US Bank National Association, As Trustee on Behalf of GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR4 3476 Stateview Boulevard Fort

Mill, SC 29715 Plaintiff vs. G. Linton Sheppard Judith A. Sheppard 2256 Washington Lane Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006-5826 Defendants

: Court of Common Pleas : Civil Division : No. 2010-16706 : Montgomery County

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter an Order for Reconsideration of the above-captioned matter, grant pro se Defendants a reasonable time period for Discovery and issue a stay of the in rem judgment that was entered in favor of Plaintiffs against Defendants in the above-captioned matter by the Order dated the 30th day of November. In support thereof, Defendants aver as follows: CASE HISTORY AND FACTS
1. Plaintiff is US Bank National Association, as Trustee on Behalf of GSR Mortgage Loan

Trust 2005-AR4. Plaintiff’s address is 3476 Stateview Boulevard, Fort Mill, SC 19715.
2. Defendants’ are G. Linton Sheppard and Judith A. Sheppard. Defendants’ address is

2256 Washington Lane, Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006.
3. On June 18, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure (hereafter

“Complaint”) to foreclose the residential real property owned and occupied by Defendants, G. Linton Sheppard and Judith A. Sheppard.
4. Defendants response to Plaintiff’s Complaint filed July 16, 2010 challenged Plaintiff’s

statement of amounts due and, subsequently, of Plaintiff’s standing in the case and evidence of ownership of the actual promissory note and mortgage instrument.
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1020. On November 15. On October 1. 2010 from Plaintiff’s attorney requesting a 30-day extension to produce the original promissory note. 2010. 9. Defendants subsequently received a letter dated December 15. the alleged Assignment to Plaintiff. Attached to Plaintiff’s Motion were copies of the Mortgage and Note. On December 2. Plaintiff claims the amounts due on the mortgage are as follows: $787. On September 2. 2010. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter “Motion”). To date. Plaintiff failed to address Defendants’ additional substantial allegations.” (Original Complaint §3) Plaintiff subsequently produced an Assignment as “proof” it is the “legal owner of the mortgage. 2010.97 plus interest. and concurrently filed a Request for Production of the Note. an Affidavit “confirming the default and the amount of the debt” and various letters required in the foreclosure process. $105. On October 15. 6. 8. Defendants filed a Brief in response to Plaintiff’s Brief. $650. The in rem judgment was issued while the Request for Production of the Note was still outstanding.29 interest.00 principal. $754.609. 7. Defendants filed an Answer which substantially denied the foreclosure allegations outlined in the Motion. Plaintiff filed a Brief in Support of its Motion in which Plaintiff challenged only one of Defendants’ substantial allegations. Plaintiff has not produced the original promissory note. the Honorable Judge Branca ordered an in rem judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants in the amount of $834.” (Attached as Exhibit A2 to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment) 12. Plaintiff claims it is the “legal owner of the mortgage.00 property 2 .168. No explanation for the in rem judgment was provided. one part of the issue of standing.68 cumulative late charges. PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENTS AND SUPPORTING “EVIDENCE” 11.500. 2010.00 attorney’s fees. $44.5. 10.

. Defendants denied that the Affidavit filed in support of Plaintiff’s claims was valid (§8) and attached proof thereto. §7 ¶4. 16.00 costs of suit and title search. Defendants denied that the mortgage instrument was properly assigned to Plaintiff (§4 rel to Truth in Lending. Plaintiff subsequently disputed Defendants’ claim of lack of standing in their Brief in response to Defendants Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants claimed lack of standing. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment) 13. 15. Defendants argued against Mr. Defendants’ Brief §1) citing violations of Truth in Lending and the fact that the Assignment filed after the original Complaint. and 2) statements that Defendants’ did not take the necessary steps to rectify the debt as required in the information “Plaintiff” sent to Defendants. NA Successor by Merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. §10 ¶2 rel to Truth in Lending. Kennerty’s statements that Plaintiff notified Defendants of their intent to foreclose when in fact it was Wells Fargo who notified Defendants. Kennerty’s statements that Defendants have not 3 . Defendants’ Brief §4 ¶1). (Original Complaint §6) Plaintiff subsequently attached an Affidavit given by Herman John Kennerty in his capacity as VP of Loan Documentation for Wells Fargo Bank. Inc. and $550.” (Exhibit B. §6 ¶1. In support of its Motion. DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENTS IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 14.inspections/property preservations. Plaintiff relied on a number of additional allegations and supposed “proof” related to ownership and communications with Defendants: 1) statements that Plaintiff sent the required foreclosure information to Defendants. Defendants’ Request for Production of Original Promissory Note. Defendants argued against Mr. in which he claimed he is “familiar with the account that forms the basis of the instant foreclosure action and am authorized to give this Affidavit. Defendants denied that the promissory note was assigned by Wells Fargo to Plaintiff (§6 ¶1.

