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P A R T z ends:­

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P A R T s
begins:­
T O B E R E T A I N E D AS TOP E N C L O S U R E

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference Date
OD(80) 13 15/02/80
OD(80) 5 Meeting, Item 1
th 21/02/80
CC(80) 10 Conclusions. Item 3 (Extract)
th 13/03/80
C.C(RQ) 12 Conclusions, Item 2 (Extract)
m 20/03/80
>- * * •"

T h e documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been
removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the
Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate C A B
(CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed iV^lA^ay C04^ Date 11 J i ^ K

PREM Records Team
MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES . lb

PS L/T 1 0 DOWNING STREET

PS/SIR I GILHOUR

PS/MR KURD

PS/PUS CABINET OFFICE DIO

US J G MOBSRLY

HD/HENAD

ED/MED

ILD/UIID

HD/OID (2)

••• ••• ••• •••
»* * »• • ••• •••
PUSD (2)

NEWS D

-RESIDENT OLERft

GRS 35fl
CONFi DENT I A L IMMEDfATF*
FN T t l A V I V 29073PZ MAY
TO IMMEDIAT€ F C O
TGLMO 135 OF 9 MAY,

INFO ROUTINE VYA->H I NSTO.V, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, BEIRUT,

fSRA^LI FOREIGN MINI STEM'S VISIT TO EUROPE,

1. I PAID MY FI3"T CALL ON SHAMIR YESTERDAY PRIOR TO Ml 3 VISIT
TO LONDON* ME HAG ARRANGED TO VISIT ROME Ofj HIS WAY TO LONDON
('MERE HE V/ILL MELT WITH A NUMBER OF ISRAEL) AMBASSADORS
T

IN EUROPE) •

?. ON CMP STRESSED THE NEED
DAVID $HAMtft SAID MOTH IMO UFA.', HUT
F09 T I K E AMD FOR DEALING WITH THE WWBLEfl SLOWLY, I T HAD TAKEN
IFHTAIN TEN YE APS TO .NEGOTIATE BHTRY IBTO Tri~ EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
(! SAID I THOUGHT THIS WAS MOT A GOOD PARALLEUl FAILURE WOUtD
NOT HAVE MEANT A SERIOUS RISK OF WAR, AND F.UROPE IUD LOST T'.TMTY
YUARS Of* OP^Oi^TUflITY IS' A PERIOD OF ECONOMIC GI'OVTW tNILF. D^AL f M<3
V'!"H Tt\- Pf?0%t CM >V
8MAMIB 'i .\5D THAT ' SH Lr 1 WAS CLEAR A3OUT
• •
OBJECTIVE. THE TWO PEOPLES HAD T O LIVE TOGETHER, B U T TIN'F. WOULD
BE REQUIRED T C F I N D A WAV. 25 MAY WAS NOT IMPORTANT JN THIS COST
WANJR WAS C L E A R L Y A N X I O U S ABOUT THE P O S S I B I L I T Y DP AN E A R L Y
EUROPEAN I N I T I A T I V E AND ASK":) ABOUJ THE P R O S P E C T ^ FCfl T H E V E N I C E
MEETING. I R E P E A T E D OUR D O U B T S A3CUT T H E WISDOM O F ISRAELI
POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT,

3. ALL TKIS WAS 3t~FCRE SADAT'S STATEMENT OF LAST HJOHT. YEST­
ERDAY EVEN'I NO (ALSO BEFORE SADAT'S STATEMENT) SHAMIR IN A PUBLIC
SPEECH HERE SAID "WE CANNOT BUDGE AMY MOTS FC2 WE HAVE COME
TC THf RED LINE BCYCND WHICH OU-? EXISTENCE 18 JEOPARDISED
.'.'HAT THE EGYPTIANS INSIST 0?) NOW IS PR EC ISLE Y THE DODDERS
ID A PALESTINIAN STATE. WE CANNOT ACCEPT T H I S " .

A. WHEN I SAID A PIECE TO SHAMIR ABOUT UNIFIL SHAMIR S 4 I D THAT
THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT REGARDED UN IFIL A3 A POSITIVE ELEMENT; AND
DID NOT WANT IT TO LEAVE. THINGS WERE-NOW QUIETER THESE. WHEN
I REFERS£D TO THE LATEST ISRAELI RAIDS, SHAMIR SAID THAT THEY
•..Vir. ANOTHER fiATTtR - ' 'THEY \<£Je. NORTH OF THE L I fAN I " .

% SHAMIR IS REPOffTgV TO HAVE DECIDED TO GIVE CREATES PRIORITY
I ) A DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO RESTORE ISRAEL'S IMAGE IN EUROPE, AND
REGAIN SUPPORT FOR HER POLICIES. THE ISRAELIS WERE SHAKEN BY
THF COUNCIL OF EUROPE VOTE AT THE END OF APRIL, AND IBBA EBAN
TELLS ME HE IS TO ADDRESS A MEETING OF THE SOCIALIST GROUP IN
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NEXT WEEK, SHAMIR HIMSELF APPARENTLY
HOPED TO INCLUDE A VISIT TO GERMANY DURI HO HIS CURRENT TRIP AMD
I AM TOLD THAT HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO VISIT PAN IS.

R O B I N S O N
GH 3 W

UNCLASSIFIED
FM CAIRO P81230Z MAY
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO OF 8 MAY
AND PRIORITY TEL AVIV WASHINGTON DAMASCUS AMMAN

TUNIS UKMIS NEW YORK HMCG JERUSALEM

AUTONOMY TALKS

1. DR MUSTAFA KHALIL RETURNED TO CAIRO YESTERDAY. TODAY'S
PRESS EMPHASISES HIS STATEMENT ON ARRIVAL THAT THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ARE STILL WIDE AND FUNDAMENTAL, AND THAT
LITTLE WAS ACHIEVED. KHALIL SAID THAT THE ONLY ITEM OF AGREE­
MENT WAS ON THE CREATION OF AN INFORMAL MINISTERIAL GROUP ON
SECURITY. IT IS TO MEET IN CAIRO ON 12 MAY, IN PARALLEL WITH
THE OTHER SUB—COMMITTEE.

2. THE CAIRO PRESS, REFLECTING OFFICIAL - AND OFTEN PRIME
MINISTERIAL - BRIEFING IN HERZLIA, PRESENTED THE TALKS AS
STORMY, AND REPORTED EGYPTIAN THREATS TO WALK OUT AT VARIOUS
POINTS UNLESS THE ISRAELIS MODIFIED THEIR POSITION. AFTER THE
INCIDENT IN HEBRON THE EGYPTIANS ISSUED A GENERAL CONDEMNATION
OF VIOLENCE, 3UT ALSO CRITICISED THE EXPULSION OF THE MAYORS
AND REASSERTED THAT SINCE THE SETTLEMENTS WERE CLEARLY DOING
NOTHING FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY THEY SHOULD BE FROZEN, AND TROOPS
WITHDRAWN. THE PRESS DESCRIBED THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FOR
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND CLAIMED THEY HAD BEEN MISREPRESENTED
IN THE ISRAELI REJECTION OF THEM. THE AMERICANS ARE ALSO SAID

TO HAVE PUT FORWARD UNOFFICIALLY COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSALS OF THEIR

OWN, WHICH EGYPT FOUND UNSATISFACTORY.

3. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS THE FIXING OF A DATE FOR THE NEXT

PLENARY WILL DEPEND ON PROGRESS IN THE COMMITTEES. DR KHALIL

HAS REFUSED TO ANTICIPATE THE SITUATION ON 26 MAY, SAYING IT

WOULD REQUIRE DISCUSSION AT HEAD OF STATE LEVEL.

WEIR

ADDITIOHA1 DISTBXBUTIOK
AEAB/ISEAEL DISPUTE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED
GRS v?,m CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 082253Z MAY 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 721 DATED 8 MAY 83

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR JOHN MOBERLY

EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON THE KIDDLE EAST

1. THE FOLLOWING IS BOTH A SUMMARY AND AN ELABORATION CF THE

THOUGHTS I PUT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THOSE

ACCOMPANYING HIM ON HIS WASHINGTON V I S I T AT THE BEGINNING OF

THIS WEEK.

2. THE NINE MUST DO SOMETHING THIS SUMM.ER. THE ARABS (IN THE
UN AT LEAST) ARE FULL OF EXPECTATIONS OF AN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE
AND THEIR EXPECTATIONS HAVE BEEN FURTHER FUELLED BY THE
EUROPEAN COUNCIL'S STATEMENT OF 28 APRIL AND BY THE SECRETARY
OF STATE'S REMARKS TO THE MEDIA IN WASHINGTON. THEY TEND TO
REGARD THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AS AN ALREADY FULLY FLEDGED
CREATURE WHICH ONLY NEEDS A PUSH TO BOUND INTO THE ARENA AND >
SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. IF WE DISAPPOINT THEM , THEY WILL TURN
SOUR ON US AND WILL NOT HESITATE TO OCCUPY THE SECURITY
COUNCIL IN THE BUMPER WITH PROPOSITIONS WHICH WE COULD FIND
VERY EMBARRASSING. THIS IS OF COURSE QUITE APART FROM THE
EROADER NEED TO PROMOTE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT IN
THE GENERAL WESTERN INTEREST, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT CAMP
DAVID WILL GET NOWHERE. WHAT SHOULD THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE
CONSIST OF?
3. HAVING WITNESSED THE INCREASING DISARRAY IN THE US

PERFORMANCE HERE ON THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE THE NEW YEAR, I FIRMLY

BELIEVE THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO THINK IN TERMS OF OUR

BEING ABLE, AT ANY TIME.BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,

TO FORMULATE ANY RESOLUTION DESIGNED TO 'FILL THE GAP IN 242',

WHICH WOULD BE fcOTH MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS AND

WOULD NOT ATTRACT < US VETO. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR

JULY OR AUGUST WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY CONVENTION TAKING

PLACE It! NEW YORK (OF ALL PLACES) IN AUGUST.

4. ON PRESENT EVIDENCE, I AM CONVINCED THAT, THE AMERICANS
WOULD MAKE HOMERIC EFFORTS TO DRIVE US OFF. WE WOULD
THEREFORE BE FACED BY THE CHOICE OF DROPPING THE
INITIATIVE (WITH THE FRENCH ASSURING THE ARABS THAT THEY WOULD
HAVE GONE AHEAD IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR THE PUSILLANIMOUS
BRITISH), OR OF FORCING A RESOLUTION TO A VOTE IN THE
CERTAINTY OF A US VETO. FRANKLY I CANNOT SEE US DOING THIS.
5. HOWEVER, FOR THE REASON'S SFT OUT IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE,
WE CANNOT AFFORD TO S I T ON OUP HANDS. WE MUST FIND SOME WAY OF
KEEPING THE ARABS IN ^ L A Y UilTlL APYEH 'HF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
IN THE HOPE THAT THE CLIMATE WILL THEN BE MORE PROPITIOUS
FOR EUROPE TC MA'E A MOVE. TO ACHIEVE THIS, WE MUST

CONFIDENTIAL lit
C O N F I D E N T I A L
EE PREPARED TO O F F E R THE ARABS THE PROSPECT OF SOMETHING

SUBSTANTIVE BOTH IN TERMS OF FILLING THE GAP IN 242 AND IN TERMS

OF FRESH PROPOSALS FOR A NEGOTIATING FORUM AS V/ELL PERHAPS

T

AS COWCPE E IDEAS ON THE DETAILED ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT.

MEANWHILE THE MORE EXTREME ARABS, EGGED ON BY THE RUSSIANS,

WILL EE PRESSING FOR FURTHER ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL -

HENCE THE NEED FOR OUR OFFER TO THE ARABS TO BE ATTRACTIVE

ENOUGH TO KEEP THESE FORCES AT BAY.

6. I BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST STE» MIGHT BE FOR THE NINE TO
INITIATE A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE ARABS, J J ^ C J ^ U ^ J T H E
?LD.. WE WOULD HAVE TO ASSURE THEM THAT THE N I N F ^ W E R ^ R E T A R E D
TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT:
THAT WE ACCEPTED THE PLO AS A LEGITIMATE PARTICIPANT IN THAT
SEARCH: THAT WE ACCEPTED SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS
AS A MINIMUM: AfJD THAT WE HAD S O M E IDEAS ABOUT WHAT SHOULD
REPLACE THE CAM? DAVID AUTONOMY TALKS IN TERMS. OF
PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE. I N RETURN , V'E SHOULD EXPLORE IN
THIS DIALOGUE WHAT THE ARABS (PARTICULARLY THE PLO) ARE
PREPARED TO OFFER IN T E R M S OF ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT
TO EXIST WITHIN THE PRE-1967 FRONTIERS: HOW THEY ENVISAGE
PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION BEING REALISED: WHETHER THEY
C O N T E M P L A T E A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND, IF SO, UNDER
WHAT AEGIS: AS WELL AS A HOST OF OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH
THE D E P A R T M E N T NO DOUBT HAS IN MIND.
7. 1 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED FOR US IN O P E N I N G

A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. THESE DIFFICULTIES COULD BE EASED

BY THE N I N E ACTING AS A WHOLE, PERHAPS UNDER THE

LEADERSHIP OF THE PRESIDENCY. FURTHERMORE, WE COULD EXTEND

THE DIALOGUE TO JORDAN THUS INVOLVING SENIOR NON-PLO

PALESTINIANS! ALSO TO THE INTERNAL PALESTINIANS THROUGH

THE CONSULATES -GENERAL OF THE NINE IN JERUSALEM. WE WOULD

OBVIOUSLY 'EEP THE EGYPTIANS INFORMED AND WE WOULD KEEP

IN TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELIS I N ORDER TO PRE-EMPT THE ACCUSATION

THAT WE WERE DEALING WITH ONE SIDE ONLY AND TO MAINTAIN

AN UPTO DATE PICTURE OF WHAT THEY MIGHT EVENTUALLY P E ABLE

TO ACCEPT.

8. IF THE ARABS, INCLUDING THE PLO, WERE GENUINELY EROUGHT

TO BELIEVE THAT WE WERE EMEARK(NG ON A SERIOUS DIALOGUE,

THEY MIGHT B E PREPARED TO HOLD THEIR FIRE UNTIL THE END OF THE

YEAR. HY PAROCHIAL VIEW OF THE ARABS IN NEW YORK IS THAT THEY

WOULD B E GREATLY INTRIGUED BY SUCH A MOVE ON THE PART OF THE NINE,

MUCH MORE SO THAN BY ANY ATTEMPT, ABORTIVE OR OTHERWISE, TO TABLE

A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS S U M M E R WITHOUT THOROUGH

ADVANCE CONSULTATION WITH THEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
9. PLEASE DO NOT THINK THAT I UNDER-ESTIMATE THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED
IN THE ABOVE SUGGESTIONS. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT I OVER­
ESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN TABLING ANYTHING IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS BETWEEN NOW AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL V
ELECTIONS WITHOUT RUNNING INTO A US VETO.
10. FINALL , MY STRONG FEELING IS THAT WE MUST TALK FRANKLY AND
URGENTLY TO THE FRENCH ABOUT ALL THIS. THEIR PERFORMANCE IN LAST
WEEK'S DEI-ATE MAKES CLEAR THAT THEY ARE STILL ONLY TOO
READY TO BREAK RANKS AND OUT-FLANK US ON THE ARAB SIDE. WE MUST
DO OUR BEST TO PRE-EM°T THIS BEFORE IT IS TOC LATE. IF WE AND
THE FRENCH PULL IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS, AN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE
"..'ILL BE IMPOSSIBLE. IF WE CAN WORK OUT A JOINT STRATEGY
THERE IS SOME HOPE THAT WE CAN AVOID PREMATURE AND EMBARRASSING
SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.
11. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE ABOVE WITH BRIAN URCUMART WHOM I FULLY
TRUST AND WHOSE JUDGEMENT I RESPECT. HE AGREES WHOLEHEARTEDLY.
FROM MORE GENERAL CONVERSATIONS I HAVE HAD WITH THEM, I
BELIEVE THAT MY FRENCH, TUNISIAN AND EGYPTIAN COLLEAGUES ARE
OF THE SAME KIND.
12. PLEASE DISTRIBUTE AND REPEAT THIS TELEGRAM AS YOU THINK

F I T . WE MIGHT DISCUSS WHEN I AM IN LONDON NEXT WEEK.

HEADS OF MISSION SECTION AND UN DEPT ARE ARRANGING MY PROGRAMME.

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL
• « ™ CONFIDENTIAL
CONFlDENT IAL

P* TEL AVIV SM610Z MAY 30

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF k MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASH I R8TON

H, I.P.T. MIDDLE EAST

I . BEFORE YOU MEET THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER ON 13 MAY AND
THE MINE BEGIN WORK OH THE KIDDLE EAST IN PREP ART IOM FOR THE VIENNA
SUMMIT, YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE A 3RIEF SUMMARY OF THE PROSPECTS SEEN
FROM TEL AVIV AND T^EIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTION BY EUROFE.
E« IT I S NOW CLEAR, AS SEEMED INEVITABLE FROM THE START, THAT THE
CAMP "DAVID NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT LEAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT.
NO AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM IS OOSSI3LE OM THE CAMP
DAVID BASIS. AS LONG AS THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON THE WEST 3ANK AND
JERUSALEM WHICH SATISFIES THE PALESTINIANS THEY WILL BE DRIVEN
INCREASINGLY TO EXTREMISM: MODERATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA AND
WESTERN INTEREST WILL BE INCREASINGLY THREATENED: OPPORTUNITIES
FO:? SOVIET INFLUENCE AND INTERVENTION WILL INCREASE: AMD SO WILL
THE DANGER OF A NEW WAR.
3. ISRAEL'S LEADERS HOPE THAT REAGAN WILL SUCCEED CARTER AND THAT

AMERICA WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY THE ARMS AN'D MONEY AND VETOES CM

THE POLICIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH WILL ALLOW ISRAEL TO MAINTAIN

SUFFICIENT FORCE TO DETER AN ARAB ATTACK FROM OUTSIZE AXD TC GO ON

CRUSHING THE EVIDENCE OF PALESTINIAN DESPAIR WHENEVER IT ERUPTS

IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ISRAEL WILL THEN 5E ABLE TO GO ON

REFUSING SELF-DETER Ml NAT 10,V FOR THE PALESTINIANS WHICH IT SEES AS

A MORTAL DANGER TO ITS SECURITY.

4. 3EH1ND THIS ISRAELI ATTITUDE L I E THREE CONVICTIONS:

( I ) THEY CAN TRUST NO ONE BUT MUST RELY FOR THEIR SECURITY OM

THEMSELVES ALONE (THEIR EXPERIENCE SPICE INDEPENDENCE GIVES THEM

STRONG ARGUMENTS MERE.)

( I I ) FAITH CAN MAKE UP FOR LACK OF MATERIAL STRENGTH (SO MANY

ISRAELIS CAM SAY THEY ARE ONLY HERE 3ECAUSE THEY HHVE SURVIVED

IMPCSSI3LE ODDS.)

( I I I ) I F TKEY ARE TO BE DESTROYED THEY WILL GO DOWN FIGHTING
THIS TIME. THEY WILL BE READ* TO USE THEIR ATOMIC WEAPON.
BECAUSE THEY CANNOT SUSTAIN A LONG WAR, THE WOULD HAVE TO USE
IT EARLY.

5. A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT HERE WILL NOT LEAD TO A SUFFICIENT

CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S POLICIES TO SSCUPE PEACE.

•'. MEW TEXTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL NOT BE ENOUGH TO PROTECT
OUR VITAL INTERESTS (THOUGH THEY CAN BE USEFUL WHILE WE PREPARE
ACTION THAT WILL.) NO ACTION BY OR IN THE UN WILL SUFFICE, BECAUSE
OF ISRAEL'S TOTAL DISTRUST OF TME UN. BUT ANY SOLUTION WHICH LEFT
IS."J A EL RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN A PALESTINIAN STATE, OR ABLE TO

INTERVENE FOR SECURITY REASONS, WOULD BE A RECIPE FDR CONFLICT.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. COULD A GRCIP OF WESTc^M COUNTRIES OFFER ISRAEL (AND THE NEW
PAL EST I f.M AN STATE) A SECURITY COMMITMENT OF THE KIND CONFERRED BY
MEMBERSHIP OF NATO? IM RETURN FOR EMACUAT\HQ ALL THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES AND ACCEPT IMG PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION ISRAEL
WOULD GET A JOINT TREATY OR A SERIES OF BILATERAL TREATIES OF MUTUAL

DEFEUCE FOR A LONG INITIAL PERIOD AMD, AS A GURANTEE OF IMPLEMENT­

ATION, THE STATIONING IN THE AREA-OF TROCPS FROM THE WESTERN

COUNTRIES INVOLVED. THESE TROOPS, OPERATING ON THE ISRAELI SIDE

OF THE BORDER AS WELL AS IN PALESTINE, COULD TAKE OVER RESPONSIB­

ILITY FOR THE EXTERNAL SECURITY OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE ( I F SHE

WERE NOT ALLOWED DEFENCE FORCES) LEAVING SOVEREIGNTY IN ALL OTr\ER

RESPECTS FULLY IN PALESTINIAN HANDS. (INDEED THE SAME DEFENCE

GUARANTEES COULD EE OFFERED TO THE PALESTINIANS.) A FORCE SUFFICIENT
TO CONVINCE ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE TO NUMBER 12,03!? - 15,002, TO DETER
AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL BY ANY OF HEP NEIGHBOURS AND TO DETER ISRAEL
ROM ATTACKING THE PALESTINIAN STATE,
6. US ?ART\C\PAT\Oti IN TREATY GURANTEE3 WOULD PR03ABLY BE ESSENTIAL
TO GET ISRAEL TO ACRZZ. BUT US PARTICIPATION IN THE RESIDENT
MILITARY FORCE COULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS, 3ECAUSE IT COULD PROMPT A
GREATER SO^\ET PRESENCE AND BECAUSE THE PROBLEM CANNOT BE LEFT
UNTIL A NEW US ADMINISTRATION HAS THE PQilER TO ACT ON THE GROUND.
9. THE WEALTHIER ARAB COUNTRIES MIGHT AGREE TO PAY PART OF THE COST
OF THE RESIDENT FORCE, I F IT WERE EUROPEAN ONLY, ALOI>'G WITH SUB­
SIDIES TO THE PALESTINIAN STATE.
10. I F EUROPE COULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING A SETTLEMENT
CF THIS KIND, ISRAEL WOULD FIND 1T DIFFICULT TO TURN DOWK, THOUGH
SHE WOULD NEGOTIATE HARD ON EAST JERUSALEM, SETTLEMENTS AND 3ORDER
ADJUSTMENTS. IT WOULD ONLY BE WORTH PURSUING I F THE CONTRIBUTING
COUNTRIES MERE PESOUEB TO BE FIRM WITH ISRAEL ON THESE ISSUES.
11. IT WILL BE EASY TO L I S T OBJECTIONS TO TH\S APPROACH, INCLUDING
THE ACCEPTANCE OF A NEW OVERSEAS COMMITMENT. BUT WE ARE ALREADY
COMMITTED BY THE THREAT TO OUR VITAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA AND
THE OBJECTIONS TO INACTION ARE MUCH STRONGER. I F A MOVE OF THIS
KIND COULD EE CONTEMFLATED (EVEN INHCONJUNCTION WITH CUft TWO MAJOR
EUROPEAN PARTNERS ALONE) THE SOONER WE MOVE THE 2ETTER, TIME IS
NOT ON OUR SIDE. WE SHOULD NOT LEAVE THE PALESTINIANS WIDE OPEN TO
THE SOVIET UNION. THE SITUATIOV IN THE REGION IS DETERIORATING,
AND \-nTr>, IT ISRAEL'S DANGEROUS MOOD OF ISOLATION AND LEF\A\CZ WILL
GROW.

ROBINSON
BEPAETMEHTAI D I S T S T 3 U T I 0 H ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
mmLTi MAZE ABAB/IS2AEL DISPUTE
MED E S & SD
NflD FED

UND ECCN D

EESD CONS D

I D CONS EM U N I T

WED CABINET O F F I C E
^

CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED

GR 3??

RESTRICTED

W

DESKBY 0 9 0 8 * 9 2

FN TEL AVIV 3 4 1 9 0 0 7 MAY 3?!

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUM3ER 176 OF A MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

PRIORITY CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS UKMIS MEW YORK

JERUSALEM TEL NO 5 ? :

PLC ATTACK AT HEBRON

1. AN INCIDENT LIKE THE ONE ALREADY 3EING DESCRI3ED AS THE

"SECOND HEBRON MASSACRE" (THE FIRST BEING IN 1?2?) WAS

INEVITABLE IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS ON THE WEST BANK IN RECENT

WEEKS. IT MARKS THE CULMINATION OF AN INCREASING SPIRAL CF

VIOLENCE IN THE AREA AND MAY OPEN A NBV PHASE.

2. THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT HAVE REACTED BY EXPELLING THE MAYORS

OF HEBRON AND HALHOUL, AND THE KADI OF HEBRON, WITHOUT PERMITTING

THEM THE APPEAL ALLOWED FOR IN THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS (BRITISH

1945 VERSION) STILL GOVERNING ISRAEL SECURITY POLICY IN THE WEST

BANK. WEIZMAN, WHO HAS ACCEPTED PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE

FAILURE AT HE3RON, HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE NEW ISRAELI HARD LINE

(24 HOUR CURFEWS, ETC) WILL FOR THE MOMENT BE RESTRICTED TO HEBRON

AS LONG AS OTHER AREAS REMAIN QUIET. BUT HIS A3ILITY TO

SUSTAIN THIS POLICY IS UNCLEAR, GIVEN HIS EQUIVOCAL POSITION

WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND RIGHT-WING PRESSURE FOR HARSHER, AND

K

CRE COMPREHENSIVE, MEASURES.

3. AT TODAY'S CABINET MEETING (PUNCTUATED 3Y THE SIRENS OF
PROTESTING MEMBERS OF GUSH EMUNIM), 3EGIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE
ANNOUNCED THAT SECURITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL MINISTERS THUS IMPLICITLY REJECTING GROWING
CRITICISM OF WEIZMAN'S " S O F T " POLICIES. MEANWHILE, SHAMIR
(FOREIGN MINISTER) IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE APPROPRIATE
ISRAELI RESPONSE IS "TO STEP UP OUR PRESENCE THROUGHOUT THE AREA".
OTHER POLITICIANS, BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, HAVE DEPLORED
THE DEATHS 0* THE YESHIVA STUDENTS (ONE OF WHOM WAS A WELL-KNOWN
EXTREMIST EVEN 3Y GUSH STANDARDS) WITHOUT GOING DEEPER. ONLY
"RESIDENT SAVOR SAID TODAY THAT THE QUALITY OF FUTURE RELATIONS
B E T W E E N JEWS AND ARABS DEPENDED ON I S R A E L .
RESTRICTED

4. FURTHER GOVERNMENT REACT I NS APE LIKELY AFTER A K.'JESSET DEBATE
TOMORROW. SEEfl FROM HERE, THE SHORT-TERM PROSPECT I S FOR FURTHER
VIOLENCE ON THE VEST BANK AG EXTREMIST JEWS TAKE -REVENGE.
AND DESPITE BRAVE WORDS FROM LINOWITZ AND KHALIL, THE HEBRON
INCIDENT WILL HAVE MADE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO DISCUSS THE
CRUCIAL SECURITY ISSUE IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS IN A RATIONAL
WAY. | . . .
5. FOR SOME MORE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS SEE M.I.F.T. (NOT TO A L L ) .

ROBINSON

IEPAHIMEETA1 DISTET3UTI01I ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

WTTTA-n MAED ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
MED ES & SD

KftO FED
USD EC OK D
EESD corrs D
EID CONS EM UNIT

WED CABINET OFFICE ,

GPS 53f5
CONFIDENTIAL P S TO P M NO 10 DOWNING 3T
CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO 29273PZ APR

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NR 2B6 OF 2B APR 80

INFO TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIW NEWYORK

SAVING TO AMMAN JERUSALEM DAMASCUS AND JEDDA.

ARAB/ISRAEL l

1. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE US/IRAN FIASCO AND VANCE'S RESIGNATION,
IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE AMERICANS OR THE EGYPTIANS WILL HAVE
MUCH STOMACH LEFT FOR THE HERZLIA TALKS 3EGINNING ON JO APR.,
LET ALONE OPTIMISM. HOWEVER THE EGYPTIANS ARE COMMITTED TO THE
INTESIFIED TIMETABLE, AND MUSTAPHA KHALIL IS PREPARING TO ATTEND.
HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, PROBABLY IN
THE HOPE OF OBLIGING THE ISRAELIS TO FIELD WEIZMAN. THEY WILL
BE JOINED BY BOUTROS GHALI ON HIS RETURN FROM THE OAU
MEETING AT LAGOS.

2. SINCE MY TALK WITH KHALIL ON 15 APR (MY TELNO 257) I HAVE

DISCUSSED THE PROSPECTS WITH BOUTROS GHALI AND THE US AM3ASSADOR.

WHAT THEY HAD TO SAY TALLIED BROADLY WITH THE SCENARIO IN

WASHINGTON TELNO 1597. BOURTOS SAW NO REASON (EXCEPT 3EGIN) WHY

THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT_ PRODUCE A COMJ>ROMI SF PACKAGE WHICH

WOULD ATTRACT PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION. ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE

SGA FOR EXAMPLE (CF TEL AVIV TELNO 166) HE FORESAW A TWO-TIER

ARRANGEMENT INVOLVING A SMALL EXECUTIVE AND A LARGER DELIBERATIVE

BODY. HOWEVER HE WAS MORE SCEPTICAL THAN ATHERTON A30UT THE

CONTINUING COMMITTEE IDEA ON THE GROUND THAT THE ISRAELIS

COULD TOO EASILY REPRESENT IT AS A DEPARTURE FROM THE SACRED

TEXT OF CAMP DAVID. THE CAIRO PRESS IS ALSO STRESSING THE

POSSIBILITY OF GETTING POSITIVE RESULTS , I F ONLY ISRAEL

T

WILL ADHERE TO HE CAMP DAVID REQUIREMENT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE TRANSFER OF ITS POWERS TO A FULLY

AUTONOMOUS ELECTED BODY ( S I C ) . THEY STRESS THAT EGYPT WILL

CONCENTRATE ON THE SECURITY QUESTION. MUSTAFA KHALIL IS SAYING

IN PRIVATE THAT HE WILL REFUSE TO DISCUSS ANYTHING ELSE UNTIL

HE HAS GOT SATISFACTION ON THIS ISSUE.

CONFIDENTIAL
/3. AS

CONFIDENTIAL

3. A S T O A C T I O N I N T H EE V E N T O FF A I L U R E , ATHERTON A N D I A G R E E D

THAT K H A L I L AND ( L E S S P O S I T I V E L Y ) GHALI R E M A I N I N FAVOUR O FA

EUROPEAN I N I T I A T I V E . B U T ATHERTON MENTIONED OTHER I D E A S , E G

THAT T H E WEST BANK MAYORS M I G H T 3E P E R S U A D E D T O FORM T H E M S E L V E S

INTO A T E M P O R A R Y S G A - A N Y T H I N G I N F A C T T O T R I G G E R AN I S R A E L I

WITHDRAWAL. T H EN O T I O N O FP R O C E E D I N G T O E L E C T I O N S E V E N I N T H E

ABSENCE O F A G R E E M E N T O F A S G A H E A T T R I B U T E D T O P R E S I D E N T C A R T E R

H I M S E L F , B U T I T HAD 3EENLITTLE MORE THAN T H I N K I N G ALOUD.

4. M Y OWN V I E W I S T H A T P A R A D O X I C A L L Y T H E I R A N I A N F I A S C O MAY

MAKE SADAT E V E N MORE R E L U C T A N T T O C O N T E M P L A T E A CHANGE O F C O U R S E

THAT COULD LOOK L I K E L E T T I N G DOWN JIMMY C A R T E R I N H I S HOUR O F N E E D .

T H E R E MAY W E L L 3E SOME I N C R E A S E I N D O M E S T I C O P P O S I T I O N T O £ ,\c.

S A D A T ' S P O L I C I E S FROM I S L A M I C F U N D A M E N T A L I S T S , THOUGH T H E H P ^ W K + T C - f T S

AND OTHER $MENTATORS HAVE B E E N T O O Q U I C K I N MAKING T H I S A S S U M P T I O N .

EVEN S O SADAT I S U N L I K E L Y T O 3E D E F L E C T E D .

FCO P S EP A S S T O S A V I N G S A D D R E S S E E S .

W E I R .

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

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-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

KIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

PS>NS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR JO 10 DOWNING- STREET
PS/I-IR HURD
PS/PUS
MR J C KOBERLY ' CABINET OFFICE DIO

HD/NENAD
HD/KSD
HD/UND
HD/OID
(2)

••• •••
••• •••
PUSD
NEWS D
(2)

RESIDENT CLERK

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON £52055Z APR 80
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NO 1618 OF 25 APRIL
INFO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JERUSALEM

INFO SAVING BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, MOSCOW, L'KMIS NEW YORK

JORDAN: NEW YORK TIMES INTERVIEW WITH KING HUSSEIN
1. TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES CARRIER AN ARTICLE BY DAVID SHlPLcR,.
DATELINFD AMMAN, ABOUT AN INTERVIEW KING HUSSEIN GAVE HIM ON 23 MM

2. HUSSEIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE MADE THt FOLLOWING POINTS!
I ) CONVINCED THAT THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PfiCCESS WAS PROVING A
FAILURE AND THAT THE US HAD PUN OUT CF ?T40Nt IN HE MIDDLE T

FAST, HUSSEIN WAS ENCOURAGING AN INITIATIVE FROM WESTERN EUROPE:
I I ) HE SAW NO PROMISE IN RECENT PROPOSALS BY THE ISRAELI LA30UR
PARTY THAT JORDAN AND ISRAEL NEGOTIATE THE FUTURE CF A DE­
MILITARISED WEST BANK. ANY SUCH SUGGESTION BY PERES ASSUMED A
STARTLING NAIVETE ON JORDAN'S PART.
| I I I ) JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE US WERE WORSE NOW THAN AT AMY
1 TIME DURING HIS REIGN. VHILE HE WISHED TO MAINTAIN FRIENDSHIP
WITH THE US HE HAD DECIDED TO REDUCE HIS DEPENDENCE ON THEM AS A
SCURCE OF WEAPONS AND TO BUY FROM A VARIETY OF CCl'NTS I : * ,
POSSIBLY INCLUDING THF SOVIET UNION. HE NEVERTHELESS MOPED TO
VISIT THE US LATFR THIS YEAR BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
IV) CRITICISM BY THE US OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN
WOULD NCT WIN THEM MUSLIM SUPPORT SO LONG AS. EAST JFRUSALFM
IV ) CRITICISM BY THE US OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN
WOULD NOT WIN THEM MUSLIM SUPPORT SO LONG AS EAST JERUSALEM
REMAINED UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION. —
V) JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION "HAVE SEEN THEIR 9
UPS AND DOWNS", BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD LEAPNSD THAT RELATIONS
WITH JORDAN "SHOULD BP BASED CN MUTUAL RESPECT AND NON­
INTERFERENCE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS / . . AS A RESULT THERE IS A
GROWING RELATION BETWEEN US BASED CN A SOLID FOUNDATION".
VI) AS HE WATCHED THD PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL
UNFOLD "THE FEARS AND SUSPICIONS WE HAD OVER A LONG PERIOD CF
TIME CAME TRUE... THE VIEW WE HAD WAS THAT ISPAEL WAS SEEKING
TO SEE EGYPT REMOVED FROM THF SCENE AND THAT THE EGYPT/ISRAEL
ASPECT OF THE CONFLICT WAS THF EASIEST ONE TO ADDRESS AND
RESOLVE. THE PEAL PROBLEM IS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, JERUSALEM
IN PARTICULAR, IN TERMS OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS ON PALESTINIAN
SOIL. "

FCO FASS SAVING BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, MOSCOW.

HENDERSON
9
" " CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FH WASHINGTON 241625Z APRIL 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1597 OF 24 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO
INFO SAVING AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK,
JERUSALEM.

MY TELS NOS 1517 AMD 1539 l ARAB/ISRAEL - BEGIN'S V I S I T TO
WASH INGTON.

1 . WE FOLLOWED UP STERNER'S AND HUNTER'S ACCOUNTS BY ASKING WALKER
(LINOWITZ OFFICE) HOW LINOWITZ HOPED TO PLAY THE HAND DEALT TO HIM
BY THE BEGIN AND SADAT VISITS.

2. WALKER SAID THERE WERE TWO CRITICAL QUESTIONS!

I) WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT DURING THE FORTH­
COMING INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS COMPATIBLE WITH SADAT'S VIEW
OF WHAT OUGHT TO BE SUFFICIENT TO ATTRACT THE PALESTINIANS
INTO THE NEXT STAGE ?

II) WOULD THE PALESTINIANS BE SUFFICIENTLY ATTRACTED AND WOULD
THE R.L.O. GIVE THEM THE GREEN LIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN ELEC­
TIONS ?

WALKER EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL OPINION THAT, DESPITE THE HEAVY POL­
ITICAL PRESSURE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER, THE ODDS WERE PROBAELY
AGAINST.

3. READING FROM WHAT WAS CLEARLY AN AMERICAN 3LUE-PRI NT FOR AN
AGREEMENT (THOUGH WALKER DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD BE PRESENTED AS
SUCH DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS EXCEPT IN PIECEMEAL FASHION), WALKER .
OUTLINED THE SORT OF QUOTE HEADS OF AGREEMENT UNQUOTE WHICH
MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS. HE ADMITTED, INCID­
ENTALLY, THAT THERE WAS NO CLEAR IDEA IN THE MINDS OF THE AMERICANS,
EGYPTIANS OR ISRAELIS WHAT THE TERM QUOTE HEADS CF AGREEMENT
UNQUOTE MEANT, BUT THOUGHT THAT THIS UNCERTAINTY COULD ITSELF HAVE
ADVANTAGES - HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE TERM WAS
ANYWAY A BRITISH INVENTIONS. IF IT FOLLOWED THE AMERICAN 3LUE-PRINT,
ANY AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A POLITICAL PREAMBLE AND WOULD IDEALLY
COVER ALL THE MAIN ISSUES, LEAVING A LIMITED NUMBER OF SUBJECTS TO E
FOLLOWED UP IN THE CONTINUING COMMITTEE. WATER WAS THE
MOST OBVIOUS SUBJECT FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION, BEING BOTH A SHARED
RESOURCE AND A HIGHLY TECHNICAL SUBJECT. BUT LAND (WHICH WCULD COVER
SETTLEMENTS WITHOUT MENTIONING THEM BY NAME) WAS CLEARLY ANOTHER
AREA WHERE COMPLETE AGREEMENT MIGHT WELL NOT BE REACHED SINCE IT
ROUSED THE SENSITIVE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY. THE U.S. WCULD PRESS

F o R
CONFIDENTIAL /
CONFIDENTIAL
W w •
_ _ _ . —— Bill

FDR MAXIMUM SOVEREIGNTY FOR THE SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY (SGA),
CERTAINLY OVER NON-PUBLIC LAND, AND AT THE VERY LEAST WOULD REQUIRE
A CLEAR REMOVAL OF LAND FROM ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY AS NOW EXERCISED.
SOME W0RDIN6 WHICH WOULD FORBID ANY ALTERATION OF THE STATUS OF ,
PUBLIC LAND WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WOULD FUDGE THE
CUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BUT AT LEAST PUT A DE FACTO FREEZE ON SETTLE­
MENTS (EVEN IF IT WOULD ALSO GIVE THE ISRAELIS A LIEN ON THE STATUS
OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS). ELECTION MODALITIES MIGHT BE COVERED IN
A DETAILED ANNEX, AS MIGHT WHATEVER WAS AGREED ON SECURITY. THE
DOCUMENT WOULD SPECIFY ALL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY WHICH BY AGREE­
MENT AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE (BUT SUBJECT TO SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT)
WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE SGA, AS WOULD THE POWERS THE S6A WOULD

NEED TOI DISCHARGE THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES. REFERENCE WOULD BE MADE TO

THE FUTURE USE OF THE CONTINUING COMMITTEE. WALKER DOUBTED THAT ANY

DATE FOR ELECTIONS WOULD BE WRITTEN IN SINCE SOME FLEXIBILITY WOULD

BE DESIRABLE ON THIS.

;
A . I F A SATISFACTORY (TO THE EGYPTIANS, AMERICANS AND ISRAELIS)

AGREEMENT ALONG THESE LINES COULD BE WORKED OUT - AND WALKER STRESSED

THE UNCERTAINTIES PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE VOTING RIGHTS OF EAST

JERUSALEM ARABS AND THE DIFFICULTIES IN FINDING LANGUAGE TO

COVER THE LAND ISSUE - THE PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE TO FORM THEIR OWN

JUDGEMENT ON WHETHER IT OFFERED ENOUGH FOR THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN

ELECTIONS. WALKER LISTED FIVE REASONS WHY IT MIGHT JUST BE HOPED THAT
THEY WOULD DO SOi

IT WOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE ELECTION OF THE SGA WOULD LEAD
I)
IMMEDIATELY TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERN­
MENT!

If) SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD ESTABLISH A DE FACTO FREEZE CN SETTLE­

MENTS!

