms is acceptable, then no switch redundancy


configuration is needed only dip switches have to be set up.

HIPER-Ring Version 2 (MRP)

2
When configuring a Connexium TCS ESM switch for HIPER-Ring V1, the user is asked to choose
between a maximum Standard Recovery Time, which is 500 ms, and a maximum Accelerated Recovery
Time, which is 300 ms.

51
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

MRP is an IEC 62439 industry standard protocol based on HIPER-ring. Therefore all
switch manufactures can implement MRP if they choose too. This allows a mix of
different manufactures in an MRP configuration. Schneider’s’ switches support a
selectable maximum recovery time of 200ms or 500ms and 50 switch maximum ring
configuration.

TCESM switches also support redundant coupling of MRP rings. MRP rings could
easily be used instead of HIPER-ring. MRP would require that all switches be
configured via Web pages and allow for recovery time of 200ms or 500ms.
Additionally the I/O network could be a MRP redundant network and the control
network HIPER-ring or vice versa.

Fast HIPER-Ring

A new family of Connexium switches is coming named TCS ESM Extended. This will
offer a third version of HIPER-Ring strategy, named Fast HIPER-RING.

Featuring a guaranteed recovery time of less than 10 milliseconds, the fast HIPER
ring structure allows both a cost optimized implementation of a redundant network as
well as maintenance and network extension during operation. This makes fast HIPER
ring especially suitable for complex applications such as a combined transmission of
video, audio and data information

52
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Selection

To end the communication level section, the following table presents all the
communication protocols, and thus helps you selecting the most appropriate
installation for your high availability solution:

Selection Criteria Solution Comments

Ease of configuration or HIPER-Ring If recovery time of 500 ms is acceptable, then no switch


installed base redundancy configuration is needed. Dip switches have
to be set up only.

New installation MRP All switches are configured via web pages

Installation with one MRM (Media Ring Manager) and


X MRCs (Media Ring Client)

Open architecture with RSTP Reconfiguration time: 15 ms (detected fault) + 15 ms


multiple vendors switch per switch.

Complex Architecture MRP, RSTP or We recommend MRP or RSTP for High Availability with
FAST HIPER- dual ring, and FAST HIPER-Ring for high performance.
Ring

53
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Control System Level

Having detailed High Availability aspects at the Information Management level and at
the Communication Infrastructure level, we will now concentrate on High Availability
concerns at the Control Level. Specific discussion will focus on PAC redundancy.

Redundancy Principles

Modicon Quantum and Premium PAC provide Hot Standby capabilities, and have
several shared principles:

1. The type of architecture is


shared. A Primary unit executes
the program, with a Standby unit
ready, but not executing the
program (apart from the first
section of it). By default, these two units contain an identical application program.

2. The units are synchronized. The standby unit is aligned with the Primary unit.
Also, on each scan, the Primary unit transfers to the Standby unit its "database,”
that is, the application variables (located or not located) and internal data. The
entire database is transferred, except the "Non-Transfer Table", which is a
sequence of Memory Words (%MW). The benefit of this transfer is that, in case of
a switchover, the new Primary unit will continue to handle the process, starting
with updated variables and data values. This is referred to as a "bumpless"
switchover.

3. The Hot Standby redundancy mechanism is controlled via the "Command


Register" (accessed thru %SW60 system word); reciprocally, this Hot Standby
redundancy mechanism is monitored via the "Status Register" (accessed thru
%SW61 system word). As a result, as long as the application creates links
between these system words and located memory words, any HMI can receive
feedback regarding Hot Standby system operating conditions, and, if necessary,
address these operating conditions.

4. For any Ethernet port acting as a server (Modbus/TCP or HTTP protocol) on the
Primary unit, its IP address is implicitly incremented by one on the Standby unit.

54
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
In case a switchover occurs, homothetic addresses will automatically be
exchanged. The benefit of this feature is that seen from a SCADA/HMI, the
"active" unit is still accessed at the same IP address. No specific adaptation is
required at the development stage of the SCADA / HMI application.

5. The common programming environment that is used with both solutions is Unity
Pro. No particular restrictions apply when using the standardized (IEC 1131-3)
instruction set. In addition, the portion of code specific to the Hot Standby system
is optional, and is used primarily for monitoring purpose. This means that with any
given application, the difference between its implementation on standalone
architecture and its implementation on a Hot Standby architecture is largely
cosmetic.

Consequently, a user familiar with one type of Hot Standby system does not have to
start from scratch if he has to use a second type; initial investment is preserved and
re-usable, and only a few differences must be learned to differentiate the two
technologies.

Premium and Quantum Hot Standby Architectures

Depending on projects constraints or customers requirements (performance, installed


base or project specifications), a specific Hot Standby PAC station topology can be
selected:

- Hot Standby PAC with in-rack I/O or remote I/O

- Hot Standby PAC with distributed I/O, connected on Standard Ethernet or


connected to another device bus, such as Profibus DP.

- Hot Standby PAC mixing different topologies

The following table presents the available configurations with either a Quantum or
Premium PLC:

PLC Layer I/O Bus Ethernet Profibus

Quantum Configuration 1 Configuration 3 Configuration 5

Premium Configuration 2 Configuration 4 Not applicable

Note: A sixth configuration may be considered, which combines all other


configurations listed above

55
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

In-Rack and Remote I/O Architectures

Quantum Hot Standby: Configuration 1

With Quantum Hot Standby, in-rack I/O


modules are located in the remote I/O
racks. They are "shared" by both Primary
and Standby CPUs, but only the Primary
unit actually handles the I/O
communications at any given time. In
case of a switchover, the control
takeover executed by the new Primary
unit occurs in a bumpless way (provided
that the holdup time parameter allotted to
the racks is greater than the lack of
communication gap that takes place at the
switchover). The module population of a
Quantum CPU rack in a Hot Standby
configuration is very similar to that of a
3
standalone PLC . The only specific requirement
is that the CPU module must be a 140 CPU 671 60.