” S. however they did not provide proof of their dispute. 2000). 167 (1993). Arbittier et al. Defendants attached numerous communications to support their argument. Kennerty’s statements related to the amount owed on the debt. 535 Pa..taken the necessary steps to cure the arrears or offer a reasonable solution to cure the arrears.2d 163.8 (10th ed. thereby admitting that Mr. 18. Plaintiff did not dispute this claim. Defendants also disputed Mr. 18. A court has inherent power to reconsider its own rulings. 4 . thereby admitting they are in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices. Moore v. 25. Plaintiff did not dispute the claims made by Defendants. Defendants asserted that Plaintiff was in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices (Defendants’ Brief §3) stating that Plaintiff willfully and deceptively concealed their identity from Defendants. 17. APPLICABLE LAW 19. § 7-2. “Motions for reconsideration are discouraged unless the facts or law not previously brought to the attention of the court are raised. Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Civil Practice Manual. thereby making it impossible for Defendants to come to a reasonable solution in the instant matter. 634 A. NA for the assignee while she was simultaneously acting as Partner in the law firm representing the assignor. Moore. Defendants denied that Plaintiff’s paperwork has been executed in a legal fashion (Defendants’ Brief §4) claiming fraud on the court due to the fact that an attorney from Plaintiff’s representing law firm signed the Assignment in the capacity of VP of Loan Documentation for Wells Fargo Bank. Kennerty’s statements were false.A.

611 A. Pike Coal Company. 268. Rule 1035 permits the entering of a summary judgment only if the pleadings. 221 Pa. Rasner. 20. 488 Pa. Prince v. Albright v. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a 5 . 548 Pa.2d 865 (1969). and all doubts as to the existence of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. § 5505. 222 Pa. Thompson Coal Company v. Gerner.Hutchison v.C. 212 Pa. 451 Pa.” Summary judgment is granted only in the clearest of cases. Miller.Super.2d 841 (1968).2d 1280. In response. 696 A. The moving party has the burden of proving the nonexistence of any genuine issue of fact. 302 A. S7e8265c9346011 286. 303 A. but must set forth specific facts which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.2d 821 (1972). 292 A.S. The moving party has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact.A. 412 A. “any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report. 417 Pa.Super. Albert. 225 Pa.2. Kotwasinski v. 359.Super. Luddy.Super.2d 466 (1979). 21. depositions. 436 Pa. 198. 32.2d 452 (1973). 294 A. 1288 (1992). 146. Kent v. 58. the non-moving party may not rest upon pleadings alone. Schacter v. 108. Moore v. admissions and affidavits. Zimmerman. 258 A. Phaff v. Abington Memorial Hospital. As per Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.Super. 390.2d 826 (1973). 93. See 42 Pa. “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The record is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. answers to interrogatories. 239 A.2d 1159 (1997). where the right is clear and free from doubt. if any. Pavoni.2d 458 (1972).