I l l ) THE VOTING RIGHTS OF EAST JERUSALEM ARABS WOULD HAVE BEEN ESTAB­
LISHED (BECAUSE WITHOUT THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
REACHED AT A L L ) i

A CLEAR PATH WOULD HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN TOWARDS THE ESTABLISH­
IV) MENT OF THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ON WHICH,
AS CAMP DAVID MADE CLEAR, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN QUOTE
NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR UNQUOTE AFTER THE ELECTION!

APART FROM THE UNRESOLVED JERUSALEM PROBLEM, THE (UNDERLINE THE
V) NEXT WORD) WHOLE OF THE WEST BANK WOULD PASS OUT OF ISRAELI
HANDS I . E . , IT WOULD BE AN ABSOLUTE RETURN TO THE PRI -1967
BORDERS. WALKER POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING WHICH NO
LABOUR GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL HAD BEEN PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE AND
THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT DO WELL TO POCKET IT WHILE BEGIN WAS STIL
•H COMING

IN POWER RATHER THAN BASE THEIR HOPES ON A MORE FORTHCOMING

PE
" S P 0 U a
- CONFIDENTIAL A.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. ON THE LIKELY PUBLIC REACTION HERE IF THE PROCESS COLLAPSED IN
FAILURE,' WALKER DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN FAILURE WHICH COULD CLEARLY
BE ATTRIBUTED TO ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE AND FAILURE BY THE PALEST­
INIANS TO RESPOND TO A DEAL ACCEPTABLE TO SADAT. THE FORMER *OULD
PROBABLY ONLY HAPPEN IF A BREAK-DOWN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE
ATTRIBUTED TO ISRAELI REFUSAL TO MOVE ON THE LAND ISSUE - ON JERUS­
,ALEM THERE MIGHT BE WIDE-SPREAD SUPPORT IN THE U.S. FOR THE ISRAELI
POINT OF VIEW, BUT ON SETTLEMENTS AMERICANS WERE MORE WILLING TO
CRITICISE THEM. GIVEN HIS OWN PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANCES
CF THE PALESTINIANS ACCEPTING ANY AGREEMENT, WALKER EXPRESSED THE

VIEW THAT THE ISRAELIS, IF THEY WERE CLEVER, WOULD NOW START MAKING

THE NECESSARY CONCESSIONS TO REACH AGREEMENT IN THE CONFIDENT EXPECT­

ATION THAT SUBSEQUENT PALESTINIAN REFUSAL TO BUY THE DEAL WOULD SHIFT

RESPONSIBILITY, IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC EYES, CLEARLY AWAY FROM ISRAEL

IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, PARTICULARLY IF SADAT GAVE A LEAD, AN AMERIC­

AN ATTITUDE OF QUOTE A POX ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES UNQUOTE WOULD LEAVE

THE ISRAELIS WITH WHAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER A SATISFACTORY STATUS QUC

AND AMERICAN PRESSURE ON THEM WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY REDUCED.

FCO PASS SAVING AMMAN BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA AND JERUSALEM.

HENDERSON

I H I S TELEGRAM

WAS NOT

ADVANCED

DEPARTMENTAL D I S T R I B U T I O N A T v n T T T r w A T . DTJ3TET3TJTICJN

NEHAD MAED ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

MED E S & SD

1 1 1 TED

WED CABINET O F F I C E -j ^— —

CONFIDENTIAL
GR 225
UNCL A 331FlED

P' TEL AVIV 22070*2 APR 5^
TO ROUTINE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 29. APRIL

7

INFO UKf'l S NEW YORK WASHINGTON CAIRO AMMAN AND JERUSALEM

SEGIN'S US VISIT

1, 0t; RETURN FROM WASHINGTON AT THE WEEKEND BEGIN TOLD THOSE WHO

M£T MIM AT THE AIRPORT THAT HE MAD MADE THREE POINTS TO CARTERi

I) JFR'JSALEM WILL NOT BE DIVIDED AGAIN DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY

THROUGH WORD GAMESt

II) THERE WILL BE NO MORE THAN AN ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL FOR THE

WEST BANK AND GAZA AND NO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL!

III) SECURITY AND DEFENCE, BOTH EXTERNAL AND AGAINST TERRORISM

WILL REM A11! IN THE HANDS OF THE ISRAEL DEFENCE FORCES.
BEGIN WENT ON TO SAY »'OUR GREATEST SUCCESS WAS THE FACT THAT WE
RENEWED JEWISH Ur\'ITY IN AMERICA IN REGARD TO THE THREE A30VE POINTS.
AMERICAN JEWRY IS NOW WILLING TO FIGHT FOR THEM".

2. IN A SU3SE0UENT INDEPENDENCE DAY TELEVISION APPEARANCE, BEGIN

SAID THERE WOULD BE NO CONCESSIONS ON THE ISSUE OF JEWISH SETTLE­

MENT IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA. SETTLEMENT WAS ' 'THE SOUL OF ZIONISM".

HE REITERATED HIS POSITION ON JERUSALEM AND ON WEST BANK SECURITY

AND SAID OF JERUSALEM THAT IT WAS ISRAEL'S RIGHT AND DUTY TO

DECLARE IN WASHINGTON THAT THE CITY IS ALL UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIG­

NTY, IS ISRAEL'S ETERNAL CAPITAL AND WILL NEVER BE DIVIDED. " T H I S

CITY IS OUR HISTORY, NOT THAT OF ANY OTHER NATION".

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

?. t RECENT OPINION POLL PUBLISHED THIS MORNING, WHILE SHOWING

A DROP IN SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENTS, STILL SHOWS 49? OF ISRAELIS

SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLEMENTS.

ROBINSON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FFWATi ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
MED

N AM D

UED

EESD

EID

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(V

1 0 D O W N I N G STREET
16 A p r i l 1980

From the Private Secretary

so

H a l l bv D r . Kissinger

D r . K i s s i n g e r c a l l e d on t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r t h i s a f t e r n o o n
and s t a y e d f o r r a t h e r o v e r an h o u r . T h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i l l be r a t h e r more i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c t h a n u s u a l
s i n c e the Prime M i n i s t e r , at Dr. K i s s i n g e r ' s prompting, in • * ­
me n o t t o t a k e a r e c o r d . D r . K i s s i n g e r t o l d me a f t e r w a r d s t h a t he
had no o b j e c t i o n t o a l e t t e r d e s c r i b i n g t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n b e i n g
w r i t t e n p r o v i d e d i t was not g i v e n t o o w i d e a d i s t r i b u t i o n . He s a i d
t h a t he w o u l d be c o n t e n t f o r i t t o be s e e n by S i r N i c h o l a s H e n d e r s o n

( f o r whose p e r f o r m a n c e a s HM Ambassador i n W a s h i n g t o n he had e a r l i e r

e x p r e s s e d t h e warmest a p p r e c i a t i o n ) .

The US Administration

late

D r . K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r was e x c e s s i v e l y i s o

i n t h e White House. P r e s i d e n t Nixon has a l s o been i s o l a t e d . But,

u n l i k e P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r he had not t r i e d t o do e v e r y t h i n g h i m s e l f .

M o r e o v e r P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r c o n t i n u e d t o g i v e an i m p r e s s i o n o f

i n e x p e r i e n c e ( D r . K i s s i n g e r a l s o commented d i s p a r a g i n g l y on

G o v e r n o r R e a g a n ' s l a c k o f e x p e r i e n c e ) . The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had

a p p a r e n t l y s t i l l f a i l e d t o f o r m u l a t e an o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y f o r d e a l :

e i t h e r w i t h t h e I r a n i a n p r o b l e m o r w i t h t h e much g r a v e r i s s u e s r a .

by t h e S o v i e t i n v a s i o n o f A f g h a n i s t a n . A*s r e g a r d s I r a n t h e r e was

s p e c i f i c p r o b l e m i n t h a t some o f t h e m i d d l e and l o w e r e c h e l o n s i n

t h e W h i t e House and t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t s y m p a t h i s e d w i t h t h e

o b j e c t i v e s of t h e I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n . T h i s a c c o u n t e d , a t l e a s t i n

p a r t , f o r t h e l a c k o f c r T,v, e d i b i l i t y i n t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s
t h r e a t s

t o z, J-UI u " ^ - - - - - - - ' ° s<=-ii tr un aa tt ii oo nn would
w o u l d hnaavvee been

very d i f f - "

I 1
had t atkhee ah o tough
s t a g e s l ibeen
ne a k e n .itua
tThe » »

by e.g. p
.nochet r e g i m e

Iran

D r . K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t he had f a v o u r e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n o f seme

k i n d at a v e r y e a r l y s t a g e i n the c r i s i s . The t a k i n g o f h o s t a g e s

s h o u l d n e v e r h a v e been a c c e p t e d by t h e US A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . However,

i n t h e s i t u a t i o n w h i c h had now a r i s e n , he was o p p o s e d t o military

action. He d i d not s e e how i t c o u l d be made e f f e c t i v e . A naval
b l o c k a d e by s h i p s w o u l d r a p i d l y r e s u l t i n a " n e r v o u s c o l l a p s e " i n
W a s h i n g t o n . E v e r y t i m e a b l o c k a d i n g s h i p s i g h t e d an a p p r o a c h i n g
v e s s e l , t h e r e would have t o be a m e e t i n g i n Washington to d e c i d e
w h e t h e r o r n o t i t s h o u l d be s t o p p e d ( D r . K i s s i n g e r •* i t clear
.as L i w
biuCi-.iiuc oil Vicu.u..'.
his experience of running

t
his mind). I f , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , m i n e s were u s e d , t h e US

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would r a p i d l y be f a c e d w i t h a d e c i s i o n a s t o w h e t h e r

o r n o t t o s i n k v e s s e l s t r y i n g t o sweep t h e m i n e s .

•»
I n g e n e r a l , t h e b a l a n c e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n and a r o u n d I r a n was
markedly l e s s f a v o u r a b l e t o t h e . U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a n i t had been i n
V i e t n a m . The US A d m i n i s t r a t i o n - had t h e n had o v e r w h e l m i n g l o c a l
f o r c e a t i t s d i s p o s a l . Moreover t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was i n v o l v e d i n a
s e r i e s of n e g o t i a t i o n s t o w h i c h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a t t a c h e d i m p o r t a n c e
and w h i c h t h e r e f o r e gave W a s h i n g t o n l e v e r a g e . The U n i t e d S t a t e s now
had n e i t h e r a d e q u a t e f o r c e s t o d e p l o y l o c a l l y n o r any b a r g a i n i n g
c o u n t e r s to use w i t h the S o v i e t Union. Moreover t h e w e a k n e s s w h i c h
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had a l r e a d y shown i n I r a n had c a u s e d a c o l l a p s e of
c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t g e n e r a l l y and,
s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n Saudi Arabia.

H a v i n g made t h e s e p o i n t s about t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r t h e US
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of r e s o r t i n g to f o r c e , Dr. K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t
n o n e t h e l e s s i t had t o be r e c o g n i s e d t h a t US o p i n i o n was now running
out o f c o n t r o l . The US i n t e l l e c t u a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t had a l w a y s , i n h i s
v i e w , u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e p o t e n t i a l b e l l i c o s i t y o f an A m e r i c a n m i d d l e
c l a s s whose members had n e v e r s u f f e r e d any s e r i o u s r e v e r s e and f o r
whom t h e p r o s p e c t o f an A m e r i c a n h u m i l i a t i o n was i n t o l e r a b l e . There
was a r e a l d a n g e r of a more o r l e s s i n v o l u n t a r y s l i d e t o w a r d s ;ne u s e
o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e . The s i t u a t i o n w a s , a s o t h e r s had s a i d , r e m i n i s c e n t
of 1914.

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t HMG would make a m a j o r e f f o r t t o

e n s u r e t h a t t h e E u r o p e a n Community g a v e P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r t h e b a c k i n g ,

e.g. on s a n c t i o n s , w h i c h he r e q u i r e d . However t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n

had been a r r i v e d i n , i t was i n t h e l a s t r e s o r t e s s e n t i a l t o s u p p o r t

t h e US G o v e r n m e n t . But i f i t w e r e a g r e e d t o go down t h e r o a d o f

s a n c t i o n s , t i m e would be needed t o put t h r o u g h t h e n e c e s s a r y

l e g i s l a t i o n and t h e n t o g i v e t h e s a n c t i o n s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o w o r k .

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t s h e w o u l d n o t be a b l e t o c a r r y t h e

Opposition with her i n present circumstances i n supporting a r e s o r t tc

force.

East/West Relations

D r . K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t he had s e e n P r e s i d e n t T i t o i n t h e autumn,

some weeks b e f o r e t h e S o v i e t i n v a s i o n o f A f g h a n i s t a n , and t h a t

P r e s i d e n t T i t o had e v e n t h e n e x p r e s s e d g r a v e c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e

i n t e n t i o n s of the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . He had e x p r e s s e d t h e v i e w t h a t

t h e r e was a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e p r e s e n t g e n e r a t i o n of l e a d e r s ­
and s t i l l more t h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n - w o u l d t a k e r a s h a c t i o n . The

p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n had a r i s e n b e c a u s e o f t h e l a c k o i a

c l e a r s i g n a l from t h e West. I t remained of g r e a t importance t h a t the

S o v i e t Union s h o u l d r e c e i v e a c l e a r s i g n a l . The s i t u a t i o n t h r o u g n o u t

t h e s o - c a l l e d a r c o f c r i s i s was c l e a r l y moving i n f a v o u r o f t h e S o v i e t

Union. More s i t u a t i o n s would a r i s e i n w h i c h t h e y m i g h t be tempted t o

intervene. The West a s a w h o l e was s t i l l not d o i n g enough t o m a i n t a i n

the c r e d i b i l i t y of i t s defences. The p r e s e n t c r i s i s was t h e most

s e r i o u s t h a t had a r i s e n s i n c e 1945.

D r . K i s s i n g e r commented on t h e g r o w i n g w e a k n e s s o f C h a n c e l l o r

S c h m i d t ' s p o s i t i o n . He g r e a t l y a d m i r e d C h a n c e l l o r S c h m i d t and h i s

p o l i c i e s but t h e C h a n c e l l o r was l o s i n g h i s p a r t y . Messrs Brandt,

B a h r and Wehner were a l r e a d y f a r too d e e p l y i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e S o v i e t

U n i o n ( D r . K i s s i n g e r commented i n p a s s i n g on t h e hoavv p r i c e "'hi '

being paid f o r the O s t p o l i t i k ) . H e r r A p e l was a n a t i o n a l i s t who was

i n c r e a s i n g l y i n c l i n e d to_ t r y t o c h a r g e a p r i c e f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f

- 3 ­

Germany's c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n i n t h e A l l i a n c e . T h e r e was no o o v i o u s
s u c c e s s o r t o C h a n c e l l o r S c h m i d t i f , a s was p o s s i b l e , t h e SPD t r i e d t o
d r o p him a f t e r t h e election. (The P r i m e M i n i s t e r e x p r e s s e d
c o n s i d e r a b l e sceptism* of the l i k e l i h o o d of t h i s l a s t e v e n t u a l i t y
occurring.) As r e g a r d s t h e F r e n c h , Dr K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t t h e y made
a p r o f e s s i o n of c y n i c i s m . T h e i r p o l i c y c o n s i s t e d o f p i c k i n g up p e n n i e s .
N o n e t h e l e s s he a g r e e d w i t h t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r t h a t t h e y w o u l d p r o b a b l y
f o l l o w t h e B r i t i s h and German l e a d on I r a n : t h e i r a n a l y s i s o f t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n was p r o b a b l y not s o d i f f e r e n t from t h a t
o f o t h e r members o f t h e A l l i a n c e .

The A r a b / I s r a e l i Dispute

Dr K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t he d i d not t h i n k t h e r e was any c h a n c e t h a t

t h e autonomy t a l k s w o u l d r e s u l t i n p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s a s o l u t i o n o f t h e

P a l e s t i n i a n problem. I t was u n r e a l i s t i c t o s u p p o s e t h a t t h e

P a l e s t i n i a n s would be p r e p a r e d t o d i s a r m t h e m s e l v e s and l i v e contentedly

i n an e n c l a v e on t h e West B a n k . Nor w o u l d t h e PLO c e a s e i t s s u b v e r s i v e

a c t i v i t i e s e l s e w h e r e i n the Middle E a s t i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The

I s r a e l i Government, f o r t h e i r p a r t , were f a c e d w i t h a c h o i c e between

t r y i n g t o s e t up a B a n t u s t a n , w h i c h w o u l d c l e a r l y be u n a c c e p t a b l e t o

t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s , and e n g a g i n g i n an i r r e v e r s i b l e p r o c e s s l e a d i n g t o

an i n d e p e n d e n t P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e , w h i c h w o u l d be u n a c c e p t a b l e t o

I s r a e l i opinion. Dr K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t he had been r u n g by Mr B e g i n

the p r e v i o u s day. Mr B e g i n had t o l d him t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s w e r e

p r o p o s i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an autonomous e n t i t y i n w h i c h t h e I s r a e l i

Government w o u l d r e t a i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and d e f e n c e

but t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s w o u l d be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l o t h e r a s p e c t s o f r c l i :

Mr. B e g i n s a i d t h a t he c o u l d not a c c e p t t h i s a p p r o a c h b e c a u s e i t c l e a r l y

i m p l i e d t h e e v e n t u a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an i n d e p e n d e n t P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e .

D r . K i s s i n g e r t h o u g h t t h a t Mr. B e g i n ' s a n a l y s i s was accurate.

D r . K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t t h e o n l y way t o r e s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m ( a n d

he a d m i t t e d t h a t he had few s u p p o r t e r s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r h i s

a p p r o a c h ) was t o i n v o l v e J o r d a n . The I s r a e l i s s h o u l d hand o v e r t h e

West Bank and G a z a t o t h e J o r d a n i a n Government a s soon a s p o s s i b l e and

i n a s unencumbered a s t a t e a s p o s s i b l e . I s r a e l ' s s e c u r i t y requirements

s h o u l d be p r o t e c t e d by a r r a n g e m e n t s b a s e d on t h o s e e n v i s a g e d i n t h e

Allon plan. Once t h e West Bank had been t r a n s f e r r e d t o J o r d a n , t h e

p r o b l e m o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s w o u l d become an A r a b r a t h e r t h a n an A r a b /

I s r a e l i p r o b l e m . The P r i m e M i n i s t e r commented t h a t when s h e had l a s t

s e e n K i n g H u s s e i n ne had seemed w i l l i n g t o assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e

West B a n k . But i t seemed t o h e r t h a t t h i s a p p r o a c h w o u l d be g r a v e l y

d e s t a b i l i s i n g for Jordan. D r . K i s s i n g e r a d m i t t e d t h a t t h i s m i g h t be

so but s a i d t h a t he c o n s i d e r e d i t t h e l e a s t damaging o p t i o n .

4* W e s t e r n Summit

D r . K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t he had been s u r p r i s e d t h a t , g i v e n t h e

p r e s e n t d i s a r r a y i n t r a n s a t l a n t i c r e l a t i o n s and t h e g r a v i t y o f t h e

g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n , no a t t e m p t had been made t o h a v e a G u a d e l o u p e ­
s t y l e summit. I t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t some way s h o u l d be f o u n d ,

p r i v a t e l y , t o f o r c e P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r t o s p e l l out h i s s t r a t e g y . The

p r o c e s s o f h a v i n g t o d e s c r i b e i t t o h i s p r i n c i p a l a l l i e s might l e a d

/him

-4­

him to elaborate i t I n rr.ore d e t a i l t h a n h e s e e m e d s o f a r t o h a v e
done. The Prime Minister i n d i c a t e d t h a t she would r e f l e c t on t h e
point.

I am s e n d i n g a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet
Office).

W p

Paul Lever Esq
F o r e i g n and Commonwealth Office

r\j""? 1r
GPS 800 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
P" WASHINGTON 112326Z A»R Bfl
TO ROUTINE F C C
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1*46 OF » APRIL 198P, P S TO P M NO 10 DOWNING ;ST

l\FO CAIRO, TEL AVIV,

HFC SAVING AMMAN, EE I RUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, UKMIS \Ew YORK, H» M C G
JERSUALEM.

T
MY TELNC l*17l SADAT'S VISIT TO WASH ING C t>, 7 -If APRIL

T

1. STER'.'ER (DEPUTY ASSISTAN SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THE

VISIT VENT WELL, BUT STRESSED THA" IT WOULD, OF COURSE, 3E UNREALIS­

TIC TC ATTEMPT A PROPER ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS ACHIEVED UNTIL BEGIIJ

HAS COME AND GONE NEXT WEEK. NOP HAS HE YET BEEN BRIEFED CN WHAT TOOK

PLACE AT THE CARTER/SADAT TETE-A-TETE MEETING ON 8 APRIL.

2. THE AMERICANS DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT CF SADAT THIS TIME,

PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF HIS APPARENTLY TOUGHER TALK PRIOR TO

T

LEAVING CAIRO. HEY WERE REASSURED TO LEARN THAT HE IS STILL FIRMLY

CN BOARD THE CAMP DAVID PRCCESS AND ITS TARGET DATE, NOT SHOWING ANY

SIGNS CF WISHING TO KICK OVER THE TRACES AMD, NHILE CLEARLY WORRIED,

STILL EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE IN HIS "FRIEND JIMMY'S" ABILITY TO PULL

IT OFF. HE ALSO LEFT THEM WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT, DESFITE THE

RELATIVELY UNYIELDING LINE STILL BEING TAKEN BY BUTRCS GHALl AND AL­
T

BAZ ON HE SUBJECT, HE WOULD IN THE RIGHT CONDITIONS BE PREPARED TO

OVER-RULE THEM ON THE MAIN ISSUE WHERE THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE ASKED

C

TO GIVE GROUND, NAMELY TO DRD THEIR INSISTENCE ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT

ALL THE POWERS OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT BE HANDED OVER TC

D

THE SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY (S G A). CARTE , THEREFORE, SHOULD HAVE

A CHEQUE TO CASH WITH BEGIN NEXT WEEK I F HE JUDGES THAT-HE CAN GET

SOMETHING WORTHWHILE IN RETURN.

\ 3. CHARACTERISTICALLY, SADAT DID NOT GO INTC DETAIL. HE LAID DOWN

tC_FJNAL NFGOTI ATING POSITIONS THOUG« HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE

EXPECTED MAJOR MOVEMENT BY BEGIN ON LAND (INCLUDING SETTLEMENTS) AND

JERUSALEM. THE AMERICANS WERE ALSO ABLE TC EXPLORE HIS THINKING ON

"GAZA F I R S T " . SADAT ^ADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NCT THINKING OF A

SEPARATE SET OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR GAZA WHICH THE EGYPTIANS WOULD

IMPOSE, IF NECESSARY, ON THE GAZANS IF THE NEGOTIATIONS FAILED TO

PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT TO CCVER THE WEST BANK: RATHER HE WANTED AN

ACCEPTABLE (TO HIM) AGREEMENT TO COVER 3CTH AREAS WHICH, IF THE WEST

BANKERS REFUSED IT, HE AND THE ISRAELIS MIGHT IN SOME WAY IMPOSE ON

THE GAZANS.

- . THE STATEMENT ISSUES BY THE WHITE HOUSE AT > . E L\2 Z THE VISIT

r

(" l F T) ? i S L I T T L E . AMERICAN CONTACT* \:\~r. THE ISRAELIS D U A I U S

v

BOAT'S V I S I T LED THEM TC C ONCLUDE THAT THEY OUGHT EVE!. TC C I " ANY
RE FRE'. CE TC THE PROCEDURAL t£PEE 'E''~ rTjRUCK WITH SA&AT.
r

h
IS WAS

THAT THE NEGOTIATORS - KhALIL, BURS A?'D LlNOWITZ - SHOL'LZ

EMBA** ON I SUSTAINED NfcGOTU^IItS S f t i l W l ON T ^ P I L , PRE EP X.SLY'

P

r r
I!- WASHINGTON, TC DEMO STRATI ; BETE*" INEZ 1
'' v
- ~-^" THE 2: MJY
CONFIDENTIAL /DLADL.I*>~
CONFIDENTIAL
v
DEADLINE (WHICH STERNE? READ I L ADMITTED CCULD SLIP ITTP JUKE) WHEN
THEY WOULD * IM TO PPODUCE A DOCUMENT, CONSISTING PPCBABLY CF "HEADS
Or AGREED EN"' ' (R ATHEP THAN THE SORT OF DETAILED ANNEXE? OF THE
EGYPT-1SRAEL
T

PEACE TREATY) SUFFICIENT TO EE ATTRACTIVE TC THE
PALES IN IANS, UNDER THE KHALIL/EUPG/LINCWITZ STEERING COMMITTEE,
STERNER ENVISAGES t NUMBER OF SUB—CCMMITTEES: THE ELECTION
MODALITIES CCMMITTEE WOULD REMAIN, WITH THREE OTHERS TC DEAL WITH
ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS, LEGAL QUESTIONS AND SECURITY (WHICH WOULD
ITSELF EE SUBDIVIDED INTO DIFFERENT SORTS OF SECURITY PROBLEMS
IN ORDER TC PREVENT THE ISRAELIS REFUSING TO TISCUSS SECURITY AT
ALL SINCE THE SUBDIVISIONS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT CERTAIN KINDS CF
SECURITY PROBLEM COULD BE HANDLED BY THE S 6 A ) , THE SUB-COMKITTEES
WOULD TURN TO THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR INSTRUCTIONS WHEN NECESSARY
AND THE CARD OF ULTIMATE SADAT/BEG IN/CARTER STEERINS COMMITTEE WOULD
3E HELD IN PESERVE FOR POSSIBLE PLAY AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR. STERNER
ADMITTED THAT IT ALL SOUNDED MUCH NEATER THAN IT WAS LIKELY TO WORK
OUT.

5. BILATERALLY, SADAT HAD ANOTHER MAJOR PUBLIC RLLtTICNS BUCCF**T
THOSE WHO SAW HIM PERFORM C COMMENTED THAT HE DIDEVEN BETTER THAN ON
PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, IN PA TICULAR IN HIS SPEAK l_NC_ TECHNI QUE.
CONGRESSMEN IN IMPRESSIVELY LARGE NUMBERS RETURNED SPECIALLY TC
WASHINGTON DURING THE RECESS TC MEET HIM, HE ALSO APPEARS TC HAVE
HAD THE WISDOM NOT TO HAVE PRESENTED ANY SHOPPING LIST ON THIS
OCCASION.

6. STERNER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FIRST HALF OF THIS MATCH WAS BOUND
TC 3E THE EASIER: THE AMERICANS WILL BE PLAYING AGAINST THE WIND
"EXT WEEK WHEN BEGIN COMES. FOR 6 START "^EY NEED FROM HIM A
PARALLEL ASSURANCE THAT HE TOO IS COMMITTED TC THE PROCESS AND THE
TARGET DATE: THAT H E WILL ACCEPT THE NEGOTIATING PROCEDURE: AND
THAT H E WILL MATCH SADAT'S WILLINGNESS TC OVERRULE HIS NEGOTIATORS
IN THE CONSIDERABLY GREATER NUMEER OF AREAS WHERE CGNCESSICNS ARE.
NEEDED.

FCC PASS SAVING AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, JERUSALEM.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
HENDERSON.
DEPARTMENTAL DISTN. ADDITIONAL DISTN.
NENAD AHAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
RED
S ATi D

CABINET OFFICE [NOT ADVANCED]

CONFIDENTIAL
GPS 800 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

F*' WASHINGTON 1123262 APR 8 ?
TO ROUTINE F C O

P S TO P M NO 10 DOWNING ST

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1^46 OF H APRIL 1980,
INFO CAIRO, TEL AVIV,

INFO SAVING AMMANj BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JELDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, KMC S

JERSUALEH.

MY TELNO 1417: SADAT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, 7-10 APRIL

1. STERNER (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT) SAID THE
VISIT WENT WELL, BUT STRESSED THA" IT WCULD, OF COURSE, BE UNREALIS­
TIC TC ATTEMPT A F'ROPER ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS ACHIEVED UNTIL BEGIN
HAS COME AND GONE NEXT WEEK. NOP HAS HE YET BEEN BRIEFED CN HHAT TOOK
PLACE AT THE CARTER/SADAT TETE-A-TETE MEETING CN 8 APRIL.

2. THE AMERICANS DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT CF SADAT THIS TIME,
PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF HIS APPARENTLY TOUGHER TALK PRIOR TO
T

LEAVING CAIRO. HEY WERE REASSURED TO LEARN THAT HE IS STILL FIRMLY

ON BOARD THE CAMP DAVID PRCCESS AND ITS TARGET DATE, NOT SHCWING ANY
SIGNS CF WISHING TO KICK OVER THE TRACES AND, V^ILE CLEARLY WORRIED,
STILL EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE IN HIS "FRIEND JIMMY'S" ABILITY TO PULL
IT OFF. HE ALSO LEFT THEM WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT, DESPITE THE
RELATIVELY UNYIELDING LINE STILL BEING TAKEN BY BUTRCS GHALI AND AL­
3AZ ON THE SUBJECT, HE WOULD IN THE RIGHT CONDITIONS BE PREPARED TO
OVER-RULE THEM ON THE MAIN ISSUE WERE THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE ASKED
C

TO GIVE GROUND, NAMELY TO D?0 THEIR INSISTENCE ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT

ALL THE POWERS OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT BE HANDED OVER TC

0

THE SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY (S G A ) . CARTE , THEREFORE, SHOULD HAVE
A CHEQUE TO CASH WITH BEGIN NEXT WEEK IF HE JUDGES THAT HE CAN GET
SOMETHING WORTH WHILE IN RETURN.

3. CHARACTERISTICALLY, SADAT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. HE LAID DOWN

NO FJjiAL-JlESOTlATIHS POSITIONS THOUGH HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE

EXPECTED MAJOR MOVEMENT BY BEGIN ON LAND (INCLUDING SETTLEMENTS) AND

JERUSALEM. THE AMERICANS WERE ALSO ABLE TC EXPLORE HIS THINKING ON
"GAZA F I P S T " . SADAT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT THINKING OF A
SEPARATE SET OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR GAZA WHICH THE EGYPTIANS WOULD
IMPOSE, IF NECESSARY, ON THE GAZANS IF THE NEGOTIATIONS FAILED TO
PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT TO CCVER THE WEST BANK: RATHER HE WANTED AN
ACCEPTABLE (TO HIM) AGREEMENT TC COVER 3CTH AREAS WHICH, IF THE WEST
v
BANKERS REFUSES IT, HE AND THE ISRAELIS MIGHT IN SOME WAY ! POSE ON
THE GAZANS.
r

T-'E STATEMENT ISSUED Bv THE WHITE HOUSE AT THE 1X2 C THE VISIT
(M I #F "J SiYS L I T T L E . AMERICAS CONTACT* WITH THE ISRAELIS BUMKS
SOAT
r
S VISIT LEL THEM TC CONCLUDE K

THAT THEY OUGHT EVE!. TC C' I" ANY
RE ERE^'CE TC THE PROCEDURAL AGPEE'E»'~ STRUCK WITH SADAT. 7-. IS WAS
THAT THE N£6CTiAT0R8 - KHALIL,T BURG ANB LIW0WI7Z - SHOL'LI
r
EMBiPK or : SUSTAINED NE60TIA WG SESSIO': :ON r ?7r t T' :P I L , PRE EPf.BLY
Tr!r : K ? v

It. MASMfftSTDN, TC DEMOPTRATE t BETSPwfNEI — ' ~ *
CONFIDENTIAL

DEADLINE (v«ICH STERNER PEATILV ADMITTED CCULD SLIP INTO JUNE) WHEN
THEY WOULD AIM TO PPODUCE A DOCUMENT, C O N S I S T I N G P P Q E A B L Y CF "HEADS
0" AGREE'-'ENT' ' ( P A T H F P THAN T H E S O F T OF D E T A I L E D ANNEXES OF THE
EGYPT-ISPAEL PEACE TREATY) S U F F I C I E N T TO BE A T T R A C T I V E TC THE
T

P A L E S I N I ANS. UN DEP THE KH AL I L / E U P G / L I NOWtTZ S'EE^ING CCMV I T T E E ,

STERNER ENVISAGES A NUMBER OF SUB-CCM*ITTEES: THE ELECTICN

MCDALITIES COMMITTEE WOULD R E M A I N , WITH THREE O T H E R S TC DEAL WITH

ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS, L E G A L OUESTIONS AND SECURITY (WHICH WOULD

ITSELF BE SUBDIVIDED INTC DIFFERENT SORTS OF SECURITY PROBLEMS

IN ORDER TC PREVENT THE ISRAELIS R E F U S I N G TO TISCUSS SECURITY AT

ALL SINCE THE SUBDIVISIONS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT C E R T A I N KINDS CF

SECURITY PROBLEM COULD B E HANDLED BY THE S G A ) . THE SUB-COMMITTEES

WJULD TURN TO THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR INSTRUCTIONS WHEN NECESSARY
AND THE CARD O F ULTIMATE SADAT/BEG IN/CARTER STEERING COMMITTEE WOULD
3E H E L D IN P E S E R V E FOR POSSIBLE PLAY AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR. STERNER
ADMITTED THAT IT ALL SOUNDED MUCH NEATER THAN IT WAS LIKELY TO WORK
OUT.

5. B I L A T E R A L L Y , SADAT HAD ANOTHER MAJOR P U B L I C RELATION'S SUCCESS.-
THOSE WHO SAW HIM PERFORM COMMENTED T H A T H E DID EVEN B E T T E R THAN ON
F^LVIOUS OCCASIONS, IN P A R T I C U L A R IN K I E S P E A K I N G TECHNIQUE.
CONGRESSMEN IN IMPRESSIVELY LARGE NUMBERS R E T U P N E D S P E C I A L L Y TC
WASHINGTON DURING THE RECESS TC MEET HIM. HE ALSO APPEARS TC MAVE
HAD THE WISDOM NOT TO HAVE P R E S E N T E D ANY SHOPPING LIST ON THIS
OCCASION.

6. STERNER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT T H E FIRST HALF OF THIS MATCH WAS BOUND

TC BE THE AMERICANS W I L L B E P L A Y I N G A G A I N S T T H E WIND

E A S I E R : THE
"EXT WEEK WHEN B E G I N COMES. FOR A S T A R T ^ E Y NEED FROM HIM A

P A R A L L E L ASSURANCE T H A T H E TOO IS COMMITTED TC T H E P R O C E S S AND T H E

TARGET D A T E : THAT HE W I L L A C C E P T T H E N E G O T I A T I N G P R O C E D U R E : AND

THAT HE W I L L MATCH SADAT'S W I L L I N G N E S S TC O V E R R U L E H I S N E G O T I A T O R S

IN THE C O N S I D E R A B L Y G R E A T E R NUMBER OF AREAS WHERE C O N C E S S I C N S ARE
NEEDED.

F C C PASS SAVING AMMAN, B E I R U T , DAMASCUS, J E D D A , JERUSALEM.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
HENDERSON.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN.
ADDITIONAL DISTN.

NENAD
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

RED
ii AM D
DID

EESD

[NOT ADVANCED]
C0MFID3HTIAI

GRS 1
1?

CONFIDEnTIAL

FM FCO 1Q -?CT APRIL To
1

TO PRIORITY CAIRO
TELEGRAM NUI'RSR 16'I OF 1
0 APRIL
INFO TEL AVIV DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JERUSALEM BEIRUT* JEDDA.
WASHINGTON. UKMIS MEW YORK
ARAL/ISRAEL
1. THE EGYPTIAN Ai: 3 ASS A DO I? TOLD MOEERLY LAST MIGHT THAT I F THERE
'..'ERE PROGRESS DURING PRESIDE!!? CARTER'S MEETING WITH MR BEG I I I .
THERE v.'OULD BE A PLENARY MEETING OF "'HE AUTONOMY TALKS AT':'ENDED
BY KHALIL. PURG AMD LTNOV'TTE IN WASHINGTON ON 21 APRIL. I F THIS
UENT WELL PRESIDENT SADA? L'OULD RETURN TO WASHINGTON FOR A SUMMIT
MEETING V.'ITH BEGIN AND CARTER SOON AFTERWARDS. ABU S E E D A SAID
HE WAS PERSONALLY DOUBTFUL WHETHER BEGIN WOULD SHOV SUFFICIENT
FLEXIBILITY '"0 ENABLE THIS PLAN TO GO AHEAD.

CARRINGTON

[EMAD
MED
UKD
OID
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HL'RD
SIR D NAITLAi
MB P MOBEPLY

1
CONFIDENTIAL
£n1„« COHFIDENTrAT
V V C

TO PRIORITY F C O J. ^

V

TELNO l^C OF l« APR Kr - c 2 /<1^
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
M

UKMIS MEW YORK, JEDDA AND SAVING TO JERUSALE (P AS3ED)•

ARA3/ISRAEL.

1. 3EGIN LEAVES FOR THE U S AT THE END OF THIS WEEK IN WHAT

MUST LOOK TO NIM A RELATIVELY STRONG POSITION IN COMPARISON WITH

SADAT AND CARTER. OF COURSE THERE IS INTENSE CRITICISM FROM

INSIDE AS WELL AS OUTSIDE BEGIN'S GOVERNMENT AND IT COULD AT ANY

TIME BE JEOPARDIZED 5Y A F I T OF TEMPER OR DESPAIR ON THE PART CF

WEIZMAN OR BROUGHT DOWN ON THE PRETEXT OF SOME MINOR DOMESTIC

ISSUE OF CONCERN! TO THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY. BUT TO

SUPPOSE THAT ANY OF THIS MAKES BEGIN'S POSITION WEAK IN THE

CONTEXT OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS WOULD, I 3EL I EVE, BE A MISTAKE.

2. BEGIN WILL HAVE A GOOD REASON TO CALCULATE THAT HIS POSITION

IS THE STRONGEST CF THE THREE 3ECAUSE HE CAN MOST AFFORD TO PLAY „

THINGS LONG. ALTHOUGH THERE I S SOME ANXIETY IN SOME QUARTERS

HERE ABOUT MAINTAINING SADAT'S CREDIBILITY IN EGYPT(THE EGYPT I AN

AMBASSADOR HERE I S TRYING TOO HARD TO PLAY ON THIS 3Y TALK OF

THE DANGER FROM MUSLIM EXTREMISTS IN EGYPT AND THE POSSIBILITY

THAT HE HIMSELF WILL BE RECALLED INDEFINITELY TO CAIRO I F SU3-

STANTIAL PROGRESS IS NOT MADE 3Y 26 MAY) IT MUST SEEM TO 3EGIN

THAT SADAT HAS TOO MUCH TO LOSE 3Y ADMITTING THAT THE CAMP DAVID

PROCESS HAS FAILED. THE U N VOTE EPISODE ON 1 MARCH, THE NEW

YORK PRIMARIES AND WHAT I S BELIEVED HERE TO BE REAGAN'S

LIKELY POLICY CN ISRAEL WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ANY ONE

HERE TC ARGUE THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIAL EARLY ISRAELI CONCESSIONS

TO CARTER.

3. SO BEGIN I S UNLIKELY TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS IN

WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. THE FACT THAT SURG AND SHAMIR ARE NOW GOING

WITH HIM DOES NOT ALTER BUT RATHER STRENGTHENS THIS IMPRESSION.

HE MAY 3E PREPARED TO AGREE, OR AGREE TO RECOMMEND TO HIS CABINET

ON RETURN, SOME NEW PROCEDURAL STEPS (PERHAPS THE ESTABLISHMENT

Of A SECURITY COMMITTEE IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS) BUT ONLY

Or A KIND WHICH WILL ALLOW THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO AVOID, OR

POSTPONE CONCESSIONS OF SUBSTANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

A. LATER THIS YEAR B E G IK WILL HAVE TC DECIDE WHETHER V

TO TRY
SERIOUSLY TO REACH AGREEMENT K I T H A CARTER AD INISTR ATI ON WHICH
(SOME I N THE C A B I N E T ARE ARGUI M S ) MIGHT 3E PREPARED TO SETTLE
ON EASIER TERMS FOR ISRAEL THAN WOULD BE THE CASE IF CARTER IS
RE-ELECTED. BUT THERE IS NO NEED FOR ISRAEL TO FACE THIS D E C I S I O N
NOW. IN THE MEANTIME, BEGIN WILL DO ALL HE CAN TO NAIL DOWN HIS
CONCEPT OF THE FUTURE - THROUGH SETTLEMENTS, LEGAL OBSTACLES TO
THEIR SUBSEQUENT REMOVAL, AND PERHAPS THE E S T A B L I S H E M E N T OF
THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE IN EAST JERUSALEM (TO WHICH HE AGAIN
RECENTLY REFERRED). IF HIS B O V E R N M E N T WERE TO COLLAPSE THIS YEAR,
NO EARLY CHANGE OF POLICY CAN BE EXPECTED F R O M ISRAEL. I N THE
FIRST PLACE, THE KNESSET MUST VOTE DISSOLUTION, AND MANY M E M B E R S
WOULD I N PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SEE THAT AS VOTING TO ADVANCE THE
DATE CF THEIR OWN DEMISE. SECONDLY, ASSUMING A KNESSET VOTE TO
DISSOLVE, THREE M O N T H S MUST ELAPSE BEFORE THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS.
THIRDLY, DESPITE WELL-INTENTIONED TALK, IT IS GOING TO 3E VERY
DIFFICULT FOR AN ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT, MORE LIKELY TO 3E A
COALITION THAN OTHER..'I SE, TO ADOPT POLICIES WHICH MIGHT ACHIEVE
A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. (A MORE MODERATE POLICY
ON NEW SETTLEMENTS WILL NOT SUFFICE).

