by J ohan Vander Hoeven

Three lectures given at the 1964 Study Conferences of The Association for Reformed Scientific


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The 1965 Christian Perspective Series Lectures were delivered at the Unionville, Ontario Study Conference of The Association for Reformed Scientific Studies in August, 1964. The lectures on Phenomenology were given also in Vernon, British Columbia and at a student conference in Unionville in September. Their appearance in printed form will make them available to a much wider circle than those who hear them delivered. Dr. Johan Vander Hoeven's analysis of phenomenology and Dr. Remkes Kooistra's critique of modern university education complement each other nicely. The lectures of Kooistra cover a broad field of modern university education and show the destructive influence of science that has divorced itself from the controlling power of the Word of God. Those of Vander Hoeven deal in some depth with a specific way in which modern philosophical thought, called phenomenology, has traveled far toward the dead end of a blind alley that started with assurance of reason's selfdirectedness. Taken together, the lectures of the 1965 Series show with new force that learning that will not bow to the kingship of Christ nor follow the law of His Word nor recognize as His the order He has set permanently in created reality, provides no hope of salvation to modern man in his quandry. Modern scholarship, separated from the source of Light and in enmity with Him who is the Wisdom and the Power of God (I Corinthians 1 :24), has bound itself in service to an idol, and in spite of its great achievements, can offer man only confusion and bondage. Unless it is redeemed by Jesus Christ, its last state will be worse than the first, The Association which has sponsored these lectures and now f'Iers them in printed form would like to think that many of t he readers will come to see that not the discovered truths of the science of pretended autonomy can set man free but only the nut horitative TRUTH of the Word of Christ.
Printed in Canada by COMPANY 1.'1'1>. Cunadu




of this

claim we would challenge
Pnul G,






J ohan van tier H oeven was born in Rotterdam,
• The Netherlands in the Theological in .1932. He studied theology

College in Kampen and pur-

sued graduate study in philosophy at the University there of

Leuien. He receuoed his doctor's degree
upon presenting a dissertation entitledJ:

Kritische ondervraging

van de fenomenologische

rede. He is now associate professor in Philosophy
at the Free University in Amsterdam.


Lecture I

Husserl and the crisis of European "Reason"

Lecture 11

Phenomenology and Existentialism

Lecture III

Beyond Existentialism

Lecture I

Husserl and the crisis of European "Reason"
1. Introduction and general remarks I should like to begin with a word of appreciation. I have only just started as a lecturer at the Free University of Amsterdam. I therefore consider it an honour to be permitted to deliver lectures on this continent and for this community. You have many ties with the Netherlands and regularly supply the Free University with enthusiastic and energetic students. II consider it the greatest privilege that the bond which joins us to our Master and the refreshing experience of contact with these students can be strengthened in this way. Rise of phenomenorogy in the beginning of the 20th century
I have been asked to speak to you on the phenomenological movement. This philosophical movement arose in Europe in the beginning of this century and quickly attained a strong influence there. Both in philosophy and the special sciences, in particular the so-called social sciences, phenomenology in Europe has slain its thousands. This does not mean that it was a very 'popular' philosophy. On the contrary, I should warn you at once that these lectures will not be easy. Much has been thought during the Pl\~t ages and phenomenology has assimilated it in its own manner. Besides, because phenomenology itself is such a laborious oxortion to find a new way in an entangled situation, it is neces('xI'I'lion to find a new way in an entangled situation, it is as necesru-y f1~ difficult to follow the leading phenomenologists as to re cog1I1i';(' the' salient point where a wrong track starts. You may already have heard or read about the inner crisis 11111\ extreme disruption, into which humanism, the leading Iil(' IHIW('" of W('Ht('1'1lsoC'iC'ty, has come since the last century. l/ollI:hly NJ)('/lldI\I~, 111('IDlh c'('tlllll'Y succombcd to positi1)iwn. This J)(I/llIlvilml WII.'1 llu: 11'1:IIhlllllt' lu-lr of l hr: 1I1~(I-()ld Nf"io'l7oo-id,<'nl, but

then in a situation which was determined by the critique of knowledge of the great humanistic philosopher Immanuel Kant. This critique itself had opened the door to a historicism) which increasingly gained ground. From this historicism an anarchistic relativism resulted.
Dilthey and the inner dialectic


the humanistic


One of the noblest minds of this period was the famous philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, He lived through this crisis intensely and all his life tried to find an escape by means of a so-called critique of historical reason. However, when he gave the final account of this critique, he had to acknowledge: "In the mind of the present period and its philosophy the last and most characteristic feature arises out of the discord of the sovereignty of scientific thought and the desperation of the mind concerning itself . . . . Here the emptiness of consciousness asserts itself, whereby all standards have been abolished; everything fixed has become wavering, an unlimited liberty of admission, the play with boundless possibilities let the mind enjoy its sovereignty and at the same time give it the pain of its lack of content." 1 These are striking and penetrating words. When they were spoken, phenomenology came into existence. In this movement age-old humanism has, as it were, made its last, impressive attempt at resurrection and renewed concentration. In this last gathering of forces the whole development contracts itself once again. But because in the above mentioned crisis we have to do with an inner crisis of humanism as such, We must state that in this undoubtedly great attempt the essential crisis becomes vividly evident. A height has been reached, which at the same time implies a Iow point. The words of Dilthey cited above give expression to a profound dialectic. A dialectic is a tension between two poles, here simultaneously excluding and presupposing each other. We can designate these poles with the words of Dilthey himself: on the one hand the sovereignty or autonomy of the human ('rational') mind, on the other hand the total

rational domination of reality, the human mind itself included. In short: a tension between rational autonomy and autonomous rationality. The first pole is and remains the primary one: man in his apostasy from the living God, his Origin, chooses himself, decides to be autonomous at all cost. But he cannot really be autonomous, he cannot really disengage himself from his Creator and from the wholesome order of creation; in his insurrection against God, man falls away to a spurious, would-be creative origin. For humanism this means an apostasy to the human function of rational distinction, a function that is dislocated from its real meaning and now continually threatens the 'autonomous' self-consciousness from which this absolutization of 'reason' originated. Now phenomenology tried anew and very laboriously to overcome this fundamental tension with all its disastrous consequences and to discover again the higher, 'transcendental' unity of life. It results, however, in a manifestation of this tension: the two poles are confronted with each other once again, but in this way the original dualism comes to light even more clearly. This is the historical meaning of phenomenology in its religious perspective.
Why we are interested in phenomeoology

Precisely for this" reason this philosophical current ticularly instructive for us all. We have to deal with people of Western culture and primarily as 'natural' men in a society wherein a dominant humanism constantly assert its power via philosophy and from there via the sciences.

is parit. As we live tries to various

"Aus dieser Dissonanz der Souveranitat des wissenschaftlichen Denkens und der Ratlosigkeit des Geistes iiber sich selbst . . . entsteht nun del' letzte und eigenste Zug im Geiste des gegenwar tigen Zeitalters und in scincr ,Philosophie .... In ihnen macht sich die Leere des Bewusstaotna gcltC'nd, da alle Massstabe aufgehoben worden sind, alles F'estc ist, schwnnkond geworden, eine schrankenlose F'reiheit dol' Annahmon, (lIlK Rpipl mit grenzenlosen Mdglichkeitcn Iasscn -dcn GOiHt H0illCl RUUV(l1'1I I, g'I'IIII'HH(11l n it,ll und geben ihm zurrleic'h d(\I1 Rc'hltH'l'l'. H(licH'r InhIlItJot\lg'lwlt.", W. III It.Ilt1y, GeSMnmcl/,(I So/Wi/II"II, vol. V Ill, n. IIll!.

There is a second reason why it is important for you and me to concern ourselves with phenomenology. The phenomenological way of thinking arose as a European, originally German and then also French, philosophy. But recently it has met with more interest in America too. Lately English translations have uppcared of the main works of the outstanding phenomenologists: l Iusscrl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. James M. Edie, nrorcssor at the Northwestern University, who studied in Europe 1111' pig-ht years, published a book What is Phenomenology?, a translnllnn of articles by the well-known French-Swiss phenomenologist 1'11'1'1'(' 'I'})('vcnnz, with Cl preface by John Wild.' In 1960 Herbert
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Spiegelberg, who lives and works in the United States, published, especially for American readers, an important book in two volumes, entitled The Phenomenoloqical Movement. A historical Introduction?

However in my opinion this influence of phenomenology is far from 'pure' that is, it is mainly the influence of phenomenology in its last phase. This phase is marked by the clear manifestation of the tensions which characterized this philosophy from the outset and by the appearance of a certain disintegration. Many adherents, to be sure, still try to hold on to what at first looked like a hopeful revival of the once vital humanistic ideals. At the same time there is an increasing search for the possibilities of cross- fertilization with schools that formerly were considered as antagonists. Precisely in order to draw your attention to this situation, I spoke briefly at the beginning about the spiritual 'climate,' wherein phenomenology came into existence. Yet we cannot deny, that the original, 'pure' phenomenology already gave occasion to the alliance which 1 now point out. Here we meet with a noteworthy course in the development of the phenomenological movement. The first impression of this course is confusing. But this cannot be a reason to neglect or to simplify it for convenience's sake. On the contrary, we must try to penetrate into the inner dialectics of the humanistic religious groundmotive as a community-motive. Thus we touch the third and main reason that induces us to a serious confrontation with phenomenology. You know or have heard about the work A New Critique of Theoretical 'I'houqhi: by Herman Dooyeweerd. This title is a clear allusion to those of the main works of Kant, the great philosopher of modern times. Indeed, nowhere in the Western world can philosophy after Kant be the same as before him. His appearance had the significance of a real turning-point, because he, like nobody else, summoned humanism to a critical self-reflection upon its own foundations. One can theoretically throw one's 'light' upon all sorts of things and try to combine this in a universal system of thought, but when one system opposes the other, when 'universal' systems of knowledge come and go and in the end all is in danger of' ending in scepticism (think of Hume) , then it is high time to-subject the 'dogmatical,' naive self-evidence of this universal

theoretical knowledge to a searching critique by asking: what is knowledge? how is it possible? what are its a priori 'transcendental' conditions? This is what Kant did. But precisely in the 'critique of reason' the humanistic original dualism appeared. (1 shall return to this point presently.) Since Kant, much has happened, but I must by-pass it now. 1 mention only the end crisis about which I spoke at the beginning. The meaning of phenomenology, briefly stated, consists then in the fact that in it we are concerned with the last, renewed endeavor within humanism to reach an integral and radical 'critique of reason.'

The cardinal



impact between humanistic philooO'phy

and Christian

Here is the cardinal point of impact between humanistic and Christian philosophy. Every Christian who works in science should be particularly interested in this attempt of humanism. For humanism is characterized by its belief in the autonomy of 'reason.' Against that the Christian thinker has to protest most profoundly for the sake of his sole Master, Jesus Christ. Opposite to the stagnation and the inevitable tensions, which this belief entails, the Christian scientist has to show in a positive way, what a great liberation. faith in Jesus Christ - a faith that discloses its own meaning - brings about for reflecting upon the many-sided reality, into which we all have been placed. It is, as a matter of fact, self-evident that, in trying to do this we can learn much from humanistic thinkers. We should not be narrow-minded or even hypocritical in this respect. From the beginning to the end we stand in the God-created reality, that surrounds us on every side. There is no other reality. And we all must work together to open up this creation, even in spite of ourselves; we have been charged with this task. But the direction is always decisive and that is chosen in faith. Only in the true direction do the various moments of truth become what they really are: moments of the Truth. Now when a philosopher like Husserl makes a critique of reason a main point of his program, the Christian thinker has 10 pay close attention. Obviously this points up that there is HOnlt'l hlrur wrong with 'autonomous reason': something in the dt'VI'lopmont hn» run stuck and the movement has to be started up IIgllll1. 'I'hl» will bc' our <'c'/11nt) point of view in these lee1111'PH(Ill phl'/1oIJlI'llo1ogy.

H. Spiegelberg,

2 vols. Den


The Phenomcnolouioal Movcm(·nt. A hi8torioal int,·orluotion. 19GO.


The difficulty

of a (definition)

2. Huseeri's


of philosophy

as a rigorous


A central point of view - which cannot be forced from the outside - is certainly needed. Of course it would be easiest for you and me, if I could begin with a short and clear answer to the question: what is phenomenology? You may ask me, what are you speaking about? But this very question encounters a great difficulty, for a concise answer is impossible. The terms 'phenomenology' and 'phenomenological' are among the most undefined, chameleon-like terms of modern philosophy. Sometimes this is considered as a sign of the particular fruitfulness of this thought. At any rate, there is no use in denying that in various respects we can learn from and be stimulated by the outstanding phenomenologists. But as a matter of fact, under the banners of phenomenology sails a rather heterogeneous company. Already during the lifetime of Husserl, grave dissidence arose between "him and Heidegger concerning the meaning of phenomenology. For various reasons this difference has issued in a grave alienation between these two great men. Nowadays we must ascertain why such great figures as Heidegger and Sartre hardly mention 'phenomenology' and 'phenomenological.' On the other hand, as far as these terms are still used with some regularity, they often are hollowed out and only vaguely intend to indicate a certain tradition which no longer has much positive uniting force. Many philosophers, strongly divergent among themselves, who, traveling along different ways, almost all came to an impasse and, more than once inclined to defeatism, clung to 'the' phenomenology as the new perspective. Since this perspective appears to fail as the final insight, for the once enthroned philosophy only two ways seem to be left. On the one hand: an escape into explicit mythology. On the other: the seal of stagnation and of powerlessness in the pragmatistic proclamation of the 'plurality of the truth.' In this case for practical philosophizing ..there. is hardly another avenue left than that of a logicistic thought-and-languagetechnique - without much to say. The vangueness of the term 'phenomenology' is rather symptom of the character of our time; it is a melting-pot into which all sorts of things are thrown together. It is difficult to say what will come from this, apart from some contours gradually appearing here and there. , Nevertheless, there is a certain continuity between Husscrl and the existentialist phenomenology, as well as bet woon the first and the last phase of th0 latter. But to <IiH(,OV(,1' this continuity, wo cannot ~tuy I'll tho Hlll'lnc·<'.


experience of a crisis

In this first lecture we speak on Husserl, the initiator of the movement. To arrive at the centre of 'Husserl's intentions, it is useful to listen to a note in his diary of 1906. Here Husserl says: "In the first place I mention the general task that I must fulfill for myself, if I should be able to call myself a philosopher. I mean a critique of reason. A critique of logical and practical reason, of 'valuing' reason in general. Without coming to clarity in broad outline about the meaning, the essence, the methods, the main viewpoints of a critique of reason, without having contrived, drawn up, established and founded a general draft for it, I most truly cannot live. I've sufficiently passed through the vexations of a lack of clarity, of wavering doubt. I must come to an inner firmness. I know that great geniuses have failed at it and if I would compare myself with them, I should have to despair in advance."