Ritmanich v. 198. a representative of Wells Fargo who has also admitted he doesn’t verify facts and amounts owed when he signs Affidavits. Jonnel Enterprises. “Q: [Y]ou’re only looking at the documents to 6 . Kennerty admits he only verifies the date. Plaintiff used an Affidavit which was given by admitted robo-signor Herman John Kennerty.” One purpose in demanding a specific denial is to enable the parties to focus upon the disputed facts and to assist the Court in defining the issues for trial. Bogley. Com. Defendants contested the amount due as stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Kennerty was asked during his deposition. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on Personal knowledge. Inc. Rule 1029(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides that “averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required are admitted when not denied specifically or by necessary implication. .2d 570 (1971). shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. .Super.material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Harting & Reese v. 310 (Ct. Defendants submitted as proof that Herman John Kennerty is a robosignor his own deposition taken in the Geline case where he admits he robo-signs 50 to 150 Affidavits per day. Under Rule 1035(d) there are strict requirements concerning affidavits which are used in support of a motion for summary judgment. 11 D&C 3d 303.’ 23. 22. Pl. (pg 8-9) On page 60 and 61. 219 Pa. and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 1979). “Q: Can you tell me about how many documents you sign a day? A: Anywhere from 50 to 150. and where he admits he only verifies the date on Affidavits. 280 A. In addition. In the Geline case. That Rule provides: ‘. Mr. BASIS FOR RECONSIDERATION 24. not the “facts” contained therein.. Stuart.

Plaintiff and potentially Plaintiff’s counsel have also committed fraud on this Court. “Q: And do you know the difference between whether or not an entity … is the actual holder of the promissory note or the requisite authority under RCW 62A. correct? A: Yes. thereby calling into question whether the Court may enter a summary judgment in the instant case “where the right is clear and free from doubt.make sure that the date is correct and consistent with the date you’re signing the document. you’re relying on the other people in the process to make sure that the information is correct on the document that you’re signing? A: Yes. Kennerty states in his Affidavit that he has personal knowledge that the information contained in the Affidavit is true and correct. is that correct? A: No.” Defendants believe this proves the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. That is not correct. “Q: And so when you sign this beneficiary declaration and any other beneficiary declaration.” (pg 62) In the instant case.” Kennerty goes on to admit (pg 64-65) that he does not know when signing affidavits whether the entity referred to actually has the authority to enforce the obligation.3-301 to enforce the obligation? A: No.” The attorney of record goes on.” Kennerty goes on to admit that he does not verify that what is contained in the affidavit he is signing is consistent with the actual amount owed. 7 . On page 64 of the deposition in the Geline case. you don’t have any independent knowledge about whether or not the information is truthful.” It is also Defendants’ belief that Kennerty has committed fraud by claiming knowledge of a financial matter of which he has no personal knowledge. and therefore. as was true in Geline. “Q: So you’re simply signing the document that’s presented to you and you’re just making sure that the date is correct? A: Correct. “Q: And you’re looking on a computer screen at the foreclosure matrix that you described to me to make certain that the name of the … beneficiary on the document that you’re signing matches with the matrix.

Defendants believe this not only calls into question Plaintiff standing in this matter. 27. Defendants raised more issues that they believe constitute genuine issues of material fact. precluding this Court from issuing a summary judgment not only on the basis that the Court cannot issue a summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact are in dispute. but it is their belief that the fact that because Plaintiff did not contest these disputes. and 4) violations of the Truth in Lending Act. It is also Defendants’ belief that these issues should raise genuine issues of material fact. the required Acts and notice of Defendants’ responsibility to meet with an approved credit counseling agency. Plaintiff also did not dispute the fact that at no time did Plaintiff submit to Defendants the proper paperwork related to foreclosure. 26. Defendants believe this should also constitute their position that there are issues of material fact in dispute. 8 . In Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Plaintiff did not dispute Defendants’ claims that Kennerty’s Affidavit was made in bad faith. 2) violations of securities laws and potential fraud. despite Plaintiff’s claims to the contrary. 3) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Plaintiff also did not dispute Defendants’ claims that at no time where they informed by Plaintiff of its intent to foreclose. Defendants raised the following issues: 1) violations of the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act. in addition to the inconsistencies and errors in Plaintiff’s documentation mentioned above. but also believes this should constitute a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff has thereby effectively admitted the same. Defendants are representing themselves pro se and as such are not completely versed on the law. including potential conflict of interest in the Assignment. Plaintiff therefore avers them to be true.25. but also because the disputed facts call into question whether Plaintiff is actually entitled to a judgment in this case.

