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THE WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics
WALDRON JEREMY Universityof California,Berkeley
1. INTRODUCTION Thereis a passage in chapter 11, book 3 of the Politics thathas not been given the attentionit deserves in moder discussionsof Aristotelianpolitical philosophy.My aim in the presentarticleis to exaggerate the importanceof a particularpassage'-to light it up in a way that may go far beyond the intentions of its author-in order to benefit from its illurmnationof other themes and passages whose importancefor the Aristotelianproject is, by contrast,indisputable. The passage I have in mind is Aristotle'sattemptto answerthe question he poses aboutpolitical sovereigntyat the beginningof chapter10:
There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state:-Is it the Or multitude? the wealthy?Or the good? Orthe one best man?Or a tyrant?Any of these alternativesseems to involve unpleasantconsequences.2
After reviewing some of these consequences,Aristotlebegins chapter11 by saying thattherermghtbe some truthin the principlethatthe people at large ratherthan the few best ought to be in power in the polis. He says-and this is the passage I want to focus on-the following:
AUTHOR'SNOTE: This essay has been improvedby discussion at philosophy department seminars at the Universityof Californiaat Davis and the Universityof Otago in New Zealand. I am grateful to David Coppand Alan Musgravefor these invitations.I am gratefulalso to Jill Frankand David Gillfor some earlier discussionsof these themes,and to the editorand referees of thisjournalfor their helpful commentsand suggestions.
POLITICAL THEORY,Vol. 23 No. 4, November 1995 563-584 ? 1995 Sage Publications,Inc.
I shall call it by thegrander term. considered as a body which is capableof collective deliberation. and when they meet together.and senses. is an initial formulationof the doctrne: DWMi: The people actingas a bodyarecapableof makingbetterdecisions.3 the The claim thatis made (or at least entertained) here is sometimesreferredto as "thesummationargument.for some understand part.of whom each individualis not a good man.experience.the people may make better. I want to For avoidthatlabel.and insight-which they can synthesize into collective knowledge.and insight-whereas the one best man can rely only on his own individualresources.just as they become in a mannerone man. and ablerdecisions. If we comparethe claim to sovereigntyof the people at large (the generalbody of citizens) with the claim to sovereignty of the individualwho happensto be the ablest.but between the subsetof them. is capableof makingon his own.when they meet togethermay be betterthan the few good. so too with regardto theircharacter thought.Although. andwisest.on one hand. of The thesis seems to be this.Justas thepeoplecanpool theirindividual knowledge.by poolingtheir knowledge.and an aristocratic actingas a body.Here."4 reasonsexplainedin section 3.judgment.so the members of the aristocratic subset can pool theirs too.judgment. who has many feet.howeverexcellent.consideredindividualby individual.andinsight.DWM1is a modest versionof the Anstotelianclaim. we may want to say that the people's claim prevails. which has the advantageof begging no questions aboutthe basis of the collective superiority the many.each of the people is inferiorto the one best man.on the otherhand.also people acting as a body.thanany individualmemberof the body.564 POLITICAL THEORY/ November 1995 Forthe many. still.then. .In consideringthe rival claims of democraticand aristocraticregimes. Thus a strongerversion of the doctrineoffers to make the case for the people againstall such subsets. Actually. For they have the benefit of each person's knowledge. if regardednot individuallybut collectively. and judgment.That case is harderto make since an aristocratic regime may itself benefit from the doctrine. and and hands.and one some another. the appropriate comparisonis not between the people as a whole and individualaristocrats. experience. A stronger version would make the case for the multitudenot only againstkingshipbut also against aristocracy.Foreach is individualamong the many has a shareof excellence and practicalwisdom. experience.Hence the manyare betterjudges thana single man of music and poetry. experience.the "doctnneof the wisdom of the multitude"(DWM).best.and amongthem they understand whole.wiser.just as a feast to which many contribute betterthana dinnerprovidedout of a single purse.
But theremay be bodies of men aboutwhom our statementis neverthelesstrue. A numberof the points I wantto makeconcernhow we thinkaboutthe relation betweenthe individualand the polis. Now.the rule of the many and the rule of the few. not betweendemocracyand kingship. Instead I shall consider its for of theoreticalimportance our understanding certainthemes in Aristotle's political philosophy..5For the purposesof abstractdiscussion. andfor thatpurposethe weakerversion issues into focus.by pooling their knowledge.althoughit is best if the laws rule and not men.I shall focus mainly on DWM. the logic of DWM seems . introduced with some hesitationin chapter 11.He applies it. 2. I these qualifications. He also does not rule out the possibility that there may be in a polis one man or a few men of such outstandingvirtue that their ability outstripseven that of the others acting collectively-an elite "so pre-eminentlysupenor in goodness that therecan be no comparison between the goodness and political capacity which he shows (or which several show. the Of the two versions.The initialquestion("[W]hatis to be the supremepowerin the state?")arosein chapter10 afterAristotlehadconceded that.Waldron WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE / 565 DWM2:The people actingas a body arecapableof makingbetterdecisions. I shall not be trying to argue that DWM is true in a way that is practicallyimportantfor constitutionaldesign."6 He says that DWM is conditional on the people not being "debasedin I character". as I have said. experience.."8 will discuss this possibility at the end of the article. however. and insight. when there is more than one) and what is shown by the rest.and insight of the membersof the subset..7shall returnto this at end of section 5.DWM2is politicallythe moreimportant: political debates in Athens to which the Politics might be taken as a contribution mainlyconcernedthe issue betweendemocracyandoligarchy. THEPLACEOF THEDOCTRINE IN ARISTOTLE'S ARGUMENT The doctrineof the wisdom of the multitudeis. is not clear. Aristotle is not sure that it clinches the this issue of sovereigntyin favor of the many:"Whether prnciple can apply to every democracy.and to all bodies of men. still we have to ask who is to make and who is to administerthe laws.to judicial as well legislative and executive functions. for example. In most of what of DWM is sufficientto bnng the important follows.Aristotle seems happyto apply the doctrine Despite his throughout political theory. experence. than any subset of them acting as a body and pooling the knowledge.