5. THE OUTLOOK FROM HERE IS NOT GOOD.

ROBINSON

IJZPAETXENTAL DISTFJTSTJTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

SZNAD MAED ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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USD ECCN D T u i e

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CONFIDENTIAL
GR ?75 d^M^Sfib'^SvfK 2.

CCNFI DENT I AL
FM WASHINGTON F92115Z APR 8C f£lMrAf*m
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 13B4 OF 8 APRIL 1S3P
INFO CAIRO TEL AVIV
INFO SAVING AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK HMCG
JERUSALEM
PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
1. SADAT'S ARRIVAL HERE YESTERDAY RECEIVED RELATIVELY LITTLE MEDIA

ATTENTION DUE TO IRANIAN DEVELOPMENTS CAPTURING THE HEADLINES. NOR

HAS THERE 3EEN ANY SIGNIFICANT CURTAIN RAISING BACKGROUND BRIEFING

OF THE PRESS ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S EXPECTATIONS FROM THE VISIT.

?. SADAT HAS ALREADY HAD ONE MEETING WITH CARTER (TETE-A-TETE, TC

THE SURPRISE OF VANCF. BRZEZINSKI AND LINQn'ITZ V'MO WERE KEPT

WAITING OUTSIDE) THIS MORNING AND WILL HAVE TWO MORE, THIS AFTER­

NOON AND TOMORROW MORNING. STERNER (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS TOLD US NOT TO EXPECT MUCH FRO* ANY COMMUMCUE

WHICH MAY BE ISSUED, SINCE THE AMERICANS NEED TO TAKE CAPE TO

AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT THEY HAVE COOKED UP SCMETHING WITH SADAT

IN ADVANCE OF BEG IN'S VISIT. STERNER HAS UNDERTAKEN TO GIVE US A

READ-OUT ON THE VISIT BUT THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TILL NEARER THE

END OF THIS WEEK SINCE IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME BEFORE OFFICIALS,

EVEN SEN ICR ONES, ARE GIVEN THE FULL S~ORY 3Y THE WHITE HOUSE.

?. A FULL AND BRAVELY CHOSEN PROGRAMME HAS BEEN ARRANGED FOR SADAT

HERE. IN ADDITION TO HIS THREE MEETINGS AND PRIVATE LUNCH WITH

CARTER, HE WILL HAVE A WORKING LUNCH WITH VICE-PRESIDENT MQNDALE
(A STRONG ISRAELI SUPPORTER) AND A MEETING WITH DEFENCE SECRETARY

T

53CWN. SEPARATE MEE INGS HAVE BEEN ARRANGED WITH MEMBERS OF THE

SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: WITH HENRY KISSINGER:

WITH SECRETARY OF COMMERCE KLUTZNICK (ANOTHER STRONG ISRAELI

SUPPORTER): WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE AFL/CIO (WHICH HAS A LONG
TRADITION OF SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL) AND WITH LEADERS OF THE JEWISH

COMMUNITY. SADAT WILL MAKE A MAJOR PUBLIC SPEECH AT A LUNCH AT THE
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ON 10 APRIL.

FCO PASS SAVING AMMAN EElRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA JERUSALEM

jT/^SVTr^ AS- / e ^ ^ c ^ S ^ r - *
HENDERSON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

MED

N AM D
UND

Tim
WED CABINET OFFICE

MIDDLE EAST.: ADVANCE COPIES

HO 10 Pr^CTlS STREET
R3
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P3/PUS

MB J C IIOBSRLY
2.

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RTSD (2)
REVS D

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENT I AL
FM CAIRO 33133;;Z APR
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 245 0 F 3 APR
INFO 'i^UO&TT^WASH INGTON (DESKBY Q415£CZ)

UKNIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV JEflUSALEM AMMAN DAMASCUS JEDDA PARIS BONN

ARAB/ISRAELI PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
1. PRESIDENT SADAT LEAVES FOR WASHINGTON ON 7 APRIL FOR MEETINGS
WHICH MUST SURELY REPRESENT THE LAST CHANCE OF GETTING RESULTS
IN T H E AUTONOMY TALKS BY 26 MAY. SO MANY DEADLINES HAVE COME AND
GONE IN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, THAT IN CAIRO AT ANY RATE THE
DOOM WATCHERS (NOW FURTHER DISCOURAGED BY THE LACK OF SPECTACULAR
REACTIONS TO THE SHAH'S ARRIVAL) HAVE GIVEN UP AND ARE CONTENT TO
WAIT AND SEE, NEVERTHELESS IT MAY BE WORTH MAKING SOME ATTEMPT
TO ASSESS THE ODDS,

2. IN A LONG TALK WITH THE US AMBASSADOR BEFORE HE LEFT FOR
WASHINGTON I WAS SURPRISED (SINCE EVEN THE PRESS BRIEFINGS HAD
BEEN NEGATIVE) TO LEARN THAT LINOWITZ HAD AFTER DISCERNED PROGRESS
IN THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS AT ALEXANDRIA. LESS SURPRISINGLY THE
PROGRESS CONSISTED LARGELY O F A CONCESSION BY THE EGYPTIANS,
WHO AGREED TC STOP INSISTING THAT FULL AUTONOMY MEANT THE TRANSFER
OF ALL^ THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S POWERS SUBJECT TO A FEW EXCEPTIONS,
UNO TO TAKE PART IN AN EXAM1LATIONTF INDIVIDUAL POWERS* TO BE
AND TO TAKE PART IN AN EXAMINATION OF I N D I V I D U A L POWERS TO BE
TRANSFERRED. THE ISRAEL SIDE, WHILE S T I L L REJECTING KHALIL'S
PROPOSAL FOR A COMMITTEE ON SECURITY, WERE EMPOWERED TO AGREE IN 0
PRINCIPLE THAT ONE MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE SET UP. ATHERTON SUSPECTS
THAT BEGIN MAY BE SAVING UP A CONCESSION ON THIS (FAIRLY
INSUBSTANTIAL) POINT FOR WASHINGTON,

3. IN FACT THE ABSTRUSE THEOLOGY OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS
HAS LITTLE RELEVANCE TO THE VISIT OF SADAT, WHO NEITHER UNDERSTANDS
NOR CARES ABOUT IT. HIS APPROACH WILL BE SIMPLY TO REM IDD HIS
FRIEMD JIMMY CARTER THAT AT CAMP DAVID HE WAS PROMISED FjJLL AUTONOMY
FOR TH E^P AL EST INI AN S, INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM, AND TO EXPRESS H i T
CONFIDENCE THAT CARTER WILL PERSUADE THEIR MUTUAL FRIEND BEGIN TO
AGREE. ALTHOUGH SADAT HAS PUBLICLY INDICATED READINESS TO STAY
ON FOR A POSSIBLE TRIPARTITE SUMMIT, THE BALANCE OF ARGUMENT
WOULD SEEM TO BE AGAINST HIS DOING SO. ON THE ONE HAND HE MIGHT
BE TEMPTED TO USE THE INTERVAL TO APPEAL TO AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.
ON THE OTHER, NOT ONLY WOULD HE RISK LOSING FACE WHILE WAITING IN
THE WINGS, BUT HIS PRESENCE COULD PERHAPS PREVENT A POSSIBLE
DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CARTER AND BEGIN. IT SEEMS MOST

LIKELY THAT HE WILL RETURN TO EGYPT ON 11 APRIL AS PLANNED,

PROCLAIMING HIS CONFIDENCE THAT JIMMY CARTER WILL FIX EVERYTHING.

4. IT IS DIFFICULT FROM HERE TO SUGGEST OR EVEN TO GUESS WHAT
A FIX MIGHT INVOLVE. THE MAJORITY OF MY EC COLLEAGUES, NOTABLY THE
FRENCH AMBASSADOR WHO IS FEELING SORE AT THE ROUGH TREATMENT
GISCARD AND THE SO-CALLED FRENCH INITIATIVE HAVE HAD FROM THE
EG"YPT| A.MS, AGREED YESTERDAY THAT SADAT WOULD PROBABLY SETTLE FOR
UNDERTAKINGS ALL ROUND TO TRY HARDER AND FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE
DEADLINE BEYO_ND 26 MAY. THE EUROPEANS WOULD BE TOLD TO POSTPONE ANY
INITIATIVE STILL FURTHER. HOWEVER THERE IS NO MISTAKING THE
INCREASINGLY CRITICAL LINE THAT THE EGYPTIAN PRESS AMD PUBLIC
O P I N I O N HAVE RECENTLY BEEN ENCOURAGED TO TAKE ABOUT ISRAELI POLICY,
ESPECIALLY ON SETTLEMENTS AND EAST JERUSALEM, AS REFLECTED IN
SADAT'S MESSAGE TO BEGIN AND A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE PEOPLE'S
ASSEMBLY ON 2 APRIL (REPORTED SEPARATELY). TOGETHER WITH SADAT'S
REPEATED REFERENCES TO A NEW SITUATION ARISING SHOULD THERE BE
NO PROGRESS BY 26 MAY, THIS WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO
1 ACCEPT A TRANSPARENTLY STERILE CONCLUSION TC THE WASHINGTON

ONE POSSIBILITY ALREADY TOUCHED CN AT THE ALEXANDRIA TALKS
c; THAT THE SUMMITEER5 MIGHT AGREE ON A FRESH SET OF GUIDELINES
P. ONE POSSIBILITY ALREADY TOUCHED CN AT THE ALEXANDRIA TALKS
^ T H A T THE SUMMITEERS MIGHT AGREE ON A FRESH SET OF G U I D E L I N E S
W-' T H E I R NEGOTIATORS ( A FAVOURITE THEME OF S A D A T ' S ) WHO WOULD
IMMEDIATELY G E T DOWN TO WORK, IN WASHINGTON THIS TIME RATHER THAN

IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE DIFFICULTY IS TO IMAGINE WHAT KIND OF

GUIDELINES INTERPRETING CAMP DAVID IN THE DIRECTION THE EGYPTIANS
WANT WOULD H A V E ANY CHANCE O F ACCEPTANCE 3 Y BEGIN I ONE MIGHT BE
T H E G A Z A - F J R S T IDEA, BUT WE HAVE HEf^Rd LITTLE OF THIS LATELY.
ANOTHER MIGHT B E THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT THAT SADAT HAS TOYED WITH OF
A US/EGYPT/ISRAEL TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL FOR T H E OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. A MORE RADICAL COURSE WOULD BE FOR
THE UNITED STATES TO COME OUT WITH ITS OWN IDEAL BLUE -PRINT FOR
PALESTINIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONTROL OF PUBLIC
LAND AND THE FRANCHISE FOR TH . ARABS O F EAST JERUSALEM. T H E U S
C

AMBASSADOR ASSUMES THAT T H E STATE DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE BEEN WORKING
ON SOME PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN, ADDRESSING SUBSTANCE RATHER THAN
PROCEDURE, THOUGH AFTER T H E SECURITY COUNCIL Tl ASCO THEY WOULD
PROBABLY TRY TO AVOID A PUBLIC SHOWDOWN.

6. APART FROM SADAT THE EGYPTIANS, ESPECIALLY
WE A G R E E D T H A T
MUSTAFA KHALIL, ARE PINNING THEIR H O P E S MORE AND MORE ON THE FALL
OF THE B E G I N GQVERNHENTM KM J HAVE B E E N UNABLE TO G E T A FURTHER*"
APPOINTMENT WITH KKALIL - YOUR TELNO 1^3 - T I L L AFTER EASTER,
AS H E IS OVER-BURDENED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS ON TOP OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS) . THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT THEREFORE WELCOME AN OPEN DISAG­
REEMENT BETWEEN CARTER AND BEG I N ON ISSUES L I K E SETTLEMENTS WHICH
COULD HASTEN THE EROSION OF BEGIN 'S DOMESTIC SUPPORT,
(ATHERTON MENTIONED~-~NOT FOfToUOTATION -THAT HE AND LINOWITZ
HAD AGREED THAT THIS POSSIBILITY COULD BE AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ANY
EARLY INITIATIVE INVOLVING PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE
P L O , WHICH WOULD BE BOUND TO HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT I N ISRAEL).
AS ALWAYS THE IMPONDERABLE FACTOR I S SADAT. IT IS NOT IN H I S
CHARACTER TO STAND BACK AND AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF A SHOWDOWN B E T W E E N
THE US AND I S R A E T W H I C H B Y TMFL I CATION ADMITS THE FAILURE OF CAMP
D A V I D ( C F H I S REACTION TO THE 2 4 2 PROPOSAL LAST SUMMER). H E WILL
WANT TO CONTINUE TO PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE. I CONCLUDE THEREFORE,
VERY TENTATIVELY, THAT HE WILL SEIZE ON ANY PLAUSIBLE FORMULA
THAT CARTER CAN DEVISE TO M A I N T A I N A SEMBLANCE O F PROGRESS IN T H E
AUTONOMY TALKS, BUT T H A T IF NONE IS FORTHCOMING HE I S MORE LIKELY
TO MAKE A SURPRISE MOVE O F HIS OWN, FOR EXAMPLE T O WIDEN T H E
NEGOTIATING FORUM, THAN TO ALLOW THE I N I T I A T I V E TO PASS-TO OTHERS,

WEIR
l O D O W N I N G STREET

3

T H E PRIME MINISTER April 1980

Thank you f o r your l e t t e r of 24 March about our policy in

the Middle E a s t . I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t F o r e i g n and Commonwealth

Office Ministers have a l s o w r i t t e n t o you on this subject.

T h e r e i s no change i n our p o l i c y towards r e c o g n i t i o n of the

PLO (a misleading term, s i n c e recognition i s not given to

organisations) nor do we accept t h e i r claim t o be the sole

legitimate representatives of the P a l e s t i n i a n s . We do however

accept that the P a l e s t i n e Liberation Organisation i s an import­
ant f a c t o r i n the area and that a t some s t a g e t h e y w i l l have to

be associated with negotiations. We have o c c a s i o n a l contacts

w i t h PLO representatives at o f f i c i a l l e v e l but there have been no

discussions at M i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l . We c o n t i n u e t o u r g e t h e PLO to

r e n o u n c e t e r r o r i s m and to accept only the p r i n c i p l e of a negotiated

s e t t l e m e n t i n v/hich I s r a e l ' s r i g h t to live i n peace w i t h i n secure

and r e c o g n i s e d b o u n d a r i e s w i l l be fully accepted. No settlement

w i l l be possible unless t h e PLO i s prepared to accept these

principles.

We have seen the I s r a e l i Embassy's p r e s s r e l e a s e and the

i n t e r v i e w w i t h Mr. Arafat w h i c h was published in a Venezuelan

newspaper. As you may know t h i s interview has s i n c e been disowned

by Arafat and o t h e r PLO representatives. I am not in a position

t o comment on the interview but we h a v e a l w a y s made i t c l e a r that,
if t h e PLO's aim i s the destruction of I s r a e l , then t h i s is quite
u n a c c e p t a b l e t o us and meaningful negotiations would be
impossible.

/I hope this

- 2 -

I hope t h i s answers your q u e s t i o n . Please assure your
c o n s t i t u e n t s t h a t our commitment t o I s r a e l ' s f u t u r e i s i n no way
diminished. At t h e same t i m e , i t i s n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e t o make t h e
point t h a t b o t h s i d e s must be p r e p a r e d t o c o m p r o m i s e . We hope
t h a t t h e I s r a e l Government on" i t s s i d e w i l l r e c o n s i d e r i t s p r e s e n t
p o l i c y of p l a n t i n g settlements i n the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s a n d show
itself r e a d y t o implement R e s o l u t i o n 2 4 2 .

(sgd) Margaret

K e n n e t h B a k e r , E s q . , MP.

10 D O W N I N G S T R E E T

2 A p r i l 1980

T H E PRIME MINISTER

n
Thank y o u f o r y o u r l e t t e r o f 19 M a r c h .

Lord Carrington i n t h e House o f L o r d s was a n s w e r i n g a question

about a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e m e n t by Y a s i r A r a f a t two y e a r s ago on

American t e l e v i s i o n t o which B a r o n e s s G a i t s k e l l had r e f e r r e d .

I a t t a c h t h e e x t r a c t from H a n s a r d . Lord Carrington i s , o f

course, fully informed of t h e p o l i c i e s and s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e

PLO.

The Government i s c o m m i t t e d t o s u p p o r t i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f

I s r a e l within secure and r e c o g n i s e d frontiers. We reject

and condemn any s t a t e m e n t f a v o u r i n g the d e s t r u c t i o n of Israel.

But on t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o u s we do n o t r u l e o u t t h e

possibility t h a t t h e PLO, who c o n t a i n within their midst

m o d e r a t e s a s w e l l a s t e r r o r i s t s , may be b r o u g h t t o a c c e p t

Israel's right to a secure existence. I f there i s some move­

ment i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , I b e l i e v e i t w i l l be i n t h e i n t e r e s t s

of I s r a e l as w e l l as other s t a t e s i n the area.

At no s t a g e has Lord Carrington c a l l e d f o r the recognition

o f t h e PLO a s y o u s u g g e s t . What t h e Government h a v e s a i d i s

t h a t t h e PLO i s an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r and t h a t t h e y s h o u l d be

associated i n some way w i t h the peace p r o c e s s , i fa settlement

is to last. We s a y t h i s b e c a u s e i t i s c l e a r that t h e PLO

attracts t h e l o y a l t y o f many P a l e s t i n i a n s . But t h a t does not

/involve

- 2

involve ' r e c o g n i t i o n ' o f t h e PLO a s a government o r a s t h e

u n i q u e spokesman o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s .

As r e g a r d s t h e o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r i e s , UN R e s o l u t i o n 2 4 2 ,

w h i c h t h e Government o f I s r a e l h a s a c c e p t e d , c l e a r l y states

t h a t any s e t t l e m e n t must be b a s e d on t h e ' w i t h d r a w a l o f I s r a e l i

armed f o r c e s from t e r r i t o r i e s occupied i n the recent conflict'

(1967). There c a n be no p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e M i d d l e East

unless this principle i s accepted. Many Z i o n i s t s , i n s i d e a s

w e l l as outside I s r a e l , accept that i t i s i n I s r a e l ' s interests

to w i t h d r a w from t e r r i t o r i e s occupied i n 1967. But I emphasise

that withdrawal must be b a l a n c e d by u n e q u i v o c a l Arab a n d

Palestinian acceptance of I s r a e l ' s right t o l i v e i n peace
w i t h i n s e c u r e and r e c o g n i s e d b o u n d a r i e s , a s l a i d down i n t h e
same resolution.

It i s t h e r e f o r e wrong t o s u g g e s t that the policy of

F o r e i g n and Commonwealth O f f i c e M i n i s t e r s i s aimed a t t h e

d e s t r u c t i o n of I s r a e l . I hope y o u w i l l h a v e s e e n t h a t

Sir I a n G i l m o u r made i t c l e a r i n t h e House o f Commons on

12 March t h a t 'the P a l e s t i n i a n people must u n d e r t a k e t o r e c o g ­

nise that I s r a e l has a right to exist within secure borders'.

Far f r o m w i s h i n g t o d e s t r o y I s r a e l , o u r a i m i s t o work

for t h e only sure guarantee of I s r a e l ' s s e c u r i t y , a comprehen­

s i v e peace s e t t l e m e n t based on a commitment by b o t h t h e

Palestinians and by I s r a e l t o r e s p e c t e a c h o t h e r ' s rights.

M.S. K e r s h , E s q .

Ctv&i t t ^ q - S e a l &r

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OFAMERICA

London

March 28, 1980

rVrJS

Dear Foreign S e c r e t a r y :

I n the Ambassador's absence from London, I

e n c l o s e the t e x t of an o r a l message from Cyrus Vance

to you concerning the handling of the P a l e s t i n i a n

r i g h t s question i n New York.

Sincerely,

<f<^^^picZ^
Edward ^Ty S t r e a t o r

Minister

Enclosure (SECRET)

The R t . Hon. The Lord C a r r i n g t o n , KCMG, MC

S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Foreign

and Commonwealth A f f a i r s ,

Downing S t r e e t West,

London SWIA 2 A L

With the compliments of
THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SVV1A 2 A H
SECRET

TEXT OF MESSAGE

I know you have been f o l l o w i n g developments i n New York

i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a S e c u r i t y Council meeting on P a l e s t i n i a n

r i g h t s . As you know, we a r e s t r o n g l y opposed t o a meeting

at t h i s time, when P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r i s preparing t o r e c e i v e

P r e s i d e n t Sadat and Prime M i n i s t e r Begin, and the autonomy

n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e e n t e r i n g a c r u c i a l phase. I t now appears

t h a t the PLO i s preparing t o p r e s s a completely unacceptable

r e s o l u t i o n to a v o t e , knowing t h a t we w i l l have t o vote

a g a i n s t i t , w i t h the o b j e c t of then seeking t h e support o f a

m a j o r i t y of the C o u n c i l f o r the convening o f an emergency

s p e c i a l s e s s i o n o f t h e General Assembly.

As I am sure you w i l l agree, such an outcome would p l a y

i n t o t h e hands of t h e enemies o f peace. I t would strengthen

the S o v i e t p o s i t i o n i n t h e a r e a , discourage moderate f o r c e s ,

i n c l u d i n g moderate P a l e s t i n i a n l e a d e r s and work a g a i n s t our

common i n t e r e s t i n maintaining the momentum o f the peace

process.

I n t h i s very s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n , I b e l i e v e i t i s e s s e n t i a l

t h a t we c o n s u l t u r g e n t l y together t o see what can be done,

and t h a t we seek to adopt a common p o s i t i o n . I would hope

t h a t you would convey your views urgently t o key Arab govern­

ments and P a l e s t i n i a n s through whatever channels you have

a v a i l a b l e , and I would be very g r a t e f u l i f you would give me

the b e n e f i t o f your advice and an i n d i c a t i o n o f how you

b e l i e v e we should proceed. I hope t h a t our Missions i n Few

York can s t a y i n c l o s e touch on t h i s .

March 28, 1980

SECRET

SR 145
UNCLASSIFIED
PM AMMAN 2715522 MAR a"1

TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 121 OF 27 MARCH
INFO WASHINGTON
SAVING TO CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, AND CG

JERUSALEM.

MY TELNO 12ff OF 25 MARCH, PARAGRAPH 4: POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE
UNITED STATES BY KING HUSSEIN
1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE LACONIC OFFICIAL JORDAN MEWS
AGENCY STATEMENT ISSUED ON 25 MARCH:
" HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN HAS RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM
PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER TO VISIT HIM IN WASHINGTON AND DISCUSS
WITH HIM REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL OUESTIONS WHEN HE NEXT
VISITS THE US AT THE INVITATION OF CULTURAL AMD EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS. THE KINS HAS ACCEPTED THE INVITATION WITH
4PPRECIAT I ON. IN VIEW, HOWEVER, OF HIS PREVIOUS NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS, HE WILL NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO
VISIT THE US DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. NO SPECIFIC DATE HAS
YET BEEN AGREED WHEN HIS MAJESTY CAN TAKE UP PRESIDENT CARTER'S
INVITATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON AND MEET THE PRESIDENT."
FCO PSE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

URWICK

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NENAD ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
MED
NAD
UND
EESD
ECD
WED
CABINET OFFICE
c->^> *+*"'W9*?*i>f* PS TO P M NO 10 DOWNING
CONFIDENT!AL

FM TEL AVIV 27^750Z MAR 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUM3ER 134 OF 27 MARCH

INFC CAIRO WASHINGTON

SAVING TO JERUSALEM

ARA3/ISRAELt AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

1. THE DCM AT THE US EMBASSY HERE, SPEAKING TO MY HEAD OF CHANCERY

LAST NIGHT, DESCRIBED LINOWITZ'S THREE ENCOUNTERS WITH BEGIN HERE

ON 23-25 MARCH AS "VERY DISAPPOINTING".

2. LINOWITZ HAD ARRIVED IN ISRAEL HOPING THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERN­

MENT WOULD 3E PREPARED TO GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THEIR WILLINGNESS

TO COMPROMISE IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. 3UT 3EGIN HAD REFUSED

TO BUDGEi THE OPTIMISTIC TONE OF LINOWITZ'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 25

MARCH DISGUISED A TOTAL LACK OF PROGRESS. IN PARTICULAR - AND

RESPITE EARLIER SUGGESTION TO THE CONTRARY IN THE ISRAELI PRESS -

BEGIN HAD REFUSED TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A

SECURITY COMMITTEE.

3. LIKE CIECHANOVAR (MY TEL NO 132), BROWN ANTICIPATED LITTLE MOVE­

MENT IN ALEXANDRIA TODAY. BEGIN WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY HIS CARDS

VERY CLOSE TO HIS CHEST UNTIL HE MET PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON

ON 15/15 APRIL. (THE LATER DATES ^OR BEGIN'3 VISIT MAY REDUCE THE

CHANCES OF A TRIPARTITE MEETING IN WASHINGTON). 3R0WN BELIEVED

3EGIN'S AIM THERE WOULD 3E TO OFFER THE EGYPTIANS JUST SUFFICIENT TO

ENABLE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE EXTENDED BEYOND 26 MAY WITHOUT TOO GREAT

A LOSS OF FACE FOR SADAT. BUT THE US EMBASSY AT LEAST COULD NOT

PREDICT WHAT 3EGIN MIGHT 3E PREPARED TO CONCEDE ALTHOUGH THEY WERE

INCLINED TO SEE THE DECISION TO ESTABLISH A RELIGIOUS SCHOOL IN

HE3R0N AS A BARGAINING CHIP FOR POSSIBLE USE IN WASHINGTON. (BUT SEE

VMI.F.T.)

A. 3R0WN REMARKED ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH BEGIN HAD DOMINATED ALL

THE DISCUSSIONS WITH LINOWITZ HERE. SHAMIR, WHILE IN7ARIA3LY

POLITE, HD SAID LITTLE: AND WHAT LITTLE HE HAD SAID ECHOED HIS

MASTER'S VOICE.

ROBINSON
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CONFIDENTIAL

GR 113

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 272319Z MAR 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 1271 OF 27 MARCH

AND TO ROUTINE TEL AVIV CAIRO

TEL AVIV TELNO 134 TO FCO > ARAB/ISRAEL: AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

1. STERNER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT CONFIRMED

TO US TODAY THAT DATES FOR TALKS (NOT YET PUBLIC) ARE 8/9 APRIL

(SADAT) AND 15/16 APRIL (BEGIN). HE DID NOT EXCLUDE MEETINGS 'WOULD

TAKE PLACE AT CAMP DAVID, BUT RULED OUT ANY OVERLAP OF THE TWO

VISITS.

HENDERSON

T H I S T E L E G RA M
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

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IH,

l€CDDLB E A S T : • COPIES-

PS HO 10 TXn/I«II7G ZtiXStif
P S / S I R I GIIiiOUH
P3/11P, HUPJ) . ' •
' PS/PUS- . ' • CABI1CT C M S DIO
MR 0" C K O E S R L Y V!
, • »*. ••. . •• •

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: PUSJ) (2)
NEWS D
BBsaassae c i r r i : .

FM CAIRO 2 1 1 1 1 5 Z MAR

TO P R I O R I T Y FCO

TELEGRAM MR 212 OF 21 MAR fl?
AND TO P R I O R I T Y TEL AVIV DEI RUT DAMASCUS AMMAN WASHINGTON
AND UKMIS NEWYORKJ

CUR TELNO 210 - ARAB/ISRAEL SUMMITRY!

U ACCORD ING TO THE MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY PRESIDENT SADAT'S
VISIT TO WASHINGTON W I L L NOW TAKE PLACE ON 3 AND 9 APRIL,
AFTER WHICH HE W I L L STAY ON I N THE UNITED STATES TO COLLECT
HONORARY DEGREES FROM A NUMBER OF AMEBICAK U N I V E R S I T I E S *
fiOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME M I N I S T E R SPOKE TO THE
PRESS YESTERDAY. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT A TER THE UNPRODUCTIVE^
r

ROU\'D OF AUTONOMY TALKS AT THE HASUE HC HAD AGREED WITH
PRESIDENT CARTER ON DEFINITE STEPS FOR THE FUTURE, WHICH HE
WOULD LEAVE MR CARTER TO ANNOUNCE. THE I N V I T A T I O N TO
WASHINGTON TC ^S H THE PROCESS FURTHER HAD HOWEVER BEEN
UNSOLICITED BY HIM. HE DECLINED TO COMMENT ON WHETHER HE WOULD
MEET BEGIN ON THE UN SETTLEMENTS RESOLUTION,
OR TO SAY ANYTHING A30UT THE NEW ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. DR KHALIL WAS MORE FORTHRIGHT IN TALKING TO FOREIGN
CORRESPONDENTS. HE SAID THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS HAD ACHIEVED
LITTLE SO FAR AND EMPHASISED THAT SUCCESS IN WASHINGTON WOULD
DEPEND ON THE TWO SIDES REACHING ARGREEMENT CN THE CENTRAL ISSUES,
IN PARTICULAR A TOTAL HANDOVER OF THE POWERS OF THE ISRAELI
MILITARY GOVT TO THE AUTONOMOUS AUTHORITY AND AN END TO
ISA AELI ATTEMPTS TO >\NNEX JERUSALEM, HE ALSO INSISTED THAT THERE
SHOULD 3E AN IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION ON THE SECURITY ISSUE
SO THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NO LONGER 3E ABLE TO INVOKE SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS AT EVERY STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHILST REFUSING
TO DEFINE WHAT THEY MEANT DY SECURITY, HE ADDED THAT EGYPT
WELCOMED PRESIDENT GISCARD'S RECENT STATEMENTS AMD WOULD SUPPORT

ANY EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.
THAT KHALIL SHOULD TAKE SUCH AN UNCOMPROMISING LINE JUST
AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SU M1T IS A FAIR INDICATION OF
V

THE CALCULATEDLY TOUGH LINE WHICH IS, FOR THE MOMENT,
3EING FOLLOWED HERE. THERE HAVE BEEN NONE OF THE CUSTOMARY
EDITORULS DECLARING EGYPT'S FAITH IN AND FRIENCSHIP FOR THE
AMERICANS (THE P.VO EDITORIALS DEVOTED TO THE SUMMIT ARE BOTH
ATTACKS ON ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE). SO FAR THERE DO NOT EVEN
SEEM TO 3E ANY PLANS FOR AN OFFICIAL CELEBRATION OF THE FIRST
ANNIVERSARY OF THE PEACE TREATY.

BARRINGTON,

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

GR 333

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 210033Z MAR 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1187 OF 20 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO AND TEL AVIV

INFO SAVING AMMAN, BERUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK,

HMCG JERUSALEM.

MY TELNO 1147! ARAB/ISRAEL SUMMITRY

1. STERNER (SAUNDERS' DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE FOR

ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTIONS) COULD THROW LITTLE LIGHT OH THE RATIONALE

BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ISSUE THESE INVITATIONS AT THIS

TIME. HE HIMSELF ONLY LEARNED ON 18 MARCH THAT CARTER HAD THAT

MORNING TELEPHONED SADAT AND BEGIN. AS FAR AS HE KNEW, TODAY'S

WASHINGTON POST WAS ACCURATE IN STATING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD

BEEN RELUCTANT TO RE-ENGAGE HIMSELF.

2. ADMITTING THAT HE WAS ONLY SPECULATING, STERNER IMAGINED THAT A

COMBINATION OF TWO FACTORS HAD INFLUENCED THE PRESIDENT:

I) LINOWITZ HAD CONCLUDED THAT HE COULD NOT ACHIEVE HIS TARGET

WITHOUT A PRESIDENTIAL INPUT, IN WHICH CASE IT MIGHT AS WELL BE

XONER RATHER THAN LATER SO THAT IT COULD BE BUILT ON BY LlHOWlTZ IN

THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO 26 MAR:

II) THE SECURITY COUNCIL FIASCO HAD INTRODUCED A NEED, IN DOMESTIC

POLITICAL TERMS, TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON A FUTUPE EVENT RATHER THAN

A PAST MISTAKE. IN THIS SENSE THE MOVE HAD 3EEN SHREWD AND MIGHT

V£LL BE SUCCESSFUL IN PRE-EMPTING KENNEDY'S BID FOR JEWISH VOTES

IN THE NEW YORK PRIMARY.

3. STERNER AGREED WITH SIR M WEIR'S VIEW (CAIRO TELNO 210) THAT THIS

MOVE MUST SEVERELY REDUCE THE CHANCES OF THE NEXT LJMCWITZ/BURG/

KHALIL MEETING MAKING ANY BREAKTHROUGHS. THE ONLYT
HOPE WAS THAT

BEGIN AND SADAT MIGHT INSTRUCT THEIR NEGOTIATORS G GIVE A 3 IT IN
ORDER TO SET A BETTER SCENE FOR THE SUMMITS. STERNER THOUGHT THE TWO
SUMMITS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF AP"IL (CERTAINLY NOT
BEFORE PASSOVER ON 7 APRIL). THEY >CULD PROBABLY HAPPEN IN QUICK
SUCCESSION AND IT COULD NOT 3£ ENTIRELY RULED CUT ^HAT THE FIRST
VISITOR MIGHT STAY ON FOR THE SECOND. BEYOND THAT HE DID NCT FEEL
A3LE TO SPECULATE ON THE LIKELIHOOD CF * TRILATERAL SUMMIT.

CONFIDENTIAL /U.TURNING TO

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4. TURNING TO A POSSIBLE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. STERNER EXPRESSED THE

HOPE THAT IF THE EUROPEANS DID DECIDE EITHER TO GO AHEAD WITH OR

SPEAK PUBLICLY ABOUT ANY INITIATIVE, THEY WOULD ALSO SEND A SIGNAL

TO THE PALESTINIANS THAT IT SHOULD NOT B E THOUGHT OF AS AN

ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. HE WAS SURE THAT

THIS POINT WAS WELL TAKEN IN LONDON, BUT LESS SURE ABOUT OTHER

COMMUNITY CAPITALS.

FCO PASS SAVING AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, JERUSALEM

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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2 [NOT ADVANCED J
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l/\lw<uS> /W.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH
fcfcjr*fo 0\tJ4>-&~A (K* 1
fa- 20 March 1980 ' *

I t may be u s e f u l for me to e x p l a i n some of the background to

Lord Carrington's answer in the House of Lords to Lord B y e r s '

question on the PLO and t e r r o r i s m (copy a t t a c h e d ) .

We have c o n s i s t e n t l y taken the l i n e that i t would be wrong

to d i s m i s s the PLO as simply a ' t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n ' but that

i t should i n s t e a d be described as a p o l i t i c a l umbrella o r g a n i s a ­

t i o n c o n t a i n i n g w i t h i n i t many people who wish to achieve t h e i r

ends by non-violent means as w e l l as avowedly t e r r o r i s t groups.

Lord Carrington's r e p l y to Lord Byers on 17 March was the f i r s t

time t h i s Government have taken the l i n e in P a r l i a m e n t . But we

have followed i t i n correspondence and diplomatic exchanges. In

ir view i t i s r e a l i s t i c .

The h i s t o r i c a l background i s that the PLO's Covenant (the

l a t e s t v e r s i o n of which dates from 1968) s t i p u l a t e s that armed

s t r u g g l e i s the only way to l i b e r a t e P a l e s J J j i e ; ' P a l e s t i n e '

i n c l u d e s , in t h i s sense, tne whole of the a r e a occupied by I s r a e l .

>io/«A^ But there has been a gradual move s i n c e 1968 away from t e r r o r i s m

, j - -) and towards acceptance of a negotiated s e t t l e m e n t . In p r a c t i c e ,
£

J^J^^ the PLO l e a d e r s h i p no longer support i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m but

s t i l l endorse v i o l e n c e against t a r g e t s in I s r a e l . Nor has the

PLO formally renounced i t s c l a i m to the whole of P a l e s t i n e ,

i n c l u d i n g I s r a e l . But the l e a d e r s h i p speak i n c r e a s i n g l y of a

compromise s e t t l e m e n t . For example, in London l a s t year K h a l i d

al-Hassan ( a l e a d i n g PLO moderate) s a i d that the P a l e s t i n i a n s

were prepared to accept an independent s t a t e i n only part of

P a l e s t i n e and would not t h e r e a f t e r use f o r c e , provided they were

Ft 1
j / ^ ! t M / l
t n o t
r e q u i r e d to give up t h e i r democratic r i g h t to s t r i v e f o r the
cl/* / u n i t y or the whole of P a l e s t i n e by p o l i t i c a l means. Although the
|i P L U l e a d e r s s t i l l r e v e r t to t h e i r o l d l i n e about the d e s t r u c t i o n
/ of I s r a e l (the attached quotation of Arafat in a Venezuelan paper
/. - i s the worst we have seen for a long time though we understand

//^/fcZA. the PLO have denied that A r a f a t was reported c o r r e c t l y ) the main
to* u<V>ub\ t h r u s t of t h e i r p o l i c y i s i n c r e a s i n g l y to use diplomatic and
IU± bl*i(id. p o l i t i c a l means to achieve i t s ends, and the PLO i s of course
<

/j . present with observer and other s t a t u s at the m a j o r i t y of r e l e v a n t
/LA J UN or r e l a t e d meetings.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p have only l i m i t e d

^ o n t r o l of some of the groups w i t h i n the PLO umbrella. Some

^continue to be involved i n t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s . Mr Bourguiba Jnr,

in h i s recent d i s c u s s i o n with the Prime M i n i s t e r , implied that these

/groups

M O'D B Alexander Esq

10 Downing S t r e e t

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

groups represent the PLO as a whole. T h i s i s not the case; the

most notorious of the P a l e s t i n i a n extremist groups involved i n

i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m are not part of the PLO and some of

t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s are a c t u a l l y d i r e c t e d against the mainstream

PLO l e a d e r s h i p ( e g the a s s a s s i n a t i o n by an I r a q i - b a c k e d P a l e s t i n i a n

group of the PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n London in January 1978). As

the Prime M i n i s t e r i s aware, the PLO assured us l a s t autumn that

i t has no l i n k s with the I r i s h Republican Army, and s i n c e then

we have had no evidence of any contacts between them.

There i s a f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The PLO in Lebanon

c o n s t i t u t e s something c l o s e to a s t a t e w i t h i n a s t a t e and has

i t s own army, as do the other p a r t i e s in the c i v i l c o n f l i c t ,
such as the C h r i s t i a n m i l i t i a s . Lebanon has a l s o served the PLO
as a base for a t t a c k s on I s r a e l . But for the l a s t two years the
PLO has been very much on the defensive throughout Lebanon.

The more the PLO l e a d e r s h i p move away from t e r r o r i s m and

towards n e g o t i a t i o n and compromise, the b e t t e r the chances of

peace. With the r e s t of the Nine, we have urged t h i s course

upon them. The PLO are i n d i s p e n s a b l e to a negotiated settlement

but t h e i r unequivocal commitment to the p r i n c i p l e of I s r a e l ' s

r i g h t to e x i s t must come f i r s t . We cannot expect to i n f l u e n c e

them to undertake such a commitment (which the US sought from

them i n d i r e c t l y i n 1977) u n l e s s , together with the r e s t of the

Nine, we continue to emphasize that we see them as an e s s e n t i a l

f a c t o r i n the equation and not accept them at the I s r a e l i

e s t i m a t i o n as nothing more than a "bunch of t e r r o r i s t s " .

Because of the ambiguity of the PLO p o s i t i o n , the Prime

M i n i s t e r might n e v e r t h e l e s s p r e f e r to use i n future a s l i g h t l y

modified formulation of Lord Carrington's p o i n t .