29. they state that “the federal government should impose a nationwide moratorium on foreclosures. attorneys general from all 50 states announced a bipartisan effort to look into the possibility that documents or affidavits were improperly submitted in their jurisdictions.” They go on to state that “on October 13. L.28. 110-343. Defendants filed a Motion to Produce the Original Note. It has come to Defendants’ attention that the Congressional Oversight Panel. the servicing agent. Pub.” On page 14 of the report. If Plaintiff did not believe this to be a genuine issue of material fact. 2010 entitled “Examining the Consequences of Mortgage Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure Mitigation. Defendants believe that the signing of the Assignment document by a partner in the law firm representing Plaintiff as an officer of Wells Fargo. the panel discusses the Legal Consequences of Document Irregularities. They state: Effective transfers of real estate depend on parties’ being able to answer seemingly straightforward questions: who owns the property? how did they come to 9 . is a significant conflict of interest that the Court cannot ignore. why would Plaintiff have requested an extension to produce the original note? Defendants therefore believe this calls into question the rendering of a judgment.” On page 13 – 14. pursuant to Section 125(b)(1) of Title 1 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. issued their November Oversight Report dated November 16. and therefore should be considered grounds for reconsideration. proving that Plaintiff has standing in the instant case. No. NEW INFORMATION 30. Clearly Plaintiff felt this was a genuine issue of material fact based on the request for an extension to produce the note that Defendants received after the Motion for Summary Judgment was ordered in this case.

fully executed. or in behalf of. and of related mortgages or deeds of trust. In order to protect ownership interests. or because robo-signing affected the homeowner’s due process rights – means that the prior homeowner may be able to assert claims against a subsequent owner of the property. if prior transfers of the mortgage were unsuccessful or improper. could be affected. such as a foreclosure or even an ordinary sale. 31. but the same inconsistencies that a Congressional Oversight Panel is calling into question.own it? can anyone make a competing claim to it? The irregularities have the potential to make these seemingly simple questions complex. a properly recorded deed describing both the property and the parties to the transfer establishes property ownership. (footnotes omitted) It is Defendants’ belief that this Honorable Court cannot ignore not only the inconsistencies present in the instant case. In this way. standing is critical for a successful foreclosure. consistent with the notion that the purpose of the recording system is to establish certainty regarding property ownership. documentation irregularities can affect title to a property at a number of stages. (footnotes omitted) As Defendants have previously discussed. Accordingly. as further described below. The Congressional Oversight Panel discusses the issue of title. transparent recordation system that supplies reliable information on ownership interests in property. real property market depends on a seller’s ability to convey “clear title”: an assurance that the purchaser owns the property free of encumbrances or competing claims. As a threshold matter. For a mortgage. They say on page 16: The U. of transfers of ownership. because if the party bringing the foreclosure does not have standing to enforce the rights attached to the mortgage and the note. their basic requirements are the same. a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures. a party seeking to enforce the rights associated with the mortgage must have standing in court. especially considering Plaintiff has failed to produce a “fully 10 . subsequent transfers of the property. must be legally able to act on the mortgage.” Thus. While each state’s laws have unique features. original (commonly referred to as “wet ink”) documents must be recorded in a grantor/grantee index at a county recording office. Further. the only party that may enforce the rights associated with the mortgage. Thus. Laws governing the transfer of real property in the United States were designed to create a public. that party may not be able to take the property with clear title that can be passed on to another buyer.S. there is question as to whether Plaintiff actually has ownership interest. failure to foreclose properly – whether because the foreclosing party did not actually hold the mortgage and the note. In the case of a purchaser or transferee. “[a] mortgage may be enforced only by. with standing to take action on a mortgage in a court. meaning that a party must have an interest in the property sufficient that a court will hear their claim and can provide them with relief. Every county in the country maintains records of who owns land there. Each of the 50 states has laws governing title to land within its legal boundaries.