shouldthe one best man or should all decide. deliberate. Anstotle says thatin democracies.or memberof the assembly. or the rule of many individuals.he goes on: Yet possiblythese objectionsare met by ourold answer. but DWM is used also as a basis for analyzingthe claims of otherthinkers."a recurring theme.and theirjudgementsall relateto individualcases. a constantreminderin Aristotle's discussion of institutions: For the power does not reside in thejuryman.566 THEORY/ November 1995 POLITICAL to apply most obviously to legislative assemblies (which is why we treatit for but as the basis of an argument democracy).And as a feast to which all the guests contributeis betterthan a is by banquetfurrushed a single man.althoughindividuallythey may be worsejudges thanthose who have special 10 knowledge. then.1 Not only this. for the people and the council. so a multitude a betterjudge of many things than any individual.12 . It is thus striking that what begins as a hesitant speculation quickly becomes "ourold answer. but whetherhe means this corporaterule.9 He applies the principlealso to vindicatethe Athenianpractice of making to stateofficials accountable thepopularassembly. Homersays that "it is not good to have a rule of many"[Iliad. Accordingto our presentpracticeassemblies meet.assemblyman.of whichthe aforesaidindividualscounsellor.But the state is madeup of many individuals.is uncertain.as a body they are as good or better.or counsellor. Now any memberof the assembly. andthe assembly. juryman-are only partsor members.andis manyin one. II 204]. Anstotle appliesit also to the laws' applicationand to the task of equitablejudgmentwhen thereare gaps or silences in the law: [W]henthe law cannotdeterminea pointat all.thatif the people are not utterly degraded. sit in judgement.andtheirproperty collectively is greaterthanthe propertyof one or a few individualsholdinggreatoffices. or not well. many may claim to have a higherauthority andthe courtsconsist of manypersons.And for this reasonthe thanthe few. the peoplebecomes a monarch.Thus in book 4.takenseparatelyis certainlyinferor to the wise man.Thoughhe feels the force of the objection that those with the special capacityto take on magistracies should be selected for that purpose only by their peers ("[a]s. but in the court.not as individuals.but collectively. andthe manyhave the powerin their hand. the physicianoughtto be called to accountby physicians")and thatthis election andevaluationcan be properlymadeonly by those who have knowledge.andthe council.
andamore variedfeastis better. then. The assembly is debatingwhetherto mount an expedition to Sicily.anotherwith the militarycapacitiesof the Sicilians.For the moment.a fifth with the dangersto a democraticstate of successful militaryconquest. though. It is interesting. and some another.one citizen may be familiarwiththe Sicilian coastline."The many are betterjudges than a single man of music and poetry. GROUNDSFOR THEDOCTRINE 3. a thirdwith the cost and difficulty of naval expeditions.and no one man. but it is argued thatthereshould be manyjudges. one may contest whethera potluckdinneris betterthana carefullyplanned and organized banquet. Forevery rulerwho has been trained . they can hope to gain the widest possible acquaintancewith the pros and cons. Between them."'5This seems to direct us to the multifacetedcharacterof the issues that arise for decision in the assembly. is there an appropriate analogy withthelkndof decisionmakinga democratic assemblywill haveto engagein? One clue is provided by a second analogy that Aristotle uses: that of aesthetic appreciation. however wise. andnot one only. not inappropriate toy with the possibility that DWM to occupies a centralratherthana perpheralplace in Aristotle'soverallconception of politics."'3 The idea behind the culinarymetaphorseems to be that of variety-more will contributors producea morevared feast. when we discuss the relationof this view to what I take to be Arstotle's pluralism. Nor does anyone deny that the decision of such mattersmust be left to man.Waldron WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE / 567 It seems. that Aristotle relates this point not only to multifaceted policy decisions. ARISTOTLE'S What groundsdoes Aristotle give us for thinkingthat DWM is true9At as times he seems to offer little more in its defense thana metaphor: a "feast is to which all the guests contribute betterthana banquetfurnishedby a single man. This is obvious enough in the case of policy decisions.'4And even if it is.and among them they understandthe whole.and so on. We shall look at the first of these propositionsin section 8. As a purely culinarymatter. There may be many aspects to a given situation. pooling their knowledge. for some understandone part. but also to equity-basedjudgments about individualcases: [M]attersof detail about which men deliberatecannot be included in legislation. so a multitudeis a betterjudge of many things than any individual. I want to concentrateon the second. can be trustedto notice them all.a fourthwith the bitternessof militaryfailure.
namely those artswhose products recogmzedeven by those who do not . or hearbetterwith two ears.568 THEORY/ November 1995 POLITICAL by law judges well. or act betterwith two handsor feet.If the criterionof wisdom is social utility.The cases where general categorizationson legal rules fail areprecisely the cases whereone wants a mode of judgment that is sensitive to all aspects of the case. by the artists are themselves.notjust the skilled artist: [T]here are some arts whose productsare not judged of solely. Indeed. which is not purely a matterof the accumuOne possible interpretation. in Aristotle's suggestion that politics is one of those arts whose products are properly judged by the consumer. and it would surelyseem strangethata personshouldsee betterwith two eyes.16 The idea here. I think Aristotle's argumentis meant to apply to ethical judgmentsor judgmentsof value as well. they put themselves collectively in a betterposition to make a judgment of overall social utility. notjust two. The accountsjust given stressthe sensitivityof manyindividualsto many factualaspectsof a situationaboutwhich a politicalor legal decision is to be made. if all groups make their decisions by majority voting. However.For thattask. or best. than many with many. includingthose which legislation might have overlooked. this crude utilitarianconception of the wisdom of the multitudehas the advantageof providinggroundsnot only for DWM.for example.'7 Readerswill be relieved to learnthat I do not think this was Aristotle's view. it is becausetheirmultifaceted which the rule of law depends.so thatit is the collective some formof majority decisionprocedure rule)which is "wiser" (presumably from the point of view of social utility than any individualmemberof the collective. A merchantmay not realize how much some measure he is imtially inclined to supportmay prejudicethe situationof a farmeruntil he hearsit from the farmer'sown mouth. Maybe what happens when the many come together to make a decision is thatthey find out from each otherhow each person's well-being By may be affected by the matterunderconsideration. lation of factual knowledge. and if all individuals vote their own interests. Never mind deliberation: each citizen may simply vote his own self-interest. There are hints of utilitarianargument.then obviously the groupthatcompriseseveryone will be "wiser" thanany subset. but also DWM2. defies the simple character certainhardcases.one needs many eyes. this means. Or the process may even be cruderthan that. if I understand is thatwhen legislationfails with regardto it. assimilatesAristotle's view of politics to the utilitariancase for democracyput forwardby the earlierMill and the later Bentham.
