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Bertsch 1

On October 3, 1993, one hundred fifty U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force operators

departed from their base outside Mogadishu, Somalia, to capture two top lieutenants to a vicious

warlord defying international famine relief efforts.1 The operation was expected to take no more

than one hour.2 Instead, the soldiers found themselves pinned down in a hostile city, in the

largest firefight since the Vietnam War.3 In October of 2001, President George W. Bush ordered

American troops to Afghanistan to eliminate al-Qaeda and remove their Taliban supporters from

power.4 Nine years later, American forces are still deployed as a resurgent Taliban fights NATO

forces and the Afghan National Army for control of strategic regions of the country.5

Examining the similarities between these two conflicts requires more than a simple

apples-to-apples comparison of how the military operated in either theater. The greater question

is whether American strategy had evolved in the eight years between these two operations. Is the

United States capable of carrying out large military operations against smaller forces? The paper

will provide summaries of UNOSOM I and II, Operations Restore Hope and Gothic Serpent,

focusing on the Battle of Mogadishu, and major military operations in. Then, using Andrew

Mack’s “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”, the paper will answer the question posed above:

can the United States expect to win against enemies many times smaller than it?

Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM

1 Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. New York: Grove Press, 1999.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Rubin, Alissa J., and Sharifullah Sahak. "2010 Is Deadliest Year for NATO in Afghan War." The New York Times,
September 21, 2010: A12.
5 Ibid.
Bertsch 2

Operation Restore Hope began on 9 December 1992, when the first troops from the

United States and other countries landed in Mogadishu, Somalia.6 Restore Hope was part of the

mandate of an expanded UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), which replaced UNOSOM I

and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).7 UNOSOM II was established by UN Security Council

Resolution 814.8 Troops deployed under Operation Restore Hope were tasked with protecting

humanitarian relief aid from bandits and militia belonging to the country’s various warlords.9

UNOSOM II also provided a mandate to set up a new government in Somalia following the

collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre’s dictatorship.10 Specifically, UNOSOM II would

assist in relief provision and economic rehabilitation, repatriation of refugees, removal of


mines, and political reconciliation and reestablishment of national and regional
institutions, including Somali police.11

Resolution 814 also called for all Somali parties that participated in an Informal

Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (the ‘Addis

Ababa talks’) to comply with cease-fire commitments they had made, as part of the UNOSOM II

mission.12 UNOSOM II’s military operations would take place in four phases: military support

of relief activities and disarmament; expanded operations in northern Somalia; a military pull-

back as Somali authorities took power; and redeployment or reduction of forces when UN

military operations would no longer be needed.13 UNOSOM II would need 30,000 troops to

carry out its mission.14

Admiral Jonathan Howe of the United States Navy was Secretary General Boutros

Boutros-Ghali’s special representative in Somalia.15 Howe was the primary driving force behind

6 United Nations Chronicle. 30,000-strong UN force steps in to 'Restore Hope'. New York: United Nations, 1993.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 [Bowden, 1999]
11 [UN, 1993]
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 [Bowden, 1999][UN, 1993]
Bertsch 3

deploying Task Force Ranger to Somalia, arguing that if Task Force Ranger could capture

warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the leader of the Habr Gidr clan that deposed Barre in 1991, the

UN would have easier relations with the various tribes and clans that now roamed Somalia.16

Aidid and the Somalia National Alliance (SNA), the political-military sect of the Habr Gidr,

ruled Mogadishu, which encouraged the lesser clans and tribes to support the UN’s nation

building plans: “[t]he UN was offering them a share of power they could never wrest from Aidid

on their own”.17

UNITAF and UNOSOM I were successful due to the presence of some 38,000 troops

(the majority U.S. Marines and the 10th Mountain Division of the U.S. Army), which stopped the

fighting among warlords and ended the famine.18 On May 4, however, the last Marines left

Mogadishu, and the 10th Mountain was relegated to quick-reaction force (QRF) functions under

UNOSOM II.19 The fighting began once again. On June 5, SNA members killed twenty-four

