JointStaffE-mailsRedacted | Gulf War | Warfare

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Sent:
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Subj ect :
Importance:
Attachment s:
Outreach Retlred
Military Advl ...
kat.i e .
OASD-PA
Wednesday, March 19. 2003 1:54 PM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCol , OCJCS/PA; McCreary, T. L.. CAPT, JCS, PAD; Rheinlander .
Thomas E., LTC. JCS, PAD
Willcox, Chris, CIV. OASO-PA; Rhynedance, George, COl,OASD-PA
conference call with military analysts
High
Outreach Retired Military Advisors Group Teleconference Call wTth Chairman Myers
03-19-{)3.doc
here 's t he list:
plea s e confirm r e ce ipt. txs!
1

GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JCS
CONFERERENCE CALL WITH RETfRED MILITARY ADVISORS
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 2003
CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE, ROOME' "{rUE PENTAGON
Participants:
Colonel Car l Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)
Major Robert S. Bevelacqua (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman (USA, Retired)
General Wesley Clark (USA, Retired)
General Ronald Fogelman (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David Grange (USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)
Admi ral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN. Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak (USN, Retired)
General Barry McCaffi'ey (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
General Will iam Nash (USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA. Retired)
General Larry D. Welch (USAF. Retired)
T Maj or General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired) Plane to New York
Declines:
General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired)
Telephone Messages Left (Office and Cellular):
General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC. Retired)
General George Joulwan (USA, Retired)
General Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis (USA. Retired)
General Will iam F. "Buck" Kernan (USA. Retired)
General Charles A. Homer (USAF, Retired)
Admiral Dennis C. Blai r (USN, Retired)
General Thomas S. Moorman (USAF, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Major General George Harrison (USAF, Retired)
In Kuwait
Plane to California
From:
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To:
Subject :
you do great work !
Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCol, OCJCS/PA
Wednesda March 19, 2003 2:00 PM
CIV.OASD·PA
RE: conference call with military analysts
:> -- - --Or i g'
>Fr om: ClV, OASD-PA
>Se n t : Wedn@sday, March 19 , 2003 12:54 PM
>To: Haddock, El len ( Kat i e) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; Mccr@ary , T. L. , CAPT, JCS, PAO;
Rhe inland@r , Thomas E. , LTC, JCS , PAO
>Cc : Will cox , Chris, ClV, OASD- PAi Rhynedance , Geor g@, COL, QASD- PA
>Subject: conf erence ca ll with milit a ry anal ysts
>lmporta nc@; High
>
>ka tie,
>
>h@r@'s the list :
>
> « Fi l@: Outreach Reti r@d Mil itary Adv isors Group T@l@conference Call
> with Cha i rman Mye r s 03 -19-03.doc »
>
>p l e a s e con fi rm r eceip t . t x s !
From:
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To:
Cc:
Subj ect :
Importance:
tom.
, , : : : : ~ ~ = ~ C I V , OASD·PA
Wednesday, March 26, 2003 10:49 AM
Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO
Haddock, Ellen (Katie) ltCol, OCJCSIPA; Willcox. Chris, CIV, OASD·PA
conference call with military analysts
High
pe r yesterday afternoon's conve rsation, i ne ed to lock in a t i me with general mcc hrys t a l
and our mi l i t a ry analysts asap. aga in. looking at approximately a IS-minute phone c all
for the general:
agenda would look like thi s:
note: if we could mimic yest e rday's me eting with formers, would be great .
1 : 00 pm
1:01 pm
1: 15 pm
1: 30 pm
welcome and introduction
chris willcox. osd-public aff airs
R!!:::::U::d:a:t:e] on humani tarian pl a nn i ng for iraq
.. osd-poli cy
operations upda t e
general s t an mcchrystal , jcs
conference call concludes
1
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Subject :
Importance:
Attachments:
OASD· PA
Tuesday, April 01, 2003 1:29 PM

Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCal, OCJCSfPA
L
__..
LCDR, CE PO·PA
Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD· P CIV, OASD-PA
final agenda + list of military analysts participating in this afternoons conference call
High
Military Analysts Conference Call Agenda 04·01"()3.doc; Map Press Iraq March 31. 2003.ppt;
Fact Sheet OIF Special Ops 03-31.Q3.doc
Milita'Y Analysts Map Press Iraq Fact Sheet OIF
Conference C . March 31, 2003.... SpecIal Ops 03· ...
attached i s the final agenda + l i s t of par t i c ipant s i n
this afternoons call:
handouts t hat went out e lectronicall y yester day include:
txs !
1
Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Tuesday, April I , 2003
Roo m l(2) The Pentagon
(As of March 28, 2003/4:30 pm)
PROPOSED AGENDA
2:00 pm Welcome and In t roduction (Guidelines)
Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs
2:01 pm Iraqi Paramilitary (Irregulars) Brief
A enc
L..--..,__--' Senior Intelligence Officer, Defense Intelligence
Agency
OIF Operational Update
....~ .I Middle East Desk Officer, Defense Intelligence
2:15 pm
Major General Stanley A. McChrystaJ , Vice Director for Operations
(J-3), Joint Chiefs of Staff
2:30 pm Call Concludes
Note:
Call-In Telephone Number: '.'.
Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Tuesday, Apr il 1, 2003
Room The Pentagon
(As of Apr il 1, 2003112: 15 pm)
Participating
General Barry McCaffrey
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
General Gl en K. Otis
Lieutenant General DanChristman
General Wi lliam F. "Buck" Kernan
Major Genera l Donald W. Shepperd
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney
General Thomas Moorman
Bri gadier General David Grange
Major General Perry Smith
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
General Charles Wilhelm
Lie utenant General Bernard Trai nor
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbe ll
Colonel Carl Allar d
Major General Paul E. Vallely
Admiral Thomas Lopez
Admiral David Jeremiah
Major General Tom Wilkerson
Tentative or Decliue
General Ronald Fogelman
General Larry Welch
General Wayne Downing (T)
Lieut enant General Buster Gl osson
Colonel Jack Jacobs
General Wilham Nash
General Wesley Clark (T)
General Hugh Shelton
Major General George Harrison
General Joseph Ralston (T)
General Merri ll McPeak
Special Operation Achievements Thus Far
(As of March 31, 2003)
• U.S. Naval Special Operations forces precluded Saddam Hussein's apparent
attempt to wage ecological warfare on his neighboring countries by seizing
at the outset of the war oil terminals off the Al Faw Peninsula.
Navy SEALs were given the Al Faw mission, with commandos from the Royal
Marines following close behind . After a preassault barrage from Marine and Air
Force jets and AC-130 gun ships, SEAL teams flew close to the water on Air
Force Speci al Operations MH- 53 Sea Stallion helicopters to their objective:
two oil platforms in the Persian Gulfoff the coast of Al Faw.
By the morni ng of March 21, the SEALs, a small contingent of Polish Special
Operations Forces, and the Royal Marine units had secured those platforms
together with most of the peninsula-reducing by 90 percent Saddam's ability
to soak the Persian Gulfwith Iraqi crude. Coalition concern was j ustified.
The SEAL teams discovered that explosives had been placed at many of the
wells, although they had not yet been wired to detonators. One ofthe open
sea oil terminals were rigged with explosives for destruction.
This action precluded Hussein from pot entially pouring millions of gallons ofraw
oil into the Arabian gulf as he did during Desert Storm, which caused an oil
slick estimated as three times larger than the Exxon Valdes oil spill in
Alaska.
It also ensured that the oil termi nals were preserved for the
resumption of oil production, which will enable a much more rapid economic
recover y for the post-Saddam government.
• U.S. Army Speci al Forces have been conducting Unconventional Warfare with
the Kurds of Northern Iraq.
They have helped, supply, and organize Kurdish formations that have successfully
smashed the Ansar AI Islam redoubt that had been establi shed in the vicinity of
Khunna near the Iranian border. The remnants of this organization thought to be
connected to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are now attempting to cross the
border into Iran.
Additionally, Close Air Support strikes in the same vicinity have forced Iraqi
Regular forces from the lines they have held for years back toward the city of
Mos ul. In addition, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces and Air Force Combat
Controllers (Air Commandos) have been conducting long-range reconnai ssance as
well as SR missions throughout the Western Desert known as the "Scud Box."
To date, no SCUDs have been launched either at Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Israel
from this area.
• From the outset of the war, U.S. Air Force AC-130 gun ships have been cont inuously
engaged in close air support missions of SOF ground forces against hundreds of targets.
They have been instrumental in attiring dug-in Iraqi formations in the North,
West, and South. Additionally, U.S. Air Force Special Operations MC-130 Talons
have flown hundreds of resupply missions dropping supplies to SOF teams on the
ground.
• PSYOP missions developed by Anny Special Operations personnel have worked with
Air Force Special Operations and conventional Air Force units to drop more than 20
million leaflets in areas under the control of the Hussein regime.
The messages on the leaflets have ranged from providing instructions on where to
get food, water and medical treatment, instructions aimed at enemy soldiers on for
properly surrendering to the coalition, and warnings not to participate in WMD
operations.
• U.S. Army Rangers and Anny Special Operations gunship helicopters have been
instrumental in attacking and seizing airfields in Northwestern Iraq, in addition to having
conducted dozens of raids and interdiction missions against Iraqi LOCs.
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Importance: High
OCJCSl PA
we will need e o get a copy of gene ral rosa 's power point (disk) first thing i n the morning
so we can l oad computer for powe r point pr e s e nt at i on . also , i ne e d to know i f the r e wi ll
be any handouts an i pass out the map that was distributed to mili tary ana l y s t s
tuesday ) ? t xs .
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Subject:
Importance:
Attachment s:
Mil itary Analysts
Conference c...
CIV, OASD-PA
Thursday. April 10, 2003 6:50 PM
Rheinlander, Thomas E., l TC, JCS, PAO; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCSIPA
Willcox, Chris CIV OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James. COL,
OASD-PA; CIV, OASD-PA
military ana ysts agen a + attendance list
High
Military Analysts Conference Call Agenda 04-11·03.doc
a t tached is f yi :
note: colonel r heinlander. i ' l l provide you wit h an updated list t omorrow AM . txs.
2:00 pm
2:01 pm
2:15 pm
2:30 pm
Note:
Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Fr iday, Apr il II, 2003
(As of April 10, 2003/6:45 pm)
AGENDA
Welcome and Introduction (Guidelines)
Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefensc for
Public Affairs
Iraqi Reconstruction Efforts
William1. Luti, Deputy Assistant Secretaryfor International
Security Affairs (Tentative)
OI F Operational Update
Major General Stanley A. McChrystal, Vice Director for Operations
(J-3), Joint Chiefs of Staff
Call Concludes (Guidelines)
Call-In Telephone Numher:
Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Friday, April ! !, 2003
(As of Apl'"i l l O, 2003/6:45 pm)
Participating
Brigadier General David Grange
General Montgomery Meigs
Lieutenant General DanChristman
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
General WilliamF. "Buck"Kernan
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
General Thomas Moorman
Major General Perry Smith
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor
Major General Paul E. Vallely
Colonel Carl Allard
General RonaldFogelman
General WilliamNash
General Joseph Ralston
Maj or General Donald W. Shepperd
Tentative or Decline
Admiral Thomas Lopez (D)
General Glen K. Otis (0)
General Wayne Downing (T)
Undecided
General Wesley Clark
General Charles Wilhelm
Colonel Jack Jacobs
Lieutenant General Thomas Mcinerney
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell
Admiral DavidJeremiah
General Larry Welch
General Hugh She lton
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson
MajorGeneral GeorgeHarrison
General Merrill McPeak
From :
Sent:
To :
Cc:
Subject:
e IV,OASD-PA
Monday, April 21, 2003 12:00 PM
Rheinlander, Thomas E" LTC, JCS, PAO
Haddock. Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS/PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD·PA
conference call with retired military analysts
Importance:
t om,
per our earlier conversation.
the one on f riday at 2:00 pm.
call.
lieu of
f or the
tomorrow's conference call in
.,;;;;;.. ..1 i s scheduling general garner
we'd like t o scrub
note:
also, re : the two addi tional outreaches. we'd like
emba s s y officials and ngo's begi nning work on iraq.
operations.
t o get the general out in
again, his remarks would
front with
f ocus on oif
can you give me some dates and times that would work for the general and i '11 go back and
schedule others around him. txs.
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO
Monday, April 21, 2003 2:37 PM
McCreary, T. L., CAPT. JCS, PAO
Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS/PA
FW: conference call with retired military analysts
Importance: High
Sir,
Given proposed briefer of the pend ing conference calIon Fri day and t he four day
delay unti l it happens i n which ope rations will continue to wa ne , from t he op e r a tiona l
POV, thi ' t is time for MG MCChyr s t a l to bow out and hand-off t o HA gurus .
~ had t a l ked about t he two out reaches t hi s morning after t he 0815 mee t i ng but
not as t o who was t he a udience . Gi ve n the listing below, would al s o use same argueme nt as
t o MG McChryst al not being t he r i gh t guy t o brief.
vi r. Tom
> - -- --Ori ~ ~ = A g ~ a o ~
>From: ~ CI V. OASD-PA
»s ent • Monday , Apri l 21 , 2003 12:00 PM
>To : Rheinlander, Thomas E. , LTC. J CS, PAO
>Cc : Haddock, El l en (Kati e) Col , OCJ CS/ PAi wi llcox. Chr i s, CIV. OASO- PA
>Subject: conf erence ca ll with ret i r ed milit ary analysts
>I mpor tance : High
»per
>
>we ' d
note :
our earlier conversat ion .
like to scrub t omorrow' s conference
is scheduli ng general
c a ll i n l i eu o f t he one
g a r ne r for the cal l.
on f riday at 2 :00 pm.
out in front with
would focus on oi f
general
remarks
t he
hi s
to get
again.
we ' d l ike
on i r aq .
>
>also, r e : t he two a dd i t i onal out reaches.
embas s y officials and ngo 's begi nning work
opera t ions.
>
>can you g ive me some da t e s and t i mes that would work f or the enera l
>and i ' l l go back a nd schedul e ot hers around him . t xs .
addock en; 1- -'
, MAJ, SJS
ril21 20034:09 PM Monda
)(8) McCreary, T.; Rheinlander, Thomas;
FW: OASDfPA Question 1- ..1
Subject:
From:
Sent:
To:
Follow Up Flag:
Flag Status:
Follow up
Flagged
Attachments: Fratricide PAG FINAL.doc
Ma ' SAP/ PAM
1;;;-,""'.-- - --<;"""" MAJ SJS i
Fratricide PAG
FINALdoc (47 K...
fyi -
> -- -- -Orig'
>From: MAJ OCPA
»s e nc : Monday, Apr il 21, 2 003 4: r
>To : McClellan Kenne t h LTC OASD-PAi -.or---------.
LtCol SAF/PAi )(8) LT SECNAVi
>Subj ect:
>
>La di es a nd Gent l emen,
>Was on leave last week when discussion occurred on this .
>please s ee the PAG on this issue, a recur ri ng one - and , i t is much be t t e r tha n my quote.
Mus t have bee n a very long day . . .
MAJ OCPAi L.. .. MAJ SJS;
>
>
>
> - --- - Or i g i na l Message---- -
>Fr om: Mc Cl e l l a n , Kenneth LTC OASD- PA
»sent • Frida, April 1 8 , 2003 12:17 PM
>To : a.1..$ /PAM
>Cc : )(8) Lt Co l SAP/PAi
LT SECNAVi SAP PAM
>Subject: RE: OASD/PA Quest ion
>
>Not at t he mome nt . I t is s imply a recurring issue that wil l c i rcle a round a f t e r we
dec lare victory in Iraq.
>
>,L.. -'
>That 's wha t I like about t he Ame rican p ress . The dirt cl ods used t o c ome befor e and
duri ng t he fi ght - - as t hey would tend t o do international ly . Now t hey seem t o come
p ri ncipa lly af terward .
>
>VR
>VERITAS I NVICTRIX
>
>Ken McCle llan
>Lt Co l (USAF)
>OASD PA Press ......
Fa x: n
)(8)
>
> -- ---Or i g i na l Me s s a e - - - - -
>Fr om: Ma j , SAF/PA
»s e nt . Friday, Ap r i l 18, 2003 8 : 58 AM
>To : C, OASD- PA
>Cc : )(8) LtCo l, SAF/PAi MAJ OCPAi
L..-__-' L ----'
MAJ,
1
SJSi ':":':::-:--;:;;--:::':. LT, SECNAVi tl!!!:=======:J,SAF/PAM
>Sub j e c t : RE: OASD/PA Question
LT, SECNAV
-----Or i gina l Message - - - - -
From: McClellan, Kenneth, LTC, OASD-PA
Sent : ' d 8, 20 03 7 : 36 AM
To : )(8) Ma j,
cc:)(8) MAJ , MAJ , SJSi L .....
Subject : RE: OASD/PA Quest10n
>
>s i r - - Do you have any quer i es on this right now?
'-------'
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
>
> Tha t was a wonderf ul answer right up to "AF, Army and Navy have all moved t o
diffe rent systems. " Tha t is prec isely what I would t hink would make this the numbe r - one
Le s sons Learned for t hi s conflict.
>
> Where are we on a r ea l - time coordi nat ion mechanism? Are we relying on some poo r
human at 40,000 f e e t trying to f igure out which coordinates are f ri e ndli e s and whi ch one s
targets? Is there an i nteroperabil i ty common denomi na t or that automatical ly sorts them
out by geographic s ector s of targets and s hooters ? If it works so wel l, why did we ki ll
our own i n Afghanistan a nd I r aq? Are we IFFF frequency s atur a t ed? Was bandwidth t he
constrai nt ? Call signs? What was fundamental ly wrong with buying a system where tanks
and F- 16s or F- 14s could autonomously r e cogni ze an American or Coali tion unit ? Have we
set up JSTARS to be the cent e r of gravity?
>
> Anyway, we might as well start f iguring out why foi l on plywood and gl int tape on
he l mets is s ti l l t he r ight answer af ter mor e than three White Sands studies on t he
f riendly f i r e i s s ue. And we need t o share whatever visual presentat ion CIDAD J - 8 i s us i ng
to make t he issue (and t he l a t e st solut ion) unders t andabl e .
>
> Many thanks. Happy Fr iday .
>
> VR
>. VERITAS INVICTRIX
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
Ken McClel lan
Lt Co l (USAF)
)(2)
Operat,1.'0mn"s:...__,
Fax : 1'1
A r il 17
> -----Or i gi nal Messa e - - - - -
> From: Maj, SAF/PA
> Sent : 'rhureda 2003 5:41 ...,.. .,
> To: , SAF/PAMi )(8) LtCoI, SAF/ PAi
McCl ellan , Kenne t h, LTC, OASD- PA
> Subject: RE: OASD/PA Question
>
Messa e -- - - -
, SAF/PAM
A r il 16 2003 7 :05 AM
Lt Col , SAF/PA
, Maj, SAF/PA
OASD/ PA Ques t ion
- - ---Ori gi nal
From:
Sent: Wednesda
To :
Cc: )(8)
Subject :
-----Origina l Message -- - - -
From : McCl e l lan, Kennet h, LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, Apr i l 16 , 2003 3 : 19 AM
2
Ken McClellan has a quest i on about bl ue f orce t rac ki ng upgrades t o ai rcraf t t o
friendly f ire . Can you help hi m?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
prevent
>
>
>
>
> All -- I asked around on thi s and the a ns we r is this was an issue several years ago
and something the Army f ound too now t he AF, Army and Navy have a l l move d to
different systems. Hope t ha t
>
>
To: SAF/PAM;
Subjec t: Is t l.S true?
>
:> Avoidi ng friendly fire . (ABC) - But f or all t he advantages of high-tech
weaponry, modern mil itary forces s till face a tragic , age -old problem: "fratricide, "
ot herwise known as "friendly fire " incident s. After De s e r t Stor m, the Pent agon conduc ted
extens i ve r e s earch i nto deve l oping ways t o di stingui sh f riend f rom f oe , but ended up
dit ching many of them due t o cos t . One s uch program - c alled t he Battlef i el d Comba t
I de nt i f i c a t i on System, or Bers - would have been an ide al s e tup for he l p i ng to pr eve nt
f rat r icide . The sys tem was simi lar to aut oma t i c i dentific a tion s ys tems deve l oped and us ed
by a ircraft since the a dvent of radar. The Army s pent some $100 mi llion to devel op a nd
t est BCI S, ana l ys t s s ay. But to equip the Army wi t h such automatic ident i fica tion s ys tems
would have cost a s much a s $40, 000 per vehicle. The pr ogram was completel y scrapped in
2001 because BCIS, des igned f o r gr ound combat , couldn' t b@ adopted for effect i ve use with
a irc r aft , sai d Ma j. Amy Hannah, a publ i c af fai r s of fi c @r f or the Army. Rl t wa s di ff i cul t
t o integrate, a nd t he system's limi tat i ons di dn 't answer the c hallenges that we r e a dded t o
t h@ [project) r e qu i r ement , R s ays Hannah. MI t j ust didn' t provide what we want or needed.
R
Instead , t he Pent agon ha s focused its effort s t o reduce f rat rici de through other means .
Chi e f a mong them is to us e the u .s . mili t ary' S clear adva nt age in advanced s ens o r s and
informat ion technologi es t o imp rove s o-cal l ed s ituational a war e ness among friendl y
f i ght i ng forces. Unde r a program ca l led For ce XXI Batt l e Command, Br igade and Be l ow, or
FBCB2, the mi l itary plans to c r e a t e wi r e l ess l oca l data communication ne t works that t i e in
various source of informat ion . Computers and software would be able t o collect video f r om
unmanned d rone s , the positi on of f r i e ndl y f o r ces wi t h GPS locat ion sys t ems , and dat a about
t he enemy from spy planes s uch as the JSTARS. By gather ing such dispa rate i nformat ion
together i nt o o ne Rba t t le s pa ce picture
R
and distr i but i ng i t to everyone on t he field,
i t ' s hoped t ha t even the common foot s oldier wi l l know where fri ends a nd foes are relat i ve
to the i r pos i t i on and si tua tion . One Army unit, the 4th I nfant ry Di v is i on , ha s already
been equipped wi th such digi tal communi c a tion s technology. But s i nce the di visi on was kept
out of most of t he fighti ng in I r aq, i t r ema i ns to be see n i f t he system real ly coul d hel p
in r educi ng f rat r i c i de.

>
>
>
3
SUBJECT: PUBLI C AFFAIRS GUIDANCE - MESSAGES, Q'S AND A'S ON FRI ENDLY FIRE
CASUALTIES/FRATRICIDE.
1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MESSAGES AND Q'S AND A'S FOR USE IN HANDLING
QUERIES REGARDING FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES. IT IS INTENDED FOR USE IN
RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY.
2. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSTURE IS PASSIVE, RESPONSE TO QUERIES ONLY.
3. MESSAGES.
A DEFINITI ON OF FRATRICIDE/FRIENDLY FIRE PER AR 600-34. "A CIRCUMSTANCE
INWHICH MEMBERS OF THE U.S. OR FRIENDLY MILITARY FORCES ARE
MISTAKINGLY, OR ACCIDENTALLY, KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTION BY THE U.S.
OR FRIENDLY FORCES WHILE ENGAGED WITH AN ENEMY, OR WHILE FIRING AT A
HOSTILE FORCE, OR WHAT IS THOUGHT TO BE A HOSTILE FORCE."
B. FRATRICIDE IS AVOIDED OR LIMITED BY MULTIPLE ACTIONS, INCLUDING
RIGOROUS TRAINING OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS IN VEHICLE RECOGNITI ON AND
KNOWLEDGE OF FIRE CONTROL MEASURES, ESTABLI SHING APPROPRIATE FIRE
CONTROL MEASURES DURING THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF AN OPERATION
TO RESTRICT OR PERMIT FIRES ACROSS THE BATTLEFIELD, ADHERENCE TO
FIRE CONTROL MEASURES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) DURING
OPERATIONS, AND EMPHASIS ON SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. TECHNOLOGY CAN
CONTRIBUTE TO THE AVOIDANCE OF FRATRICIDE, BUT WARFIGHTER TRAINING
AND LEADERSHIP ARE THE PRINCIPAL DETERMINANTS.
C. TECHNOLOGY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THEWARFIGHTERS' SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS AND ASSIST IN THE PREVENTION OF FRATRICIDE. EXAMPLES
ARE THE ARMY'S FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW (FBCB2)
AND SECOND GENERATION FORWARD-LOOKING INFRARED (FLlR) (SGF). FBCB2
SUPPORTS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DOWN TO THE PLATFORM LEVEL ACROSS
ALL BATTLEFIELD FUNCTIONAL AREAS (BFAS) AND ECHELONS. ACROSS THE
BATTLEFIELD, LEADERS CAN USE THE DIGITAL DISPLAY TO REDUCE CHAOS AND
CONFUSION, AND FOCUS COMBAT POWER AT THE DESIRED POINT.
D. SECOND-GENERATION FLiR PROVIDES ARMOR, INFANTRY, AND
RECONNAISSANCE FORCES WITH A LEAP-AHEAD CAPABILITY TO DETECT,
ACQUIRE, AND IDENTIFY TARGETS IN ALL WEATHER AND VISIBILITY CONDITIONS,
EVEN DURING NIGHT OPERATIONS AND IN CONDITIONS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY
DUE TO SMOKE, DUST, SAND, AND FOG. SECOND GENERATION FLi R
EFFECTIVELY DOUBLES THE IDENTIFI CATION RANGE AND INCREASES THE
DETECTION RANGE BY 55% COMPARED TO THE FIRST GENERATION FLiR USED
DURING THE 1991 GULF WAR. AS A RESULT, SGF ALLOWS THE SHOOTERS TO
DETECT AND IDENTIFY TARGETS BEYOND THE RANGE OF DIRECT-FIRE WEAPON
SYSTEMS, CONTRIBUTING TO IMPROVEMENTS IN LETHALITY AND SURVIVABILITY
OF OUR FORCES AND REDUCTION IN FRATRICIDE.
E. NO MATTER HOW GOOD THE TRAINING, OPERATIONAL PLANNING, TECHNOLOGY,
AND LEADERSHIP, WARFARE IS A HUMAN ENDEAVOR AND MISTAKES WILL BE
MADE. SOME OF THOSE MISTAKES MAY CONTRIBUTE TO FRATRICIDE. THE
INTENSITY AND SPEED OF COMBAT, FEAR, FATI GUE, DUST, SMOKE, AND MANY
OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO WHAT HAS BEEN HISTORICALLY CALLED "THE
FOG OF WAR." ONE GOAL OF TRANSFORMATION IS TO CUT THROUGH THE FOG
OF WAR AND GIVE COMMANDERS, LEADERS AND SOLDIERS A NEAR-PERFECT
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE BATTLEFIELD.
F. EFFORTS TO REDUCE FRIENDLY-FIRE INCIDENTS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE VERY
HIGH EMPHASIS. AS WAYS AND MEANS TO DO SO ARE MATURED, THEY WILL BE
EMBEDDED IN THE ARMY'S DOCTRINE, ACQUISITION AND TRAINING. HOWEVER,
BECAUSE CHAOS AND UNCERTAINTY REMAIN, THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF
FRIENDLY-FI RE INCIDENTS CANNOT BE GUARANTEED. WE MUST NOT LET
REASONABLE CAUTION EVOLVE INTO TIMIDITY, WHICH WOULD LIKELY MEAN
GREATER CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY ACTION.
G. THE PROGRAMS BEING DEVELOPED AND INSTITUTED TO REDUCE THE
POTENTIAL FOR FRI ENDLY-FIRE INCIDENTS NECESSITATE THE CONTINUING
NEED FOR TOUGH, REALISTIC TRAINING. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR ARMY
AND ITS ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION WITH MINIMUM CASUALTIES ARE
A DIRECT RESULT OF TRAINING.
4. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.
Q1, WHAT HAS THE ARMY DONE SINCE THE GULF WAR TO DECREASE THE CHANCE
OF FRIENDLY FIRE ON THE BATTLEFIELD?
A1. IN TERMS OF TRAINING, ALL OF OUR COMBAT CENTERS, SPECIFICALLY THE
NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER (NTC) AT FORT IRWIN, CALIFORNIA, AND THE COMBAT
MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER (CMTC) AT HOHENFELS, GERMANY, HAVE TAKEN
MEASURES TO EVALUATE IDENTIFICATION AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON THE
BATTLEFIELD.
Q2. THE BATTLEFIELD COMBAT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (BCIS) WAS DESIGNED TO
HELP IDENTIFY FRIENDLY FORCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE PROGRAM WAS
TERMINATED IN 2001, WHY?
A2. BCIS BACKGROUND - PROGRAM WAS INITIATED IN 1993 BUT IT WAS ORIGINALLY
DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ONLY A GROUND-TO-GROUND IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITY
FOR MOUNTED COMBAT VEHICLES. IT DID NOT ASSIST WITH ALL COMBAT ID REALMS
[AIR-TO-GROUND OR MOUNTED-TO-DISMOUNTED I DISMOUNTED-TO-MOUNTED
IDENTITY]. ADDITIONALLY, IT WAS NOT JOINT AND COALITI ON INTEROPERABLE. DUE
TO THE SYSTEM'S LIMITATIONS TO MEET ALL OF THE ID REQUIREMENTS AND THE
CHALLENGES OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION, AND ASSOCIATED COSTS, ITWAS
TERMINATED IN 2001.
Q3. WHAT IS THE ARMY DOING TO DEVELOP COMBAT IDENTIFICATION (CID) SYSTEMS?
A3. ARMY'S CURRENT APPROACH TO CID - 3 PRONG APPROACH - 1ST IS SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS; 2ND IS BETTER TACTICS TECHNI QUES PROCEDURES (TTP) & TRAINING;
3RD IS ENHANCED OPTI CS + INFRARED TECHNOLOGY. WITHOUT PROVIDING TOO
MUCH DETAIL FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY REASONS, IT CAN BE NOTED THAT CID
SYSTEMS ARE BEING DISTRIBUTED TO COALI TION AND ALLIED FORCES TO ENHANCE
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND IDENTIFI CATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES. THESE
SYSTEMS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, THERMAL IDENTIFICATI ON PANELS, THE
PHOENIX INFRARED COMBAT BEACON SYSTEM AND GLOW TAPE. ADDITIONAL
SYSTEMS ARE IN DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING PHASES AND WILL BE FIELDED AS
SOON AS PRACTI CABLE TO PROVIDE:
• BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DERIVED FROM BLUE (FRIENDLY) FORCE
TRACKING, FBCB2 & GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) ENSURING UNITS
KNOW WHERE THEY ARE AND WHERE FRIENDLES ARE, THEREBY REDUCING
THE POSSIBILITY OF FRATRICIDE.
• BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, COUPLED WITH IMPROVED TTP HAS
RAISED THE SENSITIVITY LEVEL & ACUITY OF TODAY'S FORCES TO ENSURE
THEY HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE OF THE TARGET' S IDENTI TY PRIOR TO AN
ENGAGEMENT. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS TRAINING INCLUDES THE RECOGNITION
OF COMBAT VEHICLES (ROC-V) , THERMAL SIGNATURE IDENTIFI CATI ON
TRAINING THAT HELP SOLDIERS LEARN TO IDENTIFY THE THERMAL
SIGNATURES OF COMBAT VEHICLES. ROC-V IS AN INTERACTIVE, WINDOWS-
BASED CURRICULUM THAT TEACHES THE UNI QUE PATERNS AND SHAPES OF
VEHICLE "HOTSPOTS' AND OVERALL VEHICLE SHAPES. ROC-V ALSO PROVIDES
SOLDIERS WITH PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE USE OF THEIR SENSOR IMAGE
CONTROLS. WITH VIRTUAL SIGHT CONTROLS, SOLDIERS LEARN TO
EFFECTIVELY ADJUST THEI R THERMAL IMAGES TO FIND TARGETS AND BRING
OUT THEIR THERMAL ID CUES.
• IMPROVED OPTICS (2ND GEN FLi RS + NEWER NIGHT VISION DEVICE SYSTEMS)
PLUS PASSI VE THERMAL TECHNOLOGY, ENABLE GUNNERS TO MAKE A
PCSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WITH GREATER CLARITY AND ACCURACY, AT
GREATER RANGES.
• THE COMBINATION OF THESE APPROACHES REDUCES THE POTENTIAL FOR
FRATCIDE.
04. WHAT ARE FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES?
A4. OEFINITION OF FRATRICIDE/FRI ENDLY FIRE PER AR 600-34. "A CIRCUMSTANCE IN
WHICH MEMBERS OF THE U.S. OR FRIENDLY MILITARY FORCES ARE MISTAKINGLY, OR
ACCIDENTALL Y, KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTION BY THE U.S. OR FRIENDLY FORCES
WHILE ENGAGED WITH AN ENEMY, OR WHILE FIRING AT A HOSTILE FORCE, OR WHAT
IS THOUGHT TO BE A HOSTILE FORCE:
Q5. WHAT CAUSES FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES?
AS. COMBAT IS HIGHLY COMPLEX AND STRESSFUL. OPERATI ONS ARE
CONDUCTED 24 HOURS A DAY, IN ALL TYPES OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER. THEY
INVOLVE RAPID MANEUVER AND INTENSE ENGAGEMENTS USING HIGHLY LETHAL
WEAPONS SYSTEMS FIRED FROM A VARIETY OF AIR, GROUND AND SEA
PLATFORMS. BATTLEFIELDS ARE OBSCURED BY DUST AND SMOKE, SOLDIERS
BECOME FATIGUED, AND EQUIPMENT CAN MALFUNCTION. THESE AND OTHER
OCCURRENCES PRODUCE WHAT IS CALLED THE "FOG OF WAR:
Q6. HOW MANY AMERICAN CASUALTIES RESULTED FROM FRATRICIDE DURING THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR?
A6. OF THE TOTAL OF 613 MILITARY BATTLE CASUALTI ES IN OPERATION DESERT
STORM, 146 SERVICE PERSONNEL WERE KILLED IN ACTION, INCLUDING 35 KILLED BY
FIRE FROM FRIENDLY FORCES, AND 467 WERE WOUNDED, INCLUDING 72 BY FIRE
FROM FRIENDLY FORCES.
Q7. WHAT ARE THE LEADING CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE?
A7. THE FACTORS THAT CAN CAUSE FRATRICIDE ARE:
• CHAOS AND CONFUSION OF WARFARE
• INADEQUATE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
• INADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT OF, AND ADHERENCE TO, FIRE CONTROL
MEASURES
• COMBAT IDENTIFICATION FAILURES
Q8. DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM, HOW DID THE FRATRICIDE INCIDENTS
OCCUR?
AS. FRIENDLY-FIRE CASUALTIES ARE NOT UNIQUE TO OPERATION DESERT STORM.
DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM, APPROXIMATELY 39 PERCENT OF THE
FRIENDLY-FIRE INCIDENTS (11 OUT OF 28) APPEARED TO BE AS A RESULT OF TARGET
MISIDENTIFICATION. MISIDENTIFICATION WAS A RESULT OF SEVERAL FACTORS-
WEATHER AND BATTLEFIELD CONDITIONS BEING THE PRINCIPAL REASONS.
COORDINATION PROBLEMS ACCOUNTED FOR APPROXIMATELY 29 PERCENT (8 OUT OF
28) FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENTS. OF THE REMAINING NINE INCIDENTS, SIX WERE DUE TO
TECHNICAL ANDIOR ORDNANCE MALFUNCTIONS; THREE INCIDENTS HAD INSUFFICIENT
OR INCONCLUSI VE FINDINGS TO DETERMINE CAUSE.
Q9. THERE SEEMS TO BE A HIGHER PROPORTION OF CASUALTIES FROM FRIENDLY
FIRE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM AS OPPOSED TO PREVIOUS CONFLICTS. IS THAT
THE CASE?
A9. BASED ON THE REPORTS USED AND THE METHODS OF SURVEY REPORTED, THE
PERCENTAGES OF CASUALTIES VARIED, TO INCLUDE: SIX PERCENT IN
PANAMNOPERATION JUST CAUSE, 13 PERCENT IN GRENADN OPERATION URGENT
FURY, STUDIES REFLECTING 10-14 PERCENT IN VIETNAM, AND 12-14PERCENT IN
WORLD WAR II AND 17 PERCENT IN OPERATI ON DESERT STORM.
ANOTHER DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OPERATION DESERT STORM AND PREVIOUS WARS
WAS THE GREAT NUMBER OF LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENTS AND BATTLES IN LIMITED
VISIBILITY. FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM5-SIGHTS AND COMPUTERS-ARE FAR MORE
CAPABLE THAN IN THE PAST. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE
HIGH PROBABLITIES OF HITS AND KILLS AT GREATER RANGES. THE NATURE OF THE
DESERT PERMITTED ENGAGEMENT OF TARGETS AT RANGES EXCEEDING TWO AND
ONE HALF KILOMETERS ON A REGULAR BASIS AND IN ALMOST ALL WEATHER
CONDITI ONS. EFFECTIVE LONG-RANGE FIRES DO MUCH TO WIN BATTLES WITH
FEWER CASUALTIES, BUT THESE ENGAGEMENTS ALSO PLACE A PREMIUM ON
POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION. IN ADDITION TO INCREASED RANGES, DESERT
WARFARE IS CHARACTERIZED BY PERIODS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY. WEATHER
CONDITI ONS, SUCH AS SAND AND RAIN STORMS THAT OCCURRED DURING
OPERATI ON DESERT STORM, THE DUST AND SMOKE OF BATTLE, AND DARKNESS
OFTEN AID ATTACKING FORCES BY SHIELDING THEM FROM ENEMY OBSERVATION. IT
IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THESE CONDITIONS WERE, TO SOME EXTENT,
RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIVELY LOW COALITION CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, THESE
CONDITIONS ALSO OEGRADE SOMEWHAT THE SIGHTING SYSTEMS AIR AND GROUND
FORCES USE. IN SUCH CONDITIONS, STATE-OF-THE-ART SIGHTS PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
RESOLUTION TO IDENTIFY GENERAL TARGETS, BUT OFTEN LACK THE RESOLUTION TO
PROVIDE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLE TYPE. LONG-RANGE, LIMITED-VISIBILITY
ENGAGEMENTS ARE PART OF THE ART OF MODERN WARFARE.
A FINAL FACTOR ON THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD IS THE PRESENCE OF COALITION
FORCES EQUIPPED WITH DIFFERENT EQUIPMENT THAN EMPLOYED BY US FORCES.
EXTRA CARE MUST BE TAKEN WHEN COALITION FORCES FROM DIFFERENT NATIONS
ARE OPERATING IN THE SAME AREA. IN MANY CASES, THEY WILL NOT SHARE A
COMMON PICTURE OF THE BATTLEFIELD OR EVEN EMPLOY SIMILAR ANTI-FRATRICIDE
TACTICS AND CONTROL MEASURES. FURTHER COMPLICATING THE CHALLENGE,
COALITION FORCES MAY BE EQUIPPEDWITH COMBAT VEHICLES OF THE SAME TYPE
AS ENEMY FORCES. COALITION WARFARE INTERJECTS A NEW DIFFICULTY INTO THE
CHALLENGES SURROUNDING PREVENTI ON OF FIRE FROM FRIENDLY FORCES.
Ql0. DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM, WHAT TYPE OF INCIDENTS RESULTED IN
CASUALTIES FROM FRIENDLY FIRE?
Al0. INVESTIGATIONS HAVE IDENTIFIED 28 INCIDENTS DURING OPERATION DESERT
STORM IN WHICH US FORCES INADVERTENTLY ENGAGED OTHER AMERICAN FORCES,
RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF 35 SERVICEMEN AND THE WOUNDING OF 72 OTHERS.
OF THE 28 U.S. INCIDENTS, 16 WERE IN GROUND-T0-GROUND ENGAGEMENTS, WITH 24
KILLED AND 57 WOUNDED, WHILE NINE WERE IN AIR-TO-GROUND ENAGAGEMENTS
THAT RESULTED IN 11 KILLED AND 15 WOUNDED. OTHER INCIDENTS INCLUDED ONE
SHIP-TO-SHIP, ONE SHORE-TO-SHIP, AND ONE GROUND-TO-AIR ENGAGEMENT.
HOWEVER, NO CASULATI ES RESULTED FROM THESE INCIDENTS.
Ql1 . WHAT PROCEDURES WILL BE TAKEN ON THE BATTLEFIELD ONCE A FRIENDLY
FIRE INCIDENT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OCCURRED?
All . ONCE A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OCCURRED, ARMY
REGULATIONS REQUIRES BOTH A SAFETY AND COLLATERAL INVESTIGATION (SEE AR
385-40) . IN THE EVENT OF FRIENDLY FIRE FATALITI ES, AR 600-34 PRESCRIBES
FURTHER REQUIREMENTS. AR 15-6 SETS FORTH PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF
INFORMAL AND FORMAL INVESTIGATIONS AND GUIDES THE CONDUCT OF
INVESTIGATIONS REQUIRI NG THE DETAILED GATHERING AND ANALYZING OF FACTS,
AND THE MAKING OF RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THOSE FACTS.
5. MEDIA QUESTIONS THAT GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THESE Q'S AND A'S
SH 0 DIA RELATIONS BRANCH, OCPA-MR, ATTN:
::-_=.... OR PA STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, OCPA-SCD,.... .....
From:
Sent :
To :
Cc:
Subj ect:
Importance:
Attachments :
Military Analysts
Conference c...
OASD·PA
Friday. Apri l 25. 2003 12:45 PM
Rheinlander. Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col. OCJCSIPA
DeFrank, James, COL, OASD· PA
military analysts conference call wilh mcchrystallcolli ns
High
Military Analysts Conference Call Agenda 04-25-03.doc
attached is the agenda + final list of part icipants for this a fternoon's
conference call w/retired mi litary analysts :
1
2:00 pm
2:01 pm
2:15 pm
2:30 pm
Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Fr iday, Apr il 25, 2003
(As of April Z4, 2003/10:00 am)
AGENDA
Welcome and Int roduction (Guidelines)
Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs
Upda te on Cnalition Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq
Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability
Operations
OIF Operati onal Upda te
Major General Stanley A. McChrystaJ, Vice Director for Operations
(1-3), Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ca ll Concludes (Guidelines)
Note:
Call-In Telepbone Number:
Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Friday, April 25, 2003
(As of April 25, 2003/12:45 pm)
Participating
Colonel Carl Allard
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
General Wi lliam Nash
General Joseph Ralston
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor
Colonel John Warden
General Montgomery Meigs
Lieutenant General Dan Christman
Rear Admi ral Thomas F. Marfiak
Major Genera l Donald W. Shepperd
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Colonel Jack Jacobs
Lieutenant General Thomas Mcinerney
General Glen K. Otis
Major General Paul E. Vallely
Tentative or Decline
Undecided
General William F. "Buck" Kernan (T)
Major General Perry Smith (T)
Genera l Wayne Downing (T)
Bri gadier General David Grange (0)
General Ronald Fogelman (D)
Admi ral Thomas Lopez (D)
General Wesley Clark (0)
General Charles Wilhelm (0)
Lieut enant General Frank B. Campbell (0)
Admiral David Jeremiah (0)
General Larry Welch (D)
General Hugh Shelton (D)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (D)
Major General George Harri son (0)
General Merri ll McPeak (D)
General Thomas Moorman (0)
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
I
Haddock. Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
9:03 PM
i I CIV JCS V, JCS,
OCJCSfPA;JD)(8) I MAJ , SJS.. ;f""»)(8).,--- - t'1
1
LCDR, JCS "')(8) ...-----'= ::.....,
SMSgt, OCJCS
30 J ULY END OF DAY REPORT
PLEASE PASS TO CAPT THORP
WINS:
--Gen McChrystal made time on his calendar for the OSD PA conference cal l wi t h retired
military analysts for tomorrow afternoon . His plan is to bring along an 06 f rom t he JOD
who will observe, then t ake this tasker on from here . I thi nk it's a g reat plan. He
indicated t hat had d i s cus s e d t hi s with Gen Swart z, and if, i n t he future, we felt t here
was need for more firepower on a particular cal l/subject, that we coul d r e-engage . I told
hi m t hat when t hese a nalysts were s ti ll on act ive duty, they r e l ied on 065 t o br ief them,
and t ha t thi s should work well .
--Go t a J5 SME to do a backgrounder with Bradley Graham this afternoon on Pr oli fera tion
Security I ni t i a tive . Spoke with J5 's EA, and sent an emai l to Gen Casey, (cc t he J 5 ,
e tc .) to "remind" all t ha t this was a lre ady i n t he works , a nd so no one woul d be surprised
when t hey read the wa s hi ng t on Post t omo r row - - or Friday , whe never i t r uns.
--WOODWARD i ntervi ew: Gen Pace brought t hi s subject up, as i t came up at the NSC t oday.
Condi Rice men tioned i t , Pr esi de nt chi med in, etc. Gen Pac e indicated that we are to
f ol l ow Condi 's l ead, ge t some input/guidance/outli ne , etc . I have a cal l i n wit h Anna
Perez, j ust to relay the conversation and s ee whe r e we are . I think she had a long chat
with Mr. Woodward t od ay. wi l l f ollow up; at l e a s t the skids a r e greased, and this wil l be
an expected event. Joan has prepared t he memo for the Chairman on thi s .
- -Got all t he Chairman 's transcr ipts you sent (New Delhi press conference ; GEO-TV,
Pa kistan; and Bagr am press conference) hung on t he webs i t e . Also passed them to Co l
DeFrank f or us e on De f ens e Li nk . I not iced t hey used one o f J i m Garamore 's s t ories in t he
Pe ntagon Brief ing (the weekly "blurb" ) wi th a hotlink to DefenseLink, so t hat 's gr eat
(add i t i ona l ) cove rage/ audi ence .
LOSSES: (wha t a re you l ooki ng he r e f or??? I ' m a Marine -- t here wi ll be NOTHING in the
loss col unm!
QUESTION: Got an ema il from t he Rendon Group folks. They origi nally s e nt i t t o you, t he n
resent t o me when they got your auto-response . John Rendon wil l be i n the bu ild i ng Monday
afternoon (4 Aug) for s everal meeti ngs, and they were hoping to get him on your s chedule
(and they promised he will not go over the time l imit . ) Do you want me to schedul e this?
30 minutes?
PREDICTION : Afraid LIBERTY for this weekend may be cancell ed . Saturday schedule is
building .
And whi l e I was putt i ng out f i res with an ice pick, the rest of the off ice was r ea lly bus y
t oday :
" aj [ .... ···'....,1
* WA Pos t backgrounder wi t h J5 on PIO. Pub lica tion expected tomorrow
* Attended Libe ri a 10 VTC today - expect an interagency one-page tal king poi nt paper
ready f o r chop by Saturday
* St af f i ng PAG for GTMO, coordinating across Joint Staf f - waiting on J5 , due tomor row
* Choppi ng of PAG on Somalia complete
* Conducted BG Brooks backgrounder wi th FrontLine today
* Chopping Nobl e Mali nda SMEB
* Ale rt order bei ng worked - - PPAG being coordi nated by Amy



PPAG on upcoming event going t hr ough appr oval channe ls
Working a Te rrorist Information Program/ J PENS - J6 Issue
deadline t omorrow
wor ki ng a J5 Gol dwa ter- Ni chol s Query
with e SD f or Boston Gl obe
Comput e r Guru's loaded Calendar Cr eator 6.0 t oda y -- LTC e nde avoring t o
i t and transfer it a s Long Range Calendar.
Worki ng I s sues for Out r e ach Pr ogram.
Coordinated with J l regarding lMA support p r opos al not a si mpl e proc e ss . .. will
it hard.
Town Ha ll mee t i ng on track for SECDEF and CJCS on 14 Aug.




work

l ea r n
That 's all the news that fits.
Stay s a f e , and hu rry back to the barn .
VI '
Kat ie
Tracking:
Recipient . ..d
Read: 7l3Ol2OO3 9:05 PM
Read: 7/3112003 7:04 AM
Read: 7/3112003 8:27 AM
Read: 7/3112003 7:46 AM
Read: 7/3112003 8:11 AM
Read: 7/3112003 5:57 AM
React 7/3112003 6:57 AM
2
From:
Sent :
To:
Subj ect:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSIPA
Monda Au ust 04, 2003 2:40 PM
CIV, JCS VCJCS
FW: Outreach Meeting with SECDEF and Military Analysts, 12 Aug, 10:30 am - 12:00 pm
Importance: Low
Just as a head's up .
SecDef is scheduled to meet with t he r et i r ed general of f i ce r s / mi l i t a ry analyst s on Tues ,
12 Aug , s omecime betwee n 1030-1200 here i n the Pencagon . He may ask the Vice Chairman
(Ac ting Chairman) t o join hi m.
The briefer , e t c . discussed below is our s for action - - NOT looking f o r Ge n Pace co be t he
duty ops briefer.
Just wanted you to be aware that thi s might pop up on Gen Pace's cal endar a s a "drive by "
with SecDef .
V! R
Kat ie
Military Analys ts, 12 Aug, 10 :30 am - 12:00
Low
,
Staf f ,
> As you know we a re wor ki ng to identify an 0 - 6 br i efe r t o communi c a t e weekly on t he
conf call,
> Howeve r , I t hought that if the VCJ CS want ed t o engage t hi s audience it would be a
great oppo r t uni ty t o do so and get hi s me s s age out .
> What do you t hi nk ?
> v! r ......_ ....
> LTC
> - n norig '
>From: LTC, JCS SJS
>Se nt: Mon day, Augus t 04 , 2003 2:01 PM
>To: Haddoc k , El l en (Ka t i e) , Col , OCJCS/PA
>Sub j ec t : Out r e ac h Meeting wi th SECDEF and
pm
>I mpo r t ance :
,
' , Ma ' am ' E ::::I
• inf ormed me about a nea t opportuni t y to engage the Mi l i t a r y Anal ysts and
Ci vi l i an Defense Expe rts next we ek, He is hos t i ng a Les s ons Lear ned out r ea ch fo r t hese
Aug here in t he bu ildi ng , vice the wee kl y telephonic conf e r enc e cal l.
e requested a IS- minut e mi litary operat ions br i efi ng f r om someone on the J oinc
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Importance:
CIV. JCS VCJCS
Tuesday. Augusl 05. 2003 9:12 AM
Haddock, Ellen (Kati e), Col, OCJCS/PA
RE: Outreach Meeting with SECDEF and Military Analysts, 12 Aug, 10:30 am - 12:00 pm
Low
Thank you . .. l ooki ng at SO's "two - we eke r " ... t here i s an "Out reach" noted for
1 100 - 1145 • .• 1 '11 put on boss 's schedule as a n FYI and keep an eye on it .
> -----Or i g i na l Message - - - - -
>Fr om: Haddock, Bllen (Ka t i e) , Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent· ust 04, 2003 2: 40 PM
>To : CIV, JCS VCJCS
>Subj e c t : FW: Outreach Meet ing with SECDEF and Mi l itary Analysts, 12 Aug. 10 : 3 0 am -
12:00 pm
>I mpor t anc e : Low
>
>Just as a head 's up.
>Se cDe f i s scheduled to me e t with the retired general off icers/ mi l i tary analysts on Tues ,
12 Aug, somet ime between 1030-120 0 here i n the Pentagon. He may ask the Vi c e Chairman
(Act ing Chairman) to join him.
>The bri efer, etc . discussed below is ours for act ion -- NOT l ooki ng for Gen Pace to be
the du ty ops brief er .
>Just wanted you to be aware that t his might pop up on Gen Pace's calendar as a "drive
by" with SecDef .
>V/ R
>Katie
>
> -----Or i
>Fr om: LTC, JCS SJS
>Sent: Monday, August 04, 2003 2 :01 PM
>To : Haddock, Bl l en (Kat i e) . Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subj e c t : Out r ea ch Meeting with SBCDBF and Mi l itary Analysts, 12 Aug, 10 :30 am - 12:00
pm
>Importance : Low
>
>Ma t
> informed me about a neat opportuni ty t o engage the Mi l itary Analysts and
Civi lian Defense Experts next week . He is hos t ing a Lessons Lea r ned outreach f or t hese
analysts on i2 Aug he r e i n the bui lding, vice the weekly telephonic conference call .
> requested a I S- minute militar y operat ions brief ing from someone on t he Joint
Staff .
> AS you know we are working to ident ify an 0 -6 briefer t o communicate weekly on the
conf call.
> However, I thought that i f the VCJ CS wanted t o engage t hi s audience i t would be a
great opportunity t o do so and get his message out .
> What do you t hi nk?
> v/ r ....--_ ....,
> LTC
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Subj ect:
L ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ' " LTC, JCS SJS
Thursday, August 07,2003 10:19 AM
Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSlPA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col , OCJCSl PA
FW: Military Analysts Conference Call with CJCS
Importance: High
Attachments: Military Analysts Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call Agenda 08-07-ea.dcc
Militafy Analysts
CHilian Del...
Sir/ Ma'am,
La t es t info on the conf e r ence Ca l l .
vi r, LTC
L.-_...l
COL, OASD- PA
CAPT, OCJCS/ PA; L. .J LTC,
AM
Frank ,
e- - ---
CI V, OASD-PA
August 07, 200 3 9 :46
CIV, OASD- PA; Thorp,
> --- --Original Me ssa
>From:
>Sent: Thur s day ,
>To: willcox, Chr i s ,
J CS SJS
>Cc: Whitman, Bryan , SES, OASD- PA; Rhyneda nc e , George,
>Subject: Military Analys t s Con f erence Call with CJCS
>Irnpor t a nce: Hi gh
>
>Fo lks,
>
>At t a c hed is an upd a ted a genda a nd lis t o f participants f or this a f t ernoon' s confe r ence
cal l wi th CJCS -- which refl ect s l a s t ni ght 's cha nge i n t '
>A f i na l r evision wi l l be f orwarded by 1 : 00 pm. Tha nks !
>
>
1
3:00 pm
3:01 pm
3:15 pm
3:30 pm
Note:
OfF Confe rence Ca ll
Retired Milit ary Analyst s and Civili a n Defense Ex
3: 00 pm, Thurs day, August 7, 2003, Roo
(As orAugust 6, 2003/6:30 pm)
AGENDA
Welcome a nd I nt roduction (Guidelines)
Chri s Willcox, Deput y Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs
Update on Joint Chiefs of Staff Tr ip to the Region
General Richard B. Myers (AF) , Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Questions and Answers
Call Concludes (Guidelines)
Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs
Call-In Telephone Number:
OIF Conference Can
Retired Military Analysts and Civilian Defense Experts
3:00 pm, Thursday, August 7, 2003
(As of August 7, 200319:15 am)
PARTICIPATING Retired Military An alysts
Colonel Carl Allard
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan
General Ronald Foge lman
General William F. "Buck" Kernan
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginni s
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Martiak
General Montgomery Meigs
Maj or Genera l Donald W. Shepperd
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor
Major General Paul E. Vall ely
Major General Thomas L. Wilkerson
PARTICIPATI NG Civilian Defense Experts
Mr. Anthony Cordesman, Fellow, Center for Strategies and International Studies
Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND
Lieutenant General Michael M. Dunn, President, National Defense University
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, President, The Center for Security Policy
Mr. Grover Norquist, President. Americans for Tax Reform
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign Defense Studies, American Enterpri se Institute
Mr. Loren B. Thompson, Chief Operating Officer , Lexi ngton Institute
Mr. John Wobensmith, Director of Development , Institute of World Politics
TENTATIVE or DECLINE Retired Military An alyst s
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (D)
Lieut enant General Buster Glosson (D)
Major General George Harri son (D)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (D)
General Merrill McPeak (D)
General Thomas Moorman (0)
General William Nash (D)
General Larry Welch (D)
TENTATIVE or DECLINE Civilian Defense Experts
Mr. Thomas Donnell y, Fell ow, American Enterprise (T)
Ms. Nina Shea. Director, Center for Reli gious Freedom (T)
Ms. Jessica Tuchman Mathews. President. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (T)
Dr. Mic hael O' Hanlon, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution (0)
Mr. Chris Preble, Director of Foreign Pol icy Studies, CATO Institute (D)
UNDECIDED Reti r ed Military Ana lysts
Lieutenant General Dan Christman
General Wayne Downing
Brigadier General David Grange
Admiral David Jeremiah
Lieut enant General Thomas McInerney
General Glen K. Otis
General Joseph Ralston
General Hugh Shelton
Maj or General Perry Smith
Colonel John Warden
UNDECIDED Civilia n Defense Experts
Dr. Daniel Goure, Senior Fellow. Lexington Institute
Mr. Michael J. Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Mr. Will Marshall, President. Progressive Policy Institute
Mr. Jack Spencer, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation
Dr. Michael Waller, Vice President, The Center for Security Policy
From:
Sent:
To :
Subject:
Importance:
Attachments:
Military Analysts
Ovifian DeL
LTC. JCS SJS
Thursday, August 07,20032:27 PM
Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSJPA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
FW; Military Analysts Conference Call with CJCS; Agenda/Participants
High
Military Analysts Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call Agenda OS-07-o3.doc
l ates t u pda te ..
>
>From : E: CI V, OASO- PA
>Se nt: Thur s day . Augus t 07, 2003 12: 40 PM
>To: Wi l l c o x , Chris, ClV, OASD- PA; Thorp, Frank , CAPT, OCJ CS/ PA; LTC,
JCS SJS
>Cc: Oi V, OSO; Whitman , Bryan , SES , OASD-PA; Rhynedanc e , Ge o r ge , COL,
OASD- PA; ClV, Ba r ber, All iso n , ClV, OASD- PA
>Su bjec t : Mi l i t a r y Analysts Co nf e r e nce Ca l l with CJCS : Ag@nda / participa n t s
>lmpar t a nce: High
>
>At t ach@d is t he age nda and f ina l l ist af part icipants f or t h i s a fternoon ' s conf erence
cal l wi t h Ge ne r al Myers:
>
>
>Those that are "te ntat ive /dec l ined/ undecided" a r e listed o n page t hr e e.
>Txs !
>
1
3:00 pm
3: 01 pm
3:15 pm
3: 30 pm
Note:
OIF Confe rence Call
Retired Mili tary Analys ts and Civilia n Defense Ex erts
3:00 pm, Thursday, August 7, 2003, Room.. •
(As of August 6, 2003/6:30 pm)
AGENDA
Welcome a nd Introduction (Guidelines)
Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs
Update on J oint Chiefs nf Staff Tr ip to the Region
General Richard B. Myers (AF), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StatT
Questions and Answers
Call Concl udes (Guidelines)
Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs
Call-In Telephone Number:
OfF Conference CalI
Retired Military Analysts and Civilian Defense Experts
3:00 pm, Thursday, August 7, 2003
(As of August 7, 2003/12:40 pm)
PARTI CIPATING Retired Military Ana lysts
Colonel Carl Allard
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan
General Ronald Fogelman
General William F. "Buck" Kernan
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
General Montgomery Meigs
General Glen K. Otis
General Joseph Ralston
Major General Donald W. Shepperd
Lieutenant General Bernard Trai nor
Major General Paul E. Vallely
Colonel John Warden
MajorGeneral ThomasL. Wilkerson
PARTICIPATING Civilian Defense Experts
Mr. Anthony Cor desman, Fellow, Center for Strategies and International Studies
Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND
Lieutenant General Michael M. Dunn, President, National Defense University
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, President, The Center for Security Policy
Mr. Michael J. Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Mr. Steven Nider, Di rector for Foreign and Security Studies, Progressive Policy Institute
Mr. Grover Norquist, President, Americans for Tax Reform
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Mr. Jack Spencer, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation
Mr. Loren B. Thompson, Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute
Dr. Michael Waller, Vice President, The Center for Security Policy
Mr. John Wobensmith, Director ofDevelopment, Institute of World Politics
TENTATIVE or DECLI NE Reti red Military Aoalysls
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (D)
Lieutenant General BusterGlosson (0)
BrigadierGeneral David Grange (D)
MajorGeneral George Harrison (0)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (0)
Admiral David Jeremiah (0)
General Merrill McPeak (0)
General Thomas Moorman (0)
General William Nash (0)
General Larry Welch (0)
TENTATIVE or DECLINE Ci vilian Defense Experts
Mr. Thomas Donnelly, Fellow, American Enterprise (0)
Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, SeniorFellow, The Brookings Institution (0)
Mr. Chris Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, CATO Inst itute (0)
Ms. Nina Shea. Director, Center for Religious Freedom(0)
Ms. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (0)
UNDECIDED Ret ired Military Analysis
Lieutenant General Dan Chri stman
General Wayne Downing
Lieutenant General Thomas Mcinerney
General Hugh Shelton
Major General Perry Smith
UNDECIDED Civilian Defense Experts
Dr. Daniel Goure, SeniorFellow, Lexington Institute
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
L.. JCS SJS
Friday, August 08, 2003 5:02 PM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCS/PA
FW: august 12 outreach meeting
fyi Ma 'am
:> - -
:> Fr om: LTC, J CS SJS
:>Sent· gust 08, 2003 5 : 01 PM
:>To: CI V, OASD-PA
:>Subject: RE; augus t 12 out reach me et ing
:> #1 - Our reque st i s in t o the J 3 f or g e neral o f f i c er support . Sta nding by for their
a ppr oval .
:> #2 - VCJCS ha s i t o n hi s c al endar t o atte nd . I think we a re fine - no need for
SECDEF to do anyt hing more.
:> The o n l y thing I could see that might prohib i t his partic ipat i o n would be
some unexpected requirement a s Ac ting CJ CS .
:> My recommendat ion i s t hat we d o not reengage o n the issue - it is o n t he
s c he dul e .
:> And I d id no te t he Press Conf o n Tuesday, I believe t ha t SECDEF and VCJ CS wi ll share
t he podi um on Tuesday .
>
If I get more i nf ormat i on tonight on t he Ope r a tions
ou know ASAP .
>
:> Hav e a wonderf u l weeke nd .
Briefe r for the 12 t h , I'll l e t
:> vIr , L.';"'__..1
:> n _nOrig '
:> From:
»s enc .
:>To :
:>Su b j e c t :
LTC, J CS SJS
Fr1 a Augus t 08, 2003 1:18 PM
CIV, OASD-PA
RE: a ugust 12 ou t r e a c h meeting
:> As ked CAPT Thorp to work t hro ugh #1 this morning - e xpect he will t e ll
:> #2 Checked r e g a r di ng the VCJCS and t ime i s set aside on h i s schedul e -
wa iting to s e e if SECDEF asks him to join him .
>
>
>
me shortly .
think he is
Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/ PA
we are st ill in need o f c losu r e on two things r e : next t uesday 'S ou treach:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:> 1 . i need a lock on lieutenant l!!!!!= = :;::= = = = J,for the mili t ary ops b ri ef ing .
with t hat obvious ly, we need t o know what h i s b riefing requiremen ts wi l l be , i f any
(u nc l a s s powe r point , han d out s etc .. . ) .
>
>
be l ow/emai l
2 . c o n fi rmat i on o f v cj c s part i c i pat i on in this o u treach meeting?
t ran s mi s s i on :
note
>
:> Gen Pace i s Ac t i ng Ma n - Wed ne x t week. I heard thro ugh our PA,
:>Tuesday's Outreach is wi t h r etir e d GOs a nd Mil i tary Analy sts . .. do you
1
>t hink my bo ss will be a s ked t o attend? Also , your 2-weeker is s howi ng
>CJCS do ing the Press Ava i l . .. do you t hi nk it will still go with my boss
>instead? Thanks ,
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
It was our understand i ng t hat the vcjcs had already been a s ked.
p leas e adv i s e soonest . t xs !
2
From:
Sent:
To:
Su bj ect :
kat ie ,
~ ~ ~ 7 ~ CIV, OASD-PA
Monday, August 11. 2003 11:05 AM
Haddock. Ellen (Katie), Col . OCJCSJPA'L ...... l TC, JCS SJS
out reach with military analysts
c hris asked me to call yo u back whi ch i 've now left a me ssage f o r yo u with deb.
a couple of qui c ki e s :
as an f yi -- osd pa stil l has not be en tol d that vc c j s is a l oc k by j c s pa . i f he is - -
great , however, please l e t u s know so we can c oordinate wi th protocol and o t he r i nvi t e d
speakers . a l s o, vccj s will not partici pate i n prep meeti ng with secdef p rior t o the
a c t ual meeting. t hi s concept has onl y been done once (t he c hai r at the las t out r each
mee ti ng ) and i t didn 't work wel l. we' ve been ins t ructed by s ecde f not to do t his agai n.
g i ve
went
1
not e ; our read
i s o ur rout ine.
a he a d
txs .
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc :
Subj ect:
Importance:
Attachments:
Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSl PA
Monday, September 22, 2003 6:55 PM
M rs Richard B Gen, JCS CJCS' GEN Peter Pace E-mail)
CAPT, OCJCS; LT
COL JCS V . H ddock, Ellen to. , 0 , i:l1 C PA; LTC, JCS
SJS; CIV, JCS SJS; Schwartz. Norton A., Lt Gen, JCS DJ· 3; Peterson, Joe
F, MG, JCS J3; Howard, Michelle J, CAPT, JCS J3· Case Gear e W LTG, JCS DJS;
Hawkins, James A, Maj Gen, JCS VDJSlDOM; Col, JCS SJS
Retired Military Outreach Delegation - 22· 25 Sep 03
Low
Agenda Revised September 21, 2003.doc
Agenda-"""
September 21, 2...
General Myers and Ge ne ral Pace,
Retired Mi l i t a ry TV- a na l ys t s arrived i n Iraq t oday. OSD( PA) followed up on t he CJCS
invi tation wi th good attendees and a great i tinerary . '
DoD selected key l ocations t hat will cause the analysts t o get the Mr e al p i c t u r e . -
The key l oc a t i ons a r e highlighted on t he a ttached itinerary and worth your pe rusal .
> The participants are some o f the more i n f l ue ntial and vi s i bl e of the anal ys t s that
commun icat e wi t h the med ia. As a mat ter of fact , several anal y sts conduct e d l i v e
interviews today from Iraq.
I t h ink we're hitting a home run on this trip. I 'll brief you on the r e s u l t s when
they return. Next step is t o s e e what other i n f l ue n tial s we c an get t o Iraq f or a similar
i tinera r y . JCOC is one idea I int e nd t o propose .. .
>
»vf r ,
>Frank
>
Fr a nk Thorp
Capta in, USN
Special As s i s t a nt f o r Publ i c Af fairs
t he J oi nt Ch iefs of Staf f
>
1
-
As of 21/09/2003 1823
Itinerary for
Outreach Delegation
22-25 September 2003
Delegation:
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
General Ronald Fogelman (USAF, Retired)
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, President, The Center for Security Policy
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Ms. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Lieutenant General Thomas Mcinerney (USAF, Retired)
Major General Willi am Nash (USA, Retired)
Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Senior Defense Expert, American Enterprise Institute
Major General Paul E. Vallel y (USA, Retired)
Mr. Mitchell Ross Semel , Sr Vi ce President, Programming, East Coast, CBS Entertainment
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
Mr. John Wobensmith, Director for Development, Institute of World Politi cs Staff
Mr. Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, aSD
Mr. Brent Thomas Krueger, Director for Community Relations and Public Liaison, aSD
Mr. Don Meyer, Special Assistant, aSD
Monday, 22 Sep
OBOOL Depart Kuwait via C-130
11ll30L Arrive Baghdad International AirRort; Met by TBO
1045-1100 En route CPA helipad via rotary wing aircraft
1100-1115 En route CPA HQ via ground vehicles
1115-1230 CPA OvelViewwith CPA Senior Staff, Ambassador'sCpnfenmce Room
Attendees:
Ambassado'"'r "P"a"'tn'"'c"'k"Kenneoy, Chief of Stat!
LTG Ricardo Sanchez, CG, CJTF- 7
Ambassador Clayton McManaway,
Ambassador Chris Segar, Head of British Office, British
Mr. GaD' Thatcher, Director, p ommunications
1230-1315 Lunch - CPA Dining Facility
1315-1430 CJTF·7 Ol)jlrational Overview,
Attentlees'
LTG Sanchez
--'O"' thers TBDon Ground
a @\lor's Conference Room
1430-1515 Meeting wi1h Dr. and MG Dayton, lrag Survey rouJl (ISGj
(WMD Update)
1515-1615 CPA Ministries Discussions, Amblissaooi's Conference Room
Attendees:
Mr. 'A"" d"v;"" so"'r"' , 'Ministry 0 ElectricitY
Mr. Philip Carroll, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Oil
Ms. Leslye Arsht, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Educalio..
Mr. Williamson Evers enior Advisor, MinilllrY of Edu<:;!tiorj
1615-1800 !lisn to 1" AD (location TBD by BG Dempsey)
1800-1815 En route AI Rashid Hotel
1815-1830 Personal time (refresh)
1830-2000
2000-2015 En route CPA helipad
2015-2030 En route Baghdad International Airport
2045 Depart Baghdad via C-1 30 en route Kuwait
2115L Arrive Kuwait
Tuesday, 23 Sep
0800L Depart Kuwait en route BIAP via C-130
1030L Arrive BIAP; met by TBD
1040-1110 En route AI Hillah via rotary wing aircraft;
met by Maj Gen Tyszkiewicz, CG, MND (CS) and Mr. Mike Gfoeller, CPA-SC
1110-1120 En route MND-CS HQ
1120-1150 M D: OJle atlonalOverview y MajGen Tl"'zkiewicz
1150·1200 Meet with CoalnionlMultinational leaders

1150-1201 1200-1245 Lunch with troops
1245-1305 En route Women's Rights Center (CPAfunded reconstruction project)
1305-1400 ;rour Women's Rights Center and $::enter !3uilding,.......
wit r. Dick Naab, CPA-SC Directo
1400-1420 n route Mahawil Mass Grave site
1420-1450
1450-1515 En route Babylon
1515-1600 Site visit of Babylon
1600-1610 En route helipad
1610-1645 En route Camp Victory helipad via rotary wing
1645-1830 'CJ I' ai vis[tand dinne(,troops
1830-1845 En route BIAP via motorcade
1900 Depart Baghdad en route Kuwait via C-130
Wednesday, 24 Sep
0730L
1030L
Depart Kuwait via C-1 30
Arrive Mosul; met by MGDavid Petraeus, CG 101" Div
1030-1050 tour of Mosul; nd t Div Main L2!
1050-1200 101" Area of Operation North Operational OverviewNideo
1200-1245 Lunch wlBrigade Commandersand Command Se[geants MaJon
DivMain DFAC
1245-1315 En route City Hall via Police Station and Courthouse
(Reconstruction projects)
1315-1345 Meet Governor and Vice ovsrnor and tour City Hall
Governor Ghanimal Basso and ice GlLve ha
( s '0
1345-1400 En route 101" helipad
1400-1500 En route Tikrit via rotary wing; met by MG Raymond Odiemo CG D
1500-1900 Program TBO
To include: "Ov "'e"' rview
Meet with soldiers
Dinner with soldiers
Meet Tikrit local leaders
Meet one local NGO
iew reconstruction
19001945 Depart Tikrit en route Balad via rotary wi ng
2000 Depart Balad via C- 130
2100L Arri ve Kuwait
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
CIV. JCS OCJCS
Wedn esday, Jury 28, 2004 11:10 AM
Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSJPA
Haddock. Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
FW: 3 Aug PA Events
Is thi s s omething t ha t will i nvolve t he Chai rman?
osn
C
OASD( PA
>
.:> Subj e c t:
>
Barber ,
CI V, OASD- PA;
CI V, OASD- PA;
Allison , CI V, OASD-PA;
CI
AS -
oso;
osc
>Looking t o do Outreach w/Mi l itary Ana lysts:
>
>Tuesday 3 August
>9 :25pm - Prep wi ?
>9 : 4 5a m- lO:30 - Out r each
>10:45am- ll :30 - Radio
>
>No Press Ava i l t hat wee k per Larry Di Ri ta.
>
>Let me know i f thi s works - thanks ,
>
>
Fr om:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject :
,-__ ... CIV. JCS OCJCS
Friday, July 30, 2004 2:33 PM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSfPA
Thorp, Frank. CAPT, OCJCS/PA
RE: 3 Aug PA Events
I t wi l l be hard to do . He
al ready had to move once.
know ho w long the a nal ys t s
i s o f f ici a t i ng at a promotion c eremony a t 1000 , which I ' ve
Don't really want to jerk the t wo-st a r around any mor e . 00 you
wi l l be i n t he bui l ding ?
> - -- --Original Me s s age - - - - -
>From: Haddock, Ellen (Ka tie) , Col,
>Sent: Thurs da July 29 . 2004 7 : 00
>To: CIV. J CS OCJCS
>Cc: Thor p , Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/ PA
>Subject : RE: 3 Aug PA Event s
OCJCS/PA
PM
>I 've a s ked t he qu es tion .
>Most of t he t i me when OSD br i ng s t he mi litary ana l ys t s in to t he bui lding to mee t with
t he Sec ret a ry, he i nvi tes t he Cha i r man to join hi m. .. s t i ll tryi ng t o ge t c larification on
ex act l y wha t thi s i s (who is comi ng , or i f i t is a conference cal l) . .. if in fac t i t do es
i ncl ude the Chairman, i t would onl y be f o r t he pr ep and out reach port ion -- not t he radio
i nt erviews.
>Should know more soon .
>V/R
>Katie
>
> - -- --Original Me s s a e -- -- -
> From: CIV, JCS OCJCS
> Se nt: Wedne s ay, u y 004 11 : 10 AM
> To: Thor p , Frank, CAPT, OCJ CS/PA
> Cc : Haddock , Ellen (Katie), Col . OCJ CS/PA
> Subj ect : FW: 3 Aug PA Events
Is thi s some t hing tha t will i nvolve the Cha i rma n?
J u l
>
>
>
> -- - H Origi '1e.i.I"' -'==
> Fr om:
> Sent : Wednesda
> To :
George, COL, OASO-PA; )(8)