whereasI thinkAristotle has in mind something more syntheticor even dialectical. becauseit suggests nothingmore than collection of experiences."19 it is meet togetherand maintainthe political communityalso truethat "mankind for the sake of mere life (in which thereis possibly some noble element).forexample. and not for the sake of life only. It may reflect Aristotle'srealistic nonutilitarian and moderateview thatmen come togetherin society notjust in orderto live well (i.21 discoveringthatcertainpolitical So. or.butalso to a certainextent simply for the sake of life itself and of life-relatedinterests. neverthelessit is a theory which gives considerableweight to subjective elements-to what it is like to live a life of a certainsort. even though Aristotle holds an objective or theory of the good life which is not hostage to purelyutilitarian welfarist calculations.It is misleadingbecauseit suggests a merely mechanicalordering. is in fact committinghimself to the propositionthatthe many actingcollectively may be a betterjudge than the few best not only of mattersof fact. just as the pilot will judge betterof a rudderthanthe carpenter. in otherwords. in orderto live a life accordingto virtue). the guest will judge betterof a feast thanthe cook.For because by definitionit is thatpurpose. not only of social utility. Aristotle does suggest in the Ethics thatthe good life is a pleasantand agreeablelife. value.Though the agreeablelife is not necessarily the good life.. but also and most importantlyof mattersof ethics.Waldron WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE / 569 possess the art. Having said all that. thatmay be misleading-not only in the way thatDavid Keyt says.The termtraditionally used for the doctrne-"the summationargument"-suggests thatall thatis going on is the aggregation But of whateach personbringsto the argument.22 even the applicationof a randomand unordered a social welfarefunctionis morethanthat.His view is thatdeliberation among the many is a way of bringingeach citizen's ethical views andinsights-such as they are-to bearon the views and insights of each of the others.18 There are two ways of reconciling this suggestion with the generally cast of Anstotelian politics. The other possibility is that. decisions make life disagreeablefor many people may be relevant to the assessment of those decisions. in espousing DWM. albeit a pleasant andagreeablelife of a certaincharacter."20 Preferrng the diners' judgment to the cook's is a way of respecting the importance-partial thoughit is-of this aspect of political community.Though"a state still exists for the sake of a good life. more widely sensitive to the conditionsof life thanthe one good man.I think thatAristotle.so that .e. the multitudeis a betterinstrument. the masterof the house will actuallybe a betterjudgethan and the builder.the knowledgeof the house is not limitedto the builderonly. the user. and the natureof the good life-issues which go beyond the mere accumulation of individualexperiences.
and then. or if not all. someone who (on my account)would do for the variouscontributing views what the authorof the NichomacheanEthics does for the endoxa:"A work of music or poetry is more than the sum of its parts. Mary Nichols has complained that Aristotleoverlooksthe need for someone who would actuallydo the synthesizing. Introducinghis and discussionof self-restraint akrasia.since if thediscrepancies be saved. hunchis thatthe kindof process My that groundsand generatesthe collective wisdom of the multitudefor the to by purposesof the Politics is similarin character the process represented Aristotle'sown methodologyin ethics.oreven in most respects.and it is not probablethateither of these should be entirelymistaken. Our propercourse with this subject as with others will be to presentthe vanous views aboutit.24 The philosopher's job-Aristotle's own job in the Ethics-is to considerthe common views and use them to cast light on each other. can see whetherthey cast light on one anotherto indicatevariousaspects of dimension Thatthis procedure the truth. Who is it who In judges or appreciatesthe whole?"26 fact. [S]ome of these views have been held by many men and men of old. For afterbriefly listing the oplmons. I think.23 It is an assumptionof Aristotle's metaethics that it is better to begin by examiningexisting views and opinions thanto proceedentirelya priori. to bring out the to respectsin which each has somethingto contribute the truth.Aristotlesays.In this way.Thinkof thepassageaboutthe endoxa at the beginning of book 7 of the NichomacheanEthics. afterfirst reviewing the difficultiesthey involve. may have (so to speak)a democratic to it-that it is not purely confined to the study of received philosophical opinion-is indicatedin Aristotle'sremarksabout views of happiness (eudaemonla)in book 1 of the Ethics.the trueview will have been sufficiently established.By one takingthe endoxaseriously. This is whereit reallygets interesting.570 THEORY/ November 1995 POLITICAL they cast light on each other.25 In a recent discussion of DWM. Aristotle'sown philosophicalmethod may be a model of what is supposed to go on when the many act and deliberatecollectively. others by a few eminentpersons. anda residuumof current oplmonleft standing.and enablinga position to emergewhich is betterthan any of the inputsand much more thanan aggregationor functionof those inputs. that butrather theyshouldbe rght in at leastsome one respect. she underestimatesthe . the greaterpart and the most importantof the opiions can generallyheld withrespectto these statesof mind.providinga basis for reciprocalquestioningand criticism. finally to establish if possible all. he writes.even when they aremutuallycontradictory.
27 On this account.Though ronistic in this context. we are told that "all men agree that what is just in distributionmust be accordingto meritin some sense. in the end.of J. It is easy to forgetthatAristotle'sargument the middlechaptersof book in 3 of the Politics is presentedas an applicationof the theory of distributive justice expounded in book 5 of the Ethics: indeed it is just about the only sustained applicationof the theory that we have in his work. 4. the absence of a master synthesizer may actually be an advant ge.by contrast. "[S]omepersonswill say thatoffices of stateought to be ./ Waldron WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE 571 confidencewe may have in genuinedialectic(as opposedto the fakedialectic of the single authorconslderng "severalviews" but always on his own terms and in his own formulations). may not be amenableto being workedout in a dialectic tightly controlledby a single thinker: Truth. the view that emerges will end up being held by someone (one hopes by all. he argued.andit has to be made by the rough to make the adjustment process of a strugglebetween combatantsfightingunderhostile banners. I want to move now to consider the wider significance DWM may have for our understanding of certain central themes in Aristotle's political philosophy."29 His discussion of what should count as merit for the purposes of the distributionof this good is a fine anticipationof the moder moral doctrne of relevantreasons. Theremay neverthelessbe in something to the idea of a consensus "emerging" open discussion rather Mill's concernsare no doubt anachthanbeing actively engineered. In the Ethics.Some issues. or by most). Think.in the greatpracticalconcernsof life. that is no reason to lose sight of the process Mill describesas the kind of possibilityAristotleis contemplatingin his model of nonaristocratic politics."28 book 3 of the Politics. S."which he says are "postsof honor. Of course. thoughthey do not all specify the same sort of merit. DWMAND THENATURE MERIT OF The firstthemeis therelationbetweenAristotle'sviews on politicalpower and his meritocratictheoryof justice. is so much a questionof the reconcilingand to combiing of oppositesthatvery few have mindssufficientlycapaciousand impartial with an approach correctness. Aristotleattemptsto apply thatdoctrine In to the distributionof one very important species of good-namely "offices of state. Mill's suggestions about the synthesis of diverse ideas in On Liberty.