Pakistani peacekeepers, resulting in the UN declaring the SNA “an outlaw faction”.20

Howe offered a $25,000 bounty for Aidid, which was quickly countered by Aidid

offering a $1 million bounty for “Animal” Howe, the SNA’s nickname for the UN’s

representative.21 Howe wanted elements of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta

(Delta Force) to come to Somalia, believing they were the only military option capable of

snatching Aidid without warning.22 Howe had allies within the Clinton administration, notably

National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, but the

Department of Defense wanted justification for sending more U.S. forces to Somalia after the

success of UNOSOM I and UNITAF.23

16 [Bowden, 1999]
17 [Bowden, 1999]
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 [Bowden, 1999]
23 Ibid.
Bertsch 4

Howe soon had the justification. On 12 July 1993, attack helicopters firing missiles into

the Abdi House resulted in 250 casualties, including fifty-four deaths.24 Four journalists were

killed as they reported on the attack by an angry mob.25 In August, four American soldiers were

killed by remote-controlled land mines, with seven more injured two weeks later.26 Task Force

Ranger, made up of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment and C Squadron of the 1st

Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, along with the 160th Special Operations Aviation

Regiment (SOAR), the “Night Stalkers”, arrived on August 23.27 Other military assets included

U.S. Air Force pararescue jumpers and combat controllers, plus U.S. Navy SEALs from the

former SEAL Team Six.28

Operation Gothic Serpent

Operation Gothic Serpent was the official name for Task Force Ranger’s operations in

Somalia, from August to October 1993. Under the command of Major General William F.

Garrison, Task Force Ranger had carried out six raids in Mogadishu, aiming to decapitate the

SNA’s leadership.29 Prisoners captured during the raids were held on an island off the coast of

Kismayo.30 However, thanks to radio broadcasts from Aidid, Somalis in Mogadishu came to

resent international forces that had originally been sent for famine relief.31 This also came at a

time when relations among the UN member states were strained.32

3 October 1993 saw Task Force Ranger launch its seventh raid into Mogadishu. Two top

lieutenants of Aidid, Omar Salad and Mohamed Hassan Awale, were believed to be meeting not

24 [Bowden, 1999]
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 [Bowden, 1999]
28 [Bowden, 1999]
29 Ibid.
30 [Bowden, 1999]
31 Diehl, Paul F. "With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
1996: 153-177.
32 [Diehl, 1996]
Bertsch 5

too far from Aidid’s base of power in Mogadishu: the Bakara Market.33 Once this intelligence

was confirmed by a human intelligence asset (a taxi driver with a marked vehicle), Task Force

Ranger launched from the Mogadishu airport on four MH-6 “Little Bird” helicopters, eight MH-

60 Black Hawk helicopters, nine Humvees and three five-ton trucks.34 At 3:43 p.m., the task

force assembled outside of the target building and quickly subdued the occupants, arresting Salad

and Awale.35 However, before Task Force Ranger could return to its base, one of the orbiting

Black Hawks, Super Six One, was hit in its tail rotor by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG).36 As

American forces attempted to reach Super Six One’s crash site, a second Black Hawk, Super Six

Four, was shot down in another part of Mogadishu.37

Though severely outnumbered by the local militia, not to mention an incensed civilian

population, the mission was a military success: both high-value (“Tier One personalities”) targets

were taken alive, and Task Force Ranger suffered eighteen fatalities (with a nineteenth two days

later during a mortar attack on the airport), as opposed to the five hundred (or more, varying with

different estimates) killed Somalis.38 However, in March of 1994, Task Force Ranger was

withdrawn from Somalia39, and the UN mission ended one year later.