'The PLO i s a p o l i t i c a l movement, but one which continues

to give cover to some t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s . Although i t

i s committed by i t s Covenant to armed s t r u g g l e , the PLO

has i n c r e a s i n g l y come to use p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r than

v i o l e n t means to achieve i t s g o a l s . We welcome t h i s

trend and urge the PLO to abandon v i o l e n c e and accept

the p r i n c i p l e of a negotiated peace with I s r a e l . '

(G G H Walden)

CONFIDENTIAL

[ L O R DS ] Lihfration Organisation 8
[Lord J a n n c r . J
I think that I have made abundantly plain reduced, il
destroy Israel whatever happens and no
the position of Her Majesty's Government, destroyed,
matter how long it takes? Surely, the
which is an even-handed one as between sovereignty
statements which are being made day by
one and the other in the hope that, i f there of the M i d
day in respect o f the PLO are encouraging
is good sense on both sides, a settlement is were well-re
the PLO in this kind of action, even
possible. East but on
though expressions are used to say that
we will wait until they recognise Israel? Foreign Sc«
Surely, the line o f action which is being Lord BYERS: M y Lords, may I ask the change has
taken by us and, with our guidance, by noble Lord the Foreign Secretary whether successive B
the EEC, is, with the greatest respect to he sees a difference between the PLO and a Labour G>
the noble L o r d , encouraging the PLO to the Palestinian problem? Will he s a y ­ succumbing
make the kind o f statement which, Yes or No--whether he regards the PLO Israel's supp
as I said before, only last February as a terrorist organisation? less of the ir
declared categorically that it will not rest
until Israel is destroyed by violence? Lord C A R R I N G T O N : No, my Lords.
I do not think that the PLO, as such, is a Lord C A I
Surely one cannot expect Israel to accept hope that Hi
a situation like that. terrorist organisation. There are some
elements of the Pl.O which in the past have keeping a be
been associated with the terrorists; but it Certainly, wl
Lord C A R R I N G T O N : M y Lords, I would be a great mistake to assume that it afternoon is i
do not believe and I repeat this that is possible to get a settlement in the area with good i
peace is possible in the Middle East until without taking into account the PLO. could settle I
such time as the Palestinians and the PLO this will be c
recognise the State o f Israel; nor do I i f the Pales
BaronessGAITSKELL: M y Lords may
believe it is possible until the Israelis I ask the Foreign Secretary a supple­ State of Israe
recognise the rights o f the Palestinians. mentary question following on the recent that the Pal
I simply do not believe that one can ignore one? Is he not aware that when I was in then there is,
the PLO in this question. I would only the United Nations a couple o f years ago bility of a se
say about the speeches to which the noble I heard Yasser Arafat, when asked on
Lord referred that, i f one looks objectively New York television after his spectacular Lord SEG
at what has been said o n both sides about debut in the General Assembly, whether Foreign Sccrc
this issue in the Middle East, one sees he wanted to destroy the State of Israel, tion of execu
that there have been some incautious say. " T h i s is the first s t e p " ? Has he PLO might we
remarks on both sides. retracted that remark? He was definitely regime of th
asked, " Arc you out to destroy the State Iran; and is n
l o r d S H I N W E L L : M y Lords, is the of Israel?" He said, " Y e s . this is the quite enough t
Foreign Secretary aware that I have never first step ". Has he retracted?
at any time condemned the PLO because
Lord CARF
of its existence? I recognise that it is a Lord C A R R I N G T O N : M y Lords, I seem to be crc
fact of life. On the other hand, I object am not aware of that. I f that is the object
we come to the
to its primary objective. I am not at all of the PLO, then I comdemn it.
satisfied that either the Foreign Secretary
in his recent declaration about the Middle
Lord W I G G : M y Lords, would the COM
East or the attitude o f some members of the
Foreign Secretary be embarrassed i f I said
EEC, are satisfactory in the sense of
that I wholeheartedly endorsed the policy 2.57 p.m.
recognising, definitely and emphatically
which he is following?—that of holding
and without any qualifications, the right Read 3", wit!
of the State o f Israel to exist i n that area a balance between Israel on the one hand
and not to be constantly under threat. and the PLO on the other. Both must Clause 3 [Pi
Could I obtain from the noble Lord the exist. Will he bear in mind when he is Director of pos.
Foreign Secretary, an explicit statement under constant pressure from Israel, and
lice]:
that, so far as he and Her Majesty's from Israel's supporters, that there would
Government are concerned, they will not have been no Israel but for the valour of
British troops who fought on the Lord T R E F f
agree to any change in the situation as long
ment No. I :
as it appears to impinge upon the sover­ plains of Mesopotamia and in Palestine
eignty of the State o f Israel ? and who broke the power of the Ottoman Page 4. line 4 3 ,
Empire; and at the time o f the second in this subsection
battle of Gaza, there were not six Jewish f r o m p r o c e e d i n g w.
Lord C A R R I N G T O N : M y Lords, i f settlements in Palestine? Is he further notwithstanding th;
the intention of the PLO is the destruction aware of the fact that this country has the s a m e m a t t e r s . " )
of the State o f Israel, I condemn that, also. enfeebled itself, its influence has been The noble Lord s
noticed— admitte
WE Do CT "I VEi LYI •*.
I HAVE KARRI ED A W H A N - HFR NAME I S
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1. : L ' T I C ' / . ' Y VIOLENCF 18 THE ONLY MEANS FOR THE L I B E R A T I O N CF
THE LAM . r CUP FATHERS.

2 i TH GOAL OF
1
T H I S V I O L E C F I S THE
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IN ALL
!T POLITICAL,
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ECONOMIC AND *'IL I T T Y FCR 'S A-'t I T S FYfULSlOE F G c

PALESTINE.

* . OUR REVOLUTION ART ACTIVITY MUST FE! * A11 INDEPENDENT OF AI.'Y PART\
OR STATE CONTROL .

A. T H I S ACTIO!.' . ' I L L 3E C F CF LONG D U R A T I O N . WE KNOW THAT THE I T C
SC'E GF THE ? f LEAIEFf I S TC SOLVE THE C O N F L I C T 3Y PEACEFUL
n

l ' £ A N ? . WHEN T H I S OCCURS- . 7 SHALL OPPOSF I T .
Extract from a n ' i n t e r v i e w p u b l i s h e d i n L e F i g a r o of

Thursday, 13th March 1980 in which Y a s s e r A r a f a t was

1
t e r v i e w e d a t B e i r u t by M a r i a n n e L o h s e , the paper's

t pecial Correspondent
=5 i

Question S i n c e you spoke of the " b l o o d t h i r s t y " B e g i n , there
i s a n e s s e n t i a l point that I w i s h to c l e a r up with
y o u . T h e I s r a e l i p r e s s a c c u s e s you of having
d e c l a r e d , in a n interview on 11th F e b r u a r y l a s t , with
a C a r a c a s newspaper: " P e a c e for us signifies the
d e s t r u c t i o n of I s r a e l " and y o u r National C h a r t e r a l s o
s p e a k s of d e s t r u c t i o n . What i s the position?

Reply It i s a n i n t e r v i e w that I gave to the paper " T h e T h i r d
W o r l d " and you have j u s t h e a r d the tape r e c o r d i n g
of i t . Hence you c a n testify that I never s a i d that. "

W h a t w a s published at C a r a c a s w a s a n interview
e n t i r e l y f a b r i c a t e d , e n t i r e l y f a l s i f i e d . A s for the C h a r t e r ,
have you even r e a d it y o u r s e l f ?
10 D O W N I N G STREET

From the Private Secretary 1 2 M a r c h 1 9 8 0

C a l l by Mr. Yadin

Mr. Y i g a e l Y a d i n , t h e Deputy P r i m e M i n i s t e r o f I s r a e l , c a l l e d

on t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r t h i s a f t e r n o o n . He was a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e

I s r a e l i Ambassador.

Mr. Y a d i n and t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r began by d i s c u s s i n g t h e s t a t e

of t h e I s r a e l i economy. Mr. Y a d i n s a i d t h a t t h e I s r a e l i Government

w e r e f a c e d w i t h an e x t r e m e l y s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n . The methods t h e y

had adopted were not d i s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e b e i n g p u r s u e d by t h e P r i m e

Minister. They had d e c i d e d t o impose a 6% r e d u c t i o n on e v e r y

M i n i s t r y , t o c u t s u b s i d i e s s e v e r e l y and t o i n c r e a s e i n c e n t i v e s to

exporting i n d u s t r i e s . The l a s t few months had s e e n a r e d u c t i o n i n

the i n f l a t i o n r a t e f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n many months. Nonetheless

the s i t u a t i o n r e m a i n e d v e r y s e r i o u s . The r e d u c t i o n i n s u b s i d i e s on

b r e a d and m i l k p r o d u c t s had a f f e c t e d b o t h t h e c o n s u m e r s , and,

b e c a u s e o f r e d u c e d s a l e s , t h e f a r m e r s . S o c i a l p r o b l e m s were

c o n s e q u e n t l y becoming a c u t e . N o n e t h e l e s s t h e programme f o r

t a c k l i n g t h e economic c r i s i s was one o f t h e v e r y few i s s u e s on w h i c h

t h e r e was n e a r u n a n i m i t y i n C a b i n e t .

P a r t i c u l a r g r a v i t y was l e n t t o t h e c r i s i s by I s r a e l ' s s h o r t a g e

of o i l . The w e l l s w h i c h had been r e t u r n e d t o E g y p t had p r e v i o u s l y

p r o v i d e d some 30% o f I s r a e l ' s s u p p l i e s . The Camp D a v i d Agreement .

p r o v i d e d f o r E g y p t t o s u p p l y t h e same amount o f o i l t o I s r a e l but

at market i e spot p r i c e s . The I s r a e l i Government e x p e c t e d t o s p e n d

t h r e e t i m e s a s much n e x t y e a r a s t h i s on o i l . M o r e o v e r , i t was not

always easy to f i n d s u p p l i e r s even a t spot p r i c e s . Mr. Y a d i n

r e f e r r e d t o I s r a e l i hopes t h a t t h e UK might be a b l e t o h e l p a t some

stage. The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t we were not y e t s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t

i n o i l and t h a t even when we were e x i s t i n g a g r e e m e n t s w i t h t h e

E u r o p e a n Community and IEA would i n h i b i t o u r freedom t o s u p p l y t h i r d

parties. Mr. Y a d i n made i t c l e a r t h a t he had not e x p e c t e d t o h e a r

anything d i f f e r e n t .

T u r n i n g t o t h e A r a b / I s r a e l d i s p u t e , Mr. Y a d i n s a i d t h a t he

t h o u g h t t h e c u r r e n t t e n d e n c y t o l i n k t h e need t o c o n s o l i d a t e Arab

opinion a g a i n s t the S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n w i t h the f i n d i n g

of a s o l u t i o n o f t h e A r a b / I s r a e l d i s p u t e was m i s g u i d e d . I f Saudi

A r a b i a and t h e o t h e r A r a b s t a t e s d i d not a l r e a d y r e a l i s e t h e g r a v i t y

of t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t , n o t h i n g was g o i n g t o make them do s o . The

l i n k a g e between t h e two p r o b l e m s was m e r e l y c r e a t i n g a p r e t e x t f o r

the Governments c o n c e r n e d t o do n o t h i n g about t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t .

/ The linkage

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The l i n k a g e c o n t r i b u t e d to a s o l u t i o n of n e i t h e r problem. The

Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d that the Arab p r e s e n t a t i o n of l i n k a g e tended

to be r a t h e r more complex than Mr. Yadin had suggested. They

f r e q u e n t l y s a i d , f o r i n s t a n c e , that the f a i l u r e of the Americans

to p r e s s I s r a e l harder t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the P a l e s t i n e problem

made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r Arab Governments to accept t h e i r help i n

f a c i n g the S o v i e t t h r e a t . I t was c l e a r i n any case that a s o l u t i o n

a c c e p t a b l e t o a l l those i n v o l v e d would f a c i l i t a t e the region's

response t o the S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n .

M r . Y a d i n d i d not d i s s e n t from t h i s l a s t p o i n t . When asked
by t h e Prime M i n i s t e r whether the Camp David t a l k s were l i k e l y to
make any f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s , Mr. Yadin admitted that the t a l k s were
not going w e l l a t p r e s e n t . He added that indeed the s i t u a t i o n might
w e l l get worse before i t began to get b e t t e r . Nonetheless he s t i l l
b e l i e v e d t h a t s u c c e s s was p o s s i b l e . Neither Mr. Begin nor
P r e s i d e n t Sadat nor P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r could a f f o r d a f a i l u r e .
The breakthrough might not come u n t i l the very l a s t moment. I t
might w e l l n e c e s s i t a t e a f u r t h e r summit meeting a t Camp David. But
agreement would, according to Mr. Y a d i n , be reached. Meanwhile,
the n e g o t i a t i o n s were extremely d e l i c a t e and the a c t i v i t i e s of
o u t s i d e r s were not always h e l p f u l . Mr. Yadin s a i d t h a t , speaking
v e r y f r a n k l y , he would be i n c l i n e d to say to the Europeans
" i f you cannot c o n t r i b u t e , p l e a s e keep q u i e t " . He was p a r t i c u l a r l y
w o r r i e d about the a c t i v i t i e s of the French who, as so o f t e n , seemed
i n t e n t on being m i s c h i e v o u s .

The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t she was conce.ned about the
p o s i t i o n of King Hussein. The West Bank had once been p a r t of
J o r d a n i a n t e r r i t o r y , y e t he was not being c o n s u l t e d i n any way a t
present. Mr. Yadin s a i d that the Camp David Agreement contained
r e f e r e n c e s to Jordanian involvement i n the d i s c u s s i o n s . King Hussein
had been i n v i t e d t o Camp David, but had r e f u s e d the i n v i t a t i o n .
M r . Yadin s a i d that he himself thought that King Hussein ought t o
be a p a r t n e r i n the n e g o t a t i o n s . H i s own guess was t h a t P r e s i d e n t
Sadat was aiming at a second Camp David i n June or J u l y at which he
would s e c u r e an agreement which was l e s s than 100% s u c c e s s f u l on
the autonomy i s s u e ; and that t h e r e a f t e r he would suggest that
King Hussein and the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the P a l e s t i n i a n r e s i d e n t s
on the West Bank should be i n v i t e d to c a r r y d i s c u s s i o n s f u r t h e r .
The d i f f i c u l t y f o r P r e s i d e n t Sadat was of course to achieve a
s a t i s f a c t o r y measure of p r o g r e s s on the autonomy i s s u e by J u l y .

There was a b r i e f r e f e r e n c e t o t h e q u e s t i o n of s e t t l e m e n t s i n

the occupied t e r r i t o r y . The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d that she had made

p l a i n to Mr. Begin that she saw no sense i n p u t t i n g up new s e t t l e m e n t s

on t e r r i t o r y occupied by I s r a e l i n 1967. Mr. Yadin s a i d that he

had noted t h e Prime M i n i s t e r ' s r e f e r e n c e to "new" s e t t l e m e n t s . The

d i f f i c u l t y about the previous week's UN r e s o l u t i o n had, of c o u r s e ,

been that i t had c a l l e d f o r the d i s m a n t l i n g of a l l s e t t l e m e n t s i n

the new t e r r i t o r i e s . The Prime M i n i s t e r d i d not respond to t h i s

beyond r e p e a t i n g that Mr. Begin was f a m i l i a r with her views on the

point.

/ On t h e g e n e r a l

- 3 -

On the g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n i n the Middle E a s t , Mr. Yadin s a i d

t h a t P r e s i d e n t Sadat was deeply worried about the S o v i e t t h r e a t .

Looking a t events i n L i b y a , E t h i o p i a , I r a n and Afghanistan he f e l t

e n c i r c l e d . He thought that Saudi Arabia was "next i n l i n e " and was

h i g h l y c r i t i c a l of the Saudi regime f o r i t s f a i l u r e to r e c o g n i s e

the danger. The i n c i d e n t at the Great Mosque had been f a r more

s e r i o u s than was g e n e r a l l y acknowledged. P r e s i d e n t Sadat was a l s o

c r i t i c a l of the Americans f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e to develop a s t r a t e g y

f o r d e a l i n g w i t h the S o v i e t c h a l l e n g e . He thought the Americans

should have made more of an attempt to a s s i g n r o l e s to eg the

E g y p t i a n , Saudi and I s r a e l i Governments. A l l t h r e e Governments

would be w i l l i n g to respond to a c l e a r l e a d . Mr. Yadin concluded

the c o n v e r s a t i o n by suggesting t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r should

d e l e g a t e a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to get i n touch with the Egyptian m i l i t a r y

i n t e l l i g e n c e a u t h o r i t i e s to d i s c u s s with them t h e i r assessment of

the s i t u a t i o n i n Saudi A r a b i a . The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d that she

would c o n s i d e r t h i s f u r t h e r .

Paul Lever, E s q . ,

F o r e i g n and Commonwealth O f f i c e .

RESTBlCTtLT iW

l O D O W N I N G STREET

From the Private Secretary
12 March 1980

Call b y M r . Ahmed Osman

Mr. Ahmed Osman, a former Prime Minister of Morocco,

paid a courtesy call on t h ePrime Minister this morning.

He was accompanied by t h eMoroccan Ambassador. One o r

two points which came up d u r i n g thediscussion are, perhaps,

worth recording.

Mr. Osman said that t h eMoroccan Army were i n control

of thesituation i r theSahara. Moroccan units were attacked

occasionally but t h ea c t i v i t i e s o f t h e enemy were essentially

terrorist i n nature. The Polisario were being financed by

Libya and Algeria and provided with arms from theSoviet Union.

The Soviet intervention, while more discreet than that i n

Afghanistan^ was part of an overall programme to destabilise

the region. The threat t o Morocco was also directly linked

with thedeveloping situation i n Algeria. There were a t

present twoo r three conflicting p o l i t i c a l tendencies there.

The Moroccan Government hoped that theposition could be

resolved. I t would be helpful i f there was someone there i n

a position of authority with whom i t was possible to talk.

Mr. Osman said that t h e Moroccan Government had helped

to foster contacts between Israel and President Sadat. But

since t h e Camp David Agreement, they had associated themselves

with thegeneral Arab position. The Camp David Agreement

would not suffice to resolve t h eArab/Israel dispute. A

European i n i t i a t i v e might be h e l p f u l . The Prime Minister

said that the

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 2 ­

said that the dangers in the area had greatly increased

since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A l l those with

whom she had talked from the Arab countries had told her

that the situation would be much easier to deal with i f

progress could be made towards a solution of the Arab/Israel

dispute.

Mr. Osman said that there were problems in his

Government's relations with the European Community. Although

there was an association agreement, the Community adopted a

protectionist attitude towards some of Morocco's exports.

The provisions in the agreement for consultation were not

being observed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Moreover, Morocco was deeply

worried about the consequences for their trade of the

enlargement of the Community to include Spain, Greece and ,

Portugal. The Moroccan Ambassador commented that B r i t i s h

imports of phosphates had fallen in recent years. However,

the Moroccan authorities enjoyed good relations with the

Departments of Trade and Industry. Discussions were in

progress aimed at rectifying the situation.

Mr. Osman conveyed King Hassan's congratulations to

the Prime Minister on the success achieved in Zimbabwe. The

Moroccan Government thought the problem had been solved in a

very elegant manner The Prime Minister said that she hoped

that what had been achieved in Rhodesia would not only be of

benefit to that country. She hoped i t would have the effect

of bringing Africa and Europe closer together. The two

Continents needed each other. She hoped that it would also

underline the fact that those nations which wished to decide

their own destiny should associate with the West. Those who

sided with the Soviet Union were unlikely ever to be given the

kind of choice which had been offered to the people of Rhodesia

M. O'D. B. A L E : : , IDER

Paul Lever, Esq. ,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
P S TO P M NO 10 DOWNING

GPS 450

CONFIDENTIAL
CON'F I DENT I AL
FM F C 0 101151Z MAR 80
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELNO 50 OF 10 MARCH

YOUR TELNO 62« MEETING WITH QADDUMl.

1. A MEETING WITH QADDUMl WOULD 3E IN LINE WITH OUR

EXISTING POLICY OF OCCASIONAL AND INFORMAL CONTACTS

AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVES.

HOWEVER, I AM ANXIOUS THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE MISINTER­

PRETED AS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE

PLO. YOU SHOULD, THEREFORE, RESIST SUGGESTIONS THAT YOU

CALL ON HIM AT HIS OFFICE (OR OF COURSE VICE-VERSA) AND

SUGGEST INSTEAD A QUIET MEETING AT YOUR HOUSE, EG OVER A

DRINK. IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO HOPE THAT THE MEETING BE

KEPT SECRET, BUT IT WOULD BE PREFEREBLE TO AVOID UNDUE

PUBLICITY. YOU SHOULD MAKE THE POINT TO QADDUMl THAT HIS

CAUSE WOULD NOT BE HELPED BY MISLEADING REPORTS ABOUT

A MEETING.

2. WHEN YOU MEET QADDUML YOU SHOULD ALLOW HIM TO D
O
THE T A L K I N G A S FAR AS P O S S I B L E . ON S E L F - D E T E R M I NATION
YOU SHOULD NOT G
O BEYONG T H E GENERAL LINES OF RETRACT
77304 . YOU SHOULD P O I N T OUT THAT NO R E A L CHANGE O F
POLICY I S INVOLVED S I N C E WE, TOGETHER WITH T H E REST
OF T H E N I N E , A C C E P T E D THAT T H E P A L E S T I N I A N S HAD THE
R I G H T TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN POLITICAL FUTURE LAST
S E P T E M B E R , WITH T H E P R O V I S O THAT T H I S COULD ONLY B E
IN T H E FRAMEWORK OF A N E G O T I A T E D SETTLEMENT IN WHICH

ISRAEL'S R I G H T TO L I V E IN P E A C E W I T H I N SECURE AND

R E C O G N I S E D BOUNDARIES WAS ALSO A C C E P T E D . YOU SHOULD

ADD THAT WE ARE STILL LOOKING FOR A MOVE ON T H E PLO'S
FART TOWARDS OPEN A C C P E T A N C E OF A N E G O T I A T E D SETTLEMENT

ON T H I S BASIS AND THAT OUR D E A L I N G S WITH T H E PLO ARE

INEVITABLY INHIBITED 3Y T H E A B S E N C E O F SUCH A MOVE.

CONFIDENTIAL /3. IF
CONFIDENTIAL

3 . IF QADDUMI ASKS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A

EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT

CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS MUST BE PURSUED TO THEIR

CONCLUSION BUT THAT WE ARE CONCERNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO

PROGRESS TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IF WE

CAN AND ARE CONSIDERING WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS

HOW AND WHEN WE MIGHT BEST BE ABLE TO HELP. YOU CAN

CONFIRM THAT AMONG THE POSSIBILITIES MIGHT BE A NEW

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD REAFFIRM THE

PRINCIPLES OF 2 4 2 AND SUPPLEMENT THEM BY COVERING

PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS. YOU COULD ADD THAT WE

WOULD HOPE ALL ARAB PARTIES WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT

SUCH A RESOLUTION.

A. IF QADDUMI SUGGESTS A MEETING WITH A MINISTER, YOU

SHOULD SAY THAT THIS REMAINS DIFFICULT. IF HE SHOWS A

DESIRE TO GO BEYOND A GENERAL DISCUSSION OR SUGGESTS

FURTHER MEETINGS TO CLARIFY RESPECTIVE POSITIONS, YOU

SHOULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT! YOUR MEETING SHOULD NOT BE

THE FIRST OF A SERIES BUT YOU SHOULD LEAVE OPEN THE

DOOR FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH FCO OFFICIALS AT A

LATER STAGE WHEN OUR OWN IDEAS ARE SOMEHWAT CLEARER.

CARRINGTON.
P I L E S ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NENAD PS ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
MED PS/LPS
UND PS/MR HURD
OID PS/PUS
NEWS D SIR D MAITLAND
PUSD MR J MOBERLT

2

CONFIDENTIAL

10 March 1980

Arab/Israel: Contacts with t h e PLO

A H I h a v e t o l d you on t h e t e l e p h o n e , t h e
P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a s s e e n and a p p r o v e d t h e t e x t
e n c l o s e d w i t h y o u r l e t t e r t o rao o f 7 M a r c h
on t h i s s u b j e c t . T h e o n l y amendment t h a t s h e
made t o t h e t e x t w a s t o t h e f i r s t l i n e w h i c h
should read:

"A meeting with Oaddurii i s i n line
with . . . "

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

P a u l L e v e r , Hsq.,

F o r e i g n and Commonwealth O f f i c e

CHMFIDR-JTIM
CONFIDENTIAL

London SW1A 2AH

7 March 1980

A r a b / I s r a e l : Contacts with the PLO

The PLO in B e i r u t have asked ' i n view of developments in

Europe', whether HM Ambassador would be prepared to see the

PLO 'foreign m i n i s t e r ' , Mr Qaddumi, next week. The PLO have

undoubtedly n o t i c e d recent p r e s s reports on a ' B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e '

and our confirmation that the Franco-Kuwaiti communique endorsement

of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h i n the framework of a negotiated

settlement i s i n l i n e with our views. They now wish to

explore our p o s i t i o n .

A meeting between the Ambassador and Mr Qaddumi next week,

which we must assume would r e c e i v e p u b l i c i t y , i s awkwardly

timed and would i n c r e a s e press s p e c u l a t i o n about a s h i f t

in our p o l i c y . However i t would be c l e a r l y w i t h i n the present

g u i d e l i n e s f o r dealings with the PLO, whereby o f f i c i a l s

maintain o c c a s i o n a l and informal contacts with PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s

i n London and some Arab p o s t s , i n c l u d i n g B e i r u t . No new p o l i c y

d e c i s i o n would be i n v o l v e d . HM Ambassador i n Damascus has met

o c c a s i o n a l l y with Mr K h a l i d a l Fahoum, Chairman of the

P a l e s t i n e National C o u n c i l , who has more or l e s s equal standing

in PLO terms to Mr Qaddumi. A s e n i o r o f f i c i a l met Mr Qaddumi

b r i e f l y i n 1976 at the United Nations i n New York.

Lord Carrington b e l i e v e s that to turn a meeting down would

be i n c o n s i s t e n t with our p o l i c y h i t h e r t o and would r i s k damaging

u n n e c e s s a r i l y our r e l a t i o n s with the Arabs, who would be l i k e l y

to draw an u n f l a t t e r i n g comparison with the French Ambassador's

recent meeting with Mr Qaddumi. He i s confident that a meeting with

in present p o l i c y i s d e f e n s i b l e s i n c e i t i m p l i e s no change i n

our view of the PLO's s t a t u s . However, he i s concerned that

the meeting should not be m i s i n t e r p r e t e d . I t w i l l a l s o be

important in answering any c r i t i c i s m to be able to s t r e s s that the

meeting was an opportunity to press the PLO to modify unacceptable

aspects of t h e i r p o l i c i e s . He t h e r e f o r e proposes to send

c a r e f u l i n s t r u c t i o n s to B e i r u t along the l i n e s of the attached

telegram and would be g r a t e f u l f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s

agreement.

(P Lever)

Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq

10 Downing S t r e e t

London

• l t * 2 (21 6 * <; D D 0 1 ) 1 0 4 ] 1 COM 9, I t C W B LTD C f (70
XV
File No
Security Classification
OUTWARD
Department C O N F I D E N T I A L

Drafted by TELEGRAM Precedence
(Block Capitals J. I M M E D I A T E

Tel. Extn. DtSKBY

FOR
COMMS. DEPT. (Date)
Despatched POSTBY
USE (Time) ...Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).
(Caveat/
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL
Privacy marking) ....
(Codeword)
(Deskby) Z
TO IMMED.IATE BEIRUT. Tel No.... of.
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO ( f o r i n f o )

Distribution. - (TEXT]

Fi les

NENAD

YOUR T E L N O 6 2 : M E E T I N G WITH QADDUMI
MED

UND

OID
1. (There is n< objection to y o u r m e e t i n g j Qaddumi , in
NEWS D E P T

line withour existing policy of occasional and informal
PUSD

PS

contacts at official level w i t h PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
PS/LPS

P S / M R HURD

However, I am a n x i o u s that this should not be misinter­
PS/PUS

PS/SIR D MAITLAND

preted as a significant change in our attitude towards th<
MR J MOBERLY

Copies t o : - PLO. You should, therefore, resist suggestions that you

call on h i m a t his office (or of course vice-versa) and
ADD'T D I S T .

A R A B / I S R A E L D I S P U T E

suggest instead a quiet meeting at your house, eg over a

'drink. It would be too much t o hope t h a t the meeting be
* - r*i i~ i-.i i

kept secret, but it would be preferable to avoid undue

publicity.- Y o u s h o u l d make the point to Qaddumi that his
/cause
cau^re would not be h e l p e d by misleading r e p o r t s abou ;

a meeting.

2. When you meet Qaddumi you should a l l o w him to do

the t a l k i n g a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e . On s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n

you should not go beyond t h e g e n e r a l l i n e s of Retrac;.

77304. You should p o i n t out t h a t no r e a l change o f

policy i s involved since.we, together with the rest

of the Nine, accepted t h a t the P a l e s t i n i a n s had the

r i g h t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i r own political future last

S e p t e m b e r , w i t h the p r o v i s o t h a t t h i s c o u l d o n l y be

i n t h e framework of a n e g o t i a t e d settlement i n which

Israel's r i g h t to l i v e i n peace w i t h i n s e c u r e and

r e c o g n i s e d b o u n d a r i e s was a l s o accepted. You should

add t h a t we are s t i l l l o o k i n g f o r a move on the
PLO'
nt

part t o w a r d s open a c c e p t a n c e of a negotiated settlem^

on t h i s b a s i s and t h a t our dealings with the PLO are

inevitably i n h i b i t e d by the absence of such a move.

3. I f Qaddumi a s k s about the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a

E u r o p e a n i n i t i a t i v e , you s h o u l d make c l e a r that

c u r r e n t p e a c e e f f o r t s must be p u r s u e d t o their

c o n c l u s i o n but t h a t we are concerned to c o n t r i b u t e t

progress towards a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e t t l e m e n t i f we

can and a r e c o n s i d e r i n g w i t h our E u r o p e a n p a r t n e r s

how and when we might b e s t be able to h e l p . You can

confirm t h a t among t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s m i g h t be a new

S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n w h i c h would r e a f f i r m the

p r i n c i p l e s of 242 and supplement them by covering

Palestinian political rights. You could add that we

would hope a l l Arab p a r t i e s would be a b l e to accept

such a resolution.

/4.

DSR I 1C

4. I f Qaddumi s u g g e s t s a m e e t i n g w i t h a m i n i s t e r , you

should say t h a t this remains d i f f i c u l t . I f he shows a

d e s i r e t o go beyond a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n o r s u g g e s t s

f u r t h e r meetings to c l a r i f y respective positions, you

s h o u l d make no commitment:

- .

gn« y o u r m e e t i n g s h o u l d not be t h e f i r s t o f a s e r i e s but

you s h o u l d l e a v e open t h e door f o r f u r t h e r discussions

w i t h FCO o f f i c i a l s at a l a t e r s t a g e when our own ideas

a r e somewhat clearer.

illPDLS EA8?J ADVA17CE COPIES I - r/fe J'HXXWLCL

PS 10 DCWKIKG STREET
PS/SIR i G i n - i o i m ^ , -
PS/MS KURD • -
PS/PUS , CiLBIlBST OFFICE DIO
KB J C MOBEELT

HD/KEHAJJ

ED/I1E.D
HD/UISD

GR 650
CONFIDENT I AL
FM TEL AVIV 071220Z MAR 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 102 OF 7 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS ROUTINE
BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN AND JERUSALEM

MY TEL NO 9 9 : ARAB/ISRAEL: PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION

1 . THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR-GENERAL WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR EURO­
PEAN AFFAIRS IN THE ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASKED ME
TO CALL ON HIM TODAY.
2. SASSOON, SPEAKING FROM A BULKY BRIEF IN TONES OF SORROW RATHER
THAN ANGER, SAID THAT HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO LODGE A PROTEST
ON THE STATEMENT BY THE FCO SPOKESMAN ON 4 MARCH COMMENTING ON
PRESIDENT SISCARB'S STATEMENT IN KUWAIT ON PALESTINIAN SELF-DETER­
MINATION. HE WISHED TO EMPHASISE AT THE OUTSET THE ISRAEL GOVERN­
MENTS AWARENESS OF THE FACT THAT THERE WERE "BIG DIFFERENCES"
BETWEEN HMG'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND THAT OF
"SOME OTHER COUNTRIES". HE RECALLED THAT HMG HAD WELCOMED THE
C»"P DAVID AGREEMENT AND THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND
ISRAEL- THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND ABOUT OUR POSITION ON
THESE TWO DOCUMENTS.
ISRAEL. THERE WAS NO DOUBT I N H I S M I N D ABOUT OUR P O S I T I O N ON

THESE TWO DOCUMENTS.
3. HOWEVER, ISRAEL HAD FROM T I M E TO T I M E BEEN " S U R P R I S E D " BY $
P O S I T I O N S TAKEN, OR STATEMENTS MADE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF HMG,
WHICH D I D NOT APPEAR CONSONANT WITH OUR ENDORSEMENT OF THE CAMP
DAVID PROCESS. HE WISHED I N PARTICULAR TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE
USE OF THE TERM *'SELF-DETERMINATION'• PER SE I N THE FCO'S SPOKES­
MAN'S STATEMENT. T H I S CONSTITUTED A STEP BEYOND THE FORMULATION
USED BY THE IRISH FOREIGN M I N I S T E R I N THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST
SEPTEMBER. I T WAS HARD TO DESCRIBE I T AS HELPFUL - AND T H I S WAS AN

UNDERSTATEMENT - AS FAR AS THE PEACE PROCESS WAS CONCERNED.

4. SA3S0N WENT ON TO STRESS THAT I N THE CONTEXT OF PRESENT EVENTS,

THE ARABS WOULD CERTAINLY INTERPRET THE USE OF T H E EXPRESSION " S E L F -

DETERMINATION" AS I M P L Y I N G B R I T I S H APPROVAL OF THE CONCEPT OF A

PALESTINIAN STATE. HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT T H I S WAS HMG'S VIEW OF

I T S MEANING. BUT ( H E WISHED AGAIN TO EMPHASISE) T H E ARABS WOULD

CERTAINLY TAKE I T T H I S WAY. AS WE KNEW, THERE WAS A CONSENSUS I N

ISRAEL ON THE I M P O S S I B I L I T Y OF ANY SUCH " H Y P O T H E T I C A L " STATE

BECAUSE OF T H E THREAT THAT T H I S WOULD POSE TO HER SECURITY. TO

SPFAK OF "SELF-DETERMINATION" NOW, WHILE THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

WERE AT SUCH A DELICATE STAGE, WAS TO PLACE AN OBSTACLE I N THE PATH

OF T H E I R SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. AT T H I S P O I N T , SASSON DREW A T T E N T ­

ION TO MR B E G I N ' S DECLARATION AT THE END CF H I S SPEECH I N THE

KNESSET YESTERDAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 101) THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT

WOULD " U N D E R NO CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO A PALESTINIAN STATE"".

5. SASSON ALSO EXPRESSED THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S " S E N S E OF PUZZLE­
MENT" ABOUT THE T I M I N G CF THE SPOKESMAN'S COMMENTS SO SOON AFTER
PRESIDENT GISCARD'S STATEMENT I N KUWAIT, SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF
THIS "NEW ELEMENT" AS NOT I N ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMP D A V I D AGREE­
MENT, AND I N FACT CONTRADICTED IT, THE SPOKESMAN'S COMMENTS WOULD
HARDLY F A C I L I T A T E THE AUTONOMY N E G O T I A T I O N S . ISRAEL WAS P A R T I C U L ­
ARLY PUZZLED I N THE L I G H T OF HER B E L I E F THAT HMG WISHED TO SEE THESE
NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEED AND AN AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY IMPLEMENTED,
MOREOVER, I N ARAB M I N D S , AS HE HAD S A I D , "SELF-DETERMINATION"
EQUALLED "PALESTINE STATE". THEY D I D MOT SEE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
SUCH A STATE AS AN I N T E R I M ARRANGEMENT. YET THE P A R T I E S TO THE
CAMP D A V I D AGREEMENT WERE CLEAR THAT THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS WERE
INTENDFD TO O B T A I N SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, AND MO MORE.
6. SUMMING U P , SASSON S A I D THAT OUR RECENT VOTE FOR THE SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON SETTLEMENTS, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE FCO SPOKE­
SMAN'S STATEMENT, CONSTITUTED ACTS WHICH WERE " N O T PARELLEL" WITH
THE CAMP D A V I D PROCESS AND WERE INDEED OBSTACLES TO IT. ISRAEL
REMAINED DETERMINED TO IMPLEMENT T H E PEACE TREATY I N FULL AND HAD
BEEN FAITHFUL TO IT I N S P I R I T AND LETTER. SHE WAS DETERMINED TO
ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. iF THERE
BEEN FAITHFUL TO IT IN SPIRIT AND L E T T E R . SHE WAS DETERMINED TO
[ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. IF THERE
WERE AGREEMENT, THE PALESTINIAN ARABS ON THE WEST BANK WOULD HAVE
TO DECIDE WHETHER OR MOT TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS. IT WAS
IMPORTANT THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE BE CREATED IN WHICH THEY
WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO DO SO. REFERENCES TO "SELF-DETERMINATION"
WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONTEXT. THEY WOULD INDEED ENCOURAGE
THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK TO HOLD OUT FOR A BETTER OFFER
I.E. A PALESTINIAN STATE, WHICH WAS A "PHANTOM".
7. AT A NUMBER OF POINTS THROUGHOUT HIS STATEMENT, SASSON STRESSED
THAT HE WAS NOT SPEAKING TO ME IN THE SAME TERMS AS HE HAD USED
WITH "ANOTHER GOVERNMENT" (AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO MR
CIECHANOVER'S PROTEST TO THE FRENCH AM3ASSAD0RI MY TELEGRAM NO 9 9 ) .
HE WAS ADDRESSING A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD WELCOMED CAMP
DAVID. KNOWING BRITAIN'S INFLUENCE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
HE HOPFD THAT OUR POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CAMP DAVID WOULD
REFLECT ITSELF IN THE COMMUNITY'S DISCUSSIONS ON MIDDLE EASTERN
QUESTIONS.
8. I CONFINED MYSELF TO RESTATING THE POINTS MADE BY THE SPOKESMAN
ON k MARCH, STRESSING THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN WHAT HE HAD SAID AND
THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S SPEECH LAST
SEPTEMBER, I ALSO EMPHASISED HIS INSISTENCE THAT ANY SOLUTION MUST
RECOGNISE THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATIOL WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THIS CU ALIFI CAT I ON WAS
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. SASSON REMAINED UNMOVED. WHATEVER OUR INTENT­
IONS, THE BRITISH PRESS WAS NOW WIDELY INTERPRETING THE SPOKESMAN'S
COMMENTS A REPRESENTING A FURTHER SHIFT TOWARDS THE ARABS. I SAW
NO POINT IN PROLONGING AND ESSENTIALLY STERILE EXCHANGE AND ENDED
THE CONVERSATION BY UNDERTAKING TO REPORT SASSON»S DEMARCHE TO YOU.

PIKE

CCN PARA 8 LINE 9 WA COMMENTS - AS REPRESENTING ETC

NNNN
DDLE EAST: ADVANCE C O P I E S X

HO lO^TJOWNING STREET
] S

P
P S / S I B I GILMOUR

PS/MR HURD
CABINET O F F I C E DIO

PS/PUS

MR J C MOBERLY

HD/NENAD

HD/MED

HD/UND

HD/OID
(2)

•• •

PUSD
(2)
NEWS D

JffiGIBENT CLERS­

€R 2(70
CONFIDENT! AL
DgSKBY ggljggit
FH BEIRUT , 7 5 1 1 5 6 2 MAR Sfl
TO IN-MEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 OF P«6 MARCH 1933

U MY FIRST SECRETARY HAS JUST HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM THL PLO :

ASKING WHETHER 'MM VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE" I WOULD DE
PREPARED TO SEE MR,_QADDOUMI ON MONDAY 13 MARCH. NO VENUE WAS
MENTIONED. WE SAID I WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS AND LET THEM KNOW
THE ANSWER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, HOPEFULLY TOMORROW,

2 . COMMENT. THIS WAS UNDOUBTEDLY PROVOKED BY THE FACTS THAT THE
FRENCH AMBASSADOR CALLED ON OADDOUM1 HERE YESTERDAY AND THAT THE
FCO OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN HAD STATED (RETRACT THAT BRITISH
POLICY WAS IN LINE WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD'S STATEMENT ABOUT SELF-
DETERMINATION. IT IS QUITE A SHREWD MOVE IN THAT OUR REFUSAL COULD
BE PUBLICISED TO LEND CREDENCE JO THE ALLEGATION THAT WE ARE THE
ANT I-AR 43 HIGOER IN THE EUROPEAN WOODPILE.