For redundant PAC architecture, both units require two interlinks to execute different
types of diagnostic - to orient the election of the Primary unit, and to achieve
synchronization between both machines. The first of these "Sync Links,” the CPU
Sync Link, is a dedicated optic fiber link anchored on the Ethernet port local to the
CPU module. This port is dedicated exclusively for this use on Quantum Hot Standby
architecture. The second of these Sync Links, Remote I/O Sync Link, is not an
additional one: the Hot Standby system uses the existing Remote I/O medium,
hosting both machines, thus providing them with an opportunity to communicate.

One benefit of the CPU optic fiber port is its inherent capability to have the two units
installed up to 2 km apart, using 62.5/125 multimode optic fiber. The Remote I/O Sync
Link can also run through optic fiber, provided that Remote I/O Communication
Processor modules are coupled on the optic fiber.
3
All I/O modules are accepted on remote I/O racks, except 140 HLI 340 00 (Interrupt module).
Looking at Ethernet adapters currently available, 140 NWM 100 00 communication module is not
compatible with a Hot Standby system. Also EtherNet/IP adapter (140 NOC 771 00) is not compatible with
Quantum Hot Standby in Step 1.

56
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
4
Up to 6 communication modules , such as NOE Ethernet TCP/IP adapters, can be
handled by a Quantum unit; whether it is a standalone unit or part of a Hot Standby
architecture.

Up to 31 Remote I/O stations can be handled from a Quantum CPU rack, whether
standalone or Hot Standby. Note that the Remote I/O service payload on scan time is
approximately 3 to 4 ms per station.

Redundant Device Implementation

Using redundant in-rack I/O modules on


Quantum Hot Standby, and having to
interface redundant sensors/actuators, will
require redundant input / output channels.
Preferably, homothetic channels should be
installed on different modules and different
I/O Stations. For even a simple transfer of
information to both sides of the outputs, the
application must define and implement rules
for selecting and treating the proper input
signals. In addition to information transfer,
the application will have to address
diagnostic requirements.

4
Acceptable communication modules are Modbus Plus adapters, Ethernet TCP/IP adapters, Ethernet/IP
adapters and PROFIBUS DP V1 adapters.

57
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Single Device Implementation

Assuming a Quantum Hot Standby


application is required to handle redundant
in-rack I/O channels, but without redundant
sensors and actuators, special devices are
used to handle the associated wiring
requirements. Any given sensor signal,
either digital or analog, passes through
such a dedicated device, which replicates it
and passes it on to homothetic input
channels. Reciprocally, any given pair of
homothetic output signals, either digital or
analog, are provided to a dedicated device
that selects and transfers the proper signal
(i.e. the one taken on Primary output) to the target actuator.

Depending on the selected I/O Bus technology, a specific layout may result in
enhanced availability.

Dual Coaxial Cable

Coaxial cable can be installed with


either as a single or redundant
design. With a redundant design,
communications are duplicated on
both channels, providing a "massive
communication redundancy.” Either
the Remote I/O Processor or Remote
I/O adapters are equipped with a pair
of connectors, with each connector
attached to a separate coaxial
distribution.

58
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Self Healing Optical Fiber Ring

Remote I/O Stations can be installed


as terminal nodes of a fiber optic
segment or (self-healing) ring. The
Schneider catalog offers one model
of transceiver (490 NRP 954)
applicable for 62.5/125 multimode
optic fiber: 5 transceivers maximum,
10 km maximum ring circumference.
When the number of transceivers is
greater than 5, precise optic fiber
ring diagnostics are required, or single mode fiber is required.

Configuration Change on the Fly

High-level level feature is currently being added to Quantum Hot Standby applications
design. This is CCTF, or Configuration Change on the Fly. This new feature will allow
you to modify the configuration of the existing and running PLC application program,
without having to stop the PLC. As an example, consider the addition of a new
discrete or analog module on a remote Quantum I/O Station. For the CPU Firmware
version upgrade, executed on a Quantum Hot Standby architecture, this CCTF will be
sequentially executed, one unit at a time.This is an obvious for applications that
cannot afford any stop, which will now become available for architecture modification
or extensions.

Premium Hot Standby: Configuration 2

Premium Hot Standby is able to


handle in-rack I/O modules, installed
5
on Bus-X racks . The Primary unit
acquires its inputs, executes the logic,
and updates its outputs. As a result of
cyclical Primary to Standby data
transfer, the Standby unit provides
local outputs that are the image of the outputs decided on the Primary unit. In case of
a switchover, the control takeover executed by the new Primary unit occurs in a
bumpless fashion.
5
Initial version of Premium Hot Standby only authorizes a single Bus-X rack on both units.

59
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

The module population of a Premium


CPU rack, in a Hot Standby
configuration, is very similar to that of
a standalone PLC (some restrictions
6
apply on compatible modules ). Two
types of CPU modules are available:
TSX H57 24M and TSX H57 44M,
which differ mainly in regard to memory and communication resources.