executed. while the security instrument provides that if the debt is not repaid. In many states. See FBR Foreclosure Mania Conference Call. a mortgage is unenforceable. See UCC §§ 3-201. In a footnote in the Congressional Oversight Panel report. supra note 3. a promissory note may be transferred by a sale contract. Defendants similarly question conveyance of a clear title for the same reason. UCC § 9-203(a)-(b). 37. there must be an authenticated document of sale that describes the promissory note. original (commonly referred to as “wet ink”) document” proving its ownership interest. 32. the report states: There are two documents that need to be transferred as part of the securitization process – a promissory note and the security instrument (the mortgage or deed of trust). There are two methods by which a promissory note may be transferred. the creditor may sell the designated collateral (the house). and What to Do About It. Alternatively. it describes general and common applications of the UCC to such transactions. also governed by whether a state has adopted particular revisions to the UCC. although one author states that the application of the UCC to the transfer of the note is not certain. States adopt articles of and revisions to the UCC individually. and the seller must have rights in the promissory note being sold. Without the note. Rather. 3-203. This report does not attempt to identify all of the possible iterations. How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Market. indorsed in blank. therefore.” the signing over of individual promissory notes through indorsement. at 758-759 (2010). First. in order for a transfer to take place under the relevant portion of the UCC. in the same way that a check can be transferred via indorsement. a note is simply an unsecured debt obligation. The first two requirements should be easily met in most securitizations. Typical language in PSAs requires the delivery to the securitization trust of the notes and the mortgages. no different from credit card debt. the transfer of the mortgage loans at each stage of the securitization involves the buyer giving the seller value and a document of sale (a mortgage purchase and sale 11 . and so there can be variation among states in the application of the UCC. The pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) for securitized loans generally contemplate transfer through negotiation. The promissory note embodies the debt obligation. Pepperdine Law Review. On pages 16 – 17. Defendants’ belief that genuine issues of material fact do exist in the instant matter. there are only three requirements: the buyer of the promissory note must give value. necessitating this Court’s reconsideration. effective transfer is discussed. Vol. while without the mortgage. Whitman. See Dale A. The rules for these transfers are generally governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). It is. it may be transferred by “negotiation. Both the note and the mortgage need to be properly transferred.

rather than a single indorsement in blank with the notes transferred thereafter as bearer paper. While the loan sale documents plus their schedules are evidence of such a chain of title. and therefore should be granted reconsideration to allow sufficient time for further discovery. it is difficult. with a final indorsement in blank to the trust. If a PSA is considered a variation by agreement from the UCC. The ownership of the Note is very important as is the issue of transfer of ownership. is important for establishing the “bankruptcy remoteness” of the trust assets. If the transfer were directly from the originator or sponsor to the trust. for both securitized and non-securitized loans. A complete chain of indorsements. 12 . this discussion only addresses the validity of transfers between sellers and buyers of mortgage loans. UCC § 1302. as well as whether. if not impossible. is more complicated. although sections of it may be incorporated by reference in the PSA. involve both the question as to whether the required transfers actually happened. It does not address the enforceability of those loans against homeowners. which requires physical possession of the original note. Further. Perhaps more critically. The PSA is the document that provides for the transfer of the mortgage and notes from the securitization sponsor to the depositor and thence to the trust.agreement or a PSA) that should include a schedule identifying the promissory notes involved. Defendants’. if they happened. acting in their pro se capacity. The third requirement. A critical part of securitization is to establish that the trust’s assets are bankruptcy remote. the loans could possibly be claimed as part of the originator’s or sponsor’s bankruptcy estate. PSAs appear to require a complete chain of indorsements on the notes from originator up to the depositor. Without a complete chain of indorsements. The transfer from the originator to the sponsor is typically governed by a separate document. In some cases. then there is a question of what the PSA itself requires to transfer the mortgage loans and whether those requirements have been met. and inexperienced in. the process relating to the production of documents. rather than directly from originator or sponsor to the trust. meaning that they could not be claimed by the bankruptcy estate of an upstream transferor of the assets. they cannot establish that the loan was not previously sold to another party. however. that the seller must have rights in the promissory note being sold. they were legally sufficient. were unfamiliar with. The questions about what the transfers required. The PSA is also the document that creates the trust. Thus. parties are free to contract around the UCC. therefore. This raises the question of whether PSAs for MBS provide for a variance from the UCC by agreement of the parties. to establish that the loans were in fact transferred from originator to sponsor to depositor to trust. it is necessary for a party to show that it is entitled to enforce the promissory note (and therefore generally that it is a holder of the physical original note) in order to complete a foreclosure successfully. as it requires an unbroken chain of title back to the loan’s originator.