Lessons Learned in Somalia

Almost immediately after United States and UN forces withdrew from Somalia, analyses

and finger-pointing began in earnest. Matt Bryden wrote in 1994 that “[t]he failure of the UN

and U.S. policy over the last year is good news for Somalia.”40 With the disengagement of

Western powers, UNOSOM can try to undo “a year of diplomatic blunders and senseless

33 [Bowden, 1999]
34 [Bowden, 1999]
35 [Bowden, 1999]
36 [Bowden, 1999]
37 [Bowden, 1999]
38 [Bowden, 1999]
39 [Bowden, 1999]
40 Bryden, Matt. "Status Quo Ante?" Africa Report 39, no. 3 (May/June 1994).
Bertsch 6

violence”.41 Bryden believed that the reconciliation talks discussed above are “a dead end”, and

that only UNOSOM’s mission can bring Somalia out of its failed state status.42 Bryden cited the

internal conflicts among the Habr Gidr clan, along with crumbling alliances between the clans.43

In 1996, the former UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Somalia, Ismat

Kittani, wrote in the UN Chronicle that there were four key lessons from the United Nations’

failure in Somalia.44 First, the UN was not equipped, nor did it have the resources, for the large-

scale enforcement operation mandated in UNOSOM II.45 Second, enforcement should not take

place alongside peacekeeping operations.46 Third, an integrated approach towards a failed state,

coordinating political, humanitarian, developmental, and military activities, is necessary.47

Finally, the UN is not a substitute for the political will of a country in need of help.48

Somalia has become a case study for policy makers and international relations theorists.

Paul Diehl argues that the next time a request for the use of force comes before Congress and the

President, there will be conditions attached to the request.49 After Somalia, the UN had an

example of how its future peacekeeping and humanitarian operations could go if they did not

address the lessons Diehl found in the Somalia case. Neither the UN nor United States forces

had an early warning system for Somalia.50 Though the UN and nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs) had been active in Somalia prior to 1992, it was not until CNN played images of the

famine-stricken populace and chaos in the streets of Somalia’s cities that any major action was

taken.51

41 [Bryden, 1994]
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Kittani, Ismat, and Ian Johnstone. "The Lessons from Somalia." UN Chronicle 33, no. 3 (1996).
45 [Kittani, 1996]
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 [Diehl, 1996]
50 [Diehl, 1996]
51 Ibid.
Bertsch 7

At the time, UN peacekeeping and humanitarian actions were “ad hoc and reactive”

operations, not preventive.52 Even if the UN had forces ready to deploy at a moments’ notice, it

still lacked the political will to use them.53 Despite a call from the UN Secretary-General, the

United States adopted only a limited strategy during Operation Restore Hope: the restoration of

relief supplies.54 The Italians refused to relieve their commander in Somalia even after he

refused orders from the UN.55 Relations between the United States and UN were tense

concerning international command of U.S. forces and strategy, which was further compounded

after several soldiers were killed in early 1993.56 Even if the UN had an early-warning system

and the political will to use its military forces, the political problems would still be a major

roadblock for the United States and the UN.57

NGOs are also a key player in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, due to their

close ties with the local community and long-term understanding of the politics, culture, and

customs of the affected region.58 Pakistani peacekeepers were unable to safeguard relief supplies

after they were unloaded at the Mogadishu port.59 Diehl argues that if the foreign powers had

interfaced with local NGOs, they would no longer be conducting humanitarian operations

concurrently with peacekeeping.60

Diehl argues that UN and U.S. peacekeeping efforts were largely unsuccessful because

they mixed peacekeeping with enforcement. The UN peacekeeping force tried to carry out an

enforcement mission, something Diehl says requires “an effective military operation more akin

to a conventional military force” with broad mandates for enforcement and the requisite

52 Ibid.
53 [Diehl, 1996]
54 [Diehl, 1996]
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 [Diehl, 1996]
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
Bertsch 8

equipment and manpower.61 Since Task Force Ranger operated largely independent of the UN

forces, it could focus on enforcement and capturing Aidid, something the UN was unable to do

even after American military forces left Somalia.62 Also, mixing peacekeeping and enforcement

can lead to confusion among international partners, as well as making states “less likely….to

accept even a traditional peacekeeping force” in the future if the peacekeepers of today are also

conducting raids or enforcement actions.63 Furthermore, simply running peacekeeping and

enforcement operations with the same force structure inhibits both: peacekeepers are unprepared

for enforcement, while enforcers are not trained in contact and mediation.64

Afghanistan

On October 7, 2001, American forces entered Afghanistan and quickly removed the

Taliban from power.65 Additionally, U.S forces inflicted extreme damage upon al-Qaeda.66