The first of the two Sync Links, the


CPU Sync Link is a dedicated copper
link anchored on the Ethernet port
local to the CPU module. With
Premium Hot Standby architecture, the
second Sync Link, Ethernet Sync Link is established using a standard Ethernet
7
TCP/IP module . It corresponds to the communication adapter elected as the
"monitored" adapter

6
Counting, motion, weighing and safety modules are not accepted. On the communication side, apart from
Modbus modules TSX SCY 11 601/21 601, only currently available Ethernet TCP/IP modules are accepted.
Also EtherNet/IP adapter (TSX ETC 100) is not compatible with Premium Hot Standby in Step 1.
7
TSX ETY 4103 or TSX ETY 5103 communication module

60
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

The following picture illustrates the Premium Ethernet configuration, with the CPU
and the ETY Sync links:

This Ethernet configuration is detailed in the following section.

Redundant Device Implementation

In-rack I/O module implementation on Premium


Hot Standby corresponds by default to a
massive redundancy layout: each input and
each output has a physical connection on both
units. Redundant sensors and actuators do not
require additional hardware. For even a simple
transfer of information to both sides of the outputs, the application must define and
implement rules for selecting and treating the proper input signals. In addition to
information transfer, the application will have to address diagnostic requirements.

Single Device Implementation

Assuming a Premium Hot Standby application


is required to handle redundant in-rack I/O
channels, but without redundant sensors and
actuators, special devices are used to handle
the associated wiring requirements. Any given
sensor signal, either digital or analog, passes
through such a dedicated device, which
replicates it and passes it on to homothetic input channels. Reciprocally, any given
pair of homothetic output signals, either digital or analog, are provided to a dedicated
device that selects and transfers the proper signal (i.e. the one taken on Primary
output) to the target actuator.

61
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Distributed I/O Architectures

Ethernet TCP/IP: Configurations 3&4

Schneider Electric has supported Transparent Ready strategy for several years. In
addition to SCADA and HMI, Variables Speed Drives, Power Meters, and a wide
ranges of gateways, Distributed I/Os with Ethernet connectivity, such as Advantys
STB, are also being proposed,. In addition many manufacturers are offering devices
8
capable of communicating on Ethernet using Modbus TCP protocol. These different
contributions using the Modbus protocol design legacy have helped make Ethernet a
general purpose preferred communication support for automation architectures.

In addition to Ethernet messaging services solicited through application program


function blocks, a communication service is available on Schneider Electric PLCs: the
I/O Scanner. The I/O Scanner makes a PLC Ethernet adapter/Copro act as a
Modbus/TCP client, periodically launching a sequence of requests on the network.
These requests correspond to standard Modbus function codes, asking for Registers
(Data Words), Read, Write or Read/Write operations. This sequence is determined by
a list of individual contracts specified in a table defined during the PLC configuration.

The typical target of such a communication contract is an I/O block, hence the name
"I/O Scanner". Also, the I/O Scanner service may be used to implement data
exchanges with any type of equipment, including another PLC, provided that
equipment can behave as a Modbus/TCP server, and respond to multiple words
access requests.

Ethernet I/O scanner service is


compatible with a Hot Standby
implementation, whether Premium
or Quantum. The I/O scanner is
active only on the Primary unit. In
case of a controlled switchover,
Ethernet TCP/IP connections
handled by the former Primary unit
are properly closed, and new ones
are reopen once the new Primary
gains control. In case of a sudden
switchover, resulting, for example,
8
In step 1, support of Ethernet/IP Quantum/Premium adapters is not available with Hot Stand-By.

62
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

from a power cut-off, the former Primary may not able to close the connections it had
opened. These connections will be closed after expiration of a Keep Alive timeout.

In case of a switchover, proper communications will typically recover after one initial
cycle of I/O scanning. However, the worst case gap for address swap, with I/O
scanner, is 500 ms, plus one initial cycle of I/O scanning. As a result, this mode of
communication, and hence architectures with Distributed I/Os on Ethernet, is not
preferred with a control system that regards time criticality as an essential criteria.

Note: The automatic IP address swap capability is a property inherited by every


Ethernet TCP/IP adapter installed in the CPU rack.

Self Healing Ring

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Ethernet TCP/IP used with products like
Connexium offers real opportunities to design enhanced availability architectures,
handling communication between the Information Management Level and the Control
Level. Such architectures, based on a Self Healing Ring topology, are also applicable
when using Ethernet TCP/IP as a fieldbus.

Note that Connexium accepts Copper or Optic Fiber rings. In addition, dual
networking is also applicable at the fieldbus level.

63
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Profibus Architecture

I/O Devices Distributed on PROFIBUS DP/PA: Configuration 5

A PROFIBUS DP V1 Master Class 1


Quantum form communication module is
available. It handles cyclic and acyclic data
exchanges, and accepts FDT/DTM Asset
Management System data flow, through its
local Ethernet port.

The PROFIBUS network is configured with


a Configuration Builder software, which
supplies the Unity Pro application program
with data structures corresponding to cyclic
data exchanges and to diagnostic
information.

The Configuration Builder can also be configured to pass Unity Pro a set of DFBs,
allowing easy implementation of Acyclic operations.

Each Quantum PLC can accept up to 6 of these DP Master modules (each of them
handling its own PROFIBUS network). Also, the PTQ PDPM V1 Master Module is
compatible with a Quantum Hot Standby implementation. Only the Master Module in
the Primary unit is active on the PROFIBUS network; the Master Module on the
Standby unit stays in a dormant state unless awakened by a switchover.