" A slightly differentproblemaboutthe meaningof meritconcerns. and in the retributive Or of concept apportionment pumshment? is meritrathera forward-looking for Aristotle.proportioned the conceptdesert.like saying thatplaces in an on orchestrashould be distributed the basis of beautyandphysical courage. as David Keyt points out. whereasin fact they should be distributed only on the basis of those excellences that directly contributeto the purposes for which orchestras are constituted-that is. and which people of positionmost aim at."the rival claims of candidatesfor office can only be basedon the possession of elements which enterinto the compositionof a state. Desertis relativeto externalgoods. is thatwhich we renderto the gods. if we take this forward-looking we get a quitestrikingresult.31 merit. concept. in whateverrespect. But it is evidence of merit. indicatingability in regardto a task to be performedin the future? view has some supportin the Ethics. Similarly.and we should not forgetthatAristotleexplicates backward-looking as of political participation a matterof honor33 the good Even so.but the sort of conceptit is.not its Is elements or criteria.BrownandJones. and this is honour. I think that it is the forward-lookingview that counts in the Politics. not on the basisof theirhavingbeenable to play well in thepast. in awarding prizes and honors.not merititself. excellence in playing.like our moder to concept. we shouldsay. sion of properpride. The effect of DWM.Maybe past performanceis evidence of prospective ability. It is.32 Honor as "the prize appointed for the noblest deeds" certainly has a flavor. Certainlythatis whatthe orchestra analogysuggests:one distributes in the orchestrato people on the basis that they will be able to play places well. and which is the prize appointedforthe noblest deeds. andthe greatestof these. is to allow the equationsof Anstotelian justice to rangeover groups.the lattera manof excellence so far as the political .an essentiallybackward-looking moral qualityof a person'spast acts? Is it like the concept of desertthat we use. he argues.notjust over individuals.3 Taketwo individuals.In his discusThe backward-looking Aristotleobserves." accordingto superior unequallydistributed but includingexcellence of wealthandexcellence of birth.30 Aristotlehas no troubledisposing of this view. view of merit and combine it with Now. but it is also not necessarilyan individualizedconcept.Not only is meritnota backward-looking DWM. for example.572 THEORY/ November 1995 POLITICAL excellence.the formera manof modestvirtue andpedestrian judgment.
for we should decide by comparng the mert thatthe departmentwould have if it included one of them with the merit that the departmentwould have if it . Considered in terms of their respective individual abilities. A groupincludingBrownalongwithJonesmaybe collectively wiserthanJones himself or any group comprisingonly Jones and his peers.35 may be the case thatC. our startingpoint is the mert of the department faculty as a whole. the difference in merit between Jones and Brown (which groundsthe differencein collective wisdom between Cj and CB)may be of limitedrelevanceso faras political office is concerned.Waldron WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE / 573 virtues are concerned.ratherthan directly on the groups basis of anything that can be regardedas "theirown" merit.is not incompatiblewith its being the case.Manyof us support or affirmativeaction because we think that a political science department a law school will be better able to dischargeits nmssionif it has a diverse membership than if it consists of a pool of similar and similarly talented individuals. affirmative action can still be regardedas a distributionaccordingto merit-only now. However. Admittedly.Thatneed not be the case of course.) would be collectively wiser than a citizen body that included Brown but not Jones (CB).this leaves open the questionof how Cj&Bmakesits decisions and how far its proceduresmay be sensitive to the difference in individual It merit as between Jones and Brown.perhapsBrown considered by himself does not mert any office at all.A person's meritis a matterof the collective political capacity of a groupof which he might be a member.if C. But if DWM appliesto a citizenry that includes both of them.not least for the light it casts on modem discussions aboutdiversityandmert in academichiring. when we arechoosing betweentwo candidates a position in a department. The or justice claims of particularindividualsto a place in the academy are then derivedfrom the merit-based justice claims thatcan be madeon behalfof the to which they might belong if appointed. It will of course almost certainly be true that a citizen body which included Jones but not Brown (C.On the accountI have given of Aristotle'sargument. then their clams to office may be identical. The dialectical dynamics of Cj&Bmay be such thatthe incrementalbenefits of combimngBrown's limitedinsightswithJones'sextensive insights accrue only in the light of a deliberativeprocedure that treats the two of them formallyas equals.But the merefact of the superiority of Jones to Brown. or of Cj to CB. Accordingly.j&does better of decisions on the basis of the equal participation its members by making thanby any procedurethataccordsgreaterweight to the votes of people like Jones. I find this an intriguingpossibility. is collectively inferor in wisdom then to a body that includes both of them (CJ&B). Jones merits higheroffice thanBrown.
he will place at the disposal of his frends. But if we turnto political property-that is. "friends. to the distributable good that in consists of the rightto participate politics-we can makeperfectsense of is the idea of common use. His examplesmainlyinvolve the sharingof privatelargesse in a very close circle of friends. of course. based simply on each person'sstatus as a citizen. "will some things have all thingscommon. It is possible.We may come up with a differentresulton thatbasis than theirindividualmeritson the unspokenassumption we would if we compared thateach of them would be actingon his or her own. just for his own purposes."as the proverbsays. AS 5. here with Aristotle'stheoryof property.37 Aristotleactuallyhas in mindwhen It is not clearwhatconcretearrangements in he talks aboutprivateproperty commonuse. ing analogy Aristotle'sdiscussionof property purportsto be somethingof a compromise between a rejectionof Plato's communism and an attemptto secure some of the social andethical advantagesthatresultfrom sharing: And Propertyshould be in a certainsense common. andthe special businessof the legislatoris to createin men thisbenevolentdisposition.but. and in respect of use. yet by reason of goodness..". the properuse of thatrightinvolves an essentially collective exercise. private. these individualparticipatory Thereis an interestentitlementsmustbe exercisedwith some responsibility. A man's rightto participate in a sense his private of But the rationale the distribution this nght requiresthateach for property. but the use of it common. as a generalrule. Apart from the customof travelers Lacedaemonian approprating provisionsfromfields that thereis nothingparticularly common in the on theirjourney. POLITICAL RIGHTS PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR COMMON USE36 Though Aristotletalks of "themany"or "thepeople at large. However.39 not use thatproperty. For.but in a way thatcontributes to the excellence injudgmentof the groupor multitudeto which one belongs.38 they pass by sense of polis-wlde in the examplesthatAristotlegives. them.althoughevery manhas his own property. Though each has an individualnght. and that of course happens in every system of private property. thatthe enfranchisement of the many could be construedby each as purely an individualistic . while of others he shares the use with It is clearly betterthatpropertyshould be prvate.574 / THEORY November 1995 POLITICAL includedthe other."members of thatclass are likely to thinkin termsof individualentitlementsto participate.inasmuch as the case for democracyis based on DWM..