Such a high and far reaching endeavor, pronounced in such charged words, presupposes the experience of a crisis. In another way this crisis was already attested by two great older contemporaries of Husserl, viz., Dilthey and Nietzsche. Towards the end of his life Husserl himself published a great and important work entitled The Crisis Of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenoloqu? You see then that in 1937 Husserl was still intensely occupied with what stirred him already in the beginning of our century. What was it, more concretely, which engaged Husserl so seriously, and what gives him his special significance and infuence in the philosophical life of this century? We discover a first
• "An erster Stelle nenne ich die allgemeine Aufgabe, die ich fiir rnich Iosen muss, wenn ieh mieh soll einen Philosophen nennen k6nnen. Ieh meine eine Kritik del' Vernunft. Eine Kritik del' logischen und del' praktischen Vernun ft, del' wertenden iiberhaupt, Ohne in allgemeinen Ziigen mir iiber Sinn, Wesen, Methoden, Hauptgesichtspunkte einer Kritik del' Vernunft ins Klarc zu kommen, ohne einen allgemeinen Entwurf fUr sie ausgedacht, entworfen, festgestellt und begrundet zu haben, kann ieh wahr und wahrhaftig nicht leben. Die Qualen del' Unklarheit, des hin- und horachwankenden Zweifels habe ich ausreichend genossen. Ich muss zu piner inneren Festig-ke,it hinkommen. Ieh weiss, dass grosse Genien daran (IHchciiert Hind und wollt ich mich mit ihnen vergleichen, so miisst ich VU/I vornhorcln vorzwoif'eln." Cited in the "Introduction of the editor" (W. Hh'ltwl) or ItL IIl1HRM1, Di« Idoc de?" Pluienomenolooie (The Idea of I'lwuonJIIllOluI{Y), I )C'II 111l/lg' 10rlO. IJ;,' oIir;H;1I


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main line in his strenuous striving in his idea of 'philosophy as a rigorous science.' With this idea Husserl placed himself over against two sides: on the one hand the so-called 'naturalistic' positivism and on the other hand the historicistic philosophy of life-and-world-views (Weltanschauungsphilosophie). That is to say, tendencies which meanwhile have passed through a certain development, but in their proper purport are still relevant. All his life Husserl was attached to this ideal of a philosophy as a rigorous science. Until his death he remained laboriously engaged in its realization. From the outset he knew that he had to row against the stream. At the end of his career he had to admit in disillusion: 'Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, even apodictical science, - the dream has been dreamt.' 6 In the next lectures we shall expand on this point. In view of this course it may seem obvious to consider Hlisserl's thought only as a last stand, as a temporarily retarding barrier in a stream that could not be stopped. Surely, there is truth in this view. However, in the history of the Western world that has searched for its great glory in its science, Husserl's impressive enterprise of a 'philosophy as rigorous science' is too important for us to dismiss merely as a more or less interesting historical phenomenon, as the cramped reaction of a clever scholar who was not able to keep up with his time.
Natural scientific method and (understanding~ (Verstehen)

total domination of all these events. There is an attempt, at least as far as the area of the 'social sciences' is concerned, to found the scientific certainty on a so-called 'understanding' (Verstehen) of the varying subjective acting and its possible 'motives.' It is an attempt) and those who make it generally are still so attached to the 'only saving' natural scientific method that they are at a loss what to do with a knowledge that surpasses it. To put it differently: they have so surrendered their heart to this way of thinking as the fundamental and all-dominating certainty, that they become uncertain, as to any question that concerns a direction-giving view-point to the theoretical investigation of that which does not belong to the 'natural' sides of reality. I mean those sides of reality where we see man in his responsible acting with 'nature' in his various societal relationships. For a fruitful investigation of these aspects, it is required that we be willing to have our theoretical knowing itself opened up by a central self-knowledge and knowledge of men, a knowledge which reaches far above any natural scientific method, and above any psychological 'understanding' or 'feeling' (Einfiirhlung). This central self-knowledge can only be granted us by the Worldrevelation and thus, once accepted in faith, liberates our whole theoretical outlook. But this opening-up is fundamentally excluded as long as one a-priorily shuts himself up in an attitude of theoretical thought, disengaged from its meaning, with the concomitant method, which - apart from this absolutization - can indeed-be fruitful for the discovery and analysis of that which really has been entrusted to the control of man.
Husserl's battle with psychologism

Against which stream did Husserl have to battle? In order to understand his specific position as a 'critic,' we must realize that he came from the so-called exact sciences. In the Western world these sciences have been presented as the model of unassailable trustworthiness. Until now final certainties in all sorts of areas, even in the so-called social sciences, have been expected from mathematical, natural scientific methods. Actually, since the end of the last century in Europe, especially under the influence of Dilthey, the monopoly of this method has been called into question. We can observe a clear aversion to the manipulations with hypotheses, which can be verified from the principle of causality and thus lead to the establishement of 'laws' that are conceived in a naturalistic way; from the determination of the eourse of all events according to these laws; from the idea that the knowledge of the latter would enable to the (in principle)
6 "Philosophie


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Positivism, dominant in the beginning of Husserl's career, operated, as best it might, from this premise of a natural scientific method. As best it might, for at any rate it had learned from Kant, that nowhere can man (or, as humanistic philosophy puts it, the (subject», with his act-life be left out of account. For every 'fact' is at least always a perceived fact, and this perception is directly accompanied by a certain interpretation. Yet it tried to sight also these undeniable 'subjective' factors in the trusted 'objective,' i.e.) natural scientific way. The result was the psychologism of the 19th century, an absolutization of the psychical Iunct ion that IH, human nets, which in reality carry only the pHyehknl fund Ion 111-1OIl(' (lmportnn t.) aspect among- others, were


enclosed in this function.

Thus there was a preference for speaking about the 'stream' of sensations, ideas etc. This 'stream' was most frequently conceived of as an 'objective,' natural-factual process, in which, by virtue of the physical 'causality,' one thing proceeded 'necessarily' from another. The 'subjective' (i.e., for a humanist, meaning-giving) character of the acts was then in danger of disappearing in the course of the 'stream,' closed in itself. The typical totality-structures of human acts (unities, pointing above themselves, of all functions in a certain typical order) were dissolved in so-called most simple 'elements' (of sensations and the like), out of which then more or less intricate complexes of 'representations' e.g., arise. That is to' say: by. means of them these thinkers tried to reconstruct the whole. (Mill even spoke about 'mental chemistry'). To understand Husserl, we must realize that in this way the logical norms of human thought-activity were directly endangered. For in this all-embracing 'process' these norms could not fail to vaporize into one psychical factuality among others, a factuality of reiatvoe stability and of more or less 'practical utility.' Thus this 'scientific' way of thinking entered the threshold of a disastrous scepticism. Just now we heard Husserl himself attest this scepticism in a penetrating way. Perhaps Husserl's program of a philosophy as a rigorous science now has come somewhat nearer to you. For another aspect of the scepticism implied the increasing distance between philosophy and the special sciences. The latter unfolded ever more quickly and widely, in consequence of an enlargement of the technical possibilities as well as through the fact that the ever more disclosing, integrating and differentiating society demanded specified and refined distinction. But at the same time the first symptoms appeared of a malady that in our time has really burst out: great activity of ever more specialists who hardly know any longer 'With. what they are occupied.
'Deecruptive psychology) and the problem of foundation

or no, Husserl placed the sober, laborious and patient analysis of that which was really 'given,' of the so-called 'things themselves.' But he wanted just as much, with this parole ('to the things themselves') to confront the so-called unprejudiced (in reality constructivistic) methods of positivist psychologism which, as we saw, developed into scepticism. According to Husserl, the important thing before all construction is to attain insight into that which is really given 'Within the human act-experience itself and to describe this as accurately as possible. Descriptive psychology against natural scientific psychology - this was Husserl's start. The general framework of his train of thought was that of his time: psychology. The basic denominator that must bring together the different sides of reality was the so-called stream of experiences of consciousness. But within this general framework Huser! had in mind something else, which could not fail to break through it and indeed did so afterwards. His main problem was the problem of foundation) namely that of the universal validity of scientific, i.e.) logical statements. That is why his first important philosophical publication bears the title: Logical Investigations (Logische Unte'tsuchungen).7 This validity, he stated, cannot be maintained; on the contrary, it is undermined when human consciousness together with its acts, notwithstanding the lip-service which positivistic psychologism renders to it, is handled as a conglomerate of contingent natural processes, characterized by certain regularities, but for the rest is conceived of as a general, indeterminate stream without any real meaning. For how can one uphold, from this point of view, the (implicitly claimed) validity and meaning of the scientific statements concerning these processes? Undoubtedly Husserl's critique of psychologism was quite to the point in several respects and did not fail to make an impression. But as for himself the way of solving the problem was far from easy. He could not return to Kant who had founded universal validity upon so-called transcendental, a priori forms of sensory perception and thought, taken together in the so-called consciousness-in-general (Bewusstsein uberhaupt). For it is true that this Kantian consciousness was meant to be subjective and Cl!'; such the last, spontaneous origin of meaning. But, on closer oxnmination, it was only a formal unity, which largely restricted

Husserl and Kant
In this situation Husser! wanted to rehabilitate philosophy. -Phtlosophy would again have to devote itself seriously to its task and reflect upon the really ultimate questions of 'conscious' humanity and upon the foundations of the various special sciences. But at the same time it would' have to proceed in a rigorously scientific manner. Over against speculative phantasy, brilliant



11,11111 1.11.1'4., 022, 102R, 2 vols. 1 1



the insight into the place and role of human acting as such, an acting which never can be reduced to a form, let alone a theoretical form of thought. The Kantlan solution shows too clearly the tenacious influence of the old rationalism for which 'reason' is the all-embracing, primarily given order of reality) the universal framework wherein we exist, our most unproblematic, self-evident asset. (Even when Kant established a second domain of 'practical' reason, where the most proper essence of man should be found, viz.) his autonomous moral 'conscience,' -even then Kant clung to a formal law: you ought (Du sollsi), and thus rather obscured the subjective auto-nomy). As a matter of fact, this was exactly one of the reasons why the renewed attention to the human act-life - after the brilliant but highly speculative metaphysics about it of German idealism - fell back into psychologism and thus in reality remained below the level of Kant. For Kant had at least tried to lift humanistic reasoning up above its stagnation, its fixation (idee fixe) with respect to the psychical aspect of life, to point out the relation of this reasoning itself to a 'transcendental idea.' In his Logical Investigations Husserl wants to overcome the impasse of this psychologism without returning to the formalism of Kant and his consciousness-in-general, however transcendental it may be called. The primary intention of Husserl is not to explain the rules for the logical activity, but to show and to establish that there are universal, 'constant essences (eide) , which, according to the great phenomenologist, are of a logical nature and must be considered as undeniably real structures of human acts themselves. But how can this be established?
Husserl's conception Of (intentionality'

certain size and geometrical form, cal1ed 'house.' But he is not interested' in this; this may be a matter with which physicists and builders are concerned. We have to make a passing reference to this point, for we must see that Husserl does not disengage himself from the old and tenacious tradition which closes 'reality' in its (abstracted) natural aspects, i.e., in those which, by natural scientific means, can be calculated and measured and thus mastered. What remains must then be placed in an (ideal' sphere, where either 'pure' logic or 'metaphysics' or artistic experience and expression or even mythology and 'religion' can try to exert their strength. Husserl does indeed distinguish between the natural, material 'reality' and the sphere of meaning, which is called 'ideal.' This appears for instance from his argument that a house can be burnt down, but not its meaning. We must allow this remark to pass without comment. Suffice it to say that this separation is based upon a more fundamental dualism which cannot be accepted by a Christian philosophy. At any rate, within this general traditional scheme H;usserl, who has experienced the consequences of positivistic phychologism with its exclusive natural scientific methods, fixes his eye towards that second domain, which for him is the prevailing one. So he takes the positivist concept of 'reality' for granted, but, as he says, real existence (in this abstract, restricted sense) is not relevant for the aim of his phenomenological investigations. According to Husserl, it is quite possible to fix the meaning or the essence of a product of phantasy like that of a centaur. In any case, however, this opinion sharpens the question: what is the meaning of this conception of 'meaning' and how is it established? Certainly, it was important and high time, too, that the question of meaning was raised again emphatically. Indeed, here we touch the typical peculiarity of phenomenological thought: its proper interest does not lie in what effectively goes n in consciousness or - in a later phase and more generally in human activity, in order to describe this as completely as posslblo, to make statistics of it and then to apply this knowledge, j('C'hnically, in 'practice'; nor is it specially concerned with the components of a correct logical statement. Its main question IN: what do we mean by perceiving, feeling, dreaming, imagining, .I1111J-tlnJ-tor - in El later phase - existing as such, and, with pC c'llk 1"('/'('1'1'11<'(' t() tll(' HJ)(\('iul :..wiC'l1ceH? What do we mean hy phYH1I'1I1, I lIolydl lcu I, loglcnl, hlatortcul, llngulstlc, ethical, 'rel


The first thing is to take the act as act, i.e.) not as a blind, mechanically passing process, but as a conscious experience. Husserl explains this by a specific term, intentionality. Every act, as an act of consciousness, is characterized by intending, by meaning something. Let us take the example of a house. You can perceive it, admire it for its beauty, pass judgment on it, design it, occupy it, even set it on fire (if you are a pyromaniac) and so on. But in all these different acts the house has meaning. That which is meant is not something like a thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) , a so-called real object. Husserl, to be sure, does not deny the real existence of the house; he is willing to concede that there is a certain collection or stones, wood etc., with a


Iigious"? (Incidentally, to prevent misunderstanding, it may be profitable to' observe that Husserl does not aim at a sort of linguistic analysis. His intentions penetrate much mare deeply than the pursuits af the linguistic school which may be sound in same respects against certain phantastic, speculative and careless tendencies in thought, but as a whale, in my conviction, is a sign of the decadence of Western philosophy, because it practically displays an indifference to' the real meaning of language as well as of analysis.)
A cardinal question

in fact, was already an abstract 'coherence'), an the other side is set apart and put in the foreground as the central 'Archimedean point' itself, the point from which the diversity of acts and their 'meaning-contents' can be viewed and established. At the same moment the psychological basic denominator is reduced to the 'objective' field which must receive its meaning from logicalmethodical reflection. This must take place _in a rigorous, methodical analysis. Starting from a definite, 'concrete' act and its contents, this analysis has to' sift, by 'varying' the act in its different possibilities and impossibilities (possibilities of thought!) , the 'individual', 'cantingent' features of it. At last it has to' accomplish itself in a sa-called intuitive insight into the 'essence' (eidos), which insight also must play the role of a final criterion. This is, in bra ad outline, the meaning of what is called in phenomenology the eidetic reduction.' In this eidetic reduction the theoretical outlook is directed primarily to the 'objective' part of the 'intentional' act, namely to' the intended 'meaning' as such. Husserl maintains that it is an intended meaning, that the meaning-content is immanent to the intentional act itself and that the units of meaning are nothing but the ideally grasped moments of these acts. But since Husserl himself reasons within the general framework Of psychologism) which had dissolved the central point of reference in the psychological 'stream' with its conglomeration of various 'objective facts', no other expedient to save the universal validity is left than the substantialization of the various logical 'meanings' to' a domain of 'ideality.' The latter oscillates between a positlvistically conceived 'objectivity' and a sphere of 'laws,' but at any rate exists at the cost of subjective activity. This is what we can call the rationalistic trait in Husserl. It cannot be the final word about him, however. Later an we meet with a 'phenomenological' or 'transcendental' reduction, in which the situation has been modified. We shall return to this paint presently.
Reflection and faith


At this paint of our exposition of Husserl we must be attentive. Far now that the question of the meaning of the different acts has been put, another (prior) question cannot be avoided: From which standpoint can the diversity of meaning be distinguished as such and can we expect to' find an answer to' the first question? This standpoint cannot be included within the diversity, far then our speaking about diversity of meaning itself would 'lose its meaning. On the contrary, it must be a central paint, to which this diversity is related. Here we meet with a fundamental tension in Husserl's thought. On the one hand there is no doubt that Husserl in his Logical Investigations considers this Point as a psycho-lagical one. The psychological 'stream of subjective experiences' is the basic denominator of his investigations. This denominator, however, presupposes) as the composed ward 'psychological' already indicates, the meaning-coherence, which precisely is reduced and put aside by this denominator, in order to' reconstruct the meaning-coherence autonomously, as well as passible. Up to' this point Husserl remains a child of his age. The Kantian solution of the problem of universal validity of taking the logical 'reason' as the sa-called transcendental, a priori form of a sensory matter of experience could no longer satisfy Husserl either. Logical acts or experiences themselves are reduced to' a species of the general, all-embracing psychological stream of experience . of this 'stream' - becomes clear. Far, an the other hand, Husserl's main concern was to' avoid the pitfalls of psychologism. Far this purpose Husserl puts forward theoretical-logical thought with its methodical abstraction as such. This means that logieal thought, which on 1he one side is classified under the 'universal' stream of (lx(lI'I'l(\IH'(1 (which,

i.e., its insufficiency as a real basic denominator

But at the same time the abstract character

Ihe act-in-its-operation Jects' (Gegenstande),

does not hesitate to declare that we must suspend and leave aside its 'naively' intended 'obin order to' reflect upon the act and its mcuning-contont - without asking himself haw this operation 0(' SW11)('IlSion CHn be executed. This question should have been put, liS I h(, 1\('ls 01' HUSp£'IlAionnd reflection themselves simula IHlII'olIsly 111'(1 dIlHS('d IIIHi('r the psyC'hologknl denominator of the