64
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

PROFIBUS DP V1 Remote Master and Hot Standby PLC

With a smart device such as


9
PROFIBUS Remote Master ,
an I/O Scanner stream is
handled by the PLC
10
application and forwarded
to the Remote Master via
Ethernet TCP/IP. In turn,
Remote Master handles the
corresponding cyclic
exchanges with the devices populating the PROFIBUS network. Remote Master can
also handle acyclic data exchanges.
11
The PROFIBUS network is configured with Unity Pro , which also acts as an FDT
container, able to host manufacturer device DTMs. In addition, Remote Master offers
a comDTM to work with third party FDT/DTM Asset Management Systems.

Automatic symbol generation provides Unity Pro with data structures corresponding
to data exchanges and diagnostic information. A set of DFBs is delivered that allows
an easy implementation of acyclic operations.

Remote Master is compatible with a Quantum, Premium or Modicon M340 Hot


Standby implementation.

9
Planned First Customer Shipment: Q4 2009
10
M340, Premium or Quantum
11
version 5.0

65
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Redundancy and Safety

Requirements for Availability and Safety are often considered


to be working against each other. Safety can be the
response to the maxim "stop if any potential danger arises,’
whereas Availability can follow the slogan "Produce in spite of
everything.”

Two models of CPU are available to design a Quantum


Safety configuration: the first model (140 CPU 651 60S) is
dedicated to standalone architectures, whereas the second
model ( 140 CPU 671 60S) is dedicated to redundant
architectures.

The Quantum Safety PLC has some exclusive features: a


specific hardware design for safety modules (CPU and I/O
modules) and a dedicated instruction set.

Otherwise, a Safety Quantum Hot Standby configuration has


much in common with a regular Quantum Hot Standby configuration. The
configuration windows, for example, are almost the same, and the Ethernet
communication adapters inherit the IP Address automatic swap capability. Thus the
Safety Quantum Hot Standby helps to reconcile and integrate the concepts of Safety
and Availability.

66
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Mixed Configuration: Configuration 6

Whether Premium or Quantum,


application requirements such as
topology, environment, periphery,
time criticality, etc. may influence
the final architecture design to
adopt both types of design
strategies concurrently, i.e. in-
rack and distributed I/Os,
depending on individual
subsystems constraints.

Premium / Quantum Hot Standby Switchover Conditions

System Health Diagnostics

Systematic checks are executed cyclically by any running CPU, in order to detect a
potential hardware corruption, such as a change affecting the integrity of the Copro,
the sub-part of the CPU module that hosts the integrated Ethernet port. Another
example of a systematic check is the continuous check of the voltage levels provided
by the power supply module(s). In case of a negative result during these hardware
health diagnostics, the tested CPU will usually switch to a Stop State.

When the unit in question is part of a Hot Standby System, in addition to these
standard hardware tests separately executed on both machines, more specific tests
are conducted between the units. These additional tests involve both Sync Links. The
basic objective is to confirm that the Primary unit is effectively operational, executing
the application program, and controlling the I/O exchanges. In addition, the system
must verify that the current Standby unit is able to assume control after a switchover.

67
High Availability with Collaborative Control System
If an abnormal situation occurs on the current Primary unit, it gives up control and
switches either to Off-Line state (the CPU is not a part of the Hot Standby system
coupling) or to Stop State, depending on the event. The former Standby unit takes
control as the new Primary unit.

Controlled Switchover

As previously indicated, the Hot Standby system is controlled through the %SW61
system register. Each unit owns an individual bit on the system Command Register
that decides whether or not that particular unit has to make its possible to "hook" to
the other unit. An operational hooked redundant Hot Standby system requires both
units to indicate this intent. Consequently, executing a switchover controlled by the
application on a hooked system is straightforward; it requires briefly toggling the
decision bit that controls the current Primary unit’s "hooking" intent. The first toggle
transition switches the current Primary unit to Off-Line Sate, and makes the former
Standby unit take control. The next toggle transition makes the former Primary unit
return and hook as the new Standby Unit.

An example of this possibility is a controlled switchover resulting from diagnostics


conducted at the application level. A Quantum Hot Standby, Premium Hot Standby or
Monitored Ethernet Adapter system does not handle a Modbus Plus or Ethernet
communication adapter malfunction as a condition implicitly forcing a switchover. As a
result, these communication modules must be cyclically tested by the application,
both on Standby and on Primary. Diagnostic results elaborated on Standby are
usually transferred to the Primary unit because of the Reverse Transfer Registers.
Finally, the application being reported a non fugitive inconsistency affecting Primary
unit, and at the same time a fully operational Standby unit, forces a switchover based
on the playing on Control Register.

Hence, the application program can decide on a Hot Standby switchover, having
registered a steady state negative diagnostic on the Ethernet adapter linking the
Primary unit to the "Process Network", and being at the same time informed that the
Standby unit is fully operational.

Note: There are two ways to implement a Controlled Switchover: automatically


through configuration of a default DFB, or customized with the creation of a DFB with
its own switchover conditions.

68
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

The following illustration represents an example of a DFB handling a Hot Standby


Controlled Switchover:

This in turn makes use of an embedded DFB: HSBY_WR:

Fragment of HSBY_Switch_Decision DFB

Fragment of HSBY_WR DFB

Note: HSBY_WR DFB executes a write access on HSBY Control Register (%SW60).