After Northern Alliance forces entered Kabul on November 17, 2001, a provisional government

was established by the United Nations, with a mandate to form a transitional government within

six months.67 After the transitional government was established, a nationwide election would be

held to form a permanent government.68 Soon after, the United States turned its attention to Iraq,

leaving behind a small contingent of troops focused on hunting al-Qaeda and Taliban members

in hiding.69 Over seven years later, the situation in Afghanistan had degraded significantly.70 In

a speech at West Point on December 1, 2009, President Barack Obama ordered 30,000 additional
61 [Diehl, 1996]
62 [Diehl, 1996]
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Hammes, Colonel Thomas X., USMC. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Minneapolis:
Zenith Press, 2006.
66 [Hammes, 2006]
67 [Hammes, 2006]
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 [Rubin, 2010]
Bertsch 9

troops to Afghanistan to reverse the gains the Taliban had made.71 In 2010, President Obama

chose General David Petraeus to replace General Stanley McChrystal72 following an article in

Rolling Stone that quoted General McChrystal as making several disparaging remarks about

America’s senior political leadership.73

The United States in Small Wars

Following the quick conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, the “Powell Doctrine” ruled

national security policy concerning military operations:74

1. Any deployment of U.S. troops must meet the national interests of the United
States or its allies.
2. If troops are deployed, the deployment must be a “wholehearted” one, with a
declared intention to win.
3. The objectives of the deployed forces must be clearly stated.
4. “The relationship between ends and means must be” reassessed and adjusted as
necessary.
5. Any deployment should have the full backing of the American people and the
Congress.
6. The use of armed forces should be considered a last resort.

A seventh criterion, have an exit strategy, was added later.75

Based on the Somalia case, as well as America’s struggles in Afghanistan, is the United

States capable of succeeding in a “small war”? To answer this question, we must look at how

well America followed the Powell Doctrine in Somalia, as well as in Afghanistan.

71 PBS. "Full Text: Obama's Afghan Strategy Speech." PBS NewsHour. December 1, 2009.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec09/obamaspeech_12-01.html (accessed October 4, 2010).
72 Cooper, Helene, David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker, and Mark Mazzetti. "Obama Says Afghan Policy
Won’t Change After Dismissal." The New York Times, June 24, 2010: A1.
73 Bumiller, Elizabeth. "McChrystal Ends Service With Regret and a Laugh." The New York Times, July 23, 2010:
A4.
74 Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books,
2002.
75 [Boot, 2002]
Bertsch 10

America’s interest in Somalia was centered on humanitarian relief. Speaking before the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1993, Under Secretary of State for Political Affiars

Peter Tarnoff said that

It is in America’s interest to preserve the gains of the humanitarian relief effort […] and
[…] to ensure that the UN’s first multinational peace enforcement effort […] is a
success.76

Tarnoff also argued for continuing America’s role in Somalia by supporting and advising

UNOSOM leadership, supporting UNOSOM efforts to restore order in Mogadishu, and by

supporting “UN efforts to use multinational coalitions for peacekeeping”.77 By many accounts,

this was a success: had the UN and United States not intervened, the famine would have killed

thousands more, and the relief aid that was shipped to Somalia would have been taken by the

warlords and clans and away from those who needed it most.78 As America’s involvement in

Somalia lengthened, the objectives slowly metamorphosed. American objectives went from

supporting UNOSOM throughout Somalia to a single-minded pursuit of Mohamed Farah Aidid

and Habr Gidr/SNA leaders in Mogadishu. The raids, such as the attack on the Abdi House

meeting, had the unintended consequence of turning the population of Mogadishu against Task

Force Ranger.79

Thus, when Super Six One was shot down (followed shortly by Super Six Four) over

Mogadishu, the crash sites were quickly overrun by militia and angry Somali civilians.80 Perhaps

the most lasting image of America’s involvement in Somalia is the footage of Somalis dragging

the bodies of Sergeant First Class Randy Shughart, Staff Sergeant Bill Cleveland, and Sergeant