'stream of experiences.' What becomes evident here? Husserl's faith in the revealing power of tl.eoreti al reflection itself - and that in a rather naive way -, together with the untenableness of this faith. For, after all, the relativity of this reflection urges itself upon him, as appears in the first place from the dialectical tension between the psycho-logical basic denominator and the absolutized logical thought itself. KJant's so-called consciousnessin-general as such is not mentioned, but even more so it is self-evident as the Archimedean point and the origin of meaninggiving. Even the Kantian reserve of the transcendental idea, which pointed to a supra-theoretical, 'practical' unity of human existence, is no longer present. As a matter of fact, this higher unity of Kant did not surmount the level of abstraction either. To Husserl speaking in this phase about an 'I-ness,' as a concentration-point of acts, makes no real sense. Factually he stays at the level of the 'psychology without a soul' iPsucholoqie ohne Seele) of his time. Of course the difficulty of this fundamental position has its consequences. Husserl's hopeful program of accounting for what is really given within human act-life, in fact amounts to a depreciation of the meaningful dynamic of this act-life itself. It is reduced to the fixed anti-pole of the primarily fixed logical reflection. From the autonomous methodical reconstruction by the latter it has to receive its meaning. The dynamic, many-sided given-ness of pre-theoretical, practical experience, which unfolds its meaning, among others, also in theoretical knowledge, cannot be accounted for. 'Meaning' is frozen into the abstract counterpart of the subjective phenomenological reflection. The latter for the time being remains as such in the background, as Husserl's most urgent task was to stem the tide of the scepticistic consequences of contemporary psychologism, to save the universal validity and meaning of scientific thought. Husserl neglects the many-sidedness of theoretical-logical concepts: there are psychological, juridical, ethical concepts etc. He also fails to see that such concepts derive their meaning from the meaning of the psychical, the juridical, the ethical sphere (which are only distinguished as such by means of 'reflection'); otherwise they would fall into nothingness. Husserl and Dilthey At this point it may be worthwhile to make a short comparison between Husserl and Dilthey, ospcclnlly h('('/lu.'1P theso

two lines converge, in a typical way, in phenomenological existentialism. Dilthey too stuck to the humanistic tradition according to which one cannot go back behind theoretical reason. Until the end, when his 'critique of historical reason' had designated the historical 'stream of life' as the true universal, he tried to cling to the theoretical contemplation and interpretation of 'history.' Nevertheless, Dilthey had much difficulty with this position, because he seriously wanted to avoid the so-called 'phenomenalism,' i.e., the attitude of the 'pure' spectator, who is not really engaged in actual life and its essential, autonomous progress. Husserl, on the other hand, advocates the position of the 'uninterested spectator,' in order to avoid the dispersion of the 'subject' into the vicissitudes and multiplicity of the 'factual' course of things. The ideal of the universal achievement of theoretical reflection revives once more in Hussetl. But it is the last revival of an idea which suffers from a vitium origin is. Indeed, the inner emptiness of this ideal appears pre-eminently in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl tries to revive Descartes, the father of modern Western philosophy, but he can not simply return to him and his mathematical science-ideal, nor to Hume and his psychologism, not even to Kant and his rigorous separation of 'pure', i.e. natural scientific, and 'practical' reason. In history there is no real return. Former simplifications and levellings, which had been constructed to carry through the postulate of the continuity of thought (a certain type of thought), can never hold out against the transcendental dynamic of the many-sided unfolding of meaning which characterizes this divine creation. Husserl had to take into account more and also more complicated problems than Descartes or Kant. 3. Some remarks about Husseri's further development The question of the origin of meaning-giving What are the main lines of the further development of Husserl's phenomenology? The ideal of a truly universal science is no longer as self-evident as it formerly was. The phenomenologist almost passionately searches for the assurance of this ideal. This implies that his thought is increasingly focused on the f'innl origin of meaning-giving. Husserl had thought to have ostubllshed the existence of a sphere of logical idealities, but (notwithstanding the frequent use of the term 'act') only at the ('OHt 01' It (kgl'll<i1l Ion of subjective activity and then in such a t wily thnt tlllH Hpll\'I'\' I'IlC'tullllyWIlHonly an upper story above

the domain of the so-called 'empirical' (psychological) diversity and multiplicity. A real coherence of meaning concentrated in a real jocue failed. Thus phenomenology was in danger of becoming a 'picture-book-phenomenology.' This danger has remained and even increased, now that Husserl's strenuous searching for a real central grasp and a universal firm ground on the whole has been abandoned. Husserl's next step is to disengage himself further from psychologism. Now all sciences, natural science as well as psychology, must be 'suspended' as self-evident units-of-validity and maintained only as 'phenomena,' in order to discover the origi?U3 of the scientific and everyday validities. This implies that now the turn to the 'subject,' already present but at the same time deviating in the logical investigations, becomes more pronounced. This turn must be appreciated by a Christian thinker, for according to God's Word revelation the human subjectivity in its actlife is always at stake. In this subjectivity, which has been made universally responsible, the whole creation is centred. Husserl, however, following the line of the entire humanistic tradition, in a very plain way puts the knowing, theoretically reflecting subject in the foreground. The Cartesian, subjective cogito is the universal focus of reality and the rest can only be significant as the cogitata (the things thought), the 'objective,' intended counterparts of this cooito, immanent to this active cogito. Nevertheless this counterpart remains a counte1'-part and is called therefore a 'transcendence within the immanence.' Thus the fundamental dualism remains in force, although Husserl tries more and more to surmount it by explaining the immanence of the cogitata to the cogito as a constituting of the object by the coqito, then called 'transcendental consciousness.' Here we explicitly meet with the humanistically distorted creation-motive, which, to be sure, was already at work. For however much is said about the necessity of being attentive to what is really g;ven, Husserl beqin» with an autonomous eliminatiOn of the coherence of meaning, within which the logical function (in its theoretical unfolding) itself is given, and then tries, on the basis of the absolutized theoretical reflection, to reconstruct methodically this coherence after the image of this phenomenological thought. At any rate, it is typical of Husserlian phenomenology that, on the basis of the fundamental dualism, and tied to the theoretically determined subject-abject-scheme, it attempts, almost passionately and repeatedly, to surmount this dualism and 10

discover the all-embracing unity, but it is its fate now to be forced to objectify ever more and to retain only a vacuum for the desired transcendental unity.
(Life-world' and (egology'

In his last phase Husserl makes a final attempt to avoid this vacuum. His first 'conclusion' is a sort of confession. HusserI, who cannot simply return after positivism to the former absolute idealism of creative freedom, admits that in the reality of being, we must stay with the 'riddle of the subject-object-correlation." We human beings live tin a 'world' (the 'life-world', Lebenswelt) and this (world,' is even the immediately given reality. But the other, in fact most important, result of Husserl's thought is his so-called egology. Here the person of the philosopher himself is immediately at stake. Husserl, although he gradually turned away from psychologism, can no longer be satisfied with a formal consciousness-in-general, and chooses his Archimedean point in the ego cogito of the phenomenologist himself. Faced with the extinction of the ideal of personality in positivism, Husserl once more tries to save the primacy of the individual person with his unremovable responsibility. In fact this individual ego passes for the final certainty of the phenomenologist. This is an important point, not only in view of the later development of phenomenology in existentialism, but also for our own position. Indeed, personal responsibility can never be avoided nor pushed off. I think, I live, I must decide, and I cannot hide myself behind anything. But for a Christian the ultimate certainty can never be his individuality, let alone his individual thought.
Intensification of the problematics

As for Husserl, now that he has found his ultimate point of support in this ego, a clear short-circuit arises. For at the same time the claim of universal validity is upheld. That is to say, IIusserl definitely wants to arrive at this 'ego,' and that by means of the so-called phenomenological reduction. The latter amounts 1.0 a methodical reflection and as such remains umproblematic, i.e.) it is trusted as the only way to the universal Truth. Husserl, to ho sure, does not simply stick to his former standpoint, when he HPol<.(' about the self-elimination of the phenomenologist. When h(· 11-1 HI'HI'('hhl~~ r-xplk-It ly /'01' the universal origin of 'meanings' and I'Clt' I h IH PIII'POHC' IIIIl'o«lIc'.'1-I hi" »honomonologtcal 01' 1ransccndental


reduction, this 'self-elimination' can no longer run so smoothly. For in this reduction the whole world (with its concomitant 'empirical' subjectivity) is, as Husserl puts it, 'bracketed' or even methodically 'annulled' and the 'pure' temporal stream of transcendental consciousness is left, and in this the pure transcendental ego appears as the constitutor of his meaning-world by means of his intentional achievements. How then can this origin, this fundamental being, be the result, the 'resuiue' of the reduction? The latter is, after all, a reflection and continually remains related to its anti-pole, generally called the (world' (with its 'empirical,' 'naive,' 'natural' or 'human' subjectivity in it). But the other pole of the humanistic ground-motive, i.e. 'autonomy,' as well as the intrinsic relativity of theoretical reflection - its tendency to the Origin of meaning - cannot fail to stir. Husserl has to concede that the phenomenological 'residue,' the 'transcendental subjectivity,' at the same time must be the condition of possibility of the reduction itself and must be 'anticipated.' But as long as this transcendental subjectivity in fact only represents the absolutized phenomenological reflection itself, which must borrow its content from the object of this reflection and in which the individual philosopher is not recognizable, the autonomy-pole remains suppressed, Therefore Husserl speaks afterwards about the 'splitting of the ego,' which accomplishes itself in the phenomenological attitude (Einstellung). And at last the reduction is also presented as an inner change, a sort of religious conversion, which must take place in one fell swoop (in einem Schlage) and without which phenomenology cannot really be understood. At the same moment the problem of (intersubjecti'llity' becomes very urgent. Husserl has given some complicated reflections to this topic," which is very important in our 'social' age and is much discussed. I cannot here retrace the line of his argument. It results in the conception that there is a plurality of 'monads': strictly individual units, which in the last resort are only bound together by phenomenological rationality and of which the phenomenologicizing Ego is the primordial one (Urmonade). On the other part, only the horizon of the 'world' can be the allembracing coherence of the subjectivities.
Esp. in his Cartesiomische Meditattlonen (Cartesian Meditations), Den Haag 1950, and his Formale und Transzendentale LoOilc (Formal and Transcendental Logic), Halle a.d.S. 1929.

As a matter of fact, even when the ego in its subjective autonomy has urged itself upon the great phenomenologist, the coqito (with its inevitable annex, the 'world') retains the predominant position. Husserl clearly expresses this, when in his last work, The Crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology, he says: (The method demands that the (transcendental) Ego comes to know itself by systematic analysis, starting from its concrete world-phenomenon." At bottom, however, it is not the method that makes its demands. Fundamentally we are concerned with the urge of the (ego' to autonomous, universal meaninggiving. This urge wants to realize itself in methodical-theoretical analysis. But analysis always remains analysis-of . , . , and a method alway remains a way, which starts somewhere. Therefore the urge to universal sovereignty, which wants to realize itself in this methodical analysis, can only 'maintain' itself in a continuously and laboriously endeavored reductive (reflexive) liberation from that to which reflection remains necessarily related. This religious 'state of affairs' implies that the constituting Ego (Ur-Ich), in spite of its key-position, must get to the background. The so-called (natural attitude' is characterized by the naive directedness of the subject to the 'world' (of things, events and values) round about it, and this attitude must be radically altered into the 'transcendental attitude,' in which the subject learns to discover itself as the 'intentional constitutor' of its world. Nevertheless, the natural attitude remains the necessary presupposition or condition, without which the apparently autonomous reflection (of the individual subject) cannot operate. In other words, Husserl, who strenuously and passionately had tried to arrive at a concrete-critical philosophy, participates in the crisis of humanistic self-consciousness and indeed became an important exponent of it.
Final remar7cs

The latter must be said, because the father of phenomenology was right in underlining the special place and meaning of our logical, analytic function in its 'acting.' Rightly he did not ontent himself with speaking about subjective 'acts' and 'experiences,' about 'significance,' 'facts,' 'values' etc., without explicitly giving account of the fact that we always are concerned with a
11 "))i(1 M!'!,hodn (1f'fOl'dC'l'L nun, dllHA dnH (1g'0 .I)hlll1ol111'1I IIUH HYML('lUlltiHC'l1 1I11)'il('lcfl'I1g'L und )(II'I1t.". 7'1/,1 i(Jrinin .•.• JI, 1(11,


von seinom konkroton Weltdaboi sich HolbHL ... kcnncn


'conscious' subject. Man knows what he does, and in the temporal order of function-coherence, to which theoretical reflection is committed, human responsibility is 'founded' in his logical (which is not the same as theoretical) distinction. In this respect Husserl, against irrationalism, which also gained ground in Dilthey's 'Critique of historical reason,' defended a right case. But precisely because Husserl focused on this zone, where the rampart of humanism is situated, he could not fail to bring to light directly the inner discord of the humanistic ground-position as such. This discord can be avoided neither by a turn to irrationalism, as Dilthey made and the existentialist phenomenologists, following his track, carried through, nor by an attempt at medi:ation between the two repelling poles of (ego) and 'coqito] as Husserl made in his last period (in the form of the so-called life-world). It can be avoided only by decidedly choosing position from the very outset in the fulness of human experience, which in itself is nothing and emptier than emptiness, but is fulfilled in man's radical, faithful submission to the fulness of God's Revelation of love in Jesus Christ. Only under the transcendental guidance of this faithful surrender to this Word-revelation, which reveals to us what nobody of himself can know, can our logical function unfold its proper and important meaning, viz.) the ever more refined and sharpened distinction of that which is really given)' i.e., the many-sidedness of the richly varied meaning-dynamics) in which God's creative power works in the direction of his coming Kingdom. This Kingdom has come and is coming through the Cross of his only Son. Therefore the primary mission of the Christian scientist in 'this world,' where by virtue of his profession he has to practice especially his logical function, cannot be any other than to distinguish sharply and continuously truth from the error which lives in the heart of us all.

Lecture II

1. Introduction)'

and Existentialism
general remarks

In this lecture we shall speak about existentialist phenomenology. Much might be said about this continuation of phenomenology. In the period between the two world wars, especially since 1930 and for some years after the end of the second world war, this phenomenological existentialism conquered the mind of the European 'intellectuals' as no other current did. It surpassed the influence of Husserl, the father of phenomenology, in the first place because of the turn which the famous modern philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who was initially an assistant of Husserl and then became his successor in Freiburg, gave to phenomenology. His book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), first published in, 1927, struck like a bomb. We shall therefore spend the greater part of this lecture on a discussion of Heidegger's train of thought. His turn, however, was prepared to a certain extent by an older phenomenologist, Max Scheler. To him we can devote only a few words. In the final section of this lecture we shall comment on the most outstanding French phenomenologist Jean-Paul Sartre. The success of existentialist phenomenology is based to a large extent on the fact that in it the lines of Husserl and of Dilthey, i.e., of historicism, converge and continue in a curious, original way and with a peculiar and suggestive expressiveness. The latter point deserves mention. Particularly the later Heidegger, but Merleau-Ponty too, deal elaborately with the importance of language. Sartre, in addition to being an outstanding philosopher, is a prominent literary figure; the first volume of his autobiography appeared recently under the title The Words. (Les Mats). 2. Sch(3Z(3r)s henomenological (personalism) p
FlrHt. of n11le'1 10 phc'IlOnl(lllOlogl(,lI\

w, I race I he' trnnsl tlon from Husscrl's thought
PX1Ht<'1I1 \1l\iHIl1. SC'!w\('r'H


ion for 1hiR


'conscious' subject. Man knows what he does, and in the temporal order of function-coherence, to which theoretical reflection is committed, human responsibility is 'founded' in his logical (which is not the same as theoretical) distinction. In this respect Husserl, against irrationalism, which also gained ground in Dilthey's 'Critique of historical reason,' defended a right case. But precisely because Husserl focused on this zone, where the rampart of humanism is situated, he could not fail to bring to light directly the inner discord of the humanistic ground-position as such. This discord can be avoided neither by a turn to irrationalism, as Dilthey made and the existentialist phenomenologists, following his track, carried through, nor by an attempt at medi'ation between the two repelling poles of {ego' and 'coqiio] as Husserl made in his last period (in the form of the so-called life-world). It can be avoided only by decidedly choosing position from the very outset in the fulness of human experience, which in itself is nothing and emptier than emptiness, but is fulfilled in man's radical, faithful submission to the fulness of God's Revelation of love in Jesus Christ. Only under the transcendental guidance of this faithful surrender to this Word-revelation, which reveals to us what nobody of himself can know, can our logical function unfold its proper and important meaning, viz., the ever more refined and sharpened distinction of that which is really given; i.e., the many-sidedness of the richly varied meaning-dynamics, in which God's creative power works in the direction of his coming Kingdom. This Kingdom has come and is coming through the Cross of his only Son. Therefore the primary mission of the Christian scientist in 'this world,' where by virtue of his profession he has to practice especially his logical function, cannot be any other than to distinguish sharply and continuously truth from the error which lives in the heart of us all.

Lecture II

1. Introduction;

and Existentialism
general remarks

In this lecture we shall speak about existentialist phenomenology. Much might be said about this continuation of phenomenology. In the period between the two world wars, especially since 1930 and for some years after the end of the second world war, this phenomenological existentialism conquered the mind of the European 'intellectuals' as no other current did. It surpassed the influence of Husserl, the father of phenomenology, in the first place because of the turn which the famous modern philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who was initially an assistant of Husserl and then became his successor in Freiburg, gave to phenomenology. His book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) , first published in 1927, struck like a bomb. We shall therefore spend the greater part of this lecture on a discussion of Heidegger's train of thought. His turn, however, was prepared to a certain extent by an older phenomenologist, Max Scheler. To him we can devote only a few words. In the final section of this lecture we shall comment on the most outstanding French phenomenologist Jean-Paul Sartre. The success of existentialist phenomenology is based to a large extent on the fact that in it the lines of Husserl and of Dilthey, i.e., of historicism, converge and continue in a curious, original way and with a peculiar and suggestive expressiveness. The latter point deserves mention. Particularly the later Heidegger, but Merleau-Ponty too, deal elaborately with the importance of language. Sartre, in addition to being an outstanding philosopher, is a prominent literary figure; the first volume of his autobiography appeared recently under the title The Words. (Les Mots). 2. Scheier'« phenomenological (personalism'






all 1('1 us 1race the' transition from Husserl's thought ('X lston 1lnllsm. St"tw\<'r'H preparation for this

transition can be called a phenomenological 'personalism.' This philosopher must have been a brilliant, fascinating personality and was very well read but had a restless mind. Till the end of his life he searched again and again for certainties in the dynamic developments of his time. As for Husserl, his main problem was the question of the universal trustworthiness of scientific thought as such. The assurance of this implies that the historical 'stream of life' as well as religious persuasions, and even the person of the phenomenologist himself have to be suspended in order to fall within the phenomenological reduction. This reduction was not meant as a real destruction) but it was at any rate an elimination of the given meaning-coherence of reality, in order to reconstruct it by a supposedly autonomous phenomenological thought. In the first lecture I tried to point out some aspects of the entanglement which then arises. The fundamental entanglement is this, that only the phenomenological method can restore order, but only at the cost of the transcendental (ego/ which nevertheless should remain the ultimate guarantee and active source of phenomenological 'constitution.' In fact this ego remains a vacuum. To be sure, Husserl makes a final attempt to fill the vacuum and for this purpose appeals, like Dilthey, to 'historicity.' This appears for instance from a statement of his last period: "The mind embraces all beings in an absolute historicity." Even then, however, the 'teleology' of history, according to him, consists in its rationality, fulfilling itself in the methodical questioning of phenomenological thought as the truly conscious, responsible way of living.
Phenomenology as a (tool)

and important question is: is this tool, this stepping stone, only an innocent and harmless thing, which as such is neutral with respect to the 'ulterior objectives'? We have seen that in Husserl the methodical problematics was a direct expression of a fundamental one: in the beginning two impulses collide with each other, namely, the ideal of autonomous freedom and the avid desire to universal rational domination, which only seeks 'accommodation' in the structure of methodical, theoretical thought.
(Practical) reason; values and logic