3 . FINALLY THERE 18 T»E PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION THAT I LI/E IN
WAT IS EFFECTIVELY PLO-CCNTROLLED TERRITORY AND WHATEVER THE PLO'3
STANDING MAY BE CONSIDERED IN THE WORLD AT LARGE, IT IS ONE OF THE
PRINCIPAL POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE LEBANESE EQUATION*
t m X & E H A S H . : ADVAKCE C O P I E S X - ' 7fc>
PS ^ ^ J J d - I O DOWMIKG S T R E E T
F S / S I f t I GIIiiOUK
P S / I K HOBD
PS/PUS CAUIKET OtfJJTCE DIO
KB J C HOBEULT

HD/KEHAD

ED/KBD

BD/ITND

KD/OID » (2)

•••

PTJSD (2)
HEWS D
GR 5f<£
CONFIDENTIAL r ~~|
ECLIPSE I" "I M itf E D ( & I & i
FM AMMAN MAR 80 -————-•-I
TO IfWlJJATE FCO
TELEORAM NUMBER 104 OF fl5 MARCH 80
INFO PRIORITY UKM J 3 NEW YORK AND WASHI NOT ON
INFO SAVING BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV.
WASHINGTON TELS NO3 9'+2 AMD D43t JORDAN/UNITED STATES*
1. PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT ON TH? SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE
ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAS CAUSED DISMAY HEME AND DEEP
BISAPPOINTMENT TO THOSE (INDLUDING, I BELIEVE, BOTH KING HUSSEIN
AND HIS PRIME MINISTER) WHO HOPED" THAT THE VOTE MIGHT MARK THE
BEGINNING OF A POSSIBLE CHANGE IN Uo POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST*
WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (ACCOMPANYING LORD
CACtlA) HE SAID THAT THE US VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAjD MADE
MlM WONDER WHETHER HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN TOO HARD ON THE AMERICANS
RECENTLY, BUT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT MADE
HIM THINK THAT PERHAPS HE HAD NOT BEEN HMD ENOUGH.
2. THE US AMBASSADOR VMS SEEN SY THE JORDAN I AN PS I ME MINISTER
YESTERDAY AFTERNOON SEMI COLON HE HAS SINCE GIVEN ME A FILL ACCOU*
OF THEIR DISCUSSION. SHARAF EXPRESSED DEEP DiSAPPCiNTMENr At
PRESIDENT CARTER KAVING SUCCUMBED TO "BLATANT ISRAELI P R E S S U R E ^
AND WAS CLEARLY VERY UPSET INDEED, SHARAF HAS ASKED FOR A FORMAL
REPLY FROM THE AMERICANS TO HIS DEMARCHE*
3. THE JORDAN I AN GOVERNMENT ISSUED A STATEMENT LAST MIGHT, APPAR­
ENTLY V\ REACTION TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECLARATION, WELCOME
THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND SAYING THAT THE JORDAN-fAS
THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESCtUTIOS ANti SAYING THAT THE JORDANIAN
GOVERNMENT "EXPECTS THE WORLD COMMUNITY, THF UNIT-ZD NATIONS
AND ALL COUNTRIES, JOINTLY AN'B INDIVIDUALLY, TO CO-OPES ATE IN
IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS FOR HALTING ISRAELI
SETTLEMENT^OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES) AND THE DISMANTLING OF
EXISTING' ISRAEL! SETTLEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRt-
TORIES, FOREMOST OF WHICH 13 ARAB JERUSALEM AND ITS ENVIRONS*"
4, THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "JORDAN TIMES" IN AN EDITORIAL TODAY
EXPRESSES SORROW THAT "ONE OF THE FEW PRINCIPLED IHO COURAGEOUS
STANDS'EVER TAKEN BY THE US WITH REGARD TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL _
CONFLICT SHOULD BE INSTANTANEOUSLY REPUDIATED 3Y THE PRESIDENT
HIMSELF", AND GOES ON TO URGE MR MCHENRY TO RESIGN, THE EDITORIAL
ASSERTS THAT IT WAS ONLY AFTER SENATOR KENNEDY CAME OUT AGAINST
THE US VOTE IN THE UN I TEED NATIONS THAT PRESIDENT CARTER H^D MADE
Hi 3 "IGNOMINIOUS REVERSAL".
3. NY US COLLEAGUf! (PLEASE PROTECT), WHO IS NATURALLY VERY
DOWMCAST, REMARKED THAT THE EFFECTS OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATE­
MENT WERE BEING RAPIDLY FELT* FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD HEARD THAT THE
US ENERGY SECRETARY'S MISSION TO SAUDI ARABIA HAD FAILED AND THAT
He. WAS RETURNING HONE EMPTY-HA'.'DEB* HE IS HIMSELF RECOMMENDING
THAT THE US SHOULD FOCUS 6k THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF SETTLEMENTS AMD
PARTICULARLY TRY TO DRAW THE LINE AT SETTLEMENT OF HEBRON WHICH
WAS AN ISLAMIC SHRINE. HE ADDED THAT IF THERE WAS ANYTHING WE
COULD DO (WITHOUT OF COURSE REVEALING THAT HE HAD ASKED US) TO
TRY TO FOCUS THE US GOVERNWENT ON THIS ASPECT, HE WOULD PERSONALLY
CS IMMENSELY GRATEFUL AS HE FELT IT OFFERED THE SfST CHANCE OF
SEEKING TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE THE US HAD SUFFERED IN THE ARAB WORLD
AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING/TO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA
AND Ta AVIV. /

UWICK
IMMEDIATE !
6

50 CONFIDENTIAL

P S TO P M NO 10

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 0 4 2 1 3 7 Z MAR 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NO. 9 4 3 OF 4 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW ORK CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS TEL AVIV
V

BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM.

M.I.P.T. ((&L 0^ 4/fc£w*^<- c/u /£L usd flu fCa OCCM^U^

1. T H I S EXERCISE HAS CLEARLY BEEN A SHAMBLES, AS STERNER
(DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT, WHO HAD THE
UNENVIABLE TASK OF RELAYING MCHENRY H I S I N S T ^ C T 1 0
" )
5 F R E E L Y

ADMITS. THOSE I N THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO WORKED HARD TO SECURE
THE P O S I T I V E VOTE ARE ACUTELY DISAPPOINTED. I T I S PARTICULARLY
DEPRESSING FOR THOSE O F F I C I A L S WHO HAD HOPED TO BE ABLE TO
DEMONSTRATE NOT JUST TO THE ARABS BUT ALSO TO OURSELVES AND
OTHERS ( I N THE CONTEXT OF IMPROVING THE C R E D I B I L I T Y OF THE
CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS) THAT THE ADMINISTRATION I S PREPARED TO
GET TOUGH WITH THE I S R A E L I S .

2. STERNER HAS EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS INDEED A COMMUNICATIONS

BREAKDOWN BUT I T WAS NOT BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MCHENRY, WHO,

SUBJECT TO ONE SMALL DEVIATION, FOLLOWED H I S INSTRUCTIONS (FOR

VHICH HE HAD FOUGHT HARD AND ANGRILY, ESPECIALLY ON 29 FEBRUARY).

ANY MISUNDERSTANDING WAS BETWEEN CARTER AND VANCE. CARTER FROM

THE BEGINNING TOOK EXCEPTION TO DRAGGING JERUSALEM INTO THE

RESOLUTION. VANCE UNDERSTOOD T H I S TO MEAN ONLY THAT OPERATIVE

PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE DRAFT I N UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM 4 8 4 HAD TO

COME OUT, SINCE THE OTHER AND SURVIVING REFERENCES TO JERUSALEM

WERE ALMOST ALL I N THE CONTEXT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES QUOTE

INCLUDING JERUSALEM UNQUOTE - A FORMULATION WHICH THE U . S . ACCEPTS

SINCE I T REGARDS EAST JERUSALEM AS PART OF THE OCCUPIED

TERRITORIES. BUT CARTER, REMEMBERING THE EMPHASIS BEGIN PUT ON

THE CITY AT CAMP DAVID, WANTED ALL REFERENCES TO JERUSALEM REMOVED

ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS ABOUT SETTLEMENTS NOT

JERUSALEM. WE ARE ASKED TO BELIEVE THAT CARTER NEVER READ THE

FULL TEXT OR SPOTTED THE MANY REFERENCES TO JERUSALEM U N T I L THEY

WERE DRAWN TO H I S ATTENTION, PRESUMABLY BY THE ISRAELI LOBBY, OVER

THE WEEK-END BY WHICH TIME I T WAS TOO LATE.

3 . THE OTHER LANGUAGE WHICH OFFENDED CARTER WAS THE REFERENCE TO

DISMANTLING E X I S T I N G SETTLEMENTS. T H I S WAS WHAT WAS PROBABLY

HOLDING THINGS UP ON 29 FEBRUARY (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM 4 1 3 )

SINCE MCHENRY BY THEN HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE THAT, BY

SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATING THE REMOVAL OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 7 .

HE CCULD NCW VOTE I N FAVOUR. I T WAS BECAUSE THEY KNEW HOW

ANGRILY HE WOULD REACT TO AN INSTRUCTION TC SEEK A FURTHER

AMENDMENT, THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOUGHT HARD AND SUCCESSFULLY

• CONFIDENTIAL /TO GET

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TO GET AUTHORITY FOR MCHENRY TO COVER THE DISMANTLING ASPECT IN

AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE STATEMENT - FOR WHICH HE WAS GIVEN A TEXT

ALONG THE LINES THAT EXISTING SETTLEMENTS WERE MORE PROPERLY THE

SUBJECT FOR THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. WHERE MCHENRY BENT HIS

INSTRUCTIONS WAS BY DECLINING TO USE THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S TEXT,

CONCOCTING INSTEAD HIS OWN VERSION ABOUT THE POSSIELE USEFULNESS

OF THE SETTLEMENTS INFRASTRUCTURE TO FUTURE INHABITANTS.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A GENUINE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN

CARTER AND VANCE, SOME POWERFUL ARGUMENTS MUST HAVE BEEN BROUGHT

TO BEAR TO MAKE CARTER WILLING TO EXPOSE HIS ADMINISTRATION TO

RIDICULE AND TO THROW AWAY ANY BENEFIT THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE GAINED

FROM ITS POSITIVE VOTE. THERE COULD OF COURSE HAVE BEEN SOME

DIRE THREATS TRANSMITTED BY THE ISRAELIS, BUT I SUSPECT THAT WE

MAY NOT HAVE TO LOOK BEYOND THE FACT THAT KENNEDY, ON THE EVE OF

THE MASSACHUSSETTS PRIMARY, WASTED NO TIME IN CASTIGATING THE

U.S. VOTE AND DECLARING THAT A KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION WOULD

NEVER CAST SUCH A VOTE. INDEED SO LONG AS KENNEDY REMAINS IN

CONTENTION FOR THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION, HIS STRONG PITCH FOR

THE PRO-ISRAEL I VOTE CAN BE EXPECTED GREATLY TO COMPLICATE THE

ADMINISTRATION'S MIDDLE EAST TASK.

5. WHAT PARTICULARLY DISCOURAGES THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS THAT
THE ISRAELI PRESS TODAY WAS APPARENTLY NOT UNANIMOUS IN ITS
OUTRAGE AT THE AMERICAN VOTE AND SOME ISRAELI COMMENTATORS
WERE PREPARED TO NOTE THE SIGNAL FROM WASHINGTON AND QUESTION
THE SETTLEMENTS POLICY AS A RESULT.

HENDERSON

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' £ _/vor- Ai)/wwCiroj

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With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH
DRAFT STATEMENT BY NEWS DEPARTMENT

The j o i n t communique i s s u e d a f t e r P r e s i d e n t G i s c a r d ' s v i s i t

to K u w a i t • i s i n l i n e w i t h o u r v i e w s w h i c h we have b e e n

d i s c u s s i n g w i t h o u r E u r o p e a n p a r t n e r s and w i t h t h e p o l i c y

o f t h e N i n e a s a w h o l e , a s e x p r e s s e d by t h e I r i s h F o r e i g n

M i n i s t e r t o t h e UN G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y l a s t S e p t e m b e r . Any

s o l u t i o n must r e c o g n i s e t h a t t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s have t h e

r i g h t t o s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e framework o f a

negotiated settlement.

3 March 1080

PLO

The Priioe M i n i s t e r has seen
and taken note of your l e t t e r to
me o f 27 F e b r u a r y a b o u t policy
towards the PLO.

M. O'D

Paul Lever, L s q . ,

Foreign and L-OLJIJOUwealth Office
CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

27 February 1980

PLO

You asked r e c e n t l y about p o l i c y towards the PLO i n the l i g h t of

FCO b r i e f i n g f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r to use in the House of Commons

on 19 February i n case Mr G r e v i l l e Janner r a i s e d the Middle E a s t .

We had suggested the Prime M i n i s t e r should not give an assurance

that the Government w i l l not recognise the P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n

Organisation u n t i l they accept I s r a e l ' s r i g h t to e x i s t . You may

a p p r e c i a t e a r a t h e r f u l l e r account of our t h i n k i n g .

Talk of ' r e c o g n i t i o n ' of the PLO i s m i s l e a d i n g . Official

r e c o g n i t i o n i s given only to Governments. The PLO i s not, and does

not c l a i m to be, i n any sense a Government-in-exile and there can

t h e r e f o r e be no question of g i v i n g the o r g a n i s a t i o n r e c o g n i t i o n i n

t h i s sense.

What the PLO themselves mean by ' r e c o g n i t i o n ' i s p r i n c i p a l l y

acceptance of t h e i r claim to be the 'sole l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s

of the P a l e s t i n i a n people*, a s t a t u s they have been accorded by the

Arab League (of which they are a f u l l member) and a l a r g e proportion

of UN membership. We, together with most other Western c o u n t r i e s ,

voted against the o r i g i n a l (1974) UN r e s o l u t i o n g i v i n g them t h i s

s t a t u s and have maintained our opposition s i n c e . There i s no cause

for us to modify t h i s view. We have not given other comparable move­

ments or o r g a n i s a t i o n s , eg the P a t r i o t i c Front or SWAPO,such s t a t u s ,

even when we have been prepared to negotiate with them. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,

no other body has come forward claiming to represent the P a l e s t i n i a n s

and i t i s u n l i k e l y that any w i l l do so in the near f u t u r e . F u r t h e r ­

more there i s l i t t l e doubt that a m a j o r i t y of P a l e s t i n i a n s at.present

look to the PLO as r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s . For

t h i s reason other members of the Nine (most r e c e n t l y I t a l y , Belgium

and I r e l a n d ) have accepted the PLO as the de facto r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of

the P a l e s t i n i a n s , but not as s o l e l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .

Recognition of the PLO has another sense a l s o : that of accepting

PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s as appropriate i n t e r l o c u t o r s for Government

M i n i s t e r s . We have f o r some years maintained o c c a s i o n a l and informal

contacts with the PLO at o f f i c i a l l e v e l , but M i n i s t e r s have taken the

l i n e that they f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to meet PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s while

the Organisation continues to have l i n k s with t e r r o r i s m and has not

accepted I s r a e l ' s r i g h t to e x i s t . The advantage of t h i s formulation

i s that the Government's freedom of a c t i o n i s not thereby unduly

r e s t r i c t e d should a higher l e v e l of dialogue with the PLO seem l i k e l y

/to contribute

M O'D B Alexander Esq

10 Downing S t r e e t

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to c o n t r i b u t e t o a comprehensive peace. Three members of the

Nine ( F r a n c e , Belgium and I t a l y ) have c o n t a c t s with the PLO at

m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l . (There was a l s o a German m i n i s t e r i a l contact

i n s p e c i a l circumstances i n B e i r u t . ) To give a commitment analo­

gous to the US commitment t o I s r a e l not to t a l k to the PLO u n t i l

they accept R e s o l u t i o n 242 and I s r a e l ' s r i g h t t o e x i s t might cause

us no immediate problems but could p l a c e l i m i t s on our freedom of

a c t i o n i n f u t u r e circumstances which are not n e c e s s a r i l y f o r e s e e ­

able now.

Lord Carrington hopes t h e r e f o r e that we can maintain the

present p o s i t i o n , which r e f l e c t s the l i n e taken by the Prime

M i n i s t e r when she met a delegation from the Board of Deputies of

3 r i t i s h Jews on 27 November 1979.

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CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 280930Z
FROM UKM1S NEW YORK 263100Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 400 DATED 27 FEBRUARY 1980
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, AMMAN, EE I RUT, DAMADCUS, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON,
MY TELNO 3 9 1 : SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
1. THERE WERE 7 MORE SPEAKERS TODAY, NAMELY ISRAEL, KUWAIT,
MEXICO, NIGER, AFGHANISTAN, INDONESIA AND THE GDR. US, UK, NORWAY,
PORTUGAL, CHINA AND BANGLADESH REPEATED THEIR RESERVATIONS
OF 5 JAN ON THE AFGHAN DELEGATE. THIS EXHAUSTS THE SPEAKERS'
L I S T . THE COUNCIL WILL NOT MEET AGAIN UNTIL IT I S READY TO VOTE
ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, ON WHICH SEE PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW.
2 . WE HAVE NOW HAD 4 DAYS OF DEBATE AND 33 SPEAKERS. IT HAS BEEN
A DEPRESSING EXPERIENCE. I HAVE NOT REPORTED THE SPEECHES, EVEN
IN OUTLINE, BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN JEJEUNE AND PREDICTABLE (THE
VERVEATIMS WILL ANYWAY SHORTLY EE AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT AND
THE POSTS CONCERNED), NO NEW IDEAS HAVE EEEN PRODUCED: THE ONLY
NEW ELEMENT IN THE DEBATE WAS THE REFUSAL OF THE ISRAELIS TO
PERMIT THE MAYOR OF HEBRON TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK TO SPEAK IN IT.
ISRAEL'S MAIN SUPPORTERS IN THE COUNCIL (THE UNITED STATES AND
NORWAY) HAVE REMAINED SILENT, ALTHOUGH THEY WILL SPEAK IN
EXPLANATION OF VOTE. ALL THE SPEECHES HAVE BEEN CRITICAL, IN MOST
CASES OUTSPOKENLY SO, OF ISRAELI PRACTICES IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES. ALMOST ALL SPEAKERS HAVE TAKEN SIDESWIPES AT THE
CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND NO CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS HAVE BEEN
FORTHCOMING ABOUT HOW THAT PROCESS MIGHT LEAD ON TO WIDER
NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT.
3 . MY ISRAELI COLLEAGUE HAS SPOKEN AT THE CLOSE OF EACH
DAYS PROCEEDINGS. HIS TECHNIQUE I S TO MAKE PROVOCATIVE ATTACKS
ON THOSE WHO HAVE C R I T I C I S E D ISRAEL EARLIER IN THE DAY. HE
DOES THIS TO GOOD EFFECT AND IT NO DOUBT EARNS HIM HIGH MARKS WITH
HIS DOMESTIC AUDIENCE. BUT IT DOES NOT ENCOURAGE SERIOUS DEBATE
(PERHAPS THAT I S A FORLORN HOPE ANYWAY) AND IT DOES NOTHING FOR
THE DIGNITY O F THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SUCH AS IT I S . HIS STATEMENTS
INVARIABLY PROVOKE STRIDENT RIGHTS OF REPLY FROM THE RUSSIANS,
THE ARABS, INCLUDING THE PLO, AND THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED,
I HAD THOUGHT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES ON AFRICAN

I ISSUES WERE BAD ENOUGH. BUT THIS DEBATE HAS PLUMBED NEW DEPTHS,
A. AT A MEETING WITH THE WESTERN GROUP THIS MORNING, ESSAAFI
(TUNISIA) AGREED THAT THE TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS IN MY TELS NOS
392 AND 393 (TO FCO ONLY) SHOULD BE MERGED. HE SAID THAT THE
ARABS' OBJECTIVE WAS A RESOLUTION WHICH "WOULD ENJOY THE WIDEST

POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL. IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL

CLIMATE THE NON-ALIGNED AND ARABS, INCLUDING THE PLO, HAD NO WISH
TO EMBARRASS THE WEST. TO THIS END HE ACCEPTED, AD REFERENDUM TO T H E

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\

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TO THE NON-ALIGNED, A NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS. MCHENRY (USA) SAID

THAT HE WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS AMD WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON

TOMORROW, PARTLY TO DISCUSS THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE URGED, AND

ESSAAFI ACCEPTED, THAT THE VOTING SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL FRIDAY.

5. THIS AFTERNOON, ESSAAFI INFORMALLY CIRCULATED THE TEXT IN Ml FT.

AND HELD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE WESTERN FIVE. A NUMBER OF

MINOR AMENDMENTS WERE PUT FORWARD WHICH THE ARABS WILL PROBABLY

ACCEPT, INCLUDING "RESPECT AND GUARANTEEE" FOR "REFRAIN

FROM INTERFERENCE" IN OPERATIVE PARA 7. AS I SEE IT, THE

PARAGRAPHS WHICH GIVE US REAL DIFFICULTY ARE OPERATIVE PARAS

8 AND THE LAST PHRASE OF 11. WE HAVE PROPOSED DROPPING BOTH.

6. FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WILL TA«E PLACE AT 2000Z TOMORROW, WITH

VOTING ON FRIDAY AT THE EARLIEST: I ASSUME WE COULD VOTE IN FAVOUR

IF OP 8 WAS DROPPED PLUS THE FINAL PHRASE OF OP 11. MY GUESS IS

THAT THE FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE WILL SUPPORT WHATEVER COMES TO

THE VOTE (WHICH WILL BE LESS STRONG THAN THE DRAFT IN M.I.F.T.).

THE US WILL PROBABLY ABSTAIN WHATEVER HAPPENS AND THE NORWEGIANS

FOLLOW US.

PARSONS

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Ref. A01478

P R I M E M I N I S T E R

Arab/Israel

( O D ( 8 0 ) 13)

When O Ddiscussed Afghanistan on 22nd J a n u a r y , one o f the proposals

put f o r w a r d b y the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was that a E u r o p e a n

initiative should be prepared amending Resolution 242 to p r o v i d e for the

acknowledgment o f the P a l e s t i n i a n s ' rights i n r e t u r n f o rtheir recognition of

Israel. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was a s k e d to put i n a

separate paper on this. O D ( 8 0 ) 13 i s t h e result. I tputs forward a new draft

Security Council Resolution, and proposes that h e should first explore i t with

our European partners, and then sound out A r a b and Israeli views a n d t a l k to

the A m e r i c a n s , with the a i m o f tabling the Resolution at a suitable moment.

2. Lord Carrington's main c o n c e r n i s to m a i n t a i n the m o m e n t u m of Islamic

h o s t i l i t y to the S o v i e t Union post-Afghanistan. The Arabs' obsession with

Palestine i s anobstacle to t h i s . I thas led m o s t of them to q u a r r e l with the

United States over Camp David and m o r e generally to r e s e n t the W e s t ' s failure

to p e r s u a d e Israel to abandon (in p a r t i c u l a r ) the West Bank and E a s t Jerusalem.

3. In a minute o f 14th F e b r u a r y to y o u , copied to other O Dm e m b e r s , the

Lord Chancellor expresses doubts whether the c h a n c e s of success o f the proposed

initiative r e a l l y j u s t i f y the certain political difficulties i t will arouse.

HANDLING

4. You w i l l w i s h to a s k t h eF o r e i g n a n d C o m m o n w e a l t h S e c r e t a r y to

introduce his paper; and L o r d H a i l s h a m to speak to his minute. T h e points to

establish i n subsequent discussion are:­

( a ) A t what stage and i n what form w i l l the p r o p o s e d new initiative involve

a d i r e c t a p p r o a c h to t h e P a l e s t i n i a n L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i s a t i o n ? What are

the d o m e s t i c political implications of proposing to d e a l w i t h w h a t many

people i n this country regard a s a terrorist organisation? Has the time

-1-

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CONr:~:^T!AL

come when the r e a l i t i e s of the p r e s e n t a n dthe needs of the future

s h o u l d be a l l o w e d to o v e r r i d e t h e m i s d e e d s of thepast? It does

happen like that s o m e t i m e s - a s with Kenyatta, Makarios and indeed

Begin himself.

( b ) H o wwill Israel regard theproposed n e winitiative? F o rt h e r e a s o n s

given by the L o r d Chancellor, I s r a e l i s L i k e l y to b e u n i m p r e s s e d b y t h e

new proposal which they will see as involving them i n giving up important

military advantages i n return for nothing concrete.

(c) H o wwill B r i t i s h and A m e r i c a n J e w r y r e g a r d the proposed newinitiative?

A l m o s t certainly with the same lack of enthusiasm a s theIsraelis. T h e

Lord Chancellor's minute stresses the importance and strength of

British J e w i s h opinion. N e w York i s the biggest J e w i s h city i n the world,

and i n a P r e s i d e n t i a l election year J e w i s h - A m e r i c a n opinion a n d support

is going to be t r e a t e d with great care by the United States Administration.

But President Carter made i t c l e a r to y o u i n W a s h i n g t o n that h e w a s not

opposed to a E u r o p e a n r a p p r o c h e m e n t with the P L O .

( d ) H o wwill o u r European partners react? W o u l d w e go i t alone i f F r a n c e

and/or Germany were unenthusiastic ? Should there be private

exploration with them before there i s a n ytalk with other partners

in the Nine?

( e ) What i s o u r real objective? D o w e r e a l l y e x p e c t to f i n d a compromise

on w h i c h I s r a e l , t h e P L O a n dt h e v a r i o u s A r a b S t a t e s c a na l l a g r e e ?

If not, a r ewe proposing to c o m e down on theA r a b side of the fence?

Would even that r e m o v e theA r a b s ' sense of grievance?

(f) What about Camp David? Do we, privately, d e s p a i r of i t ? If so what

is o u r p u b l i c l i n e o n i t to b e ?

C O N C L U S I O N

5. I n t h e Light of d i s c u s s i o n on t h e s e points, y o u w i l l w i s h to a s s e s s whether

the Committee thinks that the proposed initiative h a s enough chance of success

to j u s t i f y t h e t r o u b l e i t i s l i k e l y t o c a u s e w i t h t h e v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t e d parties.

There will be general agreement over the Foreign andCommonwealth Secretary's

CON":D^TIAL

objective. But its practicality seems doubtful. A compromise you could

suggest i s that we s h o u l d c o n s u l t the F r e n c h and G e r m a n Governments privately

and then the U n i t e d S t a t e s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n on the p r o p o s e d new initiative before

sounding out a n y o t h e r opinions.

(Robert Armstrong)

20th F e b r u a r y , 1980

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10 D O W N I N G STREET

FROM :
COM; i£ENTIAL
T HE R T . HON. LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, C.H., F.R.S., D.C.L.

HOUSE OF LORDS,
SW1A0PW

14th February 1980

Prime M i n i s t e r

h
ARAB/ISRAEL

1. W h i l s t I very l a r g e l y share the views o f the Foreign S e c r e t a r y

about the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f u s i n g the Afghanistan s i t u a t i o n w i t h a

view to improving Arab-Western r e l a t i o n s , and e n t i r e l y agree with

his assessment o f the c e n t r a l i t y o f the I s r a e l problem to t h i s

e x e r c i s e , I am a f r a i d I do not a l t o g e t h e r share h i s optimism on the

prospects o f h i s i n i t i a t i v e , u n l e s s , o f course we are prepared

to s a c r i f i c e t h i n g s which are too important morally, and too v a l u a b l e

i n our i n t e r e s t to s a c r i f i c e . I base my view on some knowledge o f the

p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the country, and some knowledge o f the

m e n t a l i t y o f Arab and Jew.

2. I s r a e l was recognised without d i s s e n t i e n c e as a member o f the

United Nations i n 19^8. Were i t to be destroyed by an aggressive war

the d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t s on the r u l e o f law throughout the world could

h a r d l y be exaggerated. Although, except i n the Yom Kippur war,. I s r a e l

has more than once r e s o r t e d t o the preemptive s t r i k e a s a means o f

s e l f defence t o ensure s u r v i v a l she has been d r i v e n t o t h i s course

by a s u c c e s s i o n o f Arab c o n s p i r a c i e s i n 19^8, 1956, and 1967 t o destroy

her e x i s t e n c e by m i l i t a r y means. She has succeeded i n this without

t
a s s i s t a n c e from the UN but w i t h US a i d and h e r own heroism.

3. P r i o r to 1967 the p h y s i c a l boundaries o f I s r a e l were v i r t u a l l y

untenable militarily. South o f the J e z r e e l v a l l e y , the geography o f

I s r a e l i s s t a r k l y simple, c o n s i s t i n g v i r t u a l l y o f three p a r a l l e l

s t r a i g h t l i n e s running North and South, the sea, the Judean hills,

and the Jordan v a l l e y . Whoever commands the h i l l s commands the r e s t .

P r i o r to 1967 the w a i s t - l i n e o f I s r a e l was only 10 m i l e s broad, and

i t s main c e n t r e s o f population was exposed to a r t i l l e r y f i r e a s w e l l

as the prospect o f d e v a s t a t i n g a i r r a i d s . A f t e r 1967 I s r a e l has

enjoyed reasonably v i a b l e m i l i t a r y f r o n t i e r s c o n s i s t i n g o i the

CONFIDENTIAL continued.../
CC^FIDENI

Judean h i l l s (and t h e no l e s s important f r o n t i e r h e i g h t s on the

S y r i a n b o r d e r ) . J e r u s a l e m i s b u i l t on t h e J u d e a n hills.

4. I s r a e l ' s f r o n t i e r s w i t h Lebanon, Jordan and E g y p t a r e , f o r v e r y
d i f f e r e n t reasons f a i r l y s e c u r e i n the absence of war. But S y r i a i s
a f r o n t i e r s t a t e , i m p l a c a b l y h o s t i l e , and a firm Soviet satellite.

t
E x c e p t E g y p t , none o f t h e r e c o g n i s e d Arab s t a t e s have i n my view given
f i r m s i g n s t h a t t h e y a c c e p t I s r a e l ' s r i g h t a s a member o f t h e UN to
continued existence. I f t h e y c o u l d once be p e r s u a d e d t o abandon this
wholly illegal s t a n c e , I b e l i e v e p r o g r e s s c o u l d be made. B u t , though
H u s s e i n m i g h t do s o , I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e S a u d i s o r I r a q w i l l do
so i n t h e f o r s e e a b l e f u t u r e , G a d d a f i w i l l n o t , and the I s l a m i c rulers
of A l g e r i a , Morocco, I r a n e t a l . w i l l not.

5. The h o l y c i t y o f J e r u s a l e m i s s a c r e d t o Moslem and Jew. I t s

p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s have l a r g e l y changed s i n c e 1967, s i n c e there

h a s been a m a s s i v e expansion o f J e w i s h p o p u l a t i o n on t h e W e s t . The

Hebrew U n i v e r s i t y o f J e r u s a l e m , w h i c h h a s e x i s t e d s i n c e t h e mandate

i s p h y s i c a l l y s i t u a t e d on Mount S c o p u s , now^what i s known a s t h e West

Bank. Under J o r d a n i a n o c c u p a t i o n t h e Jews were e f f e c t i v e l y denied

uninterrupted access. I do n o t b e l i e v e m y s e l f t h a t w o r l d wide J e w i s h

o p i n i o n t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d would c o n t e m p l a t e t h e t o t a l abandonment

o f J e r u s a l e m t o t h e i t s f o r m e r d i v i d e d s t a t u s , and I doubt w h e t h e r t h e

abandonment o f Mount S c o p u s i s e v e n m i l i t a r i l y on t h e c a r d s . But I

would doubt w h e t h e r even moderate A r a b o p i n i o n would c o n t e m p l a t e

anything less.

6. We should not underestimate the importance of J e w i s h o p i n i o n here.

It i s f a n a t i c a l l y i n v o l v e d i n the f a t e of I s r a e l . Even non-observant
i o r non Z i o n i s t Jews t a k e t h i s stance. I would n o t have c a r e d e v e n t o
1 f i g h t St.Marylebone as a C o n s e r v a t i v e candidate i n the f a c e of Jewish
1 h o s t i l i t y on t h i s i s s u e . M a n c h e s t e r , L e e d s , and t h e whole o f N o r t h

ILondon would be p r o f o u n d l y affected.

7. I f t h e r e be a r e a s o n a b l e chance of s u c c e s s without losing our

. honour y e t a g a i n o v e r t h e B a l f o u r d e c l a r a t i o n ; go ahead. B u t have we

^ n o t enough on o u r p l a t e j u s t now not to c o n s i d e r l e a v i n g t h i s hot

jpotato alone?

CONFIDENTIAL continued.../­
8. I am s e n d i n g c o p i e s o f t h i s minute t o t h e o t h e r members

o f OD and t o S i r R o b e r t A r m s t r o n g .

11 . r»„ KA
CONFIDENTIAL

PM/80/11

' /LA.
. 3 . 2..

PRIME MINISTER

Arab/Israel

1. I was i n v i t e d by the Committee at the meeting of 22 January

to b r i n g forward a paper on p o s s i b l e B r i t i s h moves i n r e l a t i o n

to the A r a b / I s r a e l conflict.

2. Events i n Afghanistan t h r e a t e n the s t a b i l i t y of the region

as a whole through subversion and d i r e c t Soviet m i l i t a r y i n t e r ­

v e n t i o n . The I s l a m i c world has r e a c t e d s t r o n g l y and the r e s u l t s

of the I s l a m i c conference i n Islamabad are an encouraging s t a r t .

The Soviet i n t e r v e n t i o n has c r e a t e d a unique opportunity f o r the

West to counter S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n a l l i a n c e with the c o u n t r i e s

of the T h i r d World and f o r the present condemnation of the Soviet

Union to be transformed i n t o l a s t i n g r e a d i n e s s i n the I s l a m i c and

non-aligned c o u n t r i e s to work e f f e c t i v e l y with the West f o r t h e i r

common s e c u r i t y . T h i s opportunity must not be missed.

3. I n p r a c t i c e , the main o b s t a c l e to such c o l l a b o r a t i o n with

the I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s remains t h e i r committed opposition to US

p o l i c y i n the A r a b / I s r a e l c o n f l i c t and what they see as a wider

Western f a i l u r e to take e f f e c t i v e s t e p s to r e s o l v e the c o n f l i c t .

In p a r t i c u l a r I s r a e l ' s continuing presence i n the t e r r i t o r i e s

occupied i n 1967, with the exception of the S i n a i , coupled with

her settlement of those t e r r i t o r i e s and i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Lebanon,

p o l i c i e s made p o s s i b l e by American m i l i t a r y and f i n a n c i a l support,

i s Jeen by the I s l a m i c world as an a f f r o n t . The l o s t of E a s t

Jerusalem i s a s p e c i f i c a l l y Islamic issue. The West i s seen as

having a p a r t i c u l a r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to put p r e s s u r e on I s r a e l to

modify her p o l i c i e s . I am convinced that i f we are to r e i n f o r c e

opposition to S o v i e t a c t i o n i n Afghanistan we must take steps now

to demonstrate our commitment to a speedy peace settlement of the

A r a b / I s r a e l d i s p u t e , a s s u r i n g the s e c u r i t y o f I s r a e l broadly

w i t h i n i t s 1967 f r o n t i e r s and acceptable t o the I s l a m i c world.

/4. The b a s i s

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4. The b a s i s f o r a settlement of the c o n f l i c t s i n c e 1967

has been and should remain Resolution 242, with i t s p r o v i s i o n

for I s r a e l i withdrawal, coupled with an assurance of I s r a e l ' s

r i g h t t o e x i s t i n peace w i t h i n secure and recognised boundaries.

A p o l i t i c a l settlement must a l s o meet the l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s of

the P a l e s t i n i a n people, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r r i g h t to a homeland.

242 does not cover t h i s . One r e s u l t has been the PLO's f a i l u r e

to accept 242 and thus I s r a e l ' s r i g h t to l i v e i n peace w i t h i n

secure and recognised boundaries.

5. Only the United S t a t e s can i n f l u e n c e I s r a e l sufficiently

to achieve a peace negotiated on t h i s b a s i s . However, P r e s i d e n t

C a r t e r i s committed to the Camp David p r o c e s s , to which the Arabs

o u t s i d e Egypt a r e v i r t u a l l y unanimous i n b i t t e r o p p o s i t i o n .

I t has achieved peace between Egypt and I s r a e l but seems u n l i k e l y

to make s u b s t a n t i a l progress on autonomy arrangements f o r the

P a l e s t i n i a n s of the West Bank and Gaza. B r i t a i n has c o n s i s t e n t l y

supported Camp David as a t r a n s i t i o n a l means toward an o v e r a l l

settlement which would take account of l e g i t i m a t e P a l e s t i n i a n

i n t e r e s t s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t has become c l e a r that Camp David

w i l l not touch the c e n t r a l p o l i t i c a l problem. I n the s i t u a t i o n

I have o u t l i n e d and i n a US P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n y e a r , Europe

cannot l e t matters take t h e i r course. The Nine are w e l l placed

to b u i l d a bridge between the US and the Arabs and t o f i n d a way

to b u i l d on the achievements of Camp David toward a s o l u t i o n of

the wider A r a b / I s r a e l problems.

6. To t h i s end, I propose to canvass with the United S t a t e s

and with European c o l l e a g u e s the p o s s i b i l i t y that the UK with the

Nine might launch a new S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n , intended to

r e a f f i r m Resolution 242 and supplement i t with p r o v i s i o n f o r

P a l e s t i n i a n s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ( d r a f t annexed). A p r i n c i p a l aim

i s to s e c u r e , through t h e i r acceptance of a new r e s o l u t i o n , a

c l e a r endorsement by the PLO of the p r i n c i p l e s of Resolution 242

i n c l u d i n g I s r a e l ' s r i g h t t o e x i s t . The proposal i s a very simple

/one but

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one but could i f s u c c e s s f u l provide a b a s i s f o r future peace

efforts. I t addresses the problem of p r o v i s i o n f o r the

future of the P a l e s t i n i a n s which has b e d e v i l l e d a l l attempts

to r e s o l v e t h i s c o n f l i c t over the l a s t ten y e a r s . I t also

o f f e r s a way forward on the problem of P a l e s t i n i a n

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , without which no n e g o t i a t i o n w i l l reach a

settlement. The Arabs w i l l not countenance any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

other than that by P a l e s t i n i a n l e a d e r s themselves ( e s s e n t i a l l y

the PLO). I s r a e l w i l l not contemplate n e g o t i a t i o n with the

PLO u n t i l that o r g a n i s a t i o n has accepted I s r a e l ' s r i g h t to

exist. I f a d r a f t on the l i n e s proposed were supported by

the PLO, a point we should wish to e s t a b l i s h i n preparation

f o r a move, t h i s o b s t a c l e could be removed.

7. The idea of a f r e s h r e s o l u t i o n i s not new. A Kuwaiti

d r a f t ( l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y ) i n August 1979 was overtaken by

the Andy Young a f f a i r and was never voted on. Others have

canvassed s i m i l a r proposals s i n c e , i n c l u d i n g King Hussein.

The Americans see some a t t r a c t i o n i n i t but are anxious that

nothing should be done to p r e j u d i c e Camp David. We share

t h i s concern. The Arabs are l i k e l y to be d i v i d e d . Israel

w i l l be opposed i f she cannot be persuaded of the advantage to

her of PLO acceptance of her r i g h t to e x i s t . T h i s may be

d i f f i c u l t ; I s r a e l i s t r a t e g y has concentrated h i t h e r t o on

e x c l u d i n g the PLO from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But as r e a l i s t s

we should recognise that I s r a e l must e i t h e r l i v e at peace with

her P a l e s t i n i a n neighbours or p e r p e t u a l l y at war with the

Arab world. In any event the wider c r i s i s w i l l not brook delay

8. I seek my c o l l e a g u e s ' agreement:

( i ) to explore f u r t h e r with our European p a r t n e r s the

p o s s i b i l i t y of such an i n i t i a t i v e ;

(ii) to sound out Arab and I s r a e l i views;

/(iii)

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( i i i ) s u b j e c t to these contacts and to a s a t i s f a c t o r y

understanding with the US A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , to

b r i n g forward a new S e c u r i t y Council Resolution

at a s u i t a b l e moment. T h i s may not be u n t i l after

the Camp David deadline i n May.

9. I am sending copies of t h i s minute to the other

members of OD and to S i r Robert Armstrong.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth O f f i c e

13 February 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ,

Conscious of the urgent n e c e s s i t y of a j u s t and l a s t i n g

peace i n the Middle E a s t through a comprehensive

settlement based on f u l l respect f o r the p r i n c i p l e s and

purposes of the C h a r t e r .

Convinced that a j u s t and l a s t i n g peace i n the Middle

East w i l l not be p o s s i b l e unless the future of the

P a l e s t i n i a n people i s r e s o l v e d i n a manner s a t i s f a c t o r y

to the P a l e s t i n i a n s themselves.

1. Reaffirms

( i ) i t s r e s o l u t i o n s r e l e v a n t to the Middle E a s t ,

in p a r t i c u l a r 242 (1967) and 338 (1973);

(ii) the r i g h t of P a l e s t i n i a n refugees wishing to

return to t h e i r homes and l i v e at peace with t h e i r

neighbours to do so and the r i g h t of those choosing

not to return to r e c e i v e compensation f o r t h e i r

property, i n accordance with r e l e v a n t General Assembly

r e s o l u t i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r r e s o l u t i o n 194(111) of

11 December 1948.

2. Affirms

that i n the context of a negotiated comprehensive

settlement the P a l e s t i n i a n people should be able to

e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .

_ . M A W

9 MIDDLE ' ADVAKCE COPIES X - I d ;

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11 February 1980

The Prime M i n i s t e r h a s s e e n t h e d r a f t

OD p a p e r o n t h e A r a b / I s r a e l c o n f l i c t which

was e n c l o s e d w i t h y o u r l e t t e r o f 8 F e b r u a r y

to Michael Alexander.

She a g r e e s t h a t t h i s paper s h o u l d be
t h e s u b j e c t o f a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n a t OD.
S h e h a s c o m m e n t e d t h a t s h e f i n d s some a s p e c t s
of the paper very worrying indeed. The

F o r e i g n a n d Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y m i g h t l i k e

t o h a v e a w o r d w i t h h e r on t h e s u b j e c t b e f o r e

t h e p a p e r i s t a k e n i n OD.

MIKE PATTISON

Paul Lever, E s q . ,
F o r e i g n a n d Commonwwelth Office
10 DOWNING SjT/REET

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(A tht^-L^s brJl Ca+u^yTLA t* tut' Kt- (pn*~$ •
COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

8 February 1980

Arab/Israel: A European Initiative

We spoke by telephone t h i s morning about

the paper which Lord Carrington proposes to

c i r c u l a t e i n OD on the need f o r a European

i n i t i a t i v e on the Middle E a s t . I enclose a

copy of the d r a f t which he has approved.

(P L e v e r )

Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander E s q

10 Downing S t r e e t

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

D S R 11 (Revised) PAPER FOR OD CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +
FROM:
Reference

Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT: T E L . NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TO:
Your Reference
Top Secret
Prime Minister
Secret

Confidential
Copies to:

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING SUBJECT: ARAB/ISRAEL

• In Confidence 1. I was i n v i t e d by t h e Committee a t the meeting

CAVEAT. of 22 January to bring forward a paper on possible

British moves in relation to the A r a b / I s r a e l conflict.

2. Events i n Afghanistan threaten the s t a b i l i t y

of the region a s a whole through subversion and d i r e c t

Soviet military intervention. The I s l a m i c world h a s

reacted strongly and t h e r e s u l t s of the I s l a m i c

conference i n I s l a m a b a d a r e an e n c o u r a g i n g start. The

Soviet intervention has created a unique opportunity for

the West to counter Soviet influence i n a l l i a n c e with the

countries o f t h e T h i r d World ± f t h e p r e s e n t condemnation
n

of the Soviet U n i o n oould b e t r a n s f o r m e d into lasting

readiness i n t h e I s l a m i c and n o n - a l i g n e d countries to

work e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h t h e West f o r t h e i r common s e c u r i t y .