69
High Availability with Collaborative Control System

Switchover Latencies

The following table details the typical and maximum swap time delay encountered
when reestablishing Ethernet services during a Switchover event. (Premium and
Quantum configurations)

Service Typical Swap Time Maximum Swap Time

Swap IP Address 6 ms 500 ms

I/O Scanning 1 initial cycle of I/O scanning 500 ms + 1 initial cycle of I/O scanning

Client Messaging 1 MAST task cycle 500 ms + 1 MAST task cycle

Server 1 MAST task cycle + the time required 500 ms + the time required by the
Messaging by the client to reestablish its client to reestablish its connection with
(1) (1)
connection with the server the server

FTP/TFTP Server the time required by the client to 500 ms + the time required by the
reestablish its connection with the client to reestablish its connection with
(1) (1)
server the server

SNMP 1 MAST task cycle 500 ms + 1 MAST task cycle

HTTP Server the time required by the client to 500 ms + the time required by the
reestablish its connection with the client to reestablish its connection with
(1) (1)
server the server
(1)
The time the client requires to reconnect with the server depends on the client communication loss
timeout settings.

Selection

To end the control level section, the following table presents the four main criteria that
help you selecting the most appropriate configuration for your high availability solution:

Criteria Cost High Criticality

Switchover Performance Premium Quantum

In Rack Architecture In Rack Architecture

Openness Premium Quantum

Distributed Architecture Distributed Architecture

70
Conclusion

Premium/ Quantum Hot Standby Solution Reminder

The following tables provide a brief reminder of essential characteristics for Premium
and Quantum Hot Standby solutions, respectively:

Up to 128 per network / ETY I/O Scanner handles up to 64 transactions

Premium Hot Standby Essential Characteristics

71
Conclusion

Quantum Hot Standby Essential Characteristics

Conclusion

This chapter has covered functional and architectural redundancy aspects, from the
Information Management level to the Control level, and up through the
Communication Infrastructure level.

72
Conclusion

Conclusion
This section summarizes the main characteristics and properties of Availability for
Collaborative Control automation architectures.

Chapter 1 demonstrated that Availability is dependent not only on Reliability, but also
on Maintenance as it is provided to a given system. The first level of contribution,
Reliability, is primarily a function of the system design and components. Component
and device manufacturers thus have a direct but not exclusive influence on system
Availability. The second level of contribution, Maintenance and Logistics, is totally
dependent on end customer behavior.

Chapter 2 presented some simple Reliability and Availability calculation examples,


and demonstrated that beyond basic use cases, dedicated skills and tools are
required to extract figures from real cases.

Chapter 3 explored a central focus of this document, Redundancy, and its application
at the Information Management Level, Communication Infrastructure Level and
Control System Level.

This final chapter summarizes customer benefits provided by Schneider Electric High
Availability solutions, as well as additional information and references.

73
Conclusion

Benefits

Schneider-Electric currently offers a wide range of solutions, providing the best


design to respond to specific customer needs for Redundancy and Availability in
Automation and Control Systems.

Standard Offer

One key concept of High Availability is that redundancy is not a default design
characteristic at any system level. Also, Redundancy can be added locally, using in
most cases standard components.

Simplicity of Implementation

At any level, intrusion of Redundancy into system design and implementation is


minimum, compared to a non-redundant system. For SCADA implementation,
network active components selection, or PLC programming, most of the software
contributions to redundancy are dependent on selections executed during the
configuration phase. Also, Redundancy can be applied selectively.

System Transparency

The transparency of a redundant system, compared to a standalone one, is a


customer requirement. With the Schneider Electric automation offer, this transparency
is present at each level of the system.

Information Management Level

For Client Display Stations, Dual Path Supervisory Networks, Redundant I/O servers,
or Dual Access to Process Networks, each redundant contribution is handled
separately by the system. For example, concurrent Display Clients communication
flow will be transparently re-routed to the I/O sever by the Supervisory Network in
case of a cable disruption. This flow will also be transparently routed to the alternative
I/O Server, in case of a sudden malfunction of the first server. Finally, the I/O Server
may transparently leave the communication channel it is using per default, if that
channel ceases to operate properly, or if the target PLC will not respond through this
channel.

74
Conclusion

Communication Infrastructure Level

Whether utilized as a Process Network or as a Fieldbus Network, currently available


active network components can easily participate in an automatically reconfigured
network. With continuous enhancements, HIPER-Ring strategy not only offers
simplicity, but also a level of performance compatible with a high-reactivity demand.

Control System Level

The “IP Address automatic switch" for a SCADA application communicating through
Ethernet is an important feature of Schneider Electric PLCs. Apart from simplifying
the design of the SCADA application implementation, what may cause delays and
increased cost, this feature also contributes to reducing the payload of a
communication context exchange on a PLC switchover.

Ease of Use

As previously stated, increased effort has been made to make the implementation of
a redundant feature simple and straightforward.

The Vijeo Citect, ConneXium Web Pages and Unity Pro software environments offer
clear and accessible configuration windows, along with a dedicated selective help, in
order to execute the required parameterization.

More Detailed RAMS Investigation

In case of a specific need for detailed dependability (RAMS) studies, for any type of
architecture, contact the Schneider Electric Safety Competency Center. This center
has skilled and experienced individuals ready to help you with all your needs.

75
Appendix

Appendix

Glossary

Note: the references in bracket refer to standard, which are specified at the end of
this glossary.