With Scheler, 'practical reason' emphatically claims its rights within the phenomenological movement. While Husserl remained mixed up in the problems of the assurance of the classical scienceideal and expected the decisive answer to all the questions of conscious life from a 'radical theory of knowledge,' Scheler shows a primary interest in "the place of man in the cosmos." 2 Just like Kant he fixes his eye on the ethical function of man's acting. For the rest, Scheler's trend of thought is considerably different from the Kantian. We cannot elaborate on this comparison now. Suffice it to say in this connection that Scheler in the final resort falls back upon the individual person as the centre of an irrationalistic act-life, wherein 'values flash up' (as he puts it). According to Scheler, the values are a priori given) namely, within 'consciousness.' Scheler wants to maintain the phenomenological principle of 'intentionality.' However, this consciousness is not theoretical-logical, but the 'emotional feeling.' Within this emotional-volitional consciousness the values are materially and a priori present. Their content can be brought to light and established by ethics, and this in entire independence of logic. Here Scheler's turning away from Husserl is clear. Logic, he says, should not be coordinated with ethics as another valuescience, because truth, with which logic is concerned, is not a value at all. It is an 'idea,' different from all values and fulfilling itself, when the meaning-content of a judgment is in accord with a state of affairs and this accord itself is given evidently. Scheler's detachment of ethics from logic is connected with his irrationalism. The accomplishment of the subjective 'emotional' acts is as such the final source of values. The values 'flash up'
" 'l'h ln iM t.hl'

In Scheler, however, we can see how the tension between the phenomenological systematics and that which the phenomenologist has ultimately in view, increases more and more. Systematics as such falls to the background. But from there, with its overstrained abstract structure, it keeps exerting its silent strength. Herbert Spiegelberg is right when he writes that for Scheler the main destination of phenomenology lies "in the development and utilization of impulses which Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson had given to modern thought long before Husserl," and that Scheler "conceived of phenomenology as the great tool ... , as a stepping stone on the way to his ulterior objectives." 1 But the interesting

H. SJli('g-clbllr~r, 01'. oit ., p.p, 240, 200.

I it.l« of nn« or t h« illHL public a Lions of Scheler: Die Stellung i/II /\OHII/li/l (1IlilK). ~'kh(\l(,t"H main work is entitled: Der II'/I"IIII/""IIIII~ ill ,/'" /I/lIIilr IIlId il i» uuurriu!» II"'/'Iothi/C (1913 ctc.) (FormalI/I'm. ;11 1'11""11 "1/'/ //11/1,'/'/'", 1)1I/1/,."I/I/(IH),

in this activity of 'feeling,' preferring, loving, hating etc. Scheler is still too much of a phenomenologist and too much of a disciple of Husserl to forget that he himself is at work in a philosophical, theoretical-logical way. He admits that his own statements concerning 'values' etc. must also satisfy a criterion of truth. What then is this criterion? No other than the universal validity of the phenomenological 'intuition of essences' (Wesensschau); in this case: essences of values, of evaluating acts and of the person as the one, unique and individual accomplisher of the different acts. Even the fact that the values flash up, come to 'givenness' in the original, 'personal' accomplishment of the act, belongs to the 'state of affairs,' and this state of affairs is established and judged by the phenomenological essenceintuition. Scheler, to be sure, describes this phenomenological intuition as an immediate insight into the a priori contents of the subjective acts and their connections, and within his system logical thought, as we were able to observe, shifts to the second rank: the reflection is called an accompaniment, be it an immediate one, of the act itself. Husserl's sharp distinction of the 'natural' and the phenomenological attitude, which had to make room for the constitutive activity of phenomenological reflection as such, fades away. Nevertheless, Scheler himself declares too that the so-called immediate phenomenological insight itself is possible only when one abstracts from every way of setting the subjects who think the act-essences, in their 'natural equipment,' as well as from an 'object' (Gegenstand) to which the act-essences might be applicable. Here the abstract character of Scheler's final criterion becomes evident.
The fundamental antinomy

'person' to his 'world.' Even ir-rationalism has fixed itself on the absolutized theoretical subject-object-relation, which nevertheless continues to manifest its intrinsic relativity. The difficulty of this position must reveal itself. Scheler says that the phenomenologically established act-essences, however clear, a priori and material they may be, require a 'supplement' (Erganzung), in so far as they also should be. The term 'supplement' is especially significant here! On the other hand, Scheler defends his irrationalistic view on the significance of the individual person in his acts (as the source of the final evidence) by saying that this 'state of affairs' has its foundation in the essence of being) not of 'truth.' He himself, however, had maintained the universally valid criterion of truth for his own statements. At any rate we must see how in this way the question of 'being' gains in importance. H.eidegger, for whom 'values' and abstract phenomenological 'essences' have lost their weight, will make this question the predominating one. As for Scheler, ultimately there is no other answer to his question of the place of man in the cosmos than this: the being of man is a fissure) namely, between the side of his natural, vital, but 'blind' existence and the side of his 'spiritual,' steering, but in themselves powerless acts. In this anwer the 'nothingness' of human being, about which existentialism speaks, already announces itself.
3. Heidegger The question of Being

Scheler further exerts himself to save his irrationalistlc position within the abstract area of the phenomenological essences. Therefore he speaks emphatically about the individual person as the immediately experienced, never objectifiable, unity of the act-life, with its concrete, strictly individual (world) as its 'objective' correlatum. But this attempt only sharpens the antinomy. For this individual, autonomous origin of values etc., which has its 'reflection' as one possibility among and even under others, 1'emains contained within the supposed universal phenomenological reflection. And the latter cannot lose its typical, so-called intentional subject-object-relation, which keeps expressing itself, for example, in the irrcmovabln rclutodnos» of the

Let us now consider how Heidegger enters the play. In the rapidly increasing collapse of former certainties (which collapse had been accelerated considerably by the first World War and its consequences) Heidegger undertakes the impressive venture of putting the question of the meaning of Being as such. According to the philosopher, it is the question of all questions, the most fundamental one because ultimately it inquires after the ground and totality of the meaning of all beings. At the same time it is the most concrete question, for Being is ever the being of a being. Heidegger says that he does not want to lose himself in vague metaphysical speculations. But however concrete and varied Being may be, everywhere it is Being that is at stake. EV('t'ything 'i.'i, a stone, a flower, a cat, a chair, a conept, n l-ltllt<', 1\ III 1111. It may be small or large, beautiful or ugly, oorl 01' bud, It IIl1ly h•• thlH or thnt, thll-l wny or that way, but



it always is. Dilthey may have drawn the attention to historical 'life' as an irreducible datum, which cannot be substantialized, Husserl and Scheler may have warned continuously against dealing with consciousness and personal acting as things) - even then the question of the meaning of the being of 'life,' 'consciousness' and 'acts' as well as of thingness remains. This seems to be a hopeful start, the most critical one till now: finally even the age-old mystifications called 'consciousness' and 'thought' seem to be made problematic; the question of their being, of their meaning, seems to be put. But how does Heidegger continue?
The question of the

of Heidegger's basic denominator, viz.) with his pronounced historicism, but that does not alter the fact that it is Heidegger's firm and permanent Archimedean point. As long as the meaning of Being-as-such remains 'questionable' and obscure for the philosophical insight, this point continues to be the first and final point, where the clue of philosophical questioning has been affixed." Since, secondly, the most fundamental question and the clue to its answer are concerned, this understanding of Being is not an accidental quality of this inquiring being, but is its most essential characteristic. To be sure, it remains one being among others and as such does not coincide with Being-itself. But it nevertheless is (literally) out-standing, by virtue of its understanding of Being. To put it in Heidegger's own words: the antic characteristic of this being consists in its being ontological. Here too Heidegger remains true to the phenomenological tackling of Husserl, who continually had harped on the string of the 'intentional consciousness,' which never should be passed. Indeed, as we observed above, in the temporal order the human function of logical distinction is presupposed by all of the following functions. But this is not to say that this function can play the role of the central core and focus in which all other functions are concentrated. No single function can take this role, but all are neither more nor less than so many rays from the one and only focus and root of our temporal existence.
The idea of (existence)

'Archsmedeosi point) of the philosopher

In order to avoid meaningless speculations and to discover a first hold and clue in the obvious obscurity of the fundamental question, we have to address ourselves to a be'ing. But which? We must realize that this is an important question. It is the question of the Archimedean point of the philosopher. The choice cannot be arbitrary; otherwise the answer to the fundamental question can be missed. The only being that is able to assume the role of the Archimedean point is the being which inquires after the meaning of Being-as-such, i.e. of us ourselves, more precisely, of the philosopher himself. Every question concerning a matter needs a preceding guidance on behalf of that which is sought. According to Heidegger this means that there is already a certain understanding-of-Being (Seinsverstandnis) and that this understanding has to be the central starting-point and clue for our inquiry after the meaning of Being. You may remark that Heidegger follows Husserl's line in his turn to the 'subject' - though he likes to avoid this charged term - and tries to present a real self-reflection. But we have to observe likewise that Heidegger as well as Husserl considers this human understanding of 'Being' as the primary, autonomous point from which we are able to start, be it in a 'provisional' way. Provisional, for the idea of Being as such is already presupposed in the fixation of this special being. Therefore, properly speaking, the investigation ought to be 'repeated' in the reversed direction, after the meaning of Being-as-such has become clear. This point is important in order to understand the significance of Heidegger's later so-called 'reversal' (Kehre). For the moment suffice it to say that the so-called provisional chn 1"11('1 ('I' of lIeidegger's starting-point is, indeed, connected with till' dllll'llC'1er :IH

Meanwhile Heidegger has coined a special term for his Archimedean point. It is the practically untranslatable German word Dasein, literally rendered: to-be-there. By this designation Heidegger does not mean that this being can be localized in a fixable here or there. We must remember that this being is out-standing. This word can be taken as the literal translation of Heidegger's other description of this being, viz., existence (ex-sistence). And this is to say, that Dasein. is the opposite of all locally determinable phenomena. Its being-there is the openness, the unlocked-ness (Erschlossenheit) as such, and only through this openness can all beings appear in their being; it is the primary and necessary .ondition of possibility for them to come to light.





p, llR.


Heidegger explains his intentions by pointing to the beingtemporality of the Dasein, i.e.) its being-historicity. Dasein is thorouglhy temporal, never fixable here or there, but always 'further,' 'beyond'; is nothing substantial, but 'existential,' standing-out. Here at the same time the true meaning of its ireedom. reveals itself, which is obscured in different manners by philosophy. We can cling to a kind of soul-substance in the manner of Greek thought, or to a thinking substance like that of Descartes, or to the consciousness-in-general as a formal unity of 'transcendental' thought (in the way of Kant), or even to the transcendental ego coaito of Husserl and the 'person' of Scheler. True freedom, however, consists in transcending all sorts of 'givenness,' in being ever beyond all these points of support. These points fix the 'time' in a present of one kind or another. Heidegger, on the contrary, admits the primacy of the future (coming) which is experienced only in the ever new 'instant' (Augenblick). For this view Heidegger in his early lectures made reference also to the New Testament and its stress on the Christian expectation of the future. Incidentally, I make bold to remark that this may be a humiliating example for us. Too often we don't live and think from the truth that we have to expect the fulfilment of the times in the coming of our Lord and that the past receives its meaning from there, unfolds it fully in this future. I don't mean to say, however, that ifIeidegger is more or less a Christian without being aware of it. On the contrary, Heidegger closes off time in its (undoubtedly important) historical aspect, and this implies at the same time a distortion of the meaning of this aspect, for the latter reveals itself only in its indissoluble coherence with all the other aspects. In this case we meet with a striking elimination of the normativity of this aspect and with the identification of it with its subjective side.
(Past> and (future>; facticity and proiect

the past as a perished 'thing,' with which we are no longer concerned. In this view our being-temporal is not taken into account, and we are (in the time,' whereby time is conceived as a sort of space with separate, successive extents. According to Heidegger, however, temporality as the meaning of existentiality unfolds itself in three existential perspectives (ex-stases), which are equally original - although, as we saw, the 'future' receives the primacy. The facticity is also called our throum-ness into the world. This term is significant for the spirit out of which Heidegger wrote: the disillusionment, the serious decay of the humanistic ideal of personality. Now that the once vital idealism of freedom with its unproblematic start from creative Ego or Mind has resulted in the historicism of Dilthey, which in its turn had no effective defence against positivism, no other support appears to be left for the reflecting man than the 'factual' world. However, the inner dissatisfaction, the silent revolt against this 'contingent' condition betrays itself in the terms used. Husserl still retained the persuasion that man's 'worldliness' or 'facti city' was a more or less accidental feature and even reserved to the subject (viz.) in phenomenological thought) to rise above this world, to 'transcend' it. Heidegger can no longer agree with this 'solution,' which indeed was none. For the moment we should stay with the implications of the 'past' in Heidegger's existentialism. Husserl had to face the vacuum of the pretended autonomous subjectivity, but he continued to keep the 'world' at a certain distance; consequently, for the filling of the vacuum there is no other 'expedient' than to let the subject cease to be subject, to let it tumble back into the factual world. Now Heidegger makes the attempt to include, from the outset, the world in the being of the subjective Dasein itself, to make it a so-called 'existential' (Existenzial). But this implies that now the tension returns, even more intensely, within this 'existential' subject itself.
The historical (objectivity)

The clearest tension which must be established is the tension between the 'past' and the 'future.' Between this past and this future stands, of course, the present. But this present cannot dissolve the tension, because in reality it is torn asunder by it. In the 'past' the contingency-side of human existence professes itself: always we are already there, in a certain world, which happens to be thus. This is a last fact which we never can get rid of, namely, our facticity) and we always carry with us and in us this 'burden' of our Dasein: This implies that Heidegger rejects the view of 110


and serviceableness)

Indeed, apart from that, Heidegger continues to speak about the thrown-noss into the world, and this apparently implies a certain pre-existence of the latter. Heidegger in fact admits this by mont lonlng the cxtant-ncss (Vor'handonhei't) as an irreducible '('11 ('goI'Y,' 1)('lolIl~i ll{ t Cl t hiH world. I I Furt her, IIcidegger introduces l H(I('()Iul, III f'lId Jll'lilllll'Y, ('lIt('I~()I'Y, namely that of being-ready-

at-hand, serviceableness (Zuhandenheit), i.e.) the world of instruments, of 'tools' (Zeug), more or less representing the objectivehistorical counterpart of the historical (existential) subject. These 'tools' are characterized by a so-called unto-structure, a structure of reference-to ... , of in-order-to .... As such they refer more directly to the existence of Dasein as to-be (Zu-sein), as being projects itself.
The tension within the Dasein as such: disposition) and authenticity anxiety;


This is all quite interesting, but the most important matter is the manifestation of the tension within the Dasein itself. The existential significance of the 'past' appears in the 'mood,' the disposition (Stimmung). By this Heidegger does not mean a psychical phenomenon. According to him the disposi.tion is a much more profound, ontological datum: we always are already disposed in one way or another; disposition is not something that we can or cannot have, that we can or cannot make, it is-there, it 'comes over' us; it is a fundamental tonality of our being-in theworld, in which we 'find' ourselves (Befindlichkeit). The fundamental, comprehensive disposition, by which Dasein as such is disclosed to itself in its thrown-ness, is anxiety. Anxiety is not the same as fear. When we fear, we are afraid of a definite something, of a being within the horizon of the world. But anxiety is anxiety about nothing. When we experience anxiety, precisely all beings with which we are occupied in the so-called dissipation of our 'everyday fallen-ness' slip away into insignificance. What is left is the being-in-the-world as such, our unfoundable thrown-ness, our being homeless, with which we are confronted directly. So at least from one side, from the dimension of the 'past,' the Dasein is permeated by 'nothingness,' by non-being. This past, as we saw, is never 'gone': anxiety can always arise. This fundamental 'facticity' is apparently cured, but in fact only disguised by our every-day life of being occupied with the beings of the world. This contingent 'non-being' remains the permanent threat - even more than this - of the Dasein. in its 'back.' But there is more. The attitude of escape, much as it attests the intrinsic fallen-ness and 'inauthenticity' of the Dasein, would be impossible if the other dimension of the 'futuro \\'1'1'(1 1I0t 'simultaneously' there. The latter is prepondorunt. IIC'ldl'gg('I', it is true, cannot do without the 'past,' but ill t hI' t I'll<I)' (II' hl~ 1I1'j.!u11'

ment it functions mainly as the spring-board, without which the leap or 'anticipation' of our ex-sistence would not be possible. In the development of modern Western philosophy we must consider Heidegger's thought about the 'past' etc. as an eloquent and penetrating, be it somewhat ghostly, expression of the final consequence of the classical humanistic domination motive. This motive, religiously considered, meant a refusal to start from what is given, from the granted-ness and therefore significance of our full existence. Now it has turned into its reverse and man is terrified by what once was considered as the terrain to which the immanent forces of human domination could be exerted. Now he cannot but concede the given-ness of our existence, the revelation which manifests itself in it. He can, however, do anything but accede to this character of our existence. He continues to maintain himself by speaking now about 'thrownness' and facti city and his final self-revelation in his anxiety. There is no point in contesting the reality of this anxiety. It does exist and the kernel of our apostate being is involved in it. I believe that the depth of the human heart opens better when man has suffered defeat than when he begins his conquest with great self-confidence, Thus the domination motive within the 'system' remains, be it in an inverted, threatening way. The other pole of the humanistic ground motive, however, the pole of autonomy, expresses itself in existentialism too, especially in Heidegger, even first of all in him. For the dimension of the 'past' may be urgently 'present,' ex-sistence also and primarily implies, that Dasein is 'in advance' (sich-vorweg) that it is a to-be and lives in possibility, as possibility. It is its own project; it has to decide responsibly in the ever new 'instant,' to choose itself again and again. Its contingent 'condition' may become a 'situation' by this resolute decision, which, if maintained as ever new resoluteness tBntschlossenheii), attests our possible authentiCity.