This opportunity must not be m i s s e d .

Enclosures—flag(s). 3. In practice, t h e main o b s t a c l e to such collaboration

with the Islamic countries remains their committed

opposition t o US p o l i c y i n t h e A r a b / I s r a e l c o n f l i c t and

what they see as a wider.Western failure to take

/ effective

CONFIDENTIAL
56-ST Dd 0532078 12/78 H*P Ltd Bly

CONFIDENTIAL

e f f e c t i v e s t e p s to r e s o l v e the c o n f l i c t . In

p a r t i c u l a r I s r a e l ' s continuing presence i n the

t e r r i t o r i e s occupied i n 1967, with the exception of

the S i n a i , coupled with her settlement of those

t e r r i t o r i e s and i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Lebanon, p o l i c i e s

made p o s s i b l e by American m i l i t a r y and f i n a n c i a l support

i s seen by the I s l a m i c world as an a f f r o n t . The loss

of E a s t Jerusalem i s a s p e c i f i c a l l y I s l a m i c i s s u e . The

West i s seen as having a p a r t i c u l a r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to

put p r e s s u r e on I s r a e l to modify her p o l i c i e s . I am

convinced that i f we are to r e i n f o r c e opposition to

S o v i e t a c t i o n i n Afghanistan we must take s t e p s now to

demonstrate our commitment to a speedy peace settlement

of the A r a b / I s r a e l d i s p u t e , a s s u r i n g the s e c u r i t y of

I s r a e l w i t h i n i t s 1967 f r o n t i e r s and acceptable to the

I s l a m i c world.

4. The b a s i s for a settlement of the c o n f l i c t s i n c e

1967 has been and should remain R e s o l u t i o n 242, with

i t s p r o v i s i o n f o r I s r a e l i withdrawal, coupled with an

assurance of I s r a e l ' s r i g h t to e x i s t i n peace w i t h i n

secure and recognised boundaries. A p o l i t i c a l settlement

must a l s o meet the l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s of the P a l e s t i n i a n

people, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r r i g h t to a homeland. 242

does not cover this.

5. Only the United S t a t e s can i n f l u e n c e I s r a e l

s u f f i c i e n t l y to achieve a peace negotiated on this

basis. However, P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r i s committed to the C^mp

David p r o c e s s , to which the Arabs o u t s i d e Egypt are v i r t u H y

unanimous i n b i t t e r o p p o s i t i o n . I t has achieved peace

/ between

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CONFIDENTIAL DSR 11C

between Egypt and I s r a e l but seems u n l i k e l y to make

s u b s t a n t i a l progress on autonomy arrangements for the

P a l e s t i n i a n ! of the West Bank and Gaza. B r i t a i n has con­

s i s t e n t l y supported Camp David as a t r a n s i t i o n a l means

toward an o v e r a l l settlement which would take account of

legitimate Palestinian i n t e r e s t s . Unfortunately, i t

has become c l e a r that Camp David w i l l not touch the c e n t r a l

p o l i t i c a l problem. I n the s i t u a t i o n I have o u t l i n e d and i n

a US P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n year Europe cannot l e t matters

take t h e i r course. The Nine are w e l l placed to b u i l d a

bridge between the US and the Arabs and to f i n d a way

to b u i l d on the achievements of Camp David toward a s o l u t i o n

of the wider A r a b / I s r a e l problems.

6. To t h i s end, I have begun to canvass with the United

S t a t e s and with Erjiiopean c o l l e a g u e s the p o s s i b i l i t y that

the UK with the Nine might launch a new S e c u r i t y Council

R e s o l u t i o n , intended to r e a f f i r m R e s o l u t i o n 242 and

supplement i t with p r o v i s i o n for P a l e s t i n i a n s e l f - d e t e r m i n a ­

t i o n ( d r a f t annexed). The proposal i s a very simple one

but could i f s u c c e s s f u l provide a b a s i s f o r future peace

efforts. I t addresses the problem of p r o v i s i o n f o r the

future of the P a l e s t i n i a n s ^ w h i c h has b e d e v i l l e d a l l attempts

to r e s o l v e t h i s c o n f l i c t over the l a s t ten y e a r s . I t also

o f f e r s a way forward on the problem of P a l e s t i n i a n representa

tion^without which no n e g o t i a t i o n w i l l reach a s e t t l e m e n t .

The Arabs w i l l not countenance any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n other

than that by P a l e s t i n i a n l e a d e r s themselves (essentially

the PLO). I s r a e l w i l l not contemplate n e g o t i a t i o n with the

PLO u n t i l that o r g a n i s a t i o n has accepted I s r a e l ' s r i g h t t o
^ m m ^ m * — m m ^ ^

exist. I f a d r a f t on the l i n e s proposed were supported by

CONFIDENTIAL

the PLO, a point we should wish to e s t a b l i s h i n p r e p a r a t i o

for a move, t h i s o b s t a c l e could be removed.

7. The idea of a f r e s h r e s o l u t i o n i s not new. A Kuwaiti

d r a f t ( l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y ) i n August 1979 was overtaken

by the Andy Young a f f a i r and was never voted on. Others

have canvassed s i m i l a r proposals s i n c e , i n c l u d i n g King

Hussein. The Americans see some a t t r a c t i o n in i t but are

anxious that nothing should be done to p r e j u d i c e Camp

David. We share t h i s oconcern. The Arabs would be d i v i d e d .

I s r a e l would be deeply opposed. I s r a e l i s t r a t e g y has

concentrated h i t h e r t o on excluding above a l l the PLO

from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But as r e a l i s t s we should recognise

that I s r a e l must e i t h e r l i v e at peace with her P a l e s t i n i a n

neighbours or p e r p e t u a l l y at war with the Arab world. In

any event the wider c r i s i s w i l l not brook d e l a y .

8. I seek my c o l l e a g u e s ' agreement:

( i ) to explore f u r t h e r with our European p a r t n e r s

the p o s s i b i l i t y of such an initiative;

_£ii) to seek Arab support;

( i i i ) s u b j e c t to these c o n t a c t s and to a s a t i s f a c t o r y

understanding with the US A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , to

bring forward a new S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n

at a s u i t a b l e moment. T h i s may not be u n t i l

a f t e r the Camp David deadline i n May.

DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ,

C o n s c i o u s of the urgent necessity of a just and lasting

peace i n the Middle East through a comprehensive settlement

b a s e d on f u l l - r e s p e c t for the p r i n c i p l e s and p u r p o s e s of the

Charter

Convinced that a just and l a s t i n g peace "in the Middle East

will not be p o s s i b l e unless the future o f the P a l e s t i n i a n

people is resolved i n a manner satisfactory to the

Palestinians themselves

1. Reaffirms

(i) its resolutions relevant to the Middle East,

i n p a r t i c u l a r 242 (1967) and 338 (1973);

(ii) the r i g h t of P a l e s t i n i a n refugees wishing to

return to t h e i r homes and live at peace with their

neighbours to do so and the right of those choosing not

to r e t u r n to receive compensation for their property, i

accordance with r e l e v a n t G e n e r a l Assembly resolutions,

in p a r t i c u l a r resolution 194 ( I I I ) of 11 December 1948

2.Affirms

that i n the context of a negotiated comprehensive

settlement the P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e s h o u l d be a b l e to

exercise their right of self-determination.
10 D O W N I N G S T R E E T

CONFIDENTIAL
h

FM WASHINGTON 082339Z FEB 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 653 OF 8 FEBRUARY, 1980,
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,
RABAT, HMCG JERUSALEM, UKMIS NEW YORK AND EEC POSTS,
INFO SAVING BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS,
ABU DHABI, SANAA, ADEN AND KHARTOUM.

TALK WITH BRZEZINSKI: CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS.

1. WHEN I SAW BRZEZINSKI TODA I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF
v

C L A R I F Y I N G WITH HIM WHERE WE STOOD ON THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN
INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RELATING TO THE PALESTINIANS.
I EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS *iS TC GET O^F THE HOOK ON
WHICH THE U S WERE IMPALED. THE BEAUTY OF A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION WOULD EE THAT IT WOULD RE ER TC RESOLUTION 2^2 SC THAT
r

THE PALESTINIANS, IF THEY ACOE-'ED IT, WOULD 3E ACCEPTING
ISRAEL'S FIGHT JO EXIST; AND IT WOULD EE EASIER O~ THE
r

PALESTINIANS TC DO THIS IN SUCK A WA THAN BY SOME SEPARATE ANZ
V

SPECIFIC DECLARATION,

2. *Y UNDERSTANDING OF THE " \yc MINISTER'S TALK WI TH THE
PRESIDENT !N DECE"3E WAS H AT WHEN THE FORMER HAD MENTIONED
? T

THE IDEA OF I EUROPEAN INITIATIVE THE PRESIDENT HAL ASSENTED.
HE HAD DONE SG IN A WAV, ACCORDING TC * READING OF THE WAY
v

THE CONVERSATION HAD GONE, THAT INDICATED THAT IT WOULD Be .
EASIER FOR THE EUROPEANS TO DC THIS THAN THE AMERICANS AND"
INDEED IT MIGHT BE TC THE ADVANTAGE OF THE LATTER THAT IT

SHOULD COME ABOUT IN THAT WAY. AFTER BRZEZINSKI HAD NODDED HIS

ASSENT TC THIS, I WENT CN TO SA THAT LlNOWlTZ WAS NOW

V

SUGGESTING THAT A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR

THE AMERICANS BECAUSE IT WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE AUTONOMY

NEGOTIATIONS AND 3E UNACCEPTABLE TC THE ISRAELIS AND WOULD

REQUIRE THE U S TO COMMIT ITSELF IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN A

WAY THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS.

3. BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT THESE WERE "HE ARGUMENTS TH AT THOSE

WHO OPPOSED SUCH AN INITIATIVE IN WASHINGTON WE=: USING. HE

/ 7r±o a a-fif­
C o rs(& O ^ rv N'A/L

THOUGHT I T WAS LARGELY A QUESTION OF T I M I N G . I F THERE WAS A
CHANCE OF THE CURRENT AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEEDING AND OF
THE I S R A E L I S ACCEPTING A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT THEN HE THOUGHT
THAT T H I S WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE PALESTINIANS THAN THE IDEA OF
BRINGING THEM IN TO THE NEGOTIATIONS EARLIER WHICH MIGHT WELL
THREATEN THEIR SUCCESS. I S A I D THAT I THOUGHT I T WAS UNLIKELY
THAT THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PRODUCE AGREEMENT WITHIN
THE STIPULATED TIME L I M I T OF THE END OF MAY. MEANWHILE THE U S'S
POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY CONTINUED TC BE HAMPERED
BY CAMP DAVID, AND WITH I T THE WHOLE IDEA OF THE FRAMEWORK OF
SECURITY. THE U S INDEED WERE ACTING WITH ONE HAND T I E D BY THE
CAMP DAVID COMMITMENT AND THE EXCLUSION OF THE PALESTINIANS.
4. BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY AGREED THAT AMERICA'S
POSITION WAS MADE D I F F I C U L T I N THE AREA BY THE CAMP DAVID
PROCESS. HE HIMSELF D I D NOT DENY T H I S , THOUGH OTHERS MIGHT.
NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT THAT THERE MIGHT WELL 3E A SUCCESSFUL
NEGOTIATION CONCLUDING MUCH SOONER THAN I WAS SUGGESTING. *HE
HAD BEEN STRUCK DURING H I S V I S I T TO SAUDI ARABIA E V
THE
DIFFERENCE IN THE SAUDI ATTITUDE SINCE HE WAS THERE LAST SPRING.
CN THAT OCCASION THEY HAD DISMISSED THE WHOLE CAM=> DAVID ROUTE
AS A DOOMED B L I N D ALLEY. NOW THEY L A I D THE EMPHASIS ON THE NEED
FOR THE AMERICANS TC PRODUCE RA ID PROGRESS B C V
PRESSURE ON THE
ISRAELIS. THE IMPLICATION (HE WOULD NOT RATE I T HIGHER THAN
THAT) SEEMED TO EE THAT f F THE AMERICANS COULD SC BY PURSUING
THEIR QAMF DAVID COURSE, TH A" WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED IT
PRODUCED THE z RgsULT QUICKLY,
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FM WASHINGTON 080100Z FEB 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 633 OF 7 FEBRUARY
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA RABAT
HMCG JERUSALEM UKMIS NEW YORK AND EEC POSTS
INFO SAVING TO BAGHDAD BAHRAIN KUWAIT TRIPOLI ALGIERS ABU DHABI
SANA'A ADEN AND KHARTOUN.
I

ARAB/ISRAEL - CALL CN AMBASSADOR LINOWlTZ

1. ON SEEING HIM TODAY I BEGAN BY MAKING IT CLEAR TO LINOWlTZ
THAT THE FACT THAT YOU HAD NOT RAISED WITH HIM THE QUESTION OF
A POSSIBLE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DID NOT
MEAN THAT YOU HAD IN ANY WAY SHELVED THE IDEA. HE READILY TOOK
THE POINT, STATING THAT HE HAD NOT FORMED THE OPPOSITE IMPRESSION
BUT THOUGHT THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE DECIDED TO LET IT DROP FOR THE
MOMENT. HE ASKED MORE ABOUT THE THINKING BEHIND IT.

2. I DREW ON YOUR TELNO. 51 TO ROME, STRESSING THAT WE SAW ANY

SUCH INITIATIVE AS HELPING TO FILL AN IMPORTANT GAP BY BRINGING

THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO INTO THE PROCESS WHILE NCT CUTTING

ACROSS CAMP DAVID. I ADDED, AND HE AGREED, THAT THE BRITISH

l*ERE FAR FROM ALONE IN THE COMMUNITY IN FEELING THAT IT MIGHT

BE TIME FOR A MOVE OF THIS SORT. I COMPARED OUR THINKING TO

THAT WHICH HAD LED THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES CLOSE TO DOING

SOMETHING SIMILAR IN AUGUST 1979. I COULD UNDERSTAND WHY IT

WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO REPEAT THE INITIATIVE NOW BUT

THOUGHT THAT THE EUROPEANS DOING SO SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER.

I HAD EARLIER UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT
BE INCONVENIENCED BY SUCH A EUROPEAN MOVE. MORE RECENTLY,
HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS APPEARED TO HAVE HESITATIONS, PERHAPS
BASED ON THE FEELING THAT AN INITIATIVE OF THIS KIND MIGHT UPSET
THE NEW SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. ON THE PLO LINOWlTZ SAID THAT, AS HE HAD ALREADY SAID TO
HUSSEIN, FAHD AND HASSAN CN HIS RECENT TOUR, FOR BETTER OR WORSE
THE AMERICANS WERE STUCK WITH THEIR 1975 COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL
(WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A QUOTE PARANOID UNQUOTE COUNTRY WHENEVER

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ANYTHING THAT THEY SAW AS THREATENING THEIR SECURITY WAS Q
INVOLVED). AS A RESULT OF HIS TOUR, HE THOUGHT THAT THE CHANCES
OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS MAKING PROGRESS WERE BETTER THAN HE AND
OTHERS IN WASHINGTON HAD BELElVED BEFORE IT, AMD HE WAS ANXIOUS
NOT TO ROCK THE BOAT. WITHOUT KNOWING IN DETAIL WHAT WE
ENVISAGED, THE SORT OF MOVE WE SEEMED TO HAVE IN MIND MIGHT WIN
THE PALESTINIANS BUT LOSE THE ISRAELIS. HE HAD DISCUSSED THE
PLO AT SOME LENGTH WITH PRINCE SAUD (WHO HAD GREATLY IMPRESSED
HIM), REMINDED HIM OF THE U.S. UNDERTAKING TO ISRAEL AND ASKED
WHETHER HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN THE PROBLEM TO THE PLO
AND SEE IF THEY COULD NOT BE PERSUADED TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE
STATEMENT. SAUD HAD ASKED WHAT THE AMERICANS WOULD OFFER THE PLO
IN RETURN AND LINOWITZ HAD REPLIED THAT THAT WAS SOMETHING WHICH
COULD BE DISCUSSED. ASKED WHAT REASON HE HAD TO BELIEVE THAT THIS
APPROACH THROUGH THE SAUDIS HAD A BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING THAN
THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT IN 1977 (OF WHICH HE WAS UNAWARE) HE REPLIED
THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGED THAT SAUD HAD NOT REJECTED THE IDEA.

4. THE LAST NEGOTIATING ROUND HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING. HE THOUGHT
THAT HIS COULD IN PART BE EXPLAINED BY THE FACT THAT ONLY 20
MINUTES OUT OF ONE AND HALF DAYS HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN PLENARY.
HE READ OUT (AND ASKED ME NOT TO TAKE NOTES) THE LIST OF 17 OR
18 POWERS WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED TO HAND OVER TO THE
SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. (THEY SOUNDED VERY LIKE THOSE IN THE
EARLIER ISRAELI PLAN BUT LINOWITZ EXPLAINED THAT THEY REPRESENTED
AN ADVANCE BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS NOW AGREED THAT THE POWERS
SHOULD BE HANDED OVER UNDERLINE FOLLOWING THREE WORDS IN THEIR
ENTIRETY). THE U.S. AND ISRAELIS HAD WANTED TO MAKE THIS LI ST
PUBLIC BUT THE EGYPTIANS HAD REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
INFERENCE WOULD BE DRAWN THAT UNMENTIONED POWERS WOULD BE

EXCLUDED (WHICH WAS EMPHATICALLY NOT THE CASE).

5. LINOWITZ HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH HIS ENCOUNTERS WITH HUSSEIN,
FAHD, SAUD AND HASSAN. HE HAD FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD
BEEN ABLE TO DISPEL THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICAN FCLLOW-UP
TO CAMP DAVID WAS ALL WORDS AND NO ACTION. HIS INTERLOCUTORS HAD
LISTENED TO HIM WITH INTEREST, EXPRESSED SOME SCEPTICISM ABOUT
HIS CHANCES OF SUCCESS BUT WERE GLAD TO BE KEPT INFORMED AND HAD
ADMITTED THAT IT WAS HARD TO SEE WHAT REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES THERE

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WERE TO THE PRESENT COURSE. THEY HAD NOT OFFERED SUPPORT, BUT
HAD EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR BEING KEPT IN TOUCH. HE HAD ALSO
MET THE MAYOR OF GAZA (WHO HAD THE DAY BEFORE SEEN ARAFAT WHO HAD
RAISED NO OBJECTION TO HIS MEETING LINOWlTZ) AND A QUOTE
LEADING PALESTINIAN WHO HAD SERVED IN HUSSEIN'S GOVERNMENT
UNQUOTE. BOTH MEETINGS HAD BEEN FRANK AND NEITHER DISCOURAGING
EVEN IF HE HAD BEEN GIVEN NO PROMISES OF WILLINGNESS TO BE
INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS. WITH BEGIN HE WORKED HARD THE THEME THAT
ISRAEL OWED IT TO HER. OWN CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD
TD FULFIL HER COMMITMENT TO QUOTE FULL AUTONOMY UNQUOTE (HOWEVER
UNDEFINED AT CAMP DAVID). HE THOUGH HE HAD MADE SOME IMPACT.
6. I ASKED HOW HE SAW THE TlMEABLE FOR THE NEXT MONTHS. HE SAID
THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO BOTH
SADAT AND BEGIN THAT THEY SHOULD NOT COUNT ON ANOTHER SUMMIT TC
RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES .THOUGH LINOWlTZ ADMITTED THAT CNE COULD
NOT BE RULED OUT IF THE GAP WAS CLOSED SUFFICIENTLY). IF THE MAY
DEADLINE WAS NOT MET BUT A GOOD MOMENTUM HAD BUILT UP AND
OUTSTANDING ISSUES REDUCED TO MANAGEABLE PROPORTIONS, HE
ENVISAGED A THREE MONTH EXTENSION.
7. I CONCLUDE FROM THIS TALK THAT LINOWlTZ, FROM HIS NARROW
NEGOTIATING VIEWPOINT, WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST A EUROPEAN
INITIATIVE WHICH HE SEES AS LEADING TO AN AWKWARD VOTE FOR THE
AMERICANS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IN ANY CASE AS DANGEROUS
IN TERMS OF THE LIKELY ISRAELI REACTION. I SUSPECT THAT HIS
INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT ARE TO KEEP CAMP DAVID ALIVE AT
LEAST UNTIL THE PRIMARIES AND BOTH PARTY CONVENTIONS ARE OUT CF
THE WAY (HENCE THE THREE MONTH EXTENSION).
8. I SHALL BE SEEING SAUNDERS ON 11 FEBRUARY, AND HE WILL NO
DOUBT SEE THINGS FROM A RATHER WIDER ANGLE.
FCO PASS SAVING BAGHDAD BAHRAIN KUWAIT TRIPOLI ALGIERS ABU DHABI
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u^rlUcnllAL

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE

PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, MR. MALCOLM FRASER, AT NO.10

DOWNING STREET ON 4 FEBRUARY, 1980, AT 12 NOON

Present:

Prime Minister
The R t . Hon. M a l c o l m F r a s e r

F o r e i g n and Commonwealth The Hon. M i c h a e l M a c K e l l a r

Secretary
S i r G. Yeend
S i r Robert Armstrong
Mr. P . Henderson
S i r Michael Palliser
Mr. W. P r i t c h e t t
S i r F r a n k Cooper
Mr. R. F e r n a n d e z
Mr. Hugh C o r t a z z i

Mr. M i c h a e l Alexander

Post-Afghanistan Situation

In r e p l y t o a q u e s t i o n from t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r , Mr. F r a s e r

s a i d t h a t he h a d d e t e c t e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a new s e n s e o f

d e t e r m i n a t i o n and u n i t y . A number o f s e n i o r A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c i a n s

(Mr. F r a s e r m e n t i o n e d M e s s r s . M u s k i e and J a v i t s ) h a d t o l d him t h a t

the s e n s e o f c o h e s i v e n e s s i n t h e country and t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n

not t o b e p u s h e d a r o u n d was g r e a t e r t h a n a t any t i m e s i n c e t h e w a r .

Nonetheless the p o s i t i o n of the United S t a t e s remained a l o n e l y

one. They f e l t t h e need f o r f r i e n d s and f o r s u p p o r t . Failing

t h i s , t h e r e was a r i s k that t h e y would once more become i n t r o s p e c t i v

and s e l f - q u e s t i o n i n g , and t h a t t h e l e a d e r s h i p t h e y were now g i v i n g

would f a l t e r . The Administration intended t o b u i l d up t h e c o u n t r y ' s

defensive capability. They were t a l k i n g o f making additional

deployments i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n . A t t h e same t i m e t h e r e was a

sharp r e a l i s a t i o n of the l i m i t s of t h e i r c o n v e n t i o n a l power i n

that part of the world. A s t a r t h a d been made w i t h t h e

commitments g i v e n i n P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s S t a t e o f the Union

Message, b u t much work would b e needed t o make t h o s e commitments

credible. T h e r e would be a r o l e h e r e f o r a number o f c o u n t r i e s .

/ The A u s t r a l i a n

LGfcriL trail 1

- 2 -

The Australian Foreign M i n i s t e r , Mr. P e a c o c k , on h i s recent
trip t o S o u t h E a s t A s i a , had found t h e Governments t h e r e prepared
to t.Rke a r o b u s t a t t i t u d e - at l e a s t i n p r i v a t e . However, they
were c o n s c i o u s o f t h e w e a k e n i n g of t h e A m e r i c a n commitment t o
the a r e a w h i c h had occurred i n the l a t t e r stages o f the Vietnam
war, and which they a s s o c i a t e d w i t h P r e s i d e n t Nixon's statement
on Guam. They w e r e d o u b t f u l about t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' determination
t o f a c e up to t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . Once t h e y had brought themselves
to believe in t h i s , t h e y would be p r e p a r e d t o be more robust
in public. Mr. P e a c o c k had a l s o s e e n Mrs. Gandhi. She had taken
a l e s s h e l p f u l l i n e w i t h him t h a n s h e had done i n h e r press
conference a f t e r her meeting w i t h the F o r e i g n and Commonwealth
Secretary. She had delivered a tirade against the United S t a t e s
whose r o l e i n V i e t n a m she had s a i d was no d i f f e r e n t from that
of the S o v i e t Union i n A f g h a n i s t a n . Mr. F r a s e r s a i d that he
expected continuing d i f f i c u l t i e s with I n d i a and Pakistan. The
Foreign and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t Mrs. Gandhi was
a n t i - A m e r i c a n but not necessarily pro-Soviet. She was afraid of
the Chinese. She had t o l d P r e s i d e n t G i s c a r d t h a t she intended
to play a leading role i n t h e n o n - a l i g n e d movement. The
Foreign and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y s a i d that i n h i s view there
w o u l d be a considerable role f o r W e s t e r n E u r o p e and Australia
i n keeping India in play. The A m e r i c a n s had so f a r played the
hand c l u m s i l y . The l a t e s t e v i d e n c e of t h i s was the imbalance
in the delegations t h e y had sent to D e l h i and Islamabad.
Mr. C l i f f o r d was a considerably less significant figure that
Mr. Brzezinski.

The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d that she agreed with what Mr. Fraser

had said about t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . I t was essential that the

West s t i c k together i n the face of recent events. The Soviet

Union's a c t i o n i n Afghanistan d i d not represent a change of

policy. But i t had served to r e v e a l t h a t p o l i c y to the world

at l a r g e . What was now r e q u i r e d was continuing condemnation and

continuing watchfulness. I t was no use e x p e c t i n g that the

S o v i e t U n i o n would change i t s p o l i c y . But r e s i s t a n c e to the

S o v i e t U n i o n demanded t h a t the West s h o u l d s t a n d together. We
s h o u l d h i g h l i g h t the t h r e a t to the r i g h t of the non-aligned to
d e t e r m i n e t h e i r own destiny.

Fraser

*w I r 1t ' . . I • , ,. . l

- 3 -

Mr. F r a s e r r e p e a t e d t h a t he saw the critical element i n

the situation as b e i n g t h e need t o b r i n g home t o t h e Russians

the r e a l i t y of P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s S t a t e of the Union Message.

He d i d not himself s e e how the U n i t e d S t a t e s could in the

present circumstances defend the P e r s i a n G u l f . There would be

attractions f o r the R u s s i a n s i n a move a g a i n s t the G u l f now.

The Foreign and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t he did not

think the i m m e d i a t e d a n g e r was the m i l i t a r y one. The Soviet

p r e s e n c e i n A f g h a n i s t a n gave them' g r e a t l y e n h a n c e d possibilities

for subversion, e.g. i n I r a n o r S o u t h Yemen. The Prime Minister

commented t h a t t h e West had been v e r y s l o w t o f o c u s on the

need t o d e v e l o p t e c h n i q u e s o f c o u n t e r - s u b v e r s i o n . There was

a considerable d i f f e r e n c e i n the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of democratic

and t o t a l i t a r i a n s t a t e s to s u b v e r s i o n . Successful resistance

by the countries of the Middle E a s t to s u b v e r s i o n would require
an e f f o r t on t h e i r own part. Mr. F r a s e r s a i d that whether
the immediate c h a l l e n g e was subversive or m i l i t a r y , he
was concerned that t h e West's f a i l u r e to respond would l e a d the
states i n the Middle E a s t to r e g a r d t h e West as a s p e n t force.

Once t h e y had reached that conclusion they would look f o r an

accommodation w i t h the S o v i e t U n i o n . Moreover, the judgement

of the S o v i e t U n i o n as t o how f a r they could force matters i n

t h e M i d d l e E a s t was not t o be r e l i e d upon. I t l o o k e d as though

t h e y had miscalculated the e f f e c t s of the invasion of

Afghanistan. They c o u l d e a s i l y make a n o t h e r m i s c a l c u l a t i o n about

the ability and w i l l o f t h e A m e r i c a n s t o r e s i s t a move, f o r

example,into I r a n . The Foreign and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y said

t h a t M e s s r s . K i s s i n g e r and Bush d i d not agree t h a t the Soviet

i n v a s i o n had been t h e r e s u l t o f a miscalculation. They argued

t h a t the R u s s i a n s knew t h e y at p r e s e n t enjoyed s u p e r i o r military

strength, and that t h e n e x t two o r t h r e e y e a r s w o u l d o f f e r them

a unique opportunity to e x p l o i t t h a t s u p e r i o r i t y . Mr. Fraser

r e p e a t e d t h a t w h i c h e v e r a n a l y s i s was c o r r e c t , the v i t a l thing

now was to ensure t h a t P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s p o s i t i o n was credible.

/ Mr. Fraser

rf—» T ^ * I •• * I t •*

Mr. F r a s e r asked about the a t t i t u d e s of the Europeans.

He argued that the t h r e a t i n Europe was now less pressing

than that elsewhere. I n Europe the demarcation l i n e s were

c l e a r l y drawn. Elsewhere the s i t u a t i o n was less well defined,

and the options f o r S o v i e t a c t i o n and mischief-making were

much g r e a t e r . Moreover, whereas a c t i o n i n Europe would

c e r t a i n l y meet a u n i t e d response by the A l l i e s , t h i s was much

l e s s l i k e l y i n other p a r t s of the w o r l d . The Foreign and

Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t he had spent some time i n

the p r e v i o u s two days d i s c u s s i n g the s i t u a t i o n with the French

Foreign M i n i s t e r . M. F r a n c o i s Poncet. The French a n a l y s i s

was e x a c t l y the same as h i s own. The only d i f f i c u l t y was that

they did not wish to be seen to be f o l l o w i n g the l e a d of the

Americans. In r e t r o s p e c t , i t had perhaps been a mistake not

to have summoned a meeting of the Foreign M i n i s t e r s very s h o r t l y

a f t e r the i n v a s i o n of Afghanistan and to have attempted to

e l a b o r a t e a joint r e a c t i o n before i n d i v i d u a l Western Governments

had taken up t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . As regards the Germans, t h e i r

p o s i t i o n was d i f f e r e n t i n c e r t a i n important r e s p e c t s to the

other Western A l l i e s : the Germans had to d e a l with the problem

of the GDR, of B e r l i n , of O s t p o l i t i k and of the impending

elections. They agreed with our a n a l y s i s , but might not respond

i n the same way. Both France and Germany c l e a r l y recognised

the S o v i e t t h r e a t to the Middle E a s t o i l f i e l d s , to the Straits

of Hormuz and to a c c e s s to the Red Sea.

In response to a question from the Prime M i n i s t e r about the

next s t e p s , Mr. F r a s e r s a i d that A u s t r a l i a intended to play i t s

part. They would be p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n extended p a t r o l l i n g and

s u r v e i l l a n c e of the I n d i a n Ocean from Tangeh and Butterworth.

(The A u s t r a l i a n s had been planning to withdraw from Butterworth

next year f o l l o w i n g the a c q u i s i t i o n of new fighter aircraft, but

were now r e c o n s i d e r i n g the s i t u a t i o n . ) They would probably be

expanding t h e i r armed f o r c e s g e n e r a l l y . A decision in principle

had been taken. They would be b u i l d i n g up t h e i r own naval bases,

and might be o f f e r i n g the Americans the use of one i n Western A u s t r a l

/ They

dmk i a ti»
They w o u l d be o f f e r i n g a d d i t i o n a l e x e r c i s e f a c i l i t i e s for the

Americans i n A u s t r a l i a . (Mr. Fraser specifically mentioned

facilities f o r t h e B52 bomber.) They w o u l d be offering

a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g f o r members o f ASEAN. Australian civil

aid to the s m a l l n a t i o n s of t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c w o u l d be stepped

up, and opportunities f o r the Russians to i n t e r f e r e there

reduced. Permission for Soviet cruise ships to operate i n the

a r e a had been w i t h d r a w n . The A u s t r a l i a n Government w o u l d a l s o

like to d i s c u s s with t h e A m e r i c a n and B r i t i s h Governments the

possibility o f d r a w i n g up an embargo on the export of certain

s t r a t e g i c raw m a t e r i a l s s i m i l a r t o t h a t o p e r a t e d under the

COCOM r u l e s i n t h e s p h e r e o f h i g h technology.

Mr. F r a s e r a s k e d w h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g c o u l d be done t o b r e a t h e

life i n t o t h e 5 power d e f e n c e a r r a n g e m e n t s . He had not spoken

t o t h e o t h e r s i g n a t o r i e s , but he t h o u g h t t h a t t h e y w o u l d welcome

the r e s u s c i t a t i o n of the agreement. T h e r e might be an increase

in t h e number o f v i s i t s by British naval v e s s e l s o r a s h i p might

be based i n the a r e a . Annual c o n s u l t a t i o n s might t a k e place. The

s t e p s might not i n t h e m s e l v e s amount t o much, b u t they would h e l p to

c o n v i n c e t h e ASEAN n a t i o n s t h a t t h e West meant what i t s a i d . Sir

1 J t

F r a n k Cooper recalled/t5n e ' communique s i g n e d by t h e 5 powers i n 1971

p r o v i d e d f o r a c o n s u l t a t i o n among them i n t h e e v e n t o f a t h r e a t i n

the area. British military involvement i n the r e g i o n was at

present very small. We c a r r i e d out some t r a i n i n g , and had

p a r t i c i p a t e d i n two e x e r c i s e s i n the previous year. We intended

t o i n c r e a s e our n a v a l p r e s e n c e somewhat t h i s y e a r . The options

for the i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e w e r e e i t h e r t o i n c r e a s e the amount o f

t r a i n i n g we c a r r i e d o u t , w h i c h was a matter of priorities;

or to i n c r e a s e the l e v e l of c o n s u l t a t i o n , w h i c h was only

meaningful i f i t l e d to something c o n c r e t e . The Prime Minister

s a i d t h a t t h e m a t t e r s h o u l d be looked a t . I t c o u l d be of

i m p o r t a n c e i n what was at present essentially a psychological

war. Mr. F r a s e r agreed that i t was in this context that even

modest a c t i o n c o u l d be u s e f u l at p r e s e n t . No one was talking

of r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g the j o i n t task force. But more e x e r c i s e s ,

more v i s i t s and more c o n s u l t a t i o n c o u l d be valuable. He noted

/ in

- 6

in this c o n n e c t i o n t h a t t h e f o r t h c o m i n g m e e t i n g o f ANZUS had been

b r o u g h t f o r w a r d and t r a n s f e r r e d from New Zealand to Washington.

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a s k e d about t h e r o l e o f J a p a n . Despite

t h a t c o u n t r y ' s g r e a t w e a l t h , J a p a n was not a t p r e s e n t contributing

to the defence of the f r e e world.

Mr. Fraser said that e v e n today v i s i t s by J a p a n e s e military

vessels t o ASEAN o r A u s t r a l i a n p o r t s would c a u s e difficulties.

But t h e r e was no r e a s o n why t h e y s h o u l d not be active i n the

N o r t h West P a c i f i c , and thereby f r e e American s h i p s f o r a c t i o n

elsewhere. Mr. Brown had argued s t r o n g l y for this during h i s

recent v i s i t to Tokyo. A g r o w i n g body o f o p i n i o n i n J a p a n was

i n c l i n e d to agree. The J a p a n e s e w o u l d be p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n

e x e r c i s e s w i t h the Canadians and A u s t r a l i a n s l a t e r i n the y e a r .

A n y t h i n g t h e B r i t i s h Government c o u l d do t o e n c o u r a g e t h e Japanese

in t h i s d i r e c t i o n , as w e l l as i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f increasing

their civil a i d t o t h e s m a l l e r P a c i f i c S t a t e s , w o u l d be welcome.

I t would o f c o u r s e be important t o c o n s u l t t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s

at every step.

R e v e r t i n g t o t h e M i d d l e E a s t , t h e F o r e i g n and Commonwealth

Secretary commented on t h e a m b i v a l e n c e of a t t i t u d e s i n the

Middle E a s t to United S t a t e s m i l i t a r y involvement there. On

t h e one h a n d , M i d d l e E a s t Governments w a n t e d t h e b a c k i n g o f

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Government; on the o t h e r hand, they were

r e l u c t a n t to provide b a s e s . S a u d i A r a b i a would o f f e r nothing;

.Cman might o f f e r f a c i l i t i e s , but w o u l d not be p r e p a r e d to

h a v e any "white f a c e s " there; Somali and K e n y a might be

p r e p a r e d t o do s o m e t h i n g ; D i e g o G a r c i a was t o o f a r away. When

one was c o n s i d e r i n g the q u e s t i o n of European re-involvement

i n South E a s t A s i a , i t s h o u l d be b o r n e i n mind t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s

might w i s h t o r e - i n v o l v e the Europeans i n the Middle E a s t as

well. S i r F r a n k Cooper n o t e d t h a t the American a t t i t u d e was

very ambivalent at present. F o r many y e a r s t h e y had been

a r g u i n g t h a t the Europeans s h o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e on E u r o p e . Now,

r e c o g n i s i n g how little t h e y knew a b o u t t h e r e g i o n s where t h e

t h r e a t was i n c r e a s i n g , they were s e e k i n g t o i n t e r e s t the

, i

V«,W* r*h* ' ""**'"' / Europeans

- 7 -

Europeans i n problems o u t s i d e Europe. S i r Michael Palliser

s a i d that the A r a b / I s r a e l dispute i n e v i t a b l y complicated the
situation i n the Middle E a s t . The F o r e i g n and Commonwealth
Secretary said that the Americans had completely misunderstood
t h e Arab r e a c t i o n s t o t h e Camp D a v i d p r o c e s s . Mr. Linowitz

was still hoping that p r e s s u r e on t h e I s r a e l i s would make

an autonomy agreement p o s s i b l e . But i n f a c t s u c h an agreement

w o u l d have no e f f e c t on t h e A r a b s . They w a n t e d t h e P a l e s t i n i a n

problem s o l v e d , and d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s c o u l d be done

on t h e Camp D a v i d b a s i s . The A m e r i c a n s were blamed by t h e

Arabs f o r the I s r a e l i o c c u p a t i o n o f Arab l a n d s , and a s a r e s u l t

were e q u a t e d w i t h the Russians. Mr. F r a s e r wondered w h e t h e r

the Americans could not be p e r s u a d e d t o move t o w a r d s t h e

Arab p o s i t i o n . Mr. Vance h a d a c c e p t e d i n d i s c u s s i o n w i t h him

during h i s v i s i t t o Washington t h e n e e d t o be f i r m e r t h a n ever

with Israel. The F o r e i g n and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y said that

he had been p r e s s i n g t h e A m e r i c a n s f o r some time on this.

Iran

Mr. F r a s e r s a i d t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s were a p p r o a c h i n g t h e

h o s t a g e i s s u e much more c o o l l y now t h a n p r e v i o u s l y . They w e r e

p l a c i n g t h e i r hopes on t h e new P r e s i d e n t , Mr. B a n i , S a d r .

They were n o t l o o k i n g f o r f u r t h e r a c t i o n b e f o r e the forthcoming

elections i n Iran. The F o r e i g n and Commonwealth Secretary

n o t e d t h a t Mr. C u t l e r h a d , e a r l i e r i n t h e d a y , been o p t i m i s t i c

about t h e c h a n c e s o f p r o g r e s s .

The d i s c u s s i o n ended a t 1 3 1 0 , and t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s

adjourned f o r lunch. The d i s c u s s i o n t h e r e i s recorded s e p a r a t e l y .

4 F e b r u a r y 1980

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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CONFIDENTIAL ECLIPSE
FM DOHA 2 4 1 1 3 0 2 JAN 8 8
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 9 OF 2 4 JANUARY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON* ROUTINE KUWAIT, JEDDA, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI,
DU3AI AND MUSCAT.
SAVING PARIS, TOKYO AND ROME.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE.

1. THE FIRST FRUITS OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE I N QATAR WERE A L'CNC
AND EXTRAORDINARILY EMPHATIC DIATRIBE 3Y THE AMIR TO SIR GEOFFREY
ARTHUR, WHEN HE CALLED T H I S MORNING, AGAiUS! U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AS
A WHOLE THROUGHPUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA. THE AMIR SPOKE CALMLY
ENOUGH, BUT SO URGENTLY THAT SIR G ARTHUR COULD HARDLY GET A WORD I N
FOR MOST OF THE HALF-HOUR THAT HE WAS WITH THE AMIR. '

2. THE AMIR'S MESSAGE WAS THAT THE U.S. - I . E . THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS - HAD NO RF/.l EflttEiflB YlUSiZ. THE]?
'
BEEN ACTIONS HAD
DISASTROUS I N I R A N , AND PROMISED TO B S S Q '/IS A V I S AFGHANISTAN,
THEIR SUPPORT RJR KHOMEINI HAD BEEN A MAJOR BLUNDER. T H E M RELATIONS
WITH CHINA WERE R I G H T I N P R I N C I P A L BUT WERE BEING HANDLED U N S K I L ­
FULLY, THE SUPPORT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD PROMISED TO PAKISTAN WAS
PJLLYt THC SUPPORT PRESIDENT CARTER MAD PROMISED TO PAKISTAN '.;AS
#

MINIMAL: AND IN ANY CASE THE COUNTRY '/AS TOO UNSTABLE TO OUPP; r A
GREATER WEIGHT OF ASSISTANCE. 3'JT IT WAS THE ISRAEL PROBLEM WiLW!
THE U.S. HAD FAILED THE ARABS MOST. THE ARADS WERE FAR LESS C^" NED
OVER IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN THAN OVER JERUSALEM* AND THERE THE U.S.
HAD FAILED THEM. IT WAS A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION FOR
WHICH THE ARA3S LOOKED TO THE U.S., AND NOT DEFENCE AGAINST
ANY EXTERNAL POWER. HE HAD ALREADY SENT A WRITTEN MESSAGE TO TH13
AFFECT TO PRESIDENT CARTER. IF THE GULF STATES WANTED PROTECTION,
THEY WOULD CALL FOR IT. RUT AMERICAN PROTECTION WOULD BE A GREATER
LIABILITY THAN ASSET, TO COUNTRIES LIKE QATAR.