then. Now I can protect my interests. for example.43And they bringus to what is perhaps the most importantconnectionI want to draw-between the doctrineof the wisdom of the multitude and Aristotle's conception of reasoned speechlogos-as the key to man's political nature.skill in bringingthe two into relationwith one another in a way that highlights their strengths and diminishes their weaknesses. patronage. which I mentioned One way of readingthe qualificationaboutcorruption. and skill once again in explainng the tentative synthesis that one has arrivedat for the benefit of others(who are. but cannotexplain himself clearly to the people. His deafness. Ronald Beiner in his book Political Judgmenttakes as a motto an interestingcomment by Thucydides:"Onewho forms a judgment on any point. or who will cast it on the basis of interestor impulse irrespectiveof what has been said back and forth in the deliberativeprocess. AND SPEECH 6.Let everyone else look after themselves.Waldron WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE / 575 opportunity "Now I can cast my vote. might as well The have never thought at all on the subject. and he must listen to others and reflect on what they say as they contributetheir insight and expenence.41 Ideally. as Beiner remindsus."42 common use of political virtues-skill in explainingone's own views.but to use it in a way that interactsdeliberativelywith others. in deliberationis the markof hls using political propertyin a narrowlyselfish way.thatattitudewill be inappropriate.each will bringhis experienceandhis opinionaboutthe good to the assembly in a form that can be communicatedto others. skill propertyrequiresspecific In listenng to the views of others. so to speak. The individualmemberof the multitudeis requiredby the logic of his not (and their)enfranchisement." But except on the assumption that DWM is basedon purelyutilitarian grounds. only to use his vote responsibly. in section 2.40is that corruptionis the vicious inability to interactdeliberatively with others. These are skills of empathy. A person under the influence of money. is likely to be someone who will cast his vote without listening to others(except his patronor the one who has bribedhim). so that the final vote in the assembly reflects a synthesis which is something more than a mere aggregationof its constituentparts. skills of rhetorc. engaged in a similarexercise).or passion. of course. of course. POLITICS Thereis a suggestion in Rousseau'sSocial Contractthatthe generalwill could be expected to emerge even (or perhapsespecially) if "thecitizens had .but they are also.
the power of speech is intendedto set forththe expedientandthe inexpedient.If a politics were typically a matterof monarchy. and is therefore found in other animals (for their natureattains to the perceptionof pleasureand pain and the intimationof them to one another. and augment. Now. in the likenesse of Good.as we often say.that which is Good.on this account. What distinguishedmen fromcreatures bees andants(whichHobbesmistakenlythoughtAristotle like as to regarded politicalammals)was. andman is the only animalwho has the gift of speech. according Hobbes.thatbees andants to want thatartof words. discontenting at theirpleasure. infamously. impossibleto overestimatethe importance the of connectionbetweenDWMandtheclaimmadeatthebeginningof thePolitics thatthe markof man's political natureis his power of speech. But the connection I want to emphasizeworks in the other direction. and Evill. And since politics takes place in the mediumof speech. If collective wisdom amountedonly to an aggregation of expressions of individualutility. that man is more of a political animalthan bees or other gregariousanmals is evident. matterof rule by the one best man.the wisdom one For of which the multitudeis capableemergesonly "whenthey meet together"a phrasehe repeatsseveraltimes.576 POLITICAL THEORY/ November 1995 no commumcation with another. Thomas Hobbes.by which some men can represent others. took the human power of speech to be indicative of man's naturalunfitness for society. it necessarily takes place in a medium of plurality-a context in which there are many speakers. I have called my approachin this essay one of heurstic exaggeration. then this power of speech would be largely redundant. in the likenesse of Evill.by contrast. And whereasmere voice is but an indicationof pleasureor pain.Speech is the markof man's political naturebecause speech is the mediumin which politics takes place. must be that speech is a mediumin which we share a view about goodness .46 For one thing the passage immediately underminesany crude utilitarian of interpretation DWM.47 It is temptingto thinkthatthe Aristotelian position.except as a vehicle for the expressionof decision and command."44 Aristotle. andtroublingtheirPeace greatnesseof Good andEvill. Howeverit is. Nature. in oppositionto Hobbes.45 institutionof theirmeeting together The is the assembly(ecclesia) andthe mediumof theirmeetingtogetheris speech.each contributingto a collective decision somethingthat none of the otherscould have got to by himself.andtherefore likewise the just andthe unjust. makes nothingin vain.and no further). in my view. the multitudecould be little more thananimals.or diminish the apparent men.