Tommie Field through the streets of Mogadishu.81

76 Tarnoff, Peter. "U.S. Policy in Somalia." U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 32 (August 1993).
77 [Tarnoff, 1993]
78 [Diehl, 1996]
79 [Bowden, 1999]
80 [Bowden, 1999]
81 [Bowden, 1999]
Bertsch 11

America’s early interest in Afghanistan is simple to articulate: to hunt down and

eliminate al-Qaeda and their Taliban enablers in retaliation for the September 11, 2001 attacks.82

After the Taliban was routed, U.S. objectives remained focused on capturing or eliminating the

remnants of al-Qaeda, leaving the “nation building” to the new Afghan government.83 In

Afghanistan, U.S. forces engaged with the local tribal leaders during the first push to Kabul.

However, once the interim and transitional governments were prepared, American forces turned

their attention towards finding the remaining al-Qaeda leadership in the hills and mountains of

southern Afghanistan.84 Even though American Special Forces worked with Afghan tribes, on

many occasions the tribes were enemies of the interim government being established in Kabul.85

Afghanistan also suffered after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The bulk of the American

military was deployed to Iraq and quickly toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. After the Iraq

insurgency began in earnest, Afghanistan nearly became a forgotten war.86 $5 billion in

international aid was promised to the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA), but less

than $1 billion was ever delivered.87 In 2002, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, or Anti-Government

Forces (AGF) as Hammes describes them88, began the Afghanistan insurgency with small attacks

against international aid organizations and the fledgling police forces.89 Even though the attacks

produced few casualties, AGF could still create an atmosphere of unease among foreign

powers.90 The steady increase in foreign casualties, especially among American troops, led to

the 2009-2010 surge of 30,000 troops.91 America’s objectives in Afghanistan have changed over

82 [Hammes, 2006]
83 [Hammes, 2006]
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 [Hammes, 2006]
87 Ibid.
88 [Hammes, 2006]
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 [PBS, 2009]
Bertsch 12

the nine years of war: from eliminating the Taliban and al-Qaeda to creating a stable government

to ending an insurgency.

Based on the Somalia and Afghanistan cases, America is currently unable to successfully

wage an asymmetric or fourth-generation war. America has not destroyed the political will of its

opponents in asymmetric conflicts. Nor has America been willing to bear the costs of a long-

term asymmetric conflict. Finally, American leaders have not heeded the Powell Doctrine when

engaging in “small wars”.

First, the issue of political will. As Henry Kissinger said, “[t]he guerrilla wins if he does

not lose.”92 A successful insurgency requires the insurgent forces to slowly break the will of its

opponent.93 Even if the opponent is the United States military, so long as the insurgent has the

support of the civilian population, a large opposing force will actually be counter-productive.94

The insurgent does not have to launch a major assault on their opponent, either. As the AGF in

Afghanistan demonstrated, small, simple raids on police stations and foreign NGOs is enough to

create tension or unease among the larger foreign power.95

The insurgent also has an interest in eroding the political will of its opponent. For the

French military, the fall of Dien Bien Phu meant the end of political support for military action in

French Indochina, even though, as Mack points out, America provided the bulk of the financial

support for the French.96 For America, the Tet Offensive in 1968 was a turning point in public

and political support for the Vietnam War.97 Even though American forces defeated their

opponents, Tet had numerous effects on American politics: President Johnson declined to seek

his party’s nomination for the presidency, while requests for additional troops were denied even

92 Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict." World Politics 27,
no. 2 (1975): 175-200.
93 [Mack, 1975]
94 Ibid.
95 [Hammes, 2006]
96 [Mack, 1975]
97 [Mack, 1975]
Bertsch 13

though they were desperately needed.98 In Vietnam, towards the end of America’s involvement,

morale among troops decreased alongside increases in drug use, desertion, mutiny, and even