OASD-PA;
, CTR,
)(8) CIV, JCS OCJCS; )(8)
OASD (PA) ;
> C •
CIV, OSD
28, 2004 10 : 48 AM
CIV OSO; Wheeler OASD-PA; Rhyn edance.
CIV, OASD-PA; )(8) O-PA; __•
CI V, OASD-PA; )(8) CIV, OSO; )(8)
CIV , OASD-PA; Ruf f, Eri c , SES.
CI V JCS VCJCS' Me r r i tt , Roxie T. CAPT, -
C. OASO-PA; LTC.
CIV, 050 ' Ma j , 050; CI V,
OSO; SSg t, OSO ; }(I) CIV,
>
>
Subject : 3 Aug PA Events
> Looking to do Out r e a ch w/Military Ana l ysts :
>
> Tuesday 3 Augus t
> 9 : 25pm - Prep wi?
> 9 :4 5am- l 0: 30 - Outreach
> lO : 45 am-11 : 30 - Radi o
>
> No Press Avail that we ek per Larry oi Ri t a .
>
> Let me kno w if t hi s wor ks - t hanks ,
1
>
>
>
>
2
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Follow Up Flag:
Flag Status:
Whitman. Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
August 11, 2004 6:28 PM

Eric Ruff (E-mail 3); Larry DiRita (E-mail 2); Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance,
George, COL OASD-PA' Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col,
OCJCS/PA OASD-PA
POTUS VFW Speech Monday -- Global Posture
Follow up
Flagged
Just to fol low-up our conversat ion . I attended a meet ing this afternoon at the White
Hous e t o discuss what the Pres ident was going to t a l k about i n hi s speech to the VFW on
Monday i n ohi o. One component wi l l be an announcement of hi s decision to
f or c e s from their overseas loca t ions . OSD was represented by
(pol i cy ) and myself.
Major communi cat i on tactics will include:
Thursday ni ght -- cabl e t o embass ies
Fri day
Sunday
Monday
Whi te Hous e ment ion i n t he week ahead (of the speech not the specific cont ents )
(T) NSC backgrounder to a maj or news organizat ion as a set -up piece
POTUS speech at 11 : 30, f ol l owed by:
-- t wo background briefin $: Penta on and Forei n Press Center (000; DOS; NSC
par ticipants -- Us ual suspect s :
and RDML Sull ivan (DJ- S).) "------------------------------------------------------"
Outreach cal l to mil i tary analyst
Pentagon Channel interview with Fe ith/
Mid-Week - Possible SecDef op-ed in a ma j or publication a couple of days after t he speech
(ca librate any of the reporting) .
Working with OSD( pol icy) to develop t he fact sheet for DOS cabl e and background br i e f i ngs
(level of detail TBD) .
I have conference cal l tomorrow wi t h t he same group t o finalize the plan . wi l l keep you
posted.
Tha nks , Bryan
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Subj ect :
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Cot, OCJCS/PA
Thursda Auqust 12, 2004 7:01 AM
DR, OCJCS/PA
FW: POTUS VFW Speech Monday - Global Posture
Foll ow Up Flag:
Flag Status:
Follow up
Flagged
Let me c heck into thi s , and discuss with Bryan at 08 30 ... .
> --- - -Orig i na l Message - - - - -
>Fr om: Whitman , Bryan, SES , OASD-PA
»s e nt • dn y , August I I , 2004 6:28 PM
>To : ClV, OSD
>Cc : Eri c Ruff (E- ma i l 3 ) ; Larry DiRita (E-ma i l 2 ) ; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA;
Rhynedance , Geor e COL OASD-PA; Tho rp, Frank, CAPT, OCJ CS! PA; Haddock, El len (Ka tie ) ,
Col , OCJ CS! PA; OASD-PA
>Subj e c t: POTUS VFW Speech Monda y -- Global Posture
>
>Ma jor commun ication t a ct i c s will include :
>
>Thursday ni ght - - c able t o e mba s sies
>
>Friday -- Whi t e Hous e mention i n the week ahead (of the s p e e c h not t he
>s pecific contents )
>
>Jus t t o follow-up ou r conversation. I atte nde d a me e t i ng t h i s afternoon at t he White
Hous e t o discuss what the President was goi ng to talk about i n h is speech to t he VFW on
Monday in Ohio . One component wi ll be an announcement of his decision t o r e t ur n some
70 000 mili tary f orces from their ove rseas locations . OSD was r epresente d by 1 -'
and myself.
>
>Sunday
>piece
>
>Monday
>
(T) NSC backgrounder to a maj or news orga nization as a s e t-up
POTUS speech a t 11 : 30 , fol lowed by:
> t wo background brief i n s : Pe n t a on a nd orei n Pr e ss Cent e r DoD· DOS ' NSC
part i c i pa nt s - - Us ua l s u s pec t s : L
a nd RDML Su llivan (DJ -S) .)
>
>
>
>
>
Outreach c a l l to mil ita ry ana l ys t
Pentagon Channel i nte rvi ew with ...
>Mid-Week - possible SecDef op-ed in a major publ i c a tion a c oup l e of days af t er t he speech
(calibrat e any of the reporting) .
>
>worki ng with OSD(policy) to deve lop the f act sheet f or DOS cable a nd ba c kground b r ief ings
( l e v e l o f de t a i l TBD).
>
>1 have conference cal l t omor row wi th the same group to fi na l ize the p l a n. Will keep you
posted.
>
>Tha nks, Bryan
From:
sent:
To:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Monda , August 16, 2004 10:50 AM
OCJCS/PA
RE: News and Schedules from OASD-PA
I thJ.nk
ViR
Co l H
t hi s went to t he wrong Tho rp -- might wa nt to send again.
SMSgt, OCJCS/PA
f rom OASD-PA a nd Sche dules
Hi gh
Messa e- -
n
-
CIV, OCJCS/PA
Monda y , August 16, 2004 10: 47 AM
cck , Ellen ( Katie), Col , OCJ CS/PAi Ctr

ft
:>Cc: CIV, OCJCS/PAi '- J
GOVT, OCJCS/PAi -
:>Subject : News
:>Import ance:
>
:>1 s poke with Ar c h i e Da v i s l a t e last week . He provided the f ol l o wi ng upda t e s:
>
:> 7 sep Outreach - Mil itary Ana l y s t s
>
:>(CJCS is TDY 8- 13 Sep) to Norway, Luxembourg , Es t o nia , La t v i a ,
:>Lithuania for Fall CHOD t o ur )
>
:>8 Sep (T) SecDef speaks a t Rand Annual Conference in DC
>
:>9 s ep SecDef attends Cong r essional Bre akfast wi th the legi s l a t o r s who
:>met wi t h DecDef on 9/11/i01
>
:>10 Sep - SecDef hosts a l unch for AMB Bremer
:> PA - Di nne r at Kal o rma f o r Coalition Ambassadors a nd CPA Le a de r s
:> (Don't know what happened to CJ CS intent to recogni z e AMB Bremer, e tc .
»
>
:>11 Sep - SecDef part i c i pat e s in wreath l ay i ng at Arl ington Na t i onal Ceme t ery
:> SecDef s t a rts NASCAR e ven t in Richmond
:> (Don't know t he p lan about t he Sunday Shows o n 12 Sept )
>
:> 21 Sep Out r each - corporate l e a de r s
>
:>2 9 Sep Ou t r e ach with Corporate suppor ters o f ESGR
>
:>Other Tidbits :
:>NLF is ev ide n tal l y i n terested in opening a USC center in Af g ha ni s t a n -
:>p r oba b l y i n r e c ogni t i o n of Pat Ti l l ma n
>
:>AVA (our gold-laden " f r i e nds " i n Ca l i fornia) - t he y ' ve moved the i r gala event from 22
October to TBD - p erhaps next s pri ng . Something about the manager of t he Wiltshire ho t e l
i n Beve r l y Hi l l having l eft , e tc . ( I ' d guess he gave them a br e a k on $$ f o r t he i r event) .
>
>V R
1
CIV, OCJCS/PA; L .....
SMSgl, OCJCS/PA
__:-. ' CIV, OCJCS/PA
Monday, August 16, 2004 10:52 AM
Haddock, Ellen OCJCSl PA; Thorp, Frank,
APT SPA
MAJ JCS SJS
GOVT, OCJCSJP .
News and Schedules from OASD-PA Subject:
Cc:
From:
Sent:
To :
Importance: High
I s poke wi t h Archie Dav i s l ate l ast we ek . He p r ov ided the following updat es:
7 Sep Outreach - Mi l i tary Analysts
(CJ CS i s TOY 8- 13 Se p ) t o Norway, Luxembour g , Es tonia, La t v i a , Lithuania f o r Fal l CHOD
t our)
8 Sep - (T) SecDef spea ks at Ra nd Annual Conference in DC
'3 Sep - Sec De f attends Congre s s iona l Breakfas t wi t h the l egis lators who met wi t h DecDef o n
9 /11/ ; 0 1
1 0 sep - SecDef hos ts a l unch f o r AHB Bremer
PA - Dinner at Kalorma for Coal it i o n Ambassa dors and CPA Le a de rs
(Do n ' t know wha t happe ne d t o CJCS intent to recogni ze AHB Bremer, etc.
11 Sep - SecDe f par t i c ipates in wreath laying a t Arli ngton Nat i onal Cemetery
SecDef s t arts NASCAR e vent i n Ri c hmond
(Don ' t know the plan abo ut the Sunday Shows on 12 Se p t)
21 Sep Out r each - Corpor ate leaders
29 Sep Out reach wi th Corporate supporters o f ESGR
Other Ti d b i ts :
NLF is e vidental l y interested i n ope ning a USO center in Af g ha n i s t a n - probably i n
recogni tion o f Pat Tillman
AVA (our go ld-laden "fr i e nd s" in California) - they 've moved t he i r gal a e vent from 22
Oct ober to TBD - perha p s next spring . Something about the manager of the Wiltshire ho t e l
i n Be ver ly Hi ll having l e f t , etc . ( I ' d guess he gave them a break on $$ f or their event) .
v
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
SUbject:
,"=,__ OCJCS/PA
Tuesda Au ust 17, 2004 1:50 PM
OCJCSIPA
iii LCDR, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
RE: News and SChedules from OASD·PA
For t he 7 Sep
operations upda te ?
Out r e ach . .. will VCJCS speak o r a r e you l ooki ng f o r a mili tary
CIV, OCJCS/PA; I!!!:======:::::J
> -----Original Messa e-----
>From : ClV, OCJCS/PA
>Se nt : Monday , August 16, 20 04 1 0 : 52 AM
>To : Haddock, El l e n (Ka t ie), Co l , LTC, OCJCS/ PA; Thorp ,
Fra nk CAPT OCJCS PA
sec . s...r-s S; )(8)
GOVT, OCJCS/PAi SMSgt , OCJCS/PA
>Subj ect: News a nd Schedules from OASD- PA
>lmport a nce : High
>
>1 spoke wi t h Archi e Davis late l a s t week . He provided t he f o l l owing upda tes :
>
>7 Sep - Outreach - Mil i t a ry Analys ts
>
> (CJCS is TOY 8-13 Sep) to No r wa y , Luxembourg, Es t on i a , La tvia,
>Li thuania f o r Fa l l CHOD tour)
>
>8 Sep - (T) SecDef spe a ks at Rand Annua l Conf e renc e i n DC
>
>9 Sep - SecDef a t tends Congress ional Br e a kf a s t with the l egislators who
>me t with DecDe f on 9/11/;01
>
>10 Sep - SecDef hosts a l unch f or AMB Bremer
> PA - Dinner at Ka lorma for Coalition Ambassadors a nd CPA Lea ders
> (Don ' t know what .happened to CJCS i nt e nt t o r ecognize AMB Bre mer, etc .
»
>
>11
>
>
>
>21
Sep - SecDef participates in wreat h l aying a t
SecDef starts NASCAR e ve nt in Richmond
(Don ' t know the plan about the Sunday Shows
Sep Outre ach - Corporate leaders
Arli ngton Na tional Ceme t ery
on 12 Sept)
>
>29 Sep Outreach with Corpo r a t e supporters o f ESGR
>
>Other Ti dbi t s :
>NLF i s evidentally interested i n ope ni ng a USC c e nter i n Afghanistan -
>probably i n recognit ion o f Pa t Til l ma n
>
>AVA (our gol d- l a den "fri e nds " i n Ca l i f o r nia) - theY've moved their gala event f r om 22
October t o TBD - perhaps next spring . Something about t he ma nager of t he Wilts hi r e ho t el
i n Be verl y Hi l l having l eft , e t c . (I'd guess he gave t hem a b reak on $$ for their event) .
>
>V R
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Subject :
JCS OCJCS
Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:26 PM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
FW: Military Outreach September 8lh.
Wo w -- enough advanc e d not ice that we might be abl e to part i cipate . Ca n you f ind
out when they want t he Chairman to t al k t o t he g roup?
esc
:>Cc:
OSD;
:>Sub] ect:
>
Mili tary
Al lison
OASD- PA; D
CIV, OSO;
SSgt, OSD;
OUt r e ach Se pt e mbe r 8th.
:> Per Mr . Di Ri t a we would like to d o t he Ou t reach (Mi l i t a ry Anal ysts ) - Looking a t
Wednesda y e September:
>
:> ll :OOa m - Pr ep
:> 11:lSa m-12 :00 - Outre ach
>
:> Le t me know if t hos e t i mes /da t e work - thanks ,
>
>
>
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Wednesda ,August 18, 2004 5:06 PM
OCJCSWA
FW: Military Outreach September 8th.
Can you
Thanks .
V!R
Col H
check wi th Archie and get t he timeline?
>
>From: E 5 , CI V, JCS OCJ CS
>Sent: Wedne sday , August 18 , 2004 4:26 PM
>To: Haddoc k , El l e n (Ka t i e) , Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subj e ct: FW : Mi litary Out r e a ch September 8th.
>
> Wow -- enough advanced notice that we might be able t o pa rtici pa t e . Can you find
out when t hey want t he Cha i rman to t a l k to t he group ?
l i ke to do t he Outreach (Mi l i t a ry Analysts ) - Look ing a t
t!!!:======JCI V,
Bt .
CIV OASO- PA; Rhyneda nce ,
CI V, OASO- PA; )(I) OASO-PA; Whi tmanW:= = :;J
CI V, OASO- PA; CIV, 050; ft
CIV, OASO-PA; Ru ff , Eri c , SES ,
. OASO- PA
CIV, OSO;
CI V, OSO
e SD
2004 4 : 2 7 PM
OASD-PA; D v·
cr y, OSO;
ssgt , 050;
Outreach s e ptember Military
Wedneeda
Rita we would
September:
>Cc:
OSO;
>Subject:
>
>Per Mr . Di
wedne sda y a
>
>
> - -
>From :
>Sent :
>To :
Ge o r ge , OL, a D-PA'
B an , SES , OASD- PA;
CTR, OSD- P&
CI V, J CS OCJ CS ;
>
>11:00am - Pre p
>11 :15am-12:00 - Outreach
>
>Let me know if t hos e times/dat e work - t hanks ,
> ....._ ....
>
>
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subj ect :
CIV, OCJCS/PA
Thursda y, August 19. 2004 8:07 AM
Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJC51PA
FW: Military Outreach September 8th.
Archie. Do you have the times f o r CJCS pa r t i c i pa t i on ? Pl ease l e t me know soonest so we
can bl ock on hi s schedule.
Many thanks , L. I
> --- - -Origi na l Mes sage -- - - -
>From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: wednesday , Augus t 18 , 2004 5 : 06 PM
>To : CI V, OCJ CS/ PA
>Subj e c t: FW: Mi l itary OUt r e ac h September 8th .
>Ca n you c heck with Arc hi e and get the timeline?
>Tha nks .
>V/ R
>Col H
>
> -----Or i g '
>Fr om: CI V, J CS OCJCS
>Se nt : Wednesda y , Augus t 18 . 20 04 4 : 26 PM
>To : Haddoc k . El len (Kat i e) , Col, OCJ CS/ PA
>Subject: FW : Mi l i tary Out r e ach Sept embe r 8t h.
>
> Wow -- e nough advanced not ice that we might be able to pa rt i c ipat e . Can you fi nd
out when they want t he Chairman t o talk t o t he group?
>
>
w
OSD
200 4 4 : 27 PM
>
Mil ita ry
CIV,
>Pe r Mr. Di Rita we wou l d like t o do the Outreach (Mili tary Analysts) - Look i ng at
We dnes day 8 September:
>
>l l:OOam - Prep
>11 : 15a m- 12 :00 - Out r e a c h
>
>Le t me know if t ho s e t i me s /da t e work - thanks , '-
>
>
>
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Davi s, Archie, Lrc, OASD- PA
lllmav",llU9us119. 2004 8:32 AM
...:..,..,....,.-=..'CIV. OCJCS/PA
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCSl PA
RE: Military Outreach September 8th.
I wi ll bring t he
10:45- 11: 15 a.m.
VCJ CS?
memo with
I recal l
t he i nvi t ed at t endee
t he CJCS is TOY t hat
list today requesting CJCS pa r t ici pa tion
week . Should I make thi s r equest for
Archi e
:> -- - --Ori
>From : crv, OCJCS/PA
»sen t • Thursday, August 19 , 2004 8 :07 AM
>To : Davis , Archie , LTC, OASO-PA
>Cc: Haddock, El l e n ( Kati e) , Col , OCJCS / PA
>Subject: FW: Mili tary Ou t r e ach September 8th.
>
>Ar chi e. Do you have the t i me s for CJCS participation? Pl ea s e l et me know soonest so we
ca n block on his schedule.
OCJCS/ PA... .....
>
>
>Many t hanks , L...........
> --- - -Origi na l Message - - - - -
>From: Haddoc k , Ellen (Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Wednesday, August 18 , 2 004 5: 06 PM
>To: CI V, OCJCS/ PA
>Sub j e c t : PW : Military Outreach Septembe r 8t h .
>
> an you check wi th Ar c hi e a nd get t he t i mel ine ?
>Tha nks .
>V/ R
>Col H
>
> -- - --Orig
>From: CI V, JCS OCJCS
>Sent : Wednesday, Augu s t 18, 2004 4 :26 PM
>To : Haddoc k , Elle n (Katie), Col , OCJCS/PA
>Subj ect: FW: Milit ary Ou t r eac h Septembe r 8th.
>
> Wow -- e nough a dvanc ed not i c e that we mi ght be abl e t o participa t e. Can you f ind
out when t hey wa nt the Chairman t o t alk to t he group ?
8th.
4: 27 PM
OSO
2 004
All '
OASD- PA; Davis,
CI V, 0 5D;
SSgt , OSO;
Mili tary Outreach Se ptember
>
>
> ---- - Or i g i na l Messa e - - - - -
>From:
>Sent ·
>To: CI V OASD-PAi Rhynedance ,
George , COL, OASD- P . , OASO- PA; SD-PAi whi
B an SES , OASO- PA; CIV, OASO- PA; CIV, OSO;
" CTR, OSO-P&R' Ba rber CIV, OASO-PA; Ruff , Er ic , SES , OASO- PA;

CIV, JCS VCJ CS; Me r ri t t, Roxi e T . CAPT, OASO- PA;
Ca t . USMC, Archi e , LTC, OASO-PA
CI V, OSO; "- ..I CI V,
CI V, OSO -
>
>Pe r Mr . oi Rita we would l i ke to do the OUt r e a ch (Mi l i t a ry Analys ts ) - Looki ng at
1
>
>
Wedne sday 8 September:
>
>11:00am - Prep
>11:15am-12: 00 - Out r e a c h
>
>Let me know if thos e times /dat e work - t hanks,
'------'
>
2
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subj ect:
Importance:
L,.;,;,.".".,...,....CIV. OCJCSIPA
Thursday, August 19, 2004 10:
O J · TC. OASD-PA· >til
CIV. JCS OCJCS; CIV.
OCJCSIPA' addock Ell '8), Cot, OCJCSIPA; TSgt, JCS.
OCJCSlPA LTC OCJCS/PA Thorp. Frank. CAPT. OCJCSlPA
SMSgt. OCJCSlPA· GOVT.OCJCs/PA; 01.
OCJCS
RE: Military Outreach September 8th.
High
Archie - CJCS wi ll be here on the 8 September , he leaves on TOY on the 10 th. Pleas e bring
t he material addressed CJCS f o r the 1045-1115 timeslot . Tha nks!
Do you know any t hi ng about 3 Se
We understand it is f r om 1100-1130, in
bring this to DJS - VADM Keat ing 's attent i on
p rovi de , 80 we can staff appropriat ely.
t embe r SecDef's Town Hall
and you have t he a ction.
f or i nput . App reciate any
with Joint Staff?
We wi ll need to
details you can
Many t hanks for your helpfulness !
V R
1,;,;,;"'__..1 OCJCS/PA.
> --- - -Or i g i na l Me ssage - - - --
>Fr om: Davis , Ar chie, LTC, OABD- PA
>Sent· ~ , Augus t 19 , 2004 8:32 AM
>To: CI V, OCJCS !PA
>Cc: Haddock , Ell en (Ka tie), Co l , OCJCS/PA
>Subject: RE: Military Outreach Septembe r 8t h .
>til
>
>1 wil l br i ng t he
10:4 5 - 11 :15 a. m.
VCJ CS?
memo with t he inv ited attende e lis t
1 recal l the CJCS i s TDY that week .
today reques ting CJCS partic ipati on
Shoul d 1 make this reques t for
>
>Ar c hi e
>
> --- - - Or iginal Me ssa e-----
> From: CIV , OCJCS/ PA
> Sent: Thur sday , August 19 , 2004 8 :07 AM
> To : Dav i s , Ar ch i e, LTC, OASD-PA
> Cc: Haddock, Ell en (Ka tie ), Col , OCJCS/PA
> SUbject: FW: Mi l itary Out r ea ch September 8th .
>
> Ar chie, Do you have t he t i mes for CJCS pa r t i ci pa t i on? Pl ea se l et me know s oone s t so
we can bl ock on hi s s chedule.
>
>
>
Many t hanks , L,;,;.. J OCJ CS/ PAL. .....
> -----Orig i na l Message- --- -
> From: Haddoc k , Ell e n (Katie ) , Co l , OCJ CS!PA
> Sent: Wedne sda August 18 , 20 04 5:06 PM
> To: CI V, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: FW : Mili tary OUtreach September 8th.
>
>
> Can you c heck wi th Archie a nd ge t t he t i meline?
> Thanks.
. 1 · _n _
> Vi R
> Col H
,
> -- - - - o r i gi na l Me s s a e-----
> From: CI V, JCS OCJCS
> Sent: Wednes day , Augus t 18, 2004 4 : 26 PM
> To : Haddoc k, Ellen (Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS/ PA
> Sub jec t : FW : Mi lit a ry Out r ea ch Septembe r 8t h.
,
,
f i nd out
,
,
Wow
when they
enough a dvance d no tice t ha t we might be
want the Chai rman t o t a lk t o the group?
able t o part i c i pate. Ca n you
PM
eaaa
> _. - -
> Fr om: CI V, OSD
> Sent :
> To: OSO; CIV, OASO-PA; Rhynedance ,
Geo rge , COL, OASD- P , OASO-PA OASO- PA; Whi
B :CIV' OASO- PA; CI V, OSD;
CTR, OSD- P&R· Allis n CIV, OASO- PA; Ruf f , SBS,
CI V J CS OCJ CS; CI V, JCS VCJ CS; Me r r itt , Roxi e T. CAPT, OASO- PA;
Ca t . USMC OASO- PA; oavis , Archi e LTC OASO- PA
CI V, OSO; CI V, OSO; L. ..I
SSgt , OSD; CIV, OSD
Out r ea ch Sept ember 8th .
CI V,
,
,
> Per Mr . Oi Rita we would l i ke t o do the Out r e a ch (Mi l i t ary Ana l ys t s ) - Looking a t
Wednesda y 8 Sept embe r:
,
> 11 : OOam . Prep
> 11 : l Sam- 12 : 00 - Out r each
,
> Le t me know i f t hose times /dat e wor k - thanks,
,
,
,
,
,
We are compi ling Holiday lis t s for Genera l Myer s and will need name s and addresses o f
mi li tary anal ys ts i n t he a r ea and a lso the updat ed l ist o f commande r s a nd execut i ve
o f f i c e r s o f s e rvi c e orga n i z a t ions . Apprec i a te your ass i s tance in pr ovi ding me t hat
i nforma t ion this wee k.
CIV. OCJCSIPA
High
Fol low up
Flagged
es ust 24, 2004 9:55 AM
IV, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA
Military Analysts and Service Organizations

1
many t hanks f or al l your support !
Vi R
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Importance:
Follow Up Flag :
Flag Status:
From:
As a l ways
Gr e et i ngs Archi e an..,......,
From:
Sent:
To :
Cc:
Subj ect :
Archil! ,
Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Friday, September 10, 2004 4:24 PM
Davis Archie LTC, OASD-PA
CIV, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Kal;el, Col , OCJCS/PA
Could you sl!nd us thl! l!l l!c trons o f your military analyst address list . .. We want to add
them to our protocol list ...
Thanks ,
FT
Prank Thorp
Captain, USN
Spec ial As s istant f or Public Affairs
to the Chairman of t he J oint Chiefs of Staf f
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject :
Follow Up Flag:
Fl ag Status:
Attachments:
Retired Military
Analysts.doc ...
Frank,
Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA
Monday, September 13, 2004 5:40 PM
"'l.WlJ.II. CAPT, OCJCS/PA
L ; ; , , - . . . . , = = ~ CIV, OCJCSIPA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
resses
Follow up
Flagged
Retired Military Analysts.doc
Of course, I can . Anything f or my c ell mate.
Archie
> - - ---Original Message- -- - -
>Fr om: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
>Se nt : Friday, September 10, 2004 4: 24 PM
>To : Da vis, Ar c hi e LTC, OASD- PA
>Cc: CIV, OCJCS/ PA; Haddoc k , El len (Kat ie) , Col . OCJCS! PA
>Sub j ect: Addresses
>
>Arc hie,
>
>Coul d you send us t he electrons of your mil i tary analyst address list . . . We want t o add
t hem to ou r protoco l list .. .
>
>Thanks ,
>FT
>
>Fra nk Thorp
>Capt ain , USN
>Speci a l Ass istant f or Publ i c Aff a i rs
>to t he Cha i r man o f t he Joi nt Chi e f s o f Staf f
1
RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS
(As of September 13, 2(04 )
Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin AF Former JAG)
Ma or Robert S. Bevelac ua SA Retired)
Admi ral Denni s C. Blair (USN, Retired)
President
Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mar k Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 223 11-1882
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Vice President forAdvanced Concepts
Lockheed Mart in
Flint Hill One, Suite 600
10530 Rosehaven Street
Fai rfax, Virginia 22030
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
Senior Fellow
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Was hington, DC 20002
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
President
WVC3 Group, Incorporated
1800 Alexander Bell Drive
Reston, Virginia 201 91
Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)
Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
General Wa e A. Downin
Colonel (Tim) 1. Eads (USA, Retired)
Blackbird Technologies, Incorporated
13900 Lincoln Park Drive, Suite 400
Herndon, Virginia 20171
General Ronald Fo elman (USAF, Retired)
c
kOI
c a (USAF, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)
Partner
Patton Boggs, LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Lieutenant General BusterGlosson (USAF, Retired)
Eagle Limited
4201 Congress Street, Suite 240
Char lotte, North Carolina 28209
Brigadier General David L.Grange (USA, Retired)
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
McCormickTri bune Foundation
435 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 770
Chicago, Illinois 60611
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)
The Steven J. Greer Foundation
Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired'
.,..,-
Admiral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)
Partner and President
Technology Strategies & Alliances Corporation
5242 Lyngate Court
Burke, Virginia 22015
General Gear e Joulwan SA Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan (uSA, Retired)
~ " J
Colonel Glenn Lackey (USA, Retired)
Operations Officer
Center forNational Security HumanCapital Management
U.S. Office of Personnel Management
1900 EStreet, NW
Washington, DC 20415
Colonel Walter P. Lan Jr. SA, Retired)
Admira l Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN, Retired)
President
Information Manufacturing Corporation
7000 Infantry Ridge Road, Suite 200
Manassas, Virgini a 20109
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA. Retired)
. " ~
Colonel Jeff McCausland, (USA, Retired)
Director
Clarke Center, Dickinson College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF. Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Louis A. Bantle Professor of Government and Business Policy
Maxwell School of Syracuse University
Department of Public Administration
215 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, New York 13244
Major F. Andy Messing Jr. (USAR, Retired)
National Defense Council Foundation
1220 King Street, Suite 230
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. (USAF, Retired)
Booz Allen Hami lton, Incorporated
8283 Greensboro Drive
McLean, Virginia 22102
Major General Michael J. Nardorti, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Patton Boggs, LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1350
C tain Chuck Nash SN, Retired)
General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
Senior Fellow and Director. Center for Preventive Action
Council on ForeignRelations
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
General Glen K. Otis SA, Retired)
General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Retired)
Vice Chairman
The Cohen Group
1200 19" Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke (uSAF, Retired)
...
Ma or General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
General Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)
President, International Operations
M.J.C. Industries, Incorporated
One Fountain Square, 11911 Freedom Drive
Reston, Virginia 20190
Maor General Donald W. Sh erd (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)
Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Ret ired)
Chief Executive Officer
GuardianGroup International
1028 Jeanett Way
Bel Ai r, Maryland 21014
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor(USMC. Retired)
Directorof National Security Programs
101m F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
80 Potter Pond
Lexington, Massachusetts 0242 1
Maar General Paul E. Vallel (USA, Retired)
Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
President
Venturist, Incorporated
8233 Old Federal Road
Montgomery, Alabama 36 117 .
General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)
Senior Fellow
Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mark Ceoter Drive
Alexandria, Virginia22311
General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC, Retired)
Battelle
1725 JeffersonDavis Highway. Suite 601
Arlington, Vir ginia 22202
General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Ret ired)
Chief Exec utive Officer and Publi sher
U.S. Naval Institute
291 Wood Road
Annapoli s, Maryl and 21402
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
SUbject:
Attachments:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col , OCJCS/PA
Monday, September 13, 2004 6:48 PM
OCJCS/PA "'1(8) .....--.,
SMSgt, OCJCSIPA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; CIY,
OCJCS/PA
RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS list --to add to Holiday invite list
Retired Military Analysls.doc
Retired Military
Analysts.doc ... 1IOli1!""- '"
Below list needs t o be added to t he Holiday Reception list you are working on .
This list should be your number one priority. We a re way overdue wi t h Protocol . . .
r want to see i t befor e we turn i t back in - - to include t he copies t hat people have
marked corrections/additions on.
See me wi t h any que s tions .
Tha nks .
VIR
Col H
1
RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS
(As of September 13, 2004)
Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin AF Former JAG)
Major Robert S. Bevelacqua (USA, Retired)
Admiral Dennis C. Blair (USN, Retired)
President
Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mark Center Drive
Al exandria, Vi rginia 223 11- 1882
Lieutenant General Frank 8. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Vice President forAdvancedConcepts
Lockheed Martin
Flint Hill One, Suite 600
10530 Rosehaven Street
Fairfax, Virginia 22030
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
Senior Fellow
The Heritage Foundation
2 14 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
President
WVC3 Group, Incorporated
1800 Alexander Bell Drive
Reston, Virginia 20191
Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)
Heritage Foundation
2 14 Massachusett s Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
General Wa e A. Downin (USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads (USA, Retired)
Blackbird Technologies, Incorporated
13900 Lincoln Park Drive, Suite 400
Herndon, Virginia20171
General Ronald Fogelman (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired)
....-
Colonel Jolm Garrell (USMC, Retired)
Partner
Patton Boggs , LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washi ngton, DC 20037
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (USAF, Retired)
Eagle Limited
4201 Congress Street, Suite 240
Char lotte, North Carolina 28209
Brigadier General David L.Gr ange (USA, Retired)
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
McCormick Tribune Foundation
435 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 770
Chicago, Illinois 606 11
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)
The Steven J. GreerFoundati n
Colonel Jack Jacobs SA Reti red)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)
Partner and President
Technology Strategies & Alliances Corporation
5242 Lyngate Court
Burke, Virginia 220 15
General Goor e Joulwan USA Retired)
General William F. " uck" Kernan SA Retired)
Colonel Glenn Lackey (USA, Retired)
Operations Officer
Center for National Security HumanCapital Management
U.S. Officeof Personnel Management
1900 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20415
Colonel Walter P. Lao Jr. SA Retired)
Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN, Retired)
President
Information Manufacturing Corporation
7000 Infantry Ridge Road, Suite 200
Manassas, Virgini a 20109
Lieutenant Colonel Roben L. Ma ' is (USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland, (USA, Retired)
Director
Clarke Center, Dickinson College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Louis A. Bantle Professorof Government and Business Policy
Maxwell School of Syracuse University
Department of Public Administration
215 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, New York 13244
Major F. Andy Messing Jr. (USAR, Retired)
National Defense Counci l Foundation
1220 King Street, Suite 230
Alexandri a, Virginia 22314
General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. (USAF, Retired)
Booz Allen Hamilton. Incorporated
8283 Greensboro Drive
Mclean, Virginia 22102
Major General Michael J. Nardott i, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Patton Boggs, LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1350
Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
Senior Fellowand Director, Center forPreventive Action
Council on Foreign Relations
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
General Glen K. Otis (USA, Retired)
l(Il)
General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Retired)
Vice Chairman
The Cohen Group
1200 19
w
Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke SAP Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
General Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)
President. International Operations
M.LC. Industries, Incorporated
One Fountain Square, 11 911 Freedom Drive
Reston, Virginia 20 190
Maor General Donald W. Sh erd (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)
0'"
Ma·orGeneral Peer Smith USAF, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)
Chief Executive Officer
Guardian Group International
1028 Jeanett Way
Bel Air, Maryland 21014
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired)
Directorof National Securi ty Programs
John F. Kennedy School of Govemment, Harvard University
80 Potter Pond
Lexington, Massachusetts 02421
Iy (USA, Retired)
Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
President
Venturist, Incorporated
8233 Old Federal Road
Montgomery, Alabama 361 17
General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)
SeniorFellow
Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mark CenterDrive
Alexandri a, Virginia 22311
General Charles E. Wi lhelm (USMC, Reti red)
Battelle
1725 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 601
Arlington, Virgini a 22202
General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired)
Chief Executive Officer and Publisher
U.S. Navallnstitute
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21402
From:
Sent :
To:
Subject:
l TC,OASD-PA
r 05, 2004 6:44 PM
Lt Col, OASD-PA; TC OASD-PA; CDR,
OCJCSIPA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA ASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T.
CAPT, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col , OCJCSIPA
FW: CONFERENCE CAl l SATURDAY MORNING !!!!
FYI
Of Def ense ( publ i c Affai rs )
Li e utena n t Colonel , USA
De f e n s e Press Off i cer
Off ice of the Ass istant Secreta
Of fi c e : DSN:
Fa,,, ....------'
Thi ng s don 't change much:
-A lie can travel hal fway around t he world while the truth i s putt i ng on i t s shoes. -
Mark Twain 1835 - 1910
! !! !
Messa
> - - - -
>From: CIV OASD-PA
>Se nt : Fr1 ay, November OS, 2004 5:06 PM
>To : LTC, OA$D-PA
>Subjece: FW : CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING
>
>He r e ya go .
>Pr ogr a m Support Specialist
>Of f ice o f t he Secret a r o f Defense
>Pub lic Affai rs (Room
>Te lephone :
>Fa x :
>
>PLEASE SEE INVITE BELOW.
>
>
>MEMORANDUM
>
s 'rc ,
>
>Fr om;
>
>
>
>Date:
Re t i r ed Mi l i tary Ana lysts
Colonel Ar chie Davi s
Direct or, Communi ty Rel ations a nd Publ ic Af f airs
Offi ce o f the Secr e t ary of Def e n s e
November 5, 2004
>
sne , Con f e r e nce Ca ll wi th Senior DoD Official
>
>We inv ite you t o par ticipate i n a conference call , Saturday, November 6 , 2004 from 8:00
AM t o 9:00 AM .
>
>Topics to be d iscussed are:
message explai n ing t he t opic
··Co l one l Dav is
of d i s c us s i o n .
wi l l foll ow this email t oni ght with a
>
>participanes i n this conference c all will be Li e ut e na nt General Thomas Metz , III Corps .
Your hos t for this call wi l l be Colonel Archie Davis .
>
1
s 'rc participa t e i n this conf e r e nce c a l l, pl ease dial '1.""'"'......""""... or ,':' ...
a s k t he o pe r a t o r t o connect you t o the Mil itary Anal ys s c o n e rence cal l .
and
>
>
>We hope you a re a b l e to partici pa t e .
>
>
,.Pl e as e R. at
emad Ltc :. or ca ll her a t l:::. ....1
2
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA
Friday, November OS, 2004 7:15 PM
Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
FW: CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING I!!!
I I I !
May wa nt to di a l i n if you can.
Gen Me tz on background wi th t he Ret i r ed Military Analysts Sat 6Nov 0800-0900 Ph numbers
be l ow.
VI R
Katie
> - -_ u Orig '
>From: LTC, OASD- PA
>Sent· vember OS, 2004
>To: , Lt Col , OASo-PA' LTC OASD- PA; ....".,._=-...,..-:! CDR,
OCJ CS! PA; Whitman , Bryan, SES, OASO-PA; Col , OASO-PA; Merritt, Roxi e T. CAPT,
OASD- PA; Thorp , Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/ PA; Haddock , Ellen (Kat i e) , col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING I ! I!
>
>
>FYI
>Lieutena nt Colonel , USA
>De fense Pres e Off ice r
>Of f i ce of the As s i s tant Sec se (Public Af f a irs)
>Of f ic DSN; .,....,
»Pax : L. ....
>
>Things don ' t cha nge mUCh :
>"A l ie can travel ha lfway around t he world whi le the truth is putti ng
>on its shoes."
>Mark Twai n 1835 191 0
>
> -- -- - Or i g ·
OASD-PA
>Se nt · Novembe r OS, 20 04 5: 06 PM
>To : )(S) LTC, OASO-PA
>Subject : FW : CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING
>
>He r e ya go .
>
>Pr ogram Suppor t Spec i alis t
>Of fi ce of the Secr etar of oefense
>Publ ic Af fa i rs Room
>Telephone:
>Fax;
>
>PLEASE SEE INVITE BELOW.
>
>
>MEMORANDUM
>
>To:
>
>From:
>
>
>
Re t ired Mil itary Analysts
Colonel Archi e Dav i s
Director , Community Re l ations and Publi c Affairs
Of f i ce of the Secret ary of De f ense
1
>Cate: Nove mber 5, 200 4
>
>Re: Conference Cal l with Seni or DoD Of ficial
>
>We invite you to participa te in a conference call, Saturday, November 6, 2004 f r om S:OO
AM to 9:00 AM.
>
>Top i c s
message
t o be di scussed are;
explaining t he topi c
**Col one l Davis
of discussi on.
will follow this emai l tonight with a
>
>Pa r t i c i pa nts i n this conference call wi ll be Lieutenant General Thomas Me tz , II I Corps.
Your hos t for this call will be Colonel Archie Dav is .
>
>To participate in this conferenc e call , please dial or and
a s k the operat or to connec t you to the Military Ana lysts conf e r ence call.
>
>
>We hope you a re able t o participate.
>
>
>Pl e a s e R t';-;:::':""::':"''mIZr- - -"- - -r'
<mai l to • or cal l her at
2
from:
Sent :
To :
Subj ect:
~ ~ T : C OASD-PA
'" er 19, 2004 9:59
i:- o-JILCDR, OCJCSIPA; Maj , OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen
(Katie), Col, OCJCSIPA L.. .....
FW: Military Analysts Conference Call
Ma' am,
Not e the time - - I was thinking in Baghdad t i me .
> - - - - -original Me ssage - - - --
>Fr om: Da v i s , Archi e , Col , OASD-PA
>Sent: Fri day , Nove mber 19 , 2004 8 : 41 AM
>To: Wh itman B a n SES, OASD- PAj Merri t t Roxie T.
OASD-PAj LTC OASD- PA; LTC,
OASD-PA
>Subj e c t: Mi l i t a ry Ana l y sts Con f e r e nc e Call
,
>Al l :
,
>The c a ll-in information f o r the mili t a ry anal ysts conference c a l l i s :
,
,
,
>We i nvi t e you t o par t ici p ate in a confe renc e c a ll , Satur day, November 20 , 2004 from 8:30
a m to 9 : 30 a . m. e s t .
,
>Top i c s to be di scus s ed are : Ope r a tiona l Update on Iraq .
,
>Partici pants i n thi s c onf e rence c a l l will be General Thomas Me tz . Your hos t f o r this
call wi ll be Colonel Archi e Dav is.
,
>To par tic ipate i n this c onf e r enc e call , p lea s e dia l or a nd
a s k the operator to conne c t you to the Mi l ita r y Ana lys t s con f e renc e c a ll .
,
,
, VR,
,
>Ar c h i e
,
>Col one l Arc hie Dav i s
>Di r e c t o r
>Commun i t y Rel at i ons & Public Liai s on
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subj ect :
Haddock, Enen (Katie), Col , OCJCS/PA
Friday, November 19, 2004 11:54 AM
Tho Frank CAPT, OCJCSIPA _ ....__...,
Maj, OCJCSlPA; LCDR, OCJCSlPA
F : Military Anal ysts Conference Call
t he operator to connect you t o the
Capt Thorp,
Ther e is a mi li t a ry a nalysts c on f e r e nce call t omorrow a . m. -- Sat , from 0830 t o 093 0 --
wi t h Gen Met z .
Dial i n i nfo fol l ows .
Th oug ht you mi ht be i n . ..
p lease d i a l o r and a s k
Military Ana y s ts con f ere nce ca
VI R
Katie
> -----Or i g inal Mes sa e- - - - -
>Fr om: TC OASD- PA
>Se nt: Frida November 19, 2004
>To: LCDR, OCJ CS! PA; Maj , OCJ CS! PA; Haddoc k , Elle n
(Kat ie). Col , OCJCS!PA ....------.....
>Subj e ct : FW : Mi litary Analys ts Conf e r e nce Cal l
>
>Ma ' a m,
>Note the time --I was thi nki ng i n Baghdad t i me .
>v!r
> -----Ori g i nal Me s sage- - - - -
>Fr om: Dav i s , Ar c hie , Col , OASD-PA
>Se nt: Fri day , November 19, 2004 8 : 41 AM
>To : Whitman B a n SES, OASD- PA; T. CAPT, ,I Col,
OASD- PA; LTC OASD- PAi LTC, OASD- PA; Lt Col ,
OASD- PA
>Subject : Mil i t ary Analys t s Confere nc e Ca l l
>
>AI I :
>
>The cal l -in i nfor ma tion for t he military a nal y sts conf e r e nce c all is :
>
>
>
>We i nv i t e you t o par ticipate i n a conference c a l l , Saturday, November 20, 20 04 from 8 : 30
a m to 9 :30 a. m. est.
>
>Topi c s to be di s c ussed a re: Ope r a t ional update on Iraq .
>
>pa r t i c i pa n t s in t his conf e r e nc e cal l wi ll be Gene r al Thoma s Met z . Your host f or t h i s
call wi l l be Co l onel Archi e Da vis .
>
>To par tici pate i n thi s c onferenc e c al l , p l e a s e dia l or ... .... . nd
a sk the ope rato r t o connec t you t o the Mil itary Ana l y sts con f e r e nc e c all.
>
>
>VR,
>
>Arc hie
>
>Col onel Archi e Dav i s
>Di rec t o r
>Communi ty Rel a tions & Publ ic Liai s on
1
>
z
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Friday, November 19 2 04 6:00 PM
'frank.thorp
FW: Military Analysts Conference Call
capt Thorp ,
Bel ow info prov ide d for tomorrow's confer e nce cal l.
p lans to call in t oo, j us t as a bac k - up .
V R
Katie
> -----origina l Mess age ---- -
>Fr om: Haddoc k , Ell e n (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
-se n e , Fr i da y , Nove mber 19, 2004 11:54 AM
:>To: Thor Fran CAPT, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: Ma j , LCDR, OCJCS / PA
>Subjec t: FW: Mi l i t a ry Analysts Con f e r ence Ca l l
>
the ope r a tor t o connect you t o the
»cepc Tho r p,
>The r e i s a mi l i t a r y anal ys ts confere nce call tomorrow a .m. - - Sa t, f r om 0830 to 0930 --
wi t h Gen Met z .
>Di a l i n info follows.
>Though t you mi ht be n : :":i:s: t: e: n: i :n:J i n ...
»p Lea ee dial or a nd a s k
Mil ita r y Ana y s s con erence ca
>V/R
>Kat ie
> -- ---ori gina Me s
>From: LTC OASD-PA
>Se nt: Fr i da Nove mbe r 19, 2004 .,
>To: LCDR, OCJCS/PA; Ma j , OCJ CS/ PA; Haddock, El l en
(Ka tie), Col , OCJCS/PA
>Subj ect : FW : Mili tary Analys ts Confe r e nce Call
>
>Ma ' am,
>Not e the t i me - - I wa s thi nking i n Baghdad t i me .
>
Col,
Lt Col,
)(8)
>
:> -----Ori g inal Message-----
>From : Da v i s , Archie , Col, OASD-PA
>Sent : Friday , Nove mbe r 19, 2004 8 : 41 AM
:>To: Whi tma n, Br an, SES, OASD-PA; Me r ri t t Roxie T. CAPT, cI
OASD- PA; LTC OASD-PA; LTC, OASD-PAi
OASD- PA L.
>Subject : Mi lita ry Analyst s Con fere nce Ca l l
>
>AIl :
>
>The c all-i n information f or the milit ary ana lysts confe rence call is :
>
>
>
>We i nvi t e you to partici pate in a con f ere nce c a l l , Saturday, Nove mbe r 20 , 2004 from 8:30
a m to 9 :30 a. m. e s t .
>
>Topics t o be discussed a re : Ope rat i ona l Upda te on I raq.
>
>Participa nt s i n this confe rence ca ll wi l l be General Thomas Me t z . Your host f o r t h i s
ca l l will be Colonel Archie Davi s .
>
>To participate in this conference call , p lea se d ial or .. and
1 1- ......
a s k the opera t or to conne ct yo u t o t he Mi l i t ary Ana lys t s conf e r ence ca l l.
,
,
, VR,
,
>Ar chi e
,
>Colonel Archi e Davi s
::oDi rect or
>Communi tv Rel ations & Publ ic Li a i s on
2
Fr om:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Oi Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD·OASD-PA
Monday, December 13, 2004 8:37 AM
Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Brooks, Vincent K BG OCPA
Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Barber, Alli son, CIV, OASD-PA; Haddock, Ellen
(Katie), Col, OCJCSIPA
we ought to t hi nk about a roundt abl e with mil i t ary ana l ys t s tha t v cjcs , secarmy . and l t gen
b lum can d o toda y to put this whole a rmor/ng issue i nt o better per s pecti ve .
1
OCJCSIPA
FW: ROUND TABLE
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
Monda , December 13, 2004 8:41 AM
CIV, JCS VCJCS ........ '1 ,
::;"= = ...J CDR, OCJCSl PA; Maj, OCJCSlPA; LCDR,
1...-_---'
Subject:
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Heads ·up .
I'm on my way t o a meeting at OSC PA... can ' t figure out if we 're supposed t o do t he r ound
table today, or thi nk about it today.
I should know more whe n I return .
Vi R
Kat ie
> - ----Or i g i nal Message - - - - -
>From: Di Ri ta, Larry, CI V, OSO-OASO- PA
>Sent : Monday , December 13 , 2004 8:37 AM
>To: Whitman, Bryan, SBS , OASO-PA; Brooks , vi nc ent K BG OCPA
>Cc: Rhynedance , Ge orge , COL, OASD-PA; Barber, Al lison, CIV, OASD- PA; Haddock, Bllen
(Katie ), Col , OCJ CS/ PA
>Subj e c t :
>
>we ought to think abou t a roundtable wi t h military analyst s that v cj c s , secarmy, and
l t gen blum can do t oday to put this whole armor /ng issue i nt o better perspective.
>
>
1
From:
Sent:
To :
Cc:
Subj ect :
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSfPA
Monday, December 13, 20041 0:16 AM
Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD·PA
Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; CDR,OCJCSIPA;L .. LCDR,
OCJCSfPA; Maj, OCJCSIPA
RE: One Pager Meeting · Tactics for Abizaid/Casey
George --
I 'll be a t the 1030 One -Pager mt g ; others from this office (a nd J3 ) wi ll cover the 1100 on
rotation noti fication.
Also , I ha ve TENTATIVELY marked Gen Pace 's calendar for a military a nal ysts ' conf call
this afternoon at 16 45 -1115. Included 1630-1645 prep; not s ure if Gen Bl um and/ or Gen
Schoomaker will be a vailable , or i f there woul d be i nt ere st i n s ome " c ombi ne d " prep time .
Sorry it 's late, but t ha t ' s the best I c ould do wi t h t he general's schedul e.
Vi R
Katie
CIV, OSO;
> -- - - -original Mess age - - - - -
>From: Rhynedance , George, COL, OASD-PA
>Sent: Monday , December 13 , 2004 9 :41 AM
>To: Ru f f , Er i c , SES , OASD-PA; Ba r be r , All ison, CI V,
Whitman, B an SBS OASD-PA; Haddock , El len (Ka tie), Col , PA
>Cc : Ca t . USMC OASO- PA; Rhynedance , George , COL, OASO-PA;
SFC, OASO-PA; CI V, OASD-PA ..
>Subject: One Pager Meeting - Tact ics for Abizaid/ Case y
>
>Coul d we meet at 10307 Wou ld like t o us e the Press Ops c on f e r e nc e room s i nce LD has an
appoi ntment at that time. Mr . Ruff has the lead for the me e t ing a nd wil l c hair same.
Sugg e st each o f you come with some t hought s on the t a c tic s we could empl oy f or Abizaid and
Ca s e y ne xt wee k . . . . If t he press ops c onf r oom is busy, might we be abl e to meet i n Ms.
Ba rbe r ' s of fice? Tha nks , please l et me know i f you c a n come .
>
>Kati e Haddoc k
s ub . . . .
>
>GR
>
>
given your me e t i ng schedule this mor n i ng , p l e a se fe e l free to send a
1
From :
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subj ect :
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSfPA

13, 20041 :05 PM
COL, JCS
)(I) LCDR, OCJCs/PA; Maj.
JCs/P )(I) CIV. JCS VCJCS L.. .....
FW: CONF CALL TODAY 4:45 PM
I'll bring this to the prep, but didn't know i f Gen Pace would appreciate this seed
earlier than that -- or i f he would have t i me t o r ead it. Gen Meigs is usually on t he s e
Military Analysts' conference calls, and he has some rather specific di s cus s ion items on
Armored vehicles .. . hi s email follows.
ViR
Katie
-----original Message-- ---
Fr om: Montgomery Meigs (mailto:mcmei gs ,.... ..
Sent : Monda December 13 , 2004 1 1 : 54 AM
To: CIV OASD-PA
Subject: RE: CONF CALL TODAY 4:45 PM
I 'm still working my schedule.
The issue s ti ll not addressed by OSD remains the tradeoff s made by the Army on whe re i t
expended i t' s investments on new gear . As you a l l know, Gen 5choomaker has done a
t remendous job of gett ing the newe s t, be s t gear out to t he t roops. But t he r e' s neve r
enough money to go around. So I 'm sur e t he r e were reasonable tradeoff s made as to what to
buy on t he ma r gin. I ' m also not s ure t he Army knew tha t t he company involved had ext r a
capaci ty. Remember, the people who do the cont r acting often don 't communica t e t hos e kinds
of t hings t o t he operators a s a mat ter of procedure.
I' d al s o be i nterest ed in knowi ng whe t her young t rooper Wil s on, a scout , had a n armored
Humme r . As a scout he s hould have and I s uspec t hi s uni t does ha ve them, and if so, he
was not di gging in l andf i l l s and was put up t o the question by t he reporter who was
observi ng - most l i ke l y - people f rom truck unit s l ooki ng f or ext ra pr ot ection . I can 't
thi nk of a t ime other than with "gun t r uc ks " i n Vi e t Nam t hat we armored 2 1/2 and 5 ton
t rucks . There may be a point of explanation the r e t ha t ca n be hel pful.
As you know t here is an ethi cal i s s ue her e a s well. As a mat ter of professional e thi c s ,
repor t e r s a re not supposed to i ns e r t thems e l ve s in the news . Cl earl y that happened in
t hi s case. Not somet hi ng one can argue i n t he hea t of the initial days of the s t ory , but
a cons ideration none thel ess .
MeM
TODAY 4:45 PM
Messa e- -- --
CIV OASD- PA [mailto:
13, 2004 11: 38 AM ...-------.... .1
-----Ori inal
From:
Sent: Mon ay . December
To : Mont gomery Meigs
Subject: RE : CONF CALL
Should I put you on the part icipants list?
Program Support Specialist
Office of
Public Af fairs (Room
Te lephone :
1
Fax:
MEMORANDUM
To:
From:
Date:
ae •
Ret ired Mili t a ry Analys t s
Colone l Archi e Davi s
Di rector , Community Re lations and Public Af fairs
Of f ice of the Secretary of Def ense
12-13 - 04
Conf ere nc e Ca l l wi th Senior DoD Of f icials
We invite you t o participa te i n a conference c a ll , TODAY, Decembe r 13 th f r om
4:45 pm t o 5: 15 pm.
Top ics t o be di scussed a re: Armor issue i n Ira q
pa r t i cipant s i n t his confere nce cal l will be Gener a l Peter Pace , vice Chairman of the
J oint Chiefs of Staf f . Your hos t f or t hi s ca l l wi l l be Colonel Archie Davi s .
..... i n thi s conf erenc e call, plea se di a l L. • or
and a sk t he operat or to connec t you to the Mili t a r y Analys t s confe r ence cal l .
'------'
Plea se at '--;-;:':':'""7:","...",- J,====I
or c al l he r a t
We hope you are able t o par t icipate .
2
)(8)
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Monda • December 13, 2004 6:43 PM
OCPA'
RE: Military Analyst Teleconference (UNCLASSIFIED)
Tha nks Joe
worki ng on to
VI R
Ka t ie
your aummary is
forward to Capt
much s ho rter (and more
Thorp/Gen Myers. ,.
to the point) t han t he one I 'm
)(8)
> n - nOrig/<' ....
>From: ..,, )(8) .:....,.._-::,...,....,. COL OCPA [ma ilto:":- I
>Sent: Monda December 13 , 2004 6 :35 PM
>To: L OCPA
>Cc: OCPAi Sorenson, J e f f rey A BG(P) ASA(ALT); Haddock, Bll en (Katie) Col
OCJCS/ PA; 01 OASD-FA
>Subjec t : Analyst Te l e confe r e nce (UNCLASSIFIED)
tel econference t oday wi t h
f o l l owed by some
Bullet s ummary bel ow:
>
>Classif ication: UNCLASSIFIED
>Cavea ts : NONE
>
>Sir : GEN Pa ce and BG Sorenson pa r t i c i pa t ed in an eSD FA hos t ed
15 military anal yst . Brief r emarks ma de by each gener a l o fficer
exce l l ent ques tions by the mi l i t a r y analys t . Al l on the record .
>
>* GEN PACE KEY COMMENTS :
>
> * Cha l lenge today i s to bal ance equipment versus tact ics f or troops deployed
thr oughout Iraq .
>met hods
>
> • Requi r ement changed over time a s
to attack our troops us i ng I EDs
a t hi nking enemy found innovative
>
> * Provided defini tion for the t hr ee l evels of protection provided on v ehic les go ing
i nto Iraq .
>
> •
a t bo t h
>
Provided a s hort summary of t he t wo SECARMY di r e c t ed tas k forces und erway to look
t he manuf acturi ng base a nd the lED thr e at.
> * Provided cont ext on what the Army has done over t ime t o armor
>ve hi c l es
>
> * Ma de c l ear that a r mor is only part of protecting Mar i ne s and
>Soldiers : t r a i n i ng , l e ssons learned, TTPs, and technology are a lso key
>e lements
>
>*BG SORENSON
>
> * Summari zed number of vehi c les a r mor ed to date : unparalleled
>accomplishme nt ver s us any other coal iti on nation
>
> * Army is accel e rat i ng FMTV armored vehicles i nto the ate r
>
> * Emphasi zed fund i ng i s the r e and we are working closely with
>industry to meet demand
>
> * Poi nt ed out the incredible t e s t i ng e f fort on-going : tested over
>1,000 "coupons " o f ma t e r i al s
>
> * Added emphasis that armor is only pa r t of the solution to protect i ng t r oops - -
s ame poi nts a s a bove .
>
1
>OSD PA officials ve ry pleas ed with t he engagement . Believe this made a bi g diffe r ence to
he l p counter media mi spercept i ons.
,
>VR, COL
....._-1
,
,
>Clas s ification : UNCLASSIFIBD
>Cave a t s : NONE
,
2
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Tuesday, December 14, 2004 8:01 AM
Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George,
COL, OASD·PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Cot, OCJCS/PA
Please share yo ur i deas about general s c asey a nd abizaid with Lessel and p itt man and l e t
t he m know thi s i s what we a re thinki ng a bout .
Don 't di stribute that full p lan you de ve l oped t ha t inc ludes secde f and de p sec i de as . Just
share t he t houghts about c asey a nd a b izaid and see ho w pe o ple f eel about i t .
I thi nk it would be pa r t i c u larl y important to e nsure one or both o f t he m speak wi th the
milit ary an a l yst s , and does some kind of publ ic eve nt, too.
Tru<. .
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Subj ect :
Follow Up Flag:
Flag Status:
Atta chment s:
JCS, OCJCS/PA
Thursday, December 16. 2004 1:24 PM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie) , Col. OCJCS/PA
Military analysts transcript for post ing
Follow up
Flagged
041213 - VCJCS Conference Call with Army Maj . Gen. Jeffrey Sorenson and.doc
041213 - vcx:s
Conference can...
Col Hadd ock,
Attached is t he Military analyst conference call you r equested me f ormat.
TSgt, USAF
Off ice of the Cha irman. J CS
..c Af f a i r s
Fax
L..-__---1
1
GENERAL PETER PACE, USMC
Vice Cbairman, Joint Cbiefs of Staff
Conference Call witb Army Maj . Gen. Jeffrey Sorenson and
Col. Lynn Callyer and Military Analysts
December 13, 2004
HOST COLONEL ARCHIE DAVI S: It is my privilege to introduce you to the group
that wi ll be speaki ng with us today. We' ve got General Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. We have General Sorenson, Deputy for Acquisition Systems
Management, Army Secretary. And then we have Colonel Callyer from Army G8.
Gentlemen, one change in the way we normally do these type things. Today the
discussion is on the record. It' s on the record gentlemen. With that I'll pass the mike to
General Pace for opening statement and then after that we will take your questions.
General Pace, pl ease sir.
GENERAL PACE: Thanks very much and thanks everybody for taking time to be on
the phone call. I just wanted to make myself available along the guys here from the
Army to try to put some things in context and answer your questions. Basically we've
got a challenge in Iraq with regard to force protection for our soldiers and our marines
that balances both, I guess the equipment that we have available to them and the tactics
that we employ with that equipment. You take the equipmen t side, going from most
protected to least protected, you can put people in tanks or Bradley' s or up-armored
humvees or thin-skinned humvees or walking the streets in flack jacket and helmet or
walking the street without flack jacket and helmet. And on the high end the more
protected you are the more isolated you are from the civilian populace, and on the low
end the less protected you are the less isolated you are. That's the science part, of course,
as you all know the art is to try to figure out where you ought to be on that spectrum of
protection so you can get both protection for your troops and the most influence with the
population. But you sure don' t want a heavy footprint or an oppressive footprint.
So about May- June of2003, after the major combat operations, we went to about a 1/3
armored; 2/3
rd
wheeled vehicle mix and were out in the light- skinned humvees and ended
up with a thinki ng enemy. Then around the October-November timeframe in 2003
started really employing lED' s and VB-lED's in a heavy way. Which caused the
commanders on the ground to reassess how they were employing their troops. Took the
commanders desired armored vehicles from about 2,000 in the June-Jul y timeframe up to
about 15,000 required in around the November timeframe and since that time it has
ramped up to about double that number. So as we've gone through the series of attacks
on our troops and we 've seen the usefulness, especially the up-armored humvee because
it' s about small enough not to be an oppressive type vehicle but it' s substantial enough to
protect the troops. You've seen that shift in emphasis. There are basically three levels of
protection or three ways of getting to that level of protection. One is the factory installed.
You buy the up-armored hunw ee and it arri ves in theat er built and ready to go. The
second is the humvees in theater and you buy the add-o n ki ts from the manufacturers and
apply those to the vehicles in theater. And the third is the folks in theater doing what
good soldiers and Mari nes do which is putting on locall y fabricated prot ecti on. to be able
to fill in the gap whi le industry ramps up.
We have done a lot procurement wise, there is a lot more we need to do. Ri ght now
we've got a little bit over 15,000 armored vehicles in theater. By the end of January we
will have prohabl y about 22,000 and by the end of March probably have about 28,000.
Which is a very heal thy appli cation of money and industry. We spent about $1.2 billion
so far on increases to armored protection and there is another $2.4 bill ion to be spent to
round out the protective requirements over there right now.
The Secretary of the Army has stood up two task forces. One, again on the equipment
side, is looking at every part of the continuum with the manufacturers to see if we can' t
run a litt le bit faster, j ump a little bit higher. to get the proper equi pment to the troops
faste r. And the other one that was stood up around last October when the rED problem
started to mani fests itself and that is what is called the rED Task Force. It is a side of the
equation that deals wi th the tacti cs. techniques and procedures that capture the data from
the attacks on our forces wi th these weapons. Analyze the results of those attacks, share
the information in theater immedi ately and then se nd it back here to the states where the
Army Task Force can work on it and prepare new tact ics, techniques and procedures and
try them out, out in the desert in Ca lifornia to see what works best.
One more thing then I' ll stop talking at you and start listenin g and that is on intercepti ve
bod y armor part, I thi nk you all know that that was a state of the art piece of equipment
when we started the war. it worked exceptionally well. We were producing about 1,200
sets per month. We are now producing 25.000 sets per month. Everybody in the
CENTCOM theater of operations, all U.S. military, all U.S. government employees, have
a set of this protective gear and the Army will co nt inue to buy these at the rate of 25,OOO
a month until we' ve got the Anny and Marine Corp completely outfitted. Let me stop
there and turn this back to our moderator.
COLONEL DAVIS: Sir, would you have comments that you' d like to make or would
you like to go into questions?
GENERAL SORENSON: Just let me put a couple of other sound bites on there which I
think, j ust to follow on to what General Pace said and that was I think it 's noteworthy that
over the last fourteen months as General Pace says we have begun to j ust the armoring
capability there. Thi s nation has armored over 20.000 vehi cles, which is something I
think if you look at the cont ext of what other nations or other armies could have done.
Probabl y unparalleled. The second thing is, as he relates to the Task Force, already we
are beginning to work with acceleration of deliveri es ofcapabiliti es for the FM TV.
which is the fami ly of medium tactical vehicles and some ofour heavier fleet s as well, to
accelerate some of that capability into theater. But clearly as has been mentioned be fore.
the focus ini tiall y from the theat er was to make sure that we could up-armor the light
skinned vehicles, specifically the humvees, because those were more in harms way and
we have now shi fted that focus because of where we are with up-armoring the vehicles,
both the vehicles in-country with armor as well as the delivery of up-armored hurnvees
from the factory as well as from other maj or commands, as well as other services. We
are now shifting that focus to the medium and heavy truck fleet and attempting to get
those fleets up-armored here within the early springtime.
COLONEL DAVIS: Ok gentlemen, with that we will take your questions at this time.
KEN ALLARD: General Sorenson, this is Ken Allard. I am curious as to what
roadblocks you are finding right now in the procurement process and where they exist. Is
it in the procurement system, the funding system or in industry itself?
GENERAL SORENSON: Well when you say roadblocks I' m not sure specifically
what.. .
KEN ALLARD: Constraints. Bad term was roadblocks. Constraints.
GENERAL SORENSON: WeUI think at this poi nt in time we have been able to work
with not only the Army but the OSD staff, as well as with the Hill in getting the funding
that we need. We have had some difficulties in some cases, I can go back into one
particular design, whereby when the requirement came in we didn't have a design for one
of these particular vehicles. We built the design, then we found we had some quality
control problems, we had to go back and fix it. But the long poles in the tent have clearly
been getting steel. We now have three steel manufacturers that are producing the steel.
We have all the depots basically producing these kits, as well as manufacturers, so from
the standpoint of constraints or roadblocks at this point in time I would say that if there
was a roadblock we have certainly busted through it at this point in time.
PAUL VALLELY: Can you talk a little more in depth on some of the tactics,
unclassified basis, that we' re able to use over there now since October 2003?
COLONEL DAVIS: Vallely, who would you like to address your question?
PAUL VALLELY: Well anyone that can answer. You know cell phone triangulation,
over head surveillance, convoy protection, anything that we could use that would give us
a little more definitive on the force protection and tactics that we' re using.
GENERAL PACE: Paul, this is Pete Pace. Let me try in an unclassified mode to
answer that and then I'll ask the guys here from the Army too, if they' ve got anything
they want to add. Clearly we have some tact ical means available to determi ne where
lED' s may be and some technical means avai lable to try to get those things to function or
not function when they are not suppose to. A lot of time and effort put into
understanding the changing tactics of the enemy employing them. First it was one lED
and then they would put that in pl ace and we would change our tactics so they put in
more and then as we responded to that they have another one go ofT. So it's very much a ------_. .--_-
force vs. force thinking process. I would not want to get into the detail s of exactly how
we are doing it right now because again, it will change what the other guys do and then
we will have to change again.
GENERAL SORENSON: Sir, the only thing I would say from the Army standpoint,
we've tried to take a hol istic look at thi s. Clearly we've talked about the annoring but
that's only one piece of it. We've also tried to use some other pieces of sop histicated
equipment to preclude the detonation of those systems. As well as we within every
parti cul ar incident have an after act ion report. As General Pace mentioned before, you
have the lED Task Force over there and they clearly go back and look at specifically
what happened and report hack. And then we introduce that immediately into our
training within less than 24 hours. So the TIP's in terms ofthe tactics, techniques and
procedures are updated on a continuous basi s.
DON SHEPPARD: I' m tryi ng to follow General Pace's numbers here. 15,000 now,
22,000 end of January, 28,000 by the end ofMarch. We heard in reports after the
Secpef's town meeting of450 vehicles a month. I assume that was probably just
humvees being updated by another hundred or so. So my question is.... Can we really
reach these numbers and how much of this was already in progress and afail accompli
before the stuff over this town hall meeti ng.
GENERAL PACE: I' ll give you what I know and then I' ll ask for backup from the
Army guys. You are absolutely right, the 450 has to do speci fically with the up-armored
humvees. When we started thi s, they were producing at 35 a month. Over time it has
ramped up to 450 a month. Every time we've gone forward to Congress with a request
for money, they have provided it. So fundi ng has not been an issue. There was a little bit
of a surprise last week when the manufacturer said that they could produce another 100
per month than we thought they could. With inside of that same day that the
manufacturer said that they could go from 450 to 550 the Army changed, modified the
contract which, if you know procedures around this place, changi ng a contract inside of
one day is kind of unusual. So the manufacturer now would be, wi th the funding to
produce that extra 100 per month, is tell ing us now that they will be able to actually start
providing those extra 100 a mont h in Apri l of next year. So it ' s not like you can j ust turn
a swi tch and have these things pour forth. In all the other vehicles there is something
like, ohhh, give or take, 32,000 plus vehicles in Iraq right now. The numbers I told you
about are things that are doable right now thanks to all the work that has been done for
the last year pl us and also in the last week or so going back one more time and scrubbing
all the industry counterparts we had to see what might be brought forward faster. Again,
remembering the continuum we are on, part of this challenge is to have the right
equipment, the other part is to have the right tact ics. So we shouldn' t lay all this off on
industry providing us X number of armored veh icles. It has to do with how the
commanders in the field take the resources that we are able to provide to them and how
we use it in a tactical world. So it' s both sides of the equat ion.
DON SHEPPARD: And j ust a follow on to that, how would you characterize, when you
say 28,000 out of32,000 are armored vehicles and of course you still going to see them
blown up on TV for reasons we understand, how would you characterize that armor for
publ ic consumption.
GENERAL PACE: What do you mean by characterize. I'm sorry.
DON SHEPPARD: So the public thinks ifwe bave 28,000 armored vehicles that there
is going to be a heck of a lot less explosions and people killed and trucks blown up and
that's really not necessarily the case. How should we characterize the levels of protection
withi n 28,000 vehicles. Some level ofprot ection, some level of armor, small arms, etc.
not all like the up-armored humvees?
GENERAL PACE: I would say that this armor will certainly protect our soldiers and
Marines from small anns. It will protect them from some of the lED' s kind, for example
use of artillery rounds, but clearly you can build a big enough bomb to blow up a tank, or
anything else we have and that ' s why we have to be careful not to have the American
publi c thinking that there is a tactical armor solution that we can put PFC Pace inside of
some kind of cocoon that ' s going to protect him from everyt hing. Clearly we cannot.
Flackjackets and helmets protect us from some level of violence, tanks protect us from
another level of violence but you gentlemen all know it is a continuum out there and a
thinking enemy that can provi de a pretty good sized blast in any particul ar place at one
time. So we are doing what we should do to provide the level ofprot ection that we know
provides an added measure of security for our guys without going to the point where we
have everybody riding around inside their own tank and we cannot do the j ob that we
were sent over to do. Which is not only to defeat the enemy but also to help the popul ace
get on to their next lives.
COLONEL DAVIS: Are there any other questions out there.
JED BABBIN: General, Jed Babbin. Some of the people I' ve been up against on the
news lately have been basically saying that Mr. Rumsfeld has been ignoring this probl em
since last August. Can you give us a timeline as to really how this burbl ed up through the
system and when it was identi fied as·a major problem and what was done. Basically in
relation to that.
GENERAL PACE: Sure, I mean this is totally inaccurate to say that about the
Secretary. As I mentioned, the commanders in the field, and I agreed with them, believe
that in the June-July 2003 timeframe that the amount of annor that we had over there and
the numbers of vehicles we had were sufficient to be able to provide security but also to
be able to interact with the popul ace. And then as I mentioned, the thinki ng enemy, in
the October-November timeframe of 2003, started using lED's and VB-lED' s very
aggressively. When that happened, the commanders on the ground increased their
request from the level that it was at, which was about 2,000 armored vehicles, j umping it
up to 15,000 inside the space of about a month, once they realized that they needed to
change our tactics, techniques and procedures. When we did that, it was at a time when
the industry, for just one exampl e, industry was producing about 35 to 40 up-armored
humvees per month. We went to Congress, got the money to increase. I think it was the
first step went up to about 220 and over time we' ve gotten up to about 450, as the
industry has been able to ramp up their capacity to build more for us. So for at least the
last year the Army Task Force, the lED Task Force and the procurement process has been
working on this to provide the right solutions. And every time we've gone to the
Secretary with a new request for added armor. and shown him the bill for it, he has been
very quick to insure that we have what we needed and has supported us very rapidly with
Congress. And Congress has given us the money we've asked for, so outside those of us
in uniform who has anything to do with leadership/providing resources to us has done it
as quickly as we 've asked for it. Within a capacity. Industry takes time to ramp up. As
you all know.
KEN ALLARD: General Pace, Goldwater Nichols gave you as the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs a lot of acquisition responsibilities and I know that you use those
authorities quit e aggressively. My question really is while I am a great fan of steel as
opposed to anything else, are we limited simply to the existing technologies for
protecting these vehicles or are you looking at anything else? Possibly the more
aggressive use of Kevlar or some substitute for steel?
GENERAL PACE: Alright, the short answer is yes. You are right on the money, you
know there are some Kevlar applique' s out there that pound for pound are really very
strong. We are looking at those. Let my Anny counterpart, who is in that business,
answer the specifics, but clearly we are out there searching for new applications of old
technology like Kevlar and new substances materials that will allow us to do what Kevlar
has allowed us to do so far.
GENERAL SORENSEN: Yes, again this is Jeff Sorensen. As we've talked about here,
we've been reall y searching the entire industrial base. Up at Aberdeen proving ground,
the people up there at the test conununity have tested over 1,000 different coupons which
essentially represents everything from steel to composites to composites with aluminum
to everything we could find, as a way to try to get the maximum protection capability for
the vehicles. As an example, we have tested, once the coupon gets tested and is
sufficient, then we have them put together a kit. As an example, for the humvee, we have
tested 12 different kits up there at Aberdeen. Most of them have been steel but there have
been some composites. But I will tell you in some cases with respect to the composites
we've had some difficulty, if you will, adhering it to the door as well with the ballistic
glass. We ' ve had a much better success with the steel doors and the ballistic glass then
we have here with the Kelvar solutions, though we have used the Kevlar solutions or
composite solutions, if you will. On the back of the vehicles provide protection because
in many cases here we have a lot ofolder vehicles out there in Iraq. You can only put so
much armor on those particular vehicles after which point in time the suspension sort of
gives way. Unlike the up-armored humvee, which was combined as a system design to
accommodate a heavier transmission, a heavier suspension, heavier engine, etc. It was
built from the ground up. Most of our vehicles over there in theater were the older
humvees that we had to look at very carefully to design a package that would not only
give the maximum force protection but also give the capabilit y that the vehicle will
continue to operate properly. So we have looked at everything and we continue to look at
everything as we try to determine solutions for this particular problem.
KEN ALLARD: General, one follow up to that and particularly in terms of commercial
technologies that you may not have looked at before, if we run across any of that is there
any way that we can get in touch with you. It mayj ust be a wild screwy idea but if it can
be something that' s productive. It' s one thing to complain about this on TV, it' s quite
another to offer solutions. So how do we get in touch if we have something like that.
GENERAL SORENSON: I can give you my email, I can give you my phone number.
I' ll leave that with Colonel Davis here.
KEN ALLARD: Super.
COLONEL DAVI S: I' ll give it to you Ken.
KEN ALLARD: Great.
GENERAL PACE: The bottom line is we really shouldn' t be collectively defensive
about this, nor should we be collectively putting too big a smiley face on this thing. The
fact is that this is combat. We had some good things when we went in, we're learning
some lessons, we' re trying to adjust to that. The enemy does the same thing. And I think.
we just need to make sure that the American publi c understands that their sons and
daughters are important to us. -We are going to do all we can to protect them, that has
both a material solution and a tactic solution and we should j ust acknowledge where we
are on the continuum and acknowledge the fact that we need to continue to press hard on
this thing to get it right.
KEN ALLARD: General Pace, I was up at MSNBC when this story broke last week and
I think. that is precisely the right attitude to take on it. That it is the constant roar of
abdication. Rather than sayi ng it' s the Army we want or the Army we don't want, that' s
really kind of beside the point. I think that what drives a lot of people crazy is when they
have the impression that we have not done enough. Certainly the story that is there is an
entirely different one.
QUESTIONER: Is the majority of these lED's come in detonated?
GENERAL PACE: I do not know the answer to that question. And I don't know that
we want to put that out anyway. Just because of some ofthe techniques we are using
against it. So if we could avoid going down that road, then it would probab ly be a good
thing to do collectively.
CHUCK NASH: General, Chuck Nash, question about the over all lesson that were
learning as wego beyond this with the armor on humvees and that is if you look at the
continuum of the regular humvees, the up-armored humvees, Stryker, Bradley, Abrams,
you know you've got a continuum there of protection you addressed earlier, how are the
lessons that we are learning now, as you look ahead and some of the things that we are
planning on buying and planning on doing, how many degrees has the rudder changed,
what have we learned from this?
GENERAL PACE: Don't know if! can answer it in degrees of mdder, I can tell you
that last Friday and Saturday and again today sitting down with the Secretary ofthe Army
and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and various meetings about budgets and
supplementals and the like, that very much a part of the discussion is as we lay out the
FY2006 budget submission, have we in fact properly identified the changes that are
needed in the budget to reflect the lessons learned without overcompensating and fixating
on one piece of our armed forces, if I can say it like that, so find the right balance.
Clearly inside of today' s understood requirement, the funding is there. But as we look to,
as the Army modularizes it' s brigades, Pete Schoomaker and his folks, are looking at the
right mix of vehicles and armored protection for those, partially based on what we are
learning in Iraq and Afghanistan, and partiall y based on what we think the emerging
threat will be in the future.
CHUCK NASH: If! could, a quick follow up. One of the criticisms that I've heard is
that the Marines are taking higher casualties because they don't have the armor that the
Army has. Is that a fair criticism?
GENERAL PACE: I don ' t think so. The numbers that I know about for the Marines
and I refreshed myself on this last week, is that the Marines have 4, 100 wheeled vehicles
in Iraq right now and all ofthem have either level one, two or three protection right now
as we speak. So to my knowledge, thanks to lessons learned by the Army, shared with
the Marines before the Marines went back in theater this time, as the Marines came back
into theater they were able to arrive either already with the new armor on the vehicles or
to put in on in Kuwait before they went in. I know they do have a small number of
vehicles that don 't have armor and those are the ones they use inside the base camp.
COLONEL DAVIS: Sir, how we doing on time? One more question. Gentlemen, we
have time for one more question.
COLONEL DAVIS: Any wrap up gentlemen?
GENERAL SORENSEN: One thing that I would just like to add up to what General
Pace was talking about with the future. I will just tell you, again, this is Jeff Sorensen
from the Science and Technology base, we are looking at other solutions such as active
protection systems and so forth to defeat these type of capabilities. And clearly at this
point in time there has been more of a focus on that as far as lessons learned as we begin
to design the future combat system and see what we are going to do there as well as with
Stryker. So that clearly in terms of lessons learned the Science and Technology base has
had an additional focus for elements of how to make sure these vehicles can be protected
in open combat.
_____m _
GENERAL PACE: And again, let me just say thanks to all of you and your time. I
know that your time is valuable and the opportunity to share some ideas with you so that
when you go out and do what you do you have at least the best info we can give you, it' s
very beneficial to us and we appreciate it.
COLONEL DAVIS: General Pace, General Sorensen, gentlemen thank you very much
for taking the time. Before we close we have one announcement.
COLONEL CURTIN: Hi I'm Colonel Joe Curtin, Army Public Affairs, on Wednesday
morning at 0800 there will be a Press Briefing on wheeled vehicle strategy in which we
are going to go into some detail with Major General Speakes and supported by General
Sorensen to address the way ahead. I invite you to be there and if not, tell your primary
media representatives for your networks to please attend.
COLONEL DAVIS: Thank you very much. Again, this entire discussion is on the
record.
CIV
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From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments :
L o " ' : ! = : ~ = : : : : : : ~ OASD·PA
Friday, December 17, 2004 12:04 PM
Haddock, Ellen (Kati e), Col, OCJCS/PA; LCDR, OCJC"SI ;;;;,. PA :.:' = = = :::::;...
CDR, OCJCS/PA ..
Rhynedance , George, COL, OASD·PA; Davis, Arch ie, Col , OASD-P
OASD·PA
TPs from Casey for review
TP 12·17-04 Gen. Casey Iraq update.doc ; 12·16.()4 Casey wi th mi l analysts.doc; 12-1&-04
Casey Pentagon presser.doc
TP 12-17-04 Gen.
casey Iraq up...
12-16-0'1 casey
WIttl nuanatys...
12· 1&04 casey
Pentagon,...,....
All :
Attached pl e a s e f i nd the f i r st draf t of talking points off Gen. Casey's briefing s .
The sources are atta ched - (1) transcript of Casey 's pr e s s e r yester day and (2) t rans c r i pt
from Bonnie Sc iarr e t to in Archi e's s hop of Casey 's br ief ing (phone) t o the mi l itary
ana l ysts .
I 'l l s t and by and wai t for di rec t i ons.
1
Gen. George Casey, commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, briefed the Pentagon press corps on
Thursday about the situation ~ iraq and the outlookfor progress. Gen. Casey said the Coalition and the
new Iraqi governmenl are broadly on track toaccompiishtheir objectives - aOOI1slitutionaily elected
govenment and security forces capableof maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as asafehavenfor
Ieml(. Followi ng are highiights.
FightingtheInsurgents.
• tt has been slx months since the transition 10 sovereignty inIraq. Commanders have reviewed theplan
they shaped in Augusl tohelpbring Iraq throughitsconstitutional electionsinDecember 2005. The
assessmenl isthe plan isbroadlyon track.
• One keyelement of the plan was to eliminate safehavens where the insurgents gather to planand
operate. With the iiberation ofFallujah, the insurgentsno longer have asalehavon inIraq where they
can plol and carry out ther operabons. They must look over their shouldersnow.
• In14 of the 18provinces. there are fewer than four violent incidents aday.
• The insurgents are toughenemies - but theyare not 10 feet tall. These same people have been
oppressing the Iraqi people for 30years. They offer no alternative positive visionfor Iraq - so they are
forced use inti midationtoget their way. Theycannot sustain this.
Iraqi security forces are growing stronger.
• Progressively more security forces were involved and activelywerljng with Coalitionforcesineach of
the recent majoroperations - Najaf, Samarra and FaJiujah.
• InFallujah, thereweretwo brigades fighting- and theyperformed well. Now there isan Iraqi Division
Headquarters in Fallujah controlling thetwo brigades, whichisthefirst time an Iraqi Division
Headquarters hasbeeninthe fieldsince the war.
• In Najaf, where the Mahdi mili tia were killingand terrorizi ng, thecity is quiet. Najafis anexampleof the
positivechangethat cantake place once Iraqisare liberated from the insurgents' tyranny. Nowthe
governor andthe Iraqi Security Forces are in charge.
Iraqi security forces are being trained and coming on line.
• ByFebruary there will be 70 battalions in the Iraqi army, including amechanized infantry battalion.
• Iraqi division commanders have recently been appointed. Coalition forcesare wor1<. ing with them to
build theirheadquarters and forces capableof independent operations. These leaders will be critical to
conducting independent counter-insurgency efforts because they will help gamerthe intelligence,
shpae the plans and direct the operations.
• Training the police isa longer-leon project. but good progress is being made, especiallywith thespecial
police battal ions. By Februal)' there wi ll be ~ x publicOlder battalions, aspecial policeregiment, foor
police commando battalions and nine reg'lnal SWATteams - each of which will helplight insurgents
and terrorists on aday-to-day basis.
Reconstruction momentum is bUilding.
• InJune. the month Iraq transilioned to sovereignty, there were 230 projects from the Iraq
Reconstruction Fund onthe ground awming dirt.·
• By the end of November there were more than 1,000 projects - adding uptomore than $3 billion into
the Iraqi economy.
• Reconstruction ismoving forward despite the insurgents' attempts todisrupt this progress.
The Iraqi people broadly accept theirgovernment and their security forces.
• Some polls show an approval rating higher than70percent.
• Iraqishaveapositive viewof their army and their new police force.
• Sixty percentof Iraqisthink their counlly ~ headed inthe rightelection.
Elections areontrackfor January 30th.
• Insurgents are trying tocreate asecurity situation that makes people believe elections are not possible.
The insurgents are desperate - theyknow they are goingtobe relegated toavery different position.
• The registration process has gone forward inmost of the country, though there were some incidents up
north and west inAI Anbar province. The election committee iswor1<:ingon alternatives for these two
areas.
• Commanders expect insurgents tooperate ina more classicinsurgent mode, with attacks insmall
numbers. Insurgents may IIy tomake some high profile attacks before the election. The Coalitionand
Iraqi forces are preparing for this.
• In general, the role of the Coalltion forces duringthe elections will be toconduct broad-based security.
The Iraqi security forces wi ll work the specifics of the polling areas.
• There will be somewhere between 6,000 and9,000 polling places. Guarding the sites won't always be
done atthe site - Coalition and Iraqi security forces have arange of options, such as controlling traffIC
around the site and restricting access. The goal isreducethe exposure of the sites rather thanhave20-
30 security forces huddlearound eachpolli ng place.
• The insurgentsdon't want the Sunnisto participate inthe elections, because they can then claim the
election was invalid. Commanders are optimistic that there will be sufficient Sunni participation.
Success in Iraq is atribute to thetroops.
• The sokl iers, sailors, airmenand Marines who havedied inIraq gave their lives tohelp25 milli on Iraqis
build better lives and toimprove the security of theUnited States and the Coalition.
• We grieve withthei r fami lies, and withthe families ofall the Coalitionand Iraqi security forces who
made the ultimatesacrifice.
• The nation isgrateful for the troopswho fight around the world todefeat terrori sm and replace it with
freedom.
Published by the U.S. Department of Defense Officeof Public Affairs
CONFERENCE CALL OF 12-16-04
Retired Military Anal ysts
&
General George Casey
Host: COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Gentlemen, Colonel Davis here from OSD Public
Affairs. Thank you for joining us this afternoon. It is my privilege to introduce to you
Genera l Casey, Commander of Mult i-National Force Iraq. General Casey has agreed to
speak with us this evening about operations in Iraq. General Casey, we lcome back to the
Pen tagon Sir and thank you for your time. The briefing today wi ll be on the record. We
have approximatel y 30 minu tes. General Casey will make an opening statement and after
that he will take your questions. General Casey, the floor is yours.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: OK I have no idea who is out there so nice to be with
you here. Oh they are handing me a list, looks like some old friends. Let me just say a
couple of things and then I'll take your questions and I will be fairly brief here. I have
been out there almost six months now, six months since transition to sovereignty. We've
just completed our first review of the campaign plan. I think most of you know we
publi shed the campaign plan there in August that shaped our way forward here through
the constitutional elections (inaudible) in December of 05. Our assessment is that we are
broadly on track in helping the Iraqi peopl e get to those elections at the end of next year.
And just a couple of point s I'd like to leave with you.
First of all, the insur gency we are fighting isn't ten feet tall. They're tough guys. They
are the same folks that have oppressed the Iraqi people for 30 years. But they are not,
certainl y not invi ncible. There is no single leader. They offer no alternative positive
vision for Iraq. And as a result they are forced to violence to intimidate, particul arly the
SUJUli part of the population to support them. We've seen time and again here where that
has blown back on them. It is not sustai nable for them. They also know that they can' t
defeat the coalition forces and they saw this in spades in Fallujah. And with the
liberation ofFalluj ah there are no longer any terrorists or insurgent safe havens anywhere
in Iraq. And so now they don ' t have a place where they can go to plan and operate and
make weapons and car bombs with impunity. Everybody's got to be looking over their
shoulder. We think that is a significant step forward. Getti ng to a point where there were
no safe havens prior to the elections was one of the main elements ofour plan. Anyway
these guys aren 't 10 feet tall.
Second, the Iraqi security forces are getting stronger every day. Thi s has been a major
effort. Dave Petraeus' folks have done a wonderful job. By February there will be 70
battal ions in the Iraqi army including a mechanized battalion. On the poli ce side we are
making pretty good progress with the local poli ce. That' s a longer term project but we've
also had good project on the special police battalions. Six public order battalions, a
special poli ce regiment, four commando battalions and nine regional swat teams, all of
those guys are involved in the fight today or will be in the next month or so.
Third point I'll leave with you. Reconstruction momentum is building. When we got
there in June there was about 230 proj ects from the lraq Reconstruction Fund on the
ground turning dirt . At the end of November there is over 1000. That ' s 3 billion dollars
into the Iraqi economy. So that is moving forward and all agai nst insurgent efforts to
disrupt and deny the ability to get on with reconstruction.
Fourth point, the government, the Iraqi government is broadly accepted. They' ve got in
some polls over a 70% approval rating. The Iraqi people have a favorab le impression of
their Army and their new police force. And by most polls about 60% of the Iraqi' s thi nk
the country is headed in the right dir ection and they've got a positive view of the future.
Lastl y, we're broadly on track for the elections. We said when I got there we were going
to have to fight our way to the elections because the insurgents want to actively deny this
because it will relegate them to a position that they are not accustomed to. Their
accustomed to Sunni dominance of the political proces s in Iraq and irs not going to
happen. Fourteen of the eighteen provinces, there are less than 4 violent incidents a day.
The registration process has gone forward in most of the country. Had problems up in
the north and out west in Al Anbar . The elect ion committee is working on some
alternatives to that. But the elections in Janu ary will go forward. The insurgents will do
everythi ng, I believe, in their power to create a sec urity situation tbat tbey will try to
make us believe that there not possible, but they will go forward and as a result we wi ll
take another step forward in the process of movin g lraq onto a democracy.
I know that most of you former mi litary folks.... boy you got a great armed forces out
tbere and you can be real ly proud of them. What they did in Fallujah, the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, mari nes and corpmen even, is a feat of arms. Some of you know about
the difficulties of urban fighting, they took down a well planned urban defense in seven
days. Infli cted 3000 folks killed or captured on the enemy, with relatively insignificant
losses to ourselves. So magni ficent feat of arms there by a great armed forces. That ' s it,
and I'll be happy to take your questions.
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Gentlemen, are there any questions out there?
KEN ALLARD: Hey George, Ken Allard. Can you tell us what you are looking forward
to in January in the run up to the elect ion. Do you expect the insurgents to make a main
effort, another Fallujah, and if so how do you intend to respond?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Nice to hear from you Ken.
KEN ALLARD: Good to hear you back.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: I don' t believe that there is going to be another Fal lujab
nor do I think they wi ll attempt to create another Fallujah. What we hear is that they
recogni ze that they cannot defeat us. And we' ve proven that time and time again. So I
don't think they will go to another Fall ujah. I think they'll operate more as classic
insurgents, small attacks, or attacks in small numbers . I do think they wi ll try to make
___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ _ n · · ·_
some very high profile attacks before the elections. And that is what we and the Iraqi
Security Forces will be preparing for.
PAUL VALLELY: General Casey, Paul Vallely. Can you tell us a litt le bit about the
development of the intelligence capability for the Iraqi battalions and the Iraqi forces . Is
that progressing or where are we at on that, because I think that ' s essential moving them
towards some type of superior position over ther e when it comes to security.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Paul , you are exactly right. Insurgency intelligence is
the number one priority. I will tell you we have work to do in that area. Building an
Iraqi intelli gence capability is our number one priority for the next year. We have done
some work already with the Mini ster of Int erior and Mini ster of Defense on their
servi ces. Mor e to do all the way down. as you suggest. down to the battalion level. We
are working to give the Iraqi 's the capability of conducting independent counter-
insurgency operations. You can't do that without intelli gence. So you will see that as a
main priority over the next year.
PAUL VALLEY: Great, thank you.
CHUCK NASH: General, Chuck Nash. Story has been running in the paper start ed
yesterday about six guardsmen from Ohio who stripped some vehicles that were offon
the side of the road. Accomplished their mission and it looks like they got court
martialled. Pretty much had the book thrown at them. There is an Ohio Senator tryi ng to
get clemency for them. Now it seemsj ust, you know, on that side of the story, and
what' s being presented, that that ' s something that should have and could have been
handled at a much lower level. Instead it didn't. What part of the story are we not
getting about that?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Chuck, I'm sorry, I have not heard that story. And I
don' t know anything about it.
CHUCK NASH: Okay, thank you.
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Any otber questions out there?
RICK FRANCONA: General Casey, Rick Francona. Can you give us an idea of your
sense of what voter turnout might be?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Yeah, it depends, kind of, where you are in the country.
It could go as high, they think, as about 80%. The real question.... It will be high in the
south and it will behigh in the Kurdish areas. The real question is the Sunni
part icipation. And right now my personal guess, it will be greater than 50% of the Sunni
population that wi ll participate. Hopefully it will be much higher. But there is just no
way of knowing right now.
RJCK FRANCONA: Thanks.
PAUL VALLELY: Any update on reconnaissance surveillance on the borders, any
improvement that you see to stave off any of the cross-border operations that are being
conducted from Syria or Iran?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: We don't really see operations being conducted cross-
border. We do see infiltration of foreign fighters across the borders. I think this is Paul
Vallely again, I think...
PAUL VALLELY: Right it is George, Thanks.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: The problem is not necessari ly surveillance on the
borders . I mean, right now we've got problems at the border crossings. With just honest
border guards that are checki ng properly the people's documentation. And that is
something that the Minister of Interior is working very hard with. We've actually had
some of our own Depart ment of Border Guard folks, our own Department ofBorders
over there working with the Iraqi' s in the effort to help them. But what we felt is that a
big ISR operation on the border doesn't necessarily service well when people are driving
through the ports of entry. So I think that would be my answer to that. Intelligence,
police and borders are my top three priorities for next year. So that is right up there.
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Next question please.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: You hit two out of three Paul.
PAUL VALLELY: Thank you.
KEN ALLARD: Yeah I've got another one. What is Dave Petraeus saying about, not
just the equipping ofthese Iraqi units but the schooling of them and the oper ational art,
how is their leadership looking and do you think that they are, in 2005, going to be a
force you can increasingl y tum to?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: [ will tell you that leadership has been a challenge. We
are working to develop the brigade and division headquarters. That will be a major focus
for the next year. They have j ust recently appointed the Iraqi division and brigade
commanders. So we are working with them to build their headquarters. As I said that' s
our greatest challenge for the next year. Again, if you go back to the task, conduct
independent counter-insurgency operations, you can' t do that if you don't have brigade
and division headquarters that can garner the intelligence, build the plans, direct the
operations. So that part of it is still to be done. What Dave has done is a magnificent job
of training and equipping Iraqi battalions. These battalions are on line and are actively
working with coalition forces on operations. I will tell you that in each of the major
operations that we've done, Najaf, Samarra and Fallujah, there has been progressively
more iraqi security force involvement in each of those operations. There were actually
two brigades of Iraqi' s in Falluj ah. During the operation there they fought well. And
there is now an Iraqi Division Headquarters in Falluj ah controlling two brigades. It' s the
first time an Iraqi division headquarters has been in the field since the war. So mechanics
of the process going fairly well. As you suggest some of the leadership development and
staff bui lding processes still be done, to bui ld forces capable of independent operations.
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Other questions.
STEVE GREER: Hey Sir, Steve Greer here. I got a question about the Madhi milit ia
and Sadr 's influence and what you think is going to happen in terms of the elections. Has
he reared his head lately or are things kind ofquiet in that area.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Knock on wood he is. . . the Madhi militia has been very
quiet since Najar. I will say that Najafis a good example ofwhat can happen once a city
is liberated from the tyranny of insurgents . Madhi mi litia was running rampant in Najaf
killing and murdering people, intimidating and terrorizing the population. Since we've
completed that operation the Governor and the Iraqi Security Forces have taken charge of
Najaf. And reall y since then, it's not only Najafbut the south has gone almost quiet. I
think a lot of that has to do wi th the influence of the Ayatollah Sistani . That' s one thing.
The second thing is we did some fairly signi ficant damage to the Muqtada militia during
the August time period. Now, I would say dormant. Okay. With a question mark. The
other point I'd say is in Sadr City, Fauawah (??spelling). Pete Carelli in the 1
st
Cav and
the Iraqi government have done a wonderful j ob there using economic development as a
tool to keep the people on side and in support of the government.
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Any more questions?
RJCK FRANCONA: Yes, General Casey, Rick Francona again. Are you detecting a
large influx of Iranians in the south?
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: I wouldn' t say necessarily a large influx of Iranians but
we and the Iraqi ' s both share a concern about Irani an influence in the south. And I do
believe that there are Iranians coming into the south attempting to influence political
outcomes. But it' s not necessarily a large number of infiltrators, if you understand what I
mean.
RICK FRANCONA: Right.
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Any more questions gentlemen?
COWNEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Last call for questions?
COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: If there are no more questions, General Casey Sir, thank
you for taking the time to discuss operations in Iraq with us. We really appreciate it and
wish you all the best Sir.
GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Hey thank you all very much. I appreciate your
questions.
SPECIAL DEFENSE BRIEFING
.BRIEFER: GENERAL GEORGE CASEY, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL
FORCE IRAQ
THE PENTAGON, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
3: 11 P.M. EST. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16. 2004
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GEN, CASEY: Hello, everybody. I think I'm self -int roducing. (l a ughter.)
Nice t o see you back in Washington here. For t hose of you I don't know, I'm George Casey,
the commander of the Multin at ional Force in Iraq.
I'd like to j ust tal k to you a little about t he sit uat ion on t he ground in I raq. I've been t here
almost six months now, and we've j ust completed a revi ew of t he fi rst fi ve month s. As I thi nk some
of you know, we developed a campaign plan in the July time period, John Negro ponte and I , with
both t he embassy staff and my st aff, and we've been working toward that ever since. And so we did
our fi rst maj or assessment here at the fi ve-month point.
I can t ell you that I feel t hat we' re broadl y on track in helping the Iraqi people complete their
transition to a constitut ionall y elect ed govemment at th e end of next year. We also believe that this
objective is bot h reali sti c and achievable.
Now I r ecognize that t hat may not be an impression that we all share here, and I by no means
want t o give you the impression that thi s process is going to be uncontested or viol ence-free. That 's
not going to be th e case.
But as we have seen in Naj af, in Tall Afar, in 5amarra and in 5adr Cit y, t he Iraqi people are
fighting to throw off the mantle of t error and intimidati on, so that th ey can elect t heir own
govern ment and build a better life for the I raqi people.
There Is progress across Iraq every day, and every day we and our Iraqi part ners are a step
closer to accomplishing our objecti ves.
Now let me j ust make a couple of points wit h you. First of all, th e insurgency that we'r e
fight ing is not 10 f eet tall. They'r e a tough, aggressive enemy, but th ey' re not 10 feet t all. They' re
t he same peopl e who have oppressed th e Iraqi people for th e last 30 years. They're th e reason that
over a mill ion I raqis are mi ssing and why probabl y several hundred thousand of th ose mi ssing I raqi s
are likely in mass gr aves around Iraq. They' re focused on th eir ret urn t o dominance, so t hat th ey
can continue to plunder t he great natural resources of Iraq. They offer no alternati ve vision. They
offer only intimidation and subj ugat ion.
With the win in Fallujah, with the li berati on of Fallujah, they no longer have any safe havens
anywhere in I raq. And also, as a result of th e success in Falluj ah, it was driven home t o t hem th at
they cannot defeat the coalition for ces.
50 th ey're attacking our will and the will of the Iraqi people, and I personall y do not believe
that th ey will def eat th e indomitable spiri t of 25 milli on fr ee people who want t o build a better life
for themselves and for th eir famili es.
second point; The Iraqi security forces are getting st ronger every day. Our plan to build t he
I raqi military and pol ice forces is broadl y on tra ck. By February there will be 70 trained and
equipped battalions In the I raqi army; one of those wil l be a mechanized infant ry batta lion.
Progress has also been made in the police and special police for ces. By February there will be
six public order battalions, a special police regiment , four police commando battalions and some
nine regional SWAT teams -- special weapons and tactics teams n all of them contributing to the
fi ght against the Insurgents and the terrorists on a day-to-day basis. As most of you know, we still
have a way to go In this area, but as I said, we're broadl y on tra ck and generally very pleased with
the performance of the Iraqi security forces.
Th jrd pojnt ; Reconstruction momentum is bUilding. I n June there were only around 230
proj ects actually what we call turning dirt, actually start ed, on the gr ound. By the end of November
there were over 1,000, with a value of over $3 billi on. All of this in spite of insurgents' efforts to
disrupt the reconstruct ion process. This is a great tribute to the folks that work on those proj ects,
particularl y In the embassy and the coalition businessmen and women who are over there working
to build a better I raq.
fourth point; The interim government and their security forces are broadly accepted by the
Iraqi people. Some poll ratings for the government are as high as 70 percent approval rati ng. The
Iraqi people express a generally favorable opinion about their new army and about their police, and
more than 60 percent of I raqis believe that the country Is headed In the ri ght direction and they are
optimi sti c about their future.
We're also broadl y on track for the electi ons. Fourteen of the 18 provinces have less t han -.
four or less mctdents of Violence a day, and the registrati on process in most of the country was
executed . The Iraqi election committee is working on some alternative solutions for the two areas of
the country In which it was disrupted.
I want t o be cl ear ; The insurgents and t he terrorists will continue to attack and attempt to
disrupt the election process. And we see that dally. They won't succeed. And the electi ons in
January will then be but anot her step forward in our relentl ess progress toward a new Iraq.
Now if I could just say a word to the home audience here In the United States. As a nation you
can take great pri de in the role t hat our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are playi ng in helping
bulld a new, a better I raq. Each and every one of them recognizes the Importance that successfully
accompli shing t his mission holds for our own security, and each and every one of t hem makes a
difference every day. Wherever I go I see their acts of bravery, ccmpesslon and selflessness, and I
couldn't be prouder of t hese wonderful men and women.
Our success to dat e Is also a tribute to t he great men and women of t he I raqi security forces
and the coalition who have given thei r lives t o defeat terrorism and to help t he I raqis t o help build a
new I raq. We grieve wit h the loved ones of all our service members and wit h those of Iraqi service
members who have died.
We are humbled by their sacrifice and their contribution In bri nging fr eedom to Iraq, and we
ar e humbled by their sacrifi ce in enhancing the securi ty of the Unit ed States and the coalitio n.
Lastly, we are, especially duri ng the holiday season, also deeply thankful for the love and
support of our famili es and loved ones, whose sacrifi ces and strength underpi n everything that we
do.
Progress towards a constitutionally elected government will not be easy. Nothing worthwhi le
ever is. But the challenge of helping the people of I raq build a better future is one that the I raqi
people in the armed for ces of 30 freedom-loving countries can take on.
So thank you very moen, and I'll take your questions.
.2 General, based at least partl y on the candidates the Shl' a are offeri ng, are you concerned
on what Influence I ran may have over the I raqi government after the January elect ion?
GEN, CASEY; I missed the very first part of your questi on.
.2 Based at least in part on what candi dates the Shl'a are offering, are you concerned about
the possible influence that Iran might have on the I raqi government after the election?
GEN. CASEY; My personal view" and this is political, but I'm here every day and I'll give you
just my personal view. I don' t see substantial I ranian Influence on this particular government that
will be elected In January. I see I ran as more of a 10ngeHerm threat t o Iraqi security. But that 's
just n that's my view, and from .. I'm a mil itary person who's j ust n who's there.
.2 You mean n from a longer view, are you tal king about a possible military attack as opposed
to poli tica l?
GEN. CASEY; No, I don't -- I'm not talking about that. I'm j ust saying from a stratearc
perspective, I raq is a long-term threat to stability -- I 'm sorry, Iran Is a long-term threat to stability
In Iraq. If you look on the other side, I think Syria is a short-term threat because of the support
they provide to the former Ba'ath lst leaders that we see operati ng In and out of Syri a.
.2 Thank you, General.
.2 General, you talked about how the government is considering alternative solut ions in some
of those Sunni Triangle areas where rect streucn is a probl em. As I underst and It, one of those is
holding elections over a longer period of time; more than one day, in other words . What's your
assessment of the security situation In doing them? Doesn't that j ust give a longer period of time for
potential attacks by Insurgents? And also could you tell us what the America n role is In security of
t hose elect ion sit es?
GEN. CASEY; I do not thin k the extended electi on period Is sti ll on the t able. I know that was
discussed, but I've discussed it with some of the leadership in t he I raqi govemment. I don't believe
it's on the table anymore, at least It wasn' t when I left.
We are working closely with the Mini stry of Int er ior and the Iraqi elect ion committee
(SIC/commission) In building the securi ty plan for the elections.
I t 's not finally formed yet. It will be probably by the end of thi s month. In general the role of
the ccaunon forces will be one of broad-area security, and it will be the Iraqi securit y for ces that will
work the specifics of t he polling areas and pl aces like that .
.2 General , how concerned are you that the s unnrs will not part icipat e or not tum out in
numbers sufficient in t his electi on, not only because of the security situation, but simply because of
disaffection? And if t hey do, what does t hat mean?
GEN, CASEY; Again, I wish n my political consul tant, John Negropont e, could probably do a
better job on this one. My view is -. I ' ll give you my opinion. My opinion is that there will be Sunnl
participation In thi s In a reasonable amount . I believe that the insurgents are pursuing a strategy I
call purposeful disenfranchisement by intimidati ng Sunnls away from the election process so they
can say, t he Sunnis didn't vote, so therefore the electi on Is 1 don't think that's gOing
t o be a successful strat egy, but it 's one that they' re trying to Impl ement . So I think there will be
sufficient Sunnl participati on in this for people to accept the fact that it Is a reasonabl y free and fair
election.
2. You talked about at the polling places it would largely be Iraqi security forces. There's what,
9,000 polling places?
GEN. CASEY; It's undet ermined. Somewhere between 6(,000) and 9(,000); 9(,000) is the
high end.
.Q And when you look at the number of Iraqi security forces, it seems like t here wouldn't be
very many I raqi securi ty forces. If you could talk about t hat, the numbers at t hose polli ng places.
And I know you don't want to be t oo specifi c on t hat, but if you' ll gi ve us more det ail about what the
Americans will do. Maybe sort of rapi d reacti on? What?
GEN. CASEY; Again, we're sti ll worki ng t hrough t he process, but it ' s like any type of security
sit uation. If you want t o guard, you don' t guard every place just at t he point . You guard it away
from the point. You restri ct access t o it. You keep vehicles from moving in the directi on of the
polling places around it . I mean, there's a range of opt ions t hat you do to reduce exposure of these
particular sites, rat her than j ust tak ing 20 t o 30 people and huddling around the site itself. That's
being worked out.
My experience with elections in t he past, in Bosnia and xoscvo, again t he forces of the
coaliti on, the security forces normally operate away from t he polling sites in an area security role
and do provide reaction force if there's problems.
And t he ot her thing we do and we will do and are doing is to conti nue t o conduct operations
prior t o t he elect ions to di srupt the insurgents and to keep them from disrupting the election
process. 50 the re's an offensive component t o this as well .
.Q General , you talk about the progress in security across Iraq. It seems t hat t hat airport road
is a symbol of what many people say is a growing insurgency. What is t he story with that road? And
why can't U.S. and I raqi forces patrol it effectively to stop t he attacks that are happening on It?
GEN, CASEY; I wouldn't necessarily see it as a symbol of a growing Insurgency , I would see it
as a symbol of the growing use of car bombs in t he insurgency. And t hat r e a l ~ y is the quest ion of
the airport road. It' s a t actic that's been adopt ed by the insurgents, They don't have to do much. A
car bomb a day in Baghdad or on the airport road sends a symbol t hat the insurgency is very
powerful, when In actuality I don't believe that t hey are. It's a classic technique of t he urban
insurgent . They are trying t o provoke us t o do something that will make us look like we' re
overreact ing to t hem.
I mean, you could t ie up tra ffic -- I mean, if you searched every car getting on t he airport
road, you'd put that part of Baghdad in knot s. 50 it really is t he issue of dealing with car bombs. We
cont inually work on t hat. And we will get -- we will get t o a point where the airport road is secure
and our people and the people in t he embassy are prot ected against car bombs. But as wit h any
battl e, it's an ect ton-reacttcn-ccunterectron cycle that we go through wit h the enemy and the enemy
does to us.
.Q So is there a pl an for that road or just a broader plan for attacking t he terrorists and their
ability to make car bombs?
GEN, CASEY; I t 's a little bit of each, but we' re actively worki ng wit h the minister of Interior
and his traffi c forces on ways t o reduce the threat s to our forces on t he airport road.
.Q. Sir?
GEN. CASEY; Behind you, and I'll come back.
.Q Yes, General. This is Drew Brown with Knight Ridder. I know you addressed this in your
opening remarks, but in your view, are we winning in I raq? And how do you defi ne winning? And as
a follow- up, do you believe, given t he current situation there, that credible nat ional elections will be
held or coul d be held or are possible t o be held by January 30th?
GEN. CASEY; My view of winning is that we are broadly on t rack t o accomplishing our
object ives, which is a constituti onally elect ed govemment t hat Is represent at ive of all the I raqi
people and with I raqi security forces that are capable of maintaining domest ic order and denying
I raq as a safe haven for t error. And I believe we will get there by the end of December ' 05, and I
beli eve we are on track t o get there by December of 'OS.
What was t he second part?
.2 About the elections, do you thi nk that .-
GEN. CASEY; I do.
.Q. n given the situation, it's -- that credible elections will be held on January 30th?
GEN, CASEY; I do. I mean, it is going to be hard. They will fight us every st ep of the way. But
I do believe elections are -- credibl e elections can be held. I mean, again, in the south and in the
nort h, 14 of those 18 provinces, my u what I believe is that they will be unevent ful . They will be
contested in the center area of the country, but I believe that we will succeed in that.
.Q. As a fi nal n final questi on, how do you -- how do you u what do you t ell the families of
servicemen who have been killed and maimed over there? How do define victory in Iraq, ultimat e
victory to these people who are losing t heir loved ones?
GEN, CASEY; I think I j ust did. But what I'd say to the famili es is what I said in my opening
statement . These soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines that have died over there have given their
lives t o help 25 mil lion Iraqis bui ld a better life and t o Improve the security of the United States and
the coalition.
And these young men and women went over there knowi ng that would be a possibili ty, and
God bless them. That 's what makes this country great.
.Q. I'm curious. Coul d you elaborate a little bit more on the sit uat ion up along that border?
There was supposed to be a joint border commi ttee that was meetin g to work out the cress-border
t raffic. Has that fallen apart?
And would you also address down In the sout h, It's my understand you all are sti ll holding
some number of Mujahldeen-e-khalq at a camp down near Kuwai t. What' s their st at us? How many
are t here? And what' s going t o finally happen t o them? And when?
GEN. CASEY; Last part first. That' s more up north. There ar e n my last recollection Is that
there was about 3,000 MEK folks still there at a camp, that we are worki ng their process with the
Red Cross. I do not have a timeli ne of when that process wi ll be complet ed.
.Q. So what will happen t o them?
GEN. CASEY; Their ultimate disposition, where t hey"
.Q. Where are the y going to go?
GEN. CASEY; Almost every one of the m has a different story, so it's a vari ety of different
places.
I 'm sorry, what was your first?
.Q. And the first one is, what 's going on at the Syrian border? You had a commi ttee that was
looki ng at that .
GEN. CASEY; Oh. There was a meeting. That process is conti nuing. I will t ell you, my
personal view is the Syri ans are mak ing some efforts on the border, but they'r e not going after the
big fi sh, whIch is really the people that we're int erested In. And we' re really interest ed in them going
aft er t he senior Ba'athlsts that are providing t he di recti on and financIng for the Insurgency inside
Iraq. That's what we' re realty like t o see them do.
.Q. Because you guys obviously can't cross the border to go aft er them.
GEN, CASEY; Right .
.Q. Yeah, your emphasis on t he elections is making them shape int o a falri y decisive element of
the entire campaign. What would be the consequences if they are successfully disrupted by the
insurgents? What's at st ake here?
GEN. CASEY; I t has been an important intermediate step in our campai gn plan since we
started this . But it is a step in the process. You' re asking me a hypothetical . I don't really know the
answer t o that.
2 Well, you plan for fail ure.
GEN, CASEY; Well, you also -- you pl an for success. I really don't have a good answer to
that , and I'd rather not get int o a hypothet ical situati on.
2 All right , you had said that wit h the fall of Fall uj ah for the insurgents, they don't have a safe
house Inside the country anymore. Mosul, since Falluj ah has seen a lot of tr ouble up there, what is
the st atus of Mosul now? And do you thi nk that Is becoming a safe haven for insurgents? And what
are you doing t o try t o alleviat e the ongoing problem up t here?
GEN, CASEY; l et me talk about safe haven for a minute, what I mean when I say safe haven.
For me, a safe haven is a place where insurgent s and terrorists can go and plan, and build
improvised explosive devices, and bring in recruits and receive them in, gi ve them trai ning, link
them up with operations, stage for operat ions, rehearse operat ions, wit h impunity .
And that 's what they had in Fall uj ah, and that' s what t hey don't have anymore. That's what
they had in Samarra for a while . They don't have that .. (inaudible). That' s what t he Muqtada militia
had In Najaf. They don't have t hat anymore.
So they' ve lost the abil ity t o operate any place wit h impuni ty. So what 's going on in Mosul, in
my view, Is not a safe haven. It's an area where Insurgent s have gone and have had some success
against t he local securi ty f orces.
Now our folks, operat ing with additional I raqi security forces, have rest ored the status quo.
But I wi ll t ell you more wor k needs t o be done the re t o Improve the securi ty sit uation prior to
electi ons, and it will be done.
2 General Casey n
2 I'm sorry . Could I j ust follow up? Do you see at all that Mosul is becoming a safe haven? I s
the re an effort at all, any intelligence that shows that these folks have act ually st art ed moving int o
Mosul and they'll make that kind of their Fall uj ah?
GEN, CASEY; I see no evidence that the t errorists are trying to make Mosul a safe haven as I
defi ne "sere haven.~ It is cert ainly an area where t hey are operati ng and attempti ng t o disrupt the
election pr ocess and the coali ti on and IraqI security force operat ions, but not a safe haven.
.Q. General Casey, if you -- if indeed, as you say, t he terrorists and Insurgents have lost the
ability t o operate with impunity, they've lost their safe havens, then how do you explain the fact
that they continue to take such a toll , to be so effecti ve against the Multinational Forces?
And what -- a second question -- what , if anything, will the Multina ti onal Force be doing
di fferently between now and January 30th to improve the situation and insti ll confidence in the I raqi
people that they can safely go to the polls and vot e?
GEN. CASEY; To be clear, I said that they could operate with Impunity inside the safe haven.
They are clearl y operating elsewhere around I raq.
Now these levels of violence since Fallujah have dropped dramati cally. And they are actuall y
now down at the levels pri or t o Ramadan and reall y right where -- back where we were at transfer
of sovereignty. So the level s of violence have come way down.
I do not n they are not necessari ly operati ng effecti vely against coalition for ces. I n fact, when
we look back, the numbers of attacks don't necessanlv produce a very high volume of casualties . I n
fact, a lot of the attacks are in fact ineffect ive against coalition forces. They are frankly more
successful against civilians and in some cases against I raqi security forces.
.Q. And the second part of the question. What , If anything, will you be doing differently between
now and the end of January to do --
GEN. CASEY; Oh, yeah.
.Q. -- in spite of all this, instill t he confidence t o the Iraqi peopl e that they can safely go t o the
polls and vot e?
GEN. CASEY; That 's a great question. We -- I think you know a few weeks ago I asked for
some additional f orces bef ore the elect ion period. We felt we needed to keep up the momentum, to
keep the pressure on t he Insurgents that moved away from Falluj ah after the Fallujah operation
t ook place. And t hose forces are going to help us bot h keep the pressure on them and then get a
more secure envi ronment prior to the elections.
The other thing that's happening now is, as I ment ioned, t he I raqi security forces are
graduating. They'r e coming out of their t raining. And we'r e .. 18 of those 27 battalions are on line,
and I think 12 of them have come on line in about the last 45 days.
And so they are now available to enhance securi ty across Iraq,
Pollee continue to graduate. We cont inue to crank out the poli ce commando battalion. So there
will be a concert ed effort across Iraq, particular ly in the greater Baghdad area and the Mosut area
and in the AI Anbar provi nce, all the way up to January 30th .
.Q. You said In your opening statement you were generally pleased with t heir performance.
That doesn't sound like a ring ing endorsement.
GEN. CASEY; I said we are generally pleased with t heir performance. Everybody knows there
have been instances -- M05Ul is a good example -- where the police collapsed. But there are 12
provinces where the poll ee are doing very well every day. So it's a mi xed bag, but we're generally
pleased.
The forces in Fallujeh -- the I raqi battalions that fought in Falluj ah did very well . And they'll
become the cent er, really, I think, of what the Iraqi Army becomes.
Eri c?
.2 General , the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard have missed their recrui ting goals
the last two months. The National Guard is announcing new Incent ives for that. Given the fact that
the Guard and Reserve represent about 40 percent of your forces over there and will conti nue to
remain an Important part u a source of your troops In the immediat e future, how concerned are you
that many of these acti ve duty forces who would normally fl ow Int o the Reserve and Guard are not
doing so because t hey don't want t o have t o go back t o places like I raq and Afghan istan? How big a
concern Is that to you as the commander of forces on the gr ound there?
GEN. CASEY; Frankly, it's not something I 've thought about deeply In about six months u
when I was the vice chief . But dearly a good flow of active forces Int o the Guard and Reserve is
somet hing that will benefit the Army, the Guard and Reserve over the long hauL And again, I
haven't thought about it in a while there, but It's somethi ng I think we need t o pay attention t o and
cont inue t o encourage and maybe incentivize active forces t o cont inue t o move into the Guard and
Reserve.
.2 General Casey, could I ask you a questi on about the level of sectari an violence? Do you
think it's on the rise? There have been several lnddents recently u the bombing yesterday against
the Shl'a and bombing of a bus load of Kurdish militiamen up In reosut. How do you assess that
aspect of the insurgency?
GEN. CASEY; I woul d not assess that there is a high or seriously increasingl y level of
sectari an violence at this ti me. There are dea rl y incidents . It is a troublesome trend, and it is one
that we will continue to watch closely.
.2 What do you think the source of it is? Is thi s n I mean, Zarqawi in his famous letter talked
about trying t o foment Just thi s sort of thing . Do you think that' s where these thin gs are --
GEN, CASEY; I woul dn't want t o guess on that. But you' ve quot ed a potenti al source.
Go ahead.
.2 General, you said a few times that th ings are broadly on track. But now that you've been
there six months, can you give us any specific areas where you had hoped to be further along than
you are at this point ?
GEN , CASEY; Fair question, because t he analysi s t hat we did did look at that . I'll t ell you, I
would have hoped we had been further along on the Iraqi .- helping t he Iraqi u particul arly the
mini stries I'm concerned With, Ministry of I nt erior, Ministry of Defense .. in building their
intelligence serv ices up.
We're work ing counteri nsurgency. I ntelligence Is key t o that. And what we've said, and what
we've seen to some degree but not the extent that I think we can If we build these effective
Int ell igence services, Is that we benefit from what the Iraqis know about t hemselves. So that's going
t o be one of our main prtortnes for the next year.
The second major t hing that we'll be working on for next year Is the local police. We are
contl nuino t o tra in folks. We've adapted their training program t o make t hem more able to operate
In a counterinsurgency environment. You know, the cop on the beat doesn't normally necessari ly
think he' s going to get attacked by a carload of guys. They need t o have some paramilitary-type
skill s so they can defend and protect themselves and operate In a count eri nsurgency environment .
So that's the second point.
Third point Is I think we' ve got to do more work on the borders and on the border guards, and
that will be another f ocus f or the next year.
.2 General , I want t o go back t o one thing you said about the insurgency, t hat they' re not 10
feet tall . That's a statement that 's been used in the past t o describe the Soviet Union soldier, the
Viet Cong, and yet we had trouble in Vietnam and it was stru ng out a long time. What is your best
int elligence about the resili ency of t he insurgency, its ability t o reconstitute? (Inaudi ble) -- you can
cut off a lot of t ails but you got to get at the head.
GEN. CASEY; Oh, absolut ely.
2 Should the American public and t he Iraqi publi c expect thi s insurgency just t o go on in some
form for quite a while no matter what happens January 30th?
GEN. CASEY: I t hink we ought to be clear that when they have the elect ions on the 30th of
January, the insurgency's not going t o go away. I mean, you mentioned some other cases, but if
you look at the history of insurgencies, these areprot racted events. They go on for a long time.
Now, they won't necessaril y go on at the same level and they won' t necessari ly go on at a level
where it will require 150,000 Ameri can troops, especially when we' re creating I raqi security forces
that we'll work wit h over t he next year to help them build independent counterinsurgency capability,
but insurgencies generally go on for a long period of time, and I think you'd expect to see t he
insurgency in I raq go on at some level for a long time.
2 They seem to be more sophisticated. I heard that there was command and control
sophist ication or the attacks seemed to have picked up. It doesn't seem t o be getting less
sophi st icated, but even more as you kill a lot of t hem.
GEN. CASEY; We are seeing military capabil iti es. I wouldn't say necessaril y sophisticated, but
we are seeing military capabilities in platoon-size attacks that we had not necessaril y seen before.
But for them to conduct an attack like that takes a lot of their t ime and their effort, and we' re not
seeing a lot of these.
2 Gener al, coul d you j ust clarify your st atement on Syri a, what your concerns are about their
role in t he insurgency or perhaps t he going and comi ng of foreign terrori st s across that border ?
GEN. CASEY: I have two concerns with Syria. One, as you suggest, is foreign fi ghters. And we
see a facilitati on mode through Syria, foreign fi ghters coming into Iraq. I do not see direct Syri an
govern ment involvement in t hat facilitati on, but It is coming through Syri a. And I do believe that
t hey have the capability to st op it if they had t he will t o stop it .
The second point is we have fairl y good information that t here are senior former Be'at hfst s,
members of that they call the New Regional Command, operating out of Syria wit h impunity and
pr OViding direction and financing for t he insurgency in Iraq. And that needs t o st op.
2 I s al-Dourl one of t hem?
GEN. CASEY; He's back and n he's a back and forther. He's not necessaril y in there.
2 General, could you -- just a qui ck n
STAFF: Let's make this ~ - let 's make this the last one, General.
2 can I do a qutck, you know, questi on on .. you said t o Kathleen (sp) that t he I raqi security
forces are performing well in 12 of t he provinces in your own -- right? But one of t he things you also
say is t hat 14 of the provinces are in pretty good shape. So it would seem that In those 12
prov inces they haven't really been tested. I presume before Mosul happened, before the most
recent Violence, you probably thought those Iraqi security forces were perf orming well. I mean,
they're the retrained Iraqi security forces. So if they haven't been t ested yet, aren' t t here still
concerns about how they would do? I mean, I guess yesterday in Samar ra a poli ce st ation was
attacked and not a shot was fired , and they also left the area.
GEN. CASEY: The 12 or 16 provinces, what I meant, those were police, not necessari ly all
I raqi security forces. Just police. And whether or not they' ve been t ested, some of t hem have. In
the south, during the Muqtada milit ia attacks, there were several pollee stations that were attacked
fairl y heavily, particularly the one in Kut for example, and t hey did fight very well. But there is
somethi ng to what you're saying about untested .
Now in Mosul, we have seen problems wit h the police in Mosul over a period of time. And so
the fact that all of t hem coll apsed at the same time was a surprise. The fact that they had a chief of
police who was not very effecti ve and who many believe was corrupt -- that problem up there had
been gOing on for a longer period of time, so it wasn't a complete shock.
Ust en, th ank you all very much. Come over here and see us.
STAFF; Thank you all for attending.
.Q. (Off mike) n are they commanding, actually, t he insurgency, this new regional command
out of ..
STAFf; No, that's their name.
.Q. That's what they call themselves.
GEN. CASEY; Thank you.
END.
II
Thank you, General.
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
CDR. OCJCS/PA
Friday, December 17, 20041 2:25 PM
Haddock, Ell en (Katie), Col, OCJCSIPA
Rhynedance , Geor e, COL, OASD· PA; Davis Archie Col, IV
OASD-PA; OASD·PA; OCJCSlPA
RE: TPs from Casey for review '-----...
Col ,
t hese TP a re very t ho rough a nd ext ensive. I know we discussed possibly t hr eadi ng some of
yest erday 's PC s eminar theme s i nt o them, but I have no t received the "bl essed- feedback
ye t f r om the J 5 folks.
I t hi nk we s houl d let these stand on t hei r own and perhaps f or next Tues pres s conf e r ence
with SD/CJCS, t hey could use some of the PC seminar theme s .
VR
> - - - --Ori
>From: OABO-PA
>Sent : Fri day, December 17, 2004 12 : 04
>To: Haddock , El l en (Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS/PA; LeDR, OCJCS/PA;
CDR, OCJCS! PA ... ......
>Cc: Rhynedance, George , COL, OABD- PA; Davis , Archie , Col, OASO- PA;
CI V OABD- PA '--------...
>Subject : TPs f r om Casey f or r e vi ew
>
>All:
>
>At t a ched plea s e f i nd the fi rs t draft o f talki ng poi nts of f Gen. Casey' s bri efing s .
>
>The sources are att ached - (1) t r anscript of Casey 's pre sse r yesterday and (2) t r ans c r i pt
from Bonnie Sci arretto in Ar chie 's shop of Casey's bri efi ng (phone ) to the milit ary
a nal ys t s .
>
>1 '11 s tand by and wait for di r e c t i ons .
> « File : TP 12- 17- 04 Ge n. Casey I r aq upda t e . doc »
>
> « Fi l e : 12 -16 -04 Casey with mil anal ysts .doc »
>
>
« File : 12 -16- 04 Casey Pe ntagon pr esser . doc »
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subj ect:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
Frida December 17, 2004 12:36 PM
CDR. OCJCSlPA
Rhynedance. Gear e COL OASD-PA; Davis Archie Col, -,' CIV
OASD·PA OASD·PA LCDR. OCJCSIPA
RE: TPs from Casey for review
Col ,
LCDR, OCJCS/ PA
Sounds like a p lan t o me.
The s e look g reat. Recommend you l a unc h t he m, an d we ' l l add i n t o t he pr ess conf
a nyth i ng more we get e arl y next week.
Tha nks for your hard wor k .
VI R
Co l H
> - : -- - Or i g ·
>From: CDR, OCJCS/ PA
>Sent : Fr i da y . De ce mbe r 17 , 2004 12: 25 PM
>To: Haddoc k , Ell en (Kat i e) . Co l , OCJCS/ PA
>Cc : Rhyned , OASD-PA- Davis Ar c hie
CIV OASD-PA; OASD- PA;
>Subject: RE: TPs f r om Casey for revi e w
>
-cei •
>t hese TP a r e ve ry t horough a nd extensi ve . I know we d isc u ssed po s sibly t hr e adi ng some o f
yest e r day's PC semi na r the mes int o t hem, but I ha ve not received the "b l e s s ed " feedbac k
yet f r om t he J5 fol ks .
>1 t hi nk we shou ld l e t t he s e s t a nd on t hei r own and perhaps f or next Tue s p r ess confe renc e
wi th SD/CJCS , the y could use s ome o f t he PC semina r t heme s .
>VR
>
>
> From : OASD-PA
> Sent : Friday, De cember 17 , 2004 1 2 :04 PM