1) Active Redundancy

Redundancy where the different means required to accomplish a given function are
present simultaneously [5]

2) Availability

Ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under given conditions,


at a given instant of time or over a given time interval, assuming that the required
external resources are provided [IEV 191-02-05] (performance) [2]

3) Common Mode Failure

Failure that affects all redundant elements for a given function at the same time [2]

4) Complete failure

Failure which results in the complete inability of an item to perform all required
functions [IEV 191-04-20] [2]

5) Dependability

Collective term used to describe availability performance and its influencing factors:
reliability performance, maintainability performance and maintenance support
performance [IEV 191-02-03] [2]
Note: Dependability is used only for general descriptions in non-quantitative terms.

6) Dormant

A state in which an item is able to function but is not required functioning. Not to be
confused with downtime [4]

7) Downtime

Time during which an item is in an operational inventory but is not in condition to


perform its required function [4]

8) Failure

Termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function [IEV 191-04-01] [2]

Note 1: After failure the item detects a fault.


Note 2: "Failure" is an event, as distinguished from "fault", which is a state.

76
Appendix

9) Failure Analysis

The act of determining the physical failure mechanism resulting in the functional
failure of a component or piece of equipment [1]

10) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Procedure for analyzing each potential failure mode in a product, to determine the
results or effects on the product. When the analysis is extended to classify each
potential failure mode according to its severity and probability of occurrence, it is
called a Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).[6]

11) Failure Rate

Total number of failures within an item population, divided by the total number of life
units expended by that population, during a particular measurement period under
stated conditions [4]

12) Fault

State of an item characterized by its inability to perform a required function, excluding


this inability during preventive maintenance or other planned actions, or due to lack of
external resources [IEV 191-05-01] [2]
Note: a fault is often the result of a failure of the item itself, but may exist without prior
failure.

13) Fault- tolerance

Ability to tolerate and accommodate for a fault with or without performance


degradation

14) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Method used to evaluate reliability of engineering systems. FTA is concerned with


fault events. A fault tree may be described as a logical representation of the
relationship of primary or basic fault events that lead to the occurrence of a specified
undesirable fault event known as the “top event.” A fault tree is depicted using a tree
structure with logic gates such as AND and OR [7]

77
Appendix

FTA illustration [7]

15) Hidden Failure

Failure occurring that is not detectable by or evident to the operating crew [1]

16) Inherent Availability (Intrinsic Availability) : Ai

A measure of Availability that includes only the effects of an item design and its
application, and does not account for effects of the operational and support
environment. Sometimes referred to as "intrinsic" availability [4]

17) Integrity

Reliability of data which is being processed or stored.

18) Maintainability

Probability that an item can be retained in, or restored to, a specified condition when
maintenance is performed by personnel having specified skill levels, using prescribed
procedures and resources, at each prescribed level of maintenance and repair. [4]

19) Markov Method

A Markov process is a mathematical model that is useful in the study of the


availability of complex systems. The basic concepts of the Markov process are those
of the “state” of the system (for example operating, non-operating) and state
“transition” (from operating to non-operating due to failure, or from non-operating to
operating due to repair). [4]

78
Appendix

Markov Graph illustration [2]

20) MDT: Mean Downtime

Average time a system is unavailable for use due to a failure.

Time includes the actual repair time plus all delay time associated with a repair
person arriving with the appropriate replacement parts [4]

21) MOBF: Mean Operating Time Between Failures

Expectation of the operating time between failures [IEV 191-12-09] [2]

22) MTBF

A basic measure of reliability for repairable items. The mean number of life units
during which all parts of the item perform within their specified limits, during a
particular measurement interval under stated conditions. [4]

23) MTTF : Mean Time To Failure

A basic measure of reliability for non-repairable items. The total number of life units of
an item population divided by the number of failures within that population, during a
particular measurement interval under stated conditions. [4]

Note: Used with repairable items, MTTF stands for Mean Time To First Failure

24) MTTR : Mean Time To Repair

A basic measure of maintainability. The sum of corrective maintenance times at any


specific level of repair, divided by the total number of failures within an item repaired
at that level, during a particular interval under stated conditions. [4]

25) MTTR : Mean Time To Recovery

Expectation of the time to recovery [IEV 191-13-08] [2]

79
Appendix
26) Non-Detectable Failure

Failure at the component, equipment, subsystem, or system (product) level that is


identifiable by analysis but cannot be identified through periodic testing or revealed by
an alarm or an indication of an anomaly. [4]

27) Redundancy

Existence in an item of two or more means of performing a required function [IEV


191-15-01] [2]
Note: in this standard, the existence of more than one path (consisting of links and
switches) between end nodes.

Existence of more than one means for accomplishing a given function. Each means
of accomplishing the function need not necessarily be identical. The two basic types
of redundancy are active and standby. [4]

28) Reliability

Ability of an item to perform a required function under given conditions for a given
time interval [IEV 191-02-06] [2]
Note 1: It is generally assumed that an item is in a state to perform this required
function at the beginning of the time interval
Note 2: the term “reliability” is also used as a measure of reliability performance (see
IEV 191-12-01)

29) Repairability

Probability that a failed item will be restored to operable condition within a specified
time of active repair [4]

30) Serviceability

Relative ease with which an item can be serviced (i.e. kept in operating condition). [4]

31) Standby Redundancy

Redundancy wherein a part of the means for performing a required function is


intended to operate, while the remaining part(s) of the means are inoperative until
needed [IEV 19-5-03] [2]
Note: this is also known as dynamic redundancy.