“fragging”, or the murder of an officer or fellow soldier.99

Second, the structure of America’s political system often means long-term war is

impossible to support.100 This logic was borne out during the 1968 election. A long war of

attrition with an insurgency carries economic costs as well as political costs. A draft may be

instituted to meet recruiting goals, or to replace soldiers who have been killed or incapacitated.101

Taxes may be levied or increased to ensure proper funding.102 The opposition party can use

public opinion of a war to increase their political capital.103

In Somalia, the images of American casualties being degraded by riotous mobs ignited a

firestorm in Washington, D.C. President Clinton, shocked at the images being played on

television news, called an emergency meeting at the White House to discuss the way forward.104

At this meeting, it was decided to call off the pursuit of Aidid while sending additional troops as

a show of force.105 The captured pilot of Super Six Four was released eleven days after the battle

of 3-4 October 1993106, a symbolic end to Task Force Ranger’s operations in Mogadishu.

True to a campaign promise, President Obama’s administration saw the removal of

combat brigades from Iraq, with a final withdrawal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011.107 This

has not been the case in Afghanistan, at least not at this writing. American forces are still present

throughout Afghanistan, with an additional 30,000 sent as part of a new strategy for the war

there, though President Obama stated that U.S. troops will begin leaving Afghanistan in 2011.108
98 Ibid.
99 [Mack, 1975]
100 [Mack, 1975]
101 [Mack, 1975]
102 Ibid.
103 [Mack, 1975]
104 [Bowden, 1999]
105 Ibid.
106 [Bowden, 1999]
107 [PBS, 2009]
108 Ibid.
Bertsch 14

In Somalia, even though objectives and interests were clearly stated, Task Force Ranger

did not have the full military support it needed. There were debates in Congress following the 3-

4 October firefight concerning requests for armor and gunship support that had been denied in

the months leading up to the battle.109 The father of one of the soldiers killed claimed that had

this additional support been granted, perhaps his son would have lived.110 Throughout the war in

Afghanistan, members of Congress and political pundits have questioned whether American

forces deployed there have the necessary equipment and support to complete their mission. The

deployment of additional troops to quell the Taliban resurgence is a step in the right direction,

but ensuring anti-government forces lose the will to fight is a long-term project that cannot be

completed overnight.

Conclusion

Flush with the success of Operation Desert Storm and the Powell Doctrine, America sent

forces to Somalia to break a famine (Operation Restore Hope) and to remove a ruthless warlord

(Operation Gothic Serpent). To the former, America was successful. To the latter, America left

Somalia in 1994, humbled by an enemy using comparatively primitive equipment but with the

public will to see America leave. Time will tell what happens in Afghanistan. The war there

very nearly became a neglected and forgotten burden, but a resurgent enemy came close to

breaking America’s political will to prosecute combat operations there. If America can apply the

lessons learned in Somalia and Afghanistan to future humanitarian or military operations abroad,

then it can succeed in an asymmetrical fight. To win, America must break the political will of its

enemies, abide by the Powell Doctrine to give its military the strongest chance at success, and be

prepared to shoulder the costs of a long-term small war.

109 [Bowden, 1999]


110 [Bowden, 1999]
Bertsch 15

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Basic Books, 2002.

Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. New York: Grove Press, 1999.

Bryden, Matt. "Status Quo Ante?" Africa Report 39, no. 3 (May/June 1994).

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July 23, 2010: A4.

Cooper, Helene, David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker, and Mark Mazzetti. "Obama
Says Afghan Policy Won’t Change After Dismissal." The New York Times, June 24,
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Diehl, Paul F. "With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II." Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 1996: 153-177.

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Kittani, Ismat, and Ian Johnstone. "The Lessons from Somalia." UN Chronicle 33, no. 3 (1996).

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October 4, 2010).

Rubin, Alissa J., and Sharifullah Sahak. "2010 Is Deadliest Year for NATO in Afghan War." The
New York Times, September 21, 2010: A12.

Tarnoff, Peter. "U.S. Policy in Somalia." U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 32 (August
1993).

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Nations) 30, no. 2 (1993): 13-17.