Ellen (Kati e ), Col , OCJCS/ PA; LCDR, OCJCS / PA;
CDR, OCJ CS/ PA
> Cc : Rhyne dance , Geo rge , COL, OASD-PA; Da v i s, Ar c h i e , Col , OASD-PA;
a;;;;;,.._-\, CI V OASD- PA L. .....
> ubject: TPs f r om Casey f o r r e v i e w
>
> Al l:
>
> At t ac hed p l ea s e fi nd t he f irst draf t o f t al k ing poi nt s off Ge n . Case y ' s bri e f i ng s .
>
> The s ources a r e at tac hed - (1 ) t r anscri p t o f case y 's p res s e r yest erday a nd (2)
trans c ript from Bonnie Sci a r r e t to i n Arch i e's s hop o f Ca s e y ' s bri e fi ng (phone) t o t he
mi l ita ry ana lysts .
>
> I ' l l stand by and wai t for d ire c t i ons .
>
>
>
> « Fi l e: TP 12-17 - 04 Gen. Ca s ey I raq update .doc »
>
> « File : 12 -16-04 Ca sey wi t h mil analysts .doc »
>
> « File : 12-16 -04 Casey Pe nt agon pres s e r . doc »
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS!PA
Thursda ,Janua 06, 20057:40 PM
u cci. JCS SJS "')(8)..-- - - '-
COL. JCS VCJCS; IV. JCS VCJCS; Thorp. Frank. CAPT,
OCJCS/PA CIV.OCJCS/PA
MOH Recipients to CENTCOMAOR
Jack Jocobs, a r etired Ar my colonel , military analyst -- a nd Medal of Honor r e cipient is
organizing a group of a handful of Meda l of Honor r ecipients who are interested in goi ng
to Iraq and Afghanistan to visit with the t roops, t o offer encouragement and motivation .
He is an acquaintance of Gen Pace 's, and ha s asked him for his input on how t o proceed .
Gen Pace asked me to get with Legal to see what, if any, support we mi ght be able to
provide. Could t hese guys travel via mili tary aircraft, would the Chai rman and/or Vice
have to accompany them, could they be worked into a "USO" type show, or ????
At your convenience , I would like to discuss this wi t h you, and get your input on how best
to proceed .
Thanks for your he lp ,
ViR
Col H
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Subj ect :
Tha t's fi ne.
J u s t wanted t o
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
2005 7:04 AM
ltCol , JCS SJS
""''''''il<1''''''' ec =,p!.! lents.toCENTCOM AOR
get i t on your s cop e (be for e i t f ell out o f my bra i n altoge t her. ) Vi R Col H
CI V, J CS VCJ CS; Tho rp,
;> ;> From; I Lt Co l , J CS SJ S
;>Se nt : Fr ida y , January 07, 200 5 6; 06 AM
;>To; Haddock, Bl len ( Kat i e ) , Col , OCJCS/PA
;>subj e c t ; RE; MOH Rec ipients t o CENTCOM AOR
>
;>Ma ' a m,
>
;>1 probably won 't ha ve a chance t o get to t hi s unt il next wek .
>
;>v / r
>
> -----Origi na l Message-----
> From: Haddock. El len (Ka t i e ) , Col , OCJCS/PA
> Sent : Thu rsda Janua 06 , 2095 7 : 40 PM
> To : Lt Col, JCS SJS
> Cc : COL, JCS VCJCSi
Frank , CAPT, OCJCS! PA; CIV, OCJCS PA
> Subject: MOR Rec ipient s t o CENTCOM AOR
>
>
>
> Jack Jacobs, a r e t i r ed Army colonel, mil itary analyst -- and Medal of Honor
recipient i s organiz ing a group of a handful of Medal of Hon or recipients who are
interested in going to Iraq and Af ghanistan t o vis i t with t he troops, to of fer
encouragement and motivation. He i s an acquaintance of Gen Pa ce 's , and ha s asked him f or
his i nput on how t o proceed.
>
;> Cen Pa c e a sked me t o get wi t h Legal to see what, i f any, support we mi ght be a ble to
provide . Coul d these guys travel v i a mi l i t a r y ai r c raft, woul d the Chairman and / or Vice
have to a ccompany t hem , could t hey be worked i n t o a "U50" type show, or ????
>
;> At your c onve ni e nce , I wou ld like to d i s cus s this wit h you , and get your input on
how best to proc e ed .
;> Thanks f o r your help,
;> Vi R
;> Col H
1
",-,
Follow up
Flagged
Wednesday, January 12, 2005 10:21 AM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie) , Col, OCJCS/PA
RE: MOH Recipients 10 CENTCOMAOR
~ ICol, JCS SJS From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Follow Up Flag:
Flag Status:
Ma 'am,
> -----Original Message-----
>Fr om: Haddoc k , El l en (Katie), col, OCJCS/PA
>Se nt : Thu r s da J a nua r y 06, 2005 7:40 PM
:>To: )(8) Lt Col, J CS SJS ........ ,
»cc r COL JCS VCJCS; ";.';;':<7;;;;- - - - .....
CAPT , OCJCS PA, CIV, OCJCS/PA
:>Subj ect: MOR Recipients t o CENTCOM AOR
CIV, JCS VCJCS ; Tho rp , Frank ,
>
>Jack Jacobs, a retir ed Army colonel , military a nal yst -- a nd Medal of Honor recipien t is
organi zi ng a group of a handful of Meda l of Honor recipi ents who are i n t e r e s t e ~ i n going
to Iraq and Af ghani s tan t o visit wi t h the troops, t o offe r encouragement and mot i va t i on .
He is a n acquaint ance of Gen Pace 's , and has asked hi m for hi s inpu t on how to proceed .
>
>Gen Pace a s ked me to get wi t h Legal to see wha t, if a ny, support we might be able to
pr ovi de . Could t he s e guys trave l via mi l i t a r y aircraft, woul d t he Chai rman a nd / or Vi ce
have to accompa ny them, could t hey be worked into a " USO" t ype show, or ? ?? ?
>
>At your convenience, I woul d l ike t o di s cus s this wi th you , and get your i nput on how
best to proceed.
>Thanks for your help,
>V/R
>Col H
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Military Analyst
Coverage · Ir...
AFIS-HQ/PIA l(Il)
2005
larry.dirita Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman,
B an SES OASD-PA
.
Merritt, Roxie T.
CAPT,OASD-PA
Rh edance, Geor e, COL,
How former military members serving as media analysts viewed the Iraqi election
Military Analyst Coverage- Iraq 02010S.doc
TV Broadcast Summary :
Analysts Tommy Franks, Jed Babbin, Don Shepperd, Montgomery Meigs and Jack Jacobs were all
featured on national news stations (Fox News, CNN and MSNBC). General ly speaking, all
agreed that t he e lection was not as violent as expected and that the Iraqi s ecurity forces
and American troops did a very good job . Several analysts a l l uded t o t he f a c t that t here
wi l l be more danger ahead. The analyst mood was positive as I raqi events unfolded.
Print/Online/Radio Summary :
Mi litary analysts ' discussion of Sunday 's e lect ion i n pr int , online and radio out lets was
mi nima l , l imited to accounts quoting Wil liam Nas h and Bob Scal es . General Nash was
f e a t ured on NPR before and during t he election process (January 30th) while Bob Scale s was
quoted in The Bal timore Sun (reprinted by The Sou th Florida Sun Sentinel ) on keepi ng
troops safe in Iraq. In addition, a washington Times r e ade r wrote a letter t o t he paper
comment i ng on Sca l es' Op-Ed piece from e a r l i e r in the week on t he need to raise troop
levels .
The attached memo provides informat ion on what each analyst said and how often they
appeared on television.
2
MILITARY ANALYST COVERAGE
IRAOI ELECTIONS
Print/Online/Radio Summary:
Mili tary ana lysts' discussion of Sunday's el ect ion in print, online and radi o outlets was
minimal, limited to account s quoting William Nash and Bob Scales. General Nash was
featured on NPR before and during the election process (January 30
th
) while Bob Scales
was quoted in The Baltimore Sun (reprinted by The South Florida Sun Sentinel) on
keeping troops safe in Iraq. In addition, a Washington Times reader wrote a letter to the
paper commenting on Scales' Op-Ed piece from earlier in the week on the need to raise
troop levels.
William Nash (NPR)
• Iraqi troops "doing their duty" and enforcing security well
• Statements made about U.S. troops pulling out within 18 months "may be
ambitious, but it's a good start."
• Nash emphasized the importance of the U.S. supporting, not leading efforts for
the new Iraq, and avoiding being asked to leave Iraq.
Boh Scales (Baltimore Sun - print/online)
• The Sun piece described the Pentagon's plans to take U.S. soldiers from their own
uni ts and add them to Iraqi units.
• Scales: "It (embedding with Iraqi unit s) would put our troops' safety at risk, as
they'd be more vulnerable to insurgent attacks."
• The key here is to quickly solidify the Iraqi troops as a standalone force from U.S.
troops.
TVBroadcast S ummary:
Analysts Tommy Franks, JedBabbin, Don Shepperd, Montgomery Meigs and Jack
Jacobs were all featured on nation al news stations (Fox News, CNN and MSNBC).
Generally speaking, all agreed that the election was not as violent as expected and that
the Iraqi security forces and American troops did a very good job. Several analysts
alluded to the fact that there will be more danger ahead. The analyst mood was positive
as Iraqi events unfolded.
Representative remarks per analyst are as follows:
Tommy Franks (Fox News - Hannity & Colmes / Fox & Friends)
• Troops feel great about what they' ve done in relation to the elections
• Any election in the Arab world is a "big deal"
• This is the first practical exampl e of democracy in the Arab world
• Does not agree with comments made by Senator Kerry and Senator Kennedy
• He is proud of the work troops have done
• Last thing you want to do is announce your "t imetable" for withdrawal
J ed Babbin (MSNBC Live Coverage - Iraqi Elections)
• Withdrawa l from Iraq is "Simply the worst thing we could do"
• Withdrawal would strengt hen the terrorists and weaken the Iraq people
• We have to look at the bigger picture, we have to deal wi th all the Jihadist nations
that are influencing Iraq
Don Sbepperd (CNN Live From....)
• What we did in the run up to the election made a big difference (i.e. controlling
traffic flow around polling areas)
• There were extensive offensive operations to stop terrorist before voting took
place especially in relation to forei gn insurgent s
• Thi s weekend was very stressful for coalition forces
• It was very important for the Iraqis to pull thi s off
Montgomery Meigs (MSNBC Live Coverage - Iraqi Elections)
• Events in Iraq have gone surprisingly well
• It is a very tough process in inventing a new government
• We will see more Iraqi forces come on board with fewer American troops
• We will have to watch how Sunnis are brought into the process
• Doesn't thi nk the coalition wi ll change after the vot e
• Need to continue to watch insurgent s from Syria and Iran
J ac k Jacobs (MS NBC Live Coverage - Iraqi Elections)
• Highlight ed "hot spots" in Iraq in real-time durin g the polling process
• Jacobs, duri ng the polli ng, predicted high voter turnout
• Securi ty expectations were "managed we ll"
• Provided an overview of how insurgents might infli ct violence duri ng the vote
• Said the training of Iraqi forces by the U. S. military was key
• Questioned whether "t wo Iraqs" would arise until the next election in October
(religious and cultural di vides a potential after Sunday' s election)
WHERE THE ANALYSTS APPEARED
• Tommy Fra nks
• Montgomery Meigs
[]Jed Babbin
DJack Jacobs
• Don Shepperd
12
6
Haddock, Ellen (Katie) , Col, OCJCSfPA
2005 1:11 PM
APT, JCS J8
CAPT, JCS SJ S;L- .J .LCDR, OCJCSIPA
FW: NOS Rollout
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subj ect :
Below i s schedule for t omorrow' s press event .
Line - up r ight now is Mr . Feith and Admira l Sulliva n t o discuss t he s t r a t egi c document s
(NDS/NMS) OSD has express ed i nt e r est i n having someone f r om J8 "i n the wings " during the
pre s s briefing i n t he event t ha t the l i ne of ques tioning takes a PROGRAMMATIC t urn .
NOT someone senior to Admiral Sullivan (made very clear t o all ) but if someone is
ava i l a bl e , I would recommend t hey be on hand from prep a t 1115 through the pr ess briefing
a t least (1215) but through the conf e rence call with mili tary analysts (1300) woul d be
preferred.
Any possibili t ies?
VI R
Kati e
:>1115;
:> 1130;
:>1215;
Prep Fei t h/Sullivan in Whitman 's o ffi ce
Feith/Sullivan Pent agon Pr e s s Corps Brief i ng/ Re l e a s e
Feith/Sullivan Ana l ysts Br ief i ng
Fei th Targe ted Me di a and I nternal I nt e rvi ews (Ra di o/ Pr i nt , Pentagon
>
:> - FYI only
:>1300-;
Channel , AFIS)
> from 130 0 - 13 4 5
:> a t 1345 ; Needs t o be firmed up. Have tal ked t o
>her once
>
>
>
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject :
I say we go wi t h the knowledgeabl e 06 . .. if you' ve got a name, I 'll r un wi t h i t , j u s t like
we thi nk we 're smart .
Is MG Hunzeker out o f poc ke t ? Some one a s ked , a nd I said I thought he wa s TDY. . .
ViR
Kat ie
LCDR, OCJCS/PA
OCJCS/PA
)(8)
e- - - - -
CAPT, J CS J8
Ma r c h 17 , 2005 12 : 44 PM
t i e ), Co l , OCJ C'fi s"l.. p"A'- ..
CAPT, JCS SJS ; LCDR, OCJCS/PAi L. .1
Pr e p Fe ith/ Su l l ivan in Wh i t man ' s office
Fei t h/ Su l l i v an Pe ntagon Pres s corps Bri e f ing/Release
Feit h/ Sul l i van Anal yst s Br ief i ng
Messa ge -- -- -
From: Haddoc k , El l e n (Katie) , Col,
Sent : Thursda Marc h 17 , 20 05 12 : 11 PM
To : CAPT, JCS J 8 ....... ..
Cc: CAPT, JCS SJS ;
Subject : FW: NOS Ro llout L ..I
Any po s s i bi l i t ies?
ViR
Ka t ie
1115 :
1130 :
121 5 :
>
>
>
>
>
>
:> - - -- - Orig i na l Me s s a
:> Fr om:
:>Sent : Thur sday,
:>To :
»cc . )(8)
CAPT, JCS J 8
>Subject: RE: NOS Rollout
>
>Ka tie, RDML Bl a ke i s the Fr e nc h CHOD Es cor t t h i s week . As s uch , he i s
>out o f pocket f o r this ev e nt. Offer an 0-6 with c urrent Budget
»KnowLe dge . VR
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:> Below i s schedul e for t omo rrow' s pre ss event .
> Li ne-up r i ght now is Mr. Fei t h and Admiral Sulliva n to d iscuss the s trat egic
documents (NOS/NMS)
:> OSD has expressed i nte rest i n ha v i ng someone from J8 "in the wings " duri ng the press
brief ing i n the eve nt that the line of ques t ioni ng takes a PROGRAMMATI C t ur n.
:> NOT some one senior to Admira l Sul l i van (ma de ve ry c lear t o all) but i f s ome one i s
avai lab le , I woul d r e comme nd they be on hand f rom prep at 111 5 through t he press briefi ng
at l e ast (1 215 ) but thr ough the conference cal l wi th mi l itary anal ysts (1300 ) wou l d be
p referred.
>
>
>
Feith Targeted Me d i a a nd Internal I nterviews (Radio/Print , Pe ntagon
)(8)
from 1300- 13 45
a t 13 45; Ne eds t o be fi rmed up . Have t a l ked t o
L..-__---I
>
>
>her onc e
>
>
>
:> - FYI onl y
:> 1300 - :
Channel, AFI S)
.J'£n!""""'l.-""'"/'''4
1
r'v'
FIS-HQ/PIA 1'''''' From:
Sent: Frida Ma 13 20054:57 PM
To:
11''''
-
Haddock Colonel Ellen
....
Merritt Roxie T. CAPT
-
....
anee bro -
)(ll)
IThome Frank
1'I'j(i)---------=--.. •.-.-
r'"
Subject: Initial Media Reaction to BRAe announcement
Atta chments :
BRAe Post Briefing-
Mediageec...
BRAG Post Briefi ng- Media Reaction - 051305.doc
The attachment inc l ude s an examina t i on of medi a cove r age from t he top 10 news
outlets by circulation a nd nat iona l t elevision br oadca s t stations f ol lowing the BRAe
a nnounceme nt . Ea r l y onl i ne coverage consis ted pri mar i ly of a r epri nt ed AP story
a nnoun c ing the number of c l os ur e s and cos t savings. La t e r update s i ncluded more or i ginal
commentary and r eaction from s tat e offici al s and legi s lators. National t elev ision had
s imi lar cover age a nd i ncluded commentary by mi l i tary analysts.
1
BRAe Base Realignment and Closure 2005
BRAC - POST PRESS CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT
MEDIA REACTION
FRIDAY 13, 2005
The following includes an examination of media coverage from the top 10 news outlets
by circulation and national televis ion broadcast stations following the BRAe
announcement. Early online coverage consisted primari ly of a reprint ed AP story
announcing the number of closures and cost savings. Later updates included more
original commentary and reaction from state officials and legislators. National television
had similar coverage and included commentary by military anal ysts.
ONLINE HIGHLIGHTS
Immediate coverage of the announcement :
~ The NYT, WP, USA Today, NY Dail y News and WSJ reprinted an AP story,
without adding origi nal report ing.
» Denver Post, Houston Chronicle tailored the AP piece for a local slant
~ The L.A. Times, Chicago Tribune and At lanta Journal-Constitution ran original
stories.
Updated stor ies incl uded:
~ A WP piece on the proposal to shut down WaIter Reed
}> A NYT piece by Eric Sclunitt and David Stout on "intense reaction" across the
country to the announcement.
Co mmentary included:
}> Reprinted AP stories highlighted overall cost savings, a "massive shift of US
forces," employment numbers in affected communities, and part of a written
statement by the Secretary: "Our curr ent arrangements, designed for the Cold
War, must give way to the new demands of the war against extremism and other
evolving 21st Century challenges."
o Also incl uded several quotes from state legislators who were disappointed
in their state's closings. For exampl e, New Jersey's Fort Monmouth was
on the list, to which Democratic Rep. Rush Holt vowed to: "Fight like hell
to change if' and "the Pentagon' s error."
» "Atlanta was a major loser . . ." but the rest ofGA fared well and the state will gain
jobs.
}> The news that Illinois will lose jobs due to closures, but such major installations
as Scott Air Force Base will stay open was greeted with "loud applause: '
}> That CO has no closures and will gain jobs was called good news for the state by
Wayne Allard, R-Col o.
)l> "California has done very well in this round" of closures, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-
Alpine), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said today
Messages and quotes:
:> The aim to "promote jointness" - "The Pentagon also proposed eliminating scores
of Reserve and National Guard bases, part of Rumsfeld's effort to promote
"jointness" between the active-duty and reserve uni ts." (NY Dail y News, via an
AP article).
:> The updated NYT piece on immedi ate reaction to the closures:
o Quoted Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute: "savings are
generated more by reorganization than closures"
o Quoted Gen. Richard Myers: "The degree with which the services
coordinate, integrate and operate together will be increased, and it will
include how we manage some of our bases and posts."
o The Secretary "sought to ease fears" about unemployment caused by
closed bases.
TELEVISION HIGHLIGHTS
:> ''Bottom Line - the DoD needs the money. They want to make better use of tax:
payers money" - (CNN)
:> People in congress are saying "t he battle starts today" - (Headline News)
:> ''There is li fe afte r closure but it is diffic ult" - Audience interview (Fox News
Dayside with Linda Vester)
:> We are going to fight thi s decision and we have plenty of ways to fight it -
(MSNBC - Rep. Rob Simmons)
:> Emphas is on which bases have had j ob gains (rat her than losses) - (Fox News)
» BRAC sets-up a nat ional competition between communities ... that is what thi s
process is about - (Fox News Dayside with Linda Vester)
:> Historically. Jess than 10% of bases were able to get off the list - (Fox News
Dayside with Linda Vester)
» Analyst : General Montgomery Meigs comments:
o Efficiency is the core principl e of this BRAC closure
o Enhancement of "joint consol idation"
o More open minded mili tary culture
o Biggest challenges: communities that lose jobs
o BRAC is probably a combination of the transformation initiat ive and the
wars overseas
ONLINE EXCERPTS
THE ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION
ORIGI NAL: Four Georgia bases on closure list
Ron Martz, Bob Kemper
9:24 AM
After surviving four previous rounds of base closings unscathed, metro Atlanta took a
maj or hit on Friday in the latest announcement of facilities the Pentagon wants to shut
down.
The Pentagon announced it plans to close three bases in the Atlanta area ~ Fort
McPherson in southwest Atlanta, Fort Gillem in Fores t Park and the Naval Air Station in
Mari etta. That wi ll mean a loss of near ly 6,500 mi litary and civilian j obs and about $560
mi llion in annual payroll.
Whil e Atlanta was a maj or loser. the rest of Georgia fared well and the state wi ll act ually
gain abo ut 7,500 military and civilian positions...
State officials had no immedi ate word on the list but Gov. Sonny Perdu e was holding a
news conference and will visit each of the targeted facilities later today.
"We' re disappointed. We think the community action group did a great j ob. ... We 're
prepared to chal lenge the recommendat ion," said Fred Bryant, deputy director, Georgia
Military Affairs Coordinating Committee. "We don ' t know yet what were the key factors
in the decision."
THE CHICAGO TRI BUNE
ORIGI NAL: Illinois takes job hit but escapes major base closures
Rebecca Carroll, AP
8:56AM CDT
Illinois would lose nearly 2,700 mili tary and civi lian jobs under base closur es
recommended Friday by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfel d, but the state's major
mil itary installations would remai n open.
Scott Air Force Base, located about 20 mi les east of S1. Louis, near Bellevill e, emerged
as the big winner, gaining 797 military and civilian jobs. Great Lakes Naval Training
Center in North Chicago is slated to lose 2,022jobs . . .
The announcement that Scott would not close was greeted with loud applause and a
standi ng ovation at MidAmerica Airport in Mascoutah, IlL, where lllinois U. S. Sen. Dick
Durbin and Reps. Jerry Costello and John Shimkus held a news conference to announce
its fate.
DENVER POST
ORIGINAL: Colorado a Winner in Base Closure Plans
Mike Soraghan, Denver Post Staff Writer and The Associated Press
09:31:52 AM, updated at 11:00 AM
...Not only was Colorado spared any base closures, the state stands to gain nearly 5,000
militaryjobs. .. Members of Colorado's congressional delegation expressed pleasure over
the plan's impact on the state.
"I think it's good news for Colorado and it's great news for the Colorado Springs area, "
said U.S. Sen. Wayne Allard, R-Colo., who served on the Senate Armed Services
Committee until recentl y.
HOUSTON CHRONICLE
UPDATED: 180 U.S. military bases targeted for closure by Pentagon
AP - 10:08AM, updated at 10:39
. .. The 147th Fighter Wing ofthe Air National Guard will remain at Houston' s Ellington
Field under the plan. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison said the wing's mission will beshi fting
from national defense to homeland security.
LA TIMES
ORIGINAL: Califor nia Largely Spared in Latest Round of Base Closures
Tony Perry, rmes StaIfWriter
. . .The Los Angeles Air Force Base, the language facility at Monterey and major Navy
and Marine Corps bases in San Diego were spared in the Pentagon's list ofbases
proposed for closure, which was unveiled this morning.
"California has done very well in this round" of closures, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-
Alpine), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said today...
Cal ifornia' s biggest job loss appears to be the Naval Surface Warfar e Center in Corona,
which employs 900 workers and is listed for closure .. .
Although the Pentagon's list is meant to be only the beginning of the process, 85% of
bases targeted by the Pent agon in the past have been closed
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
ORIGINAL: Pentagon Plans to Close 33 Major Bases - AP
Liz Sidoti
12:44 PM EDT
NEW YORK TIMES
ORIGINAL: Pentagon Proposal to Include Shutti ng 33 Ma ior U.S. Bases - AP
11:01 AM
UPDATED: Pent agon Proposes Shutting 33 Major U.S. Bases and Oth er Cuts
Eric Schmi tt and David Stout - I :II PM
The bases proposed for closing include some famili ar names in mil itary history: the
Navy's submari ne base in New London, CoM., Fort McPherson in Georgia, Fort
Monmouth in New Jersey and the Pascagoula Naval Station in Mississippi. Scores of
smaller installations would also be closed, and others would be consolidated.. .
Whi le the list ofrecommended closings was smaller than expected, the reaction from
those affected was intense.
Senator Joseph L Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut, called the recommendation to
close the New London base, which would cost several thousands jobs, "irrational and
irresponsible."
"It insults our history and endangers our future," he told The Associated Press.. .
"The savings projected by this round seem to be generated more by reorganization than
outright closures," said Loren Thompson, a military analyst with the Lexington Institute,
a consulting finn. "At present, the military is very inefficiently located and organized.
Many facilities are sited in places that made sense a century ago but not now."
After more than two years of exhaustive study, this round ofbase closings is an integral
part ofMr. Rumsfeld's strategy to revamp the military into a leaner, more agile force.
"The degr ee with which the services coordinate, integrate and operate together will be
increased, and it will include how we manage some of our bases and posts," Gen. Richard
B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said.
Mr. Rumsfe ld sought to ease fears in many communities that closings could leave
thousands of local employees out of wor k. He cited examples of closed bases that had
been converted into commercial airports and economic centers. And he pledged that the
Defense Department would provide retraining for workers and economic aid to help
offset the immediate economic impact in communities where bases close.
USA TODAY
UPDATED · Battle over Bases Begins: Pentagon proposes closing of 33 maj or bases
- AP
Updated 12:30 PM
... One maj or closure Rumsfeld seeks is Ellsworth Air Force Base in Sout h Dakota, home
to 29 B- IB bombers, half the nation's fleet of the aircraft , and the state's second largest
employer.
Republican freshman Sen. John Thune on Friday called the Pentagon "flat wrong" about
Ellsworth, and he vowed to help lead the fight in the Senate to delay the entire round of
closures. "We will continue to keep Ellsworth open," Thune said . . .
Rumsfeld also recommended closing the Naval Station in Pascagoula, Miss., which
barely survived previous base closure rounds. The decision was a blow to Sen. Trent
Lott, R-Miss., who had fought the 1995 round of closures. At stake are 844 mi litary jobs
and 112 civilian jobs...
New England took a major hit, and Connecticut suffered the biggest loss in terms ofjobs
with the proposed closure ofthe U.S. Naval Submari ne Base in Groton, Conn. Shuttering
the installation would result in the loss of 7,096 military j obs and 952 civi lianjobs.
Calling the recommendation "irrational and irresponsible," Sen. Joe Lieberman (D-
Conn.) said, "It insults our history and endangers our future."..;
WALL STREET J OURNAL
ORIGINAL: Pentagon to Propose Closure - AP
UPDATED: Pentagon Proposes Closure Of About 180 Installations - AP
10:55 a.m.
Later updated with AP piece
WASHINGTON POST
ORIGINAL: Pentae:on Proposing to Shut 33 Ma ior Bases - AP
Liz Sidoti
11:01 AM
UPDATED: Pentagon Proposes Shutting \V.lter Reed
William Branigin and Ann Scott Tyson
12:54 PM
The Pent agon today proposed eliminating about 180 military installations across the
country in a new round of base closures and realignments aimed at saving nearl y 549
billion over 20 years , One major proposal calls for essentiall y moving Walter Reed Army
Medical Center from Washington, D.C. , to a new state-of-the-art. jointl y staffed faci lity
in suburban Maryland. ..
Housing and some research facilities at the Walter Reed site in Washington woul d stay
open, but the faci lity as it exists today would practicall y be shut down, and it would lose
5,630 military, civilian and contractor jobs...
Among the luckiest states on the list is Maryland, which gains 9,293 jobs -- more than
any other state. The District loses 6,496 jobs under the proposal -- mainl y from the loss of
Waiter Reed -- while Virginia loses 1,574.
The hard est-hit states include Connecticut, which loses 8,586 jobs; Maine, with a loss of
6,938 jobs; and Alaska , whicb stands to Jose 4,619. Overseas, a total of 13,503 jobs
would be cut in the closure or realignment ofU. S. mi litary install ations in Germany,
South Korea and elsewhere. Many of those jobs would move to the United States.
TELEVISION EXCERPTS
MSNBC
5/1 3/20052:19:22 PM
Newscaster : Joining us to talk a little bit more about the strategic impli cations of today's
announcement is MSNBC anal yst Mont gomery Meigs. Thank you so much for taking the
time today. Meigs: Good to be on the show. Newscaster: It's unusual when you think
abo ut closures and the loss ofjobs as something that might be helpful and mi ght make a
uni t or a situation better. But can you explain to us why this realignment wi ll make the
mi litary stronger? Meigs: Sure. There are three things that I see. First of all as general
efficiency, a lot of these face that's are being closed can beconsolidated with other
functions . And can you get more things done for the equivalent DoD dollar . Efficiency
that is the first principle. Secondly, there is some joint consolidation going on. So, for
instance, the third Army headquarters, which is now in Atlanta, is being moved to Shaw
Air Force Base where it will consolidate with the Air Force headquarters that also works
for U.S. central command. So that will make planning easier, coordination, etc. and
enhance jointness. Finall y within the Army, Chief of the StafTof the Army is breaking
down some of the tribal barriers. He' s consolidating the infantry and armor schools, a
number of the logistics schools. That way you'll get much more open minded culture in
the office corps of the army. Newscaster: Knowing Secretary Rumsfeld's vision of a
more compact Army, do you think this was something that, perhaps, was always in the
planning or is it a result of fighting two wars? Meigs: Well, I think it's a combination.
For instance, foreman was up for election last time. This time they're going to close it and
move the headquarters a little further north in the state of Virginia. And there are some
things that have changed as a result ofwhat we've seen in the last 10 years. Now the army
is going to have more brigades than it has in the past. You have to have a place to put
them. Some of that is deflected in the BRAC numbers . Newscaster: We talk about all
the positive things that will come out ofthis. What is the difficult thing? What is the
challenging thing? The not so great news today? Meigs : Well, you got to have some
communities that are going to lose jobs. That ' s a painful transition process.
Fox News Channel
511312005 1:17:35 PM
Interviews with Tom Markham (Association of Defense Communities) and Jim Saxton
(New Jersey, Congressmen)
Those that are losing will be trying to reverse the signatures of the Pentagon. That's what
this process is about. Linda Vester: Tom, you have been through this. You know what
the fight is like when you try to save your base. How often is it a winning fight? Tom
Markham: Those hit during the first four rounds of closures said less than 10% of the
communities were able to get off the list. We don't know about this round but that was
the case in the last round. Linda: This is democracy in action, but, you know,
communities who are supportive of the military are being forced to compete with each
other to stay alive. Rep. Saxton: That's true. While, less than 10% of the bases may have
gotten off before this is not a mission impossible task to get a base ofTthe list. I would
point out in 1989 and 1991 both those round of BRAC, Fort Dix was on the list and it got
off In 1993 McGuire Air Force base was on the list and it got off So, we've got a good
record ofknowing how to do this in New Jersey, we'll spare no effort to try to make our
case. Linda: I want to bring a member of the audience. Tum out this fellow is a retired
Marine. I would have thought you would say not to close the base. But instead, you said
no, close them down. Audience Member: I'm assuming all the work that's being done
there can be done elsewhere. The reason they are closing them is they are obsolete or not
need. If they are not needed they should close. Linda: How well do the communities get
handled after the fact in terms of retraining and stuff like that? Tom Mar kbam: There is
some retraining that goes on. However, the main challenge after these bases do close is
the economic recovery. As an example, in Denver we have been closed for 10 years. We
lost 700 jobs and $290 million a year spent on the local economy. Today we have 20,000
people living there, new houses, and a $4 billion economic impact. The message is that
there is life after closure but it's difficult.
Headline News
5/13/2005 11 :31:50
Newscaster: Tens of thousands of military and civilian personnel could lose their jobs.
Jami e Mcintyre joins us live from the Pentagon with details. Hi, Jaime. Mci ntyre: Hi
Kathl een. It started as a major military operation this morning lone capitol hill as several-
inch-thick base closure recommendation report was delivered to capitol hi ll where
lawmakers are very interested to hear whether their particular bases are being closed or
scaled back or in some cases actually gaining, according to this Realignment plan
released by the pentagon. Lets look at some of the major closures. Thirty-three major
bases . Here are some ofthe top ones around the country. New England would lose the
submarine base at New London and also the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard targeted there.
The naval station in Mississippi is on the targeted list. Cannon air force base in Texas as
well as Ellsworth air force base where they have the b-2 bombers. The Pentagon plans to
keep the planes, j ust move them to other facilities. In some cases some of the bases are
gaining in some personnel and responsibility. Again, twenty-nine of thirty-three major
closures. twenty-nine bases where they are going to have major reductions. Then another
forty-nine bases will be gaining either in personnel or missions under this Pentagon plan.
which now goes to the base closure commission over the next couple ofmonths. That
begins its work on Monday when the Pentagon will formally present this plan and
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld will testify favor of it. One of the arguments they are going
to make is that tbis plan has been carefully worked out, the pieces are interdependent and
to change one base could affect the whole plan. The commission is going to have to look
at the whole thing in entirety whether it sends recommendation to the president and
ultimately to Capitol Hill . Newscaster: Is there the possibility that the commission
could change its mind about some of these closures or is this really a done deal?
Mcintyre: well, in the past, the base closure commission has made some changes. but the
prospect for any particular base is going to be kind of tough. The pentagon has spent a
long time working up the rational e for each one of these. They say it is based on mili tary
necessity. They say they need the savings that have come from the base closings. The
whole reason, there is an independent commi ssion to do this is that if it were left up to
congress, no base would ever be closed because members of Congress would simply
stall.
CNN
5113/2005 1:05:03 PM
Newscaster: There's a lot of people crying foul already Jami e. We' ve received so many
e-mails and viewers wanting to know. sort of asking the direct question. during a time of
""operation Iraqi freedom"" and other ongoing wars. why base closures? What' s the
strategy. militarily for safety here at home. homeland security and, of course, fighting
wars overseas? J amie Mcintyre: it's a very simple answer is, they need the money. That
savings that I talked about, the Pentagon needs that money for better weapons, better
materials, to better use the forces. Right now they're spending a lot of money on facilities
they don't really need. They haven't been able to close them since 1995 because of the
politics and the very sensitive nature of these kinds ofclosings. Because in particular, in
1995, there were accusations of people playing politics with the list because of the
presidenti al election. It made it almost impossible for the Congress to agree to a round.
They want to get as much savings as they can to make better use ofthe taxpayers' money.
When it comes down to the base in your backyard people don't want to see that go.
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
5:15 PM
CAPT, JCS SJS
!!; L; I JCS J3;
CS; CIV, JCS SJS; CDR, OCJCSIPA;
LTC, OCJCSlPA 10,.;;,;...._.....
FW; RETIREDMILI TARY ANALYSTS MTG- 16 June 05
Draft Agenda · Military Analysts.doc
Draft Agenda •
Mil".., Analys.. . lliliir-- .,
I apo l ogize up f r ont f or the s hort l ead on t h i s one.
OSO PA occ a siona lly hosts a g r oup of ret i red military personn el who now s e rve a s media
a nal ys t s ( " t a l ki ng head s") -- t hey a r e scheduled t o be i n t he Pent agon on Thu r sday , 16
J une from 1130-13 45 . Agenda is attached .
La s t week, e SD asked f o r t he Chairman t o part i c ipat e ; he ' s on l eave . Gen Pace has
i ndi cated his schedul e i s too bus y on Thu r sday , s o we a re now l ooking for another
gene ral /flag o f ficer t o appr opriatel y represent t he Joint Staff with this group .
Ot her spe a kers i nc l ude Ac t i ng Deps ecDe f England, Pr i nc ipal Deput y As s i stant Sec r e tary f or
I nterna tional Se curity Af f ai rs Pe ter Fl ory, a nd a fi nal wrap · up wi t h Se c r etary Rums f e ld .
Requi r eme nt i s 30 mi nute s , f rom 1200- 1230 , and rathe r t han p rovide them wi t h a det a i led
bri e f , t hi s g r oup pre fer s the opportuni ty t o have a di s cus s i on (Q&A. ) Not s ure i f t he
Direct or or J 3 woul d be i nt e r e s t ed/ ava i l abl e, bu t I woul d app r e c i a te your he l p with t h i s
one.
As of this mor ning, t he list o f r e tir ed mil i t a ry analys t s who are conf i rmed t o attend :
Colonel Ca r l Kenn e t h All ard (USA, Reti r ed )
Li eu t enant General Frank (Ted) B. Campbe l l (USAF, Reti r ed)
Lieutenant Colonel Bi ll Cowan (USMC, Ret ired)
Mr. J ed Babbin (USAF, J AG)
Ma j o r Dana R. Dil l on (USA, Re tired )
Co lonel J ohn Garret t (USMC, Retired )
Command Se r gean t Ma j o r St eve n Greer (USA, Reti red )
Admiral David E. J e r emiah (USN, Reti red)
Lieutenant Co lonel Robert L. Maginni s (USA, Re t i r ed)
Col onel J e f f McCausland (USA, Ret ired )
Gene r a l Mon t gomery Me igs (USA, Re t ired)
Maj or F . Andy Me ssi ng , Jr . (USAR, Ret ired)
Cap tain Chu ck Nas h (USN, Re t i r ed)
General William L. Na s h (USA, Retired )
Wayne Simmons (USN, Reti r e d )
Thanks agai n f o r your he lp .
ViR
Kat ie
> --- - -Or i gi na l Me s s a e- - - · -
>Fr om; Cl V, OASD- PA
»senc . Tue s da June 14 , 2005 4: 35 PM
>To: CDR, OCJCS/ PA
>Subjec t: dra ft agenda
>
s f or your he l p on t hi s.
>
>
1
,
,
,
>080 public Aff a i r s,
:>Communi ty Relations and Public Liai son
The Pent a gon
:>Was nO . 20301 -14 00
,ll2l
,.L..-__......
,
>www.Ameri caSupportsYou.mi l
,
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Tracking:
Recinient
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.ead
Read: 611412005 5:26 PM
Read: 6114120057:32 PM
Read: 6114120056:04 PM
Read: 61' 4120055:27 PM
Read: 611412005 5:47 PM
React 6115f2005 8:55 AM
Read: 6114120055:17 PM
As of June 14, 2005
4:00 p.m.
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
Meeting with Military Defense Analysts
Thursday, June 16,2005,_ ,........,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Conference Room The Pentagon
AGENDA
11:30 a.m, Wel come and Introduction
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Ms. Allison Barber
11:31 a.m. Update on Detainee Operations
• Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy Gordon England
12:00 p.m. Update on Glohal Operations
• Joint Staff - TBD
12:30 p.m, Update on GWOTllraq Operations
• Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Peter Flory
1:00 p.m. Break
1:15 p.m. Discussion and Questions with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
1:45 p.m. Meeting Concludes
• Ms. Allison Barber
OCJCS/PA
RE: newest agenda
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Wednesday, June 15,2005 1:09 PM
Barber Allison CIV, OASD-PA
Maj,OCJCSIPA,,'L .. CIV,OASD-PA;'. oJ CDR,
Subject:
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Allison,
we're experi enc ing s ome sche dul i ng issues -- is i t at a l l possib l e t o swap t he J oint Sta f f
bloc k o f t i me (1200 - 1230) with Mr. Flory' s bloc k o f time ? (1230- 1300) ? ?
Thi s would a llow t i me f or Gen c onway t o do the press b r ief i ng wi th Mr . Di Rita begi nning
at 11 30 , and s ti ll get over to the Mil Ana l ysts on t i me .
ThoughtS? ??
V i R
Katie
:> - - -
:>From; CIV , OASD- PA
:>Sent · a y, J une IS , 20 05 12 ; 37 PM
:>To; CDR, OCJCS/ PA
:>Cc; Maj , OCJCS/PAj Ha ddock, El len ( Ka t i e ), Col,
:> Subj e c t: RE; newest agenda
OCJ CS/ PA
>
:> he' s more than we l c ome t o si t at t he head o f t he t a ble if that feel s mor e natural . s e c de f
prefers to s t a nd.
:> a s menti oned, the a nal ysts have a s ke d about recrui t ment and r e t e nt ion issues , so t he
general will mos t like ly be asked t ho s e questions.
:> a l s o, i j ust heard f rom the deputy 's office t ha t he (sec england) is going to be s peaking
about QDR, BRAC, NSPS and Acquisition, fyi.
>
:>t ha nk s
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
- - -- - Or i g i
Fr om; CDR, OCJCS/PA
Sent; Wednesda June 15 , 2005 12; 26 PM
To; CI V, OASD-PA
Cc; Maj, OCJCS/ PAj Ha ddoc k , El l e n (Kat ie), Col ,
Subject: FW; newest agenda
OCJCS/ PA
-- - --Orig i
Fr om: CIV, OASD-PA
Sent : wednes day , June 15 , 2005 12:22 PM
To : CDR, OCJ CS/ PA
Subject : newes t agenda
>
>
>
>
>
:> he s tands a t the head of t he t a b le? ?? s eems odd.
:> Anyway , because DiRi ta wants t o a l s o do a pres s brief t omor r ow at 1130, we 're
j uggling ge ne r a l s . Lt Ge n conway may do the press brief a nd BG Ham may do t he anal ysts.
I 'l l let you know a s soon as we have a decision.
:> Thanks ,
>
>
>
:> hi there .
:> tha nks for t he phone c al l . attached is t he most rece n t a genda.
:> p lea se l e t me know what a / v ne e ds the genera l wi l l have . a lso, if t he r e i s any thing
he woul d like handed out , i will ne e d i t nI t 1600 s o t hat i c a n p r e pare the bri e fing books
f o r the a na l y sts .
:> genera l l y, we do not have a podi um. secdef s t a nds at the he ad o f the tabl e s o t hat
i t feel s like mor e o f a d i s c uss i on , so t ha t' s the f ormat we 're as s uming a ll of our
1
s peakers wil l hav@. l e t me know i f this is not doable.
=> thanks!
,
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Cot, OCJCS/PA
Frida June 17 20052:21 PM
CAPT, JCS S J S ~ ~ ~ ~ l : = = = 5
CDR, OCJCSIPA; LTC, OCJCSlPA; MAJ,
Maj, OCJCSfPA; LCDR, JCS OCJCS\PA;
MAJ,JCS SJS
MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
perhaps you can help dire c t me on how to best s upport this a ction:
SecCef , J3, and ot he r s met wi th several ret ired military analyst s yesterday. They
di scussed a number of i ssue s, wi t h great empha s i s on GTMO and De t a ine e Opera tions. Se cDef
encouraged t he m a l l to go t o GTMO and see f or t hems e l ve s . OSO PA i s currently worki ng
wi t h SOUTHCOM to ar r ange a v i si t t o GTMO by thes e mili t ary anal ys t s soon - - could be a s
soon as firs t week or two in July. I' ll get t he date from SOUTHCOM once they have f i rmed
up a plan.
OSC PA has taken members of this group on s imilar trips -- jus t not t o GTMO.
Question/role for Joi nt Staff i nvolve s the air t r a nsport a t i on . I believe t he intent is t o
fl y t hem in e a r l y and out l a ter on t he same day .
What can we do t o e nsure dedicated ai rl ift is available to s upport this vi si t ?
Thanks f or your help .
Vi R
Kat ie
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject :
Haddock. Ellen (Katie). Col. OCJCSIPA
esc un 00512:46 PM
JCS SJS
Thorp. Frank. CAPT. OCJCSIPA
RE: Mil ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Bel ow is a sampl e; these a r e the f olk s who at tended t he roundtabl e wi th SecDef ( a nd
DJ3 ) last week.
The g r o up is made up of r etired mili tary who serve a s "t a l ki ng bea d s " for va rious media.
OSD PA has c oord inated other v i s i t s in t he past t o help e duc a t e them on wha t 's really
going on in Iraq, e tc.
The y also do a c onference call with t he m on a r ecurring basis.
We (J o i nt Staff ) usual ly provide a J3 ops briefer for t he cal l. Occa s i ona lly the Chairman
o r t he Vi c e do t he call -- de pendi ng on t he top i c / i s sue at hand . CJCS/ VCJCS try t o mee t
with t he ret ired mi l itary ana lysts each time they actual l y ha ve a group of t hem i n the
Pentago n , but last week's schedule was t oo har d , wi t h the Chairman o ut of t o wn, so t he OJ3
fi lled in .
Hop e t ha t he l p s .
VIR
Kat ie
Katie, do you have a ny details o f t h i s g r oup ?
Capt ain, JAGC, US Navy
Legal Counsel t o t he Chairman of t he Joint Ch iefs of Staff
1lIi......."'ol-"'p.aAAOP- - - - -
Fr om: Ca pt , JCS SJS
Sent: Mo nday, June 20, 2005 6:18 AM
To: Haddock, El l e n ( Kat ie), Col , OCJ CS/PA
Sub j e c t : RE: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLI FT REQUEST
(USA, Retired)
Campbe l l (USAF, Retired )
(USMC, Re t ired)
(USAF , JAG)
(USA, Retired)
(USMC, Re t i r e d )
(USA, Reti red )
(USN, Retired)
(USA, Re t ire d )
(USA, Re t i red)
(USA, Ret ired)
(USAR, Ret i r e d )
(USN, Reti r ed)
(USA, Re tired)
(USN, Retired)
Conf i rmed Retired Mili t a ry Analysts :
Colonel Carl Kennet h Allard
Li e ut e na nt General Frank (Ted) B.
Li e ute na nt Col onel Bi l l Cowan
Mr. J ed Ba bbi n
Ma j o r Da na R. Di l l o n
Colone l J ohn Garrett
Command Sergeant Major St even Gr e e r
Admiral David E. J eremi a h
Li e ute nant Co lone l Robert L. Maginnis
Co l o nel J e f f Mc Ca us l and ,
Ge neral Mon t gome ry Meig s
Ma j o r F . Andy Me s s i ng, J r.
Captai n Chuck Na s h
Ge ne r a l Wi l l i a m L. Na s h
Wa yne Simmons
- --- -Origi na l Me a s a ge - - - - -
From: MCNabb, Dunc a n J, Lt Gen, JCS J4
Sent : Sunday, June 19 , 2005 10:11 PM
To : Schwa rtz , Norton A, Lt Gen , J CS OJS
cc • Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, J CS J4j J4 ;
Ha ddoc k Ellen Katie ) , Col , OCJCS/PA; Capt, JCS SJ S j
CAPT, JCS SJSj J-4 JLOC Personnel j Harnitchek , Mark
1
D, RDML,
Subject:
J CS
Re:
J 4 ;
MIL ANALYSTS TO
COL, J4
GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Norty,
Our folks have been running the traps.
affairs activi ties such as this per DOD
We can provide dedicated
45 15 .13 -R, Chapter 3 .
airlift for public
coordinated thi s wi th our pol icy experts and OCJCS/LC.
Per OSD Exec Sec yesterday, once OSD/PA and OSD Transportation policy coordinate and
DEPSECDEFapproves the travel, exec sec wi ll transmit to JS (J4) f or validat ion and tasking
USTRANSCOM . We have already given TRANSCOM a heads up.
We 'll fi nish wor ki ng it with the OSD fol ks on Monday and keep you i nf orme d on progress .
VR
Duncan
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
J -4 JLOC Personnel
( Katie) ,
JCS SJS
JCS SJS
Col, OCJCS PA
Sent: Sat Jun 18 10:07 :51 2005
Subject : RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQUEST
Duncan, please take for action. Could we get this approved for SAAM? Thanks. vir,
Norty.
- - - - - Or i g i na l Mess a e - - - - -
From: CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent : Saturday, June 18, 2005 8 :58 AM
To : Schwar t z, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc : McNabb , Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4; Harnitchek, M
COL, JCS, J 4 ; Haddock, Ellen ( Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLI FT REQUEST L.-----------------'
Sir :
During Thursday 'S SecDe f session wi th military analysts, he apparently e ncouraged them
t o go t o Gitmo a nd s ee t h i ng s for t he ms e l ve s . OSD PA is worki ng t his with SOUTHCOM bu t
question has arisen as t o what we can do wi th dedicated DoD lift to support getting t hem
in a nd out o f Git mo. Recommend passing this to the J 4 team and letting them work it.
v r
USN
AssJ.s tant
Joint Staff
CAPT
Execut1ve
Director
l(2)
-----original Message- -- --
Fr om: Ha ddoc k , Ell en (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
2
LT
MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQUEST
MAJ, J CS SJS
Subject:
Sent: :2: 21 PM
To: CAPT, JCS SJ S
cc. OCJCS/PA; MAJ·,
JCS SJS' Maj, OCJ;S!PA; LCDR, JCS OCJCS\ PA;
"---'"
Perhaps you can help direct me on how t o best suppor t t his action :
SeeDe f , J3 , and othe r s me t with s everal retired military analysts ye ster day . They
discussed a number of iss ues, wi t h great emphasi s on GTMQ and Detai nee o pe r a tion s . Se e De f
encouraged t hem all to go t o GTMO and see f or themselves . a so PA is currently wor king
wi t h SOUTHCOM t o a rrange a vi s i t to GTMO by these mi li t ary anal ysts soon -- could be a s
s oon as f irst wee k or two i n July. I'll get the date from SOUTHCOM onc e they have firmed
up a plan .
a SD PA has t a ken members of this group on simi lar t rips -- jus t no t to GTMO.
Question/role f or J oint St a f f i nvolve s the a ir trans portat i on . I believe the intent is to
fl y them in early and out l a t e r on the same day.
What can we do t o ensure dedicated airl ift i s availabl e t o suppor t this visit?
Thanks for your help .
VI R
Katie
3
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
COL
.....- ....
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

12:48 PM
Col,
COL, JCS, J4l': CDR, OCJCSIPA; LTC, OCJCSfPA
FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST '...._-_...
REQUEST
I was g i ve n your na me a s a point o f c o nt act f or t h i s Airlift Re ques t - - is t hat a c cur a t e ?
I f s o, p l eas e g ive me a c all . I understand t ha t t hi s g r o up i s sche d ul e to. vis i t GTMO
Sa turday, 25 J une ...
V! R
Co l Kat ie Ha dd oc k , USMC
--- - -Origi nal Message - --- -
From : Schwartz , No rt on A, Lt Gen , JCS DJS
Se nt : Monday , J une 20 , 2005 5 :57 AM
To : McNabb Dunc a n J, Lt Ge n , J CS J 4
Cc : CI V, JCS SJS; Ha rni tche k , Mark D, RDML , J CS J 4 ; COL,
4 ; Tho rp, Fr a nk , CAPT OCJCS/ PA; Haddoc k , Ellen (Kat i e), Col , OCJCS/ PA;
Ca p t , J CS SJS; CAPT, J CS SJS ; J - 4 JLOC Pe rsonnel; Ma p les ,
Mi c ha e l D, MG, J CS VDJS; COL, J 4
Subjec t: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLIFT REQUEST
Thanks , Dunca n . vI r, No r t y .
-----Or i gi na l Mes eage - - - - -
Fr om : McNabb, Duncan J , Lt Ge n , JCS J 4
Sent : Sunday, June 19, 2005 10 : 11 PM
To: Sc hwa rtz, No rton A, Lt Ge n , JCS
Cc: Harni tchek, Mark D, RDML, J CS J 4; COL JCS , J 4;
Ha ddo c k El l e n (Ka t i e ) , Col, OCJCS/PA; Cap t , JCS SJS ;
C s.P . J- 4 JLOC Pe r s o nne l ; Harnitchek , Mar k
0 , RDML , JCS J 4 ; COL, J 4
Subjec t : Re : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT
No rty ,
Our f olks ha ve been r unni ng the t raps.
affairs act ivi t ies s uch as t hi s per DOD
We c a n prov i de dedi c a ted
451S . 13 - R, Chap ter 3.
a i rl ift f or publ ic
We coor di na ted this wi t h o ur p ol icy expert s a nd OCJCS ! LC.
Pe r OSO Ex ec Sec yes t e r day , o nce OSO/ PA and OSO Tr a nspo r tat i o n Policy c oor dinate a nd
OEPSECOEFa pp r o ves t he t r avel, ex e c sec wi ll t r a n s mit t o JS (J 4) f o r v alida t ion a nd t a s king
USTRANSCOM. We hav e a lready g i ven TRANSCOM a heads up .
we ' l l fi n ish wo r k ing it with t he OSO f o l ks on Mo nda y and keep yo u i nf o rme d on p r ogre s s .
VR
Dunc a n
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handhel d
---- -Ori gi nal Message - - - - -
Fr om: Schwartz , Nor t o n A, Lt Gen , JCS OJS <norton. s chwart z1o.........."- J
1
J- 4 JLOC Personnel
To : McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J 4
CC: Harni tche
COL, JCS, J4
<ellen. haddoc
)(8)
<du nc a n . mcnabb
.harnitchek
Haddock, El len
Capt,
CAPT
( Ka t i e) ,
JCS SJS
JCS SJS
Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Sat Jun 18 10 :07:51 200 5
Sub j ect : RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQUEST
Duncan, please take for action . Could we get this approved for SAAM? Thanks . vir,
Norty .
JCS SJS
J 4 ;
Capt,
CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 20 05 8 :58 AM
To : Schwar tz , Norton A, Lt Gen, J CS DJS
Cc : McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4; Harnitchek, __"
COL, JCS, J4; Haddock, El len (Katie), Col, OCJCS /PA;
Subject : FW : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Sir:
During Thursday's SecDef session with mi litary analysts, he apparently e ncouraged the m
t o go to Gitmo and see things for themselves . OSD PA i s working this wi t h SOUTHCOM but
question ha s arise n as to what we can do with dedicated 000 l i ft t o support gett ing them
in a nd out of Gitmo. Recommend passing this to the J4 t e a m and l e t ting t hem work it .
v r
CAPT USN
Execut ive As s i s t a nt
Director, Joi nt Staff
)(8)

LCDR,
MAJ, JCS SJS
MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLI FT REQUEST Subject :
- - - - - o r i g i na l Messag e - - - - -
From: Haddock, El l e n ( Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent : Fr i d a June 17 2005 2 :21 PM
To : CAPT, JCS SJS
Cc : CJCS/PA; LTC
J CS SJS ; Ma j , OCJ CS PA;
'---------'
Pe r ha p s you c an he lp d irect me on ho w to bes t s up po r t this action:
SecDef, J 3, and others met with several ret ired mil itary analysts yesterday . They
discussed a number o f issues, with g reat emphasis on GTMO and Detainee Operations. SecDef
encouraged them a ll to go to GTMO and see for thems e lves. OSD PA i s c urrently worki ng
with SOUTHCOM to arrange a visit to GTMO by t he s e mi l i t a r y analysts soon -- cou l d be as
s oo n as f irst week or two in J uly . I 'll get the date from SOUTHCOM once t hey hav e f irmed
up a p lan .
OSD PA ha s t a ke n members of this group on simi lar trips -- j us t not t o GTMO .
Question/rol e for Joi nt Staff i nvo l v e s the air t ransportat i on . I be lieve the intent is to
fly them in early and out l a t e r o n t he same day.
What can we do to ensure ded i c a t e d airli ft is avai lable to support this visit ?
Thanks for your help.
Vi R
Katie
2
Tracking:
Recipient
3
Read
Read: 6/2112005 1:42 PM
React 6/2112005 1:07 PM
Read: 6/2112005 1:15 PM
Read: 612112005 12:52 PM
From:
Sent :
To:
Subj ect:
Thorp, Frank. CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Tuesday, June 21, 2005 1:19 PM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA;"';;;;:;;;c.;'T'"_ ....Capt, JCS SJS
Re: Mil ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT-REQUEST
Thi is perfectly legal ... Or the US mili tary has been br e a ki ng the law f or 24+ years ....
PIs proce ed aggre s i vely with plann ing this whi le we work t his i s s ue ...
Frank Tho r p
Capt.a i n , USN
- - - --Or i gi na l Message - - - - -
Fro a.d. Kat iel, Col, To : Capt, JCS SJS
CC, Thorp , Fr a nk , CAPT, OCJ CS/ PA <f r ank . thor
Sent , Tue Jun 21 12 : 45 : 46 2005
Subject, RB : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLIFT REQUEST
Below is a sample ; t hese a r e the f ol ks who attended the r oundtabl e wi th SecOef (and
OJ3 ) l ast. week.
The group i s made up of reti r ed mil i t ary who s erve as Wt a l king heads " f or va rious media.
OSO PA has coordi na ted other vi sits i n t he pa s t t o help educate t hem on what 's really
goi ng on i n I r aq, e t c.
They also do a con f erence c all with t hem on a recurr i ng basis.
We (J oi nt St aff) usually prov ide a J3 ops bri efer f or t he cal l. occa sionally t he Chai rman
or the vice do the cal l -- depending on the topi c /issue a t hand. CJ CS /VCJCS try t o meet
wi th t he ret ired mili t a ry analysts each t i me they actual l y have a gr oup of them i n t he
Pentagon , but last week's s chedul e was t oo hard, wi t.h the Chai rman out of t own, so the OJ 3
filled in .
Hope that he lps.
Vi R
Katie
(USA, Ret i r ed)
campbel l (USAF, Ret ired)
(USMC, Ret i r ed)
(USAF, JAG)
(USA, Ret ired)
(USMC, Reti r ed )
(USA, Ret ire d)
(USN, Ret ire d)
(USA, Retired)
(USA, Ret i r e d)
(USA, Ret i r ed)
<USAR, Reti r ed)
(USN, Reti r ed l
(USA, Retir ed )
(USN, Retired)
Confi rmed Re tired Mi l itary Analysts:
Col onel Carl Kenneth Al lard
Lieutenant Gener a l Frank (Ted) B.
Lieutenant Colonel Bil l Cowan
Mr . Jed Babbi n
Ma jor Dana R. Dillon
Col onel J ohn Garrett
Command Se r geant Ma jor Steven Gr ee r
Admiral David E. J eremiah
Li eutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginni s
Colonel Jeff McCausl a nd ,
Gene r al Montgome ry Me igs
Maj or F. Andy Me s s ing , Jr .
Captain Chuck Nash
Ge neral Will i a m L. Na s h
Wayne Si nvnons
r i inaI Me ssa e- - - --
Fr om: Capt, JCS SJS
Sent : on ay, une , 005 6:18 AM
To: Haddock , El l en (Kat i e l, Col , OCJCS/ PA
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLI FT REQUEST
REQUEST
Katie, do you have a ny detai ls o f t h is group?
l(ll)
Cap tain, J AGC, US Navy
Le ga l Counsel t o t he Chairma n o f t he Joi nt Chiefs of St aff
-- - - - original Me s s age - - - - -
From: McNabb , Dunc a n J, Lt Gen , JCS J 4
Sent : Sunday, June 19, 2005 10:11 PM
To : Schwart z , Norton A, Lt Ge n, JCS D
Cc: Ha r nitchek, Ma r k D, RDML, J CS JCS, J4;
Haddock El len Ka t ie) , Col, OCJCS/PA; Capt, JCS SJS ;
CAPT, J CS SJS; J - 4 JLOC Personnel ; Harnitchek, Mark
D, RDML, JCS J4; COL, J 4
Subject : Re : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT
No rty,
Our folks have been running the traps.
a f f airs activi ties such a s t h i s per DOD
We c an provi de dedi cated
451 5. 13 - R, Chap t e r 3 .
airli ft for public
We coordinated thi s wi th our po l i c y e xperts a nd OCJCS/LC .
Per OSD Exe c Sec yest erday, once OSD/ PA and OSD Transportation Policy coordinat e a nd
DEPSECDEFapproves the t r a ve l, e xe c s e c will transmit to J S (J4) for validat ion a nd task ing
USTRANSCOM. We have a l r e a dy g i ven TRANSCOM a he a ds up.
We 'll f inish wor ki ng i t with the OSD f ol ks on Mo nday and ke e p you i nf orme d on pr og r ess.
VR
Duncan
Se nt from my Bl ackBe r r y Wire l e ss Ha nd he l d
OCJCS/ PA
l(ll)
l(ll)
J - 4 JLOC Pe rsonnel
Se nt : Sa t Jun 18 10:07 :51 2005
Subj ect : RE: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Dunca n, please t ake f o r a c tion . Could we get this approve d for SAAM? Thanks . Vi r,
Norty .
- - - - - Orig i
From: CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent : Sat urday, June 18 , 2005 8 : 58 AM
To: Schwart z, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc : McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4; Harnitche k,
COL, J CS, J 4; Ha ddoc k , El len (Katie) , Col, OCJCS/PA; Capt, J CS SJS
Subj ect: FW: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Si r:
Dur ing Thursda y'S SecDef s ession wit h military anal ysts , he apparent ly enc ou r age d
t o go t o Gitmo and s ee things for the ms e lves . OSD PA is wo r k i ng t h i s wi th SOUTHCOM
question has arisen as t o what we can do wi t h dedi c a t e d DoD lift t o support get t i ng
2
them
but
t hem
in and out of Gi t mo. Re c ommend passing t hi s to the J4 team and let ting t he m work it.
v/[r:'==:J
Assistant
Joint Staff
MAJ
OCJCS/ PA;
LCDR, JCS OCJCS\ PA;
"-----_.......
JCS SJS
ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AIRLIFT REQlJBST Subject :
---- -Original Message---- -
Fr om: Haddock, El len ( Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS/PA
Sent: Frida, J une 17 , 2005 2:21 PM
To: CAPT, JCS
Cc: OCJCS/PA; L
JCS Ma j , OCJCS/PA;
Perhaps you can help d i r e ct me on how t o best support this action:
SecDef , J3 , a nd others met with s eve ral r etired mi litary analysts yesterday_ They
discussed a number o f issues, wi th gre a t emphasis on GTMO and Detainee Operations. SecDef
e nc our aged the m all to go to GTMO and see for themselves. OSD PA is cur rent ly working
with SOUTHCOM to a rrange a visit t o GTMO by these mili t a ry analysts soon -- coul d be as
soon as firs t week or two in J u ly. I 'll get the date from SOUTHCOM once they have firmed
up a p l an .
OSD PA has take n members o f thi s g roup on s i milar t rip s -- j ust not t o GTMO .
Question/ rol e for Joint Sta f f i nvolves the a i r transpor tat ion. I believe the i nt ent is to
fly the m i n e a r l y a nd out l a t e r on the same d ay .
What c an we do t o ensure de d ica t e d ai r l ift is av a ila bl e to s upport t hi s v i s i t?
Thanks for your he lp .
VIR
Katie
3
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subj ect:
Col , JCS J4
Tuesday, June 21. 2005 1:46 PM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCSlPA
J -4 JLOC Personnel
RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Kat ie ,
This i s t he right place . .. 1 '11 have t he Batt l e Capt ca l l you. We'll need t o connec t
the dots wi t h DoD Exec Sec.
-----Or i gi na l Me s s age -----
Fr o m; Ha d d o c k , El len (Kat i e) . Col , OCJ CS/ PA
Se n esda un 2 2005 12:48 PM
To: Col , JI!S!!Jt4====::::J
cc • COL, JeS , J4 ; CDR, OCJCS /PA; '- 1 LTC,
OCJ CS / PA -
Sub j ect : FW : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
COL .... ,
I was given your name as a poi nt of contact f or thi s Airl i ft Reque st - - i s that accurate?
I f so, ple a s e gi ve me a call. I unde r s tand that thi s group is schedul e t o v i s i t GTMO
Sa t urday, 2 5 June . . .
Vi R
C K i Ha ddoc k . USMC
- -- - -ori gi na l Message-----
From: Sc hwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Sent : Monday , June 20, 2005 5;57 AM
To ; McNabb Duncan J, Lt Gen , JCS J 4
Cc ; CI V, JCS SJSj Ha rni t che k , Ma rk D, RDML, J CS J4;
COL, JCS, J4; Tho Frank CAPT OCJ CS/PAj Hadd c
El len Kat 1e, Col , OCJ CS/ PAj capt , J CS SJS ;
JSj J - 4 JLOC Personnel; Maples, Mi chae l D, MG, JCS
VDJS; COL, J4
Subject: RE: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AI RLIFT REQUEST
Thanks, Duncan. VIr, Norty.
---- - Or i gi na l Me s sage - - - - -
From: MCNabb, Duncan J , Lt Gen, JCS J 4
Se nt: Sun day , J une 19 , 2005 10 : 11 PM
To : Schwar tz , Norton A, Lt Gen, J CS
Cc : Har ni tchek , Ma r k D, RDML, JCS J4 j J CS, J4 j
ddc tie ) , Co l , OCJCS/ PA; Capt, JCS S J Sj
JLOC Pe r s onne l ; Harni t che k, Ma r k
RDML , J CS J4 ; COL, J 4
Subj e c t : Re : MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLIFT REQUEST
Norty ,
OUr f olks have been running the t r aps .
af f a irs act ivi tie s s uch a s t his per DOD
We can prov ide dedi cated
4515. 13 -R, Chapter 3.
airl i ft for publ i c
We coordi nat ed t his with ou r po l icy e xper t s and OCJCS/LC.
Per OSD Exe c Se c ye s t e r day, once OSD/ PA and OSD Transportat ion po licy coordina te and
1
DEPSECDEFappr ove s the travel, exec sec will t r a ns mit t o JS (J 4) f o r v a lidat ion a nd tas ki ng
USTRANSCOM. We have a lready given TRANSCOM a heada up.
We 'll f i nish working it wi th the OSD f o l ks on Monday and keep you i n f o rme d on progress.
VR
Duncan
Sent f r om my Bl a c kBe r ry Wireless Handhe ld
---- -Origi nal Measage-- -- -
From: Schwartz , Norto n A, Lt Gen,
To : McNabb, Dunc a n J, Lt Gen, JCS
CC: Ha r n i t c hek , Mark D RDML, J CS
COL, JCS, J4
<e l l e n. haddock
JCS DJS <no r ton . s
J4 <duncan .mc nab
J4 <mar k. ha r n i t c hek
Haddock El l en (Kat i e), Col ,
apt, J CS SJS
CAPT, JCS SJS
OCJCS!PA
"",.""....,"',...",,,. .., J-4 JLOC Personnel
Duncan , please take for action.
Norty .
Could we get this a pproved f or SAAM? Thanks. Vi r,
,
- u u Or i g i
From: CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent: Satur a y, une 8 , 2 5 8,58 AM
To: Schwartz , Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen , JCS J4; Ha rnitche k ,
COL, JCS , J4 ; Haddock, Ell e n (Kat i e) , Col, OCJ CS! PA; • Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: FW : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Sir:
During Thursday's SecDef sess ion wi th mili tary analysts, he apparent ly encouraged them
to go to Gitmo a nd see things for t hems e l ves . OSO PA i s working this with SOUTHCOM but
question has ari sen as to what we can do wi t h de d i c a ted 000 li ft to s uppor t get t ing the m
in a nd out o f Gi tmo. Re c ommend pa s si ng thi s to t he J4 t eam a nd letting them work i t .
CAPT USN
Exe cut 1v e Ass1stant
c·"-.,,,.....
MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST Subject:
-----Or i g i nal Measage- - - - -
Fr om: Haddock . El len (Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS!PA
Sent : un 2 05 2:2 1 PM
To: CAPT,
cc . CDR OCJCS! PA;,! LTC OCJCS!PA; .......JL.l"""
JCS Ma j . OCJCS! PA; • LCDR, JCS OCJCS\ PA; L __.....
Perhaps you c a n help di rect me on how to best support t his a ction:
SecDef , J 3, a nd others met with s e ve r a l ret ired military analysts ye s t e r da y . They
2
di s cus s ed a numbe r of issues, wi th great emphasis on GTMO and Detaine e Oper ations . SecDef
e ncouraged t hem a ll to go t o GTMO and s ee f or themselves. OSD PA is currently working
with SOUTHCQM t o arrange a visit t o GTMQ by t hese mi li tary analysts soon . - could be as
soon as first week or two i n July . I 'll get t he da te from SOUTHCOM once t hey have firmed
up a pl an .
OSD PA has taken members of this group on similar t r i ps -- just not to GTMO .
Question/role for Joint Staff involves the air t ransportation. I believe t he intent is t o
fly them i n earl y and out later on the s ame day.
What can we do t o ensure dedicated a irl ift is available t o support this v i s i t ?
Thanks for your help .
V!R
Katie
3
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Haddock, Etlen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
2005 3:43 PM
.. Capt. USMC,
Thorp, Frank CAPT PA DR,
OCJCSIP . LTC, JCS J4; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-P KI)
J, Col, JCS J4; LlCdr, OASD-PA
GTMO AIRLIFT REQUEST
I und@rstand you are the OSD PA POe f or the flight r @que st for r etired mi litary analysts
to go to GTMO.
I ' ve tal k@d with the POC at our J 4, and unde rstand t hi s to be the process.
1) OSD PA submits requ@st through SecDef's ExecSe c
2} ExecSec approv@s reque st , and forwards to J 4 (memo, via email)
3) J 4 gets t he approved request and tasks TRANSCOM t o execute
Watch Off icer in J 4 (LTC
expec t the r eque s t, but needs more details ,
number of PAX
-- fl ight from where t o where
-- departure/return dates & t imes
woul d like to pr ovi de TRANSCOM a heads up to
such a s :
hone numbe r s that may be useful :
OSD PA Press Desk : LCDR
When I spoke wi th others on this list earl ier. I unde r s tood Saturday as t he possible da t e ;
now under s t and t hat mi ght change to Sunday.
Also understand that t his group mayor may not be combi ned with a CODEL on Fri /Sat ...
I will be l e avi ng in about an hou r t o go to my s on ' s graduat ion, but I'll be back first
thing in the mor ning i f you need anything e l s e from me on this.
ViR
Col H
Tracking:
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Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSJPA
Lawrence , Dallas, OA$Q.PA
1
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)(8)
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSIPA
Frida Jul 08 2005 2:59 PM
)(8) APT, JCS S S
)(8) Col JCS J4; )(8) Ca t. USMC, OASD-PA; )(8)
CDR, OCJCS/PA LTC, OCJCS/PA Maj,
FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Just got a cal l from aSD PA action officer, wor ki ng a r eturn trip to GTMO for t he Ret i r ed
Military Analysts .
Bet ween weather, CODELs, etc., the date jumped around a bit, bu t they are scheduled to go
Tuesday, 12 July .
Unfortunat ely, the airlift support has not materi ali zed. I understand they 've di s cus sed
wi t h each of the s ervices, but nothing yet.
The call I got was i n hope s of Joi nt Staff assisting with airlift - - I know Col .
he l pe d out t he last time, and our JLOC team made t hi s happe n. Want t o make sur e the
Director is aware of a similar r eque s t for support (again) .
I 'm off to a me e t i ng , and wi l l try to stop by af terwards to discuss in more det ail.
VI R
Ka t ie
--- --origi nal Message-----
From: Schwart z, Norto n A, Lt Ge n, JCS DJS
Sent: Mo nda y , June 20, 2005 5 : 57 AM
To: McNabb Dunc a n J , Lt Gen, JCS J4
Cc : Cl V, JCS SJS ; Harni tchek, Ma rk D, RDML, J CS J 4;
J CS J 4; Thorp , Frank , CAPT, OCJCS/ PAi Haddock, Ell e n (Katie), Col , OCJ CS PA,
Capt, JCS SJS; CAPT, JCS SJSi J-4 J LOC Per s on ne l ; Map l e s,
Michael D, MG, JCS VDJS; COL, J4
Subject : RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLI FT REQUEST
Thanks, Duncan . Vir, Nor ty .
D, RDML,
Subj ect:
Nor t y ,
Our folks ha ve be e n running the traps .
a f f ai r s activi t i es such as thi s per DOD
REQUEST
We can provide dedi c a t e d
451 5 . 13 - R, Chapter 3 .
airli ft for publi c
We coordina ted this with our policy experts and OCJCS/LC.
Per OSD Exec Sec ye ster da y , once OSD/PA and OSD Transportation po l i cy coordinate and
DEPS ECDEFapproves the trave l , e xec sec wi l l transmi t to JS (J4) for validation and t a s k i ng
USTRANSCOM. We hav e already given TRANSCOM a heads u p.
We' l l f i nish wor k ing it with the OSD folks o n Monday and ke e p you i nf o rme d on pr og r e s s.
VR
Duncan
1
Sent f rom my Bl a c kBe r r y wireless Handhel d
OCJCS PA
JCS DJS
J4 <dunc a n . mc na b
J4 <mark.harnitchek
(Kat i e ) , Co l,
Capt , JCS SJS
CAPT, JCS SJS
- - - - - Or i g i nal Me s s age - - - - -
From: Schwartz , Norton A, Lt Gen ,
To: McNabb , Duncan J, Lt Gen, J CS
CC; Harni t c hek , Mar k D, RDML , JCS
COL, JCS , J 4
<el l e n. haddock
J -4 JLOC Pe r s onne
Sent: Sat Jun 18 10: 07 : 51 2005
Subj ect : RB : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLI FT REQUEST
Duncan , please take for a c t i on. Could we get this a pproved f or SAAM? Thanks. vIr ,
Nort y.
--- - -Or i gi na l Me s s a ge - - - - -
From: Rogers , Mic hael S , CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent: Sat urday , J une 18, 2005 8;58 AM
To ; Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS I!!:::::::::::;:: :J
Cc ; McNabb , Duncan J , Lt Gen , J CS J4 ; Harnitchek,
COL, JCS, J4 ; Haddock , Bl len (Kat i e) , Co l , OCJ CS/ PA; Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: FW : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AI RLIFT REQUEST...-------......
Si r :
Duri ng Thur s da y' s SecDef session with mi litary a naly s t s , he a pparently encouraged them
t o go to Gi t mo a nd s e e things f or themselves. OSD PA i s work ing this wi th SOUTHCOM but
questi on has arisen as to what we can do wi t h dedicat ed DoD lift t o support gett ing t hem
in and out of Gitmo. Recommend pass ing this to the J4 tea m and l e t ti ng the m work i t .
v r
As s ista nt
a
CAPT ..... USN
Exe cut i ve
D' r
OCJ CS! PA
MAJ , JCS SJS
MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO : AI RLIFT REQUEST
--- - - Or i g i na l Message - - - --
From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col ,
Se nt: Fr iday , June 17, 2005 2 :21 PM
To: i ch el S, CAPT,
Cc: / PA; .
Maj, OCJCS/ PA; LCDR, JCS OCJCS\PA;
'----I
Subj ect:
perhaps you can help di rect me on how t o best support t hi s a c t i on:
SecDef , J3 , and others me t with s e ve r a l retired military analysts yesterday. They
d i s c us s ed a number of i s sue s, with g rea t e mpha s i s on GTMO a nd Detainee Opera tions. SecDef
e ncou r a ged t hem all to go t o GTMO a nd s e e for themselves . OSD PA i s currently working
wi th SOUTHCOM t o arrange a vi si t t o GTMO by these mi li t a ry analys t s soon - - coul d be a s
soon as fi r s t week or two i n July_ I ' l l get t he date f r om SOUTHCOM once t hey have f irmed
up a p l a n .
OSD PA has taken members o f t h i s gr oup on s i milar trips -- j u s t not to GTMO .
Question/rol e for Joint St a f f invol ves the air t r a n s por t a t i on. I bel iev e t he i ntent is to
2
fl y t h ~ m in early and out later on t he same day.
Wha t can W ~ do to ensure dedi cated a irli ft i s available to support thi s visit?
Thanks f or your help.
VIR
Ka tie
Tracking:
3
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From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sunday, July 10, 2005 5:08 PM

." LTC. OCJCSJP, CDR. OCJCSJPA;..... --' Maj.
Subject :
Captain Thorp --
Ou r JLOC is worki ng t his s e cond lift request f or Mi l Analys ts to go to GTMO.
The dat e bounc e d around a b it -- as o f Friday, the i ntent was for t he m to go on Tues , 12
July .
VI R
Kat ie
- - - - - Original Message - ----
From: Harnitchek , Mark 0 , RDML, JCS J 4
Sent : Frida , Jul 08 , 2005 4 : 35 PM
To: CAPT, J CS SJS; Haddock ,
Per
Cc: JCS J4 ;
LTC OCJCS PA·
SubJect :
El len ( Kat i e) , Col , OCJ CS! PA; J-4 JLOC
C, OASD- PA;
Maj , OCJCS!PA;
L.-_.......
of course .
L...-.....
JLOC , PIs take t ur n o n thi s ... some prior hist ory be l ow .
thanks,
L.-_..1
Ha r n i t c he k , Mar k D, RDML, JCS
Messa e - - - - -
CAPT, J CS SJS
08, 2005 3 : 36 PM
(Katie), Col, OCJCS! PAi
- -- - - Ori inal
Fr o m:
Sent: Friday, J u ly
To: Haddoc k , El l e n
J4
Cc:
Subject : RE: MIL
Admiral:
Coul d the good JLOC team p lease work this MILAIR li f t issue.
vir
CAPT &.;.;,;.................._....1
Execut i ve
Direct o r
USN
---- -Ori gi nal Me s s age - - - - -
From: Haddoc k , Blle n ( Ka tie), Col, OCJ CS! PA
Se nt : Fri da Jul 08 2005 2:59 PM
To : CAPT, J CS SJS
1

Col, JCS J4 ;'1.::'=====:l,caPt . USMC , CDR, OCJ CS/ PA; LTC, OCJCS/PA;
Ma j, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Just got a call from OSD PA a cti on o f f icer , working a r e t urn t r ip t o GTMO for t he Retired
Military Ana lysts.
Betwee n weather , CODBLs, etc., the da te jumped a r ound a bit, but they are schedul ed t o go
Tuesday, 12 J uly .
unfortunately, t he airli ft suppor t ha s not materialized. I understand theY' ve discussed
wi t h each o f the services , but noth i ng yet.
The call I got was in hopes o f J oint Staf f assist ing with airlift -- I know 1
helped out the last t i me , and our JLOC t e am made t hi s happen . Want to make sure the
Director is aware of a s i mi l a r reque s t f or support (agai n) .
I 'm o f f to a mee ting. a nd will try t o stop by afterwards t o discuss in mor e detail.
ViR
Kat ie
- - - - -Or i g i na l Mess age- - - - -
From: Schwa rtz, Norton A, Lt Gen, J CS DJS
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 5:57 AM
To: , r.e een, JCS J4
Cc: CIV, JCS SJS; Harnitc he k , Ma r k 0 , RDML, J CS J 4 ;
COL, J CS, J4; Tho , Fr ank CAPT OCJCS /PA;
i e ) , Col , OCJ CS/ PA; Capt , J CS SJS ; .

J- 4 JLOC Pe rsonnel ; Maples, Michael 0, MG , J CS
COL, J4
RE: MI L ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLIFT REQUEST
Thanks , Duncan. vi r, Norty.
-----Orig i na l Me s s age-
u u
Fr om: McNabb , Dunc an J, Lt Gen, JCS J 4
Sent: Sunday, J une 19, 2005 10: 11 PM
To: Schwartz, Nor t on A, Lt cen, JCS DJ S
Cc : Harni tchek, Mark D, ROML, JCS J4 ; OL JCS, J4 ;
Haddock Ellen Kat i e ) , Col , OCJCS/PA;
)to)
capt , JCS SJS ;
C P J CS SJS' J -4 JLOC Personne l; Harnitchek, Mark
D, RDML , JCS J4 ; COL, J 4
Subject: Re : MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST
Nor t y ,
Our folks have been r unning the
a f fa i r s activ i t i e s such a s thi s
traps .
per DOD
We c an provide dedicated
4515 . 13 - R, Chapter 3 .
ai rlift for publ ic
We coordinated this with our pol icy exper t s and OCJCS/ LC.
Per OSO Exec Se c yes terday, once OSD/ PA and OSD Transportat ion Policy coor d ina te and
OEPSECDEFapprove s the travel , exec sec wil l t r ans mi t t o JS (J 4 ) for validation and tas k i ng
USTRANSCOM. We have a lready given TRANSCOM a heads up.
We 'll finish wo r k ing i t with the aSD folks on Monday and keep you informed on progr e s s .
VR
Duncan
Sen t from my Bl a ckBe r ry Wireless Handhel d
,
OCJCS/ PA (Ka t ie) ,
J CS SJS
JCS SJ S
JCS DJS <nor ton
J 4 <duncan .mcnab
J 4 <mar k .ha r ni tchek
Ha ddock, Ellen
Cap t ,
CAPT
- -- - - Or i g i na l Mesaage - - - - -
From: Schwart z , Nor t on A, Lt Gen ,
To: McNabb , Dunc an J , Lt Gen, J CS
CC: Ha r ni t chek Ma rk D RDML J CS
COL, JCS , J 4
<e llen . haddock
J -4 J LOC Personnel
....._---_......
Sent: Sa t Jun 18 10 : 07 : 51 20 05
Subject : RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLI FT REQUEST
Duncan, plea s e t a ke fo r ac t i on . Coul d we ge t t his appr oved f o r SAAM? Thanks . Vi r,
Norty .
JCS SJS
J4;
Capt ,
--- - -Origina l Me s s age - - - - -
Fr om: Rogers , Mi c hael S, CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent : Sa t u r day , J une 18 , 2005 8: 58 AM
To : Schwa r t z, Norton A, Lt Ge n, JCS DJS
cc . McNabb , Dunca n J , Lt Ge n, J CS J4 ; Ha rni t chek ,
COL, J CS, J 4 ; Hadd ock, El len (Ka t i e ), Col , OCJCS/ PA;
Subj e c t : FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AI RLI FT REQUEST
Si r:
Dur ing Thursday ' S Se cDe f session with mi litary anal ys t s, he appa r ently encou raged t hem
t o go t o Gitmo and s ee t hings f o r t hemse l ves. OSO PA i s working t hi s with SOUTHCOM but
qu e s t i on has ari s en a s t o what we can do wi t h dedi cat ed 000 l i f t to suppor t getti ng t hem
i n and out of Gi t ma . Recommend pass i ng t hi s t o t he J4 t eam and l e t t i ng t hem wor k it .
As s i stant
J o int St a f f
USN
Execu t i ve
Direc t o r
MAJ
MAJ , JCS SJ S
MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLI FT REQUEST Sub ject :
--- --Or i g i na l Me as age - - - - -
From : Haddock, El l en (Kat ie), c ol , OCJCS/PA
Se nt : Friday, J un e 17, 2005 2:21 PM
To : Ro era Mi ha e l S, CAPT, JCS SJS
ce- CJCS / PA; LTC OCJ CS/ PAi
JCS SJS ; )(8) Maj , OCJ CS/ PA; )(8) LCDR, J CS OCJCS\PAi
....._-----' '------'
Pe r haps you can help d i r e ct me on how t o bes t s uppor t t hi s acti on :
SecDef , J3, and o t he rs me t s eve ral ret i r ed mil i t a ry a nalys t s ye s t e r day . They
d i s cus s ed a numbe r of issues , wi t h great emphasi s on GTMO and De tai nee Ope r a t ions. SecDef
encouraged t hem a l l t o go t o GTMO and s ee for t hems e l ves . OSD PA is cur r e ntly wo rki ng
wi th SOUTHCOM t o a r range a vi sit t o GTMO by t hese mili tary a nal ysts soon - - could be as
soon a s firs t week or t wo i n J uly . I 'l l ge t t he date from SOUTHCOM once t hey have f irme d
up a pl an .
OSO PA has taken member s o f t hi s group on simi l a r trips -- J UBt not t o GTMO.
Quest i on/ rol e f or J oint Sta f f i nvo l ves t he ai r trans po rtat i on . I bel i eve the intent is t o
f l y t hem in e a rly and out l a t e r on t he s ame day .
Wha t can we do t o ens u re dedicate d a i r l i f t i s ava i lab l e t o suppor t t hi s vi sit ?
Thanks for your help.
VI R
3
Katie
4
From:
Sent:
To :
Cc:
Subj ect :
OASD-PA
Tuesday, September 27, 2005 7:51 AM
Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCSl PA 'p-f::: : : : J
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, CDR, OCJCSIP '
LTC, OCJCSIPA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Outreach meeting tomorrow
Attachments:
J-S Request memo.doc; Retired Military Analysts Outreach Group- Names only.doc
RetIred Military
_ow,..
,-s Request
memo.doc (26 KB)
sir ,
j us t wanted you t o ha ve e l e c t r on s for t he memo i dropped o f f f or you r equesting general
casey and someone on t he joint s t a f f t o brief t he r e tired mili t ary analysts at a
r ound table t omor r ow.
oiI;'\l/·ks
OSO Public Af f a irs
omm 'ty Re lat i ons and Publ ic Li a ison
Pe nt a gon
Wa s h ing t on , D. C. 203 01
www.America Support sYou.mi l
1
To:
From:
Date:
Subject:
MEMORANDUM
CAPT Frank Thorp
Allison Barber
September 26, 2005
Outreach Meeting with Retired Military Analysts
OSD Public Affairs requests the Joint Staffs participation in an outreach briefing for Reti red
Mi litary Analysts assemhled hy the OASD·PA Office of Community Relations and Publi c
Liaison.
The purpose of this meeting is to provide the group with an operational update on Operat ions in
Iraq, DoD' s hurri cane recovery and relief efforts, and the military commissions process.
We request General Casey address the analysts on Operations in Iraq. The General's
part icipation, consisting of brie f remarks and Q&A, is requested for 30 minutes, 9:30 a.m. to
10:00 a.m., on Wednesday, September 28, 2005, in room 3E928.
Hon. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will be invited to
provide an update on recovery and relief effort s from 10:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. We request
someone from the Joint Staff address the analysts on the military' s role in coordinating with
Homeland Defense alongs ide Me. McHale.
Bri gadi er General Thomas Hemingway, Legal Advisor to the Appointing Authority, Office of
Military Commissions, wi ll be invited to address the analysts with an update on the military
commission process from 10:30 to 11 :00. Deputy Ass istant Secretary Alli son Barber will
conduct the meet ing.
The list of invited Military Analysts is attached.
Should you or your please contac .... Relations
and Public Liaison at -
Attachment:
As stated
RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS
(As of July 20,2(05)
Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG)
Admi ral Denni s C. Blair (USN, Retired)
CommanderPeter Brookes (USN, Reserve)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Reti red)
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu (USA, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)
General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Tim J. Eads (USA, Retired)
Dr. David M. Finkelstein (LTC, USA, Retired)
General Ronald Fogleman (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (USAF. Retired)
Brigadier General David L.Grange (USA, Retired)
Command Sergeant Maj or Steven Greer (USA, Ret ired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah(USN, Retired)
General George Joulwan (USA, Retired)
General Wi lliam F. "Buck" Kernan (USA, Retired)
Colonel Glenn Lackey (USA, Retired)
Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Dr. Je lTMcCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF. Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Major Andy Messing Jr. (USAR, Retired)
General Thomas S. Moo rman, Jr. (USAF, Retired)
Major General Michae l 1. Nardotti, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
General Glenn K. Otis (USA, Retired)
General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke (USAF, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
General H. Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steve Short (USA, Retired)
Mr. Wayne Simmons (USN, Retired)
Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)
Captain Robert R. Timberg (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant General Bernard Traino r (USMC, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA, Retired)
Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)
General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired)
From:
Sent :
To:
Subject :
Friday, October 14, 2005 10:25 AM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col , OCJCS!PA
WHAT THEY'RE SAYING: Military Analysts Back From Iraq
What The y 're Saying . . .
Military Analys t s Back From I raq
Recent l y , a group of mi l itary analysts for various medi a out l e t s t raveled t o Iraq to gain
a firs t-ha nd a s s e s s ment of ongoing ope r a tions . Below is a synopsis of t hei r r epor ts from
the past week :
Major Gene r a l Don Shepper d : "And I Thi nk You Are - I ' m Encour aged And Optimistic For The
First Time I n A Long , Long Time Tha t The Iraqis Are Going To Pull Off - They 're Going To
Pul l Of f The Elec t i on. They Ar e Going To Get Their Forces Trai ned, And That I s Goi ng Very
Well . " (eNN's "Daybreak, " 10/11/05)
Ma j or General Robe r t Sc al es : "But I Think The Gr eat e s t Hope I s I raq, Iraq Units, The
Regul ar Army, Bui l ding Them Up Very Quickly So That They Can Take Ove r The Fighting And
Increase The Pr obabi l i t y Of Coming Out Of Thi s OK." Hume: "And You Think It 's
Happeni ng? " Scales: "I t' s Happeni ng . " (Fox News' "Special Report Wi t h Bri t Hume, "
10/ 11/05)
Capt a i n Chuc k Nash : "Be ca us e There Ar e So Many Iraqi Troops, The re Are About 140, 000
I r aqi Troop s And Those Ar e n 't Guys Just Wear ing Uniforms; They Are Ful l y Comba t Trained,
Ready To Go Troops And That 's The Ot her Thing Tha t's changed Since January . It 's Not A
U.S. Face On This . It 's An I r aqi Face And They Ar e Competent Troops ." (FOX News' "Fox &
Fr i ends, t1 10/11/05)
Lt . Colonel Robert Maginnis Ta l ks To Soldiers I n The Middle Ea s t who Are Optimisti c And
Suppor t The Mi s s i on . "Af ter a dinner last night with Army soldiers, Mr. Maginnis repor t s
t o us: ' The soldiers expre s sed frus tra tion with t he f act t hat mos t of the U. S. news
cove r age about Iraq is bad , which contradict s t heir f i r sthand v i ew.' " (Bill Gert z And
Rowan Scar bor ough, "Ins ide The Ri ng ," The Washi ng ton Times, 10/ 11/ 05)
Iraq's Refe r endum:
Na sh Says The I r aqis Are Running The Cons t i t utional Referendum, Intend To Vot e , And Ar e
Provi ding Se curi ty . nash: "As a ma t t er of f act, the Iraqis a re out f r ont on thi s. Thi s ha s
be en t he long - there 's so much di ff erence between now and the vote, the e lect i on back i n
1
J anuary. The biggest d i f f e renc e in t h i s is number one, the Iraqi population is l e aning
very far forward t o vote . Over 88 percent of t he people in Iraq a r e registered to vote and
intend t o. There are some areas where as ma n y a s 98 pe r c e nt of the people are regist ered
to vote and the s ecurity, t he p lan i tse l f f o r t he security is an Iraqi plan . The u .S .
fol ks when t hey got i t, were r e a dy t o make wha t ever c hanges were necessary and they looked
a t it and t hey went wow, thi s is a great plan, so the Iraqis a r e providing the forces. The
Iraqi s are p roviding all of t he security planning and o ur f o r c e s are t he r e strictly as
response unit s to help out should the Iraqis get in troub le, but the Iraqis are running
t h i s t h i ng. " ( FOX News' "Fox & Friends," 10/11/ 05 )
Shepperd Says Tha t Iraqis See The Referendum As "A Victory Either Way" Because The Sunnis
Ar e Participating. SHEPPERD: "Now, a couple o f things about the election . Aga i n , the
people I 've talked to say t he y belie ve the Sunnis are goi ng to turn out despite the
viol ence .... They t hi nk that e ven if the r e fe rendum is voted down that it wil l be a
positive , because t he Sunnis have joined t he process for the firs t time. And they get can
them a modified constitution. So, t he y see it as p erhaps a victory eithe r way, a l t ho ug h
i t certainly will be somethi ng less t han what we hoped for . " (CNN's "Day br e ak , " 10/11/05)
Iraqi Security Fo r c e s :
Scales: " From My Visi t I Conc l uded Tha t The Great est Change In The
Since Last Summer Has Been Achi eved By The Iraqis Securi ty Forces . "
Op- Ed, "The Emerging I r aqi Army , " The washington Times, 10/14 / 05 )
Mili t a ry Ba l a nc e ...
(Robe rt H. Scales,
Shepperd On I r a qi Secu r ity Fo r c e s: "These GUys Are Good. " SHEPPERD: "But I think t h i s
is wha t's going to happe n : We 've got impressions tha t the I raqi forces are not good. The
t r a i ni ng is not going well. Fr om everyone that we tal ked t o , nothing could be furt her from
the truth . These guys a re go od. The y' r e coming up to speed very, very quickly." (CNN's
"Da yb r eak , " 10/11/ 05)
Shepperd "Impressed" By Iraqi Troops. SHEPPERD: "But t he y can d o the key things. They can
do intelligence . They can do raids. And they can do presence . And they are being - areas
are be i ng turned over to them. For instance, about 20 percent of the city of Baghdad has
now be en turned over to the I r aqi forces . I was very, very impr e s s e d with wha t I s aw, and
I t hi nk thi ngs wil l get be t t e r as they get better and as they start taking over some of
our duti es, a nd we g r a dually be gi n to wi t hdraw. " (CNN 's "Daybreak," 10/ 11 / 05 )
Shepperd Says Iraqi Forces Are Beginning To Ta ke Charge Of Securi ng Parts of I r a q .
SHEPPERD: "The Iraqi forces a r e r eady t o pro t e ct t he polli ng places . They 're ready.
They 're starting to get ready in various a r e a s. For instance, 20 pe r c ent of the territory
o f Baghdad ha s al ready been turned over to I raqi forces. You 're s t arting t o see that
s pread slowly a s they come up to speed . When the y come up to speed, they are ma tched with
u. s. forces, and then they are given thei r own territory. All of that appea r s to me to be
working. I t' s s low, tough work, a nd we 'll be there for a whi le helping them." (CNN's
"Live From, " 10/ 11/05)
After Vis iting Ninth Iraqi Mechanized Div i s i o n , Scales Concludes "And , Frankly, What I Saw
Was Very Encouraging." (Fox News ' "Speci al Re po r t With Br it Hume ," 10/11/ 05)
2
* Scales Prai ses The Iraqi Commanders Of Iraqi s ecur i t y Forces. "We visited the Iraqi
9th Mechanized Divi sion located in Taji a few mi les no r t h of Baghdad i n one of the hot test
and mos t contested r egions of Iraq. The un it was activated l ast Oct obe r and has ye t to
f orm compl etely . It is commanded by Gen. Basha r , a thi r t y -year ve t e ran and , like many
patriot ic , i nnova tive and se l f- r e l i ant of fi cer s , a victim of Saddam Hussein 's brutality.
The genera l cre a t ed the division by calling up many of hi s old regular-army comrades .
Three quarters are ve t e r ans who have been recruited f r om every pr ovi nce and ethnicity in
Iraq. The di vi sion's mot t o i s, appropriatel y , 'Iraq fi r s t .' Gen . Bashar built his divi sion
from a junkyard . In l e s s than a year his s oldier s pi c ked t hrough acres of destroyed Sov i e t
tanks a nd a rmored pe r s onnel carriers t o pat ch together a f l e et of over 200 ope r a t i ona l
fi ght ing ve hicl e s.
W
(Robe r t H. Sc al e s, Op - Ed, WThe Eme r gi ng Iraqi Army , " The washington
Times , 10/14 / 05)
* Scal e s Recount s Divi sion 's Suc cess I n Tak ing The Fight To The Te r roris t s . " I met
Colonel Mohammed, division operat i ons of f icer, an i ntensely proud a nd nationa lis t i c
officer. He made clear t o me that the di vi sion' s eventual goal was to de f end Iraq against
t he ins ur gents wi thout Amer ican help . But he attributed the di vi s i on 's rapid progres s t o a
remarkabl y small cadre of Ameri can soldi ers who provided t raining , logi s t i c al and
communicat i ons suppor t . Thi s i s a unit that f ight s a s it f orms . They have ki l l ed or
captured over fi f ty t err or i sts and removed ove r s i xt y r oadside bombs from t he maj or
hi ghway t ha t travel s t hrough its area of ope r a t ions . " (Robe r t H. s c a les, Op-Ed , WThe
Emerging I r aqi Army, w The Washington Ti mes , 10/14/ 05)
Shepperd:
Fr om, " 10/11/ 05 )
WThes e Are No Amateurs Her e . They 're ve ry Tough ." (CNN ' s wLive
Nas h Sa ys Iraqi Troops Are Supported By The Iraqi people . na sh: "They 're out there and
the Iraqi people are turning t o them - r e s ponses t o surveys, 89 percent of t he Iraqi
population has support and trust t he Iraqi troops and t hey ' r e telling t hem where the bad
guys are and we are rolling up that network . That' s a rea l take away. The real take away
is tha t t e r rorist t hi ng is c r umbl i ng over t her e . " (FOX News' "Fox & Friends ," 10/11/ 05 )
Scales Notes That Iraqis Are providing Security And Have The Capabilities To Take On The
I ns ur ge nt s . SCALES: "I'll give you one example. Remember about eight mont hs ago, Bill
Cowan was in here talking about the BlAP road, you know, t he airport road? " HUME: "Ye s ,
yes, yes, yes, yes, the al ley of dea th ." SCALES: "Right. I drove the BIAP road, five
mi l e s along that road. And it 's clear of the enemy. I t 's full of commerce . And who's
protecting it? The Iraqi s ixth i nfantry division. And in many ways, they ' r e be t t e r t han
we are, i n the sense that they 're bet ter able to gather intel ligence. I mean, they can
spot insurgents by t he i r body l a nguage a nd by how they a ct and the language they use. They
can spot fore igner s far better than our soldiers can. And they're better able t o engage
t hese terrorists when t hey find them oftent imes than our own soldiers are. YOU know, being
part of the cul ture real ly means a lot when you 're fight ing an insurgency." (Fox News'
"Speci a l Report With Brit Hume, " 10 /11/ 05 )
* Sc a les: " (I r aqi Securi t y Forces ) Are Of t e n Very Suc cessful At Finding Terrori sts
And Road side Bombs Be cause Of The i r Intimat e Familiarity With The Countryside And Local
Triba l Leaders . " (Robe r t H. Scales , Op-Ed , "The Eme rgi ng Iraqi Army ," The Washington
Ti mes , 10/14/ 05 )
Shepperd: "But Remember, We Have Built Ove r Ti me The se I nsurgents As 10 Fe e t Tall . They
Are Not 10 Feet Tall. They' r e Able To Do Small Attacks Wit h IBDs , But You Notice They
Have Not Taken Ove r Pol i ce Stations Or Done Any Large Movements Actions In The Last
Several Months . · (CNN' s "Live From, " 10/11/ 05 )
Sc al e s : "I
Mat ure This
Only Hope The American people wi ll Gi ve OUr Soldiers The Ti me They
Army . Gi ve Them Time , Trust Them, And Thi s War will Tur n Out OK. "
3
Ne ed To
(Robe r t H.
scales, Op- Ed, "The Emerging I r aqi Army ," The Washi ngton Times, 10/14 / 05 )
Sheppe r d ; "I Think You'll St a r t Se e i ng The Insurrection Or The I nsurgency Take Some Hits
Next Year And Start To Peter Out. But It Won ' t Be Until Next Year - Carol." (CNN ' s
"Daybreak, " 10 /U/05)
U.S. Troops In The Middle Ea s t :
Sc a les Says The Capabilities Of American Forces In Iraq Are Only Increasing_ SCALES :
"That's a great question . The American commitment is s teady. We're not going to s ee an
increase in American forces. And thei r capability is increasing, thanks to i nfusions of
technology and the combat experience ... • HOME : · Ame r i c an forces? " SCALES: ·American
forces . And the infusion of ne w units coming over, combat -experienced uni ts. The
i nsurgency is on a steady downwa rd trend, mainly because U.S. forces and Iraqi forces have
been successful in cleaning out t he ratlines . .. • (Fox News' "Spec i a l Report With Bri t
Hume," 10 / 11 /05)
Shepperd; "The U.S. Forces, They're Under Attack By IEDs. But The re's Very Li t t l e Direct
Act ion Against U.S. For ce s Anymore. EVery Time Insurgents At t ac k The U.S. For c e s , They
Really Get Hammered. And So The Level Of Violence Against U.S . Forces Has Gone Down,
Except For The IEDs. " (CNN's "Live Fr om, " 10/ 11 / 05 )