But what is the meaning or the content of this decision? To what is Daeein resolved? To itself. But what can this 'self' be? It is no longer a 'substance' nor a 'transcendental subject' nor a 'person.' It is thoroughly temporal, t.e., historical, and the two co-ordinates ( this historicity, the 'past' and the 'future,' are all-embracing: the 'present' romalns framed within these two and oscillates to and I't'O by t I\p Il t t I'llet ion of' both. Especially in the future di1I\('IIHlolI 01' ('XiHklll'C' (j()('H 111(' ('iIlHHic'lIi humnnlst k ideal of autono4:\

mous personality show its last traces, its last convulsions, which themselves however demonstrate the obstinate will to autonomy, even in its downfall; for the future as anticipation of being also results in nothingness. From this side death is the permanent threat. Here too we must be on our guard against considering temporal existence as a succession of points, of 'now' points, the last of which will then be death. Our being is not a being that has an end, it is a being-unto-end (Sein-zum-Ende). Death is the utmost possibility for existence, because at the same time it is its mere impossibility. The really authentic way of existing consists in facing, in holding out, without any illusion, this utmost possibility. Then we re-call ourselves, consciously and in conscience, from the fallen-ness of our always being-present-to-the-world to ... ? Indeed, to 'nothing,' to our utmost possibility which coincides with our impossibility. There is no real centre left, towards which the 'historical' movement of the Dasein can gravitate. Authenticity in reality amounts to an ever failing and ever renewed attempt at liberation from inauthenticity, without any positive aim. Even Being-assuch, the question which directed Heidegger's first start, is not able to come to the rescue. Indeed, at the end of the book it turns up again, but only as a question. For this Being-as-such remains at most an idea. An idea which must derive its meaning from the Archimedean point and root, where the philosopher has chosen position, namely the abstracted 'historical' existence in its radically subjectivistic and irrationalistic shape. But is this point able to serve as a real Archimedean point? No, for it manifests its abstract character in the permanent polarity of Dasein and its 'world,' and it consumes itself in its inner discord. Thus its inner in-self-sufficiency manifests itself after all. Therefore the questionof-Being, as the question of the totality of meaning, must persist, but also continue to be a question, because a preliminary answer, and a false one, has been given.
The peculiar char,acter Of the fundamental tension in H eidegger

Here we touch the fundamental problematics of Heidegger's phenomenological ontology as well as the roots of the general and sharp distinction of authenticity and inauthentlcity. A similar distinction turns up, somehow and somewhere, in every humanistic philosophy. In Husserl we came across it in his speaking about the 'natural attitude' and the 'trancendcntal,' pbonomonologlcal ono, which at a glv('n moment resulted ill !\ ':4pliWt)r~ of 1hC'

the problematics of the 'outer' world and its existence loses its preponderance in the development of Western philosophy and the main interest concerns the 'subject' and its act-life. But as this happens, even more strongly a dualism appears within this 'subject,' which always remains primarily a knowing, either a principially 'theoretical' or a historically 'understanding,' subject. We should make a serious mistake if we should think that in the distinction of authenticity and inauthenticity a point of contact might be discovered with the Christian confession of the inner discord of our life, about which Paul speaks so penetratingly in the 7th chapter of his epistle to the Romans. We must be clearly aware of the fact that the 'natural' or 'inauthentic' way of living is essentially indispensable and insuperable within the system of the phenomenologist. This system, as a manifestation of the supposed 'original,' i.e., revealing and re-creating phenomenological thought, cannot do without a certain opposed domain, which as such is marked by meaninglessness and obscurity, and therefore is capable of re-creation and revelation. In this oppositional relation the typical structure of theoretical thought, however absolutized and distorted, continues to shine through. (In theoretical thought we always meet with an element of resistance.)" That is why the frequently mentioned (worrld' retains, on the background, an irreducible position, which makes possible the so-called natural attitude or inauthenticity of the 'subject.' This 'world,' to be sure, is no longer the fixed and closed natural area of the former natural scientific ideal of science, but in the first place is the 'lived' world of the 'historical' subject in its handling and shaping things, its 'field' of historical experience and 'practical' understanding. Certainly, this historical 'dress' as such undoubtedly gives evidence of 'a better awareness of the dynamic character of the whole creation. But in this dress the classical scheme itself, with its subject-object-polarity, is maintained." Consequently, because, on the one hand, the 'world' always remains related to the human subject and its responsible activity, the inauthenticity must be a subjective matter, but because, on the other hand, the world happens to be here in its mere and permanent presence, even the 'authentic' existence must retain its polar relation to this world, be it in a 'reserved' way.
, For an elaboration of this point I may refer to the publications of Prof. Dooyeweerd, esp. his A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, and also his In the TwUiUht o] Western Thouuht.

Ego.> Gradually

Ro(\ 1I1HO Prof', Mt'lt1c(IH,



WijsllC'!lOlwto (1961), p, 91-

But on account of this splitting-up of the subject, a very urgent question arises: where does the philosophizing subject itself stand, the thinker who reveals all these 'relations' in his phenomenology? Let us give the answer at once: nowhere, i.e., he 71.a8 crept auay behind his phenomenoioqical (system' in order to let his thought retain the character of revelation of the T1"Uth at any price. This price is high for a fundamental antinomy becomes evident now. As phenomenological existentialism, strongly influenced by the increasing historistic trend of Western thought, - which in Husserl still had remained mainly an undercurrent -, puts all its eggs in the basket of individualistic, moving and split-up 'existence,' the more the necessity of aiming at the position of the philosopher himself must suggest, together with the impossibility of this position. The more the philosopher is forced to conceal himself, in order to be 'able' to maintain the silently claimed (unity' and universality of his position as a philosopher. The more the trust, the faith in his phenomenological thought comes to light, a thought which in this case tries to join, in an a priori synthesis, the (abstracted) historical function as its basic denominator. Indeed, it is the significance of phenomenological existentialism to have made this fundamental problematics (with which we all are concerned) clear as to its fundamental character. As for Heidegger, in order to loosen the question of Being, he had chosen his starting-point in our 'understanding' of Being. This is explained as 'existential,' historical, 'risky,' because in this 'understanding' Dasein's own being is 'at stake,' because ready-made answers and certainties can never be given and this being is rather a question in itself. It is also explained as ever individual (jemeinig). Of course Heidegger does not deny the reality of society, but this is in the first place a datum belonging to the inauthenticity. Here precisely 'nobody' or, as Heidegger prefers to put it, 'people' (das Man) is leading. The philosopher, it is true, theoretically reserves a place for authentic being-with-others (Mitsein), but as a matter of fact this is a very small place and, in the last resort, this authentic being-with-others can derive its meaning only from the authentic being-in-advance of the strictly individual existence. As Heidegger himself states, "the Dasein is authentically itself in the original isolation of the silent, anxietyfacing resoluteness." 6 All these features may be elaborated in an impressive and suggestive manner, but very soon it appears that this 'existence'
n SlIin.

cannot be the true Archimedean point. It is not really a prime datum} which is unfolded within philosophical reflection, but it is a first point of contact to philosophical thought and finally appears to be a point fixed by and receiving its meaning from this supposed autonomous thought. Heidegger declares that this 'primary' understanding of Being is vague and average and therefore cannot serve as the suitable clue to the ontological reflection; on the contrary it must be investigated by this reflection itself. Heidegger to be sure finds himself obliged to say, that this ontological reflection also ultimately must be rooted in the existential, ontic being-and-understanding of the philosopher himself. He has to say this because he pretends to give a true self-reflection, even the most fundamental one until now. But this remark in fact remains only incidental and the philosopher himself for the rest remains hidden behind his philosophy, even to the extent that further on in the argument this existential philosophy is brought on the scene as the "interpretative liberation of the Daseisi to. its utmost existential possibility." Here the proper character of this humanistic philosophy, its pseudo-revelation/ its pretention to be the final, universally valid Wor'd, is very clear. It is all the more clear because the content of this philosophy is marked by 'historicity,' 'individuality,' 'question,' threat, anxiety, death etc.

Heuieqoer's idea of phenomenology



Concerning the phenomenological character of this ontology, Heidegger like Scheler accentuates the methodical, the way-character of phenomenology. Now that reality and even the vehemence of 'history' and its speed has urged itself upon theoretical reflection too, the so-called transcendental, disengaged attitude of the 'coqito' with its 'constitution' of an ideal universe - which Husserl himself already tried to 'supply' later on is quickly going to lose its appeal. But this does not imply that a really new position is discovered. Heidegger, who wants to focus the true depth of life, its dynamic 'being,' presents the phenomenology as a 'hermeneuiice,' This term is adopted by Heidegger from Dilthey, who had borrowed it from the theologian Schleiermacher.
'l'hiA 1.(\'m hnfl h(lOI1 borr-owed I from Prof. Mckkcs. For a more elaborate of' 1.1\" qll!'Hli(loIlH wh irh in ~I!(\H(, lectures can only be glanced ut, tWlI lily li?"lI;"I'/u.' tllld"/'''/'(/(/;//I/ //(11/ cl" fl'lI(/ml'l/ol()fI;~o/w ?·lldo. vol. J, A'rlullI loua (('",.".,,(// ;1I/II/,/·tll/lIl;tllI u] /th,'/ItI///I'lItlltll/;I'II! 1'IIII~O/l J).




p. 822.


Theology has a lot on its conscience already, but especially in its idea of 'hermeneutics' it has increased its guilt, precisely because this subject looks rather innocent and apparently involves no speculative dogmatical constructions. Nowadays this subject enjoys an unprecedented interest (cf. Bultmann). But we have to be very careful here! Too often the essential idea of this 'hermeneutics' implies that God's Word-revelation needs theological interpretation) in order to be understood really by the faithful to whom it speaks. The reliable methods of this theological interpretation must then be learned in 'hermeneutics.' It goes without saying that those theologians, who still maintain that God reveals Himself in his Word, never want to attach more importance to hermeneutics and interpretation than an intermediary one. This in itself is enough to shrink from, but, as a matter of fact, it is not all. For since in God's Word-revelation we are concerned most eminently with our only Creator and Redeemer himself, who can be heard only with our heart (which does not mean that our logical function is excludoo), the mere thought of being an (intermediary) is foolish pride and in fact implies a substitution of God's living universal and re-creating Word-revelation by theological 'reason.' A similar state of affairs must be established with regard to Heidegger's idea of phenomenology as an 'hermeneutics of the Dasein:' Here this Dasein in a humanistic manner is put in the foreground as the primary and final origin of meaning-giving and therefore as self-revealing. But because this Dasein at the same time is 'vague' and 'inauthentic' self-understanding and lives in 'dissimulation' and 'forgottenness,' i.e.) because the selfsufficiency of philosophical reflection must be maintained, therefor the Dasein needs phenomenology to discover, to reveal to it its true 'being.' To reveal to it, I say, for the existential Dasein must remain the point from which (as Heidegger puts it) philosophical questioning arises and to which it hits back. Therefore phenomenology as 'hermeneutics' plays 'only' an 'intermediary' role. But we have seen already, that this 'modest' role can no more be upheld than theological 'hermeneutics' can be (the wrong hermeneutics, I mean). Phenomenology, even if adjusted to Heidegger's specific aims, remains the decisive and universally valid "way of access to and determination of that which becomes the theme of ontology." 8
n 8(1ihl

3. Sartre Introductory remarks

I should like to conclude this lecture with a few remarks about the most outstanding representative of French phenomenological existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre. If you now feel inclined to heave a deep sigh, I can assure you that I can 'understand' that in a more than phenomenological way. But recall the warning I gave you in the beginning of my first lecture: the subject-matter cannot be presented more easily. It is Cl. laborious and difficult endeavor to penetrate into the phenomenological philosophy and to arrive at the points which really are at stake, without breaking off the 'dialogue' prematurely, Sartre openly admits that he has been influenced profoundly by Heidegger. He also wants to present a phenomenological 'ontology,' which is both existentialistic and historicistic: the (distorted) historical temporality in its subjective, even still more pronouncedly individualized, side functions as the basic denominator of human existence, i.e., of 'human reality,' as Sartre often puts it. Nevertheless Sartre's existentialism is specific. To characterize it very briefly, we may call it an existentialism of cansciousness. Sartre wants to cling to the cogito of his famous French predecessor, Descartes. However, within his system this subjective cogito ultimately falls into the abyss of nothingness) of non-being. The title of Sartre's main work is Being and Nothingness

(L'etre et le neant),
Dialectics of



p. 36.

Let us try to understand what this curious accentuation of consciousness means. According to Sartre, Heidegger has not yet entirely settled accounts with idealism. This is a rather serious reproach, because Sartre thinks that we are in need of a 'concrete' philosophy, which throws idealism overboard for good. The latter must be considered as an alienation of man from himself, from his being-free and being-responsible. It fixes man, above his 'world,' in a so-called transcendental consciousness, conceived of as a system of ideas. Indeed, man's freedom and responsibility arc anchored in his being-conscious. But then we must take consciousness in its phenomenological meaning, viz., as intentionality) and this implies for Sartre that consciousness always is consciousncsH-of-sV?nOLh'i.'I'lfl-ol.'W. Consciousness has no interiority, it is only its own outside'; it. is un nhsolutc 'flight,' a refusal to be 'subxtunthtl.' ThlH IH' dllll'ne'tc'!' 01' ccnscfousncss involves



that it is a movement. Here Sartre's irrationalistic historicism appears: this movement is primordial, fundamental and unregulated, norm-less, is wholly an affair of subjective, individual consciousness itself.
The presence-to . . . .

Dasein ultimately

lar tendency in Heidegger's idea of Being-as-such, in which the seems to be lifted up above its tensions and 'saved' in a new substitute of the religious 'transcendent.' Sartre himself resolutely endeavors to explode for good the self-complacent attitude of the (bourgeois satisfaW (self-satisfied bourgeois), be this either a more idealistic or a more positivistic one, and to arrive at a radical, open confrontation of man with himself, however horrible this may be. As to the question of idealism or positivism, Sartre believes there is no fundamental difference. In the first case the self-sufficiency - which in reality is only an alienation - is expressed, in the projection of a 'transcendental subjectivity'; therefore Sartre plainly rejects Husserl's transcendental Ego as the 'inhabitant' of consciousness: he calls it the death of consciousness, because consciousness only 'lives' in its being-unfixed and without any content. In the second case the self-sufficient subject remains 'safe' on the background as the self-assured master of his 'world.'