it enables the group as a whole to attain a degree of wisdom and practical knowledge thatsurpasseseven thatof the most excellent individualmember. is pursue that idea to an extreme. is not just the unanimouschanting of accepted truths about justice: it is a matter of conversation. for Aristotle. manyhands.51 DWM . in the contextof book 3. of a sign thatwe have somethingdistinctiveto learnfrom one another. book 9 of the Ethics. which we could do if speech were merelya matterof each giving voice to a preordained unanimity. chapter11. Anstotle must think mediumfor the expressionof the amicableunanimthatspeech is the natural ity which is discussed in chapter6. Speech. debate in the ecclesia.(It is perhapssignificantthatAristotle characterizesthe individual's dependenceon the polis in book 1 by asking us to consider what a foot or a hand would be like if the whole body were destroyed49 and that he characterzes the wisdom of the multitudein book 3 with the analogy of a body that has many feet.4 In fact. WhatDWM does. Between divisiveness and unanirmty debateand complementarity: is different views coming togetherin deliberation contribute to to a new dynamically synthesis.one by one.But the passage from book 1 does indicate the centrality of the logic of DWM to Aristotle's overall in argument the Politics: thatpeople do betterin theirpracticalthinkingwhen thanwhentheyrely. articulate discussion. it would be a mistaketo statethecontrastbetweenAristotleandHobbesin these terms. None of us can get by without the others in political life. the sortof dialecticwhich (as I said) one finds representedin Aristotle'sworks themselves. politics. Hobbes thinksspeech is essentiallydivisive. Each can communicateto anotherexperiences and insights that complementthose that the other alreadypossesses. Speech is a sign of diversity. I don't want to push the exaggerationtoo far. In other words. can see thatAnstotelianpolitics cannot we just be the unanimousrepetition sharedviews.Waldron WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE / 577 or justice.)50 My suggestion then is thatDWM standsas a kind of model or paradigm of our natureas speaking beings. on theirindividual they workin groupsrather excellence.is a matterof genuine interdependence. PLURALISM I said a moment ago thatif we connect DWM with the idea thatspeech is the markof man'spolitical nature. and when this happens in dense interactionthroughouta community. for Aristotle.I do not want to say that the book 1 doctrineof speech as the markof man's political characterintimates a direct essentialist argumentfor democracy. 7.and manysenses.
attainall necessaryknowledge. our own special needs to be takeninto accountin any plausible conceptionof the commongood.53 In addition."54 my hunchesbearout. We aretalkingherepartlyaboutsomething to to amounting a divisionof laborwithregard knowledgeorunderstandingin a point madeprominent Aqulnas'sdevelopmentof these ideas: Man has a natural knowledgeof life's necessities only in a generalway.Thisis further sciences.so that dividing the labour with his fellows each may devote himself to some branchof the some otherscience.as opposed to mere complementarty. we should expect the citizens in Aristotle's to hold views aboutthe good at least as diverse as those canvased as polis endoxa in the Ethics.we may also be talkingaboutdialecticaldifference. taking anything that is said by an into account. there formof the corrupt of is a large gap betweenthe moderation conflict thatis necessaryto sustain and deliberation the generaleliminationof diversityof ethical view.no one man could thus.some among the elite.another evident from the fact that men alone have the power of speech which enables them to convey the full contentof theirthoughtsto one another. Of course.This extreme of partisanconflict is perhapsitself a opponent I "deafness" mentionedat the end of section 5. He gave no indicationthatone would expect a good society to exhibit anything less than the diversity of ethical view displayedin the pages of the Ethics-the diversity he used as the startingpoint of his own dialectical wisdom and that I am suggesting . he must use it to pass from such unversal pnnciples to the knowledge of what in particular concernshis well-being.578 / POLITICAL THEORY November 1995 thuspoints us to Aristotle'scritiqueof Platoic unty in Politics. Reasomnng however.naturehas destinedhim to live in society. one followingmedicine. Being gifted with reason.My earliercomparisonbetween DWM and Aristotle's way with the endoxaindicatedthata multitudemay be moreinsightful than one excellent man if its members contrive to spark off each other's dissonant ethical views and sharpen their moral awareness dialectically. andso forth. that's what common sense tells us also."Thenatureof a state is to be a plurality. They were views commonly held. Still. for similarsdo not constitutea state. book 2. Maybe there are some forms of conflict which are so extreme that the proponentsof differentviews (or interests) are just talking at or past one not another.Instead. some among ordinary people. and to his own insistenceon differenceand diversity. but of differentkinds of men.not listening particularly. [A] state is not made up only of so many men. Aristotle did not conjurethe conflicting endoxa up out of his own imagination. genuine There is thereforesome difficulty with AlasdairMaclntyre'sclaim that Aristotelian political community is "informedby a shared vision of the If good. some among philosophers."52 Differencehere amountsto more thanthe fact thatwe etch have our own lives to live.
however. in a given society. and that it is the sharing of a view about these things that constitutesa polis.it can only be because we started from Aristotle's own method in ethics intimates no such asshared prermses.or more thanone.talk thatpresupposesthat we come to the conversation from different startingpoints. is his assertiona paragraph two laterthat the personwho providesthe counterexample DWM mayjustly or properly to be regardedas not a part of the polls: If. for him to suggest thatif we ever actuallyreachnew ethical conclusions throughdeliberation.Waldron WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE / 579 forms the basis also of the wisdom of the multitudeconcocted in political deliberation. sumption. too.I am arguing. So it is misleading for Macintyreto couch his position in terms of a "formof social order whose sharedmode of life alreadyexpresses the collective answeror answersof its citizens to the question 'Whatis the best mode of life for humanbeings?' "56 It is wrong. and not the many. justice and injustice. book 3 of the Politics where he asks:Whatif.57 and nor.he or they can no longer be regardedas partof a state. but not a majorty. whose excellence is so pre-eminent the excellence or the political capacityof the rest admitof no comparson with his or theirs. they ought to rule. however.does his politics. or The strikingthing. if he is reckonedonly as the equal of those who are so far inferor to him in excellence and in politicalcapacity.55But the fact that that passage immediately follows the discussion of man's power of speech cuts at least both ways. forjustice will not be done to the superior.as perhaps the upshot of our talking with one another. therebe some one person. 8. or more thanone. "if the people are to be supreme."58 we know that Aristotle was preparedto countenance predictableenough: aristocracyor monarchyin certaincircumstances.59 You will not be surprisedto hear that in my presentexcited state I cannot resist malknga connectionbetweenthis passageandAristotle'sinsistence in . Now Aristotledoes say early on in the Politics thatman alone among the animals has a sense of good and evil. then if one man. althoughnot enough to make that up the full complementof a state. That's is strongerthan the many.because they are strongerthan the few. DWM is false? After all.Such a man may trulybe deemed a God among men. A GODAMONGMEN The final connectionI want to make stems fromAnstotle's discussion in chapter13. I readit as indicatingthatour sharinga view about the good or justice is to be understooddynamically.