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Military Analysts in Iraq
Final Military Analyst wrap-up - Iraq Referendum 10.18.05.doc

Final Military
Anatyst wrap-up...
This r@por t takes a look a t over all cov@r age numbers and wee kend commenta ry
(October 15 - 16) by mili tary ana l ys t s who recent ly vi s i t ed Iraq. As a cont rol gr oup , we
have also pr ovi ded some i nsight i nto comment a ry (or lack t he r @of ) o f thos e mi litary
anal ysts who did not trave l to I r aq r i ght be f ore the r e f e r e ndum.
.----- - - - - --------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PAR
Military Analyst Media Coveraee Wrap-Up
Weekend Commentary-Iraq Ref erendum
October 18. 2005
This report takes a look at overall coverage numbers and weekend
commentary (October 15-16) by military analysts who recently visited Iraq.
As a control gro up. we have also provided some insight into commentary (or
lack there of) of those mi litary analysts wbo did not travel to Iraq right before
the referendum.
_ . tr '> TeIaIC o v ~ ~ cc;-,
~
Analyst Television Radio Print Online
Montgomery Meigs 1 0 0 0
Robert Scales 3 0 0 0
Don Shepperd 8 2 0 0
Chuck Nash 1 0 0 0
John Garrett 0 0 0 0
Robert Maginnis 1 0 1 0
. .
Weekeiiil'Cove.age ~ O c " 1S.U) , ~
Montgomery Meigs 1 0 0 0
Robert Scales 1 0 0 0
Don Shepperd 6 0 0 0
Chuck Nash 0 0 0 0
John Garrett 0 0 0 0
Robert Maginnis 0 0 0 0
HIGHLIGHTS
Bob Scales:
J;o> The insurgency is on «a slow downward decl ine," because the Americans and the
Iraqis are working together.
). Feels optimistic that the Iraqi troops are up to speed " in terms of the intangi bles">
willingness to fight for a cause, cour age, cohes ion, and ' 'the bottom line is yes -
these guys want to fight ."
Montgomery Meigs:
)0> Things were better than he thought they' d be in Iraq.
)0> They have secured "roughly 100 people connected to Zarqawi's networks.. .in the
last 10 months... that's amazing."
)0> U.S. troops will be in Iraq through the first government term, through the next
four years, but with significantly less troops. As Iraqi forces get better and
stronger, US. troops will be drawing down.
)0> A positive sign is that lots of Iraqi troops, instead ofUS. forces, are leading
battles in certain areas, including recently in the successful Tal Afar situation.
Donald Shepperd:
)0> Very difficult (for the Iraqi people) to elect a competent govenunent that is not
corrupt and gaining confidence of the people will take time
)0> Iraqi forces just need to be better than the insurgents; not as good as US. soldiers
(in response to "readiness numbers").
)0> The Iraqi security forces, both the police and the military are getting better and
more capable and this is their second election. They learned from the last one.
)0> I see a rapid acceleration of the training and the capabilities of Iraqi forces over
there. The ones I visited were really good and very motivated.
)0> We must not set a date on troop withdrawal.
Other Military Analyst Coveraee
As a means of comparing the analysis provided by the six persons who recently traveled
to Iraq, we also looked for commentary by six other retired military personnel who
regularly appear on television, in print, or on line. We chose Ken Allard, Jed Babbin,
Bill Cowan, Gordon Cucullu, Barry McCaffrey, and Wayne Simmons. We found a
combined total ofone item among the six. This was a short excerpt in a piece Jed Babbin
wrote on Sunday about Washington, DC, politics (see below).
Excerpt from The American Spectator online (posted today but written 10/15)
The unrestrained glee among the Sunday morning liberal talking heads at the Miers-
driven internecine war among conservatives was equaled only by their celebration of the
possible (and possibl y imminent) indictments of White House staffers in the Plame leak
investigation. Those political currents swept away the topic of the Iraqi constitutional
referendum, which seems to have been an unqualifi ed success. At this writing - Sunday
afternoon -- we don't know the result. Regardless of whether the constituti on was
ratified, about 60 percent of Iraq's eligible voters u roughly 9 million peopl e -- braved the
insurgents' threats and voted. Even in the Sunni provinces, the turnout was reportedl y that
high or higher. No matter how the vote turns out, this is an overwhelming victory over
the terrorists, whose murder campaign failed to keep the Sunnis out of the political
process. This vote doesn't preclude failure of democracy in Iraq, but it makes it much less
likely. The Sunnis -- and the other Iraqi ethnic groups -- will long remember this vote as a
Public Affairs Research and Analysis 2
milestone on theirpath to freedomand self-government. Theirmemoryis bound to last
longer than that of Judith Miller.
Note: General TommyFranks appeared on FoxNews on Sundaymorning, inpart to talk
aboutthenewly issued paperback edition of his book. In response to questions about the
elections, he provided supportive answers, suchas; it shows"the strategy is working."
Additionally. Rick Francona was laterdiscovered to have multiple televisionclips on
MSNBC. Generally, his commentary was about the referendum process and the
insurgency. Unlikethe traveling military analysts. he had much less focus ontroop levels
and Iraqi troop readiness.
Weekend Television Coverage
(Link to Actual Coverage on Fox, CNN and MSNBC)
Robert Seales:
Fox News - On tbe Record With Greta Van Susteren
10/15105 03:57:05
Donald Sbepperd:
CNN - Live Saturday
1011 51051 6:20:53
CNN - Live Saturday
10/ 15105 12:08:3 1
CNN - Saturday Morning
10/15105 07:48:53
CNN - Dolans Unscripted
10/ 1510510:18:43
CNN -- Live Saturday
1011 5105 18:37:57
CNN - DolaDs Unscripted
10/1510510:07:59
Montgomery Meigs:
MSNBC - Ha rd ball
10/1 510503:57:04
Public AJTairs Research and Analysis 3
From:
Sent:
To :
Cc:
Subj ect :
Maj, OCJCS/PA
Oct,,!,e, 19, 200512:06 PM
lIIl CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/P 0 rank, CAPT, OCJC
Haddock, Ellen (Katie Col OCJCSl PA; CDR. OCJCS/PA; L- ---'
LTC. OCJCSIPA; TSgt, JCS. OCJCSl PA
FW: Fact Sheet - 1268 Report to Congress on Measuring the Security & Stability in Iraq
Attachments: Fact Sheet October Report.doc
Fact Sheet0ctDber
Rej>ort.doc ...
Sirs ... her e ' s the fact sheet f or t he 1268 Report
s e curi ty & St a bi lity i n Iraq from the DRSO off i c e .
t o Congress on Measuring t he
If you r ead this fact s heet , as we l l as the draft TPs that were generated earl i er in the
process , it qui c kl y becomes apparent that t he i n formation is j ust too ol d to cont inue
t a l ki ng about i t. I t was ol d data the day it was publ i shed . .. a nd t ha t will continue to be
t he problem f or f uture reports if the 'process' does n ' t a l l ow f or i t to be published more
qui ckl y.
I propose we make t he deliberate dec ision t o discont inue executing the rema1n1ng proposed
pieces of a PA plan (whi c h are civic gr oups , J -SCOPE, and a l l-hands calls) . This wil l
probabl y be discus sed a t t he next Steeri ng Group Meet ing next week.
Whi le execution on thi s report was poor , I bel ieve we have enough lead time and less ons
learned from the las t two that I can prepare a mor e aggre s si ve plan for the next report
that will be issued i n J anua ry. This wil l be published every 90 days.
I a lso be lieve i n the midst of al l the ac tivities going on r ight now (referendum,
elect ions, Saddam t r ial, NMSP -WOT, NSSI, etc.) that t hi s i nformat ion wil l get lost i n the
fray, especial ly sinc e we're already wel l ou t of the cycle for whe n it was r e lea s ed a nd
t he data, even when published on 12 Oct, was a lready old compa red t o what's be ing wr i t t en
about and discussed t oday .
Wit h your approva l , I will i ncor porat e t he following elements into the dr a f t plan for the
next r eport (Jan ' 06) :
- - J -S COPE a rticle (written by J -S or use t he AFI S ar ticle that's usual ly wr i t ten f r om the
pr e s s conf e r ence )
- - Al l - hands cal ls (CONCERN: unl ess the CJCS does i t AND it 's mandatory, who wi l l rea lly
be i nt ere s t ed? We can ' t force -feed t he Joint Staff , but I woul d hate to have Lt Gen
Renuart (or ot he r designated rep) stand up in f ront of an empty conf room/auditorium. )
-- Talking Points /fact she et (pr oduce d by DRSO) f or a senior l eader 'module' of
i nformation f or speeches/public e ngagement s / c i vi c gr oups , e t c .
Pres s Confe rence
Mi l i t a ry anal yst cal l
-- Select mi lit a ry i nt e rvi ews
-- Pos t report t o Defense Link (Cur r ent report i s posted)
Please let me know what you think.
v r,
L..-_---'
J CS, NMCC
LtCol, J CS J5
ctober 1 8, 2005 3 : 55 PM
J 5;
MAJ, JCS JS ;
OCJCS/ PA; CIV,
1
:> - - - -
:> From:
:>Sent ·
:>To:
Lt Col , JCS J5; LTC, JCS NMCC; "-
Maj ,
:>Cc:
:>Subject:
CAPT, JS J5
FW: Fa c t Sheet
>
:>L&G
:>HR 1268 fact sheet as promised
>VR
Lt Col , USAF
:>Joi n t Staff , J -S policy Division
:> I y Branch Chief Pen tagon Rm L.__-'
>
f a cts a r e
I'm no t s ure
Fact Sheet
:> - - - -
:> From: MAJ, WSO- DRSO
:> Se nt· ctobe r 18, 2005 2: 1 9 PM
:>To: Lt Co l , JCS J5
>Subj ect,
>
:> Si r,
>
:>He re is t he fac t s heet a s formatted per g u idance fro m OSD PA and /or LA. The
u pd a t e d but the res t of the i nformat i o n (e . g . o r
abou t (J o na t ha n wa s working wi th PA/LA o n thi s ).
>
>
>
:>Respec t f ully,
>
>MAJ _'
:>Metr ics Coo r d i na t o r
:>De f e nse Recons t ruction Su ort Of fice, a SD Pentagon, Room
......- ...
:> " ¥ou c a n ' t manage what yo u can ' t
>
2
Fact Sheet
OSD - Defense Reconstruction Support Office
Washington, DC
October 13, 2005
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq -1268 Report to Congress
Thi s is the second in a series of reports to Congress meas uring stability and security in Iraq. The
first report was del ivered on July 22, 2005. The report provides baseli ne measurements and
indicators of Iraq' s political cl imate, security environment activity and security force training
and performance.
Following is a li stin g of init iat ives and activities that have occurred since the last report in July:
Political Stabil ity
• The national referendum will be held on October 15th; reports indicated one million new voters
registered
• Iraqis overwhelming intend to vote on October 15th, representing another major democratic and
political milestone
• A private media is thriving and growi ng in Iraq; 44 commercial television stations, 72 commercial
radio stations and more than 100 private newspapers are operating in Iraq
• Other countries have committed an additional $235 mill ion to rebuild Iraq
• NATO has partnered with Iraq and is trai ning and developing a new staff college for Iraq' s military
Economic Stability
• Iraq has normalized relat ions with the International Monetary Fund received $436 million in
emergency loans
• Worl d Bank projects 3.7% growth for 2005
• Despite terrorist attacks, Iraq continues to produce 2. 16 million barrels per day (bblJd) and export
1.4 million bbl/d; key oil infrastructure repairs are underway
• The-U.S. Govemment is training new infrastructure security battalions and creating a "train-the-
trainer" program
• Thi rty years of neglect and corruption in the electricity sector have severel y limited Iraq' s ability to
improve electricity output
• Communications sector expansion fueled by broad-based and strong cell phone sales and use
Securi ty Environment
• The Iraqi Army is in the lead for planning and executing counterinsurgency operations in one Iraqi
province that is roughly the size of New Jersey. The ISF also have the lead for 87 square miles
in Baghdad and over 450 square miles of battle space in the other Iraqi provinces
.----- - - - - - -------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -
• Intimidation and brutal violence remains the terr orists and insurgency's weapons of choice, and
will remain so for the foreseeable fut ure
• Coalition commanders and local leaders continue to disrupt insurgent cells
• Signmcant numbers of Sunnis remain concerned about secur ity, but intend to vote in the
upcoming referendum
• Insurgents want sectarian viol ence and are promoting violence agai nst innocent Iraq civi lians
• Four provinces account for 85% of all attacks
• Fifty percent of the population is exposed to only 6% of the attacks
security Forces Training and Performance
• We have 36 battalions taking the lead - capable of planning and executing missions with little or
no support from Coalition forces. And this incl udes one battalion completely capable of operating
independently of Coalition backstopping. This is a 50% increase in the number of ISF capable of
taking the lead in combat operations.
• 116 ground combat battalions conducting operati ons - 22 additional battalions since July
• Over 192,000 Iraqi Security Forces trained and equipped - a 12% increase since July
• The total force structure proj ection has increased by 28,000, and is expected to be completed by
August 2007
• Since January 2004 the Ministry of Defense has fielded 88 Iraqi Army battalions including 2
special operations battalions
• Iraq units being fully integrated into all major Coalition operations
• Since JUly the Mini stry of Defense forces received approximately 10,000 AK-47s, 1,800 pistols,
2,700 machine guns and 750 vehicles
• Eleven Iraqi comb at battali ons were independently employed in Tal Afar; this is twice the number
during Falluj ah operat ions
• The new logistics system is now being bui lt
• Special Operat ions units are undertaking reconnaissance and di rect action missions
• Since July, Strategic Infrastructure Battalions have been integrated into Ministry of Defense plans
anf:J will complete Multi· National Security Training Corp - Iraq {MNSTC· I} training in October
• NATO has trained 24 Iraqi senior officers - colonels and lieutenant colonels; two additional
course curricula have been planned
• Since July, Ministry of Interior forces received approximately 21,000 AK-47s, 15,000 pistol s,
1,700 machi ne guns and 1,900 vehicl es
• 5,500 additional Iraqi Pol ice Service personnel have been trained and equipped since July
• 2,000 additional Special Police Commandos have been trained and equi pped since July; this
program is well ahead of schedule
• The Mechanized Police reached its target force level during this reporting period
• 1,200 additional Public Order Police have been trained and equipped since Jul y; full force level s
are expected by the October referendum
• Since July, the Emergency Response Unit has conducted nightly operations in Mosul and
Baghdad; its forces have increased by 50% since July
Announcement s or act iv it ies by President Bush and Department of De'ense Officials related to
this report
President Bush:
• Rose Garden press conference
• Oval Office briefing from LTG David Petraeus
Secretary Rum. ' .ld:
• Congressional appearance with Gen. Casey, Gen. Myers, and Gen. Abizaid
• Press conference with Gen. Casey
• Press briefing by l TG David Petraeus
• Briefing to AEI by l TG David Petraeus
From:
Sent:
To :
Cc:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Kat ie) , Col, OCJCS/PA
Tuesday, December 20, 2005 6:03 PM
'Tobias. Ed' Ibliiil"'"- - - '
OCJCS/PA; IVJCS SJS
: rave Wit CJCS
Thanks f o r t he emai l - - I ' l l answer what I c an, and look i nto t he res t .
The f ocus o f the t r i p is t r oop visits , so I believe you will have plenty o f acc ess to t he
troops for i nterviews. We wi ll he l p f acili tate wha tever you need .
I' l l need to get some clar i fi c a t ion from t he entertai ners t o s e e what t hei r gu i de l i ne s are
wi t h regard t o granting interviews a nd or r ecor di ng the ir performances .
The enter t a i ners who are confi rmed for the t r ip are;
--Reggie McFadden .- Comedian
- -Diana DeGarmo . - pop voca l i s t (runne r up i n American Idol ) - - Mic hael Peterson --
country-we s tern singe r -- (Retired Col onel ) Jack Jacobs Vietnam-era Medal of Honor
r ecipient (and more recent l y , mili tary anal ys t f or MSNBC)
We might have a NASCAR d river , but won't know f or ce rtain unt i l t omor r ow.
Hope that is useful ; I' ll t ry t o get more det a ils t o you s oon .
Best Wis he s,
Katie
-- -- - Or i gi na l Message - - --.. -.. -.
From: Tobi a s , Bd [ma i l t 0 "n__
Sent: Tuesday , December 2 0, 2 005 4:58 PM
To ; Haddock , Ellen (Ka t i e ) , Col, OCJCS/PA
Sub j ect; RE ; Travel wi t h CJCS
Col . Haddock -
Thank s f o r the s eat of f e r . I have a couple of ques t i ons whi ch I' m e - mai l i ng, i n
c ase I don ' t reach you on t he phone t his evening.
How much access wi l l we have t o i nt erviews wi th troops?
i nt e rvi e ws with entertainers? Who are the entertainers? wi ll
perf ormances , audi o and /or video?
What access wi l l we have t o
we be able to record act ual
Thanks f o r t he help. I 'll be back i n t ouch t omorrow with a trave l de c i s i on .
Ed
1
Ed Tobias
Associated Pre s s
Asst. Manag ing Editor , Broadcast
1B25 K St. N.W. , Sui t e BOO
Wa shing t on DC 200 06
- Off ice
~ - : - _ - ; - : : - .. - Fax
ht t p : / /www.ap.org <BLOCKED: : ht t p ://www. ap . or g/ >
El l en (Kat i e), Col , OCJ CS/PA
De cember 20 , 2005 1 :10 PM
From: Haddock ,
Sent : Tuesday ,
To: !!!!E=;===; =J Cc: LTC, OCJ CS/ PA
Subj ect : Tr ave l with CJCS
Mr. Tob i as ,
[mai lto:ellen .haddock
"-------.....
Tried t o reach you vi a phone , but unsuc cessful .
Pleas e give me a cal l a t your conveni ence t o discuss possi bl e trave l wi t h the
Chai rman during next week' s troop v i sit.
Thanks i n advance,
Ka t i e
Col onel Kat ie Ha ddock, USMC
S ecial Assi stant f or Publ ic Aff a irs to t he Chai rman
The i nformation cont a i ned i n this communicat i on i s i nt ended f or the use o f the
de s i gna t ed r ecipi ents named above.
If the reader of t his communication is not the intended r ecipient, you a re hereby
not i f i ed that you have r e ceived thi s communi ca t i on in e rror, and that any r eview,
dissemination, distri bution or copying of thi s communi ca tion is strictly prohi bi t ed.
If you have r e ce i ved thi s communi cat i on in error, pl ease not ify The As s oc iated Pr e s s
i mmediat e l y by telephone at +1- 212- 621- 1898 and de l e te thi s ema i l . Thank you.
2
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Kat i e -
Tobias, Ed
Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:22 AM
Ha d kiln(Katie). Col. OC _ S ~ ....__'I-
)(I) LTC. OCJCS/PA; )(I) IV JCS SJS; Meyer, Lisa
RE: Travel with CJCS
We'd like to take you up on your o ffe r and have Li s a Meyer accompany the CJCS on t h i s
trip . We won 't be a b le to spring a videographer, though, so o nl y one seat i s necessary.
Yo u s houl d feel fre e to wo r k logist i cs d irectly wi th Lisa , but would apprec iate being ke p t
in the i nfo l oop .
Thanks,
Bd
Ed To bias
As s oc i a t e d Press
Asst. Managing Ed i t or, Broadcast
1825 K St. N.W. , Suite 800
Washi n ton DC 20006
~ - Of fi c e
~ - : - ~ ' : " : ' ~ ~ . - Fax
h t tp://www.ap .or g <BLOCKED : : http ://www.ap .org/>
From: Haddock, Ellen (Ka t i e) , Col, OCJCS/PA [mailto :ellen.haddock
Sent : Tuesday, December 20, 2005 6 :03 PM ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
To : Tobias Ed
cc • LTC, OCJCS/PAi CIV JCS SJS
Subject : RE: Travel wi th CJCS
se .
Thanks for the emai l - - I 'l l answer what I can, and l ook i nt o the rest.
The focus of the t r i p i s troop v isits, so I believe you wil l have plenty o f access to the
troops for i nterviews . We wi l l he l p f a c i l i t a t e whatever you ne e d . .
I 'll need to ge t some clarification f rom t he entertai ners to see what their guidelines are
wi th regard to granting interviews and or r e c o r d i ng their performances .
The e ntertainers who a re conf irmed f o r the trip are :
1
--Reggie McFadden -- Comedian
--Di ana DeGarmo -- pop voc a l i s t (runner up in Amer i can I dol)
--Mi c ha e l Pe terson -- country-western singer
-- (Reti r ed Col one l ) Jack Jacobs -- Vietnam-era Medal of Honor recipient (and more
r e ce nt l y , mi l ita ry analys t f or MSNBC)
We might have a NASCAR dri ver , but won 't know f or c e rtain unt il tomorrow.
Hope that i s usef ul ; I 'll t ry to get mor e detai ls to you soon.
Best Wishe s ,
Kat ie
-- - - - Original
From: Tobi as, Ed
Sent : Tue s day, December 20, 2005 4 :58 PM
To : Haddock, El l e n (Kat i e) , Col , OCJ CS/ PA
Subjec t : RE: Travel with CJCS
Col. Haddock
Thanks f or t he seat offer. I have a couple of ques t ions which e -mail ing, i n
case I don't reach you on the phone t hi s evening.
How much a cce s s wi ll we have to i nterviews with troops ?
i nt e rviews wi th e nt e r t a i ne r s ? Who are t he entertainers ? wi l l
performances, audio and/or video?
What access will we have to
we be abl e t o reco r d ac t ua l
Thanks for t he help . I 'll be ba ck in touch tomorrow wit h a t rave l deci sion .
Ed
Ed Tobi a s
Associated Pr ess
Asst . Managing Editor, Broadcast
1825 K St. N.W. , Sui t e 800
Washin ton DC 20006
Office
- Fax
....__......
2
http://www.ap.org <BLOCKED : :http: / / www. ap. or g/ >
From: Haddoc k ,
Tuesday,
To: Tobias Ed
Cc:
Tr ave l
Ellen (Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS/ PA
December 20, 200 5 1 :10 PM
LTC, OCJCS/PA
with CJCS

Mr. Tob ias,
Tried to reach you v i a phone, but unsuccessful.
Please give me a call at your convenience to discuss possible travel with the
Chairman dur ing next week's t roop vi s i t .
Thanks i n advance,
Katie
Colonel Ka t i e Haddock , USMC
S ecial Assistant for Public Affairs to the Cha irman
The information contained in t his communication i s i ntended for t he use of t he
designated recipients named above.
If the reader of thi s communication is not t he i ntended recipi ent, you are hereby
notified t hat you have received t hi s communication i n error, and t ha t any review,
dissemination, distribution or copyi ng of this communicat ion is s trictly prohibi ted .
I f you have this communication in error, please notify The Ass ociat ed Pr e s s
i mmediat e ly by t elephone at +1 -2 12- 621 - 1898 and delete t his email. Thank you .
3
From:
Sent:
To :
Cc:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA
Wednesday, December 21, 200510:31 AM
TC, OCJCSJPA;- .....--....,CIVJCS SJS
RE: Travel with CJCS
Great news !
Looking f orward to worki ng wi t h Lisa, and with you .
All the be s t f o r t he hol idays,
Ka t i e
- - - - -Origina l
From: Tobias , Ed
Sent : Wednesday, December 21 , 2005 10 : 22 AM
To: 0 ( Kat i e) , Col , .....
Cc : LTC, OCJCS/PA; I V J CS SJS; Meyer, Lisa
Subject : RE: Travel wi th CJ CS
Ka t ie -
We'd
t h i s trip .
necessary .
like to t ak e yo u up on you r o f f e r a nd have Li sa Meyer a c c ompa ny t he CJCS on
We won't be abl e to spri ng a vi de ogr a phe r, tho ugh , s o o nly o ne s e at is
You should f eel free to work logistics directly wi th Li s a , but wou l d apprec i a te
being kept in t he i nfo loop.
Thanks ,
Ed
Ed Tobias
Associated Press
As s t . Managing Edi t or , Broadcast
1825 K St . N.W. , Su ite 800
Wa shin ton DC 20 006
- Off ice
!-,-.,....,..,...__..1 - Fax
http: / /www.ap .org <BLOCKED : : http: / / www.ap . org/ >
From: Haddo c k , Ellen ( Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS / PA [ma i l t o : ellen . haddock
Sent : Tuesday , De c emb e r 20 , 2005 6: 03 PM L.
1
To: Tobi a s Ed
Cc:
Subject : RE: Tr ave l
Ed ,
LTC, OCJCS/PA; L JCS SJS
with CJCS
Thanks f or the ema i l -- I ' ll ans wer what I c an , and look i nto t he rest .
The f ocus of the t r i p is
t o the t r oops f or i nt e rviews.
troop visits, so I bel ieve you wil l have pl e nt y of ac ce s s
We wi l l help facil itat e what ever you need.
I 'l l need t o get some c larificat i on f r om t he ent ertai ne r s t o s e e what t hei r
guide l ines a r e with r egard to granting i nt ervi ews and o r r ecording t he i r pe r f ormances.
The enter t ainers who are conf irmed for t he t r i p are:
-- Reggie McFadde n -- Comedian
--Di ana DeGarmo -- pop voca l i s t (runner up in Ameri can Idol )
--Mic hael Pe t e r son - - count ry- western s i nger
- - (Retir ed Col onel ) J ack Jacobs -- Vi e tnam- era Meda l of Honor rec ipi ent (and more
r ecently . mi li tary analyst f or MSNBC)
We might have a NASCAR drive r , but won' t know for cer t ai n until t omor r ow.
Hope that i s us e f ul ; I ' l l t ry to get mor e det a i l s to you s oon .
Best Wi s he s ,
Kat i e
- -- - -Or i gi na l
From: Tobias, Ed
Sent: Tue sday . Decembe r 20, 2005 4: 58 PM
To : Haddock , Ell e n (Ka t i e ) , Col, OCJCS/ PA
Subjec t: RE: Tr avel wi t h CJCS
Col. Haddock
Thanks f or t he seat offer .
i n case I don ' t r each you on t he phone
I have a coupl e of ques t i ons which I ' m e-mai l i ng,
this eveni ng .
How much a ccess wi ll we have to i nt e rvi ews with t roops ? Wha t a cces s wi ll we
have t o int ervi ews with ent e r taine r s ? Who a re t he entertainers? Will we be able t o
r ecord ac t ua l performances, audio and/ or video?
Thanks f or the help . I 'll be back in t ouch tomorrow wi th a trave l deci sion .
2
Ed
Ed Tobias
As s o c iated Pres s
As s t . Managing Ed i t or , Broadcast
18 25 K St. N.W. , Sui t e 800
wa ah i n ton DC 20006
- Of f ice
- Fax
http: / / www. ap. or g <BLOCKED ::http: / /www. ap.org/ >
Col , OCJCS/ PA
LTC, OCJ CS!PA
wi t h CJCS
BUen Katie
December 20 , 2005 1 :10 PM
From:
[mai l t o :ellen .haddock
Sent: Tuesday,
To : b '
Cc:
Subj ec t : Tr ave l
Mr. Tobias .
Tried t o r each you via phone, but unsuc ces sful .
Please gi ve me a call at your conven i ence to discuss possible travel with the
Chairman during next week's troop vis it.
Tha nks in advance,
Kat i e
Colonel Kat i e Haddock, USMC
S ec lal Assistant for Public Af f a irs t o t he Chairman
The i nformat ion cont a i ned in this communicat i on is i ntended for the use of the
designated recipients named above.
If the reader o f this communicat i on is no t t he int ended recipient, you are
hereby not if i ed t ha t you have recei ved t h i s communication i n error , and t hat any rev iew,
d isseminat i on, d i stribut i on or copyi ng o f t his communication is s t rictly prohibited .
I f you have recei ved this communi cat i on i n e rror , pl e a s e not i fy The Assoc i a ted
Press immed i a t ely by t el ephone at +1 -2 12 -621- 18 98 and de l e te this ema i l. Thank you .
3
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subj ect :
Ed ,
LTC, OCJCS/PA
Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:43 AM
'Tobias Ed'
We will ne ed t he below inf orma t i on on Lisa to ensur e we can add her to t he t r i p .
Passport # / d a t e issued/locat ion
Social s ecurity #
DOB/location
Thanks .
-----Origi nal Message-----
From: Ha dd o c k , Ell en (Katie), Col, OCJCS!PA
Sent: We dnes d a y , December 21, 20 05 10: 31 AM
To : ' Tobias Ed '
Cc : LTC, OCJCS! PA; L ..IC1V JCS SJS
Subj e c t : RE: Travel with CJ CS
Great ne ws !
Looking f or wa rd t o worki ng wi th Lisa . and wi th you.
Al l the be s t f or the holidays ,
Ka tie
--- --Origi nal
From: Tobi a s , Ed
Sen t: wednesday, Decembe r 21, 2 00 5 10 : 22 AM
To : ddo e (Katie), Col, 0 J_CSil.\:<'. ..
Cc : LTC, OCJCS/ PAi e l V J CS SJS i Meyer. Li s a
Subj ect : RE : Travel wi th CJ CS
Katie -
We'd like to take you up on your of fer and have Li sa Meyer ac company t he CJCS
on t hi s trip. We won ' t be a bl e to spr i ng a videographe r, t hough , so only one s eat is
ne ce s s a ry .
You s hould f eel f r ee t o work logist ics directly wi t h Li s a , but would
appreciate being kept in the info loop.
Thanks ,
1
Ed
Ed Tobias
As s ociated Press
As s t . Managing Editor , Broadcas t
1825 K St . N.W. , Su ite 800
0006
- Of fi c e
':-:-:-_,,:,,: -' - Fax
http: / / www .ap . org <BLOCKED: :ht t p: / /www. ap.org! >
From: Haddoc k El en Ka "e , Col , OCJCS !PA
lmailto:ellen.haddock
Sent : Tuesday, De c embe r 20, 2005 6:03 PM
To : Tobia s Ed ..... .,
Cc: LTC, OCJCS!PA; crv J CS SJS
Subj ect: RE: Tr avel with CJCS
Ed ,
Thanks f or the email -- I' ll answer what I can , and l ook i nto t he rest.
The focus of t he trip is
ac ce s s to the t r oops f or i nterviews .
t roop vi si t s , s o I be l i eve you wi ll have pl enty of
We wil l help faci l ita te whatever you ne ed.
I ' ll need to get some c l a rif i c at i on from t he ente r t a i ne r s to see what their
guide lines are with r egard to g ranting i nt e rvi ews and or r ecordi ng their performances.
The entertainers who a re conf i r med for the tri p a r e :
- -Reggie McFadden - - Comedi an
--Di ana DeGa rmo -- pop vocal i s t (runner up i n American I dol )
- - Michae l Pe t ers on -- country- we s t e r n singer
- - (Re t ired Colonel ) Jack Jacobs - - Vi e tnam-e r a Medal of Honor r e cipient (and
more r e ce nt ly, mil itary analyst f or MSNBC)
We mi ght have a NASCAR driver , but won' t know for ce r t ai n until tomorrow.
Hope that is useful ; I' l l try to ge t more detail s t o you s oon.
Be s t Wishes ,
Kat ie
2
-- - - -Origi nal
From: Tobi a s, Ed -'
Se nt : Tuesday, December 20, 2005 4 :58 PM
To: Haddock, El l en (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Tr avel with CJCS
Col. Haddock
Tha nks for t he s e a t offe r . I have a couple of quest ions whi ch I 'm e-
mailing, i n case I don ' t reach you on the phone thi s evening.
How much access will we have to interviews wi t h troops?
will we have to interviews wi th ent ertainers? Who are the entertainers?
to record actual performances, audi o and/ o r video?
Wha t access
Will we be able
Thanks for t he he l p . I ' l l be back in touch t omor r ow with a trave l
decision.
Ed
Ed Tobi a s
Associat ed Press
Asst . Managing Edi t or , Br oadcas t
1825 K St. N. W., Suite 800
B 00 06
~ Office
~ ~ ~ " ' : " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . Fax
http: / /www.ap.org <BLOCKED:: ht t p: / / www. ap . org/ >
From: Haddock, Ellen (Kat i e), Col, OCJCS/PA
[mai l t o :el l e n . haddock
Sent: Tue sday , De cember 20, 2005 1 :10 PM
To: Tobias , Ed
Cc: LTC, OCJCS/PA
SUbject: Travel wi th CJCS
Mr. Tobi a s ,
Tr ied to reach you vi a phone , bu t unsuccessful.
Pl e a se g i ve me a cal l a t your convenience to di s cus s possibl e travel
wi th t he Chairman dur ing next week's troop visi t.
Thanks in advance,
Katie
Colonel Katie Haddock, USMC
S ecial Assist ant for Public Af fairs to the Chairman
3
The inf ormation contained in this communicat ion is i nt ended f or the us e
of t he de s i gnated r ecipi ent s named above.
If the r eade r of thi s commun icat ion is not t he i nt ended recipient , you
a re he reby noti fied t ha t you have rece i ved this communication i n error , and t hat any
revie w, diss emi nation, di s tribution or copying of thi s communica tion is s tric tl y
prohibited .
If you have recei ved t hi s communi c ation i n e rror, please notify The
Associated Pr e s s immedi ately by telephone a t +1- 212- 621 - 1898 and delet e this emai l . Tha nk
you.

Fw: your mail
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCS/PA
~ ~ ; : : : 5 r , 3 , 2005 1:48 PM
~ LTC, OCJCS/PA
From:
Sent:
To:
Subj ect:
-- ---Or i gina l Message---- -: :::;J
Fr o m: Merrit , Roxie T . [Merr i tt, Roxie
To: Haddock , Ellen (Katie) , Col , OCJCS/PA
Sent: Fri De c 23 13 : 08 : 05 2005
Subject : FW : your mai l
T. CAPT, OASD- PAl
Katie ,
I can ' t fi nd Di a ne on the g lobal. Could you forward t hi s e mail to he r. Follow- up t o the
Conway analyst cal l t hi s am.
Rox ie T. Merri tt
Captai n , u . S. Navy
Director , DoD Pre ss Oper a t i ons
Off ice o f the Assi stant Secretary o f Defense f or Publ i c Af f a irs Pentagon, Room 23565
a.t.o 20301 - 14 00
c ell )(2)
" Li fe , Liberty a nd the Pur suit o f Al l Who Thr eaten I t"
--- - - 0 . . ge - - - - -
Fr om: CI V, OASD-PA
Sent : Friday, Dec e mbe r 23, 2005 12:27 PM
To : Merritt Ro i e T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Cc : CIV, OASD-PA
Sub ect: Fw: your ma l l
hi r oxi e , cou l d you pa s s this alo ng t o someone in jcs who can get it to conwa y ??
t hank,s !
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handhe l d
-----o ri gi na l Mes
From: r ober tma 73
To : CIV, OASD- PA
Sent: Fri Dec 23 11 :39 :12 2005
Subject: Re : your mai l
I' m on notic e f or t he News ho ur for this e vening . I ' d l ike Met r i c s t hat indicate
downs i zi ng at t his t i me makes sense. Spe ci fi c a l ly, numbers o f attacks , t urn ove r
ba t tlespace t o I SF etc.
Can yo u he lp?
Bob
1
Robert L. Ma i nni s

.....
From:
message
CIV , OASD- PA"
« . • . OLE_Ob j ... »
MEMORANDUM
To: Re t i red Military Ana l ysts
From: Da l las La wrence
Dire ctor , Community Relations and Publ i c Lia ison
Office of the Secretary o f Defense
Da te: Dec ember 21 , 2005
Re: Conf erence Call with Senior 000 Of fi c i a ls
We i nvite you to participate in a conference call , Fr i da y , De cember 23 , 2005 from
9:30 -10:00 a .m.
Li e ut e na nt General J a me s T. Conway would like t o brief you
Iraq. In order t o part icipate in this call, you must a g r e e
r eceive on the c all until NOON, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23 , 200 5 .
ba c kgr ound , s o you are free to quot e a senior DoD o f f i c i a l
regarding troop adjustments in
t o EMBARGO t he information you
The cal l will be on
once the embargo is lifted.
or
Please R. S . V. P . to L. ..... at .... .. or call her a t L. -'
TO participate in this conference cal l, please dial and
t o be connected to t he Analysts conference call. I...........
We hope you are able to partici pat e .
OSD Pub l ic Af fai rs
Community Relations and Public Li ai s on
The Pentagon
Washin ton D.C. 20301
www.Ame ricaSupportsYou . mi l
2
r·'
1

From:
1
Sent:
To:
11 2006-5,0
i
Haddock Ellen (Katie\'
Col, OCJCSfPA;
l·x.,-
I

)(I)
.
RoxieT. Merritt Roxie: T CAPT OASD-PA · )(8)