Sartre, however, differs from Heidegger in his accentuation of the present. He wants to maintain that the movement is conscious, and consciousness in the first place is presence-to; that is, when I am conscious of a thing, I am present to this thing. NQIW I must take my decisions, which according to Sartre constitutes my most proper being: I am choice, which is the same as to say: I am freedom. I am consciousness, and this is an instantaneous manner. Consciousness as presence-to and as choice is thoroughly spontaneity. It retains, it is true, its temporality-structure, i.e., the dimensions of the 'past' and the 'future' can never be neglected. Every decision has a certain motive) because it is accomplished in a factual 'situation.' But this implies by no means that this decision is explicable or would be predictable from this 'motivation' and 'situation.' On the contrary, in the same condition a certain person, as a free existence, might have made quite another decision, might have projected himself as quite another possibility. In fact the meaning of the 'situation' is determined by the choice as its situation. Without this spontaneous meaninggiving there would only exist a brute, meaningless massive 'condition,' a pure being-in-itself (en-soi). Of course in this 'project' the dimension of the 'future' immediately announces itself. Sartre does not deny that there is something like Heidegger's 'understanding' as the anticipating project of the subjective possibilities. He does not think, however, that this 'understanding' is the most original one. Man can withdraw too easily from his 'conscious' present and his present responsibility. Too quickly the 'primacy' of the future may become a last idealistic port of refuge, in which man, especially philosophizing man, tries to evade his real 'situation,' namely, that he has to decide now. According to Sartre, Heidegger's idea of existence in general labours under the mistake that it wants to retain a last reserve, that is, in the so-called being-in-advanceof-itself the projected 'self' is in danger of becoming a new mainstay, be it a weak one. Then the 'world' can only appear as the pure distance from 'self' to 'self,' in spite of Heidegger's description of the Dasein as being-in-the-world. Sartre perceives ft slmi-

Sartre is relatively correct in his criticism of Heidegger. Though time is indeed directed to the future, we can never make an attempt at playing it off against the present, let alone use it as an escape from the present into a 'future' as a sort of mystification. Heidegger speaks about the 'silence' of authentic existence, and his extreme historicism does not bring out clearly the proper place and meaning of man's logical function, which in the real temporal order precedes his historical function and in which his universal responsibility begins to manifest itself. Indeed, my 'intuition,' as the universality-in-its-own-sphere of my analytical (not primarily theoretical) function, accompanies all my acts, including those that are historically qualified. Equipped with this function I have to decide now with respect to the 'future.' This is what Sartre has in mind but cannot really understand because he, if possible still more strongly than Heidegger, has bound his thought to the fixed abstract theoretical subjectobject-relation in a logicistic and irrationalistic manner. This we should consider briefly.
The dJissolution of the (self'

uppenrs to be f'ascinatcd by the word 'oneself,' which IH ('1111('(1 It 1'1'I'1('xlv(' pronoun. TIc refuses to make 1111.'1 'rt-f'h-xlv« rr-ullty 1\ ('('1'111111 jIl'o.l(·('llolI In tho future: it Is




immediately present as one's own 'reflection.' This 'reflection' is not a real object, as the 'oneself' directly refers to the subject. Nevertheless, some dietomce is left; otherwise, it would not be a 'reflection.' Therefore Sartre speaks about the 'tpreretlecciue coaito; which is the heart of 'human reality' as a self -conscious one. Consciousness-of is possible only as consciousness-of-oneself. By preference Sartre writes this as consciousness (of) oneself, in order to emphasize that nothing separates the two. This structure is not accidental, as if there would exist a human subject which has also a self-consciousness. It is the most proper being of this subject: being self-conscious does not mean that there is a 'self' somewhere, which has consciousness, for the mentioned 'self' is itself a conscious one. In this way Sartre arrives at his thesis that self-consciousness as such is the pure 'reflection,' i.e., nothing, non-being, because there is nothing 'substantial' in it, which would not be 'reflection' itself. Self-consciousness is the split-ness as such, the pure distance, and the origin of all 'negativity' in the world, but at the same time the essence of human freedom, which does not tolerate any fixation. This is all elaborated in ample, difficult, dialectical reasonings, which continually force the reader to leap from one side to the other and vice versa. When we read Sartre, it is as though we enter a hall of mirrors which all reflect our image in such a confusing way that at last we no longer know where we are.
{Bad faith'

1 I

I happen to be that way, I cannot help it. In that case the reproach is also empty for at bottom it does not hit me. As a matter of fact, my dipsomania in me drinks, not 1. Sartre concludes that in bad faith the point is to constitute human reality as a being that is what it is not and is not what it is. And this bad faith is made possible by the fact that human reality in its centre does indeed not coincide with itself, that it is a beingin-non-identity. Therefore bad faith remains the permanent threat of every existential self-project. The bad nature of this faith however consists in its use of this being-in-non-identity, in order to shelter oneself (as one 'self') behind this being-in-nonidentity ... as a new 'identity,' as a new being-in-itself. According to Sartre we have to take this split-ness quite radically: our non-being cannot be made a new 'being,' but it must be understood as non-being, as a 'hole within being.' On close examination we cannot say that we are free, but only that we have to be free. Freedom means to make oneself free, again and again, from the being-in-itself, which is always present to and even in the heart of consciousness itself, and thus to experience in a radical manner the split-ne ss of self-consciousness. There is no other 'synthesis' than the nothingness of the split itself, and in Sartre Being-ingeneral is entirely absorbed in the dialectical movement between these two fixed poles (of being-for-itself and being-in-itself).
The question of the origin

Sartre tries to approach and illustrate the essential negativity of consciousness by the discussion of some specimens of human conduct. Sartre dwells especially on the phenomenon of 'bad faith' (mauvaise [oi), the analysis of which is a striking example of his undaunted, piercing intellect and of his dialectical ability. Let this suffice to make clear Sartre's argument." Suppose somebody reproaches me for drinking too much. Then I might answer: you are right, this has happened in the 'past,' but just now I have made up my mind to prevent it from happening again. At that moment the reproach becomes empty. It hits a past person but not me as I am now. I appeal to my freedom and my future and remove myself entirely from the past; my bad faith consists in my doing as though nothing has ever happened. But a different answer is possible too. I might reply:

See also J. Th. C. Arntz OiP., De liefde in de ontologie vc~n Jcam-Paul Sortre (Love in the ontology of Jean-plJIUl Sartro), 1960, p. 205.

But when only these two poles are ultimately left, where can the movement as such, the dynamics of consciousness, arise? This is an important question, and Sartre cannot neglect it. He thinks that human reality does indeed pursue a certain ideal, by which it is attracted, namely the synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself. This ideal, however, is impossible, according to Sartre, because every synthesis between 'the two antagonistic 'beings' is excluded. It is the idea of God as causa sui (cause of himself), and this idea must therefore be rejected. But because this striving, this 'desire to be,' apparently is essential to human reality, this reality as such must be called antinomical. As nothingness can only appear as non-being, against the background of bring, in metaphysics an attempt might be ventured to say more. The most acceptable hypothesis would be, then, that once, at some mOI1H\nt,Bdng-l1fHmch has made an attempt at self-foundation, 1111<1 tl11H IItl('mpt. has resulted in its divlsion. Here the power(,WIWI'HN 01' Sn 1'1 I''''H Id('1I or t1w humnn exlstonco becomes evident: Iho 'world.' however 'Iuctunl' IIlId IIH I1ll<'h 1lH'lIlllnl.!ll'HH at bottom

it may be, is overpowering, and so the ideal of autonomy has bled to death into a 'total void' (one of Sartre's expressions for consciousness) . Nevertheless this autonomy is maintained at all cost. We cannot but start from the consciousness (of) self as the 'foundation' of its own 'non-being' and 'temporal' moving. The 'world,' however, in the broad sense of 'natural' and 'cultural' 'milieu,' simultaneously is 'there' with its massivity; it immediately urges itself upon consciousness, and in the 'natural attitude' the latter even loses itself in it. But consciousness cannot fail to present itself. Then, however, a new danger appears, namely that of the so-called accomplice-reflection. This means that it has a complicity in the 'natural attitude' and is characterized by 'bad faith,' because in this case consciousness and freedom are made independent and indifferent 'beings.' True authenticity can only consist in a way of living, which in a radical way takes on and experiences the being-at-distance-from-oneself as a never accomplished task. This 'structure' of human 'being' can be discovered, on the one hand, by anxiety (which appears only occasionally), but generally and with universal validity by the so-called (pure,'
phenomenological dialectical. reflection.

losophy and in this sheltered position, which according to him can be none, he holds his universal pretensions. It is very important to have a clear insight into this state of affairs, for otherwise we might think there is much in this philosophy that can or must be accepted and possibly may be 'completed' or 'interpreted' in a 'Christian' manner. I don't deny that there are appealing parts in this thought, namely, as possible antidotes) for instance against a certain 'Christian' hypocrisy and theological self-complacency, which no longer lives by faith. But this is at stake: that we seriously try to confront the philosopher at the right point, that is the point where he himself wants to stand and where he too often tries to withdraw himself, precisely in order to save his real 'faith,' namely the faith in the universal validity of his phenomenological thought, which operates within the absolutized subject-object-scheme. From this point all his statements receive their proper meaning. Concerning our self -consciousness, this secret is never explicable on the basis of this scheme. It is indeed a presupposition of our reflection and is experienced and understood only in faith. In faith we 'understand' it as the outstanding revelation of our Creator within our 'being-there.' In the complete surrender and subjection of this faith we actually profess our being-nothing in ourselves, but right then we experience the true fulness of meaning of our existence as 'subjective,' or responsible and as a transcendental related-ness to the living God, who out of His love has been pleased to reveal Himself in and through us. But this surrender is indeed a decisive, fundamental choice, which cannot be cleared up by any philosophy, not even a Christian philosophy, but rules every philosophical formation of concepts and ideas.
Two more points:

With Sartre this reflection is on the way to become explicitly The transcendental trait of reflection, its directedness to a unity which reaches above 'time,' disappears more and more, in favour of the dialectical-logical domination as such. Sartre, to be sure, remains true to the proper tendency of phenomenology, i.e., its turn to the 'subject' with its actual and irreplaceable responsibility. In a way he radicalizes this turn, because he cannot rightly be content with Husserl's Ego and the 'silent' retiredness of Heidegger's 'authentic' existence. But the remedy to 'liberate' human reality from these positions turns out to be worse than the disease. The craving for logical domination manifests itself clearly in the splitting-up of our self-consiousness without any reserve. The only possibility to 'save' human reality then is to let the 'world' become immediately present, be it as an anti-pole, and to have the relations settled in the last analysis by the dialectics as such.
The meaning of Sartre

1. The problem. of (intersubjectivity'

It might be interesting and useful to mention more of Sartre's thought but time fails me and so, in conclusion, we glance at two points only. The real insufficiency of the logical subject-object-scheme and the disastrous consequences of its absolutization come to light especially in the discussion of the problem of 'inter-subjectivity.' This discussion covers the largest part of Sartre's main work. Here we can perceive the more 'social' strain of Sartre with respect 10 ITURRCrl and Hcidcggcr, but at the same time we HC'(, tho utter ilnpoHHibility of any real 'communication' within fhl' ,'.'/IIU(lWOI')( or filtH thoiurht,

Considered from this point, the so-called 'risky' position of our existence, about which the philosopher manages 10 Ray much, does not exist for Mmself: he 100 has ('rl'pf nwny hohlnd hls phi.1

Sartre wants to explain the meaning of my real meeting with the other subject. He does not want to prove the factual existence of other subjects; they are 'there' contingently. But what does their mutual meeting imply? To make a long story short, this meeting is an encounter; contact is conflict and conflict is contact. It cannot be otherwise, because the (look) of another subject, his actual presence-to ... , makes me an object} while I remain subject, and have the possibility to make the other subject an object (a real 'clash') or to recognize his subjectivity and to take my objectivity upon myself. But when I act in this way, I do so in order to 'save' my subjectivity furtively. This is an attitude of 'escape' and of 'bad faith.' Sartre analyses, often in a penetrating manner, different kinds of possible attitudes: hatred, love, masochism, sadism and the like. At any rate, the encounter (in the sense of conflict) is inevitable; it is, as Sartre says, the essence of my relations with the other. We have to live with it, i.e., we have to take on this reality 'consciously,' in every situation we have to strive after the best possible 'contact.' Practically this means for Sartre, that he seeks the side of the 'most oppressed' 'class' of society, the labour-class. This class, be it rather outwardly, is in a way brought 'together' as a consequence of its together-being-oppressed by the individualistic 'exploiting class' and therefore is necessitated to make itself free.
2. The (existential psycho-analyisis)

fundamental self-project. The 'emotional' man for example, has decided to live in a 'magic' world in which he looks for 'symbolical' solutions to the question of his being. The fundamental selfproject itself, however, which gives meaning and coherence to my life, remains inexplicable, and without foundation. There is no reason why it might not have turned out differently. Every 'motive' is only a motive in function of this fundamental choice, which coincides with consciousness. When we make an attempt at understanding another person, we should recognize this fundamental project as well as possible. In my opinion Sartre's criticism of Freudianism is sometimes to the point. As a matter of fact, psychology in traditional Western thought, generally has a tendency to present itself as a sort of general science of man. The traditional natural scientific strain of this psychology, either in a Freudian or in a more 'behavioristic' or in a mainly 'statistical' sense, is on the whole still carried on. Thus, in this varied psychologism, both sides of the old humanistic tradition seem to have entered into a happy alliance. In so far as Sartre tries to disengage hilmself from this idea of psychology and to accentuate the entire responsibility of man, this endeavor deserves our sincere interest. Indeed, the task of psychology is nothing more or less than the investigation of the psychical aspect of humam. acts (I leave the psychology of animals out of consideration now). But because of the universality of the spheres, all the other aspects are mirrored here in a special arrangement." Every psychology which does not take into account that man can and does digest his 'impressions' and control his emotions - which deals with the psychical life as a closed sphere, entirely ruled by so-called natural scientific 'laws,' representing the (absolutized) analogies or retrocipations to preceding natural aspects (especially biotical and mechanical ones), and which therefore cannot really account· for such phenomena as the sense of justice, linguistic feeling, sense of beauty, moral feeling and the like, in which the anticipatory structure of 'feeling' reveals itself, - every similar psychology cannot fail to come to a deadlock and do violence to the central meaning-dynamics of human life in its transcendental directedness. Sartre's extremely irrationalistic subjectivism does not permit the admission of any real structures at all. That is why snrtro at a given moment describes the emotion as a 'degradation cr.
I)". 111111111'"

The second point is Sartre's idea of 'existential psycho-analysis.' This method of 'insight into fellow-men' has been used by Sartre in some expositions of the life and work of literary figures, and also of himself." As the name indicates, it intends to be a substitution for the psycho-analysis in the style of Freud. Sartre, who considers consciousness as the heart of human being, cannot agree with Freud in his reduction of the phenomena of consciousness to unconscious 'processes' of various psychical drives, which are understood in a biological sense. Sartre himself does not say that every act is founded on consideration and reflection, for consciousness is primarily pre-reflexive consciousness (of) oneself. In this sense even psychical emotions as well as our will must be called 'conscious.' In all his acts man is in a certain relation to the purposes he makes for himself on the basis of a

In his already mentioned book "The Words" (Lee mot.R), 10(13 tC]. my article in Mededeli'l1gen va.n de VerO'l1igi'l1ll voor Call1illiMliM(·lttl Wijllbflgeerte, July 19601).





p. (ill


of consciousness,' i.e.) a being involved in the 'desire to being,' which is unfaithful to the 'authentical' attitude. This all on the basis of the fundamental split-ness of self-consciousness, which, once seen and experienced as such, at the same time 'degrades' emotional life more or less to insignificance - at least in the theoretical conception. When we don't take this position, we can acknowledge, without any repugnance, that the psychical function is present everywhere in our ad-life, at every turn determined in its meaning by that specific act, but also, in the temporal order, presupposed by every 'consciously' accomplished act. Then, in my opinion, there can be room for the insight into a reality such as the 'emotional value' of a certain word (as a symbolical designation), but also for a frank admission of 'unconscious' processes in the psychical sphere and of a certain 'mechanical' aspect of the course of these 'natural' processes - prrovided that it is not considered as a closed 'sphere,' let alone as a basic denominator of human existence, but from the very outset is considered as an (important) function of human responsible actlife, i.e.) in its vertical direction.



Beyond existentialism?
The last phase


phenomenology: Sartre Introductorry




In this last lecture I propose to comment on the last phase of phenomenology. This last phase might be called the 'fall' of the movement because especially in the case of Merleau-Ponty we notice a second flourishing of phenomenology. On the whole however the decrease of inner vitality is perceivable through the late glow of Merleau-Ponty's, Heidegger's and Sartre's thought. As a matter of fact, we have to be very careful in using biological categories in historical connections. Often they are too 'innocent,' too uncomplicated, especially when a difficult, revolutionary and 'grim' philosophy like existentialism is involved. 'History' is made by man in free responsibility and only secondarily can we say that it is 'passed on' by him. But at any rate there is an analogy with biotical development as such. -

I. Merleau-Ponty

As for Merleau-Ponty (hereafter: M-P), who died a few years ago, his philosophy might have been discussed in our second lecture, because he was nearly the same age as Sartre and remained a phenomenological existentialist whose influence, at least in scientific life, gradually surpassed that of Sartre. Most likely this must be explained by the fact that he tried to answer the internal problematics of the special sciences (especially psyihology) more fully, and seemed a more 'real' and less 'scandalous' author. On the other hand, this fact itself is connected with a certain transitional character of his thought. Therefore he may 1>(' plll('('d 111I hls IItHI 1(1('1111"1'. lkHi<1(,H, the second lecture was, I thlnk, 1(}1l1~ ('IIIHlldl!

of consciousness.' i.e., a being involved in the 'desire to being,' which is unfaithful to the 'authentical' attitude. This all on the basis of the fundamental split-ness of self-consciousness, which, once seen and experienced as such, at the same time 'degrades' emotional life more or less to insignificance - at least in the theoretical conception. When we don't take this position, we can acknowledge, without any repugnance, that the psychical function is present everywhere in our act-life, at every turn determined in its meaning by that specific act, but also, in the temporal order, presupposed by every 'consciously' accomplished act. Then, in my opinion, there can be room for the insight into a reality such as the 'emotional value' of' a certain word (as a symbolical designation), but also for a frank admission of 'unconscious' processes in the psychical sphere and of a certain 'mechanical' aspect of the course of these 'natural' processes - provided that it is not considered as a closed 'sphere,' let alone as a basic denominator of human existence, but from the very outset is considered as an (important) function of human responsible actlife, i.e., in its vertical direction.



Beyond existentialism?
The last phase of phenomenology: Sartre Introductory remarks MerZeau-Ponty, Heuieqqer,

In this last lecture I propose to comment on the last phase of phenomenology. This last phase might be called the 'fall' of the movement because especially in the case of Merleau-Ponty we notice a second flourishing of phenomenology. On the whole however the decrease of inner vitality is perceivable through the late glow of Merleau-Ponty's, Heidegger's and Sartre's thought. As a matter of fact, we have to be very careful in using biological categories in historical connections. Often they are too 'innocent,' too uncomplicated, especially when a difficult, revolutionary and 'grim' philosophy like existentialism is involved. 'History' is made by man in free responsibility and only secondarily can we say that it is 'passed on' by him. But at any rate there is an analogy with biotical development as such. -

I. M erleau-Ponty

As for Merleau-Ponty (hereafter: M-P) , who died a few years ago, his philosophy might have been discussed in our second lecture, because he was nearly the same age as Sartre and remained a phenomenological existentialist whose influence, at least in scientific life, gradually surpassed that of Sartre. Most likely this must be explained by the fact that he tried to answer the Internal problematics of the special sciences (especially psyhology) more fully, and seemed a more 'real' and less 'scandalous' author. On the other hand, this fact itself is connected with a cortaln t,/'(t'Yu{Uioool character of his thought. Therefore he may 1>('plll('('(( ill tills IlIst lccturo. B('sidc's, the' second lecture was,
I thluk,
IOllg ('IHl\II~h!