3. THE AMIR WAS EMPHATIC THAT FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, JAPAN AND
BRITAIN SHOULD CONCERT MEASURES TO REDRESS THE SITUATION, AND ADO/E
ALL TO PUT PRESSURE ON AMERICA TO BRING ISRAEL TO A SETTLEMENT
SATISFACTORY TO THE ARABS* OTHERWISE, THE WHOLE RANGE OF ENERGY
SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF, ON WHICH WESTERN CIVILISATION DEPENDED SO
LARGELY, WOULD BE AT RISK FROM THE MALADROIT AMERICAN POLICIES. HE
WOULD SPEAK IN THIS SENSE TO PRESIDENT GISCARD WHEN HE CAME TO
QATAR.

4 . EVEN THOUGH THIS DIATRI3E FOLLOWS CLOSELY ON SOME OF THE
REMARKS WHICH THE AMIR MADE TO THE MINISTER Or STATE DURING HIS VISIT
HERE, IT IS SuPRISIMG THAT HE SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN SO STRONGLY,
MOREOVER| I THINK HE IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE T^EN SUCH A STRONG LINE
WITH SIR G ARTHUR*¥lTHOUT KNOWING THAT THE SAUDIS VIEWED TH£~
SITUATION IN MUCH THE SAME WAY.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING.

BRANT

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REWS D

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PM WASHINGTON 232309Z JAN 8K
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 366 OF 23 JANUARY 1983
INFD PRIORITY CAIRO TEL AVIV ROUTINE JEDDA, RABAT, AMMAN, BEIRUT
DAMASCUS, UKMIS NEW YORK, HMCG JERUSALEM.

CAIRO £ L N O 54 (NOT TO RA3AT)s LI NOWlTZ MIDDLE CAST TCUR.
T

1. LIMOVITZ'S ITINERARY WILL TAKE HIM TOi
LONDON 25-26 JANUARY (WHERE HE WILL SEE HUSSEIN ON 26 JANUARY)•
K | N G

CAIRO 27-28 JANUARY, TEL AVIV/JERUSALEM, 29/31 JANUARY (PLENARY
NEGOTIATING SESSION ON 31 JANUARY), RIYADH 1-2 FEBRUARY, MARRAKESH
3 FEBRUARY (MEETING WITH KING HASSAN), WASHINGTON 4 FEBRUARY.
?. LlNCWlTZ'S PARTY WILL CONSIST OF i STERNER (DEPUTY ASSISTANT
S'C^ETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT), HUNTER (NSC), KCRN (ISRAEL COUNTRY
DIRCCTOR, STATE DEPARTMENT), HANSELL (STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL
ADVISER), AMES (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR THE NEAR CAST
AND SOUTH RSI A C t A ) , MARKS AMD WALKER (LINOWITZ PRINCIPAL STAFF
'!:M3ERS RESPONSIBLE FOR DOMESTIC AMD FOREIGN POLICY RESPECTIVELY).
l

?. WALKER HAS TOLD US THAT LINOWITZ IS FULLY AWARE OF THE MAGNITUDE
CF THE TA'.'K THAT FACES HIM ON THIS TRIP. PRESIT.Z'AT C-ARTER HAS MADE
IT :LS*R TH^T HE HAS NOT LOST SIGHT OF THE CRITICAL t.'rORT^-::
OF

PALESTINIAN ISSUE FOR THE WIDER SECURITY OF THE REGION. THg
~"- rT IANS AND ISRAELIS ARE. HOWEVER, STILL FAR TOG FAR APART FOR THE
v

JIVE TO RIPE FOR AN AMERICAN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, LET ALONE
PRc 31 DE'IT I AL INTERVENTION. WALKER SHARES STERNER * S VIEW (MY TELNO
353 » O T TO ALL) THAT THE FACT CF THERE BEING PROPOSALS ON THE TA3LE
i' ALL IS A PLUS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAVE MADE I T
CLEAR THAT THE IR PROPOSAL I S ENTIRELY NEGOTIABLE. OUT THE PROPOSALS
VIVIDLY ILLUSTRATE THE GULF WHICH SEPARATES THE TWQ APPROACHES
TO THE NEGOTIATION. AS WALKER PUT I T , I T IS AS IF THE EGYPTIANS HAD
BEEN DRAFTING THE rREAMBLE TO A UN RESOLUTION WHILE TIE ISRAELIS
HAD BEEN DRAFTING THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS: THE TROUBLE IS THAT
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT I N ADVANCE ON WHAT THE RESOLUTION WAS TRYluG
TO ACHIEVE. A HICLY DESIRABLE OUTCOME OF LlNOWlTZ'S TOUR WOULD 3E
FOR THE 31 JANUARY PLENARY TO RESULT I N A JOINT EGYPT/ISRAEL
DECLARATION THAT CERTAIN POWERS•WOULD BC TRANSFERRED TO THE SELF-
GOVERNING AUTHORITY WHILE OTHERS WERE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. WALKER
ONCEDED THAT SOMETHING OF A MIRACLE WOULD 3E NEEDED TO ACHIEVE
WAT. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TC PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO BE
VILLING TO SOME EXTENT TO DISCUSS PRINCIPLES AND THE EGYPTIANS TO
DISCUSS PRACTICAL DETAILS.

3. I T WAS CLEAR FROM WHAT WALKER SAID THAT HIS EARLIER HOPES THAT
LI NOW ITZ WOULD BE EASIER TO WORK WITH THAN STRAUSS HAVE NOT BEEN
DISAPPOINTED. LINCWITZ GETS ON WELL WITH BOTH BRZEZINSKI AHD VANCE
PARTLY NO DOUBT BECAUSE HE REPRESENTS NO THREAT TO EITHER CF THEM),
AND HAS REGULAR ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT. HE WORKS WELL WITH THE
STA E DEPARTMENT BUT KEEPS I N CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE NSC THROUGH
T

HUNTER, H I S ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINE WORKS SMOOTHLY AND H I S WHOLE
APPROACH I S SERIOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE. AND HE HAS A HEALTHY RESPECT
FOR THE D I F F I C U L T I E S .

HENDERSON

NNKNN

The Arab/Israel Problem

The F o r e i g n and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t he a g r e e d

w i t h K i n g H u s s e i n about t h e t h r e a t t o t h e u n i t y o f t h e r e g i o n posed

by the continuing f a i l u r e to f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the A r a b / I s r a e l

problem. E v e r y o n e he had spoken t o on h i s t o u r c o n f i r m e d t h a t this

issue bedevilled everything. I t affected the a t t i t u d e of the

countries i n t h e r e g i o n t o e a c h o t h e r and t o t h e U n i t e d States

s i n c e they b e l i e v e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was u n w i l l i n g to use i t s

m u s c l e t o f o r c e t h e I s r a e l i Government t o r e a c h an a g r e e m e n t . The

Camp D a v i d p r o c e s s was c l e a r l y g o i n g t o p r o v e i n a d e q u a t e i n

s a t i s f y i n g Arab o p i n i o n , s t i l l l e s s t h a t of the P a l e s t i n i a n s . In

a P r e s i d e n t i a l y e a r American A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s tended t o have two

Mi'ddle E a s t p o l i c i e s : t h e i r r e a l p o l i c y and t h a t w h i c h was a d v a n c e d

for e l e c t o r a l purposes. I t was i m p o r t a n t f o r o t h e r W e s t e r n

g o v e r n m e n t s t o b e a r t h i s i n mind^/to a v o i d u n d e r m i n i n g t h e p o s i t i o n

of t h e American A d m i n i s t r a t i o n by r e a c t i n g t o t h e s e c o n d p o l i c y .

If t h e y d i d s o and i f P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r was r e - e l e c t e d , t h e w i l l i n g n e s s

of h i s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n to pursue a c o n s t r u c t i v e p o l i c y i n future

would be uridermined. On t h e o t h e r hand, i f o t l e r g o v e r n m e n t s d i d

nothing, the p o s i t i o n i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t would deteriorate.

A g a i n s t t h i s b a c k g r o u n d , t h e F o r e i g n and Commonwealth Secretary
a s k e d w h e t h e r K i n g H u s s e i n t h o u g h t t h e r e would be any f u t u r e in a
European or B r i t i s h initiative i n favour of a S e c u r i t y Council
Resolution which:

(a) recognised the r i g h t s of the P a l e s t i n i a n s ; and
(b) involved recognition by t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s o f I s r a e l ' s right
to exist.

I t would n o t be e a s y t o p r o d u c e s u c h a R e s o l u t i o n because the

spectrum of opinion w i t h i n t h e E u r o p e a n Community was s o w i d e . It

stretched from t h e F r e n c h , who might be s a i d t o have a v i e w n o t

dissimilar from t h a t o f I r a q , t o t h e D u t c h who t e n d e d t o s u p p o r t

the Israelis. N o n e t h e l e s s , p e r h a p s t h e e f f o r t s h o u l d be made.

King Hussein s a i d that i t would be e x t r e m e l y h e l p f u l i f one o r more

SECRET

E u r o p e a n Governments were a b l e t o g e t t h e p r o c e s s m o v i n g . He had

tried a s i m i l a r i n i t i a t i v e himself i n t h e autumn. But t h e d e c i s i o n

o f A r a b Governments a t T u n i s h a s f a l l e n f a r s h o r t o f what he had

hoped f o r . They had f a i l e d t o e v o l v e a united p o s i t i o n . Commenting

on t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e A r a b / I s r a e l i s s u e f o r t h e region as a

w h o l e , K i n g H u s s e i n n o t e d t h a t i t d i d not make i t e a s y f o r him t o

respond q u i c k l y t o appeals from P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r f o r h e l p i n

dealing with the Afghanistan s i t u a t i o n or the s i t u a t i o n i n I r a n .

Jerusalem was a l s o a m a t t e r w h i c h a f f e c t e d the e m o t i o n s and b e l i e f s

of t h e p e o p l e t h r o u g h o u t t h e Arab w o r l d . As r e g a r d s the hostages,

one m i l l i o n A r a b s had been l i v i n g i n occupied land s i n c e 1967.

The Foreign and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t a E u r o p e a n

i n i t i a t i v e would e n a b l e t h e governments c o n c e r n e d t o m a i n t a i n an

appearance^ o f a c t i v e i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e r e g i o n . T h i s would be t h e

more i m p o r t a n t s i n c e t h e Camp D a v i d p r o c e s s was l i k e l y to run into

t h e s a n d i n March o r t h e r e a b o u t s . Mr. Moberly commented t h a t t h e

P r e s i d e n t might w e l l a t t e m p t t o e x t e n d t h e p e r i o d o f n e g o t i a t i o n

for e l e c t o r a l reasons b u t t h a t t h e r e was no r e a s o n why t h e r e
s h o u l d n o t be n e g o t i a t i o n on a E u r o p e a n i n i t i a t i v e g o i n g on i n
p a r a l l e l w i t h t h e Camp D a v i d p r o c e s s . The F o r e i g n and Commonwealth
S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t n e i t h e r Mr. Vance n o r Mr. B r z e z i n s k i had r u l e d

out t h e i d e a o f a E u r o p e a n i n i t i a t i v e when he

them. The d i f f i c u l t y i n g e t t i n g anywhere w o u l ^ be t h a t Israeli

p o l i c y had become c o m p l e t e l y ossified.

I r a q and S y r i a
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a s k e d about t h e s i t u a t i o n i n I r a q and
Syria. K i n g H u s s e i n s a i d t h a t he was i n c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e
governments o f both c o u n t r i e s . The s i t u a t i o n i n I r a q was good a t
present. I n S y r i a i t was n o t . P r e s i d e n t As ad was f a c i n g difficulties
there. He had r e a c t e d by a d o p t i n g more r a d i c a l , left-wing policies.
P a r a d o x i c a l l y , though p u r s u i n g an a n t i - I s l a m i c c o u r s e within Syria,
he had s u c c e e d e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g good r e l a t i o n s w i t h Ayatollah
Khomeini.
EAST: ApYAKCE COPIES X ­ 10
V
:
no i o :oo;.f;?:r:? STREET
WI^'SA:: I GUiioUB

PS/PUS . . • .CABINET Oi?FICS DIO *•
M R J C KOBERLY

HD/NENATJ

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HEWS D

CONFI DENT I AL
Rt AMMAN 1312QHZ JAN 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 92 OF 13 JAN 8 0
INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVI V
UKMIS NEW YORK WASK1NGTCN AND CG JERUSALEM

MY TELS NOS 14 OF 10 JANUARY AND 21 OF 17 JANUARY:

JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 17 JANUARY, HE AGAIN REFERRED
TO THE SCEPTICISM WHICH AMERICA'S "PISCO/ERY Or ISLAM" IN
THE WAKE OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHAN I STAN HAD AROUSED IN ARAB
COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN THOSE LIKE JORDAN PART OF
WHOSE TERRITORY WAS UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION. HE REITERATED HIS
BELIEF THAT RECENT EVENTS MADE IT MORE RATHER THAN LESS URGENT
I TO TRY TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A MJDOLE EAST ^ETTLg-'ENT AMD THAT
AS LONG AS THE ARAB COUNTRIES REMAINED IN CONFRONTATION WITH
ISRAEL, THE RESPONSE OF THE AREA TO THE GRAVE EXTERNAL DANGERS
WHICH IT NOW FfiCED WAS BOUND TO BE CONFUSED AND UNCERTAIN.

2. BUT WHEN I ASKED KING HUSSEIN AND ALSO MIS PRIME MINISTER
WHOM I HAD SEEN EARLIER OM THE SAME DAY HOW THEY THOUGHT
PROGRESS COULD BE MADE, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THE SETBACK AT
- W E TUNIS SUMMIT TO JORDANIAN HOPES FOR A NEW ARAB INITIATIVE,
THEY HAD VERY FEW IDEAS TO OFFER. THE KINO SAID HE COULD STILL.
y t r"r>
SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO A FRESH NEGOTIATING EFFORT UNDER U1
SHE NO ALTERNATIVE TO A FRESH NEGOTIATING EFFORT UNDER UNITED
NATIONS AUSPICES INVILVING ALL PARTIES TO THE DISPURT
INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS. ^

3. -HE WILL AS YOU KNOW BE SEEING MR LINOWlTZ IN LONDON NEXT
WEEK, BUT I VERY MUCH DOUBT WHETHER MR LINOWlTZ WILL HAVE ANY
GREATER SUCCESS THAN MR STRAUSS OR MR BRZEZINSKI BEFORE HIM IN
AROUSING THE LEAST ENTHUSIASM ON THE PART OF THE JCRDANIANS FOR THE
AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS OR FOR ANY SUGGESTION THAT JORDAN SHOULD SOME­
HOW OR OTHER ASSOCIATE HERSELF WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.

4. INDEED THE KINO REGARDS THE FAILURE OF US/1SRAELl/EGYPTI AN .
EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN
PARTICULAR THEIR INA3ILITY TO OFFER ANYTHING WHICH THE
PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES MIGHT CONSIDER ACCEPTABLE, AS INE ' I TABLE
AND WOULD REGARD IT AS MORE WORTHWHILE TO DISCUSS WHAT SHOULD
REPLACE CA^P DAVID THAT TO CONSIDER WHAT IF ANYTHING MIGHT BE DONE
TO RESCUE IT. HE r<"JST ALSO KNOW THAT HIS OWN GLOO'-'Y VIEWS ON
THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS ARE
SHARED BY MOST OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S OWN ADVISERS. HE
DOES NOT TRUST PRESIDENT SADAT AND 3ELIVES THAT DESPITE
AMPLE WARNINGS FROM HIS FELLOW ARABS HE HAS ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE
MANCEVRED INTO ACCEPTANCE OF A PRIMARILY EILATERAL AGREEMENT
BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WHICH HAS LEFT JORDAN AND OTHER FRONT
LINE ARAB STATES IN THE LURCH. THE RECENT RE-EMERGENCE OF IDEAS
FOR A SETTLEMENT COVERING GAZA IN ADVANCE OF ONE FOR THE WEST 3ANK
WILL HAVE FUELLED THE KING'S SUSPICIOUS Of- SADAT'S MOTIVES.

4. AS FOR THE ISRAELIS, KING HUSSEIN REMAINS CONVINCED THAT
NEITHER THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT NOR AiiY PROBABLE SUCCESSOR IS' LIKELY
TO OFFER ENOUGH TO MAKE WORTHWHILE NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE.
INDEED HE WOULD ARGUE THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ALL POINT IN
THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION", INCLUDING:
A. THE ISRAELI DECISION TO EXPROPRIATE THE JERUSALEM
DISTRICT ELECTRICITY COMPANY!
B. THE ANNOUNCEMENI OF PLANS FOR ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS ON THE
WEST BANK (AS MR HANNAM HAS REPORTED FROM JERUSALEM IN HIS
ANNUAL REVIEv:, THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF ISRAELI SETTLERS ON THE WEST •
BANK OUTSIDE JERUSALEM HAS INCREASED BY NEARLY $00 DURING 1979
AT GREAT COST TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT)t

C. THE DECISION TO ALLOW JEV/S TO PURCHASE LAND IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES WHICH, HOWEVER LIMITED ITS APPLICATION MAY BE IN
PRACTICE, AROUSES THE STRONGEST FEELINGS AMONG ARA3S WITH
f€KORIES OF THE MANDATE PERIOD:
D. THE CONTINUED INS ISTENCE 3Y MR BEGIN ON ISRAELI
SOVEREIGNTY OVER JERUSALEM AND THE EXCLUSION OF THE CITY FROM
THE LLlMb Ul- IHL RDTONOMY TALKS.

6*. KING HUSSEIN THEREFORE LOOKS TO OTHERS TO GENERATE THE
PRESSURES WHICH WILL BE HEEDED TO PUSH THE ISRAELIS INTO
WORTHWHILE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT HS IS ALSO A REALIST AMD KNOWS THAT
HE CAN EXPECT LITTLE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER IN A US ELECTION
YEAR AND THAT THE EUROPEANS WILL NOT -'ANT TO ADD TO PRESIDENT
CARTER'S TROUBLES AT THE PRESENT TIME. HENCE HIS EMBARRASSMENT
AND UNEASE IN REACTING TO EVENTS IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN. HE
SEES THE DANGERS ALL TOO CLEARLY, 3UT AT THF. SAME TI ME HE KNOWS
THAT, WHILE THE ARAB/ISRAEL PR03LE'' REMAINS .UNRESOLVED, THE ?.RA3S
WILL NOT WANT TO FACE THEM AND WILL CONTINUE TO REGARD THE
AMERICANS IN PARTICULAR VJTH DEEP SUSPICION AND CYNICISM BECAUSE
OF THEIR CONTINUING SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. WHILE THE SOVIET MENACE
STILL SEEMS RELATIVELY DISTANT, ISRAEL REMAINS THE ENEMY AT

THE GATE.

URWICK

NNNN
lO D O W N I N G S T R E E T

27 December 197?

T H E PRIME MINISTER

Thank you v e r y much f o r y o u r letter o f 13 November,

which r e a c h e d me o n l y a s h o r t w h i l e ago, e n c l o s i n g a copy

of y o u r s t u d y on Jerusalem. S i n c e you t o l d me about i t

i n London I have o f t e n wondered how i t was p r o g r e s s i n g .

I v e r y much l o o k f o r w a r d t o r e a d i n g i t o v e r t h e C h r i s t m a s

recess.

I agree t h a t the f u t u r e of J e r u s a l e m w i l l i n the end

be a m a t t e r f o r p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n . But the political

and l e g a l a s p e c t s of the c o n f l i c t i n g claims are closely

bound t o g e t h e r . I f e e l s u r e t h a t y o u r own study will

s t i m u l a t e d i s c u s s i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a l l t h e i n t r i c a t e

l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s involved.

His Royal Highness Crown P r i n c e E l H a s s a n bin Talal

lO DOWNING S T R E E T

T H E PRIME MINISTER

Thank you very much f o r your l e t t e r of 13 November,

which reached me only a s h o r t whyie ago, e n c l o s i n g a copy

of your study on Jerusalem. >"*i^pi moot g r a t o f u l to you . ~,

^ f o r drawing t h i s f a i r and comprehensive study to my

Th& f u t u r e of Jerusalem/io qmongot the moat d i f f i o u - l i ^ ^

i s A u c o which w i l l have to r e s o l v e d i f wu d i e to achieve";

<aa wo m u o t , — a j u s t and l a s t i n g settlement Of LheMiddlra

Jiae^SH^ute. An y,nn say $ h i c w i l l i n the end be a

matter f o r p o l i t i c a l decision. But i n man; 11 j p i u Umi"

the p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l aspects of the c o n f l i c t i n g claims

te tho C i t j are c l o s e l y bound together. I—aj^nnj-* »Nnt~

wour/study w i l l h rr 1 r prnmntm n m i r l n r nnri mn i r n h j i n l i i i i i

discussion and understanding of|_the A e g a l p y o b l o m n involved.
H»U^*^ (L~Ut~* ^ H ^ u

His Royal Highness P r il nnc
c e
Hassan b i n T a l a l

\J
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 December 1979

Your l e t t e r of L a ^ e c ember enclosed one from Crown

P r i n c e Hassan of Jordan covering h i s r e c e n t l y published

study of the l e g a l s t a t u s of Jerusalem. You asked f o r a

substantive reply.

The Department's Legal Advisers have been c o n s u l t e d .

We would not disagree with any of the p r i n c i p a l conclusions

reached by the study on the question of sovereignty over

Jerusalem. There are a few l e s s e r p o i n t s on which the

study might be open to dispute but these arguments are not

e s s e n t i a l to the c o n c l u s i o n s . In some r e s p e c t s the study

i s b i a s e d towards the Jordanian p o s i t i o n and the paper

i n c l u d e s the statement, l a t e r q u a l i f i e d , that the PLO

r e p r e s e n t s the P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs. But, on the whole, t h i s

i s a remarkably f a i r and o b j e c t i v e document. T h i s i s

perhaps l a r g e l y because of the a s s i s t a n c e given by P r o f e s s o r

Draper i n i t s p r e p a r a t i o n . He i s a leading a u t h o r i t y on

the Geneva Conventions and was a member of the UK delegation

which negotiated the P r o t o c o l s to the Convention. He

d i s c u s s e d the i s s u e s at some length both with the geographi­

c a l department in the FCO and with the Legal A d v i s e r s .

I enclose a d r a f t r e p l y from the Prime M i n i s t e r . Lord

Carrington b e l i e v e s that a short acknowledgement would be

p r e f e r a b l e to a more d e t a i l e d commentary on the r e p o r t . Too

fulsome a commendation of i t would be l i k e l y to a t t r a c t

domestic c r i t i c i s m from supporters of I s r a e l .

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq

10 Downing S t r e e t

DSR 11

Registry
No. DRAFT LETTER Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION From
To:­ H i sRoyal Highness P r i n c e Hassan The Prime M i n i s t e r
Top Secret, bin Talal
Secret.
The R o y a l Palace Telephone No. Ext.
Confidential.
Restricted. Amman
Unclassified.
Department
PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Your Royal Highness

Thank y o u v e r y much f o r your letter o f 13 N o v e m b e r ,

which r e a c h e d me o n l y a short while ago, enclosing a

copy o f y o u r study on J e r u s a l e m . I am rijost g r a t e f u l to

you f o r drawing t h i s fair and comprehensive study t o my

attention.

The future o f J e r u s a l e m i s amongst t h e most difficult

issues which w i l l have t o be r e s o l v e d i f we\ a r e t o

achieve, a s we m u s t , a just andl a s t i n g settlement of the

Middle East dispute. As y o u s a y t h i s will In t h e end be

a matter for political decision. B u t i n many respects

the political andl e g a l aspects of theconflicting claims

to theCity a r eclosely bound together. I am s u r e that

your study will help promote a w i d e r a n d more objective

discussion and u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the legal problems

involved.

Dd 0532000 800M 5/78 HMSO Bracknell

SrxO^tX </V
U/< USA
CONFIDENTIAL

OWL CouW , U W U f ^ , / 1 . (X ,~> ^

_M_i_d_d_l_e_ _ _E _a_s_t

The President s a i d t h a t Mr L i n o w i t z h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d fron

a visit t o the Middle E a s t during which he had seen P r e s i d e n t Sadat

and Mr. B e g i n . He h a d been much e n c o u r a g e d . I t m i g h t be a good

i d e a f o r him t o v i s i t t h e U n i t e d Kingdom soon t o t a l k about

the d e t a i l e d p o s i t i o n i n the n e g o t i a t i o n . The US Government

wanted t h e I s r a e l i s and t h e E g y p t i a n s to continue with the

i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e t e r m s o f t h e Camp D a v i d agreement .vith a

m'uiimum o f i n t e r f e r e n c e . I s r a e l ' s r e t u r n o f t h e o i l w e l l s had

been a v e r y i m p o r t a n t g e s t u r e . He hoped t h a t i t would now be

p o s s i b l e to proceed without f u r t h e r complication to t h e r e t u r n

o f t h e r e m a i n i n g t e r r i t o r y a n d t h e exchange o f a m b a s s a d o r s .

It would b e d e s i r a b l e t o g e t t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f f t h e d i f f e r e n c e s

between t h e two s i d e s e.g. o v e r t h e numbers o f p e o p l e who would

s e r v e on l o c a l government c o u n c i l s , a n d on t o more p o s i t i v e

m a t t e r s e.g. what t h e l o c a l government c o u n c i l s m i g h t d o .

Mr* Vance s a i d t h a t t h e r e would be a c r i t i c a l point a t t h e end

of J a n u a r y . By t h e n a l l t h e o c c u p i e d l a n d up t o t h e Has Mohammed

l i n e , a s w e l l a s t h e o i l w e l l s , w o u l d h a v e been r e t u r n e d . The

President said that the question o f t h e exchange o f a m b a s s a d o r s

w o u l d t h e n come t o t h e f o r e f r o n t . B e g i n and Sadat h a d a

remarkable r e l a t i o n s h i p . S a d a t was s u p r e m e l y c o n f i d e n t . When­

ever the P r e s i d e n t spoke t o h i m on t h e t e l e p h o n e , h e s a i d that

everything was g o i n g a c c o r d i n g to schedule.

The Foreign a n d Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y a s k e d whether,

given thehelp the U n i t e d S t a t e s had r e c e i v e d o v e r the hostages

f r o m t h e PLO a n d K i n g H u s s e i n ' s w i s h t o b r i n g i n a r e s o l u t i o n

amending o r e n l a r g i n g R e s o l u t i o n 24.2, t h e A m e r i c a n Government

was likely t o change i t s p o s i t i o n on t h e PLO a n d 2 4 2 . The

/President

- 5 -

P r e s i d e n t s a i d that R e s o l u t i o n 242 was something of a b i b l e .

Amending i t would be very d i f f i c u l t . But addenda o r f u r t h e r

r e s o l u t i o n s might be p o s s i b l e . The Americans had explored the

p o s s i b i l i t y s i x months p r e v i o u s l y , but had dropped the i d e a b e c a u s e

of I s r a e l i o p p o s i t i o n . The US Government would not oppose a

r e s o l u t i o n b u i l d i n g on 242. But i f a new dimension were i n j e c t e d ,

e.g., I s r a e l i withdrawal from t h e West Bank, the Americans would

oppose. The Prime M i n i s t e r asked whether i t was p u b l i c knowledge

t h a t the PLO had given help during the I r a n i a n c r i s i s . Mr. Vance

s a i d the Congress had been informed and indeed he had mentioned

the matter p u b l i c l y . The P r e s i d e n t remarked t h a t the present

a l t e r c a t i o n between Qadhafi and the PLO stemmed from Qadhafi's view

t h a t the PLO had r e c e n t l y been too moderate. The I s r a e l i s w e r e ,

of c o u r s e , aware of the PLO's r o l e and that i t had been

acknowledged. However the understanding that the U n i t e d

S t a t e s would not recognise the PLO u n t i l the r i g h t of I s r a e l

to e x i s t had been accepted was s t i l l valid.

The F o r e i g n and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y asked whether t h e r e

was any movement i n the American p o s i t i o n on t h e v a r i o u s

formulae about r e c o g n i t i o n . The P r e s i d e n t s a i d that Mr. L i n o w i t z

had ideas. The Camp David t e x t , l i k e 242, was s a c r o s a n c t .

But i t was a l s o very f a r r e a c h i n g . Although Mr. Begin had

r e v e r s e d h i m s e l f on the question o f autonomy and, by e x c l u d i n g

land and water from the ambit of the agreement, t h e framework

of the agreement remained very u s e f u l . Jerusalem was the most

d i f f i c u l t issue. Progress had i n f a c t been made at Camp David

on t h i s q u e s t i o n . There was u n t i l a r e l a t i v e l y l a t e stage a

paragraph on the s u b j e c t agreed by both Mr. Begin and President.

Sadat. But before the agreement was f i n a l i s e d , both men

s e p a r a t e l y had asked f o r t h e removal of the paragraph because

of the l i k e l y r e a c t i o n s i n t h e i r own c o u n t r i e s . I t would not

be easy t o keep the Camp David process going i n an American

e l e c t i o n year and against the background of Mr. Begin's p o l i t i c a l

weakness. But Mr. L i n o w i t z thought t h a t Mr. Begin was back t o

h i s o l d form.

/ The

r*

CONFIDENTIAL
- 6 -

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e A m e r i c a n p o l i c y was in

fact t o e x h a u s t t h e Camp D a v i d p r o c e s s b e f o r e t r y i n g something

else. The President said i t might be p o s s i b l e to reinvolve

moderate A r a b s , i . e . Saudi A r a b i a and Jordan. Some mechanism

t o make t h i s p o s s i b l e would be very helpful. I f t h e PLO would

accept Resolution 242 and I s r a e l ' s r i g h t to e x i s t , t h a t would

absolve t h e US from i t s commitment t o Israel. The Prime M i n i s t e r

s a i d t h a t t h e PLO could not be expected to accept Israel's right

to e x i s t without simultaneous compensation. She had found K i n g

H u s s e i n h e l p f u l on these problems. The ' P r e s i d e n t s a i d that despite

King Hussein's earnest t o n e , he was t h e most u n h e l p f u l man in the

Middle E a s t . "Mr. Vance commented t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e in the

P r e s i d e n t ' s s p e e c h a t Aswan t o the r i g h t o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n people

"to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the determination o f t h e i r own f u t u r e " had been

very carefully contrived. President Carter said that during his

Middle E a s t tour i n 1978 he had met no Arab l e a d e r who was i n s i s t ­

i n g on an independent P a l e s t i n i a n state. He thought t h a t that

concept, l i k e t h e c o n c e p t of t o t a l w i t h d r a w a l from t h e occupied

t e r r i t o r i e s , was dead. The p r o b l e m now was how to accommodate

t h e r e m a i n i n g d i f f e r e n c e s between I s r a e l and the moderate Arabs.

The Foreign and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t t h e PLO band­

wagon was rolling i n Europe. The B r i t i s h Government was virtually

t h e o n l y Government not a l r e a d y on i t . The reason f o r the r e a c t i o n

against I s r a e l was t h e i r p o l i c y of e s t a b l i s h i n g s e t t l e m e n t s on the

West Bank. Mr. B r z e z i n s k i a s k e d how t h e move i n f a v o u r of t h e PLO

would e x p r e s s itself. The President s a i d t h a t i f i t were t o be in

t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s he would not deplore t h i s . The US Government

was f o r t h e moment committed t o I s r a e l but t h e PLO had been very

h e l p f u l of late. I t would however be valuable i f the isolation of

I s r a e l could be a v o i d e d where o i l was concerned. He hoped t h a t the

U n i t e d Kingdom, a l o n g w i t h Norway and M e x i c o , might be prepared

to s e l l the I s r a e l i s some o i l i f t h e y a s k e d f o r i t . The Prime Minister

pointed out that

/ Britain

- 7 -

Eritain was a member o f t h e I E A a n d o f t h e E E C . We were

committed to s h a r i n g our o i l w i t h t h e o t h e r members o f t h o s e

o r g a n i s a t i o n s i f t h e r e was a s h o r t f a l l of 7 per cent. The

President repeated t h a t i t would h e l p i f t h e UK c o u l d sell

Israel a few tens of thousands o f b a r r e l s of o i l . The F o r e i g n

and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y recalled t h a t o u r EEC p a r t n e r s had

made i t p l a i n i n D u b l i n t h a t t h e y e x p e c t e d t h e UK t o s e l l then

whatever spare o i l they h a d . The P r e s i d e n t s a i d t h a t i t was

necessary t o overcome d i f f i c u l t i e s r a t h e r t h a n t o enumerate them,

VilWlZ EAST*i ADVAKCE" COPIES

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I
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ORS 1
CONFIDENTIAL
FM TEL AY IV 13063&2 DEC
TO I"MED I ATE FCO
TELNO 533 OF 13 DEC
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO

PRIORITY AMMAN, WASHINGTON,

m HURO'S VISIT TO ISRAEL! MEET PIG WITH MR SOL LINOWITZ*

1 . ON IP DECEMBER THE MINISTER OF STATE ACCOMPANIED 3Y MR

MD3ERLY, AND MYSELF, CALLED ON MR LINOWITZ I 'I THE KI NO DA/ID

HOTEL IN JERUSALEM AND HAD A HALF HOUR DISCUSSION. MR LINOWITZ

WAS A~OUT TO LEAVE WITH DR BURG:FOR CAIRO, TO SEE THE EGYPTIAN

PRIME MINISTER, BEFORE RETURN I NG TO JERUSALEM IN THE EVENING.

2. MR LINOWITZ SAID THAT HE HAD COME TO THE MIDDLE EAST BELIEVING
THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A HOPELESS MISSION. HE WAS NOW VERY MUCH
MORE HOPEFUL THAT SOMETHING COULD BE ACHIE/ED. ONE 3A3IS FOR
HIS INCREASED OPT I"ISM WAS THE HELPFUL TWO HOUR CONVERSATION
WHICH HE HAD HAD './ITH MR BEGIN, WHEN HE HAD FOTJND THE LATTER
OPEN TO A FRANK AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. HE WAS
ALSO I"PRESSED BY THE SHARED COMMITMENT OF PRESIDENT SADAT AMD
MR 3EGIN TO WORK TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS TOWARDS EACE. P

o i r r . ^ F EMBARK IN&ON AN ACCOUNT OF HIS OWN VIEWS, MR LI NOv/ITZ
3. BEFORE EMBARK INGON AN ACCOUNT CF HI 0 OWN '/JEWS, MR LT'DWITZ
90UGHT THOSE OF MR HURD AND MR MOBERLY CV THE PROSPECT OF KING
HUSS&IN, WHOM HE WAS SHORTLY TO VISIT, AGREEING TO JOIN IN IN
THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. MR HURD SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE
THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD JOIN, HE WAS ANXIOUS TO FIND SOMETHING
LABELLED * ' PEACE'' BUT COULD MOT MAKE DO /1TH SOMETHING LABELLED
'•CAMP DAVID" . MR MOBERLY ELABORATED ON THE REASONS WHICH
INHIBITED KING HUSSEIN FROM PARTICIPATION.

4. MR LINOWITZ SAID THAT, AFTER HIS TALK WITH MR BEGIN, HE
HAD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF AGREEMENT
IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTI AT IONS WHICH HAD NOT SURFACED. THERE
WAS A BASIS ON WHICH TO BUILD, AND IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO
FIND SOME REAL CONTENT FOR AUTONOMY. DESPITE APPEARANCES, MR
BEGIN WAS NOT SEEKING TO 3TALL THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.
HIS OVERWHELMING FEAR A PALESTINIAN STATE, AND HE WISHED TO
CO-OPERATE IN CONSTRUCTING A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WHICH
WOULD GUARD AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE
WITHOUT REPUDIATING IT. .

5. MR HURD ASKED ABOUT THE PROBLEMS FOR THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS
CREATED BY ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY. MR LINOWITZ REPLIED THAT
KR BEGIN WAS UNDER INTENSE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE ON
SETTLEMENTS, AND COULD NOT "LEVEL" ABOUT THEM PUBLICLY. HE
BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT MR BEGIN HAD LEVELLED WITH HIM (THOUGH
ME DID NOT EXPLAIN TO US THE BASIS FOR THIS BELIEF). MR BEGIN
KNEW THAT THE SETTLEMENTS WERE AN OBSTACLE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS,
AND MR LINOWITZ CONCLUDED THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AUTONOMY
AGREEMENT THE REMOVAL OF THE SETTLEMENTS (CR A FREEZE ON THEM) •
WOULD NOT BE AN UN5URMCUNTAUE PROBLEM, THOUGH IT WOULD BE A
VERY DIFFICULT ONE. THERE WERE, HE ADDED, OTHER ELEMENTS OF
PROMISING PROGRESS, ALTHOUGH AGAIN HE DID NOT SPECIFY THESE, ,'
AS HE HAD NOT THE PREVIOUS DAY WHEN HE MADE A SIMILAR REMARK
TO JOURNALISTS.

6. MR HURD ENQUIRED WHETHER, IF AM AGREEMENT WAS Rtr\CHEd NEXT
MAY OR SU3SECUENTLY BETWEEN THE EGYPTIANS AND THE ISRAELIS,
PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK COULD BE FOUND WHO WOULD OPERATE
THE AGREEMENT. MR LINOWITZ BELIEVED THAT, PROVIDED THE
AUTONOMY AGREED EMT "RANG REAL", AND PROMISED FULL AUTONOMY,
M

THEN THE P L 0 WOULD PERM IT THE '.'EST BANK PALESTINIANS J f l .OPERATE
IT BECAUSE IT OFFERED THEM A BETTER PR0SPH6T THAN ANYTHING ELSE
CN THE HORIZON. THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR MADE THE POINT THAT,
PROVIDED THE AGREEMENT SEEMED RF.ASONAH! Y ADF\;||^TE THE WEST ^A^'K
iSEL'/cS ;LL THE P I 0 THAT Tl
THE*' THE P L 0 WOULD PERMIT THE WEST BANK PALE3TINIA"S TO OPERATE
. I T BECAUSE I T OFFERED THE" A BETTER PROSWGT THAN. ANYTHING ELSE
ON THE HORIZON. THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR MADE THE POINT THAT,
gRO/IDED THE AGREEMENT SEEMED REASONABLY ADEQUATE, THE WEST BANK
PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES MIGHT TELL THE P L O THAT THEY WERE
GOING TO CERATE I T , AN ATTITUDE WHICH THE P L 0 MIGHT FIND I T

PRUDENT TO ACCEPT.

7. ON JERUSALEM, MR LINOWITZ AGAIN DISPLAYED A B E L I E F THAT A
SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND, IN THE EARLY DAYS*OF HIS INVOLVEMENT
HE HAD NO IDEA WHAT I T MIGHT BE THOUGH HE HINTED AT SOME SPECIAL
STATUS FOR THE HOLY PLACES. BUT HE HAD LEARNED DURING THE LONG
YEARS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER PANAMA THAT I T WAS IMPORTANT
NOT TO BE FRIGHTENED BY WORDS, NOR TO ASSUME TH'AT AGREEMENT WAS
IMPOSSIBLE FROM THE OUTSET.

3, QUESTION ABOUT EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES, MR
I N REPLY TO MR HURD'S
LINOWITZ SAID THAT PRESIDENT SADAT, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF HIS
CONCERN ABOUT THE REVISED SUDANESE ATTITUDE TO CAMP DAVID, WAS
NOW DETERMINED TO FOCUS ON PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE
AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS, AS HE HAD MOT ALWAYS DONE BEFORE. HIS
OBJECTIVE NOW WAS TO PUT TOGETHER AN AUTONOMY PACKAGE WHICH
WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE PALESTINIANS. AT THE SAME TIME HE
WOULD SEEK TO CONVINCE MR BEGIN THAT I T WAS I N ISRAEL'S INTEREST
AS WELL AS THAT OF EVERYBODY ELSE, THAT T H I S SHOULD HAPPEN,

9. FINALLY, MR LINOWITZ ASKED MR HURD WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT IT
WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR H I M , I N THE FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE, TO V I S I T A
NUMBER OF EUROPEAN CAPITALS, WHERE HE SENSED THE NEED TO EXPLAIN
THE UNITED STATES POSITION MORE FULLYi HE FEARED THAT WE HAD
NOT RECENTLY BEEN FULLY "CLUED I N " TO U 3 ATTITUDES. MR
HURD SAID THAT A V I S I T TO LONDON WOULD ?•£ VERY WELCOME, AND .MR
LINOWITZ SAID THAT HE WOULD BE I N TOUCH WITH THE U S AMBASSADOR
IN LONDON ABOUT IT.