I"xo
1
To:
Subj ect :
Attachments:
Body Anno<
.s.os.ecc (213 KB).
Rh edance Gear e Colonel K8)
Media Coverage of the Body Armor Issue
Body Armor 1.9.06.doc
« Body Armor 1 . 9 . 06 .doc»
Note: For t hose of you i nt e r e s t ed i n what r etir ed mili tary personnel now s erving as TV
analys t s have to say, several have commented on the i s s ue .
2
PAR
MEDIA COVERAGE: BODY ARMOR STUDY
January 11, 2006
SUMMARY POINTS
» "Secret" Pentagon study call deaths preventable-"Either a larger plate or
superior protection around the plate would have had the potential to alter the final
outcome," the study concluded.
)- Vulnerabili ty ofthe military' s body armor has been known since the start of the
war-data collected since 2003
);> Pentagon continues to have armor problems ranging from shortfal ls in bulletproof
vests to heavily armored Humvees and trucks
);> Pentagon working to adapt and improve solider protection but need to consider
safety from extra armor against the loss ofcombat effectiveness from too much
annor
» Soldi ers question the use of more annor---compJain that it is already diffi cult for
them to move
,... Politicians criticize the Pentagon-Senator Clinton requests an inquiry into the
issue.
Print/Online Summary
Media coverage of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner's body armor study has followed
the lead of New York Times report er, Michael Moss, who first broke the news on
January 7. The coverage centered on the studies finding that additional armor would
have prevented close to 80% of the deaths caused by wounds to the upper body.
The media provided a relativel y descriptive explanation of the study's findings, but
shifted to a more critical perspective in its presentation of the Pentagon' s efforts to
provide armor to its troops. After the initial reporting, coverage expanded to incl ude
skepticism voiced by soldiers regarding the benefit of added armor to combat
effectiveness and criticism of the Pentagon from politicians.
Widely quot ed Pentagon comments:
:> "As the information became more prevalent and aware to everybody that in fact
these were cas ualty sites that they needed to be worried about, then people were
much more willing to accept that weight on their body"-Maj. Wendell
Leimbach, Marine Corps Systems Command
}> " In response to the changing battlefi eld conditions and as new technologies
emerge, the Army continues to develop improvements to soldier protec tion
equipment to enhance survivabi lity and mobility. We take operational security
very seriously and wi ll not discuss in public sensitive issues that may render any
insight to the enemy about our capabilities, fielding plans, or tactics, techniques
and procedures"- Anny spokesman Paul Boyce
Television Summary
Television broadcasts also referenced the New York Times as the media outlet to «break
the body armor" story, however, it is Good Morning America's dai ly segments keeping
the issue alive. It has included interviews with Senator Clinton, the manufactures of body
armor and official U.S. Army statements about the distribution of armor overseas.
Addi tionall y, many mi litary analysts such as Wesley Clark, Bill Cowan and Boh
McGinnis have also provided their perspectives. Coverage was on all major national
networks and local markets (ABC, NBC and CBS).
Mjlitary Ana lyst Quotes:
:> The reali ty is we're fighting a real war. Unfortunately, if you burden soldiers
down with every piece of protective Annor that we would like to, they wouldn't
he ahle to move. (McGinnis)
:> We've been worried about this for a long time this, is historic under inves tment in
the protecti on of individual soldiers and marines. It' s been going on 25 years,
since Vietnam. (Clark)
:> On this part icul ar issue, I believe the mi litary conti nues to do the absolute best
that they can for the troops out there... (Cowan)
PRINT/ONLINE EXCERPTS
Clinton: Vests not protecting troops in Iraq Jan uary 10
(Newsday) hy Glenn Thrush
Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton clai ms that hundreds ofV.S. soldiers may have died
"needlessly" in Iraq because of inadequate body armor and wants the Senate Armed
Services Committee to hold hearings into the safety of the standard armored vests issued
to troops.
Sen. Clinton seeks inquiry into body armor st udy January 9
(Newsday/AP)
Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton urged Congress Monday to re-examine the Pentagon's
standards for soldiers' body armor in Iraq, after a new study found most fatal torso
wounds to Marines would have been prevented or minimized with more protection.
"With U.S. troops risking their lives dai ly in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, we owe it
to them to make sure they have the best equipment possible," Clinton wrote to committee-
chairman John Warner.
B o d y ~ A r m o r Gaps Are Shown to Endanger Troops January 7
(Washington Post) Arm Scott Tyson
The Marine Corps and Army are working to upgrade body armor to prevent fatali ties
caused by torso wounds from gunshots and explosions, after cl assified Pentagon forensic
studies highlighted how gaps in current armor are leaving troops vulnerable.
U.S. troops in lraq often complain that insurgents -- espec ially sni pers -- have
demonstrated they know how to exploit the gaps in the current armor. For example,
enemy snipers have killed U. S. forces with single shots to the neck or upper torso.
PeDta!!On Stu dy Links Fatatities To Body Ar mor - January 7 (widely reprinted)
(New York Times) by Michael Moss
A secret Pentagon study has found that as many as 80 percent ofthe marines who have
been killed in Iraq from wounds to the upper body could have survived if they had had
extra body armor. Such armor has been available since 2003, but until recently the
Pentagon has largely declined to supply it to troops despite calls from the field for
addi tional protection, according to mi litary offi cial s.
Military offi cials and contractors said the Pentagon's procurement troubl es had stemmed
in part from miscalculations that underestimated the strength of the insurgency, and from
years of cost-cutting that left. some armoring compani es on the brink of collapse as they
waited for new orders.
Armor Faulted in Some U.S. Deaths - January 7
(Los Angeles Times!AP)
An unreleased Pentagon study of fatal torso wou nds to Marines in lraq found that most
might have been prevented or minimi zed if the troops had bee n weari ng improved body
armor.
The findings underscore the difficulty facing the Army and Marine Corps in providing
the optimum level of body armor protection. The Army and the Marine Corps have
weighed the benefits of additional safety from extra armor against the loss of combat
effectiveness from too much armor.
U.S. Soldiers Question Use oeMore Ar mor - January 7
(Houston ChroniclelAP) by Ryan Lenz
BElli, Iraq - U.S. soldiers in the field were not all supportive of a Pentagon study that
found improved body armor saves lives, with some troops arguing Saturday that more
armor would hinder combat effectiveness.
But man y soldiers say they feel encumbered by the weight and restri cted by fabric that
does not move as they do. They frequently joke as they strap on their equipment before a
patrol and express relief when they return and peel it off.
Both the Army and the Marines have weighed the expected payoff in additional safety
from extra armor against the measurable loss of combat effectiveness fromtoo much
armor. . .Others questioned the effectiveness of additional body armor.
Mass. pols blast Bush for ski mpy GI armor - January 8
(Boston Globe) by Laura Crimaldi
Bay State congressional leaders yesterday blasted the Bush administration over a new
Pentagon study that revealed as many as 80 percent of Mari nes killed in Iraq from torso
wounds could have survi ved if they had better body armor.
"That fatalities that have occurred could have been prevented is unforgivable. The first
basic responsibJity that we have to those people that put on that uniform is to gi ve them
the tools that they need to do the job and come home safely," said Ll.S. Rep. Stephen F.
Lynch (D·9th), who is leaving for a fourth trip to Iraq in a few weeks.
"It is outrageous that this mistake was identi fied at the outset of the war, but armored
vests were not ordered unt il this September. Our troops deserve more than speeches about
' staying the course .' They deserve a plan for victory in Iraq and the latest military
tec hno logy. President Bush has deni ed them both," U.S. Rep. Edward Markey (D- 7th)
said in a statement.
Pentagon studYfa ults US body armor in Ir aq deaths - January 7
(Reuters) by Will Dunham
Bett er body armor could have prevent ed or limit ed about 80 percent of fatal torso wounds
suffered by Mari nes ki lled in Iraq, a report by U.S. military medical experts obtained on
Fri day said.
Christopher Kell y, spokesman for the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, said the
office that conducted the study performs full autopsies on all troops killed in'Iraq and
Afghanistan and that the evaluation of body armor "is one of many issues we address
with these investigations."
"Information regarding the effect iveness of body armor has been shared with those who
des ign and field personal protective gear, " Kelly said.
Sena tor Barb visits Indiana t roops - January 7
(WTHR, IN) Roger Harvey/Eyewitness News
A Pentagon study shows the US needs to do more work to prot ect troops fighting in Iraq.
Senator Ba yh and other lawmakers say the report is disturbing and bette r body armor is a
must for Americans fighti ng for freedom.
For the families of these soldiers who lost thei r lives, they would like to see some quick
action. Senator Evan Bayh responded, "Frankly, heads ought to roll if there are people
who are responsible for not getting our troops the body armor they need to protect
themselves. That is just not acceptable."
TELEVISION EXCERPTS
WSB - Good Morning America
1/1112006 7:14:19 AM
Continuing on issues of security. Good Morning America is still on the case ofbody
armor and protection of American troops. ABC news has now received new informati on
from the army (they had been reluctant to give a statement). They now say:
"Every solder in harms way has a complete set of body armor, the best body
armor in the world---nearly 700,000 full sets of interceptor body armor have been
provided to soldiers." - U.S. Army
They add now updated side armor will enter production shortly. Our question is what
does "shortly" mean? Thi s afternoon there will be a hearing of the senate anned servi ces
commi ttee looking into the whole issue. We will have more on all of this for you
tomorrow.
WSB (ABa Good Morning America
*Interview with Hilary Clinton. Some commentary by Howard Dean (partial transcript)
111012006 7:1 2:32 AM
Diane Sawyer: Still on Body Armor watch this momi ng. We told you yest erday about
the secret Pentagon study that found the lives of more than 80010 of troops in Iraq with
fatal wounds may have been saved if they had additional pieces ofbody armor. After our
report later, "good morni ng America" received so many phone calls from so many
mi litary parents anxious to buy body armor for their children being sent to Iraq and this
morni ng New York Senator Hi lary Clinton joins us. She called for an inves tigation and
she's at her home in Chappaqua, New York. Thank you for being with us. I want to get
right to it. You have called on the Pentagon to make the additional armor available. Have
you gotten any reaction from the Pent agon?
Senator Clinton: Well, Diane, this is the last of many requests that not only I but a
number of my colleagues in the congress, parents soldiers and marines and others have
made on their own behalf over the last now nearl y three years. and it just is heartbr eaking
to me that once again we have a study that looked at the wounds that marines suffered
and concluded as you rightl y said that we perhaps could have avoided so many ofthese
fatalities with the right body armor. The problem is that we have not provided that body
armor in a timely way. We have not given many of our soldiers and marines the
protecti on that they need. It' s just unforgivable and unacceptabl e. We' re looking for
answers and I hope finally we will get them.
Sawyer: The army has issued a statement; the Department of Defense has issued a
stateme nt. They both said the same things. They continue to develop improvements to
soldier protection equipment but they also add they won't discuss these issues in public
because it might render insight to the enemy and aid the enemy in some way. Does this
aid the enemy in some does this aid the enemy in some way to discuss this publicl y?
Clinton: Ofcourse not. In fact, this has been discussed publicly for nearly three years .
WLS (ABCl - Good Mo rni ng America
119/2006 7:14:02 AM
Diane Sawyer : Now someone who knows all about this, Jason Beck, president and CEO
of Diamondback Tactical Defense, which makes body armor. He' s also a former Marine
and an instructor in hand-to-hand fighti ng. The vulnerabilities are here and on the
shoulder?
Jason Beck: The shoulder region as well as the sides . There are no balli stic plates in
either of those regio ns. We have ballistic plates in the front and back.
Sawyer : But it is available to provide for the side?
Beck: Correct. And the Marine Corps has purchased 27,000 sets. They have
approximately 2,500 sets in the field currently.
Sawyer : But the anny?
Beck: The study just came out about a month and a half ago or right around that time,
the anny has been moving as fast as they can. They're a big machine.
Sawyer: Well, you say that. But these are lives at stake. As fast as they can?
Beck: They should be able to provide these within the next six months to a year to where
they actually have every single troop covered.
Sawyer: Should be able to. We' re going to keep the pressure on, ifwe can.
Headline News
1/812006 5: 16:37 PM:
A Pentagon study suggests that not all U.S. troops are happy about improved body armor.
Many soldiers say the armor is restricti ve, weighs too much and increases the chances of
getting killed.
MSNBC - Scar borough Countrv
"Interview wit h mili tary analyst Lieutenant Colonel Robert McGinnis
1/9/2006 10:00:25 PM
J oe Scarborough: Did a Pentagon cover-up kill hundreds of marines in Iraq? A
shocking secret report from the Pentagon says as many as 80% of the marines killed in
Iraq from wounds to the upper body could have been saved if they had been wearing
extra Body Armor. Why was the secret Pentagon study focused on savi ng lives buried for
two years? (Gap in Transcript)
J oe Scar bor ough: Let me bring in Lieutenant Colonel McGinni s, saying that 80% of the
mari nes may have been saved from upper torso wounds if he had had the right type of
plates. What do you make this Pentagon report? Why don't you think that those types of
plates should be used?
McGinnis: Well, the types ofplates that are used are ceramic plates, ballistic plates.
They have di fferent characteristics that we can't describe here. But I looked at the study
on the website. 93 cases, of course, you gave the statistics and the breakdown and
interestingly recommended that they use larger plates, ceramic pads for the shoulders and
sides. And you put a lot more weight on the soldiers. And you ask the soldier on the
ground, I was there in 2003, I was there twice, I was not issued protective gear in the fall.
This past fall, I had the Kevlar as well as the body armor and every soldier now over
there obviously has it. We' ve learned a lot, clearly in three years . But the study is not; it's
not been done in a laboratory. The reality is we're fighting a real war. Unfortunately, if
you burden soldiers down with every piece ofprotective Annor that we would like to,
they wouldn't be able to move. And the irregular warfare that we're fight ing. they would
endanger themselves based on what the soldiers are telling us.
CNN Late Edition With Wol f Blitzer
"Intervi ew wi th Howard Dean
1/812006 12:47:23 PM
Howard Dean: I was disgusted when I read in the New York Times yesterday that 80% of
the inj uries in the Marine Corps could have been prevented if the Pentagon, Secretary of
Defense and the Presi dent supplied them with the armor they had. They requested that
from the field, the Pentagon refused. Secretary Rumsfeld ought to resign.
Fox News - Fox News Live
"Interview with General Clark
118/2006 11:26:24 AM:
Newscaster: I'm going to ask you about a New York Times article saying that 80% of the
U. S. forces who have suffered who died, actua lly from chest wounds didn't have to, had
only they had the right body armor. Do you agree?
General Clar k: Yeah, I do. We've been worried about this for a long time this, is
historic under investment in the protection of individual soldiers and marines. It's been
going on 25 years, since Vietnam. We knew when we came out of Vietnam the key thick
was the body count. How many peopl e we have lost. Yet , we invested in armored
vehicles, high tech weaponry, missiles, and radars. But we didn't put enough money into
the protection of the lives ofthe individual soldiers and marines on the battlefield.
Fox News - Fox and Friends Sunday
*httervi ew with Bill Cowan
118/20068:25:38 AM
On this particular issue (body armor), I believe the military continues to do the absolute
best that they can for the troops out there and here are the big issues, one, procurement is
very difficult. Even if we had the absolute solution today getting it bought through the
procurement manufacturing and distribution proc ess could take a long time. Secondly for
troops on the ground, I know from experience wearing body armor in Vietnam it's
restrictive and the study says if we had more parts of the body covered we would have
lost less people, but the issue for the trop on the ground is he's got to have mobility, these
kids are carrying heavy equipment and gear and packs already and they've got to be able
to move so sometimes you're willing to give up some of that body armor because you
need that mobi lity and that flexibility on the ground
I think if you talk to the mari nes or soldiers operating against the enemy out there
conducting, engaging, fighting, maneuvering, yeah, they' d like to be more prepared, a
littl e bit more prot ected but I certainl y want to maintain my mobility, my flexibility, my
ability to j ump, move, run, shoot , communicate, all the things that somebody down there
on the ground has to do, that' s what their mission is and you don't hear a lot of complaints
from the troops right now.
We hate to lose any of our men or women over there, but you can't protect them 100
percent of the time with 100 percent perfect solutions.
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
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13 20061:01 PM
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Transcript - Military analysts body armor
01-11-06 Lehrer NewsHour body armor.doc; 01-12-06 Speakes, Sorenson body armor
final .doc
Attachments:
Subject:
01-11-06 Lehrer 0l-lH16 Speakes,
NewsHour body ... Sorenson bod...
Attached i s the trans cript f or the mili t ary analyst cal Ion
Thursday , Jan . 12 a t 14 30 .
Top i c was body armor.
Gues t s were MG St ephen Speakes of the Army G-8 and MG Jeff Sorens on from Assi s tant
Secretary of t he Army Cl aude Bolton 's office (Army acqui s itions l.
Briefing was ON THE RECORD.
Pl ease note:
1 . Mr . Ruf f has a sked that CAPT Me rri tt get the transcript to our reporters and a l s o
posted on our Defe nael i nk web site i n the transcript bin.
2. The t ransc r ipt references an appe ar ance by Lt. Col. Bob Maginnis (r e t l , one of our
mili t ary anal yst s , on the Lehrer NewsHour on wednesday, Jan . 11. I ' ve at tached a
transcript of tha t discuss i on in case anyone would l i ke t o r e ad i t . He appears with
retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Roge r Charles , pr esident of Sol dier s for the Truth. t he
advocacy group that obt ai ned and published t he Pentagon s tudy of Marine de a t hs from t or so
wounds.
Any questions s ee or ca ll me
1
Copyright 2006 MacNeiVLehrer Productions
The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer
January 11, 2006, Wednesday Transcript #8439
HEADLINE: The Ailto Hearings;
Blueprint for Rebirth;
Protecting the Troops
BYLINE: ANCHOR: JIM LEHRER; GUESTS: TED OLSON; DAWN JOHNSEN; LT.
COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.); LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.);
CORRESPONDENTS: KWAME HOLMAN; RAY SUAREZ; SPENCER MlCHELS;
MARGARET WARNER; GWEN IFILL; TERENCE SMlTH; KWAME HOLMAN
BODY:
JIM LEHRER: Good evening, I'm Jim Lehrer. On the NewsHour tonight, the news ofthis
Wednesday, then : Highlights from day three of the confirmation hearings for Supreme
Court nominee Samuel Alita, plus analysis by Ted Olson, former solicitor general for
President Bush, and Dawn Johnsen, deputy assistant attorney general in the Clinton
administration; a report from New Orleans on a blueprint for rebuilding the city; and a
debate between two retired military offi cers on the effectiveness of body armor for U.S.
troops in Iraq.
FOCUS - PROTECTING THE TROOPS
JIM LEHRER: Finall y tonight, the debate over body armor for U.S. troops in Iraq.
Margaret Warner has our story.
MARGARET WARNER: As U.S. casualties have mounted in Iraq so too has criticism of
the body armor supplied to soldiers and Marines. It's called intercept or body armor and
its design has been modified five times since the war began.
But insurgents appear to have figured out how to exploit gaps and weak points in the
troops' protective vests.
Some members of Congress have jumped on the issue, including Democratic
Congressman John Murtha when he called for a rapid timetable for withdraw.
But the Pentagon has defended the level of protection for American troops. The latest
turn in the controversy came from a veterans group called Soldiers for the Truth
published preliminary findings of a secret Pentagon study of93 Marine deaths from torso
wounds over two years .
According to the New York Times, the study found as many as 80 percent of those
Marines could have survi ved if they had had extra body armor. For example, the study
said as many as 42 percent of the Marine casual ties who died from isolated torso injuri es
could have been prevented with improved prot ection in the area surrounding the plated
areas of the vest.
The Pentagon responded last week by stating it will continue seeking improvements to
body armor, but, quote, will not discuss in public sensitive issues that may render any
insight to the enemy.
Today Senate Armed Services Committee chairman John Warner called Pentagon
officials, including a soldier and a Marine wearing body armor, to a closed-door hearing
on the issue.
MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM CAITO, U.S. Marine Corps: We're fielding the best body armor
and protective equipment avai lable we think in the world today. And as we have the
opportunities to upgrade the equi pment, we do that.
MARGARET WARNER: Last September the Marine Corps ordered 28,000 sets of side
plates to offer additional protection for its troops in Iraq.
MARGARET WARNER: Do U.S. troops in Iraq have adequate body armor? For that, we
tum to two former military officers who are weari ng alternative varieties of protected
vests: Retired Army Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis served in Vietnam. He's currently a
consultant to the Pentagon and receives regular briefings there. He's wearing the body
armor common ly worn by American troops in Iraq. Retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Roger
Char les is president of Soldiers for the Truth, the advocacy group that obtained and
published the Pentagon study of Marine deaths from torso wounds. He's wearing one
more expensive alternative advocated by some Pentagon critics.
We invited the Anny and Marine Corps to participate in this discussion, but they
declined.
Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for coming in.
And Col. Charles, let's start with you. Why did your group publish this, expose this on
your web site?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.) : We had quite a bit of communication from groups
in theater -- Afghanistan and Iraq express ing strong dissatisfaction with the current body
armor for various reasons.
11 began to appear like there might be a story. We decided to pursue it beginning in
September, and along the way picked this part of the study up. We did not get the
complete study.
MARGARET WARNER: Now the study only looked at a certain kind of death: That is,
torso wounds. Were you able to extrapolate from that to say how many of the overall
American deaths in Iraq might have been prevented with different body armor?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): We did not do that but the New York Times in
their piece which aired -- which was publishedlast Saturday in theirnewspaper did
extrapolate.
I knowthe reporter, Michael Moss, that did this work and veryconfident in his
meticulous research, and he said that over 300 deaths, if youincluded the Army, killedin
action were probably -- possibly prevented had we had thebetterbody armor.
MARGARET WARNER: So 300 ofthe more than 2200 deaths.
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): Yes.
MARGARET WARNER: What was your reaction to the study, Col. Maginnis?
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well, you know, Margaret, the battl efield is not
a controlledenvironment. It's not anexperimental lab.
Yes, there's no doubt that soldierswere killedand theywere killedbecause there were
gaps inbody armor. But it's hard to tell fromthe study whether or not all of lhemwere
wearing the samebody armor and a lot of the otherdetails that you'd want to have in
trying to make this deci sion .
MARGARET WARNER: And they did say they were preliminary result s.
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): They did.
MARGARET WARNER: Well, now, Col. Maginnis, you are wearing what American
troops wear in the field. Could youstand for us andjust tell us what this is and howit
protects the soldier wearing it.
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.) : Okay. Thi s is the outer protective vest, about
eight pounds.
MARGARET WARNER: Thi s is called the --
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): The interceptor body armor but it's the vest.
Andthen youhave inside both the front and the back ll-pound ballistic ceramic, you
know, protector -- small anns protection inserts.
Now we have a deltoidshoulderprotectorhere. They weighabout five pounds. Now the
Army soon will come out withsidepanels that weighabout three-and-a-half pounds that
are ballistic plates just like the front. And thenofcourseyouhave things on theneckand
in the groin.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Col. Charles, so what is wrong with this? What did
the study show? Where were the vulnerabilities in this vest according to thi s study?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret .): We ll, the major vulnerabilities were in thi s area
bere. And I'd like to point out thi s is not a ballistic defense piece of gear. This is
protect ion against shrapnel but it's not the same as thi s hard plate that's in the front and
the rear.
So there is no ball istic plate protection here, so this is an area ofconcern -- this whole
area here and then around the throat and neck.
MARGARET WARNER: Stay standing both of you, please. Col. Charles, you're wearing
one more expensive alternative advocated by some. What is it and why is it better? It
actually looks skimpier, ifI may use that word, than what Col. Maginnis is wearing.
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Rer.): Well, first of all, we did not bring the shoulder
attachments which are available.
But thi s is an out fit called Pinnacl e Armor. produ ces -- the trade name is Dragon Skin.
And these are small titanium ceramic plates that are positioned in ki nd of a fish scale
approach.
And it gives you protecti on from there to here, and then from the rear there back. There' s
about an inch-and-a-half on each side where there is no prot ect ion as compared to, you
know. about a foot on the side on here.
There also obviously is vulnerability here and around the thr oat and so on. But, overall
it's about 140 percent more area of protection with thi s system than the interceptor.
MARGARET WARNER: Why wouldn' t 140 percent more area be better?
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNlS (Ret.): Well, it would be ifit was all proven through
science. You know, certainly the shoulders and the neck, major difference with this -- no
groin prot ecti on.
And, you know. the contracting people as well as the Army scientists say. look. be
careful wi th Dragon Skin because it's good for a kni fe fight but we don't want to take it to
Iraq because o f the ballistic issues. And they're not comfortabl e with it yet, but perhaps in
the future.
MARGARET WARNER: Please be seated. What do you mean the ball istic issues? Is thi s
a question of mobi lity or is there a difference in these two between. let' s say you took a
direct hit -- let's forget about the gaps or set that aside -- is there a difference in the level
of protection between thi s ceramic one and this one with these disks?
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNlS {Ret .]: Well, [ can't tell you the exact because it 's
classifiedbut this will take a fairl y sizable small arm direct hit. And he'll have to speak
for his own.
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret ): This will not only will take that hit but will take
multiple hits and the ceramic plate usedin interceptor, oneof the complaints fromthe
troops in the fiel dwas that too often after oneround impact, then youhad a bunch of
gravel basically inside the pouch.
It basicallyjust kind of disintegrated and lost his rigidity andcrumbleduponimpact.
MARGARET WARNER: Is there also -- [ had read today, Col. Maginnis, an issue of
mobility or at least some commanders were sayingthough you look a linle more
mobilizedthan Col. Charles at themoment, that this actually was a little more flexible
than this.
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.) : Well, you know, you can modify this. You can
take these shoulderpads off. Youcantake this neck guardorr: You caneventake other
aspects. Youknow. it really depends uponwhat themissionsays.
Now. we'veupgradeda lot, at least five times overthe last couple of years to include this
ballistic plate, and it really addresses the issue that he just brought out.
MARGARET WARNER: Col. Charles, the insurgents are tremendously adaptable, and
as been pointed, out they've kind of adapted; they know what this vest looks like. Why
wouldn't theyjust adjust to this vest?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret): Well, they had the chance. There was an
unsolicited letter from an American contractor overthere who was shot eight times inthe
back wearing one of these that he purchased forhis own use.
And he did not know he had been shotunti l he got back and took it off and saw thebullet
perforations in the canvas cover. There was no soft ti ssue damage so it's proven inthe
field that it can take multiple hits and still provide protection.
MARGARET WARNER: What do the people you've talked to tell you about why the
military has not adopted this? Is it the cost? Is that they really have doubts about its
effectiveness?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret): The basic reason, as hard as this may be for your
audienceto understand, is not invented here: Bureaucratic turf protectionbecause the
Army people that were chargedwithproviding this ten, fifteenyears agohad a program -
- it produced something beginning in 1998 I believe, 1999. But it wasn't this - and t. They
didn't want to use this because they didnot claim inventionof it.
MARGARETWARNER: Is there a little bureaucratic problemhere or--
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): There's bureaucracy everywhere Margaret. In
1999, the interceptor came on line. There have been a lot of modifi cations since. We're
still maki ng those modifications. It's not perfect.
There' s no protection system that' s 100 percent perfect but it is a lot better than it was and
it's getting better all the time. The scientists tell us that it's the best that the world has
today.
MARGARET WARNER: Better than this?
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): They said bar none. Ynu know, I've already
made my statement wi th regard to Dragon Skin.
You know, they're looking at this. Anything that comes across their table they will
examine. They have research going on at MIT even now on a variety of technologies.
We want to find the best technology to save our soldiers without j eopardizing mobili ty.
MARGARET WARNER: How much more would it cost to buy these?
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well , you know, that's a contractual issue . I
don't know what his firm would sell the Army his parti cular product for. But first it has to
go through all the extensive ballistic tests which it hasn't but this material has .
MARGARET WARNER: And, finally, to you, Col. Charles, as Col. Maginnis has said,
the Marines have ordered now side panels for these vests. How much of the problem will
that solve?
LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): Well, it won't solve the proportion to the addi tional
area that's being covered hut let me just say I am not a representative for Pinnacle Armor.
We were told by several independent consultants who work for the Pentagon that cannot
be narned because of fear of losing their jobs that this was probably the best available
body annor. It's what they would take to Baghdad. They do not have any financial ties
with Pinnacle Armor. We're not saying it's the best. We're saying it ought to get a fair
test.
MARGARET WARNER: And what's your very briefexplanation ofwhy 80 percent of
these soldiers did suffer wounds that went into the gaps?
LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret. ): Well, some of the soldiers weren't wearing body
armor because the study j ust isn't clear. You know, those that were, you know. yes, there
are places that you can shoot them. And it depends upon their positi on and so forth. So
it's a tough. tough finding. We're doing our best I think.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Col. Maginni s and Col. Charles, thank you both.
RECAP
JIM LEHRER: And, again, the major development of the day: Supreme Court nominee
Samuel Alita again declined to say the right to abortion is settled law.
JIM LEHRER: And to our honor roll ofAmeri can service personnel killed in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We add them astheir deaths aremade official and photographs become
available. Here, in silence, are eight more.
JIM LEHRER: We'll see you online, tomorrow at 9:30 A.M. Eastern Time with ourAlita
hearingcoverage, and againhere tomorrowevening. I'm Jim Lehrer. Thankyou, and
good night.
LOAD-DATE: January 12, 2006
Jan. 12, 2006
Military Analysts Call
Briefers:
MG Stephen Speakes, Director, Force Development , Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8,
United States Army
MG Jeffrey Sorenson, Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
Host: Allison Barber, DASD eSD-public Affairs
Ms. Barber: This is Allison Barber. We have with us General Speakes and General Sorenson .
Today's call and information is on the record and we'll open it up. General Speakes, if you'd like
to go ahead, and then we'll take some questions and move forward . Thank you both for your time
today.
Speakes: Sure. This is Major General Steve Speakes. My job on the Army staff is the director of
force development. As the director of force development, we're responsible for Army investment
accounts for equipment; we're also responsible for overseeing the distribution of all of that
equipment. And so we get in the business of insuring that soldiers across the Army have the
equipment they need in accordance with the missions they are given.
What we would like to do is - General Sorenson and I - is talk our way through this. What we'll
do is Quickly highlight what we think some of the key issues are, and then we'll talk through what
we believe is the appropriate u or frankly, the truth in terms of some of the issues from our
perspective.
The first issue is we saw in the weekend coverage the perception that essent ially, once again, we
in the military are react ionary to the developments that are happening over on the battlefield. And
so what we'll talk a little bit is our longstanding commitment to go ahead and field the right stuff,
and to antici pate trends on the battlefield.
The other thing that you saw is some discussion that said we conti nue to have a problem with
various armored vehicles. And what we can quickly summarize for you is the success story that
we have had in armored vehicles, and what we continue to do to improve our overall armored
vehicle posture.
So what we' d like to do first of all is to begin by talking a little bit about body armor. I think that-
and for exampl e, I saw Colonel Maginnis the work that you did on MacNeil Lehrer (referencing 11
January broadcast), and obviousl y, you have not onl y worn it, but you can talk it, and so what I
will do for everybody else is j ust summarize some of the key points from our perspective.
Integrated body armor, interceptor body armor is something that has been in the Army inventory
essentia lly since the start of this war. We have gone from about 75,000 sets that were available
and distributed in the Army at the time we crossed the line of departure in Kuwait, to now over
700,000 sets. This amount is enough for all the forces operati ng in the Area of Operations plus
the maj ority of the operating force of the Army.
But, more importantly, it has gone through a continuous series of improvements, and the
improvements have been a twin pull of the dynamic of what we see on the battlefield and then
what our venous research, development and testing activit ies teU us back here in the United
States. And so those two imperatives are then constantly giving the Army the chance to see
where we ought to go to improve, and then to make those improvements.
The most important feedback we get always is what we call operational need statements, which
are statements from the commander in the combat zone of what he needs to improve the
capability. And they are short, specific requirements that communicate here is the need that we
see, and then here is the quantity that we want fielded . They are then brought in to the Army; they
are worked wit hin the Army, both as a matter of strategy in terms of how fas t we can do it, what
the technology is, and then to make sure that we have a distribution program once we get the
actual capability put together. So, those are the dynamics that dri ve us.
Now, let's talk specifically about what we have been able to field. I mentioned 700,000 sets of
interceptor body armor has been provided to soldiers. The next major improvement that we saw
in terms of the qual ity of armor was what we call the deltoid axillary protector (DAP). And as many
of you have seen on TV, what that involves is an abil ity to protect both the shoulder and also the
side of the body.
Now, the issue there was that that came in (inaudi ble) in 2004, and essentially by January [sic.
september] in 2005, we had complet ed fielding about 170,000 sets of what we call DAP. Now
DAP was our best effort to insure that soldiers had mobility in thei r shoul ders and upper body.
And so what it did is it gave you a protecti on against fragments , because what we were seei ng
was soldiers in the combat zone - particularly who wer e up in turrets - had a problem in that they
were being exposed to fragmentation and had no protection over their shoulders and side. And so
this material , which has the same basic ballistic protection as the outer tacti cal vest - which is
worn across the rest of the body - gave us the ability to protect shoulders on this - soldiers that
were exposed, and also the side of their body.
And so that was the initial effort that we undertook to try to fix something that we saw was a resu lt
of combat - which is the need to protect soldiers against fragmentation .
The next thing we wanted to do was to continue to improve the quality of the armor that we
actuall y issue to soldiers. And so what we've been able to do is work on an increase to the quality
of the act ual armor plate that we have provided to soldiers. And at thi s point now, we've got
essentiall y the second generation of armor plating that has been issued - actually. I'm sorry - the
third generation of armor plating that we have issued this war to enable soldiers to better be
protected against the ballist ic threat that they face.
And so. that is something that we have undertaken to do over the course of the last year, and it's
anot her success story, and one that we don't want to publicize. The rationale for that is obvious:
the more we talk about it, the more information we provide the enemy. And one of the things
that's been very, very concerning to Army leaders is the open discussion of specific targeting
weaknesses or vulnerabi lities that we see on soldiers when we see it in the media. And so in this
case, what we have done is quietly fielded an enhanced capability to the basic SAPI (small arms
pr otecti ve inserts) plate that many of you have worn in theater when you have been in there.
So that is another important aspect of our overall program, whi ch is as we improve, not to
publicize what we're improving and why . And you can obviousl y anti cipate with your respect ive
backgrounds why that' s so important.
The next issue then was something that the Army and the Marines both took on in their own way
and that was the act ual addition of SAPI plates to the side of the body. To give you a perspective.
you're talking about essentiall y about nine inches of the side of a body that is right now not
protected by the side of a SAPI plate. In ot her words , what you' ve got is the OAP protecti ng a
large measure of the side of a body, but you don't have the actual ballistic protecti on that is
afforded by a SAPI plate.
And so, the requirement came in essentially in September to the Army in a final form that
identifi ed our requirements then to provide what we are now call ing side SAPI protection. And
side SAPI protect ion was the final element in all of this. It was designed to give us essentially
protect ion that augmented the Deltoid Axillary Protector or OAPI which alread y had pr ogressed to
the shoulder and side of the body. So this was our latest effort in terms of continuing to improve
this overall design and our capabilities.
What we are seeing obviously is cont inuing evolutions in the nature of threat that we face. As you
know, the rise of the lED has been something we've noted and we are reflecting in our body
armor protection, and the increasing lethality of the weapons systems being used against us.
And so those dynamics will make this a cont inual process. And so when headlines that we see
right now describe that we are now belatedl y issuing or rushing out to correct a deficiency, those
headlines entirely miss the point.
This has been a programmatic effort in the case of the Army that has gone on with great intensity
for the last five months; was underway in December in terms of final deci sions were being made
and capabilities that we will see fielded here in the spring. And so all of this is something that the
Army is very committed to, which is a conti nuous evolution in our ability to bett er protect soldiers,
and yet at the same time, to master the dynamics of not overburdening them.
The soldiers who appeared yesterday in front of Senators Warner, Levin and Reed captured very,
very well the fact that we are at about the point wher e a soldier has to make serious decisions
about how much this armor he or she can afford to wear consistent with mission, and with the
operat ing environment in terms of temperature or other environmental factors.
And the Marine that appeared in front of the public yest erday specifICallyaddressed why he
doesn't use DAP. And his view of DAP is that it is unduly restrictive to his ability to operate with
his soldiers and upper body, and he doesn't prefer to wear it. We certai nly understand that, and
that has been a part of all of this. is the design of all this body armor, and General Sorenson win
talk to that in detail because that is critical . None of thi s stuff is rushed out to the point that
sol diers look at and don't feel irs been integrated or proper1y tai lored to the rest of the equipment
they are wearing. And that involves soldiers who are operating in a prone position, or soldiers for
example who are in combat assaults, or soldiers who are truck drivers. And this capability has got
to be universal in the sense that it fits all those operating environments and enables the soldier to
do his or her job.
The other thing, when we say his or her, it's an important factor to consider. We can be outfitting
a 245 pound man, as we demonstrated yesterday, or you can be outfitting a 115 pound female
military policeman. Both of them require the same amount of protection. Both of them obviously
have very different carrying capabilities in terms of how much they can hold in the way of body
armor and then all the rest of the weapons ammunition that they carry with them as a part of their
basic load.
So those are the factors that then cause implementation decisions to not be snap decisions. It' s
not a matter of simply snappi ng your finger. And then the other final part is that all of this is
rigorously tested as part of the design process that General Sorenson will talk about, and is also
then a part of cont inuous surveillance as we continue to buy and test as we go through this
program.
So all of this I would summarize is designed to give you the belief that the protection of soldiers is
our number one mission. Continuous evolution of this protection is absolutely essent ial , and that
we can't get by by ever saying that a solut ion that we have today is the optimum. It represents our
best at the moment, and will cont inuousl y be improved as we see the need to do it or we develop
the capabil ity to do it.
So what I would like to do now is pause, and I will give over to General Sorenson, who is our
military deputy for acquisition.
MG Sorenson: OK, my name is Jeff Sorenson. I am the deputy for acquisition and systems
management. Let me j ust kind of cover a couple points that I think Steve - General Speakes -
has already mentioned, but let me j ust emphasize it.
As he pointed out, we have gone through a continual evolution here of improvement in terms of
capabil ity. I mentioned yesterday we've gone through seven improvements. He ment ioned the
fact that we are on our third generation of plates. The other part icular improvements are
essentially to the vest itself, as well as to other outer parts, specificall y the DAP and as well now
the side plates.
In all cases we have taken a very rigorous approach to making sure that as we produce this
capability and develop it that we are taking into accou nt much of the human recto-s wtlich the
soldiers have to operate within. And I know in some cases people think that's a very bureaucratic
process, but as we cert ainl y take a look at this the last thing we want is to protect these soldiers
from gett ing kill ed by a bullet , and yet have them suffer with this additional weight of - you know,
a 130 pound female or a 140 pound male, 30 extra pounds of body armor in 130 degree heat and
suffer a death from heat stroke. So these are the types of things that have made this very
complex, as well as their abi lity to even move, and in some cases, get up and get down and get
out of the way.
I'd like to take this moment just to cover a couple other points which I think probably would be of
some val ue, because I think they are important, especiall y in the last 24 hours with people in
different companies mak ing accusations and al legations in wtlat their capabil ities are.
I have seen, to some distress , part icular members of the Hill talking about how we need to talk in
very high degrees of specificity what types of coverage and capabilities we are doing. As General
Speakes says, we don't want to give any of this information out. This is very sensitive to our chief;
in fact, even contin uing to have these discussions is something that I don 't think he is really
appreciative of because of the fact that it talks to something that is very sensiti ve to him with
respect to force protect ion.
But recognize as we've done this, this is just one piece of the overall for ce protection capability.
This is the personal piece. We 've done the armoring of the vehicles ; we've also done and added
electronic and counter measures, and we have also changed a lot of the techniques, tactics and
procedures with which they operat e. And all these are generated to trying to improve the soldier's
ability to be better protect ed wit h respect to force protection.
Now one particular instance here, we had a company come up yesterday and basically allege
that they had a capability that quite frankl y the Army has ignored and has reall y not taken
seriously, and so I just want to put out some facts with respect to that.
The company's name I beli eve was Pinnacle. Facl s are that we did test this parti cular capability
back in 2004, and it failed. They have subsequently worked to improve their particular system, but
wit h respect to our abili ty to validate with their improvements, we have not been able to do so as
yet.
The PEO and the PM have discussed this with the CEO as of the end of December, and offered
to procure some systems to verify manufacturer's performance claims, but at this point in time the
company said that they don't really have a production system available and will not have it ready
for testing or even prototypes unti l February of 2006. However, with respect to the system, they
have provided some plates, which we have done some initiall y testing of up at Aberdeen test
center . And though the tests are not maybe at this point in time representative of the entire
Pinnacl e armor system, the preliminary test data says at this point that this will not meet the
Army's requirements. Again I say this will not meet the Army's requirements. It will not meet it
with respect to performance; with respect to weight it is est imated at this point in time that it will
add 10 more pounds to just a medium size, so as opposed to a 3D-pound weight, we now have
40 pounds. In addition, the initial understanding of the costs, it's about 50 percent greater.
So we are welcome at this point in time to have them provide this capability and have us analyze
it, but to date, it has not been anything that has passed our part icular test , nor is it something that
they are able to produce at this time for our evaluation in a complete system.
And with that, I think I will stop and let anybody ask any questions that they might have.
Q: It may be for General Sorenson, or whichever of you gentl emen . Two questions keep coming
up. Number one, is the cost an issue? How much extra are we spending? Is there a default in the
budget? And number two, I would like to know if you guys are using any speci al fast -track
procurement methods to get this stuff bought and in the field?
MG Sorenson: Let me try to address that. With respect to cost , we do have funding to pay for this
particular added capability.
Q: What is it costing per set?
MG Sorenson: The costing per set, at this point in time, all I can tell you is right now the entire
contract is going to be - are you talking about the extra side plates now, or are you talking about
the entire ensemble?
Q: Well, let's take each. I mean, you know, can you give me an idea what each costs per soldier,
what are spending on armor for the basic vest? Jeff and I and a bunch of others were over in Iraq
in December and we wore the basic vest which has the front and back plates, and some sort of a
collar arrangement, and I don't know what that costs, and what do the enhanced systems cost ?
MG Sorenson: OK, if I add up all the different pieces and parts that go to what you now know to
be your IBA, which is essentially your vest, with your side plates , it' s roughly at this point in time
about $2,100 for that particular piece. If you add the OAP, it' s another $300, and you add the side
plates we are probably talking about another 51,000. So add it all together, you're probably
$3,400 or something of that-
Q: Right. So basically everyone who's sayi ng we're not willing to spend another $260 a soldier is
full of something other than Swiss cheese.
MG Sorenson: Thai 's correct, that 's correct.
Q: Last question, I'm sorry. Can you tell us if you're using any of the fast-track procurement
procedures to get this stuff out and in the field?
MG Sorenson: I think at this point in time we are. In fact, the way they basically work this
particular cont ract is we're goi ng to put on contract initially, if you will- and I don't know if you got
to see yesterday what the particular soldier wearing it looked like, I mean, he had - the side
plates .go into a pouch, the pouch is attached to the melle - if you will - vest there . And what
we're doing right now is accelerati ng the delivery of the pouches themsel ves. And clearly we've
struct ured in the cont ract a very aggressive capability. In fact, in some cases we will be able to
produce and outstr ip what the Mari nes are producing in the time frames they are looking at
because of access to addi tional contractors.
Q: A couple questions. The weight of the average soldier, the weight of the average combat load.
I have a picture of a Marine with all the accou trements and it came out to 95 pounds. That 's
hel pful in this argument. So if there are some offi cial numbers we can have that would be well
received.
Yesterday the representative I was debating was arguing that the SAPI front plate, you know,
shatt ered inside wi th one round became useless. I didn't accept that. But I need - and I am
sensitive to what the chief is saying, so, you know, help me as to what we can say. And then the
last question, on this dragon skin stuff. This guy was saying you had (Navy) SEALS using it, a
number of federal agencies, a whole bunch of people over there, and the last thing I didn't accept
is one of them took eight shots in the front or the back. I forget, and none of them penetrated.
Can you help me on any of these?
MG Sorenson: Bob, the onl y thing I can help you with is the following. Al l I can lell you is the PM
and the PEO have engaged that company with respect to dragon skin. That's the name of the
company, it' s called Pinnacle Armor. We have offered to buy some of their systems to verify their
claims. The answer that we got is that they do not have a production system available for us to
test. So all the claims with respect to, you know, they took eight shots and everybody's wearing it
and all that kind of stuff is interesting and nice; however, comma , they have not come through
and not been validated by the Army with respect to testing to our requirements.
As I said before, to date, they failed in 2004, we brought them back right now. we've tested their
plates. Their plates at this point in time do not satisfy the ballistic protection required. They do not
satisfy the ballistic protection required. As well , their plates are heavier, they would add about 10
more pounds to what we think we are currenUyweighing, and that's about 31 pounds, and as
we ll . the cost of it is such is that it adds - I mean, their cost right now, I've seen cost fIQures that
j ust to get their pl ates is at like $5,000, so already, you're not even talking about the system,
you're just talking about the plates.
Q:Wow.
MG Sorenson: So, all their stuff, in terms of their discussion, is interesUngand probably
noteworthy and newsworth y, but the fact of the matter is it' s aJl - you know, we haven' t seen the
beef here. It's all , as someone would say, all Hooah, no do-ah. You can quote me on that one. I
mean the fact of the matter is they haven't brought anything to bear . I mean, they just have not.
And we cont inue to ask for it, and it has not been available.
MG Speakes: There's one other point that I would like to add without going into to much specifics,
and that is when General Sorenson's guys do the testing. Obviously, we are not satisfied with just
one impact.
MG Sorenson: Correct .
MG Speakes : And so that idea that because their system has the ability to repel multi ple-round
impacts, that it's better than ours, is just wrong. That' s fundamental to the testing that the Army
does . And obviously, we don't want to go any more specific than that. But there is an issue there
of basic credibil ity. You're not going to give a soldier something that is good for only one round
before the plate shatters, and that was the impact that you were left from listening to the McNeil-
Lehrer stuff last night. That guy made that claim.
MG Sorenson: I would second that, and I forgot to make that statement before, but I completely
agree with General Speakes. I mean, the fact of the matter the perfonnance of this capabil ity is
obviously exceeding one round. And we won't go into what either type of round or what
exceeding that means. But the fact of the matter is it does not shatter wtth one round.
MG Speakes: And then there is one other issue that we probably ought to take on, which is the
fundamental question of have we provided protection in a timely way? We just addressed both
the cost that is being invested by the American government, by the American taxpayer in
protect ing every sokl ier. It's extraordinary. The other thing we need to address is the fact that we
are not operating on a timel y basis.
Let's put it in terms of comparison. Once we adapted to the operating environmen t in Iraq, it
became clear that the original concept that said that body armor was somet hing that was
prioritized to essentially di smounted soldier - the combat infantryman, the combat engineer. and
instead became a full-force requi rement , what we had was in the summer of 2003 the realization
that we had additional need for essentially the rest of the force. Now the enormity of that
requirement was staggering at the time. I think the important thing then was that within the period
of then to April of 2004, we were able to equip the entire operating force in the CENTCOM AOR
with body armor. And that was a figure approaching 200,00.0soldiers . And so the enormit y of
both the Department of Defense's response, but also the American manufacturers who did what
they were asked to do to produce this to a standard. And one of the other things General
Sorenson hasn' t highlighted, I guess but is the normal product that he does, is in addition to the
testing he's highlighted is he certifies, the other thing is the continuous testing of every lot that's
produced. And so what you are talking about now is the ability to propert y equip every soldier in
the AOR, and to do it to a standard where we coul d guarantee to American taxpayers and family
members that what we were giving them met standards.
And so this idea that we're simply not interested, and we're not timely, and we're reactive and we
only wait for press reports is j ust frankly offensive. And I think that's the other thing we' ve got to
refute is somehow we are passive and uninterested in this business. It is a matter of passion, and
every one of this who is a part of this thing feels the moral imperative to do the best we can.
Ms. Barber: Any other questions?
Q: All ison, is there someone who can give us the weight of the average soldier, and the weight of
the combat load, if there's a difference between the Marine Corps and the Army in the field in
Iraq?
MG Speakes: This is Steve Speakes. I would suggest that we not go that way. Here's why. When
we are talking combat load, I was fascinated because what you had was twodifferent dismounted
professionals appear in front of Congress yesterday. Both of them acquitted themselves very
well. They both explained that the whole issue of how much a soldier is wearing, or a Mar ine, is
dependent upon mission and the oper ating environment and not upon the Service. In other
words, both of them discussed the same basic terms - outer tact ical vests, SAPI plates, it' s a
given. After that, then, do you wear the DAP or not ? An important question. I think when we get
the side armor out in sizable quantities, it is going to be something where soldiers are once again
going to interact with their chain of command and decide whether they need it and want it,
because it's more poundage once agai n. And the other thing is it seals your body in in a way that
is going to become very, very heat producing. Because right now your body breathes essentially
in the sides, in the top where you have some level of ventilation.
The other thing that you then have is your weapons, and most soldiers are carrying two weapons
now, they are carrying an M4, they are probably also carryi ng a nine millimeter. You're car rying
the magazines for both. You're carrying the ammunition that's in the magazines. You're carryi ng
water, and then you're carryi ng at least probably one day's worth of some kind of combat ration.
When you put all that together , the figures really become staggering. 00 they wear it on a
sustained basis, or do they take it on and off ? All of those subjects that become something that
as we talked poundage yesterday, it became very confusing for the civili ans who were listening.
And so I'd simply say, if you take a look at it right now what we' re showing is the basic armor that
we are issuing a soldier, for a med ium-size soldier, went from about 60 pounds to about 31
pounds. That 's only the start of what a soldier or Marine is wearing. And after that. it's all mission
dependent, not Service dependent. Does a 16 to 31 pound increase help a little bit?
Q: So the other take away is this. You have gone through three basically continuous evolut ions in
the fielding of these sets. Is that correct?
MG Sorenson: No, not exactl y. Partially correct. What was said was we have gone through three
generations of the protective plates. We have gone through another four evolutions of the ent ire
ensemble, so in all pieces here we have continued to improve everything, OK? So, total is seven.
So we have made improvements to the vest , we've made improvements to the external elements
of the vest. we've made internal improvements to the type of composites, if you will, that are used
in these plates. And those have gone through three generations.
Q: OK, and the total is you now have enough to, you know, to equip on average about 700,000 or
more than (enough ?) to equip the entire operating force?
MG Sorenson: Oh, absolutely. No question .
COL Thoma s Spoehr (Director of Materiel, AITny G-8) : More than enough to equip the soldiers in
Iraq, not quite the operating force. (The operating force is defined as every soldier in the Army
that could potentiall y deploy.)
Ms. Barber: Great, well with that, thank you folks for calling in and for your time. General
Sorenson, General Speakes, thank you for your time.
Follow up
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At t a ched is the t r ans cr ipt from ye sterday ' s bri e fi ng wi t h Mr. Ryan , VADM
Cha ni k and t he mi li tary analys ts.
The br iefing was on background.
1
Transcript
Military Anal yst Briefing
Topic: QDR
Jan. 25, 2006, 2E556 The Pent agon
Mr. Ryan Henry, PDUSD Policy; VADM Evan M. "Marty" Chanik
Host: Eric Ruff OASDPA
ON BACKGROUND
Transcriber: Murphy
Mr. Ruff: Hell o? Folks, this is Eric Ruff and with me is, among others, are Ryan Henry
and Admiral Marty Chanik, and they'll be talking to you for a second - in a second or
two.
I just wanted to open up by talking a little bit about sort of what we are doing here.
Obviousl y, as we are getting closer and closer to releasing the QDR, in about - what is it
now, probabl y about 12 days or something like that - a week from this Monday,
information is already start ing to come out more and more.
You probably saw Mark Mazzetti ' s piece in the LA Times (Jan. 24), so we kind of made
a decision to start talking about this a little bit. So we are talking on background now
about the QDR. And I think the framework we are working in - and we have a document
that' s called a preface. It ' s a preface that' s going to go in the front of the QDR when we
send it up. And we can make this available to you guys. I don't know if we have the
electrons on it yet - but we have a - it ' s about a three-page document, and Tara (Jones)
or somebody will get it out to you either by fax or email, if we can email it OK? So, I
think we've got all that information for everybody who ' s on the call.
Import ant to remember here is that this QDR is not a new beginning. In essence, we've
been working lessons learned since we came in in 200 I. And it ' s been a process by which
over the last year or so a number of assumptions have been looked at and tested and
tested and the thinking has been throughout this what have we learned from Iraq? What
have learned from Afghanistan? And what do we know going into the future about what
our force structure is going to be?
This thing has been a very high collaborati on with civilian - I haven't been here mor e
than two years, but the civilian and military collaboration in terms of this document, and
Ryan and the admiral can certainly speak to this - has been really something to watch
over the last year-plus.
So with that in mind, I'll just - we' ll tum it over to Ryan and then Ryan, you and Marty
can just take it from here.
Mr. Ryan : Yeah, hi, this is Ryan Henry. First of all I want to say hi to Ken and Tim from
a former life. I am going to walk you through some high points on the QDR. My role was
as I guess basically the traffic cop, the manager, and then I was supported by Marty who
is the J-8 here, and also the folks in PA&E, and the three of us pretty much represented
the management cel l.
One thing unique about this QDR as Eric was alluding to is that it was not a staff product.
It is the work of the four stars, and their Senate-confirmed civilian equivalents in the
building. They drove it; they made all the decisions; they directed the work on it; and
. they' re the guys that put thousands and thousands of hours into it.
It is a wartime QDR. That ' s one thing that ' s different from in the past. We think that
we' re in the fourth year of a very long war. It' s a war with a different sort of enemy than
we faced in the past, and different sort of needed capabilities that we have to develop.
The QDR itselfis supposed to be a 20-year look into the future of what the department
needs. We're supposed to develop a strategy and then resource that strategy. Another
thing that we did different this time is before starting the QDR we did the strategy. That
was published in March of '05. It ' s available on DefenseLink. It ' s an unclass document.
That strategy took about six months of the senior leadership ' s time. And when we refer to
the senior leadership, we' re talking the secretary and the deputy, the chairman and the
vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs , three Service secretaries, five ~ four service chiefs, and
five undersecretaries. And that comprises the headquarter' Ssenior leadership, and then on
a periodic basis we bring in the nine combatant commanders to get their inputs. That
group was supported by the vice chiefs ofthe Services and some of the other direct
report s to the secretary who, at their four-star level, ended up doing an awful lot of the
staff work to push it forward to the senior leadership.
What we came out with were two twin imperatives. And the bottom line of the QDR
report itself says that we need to shift our balance and the capabilities we had, that the
Sept. I 1, 2001 represented a change and an off-balancing ofwhat the strategic context
that we thought we had up until that point. And so we are shifting our balance and we are
shifting our capabilities. And I' ll talk to some of the areas we are doing that in.
We see four sets of challenges that we have in the future to be able to address. And
historically we've looked at a traditional set ofchallenges which basically involved major
combat ops, and state-versus-state conflicts. And we looked at everyt hing else as a lesser-
included case to be able to meet that.
As we look to the future we see a set of irregular challenges which are represented by
both Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the operations that we saw in Hait i and Liberia, and
this is where usually the enemy is within a state, but not part of a state. We are not
fighting anothe r nation-state, but some sort of movement, and it requires a di fferent set of
capabilities, sometimes thought as lower level but still an area where we need to develop
more expertise.
The second set is a catastrophic set ofchallenges. And those are one time of events that
could occur to the U.S. They are just unacceptable for us to accept that blow. Pearl
Harbor would be an exampl e of that; 9-11 is an example of that; getting hit by a nuclear
lED in one of our cities would be an example of that. And so defense has a role in
protecting the nation against that in the future.
And then the final set ofthe four is disruptive. And that is a challenge or a threat which
might come against us that would basically neutrali ze the American military as a key
instrument of national power.
And you kind ofthink of if another country would have gotten stealth rather than us,
what would have that meant? If somebody comes up with a bio-warfare agent that can
genetically target our soldiers or something, than those are the type of challenges that we
want to beable to meet.
So we look at the future; we look at about .getting capabilities across all four of those sets
of challenges. .
The second big part of the QDR was a recogniti on that as we change the capability of the
forces in the field we have to change the headquarters. That the headquarters and the way
that we're currently and operated is not sufficiently agile to be able to support the
fighting forces that we have over there. So we have to do things to better support them
and to be able to accelerate our ability to reorient the force. So there is an intemal look
here, too.
There' s a recognition that this QDR, as Eric was saying, is a point in time across a
continuum oftransfonnation. Show it represents a snapshot in time. It is something that
started worki ng on basically two years ago started the initial effort, and we' ll stilt be
working on it two years from now.
There is a point in time on the 6
th
of February where we send up a report to the Hill, but it
is an evolving process.
Eric talked a little bit about the lessons leamed and what went in here. It was more than
just Iraq and Afghanistan. It is the - the other areas in the global war on terror - the
Philippines, the Hom of Africa, Georgia and the Pan-Sahel (in Africa). These are areas
where we are trying to fight the global war on terrorism. We are working with partner
nations; sometimes they lack the capability, sometimes they lack the will to be able to
effectively prosecute this, and we need to do things to build up their capabilities.
Another big area is humani tarian. Our biggest victories to date in the global war on
terrori sm which involves impacting the hearts and minds of the moderate Muslims have
been in our responses to humanit arian disasters. Specifically, the earthquake around
Christmas of ' 04 and then the tsunami from the earthquake, and then Pakistani
earthquake (October ' 05). And the polling that the agency does and the shift ofopinions
because of those toward the United States and away from radical Islam has been very,
very significant.
So that speaks to another problem that we face in the future and that ' s one of
unpredictabilit y and uncertainty. We cannot predict with any certainty whatsoever how
our forces might be able to be used in the future. We can say with a very high probability
that within the next 10 years U.S. forces will be employed somewhere in the world where
they are not today. But as far as when that will be, where that will be, or how that will be.
there is j ust no way to determine that. So we have to have an agility of forces and we
have to build capabilities, rather than focusing on a specific threat.
And then the final area that has informed the work is our response in support of civil
authorities. specificaUy, lhe military' s response to 9- 11, and now more recently Hunicane
Katrina and Rita. And that in providing the American people security. we have a role to
play on the domestic front, too.
So the QDR then will speak to - the document will speak to four key focus areas that we
are concerned with building more capabilities at the begi nning of the 21
51
century.
How do we provide defense in-depth to the homeland? How do we hasten the demise of
terrorist networks? How do we preclude hostile powers or rogue elements from acquiring
or using WMD? And then finally, how do we influence and impact countries that are at
strategic crossroads?
And they're we are thinking ofthree countries specifically. We are thinking ofRussia
and to temper its move toward authoritarianism. We are thinking of China and
successfully managing its rise in the community of nations as a constructive force, and if
that didn 't prove successful, how do we dissuade them from hostile ambitions? How do
we deter them from (inaudible - cursor? Cursory?) actions and ifcalled 00, how would
we be able to defeat them? And then finally then India. the world's democracy, second-
largest Muslim nation, we think: a key partner in the future, and how do we build a
strategic alliance with them?
So those are four problem areas that the QDR addressed, and in doing that, they tried to
come up with for our external customer, who we personify in the president. how are we
going to be able to provide him. and his successor more importantly, options to be able to
deal with these key problem areas ofthe beginning of the 21
5t
century?
And then for our internal customer, who we view as the joi nt warfighter, how do we get
them the capabilities set that they'll be more effective in dealing with these? And so the
QDR then goes through and takes 12 different areas where we are interested in
developing and enhancing capabiliti es. And then it goes on to look at the headquarter' s
function - how do we do governance at the headquarter' s level? How do we improve on
some ofour processes? What do we do as far as the human capital strategy? And then
finally, and probably most importantly, what can we do in the area of building
partnership capability and capacity?
Now that partnership and capability capacity happens domestically. as far as working
with state and local governments, Department of Homeland Security; it happens
interagency on the national security front , working with State Department, the NSC, CIA
in an interagency process; and then internationally, how do we build the capability of the
partner nati ons that we work with? Because thi s is very clear to the Department of
Defense that we have to have lots of humility as we approach the problem set before us.
We are not goi ng to be able to predict what is going to be able to happen, and we are not
going to be able to solve it on our own, either as a department or a nation. We are going
to be dependent on partners. Most times for sure they are going to be able to for sure
address the problem cheaper than we can, and many times they are going to be able to do
it more effectively because they are fami liar with the local cultural terrain, they know the
language, and they can operate more effectively in the environment we are in.
Along those 12 areas that we talked about being able to make changes, we talk about
leading-edge investments that we can make and decisions that we can make in the fiscal
year ' 07 budget, that arri ves on the Hill the same time that the QDR does . But those are
only leading-ed ge investments. The major shifts the department needs to make will be
made as we do the program - future-year defense program in the coming year, which will
look at the years ' 08 through ' 13. So that' s where a lot of the significant vectors that the
QDR has set will find their way into programmat ic change, alt hough there are some that
are handled in the QDR itself.
And with that, at a top level - I guess one of the things - two other points real quick. One
is we did do a force-planning construct. We have refined the force-planning construct
from 2001. We maintain that we will still be able to do two major conflicts nearly
simultaneously, take one of them to the level of what we call a win-deci sive, sometimes
categori zed as something that might result in a regime change. We'll be able to do those.
In the past , we had thought of both of those as conventional campaigns. Goi ng forward,
we want to have the capability to have one of them he a pro longed, irregular campaign.
The analysis that we did in the QDR cl early proved that the most stressing thing on the
force is not the high- intensity major combat operations, but it is the prolonged, irregular
campaign that goes on for a number of years and requires a rotational base to support it.
And the multiplier effect there is what puts the stress on the force.
Some of the other things we learned is that we talk about the force some people think of
an acti ve-reserve component. We also need to think about an operational and an
institutional component. And the usability and the force that we employ forward is onl y
the operational component. And so as we look at what the size ofthe force is, rather than
looki ng at total end strength, whe re there is many things on the institutional force we can
do to transfer to civilian jobs or contractor j obs, we reall y - what the number we' re reall y
interested in is what do we have in the operational force, and what are the capabilities of
those forces versus the problem set we are confronted with?
And so the QDR does a lot to move more capability and more numbers into the
operational force. It also does a lot to move more capability into the irregular special
operations arena, making some sizable increases there, and taki ng the general purpose
forces and start to give them (soft-light ?) capabilities.
Also in the force- planning construct, we recognize the need to have a deterrence, but not
a one-size-fits-all deterrence, which we've had in the past of massive retaliation, but one
that wi ll also work against rogue powers who might be in a state of collapse or would
seemingly appear to beundeterrable and also terrorists and their networks.
And so there was the addition of a broader deterrent capability. So the force-planning
construct maintains the two-war strategy; maintains the forward presence; talks to a
steady stat e versus sur ge. In the area of surge there's going to betwo - we wi ll be able to
handle two maj or conflicts, one of them which might be a prolonged irregular and take
one of them to a win-decisive level.
It also recognizes that the force sizing, versus the force planning. is going to tend to be a
function of policy choices being made. What are you going to have in the way ofa
mobilization as you face different conflicts? What are you going to do as a rotational
base? What are you going to do for timeIines (inaudible - at?) the operational criteria that
you set for yourself? Are you going to stay engaged at the same level aro und the world?
Are you goi ng to do anythi ng different institutionally to be able to move forces from the
institutional to the operational? And then what will you do with emergency autho rities
you might have like we currently have on end strength?
The QDR went in with the assumption that the force size, while it was about right, but the
force capability distribution needed a lot ofrebalancing. After a year of work and
analysis, we feel comfortable with that initial assumption and have kept it.
So wi th that, if Marty Chanik has anything to add I'll let him do that, and then we can
start taking your questions,
VADM: Chanik: Good afternoon. I think probably the best use of your time that goes is
to go to your questions, because quite frank ly, Ryan really captured the essence of the
report and I think he hi ghlighted it pretty well. So I think we' re ready for questions.
Q: Yeah, this is Jeff MacCausland, sir, with CBS. Can you tal k a bit more detail ,
parti cularl y about the Army. I mean the secretary, frankly, got beat up a little bit beat up
today in the pr ess conference I watched. There' s been some leaks about reduction in
National Guard bri gades and shifting force structure to the active, which could make
some sense, but it gets people down in communities all exe rcised (inaudible) interviewed
the other day.
So can you talk a little bit specifically about Army, what you' re thinking about there
force-structure wise, change the National Guard-active mix, those kind of things?
Mr . Henry: O ~ well the Army is going away, obviously, from the differentiated division
concept to modular bri gades, 77 of those of the combat bri gades. Of those 77. in the
reserve component, there will be 28 that will be fully capable and on the par with the
active.
In the past, there was - we had 16 enhanced brigades, and not all of those were actually
whole brigades. We're moving it up to 28. The brigade structure on the reserve
component will stay at 106, but the remaining brigades will be in the combat support,
combat service support.
So, from our way of thinking, we are bringing up the reserve component and making
them part of the varsity. As we start to develop how we will use these brigades and
develop rotational models, then the reserve component will be part of that force
generation model for the Army.
So, to be perfectly honest with you, we are a little bit perplexed on the type of responses
that we are seeing. Now, in a planning process and as one starts to look at alternatives, all
sorts of numbers are thrown around. And I think the reaction you are seeing is is it's not
that we are decreasing the Guard or taking them down. There is a mentally that says that
the highest number that a Guard guy ever saw that what they might be at is not the
number we settled at as we worked everything out. So at one point in time there were
numbers that were under consideration that were above 28 on the combat brigades, but at
no time had anything been finali zed, as we balanced everything out, keep them·at the
same level , 106 total brigades, 28 which are the combat ones, which is up from the 16
quasi-full brigades that they have now.
Q: One quick follow up. Will there be any on the Guard side divisional flags go away?
Because that gets them upset even if, you know, the number of brigades stay constant.
Mr. Ryan: Right, right. And as you are probably aware, there's a lot of flags around right
now to which there aren't necessarily whole unit s to go with. The number of flags will
remain the same. The percentage of flags that have real , viable forces associated with
them will go up. But that is not to say that there might not he a handful around that are in
the current status that they are now that there's not necessarily a fully associated unit with
them. But no flags - to my knowledge - to my knowledge no flags will go away.
So they'll still have the same bragging rights.
Q: Exactly.
Q: Hello. Jed Babbin, American Spectator. Have you guys gotten a sign off from
Negroponte and Goss (Porter Goss?) on this? Because what I am hearing is you guys are
going to be putting an awful lot more into establishing defense-related intelligence
capability and there could be a little bit of a turf war brewing, no?
Mr. Ryan: The QDR has been staffed through the NSC, up to the highest levels, in
(and?) components that comprise the NSC - the intelligence community, the State
Department, the Department of Homeland Security, Justice Department, it has also been
staffed through those organizations also.
I - we have not solved the problem of the iron major and the titanium colonel, either in
our organization or other ones. You will be able to find somebody buried in an
organization who somehow feels that his particular parochial interest was not served as
fully as he thought. You will oot find anybody at the senior levels of the defense
establishment - and that' s the four stars - that don't believe in this document. That 's -- [
mean, some of us that have participated in it think that the document itself is just an
artifact of the QDR. But really what the QDR was it was a process that brought the
department in, looked at a common set ofproblems, and came up with a cohesi ve
approach to it that everyone buys in.
There - one of the things we get hit for is that there were no major weapon cuts. We
didn't kill any major weapon systems in the QDR. Because we had such a collaborative
effort, we were able to make large investments in the areas we need to do, without having
to do that. And it couldn' t have been done if it weren't the Services that were coming
forward and saying this is how I can do my part to contribute to be able to shift the
balance and where we need to go.
So, I' ve only been in the Pent agon for three years, but guys that have been through here
and sat through all the QDRs say that this was fundamentally different in kind as far as
not just the approach at the senior leadership, but as it developed, the collaborative effort,
the fact that - and the vices - and maybe Marty' s got a better count than I do - but I
would say the vices put in 500 hours of their time over the last 15, 16 months, in sitting
down and collaboratively working with the under secretaries and the deputy and the vice
chairman in trying to come up and work through these solutions.
And we couldn't got to where we did if this wouldn' t have represented - the spirit
wouldn't have been one of that we are all in this together and we have to come up with
common solutions.
We also, as far as inclusivity, brought in on many of our meetings members ofthe
Department of Homeland Securit y, the CIA; we actually had some of our key allies
part icipate in our internal discussions. And so this was much more inclusive than it' s
been in the past, too.
So, you know, there might be some people who feel that they were injured but we are not
aware of anybody at a leadership level anywhere in the government that feels
uncomfortable wit h this report.
VADM Chanik: And just to put an asterisk to the question on Ambassador Negroponte,
Office ofthe Secretary of Defense folks that are the intel side of tbe house is working
very closely continuous process working with the director of national intell igence and the
CIA. So there' s been an awful lot of crosstalk during the development of this QDR and
continuing onward with balancing the capabilities that are represented in all those three
organizations.
Mr. Ruff: More questions?
Q: If nobody else is going to jump in, it' s Jed Babbin for one more. You've mentioned a
term and you just scared the liver out of me, guys. Nuclear lED?
Mr. Ryan: Yeah, I mean if - let' s face it, we've got some bad guys out there that are
trying to develop a full nuclear full cycle, and have the abil ity to produce fissi le material.
This is al l about what the (? Response) to the global war on terrori sm. It is weapons of
mass destruction. It is a globalizat ion mechanism which allows the movement of
materials and ideas in a network world, and it is the emergence ofterrorist organizations
that have no limit to the amount of terror that they are willing to put on any nation or any
group of people to get to their political ends.
And the nexus of those three things is what keeps us up at night.
Q: Forgive me for interrupting but I think one of things that I am heari ng is that if it is a
new term, it ' s got to be an identifiabl e threat. Is this near or longe r term?
Mr . Henry: We have countri es that are producing nucl ear materials that are not under the
non-proliferation treaty right now. So it is a possibility of which we cannot ignore . And I
mean it is the high end, worse case. It doesn't necessaril y - a nuclear lED is not
necessaril y something that would have to go critica l, and it could j ust have a radiological
dispersion aspect of it -- known as an ROD - radiol ogical dispersion device.
And the other thing is is the QDR is given a responsibilit y to look out in the next 20
years. When we go to the int elligence community and ask them to look into the future,
and to give us an ass essment ofwhere we are going to be, they can do it with a certain
degree of accuracy out to five years.
The world we live in right now though, going out 10 years is an extremely iffy exerci se,
one that they feel uncomfortable with. And they will not venture out to the 20-year mark
because the world's just too uncertain; we cannot predict which way things are going to
go. The enemy is evolving too fast to be able to do any sort of linear extrapolation.
And so we have a responsibi lity in looking out at that 20 years to be able to address all
feasible threats and to try to anchor what the high-end one is. And a terrorist with a -
with a - with fiss ile material, and with a little bit of know-how, is the worst-case
scenario .
That coupled though - I would say that' s on a par with a terrorist with bio-warfare
knowledge, too, or access to bio-warfare materials. Both of those are the high end one.
Q: Thank you.
Q: This is Jeff MacCausland again. There's been a lot of leaks, and I emphasize the
words leaks, so you can say that' s not necessari ly true, that one of the things this report is
going to say to the shifting of a particular number of forces - particularly air and naval -
from, frankl y, the Atlantic to the Pacific. Can you talk about that for a second?
And also, how do you see balancing the effort to, if you will, find a good relationship
with the Chinese as opposed to creating a force structure that they find threatening and
then we end up, you know, fulfilling our own prophecies?
Mr. Ryan: Right. I mean that's a - let me deal with the latter one, the Pacific and stuff
like that. I mean, stability is the coin of the realm in the Pacific. It' s not subject to an
alliance structure like the Atlantic is. The U.S. is a force for stability in the region. I think
it's recogni zed by all. We don't use our forces out there in an aggressive nature.
By the same token, for operational responsiveness, the timelines due to the distance
involved are significantly different in the Pacific, so we need to have things forward . Our
abilit y to respond with 17,000 troops within one week of Lbe Banda Aceh tsunami , to be
able to bedelivering relief, we could not have done if we didn 't have our forward basing
and forward presence structure that we have there.
In order to do that, there will be a shift of maritime toward the Pacific . We talked about
that in QDR '01; we continue to talk about that in QDR ' 06. And you' ll probably see
some specific metries in the report that will very discretel y deal with that.
In the Atlant ic - the Atlantic is a -- to maintain our traditional relationship with NATO,
to encourage the transformation of NATO from a Cold War structure to one that can
make a difference to the world we live in. Obviously you' re aware that we' re doing [SAP
(International Security Assistance Force) out-of-area ops there in Afghanistan, and we' re
working with them on the NATO response force, and we' re having discussions on other
areas as we' ll go to Werkunde (Gennany) and the mini sterial is coming up here in couple
of months on areas that NATO can continue to grow there. But it probably doesn't
requi re the same force structure that it did during the Cold War.
Q: Thank you.
Mr. Ruff: OK. we'I l just recap here. We' ll get this material out to you, and [ know one or
two folks asked if they could get a transcript of this just for your own personal use and
the answer is yes, we'll give you that. It' s on background.
And I would just add one last thing and that is, you know, there ' s been a lot of discussion
is building and QDR is certai nly part ofthis umbrella in the long war. And just for your
assay, you' re going to be seeing in the days and weeks ahead the secretary and leadership
in this building talking more about this long war and what the components are. And I
would just give you that as something to be watching out for as we go forward with
speeches and things like that.
OK? Thanks everybody.
(end of call).
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Haddock , Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSfPA

31. 2006 11
CDR, OCJCSfPA )(0) Maj, OCJ CSfPA
)(0) CAPT, JCS OVCJCSfPA
FW: Iraq Progres s Report
Your thoughts?
This is the "9010 " brief . .. appropriate briefer? Mil Analysts seems tame enough . ..
ViR
Col H
OCJCS/PA Ellen (Katie), Col,
:> -- -- -Ori
:> Fr om: OASD-PA]
:>Sent :
:>To:
:> Sub j e c t:
>
:>Sir/ Ma 'am - During our morni ng meeting with the service PAs to discuss the
QDR/Budget/ Defense Posture, an interesting i de a came up wr t the Iraq Progress Report .
>
:> I s t he r e val ue to brining in some of the mi litary analys t s (s i mi l i a r t o what we're do ing
wi th t he QDR ) and briefing them on t he 9th about our release of the progress report on the
10th? We can also set up a phoner t oo i f you wis h . who would be the appropriate person
to br i e f them?
>
:>VR/ CDR!,-:--:--:-_ ...,.
:>OASD PA Defense Press Office Pol icy Team Defense Intelligence
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
:=::l':::-l==:Ma
j
, OCJCSlPA
Tuesday, January 31, 2006 11:30 AM
'" dock Ellen Katie), Col, __.... CDR, OCJCSlPA
JCS OVCJCSlPA
RE: Iraq Progress Report
Yes ma'am... Lt Gen Re nua r t and Mr Rodman b riefed the n l y s t s on t he r eport i n
October. He would be good a gain . . . or BG Jones or COL i f you want a d i f ferent
level . Either way , I wou l d r ecomme nd an OSD-JS j oint bri e f1ng - - wi t h the OSO brief e r
s peaking fi r s t since t hey brie f on t he f i r s t t wo sect ions of t he report (po l i t i c a l ,
economi c ) and we can mat c h t he appropriate l e vel J -S speaker to who t hey get f o r OSO. Does
t hat ma ke s e ns e? ......
:> -- -- - Or i g i na l Me ssage - - - - -
:>From: Had doc k, El l e n ( Kat i e) , OCJCS/PA
»sent • Tue s da , January 3 1, 2
:>To: CDR, Maj, OCJCS / PA
:>Cc; CAPT, JCS OVCJCS PA
:>Sub j e c t : FW : Iraq Pr ogres s Report
>
:>¥our thoughts?
:>This i s t he " 90 10 " b r i ef .. . appropriate briefer? Mi l Analyst s seems t ame e nough . ..
:>V/ R
:> Col H
>
of t he mil i t a r y a nalyst s {si mil i a r t o wha t we 're doing
the 9th a bout our r e l e a s e o f t he progre ss report on t he
t oo i f you wish. Who wou ld be t he appr op r iate pe r s on
Report.
OCJ CS/ PA
esci nua ry 31 , 2006 10: 02 AM
CAPT, JCS OVCJ CS/ PA; Ha ddoc k ,
I raq Progress Re por t
:> - - - -
:> From: CDR, OASD-PA)
:>Sent ·
:>To : Ell e n (Kat i e ) , Col,
:>Subjec t:
>
:>Si r/ Ma 'am - Duri ng our morni ng me e t i ng with the service PAs t o d isc uss t he
QDR/ Budget /Def e nse Po s t ur e , an i nteres t ing i dea came up wr t t he I raq Pr ogr ess
>
:>Is t he r e val ue to br i n i ng in some
wi t h t he ODR) and briefing t he m on
10t h ? We can al s o s e t up a phoner
t o b r i e f t he m?
>
:>VR/ COR
:>OASD PA De fe nse Pr e s s Of fi c e pol icy Te a m Defen s e I nte l l i ge nce
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subj ect :
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
esda an 31, 2006 7:46 PM
6:.- OCJCSIPA
l(O) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA CDR, OCJCS/PA
RE: Iraq Progress Report .... ...1
if t he y have s ome one i n mind f rom t hei r side.
t he y are a va i labl e a.nd wan t t o do it . The other
make s e nse .
i n OSD and s ee
good by me, if
good .
ThanksL,..;._ .,.... it does
get with
The Rodman/Renuart t e a m is
recommended na me s are a lso
VIR
Col H
OCJ CS/ PA
>Sent : Tuesday, January 31, 2006 11 :30
>To: t i e l , Col , CDR, OCJCS/ PA
>Cc: CAPT, JCS OVCJCS /PA
>Subject : RE: I r a q Pr ogr e s s Report
>
>
>Yes ma 'am. _. Lt Gen Re nuart and Mr Rodman briefed the mil a naly sts on
>t he re rt i n October . He would be good again . .. o r BG J ones o r COL
if you want a dif ferent l evel. Ei t her way, I would recommend an
>OSD- J S j o int briefi ng - - wi th the OSD briefer speaking firs t si nce they
>brief on the f i rst t wo sections o f t he r eport (pol i tic a l, e conomi c) a nd
>we ca n ma t c h the appropri a te l evel J - S s peaker to who t he y get for 0 5D.
>Does that s ense? vr ,
....._......
> -----Or i g i na l Me s sage - - - - -
> Fr om: Had doc k , El l en (Kati e), Col , OCJ CS/ PA
> Sent : ry 31, 200 6 •
> To : CDR, OCJCS/ PA; .,.... ... Maj , OCJCS/PA
> Cc : CAPT, JCS C;{!
> Subject: FW : I raq Progr e s s Rep ort
OCJCS/ PA
CDR, OASD- PAl
Mil Analys ts seems tame enough . .. brief . .. a ppropriate briefe r?
Janua
Messa e-- - - -
thought s ?
is t he " 901 0"
-- --
From:
Tue sda
To:
Su bj ect:
You r
This
VIR
Col H
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Si r / Ma' am - During our mor ning mee ti ng with the service PAs to di scus s t he
Po sture , a n i nte r e s t i ng idea came up wrt the Iraq Progres s Report.
>
> Is there v a l ue to bri n i ng in some of the mi l i t a ry a nalysts (s i mi l i a r t o what we 're
doi ng with the QDR) and b r iefing the m on t he 9th about our release o f t he p rogres s repor t
on the 10th? We ca n also set up a phoner too i f you wish . Who woul d be t he a ppropri a t e
person t o them?
>
> VR/ CD
> OASD ( PAl Defense Pr ess Off ice Pol i c y Te am
> Defense Intelli e nce
>
>
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Maj, OCJCS/PA
ednesday, February 01,20064:03 PM
Haddock. Ellen Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA
CAPT JCS OCJCSIPA;.. .I
lTC, OCJCSJPA; lTC, JCS SJS
RE: Iraq Progr ess Report
Ma'am... I just spoke with CDR i n OSC/PA... The r e port is due to be del i ve r ed to
Congress on the 10t h o f Februa ry, so it won't be included in the rol lout o f a l l the other
s trategic documents.
Here are the things OSC/PA is conside ring :
9 Feb - - Mi l Analyst Call with two bri e f e r s ( t hey haven 't decided who from OSD yet and
then appropriate level from J -S)
9 Fe b -- Select one or two media members and provide an embargoed interview with same two
briefers 10 Feb -- Report del ivered to Congress 10 Feb - - Media Advisory for i nterested
media to attend i nt e rvi e w with s ame t wo br i e f e r s
I've cc 'd on this e-mail to b r i ng him
t he LA p iece s o we can coordina te approp r i ate l y .
i nto the fold and get his t hought s on
I will let everyone know a s thi ngs p r ogr e s s and when a final action p l an is app r oved and
agreed to b everyone.
vr,
have someone i n mi nd from the i r side .
a va i l abl e a nd want to do it . The ot her
s e e if t he y
if t hey are
> --- - - Or i g i na l Me s s age - - - - -
>From: Haddock , Ellen (Kat i e ) , Col, OCJCS/ PA
»sene . Tue s da J a nua ry 31, 2006 7: 46 PM
>To : Ma j . OCJCS / PA
»cc • CAPT, J CS OVCJCS/PAi CDR, OCJCS/ PA
>Subj e c t: RE: Iraq Progress Repor t "------------"
=::::;1,it doe s make sens e.
»Pkeaae get wit h in OSC and
The Rodman/Renua rt t e a m i s good by me,
r e commended na mes a re a l s o good.
>V/R
>Col H
-- - - - Or i g i na l Message-----
From: Haddock , Ellen ( Ka t i e ) , col , OCJCS/PA
Se nt: Tue s da January 31. 200 6 11:23
To : • OCJCS/PA; Maj , OCJ CS/ PA
Cc : CAPT, JCS OVCJCS PA
Subj e ct : FW : Iraq Progress Report
o n
CDR, OCJ CS/ PA
- -- --ori gi -- - - -
Fr om: Maj , OCJCS/ PA
Sent : Tue s day , a nuary 31 , 2006 11: 30 AM
To : Haddock, Ell e n (Ka t i e ) , col , OCJCS/PAi
Cc; CAPT, J CS OVCJCS/ PA
Subjec : raq r ogre s s Report
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Yes ma'am... Lt Gen Renuart a nd Mr Rodman briefed the mi l a nalysts
>the r e ort i n Oc tober. He would be good again ... or BG Jones or COL
' f you want a d i fferent l evel. Ei t he r way , I would recommend a n
>OSO- JS joint briefi ng -- with the OSO b r i efe r s peaking firs t since they
>br i e f on t he f irst two sections of the repo rt (pol i t i ca l , economi c ) and
>we can match the a pp r op r i a t e l ev el J-S s peaker to who t hey get f o r OSO.
>Doe s that make sense? vr ,
"""'---'
>
>
>
>
>
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>
1
VI R
Col H
Your t houghts?
This is the "9010" brief . .. appropriate briefer? Mi l Analysts seems tame
Messa e-- -- -
Iraq Progress Repor t
I , 20 06 10;02 AM
J CS OVCJCS!PAi Haddock, El l e n (Ka t i e) , Co l,
Subj ect:
>
>
enough . ..
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
OCJCS!PA
>
>
> Si r / Ma 'am - During our mor ni ng mee t ing wi t h t he s e rvi ce PAs t o discus s t he
QDR/Budget !oefense Pos ture , an i nt e r e s ting i dea came up wr t t he Iraq Progress Report .
>
Office Pol i cy Te am
VR/ CDR
OASD (PA) Def ense Press
Def ense Intell! ence
>
>
>
>
> Is there value t o brining in some of t he mi litary a nalysts (s i mi lia r t o what
we 're doi ng wi th the QCR) and bri e fi ng t hem on the 9th about our relea s e o f the progres s
report on t he l Ot h? We can a l s o set up a phoner too i f you wish. Who would be the
appropriat e per s on to bri ef t hem?
>
>
2
From:
Sent :
To:
Subj ect :
, CIV, OASO-PAI
Monday, February 20, 2006 5:32 PM
Haddock, Elien (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA
FW: "Fighting the Long War" - copy? L.. .1
Long War- - copy?
hi. can someone on your s taff he lp with this request for one of the mi lit a ry analysts?
thanks !
From : [mailto:robertmag73,. ..
Sent : Monday , February 20 , 20 06 5: 30 PM
To :
Subject: - Fi ght i ng t he
Today's Washingt on Times includes an article by Rowan scarborough that mentions an
unclassified 27- page Joi nt s taff briefing for Read Admiral Bil l Sullivan. I believe ,
a c cor di ng t o the article, t he firs t s e c t i on i s - Why Ameri ca wants a short war. -
I'd like a copy and I suspect others would like one a s well.
Can you help?
Thanks .
Bob
Rober t L. Magi nni s
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Subj ect:
)(8)
Foll ow Up Flag :
Flag Status:
follow up
Flagged
FYI
brua r y 21 , 200 6 1: 40 PM
Cr y , JeSt OCJCS
RE : 22 Fe b Ou tre a c h - time .
inal Me ssa e - - - - -
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>To :
>Subj ect :
>
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>
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>Se nt· Au.
>To :
>Su b ject : RE : 22 Feb Ou t reach - time .
CIV, OSO)
>
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CI V, OSO];
CI V, OASD-PA] ; Ruf f,
[Me r ri t t , Roxie T.
CIV, e SO);
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From:
Se nt:
To :
conf i r ming t hat we a r e s t i l l on f or t omorrow as s hown bel ow - r oom? Is it
guy i s no t i nvolve d . . .. ri ght ? >My
>
>
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>
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OSD;
CI V, OASD-PA;
CI V, 050;
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CIV, JCS, OVCJCS
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USMC,
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CIV, OSO
Schedule Items from 12 Jan Meeti ng
Janua
RE : PA
thanks ,
·PA Prep
Outreach
crv, OS'eo''''''- - - - - ...
: CIV, JCS, ..
22 Feb Outreach - t i me .
cc . CI V, J CS , OCJCS;
Subj e c t :
1 :30pm-l :4 5
1 :4Spm-2 : 30
Cc:
Subj ect :
Le t e know
CIV. 050;
> For t he out reach on 22 Feb , i s it possible t o a djust the time to start 15
mi nutes later - new time wou l d be :
,
,
,
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From: CIV, 050
Sent : 20 06 9: ......

1 , 050;
CIV OASO- PA;
CIV,
CIV,
Ca p t .
St even
> Fr iday 3 February:
> 10 :45am-l0:55 - PA Prep
> 1100 - 1120 - Tri -West Heal thc a re All iance - SO par t icipate in cermeony
present i ng por tra its o f MoH recipients - locat ion TBO .
,
,
,
,
>Oef ense Experts
,
,
,
,
>TBO
Wednesday 22 Fe bruary:
1 :15a m- l : 30 - PA Prep
1: 30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/ Re ti red Mili tar y Analys ts & Civilian
- l ocat ion TaO
Tuesday 28 February:
8:4Sam-9 :00 - PA Prep
9:00am-9:20 - Meet w/ National Gua rd Yout h Cha lle nge Group - l oc a t i on
Le t me know i f thi s work s - t hank s,
Cathy.
Fr i da y 1 0 March:
11:10am- l1 : 20 - PA Prep
11:25 - Wa l k to POAC
11 : 30am- l 1 : S0 - Me e t W/USA Basketbal l Leadership (MY e vent ) @ POAC
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
Thur s day 16
1: 15pm-l:30
1: 30pm-2 :1S
March :
PA Prep
- Ou t r e a c h w/Strat egai c Communica t ors
>-----Origina l Message--- --
,
2
,
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject :
Follow Up Flag:
Flag Status:
Attachments:
"' CIV' OASD·PAj
I! IV, OASD·PAj
Smith, Dorrance HI) [Smith. Dorrance HON, OASD-PAI; Ruff, Eric [Ruff,
OSO]; Whitman.
-; [Thorp, Frank, ROML. OASD-P ; arber, Allison Barber Allison CIV
OASD·PAj ; Haddock, Ellen Katie Col OCJCSIP
U Col, OASD·PA .
Ballesteros, Mark j. (Ballesteros. Mark J .
(Vician Todd Ma' OASD-PA ' Ca nter Jose h
P
CIY • OASD(PA))
Dempsey military anetyst transcript
follow up
Flagged
03·16-06 Dempsey ISF training.doc
03-16-06 Dempsey
ISFtraining....
Attached
LTG Dempsey .
is the edi t ed t ranscript f rom yesterday's milita ry anal yst c all with
The e nti re ca ll wa s on background.
1
Military Analysts Call
Thursday, March 16, 2006
Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, commander of the Multi-National Security Transition
Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I)
On Background
Hosts: Mr. Dallas Lawrence, OASDPA, OASDPA
Roo LTG Dempsey in Iraq
Transcriber: Murphy
Lawrence: (in progress) the entire call will be on background. You are free to quote
the source as a senior military leader, but other than tbat, it' s 00 background, and
General Dempsey should be calling in shortly.
(break to wait)
The show is YOUTS, sir. We have gone over the ground rules. Our folks know this call is
on background, and we appreciate you joining us this eveni ng from Iraq.
Dempsey: My pleasure.
Lawrence: General, if you' d like to kind of give an openi ng overview of the current status
of forces, what the successes your folks are seeing there, anyt hing you' d like to discuss,
then we can open it up for questions.
Dempsey: Yeah, I think I would. But I will keep it brief, because I would rather j ust field
the questions that they are interested in.
Firs t of all, hello to all or you. Most of you have been over here at one time or another. I
am just crossing my 21$1 month in Baghd ad, 14 the first time and seven now. So I' ve got
a bit of a, it seems to me, a historic al perspective on thi s who le thing.
And what I would say in general terms in that regard is that although the generation of
the combat forces, the more than 100 battalions of Army and poli ce battalions that are out
there get most of the notoriety. the - it seems to me that the - an equally important story
is the institutions that are being built above it, that is to say the Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior, as we ll as the - kind of the foundati on of the whole thing which is an
education system, an lraqi training and doctrine command that incl udes 18 institutes,
academies, colleges and trai ning centers so that this force we are building will be two
things princi pally - three really. One is capable, clearly. But the other two are one that is
an institution from top to bottom, from foot soldier to minister, and even more important
than that an institution ofnational unit y, that is, a cohesive force inside the country at a
time when they clearly need some cohes ive forces working on their behalf. And I thi nk
there' s been some reasons to believe that that endeavor and that entire enterprise is
moving in that direct ion.
And with that , I will say onl y one other thing, and that is I know nothing, literally, about
Operation Swanner, so if you will stay clear of that, I would be happy to answer your
questions.
Q: General, thi s is l eff McCausland. Good to talk to you agai o. Could you talk a little bit
abou t that national uni ty functi on? Of course, there's been various reports after the
bombing of the Golden Mosque (22 February in Samarra). And in genera l, the ones I
have read seem to be summarized by saying the Iraqi securi ty forces, the army,
performed quite well; in fact, they deployed rapidly and were a settling influence,
however, that the police forces were somewhat mixed results in terms of that whole being
cohesive, being identified as a unifying force, et cetera.
Could you talk a little about those events, and those two different parts of the security
force?
Dempsey: Sure. In general terms, I would say that the anny and the national police - and
the national police, by the way, used to be called when you were here last time the special
poli ce - and consis t of the commando di vision and the public order division, those
nat ional forces , we have more visibility on them than we do the local police, but -
performed very well. They were very deliberate; they were poised. I would describe their
activities as a settling - cl early a settling influence on what was essentially a very
emot ionally charged atmosphere.
There were reports of certai n unit s that chose not to confront armed militia, and there
were some armed militi a activities that cropped up, notabl y the (Muqtada Sadr' s) Jaysh al
Mahdi in and around Sadr City. But frankl y, they didn 't have much politi cal top cover to
do so. In other words, there was a conscious decision taken at the national level not to
exacerbate the probl em by handling two problems at once, you know, you've got the
emotionally charged atmosphere of the mosque and the religious undertones of that and
the deci sion was made not to confront militias, but rather ensure that they were not acting
in criminal ways. So, for example, there were a couple of mosques that were taken over
by militi as - the militia of course claimed - and it may be true -- that they took them over
in order to protect them - but when the legitimate forces went and said, okay, we got it
now, they -- in every case -- they dispersed.
There were other reports about armed groups moving through the streets, you know,
shooting their rifl es in the air and things that over here are somewhat common place, I
don't want to diminish that, but in every case, again, the legitimate securi ty forces had a
leveling effect on all that and kind of channeled all thi s excess energy.
Now we 're still in the - thi s is all very recent, so we're stilt in the process at some level
of accumulating our lessons leamed. And there were a couple of instan ces where local
pol ice in parti cular, I am not talking about the nat ional police or the national army, but
the local police may have, you know, turned a blind eye to some thi ngs. But frankly, I
saw this as a watershed moment for the Iraqi Security Forces, and they not only passed
the challenge but did so very well .
Q: General, Jed Babbin. Thanks again for hosting us when we were over there in
December. What can you tell us about the militias infiltrating the "legitimate forces and
we hear all sorts of goofy reports about peopl e coming in and sect ari an violence coming
out of some ofthese forces.
Dempsey: First of all, let me go from the latter part of your question to the former. Make
no mistake about it, there are intelligence report s on a frequent basis that cause us to be
concerned about the activities of pieces of the legitimate security forces, never an entire
unit , but rather an individual or two or three or 10, maybe, inside of a legitimate unit.
And we' ve got a system in place with our Iraqi counterparts to investigate those. And we
have on, [don't know, in the last six months or so, we've had the occasion to change
commanders of battaJions in both the army and the national police - again, the
commandos and publi c order.
We've also changed a number of brigade commanders because there was enough
evidence they were not exerting the kind of control and discipline over their force they
needed.
But again, thi s is probably two or three battalions out of 100 or so in the army, and one
bri gade out of eight in the national police and two battalions out of 24 in the national
police.
So, I mean, you know, it ' s significant, but not anything that would me to describe this as
an endemic probl em.
Now, back to the issue of infiltration. Thi s is one of my favorite words, naturally. And
it' s hard for me to sign up for infiltrati on when we talk about the legitimate, that is to say,
the governmental recogni zed militias - you know, the peshmerga, the Badr and seven
others are identified in CPA order No. 91 as legitimate militias that must be over time
disarmed and/or assimilated into Iraqi society and even the Iraqi Securit y Forces.
So we clearly have had former Badr Corps, former peshmerga come in to the security
forces as individuals, intentionally. In fact, in some cases we 've taken input s and allowed
them to be recruited int entionally that way as part of an assimilation process. The key is
not to have them all in one place, and the second key is to have the leaders of units be
diverse, and have the MiTT (Military Transiti on Team) teams that overwatch them be
sensitive to these kind of things and also the special police transition teams as well.
Now there are other militi as, let' s even be less speci fic, and call them armed groups out
there that are more probl ematic. And I mentioned the Jaysh al Mahdi as one of them,
because it 's not a recognized militia by the CPA order No. 91.
Secondly, many of the young men that tend to drift toward Jaysh al Mahdi are
uneducated, almost universally unemployed, and as a result they can't even get into the
._------ -
legitimate securi ty forces because the legitimate security forces have a recruiting standard
and generally they can't pass it. So they pose a little bit different kind ofproblern.
But infi ltration is probably less precise than it ought to be, gi ven that in some cases these
men are actuaUy invited in.
Q: Hey Marty. Bob Scales, how are you doing?
Dempsey: Hi , Bob, good to hear from you.
Q: Listen, I am intrigued by your descript ion of a building of an institutional part of the
army. a sort ofTRADOC if you will. Are you actually building things like academies,
staff colleges, war colleges , NCO academi es, things of that sort? And if so, is that your
mission or does that bel ong to somebody else? And I guess the last part is how is that
goi ng?
Dempsey: It is my mi ssion. It was actuall y - it all started on Dave' s (petraeus) watch,
actually. The concept has kind of matured and in fact, in my other hat, which is the
NATO commander in Iraq, that ' s really in terms of officer education, that ' s their niche.
But , yeah, we've graduated our first cl ass from the Iraqi mi litary academy at Rustamiyah
78 new second lieutenant s, none of whom had previous military experience. And that ' s
significant, because you know we' ve also brought in, as you know, former officers to fill
the ranks, and this was the first class - it graduated in January, that is young men who
never had any previous military experience. So that' s the begi nning, it seems to me, of an
officer development system, officer education system that will over time, you know,
essentially repl enish the ranks from start to finish.
And we ' re goi ng to - we act ually, it' s another one of these national unity initiatives.
There' s three military academies in Iraq. One in Zakho, one in Qualachulon (?), they're
both in Kurdistan, and one at Rustamiyah. And we 've got them linked together with a
common curriculum, a common program of instruction, common course length, they
share instructors. And now they are each producing about 100 every nine months. Where
we want to get them is to each produce about 300 because our analysis of the life-cycle
needs of the anny is that they' ll need about 900 new lieut enants every year.
But that 's all in place. There' s a j oint staff college equivalent to our Command and
General StafT College in place. It wi ll graduate 50 juniorlevel they call it - that'd be
majors and lieutenant colonel s and then this year, this is the pilot year, 37 of the seniors,
which are essentially full colonels and civilians, by the way, and that course wi ll double
in size next year as well.
There's a war college - actually they are going to call it a national defense uni versi ty,
that will open in September. And by the way, that ' s not unique on the anny side. On the
police side we've recently converted Baghdad police college to the product ion of
officers, and they' ve got a nine-month course - I' m sorry, they' ve got a six-month, a one-
year course, and they've got a three-year course . And all those are up and running and if
you all come over here and want to visit them -- I think that this is what will essentially
create this enterprise that will endure over time.
Q: I am trying to get over there specifically just to bother you for a couple days so I can
come back and report all that. I really think the larger message needs to be made. It's not
just about producing battalions or producing soldiers and policemen, but it ' s also about
producing infrastructure, and I think that' s a story that the American peopl e need to hear.
Dempsey: Absolut ely right . And, just to highlight - or reinforce that point, it' s really
what we focus on now. I mean the generation of units is really (in train?) and requires
very little - and by the way, handed over in great measure. The platform instructors for
all of these institut es, academies, training centers, used to be exclusively Coaliti on and
now it' s 70 percent Iraqi. And by the end of this year, we will have transitioned most
instructor positions over to Iraqis and then we' ll be in a mentoring and advi sing role
there.
We' ve also sent 500 mid-grade officers out ofcountry as part of a NATO initiative to,
you know, to the Marshall Center. And we had a kid graduate from Sandhurst who
graduated with an award for the best foreign cadet. So, I mean, that' s the institution side
of it. It' s not sexy, but it' s the most important thing we' re doing.
Q: And a story that needs to be told.
Q: Hey, sir, Ken Allard. Actually I thiok we adopted the class at Rustami yah on our last
trip over there ourselves. And we sure remember them very fondly.
Dempsey: Yeah, that' s right, I do.
Q: The thing that I am gett ing a lot ofquestions about from our correspondents -- by the
way, they talk about the present level of violence is making it even tougher on them to
cover the story than it otherwise would have been.
One ofthe things that is interesting to me, based on my own experience in Bosnia, is
whether or not you are seei ng any signs of what amounts to a de facto ethnic cleansing?
Because what happened over there was not so much that you had the death squads
moving around, they were certainly present, probably in the same way that they are in
Iraq, but what was happening is that a lot of what was going on was simply people
getting out ofhann' s way. Are you seeing any signs that that is going on, and ifso, what
are the institutions you're building doing about that?
Dempsey: Yeah, one of the - well, a couple of ways to answer that, or a couple of aspects
to the answer. And that is most of the problems, this is no surprise, it 's a flash to the
obvious, you know, it' s where the fault lines exist. And the principal fault line exist s in
Baghdad, pure and simple. It's also the center of gravity politicall y and so forth.
So we haven't seen the kind of problems that you are talking about any place else than
Iraq with the exception of Baghdad. One of General Casey's CClR (commanders' cri tical
information requi rements) is displacement of civilians, for exactly the reason you talk
about. Are they being forced out, are they leaving?
By the way, the analysi s of that is very complicated right now because we are right in the
middl e of Arba'een. Ashura is, you know, their Good Friday essent ially, and then 40 days
later is the Arba' een holiday and they - and many of them troop south, many of the Shi ' a
pilgrims, I should be more specific - troop south. And that 's going on at precisely the
time we are trying to figure out, you know, what ' s truth and what' s fiction about the
movement of people.
There have been two - since the Samarra mosque incident - there' s been two reports of
fami lies on the move. One was I think - and again thi s is all on background, so please
don't use the exact number - one involved 200 fami lies and another one about the same
number moving from Baghdad south. And the first report was absol utely determined to
be pil grims. The second one we don ' t have the answer yet; it could very well be that there
were peopl e that had moved out of southeast Baghdad to the south, to get away from
what they perceived to be an unsecure situation.
As to what we' re doing about it, thi s is really an operationa l answer to that question, but
we are really focused like a laser beam on Baghdad, because again, for all the reasons I
mentioned . And General Casey as you know has brought up the - a piece of his
operational reserve to thi cken the ranks. It' s also been, by the way, apretty good test of
their abi lity to move and determi ne what timelines they would need to have to move.
We've brought three battalions of public order back from - they were forward deplo yed
elsewhere, we brought them back into Baghdad. The Iraqi army has moved another
couple battalions into Baghd ad.
So we' ve probabl y increased the force levels in Baghdad by about anywhere from 3,500
to 4,000. Increased a number of patrol s by between 150 and 200 a day. Kind ofthe issue
now is restoring public confidence, frankly, and that takes place by increased presence.
And so all that ' s happening. And we're moni toring the kind of things you j ust talked
about as part of our CCIR.
But to this poi nt, we haven't seen those kind of di splacements. What we have seen is kind
of a bit of a back and fort h, you know, there will be a Sunni atrocity and then there will
be a Shi'e atrocity and a Sunni atrocity. So the real trick here is to break the cycle, and
we are worki ng on that.
Q: Genera l, Bob Maginni s. Questi on regarding the defense ministry and the interior
ministry and whether or not you are seeing indications that they are maturing enough to
be able to oversee countrywide the types of functions that you j ust described.
Dempsey: Yeah, maturing -- the present parti cipl e applies. They are clearl y, they are
clearly maturing. And we monit or - just like the tactical units have a - we call it a
transitional readiness assessment. It' s a monthl y report card, if you will. We' ve got one
that we, that we - where we evaluate ourselves, because we are not advisors over there,
we' re partners with them. And so on a monthl y basi s we determine what progress we
have made or have failed to make on 18 key functions in any ministry, and it's everything
from personal management with, you know, subtext of pay and promotion and
retirement, all the way down to the inspector general function.
And we have - you know that I've got developmental responsibility for both ministries.
And I've got right now about 70 soldiers and civilians in each ministry, and that number
is going to go up a bit here in the next month because we have made some analysis of
additional needs. And we real ly want them to get off to a promising start in this first 100
days of the new government. We are really focused on having them achieve some
successes in the first 100 days or so in the new government. And so we're really, we've
got some programs we' ve worked out wi th them to give them a few early wins if you
want to call it that.
So, now there are some processes though where we have made enormous strides, pay for
example. Promotion we're close, very close. And some that are just going to take longer.
And the two that come inunediately to mind are procurement and contracting. You know,
they come from a command-directed economy where pretty much if you needed it you
asked for the money, if you got it, you spent it. There was no competitive biddi ng and no
competing in the free market economy against other sectors of the economy.
But they are very much in a free market economy now. The y have to make their case to a
council, and they' ve to do competitive bidding. This is their law, by the way, not ours -
their new law r should say. So that' s been a real eye opener for them, and that probably is
going to take, you know, a couple of years, I think, to mature.
Q: General , just one follow-up . The pay you mentioned, you know, what have you done
to fix that?
Dempsey: Great question. Well, first of all, we've identi fied the probl em. The problem
wasn' t pay; it was easy to lump it in to the category ofpay. The problem was really
personal accountability, frankl y. So, for example, if a commander up in Mosul didn 't
have proper accountability of his people and either numbers or in rankstructure and he
placed a demand on the system - and it 's still a manual system - and here came the
payroll (north?) and he got there and he didn't have enough money to pay, then it was
sort ofl umped in in precisely as a pay problem. Well , it wasn' t a pay probl em, it was a
personal accountability problem. So that' s where we put our effort.
And we've got a couple of initiatives in place to build for them what we might call a little
personnel admi nistration center in each battalion where as these soldiers go on leave, you
know, they're basically on a zl-day on, seven-day olTcycle, they process in and out each
time. And it' s beginning to give us a heck ora lot more clarit y on what's out there. And
as a result, I would venture to say - now thi s, our last month may have been an anomaly,
I hope not, but the last month we had fewe r than 1,000 pay problems in an army of, you
know, that's just now at about at 106,000. And those were corrected very quickly upon
identification.
The police is a little different. You know, they draw their pay and their support for local
police from the provinces and then the national police are supported from the center. So,
you know, we' re learning as we go with that, but we 've made some pretty significant
strides with that as well .
Q: General, this is l effMcCausland again. On the (inaudible) side, there' s been a lot of
focus frankl y on the actual ministers, a Mr. (inaudi ble - sounds like he might mean
Sayan Jaber, interior minister) the minister of interior is one that (inaudible - is talked
about?) an awful lot. I'll full y understand if you don't want to want to comment at all.
But I am curi ous about your thoughts at all , because obviously the guys at the top are
going to be key and essential on answering a lot of these questions, whether it's
infiltration, whether it 's pay, (inaudible) et cetera.
Dempsey: You know ministers - in general terms - I don't want to comment about them
personally because, you know, I mean, I have such a close relati onship to them it
wouldn't take too long to figure out where it came from.
But I will tell you in tell you in general terms, what this country needs in my view is
mini sters who -- you know, we tend to say we need a government of national unity, and
that' s a fact. No doubt about it. But you do need ministers in the key positions who have
a strong poli tical backing. In other words, they've got to have a consti tuency so that as
they are buffeted by other influencers they' ve got some political backing. I mean, this is a
democracy now.
(break in transcript)
Q: Sir, Ken Allard again. I was reall y impressed wit h some of the (inaudible - sounds
like BUDS) that we saw, particularly with the overlapping surveillance systems. Have
those things been any real assi stance to you guys in dealing with the problem of the civi l
violence? Have those systems helped you guys at all react ?
Dempsey: Yeah, I think so. Frankly, Pete Chiarelli would be better posi tioned to answer
that because he reall y has access to that all the time. But I do know that --
Q: WeUteUhim that [ said hi and also that -
Dempsey: I will .
Q: And ['U ask him those embarrassing questions myself.
Dempsey: Yeah, yeah. No problem. But I will say that he has reported that some of those
things have allowed - you know the who le issue in thi s part of the world, I am not j ust
talking about Baghdad or Iraq, but this part of the world is rumor generally trumps fact.
And what these overlapping systems have allowed us to do in many cases is confirm or
den y and tamp down things that otherwi se could rea lly spin out of control.
Lawrence: Any additional questions for the general ?
Q: Well, thanks for what you' ve done, buddy. This is Bob Scales. You know, you've
done a terrific job and all of us over here are really proud of you.
Dempsey: Well , thanks. That means a lot. And by the way though, it hasn't escaped me. I
know you're trying to get over here, but I notice you didn't try to get over here before St.
Patrick' s Day (laughter).
Q: Hel ' I am on a (six - inaudible) train tomorrow morni ng; I am going to O'Houlihan's
on 57 Street, and I'll drink a beer (inaudible) I am going to march in the parade, Marty
(laughter).
Dempsey: Are you really? That 's great.
Q: Take care, my friend.
Dempsey: Al l right, you all take care.
Q: Take care, sir.
Q: Thanks to you, general.
Q: Hey Dall as?
Lawrence: Yes, sir. Folks , just a qui ck reminder that was on background. Go ahead,
colonel.
(sidebar conversation continues).
End of transcript
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
General Pace, Si r :
I have the f ollowing i nformat ion regarding upcoming media i nt ervi ews on t he topic of
ret ired general s cal l ing f or Se cre t a ry Rumsfeld' s r esi gna tion. Al s o pasted below is the
text of the Pr e s i dent ' s s tatement of s upport f or SecDef.
Ve ry Respectfully ,
Ka tie
TONIGHT
Friday , 14 Apri l:
1700- 1800 GEN Franks on "Hardball" (MSNBC) 1800 - - Oen Mye r s on Fox News 2200 - - Gen
Jumper on "Anderson Coope r 360 " (CNN)
Al s o toni ght : Gen Mye r s ha s t aped an i nt e rvi ew wi th Ba r ba r a Starr , CNN ... she ha s bee n
doi ng segment s a t the top of t he news at 1700, 18 00 , 1900 , a nd 2000 -- a l though I am not
certain when his interview wi ll air.
Sunday, 16
0900 -1000:
April
Gen Mye r s on FOX NEWS SUNDAY with Chris walla ce
In ot her ne ws :
-- Expe c t i ng to see an OpEd by Lt Gen DeLong i n Saturday, 17 Apri l New Yor k Times - -Ge n
Jumper has interviewed with AP and LA Times -- should see something f r om t ha t s oon.
- - Lt Gen Mc I ne r ny (and another mi l i t a ry a nalys t) have written an OpEd p i ece t hat should
appear i n wa l l Street Journa l on Monday , 19 Apri l.
- -Oen Mye r s i s also writing an OpEd , and is expect ing to i nt e rvi ew wi t h AP, Newswee k , a nd
Kansas Ci ty Star -- no furt her detai ls on these yet.
Subj ect: STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
THE WHI TE HOUSE
Of fi c e of the Press Secretary
For I mmediate Release
1
Apr il 14, 2006
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Earlier today I s poke wi th Don Rums f e l d about ongoi ng military operations in the Gl obal
War on Terror. I rei terated my strong s uppor t for his leadership during this historic and
challenging time f or our Nation .
The Department of Defense has bee n tasked with many difficult missions . Upon assuming
of fice, I asked Don to transform the largest department i n our government . Tha t kind of
change is hard, but our Nation must have a mi l i t a r y t ha t i s fully prepared to confront the
da nge r ous threat s of t he 21st Century. Don and our military commanders have also been
t a sked to take t he f ight t o t he e nemy abroad on multiple fronts.
I have seen first - hand how Don relies upon our mi l i t a r y commanders in the field and at the
Pentagon t o make decisions about how best to complete t hese missions. secretary
Rumsfeld's ene r ge t i c a nd steady leadership is exactly what is needed a t t his critical
period . He ha s my full support and deepest appreciation .
GEORGE W. BUSH
# # #
Tracking:
Recipient