,,! I

The two major works of M-P are: The structure ot conduct (La structure du comportement, 1942) and Phenomenology oi perception (1945). M-P wants to call his own theory a 'phenomenological positi'1{ism/ a remarkable characterization indeed, of which, however, the adjective 'phenomenological' must not slip our attention.

the 'consciousness-ss' are woven into the tissue of the objective world and of the events-in-themselves." 2
'Phenomenoloqical positivi8'YI'l,J

'Consciousnees' and (nature>
In the opening sentence of his first book, M-P clearly explains his principal aim. There he says that he desires to understand the relations of consciousness and nature, the latter conceived of as 'organic, psychological and social.' Nature, then, is understood as a multiplicity of events which are exterior one to another and are connected by relations of causality.' As a matter of fact, this beginning expresses the constant main theme of his works. But at the same time we have to notice that M-P appears to start [rom. a duality. Like all other humanistic philosophers, he wants to surmount this duality - and this the more emphatically, as especially in Sartre's thought the dualism had become crudely pronounced -, but as it is the starting point and the expression of the dualistic humanistic ground-motive, it can at most be repaired somewhat. When, for instance, M-P describes the essential relation of the two as a 'circular causality,' then, on close examination, the term 'circular' appears to lack real foundation, because there is no real centre) round about which a circle can be drawn. 'Consciousness,' which in itself was already a precarious 'synthesis' of the subjective logical function and another subjective function (psychical, historical etc.), was, as we have seen, the traditional point of attachment for the impulse of autonomy, while 'nature' has represented of old the terrain on which the domination-motive, by means of theoretical thought, had to try its strength. Another way to describe his intention is the following sentence of M-P: " ... the point is to join the perspective of 'idealism,' according to which everything is only an object for consciousness, and the perspective of 'realism,' according to which

M-P thinks it is the proper achievement of phenomenology to have joined the utmost subjectivism and the utmost objectivism, to wit, in its notion of the (world.' This is, indeed, a quite remarkable pronouncement, especially considering the 'radical subjectivism,' which was proclaimed by Husserl as the only outlet in the 'crisis of European reason,' and, in a way, was radicalized even more in the 'existential' phenomenology of Heidegger and Sartre. For these philosophers, too, the notion of the 'world' was, it is true, already important, especially as the inner emptiness of the 'subject' had clearly manifested itself. At any rate, they had, apart from their mutual differences, explicitly chosen their fundamental position in subjective autonomy as the origin of true meaing-giving, be it an ever 'failing' meaning-giving. For M-P, however, the 'world' has gained in importance. Somewhere he calls it 'the true transcendental' or 'the cradle of meaning.' Here indeed, we can perceive a peculiar trait of M-P's 'phenomenological positivism,' which, however, remains phenomenological and even existentialistic and not a traditional, 'natural scientific' positivism. The latter point will demand our attention presently. At any rate, there is a connection with this curious 'positivism,' when M-P, after he, too, has established (time> as the final horizon of our existence-in-the-world, also disputes Heidegger's 'primacy of the future' and, like Sartre, accentuates the 'present' - but then as a present that is rooted in the (past,' which constitutes the indispensable 'field' of my present and anticipating 'decisions.' Ultimately M-P's 'phenomenological positivism' even shows a development to a 'mythology' of 'Nature' (written with a capital). 'Nature,' then, is conceived of as a universal stream of 'savage' life, which, it is true, can toss us to and fro, but at the same Li:me'bears' and holds us and is experienced immediately in our 'corporeal' existence and its bodily 'perception.' Even then, however, the primordial duality still operates. For the notion of Being-us-such is not wholly absorbed in this 'Nature.' The dimenxion of' the 'Logos' ultimately cannot be reduced to it. According
.. ". , , il H'HI(IHllllil. dll 1'('11('1' lu P("I'H\lpcLivo ldcaliate, salon laquelle 1\11(\ ('011111111 ohJl'I, pnu r \11 ('(11111('1(11\('(\, «L 1/\ lWI'Hp("('~iv(\ realisto,
1I111111c. \"M ('IIIIH('I"III'''" Mllllt. 11111"'1,,"(111 lllll1 d ,'VdU'IlIC'II!." ('11 ~111." l'h,"1I011I,<lIUIIlJ.(11I cI," III


"Notre but est de comprendre les rapports de la conscience et de la nature, organique, psycholcgique, ou meme sociale. On entend ici par nature une multiplicitc d'evcnements oxtericurx les uns nux autrcs ot lies par des rapporta do cuusnl iL('." L« 81'/'//('/1/1'(1 dn~ (lO'll/1101'! ('1//('11 t, p. 1.

rien n'est


tlHRII P"I'('(lpt

solon laell! mond« objcctlf ot dos lun, p, IIHIl.


to M-P this dimension shows itself pre-eminently in human 'language,' in its unique, creative revelations (cf. lecture IT). This, in a nutshell, is the main line of development of M-P's endeavor to achieve a doctrine of (engaged consciousness.' At last it results, in order to avoid the triviality of a positivism and pragmatism without any trace of self-reflection, into a rapprochement to Freudian psycho-analysis with its descent to the hidden 'depths' of (un-consciousness.' In this 'descent' the really transcendental trait of phenomenology, which we have pointed out more than once already, has turned into its reverse in a remarkable way.
The inner tension in M erieau-Pontu's idea of pheoomenology

with my look." 3 Strictly speaking, this would imply that we have to consider this pronouncement as well as the rest of this philosophy as the highly personal expression of the highly personal individual, viz' M-P. But, of course, this is not what the philosopher means. He wants to discover universally valid truth; he wants to address you and me.

Nevertheless, we must continue to notice that for M-P too, from the outset, it is consciousness which has to 'engage' itself, and that it is consciousness which has to 'engage' itself· What does this mean? When we see the development of phenomenology in the central light of its dialectical religious groundmotive and the inner tensions of the latter, we must establish that M-P is the phenomenologist who tries to rescue the 'autonomous' subject from the 'lost' position of emptiness and 'nothingness,' in which it had made its final attempt at self-maintenance in Heidegger and Sartre, by means of a reinforcement and consolidation of its relations to the 'world.' The question remains whether this 'remedy' is able to improve the situation, considering the fact that phenomenology does not leave a real escape from the problematics of the 'subject'-and-its-'world.' At any rate, in the famous preface of his Phenome?Wlogy M-P clearly shows his existentialist intentions. After he has pointed out the various difficulties and interpretations of phenomenology, which again and again revive the question: what is phenomenology? he declares that only in ourselves can we find the unity of phenomenology and its true meaning. This pronouncement is strongly stressed when he writes: "I am the absolute source, my existence does not come from my antecedents, from my physical and social surroundings, it goes to them and supports them, for it is I who make be for me (i.e' 'be' in the only meaning which the word can have for me) that tradition which I decide to resume or this horizon whose distance to IInC would disappear . . . , if I wcre not there to traverse it
of Perception

But how must this take place? Here already M-P declares at the same time that phenomenology - about which he said that it has its unity and true meaning in ourselves - is only accessible to a phenomenological method. So phenomenology, conceived in this way, seems to be self-sufficient. This is indeed what M-P means, for according to him phenomenology, as revelation of the 'world,' i.e., as truly universal, rests in itself. And thus we see M-P fill, in a way that looks somewhat 'innocent' in comparison with the 'grim' self-reflection of his predecessors, the greatest part of his main work with a so-called 'direct,' phenomenological 'description' of the so-called 'liie-uiorld/ in which we live (Lebenswelt). Yet M-P is too great a phenomenological philosopher to let it go at that. After the accomplishment of this 'direct description' - into which we shall go further presently a 'phenomenology of phenomenology' is necessary, he says. In this one the preceding 'description' has to receive its final check and certainty.
The shift in the phenomenology of M erleau-Pontu

What is the final inspection-point? It is the 'subject' again, and this subject again first conceived of as cogito. However, even here at this 'final' inspection-point, we are concerned with a "phenomenoloqu of phenomenology'! Therefore the question can no longer be suppressed now, if in this way we don't land in a so-called regressus ad infinitwm: phenomenology of phenomenology of phenomenology of phenomenology etc. without any perspective. Precisely to avoid a similar reqressus, Sartre had put in the foreground the so-called pre-reflexive cogito, in which no distance at all is left, but which also appeared to be as such pure 'nothing-ness.' Merleau-Ponty, who wants to steer clear of this rock, has, in fact, no other expedient than to fall back upon
n " ..
jo suis la source absoluo, mon existence ne vient pas de mes anter6ci(\I1IH, do mon cntournze physique et social, elle va vers eux et les HOlIllC'lIt, ('/11' ("('Hl moi qu] fah; Gll'o PO'tl1' moi (et done Iltre au soul sens 1111(\10 mol. 111111-11\(1 uvnlr 110\11' mol) cctto tradition quo [e choisis do reIIt'HlIIII'II 0111.('1'1. lun-Izon dOIl't In diHlulH'o mol 1\'(,fConcll'c'l"nit ... , si jo n',"11I11I III IIUIII' III 1)111'('11111'11' 1·I'~rnl'd,". /'/1111/11/11. /(1. 1)('?'o(Jl>timl, p. TIT. du rill




phenomenology as such i.e., with respect to the content of his philosophy, a heavier weight of the (world/ This is, in my opinion, the proper meaning of the shift in M-P's phenomenology with regard to Heidegger's and Sartre's thought. This is also why in M-P's work the fundamental 'dispositions' of 'anxiety' and 'loathing',' as expressive utterances of subjects which are entirely thrown back upon themselves, hardly return. This shift, especially for us who are able to look back and to see some of its historical consequences, is significant, but is no more than a shift. As we saw, M-P returns at last to the subjective coqito, which, in the preface of his book, he had already indicated as the ultimate source of meaning-giving. Again, to be sure M-P is out to show the cogito as an intentional one, i.e., as an (act) directly moving to the (things.,' to the (world.' To think always means in the first place to think something. This sounds rather general and vague, indeed, but it is this general (opinion,' this 'rough adhesion to the world' (as M-P calls it), which is and remains our fundamental 'hold,' because it is this which makes 'something in general' arise for us. M-P too, however, holds fast a sort of 'prereflexive coqito:' The intentional moving toward the world remains in itself conscious; it must start frOm a primordial opening-to this 'field' of the world. Therefore M-P introduces a 'tacit-coqito' (cogito tacite), which he describes as an 'undeclinable subjectivity,' a 'presence of oneself to oneself,' which precedes all philosophy. But now at the same moment we are faced with the limit) where the fundamental difficulty appears again. For this 'tacit cogito,' this 'undeclinable subjectivity,' upon which consequently also this philosophy must be based and be dependent, simultaneously functions within this philosophy, behind which the philosophizing subject himself - whose position, indeed, is untenable - hidJe.s himself, in order to (save,' anyhow, the universal validity of this philosophy, i.e., of his own 'Coqito' as (pseudo-j Word-revelation.' Because M-P desires to avoid the snares of Sartre's 'nothingness' and its concomitant dialectics, inexorably elaborated with logicistic means and henceforth 'unreal,' he soon lets the problematics, so to speak, 'slip,' and returns to his 'world.' The 'tacit cogito' has, according to him, only a 'gliding,' slipping hold on itself and on the world. It 'guesses,' presumes, the latter round about itself as its 'field,' which happens to be there and in the 'ambiguous' conversation with which a 'meaning' appears. This 'slipping' presence is explained also by M-P as the direct expression
• Cf. lecture H.

of the thoroughly 'temporal,' i.e.) historical, character of our existence. With him, too, this 'historical' temporality ultimately serves as the final denominator of this existence. And the mentioned absolutization of phenomenology as such, its self-sufficiency, must be 'compensated' by the statement, that phenomenology, however much it is maintained as the final 'revelation' of meaning, is an 'infinite meditation,' which never knows where it goes, but which is 'odoeniurous:' This statement, indeed, has come true, for, as we saw, with M-P phenomenology, once born as a 'rigorous scientific' investigation of the 'intentional consciousness,' finally passes into a certain 'mythology' of 'Nature.' The fundamental difficulty Once more, however, the fundamental tension becomes evident within the 'historical' denominator itself. At the end of his expositions the philosopher, after his 'conclusion' that he is 'a psychological and historical structure,' states that "even the thought of a philosopher is only one way to explicate his hold on the world, that which he is.)) 5 Again, then, he neglects that it is precisely this philosophy itself to which the final word continues to be reserved and which alone reveals the so-called psychological and historical structure. The antinomy is very sharp here, precisely because at last the philosopher himself, in a critical self-reflection, seems to turn up, as he is. But in fact he conceals himself the more firmly. He spooks) from the outside, within his Phenomenology and without any possibility to account: Here lies the essential weakness of this philosophy as well as its fundamental point of encounter with a Christian way of thinking. Therefore we first purposely discussed somewhat elaborately this idea of a 'phenomenology of phenomenology.' In the idea of 'temporality' (historicity) itself, which should bring the final elucidation, the tension still works. Now the three dimensions of this temporality become its components, while M-P shows the tendency to accentuate the present-in-its-broad-sense (as he puts it). This is to say, the 'field' of the present, the ambiguous alliance of (moving) consciousness-and-life-world. This
" "Jo IItliH uno structure psychologique ct historique. J'ai recu avec I'existence uno ttl'llllc'II'(\ d'('xiHLul', IIn HLyk, T'outos mos actions et mes pensces sont en ruppnr], IIVCW (,t'LLcI HLl'lu't,III'O, (',L m~n'll' In pcns60 d'un philosophe n'est

Itlll,dc'm ,1'c'xplfcoILt'I' lu 1//1/'(1., 11, Jj Ill,






de, cola qu'll cat", l'hrlnmn,


field always is already 'present,' and thus it is rooted in the 'past.' In reality M-P has to fall back, in this concluding part of his 'phenomenology of phenomenology,' upon the result of his so-called 'direct description,' namely the (,natural' and 'social') 'world' as the 'true transcendental.'
The (direct description) and the (life-world)

The 'reduction'

and the (natural


This is not to say that the typically phenomenological ideas are not already present in this 'direct description' as such, which, indeed, serves as a demonstration of 'phenomenological positivism' and tries to keep a close contact with the so-called 'positive' sciences. They are. In the first place there is the idea of 'description' as such. We spoke about it in the first lecture already and we saw that it had a polemical side, namely, against the natural scientific method of causal explanation and construction on the basis of an 'objective' basic denominator, as it was practised in current positivism. M-P agrees with this idea of description. By the 'world' he means the so-called 'life-world,' the world lived in by the subject in its moving existence and, therefore, a moving, 'open' one itself. This life-world does not consist of a series of separate physical-chemical 'elements,' but is the universal, shifting horizon of our 'lived experience,' a whole with different levels, each of which are characterized as 'wholes,' as 'structures,' showing a primary and clear coherence. The organic, the psychical and the historical level are the main ones which M-P distinguishes here (especially in his Structure of conduct). As such this life-world 'is more original than the fixed, determinate universe of 'science' or the closed world of the 'natural attitude.' M-P develops this view in the way of a critical discussion of the postulates and results especially of modern psychology. More than once, indeed, he shows in a striking manner that the discoveries made particularly by the so-called Gestalt-psychology clearly evince the untenability of the usually behavioristic-positivistic postulates of modern psychology, Gestaltpsychology itself included. These discoveries can only be really utilized and interpreted in their true meaning-COherence by a philosophical, i.e., phenomenological, 'description,' which has broken resolutely with these postulates and is able to discover this really primordial 'world' under that of science and of the 'natural attitude.' As a matter of fact, over against the positivistic, behavioristic constructions, he often gives evidence of a considerably greater sense of reality, and the perusal of this can be very instructive: 6

This is not to say, however, that M-P has managed to liberate himself entirely from ordinary positivism. Now a second typical trait of his phenomenology must be mentioned, namely the reduction. The life-world with its mobility may represent the most original and most embracing horizon of our directly lived experience, i.e., of our 'perception,' it can be discovered only by means of this reduction, which is a reflection. This implies that, in order to become aware of our being-intentional-movementto-the world, We must suspend this movement. The natural attitude and its certainties are, it is true, not annulled by this reflexive reduction. It is characteristic of M-P, who wants to surmount the vacuum of Husserl's transcendental cogito as well as the existential non-being of Heidegger and Sartre, which is absolutely present to itself in anxiety, that he, on the one hand, shows his trust in the immanent possibilities of the reflection also within his expositions, but, on the other hand, remains enough of an existentialist to reject a simple return to Husserl's 'transcendental coqito' and its constituting of a previously 'annulled' world. This is the fundamental 'ambiguity' of his position; the ambiguity, about which he speaks much within his argument, is only a consequence of the first. 'He thinks that the 'natural attitude' must be considered as presupposed by every philosophy. Nevertheless, it is not able to know itself really as movement-tothe-world; its certainties 'pass' as 'self-evident.' So the phenomenological reduction is indispensable in order to cause the appearance of the being-in-the-world, inaugurated by Heidegger. I believe that rafter all our previous discussions it needs no demonstration that the order is in fact an inverse one. First of all the phenomenological reflection is dis.engaged from the coherence of meaning of our full experience, set and held aside as the decisive self-revelation. Thereiore as this reflection remains a reflection-upon-something, and, as self-revelation, primarily upon a subjective 'something' - the so-called 'natural attitude' is needed as the so-called 'presupposition' of this reflection. At the same time, however, it must be 'reduced' and remain secondary with regard to this reflection. 'Secondary,' then, implies always a degradation of this 'natural' experience. ~ven M-P, who pursues a certain 'rehabilitation' of this natural attitude, cannot avoid this degradation. More than once this It Lt it ude il-1 dcscribod as 'dogmatical,' as orientated to the world liS 11 {Iiv('n, fi::n()(t 1111ivcrso, in which everything has been settled, In shurt, IlH 11 'l)()HlllvIHtk' world. But bocausc this natural attitude

within the phenomenological view indeed remains indispensable, we must say that positivism, be it in a mere or less negative sense, continues to be presupposed by this phenomenological philosophy, As fer the phenomenological reflexion and reduction as such, which is set and held apart, where does it stand? Nowhere, i.e., everywhere. Even the se-called pre-reflexive of pre-conscious experience of the life-world, which according to what the philosopher says, is the initial, constant and final 'situation' of the 'conscious' activity of reflexion, can only really go en as a 'subjective' giving of meaning, when the abstract, absolutized structure of reflexion, se to speak, has been projected 'back' into it beforehand. Even the 'life-world,' then, remains on the 'objective' side of the line, whereas the 'lived experience' of this 'world' keeps to the 'subjective' side.
Inbentiorvality as {perception.' Functionalism

of meaning which unfolds in the vertically directed typical structures of the human act, in which the different functions only function. A sensory 'impression,' er a perceptive 'linage,' can never be made a closed, possibly even 'movable,' 'whole,' but we have to admit that such an 'impression,' in the temporal order, in itself demands, is designated to, 'conscious' (logical, but not primarily theoretical) distinction, to historical 'control,' to symbolical expression etc., and this all in one dynamic direction, which points above time. Functienalism, en the contrary, remains confined within the temporal horizon with its 'horizontal' order of functions, and it revenges itself in the lability and inner tensions of the function chosen as the basic denominator. Se much fer M-P's 'perception,' which, as we established already, appeared to require 'completion' in another basic denominator, namely the 'historical' function.