multiple assignments. the transfer would be void. Defendants also question whether the securitization of their mortgage has been preserved. Most PSAs are governed by New York law and create trusts governed by New York law. because a mortgage represents a first-lien security interest on an asset in the pool – a house. 13 . this Honorable Court cannot determine that 1) Plaintiff is the legal owner of the mortgage in question and 2) Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore. The pools were collateralized by the underlying real property. It also describes the responsibilities of the trustee. in many cases the assets could not now be transferred to the trust. who is responsible for holding the recorded mortgage documents. this Honorable Court nor Defendants can ensure that title has been passed in accordance with the trust documents.33. Securitizations of mortgages require multiple transfers. PSAs frequently have timeliness requirements regarding the transfer in order to ensure that the trusts qualify for favored tax treatment. trusts that qualify for Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) status. any transaction by the trust that is in contravention of the trust documents is void. The Congressional Oversight Panel discusses the process on pages 18-19 of their report. who plays an administrative role. each transfer in this process required particular steps. and of the servicer. Similarly. and therefore cannot ensure that the transfer is not void. Mortgages that were securitized were originated through banks and mortgage brokers – mortgage originators. accordingly. Furthermore. meaning that the transfer cannot actually take place as a matter of law. As described above. this Honorable Court nor Defendants can ensure that a non-performing loan has been transferred into the trust. Next they were securitized by investment banks – the sponsors – through the use of special purpose vehicles. if the transfer for the notes and mortgages did not comply with the PSA. Moreover. and the assets would not have been transferred to the trust. Without this crucial evidence. tax-exempt vehicles that pooled the mortgages transferred to them and sold interests in the income from those mortgages to investors in the form of shares. These trusts are bankruptcy-remote. in order to convey good title into the trust and provide the trust with both good title to the collateral and the income from the mortgages. collecting and disbursing mortgage and related payments on behalf of the investors in the MBS. which would prevent the transfer of any non-performing loans to the trust now. PSAs generally require that the loans transferred to the trust not be in default. and. A governing document for securitizations called a pooling and servicing agreement (PSA) includes various representations and warranties for the underlying mortgages. (footnotes omitted) As Defendants and this Honorable Court have received an Assignment that does not indicate an actual date of transfer (but rather simply a date of record for the Assignment). New York trust law requires strict compliance with the trust documents.

Respectfully submitted. if the securitization process was deficient or illegal. It has also come to Defendants’ attention that there are questions related to false signatures on documents and cases where officials claiming to have personal knowledge as to who owns the debt and how much debt is actually owed have used numerous job titles. grant Defendants the opportunity to present Oral Arguments to the Court in support of its facts and. has abdicated its responsibilities and ignored Defendants’ fundamental rights to be protected from foreclosure fraud. then the mortgage may not have been transmitted to the trust at all. things which could also affect ownership and clean transfer of title. whose function is to enforce the law and provide justice to those who need it. In the case of a put-back. if Plaintiff is in violation of any of the foregoing processes. until such time as this Honorable Court has heard the Oral Arguments. WHEREFORE.34. 35. Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court reconsider the facts presented herein. 14 . Given the numerous questions raised above. that this Honorable Court grant a stay of any Sheriff’s Sale that may be scheduled as a result of the Order dated the 30th day of November. the investors in the trust would be protected and the originator of the loan would have to take the loan back. In that case. Furthermore. It is Defendants belief that the judicial system. 36. This calls into question who owns the mortgage. calling into question the legitimacy of their claims in a court of law. reconsidered the matter and issued its Order as a result of its reconsideration of the facts. a put-back could result. as Defendants suspect could be the case in the instant matter. Plaintiff would have no standing to foreclose on Defendants’ property. thereby requiring the process to be halted until ownership can be clearly established.

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