Giambastianl , EP, ADM, VCJCS
ooemo. Raymond T, LTG, JCS ACJCS
Sham, Walter L., LTG JCS DJS
...,
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Read: 41t4l2006 4:59 PM
Read: 4/1712006 12:35PM
Ruff, Eric Jb)(8)
I' '''
Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD)
Read: 4/1 4120065:36 PM
Read: 411412006 4:22PM
React: 411412006 3:46 PM
React: 4/1412006 3:54 PM
Read: 411412006 3:45PM
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Deleted: 4/17120065:14 PM
Whitman, Bryan ! g)(8) . [Whitman, Bryan, SES,
OASD-PAJ
2
Read: 4/1 912006 3:53 PM
Read: 4/14/20065:32PM
Recipient
Pace, Peter, Gen, JCS. CJCS
3
Read
Reac!: 4/1412006 3:45 PM
Read: 4/1412006 4:38 PM
Read: 4/1412006 3:47 PM
Read: 4/14120064:18 PM
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subj ect:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA

63:57 PM
MAJ, OCJCSI
LTC OCJCS/P . LCDR JCS ......
A CIV JCS SJS CIV, JCS OCJCS CIV JCS SJS
FW: INTERVIEWS IN SUPPORT OF SECDEF
Ma j,
JCS,
LTG, JCS ACJCSi Sha rp, Walter L.
Co l, JCS SJS ;
COL,
ADM EP
OCJ CS'
Might want t o c a pture t he s e transcript s for Monday ...
Than ks .
VIR
Col H
-----Original Messa ge- - -- -
Fr om: Haddo c k , El l en ( Kat i e ) , Col , OCJ CS/PA
Sent: Friday , r i l 14 2 006 : 4 PM
To: ' peter. pace
Cc: Giambas t ian
S,
CAPT J CS
Co l J CS SJS;
CAPT, S , Lt CoI,
MS t OCJCS PA, Ruff, Eri c Ruff Bri c, SES ,
CIV, OASD- PA}i COL, J CS J S '
LTC, OCJCS/ PAi 0;;;;;;' ..1CDR, OCJCS/ PAi
OCJ CS/PAi CI V, JCS SJS
Subject : I NTERVI EWS I N SUPPORT OF SECDEF
Genera l Pace , Si r :
I have t he f o l l o wi ng i nformation reg a r d i ng upc omi ng media i nt e rvi e ws on t he t opic of
r e t i r ed gene rals c a l ling f o r s ecretary Rumsfeld's r es i gnation . Also past ed belo w i s t he
text o f t he Presi d e nt ' s s tatement o f s upport for SecDef.
Very Re s pectfUlly,
Ka tie
TONI GHT
Fr i d a y , 14 April:
1700 -180 0 GEN Fr a n ks on "Ha r dba ll " (MSNBC) 1800 -- Gen Mye r s on Fox News 2200 -- Ge n
J umpe r o n "And e r s o n Cooper 360 " (CNN)
Al s o tonight : Ge n Mye r s has taped an interview wi th Barbara St a r r , CNN ... s he has bee n
d o i ng segme n t s at t he t op o f t he news a t 1700 , 18 00 , 19 00, a nd 2000 -- a lthough I am no t
certain when his i nt e rview wi ll a ir.
Sunday , 1 6
0 900 - 1000 :
April
Ge n Mye r s o n FOX NEWS SUNDAY with Chr i s wal lace
In o t her ne ws :
-- Expect ing to see an OpEd by Lt Ge n De Long in Satu r d ay, 17 Apri l Ne w York Times --Gen
Jumper ha s i nt erviewe d wi th AP a nd LA Ti mes -- should s e e somethi ng from t ha t 800n.
--Lt Gen McInerny (and anot her mili t ary a nalyst ) ha ve wri t ten an OpEd p iece t ha t s hould
a ppe ar i n Wall Stree t J our nal o n Mo nd a y , 19 April.
--Gen Myers i s al s o wri ting an Op Ed , a nd is expecting to intervi ew with AP, News week , a nd
Kansas Ci ty Star -- no fur the r d e tai l s o n t hese yet.
Subjec t: STATEMENT BY THE PRESI DENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
1
Office of the Pres s Secretary
For Immediate Re l e a se
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Apri l 14 , 2006
Earlier t oday I spoke with Don Rums fel d about ongoi ng mi lita ry ope rations in the Global
Wa r on Terror . I reite rated my strong suppor t for his l e ade r s hip dur ing this hi s t oric and
challenging time for our Nat ion.
The Departme nt of Def ens e ha s been t a sked with many di f f i cul t missions . upon a s s uming
offi ce , I asked Don t o trans f orm the l a r ge st department i n our gove r nment. That kind of
change is har d, but our Na t i on must have a mili tary that is full y prepared t o confront t he
dang erous threats of t he 2'l s t Century . Don and our mi l i t a r y commanders have alao been
tasked to take the f i ght to the enemy abroad on mul t i ple f ronts.
I have seen first-hand how Don r e l i e s upon our military commanders in the f i e l d and at t he
Pentagon t o make decisions about how best t o complete these mi s s i ons . Secret ary
Rums f eld' s energetic and s t eady leadership is exact ly what is needed at t his cri tical
period. He has my f ul l support and deepest appr e c i a t i on.
GEORGE W. BUSH
# # #
2
",-,
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Giambastianl, EP, ADM, VCJCS
Saturday, April 15, 2006 8:14 AM
Col , OCJCS/PA; Pace, Peter, Gen. JCS, CJCS
1:"" Col, JCS SJS CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA;O:
A, COL JCS OCJCS' CAPT JCS, OCJCS; Sharp Waller L. LTG JCS
DJS; COL, JCS J5; "" CDR, OCJCS/PA; CIV,
JCS SJS
RE; INTERVIEWS IN SUPPORT OF SECDEF
TKS Katie .
OCJ CS ' )(8)
From: Haddock, Ellen (Kat ie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, April 14 , 2006 3 :45 PM
To : Pace , Peter, Gen, JCS, CJCS
cc.Giambaati . CJCS;
LTG , JCS DJS i )(8) CAPT HI)
CAPT J CS OVCJCS/PAi J CS SJSi )(8) CS,
CAPT, JeS, . LtCol , OCJCS/PAi HI)
MSgt, OCJCS/PA: Ruff, Er ic ' c , SES, eSO] !
Turner James CI V, OASD-PA] COL, JCS J
"" OCJCS/PA; KI) CDR, OCJCS/PA; Maj,
OCJCS/PAi CIV, JCS SJS
Subject: INTERVIEWS IN SUPPORT OF SBCDEF
General Pace , Sir :
I have t he f ollowing i nfo rma tion regarding upcomi ng media i nt e rvi e ws on t he topic o f
retired generals calling f o r Secretary Rumsfe ld's resignat ion . Also pasted below i s the
t ext of the President's statement of suppor t for SecDef.
Very Respectfully,
Kat ie
TONIGHT
Friday, 14 Apr i l:
17 00-1800 GEN Franks on "Ha r dba ll " (MSNBC)
1800 -- Gen Myers on Fox News
2200 -- Gen J umper on "Ande r s on Cooper 360 " (CNN)
Also tonight: Gen Myers has taped a n i nterview with Barbara Starr , CNN . .. she ha s been
doing s egments at t he t op of t he news a t 1700, 1800, 1900, and 2000 -- al t hough I a m not
c ertain when his interview wi l l a ir .
Sunday, 16
090 0- 1000:
April
Gen Myers on FOX NEWS SUNDAY with Chris wallace
I n other news:
-- Expec t i ng to see a n OpEd by LtGen DeLong in Saturday, 17 Apri l New York Times
--Ge n Jumpe r has interviewed with AP and LA Times - - should see somethi ng f r om that s oon.
--Lt Gen McI nerny (a nd another mili t a ry analyst ) have writ ten an OpEd p iece t ha t should
appear i n Wall Street J ournal on Monday, 19 Apri l.
--Ge n Myers is a lso wr iting an OpEd, and i s expecting to i n terview with AP, Newsweek, and
Ka n s a s City Star - - no f urther deta i ls on the s e yet .
Subject: STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
1
----------------- - - - - - - - ----- - - - - -- - --
THE WHI TE HOUSE
Of fice of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
April 14 , 2 006
Earli er t oday I spoke with Don Rumsfe ld about ongoing mi l i t a ry ope r a t i ons in the Gl obal
War on Terror . I r eiterated my s t rong support for his leadership during this hi s toric and
chal l eng i ng t ime for our Nation .
The De partment o f Defense ha s been tasked wi t h many difficult mi ssions . upon assumi ng
o f f i c e. I a s ked Don to transform the largest depar tment i n our government . That kind of
change i s ha r d , but ou r Nati on mus t have a mi l ita ry t hat i s full y prepared to conf r ont the
dangerous threats o f the 21st Cen t ury. Don and our mil i t ary commanders have a lso been
tasked to take t he f i ght t o the enemy abr oad on mult iple f r ont s .
I have seen first -hand how Don r elies upon ou r mi litary c ommanders i n the f iel d and at the
Pe nt agon t o make decisions about how best t o complete t hese missions. Secr etary
Rumsfeld'9 energetic and steady l eade rship i s exactly what is needed at t hi s critical
pe riod. He ha s my full support and deepest appreciat ion .
GEORGE W. BUSH
# # #
2
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subj ect :
Attachments:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), cor, OCJCSJPA
o d 20067:11 PM
lOll COL. JCS. OCJCS
lOll CIV. JCS. OCJCS; LCDR. JCS. OCJCS
FW: Read Ahead Retired Military Analysts 04-18..(l6.doc
imageOO1.gif; oledata.mso
e SD PA is coordinat ing a RoundTable t omorrow wi th s e cDe f , CJCS , and 17 r etired mi litary
anal y sts . (Li s t of atte nde es is at t he bot tom o f thi s e mai l . ) The y wi l l be here from 13 40
t o 1600 , l oc a l.
I tinerary inc l udes:
1345 - 14 30, b r i ef i ng from I raq v i a c onfere nce c all (br i e f e r s till not ye t identif ied)
1445- 1515 with Gen Pa c e a nd
1515-1600 wi t h SecDef
I' l l provide Gen Pa ce a c opy of t hi s rea d-ahead i n the a . m.
Just wanted t o g i ve you a head 's up.
Vi R
Katie
liItal-l'easaa - - - - -
Fr om: CIV, OASD- PA]
Se nt: Monday , Apr i l 17 , 2006 5 :20 PM
To : Haddock. Elle n (Kat i e) , Col , OCJ CS/ PA; Barber , All ison
OASD- PA]
Cc: La wr e nc e , Da llas [Lawrence Dal l a s OASD- PA] '
CI V, OASD- PA];
Subject : Read Ahead Retired Military Analysts 04 - 18-06.doc
[Ba r be r , Al lison, CI V,
tCol , 0 5 0 ]
hi . p l eas e note a ddi tional analysts for t omor r ow' s r oundtabl e. we now have 17 .
r:il-
n
_
k
_
s
_
updat e d April 17, 2006
READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
OUTREACH MEETI NG WI TH RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS
Da te/Ti me : Tuesday. Apr i l 1 8 , 20 06
t o 4 :00 p .m.
3: 15 p .m.
Locat i on :
Backgr ound :
SecDef Di ni ng Room, L. 1
1
* Approximately sixtee n retired mi litary analysts who serve as mi l i t a ry/ defe ns e
experts for ma j or media ou tlets .


Ti me l i ne :
1:40 p .m.

1 : 45 p.m.

2 :30 p.m.
2 :45 p . m.

3 :15 p.m.
4:00 p.m.
La s t outreach meet ing with t his group was September 2005.
Comments should be cons idered on ba ckgr ound .
welcome and I nt r oduc tion
All i son Barber , Deput y Assistant Secretary of Defense f or Pub l ic Af fairs
Update on Iraqi Security Forces (via video t eleconfer e nc e )
Briefers TBD
Break
Upda t e on Global Operations
General Peter Pace, Cha irman of t he J oi nt Chiefs of Staff
Discuss ion and Quest ions wi th Secret ary of De fe nse Donald H. Rumsfeld
Meet i ng Conc l udes
At t a chme nt s:

Tab A
List of part icipants
Secretary Dona ld H. Rumsfe ld
Meeting with Retired Military Ana lysts
Room The Pent agon
L...-......
Tuesday, Apr i l 18, 2006
Part ici pants
CONFI RMED :
Mr. Jed Babbin
2
(USAF, JAG)
(USA, Re t ired)
(USAF, Ret ired )
(USMC, Ret ired )
Li e u t e na n t General Frank B. Campbe l l (USAF , Retired)
Dr. J ames J ay Carafano
Col onel (Tim) J . Ead s
General Ronald Fogelman
Co l one l J ohn Ga rrett
(LTC, USA, Ret ired)
(USA, Ret i red)
(USAF, Retire d )
(USN, Reti red)
(USA, Re tir e d )
(USA, Retired)
(USAF, Re tir e d)
(USN, CIA , Retired )
(USN, Retired)
(USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Re t ired)
Li e ute nant Colonel Robe r t L. Maginnis (USA, Re tire d )
Co l onel Jef f McCausland
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney
Ca p t a i n Chuck Nas h
Genera l Wil l iam L. Nash
Maj or Genera l Robert H. Scales , Jr.
Ma j or Ge ne ral Donal d W. She ppe r d
Mr. Wayne Si mmons
Ca p t ain Ma r t i n L. St r ong
General Tom Wilkers on
3
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Follow Up Flag:
Flag Stat us:
Attachments:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Cot, OCJCS/PA
~
~ e S ~ d ~ a ~ ; ~ , 2006 9:28 AM
CIV, JCS, OCJCS
... COL, JCS, OCJCS MS91. JCS. OCJCS
FW: Read Ahead Retired Military Analysts 04-18-06.doc
Follow up
Flagged
imageOO1.gif; oledata.mso
During prebrief wi th SecDef, he mentioned Gen Pace should have 45 minutes with these guys
too ... not sure i f t hat works, or if SecDef mentioned it t o Gen Pace t his a . m. , or what,
but wanted t o g i ve you a head's up.
- - -- - Or i inal Messa e -----
From: crv , OASD-PA]
Sent: Monday, April 17 , 2006 5 : 20 PM
To : Haddock, Ellen ( Kat i e) , Col , OCJCS/ PAi Barber, Al lison [Barber, Allison, crv,
OASD-PA]
Cc: Lawrence , Dallas
Clv, OASD- PA] ; Lt Col , OSD)
Subj e c t : Read Ahe a d Re tired Mil itary Analysts 04-1S-06.doc
h i . please note addi tional a nal ys ts f o r t omorr ow' s roundtab le. we now have 17 .
ks
Upd a ted April 17 , 2006
READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
OUTREACH MEETING WITH RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS
Dat e /Time : Tuesday, Ap ri l 18 , 2006
t o 4 : 00 p. m.
3 :15 p . m.
Loca tion :
Ba ckgr ound :
SecDef Dining Room,
1....----1

experts

App r oxi mate l y sixteen ret ired mili tary analysts who serve as mili t ary/defense
f o r major medi a out lets.
Las t outreach meeting with this group was September 2005 .
1
• Commente should be cons i dere d on background.
Ti me l i ne :
1 :40 p.m.

1:45 p .m .

2 :30 p . m.
2 :45 p .m .

3:15 p .m .
4:00 p . m.
welcome and Introduction
Al l ison Barber , Deputy Assistant Secretary of De fense f or Public Affairs
upda te on Iraqi Security Forces (vi a vi deo teleconference)
Briefers TBD
Br eak
Update on Globa l Ope r a t ions
General Peter Pace, Cha i rman of the J oint Chi e f s of St a f f
Di scussion and Questions with Se cretary of Defense Dona l d H. Rumsfeld
Meeti ng Concludes
Attachments :

Tab A
List of Part ici pants
Secretary Dona ld H. Rumsfe ld
Mee t i ng with Retired Mil itary Analysts
Room
L..-.....
The Pent agon
Tue s day , April 18, 2 006
pa r t i c i pa nt s
CONFIRMED :
Mr. Jed Babbi n
Lieutenant General Fra.nk B. Campbe ll (USAF, Ret ired)
Dr. James J ay Carafano
(USAF, J AG)
(LTC, USA, Retired)
Colonel (Ti m) J . Eads
2
(USA, Ret ired)
Genera l Ron a l d Foge lma n
Colonel J ohn Garrett
(USAF, Retired)
(USMC, Ret ire d )
(USA, Retired )
(USAF, Retired)
(USN, Re tired)
(USA, Retired)
(USA, Retired)
(USAF, Re t i r e d )
(USN, CIA, Re t ired)
(USN, Retired)
(USMC, Retired)
Comma nd Sergeant Ma j or Steven Gr e e r (USA, Ret i red )
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Ma g innis (USA, Ret ire d )
Colo nel Jeff McCausland
Lieutenant Gene r a l Thomas McI ne r ney
Ca p t a i n Chuck Nash
General William L. Nash
Maj or General Robert H. Sca l e s, Jr.
Major General Donald W. Sheppe rd
Mr . Wayne Simmons
Captain Ha r t i n L. St rong
General Tom Wilkerson
3
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Tuesda ril1 8 20065:16 PM
COL, JCS __..... ,
......... CDR, OCJCS/PA, Lt Col, JCS J3
RE: 191100 APR O/C with DJ3
Tha nks, __J
First off, I appr eciate you comi ng to t he rescue today, a nd helping us get BG Ham t o brief
the r e t i r ed milita ry a nalysts .. . he was very well rece ived.
The analysts spoke ve ry highly of him (t o the SecDef). Thank you for your part i n making
that happe n !
I' l l t here t omorrow at 1100 to discuss Ops Only pr e s s ava i l abil i ties, or anythi ng e l s e
t he general want s to talk about !
VI R
Kat ie
Lt Col , JCS J3
JCS NMCC
5 :00 PM
add
> -----Origi na l Messa e - - - - -
>From; COL,
>Sent: Tuesday, April 18 , 2006
>To: (Katie ), Col,
>Cc: CDR, OCJ CS/ PAi
>Subj e c t: 191 100 APR o/ c with
>
»xa ci e,
>Ca l l ed e a r lie r t oday ref possible OPS on ly press ava i lability oppor t uni t y f or t he OJ3 . I
spoke wi t h hi m l a s t ni ght and LtGen Conway would like t o s ee you f or 20 mins to get the
t he way ahead f or an ops only s essi ons. Themes, t al ki ng points , possible sticking points ,
agendas .... e tc. Also what are possible DTGs for an ops only session? This week? I am
runni ng out of white space t hi s week . Woul d be bes t to f ocus on next week. Give me a
hollar .
>
»v r
>
>
>
M C i
LCDR JCS
& CJ CS press
>
> « File : ' 060418 SD & CJCS press er . doc » Gene r al s, Admirals, Attached is the
transcript from t oday ' s press avai l abi lity wi t h SecDef and Gen Pace. I t is 13 pages - the
fi r st 11 of whi ch discuss the cr iticism of the Se cretary by retired general of ficers.
Gene ral Pace discusses (again) the pr ocess of how senior of fice r s and c i vilian l eadership
discuss de c i s i on making - page 8.
>
> At page 11 , t here is a question about Afghanistan a nd the conce r n about t he poppy
crops . Ot he r topi c s (not that there was much t i me for s uch) incl uded Kethni c c leansing - i n
Iraq, dealing with t he mil i tia s and the f orma t ion of the Iraqi government.
>

> Publ i c Affai rs Of fice
> Of fi ce of the Cha i rman of the Joint Chief s of Staff
> The Pe nt a on
>
1
:> niprne t :
:> s i p r net:
>
2
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
OCJCS/PA
Tuesday, April ' S, 2006 5:27 PM
Ham Carter F BG JCS NMCC
CAPT, JCs NMCC; LCDR JCS J3; Haddock, Ellen
(Katie), Col, OCJCSJPA L.. ......
FW: 191100 APR O/C with DJ3
Sir -
Echo Col H' s note - t ruly - t hey really appre ciated the perspective you prov ide d .
Thank you SOOO VERY MUCH for coming t o t he rescue today. Name your flavor !
OCJCS! PA
PM
> -- - --Or i g ina l Me s s age - - - - -
>Fr om: Haddock , El len (Kat i e) , Col,
»aent • a ' 1 18 , 200 6 5: 16
>To : COL, JCS
>Cc : CDR, OCJCS!PAi l Lt Col , J CS J3
>Subj e c t : RE: 191100 APR O!C wi th OJ3
>
>Tha nks , 1,;,;';"_ ..1
>Fi rst off , I appreci ate you c omi ng to t he rescue today, and helping us get BG Ham t o
b r ief the r e t i r ed mili t ary a nalys ts . .. he was very wel l r eceived .
>The a nalysts spoke very highly of him (t o t he SecDe f ). Thank you for your part in making
t ha t happen !
>1 '11 be there tomorrow a t 1100 t o di scuss Cps Only p ress avail abilities , or anythi ng else
the general wants to t a lk about !
>V!R
>Ka t i e
J CS NMCC
5:00 PM
OCJ CS PA
>
> --- - -orig na - --- -
>Fr om, ltlll COL,
>Se nt : Tues da y , Apr i l 18 , 200 6
>To : Had dock Elle n (Kati e) . Co l,
>Cc : CDR, OCJCS! PAi Lt Col , JCS J3
>Subj e c t : 19110 0 APR OIC wi th
>
»xa t I e ,
>Ca l l e d e arl ier today ref po ssible OPS only p r ess a vai labi li t y oppor t uni t y for the DJ 3 . I
s poke wi t h him last n i ght a nd LtGe n Conway wou ld like t o see you for 20 mi ns to ge t t he
the way a he ad for an ops on l y s essions . The me s, tal king poi nts , possibl e sticking points ,
agendas . .. . etc . Al s o wha t a re poss ible DTGs f o r an Cps only sess ion? This week? I a m
r unning out o f white s pace t h i s wee k. Wou ld be be st t o focus on nex t week. Give me a
hollar .
>
>Vr
Ant hony L,
C,
LCDR J CS J3 ;
CJCS press con f e r e nc e
JCs NMCC;
t r anscript of SecDef & >
>
>
> « File : 0604 18 SD & CJCS pr esser .doc » Generals , Admirals , At t a c he d is t he
transcript from t oday ' s press a vailabi l i t y wit h SecDef and Gen Pace . It i s 1 3 pages - t he
f irst 11 of which d i s c u s s the cri t icism of the Secretary by retired general o fficers.
General Pa c e d i s c u s s e s (a ga i n ) t he proc e s s o f how senior o f f i c e r s a nd civi lian leadership
1
di s cus s decision maki ng - page 8 .
>
> At page 11, there is a ques tion about Af ghanistan and the conc e r n about t he poppy
crops. Other t opi cs (not that there was much time f or such) included "e t hnic c leansing" in
Iraq, deal ing with t he mi l itias a nd the formati on of the Iraqi government .
>
> Vr
>
>
> CDR
> Publ i c
> Of f i ce of
> Th. Penta
>
> n ~ p r n e t :
> s iprnet :
>
of the Joint Chiefs of St a f f
2
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subj ect :
Attachments :
crv, OASD-PAI
Smith, Dorrance KI) (Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PAj ; Whitman, Bryan _t..-.....,:-...

n, SES, OASD·PA); Ruff, Eric (Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD); Thorp, Frank
[Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD·PAj ; Barber, Allison arber Allison CIV
OASD·PA · Maka, Brian Maka, Brian, LTC, OASD-PA);
CDR, OASD-PAI; AFI5-
Haddock, Ellen Katie Col
.. CIV,OASD-PAI;
transcript China report
05-22-06 China Rodman.doc
05·22-06 (]\ina
Rodman.doc(58 .,.
At t a ched is the transcri pt from this morning's conference cal l wi th Mr. Peter
Rodman and the military analysts regarding the 2006 China Mil i t a ry Report.
As you announced , t he call was on bac kground and the i nf ormation is emba r goed un til 1500
Tuesday.
1
Transcript:
Peter Rodman, Ass istant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Monda Ma 22 2006
Host OSD·Public Affairs
OSD-Public Affairs staff : LTC Brian Maka
Trancri ber: Mu hy (digital)
Room
Topic: 2006 China Mili tary Report
On Background
~ - : - _ ... ,We are going to go ahead and get started. , will just remind you quickly we are on
background so you are free to quote a senior DoD offi cial. All of the information that you get here
today we ask that you embargo until 1500 tomorrow. So with that I am going to go ahead and rum
it over to the assistant secretary of defense, Peter Rodman.
Mr. Rodman: Good morning. Good morning and thank you for comi ng in, or tuning in, or whatever
the phrase is. I think you are familiar with the origins of this report. I'll just say a brief word about
that and then secondly, what we think some of the highlights are. And I think we should try to get
- well we don 't post , I guess we won't post the full text .
LTC Maka: Sir, it will be an active link on it tomorrow morning, or tomorrow aftemoon.
Mr. Rodman: Okay. But anyway, you know, this is a congress ional mandate. We have done this
every year for a number of years. And the Congress asks us a number of questions about
China' s not onl y China's mili tary programs but its long-term strategy. So the report, as in past
years, has a lot of discussi on about the underlying factors in Chi na's mili tary policy and so it
ranges - you know, it isn't j ust nuts and bolts. It's about strategy, it' s about economic factors, a
little bit about polit ical context, and so forth.
The - I would mention before I get into this report a couple of important quotes in some other
reports. The president's Nati onal Securi ty Strateg y Report in March had a very important
sentence in it about hedging. You may remember that sentence. (")Our strategy seeks to
encourage Chi na to make the right strategic choices for its peopl e while we hedge against other
possibilities.(") Tha t's from the president's National Security Strategy Report , and that pretty well
encapsulates what our strategy toward China is. We try to put a constructive - we try to shape
developments in a constructive direction but obviously, particul arly in this department. our job is
to watch closely what China is doing, and to be the one to be prepared to do what's necessary to
carry out our commitments in the Asia-Pacifi c region . And part of that task is 10watch closely
what China is doing.
The QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) al so had an important discussion about China , and it
tal ked about China having the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S., and to field
disruptive mili tary technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages .
That's the QDR in February. You may have copies of that.
So that gets us into the subject here, which is what China is doing. That's - I can now get into
some of the specific highlights. A lot of what' s in the report is not new, because a lot of what we're
talking abou t has been a trend that we have spotted in previous report s. But some of the things
that we highlighted in this report are China's strategic forces modernization.
We've mentioned this before, it's not brand new; but it' s something that we are reall y commenting
on that I think we shoul d call your attention to. There are at least 10 varieties of ballistic missiles
deployed or in development - at least 10 variet ies of ballistic missiles either deployed or being
developed. We see qualitative improvements as well as quantitative improvements. So. you
know, the qualitati ve improvements include improved range, mobility and accuracy. You know,
ICBMs, for example, are the mosl advanced, they're solid fuel road mobile ICBMs that can reach
the United States.
Again , this is not new, but we're struck by the strength of these programs. Shorter range missiles
opposite of Taiwan - they have continued to build about 100 new ones a year, and so the total is
up, you know, close to 800. That again is not new, but it's just inexorably growing, that missile
force opposite Taiwan, about 100 a year.
We see very capable cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons. Again,
it's not new, but we are, you know, calling attention to some of these developments and these are
giving the Chinese new options . Five submarine programs, five different submarine acquisition
programs.
Now what does this mean strategically? Well, we see a number of things. We see, as we
ment ioned last year, a lot of these things are - they go beyond Taiwan in their significance. It's
obvious that much of China's military development is focused on a Taiwan contingency. But we
see both in their statements by some of their strategists and in some of thei r procurement that
China is beginning to develop - again, I emphasize beginning - to think in terms of it to develop
the capabil ity to project power. They're only at the beginning of it, but I think this seems to be part
of their long-range intention. And this could relate to contingencies - for example related to
resources or territorial disputes, of which there are many in the region.
So, again, this is worth noting. We have noted it before but it continues to be worth noting.
Another issue - well, another issue we' ve caned attention to before is about their use of nuclear
weapons. There seems to be a debate going on about the no first-use doctrine. The Chinese say
that they're commitled to a doctrine of no first-use weapons , but we' ve seen a few stray
comments by more than one strategi c thinker calling this in to question. Now, they have
reassured us, I repeat - when Secretary Rumsfeld was there, he was reassured by the Chinese
that they adhere to the no first-use doctrine, and we take them at their word. But they say there is
- we see these occasional comments as an indication of a possible debate that is going on
among Chinese strategists and we think it is worth of note that there may be this debate going on.
But the issue gets to another big issue about transparency, which is how we often state our
concern. China is a sovereign country, it has a right to build up its defense capabi lity as it
choose s, but the lack of transparency is dearly a concern for not onl y us, but China's neighbors.
This lack of transparency is reflected in a number of things; we talk in this report as in the past
about the defense budget. We think their defense budget understates their real defense spending
by a factor of two or three. In other words, their real defense programs are we think two or three
times what their declared defense budget is because of --probabl y because of different
accounting methods, probably because a lot of things n they just do not include a lot of their
research and development, a lot of their foreign purchases, they just don't include in their defense
budget. But in any case the lack of transparency adds to the concern of China's nei ghbors.
Another aspect of this is a surprise factor. We mention in this report, as in the past , that every
once in a while we encounter a new program of theirs Ihat we didn't know about. You know, a
new submarine or some program that, you know, has reached a mature stage that we just didn't
know about. And that's a concern, obviousl y. And that is a continuing concern, and that is
mentioned in this report.
Another problem is we worry about the dangers of miscalcul ation. 1mean it's - we don't want to
overestimate Chinese capability, we don't want to underestimate Chinese capability. And we
don't want them to make a misjUdgment, you know, to overestimate their capability. And so, you
know, one of our objectives of our military exchanges with China is to try to illuminate a little more
what they're up to, get them to disclose more of what they are thinking. They publish a white
paper every couple of years, which is a step forward, but it' s not anything like what we do. I
mean, we have our QDR for example, as well as, you know, every year, SecDef goes and
testifies. We are incredibly transparent about our assumptions, our planning , our strategies, you
know, as well as the procurement that supports those.
And Tai wan, by the way, came up with a recent with a recent statement that their national
security strategy whi ch - again, reflects the fact that it's a government accountable to a
legislature and - but the Chinese have -- are only at the beginning of , you know, disclosing what
their real thinking is, and that, as I say, is the problem.
We are concerned about the specifics of their build up, but as I said, the lack of transparency
gives a whole new dimension to the problem.
I would ment ion just a couple - well, a couple of other nuggets in the report. There's a famous
quotation from Deng Xiao Ping -- this is in previous reports -- it's called the 24-character strategy.
And it's a maxim of his that goes back about 15 years but- it has been often quoted by senior
Chinese strategists. And it's about - you may have seen it before, but I'll read it again. n Observe
calmly, secure our position, cope with affair s calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time. Be
good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadershlpf").
The phrase that strikes me of course is hide our capacities and bide our time. I think this
encapsulates what China's strategy is - they're very patient, they know their weaknesses. And
our report , by the way, is very clear about Chi na's weaknesses; we're not trying to portray them
as 10 feet tall .
But the Chinese are - seem to be aware of their limitations, but they are patiently and
systemati cally bUilding up their options so that five years from now, 10 years from now, they will
have significant options that they don't have now. And that the balance of forces may be shifting if
we are not careful to be, you know, to respond in our own planning.
So I think the Chinese have a strategy. They talk about comprehensive national power . You
know, there's a debate in the west - oh, are they focusing on economic development versus
military. Well, in a way they are doing all of the above. Clearl y their economic growth is the
foundation of everything else and their defense budget - their declared defense budget is rising
faster than thei r GOP. They recentl y announced 14.7 increase in their defense budget. And that's
a lot more than their economic growth rate, and that al so reflect s a recent trend. So they are
modernizing their military rapidl y, systematically. It certainly lacks - there are a lot of things they
can' t do. Their power projection capability is very, very limited right now. And again, we are very
aware of China's weaknesses and China's vulnerabilities. But they have a patient long-term
strategy and I think we have to recognize that.
Anyway, let me stop there, and I am happy to answer some questions.
Q: Mr. Rodman , Jed Babbin, American Spectator.
Mr. Rodman : Jed, how are you?
Q: Well, not bad for a grumpy ol d guy. Hope you're well. The issue that pops into my head is the
question of Taiwan's investment in their own defense. The last I heard the legislative yuan (juan?
Taiwanese legislature?) had turned down the appropriations for the 2001 arms package 50-some
odd times. Is there any change in that or any change or modifi cation or spending?
Rodman: Well, you're absol utel y right to raise that. We discuss that in this report, at least to some
degree it' s clear that if it doesn't get serious about national defense and the balance of forces it's
going to tilt even more radicall y. We had a - well, first of all the Chinese issued their - I mean the
Taiwanese issued their - the government issued its own national security report , which is a good
thing. And we hope that there's a serious national debate beginning in Taiwan.
The government has committed itself to a three percent - a three percent of GOP by 2008. In
other words , whatever happens to the special budget - you know, whether it's done by special
budget or just the regular defense budget , (Taiwanese) President Chen has said that they ought
to be spending three percent of GOP on defense. The mayor of Taiwan was in this country a few
weeks back and Mayor Ma, he's the mayor of Taipei. And we had a chance to talk to him about
this - you know the KMT (Kuomintang), the opposition party has to be serious about defense, I
mean, we just indicated, you know, without taking any sides in their politics that the United States
as a friend, you know, expects them to be carrying a significant load for their own self defense,
and he said he agrees with that, and he said it's, you know, at some point as his party or his
campaign, you know - as his campaign develops that he'll come out with his own defense
program. And we certainly emphasize what the American view is and as I say he may -- he gave
us some reassurance, and we just hope that will be reflected . You know they, you know, there
ought to be a national consensus in Taiwan about facing up to the threat that they face. And we'll
see, we'll see how it unfolds, but at least we delivered the message - we deliver the message to
both sides, you know, to both parties or both the major parties whenever we get a chance.
L.. .. Gentlemen, any other questions for Mr. Rodman?
Q ; Well , if nobody else is going to jump in, let me jump back in.
Mr. Rodman: Please.
Q; A couple of things that struck me in last year's report. Again, their dedication to asymmetric
weapons such as anti-satellite weapons, cyberwarfare and so forth.
Mr. Rodman ; Yes.
Q ; Is there any change in your assessment from last year or, and if so, what is it?
Mr. Rodman ; No - well, they're highlighted again, both of those things . So you're right, we don't
have a concrete development to point to except they're among the developments that we
highlight. They're still working on those things.
I mean a lot of things -I mean the report is - every year a lot of it is not new, a lot of it is
cumulative information, but as I say, there's a section that highlights what some of the new
developments are, at least the highlights that we think are worth pointing to, and those things -
cyberwarfare, anti-satellite, R&D, they're still in there.
Q; Don't mean to just dominate the whole conversation, but in terms of Adm. Fallon's (PACOM
commander) visit a week or so ago, he was, I think doing what you suggest needs to be done,
trying to leverage them into being a little bit more open. Is that having an effect, do you notice an
effect on the openness question?
Mr. Rodman ; Well we - it's incremental. When Secretary Rumsfeld was there in October, we
visited the 2
nd
artillery headquarters. And that was a bit of a breakthrough. And we had their
command brief and they didn't disclose a whole lot, but it was an interesting contact. And we
have now, we have invited - you know, that's their missile forces -- and we invited the
commander to visited STATCOM, to come to the U.S. as a guest of STRATCOM, and they have
accepted that invitation . When Hu Jlntao was here they let us know.
So that 's an interesting contact. We want to continue - develop a dialogue with them about
strategic contact and so forth; you know, the no first use issue, or any other issue. So that's
useful. You know, we' re always pressing to see new places, we're always making that point we're
- you know, we're trying to invite interesting Chinese here.
Another focus is j unior officers - educational exchanges. It' s something that President Bush is
particul arl y interested in. And we think we' re making some headway in some of these areas.
Secretary Rumsfeld talks about, you know, demystifyi ng each other . You know, we don't want to
exaggerat e this because, you know, there are some laws of geopolitics that aren't going to be
repealed here, but it certainly helps if more Chinese younger officers get some exposure to us
and vice versa. So we think we're making some headway in doing that since secretary
Rumsfeld' s trip there.
Q: Last quest ion for me then I'll shut up. There' s - one of the things that I think came up in a
previous conversation we had was your statement, or words to the effect, that one of the princi pal
lessons of Mr. Rumsfeld's visit was that we coul d have . I think you said, very candid discussions
with the Chinese and it wouldn't blunt the relationship. Is that still true? And who is having very
frank talks with these guys?
Mr. Rodman: Well , the president raised a lot of these issues when he saw Hu Jintao. I am goi ng
over there in early June for our defense consu ltati ve talks and we - these are high· level strateqic
discussions and we talk about everything. And, you know, I am not goi ng to be inhibited about
raising questions about things they do that are disturbing.
But I think you are absol utely right, when Secretary Rumsfeld was there in both his public
remarks and private remarks, you know, he listed things they are doing that are di sturbi ng, and
you know, not in a lecturing way but in a very calm way, and, you know, they are perfectl y able to
deba te. But I think that is the right tone for a discussion.
Q: Thank you very much.
I-__... Genttemen, any other questions for the secretary?
Mr. Rodman: Let me mention one other small thing. It' s not in the news right now. This is the EU
arms embargo and we discuss this and this report as before. The Europeans have backed away
from, you know, the attempt to lift their arms embargo. Now, they haven't killed this, but it hasn't-
has not been a live issue for them, and we hope it won't be. We have not changed our position
that we would strongly oppose it.
Simil iarly with Israel . We've had more successful discussions with the Irsraeli s to shut down their
arms trade with China. We think we' ve reached a good understanding with them. And then finall y
we've put this on the agenda of our discussions with the Russians, who are the - of course, the
biggest source of weapons.
But the importance of the European embargo is that the Chinese, we expect, would seek
technology, dual-use technology in Europe, things they could not they could not get from the
Russians. And we are conv inced that the Chinese would exploit any opening very effectively and,
you know, their technological development is their focus, and we woul d, you know, not want the
Europeans to be contr ibuting to that.
But anyway, the good news there is the Europeans have - yeah, it's software - I think what they
would get from the Europeans is not, you know, jet fighters but dual-use technologies of different
kinds that would help them qualitatively upgrade. But anyway, the good news is that the
Europeans have backed off. I mean, our president made a very strong - began a strong
campaign last year, and the Europeans seem to have backed away. But , anyway, we reiterate in
this report our strong feelings on that matter.
Anything else?
t!!!:= :::JOkay. Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us. We appreciate your time.
Q: Thank you very much.
, , : : : : ; : = ~ . I f you have follow-up questions, please don't hesitate to emai l me as always and we'll
get some documents out to you over email.
Q: l et's have another one of these when Mr. Rodman gets back from his June trip.
Mr. Rodman : Okay.
...__... Okay, great. All right gentlemen, have a good day.
Q: Good bye.
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Attached pl e ase find t he trans c r i pt f r om this afternoon 's mi l i tary anal ys t
cal lan Hadi tha .
Br iefe r s were BGen Sa ndkuhler and Col Dave Lapan ,
The cal l wa s ON BACKGROUND ,
1
~ - - - - - - -
Transcript
Conference call with military analysts
Thursday, June I, 2006
Subject: Haditha
Host: OSD-Public Affairs
Bri efers: Marine Brig. Gen. Kevin Sandkuhler, staffjudge advocate to the Commandant;
Marine Col. Dave Lapan, deputy director of Mari ne Corps Public Affairs
Transcriber: Murphy
ON BACKGROUND
Jones: Again, thanks for joining us this afternoon. This is obviously a hot topic and an
important one and we appreciate you taking time out.
I have with me Brigadier General Kevin Sandkuhler. He is the staffjudge advocate to the
commandant of the Marine Corps. And I also have Colonel Dave Lapan with me who is
Bri gadier General (Mary) Krusa-Dossin' s PAO. So he 'll be also able to speak to you on
the subject.
This call is on background, so as always, we ask that you only quote senior DoD officials
with the information that you receive on thi s call. So with that, I am going to go ahead
and hand it over to the general and the colonel , so they will make bri ef opening remarks
and then we're, you know, free to take questions.
Lapan: Gents, thank you again. Dave Lapan here. Again, I am the deputy director of
public affai rs for the Mari ne Corps. We do appreciate you taking the time. Hopefully we
can give you some informat ion that will be of use to you, as I am sure you are being
pressed - maybe not as much as we have - but certainly enough to comment on thi s
situation.
As you all recognize, we are in a pretty tenuous situation here, with an ongoing
investigation which constrains us from what we are able to say. We are certainl y helped
by those of you who have an underst anding of the system and aren't on acti ve dut y. You
have a litt le bit more freedom to talk about things, so we' re hoping that we can give you
information that' s useful in allowing you to do those things when you are asked to
comment.
I guess , just as a - I'll do a quick background on the situation just in case anybody isn't
completely up to speed. Incident s of 19 November 2005 in Haditha in western Iraq. At
the time it was Two Marine Expeditionary Force, which had command of that area of
operations in Anbar Province. The third battalion, 1st Marines, which is normally part of
the Fi rst Marine Di vision, was attached to 2 MEF for those operations. Three-one, I'll use
the shorthand - is back in the U.S. now, has redeployed to their home base at Camp
Pendleton . If there is from the investigati ons that are ongoing any type of follow-up legal
action it is likely to be handled at Camp Pendleton because aga in that 's where the unit
that is invol ved is based currently.
As you may all may know already, Ti me Magazine is the ones who kind ofbrought thi s
to the mil itary that started at first an initial inquiry by Multi -National Corps - Iraq. They
found enough there to convene a second AR15-6 investigation, which is headed by Major
General (Eldon) BargewelI , which is ongoing at this point. And Major General (Richard
C.) Zi lmer, who is the current commander of Multi-National Force - West convened a --
Naval Criminallnvestigative Service investi gation. So those are the two ongoing
investigati ons -- the AR15-6 and the NCIS investi gation.
I am sure you have been asked, as we have, about when those are going to wrap up. We
don't know. It is certainly not expected to be imminent, despite repo rts that you see.
Again, can 't put a time frame on it, and General Sandkuhler can probably talk more about
why it 's so difficult to kind of nail down how long investigations take and he' ll talk
process stuff.
So hopefully that brin gs you all up to speed. If I have repeated or sai d anything that you
are already aware of I apologize, but I just wanted to make sure we are start ing on a level
playing field. I'll let General Sandkuhler now talk about some of the legal issues
associated wi th where we are today.
Sandkuhler: Good afternoon, Kevin Sandkuhler here. I am the staffjudge advocate to the
commandant of the Marine Corps, the senior military lawyer to the Marine Corps.
One of the reasons we took thi s opportunity to talk with you gentlemen is to reiterate
some things which I thi nk you all probabl y know, but to make the points concerni ng what
it is we can and cannot say at this time as these investi gations are being completed.
First of all, with the pending investigation - the old statement that you don't know what
you don 't know. The investigators are out there gleaning facts eac h and every day, and
you don't know what they have uncovered each and every day, so whatever you say
could probabl y be wrong about the investi gation or the status of the investi gation, and
you don't want to int erfere with their processes.
But the other thing that really constrains us that I was asked to discuss is, you know, the
topic of unlawful command influence. Most of you are aware of it. Most of you -
especially General Scales and General Shepperd - have probably had SlAs tell you about
this in the past. But it becomes critical now for us to make sure that we do not do
anything or say anything that will prejudice our abil ity to brin g whatever charges or
whatever wrongdoing is uncovered in the investigations to the proper level or the proper
forum for accountability.
We have to - and that puts us in the bad position, if you will, with the media of not being
able to tell them all that they want to know or confirm items that they find from other
sources that they wanted to talk about that perhaps in other settings local distri ct attorneys
would be more than happy to talk about -- but their system doesn't have the same
features that OUTS does.
So I wanted to stress the topic of unlawful command influence and why there is
frustration - there is frustration on our part as to what we can and cannot talk about.
So 1will leave it at that and let ' s see if you gentlemen have questions and items that we
could address for you.
Q: Yeah, this is Bob Scales real quick. I - this is a little short-fused but I am supposed to
- I have written an essay, if you will, on the subj ect, which I am supposed to talk about
and record thi s afternoon. I wonder if I might just send it to you just for a truth check, if
that's okay.
Lapan: Yes, sir. Dave Lapan here. My email address - and all of you feel free to email
me if you need to - is David dot Lapan. That's I, a, p as in papa, a, n as in November, at
USMC dot mil.
Q: Well thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Q: Don Shepperd. Process question here . The AR15-6 and the naval criminal
investigation are two separate investigations. What happens to the AR15-6 report if it
goes to -- when the facts are found, who does it go to? And who decides whether or not to
prefer charges? And is that - is that decision to prefer charges or not independent of the
NCIS? In other words, if they decided not to, could NCIS also go ahead and prefer
charges?
Sandkuhl er: Kevin Sandkuhler here. NelS does not prefer charges. A convening
authori ty would have to prefer charges. The AR1 5-6 is an administrative investigation
that is looking the two topics that you have heard about before - the training and the
reporting (report?). Those are the two items they are looking at. That is an administrative
investigation, and they will produce their findings and that is going to General Chiarelli
in Iraq and Casey-- General Casey had him do that. And 1think the flow will be Chiarelli
to Casey to us - to the Marine component, and perhaps, back through Abi zaid as well. Up
and down the chain of command.
NCIS investigation was convened by General Zilmer, the Multi-National Force-West
commander, but he is in the operational chain of command as well. We expect that
investigation to flow up the same chain ofcommand. We expect those cases, those
findings, to come back to the Marine Corps, to the Marine Component at least , which is
Marine Forces Central Command, for us to take action.
That's how the processing of those investigations should follow. There will be - there
could be the preferal (sp) ofcharges by the Marine COI]>S based upon the 15-6, but if they
find some other criminal conduct we could go back to NClS and say investigate further
on another avenue of inquiry.
Q: So Marine Corps Central Command will be the one to decide after it goes through the
chain of command and the recommendations decide whether to prefer charges is what I
hear you saying?
Sandkuhler: I think that's what the process worked out by the commanders has been. It ' s
an operational chain of command issue and that's how I believe it's going to work out.
Q: What's the name that goes with that?
Sandkuhler: Sattler. You all know John (LtGen John Sattler), right?
Q: Yes. Absolutely.
Sandkuhler: I think John is the one on this situation who has been tagged, with the
concurrence of General Abizaid and others, that that' s how it's going to work.
Q: This is Jeff McCausland. I understand that - if I have got this - that the 15-6 with the
traini ng and (inaudible) reporting. Can you comment at all on - apparently there have
been reports that the battalion commander was relieved. Can you comment on that? And
can you also comment as far as the Navy criminal investigation just in terms of how
many Marines are at least subject to the investigation, or does that go too far?
Sandkuhler: Well, on the commander of the battalion - 3
rd
battalion, 1
st
Marines, was
relieved by the commanding general of 1st Marine Division. And it was done for the
traditional stated reason of loss of confidence. I cannot tell you, and the commander does
not have to explain to us, if there was somethi ng more - (were they involved?) the event
that's the subject of all the media attention now, or whether there are other actions? You
know, there could have been failures of inspections. There could have been a higher
disci plinary rate than other commands. I don't know other than the commander ofthe 1st
Marine Division lost confidence in the ability of that lieutenant colonel to command that
battalion. And I think that's what we have reported before.
Now the second question about -
Q: How many Marines, at least in raw numbers, are the subject of the Navy criminal
investigation?
Sandkuhler: Now, I don't - I don' t think I know an exact number so I hesitate to give you
a number.
Q: Okay.
Sandkuhler: They are talking to a number ofpeople. They have been interviewing any
number of individuals, and some of those individuals they may interview you for one
purpose, but then find out that perhaps there is some other reason they had to talk with
them further, or they might have done something else wrong that may have nothing to do
with this. So I would be very hesitant to throw out a number, because I am pretty
confident I would be wrong.
Lapan: And j ust to jump on again, on the first part of the question, the battali on
commander of3-1 was relieved, as were two of the company commanders within that
organization as well. And as the general said, the relief was done by the commanding
general of the 1
st
Marine Division because the unit was back at Camp Pendleton at that
time and so 3-1 feU under the 1
51
Marine Division because they were back in the States,
and they weren' t forward when these reliefs took place.
Sandkuhler: And to reinforce that, the general did that, General Natonski and that ' s been
reported before, he could have figured out stuff or seen stuff upon their return from Iraq
that was enough for him to decide to relieve him, and I have - you know, I would not tell
you and I do not know his mental calculati ons he went through before he did that.
It could have been any number of events that led him to that conclusion, and I don't think
it is centered on this investigation because this investigation - or the investigations
relating to (Haditha?) have not been completed yet.
Q:Ok.
Q: Gents, Jed Babbin, Two questions. Number one, can you tell us ifIGl (sp) was
brought back early because of the suspicion of these events and number two, can you also
tell us going back to the command influence point, how strongly you guys have been
counseling both the military and civilian leadership to basicall y clam up so we don't
screw up the prosecution?
Lapan: Dave Lapan here. On the first part, no, 3-1 rotated back on their normal schedule;
they were not brought back early. An aside to that, the other incident that has been
recently discussed involves 3«1 battalion, 5
th
Marines. That unit still is in country, and
members ofthat unit have been returned to the United States pending the investigation
into those allegations.
So in the case of 3-1, the Haditha incident, they were not brought back to the States early.
But 3«1 battalion, 5
th
Marine, separate incident - Hamandiyah - that just happened more
recently, some of those individual s have been returned to the States early pending the
investigation.
Sandkuhler: On the unlawful command influence issue, what we have done is you have
probably all seen the press release done by the commandant. That includes - you know,
that was carefull y crafted by us, if you read those words, and I know General (inaudible,
sounds like reid?) has read those words carefully, to take it above, and keep it above any
claim where we are trying to influence the course of the investigation, or influence the
discretion that subordinate commanders will have to exercise in the course of any
investigation, any court martial that mayor may not result, or any administrative action.
As you all know, there are a variety ofpeople who will now have roles to play, from
members of court marti als, judges, lawyers who make decisions as to what the charges
should or should not be, and the convening authorit ies.
We could have peopl e who get charged for some not obvious offense by some other
subordinate commander that we can ' t predict today. So we are trying to put out the word
to the Marine Corps, through the commandant's words, and other things Jdo through the
SJA channe ls, to make sure everybody keeps it at the right level so we retain our abili ty
to use the mil itary j ustice system for the purpose for which it was intended - to provide
good order and discipline for the force, and to hold people accountable when necessary.
So that ' s what we 're working on, Jed.
Q: That's great. Hey, appreciate that. One quick follow up. Have the Iraqi s squawked at
all about bringing any of these guys back, early or late?
Sandkuhler: This is Kevin Sandkuhler. I have no idea. I haven't heard.
Q: On that, two quick follow-ups. those who have not - at least I haven' t seen
this press release by the commandant could you possibly have that sent out to us?
That' d be great.
L.._.. Yeah, absolutely.
Lapan: I can get it to you. And I will also - well, I will get it to Tara and let her pass it to
you. The other thi ng, too, is those of you who read Tom Ricks' s story this morning
probabl y saw reference to some other guidance we put out on this very subject, again, to
make sure that anybody who - anybody out there who was being approached on the issue
of Haditha knew where the out-or-bounds lines were and why. I can get you some of that
guidance, as well .
Q: That' d be great. (inaudible) couple ofTV spots. Second question is, what Jed j ust said.
The Iraqis have announced that they are going to do their own investigation, and maybe
it' s too soon to comment on that. But will there be any coordinat ion between what we ' re
doing, NCIS in particular, wi th the Iraqi s, or do you guys see that as being totally out of
bounds?
Lapan: Don't know at this point. We have not heard anything along those lines.
Obviously we have seen the comments coming out of the Iraqi government, but it hasn 't
translated into any action at our point at this juncture.
Q: Thi s is Bob Maginni s. Question on press release that came out earlier today, I think
out of Iraq, out of the Corps. Is this being typified as a trainin g stand down? Or, I saw the
commandant 's message a couple days ago. What exactly is he doing in country? What
are the messages he' s sending? Can you go over that agai n, j ust for clarifi cation?
Lapan: Sure. Two separate things, obviously. The commandant had a trip previously
scheduled in which he was going to be visi ting Iraq. It was not a trip that was put together
for this purpose, but since he was goi ng, he wanted to talk to his Marines.
The things that he talked to the Marines about were the importance of our core (Corps?)
values - honor, courage and commitment, talking about doing the right thing. Also,
making the point that the vast majority ofMarines are doing the right thing - day in, day
out, under very chalJenging circ umstances both in combat and out of combat.
Wanted to get the message to them that eve n though there has been a lot of attention paid
to this incident and these allegations that he believes that most Marines - that this is an
aberration, that most Marines are doing the right thing. He wanted to reinforce that. But
he also wanted to talk about the importance ofdoing the right thing, of having moral
courage, of adhering to our core (Corps?) values again. Those are some ofthe things that
he wanted to talk about. It was not intended to be a training in the way that this MNC-J
announcement came out, done separately by General Chiarelli for whatever reasons.
J don't have any indications here that there would be any ki nd of training stand down.
Obviously those guys across the batt lefield are busy, and they can't afford to have
everybody stop what they are doing but I think - and again I am talking a little bit out of
school because it' s an MNC-I issue, but I don't get the sense it's a stand down as much as
making sure that commanders are reinforcing those training aspects on some type of
schedule.
Q: As a folJow up, perhaps or someone in OSD can clarify whether the Corps has
put out something that is in fact - I am hearing through other people is being interpreted
as a training stand down, and that ' s why I wanted some clarification.
A follow up question about this particular battalion, 3-1. Wasn' t this their third tour, and
were the people we are talking about that are being investigated, were they on their third
tour wit h this battalion?
Lapan: The batt alion itself, it was their thi rd time back, but remember, the people in the
battalion change out all the time, so it's not as if the enti rety ofthe battalion was there for
the third time, you would have variations throughout the ranks. In fact, I am sure they had
people that were on their first tour at this time.
The second part of the question was - oh, whether the individuals that were involved -
don't know to that level of detail in terms of if it was this person ' s first time or third time.
Again, as General Sandkuhler said, it's a pretty wide net. It'd be tough to decide who it
was that is considered, you know, part ofthe investigation.
Q: Thank you.
Q: Don Sheppard. I got hit with a question on radio the other day about - it had been
reported that $2,500 payments were made by the Marine Corps to some of the fami lies
involved, and it was not the normal pol icy to pay reparations in the field.
I am not sure this is your area, but do you know anything about that?
Sandkuhler: Well J think, one thing is that we call it salatia payments and they' re done a
lot in Iraq. They are done in other parts of the wor ld, as well. And what they are is - and
they range from things like when we have automobile accidents, when we damage
property through either operational damage or through other damage; you know, our big
trucks run into buildings on a regular basis, or run into Iraqi cars, and we offer them
compensation for the damage that they suffered. And in this case, there was some salatia
payments done to the famili es - or paid to the families, and I would not classify it as
being unusual.
Lapan: The other important aspect is that salatia payments are not an admissio n of guilt,
either. Again, they are a way to recompense individuals, fami lies, whatever, for damages
ofone type or another. Again J know - in fact, to take it to the lowest level, when J was in
Haiti two and a half years ago, we were paying people for breaking locks off their doors
when we doing searches. I mean, it goes from the very small level to the very large level.
Q: This is Jeff McCausland again. Can you guys comment at all about this one young
Marine, I think he is still on active duty out in California, apparently he has released a
bunch of photographs. His mother has been on TV. He claims he was part of the quote
unquote clean-up crew, but also has gone on to make allegations about the fact that - or
his mother has at least - that the Marine Corps has not addressed this kid' s PTSD and all
the probl ems associated with this Haditha thing. Have you got any comment on that as
well?
Lapan : The Marine in que stion did do an interview with the Los Angel es Times. He has
since stopped doing interviews, from what I understand, of his own volition - nobody
told him - again, as far as I understand nobody told him not to. But his mother is carrying
the case. She has done a number of interviews. Again, her focus has been more on the
PTSD issue and she has talked somewhat about what her son told her he saw and
experienced.
Sandkuhler: He' s also been accused of a variety of crimes in the local community there,
which is report ed in that article from the LA Times. I don't think we've seen anything
official or unoffici al about his claims of PTSD and whether he' s being treated and stu.ff in
(and?) that. We have not explored that yet.
Q: Bob Maginnis again. The LA Times today, a town awoke to slaughter. Very detailed.
Were these two reporters on the ground, or are they basing what they are saying in here
on second and terti ary sources?
Lapan: Well the - and I am just going offrnemory from reading the story this morning
because I think that it mentioned that they wouldn't reveal the name ofthe reporter for
security reasons, one who may have gone into Haditha to conduct the interviews, but also
believe that they conducted interviews with individuals, so various levels ofsourcing in
terms ofpeople who may have seen what happened, may have been involved, or may
have heard from others - so it could have been second- or third-hand infonnation. I
didn 't get the indi cation that the reporters were there when any of this happened, but then
went back afterwards to talk to the townspeopl e. Does that - does that help at all?
Q: Yeah, it is littered with quot es that are very incendiary, so I am j ust curi ous as to the
sourcing, so if that' s what you have, that' s what you have.
Q: Jed Babbin again, guys. In terms of the Congress, we' re hearing that Senator Warner
might want to have hearings or something, I mean, what requirements or what requests
are these helpful folks levying on you these days?
Sandkuhler: Kevin SandkuWer. We have - I am not aware of having recei ved any official
request for information or documents or peopl e to testify, et cetera, yet. They have all
said that, you know, we are going to have hearings on this some time. We have not
gotten, as you characterize it, the helpful requests so that they can help clari fy the issues
for us.
It does raise Jed, as you know, a significant number of legal issues. Are they going to
subpoena witnesses? Are these witnesses going to be peop le that will have to get some
level of immunization to testify at the Congress? How does it impact cases in the future if
there are cases? Evidence, other information. It does not make life simpler.
Q: It ' s preci sely the kind of help you really don' t need.
Sandkuhler: From the legal standpoint, I would love for everybody to keep their mouths
shut so we can get the investigations done so people will keep talking to us, so we can get
all the evidence gathered without having any taints and peop le running and hiding with
information when they find out, you know, their name is going to be plastered all over the
media, and get that all conc luded so we could proceed in an orderly fashion without the
helpful people from other sources.
So the Congress - that will be problematic, as you can imagine. And just go back to the
prior history - you know, the last, I don 't - go back 30 years, 25 years, 20 years - think
of all the problems when they wanted to have Ollie North before the criminal
investi gation was done, and how that impacted the ability to prosecut e and defend, et
cetera.
Q: Thanks.
Lapan: One other note on the congressi onal piece, too. As I am sure you are aware, the
commandant did go over to the Hill , again not on specific request, but in order to keep
the leadership apprised of what was going on in these cases and his legislative director
followed him and did some bri efing as well.
Q: The nature of the enemy that was bei ng fought on November the 19
th
in Haditha, were
they characterized in the immediate after action as j ust Sunni insurgents, or were there
evidence of foreign j ihadists that were embedded and perhaps were even using children,
women as shields?
Lapan: Don' ( know the answer to that one. That may be something that comes out in the
course of the investigation, but I do not know. I was there at the time in terms of - in Iraq
- we felt, in our intelligence, you know, verified that the foreign fighter influence-
influence, I should - the numbers of foreign fighters in western Iraq was pretty small.
Obviously they had a big influence. But most of the guys we were fighting in western
Iraq were local Sunni insurgents.
Q: Okay.
L.._.IAll right gentlemen, any other questions?
Q: Yeah, I just sent that emai l to you David. Could you just read that over and make sure
it's okay?
Lapan: Will do, sir.
Q: are you going to follow up with the Corps to find out if they sent out something
on a training stand down, because I am confused by what is on the web page.
L.._J Yeah, no, we' ll get that to you.
Sandkuhler(?) : I don't think they have used the term stand down. I am looking at the
press release, and they just talked about a training, commander direct training.
Q: They even said one report I got (inaudibl e - that it?) would be conducted over the next
30 days.
Voice (?): Right , that' s what it says in here.
Q: anything you can get on that, I' ve got to go on two TV programs here, that
would be great, as well as that press release by the commandant of the Mari ne Corps.
........1 Sure.
Lapan: And, Dave Lapan again. Just one last point I' d like to make, and I think General
Sandkuhler will probably jump on. As you can imagine, we have received a lot of
requests from media to get the commandant out there to talk, to do interviews, to have
media tag along as he goes and talks to Marines. Obviously, lots ofconcerns with that on
a number of leve ls, not the least of which is, agai n, perceptions of unlawful command
infl uence. So we are getting a lot of pressur e, but the commandant's talks to his Marines
are intended to be that, for him to talk to his Mari nes.
Again, we do not want to put the commandant in a position based on, you know, the
media' s desire to get him to talk that' s going to pollute the system. So, while be is
obvious ly concerned. he has serious concerns with these allegations, he is not in a
position to address them whi le there are ongoing investigations. Sir?
Sandkuhler : I would j ust reinforce, you know, the statement that he has made on Marine
virtue is the kind of statement that you would expect the senior Marine, our leader, to talk
abo ut with Mari nes when there' s investigations pending, to talk about bow we expect
each of us to behave, and at what level to behave, and how we can comport ourselves to
comply with our honor, courage and commitment. And that' s the kind ofthings he needs
to go out and reinforce.
Talking to specifics to all of the Marines in the Marine Corps doesn't do any good. That' s
not what he needs to reinforce. He needs to reinforce the basi c virtue. So that' s what he is
goi ng when he goes out; he is talking to his Marines about how we expect Marines to
behave, whetber it is on liberty, on duty, on the battl efield or off the battlefield.
Q: Could you say again the exact title of AR15-6 investigation, what do you call it in the
Mari ne Corps?
Sandkuhler: Well, in the Marine Corps terms we' d call it like a JAG manual
investigation. And that the 15-6 agai n is - the Army guys can tell you thi s - is AR15-6
that refers to the regulation that guides it. It' s an administrat ive investigation that
commanders can use for a variety of reasons - to find out why their supply system is
losing gear, to find out why people are getting in trouble in town - they can use it for any
number of reasons. In this case it 's to look at why the reporting was not acc urate, and
also was the level of training ofthe Marines involved prior to the event sufficient? And
those are characterized as administrative investigations. And then if they find the criminal
investi gat ion - criminal matt ers that they think exi sts, then they can tum it over to NCl S,
or the commander can take some admi nistrat ive and disciplinary action based up on that
investigat ion.
Q: Thi s is Jeff McCausland again. Sadly, I don't think this is going to go away any time
soon -- I sure hope to God it does -- but it mi ght be useful Dave, and General
Sandkuhler, if you can have send us some contact info in addition to Dave' s email
address and you all ' s offices in case we need to make a quick check on the legal side or
on the public affairs side as thi s thing goes on for however long it goes on.
I am happy to do that. All right gentlemen, thanks again for j oining us, and I
will send - and I will besending out stuff this afternoon. Keep us posted for media that
you do on this.
Q: Yeah, I'll be on O' Reilly toni ght Tara.
Q: CNN inthemorning.
L..-..I
.......... Okay, great.
Q: Thanks very much guys.
1-_'"Let us know i f we can do anything els e for you.
Q: Bye.
From:
Sent:
To:
Subj ect :
Lapan Col David .....
Friday, June 02. 2006 7:11 AM
Haddock. Ellen (Katie), cor. OCJCS/PA
Re: Hope you're not working today
Thanks Kat i e . As it turned Qu t, a pre -pl a nned backg r ounder f or s ome mi l a nal ysts happened
yester day af t e r noon . J ed Babbin wa s one of t he participant s .
v r
Co l Da ve Lapan. USMC
Deputy Direc t or of Mari ne Corps Publ i c Affairs
Se nt f r om my BlackBerry Wi r eles s Handhe ld
-----Original Message - - - - -
From: Haddoc k , El l e n Kat ie) , Col , OCJ CS! PA
To: JedBabbin
CC : CDR, OCJCS/PA;
OCJCS PA -
Sent: Fr i J un 02 05: 23: 52 20 06
Subject: Re: Hope you ' r e not worki ng toda y
LtCol . OCJCS/ PA;
.....__.......
LTC,
J ed,
Can't be certain you wi l l r e ceive t hi s i n time, s i nce we a r e airborne , a nd wi l l be f or the
next 16 p l us hours. Re commend you t al k t o Col Dav e Lapan in USMC PAO o f f i ce . I know the y
are not i nt e r e s t ed i n t a l k ing a bout the case -- bu t f o r t he very s ame reason you are
hopi ng to h ighl i ght .
The number t o USMC PAO i s
Hope t hat is us ef ul . .. L- -'
Ta ke care ,
Kat i e
- ----Or i g i na l M -----
From: J edBabbin
To: Haddock, El len (Kat ie) , Col, OCJCS!PA
Se nt : Wed May 31 07 :10 :56 2 00 6
Subj e c t: Re: Hop e you 're not wor king t oday
Katie : I got wha t I needed from anot her sour ce . No worri e s . And would very much l ike t o
t a l k t o you or one o f the bos ses on background before 1700 t oday. Any cha nce ? I'm doi ng a
column a bout why we need t o l e t t he mi li tary j u s t ice syst em run i ts course a nd not l e t the
med i a spi n this i nto a nother My Lai . Best , J ed.
ab .
(home o f fi c e )
(home f ax)
(mobil e )
1
From:
Sent :
To:
Subj ect:
Attachment s:
07-19-06 Barbero
L.ebanon.doc(m
Thorp, Frank , [Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PAJ
u[sda u!'l.20 0067:3" AU ., ...... ,
(USAF); l<'Ol -,! DoD\-r · · ' I CAPT OVC
Washingtoo DC-l':' CAPT CHINFO
: CAPT CHINFOj ; l<'Ol I CDR. OCJCSIPA; Haddock.
en a Ie , , OCJCSlPA
FW: Transcript - BG Barbero Lebanon military analysts
07-19-06 Barbero Lebanoo.doc
Wanted t o make sure you s aw t hi s
Frank Tho rp
Rear Admiral , U.S. Navy
Deputy Ass istant Secretary of Defense
Joint Communication)
a ---- -
From; OSD PA
Sen July 19, 2006 6;17 PM
To ; CI V, OASC-PA
Cc; Smith, Dorra nce HON OSC PA; Whi t man , Brya n SES OSC PAj Ru f f , Er i c ,
Fr ank RDML OSC PAj Barbe r , Allison SES OSD PAj Col OSD PA;
CI V, OASD- PA; Ba l l e s teros Mark J LTC, OASD-PAj Ca enter, J os e ph LCDR
OSC PAj CIV, OASD- PA; OSD
CDR, OCJCS/ PA
Subjec t ; Trans c r ipt - BG Ba r bero Le ba non mi litary a na l y s ts
At t ached i s t he t r a ns c r i pt f rom the 163 0 phone cal l wi th BG Mi ke Ba r be r o and the mi l i tary
a nal y s ts on Le ba non .
The call wa s on background.
1
MilitaryAnalyst Call
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
Briefer: U.S. Anny Bri g. Gen. Michael Barbero, DeputyDirectorfor Regional Operations, Joint
Chiefsof Staff, J-3
Topic: E . nof U.S. citizens fromLebanon
Location The Pentagon
ON BACKGROUND - quote as senior DoD official
Host: OSDPA
Transcriber. Murphy
I-....I(introductlonof thegeneral). Again thiscall isonbackground, so youmayquoteasenior
DoDofficial. Sowith that, General Barbero.
Barbero: This isMike Barbero, and I know afew of you, so thoseof you who know me please don't
hold that against me.
Let me just tell you where we are as far as contracted shipping. Navy ships are going to be inthe
area; I can discussthe command andcontrol arrangementsandthen some of the messages that-
I just camefroma pressconference at theState Department totry toshoot back at thiswhy are we
so slow, the delay, et cetera.
Let metalkabout contract shipping. Acontracted ship, the Orient Queen- I think you sawit onthe
news, departed Beirut approximatelynine o'cl ock eastem daylight timethis moming. Inour count,
over 1,000 Americancitizens.
Wethink it will take 24hours for that ship to makea round trip - download inCyprus, back- to
arri ve back dockside in Beirut. Andthisis the maidenvoyage, so we'll seehow that works.
Hopefull ywe can make onetrip every24 hoursof athousand passengers.
We have- Transportation Command has been aclive since thestart, and theyarethe ones doing
the chartering insupport of StateDepartment, andtheyhavechartered two other commercial ships
- the motor ferry Rahmah- spelled R-A-H-M-A-H, aPanamanian flag ship, capacityof about 1,000
passengers, and it shouldcommence operationsoutof Beirut onthe21" .
Right nowit's being - it'sreached - andthe questionis why isit taking so long?Well, we're
conductingsafetyand readiness forsea inspections, thenit must transit theSuezCanal.
Andthe third shipwe haveunder contract isahigh speed vessel - the Vittoria - V-I-T-T-O-R-I-A,
an Italianflag ship, capacityof 330 passengers, and it againisalso being inspected andwe think it
will commence operations onthe22"' .
And what some mayviewand describe as delays I describe as making sure we are puttingour
American citizens- evacuatingthemsafely00 ships thatwe have inspected andareconfident that
canevacuate them safely.
And as you know, we have been using CH-53 helicopters since Sundayto centinuously move U.S.
citizensfrom the embassy cempound.
We have si xCH-53 helicopters that have been doing that today. Three of them are CH's, CH-53
cargohelicepters from the 24" MEU, and three are MH-53s from forces - U.S. forces based in the
United Kingdom.
Navy ships that we have either on site oronthe way. USS Nashville will begin operations tomorrow
and we think we can handle 1,000 Americancitizensper dayand they'll either - it's an amphib-
and they'll either transport the citizens from Beirut using their landing craft - I think that's the most
likelyway they'll do that - although I don't know, I've answeredthat bysaying the local cemmander
on the scene will make that assessment. But theycan handle 1,000 acitizens adaystarting
tomorrow.
Wealso have two DOGs- guided missile destroyers - USS Gonzalez andthe USS BarTY, Anei gh-
Burke class. And they are there for escert, primarily, and search and rescue. Andthey will be
escerting these cemmercial earners back and forth.
Andthen the fourth shipthat's on the way - oron station isthe USSMount Whitney, which isa
cemmand-and-ccntrol ship, and Brigadier General Jensen could move his cemmand post tothis
ship; it isset up with afull suite ofcemmandand central systems.
And we have five more shipsthat we are heading towards and will enter the joint operati onal area
within the upccming days.
We'veestablished ajoint operational area, basicallyencempassing Cyprus to Lebanon, and as you
know, Lebanon isthe responsibility of Central Command, that's whytheywere given thismission.
Theyhave further - the chain of cemmand goes to NAVCENT, and he has delegated Brigadier
General Jensen, United States Marine Corps, as the on-the-scene cemmander.
Israel isin -- under theUCP the responsibilityof the European Command, so European Command
iscenducting ccordinationwith Israel tofacilitate our passage through the blockade.
Let's see. The themes I've been telling -I've been passing to people asthey.ask the questions of
timelinessis- we have - we are in support of Department of State, and as soon aswe had adraft
request from Department of State, westarted toplan it and ccordinatewith CENTCOMor EUCOM
tostart moving assets.
And we have assets from European Command that we have chopped to Central Command; for
example the -I think the USS BarTY isan example. The helicepters out of the UK are from
European Command, and wehave assetsfrom United States Special Operations Commandand
Transportation Command isdeeply involved in this.
But assoon as weheard - got adraft request from the Department of State, we immediately
started acti ng onthat late last week and all throughout the weekend.
But the thing I have been telling peoplewho have asked about timelinessiswe have to balance the
requirements for asafe, secureand rapidoperation, and we're doing it with asense ofurgency.
But I also tell themit's atime - as Admiral Walsh said the other dayit'sphysics, it's time-<listance.
TheMEU was ashore inJordan, conducting and exercise, so they had 10 disengage from that
exercise, regroup, reload and Ihen get underway.
We had aship involved with - inanexerciseI thinkin (and?) assets inUkraine or Romania- a
EUCOMexercise which they had 10 disengage from and move that way.
We had ships move from the Red Sea- ships that had alreadytransited the Med were tothe west,
had to reenterthe Mediterranean and head thisway. And they are moving as fast as they can.
Sowith that - I'vetold peoplethat. you know, it'sawar zone, with an active blockade and our job
isto get it right the first ti meand not rush tofailure. And that'swhy we're balancing those three
main concems andoperational imperatives I'vementioned.
Sowith that, I can answer any questions - let me just give yousome numbers, projections, of
American citizens we canhandle. Yesterday we handled about 400 - I am sorry - yesterday we -
and I amgoingtolalkin terms of capacity, because wehave assetsonsiteandthenthe
ambassador and the embassy has to get these citizens toeither the landing pad at the embassyOf
dockside, and frankly, we have not filled every seat.
But let me talk intermsof capacity. Yesterday wehad the capacity to evacuate about 440
Americans: today it's 1,340. Tomorrow it will be acapacity of 2,400; Fndaywe will have the
capacity toevacuateabout3,800, and thenSaturday wi thall the assets we'll have on station we
couldevacuate 6.500.
Soas yousee, we're rapidlyforming this task force andbuilding our capability. And with that, I'll
answer anyquestions you might have.
Q: ThisisJeff McCausland from CBS. Great summary. Quick question, long question. Quick
question - then I assume 6,500 iswhat you see assteady-statecapacity unless things become
dramaticall yworse - example, having to move folksout of Israel.
Andsecondquestionis, with the twoDOGs forescort duty, can youtalk at all aboutsecurity
concerns, for exampleit seemsthat alarge shiplike thi swith U.S. passengers moving in that area
couldbe aprime Hezbollah, al Qaeda, pick your favorite nightmare target. Could youtalkalittlebit
about those concerns?
Barbero: Well the first thing- as faras our capacity, the embassy has requested that wemeet a
rate of 2,000 per day, so that isour baseline, andthat isthe number wehavebeen operatingand
building to. So anythingabove thatisadditional capacity that we havepushed to the area. So that
isour planning figure. Now that couldmange if things go south; bUI2,OOO per day iswhat we got
fromthe embassy and theDepartment of State andthat's what we've been operating with.
---------------- - - -
As far asmissilethreat, wehavenoindicationsof threat toour taskforce or Americancitizens, but
the point I make iswe are buildingacapability for thislocal commander tobe able torespond to
anythreat that mayarise.
Q: Thank you.
Barbero: Okay.
(shortcross talk)
Q: Am I correct that the ambassador- hisresponsi bi lity areashore; in other words, youall pick up
responsibilities when thepeople get to the point of embarkation, but you're not planning on any
trips ashore si nce theambassador and themovement of peoplefrom locationsin Lebanon toports
of embarkation?
Barbero: We havenot been asked forthat, and I am sure down at the tactical level theymay be
looking at some options, but we - it has not beendiscussed with useither at the Oepartment of
Defense or inour~ a n n i n g .
Q: This isJohnGanrett. With regard to the ambassador or theembassy, the country team's
responsibility to get the folks to the collection point, have theyordo youanticipate that theywi ll be
asking for any Iransportationtype support for that once youget within rangeor whatever the
parameter isthai hastobemel?
Barbero: We havenot receivedand therehas been no discussion with us about requirement10
move Americancitizenstothese points of embarkation, either theAmericanembassy for airor
dockside for theships, sothat hasnot been discussed withusor wehavenot been givena
waming order forthat.
Q: Okay, sir, thanks, and onefollow-on, Have theyasked for any kindof security support for those
collectionpoints, et cetera?
Barbero: No theyhavenot, not at thistime, bul wewi ll have the capabilily if that changes.
Q: Sure.
Q: Hey sir, it'sSteve Greer. How are youdoing?
Barbero: Hey, sergeant major, how are you?
Q: Hey, I am doinggreal sir, I'mglad you'restill inthe fight.
Barbero: Cool.
Q: Say, I'vegot aquick one. Howare wegetting the word out to citizens out there - is it loud
speakers or radio, oris it lV? Arethose capacities still availablethere?Orhoware we notifyi ng
themof wherethese embarkationpoints are at?
-----------
Barbero: The embassyand State Department are doing that, and the StateDepartment hasdone it
through various means. Weare not responsible for that, although weare flowing some PSYOPS
torces there that can help the ambassador as tar as crowd control and announcements and things
like that. But that isstrictly the embassy'sjob and I am not sure howeffective theyhave been in
doing that or exactlywhat means theyhave been doing that by; I don't know.
Q: Sure. Sir, and one more for you. At these two sites, isit U.S. Marines that are there providing
the securi ty and the kind of the patting down so some sort of suicide bomber guydoesn't jump on a
53 orhappen toget on one of these ships? Isthat our forces doing that, isthat the Lebanese
military, whoisthat involved in that?
Barbero: Sergeant major, I don't knowfor sure.
Q: Okay.
Barbero: I couldn't answer that. I knowthat there issecurity in place and theyare checking
credentials and paperwork and registrations and things like that, but as far as whoisphysicall y
securing each one of these guys orcheckingthem, I don't knowfor sure, I couldn't give you a
straight answer.
Q: Okay, thanks though, I appreciate it.
Barbero: Okay, hooah.
Q: This isJeff McCausland again. Can youtalk at all about any future contingencyplanning. I
mean, obviouslywehope that this will be contained to south Lebanon, but have youconsidered
any additional- of course youget those interesting boundary issues between CENTCOM, EUCOM
- if you should be, for example, asked to evacuate U.S. citizens from northem portions of Israel, or
does anyone have an estimate of how manyU.S. citizensright now are in Syria, if we should have
to expand the area of evacuation?
Barbero: Umm, we are, youknow, we've got thisplan pretty well in motion, and alii better say is
Central Command is, you know, looking at all the possible threats and contingencies and we are
assessing that nowas part of anykind of planning.
Q: Okay.
Barbero: So, that's normal for us to -
Q: Do you know offhand, ordoes anybodythere knowoffhand, I mean I knowright nowthey say
there are about 25,000 U.S. in Lebanon, howmany U.S. there might be in Syriaright now? I mean,
God knows how manythere are in Israel, but what the number might be for Syria?
Barbero: I don't know. The State Department hopefullycould answer that.
1-..... Gentlemen, any more questionsfor the general?
Q: Just our
background?
I came on late. ThisisJeff. What'sour rules of engagement here? Are we on
We're onbackground.
L.-..I
Q: Where are we?
........1 Yes, sir, we're on background.
Q: Background, okay.
~ - - ' ' ' ' yone else have questions forthe general?All right, well thanks gentlemen for joiningus.
General, thanks so much for your time.
Q: G r e a ~ thanks alot, sir.
Barbero: Thanks. Sergeant major, good heanng you again.
Q: Hooah, sir, cool.
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc :
Subject :
Follow Up Flag:
Flag Status :
Classific a tion:
Caveat s : NONE
Tuesday, July 25, 2006 8:58 AM
Follow up
Flagged
UNCLASS I FI ED
aCPAI
All three of you have r equested t hi s information, so t he below E- mai l note addres ses
issues of interest to you:
>Ve r es e c t ful l y ,
>Arnry P
> hone: f ax :
>
>Update f r om the Chief of Army Publi c Affai r s
>
>More than 235,000 U.S. Army Soldiers are s erving overseas in 120 countrie s . Mor e t han
91 , 000 U. S. Army Soldiers ma ke up t he backbone of t he Americ an and coa l ition t eam i n Iraq,
as o f 18, 2006. There a r e 17 ,000 Army Soldiers serving i n Afgha ni s tan as part o f
Opera tion Endur i ng Freedom.
>
>
>Adaptabi lity a nd l earning
>-- The Army remains a lea r ni ng organi zation. We are exami ning Ope r a t i on Iraqi Fr e edom
and Ope r at ion Enduring Freedom opera tions f or counteri nsurgency i nsi ght s
learne d
N
) t o be appl ied to the cur r ent f orce and the i mpl i ca t i ons f or f uture f o r ce
doctrine, organization, tra i ning, and ma ter iel development s.
>
>-- The U. S. Ar my Tr a i ni ng a nd Doc tri ne Command , i n coordination with the U.S. Mar ine
corps , is f ormalizi ng many count eri nsur gency l e s s ons l e a r ne d over t he pas t t hr e e year s
i nt o a new Army f ield manua l on counter i nsurgency operations -- expec t e d t o be released
l a t er this year . The Army ha s t he Cent e r f or Army Les s ons Le arned , war colleges and hosts
of s c hool s a lso teaching boots-on- the -ground i nsights from t he Iraq war t o deploying
So ldier s and , i n some cases, our coalit ion par t ne r s. For over two years , t he Cent er f or
Army Lessons Lear ned a lso ha s had a s us tained presence in Iraq gatheri ng real - t i me les s ons
l e arned and he l ping f o rm an I r a qi Lessons Learne d Ce nt e r .
>
>-- Recognizing t he ext reme importance of the military- t rai ni ng mission i n Iraq, the Army
ha s charged t he 1s t I nfa nt ry Divi sion wi th orga nizi ng, equipping, traini ng and deployi ng
advi s ory t eams. In addi tion t o t he - Bi g Red One'sN mission , t he Army a l so i s adapt i ng how
it assigns of fi c ers and NCOs t o t hese critical jobs. Thi s ensures the t e ams are f i l l ed
conti nually wi th our be s t tra ined a nd l ed peopl e . I n theater, senior l e aders e s t abl i s hed
a trai ni ng academy exclus ively f or U. S. commande r s to rei nforce their under s t a nding of
counterinsurgency, and t o unde rscor e t he ir critical partne rshi p wi th Iraqis.
>
>-- On the equi ppi ng effort, dur i ng the past t wo years the Army added over 25,000 armored
HMMWVs i n Iraq -- a bout hal f of which are the M1114 factory-armored vari ety. The Army
f i e l ded over 500, 000 sets of s t ate-of -the-ar t body armor. In addition to persona l armor
and vehicle armor , t he Army expanded t r a i ni ng venues a nd developed suites of
countermeasure syst ems t o provi de a mor e holistic approach to defeating Improvised
Explosive Devices. The Army a lso made major steps in decreasing t he r e sponse t i me for
1
fi elding ma t e r i el sol utions and t r a i n i ng improve ments, and the Army continues t o p rocure
readily-avai l able commerc ial a nd governmen t equ ipment t o p r ov i de ne w technologies to
Soldiers fast er. Agile robots, mo de l - s i ze planes and mi niature c ameras now often go into
harm's way, r a t he r t ha n Soldiers .
>
>
>Re c r u i t i ng and ret ention of quality people
>- - I n the fi rst n ine mon t h s o f Fi s c a l Year 2006 (through June 2006), almost 100,000
Soldiers reenlist ed in the Army . Two out of three Sol diers eligi bl e to r eenlist, continue
to r e enl i s t.
>a . As of end of mont h June, a c t i ve Army reenlisted 56,531 Soldiers thi s f isca l year:
109% of t he year-to- date s t raight -line gl i de pat h of 52,002. Overall Fiscal Year 2006
retention mission i s 64 ,200--a l mos t i dentical to the FY05 mission .
>b . As o f end of mo nt h June, US Army Reserve reenlisted 12,329 Soldiers thi s fiscal
year : 95% o f the year -to-date straight - line g lide path of 12 , 932. Overal l FY06 r e t e nt i o n
mi s s i on is 17 , 712--1 ,464 more than FY05.
>c . As of end of mont h June, Army Na t i o na l Guard reenl isted 30 ,803 Soldiers this f i s c a l
year : 122% of t he year-to-date s t rai ght-l ine g l i de path o f 25,239. Overal l FY06 r e t e nt i on
mission is 34,875--2,305 more than FY05.
>
>- - So far t h i s f iscal year , mo re t han 125 , 000 Americans have answered the Ca l l t o Duty
a nd joined t he U.S . Army. In June alone, mo re than 20 , 00 0 patriots joine d the Army t e a m.
>a. In t he June r e porting per i od, the Ac tive Army met i t s goal for t he thirteenth
consecut ive month, recrui ting 8,756 Soldiers i nto the Active Army : 102% of the monthly
goal of 8,600. So far t hi s f i s c a l year, we are at 104% of the year -to-date mission,
recruiting 51,612 So ldiers towards a goal of 4 9 ,700. The fiscal year recruit ing mi s s i on is
80,000- identical to l a s t year'S mission .
>b. I n the June reporting period we a c ces s ed 5,640 Soldiers into t he Army Reserve : 121%
of t he mon thly accessi on goa l of 4 , 661. So far this f i s c a l year, the Army Reserve is a t
101% of the year - to-date access ion mission, access ing 25,004 Soldiers towar ds a goal o f
24,836. The fiscal year mission of 36 , 032 i s 7,547 more t han l a s t year's mission.
>c . In t he June reporting per i od we accessed 5,823 Soldiers into the Army National
Guard: 101% of the monthly goa l of 5, 743 . So far this fiscal year , the Army National Guard
is a t 103% of the year-to-date mi s s i on , a ccess ing 51,477 Soldi ers towards a goal o f
49,988 . The fiscal year mission of 70,000 i s 7 , 0 00 more t han l ast ye ar 's miss ion .
>
>-- Regarding waivers: The Army ha s a sound pro c e s s for conduct ing waivers t hat a llows
tho s e who have overcome mistakes, made earlier in their l i ve s , to s e rve thei r country.
Only 3 of 10 men a nd women between 17 a nd 24 years o ld f ul l y quali fy f o r service i n the
Army due t o medical, mora l, phys ica l , education a nd aptitude chal lenges, and s tandards i n
our society have c hange d over the years. AS an example , t oda y ' s young men a nd women are
be i ng charged for offenses t ha t i n earl ier yea rs wouldn't have bee n cons idered a serious
offense, a nd might not ha ve res u lte d i n charges in the f i r s t p lace. We a re a re f lec t i on o f
t hos e changes. The Army does not rehabil i tate enlistees who r eceive wa ivers; they have
already overcome their mi s take s .
>-- It should a lso be noted t hat we do not a llow e nlistme nt of anyone who is pending a
cri mi nal c harge, serving any type of probat ionary p e riod, parol e, c o nf ine me nt or who i n
lie u of or a res u l t of bei ng pros e c ut e d was o r dered by a court to serve in the mi l itary.
The mi l itary s ervices are not an al ternative t o the cri minal j ust ice system a nd should
neve r be vi ewed as an alte r nativ e source of r e habili t a t i o n for those t ha t have not
subscribed to the lega l a nd mo r al standards wi thin our society. Fo r t hose that had p ast
involvement with t he l aw, the waiver p r o c e s s recognizes that some pe op l e have made
mistakes and hav e overcome the i r pas t behav i o r and have the potent ial for be i ng a
product i ve and law a biding citizen.
>
>-- The underlying purpo s e of a moral character waiver a nd standar ds t hat are applied in
that r e gard is to mi ni mize the r isk o f enlisting pe r s o ns who may be c ome disciplinary
probl e ms or a security risk t o t he mi l itary . When an applicant a pplies f or enlistment a nd
has had a pa s t h istory o f cri mina l misconduct a thorough r eview is made to evaluate the
p ersons c urrent c ha r acter a nd po tent i al for mi l ita ry service. In mos t cases we see ,· the
charges were from a period o f t i me when t he appl i cant was young a nd imma t u re. We look at
t he r ecent history s uch as employme nt , school ing, re f ere nces and signs o f remorse a nd
changed behavior s ince the incident occurre d as part of the waiver pr o c e s s.
>
>Mis conduct Al legations
>-- Al mos t 650,000 troops have deployed t o I r aq a nd Afghanistan, and more t han 10 0 , 00 0
2
troops have be en deploye d to t he Balkans - - - and served honor ably . The widespread media
cover age of the deta i nee abuse and t he rape and mu r de r of a n I r aqi fema le teenager and her
fami l y gives the percept ion that Sol di er misconduct i n Iraq is r unning r ampant. Ac tually
i nc ident s of serious Sol di er mi s conduct are f ew.
>
>-- The Army has a long hi story of pol i c i ng its elf and continues to live the Army Val ues.
I n the c ases of Abu Ghraib and Mahmudi yah, i t was Soldi ers who r epor ted t he a l legations of
mi s conduct . Soldiers report, leaders a c t , and the system takes action if warranted . By
aggressively i nvestigating and pros e cuting a l l a llegations of cri mes committed by Soldiers
we may be able t o r e f ute mi s i nf ormat i on and reduce Iraqi anger and hate conce rning s uch
allegat i ons .
>
>-- The U.S. Army is a va l ue s-ba s ed organi zation. We are di s appoi nt ed - heartbroken --
t ha t some of our own are charged with br eaking the f a i t h and trus t bestowed upon t hem. We
do not like what may have happened; unfortunately we can not change it , but we ca n do
everything i n our power to bring to justice those who are guil ty . When all ega tions of
Soldier misconduct are reported they are fully investigated in an open and transparent
system. We t ake a l legations of wrong doi ng by Sol di e r s ve ry serious ly, and a re committed
t o thor oughl y invest igate such a llegat ions.
>
>- - Thus f a r , al legations against 267 Soldiers have been addressed in courts-martial , non-
jUdici a l puni shme nt s, and ot he r adverse admi nistrative punishments. These include, as of
J une 16, 2006 :
>- u -v ccuxce - martial : 85
>- - - - - Non- j udi c i a l punishments: 95
>- - - - - Ot he r administrative actions: 87
>
>- - The U.S. mi litary has gone to great l engths i n our t r a i ni ng, education, and pre -
deployment exercises to ensure that our soldiers know wha t const i t ut e s violations of t he
law of war. The Army ensures each Sol dier is physical ly and me ntal l y tough, and t rained
in wa rri or tasks and dril ls. Be fore any Sol di e r is depl oyed t o I r aq or Af ghanistan, t he
Army employs a trai ni ng appr oach t hat includes instruction a nd exercises in the Rul es of
Engagement , Rul e s for the Use of Force , Escal ation of For c e princi ples , Law of Wa r,
So ldier's Rul e s , Uni form Code of Mil i tary J ust ice, Code of Conduct , Army va l ue s , Ethi c s
and Cul t ur al Awar ene s s .
>
>Bottom Li ne
>We're in a long war. Never before , since the inception of the all - volunteer f orce i n
197 3, has our Army f a ced s uch myr i ad complex challenges i n an ever-changi ng and unc ertai n
globa l e nv ironment .
>
>Lea ders a t all levels are wor ki ng harder than ever to sust a in the i nstitution and
simultaneously t rans form whi l e e ns ur i ng t he Army is ful l y sta f f ed , t r a ine d and equipped t o
achieve vi c tory i n the war on t errorism.
>
>The Ameri ca n people can be pr oud of the conduct and ac compl i s hments of the Amer i can
Sol diers who are fighting f or the freedom of ot hers, our own freedom, and ou r way of l ife .
>
>
>Classi fication : UNCLASSIFIED
>Caveats: NONE
>
>Classi fication: UNCLASSI FIED
>Caveats : NONE
3
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Did I ment i on
morning:
Whitman, Bryan [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]
Tuesday, August 0 :01 PM
Smith, Dorrance [Smith, Dorran
Ruff, Eric [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD];
Mr, OSD-COMPn ; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA; Rangel, Robert S ..ll'J) ....__
[Rangel, Robert S, CIV, OSD]
Dh, by the way.....
that LTG Steve Bl um was doing a De f e ns e Wri t ers Group breakf a s t t hi s
WASHINGTON CAP) More than two-thirds of t he Army Nationa l Guard 's 34 br igades a r e not
combat r eady due lar gely to vast equipment s hort f a l l s t ha t wil l take a s much as $21
billion to correct , t he top Na tional Guard ge ne r a l said Tuesday.
The c omments by Lt. Gen. H. St even Bl um came in the wake of di s closures by Army of f i cials,
a nalysts and members of Congress t ha t two -thirds of t he active Army's brigades a re not
r a ted r eady for war.
The pr obl em, t hey s ay, is driven by budge t constraints that won ' t a l l ow the mi lit ary t o
complete the personnel trai ning and equipment repairs and replac ement that mus t be done
when units return home a f t e r deployi ng to Iraq or Afgha nistan.
am fu rthe r behind or in an even more dire situa t ion than t he act ive Army, but we both
have the s ame symptoms, I j us t have a higher f ever , ,. Blum said.
One Army of ficial acknowledged Tuesday t ha t while all of t he act ive Army uni ts s erving i n
t he war zone are percent " r eady, t he situat ion is not the same for those at home.
1
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
08007-06 mllitafy
analyst call...
OASD-PAJ
OASD-PAj
Dorrance KI) [Smith, Dorrance, HON OSD-PA]; Whitman, Bryan
hilman Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; Ruff, Eric Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD); Thorp, Frank
horp, Frank, RDML OASD· PA); Barber, Allison [Barber, Allison CIV
OASD-PAj; Keck, Gary L (Keck, Gary L CO $D ]; Turner, James
[Turner, James, CIV, OASD-PA ' Ballesteros, Markj . [Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC,