Redundancy in which some or all of the redundant items are not operating
continuously but are activated only upon failure of the primary item performing the
function(s). [4]

80
Appendix
32) System Downtime

Time interval between the commencement of work on a system (product) malfunction


and the time when the system has been repaired and/or checked by the maintenance
person, and no further maintenance activity is executed. [4]

33) Total System Downtime

Time interval between the reporting of a system (product) malfunction and the time
when the system has been repaired and/or checked by the maintenance person, and
no further maintenance activity is executed. [4]

34) Unavailability

State of an item of being unable to perform its required function [IEV 603-05-05] [2]
Note: Unavailability is expressed as the fraction of expected operating life that an
item is not available, for example given in minutes per year

Ratio: downtime/(uptime + downtime) [3]


Often expressed as a maximum period of time during which the variable is
unavailable, for example 4 hours per month

35) Uptime

That element of Active Time during which an item is in condition to perform its
required functions. (Increases availability and dependability). [4]

[1] Maintenance & reliability terms - Life Cycle Engineering

[2] IEC 62439: High Availability automation networks

[3] IEEE Std C37.1™-2007: Standard for SCADA and Automation System

[4] MIL-HDBK-338B - Military Handbook - Electronic Reliability Design Handbook

[5] IEC-271-194

[6] The Certified Quality Engineer Handbook - Connie M. Borror, Editor

[7] Reliability, Quality, and Safety for Engineers - B.S. Dhillon - CRC Press

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Appendix

Standards

This section contains a selected, non-exhaustive list of reference documents and


standards related to Reliability and Availability:

General purpose

 IEC 60050 (191):1990 - International Electrotechnical Vocabulary (IEV)

FMEA/FMECA

 IEC 60812 (1985) - Analysis techniques for system reliability - Procedures for failure mode and
effect analysis (FMEA)

 MIL-STD 1629A (1980) Procedures for performing a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis

Reliability Block Diagrams

 IEC 61078 (1991) Analysis techniques for dependability - Reliability block diagram method

Fault Tree Analysis

 NUREG-0492 - Fault Tree Handbook - US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Markov Analysis

 IEC 61165 (2006) Application of Markov techniques

RAMS

 IEC 60300-1 (2003) - Dependability management - Part 1: Dependability management systems

 IEC 62278 (2002) - Railway applications - Specification and demonstration of reliability, availability,
maintainability and safety (RAMS)

Functional Safety

 IEC 61508 - Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety related


systems (7 parts)

 IEC 61511 (2003) Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector.

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Calculation Examples

Reliability & Availability Calculation Examples


The previous chapter provided necessary knowledge and theory basics to understand
simple examples of Reliability and Availability calculations. This section examines
concrete, simple but realistic examples, related to current, plausible solutions.

The root piece of information required for all of these calculations, for all major
components we will implement in our architectures, is the MTBF figure. MTBFs are
normally provided by the manufacturer, either on request and/or on dedicated
documents. For Schneider Electric PLCs, MTBF information can be found on the
intranet site Pl@net, under Product offer>Quality Info.

Note: The MTBF information is usually not accessible via the Schneider Electric
public website.

Redundant PLC System, Using Massive I/O Modules Redundancy

Standalone Architecture

Consider a simple, single-rack Premium PLC configuration.

First, calculate the individual modules’ MTBFs, using a spreadsheet that will do the
calculations (examples include Excel and Open Office).

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Calculation Examples

The calculation guidelines are derived from the main conclusion given by Serial RBD

n
analysis, that is:. λ = ∑ λ : Equivalent Failure Rate for n serial elements is equal
S i
i =1
− λSt
to the sum of the individual Failure Rate of these elements, with R S (t) = e .

The first operation will identify individual MTBF figures of the part references
populating the target system. Using these figures, a second sheet will then
subsequently consider the item, group and system levels.

 For each of the identified items part references:

- Individual item Failure Rate λ, calculated just by inverting individual item


MTBF : λ = 1 / MTBF
-λ t
- individual item Reliability, over 1 year, applying R(t) = e , where t = 8760
that is the number of hours in one year (365 * 24)

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Calculation Examples

 For each of the identified items references groups:

- Group Failure Rate: Individual item Failure Rate times the number of items in
the considered group

- Group Reliability: Individual item Reliability powered by the number of items

 For the considered System:

- System Failure Rate: sum of Groups Failure Rates

- System MTBF in hours: reverse of System Failure Rate

- System Reliability over one year: exp(- System Failure Rate * 8760)]
(where 8760 = 365 *24 : number of hours in one year)

- System Availability (with MTTR = 2 h): System MTBF / (System MTBF + 2)]

Looking at the example results, Reliability over one year is approximately 83%
(This means that the probability for this system to encounter one failure during
one year is approximately 17%).

System MTBF itself is approximately 45,500 hours (approximately 5 years)

Regarding Availability, with a 2 hour Mean Time To Repair (which corresponds to


a very good logistic and maintenance organization), we would have a 4-nines
resulting Availability, an average probability of approximately 23 minutes
downtime per year

Note:

 As previously explained, System figures produced by our basic calculations only


apply the equations given by basic probability analysis. In addition to these
calculations, a commercial software tool has been used, permitting us to confirm
our figures.

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Calculation Examples

Redundant Architecture

Assuming we would like to increase this system’s


Availability by implementing a redundant architecture,
we need to calculate the potential gain for System
Reliability and Availability.

We will assume that we have no additional hardware,


apart from the two redundant racks. The required calculation guidelines are derived
from the main conclusion given by Parallel RBD analysis, that is:
n
RRe d (t) = 1− ∏1− Ri (t)
i=1

This means if we consider RS as the Standalone System Reliability and RRed as the

Redundant System Reliability: RRe d (t) = 1− (1− RS (t))2

As a result of the redundant architecture, System Reliability over one year is


now approximately 97% (i.e. the probability for the system to encounter one
failure during one year has been reduced to approximately 3%).