do not have the full selfsufficiency associatedwithpoliticalcommunity'67 needto live alongside they those with whom they cannotbenefitfromspealkng. is eithera bad man or above humanity. or the few excellent men. perhapshe should not be bound himself by the rules he makes.And those othersin turn would be fools to forgo the benefitof theirexcellence.althoughthe "Godamongmen"shouldlegislate.The images of diviilty and bestiality that Aristotle associates with apolitical naturestake another turnat this point-"he who bids the law rule may be deemedto bid God and Reason alone rule.61 Aristotle does not leave the matterthere.He is a god among men."60 The manwho is betterthanthe rest even whenthey act collectively-the man who is as good without speech. he is (as Hannah Arendt recognizes) as much the antithesis of mundane politics as Billy Budd."62 chapter13 passage continues. that anyone who can survive or flourish without the polis is either a beast or a god: "[M]anis by naturea political animal. even thoughthatmay mean denying the efficacy of theirown political natures. Fromone point of view.they are "notenough to make The up the full complementof the state. Aristotle'spoint seems to be about the rule of law.and thatfor men of pre-eminent excellence thereis no law-they are themselvesa law.Yetthatwill not do for all sortsof reasons.as the multitudeare with it-has an excellent nature. Evenharder figureout areAristotle'scommentson ostracism. without conversation.not least it."as follows: Hence we see thatlegislationis necessarilyconcernedonly with those who are equal in birthandcapacity."65 They cannotbe subjectto law. thatthoughthey are betterthanthe multitude. though morally self-sufficient. but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast"64-thatI have not been able to figureout. Anyone would be ndiculous who attempted make laws for them.580 POLITICAL THEORY/ November 1995 book 1.63 to It is difficultto know whatto makeof this.from anotherpoint of view. they are. for he has no need of the power of speech. And so the discussion in book 3 ends with unsatisfactoryreassurances: "The whole is "Thebest must be that which is administered the best".68 by to the part.And he who by natureand not by mere accidentis without a state. in a sentence immediatelypreceding the stuff about speech.In chapter to he toys with the idea that the ostracism of the truly excellent-thelr 13.Though he says in chapter 15 that "thebest man must legislate.butnot apolitical nature.after the "aGod amongmen. he is the ideal absolutemonarch. as Aristotleputs a law untothemselves. expulsion from the polis over which they tower-"is based upon a kind of politicaljustice. and he who has this pre-eminenceis in the naturallysuperior ."66 one excellent man.
. David Keyt and Fred D. than by pooling the knowledge. 1988). or requirethat he take his turn n being governed. Ibid. 89: book 4. as were of children. experience. 66: book 3. would thatI had ten such counsellors!7 NOTES 1. 1281a1. as I said before. 67: book 3. 66: 128 b 15. to deformit. or exile such a person. 126: 1282a. 1284a.). to make it groanandprotest. and judgmentof the membersof a body thatincludes lum. who made this response to someone who of quibbled about his interpretation Nietzsche: "The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is preciselyto use it. 13. Ibid.And if commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithfulto Nietzsche. DWM might be used as a criterionfor such exclusion: a person is justifiably excluded from the citizen body if better decisions can be made by pooling the knowledge.. The claim made in DWM is made with regardto a body which is itself a subset of all the inhabitants Athens: women.. and so on. Politics (Jowett/Barnestrans."in A Companron to Aristotle's Politics. Ibid. chap. chap. 270. and the prayerof Agamemnon. 68: 1282a34-41. 76: book 3. ed. For example. 9. Ibid. chap. 2. 1281a43-b9. Ibid. ed.as were those who were enslaved... as were residentaliens. 7.. 12. 6. "Arstotle's Theory of DistributiveJustice. notoriously. 11./ Waldron WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE 581 relation of a whole to a part". the good man has a rght to rule because he is better. 10. chap. 1286a27-31.69"Surely it would not be right to kill. Stephen Everson (Cambridge:Umversity Press. 1980]). 5. that is of absolutely no interest" (Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviewsand Other Writings1972-1977 [New York:Pantheon. 8. and judgment of the membersof a citizen body thatexcludes him.still two good men are betterthanone: this is the old saying.were excluded.Politics. 11. 71: book 3.. 15. Aristotle. David Keyt. chap. 3. We know that when Arstotle talked aboutthe people at large. . 1292a10-14. Eitherversionof the doctnne mightalso be used as the basis of an exclusionaryclaim. Miller (Oxford:Basil Blackwell. 1991). or ostracize. 65: book 3. chap. 4. 1282a14. he-like most Athenians-did not have unversal suffragein mind. two going together. experence. 11. My hermeneuticalhero is Michel Foucault. Ibid. 10. Ibid. Arstotle."70 conclusionis not the one from Surely?I am not so sure thatthe preferable 16 thatpersevereswith the power of speech and takes accountof the chapter logic of collectivity: If. 4.