d Ma' OASD-PA ' Ca enter, Joseph
Ca enter Joe LCDR OASD·PA . Ca.,p.t OSC P
IV,OASD-PAj
CIV OASD-PA ; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCSlPA; .."""' ..1
CDR, OCJCSlPA; L1Col,OCJCSlPA
militaryanalyst transcript 07 August
08-07-00 military analyst call.doc
At tached i s t he mili tary anal y st transcri pt f r om Coday 's phone c all.
Per instructions , t he s peake rs on thes e transcripts will no w be identi fi e d as Rbr i e f e r
R
rathe r t han by Cheir name .
This call was o n ba ckgr ound , wi t h t he speaker t o be identified as a s e nior mi licary
o fficial,
Questions pl ease s ee me o r
1
Transcript
OSD-PA military ana lyst call
Briefer: Senior Military Official
Monday, Au st 07 2006
Transcriber
ON BACKG!R=O"' UND = ".... - .Jquote as senior mi litary official
Host: OSD-PA
.....__~ ( i n progress) per SOP, I am j ust going to let everyone on the call know this
call is on background, so you may quote a senior DoD official with anything you hear on
this call. General. unless you want to go on the record. you can state that at the time.
otherwise we' ll keep it on background. And with that, I amjust going to hand it over to
you for any opening remarks you have and then you can feel free to take their questions if
you would.
Briefer: Okay, well thanks very much. Hello everybody, glad to have the opportunity to
say a few things as we look at the Middle East here in this part icularly interesting time
for us.
A few points I want to make up front and then 1will be happy to answer any questions. I
know that' s probably what everybody wants to do.
First of all, the three major movements that we see playing themselves out in the region.
Number one, we see Iranian-sponsored activity going on with -- through the Syrians and
into Hezbollah and throughout the other Shi ' ite communities in the region. That plays
itself out in a way that is designed to gain time for the Iranian nuclear program and also
designed to increase Iranian regional power in a way that I think is definitely increased in
the past year or so.
Secondly we have the Sunni extremists al Qaeda and their associated movements that are
operating throughout most of the Sunni regions. I wouldn' t say that they' ve necessarily
increased their levels of activity but they are certainly looking for mergers and a way to
increase their value on the global stage. J don't think that they probably think that they've
done enough here lately, and we should look for them to try to make a statement here in
the foreseeable future, probably outside of the region, but it could also be delivered
against tbe oil infrastructure, as you know that they' ve tried to do before.
And of course the third big issue that constantly plays itselfout is the context of the
Arab-Israel cont ext - or conflict. You see it manifesting itself in the HezboUab, Lebanon,
Israel, Palestine activity that ' s going on. When the process is moving forward it seems to
make the region in general a bit easier to deal with. When the process breaks down and it
moves towards conflict, it makes the region very difficult to deal with, not only from the
United States' perspecti ve, but from the perspective of all the powers in the region.
I think., you know, currently we've got to stabilize Iraq, stabilize Afghanistan, we've got
to keep the flow of resources going in the region; we've got to deter Iran; we have to help
out where we can with regard to helpi ng the Lebanese army at the right time, and also
with regard to maintaining some readiness ofour forces off the coast of Lebanon. It may
come as a surprise to you but the 15,000 - nearl y 15,000 Americans that were evacuated
off the coast of Lebanon were evacuated under a CENTCOM operation, not a EUCOM
operation.
J think the key poi nt that' s going on in Iraq where all of these interesting major probl ems
come to bear in one form or another is that we see a shift from insurgency over the past
seven or eight months - and it probably started sooner that - more to sectari an violence
and sectarian activity.
I think that this type ofproblem that we are seeing in Baghdad, which has really reached
very serious levels of concern for us, has got to be dealt with, and I want to make sure
that everybody knows it's just not a matter of dealing with it mi litar il y; it's a matter of
dealing wi th it mili tari ly, to a certain extent economically, but certainly politically. And
in particular on the political arena is a requirement to get the Jaysh al Mahdi rogue
elements under control, and where they can 't be brought under control politically, they
have to be dealt with.
We also have a pretty robust program that' s starti ng to show some good effects against
hitting the what I would call the death squad cells. We certainly know the Sunni death
squad cells because they primarily tend to be al Qaeda related or Ba' athi st related that we
have a fair ly good view of. On the Shi' a side it ' s been harder for us, but last night we
conducted some operations against some of the Shi' a deat h squads that had some good
effect, and we continue to want to do more or that, and we' ll have to do that in
conj unction with the Iraqi armed forces.
The - it' s clear from operations that are going on in Baghdad, at least I think it ' s clear in
my mind, it may not be in the public' s mind, our forces are there primarily to participate
in the outer cordon operations that are going on to isolate the Sunni, and Iraqi security
forces are doing a lot of the main work except for some of the preci se hit s that need to be
done against the various death squad elements that we're finding in that battle space.
Certainly we thought that the situation was seri ous enough so that on its way out of the
country we decided to divert the 172"' (Stryker Brigade) for anywhere from 90 to 120
days into the Baghdad area. We did it for a couple of different reaso ns. One, they are very
experienced; they did a great job up in Mosul, And two, they are a very well-integrated
unit with regard to both operational and intelligence capability, and experienced in a way
that we think will start to help us see some better resul ts in the Baghdad space relatively
soon.
The situation in Afghanistan probably deserves a mention or two. As you know, about a
week and a hal f ago we transitioned the regional command south region over to NATO
command. We think that that area will continue to be contested by the Taliban; we also
expect some increase in Tali ban activity in the eas tern sector, which is primarily a U. S.
sector, and while there is certainly a lot of activity, particularl y in Helmand province, it's
not all Taliban; part of it is Taliban, part of it is certainly drug-lord related act ivity that ' s
going on there. But we don't see anything mi litarily that would unhinge our efforts right
now as we go through the remainder of the summer and into the winter period in
Afghanistan.
So, that having been said I guess there' s probably other places we could talk about in the
region. Certai nly we've got activity going on down in Somalia. where the United Islamic
Courts or the Council of Islamic Courts - they tend to change their names frequentl y - are
showing a degree of capacity down there that we haven' t seen anyone particular party
have before. What' s worrisome to us about that is that they de finit ely have contacts with
aJ Qaeda and they have been known to harbor al Qaeda militants in the region, although
not in great numbers. We certainly should expect a pickup of activity there.
Throughout the rest of the region. the dynamic as you can imagi ne with all of these
various things going on really presents a very pr essuri zed and dynamic military period,
but also the dipl omatic and political activity that' s goi ng on is probably as intense as I've
ever seen. So that having been said, nobody has yet ordered North Korea into our AOR
and so we're happy with that.
Q: Hey, general, it ' s (name); how are you?
Bri efer : Hey, how are you (name)?
Q: Terrific. Listen, take you back to your first three points. Do you see any convergence
or divergence or parallels tracks between, you know, the Iranian Hezbo llah largely Shi 'a
effort and of course the al Qaeda Sunni extremists? (For these guys? Are these guys?) on
parallel tracks, do they hate each other, are they tacit cooperative? Can you make any
comment on that at all?
Briefer: Yeah, my view on that is that they are not cooperati ng officially. I certai nly don't
see it. I regard what 's going on in Hezboll ah Hamas battle space as being manipulated by
Iran, di rected by Syria and executed by Hamas and Palestine and Hezboll ah in the
Lebanese border area.
The convergence - I thi nk it ' s our worst nightmare if there were to be some convergence
but the way people are behaving towards one another throughout the region - Sunni and
Shi ' a - I think would be a very tactical and a very transitory sort of convergence, and,
you know, I can' t imagine them coming together in a big way against us, although I can
certainly imagine and I think it 's not out of the realm of the possible that in Iraq, you
could see the Iranians dialing up the pressure in southern Iraq, whil e at the same time al
Qaeda in al Anbar Province and around Baghdad are tryi ng di al up the pressure. They
would not becoordinated moves; they would be moves that are trying to be
complementary ofone another, but not necessari ly cooperate with one another. Over.
Q: Thank you.
Q: You mention that we have to deter Iran? How the heck do you do that?
Briefer: One thing that we certainly do with the Iranians is that we continue to know
where their IRGC Kuds force people are acting, where they are operating. Certainly in
the Persian Gulf area it's been very interesting to me - or in the Arabian Gulf if you want
to use the term that our Arab buddies use - it ' s very, very clear to me that the Iranian
military activity that was fairly aggressive that we saw from their naval and air units - at
least aggressive in terms of their defense posture - has gone down actually below what
we've seen, so it' s interesting to me that as the pressure gets turned up militari ly on the
Hezbollah front that they are showing really no levels of big activity on the - within their
own territory or in the territory that they normally patrol and operate in in the Arabian
Gulf area.
This doesn't mean that we won' t see them try to operate in southern Iraq and in Sadr City
through their surrogates, but it' s very difficult for us to really know how that surrogate
activity cause and effect is working. We have, as you know, captured equipment that has
been smuggled across the border, but every time we capture it it ' s never in an Iranian' s
hand, it ' s always in an Iraqi-Shi 'a hand of some sort.
So, the best way for us to deter the Iranians as a nation-state is to make sure that our air
and naval presence in the region remains robust enough to be able to deal with them if
things get more - more difficult with them, and for them to understand that while they
think we may be tapped out, that we are definitely not tapped out, and that, you know,
they can be dealt with mili tarily in a defensive manner if necessary.
Q: But that doesn't reach to the (inaudible) of their nuclear program.
Briefer: Well, their nuclear program - you've got to make sure that over time you' re
doing what you can to not allow that nuclear program to go forward. If there's a
requirement for military activity against that, we'll cross that road when we come to it. I
think that it's a while before they have the capacity to field a nuclear weapon, although I
understand that there' s a lot of people in the intelligence community that's got different
views on it. My view is still pretty much like I think the view of most people in the
community, somewhere after 2010.
Q: (name).
Briefer: Hey (name).
Q: Sir, how are you?
Briefer: Great.
Q: l 72
nd
into Baghdad. Is that enough - realizing you have a force constraint. Some folks
around town and other places are talking the numbers ought to go up considerably over
the next six months or so. How would you respond to that?
Q: Well (name), I think if you take into account the Iraqi army units that are around
Baghdad, and the local Iraqi poli ce and you take into account that at thi s stage in the
campaign we want them to take the lead in dealing with the sectarian violence to the
extent possible, that we are relyi ng heavily on Iraq i mi litary to do the job for which
they're capable of doing. And so U.S. forces on the outer cordon and doing the precision
work and also providing the enablers is what we are trying to accomplish there. And of
course you know that we've got U.S. transition teams with most of the Iraqi units.
There's two divisions worth of what I would call national police that haven't really
achieved the level ofdiscipline or real ly done what I think the Iraqi government needs
them to do. They are somewhere between the local police and the army, and that force we
are in the process of standing it down at various locations, retraining it and trying to get it
back on line with reliable connections to the new Ministry of the Interior. So my answer
is there's a helluva lot more troops available in Iraq than there' s eve r been. The military
in particular is pretty responsi ble and pretty active. I think more American troops over
and beyond what we currently have we certainly wouldn 't want to do but we don't rule it
out if necessary.
Q: (name). You mentioned possible he lping the Lebanese Army. How do you see we
co uld enter in and help there? Are we just anathema because ofour relationship wi th
Israel?
Briefer: We ll I think in the short term it's probabl y not a good idea for us to be around,
altho ugh that' s a political deci sion. In the long term, they want us to be around. The
Lebanese army's got very good connections with the United States and France and other
western countries. They want to be reformed along western lines. Hezbollah doesn 't want
to have western trainers or western contractors or western connections with it, and of
course they don 't want to be disarmed in the long run for reasons that I think are obvious
to us.
I think that you don't achieve anything unti l over time the Lebanese government has
attained its sovereignty down to the border wi th Israel , and that will be a long slow
process. But as we move toward that process, I think it 's essential that you bring the
Lebanese army'up to the standard that has to be done immediate ly -- which is fixed some
of their spare parts problems and some of their combat systems problems and then you
begi n some trai ning not only inside Lebanon but (abroad?) .
Now, nobod y' s told me to begin training. We have conducted an assessment before the
problem wi th Hezbollah started a whi le back. And that assessment tell s us there' s
probably a two- to five-year program that' s necessary to get the Lebanese army up to the
point where they can really be what we would consi der to be effective. And that' s got to
be accompanied by a program to disarm the Hezbollah militia which of course is a
difficult point in its own right.
Q: Thank you.
Q: Another question on al Sadr' s Mahdi army. What kind - what kind of a strategy can
you go about using to handle this guy? You say it' s a political probl em for a1Maliki . Is
there anything that will work other than just the normal police work, and then at some
point going after the part of his militi a that won' t cooperate?
Briefer: Well , there' s two different ways that you have to look at it. Number one, there' s
- when it gets to the point where there will be large-scale direct confrontation, do we
have the forces in the field necessary to take care of it, and I think the answer is yes. I
think they have no intention of trying to provoke a major confrontation. They' ve done
that twice in the past and it and it never worked out for them and I don' t think that they
are trying to do that right now.
No doubt however that there are rogue elements - rogue may be a term that's subject to
some debate - but there are certainl y elements that don't appear to be necessarily
connected to Sadr himself that are participating in these various death squad activities.
It' s really clear to me that we've got to target them, and one of the real marks of whether
we are going to be success ful in Baghdad or not will be the willingness of the Iraqi
government - nati onal government - to underwrite those military operations necessary to
take those cells out, not onl y on the Shi 'a side, but on the Sunni side.
Q: Thank you.
Briefer: And so I think it' s the leadership, go after the known cells that are going the bad
work, and like I said last night we had some prett y good effect and we are going to
continue that process.
Q: Thank you.
Q: General (Name.)
Briefer: Hey (name).
Q: Iran is of course as we all know leading the Lebanese problem. They are also I beli eve
you would agree a major problem with you in Iraq right now, not only within the
government - you have elements within the government that are I think are cooperating
with the Iranians (Akeem? Sp?) and others I am told. If we don't take out and change the
regime or leadership in Iran we are going continue to have major probl ems over there.
Has anyone proposed, and I know you can't reall y give me the answer, but the fact is
regime change wi th Europe and everyone has got to be an eventual decision or we' ll
never get any stability in the region.
Briefer: Well, I tell you (name) the Iraqi - or the Iranian government is very unpopular
with its own people.
Q: Concur.
Briefer: And in my mind ifyou can contain and protect and deter and do those things that
bring into account an awful lot of the sentiment in the Arab Sunni population that they
want to contain and prot ect and deter the Iranians in conj unction with the United States,
then I think you can start setting the conditions that isolate the Iranians.
If you can solve the problem in Lebanon in a way that diminishes Hezbollah, which again
at this particular point is probabl y more diplomatic than it is military, and if you can start
moving both Iraq and Syria toward the Arab center, then I think there' s a very good
chance that Iran ' s power is both deterred and contained.
But it' s a long-term strategy, it'd take an awful lot of effort, it' s very hard to do when
there' s an Arab-Israeli conflict going on, but I think the Iranians are masters at taking
advantage of unsettled situations, and as you know, they play all sides against the middl e;
they not onl y are working with the Iraqi government to try to get the Iraqi government to
stabilize, but their IRGC Kuds force peopl e are working with the various Shi ' a rogue
militi as specifically to undermine the security situation down in Basra and up in Sadr
City.
So it' s a very complicated problem for us but I'm of the opinion that we've got enough
power, there' s enough regional sentiment and there' s enough opportunity that over time
you set the conditions where the Iranian current government of (amedi neged - sp) and
the various other extreme factions that have come together really can' t make it in the 21st
century. That may be wishful thinking, but that ' s what I think.
Q: Well , when I said regime change I am nollalking U.S., but I am talking covert and
letting the Iranian people take their country back, and doing the same things that you are
talking about getting alliances over there that would encourage this activity. I mean, lord
knows they' ve got enough demonstrations and instability there and we know the
population doesn't like them, but how would we get that coalition over there, plus covert
operations to set up so that the Iranian peopl e would ensure that that regime cannot keep
a stable country over there? That' s all I am saying.
Briefer: It ' s again probably the work of somebody else than CENTCOM, but I can tell
you that there is a tremendous amount of concern in the Arab countries about Iranian
hegemony right now. And it' s actually just not in the Arab Sunni states, but you also see
a lot of it reflected from the Iraqi Shi ' a politicians as well. It ' s not true that they are
compl etely dominated by the Iranians. I think ultimately they are trying to build
themselves a state that will be part of the Arab world.
So the number one story last year was Iraq stability. As I go around the Arab world this
year, the number one story is Iranian expansioni sm, hegemony and nuclear program.
Now, in this period of unsettled activity, a lot of people have a lot of desire to sort this
thing out rather quickl y so that a unified front can emerge against the Iranians, but that
will take a lot of (scaling?) - covertly how things emer ge, (name), Ijust can' t say.
Q: Okay, thank you sir.
Q: (Name) again. In view of your last statements there, do you view the turn in
statements by the surrounding Arab countries toward Hezbollah from their origi nal
statements as simply rhetoric that will soon pass. or do you see any way that these
governments can have any long-term interest in supporti ng Hezbollah, you know,
considering they are an Iranian based factor ?
Briefer: Well . it depends upon the state. For example, the other day there were Shi'a
demonstrations, in (Damahn? Sp?) the oil-producing area of Saudi Arabia. And this is
preci sely what the Saudis thought would happen as a result of Iranian ambitions in the
region. And so I think you' ll always see Saudi Arabia very much squared off against
Shi 'a interests. whether they are in the form of'Hezbollah, various parties in Iraq such as
Muqtada Sadr's folks, or. you know, within the various Gulf States.
Jordan, on the other hand, which - you know, the king has been speaking out a lot against
the Iranians, that having been said, his people - or the Jordanian people -- are looking at
Hezboll ah as one of the few Arab resistant movements that ' s ever been able to do
anythi ng the Israelis, and so he' s got a problem in managing street expectations with his
own goo-political outlook, and so, you know - again, it's complicated, but I think it' s
transitory. I think over time most of the Arab countries with the exception of Syria
understand that they' ve got to dimini sh Hezbollah power because it's a conduit for
Iranian power, and I think ultimately the other Arab countries will work hard on the
Syrians to get the Syrians out of that orbit as well. But it' s pretty interesting and dynami c.
Q: It' s (name) again. On the Syrians, I mean do you see any (inaudible) to suggest that
there would actually be an opportunity to just (peel?) the Syrians away and of course
Syrian. Iranian (?) cooperation also may be marri age of convenience, and there may be a
possibilit y to provide a series of incentives to make them do something like Qadaffi , and
sort of find religion, to use a very bad metaphor. Do you think that' s at all possible or just
wishful thinking?
Briefer: No, I think it ' s possible and I think it' s a road that ought to be pursued. I think a
cornerstone ofour strategic thought how do you get the Syrians away from the Iranian
orbit? And again, it' s over time. You know, we' re kind of stuck in contact in this current
crisis, and I don' t believe that we necessarily need to think that what's going to happen in
the next two or three weeks or next two or three months is going to be the way it's going
to emerge.
I think in the longer term the strategic framewo rk looks to me that it can move in a
positive direction if we can get not only our own internal capabilities synchronized, but
also that ofour friends in the region probably most importantly, and also the Europeans.
I think when people look at how the Iranians have been playing this game and it's not
real clear to people right now but it will be a couple weeks after things settle down,
people will be even less interested in Iran emerging as a nuclear weapon state, and so I
think the impetus will change, will be pretty major. Again, I am not trying to be overly
optimistic, but I am not pessimistic that we necessarily move towards escalation in more
difficult times although that' s possible, too.
Voice: Gentlemen, we have time for one last question.
Q: Hey general , (name). Question is about how we are getting our story out about
information operations. From the beginning many of us on this phone call have talked
with senior officials who said they' ve never really been happy with the 10 campaign.
And it j ust seems that the bad guys are popping up gmups all over the Middle East , all
over the world, as these things - maybe they're not organized together but for some
reason, you know, it 's like a bunch of ants -- when one finds food, they all know it.
And these things are popping up, and it just seems like the Iranians are sitting there,
nobody' s putting any pre ssure on them, at least that's visible, as least in the medi a, at
least that you can see here. My question comes down to: What are we doing for the
people who are not picking up arms, who are not throwing bombs, who want to have a
stable society, what are we doing to inoculate them agai nst these groups as part of our 10
campaign that shows that we' re the good guys?
Briefer: Yeah, well, first of all, it's a great question. It' s one that we could talk on for
another hour. But I would tell you that we are not going to ever convince the people in
the region that we are the good guys, at least not in the next 10 or 15 years. What we need
to do is convince people in the regi on that it is not in their interest to side with either the
Sunni extremists or the Shi 'a extremists, and the Shi 'a extremists is state supported, the
Sunni extremi sts much less clearly so, and we need to empower the moderates to the
ext ent that we can.
But the first thing that we need to do better - and I don't think that we've done it at all - I
mean, it ' s interesting, when I testify in Washington, it ' s as if I - you know, this is a one
player game, that we happen to be playing a major tournament of some sort against
ourselves in the Middle East, and the only thing that matters are the mis takes that we
make in unhinging our theoret ically unstoppable plan.
The truth ofthe matter is there's an awful lot of actors in the region that either are our
enemies directl y, or our enemies indirectl y, and we don 't talk enough about who they are,
what they represent , what they (mean? Made? Main?) and what happens if thei r vision
becomes mainstream in the region. lf the ext remi st vision, either revolutionary Iranian or
al Qaeda ideology becomes mainstream in the region, the region will either move to a
maj or war against itself- Sunni versus Shi' a, or one of those two groups will move to a
maj or action against us in the west, at a helluva lot more cost and problem then we
currently have.
So, why doesn't thi s work it out? Why can' t we seem to talk about the enemy? Your
guess is as good as mine. We talk about it as much as we can; I guess we' re not doing a
very good j ob of it, but I think we've got to expose this enemy for what this enemy is,
and at the same time admit that we make plenty of mistakes, but on the other hand, we
need to understand that there's an enemy that' s got a plan, got an ideology and there are
actually two very directions that are designed to throw the United States out of the region
and it' s fortunate for us that they haven't come together. I don't think they will come
together, at least not in the short term, but, you know, we've got to be talking about what
revolutionary Iran means and thinks, because they are in my mind clearly doing
everything they can to be at war with us.
I read somewhere today somebody said, well the Iranians have been at war with us for a
long time, we' ve just never been at war with them. But the question is, you know, how do
we articulate what the Iranians have done, are doing and will do against our interests in
the region and against the interests of the moderates in the region? To me it' s easier to
deal with that because it's tied to a state sponsor. AI Qaeda is a tougher thing to deal
with, because it ' s an ideology. Yet, if you get on their web sites and you just use their
own words and show their pictures ofwhat they think they' re all about, you would think
it would disgust thinking people the same way that fascism and Japanese militarism
disgusted people in the Second World War, but unfortunately, it really hasn' t got to the
danger point yet.
Now, the other final thing I' d say to you is I have been reading a lot of intelligence here
lately about what these various groups are saying to one another, and interest ingly
enough they seem to think that they are getting chewed up by the media as well. And I
was reading some conversation points here of some senior al Qaeda information where
some of the senior leaders exchanged information and I won' t reveal how we know this,
you can imagine, but they' re essentially saying we j ust can't seem to get the media to
understand what we 're doing and why we're doing it. And certainly within Iraq as we
capture al Qaeda people that operate for AQIZ that they seem to think that all the media
outlets are against them, and if people only knew their story, they would be on their side.
But of course, people know what they're doing, and they're not on their side.
So, look, I hope this is useful for you. I appreciate what everybody is doing. It's an
interesting time, but not one in which we ought to wring our hands and be pessimist ic. I
think there' s ways to maneuver through this successfully.
time.
L,-__..... .General, thanks so much for j oining us again today, we really appreciate your
Briefer: Okay.
'-;;:""''"7'::-' Gentlemen, again, just as a reminder you are free to quote a senior military
official from today's call, and thanks for joi ning us.
From:
Sent :
To:
Subj ect :
Atta chment s:
.... CAPT OVCJCSfPA
Thursday, November 16, 2006 1:23 PM
Haddock, Enen (Katie Col M LTC OCJCSlPA CIV JCS SJS; LtCol OCJCSIPA;
PA CIV, JCS
OCJCS' )(I) CIV JCS OVCJCS' CPT JCS SJS
Gen McCaffery GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06
McCaffrey,NDUConf,GWOT- l l 0606.ppt
McCaffrey.NOUCon
f.GWOT· l10606....
Kat i@ and Team - -
Received th@ a ttached GEN McCaffrey ppt brief f rom CENTCOM; i t i s a GWOT pr esentation made
recently a t NOV.
Wh ile t h@r @ i s nothing pa r t i c ular l y new he r e. he do@s provide unfettered observati ons on
I r aq. incl uding dys functi ona l /broken gove r nance . lack of Congressional support f or long -
t erm f undi ng s olut i ons . dangers of diplomatically confronting I r an . and "grossly"
i nad@qua t@ interagency suppor t. Thi s i s relevant because GEN Mcca f f r ey speaks i n va r i ous
venues , i s a n adjunc t pr ofe ssor at We st Point . and i s a mil itary ana lyst f or NBC and
MSNBC. Hi s a udience r e a ch i s signi fi cant. and hi s observati ons wi l l cont i nue to s hape
popular opi nion as we transi tion t o a new SECDEF and cont inue t o l ook hard a t t he GWOT way
ahead.
For your SA.
v
1
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
United States Military Academy at West Point
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
Presentation to:
National Defense University
Defense Worldwide Counter Terrorism Conference
Monday, 6 November 2006
BARRY R. McCAFFREY
GENERAL, USA (RETIRED)
2900 South Quincy Stree t, sune 300A
Arlington, VA 22206
brm@Imccameyassociatel;.com
10)·824·jl60
SIX INSIGHTS ON THE WAR ON TERROR
• The threat terrorist organizations have been intimidated and badly damaged.
• The threat has morphed and remains a huge danger to the US and our allies.
• Global animosity toward US foreign policy and the Administration is
universal, intense, and growing.
• Homeland security has improved immeasurably since 9/11 (not withstanding
Katrina).
• Homeland security is grossly under-resourced, lacks congressional support,
and remains incoherent.
• The proliferation ofWMD nation states and technology remains the principal
threat to the American people and our allies.
GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey
ELEVEN OBSERVATIONS ON IRAQ -- 2006
l it - The morale, fighting effectiveness, and confidence ofV.S. combat forces continue to be simply awe-inspiring. Our allies are leaving.
2
nd
- The Iraqi Army is real, growing, and much more willing to fight. However, they are very badl y equipped. The Iraqi Police are a
disaster.
3
rd
- The Maliki Administration is dysfunctional. Governance is broken. The nation is gri pped with fear and distrust.
4
t
h. - Coalition and Iraqi forces have largely succeeded in neutralizing the foreign jihadist threat at a strategic and operational level.
5
t
h. - Inter-Agency Support for our U.S.- Iraq strategy is grossly inadequate. Onl y the Armed Forces and the CIA are at war.
6
t
h. - We face a seri ous strategic dilemma - Are U.S. combat troops conducting a police action governed by the rule of Iraqi law --
or -- are they a Coalition Military Force supporting a counter-ins urgency campaign in a nation with almost no functioning
inst itutions?
7
t h
- U.S. Detainee policy and conditions have improved dramat ically. We may have over-corrected.
8
t h
- U. S. combat forces need to reduce their footprint to get down to ten combat brigades by Christmas. We are going to break the US
Army.
9
t h
- Iraq cannot sustain economic recovery without enhanced and long-term U.S. budgetary support. Congressional support is lacking.
10
t h
- Tough U.S. diplomatic rhetoric about confronting Irani an nucl ear weapons is ill-advised.
n» - There is growing animosity by the US Armed Forces towards the Media.
GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey
NINE OBSERVATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN - 2006
1st _ Afghanistan has in five years moved from a situation of: mindl ess violence, cruelty, povert y, massi ve production of drugs, the absence
orgovernment, and isolation -- to a nati on with a strugg linS democr atic governme nt; an exploding economy; a rapidl y growing,
disciplined Army; a vibrant free press, and active dipl omatic and economic ties with its neighbors and the world.
2
nd
- There is little question that the level of fighting has intensified rapidl y in the past year. Three years ago the Taliban operated in squad
sized units. Last year they operated in company sized units ( 100+ men). Thi s year the Taliban are operating in battalion sized units
(400+ men).
3
rd
_ The early assumption by NATO of a lead role in supporting the Afghan government is a triumph. NATO is dramatically under-
resourced for the task at hand.
4
t h
• Afghanistan also produces more than 90% of the world ' s opium poppy (4,475 met ric tons 2005) and is also the world's largest heroin
producing and trafficking country.
51. _The creation of 44 battalions of ANA Forces (30,000 troops) in 36 months is an enormous success story. They are the most disciplined,
and effective military force in Afghanistan's history. In general, these troops are very courageous, and aggressive in field operations.
The Afghan Army is miserably under-resourced.
6
1h
_ The Afghan National Police are vital to establishing order in the urban and rural areas . (33,000 Afghan National Police ANP nominally
exist and 5,200 Afghan Border Police) Th ey are in a disastrous condition: badly equipped, corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and
trained, riddled by drug use and lacking any semblance of a national police infrastructure.
7l
h
- We must eradicate the opium crops without fail each growing season -- and massively resource alternative economic development.
8
1h
_ remains devastated th.e peril of which kill and maim a foreign .
nussronen es are harassed; there IS Widespread public perception of government corruption, mcludmg mini sterial involvement Iii
illegal narcoti cs; intimidation and violence directed at NGO workers increased during the past year.
9
t h
- We must re-think the relative importance we place on Afghanistan, This was the source country ofintemational terrorism. If we fait
and it slips back into anarchy -- it will again be a sanctuary for international terror .
GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS FROM GUANTANAMO - 2006
1st - There is now zero physical or mental abuse of prisoners in this facility by eitherguard personnel or military intelligence
interrogators.
2'· - Military interrogations are clearly in compliance with previously published U.S. military training standards.
3
nJ
- Procedures to review the status of Detainees exist. 179 have been released. More than fourhundred and fifty Detainees
are now being held. At least one-third are extremely dangerous terrori sts.
4
th
- Environmental conditions clearly exceed those provided to U.S. Military personnel on garrison active duty.
5
1h
- Opportunity to worship is respected. There is uninterrupted prayer time.
6
1h
_ Medical care, dental care, mental healthcare, nutrition, and cultural sensitivity exceed the standards of'Ll.S. first-line
institutions.
7
th
- Detainees receive 4200 calories a day with 53 individually prepared special diet meals. Four different menus and three
meals a day areoffered. Halal and cultural dietary requirements are supported.
8
th
- All Detainees have significant opportunities for recreation (2- 12 hours daily).
9
tb
_ Detainees areprovided two full sets of clothing, have privacy in cell toilet faciliti es, and are permitted regular showers.
10'>- Books and magazines are offered to all compliant Detainees. (All Detainees regardless of status have a Koran in their
cell).
GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey
WHAT IS IN OUR FUTURE?
I I' - The US economy continues to dominate the global marketplace.
2
nd
- US - Japanese economic and political cooperation grows even more intense.
3
r d
_ Saudi Arabia continues to modernize and maintains stability.
4
t h
- Relations with Europe dramatically improve with the next Administration.
5
th
- Relations with Russia, China, India, and Pakistan -- now immeasurably better than pre-91l1 -- will continue to strengthen.
6
1h
_ North Korea comes apart.
7
111
- Terrorists strike America.
8
1h
_ Crisis in Iraq -- uncertain outcome.
9
l h
_ Showdown in Afghanistan -- uncertain outcome.
l Oth- The death of Castro -- meltdown of repression.
11t h _ Confrontation with Chavez -- instability and oil.
GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey
From:
Sent :
To:
Subj ect :
JCS , OCJCS
Thursday. November 16. 2006 2:28 PM
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCS/PA
RE: Gen McCaffery GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06
Thanks Ka t ie !
USN
Spe c1a l As s 1s tant t o CJCS
Di r e c t o r , Cha o Act i on Group
From: Ha ddock , El l e n ( Kat ie) , Co l . OCJCS / PA
Sent: Thursda Nove mbe r 16 , 2006 2 : 27 PM
To : CAPT, J CS, OCJ CS
Subject: FW : Ge n Mc Caffe ry GWOT br i e f - 6 NOV 06
No t that you n eed one mor e thing to read -- and maybe you 've he ard d irectly fro m Ge n
McCa f f rey , bu t thought these 6 brief s l i des were wor t h s ha r ing . . .
Vi R
Katie
J CS SJS
LTC
CS SJS ;
CIV JCS
Fr om: CAPT OVCJ CS/ PA
Sent : Thurs day , November 16, 2006 1: 23 PM
To : Haddock,
M LTC OCJCS/ PAi
Ma' , OCJCS/PA; )(I)
JCS OVCJe S ;
Subjec t: Gen McCaffe ry GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06
Kat ie a nd Te a m --
Re c e i ved the a t tache d GEN Mc Ca ffrey pp t bri e f f r om CENTCOM; it i s a GWOT p r e s entat ion ma de
r ece n t l y a t NDU.
Wh ile t here i s no t hing par t icu l arly ne w here , he does p r o v ide unf e t t e r e d o bs erva t ions o n
I r aq, i nc l uding d ysf unct i o nal /br o ken governance , l a c k of congressi ona l s uppo r t f or long-
t e rm f und ing s o l u tion s , dangers o f d i p l oma t ica lly c onf ronting Iran , and "gr os s l y "
inade qua te i nteragency s uppo r t. Th is i s rel evant be c a u s e GEN McCaff r ey s pe aks in va r ious
venue s , i s an a d j unc t profess o r at West Po i nt , a nd is a mil i t ary analys t for NBC and
MSNBC. Hi s a ud ienc e rea ch i s s igni f icant , a nd h i s observa tions wi l l continue t o sha pe
popul a r o p i nion a s we tran s i t i o n t o a ne w SECDEF a nd conti nue to l ook ha r d at the GWOT way
a he ad .
Fo r your SA.
v r
From:
Sent :
To:
Cc:
Subject :
Lt Col, OCJCS/PA
Monday, December 11, 2006 10:54 AM
Col, OCJC
1::"" CAPT OVCJCS/PA' LTCOCJCS/PA'- -'
LTC,
UPDATE: MEDIATNTERVIEW REQUESTS
Importance: High
Ma'am. .. r ev i s ed r eque s t below, t o include br i ef ing to mil analysts t omor r ow, for DJ S
appr oval .
v r ,
t o : sharp:
. barbero· r ichardson, j ohn ; sattler;
whitman;
DJ S, Sir; a couple of r equests p l e ase,
1 ) Secretary Rumsfeld wi l l hol d a lunch meeting wi t h t he mi l itary a nal ys t s tomorrow a t
noon. This morning, SecDef r equested t he analysts receive an Iraq Update Briefi ng prior t o
his lunch meeting with them.
Lt Col from office as r eached out t o J -5 (ME) a nd J -3 to request a briefer be
identif1ed to present a combined UNCLASS strategy/curr ent ops br i e f i ng (20 mi n ea) for the
gr oup tomorrow at 1115 i n the DepSe cDe f (T) conference room. BG Jones has t entat ively
agr eed, pend ing a f or ma l tas ki ng , to brief I raq strategy. Read- a he ad packages a r e
fort hcomi ng f r om OSD/PA f or the br i e fer (s ) i dent i f i ed .
With your concurrence, I r equest you pl e a se f orwa r d t o J - 3 and J-5 reque s t ing the i r
a s s i stance in i de nt i f yi ng a bri efer f or tomorrow's event.
2) Thorn Shanker, New York Ti me s , has r equested a background interview with LTG Lut e.
He j ust r eturned from I raq and one of the stories he 's worki ng on i s a profile of GEN
Abizai d. One of GEN Abi zai d 's s enior aide s e ncourage d Thorn to talk wi t h LTG Lut e a s he i s
someone who knows GEN Abi zai d well and can talk about hi s ca reer .
LTG Lut e ha s agreed to the i nt e rvi ew a nd, pe nding approval, we ' ve tenta t ive l y s cheduled
t he i nt erview f or t omorr ow, a t 1230.
Lt Col 1 f r om my of fi ce wi l l be present to monitor t he i nterview.
Recommend we s upport . Thorn is one of the bes t and will write a me ani ngf ul and t hought f ul
per sona l pr ofi l e.
Ve ry Respectfull y,
Katie
t
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Lt Col, OCJCSIPA
Monday, December 11, 2006 11:25 AM
Haddock Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJC
CAPT OVCJCSJPA LTC OCJCSIP
LTC,OCJCSJPA; CDR, OCJCSIPA
UPDATE 2: MEDIA INTERVIEW REQUESTS
Ma 'am... j us t got a cal l f r om BG J ones (J- 5, ME) . .. he honest l y doesn 't t hi nk we s hould be
of f e ri ng a strategy br ief for I r aq because the r e isn't a nythi ng new to s ay and we could
only get our s e lves i n a jam by pot e nt ially conf l i c ting wi t h wha t Se cDe f wi l l s ay 45
minutes l a t e r when he meets wi t h t hem. He suggests a J -3 current ops updat e and leave
strat egy/ pol i cy ques t ions t o t he SecDe f. I actual l y agree with hi m. .. t hi s t i me. Based on
your t hou hts , I ' ve adjusted the request below a s such .
v r,
Fr om: 1::-__,.--..".-...,..... Lt Col, OCJ CS/ PA
Se nt : Monday, December 11 , 2006 10 :54 AM
To : (Kat i e) , Col , OCJ",CiS!i::PA = = = = = = 1
ce , PA; I LTC OCJ CS/ PAiL ....
LTC, OCJ CS PA; J CDR, OCJ CS/ PA
Sub jec t : UPDATE: MEDIA INTERVI EWREQUESTS
I mpor t ance: Hi gh
Ma 'am... r evi sed r equest bel ow, t o inc lude br i e f i ng t o mi l anal ysts tomor r ow, f or DJS
approva l.
v r,
to: s harp :
c c:
====: ;:J,.e:tdOC:J<,;I-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---,..- J whi tman ;
DJ S, Si r ; a coup l e of r equests please,
1) Secre t ary Rumsfel d wi l l ho ld a l unch me e ting wit h t he mili tary ana l ys t s t omor r ow a t
noon. Thi s morning , Se cDef requested the anal ysts r e ceive an I raq Update Br ief i ng pri or t o
his l unch me e t i ng wi t h t hem.
Wi t h your concurrence, I reque st you p l ea se forwa rd to J-3 requesti ng t heir ass ist ance in
i dentifyi ng a briefe r for tomor row' s event .
2) Thorn Shanker, New Yor k Ti mes , has request ed a background i ntervi e w wi th LTG Lut e .
He j us t r e tur ned f r om I r aq and one of the stories he 's wor ki ng on is a profi l e of GEN
Abi zaid . One of GEN Abizai d ' s s eni or a i de s encour aged Thorn t o talk with LTG Lute a s he is
s omeone who knows GBN Abi zaid we l l and can tal k about hi s career.
LTG Lute has agr eed t o the i nterview and , pend i ng appr oval , we ' ve tentativel y schedul ed
the interview f or t omorr ow, at 1230 .
1
Lt Col ~ ...........l f r om my office will be pr e s e nt to moni tor the i nt e rvi ew.
Recomme nd we suppor t. Thorn is one of the be s t and wil l wri te a meaningf ul and thoughtful
pers ona l pr of i l e .
very Re s pe c t f ul l y .
Katie
2
CAPT
CDR JCS
JCSJPA

0gDJS;
OVCJCS/PA; TG JCS J3; Col JCS
MAJ, JCS, J3; ..... W, L1Col, JCS J3;
i n, Bryan )(II) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA ;
IB. roero, Mk:h.el 0 BG JCS NMCC'
J3; ':" CAPT JCS NMCC; COL JCS J3; ...
Col , JCS, J-3 L.. -'
RE; MEDIA REQUESTS Subj ect :
Fr om:
Sent:
To :
Cc :
Both approved
Col , J CS,
OCJCS PA·
JCS J 3 · LCOR
J CS, ODJS;
JCS J3 ;
Lt Col
JCS J3 ; COL
[Whi t man ,
Barbero, Micha e l 0
CAPT J CS NMCC;
Haddock, El len (Kat i e) , Col, OCJ CS/ PA
Monday, December 11 , 200 6 12 : 56 PM
Wal ter L, LTG, JCS DJ
b
..- .,
Col J CS SJ S; Lt Col ,
Dou l a s E LTG J CS J3 ;
Lt CoI , JCS J3 ;
Brya n , SES, OASO- PAl;
MEDI A REQUESTS
J- 3
>Sub j e ct:
:.
>Sent:
>To: Sha
>Cc:
CAPT OVCJ CS/ PA; Lute
G, MAJ, J CS, J 3 '
Whi tman , Bryan
L COL OSO PA .
>
>Genera l Sharp, Si r;
>We have the fol l owing medi a requests f or J oint Staff pe rsonnel:
>1 ) Secr e tary Rumsfeld will hol d a l un ch meet i ng wi t h the mil itary analysts tomorrow at
noon . Thi s morning , SecDef r equ e s t ed the a na lys ts receive an I r aq update Br iefing prior to
his l unch mee t ing with t hem.
>Lt Col f r om my off i ce as reached out t o J- 3 t o r eque s t a briefer be i dent ified t o
pr esent an UNCLASS cur r ent ops upda t e brief ing f or the group tomorr ow at 1115 in t he
DepSecDef (T) conf erenc e r oom. Read -ahead packages are f ort hcoming f r om OSD/PA for t he
briefer ident ified.
>J-3 s taff ha s bee n informed of the reques t ; with your conc ur r e nce , we wi l l continue
coordinat ion with J3 to i dent i f y a briefe r for t omorrow's event.
>
>I mport ant one t o s uppor t - - the s e analyst s wi ll use thi s i nformat i on to inform the i r
frequent report i ng/ a na l ys i s in the national me di a .
>
>2) Thorn Shanker , New York Times , has requested a ba ckground interview with LTG Lute.
>Thom Shanker j us t ret ur ne d from Iraq and one of the s t or ies he 's wor ki ng on is a pr ofile
of GEN Abizai d . One of GEN Abizaid 's senior a i de s encour aged Thom t o tal k wi t h LTG Lute a s
he i s someone who knows GEN Abizaid well and can talk about his career.
>LTG Lute has agreed t o the interview and , pendi ng approval, we 've tentat i ve ly s chedul ed
the interview for t omorrow, a t 1230 .
>Lt Col f r om my of fi ce will be pre sent to moni t or t he i ntervi ew.
>Re commen we s uppor t . Thom i s one of t he bes t and wi l l wr ite a mea ningf ul and t hought f ul
profile .
>Very Res pect ful l y ,
>Ka t i e
>
1

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