System MTBF has increased from 45,500 hours (approximately 5 years) to


68,000 hours (approximately 7.8 years).

Regarding System Availability, with a 2 hour Mean Time To Repair we would


receive an 8-nines resulting Availability, which is close to 100%.

Note: Formal calculations should also take into account undetected errors on
redundant architecture, what would provide somewhat less optimistic figures.

A complete analysis should also take in account the additional wiring devices typically
used on a massive I/O redundancy strategy, feeding homothetic input points with the
same input signal, and bringing homothetic output points onto the same output signal.

Also, with this software, a parallel structure has been retained, with the Failure Rate
the same on the Standby rack as on the Primary rack.

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Calculation Examples

Reminder of Standby Definitions:

Cold Standby: The Standby unit starts only


if the default unit becomes inoperative.

Warm Standby: The Failure Rate of the


Standby unit during the inactive mode is
less the Failure Rate when it becomes
active.

Hot Standby: The Failure Rate of the


Standby unit during the inactive mode is the same as the Failure Rate when it
becomes active. This is a simple parallel configuration.

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Calculation Examples

Redundant PLC System, Using Shared Remote I/O Racks

Simple Architecture with a Standalone CPU Rack

Consider a standalone CPU rack equipped


with power supply, CPU, remote I/O
processor and Ethernet communication
modules.

As in the previous section, calculate the


potential gain a redundant architecture would
allow, in terms of Reliability and Availability.

First calculate the individual modules MTBFs,


then establish, for each subsequent rack, a
worksheet that provides the Reliability and
Availability metrics figures.
Standalone CPU Rack

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Calculation Examples

Remote I/O Rack

Simple Architecture : Standalone CPU Rack + Remote I/O Rack

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Calculation Examples

For this Serial System (Rack # 1+ Rack # 2), Reliability over one year is approximately 82.8% (the
probability for this system to encounter one failure during one year is approximately 17%).

System MTBF is approximately 46,260 hours (approximately 5.3 years)

Regarding Availability, with a 2 hour Mean Time To Repair (which corresponds to a very good logistic
and maintenance organization), we receive a 4-nines resulting Availability, which is an average
probability of approximately 23 minutes downtime per year

Note: As expected, Reliability and Availability figures resulting from this Serial
implementation are determined by the weakest link of the chain.

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Calculation Examples

Simple Architecture with a Redundant CPU Rack

One solution to enforce Rack #1 Availability (i.e.the


rack hosting the CPU, and at present the process
control core) is to implement a Hot Standby
configuration.

As a result of Rack #1 Redundancy, Reliability over one year would be approximately


99.7%, compared to 94.6% availability with a Standalone Rack #1 (i.e. the probability for
Redundant Rack #1 System to encounter one failure during one year would have been
reduced from 5.4% to 0.3%).

System MTBF would increase from approximately 157,000 hours (approximately 18 years)
to 235,000 hours (approximately 27 years).

Regarding System Availability, with a 2 hour Mean Time To Repair we would receive a 9-
nines resulting Availability, close to 100%

Note: As expected, Reliability and Availability figures resulting from this Parallel
implementation are better than the best of the individual figures for different links of
the chain.

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Calculation Examples

Consider a common misuse of reliability figures:

 Last architecture examination (Distributed Architecture with a Redundant CPU


Rack) has proven a real benefit in implementing a CPU Rack redundancy, with
this architecture a sub-sytem would be elevated to a 99.9 % Reliability, and
almost a 100% Availability.

 The common misuse of this Reliability figure would be to make arguments for the
potential benefit on Reliability and Availability for the whole resulting system.

Note: This example has considered the Sub-System Failure Rate provided by the
reliability Software.

Regarding the Serial System built by the Redundant CPU Racks and the STB Islands,
the worksheet above shows a resulting Reliability (over one year) of 84,06%, the
Standalone System Reliability during the same period of time being 81.95%.

In addition, the worksheet shows a resulting Availability (for a 2 hour MTTR) of


99.96%, the Standalone System Availability (for a 2 hour MTTR) being 99.9957%.

As a result, this data suggests that implementing a CPU Rack Redundancy would
have almost no benefit.

Of course, this is an incorrect conclusion, and the example should suggest a simple
rule: always compare comparable items. If we implement a redundancy on the CPU
Control Rack in order to increase process control core Reliability, and to an extent
Availability, we need to then examine and compare the figures only at this level, as
the entire system has not received an increase in redundancy.

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Calculation Examples

Recommendations for Utilizing Figures

Previous case studies provide several important items concerning Reliability metrics
evaluation:

• Provided elementary MTBF figures are available, a "serial" system is quite easy
to evaluate, thanks to the "magic bullet" formula: λ = 1 / MTBF

• If you consider a "parallel sub-system", System Reliability can be easily derived


from the Sub-System Reliability. Thus System Availability can be almost as easily
calculated, starting from the Sub-System Reliability. But the "magic bullet"
formula no longer applies, as in those conditions, exponential law does not
directly link Reliability to Failure Rate. However, System MTBF can be
approximated from the Sub-System MTBF :

"System MTBF (in hours) # 1.5 Sub-System MTBF"

But no direct relationship will provide the System Failure Rate.

Because these calculations must be precisely executed, the acquisition of


commercial reliability software could be one solution. Another consideration
would be the solicitation of an external service.

93
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