. and if one set of men always hold them. 1123b(my emphasis). the rest must be depnved of them"(Arstotle.. My argumentin this section owes a lot to manyconversationswith Jill Frank. 3. 65: book 3. "Thenought the good to rule an have supremepower?But in that case everybodyelse. 33. Compare A MaryP. Ethics. 20: "Inthe background Anstotle's referenceto to the feast to which many contributeis the meal describedat the end of Arstophanes'Assembly (1163-82).In of terms of our formulation the pnnciple in modem functionalnotation. 30. 66: book 3. Rackham(London:Heinemann. 58: chap. Arstotle.is the oppositeof mine. Ibid. 1131a-1131b.ed. 17. Bobbs Merrill.. chap. Politics.all referencesto the Ethics are to this translation. Arstotle. 1281a30)." 35. 15. chap.Nichols. 60: book 3. 11. Keyt. 23. 10. 79: book 3. 195. or some of its partsenjoy happiness" (ibid. I am gratefulto one of Political Theory'srefereesfor pressingthis point. CitizensandStatesmen: StudyofAristotle'sPolitics(Savage. Arstotle.1956). 26: book 2. 29: book 2." of Women 15. chap. Ibid. Mill. culinarymetaphorspervadethis partof food whenrmxedwith whatis puresometimesmakestheentire book 3. Politics. Ibid..1934). 90: book 4. 1282b23. Nichols. a meal made up of so manyrandomfoods thatthe mixtureis revolting. the offices of state are posts of honour. chap. (Unless otherwise indicated. 8. 1. 112: book 5. 9. 26: 1263a35..66.providedof course that additional groundsfor the doctnne are also available. We aretold that"impure mass more wholesome"(ibid. 1278b25. 15-6: book 1. 6. however. 377.67-8: book 3. 9. 38. 68: 1282a23). 1145bl. For example. 31. 20. I am gratefulto David Gill for several conversationson the topic discussed in this and His the following paragraphs. 11. paragraph 28. MD: Rowmanand Littlefield. 21. 19. chap. 16. 67' chap. Ibid.) 22.the strategyis to allow the individualvarables 'x' and 'y' to reignnotonly over individualfree men butalso over groups or bodies of free men. 1263a25-35. Politics. Arstotle.582 THEORY/ November 1995 POLITICAL 13. 29. . 63: book 3."271. 1286a29. Ibid. Arstotle. S. "Aristotle'sTheoryof Distributive Justice. 32. chap. view. V. Arstotle. 14. Keyt. will be dishonoured. Ethics (Ross translation). Carragheen Shields(Indianapolis. IN: 36. Indeed. J. chap. 12. For this passage I have used the translation by H. chap. Ethics: book 7. I shouldaddthat Aristotleuses this methodto talkabout DWM itself-treating this too as a common view that may "containsome difficultyand perhapseven truth.. 2. For being excluded from power. Arstotle. "thewhole cannotbe happyunless most. 5. 11. 25. 24. 27. chap. 76: book 3. NichomacheanEthics (hereafterEthics). On Liberty. Beanng in mindthat. chap. or all. 1280a32.. is 34. 10." There is nothing either tautologicalor vicious in this form of self-reference. chap.. 3. Ethics. 1287b23-8. 26."270: "Thestrategyof the argument to applythe pnnciple of distributive justice to men takencollectively as well as individually. n. Citizensand Statesmen. chap. 1170a. 5. chap. trans. chap. 16. 37.. 36. Politics. Ibid. chap. 1992). 1954) 240-1: book 9. 18. Ibid. 1282al8. 69: book 3. 1281a30. 1098b. 1264bl8). Arstotle. 1281b36) and that"theguest will judge betterof a feast thanthe cook" (ibid. 65: book 3. chap.accordingto Arstotle.Sir David Ross (London:Oxford University Press. 1281a43-b9.. "Anstotle'sTheoryof Distributive Justice.
63.Leviathan. chap. chap. ed. Ibid. See HannahArendt. chap. 47. in The Social Contract and Discourses. chap. 65. quotedby RonaldBeiner. 17. trans. 15. 1284bl7. 70. 55. Ibid. 3. M. After Virtue: Studyin Moral Theory(London:Duckworth. chap. Anstotle. 1253a18.6. 2. 1253a2. 1991).and whose natureit is to live with others.6. 1973). Ibld. 71: book 3. 66: book 3. RichardTuck(Cambridge: CambrdgeUniversityPress. 238: book 9.. Anstotle. Arstotle. chap. chap. A 54. respectively. 13. Politics. chap. 9: "It would be a strangethingto make the happyman a solitary:no one would choose to have all the good things of the world in solitude:man is meantfor political association. chap. Politics. 1288a34. 83. 1284a4-14. Ibid. 1983)." 61.On Revolution(Harmondsworth: Penguln. Thomas Aquinas. 68. 26: book 2. chap. 13. . chap. 79: book 3. Politics.G. 2. see ibid. chap. 81: book 3. 146. Ibid.Politics. 43. 46. chap.see also 79: book 3. 1167a. "It is precisely because the members of the multitudehave differentcontributionsto make that they have a just claim to rule. 66: book 3. chap. 52. 67. in Aquinas: Selected Political Writings. Dent. Anstotle. chap. but that is what is implied by Aristotle's treatmentof politicalrghts underthe auspices of distributive justice. 1288a26. 3: book 1. 66. Ibid. chap.. 49. 11. chap. 59. 50. 1988). 71: 1284a5. chap. But "communication" arguably refers to the formationof factions. Ethics. 1281bl and 1281b5. Ibid. Ibid. 80: book 3. 76: book 3. 1261a18-25. AlasdairMacintyre. 64. 1284a4-11. chap. See also 72: 1284a19. 42. ThomasHobbes.83. 69. 2. chap. 1253a8. Ibid. 1959). 53. 62. 13. See also Arstotle.H. 1287b12-15. 1282a.. Ibid. 3. Ibid. chap. Ibid. Anstotle. 2. 5.Historyof the PelopennesianWar: Political Judgment(London:Methuen. Arstotle. 16./ Waldron WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE 583 39. chap.1981). 78: book 3. A. 134. Whose Justice? WhichRationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 44. 1253a21. Cole (London:J. 71.. Politics. 17. 17. 1287a30. 3: book 1. 2. 1. Ethics. 1287b26. 2.Political Judgment. 2. 231: book 9. 3: book 1. Jean-JacquesRousseau.D. Alasdair Macintyre. The Social Contract:book 2.I am gratefulto Paul Thomas for this point.. X 224 and II 372. Anstotle. 57. 1973). 1286a22. 40. 51.The quotationsare from the Iliad.ed.. Politics. 56.66). I know it seems odd to describe it this way. 119-20. chap. 13. D'Entreves(Oxford:Basil Blackwell. Beiner.. For the self-sufficiency of the polis. 3: book 1. Ibid. 18. 45. 1283b23-26. I am gratefulto one of Political Theory'sreferees for this point. St. chap. 60. Arstotle teaches democrats the value of heterogeneityto a defense of their claim to political participation" (Citizens and Statesmen. 80: book 3. 71: book 3. Thucydides. chap. 16. Politics. 73: book 3. 41.. As Mary Nichols writes.. 21: book 2. 71-2: book 3.. 16. 4: book 1. 133. 1281b6. 48. chap. 1288a25. 58. 11. chap. book 2. Aristotle... P. 1252b30.. On Princely Government:book 1..
and chair of Boalt'sJurisprudence Social Policy of He Program. (OxfordUniversity Nonsense upon Stilts:Bentham. His present research interests center on the Idea of political decision making and.legislationin large-scale diverse assemblies.and soctaljustice. includingThe Rightto Prvate Property Press.BurkeandMarxof the Rightsof Man(Methuen. and LiberalRights:CollectedPapers 1981-91 (CambridgeUniversityPress. is the authorof several books.He is also a memberof Berkeley's philosophydepartment.property. .Berkeley.1989). He has publishednumerousarticles on rights. and University California.584 POLITICAL THEORY/ November 1995 Is JeremyWaldron professorof law and associate deanat theSchoolof Law(Boalt Hall).liberalism. 1993). 1988). in particular.
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