On the whole, however, M-P tries to surmount the age-old dualistic subject-object-scheme by means of this denominator of 'lived experience,' which he usually calls {perception.' It is in this 'sensory' perception and its typical mobile 'structure' that the true unity must be found, But the difficulty of this task does not fail to appear. On the one hand, perception is defined as an (intentional' act; but as such it should anticipate the 'conscious,' i.e., fer M-P, the logical and historical functions of our existence and thus a 'subject' with an 'objective' field over against it. Therefore, en the ether hand, M-P sets perception apart as a se-called {operating,' even sometimes 'unconscious,' intentionality, which, in a way, remains 'active,' but in the first place refers to a certain receptivity as the expressions ef our always being-inthe world. This concept of 'operating intentionality' is quite obscure and confusing, though M-P's abundant imagery gives it a suggestive force. At any rate, he insists en it and in this line later on even inclines to the already mentioned mythology of 'Nature.' In order to judge the expositions of M-P. correctly, we have to realize that there is indeed ne logical distinction er historical formation without preceding sensory affect-ivity, in the sense of psychical sensitivity, in which indeed, a specific 'mobility' as well as a certain receptivity are evident. These features, however, can never be closed up and understood in themselves by means of an absolutized abstraction. This is what we call 'functionalism.' They only reveal their true meaning in the dynamic coherence

One point must still be briefly dealt with, namely M-P's view of corporality. In this corporality M-P. thinks he can point out the real intermediary between 'subject' and 'world.' In our perception, my enaaaement-m-the-uorui attests itself, but it continues to be my perception. This perceiving subject, this 'natural Ego,' is called 'body' er bodu-subieci, On this point, again, M-P is correct and also instructive in his protest against every attempt at closing up and confining our bodily existence in its physicochemical or even biotical functions. The body, he says, has its own motorial experience, which implies a direct, practical 'knowledge' of the 'world' without the necessity of any 'representations.' It is an original, general, be it a rough, 'adhesion to the world.' As such, however, it has an impersonal character. The truly personal, i.e., 'conscious' and 'active,' existence continues to be characteristic of the {historical' existence. Therefore the body-subject is, en the ether hand, called only a provisional draft of this historical existence. The relation between body and 'existence' is dialectical; he says that the body is the fixed or generalized existence and that existence is a continual incarnation. Ultimately the true initiative is reserved to the 'historical' subject, on the constant basis of the subject-object scheme. Fer he declares that this bodily perceiving subject is never an absolute subjectivity, that it remains a {blind' adhesion to the world and is destined to 1>C"C'OI11(' o1>,1('('t to an ultimate Ego, This means that this would-he 'Ill I«rmorlln ry' of OH' 'body,' ttsolr, in sptto of some useful


descriptions of it, is a clear demonslration in which his thought moves.
II The last phase of Heidegger Heidegger's (reversal'

of the general tension
and Sartre

This must suffice to give you a general impression of this thought. To conclude these Iectures about phenomenology I should like to make some remarks about the last development of Heidegger's and Sartre's thought. Don't be afraid that it will be too difficult and tiring - I, too, 'bodily' know that it is the last day of the conference -, for we are not concerned with an entirely new philosophy, but with a certain development of the previously elaborated lines, which development in a sense implies a (reversal.' This development, however, is worth considering for a moment as a sign of the times. When we say 'reversal' tEehre), we touch the central term of the second phase of Heidegger's thought. What does it mean? According to the philosopher himself we have to understand it primarily as a turn in the history of Being-as-such, i.e., in Being-as-such as history. A turn, in which this thoroughly historical Being has imparted, has com-mitted (sich eu-schiclcen) itself as such. This reversal implies, in the second place, that now the way of the book Being and Time, which we discussed last time, must be reversed. Now the question is not to find and to investigate a being, viz., 'existence,' as the central point from which Being-as-such, or rather, the 'idea' of Being, may be discovered, but now Being itself, its truth, its self-revelation and its relatedness to beings, the Dasein included, are at stake. Here we are concerned with the most primordial question and questionable-ness (Frag'UYilrdigkeit). The question of 'existence' is dependent upon this most primordial question, although the questionable-ness of this Being-as-such can only appear in the true light via the start of Being and Time, i.e., via the profound, penetrating investigation of the Dasein, which, as you will recall, resulted into 'nothing.' Only in this way can the age-old 'error' (1rre) of history be discovered as such, namely, the 'error,' which derived from the '[orqotten-ness' of Being-as-such, i.e., of its dif-ference tUnterschied) from the beings. This age-old error, which according to Heidegger already starts clearly with Plato, is called by him the era of metaphysics. Metaphysics, to be sure, cannot really disengage itself from the dif-ference (of Being-as-such and 'being(s) '), it has, like all human thought and activity, to receive its primary stimulus from this all-porvading dlf-J'crcnco. nut. 01(' inner ton()

dency of metaphysics is to efface this dif-ference. It starts from the 'beings' or from Being-in-general and strives to 'explain' it from -, to re-present it to a highest being as the uniting 'foundation' of being-in-general. In modern times this founding 'ground,' to which beings are re-presented, is called 'subjectivity,' to which the rest appears as its 'ob-ject' tGeqen-etosui), The pre-eminent demonstration and also ultimate completion of this development is the modern technical system (Gestell), in which everything is re-presented,calculated and arranged, and in which the meaninglessness of being-in-general together with the immediate threat to our free, 'ex-sistential' Dasein becomes terribly clear. In this all-embracing re-presentation the most proper character of Being, its 'verbal' character, its to-be what we 'may translate as (presence' - remains forgotten, becomes 'dissimulated,' even beyond all recognition. Especially Nietzsche was already aware of this" when he proclaimed the era of (nihilism.' But Heidegger goes a step further. He thinks that precisely in this 'ultimate' situation of 'planetary' re-presentation, which is rapidly perfecting itself now, Being-as-such, i.e., the truth of 'presence,' of to-be, has its proper chance. Precisely in this utmost hidden-ne ss it might reveal itself as different, namely to him who has undergone the radical experience of 'Being-forgottenness' and who is willing to take the radical existential (leap' (Sprung). This view, however, implies that the era of 'metaphysics,' the age-old 'error' of history was (properly we should say: is) a necessity. Indeed, the inner tension in the Dasein as 'existence' between 'freedom' and 'necessity,' which we established in the previous lecture, now returns in Being-as-such, and this the more so, because 'historicity' is now presented as the truly universal 'origin,' which leaves no room for any 'foundation' whatsoever, not even to a 're-solved' existence and its 'decisions' (which, as a matter of fact, appeared to be without any perspective). Now that Heidegger in order to veil this lack of any perspective, has shifted the essential 'decision' and the responsibility for it to 'Being-as-such,' he has to admit that this 'inauthentic' era of 'metaphysics,' of re-presentation, belongs to this 'Being-as-such.' Being as presence, as dif-ference, can only 'be,' if, in itself, in its being-difference, it sets free the manifestation of being-ingeneral and, thus, occasions the re-presenting, 'technical' turn to the latter, in order to continue to be free. This latter trait, which rcmnlns the prvailing one for IIeidegger, he describes as Ilt'i 11 INJVn1 t (lO'r-f"i{/'I'I';,'1), the kC'l'I1C'l of historicity. In the e-vent, ,1

the proper 'gathering' of beings takes place, precisely because the e-vent as such is a 'withdrawal' (Entzug), and only in this withdrawal can it really continue to be 'authentic.' The 'issue' (Austrag) in the being-in-general and this withdrawal balance each other in a dialectical and at the same time labile way, whereby the latter remains accentuated, but the first cannot disappear. We might, if need be, denote this as the inner 'risky' character of Being.
(Mythological' thought

All this may look like quite obscure language to you, although I tried to present it in such a way that you might observe the continuity of Heidegger's thought. It is obscure, indeed, and all the numerous 'interpretations' are not able to make this thought-and-language-of-Being (Seinsdenken) 'clear'. In fact, this thought-of-Being results in a sort of mytho-logy, wherein Beingas-such and its 'revelation' - the transcendental question of which, as we saw, had to arise - evaporate into an idle myth. At the same time the philosopher appears as the 'prophet,' as a sort of 'oracle,' but without any real message. This thought-of-Being, however, remains thought: the dialectical balance, in which the polarity of concealment and un-covering, of withdrawal and leaving 'behind,' stand in the foreground, in the last resort hinges on mouatu; namely a thoroughly historicis,tic thought. Presumably we can say that in Heidegger historicism arrives at its final consequences, and thus, at its end. The philosopher himself, who had started with a so-called 'fundamental ontology' with an apparently radical and critical questioning of our truly primordial position, now seems to have abandoned every attempt at a really philosophical account of essential 'states of affairs'; he speaks, but without message. For in this mature historicism, this historicism in its 'eventide,' both 'history' and 'thought' lose their intrinsic, specific 'speech.' In reality both structurally are designated one for another within a super-arbitrary meaningcoherence which points forward, and, thus, function within God's universal revelation in creation. Here they mutually become each other's 'echo' 6 Heidegger's later philosophy can, in a way, as has been done, be designated as 'metacritical.' The 'grim' accents of this first thought, it is true, are replaced by milder ones. But Heidegger's final word is the description

of Being as a (play,' which is, in fact, only a more 'innocent' and friendly word for the dialectics we mentioned above. When at bottom nothing happens (in the e-vent), everything can 'happen.' In this 'play' the search for 'foundation' can be abandoned. But rules too, fail, and even something that is at stake. In my opinion this 'play' betrays the 'resignation' of the humanistic European thinker to the (force maieure' of a 'technically' dominated time together with a final attempt at preserving an inner 'distance.' It goes without saying that this attitude, at least with less profound and erudite disciples, easily may join a pragmatistic opportunism, which, under the guidance of a powerful elite, seems to promise more for the 'present.' Sarire'e turn to Marxism For Sartre too, systematic philosophy, as it recently has appeared in phenomenological analysis, is no longer that selfevident authority and cultural power, which it has been in Western SOciety centuries. His last work, Critique of dialectical reason/ for it is true, to judge by its title and appearance, looks traditional. But Sartre in fact professes here his new 'universal,' namely Marxism. That is to say, he wants to present an (engaged) critique, which no longer takes a retired, idealistic position (actually a refuge-position), which at the same time rejects the positivistic trend of dispersion into a multiplicity of 'facts' and 'events' without real self-reflection, i.e., a critique which joins the central movement of reality, i.e., of (history! This movement according to Sartre is that of the 'rising class,' the labour-class, which gradually has become (conscious' of its prominent position and has re-flected itself in the dialectical doctrine of Karl Marx. The .latter had already said that the point was, to change the world, instead of endlessly 'interpreting' it, and to 'engage' philosophy in this 'historical' endeavor. Because, as we have seen, 'freedotm' ultimately means: making oneself free, Sartre thinks that this 'human reality,' this motor of all historical movement, is represented pre-eminently by the 'oppressed' labour-class, which has to struggle for 'freedom.' It never can be satisfied with the existing conditions and consolidate itself in a 'natural attitude,' but it experiences, practically, its (dialectical' relation to its present 'natural' existence, which relation urges itself immediately upon the labourer in his (needs' (besoin), at the same

Cf. J. P. A. Mokkos,






Cr;,1il/lHl tl« la rainOrl (Unirotiq'lto, vel. I, Thtlorio ,les ensembles



time requires his (project' and thus constitutes the real historical movement. In this movement class-consciousness increases gradually, i.e., mostly in a revoZutionaTY way. You see, Sartre's existentialistic categories are used now to justify the dynamic progress of communism. At the same time the factual powerlessness of phenomenological-existentialistic 'reason,' gravitating to the idea of 'freedom,' becomes evident. Still Sartre wants to save this idea within the Marxist framework. The 'historical' dialectics as such can be neglected in favour of a new tyrannical dogmatism, which theoretically works with the primacy of 'matter' and admits 'consciousness' only as a 'superstructure,' based on the primary substructure of 'matter.' The Stalinistic period was a very striking example of this. Therefore, a critique of dialectical reason' is needed. This critique, however can only be accomplished by dialectical reason itself. This dialectical reason first of all has to take seriously the historical, 'temporal' character of dialectical existence. This is to say, within the primarily 'economical' engagement of the subject in its 'material' world, this subject, on account of its self-consciousness is at the same time already beyond its present condition. Within this engagement, which also Implies an increasing engagement in 'groups' and other 'communities,' although starting from the individuals as such, subjective consciousness holds itself free for itself in its being-beyond-itself. As such this 'historical' consciousness, however, to use Sartre's own words, is nothing more than an 'ephemeral' subjectivity. In this manner the existentialist subjectivity, which in its radical 'autonomy' had fallen into 'nothingness,' is now wholly absorbed into a dialectical historical 'process' in Marxist fashion, with the only reserve that it retains its inner, in reality ineffective, consciousness- (of) -freedom. On the other side, however, 'consciousness,' i.e. dialectical as such continues to be itself, i.e., in spite of all 'historicity,' it remains umioersal. For this conscious reason remains, in the final analysis, that which 'jYUts ioruxmi this 'critique of dialectical reason,' that behind which the philosopher himself, who within his philosophy presents himself as one of the 'ephemeral subjectivities,' remains concealed in a definitely uncritical way, that which he SImply lets speak. Here the insuperable religiOUS dialectics of the humanistic qrousui-motive appears once more. The historical development of this ground-met ivc, however, now, after the last, violent, but at tho same 1lmo powl'l'lc'HH 1'('vo11 the of autonomy-polo, hnA nrrlvrxl n1 11 phllHl', WhC'I'I'III, wlt h J h'jcl('g1!f'I'

as well as with Sartre, though in divergent directions, the factual inner capitulation of humanistic philosophical self-reflection, polarized of old to the idea of 'autonomy,' has become clear.

What can still be expected of this developement? It is not easy to speak positively about this point. At any rate, as may appear already from our brief discussion, we are faced with a drastic transition in the history of philosophy, which of course is connected with the present intensity of history in general. We may presume in the European area a rapidly increasing decay of real philosophy, i.e., of serious critical self-reflection, a growing rapprochement to a practical pragmatism with philosophy in the secondary position of a 'supporter' and, at times, of a weak 'brake.' We may presume, on the other hand, an attempt at a final refuge of Western, autonomously 'reflecting' man into a certain mytho-logy, more or less new, at any rate 'esoteric' and lacking any power of historical formation. This is the only 'beyond' I am able to point out, when I take up again the questioning title of this lecture and try to answer it. We may presume. We shall have to wait. But this waiting cannot be passive. If anything has became clear in the present confused situation, it is this that the question of the true, tenable, universal and responsible, engagement is now most urgent for us all. The primordial decision concerning this vital question is also decisive as far as the fulfilment of our philosophical and scientific vocation is concerned, as an integrant part of our total life-vocation. First of all we have to learn again and again that philosophy is a modest occupation, that our whole life has to be evangelization, always and everywhere. Philosophy has to be subservient to this 'authentic' life, which, however, can use all available really philosophical and scientific means. In this full engament, which coincides with our real liberaiurn, also philosophy can unfold its true meaning, namely in a direction which always points (beyond,' towards the only full unity of life, Jesus Christ, who is coming - now.