V. COMMENT.

MR LINOWITZ,WHOM NONE OF US PRESENT HAD MET BEFORE, STRUCK US
AS A MOST ATTRACTIVE PERSONALITY, AND A GREAT IMPROVEMENT ON
HIS PREDECESSOR. I T I S DIFFICULT TO BE SURE 'WHETHER H I S NEW
POUND ENTHUSIASM I S GENUINE, OR WHETHER HE HAS DECIDED THAT H I S
TACTIC MUST BE TO RADIATE OPTIMISM I N AN ATTEMPT TO PULL THE
AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS OUT OF THE TROUGH INTO WHICH THEY HAVE
DESCENDED, IN THE LIGHT OF WASHINGTON TELNO 4 1 5 ^ TO FCO THE
LATTER SEEMS THE MORE PROBABLE. I T I S TO 8E HOPED SO, AS I T I S „
WOULD EE HELPFUL FOR HIM, IN THE FA I LY NEAR.FUTURE, TO V I O I T ^
NUMBER OF EUROPEAN CAPITALS, WHERE HE SENSED THE NEED TO EXPLAIN
THE UNITED STATES POSITION MORE FULLY: HE FEARED THAT WE HAD
NOT RECENTLY BEEN FULLY "CLUED I N " TO U S ATTITUDES. MR
HURD SAID THAT A VISIT TO LONDON WOULD "E VERY WELCOME, AND MR
LI MOWITZ SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE U S AMBASSADOR
If! LONDON ABOUT IT.

10, COMMENT,

MR L I NOW ITZ,WHOM NONE OF US PRESENT HAD MET BEFORE, STRUCK US
AS A MOST ATTRACTIVE PERSONALITY, AMD A GREAT IMPROVEMENT ON
HIS PREDECESSOR. IT IS DIFFICULT TO 3£ SURE WHETHER HIS NEW
FOUND ENTHUSIASM IS GENUINE, OR WHETHER HE HAS DECIDED THAT HIS
TACTIC *'UST BE TO RADIATE OPTIMISM IN AN ATTEMPT TO PULL THE
AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS OUT OF THE TROUGH INTO WHICH THEY HAVE
DESCENDED. IN THE LIGHT OF WASHINGTON TELNO 4154 TO FCO THE
LATTER SEEMS THE MORE PROBARLE, IT IS TO BE HOPED SO, AS IT IS
IMPOSSIBLE TO TAKE SOME OF MR LINOWITZ'S MORE OPTIMISTIC
PRONOUNEMENTS TOO SERlOSUSLY, ONE OR TWO GLANCES WHICH THE
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR EXCHANGED WITH ME DURING THE CONVERSATION
LET ME TO CONCLUDE THAT HE SHARES THIS VIE.'. NEVERTHELESS, AS
SEEN FROM HERE, MR LINOWITZ MUST BE ABOUT THE MOST HOPEFUL
THING THAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS SINCE'
THEY STARTED SEVEN MONTHS AGO: 3UT, AS HE VOLUNTEERED, IN.A
MONTH'S TIME HE MAY BE CRYING ON OUR SMOULDERS. MEANWHILE,
WASHINGTON T U B IS CF COURSE A MORE SUBSTANTIAL ACCOUNT OF
U S THINKING THAN THE SKILFUL PRESENTATION TO WHICH MR LINOWITZ
TREATED US.

MAS0 N

•i
J i t 4

I e n c l o s e a copy o f a l e t t e r t o t h e P r i m e
/ M i n i s t e r from Crown P r i n c e H a s s a n o f J o r d a n ,
A t o g e t h e r w i t h h i s " r e f l e c t i o n s " on t h e p r o b l e m
of J e r u s a l e m .

I have not acknowledged t h e l e t t e r , but
I t h i n k the Prime M i n i s t e r w i l l wish t o send
l a s u b s t a n t i v e r e p l y f a i r l y soon. I should
/ be g r a t e f u l i f you c o u l d l e t me have a s u i t a b l e
I d r a f t by Wednesday 19 December.

M. O'D. B. AL

Paul Lever, E s q . ,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

£y v\a, Clo­

the case o f Rhodesia, the sooner a settlement was a c h i e v e d i n the

Middle E a s t , t h e b e t t e r f o r a l l p a r t i e s concerned.

Mr. J a n n e r a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e r e might be some q u i e t Govern­
ment move on o i l s u p p l i e s f o r I s r a e l . Her d i f f i c u l t i e s were
much g r e a t e r now t h a t t h e l a s t f i e l d s had been handed back t o
Egypt. The P r i m e M i n i s t e r doubted w h e t h e r t h e r e c o u l d be any
developments h e r e . Britain had r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b o t h a s p a r t o f
t h e E E C and a s a member o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n e r g y Agency. The
5% s h o r t a g e c r e a t e d by t h e I r a n i a n s i t u a t i o n had been bad enough.
If t h e 7% s h o r t a g e were t o be r e a c h e d , t r i g g e r i n g t h e I E A s h a r i n g
a r r a n g e m e n t s , t h e r e would be an e n t i r e l y new s i t u a t i o n . Politics
had taught her never to e x t r a p o l a t e from t r e n d s . I n respect of o i l
s u p p l i e s t h e r e had been few p r e d i c t i o n s o f t h e Yom K i p p u r war and
recent I r a n i a n e v e n t s , b o t h o f w h i c h had had a d r a m a t i c impact.
T h o s e m o n i t o r i n g d e v e l o p m e n t s had been a l a r m e d by t h e Mecca Mosque
a t t a c k whose u l t i m a t e meaning was n o t y e t c l e a r . I t was still
proving impossible t o g e t t h e consumer c o u n t r i e s and OPEC c o u n t r i e s

together. I n Western c o u n t r i e s f a c e d by t h e a l t e r n a t i v e o f

m a s s i v e unemployment, Governments were g e t t i n g t h e i r o i l where

they could. T h i s created a v o l a t i l e spot market. The P r i m e

M i n i s t e r could n o t blame Governments who took t h i s a c t i o n . The

UK was n o t y e t up t o s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . I f future developments

did create shortages above t h e 75c, i . e . t h e t r i g g e r p o i n t , there

would be m a j o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y because of the c r i p p l i n g

economic e f f e c t : the long-term i m p l i c a t i o n s could n o t be p r o p e r l y

assessed. I t was n o t i n t h e Arab i n t e r e s t t o c r e a t e s u c h a d i s ­

turbance. Mr. J a n n e r s a i d t h a t S a u d i A r a b i a , K u w a i t and some other

p r o d u c e r s had an i n t e r e s t i n s t a b i l i t y , b u t i t was n o t t r u e o f a l l .

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t i t was i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f some m a j o r

Arab s t a t e s t o keep t h e W e s t e r n e c o n o m i e s functioning.

Dr. Kopelowitz s a i d that the delegation were a s k i n g w h e t h e r t h e

I s r a e l i o i l companies c o u l d o b t a i n c o m m e r c i a l s u p p l i e s from t h e

N o r t h S e a companies.The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t N o r t h S e a

p r o d u c t i o n was committed f o r some t i m e a h e a d . About h a l f o u r

exports were a l r e a d y g o i n g t o E u r o p e . Mr. J a n n e r s a i d t h a t t h e

B o a r d o f D e p u t i e s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e r e had been a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e

/ British Government

- 4 ­

^fc3ritish Government i n c o n n e c t i o n v/ith t h e E g y p t i a n / I s r a e l i p e a c e

process. The P r i m e M i n i s t e r r e s p o n d e d t h a t s h e was not in a

position to comment on detailed possibilities. The Board of

Deputies should pursue t h i s with the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for

Energy.

Mr. J a n n e r a s k e d about t h e Government's a t t i t u d e t o t h e PLO.

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r e m p h a s i s e d t h a t t h e Government had never

recognised t h e PLO. The Foreign S e c r e t a r y had not done s o i n h i s

recent speech. He had, c o r r e c t l y , s a i d t h a t t h e r e must be ,.

discussions with the P a l e s t i n i a n people. Mr. L u c a s commented

t h a t t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r must mean t h e P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs. The

P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t t h e PLO was l i n k e d with terrorism.

Mr. Young s a i d t h a t the Board of D e p u t i e s b e l i e v e d t h e r e were

l i n k s with the IRA. They had been u n a b l e t o p r o d u c e evidence.

They hoped t o be a b l e t o do so i n the future. The Prime Minister

s a i d t h a t she had an i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o b l e m when she spoke o f no

r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e PLO. P e o p l e a s k e d why she was negotiating

w i t h M e s s r s . Mugabe and Nkomo. Her answer was t h i s was essential

to stop a war. She had had t o d e r o g a t e from h e r absolute stand

on t e r r o r i s m to pursue peace i n Rhodesia. T h i s was a practical

problem. Lord Carrington's whole s p e e c h s h o u l d be considered.

I t was a very balanced presentation. T h e r e was a major problem

in the Middle E a s t . For t h i s reason the Prime M i n i s t e r c o u l d not

say t h a t she w o u l d n e v e r , n e v e r , d e a l w i t h t h e PLO. T h i s might

be n e c e s s a r y t o get a settlement, as i n R h o d e s i a . The r e p r e s e n t ­

a t i v e s o f a l l p e o p l e i n v o l v e d would h a v e t o p a r t i c i p a t e . King

H u s s e i n had t o l d her t h a t he was w o r k i n g on Y a s s e r A r a f a t , to get

him t o c u t down t e r r o r i s t activity. He believed that Arafat was

becoming more m o d e r a t e . Mr. Janner s a i d t h a t the Board of Deputies

appreciated t h e Government's s t a n d i n r e s p e c t o f t h e PLO within

E u r o p e and w i t h i n the EEC. I t mirrored the p o s i t i o n that

Mr. Callaghan had taken i n the p a s t , i n the t e e t h of strong

opposition, especially from the F r e n c h . The Board of Deputies

w o u l d not disagree with t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s v i e w about the

p o s s i b l e need f o r c o n t a c t s i n the f u t u r e . They w e l l understood

the reasoning. Mr. Savitt said t h a t the problem i n t a l k i n g to

moderate P a l e s t i n i a n A r a b s was their difficulties with the PLO.

/ The Prime Minister

- 5 -

The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d she did not know how e f f e c t i v e King

Hussein's c o n t a c t s with A r a f a t were proving. She b e l i e v e d that

he was having q u i t e an i n f l u e n c e .

Dr. Kopelowitz asked how the Prime M i n i s t e r saw the f u t u r e

of the West Bank. The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d she had no definitive

answer to t h i s question which was f r e q u e n t l y put to h e r . There

were a range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . She d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t the

problem had yet been thought through with proper i n t e l l e c t u a l

clarity. But, whatever p e r f e c t s o l u t i o n might be d e v i s e d , i t

could not be imposed on the v a r i o u s i n h a b i t a n t s of the a r e a who

had t h e i r own strong i d e a s . A loose f e d e r a t i o n with Jordan seemed

perhaps the most l i k e l y outcome. Mr. S a v i t t asked whether the

. p o s i t i o n would not be eased i f King Hussein would d e c l a r e h i m s e l f

and j o i n the peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t t h i s

might seem the case to the B r i t i s h , but i t was not for the

B r i t i s h Government to do anything which might weaken h u s s e i n ' s

internal position. Mr. Janner agreed, but asked f o r the Prime

M i n i s t e r ' s assessment of the l i k e l i h o o d of h i s j o i n i n g the peace

discussions. The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t she did not see much

l i k e l i h o o d of f u r t h e r changes i n the c u r r e n t groupings over the

peace p r o c e s s . Mr. Janner s a i d t h a t i n I s r a e l King Hussein was

seen as having made the wrong c h o i c e s , f i r s t i n 1967, again i n

1973 and now over the peace p r o c e s s . Mr. Pinner s a i d t h a t the

peace making process l a c k e d encouragement i n the United Kingdom,

e s p e c i a l l y in the media and i n the u n i v e r s i t i e s . He would not

wish to extend h i s c r i t i c i s m to the Government. The Prime M i n i s t e r

s t r e s s e d that everybody had to work f o r a comprehensive s o l u t i o n .

I t would be to the advantage of everyone i n the a r e a , and of a l l

Western c o u n t r i e s . Only the Soviet group could b e n e f i t from

maintenance of the problem. She found i t s u r p r i s i n g that t h i s

r e a l i t y was not u n i v e r s a l l y r e c o g n i s e d . But reason did not

always work i n p o l i t i c s . Mr. Janner commented t h a t t h i s was

p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n the case of I s r a e l , a democracy with groups

p u b l i c l y e x p r e s s i n g p o s i t i o n s which were d i f f i c u l t to r e c o n c i l e .

Dr. Kopelowitz commented that November was a s e n s i t i v e month f o r

the Jewish community, and included the a n n i v e r s a r y of the B a l f o u r

/ Declaration.

- 6 ~

Declaration. The B o a r d o f D e p u t i e s a s k e d Her M a j e s t y ' s Govern­

ment t o do a l l p o s s i b l e a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l to a s s i s t the

peace p r o c e s s . The P r i m e M i n i s t e r n o t e d t h a t t h e r e was probably

very'little p r o s p e c t o f movement d u r i n g t h e b u i l d - u p t o t h e

United States election.

I n c o n c l u d i n g , t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r a g r e e d w i t h Mr. J a n n e r

t h a t t h e m e e t i n g s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d a s t o t a l l y private.

Mr. J a n n e r s a i d t h a t t h e B o a r d o f D e p u t i e s would be p u t t i n g o u t

a p r e s s r e l e a s e n o t i n g t h a t t h e m e e t i n g had t a k e n p l a c e and

l i s t i n g t h e t o p i c s touched upon. T h e r e would be no f u r t h e r

comment.

The m e e t i n g c o n c l u d e d at 1050.

27 November 1979

lO DOWNING STREET ^ C
^ J i
^

23 November 1 9 7 9
frem the Private Secretary

Call b y t h e P r i m e ' M i n i s t e r o f t h e Yemen A r a l ) J<jpj)ubi i o

T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r o f t h e Yera»& A r a b R e p u b l i c , M r . A b d u l •
Ghp.ni, c a l l e d on t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r y e s t e r d a y e v e n i n g a s a r r a n g e d .
He w a s a c c o m p a n i e d b y M r . S h o h a t i , M r . Muhanni , M r . K r i y a n i a n d
one o t h e r o f f i c i a l . M r . M o b e r l e y a n dM r . W a l k e r w e r e a l s o present.

The conversation wasn o t o f s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t t o w a r r a n t
a formal r e c o r d b u t o n e o r two p o i n t s t h a t a r o s e mayb e w o r t h ••
noting.

On r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n h i s c o u n t r y a n d S o u t h Y e m e n , M r . A b d u l
G h a n i s a i d t h a t t h e S o u t h Y e m e n w a s m o v i n g i n o r o a s i rig3 y c l o s e :
to t h e Soviet bloc « As a r e s u l t , t h e unity t a l k s between t h e
two c o u n t r i e s w e r e g o i n g e x t r e m e l y s l o w l y . T h em a j o r i t y o f t h e
people i n h i s country wanted to l i v e under a democrat!6 regime
w i t h a m i x e d e c o n o m y a n d s c o p e fox* f r e e e n t e r p r i s e . They would
not accept a t o t a l i t a r i a n system. Mr. Abdul Ghani compared t h e
p o l i c i e s o f h i s G o v e r n m e n t w i t h thos3 o f M r y . T h a t c h e r i n
encouraging individual i n i t i a t i v e . He s a i d t h a t t h i s policy
was i n keeping w i t h t h e Arab c h a r a c t e r andw a sworkin g w e l l .

As p a r t o f h i s d e m o c r a t i c p o l i c y , Mr. Abdul Ghani s a i d that
t h e Government w a s e n c o u r a g i n g t h e dove:'opment o f s m a l l industry
in t h e Yemen Arafi R e p u b l i c . lie sawconsi.deruble scope f o r
e n t e r p r i s e based on B r i t i s h know-how, Arab c a p i t a ] a n dYemen labour.
He s a i d t h a t h e w a s v e r y s a t i s f i e d w i t h r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n h i s
country a n dt h e U n i t e d Kingdom a n dt h a t h i e v i s i t w a s going w e l l .
H o e x p r e s s e d i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o s p e c t o:'' a n . i n v e s t m e n t guarantee
agreement w i t h t h e U n i t e d Kingdom. T h e )'j\ii<>t; M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a i ,
she understood that he would be d i s c u s s i n g t h i s f u r t h e r w i t h
Mr. H u r d t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y a n dt h a t s h e hoped t h a t agreement could
be r e a c h e d . More g e n e r a l l y , M r . Abdul G h a n i s a i d h e w a s s e e k i n g
c l o s e r l i n k s with i n d i v i d u a l Western c o u n t r i e s and w i t h t h e E E C .
He e x p r e s s e d t h e h o p e t h a t B r i t a i n w o u l d s u p p o r t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
o f c l o s e r l i n k s between t h e YAR a n dt h e E E C . Be w a shoping f o r
an i n c r e a s e i n a i d . He p r e f e r r e d t o d e v e l o p r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e
West, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n education, r a t h e r than w i t h t h e .Soviet
bloc-.

There wasa b r i e f discussion o f t h e A r a b / I s r a e l i dispute.
Mr. Abdul Ghani s a i d t h a t h e welcomed t h e F o r e i g n a n d Commonwealth

'V; / S e c r e t a r y ' s
S e c r e t a r y ' s s p e e c h a t /the UH G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y i n S e p t e m b e r .

He t h o u g h t t h a t B r i t a i n had a r o l e t o p l a y and hoped t h a t we

w o u l d be p r e p a r e d t o go . f u r t h e r i n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f P a l e s t i n i a n

rights. The M i d d l e E a s t l o o k e d t o B r i t a i n f o r g u i d a n c e and l e a d e r ­

ship! The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t r e c e n t i n i t i a t i v e s seemed t o

h a v e " r u n i n t o t h e s a n d . The Camp D a v i d p r o c e s s was a t p r e s e n t

g e t t i n g n o w h e r e . She r e c a l l e d h e r d i s c u s s i o n w i t h K i n g ' H u s s e i n i n

October. R e f e r r i n g t o h i s e f f o r t s t o g e t t h e PLO t o m o d e r a t e

t h e i r t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s , s h e s a i d that* i t was t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s

w h i c h p r e v e n t e d h e r f r o m r e c o g n i s i n g t h e PLO. The w o r l d was taking

n o t e o f what t h e PLO had t o s a y and t h e r e was t h e r e f o r e ho l o n g e r

any n e e d f o r thero t o i n d u l g e :ln t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y . I t was not

enough t o t a l k a b o u t t h e r i g h t s o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s t o s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The m a t t e r h a d t o be t h o u g h t t h r o u g h more t h o r o u g h !

Acknowledgement o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s r i g h t s and o f I s r a e l ' s r i g h t

t o e x i s t w o u l d h a v e t o be s i m u l t a n e o u s . Mr. A b d u l Ghani s a i d t h e

PIO had come a l o n g way s i n c e t h e h i j a c k i n g i n c i d e n t s o f t h e

e a r l y 70s. I f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n r i g h t t o a homeland was accepted,

i t w o u l d be e a s i e r t o i n f l u e n c e thern. But i t w o u l d be v e r y

d i f f i c u l t f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n s to ackcovledgo I s r a e l ' s r i g h t to

exist. Mr. Mober'Ley commented t h a t a S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n

c o u p l i n g t h e two a s p e c t s o f t h e p r o b l e m m i g h t be h e l p f u l .

The m e e t i n g e n d e d w i t h e x p r e s s i o n s o f mutual e s t e e m .

Mr. A b d u l G h a n i i n v i t e d t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r t o visit t h e Yemen

Arab R e p u b l i c . The Prime M i n i s t e r i n d i c a t e d :xri i n t e r e s t i n

v i s i t i n g t h e M i d d l e E a s t i n due c o u r s e . The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a l s o

e x p r e s s e d t h e hope t h a t a n o t h e r member o f t h e Government m i g h t

be a b l e t o v i s i t t h e YAH a t some s t a g e .

Paul Lever, Esq.,

F o r e i g n and Commonwealth Office.

P(v\i C^oco^L cd c^w 1 °l Ncv 79 ^ r\Jo (O . ­
^>r the* s p i r i t u a l h e a l t h o f t h e n a t i o n , and F r a n c o would r e t a i n i t
so long a s the p r e s e n t m i l i t a r y situation i n Europe c o n t i n u e d .
F r e n c h t r o o p s were now o f good q u a l i t y , and their officers were
wel1 -mot i v a t e d .

Energy

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t t h e o i l s i t u a t i o n continued to be

v e r y gloomy. P r i c e s w e r e r i s i n g . , and more and more o i l was being

s o l d a t spot market p r i c e s . The f o l l o w - u p t o S t r a s b o u r g and Tokyo

had not got v e r y f a r . T h e r e was still no d i a l o g u e between t h e EEC

and OPEC. I n the meantime, the U n i t e d S t a t e s d u a l p r i c e structure

was causing d i f f i c u l t i e s . In particular i t gave them an unfair

a d v a n t a g e i n t h e t r a d e o f any p r o d u c t s w i t h an o i l b a s e , e.g. synthetic

textiles.

President Discard s a i d t h a t he t h o u g h t that, the p r e s e n t o i l

s i t u a t i o n was a complete f a i l u r e f o r t h e West. D e s p i t e a l l h i s

u r g i n g s i n t h e p a s t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had n e v e r had t h e political

will to a c t d e c i s i v e l y . I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o s e e how they

handled the I r a n i a n s i t u a t i o n . He was a l s o o b l i g e d to say t h a t the

British approach t o p r i c e s o f N o r t h S e a o i l was not w e l l r e c e i v e d by

t h e o t h e r members o f t h e Community. The U n i t e d Kingdom were always

amongst t h e f i r s t to j o i n i n any increase in price. France was

g e t t i n g o i l from S a u d i A r a b i a and Iraq at s i g n i f i c a n t l y lower prices

t h a n t h o s e t h e y had t o pay f o r North Sea o i l . The P r i m e Minister

s a i d t h a t we charged the r i g h t p r i c e f o r the grades of o i l . We did

not put o u r p r i c e s up ahead o f L i b y a and A l g e r i a but followed the

world p r i c e . We were d o i n g what we r e a s o n a b l y could to help our
European p a r t n e r s . F o r e x a m p l e , we had agreed to produce 5 million
tonnes a y e a r more t o h e l p t h e Community o v e r t h e Tokyo Agreement.

We had no r e a s o n to f e e l g u i l t y about our p o l i c y : on t h e c o n t r a r y ,

we had been v e r y r e a s o n a b l e . P r e s i d e n t G i s c a r d added t h a t he had

o n l y wanted to mention t h e m a t t e r . We should expect i t to come up

again at Dublin.

The M i d d l e E a s t

P r e s i d e n t G i s c a r d s a i d t h a t he was generally pessimistic about

the s i t u a t i o n i n the Middle E a s t . He had a l w a y s been s u r p r i s e d at

the degree of support which t h e L a b o u r Government had given Israel.

V l

^ ' L ^ L 1 /**° understood

- 8 -

He understood the emotional reasons for t h i s . They a p p l i e d t o

F r a n c e a s w e l l f o r s h e ' h a d t h e b i g g e s t J e w i s h community i n Western

Europe. But we had to look at the s i t u a t i o n realistically.

I t was impossible for I s r a e l t o keep t h e O c c u p i e d Territories

and their attempts t o do s o were an e m b a r r a s s m e n t f o r e v e r y b o d y .

He d i d not know i\!r. B e g i n , whom he had n e v e r met, but he thought

h i s a p p r o a c h f a n a t i c a l and u n r e a l i s t i c . On the other hand,

Y a s s a r A r a f a t was adopting a m o d e r a t e l i n e a t t h e moment and he

seemed t o be i n command o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n forces. A r a f a t wanted

i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n and would g e t i t . A number o f E u r o p e a n

c o u n t r i e s had a l r e a d y accorded t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s some form o f

r e c o g n i t i o n , . a n d t h e r e was now g r o w i n g p r e s s u r e from a l l t h e

Arab c o u n t r i e s , even i n c l u d i n g E g y p t , f o r France to o f f e r r e c o g n i t i o n

N o t h i n g would be g a i n e d , i n h i s v i e w , by rejecting the Palestinians

and t h e West Bank w o u l d h a v e t o be g i v e n b a c k to them i n due course.

F r a n c e wanted t o be on normal t e r m s w i t h t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s and althoug

t h e y would not be a b l e t o g i v e them d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n s i n c e

t h e r e was not a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e , F r a n c e would make some move

towards r e c o g n i t i o n . The only reason f o r t h e d e l a y was the

f e e l i n g s o f t h e F r e n c h J e w i s h community. The A m e r i c a n s were

s u p p o r t i n g F r a n c e on this: though Germany s t i l l remained reluctant,

t h e y now seemed t o be n e a r e r t h e F r e n c h position.

/ The Prime M i n i s t e r

ScC[lET

The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t s h e was d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r we

c o u l d t a k e f u r t h e r s t e p s on t h e M i d d l e E a s t u n t i l t h e Camp D a v i d

t a l k s had f i n a l l y run into sand. She a g r e e d e n t i r e l y w i t h what

P r e s i d e n t G i s c a r d had s a i d about Mr. B e g i n . She had n e v e r had

a more d i f f i c u l t man t o d e a l w i t h . She had t o l d him t h a t h i s

West Bank p o l i c y was u n r e a l i s t i c and t h a t s h e knew o f no

arrangement which gave a p e o p l e autonomy o v e r t h e i r political

future without autonomy o v e r t h e s o i l . Mr. B e g i n ' s policies

w e r e making t h i n g s v e r y d i f f i c u l t f o r P r e s i d e n t S a d a t who had

been v e r y c o u r a g e o u s and who w a s , i f a n y t h i n g , t o o g e n e r o u s

minded t o w a r d s Mr. B e g i n . A l l our e f f o r t s t o c o n v i n c e Mr. B e g i n

t h a t h i s West Bank p o l i c y was a b s u r d and t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d n o t

be I s r a e l i s e t t l e m e n t s on t h e West Bank had f a i l e d t o move h i m .

K i s r e s p o n s e was t h a t J u d e a and S a m a r i a h a d been J e w i s h i n

biblical t i m e s and t h a t t h e y s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e be s o t o d a y . But

notwithstanding Israel'3 p r e s e n t i n t r a n s i g e a n c e we w e r e reluctant

t o r e c o g n i s e t h e PLO. R e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e PLO would have t o be

accompanied by t h e PLO's a c c e p t a n c e o f I s r a e l ' s right to e x i s t .

I n t h e meantime, h o w e v e r , B r i t a i n was r e a d y t o t a l k w i t h

representatives of the P a l e s t i n i a n people.

The discussion ended a t 1 6 1 0 .

21 November 1979

THE ROYAL PALACE

AMMAN JORDAN

13 November 1979

I r e c a l l w i t h p l e a s u r e our m e e t i n g i n London

l a s t F e b r u a r y , and knowing of your i n t e r e s t i n

developments i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t , I would l i k e

t o f o r w a r d t o you t h e e n c l o s e d r e f l e c t i o n s on

a s p e c t s of t h e problems i n J e r u s a l e m , i n t h e

knowledge t h a t s u c h i s s ues have t o be g i v e n t h e

f u l l a t t e n t i o n t h e y d e s e r v e by a l l p a r t i e s con­

cerned .

I would v a l u e any comments you might w i s h t o

make r e g a r d i n g t h i s s u b j e c t , and l o o k f o r w a r d

t o r e m a i n i n g i n c o n t a c t w i t h you over t h e coming

months.

The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher,

Prime M i n i s t e r ,

10 Downing S t r e e t ,

London SWl

3^

lO D O W N I N G S T R E E T

T H E P R I M E MINISTER 12 November 1979

IN CONFIDENCE

Thank y o u f o r y o u r l e t t e r o f 26 O c t o b e r and t h e n o t e s o f

your very i n t e r e s t i n g t a l k s i n Cairo.

I s h a l l t r y t o respond t o t h e c r u c i a l p o i n t s o f p r i n c i p l e
w h i c h y o u r a i s e about o u r p o l i c y i n t h e Middle East.

T h e r e s h o u l d be no doubt t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d a n d welcome t h e

g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Camp D a v i d . The p e a c e t r e a t y between

Egpyt and I s r a e l i s a r e m a r k a b l e a c h i e v e m e n t . I t has transformed

the political a n d s t r a t e g i c s t r u c t u r e o f t h e a r e a and o p e n e d up

new p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r wider peace. The t r e a t y ' s p r o v i s i o n s have

so f a r been c a r r i e d o u t p r o m p t l y a n d c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y by b o t h sides.

We hope t h a t p r o g r e s s on t h e autonomy p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Camp D a v i d

framework w i l l p r o v e e q u a l l y s u c c e s s f u l . This i s t h e view which

we c o n s i s t e n t l y e x p r e s s t o o u r Arab friends.

The autonomy p r o v i s i o n s , o f c o u r s e , a r e an i n t e g r a l part of

the agreement between Israel and E g y p t . None o f t h e p r i n c i p a l s

has claimed that t h e peace t r e a t y i sin itself a full settlement

of t h e c o n f l i c t o r t h a t t h e autonomy p r o v i s i o n s c o u l d automatically

b r i n g comprehensive peace t o t h e r e g i o n . B u t i f t h e Camp D a v i d

autonomy n e g o t i a t i o n s do n o t l e a d t o w a r d s a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e t t l e ­

ment, t h e r e i s a s e r i o u s d a n g e r t h a t e v e n t h e E g y p t / I s r a e l peace

will f a i l to hold. I n s u p p o r t i n g Camp D a v i d , we do n o t and c a n n o t

b a c k E g y p t and I s r a e l i n t h e i r confrontation with Jordan, Saudi

A r a b i a and t h e r e s t o f t h e A r a b w o r l d . I four i n t e r e s t s i n the

area, strategic a s w e l l a s e c o n o m i c , a r e t o b e s e c u r e d we need

to s e e Camp D a v i d l e a d t o a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e t t l e m e n t i n w h i c h

/ a l l can

- 2 ­

all can j o i n . Only then can t h e p o t e n t i a l o f t h e alignment between

E g y p t , I s r a e l a n d t h e West o f w h i c h y o u s p e a k be t u r n e d to f u l l

account. T h a t i s why t h e P a l e s t i n i a n issue i s crucial and why

t h e PLO h a s become a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n Middle E a s t politics.

You r e f e r to President Sadat's concern to l i m i t Soviet

influence. This i so f course a c o n c e r n w h i c h we s h a r e . The q u e s t i o n

a t i s s u e i s n o t o u r o b j e c t i v e b u t what means we s h o u l d use. Many

of our best f r i e n d s i n t h e a r e a do n o t s e e Camp D a v i d a s t h e a n s w e r .

King Hussein f o r e x a m p l e b e l i e v e s t h a t Camp D a v i d i s l e a d i n g t o a

polarization i n t h e A r a b w o r l d i n i m i c a l t o t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e

West a n d t h e i r f r i e n d s . T h i s i s why he u r g e s u s t o move t o w a r d s

the P a l e s t i n i a n s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t we h a v e A r a b i n t e r e s t s a t

heart. To i g n o r e this aspect entirely i s to play i n t o t h e hands o f

the extremists.

To p u t i t b l u n t l y , i f we a r e t o h e l p o u r f r i e n d s a n d d e f e n d

o u r own i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r e g i o n , we c a n n o t i d e n t i f y ourselves

solely with Israel and E g y p t w i t h o u t r e g a r d to our l i n k s with the

r e s t o f t h e Arab w o r l d ; i f we d o , t h e A r a b s w i l l undoubtedly

move, w i l l i n g l y o r n o t , towards t h e Soviet Union. And t h e r e g i m e s

which f i g h t this t r e n d w i l l be a t g r e a t e r risk.

I n t h e G u l f , we h a v e b e e n t r y i n g t o f o s t e r some community

of purpose and r e g i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n i n matters o f d e f e n c e and

security. The r e c e n t concerted G u l f s u p p o r t f o r t h e Government

of Bahrain i n t h e f a c e o f renewed I r a n i a n c l a i m s was e n c o u r a g i n g .

At t h e same t i m e we c o n t i n u e t o encourage t h e s t a t e s o f t h e a r e a

to look t o t h e West f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n a l l f i e l d s . We shall

c e r t a i n l y continue to help Oman.

However, t h e G u l f S t a t e s a r e g e n e r a l l y u n e a s y a t t h e p r o s p e c t

o f any i n c r e a s e d W e s t e r n m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e i n t h e a r e a . I f we

were t o a t t e m p t t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e G u l f u n i n v i t e d , we w o u l d m e r e l y

precipitate the sort of increased i n s t a b i l i t y i n the a r e a which

we a r e s e e k i n g to avoid. Support f o r our f r i e n d s i n t h e G u l f can

be best d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e p r o v i s i o n o f l o a n s e r v i c e personnel

and military t r a i n i n g i n t h e UK; supply o f defence equipment;

and r e g u l a r n a v a l and a i r deployments t o t h e a r e a , i n c l u d i n g , i f

possible, joint e x e r c i s e s with friendly States. I n a d d i t i o n , both

/ Peter Carrington

- 3 -

Peter Carrington and D o u g l a s Hurd w i l l be v i s i t i n g the Gulf i n

t h e New Year. Their v i s i t s w i l l provide good o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o

r e a f f i r m o u r s u p p o r t and u n d e r l i n e t h e community o f o u r i n t e r e s t s .

I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t F r a n c i s Pym w i l l be r e p l y i n g s e p a r a t e l y

to your proposals f o r the establishment o f an i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r c e .

The R t . Hon. J u l i a n Amery, M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

*
OR 180

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 091251Z NOV 79

TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1604 OF 9 NOVEMBER

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA

KUWAIT HMCG JERUSALEM PARIS

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
CONSCIOUS OF THE URGENT NECESSITY OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON FULL
RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE CHARTER.
CONVINCED THAT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL NOT
BE POSSIBLE UNLESS THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IS RESOLVED
IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES ­

1 . REAFFIRMS
( I ) ITS RESOLUTIONS RELEVANT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, IN PARTICULAR

242 (1967) AND 333 ( I 9 7 3 ) i

( I I ) THE RIGHT OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN TO THEIR
HOMES AND LIVE AT PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS TO DO SO AND THE
RIGHT OF THOSE CHOSSING NOT TO RETURN TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION
FOR THEIR PROPERTY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, IN PARTICULAR RESOLUTION 194 ( I I I ) OF
11 DECEM3ER 1948

2. AFFIRMS

THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATED COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT THE

PALESTINIAN PEOPLE SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT OF

SELF-DETERMINATION.

CARRINGTON

FILES P S ADDITIONAL D I S T N .

A D

MED PS/PUS ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

N AM D PS/MR HURD

UND MR J MOBERLY

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 560 CONFIDENTIAL
^CONFIDENTIAL
FKFC 0 0912507 NOV
TO.PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1*03 OF 9 NOVEMBER 1979
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BEIRUT,
DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, HMCG JERUSALEM, PARIS.

YOUR TELNO. 3447 (PARA ?) i SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS.

1 . A SHORT RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING 242 AND ENDORSI NG THE
PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO 'ELF—DETERMI NAT I ON, WHICH WOULD'BE
PU3ILICLY ACCEPTED BY THE PLO, COULD HELP OLVE THE PROBLEM
c

OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. T:UT THERE
APE SERIOUS OBSTACLES. THE CHANCES OF A RESOLUTION ACCEPTABLE
BOTH TO US AND THE ARAB GROUP ARE SMALL. ISRAELI OPPOSITION
IS LIKELY TO 3E AS FIERCE AS IN AUGUST AND WE DOUBT IF THE
•AMERICANS WOULD STAND UP TO IT, PARTICULARLY IN AN ELECTION
YEAR.

2. A FURTHER UNKNOWN FACTOR IS THE ATTITUDE THE ANTI-SADAT
ARABS MAY ADOPT. KING HUSSEIN HOPE' TO SECURE UNITED SUPPORT
FHOM THE ARA5 SUMMIT FOR HIS IDEA OF A RETURN TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, PROBABLY EiCOMPASSING A NEW RESOLUTION. WE DOUBT IF.HE
WILL SUCCEED, AND DO NOT BELIEVE THE PLO WOULD AT THIS STAGE
ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF RESOLUTION 24? IN PETURN FOP A MODERATELY
VOIDED RESOLUTION OFFERING THEM ONLY SELF-DETERMINATION.
THEY WOULD CERTAINLY ^EEK THE PLC'S SPECIAL POSITION
AFFIRMED AND ALSO THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE FOR
ARAB PALESTINE,

3. AGAINST THIS UNCERTAIN -ACKG^OUi , WE EE A NEED FOP
n
C

r
AUTI ON. THE TIMING OF ANY NEW MOVs IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
"WILL BE CRUCIAL. NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN
RESPONDING TO WALKER'S QUESTIONS. IN ^OING SO, YOU WILL WISH
TO 1RAW UPON UKMIS TEl.NO. 1399 AND GO ON TO M.AK THE FOLLOWING
r

POINTS:
(I) THERE IS MUCH TO EE SAID FOR A RESOLUTION SUPPLEMENTING
242 WHICH MAY OFFER THE BEST MEANS TO SECURE PLO ACCEPTANCE

CONFIDENTIAL /OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

OF THE P R I N C I P L E S OF 2 * 2 AS THE B A S I S FOR A SETTLEMENT. IT
WOULD BE E S S E N T I A L THAT ANY SUCH RESOLUTION SHOULD HAVE
FORMAL PLO ENDORSEMENT. 3UT T H I S V I L L CERTAINLY NOT BE
FORTHCOMING WITHOUT AFFIRMATION I N THE RESOLUTION OF THE R I G H T
OF P A L E S T I N I A N SELF-DETERMINATION. EVEN SO, Tr-E ARABS W I L L
PK03ABLY WANT FAR MORE: A F F I R M A T I O N OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
MD THE S P E C I A L POLE OF THE P L O .
(II) IT I S ESSENTIAL THAT ANY NEW RESOLUTION SHOULD NOT
UNDERMINE THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF CAMP D A V I D . A RESOLUTION
VETOED BY THE U S WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK FOP WESTERN
INTERESTS I N THE AREA. VE WOULD NOT EXPECT EXPLICIT
SUPPORT F*OM THE U S BUT V E ^OULD AT C
OME STAGE VANT AN
ASSURANCE THAT A NEW RESOLUTION WHICH WE WERE SACKING
WOULD NOT BE VETOED.
(III) MUCH W I L L DEPEND ON THE APA.: SUMMIT. AN ARA ; 7
DRAFT
WOULD PROBABLY BE U :HELPFUL ANTJ UNACCEPTABLE. I F SUCH A
DRAFT WERE PUT FORWARD AND VETOED BY THE U S , I T WOULD NO
DOUBT LEAD TO CALLS FOR A S P E C I A L SESSION AND A W I D E N I N G
GAP BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARABS.
(IV) I N SO'-'E CIRCUMSTANCES I T MIGHT BE BETTER TO PREVENT
T H I S DEVELOPMENT BY GETTING IN F I ^ T
C
I N THE NEW YEAR WITH
A EUROPEAN OR B R I T I S H TRAFT OF OUR OWN, PERHAPS ON THE L I N E S
OF MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

4 . I N VIEW OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S
OFFICE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT, YOU MAY.CONSIDER I T ADVISABLE
TO SPEAK TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS WELL AS WALKER.

5. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE^E ARE P R E L I M I N A R Y IDEAS ON
VHICH WE SHOULD EE GLAD OF A U S VIEW BEFORE CONSULTING
MINISTERS.

CARRINGTON

FILES ADDITIONAL D I S T N .

NENAD

ARAB/ISRAEL D I S P U T E

MED

N AM D

UND

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

MR J C MOBERLY
CONFIDENTIAL

^CLASSIFIED
I WASHINGTON A 2 1 7 1 5 Z NOV 7 9
TO ROUTINE FCO
5". '<

TELNC 3 3 0 9 CF 2 NOVEMBER 1 9 7 9 .

INFO ROUTINE T E L A V I V CAIRO JEDDA AMMAN B E I R U T DAMASCUS

UKMIS NEW YORK AND JERUSALEM.

MY TELNO 3372: ARAB-ISRAEL: STRAUSS

1. TODAY'S NEW YORK T I M E S REPORTS AN INTERVIEW WITH STRAUSS IN
WHICH FOR THE F I R S T T I M E HE OPENLY DISCUSSED THE P O S S I B I L I T Y THAT
HE MIGHT G I V E UP H I S M I D D L E EAST J O B . ASKED S P E C I F I C A L L Y WHETHER
HE WOULD S T I C K WITH THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS TO THE END, HE
REPLIED QUOTE I DON'T WANT TO COMMENT. I DON'T WANT TO MISLEAD
YOU. UNQUOTE
2. REFERRING TO PRESSURES ON H I M TO DEVOTE MORE T I M E TO THE

CARTER RE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN HE S A I D QUOTE I AM UNDER AN AWFUL

LOT OF PRESGURTFRCM ALL OVER THE COUNTRY, FROM-MEMBERS CF CONGRESS.
THEY SAY THE CAMPAIGN I S MORE IMPORTANT TO THE U N I T E D STATES
THAN ANYTHING ELSE. EVEN PEACE I N THE M I D D L E EAST I S DEPENDENT
ON CARTER UNQUOTE.
3. SUGGESTING THAT HE WAS HARDLY I N D I S P E N S I B L E TC THE MIDDLE
EAST NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT I F HE Q U I T THERE WERE OTHERS WHO
COULD DO THE JOB BETTER, HE ADMITTED THAT QUOTE THE PROBLEM I
HAVE I N T H I S JOB AND W I L L ALWAYS HAVE I S THAT I HAVE A B A S I C
WEAKNESS THAT I W I L L NEVER CATCH UP ON. THAT'S A LACK CF
KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THE NUANCES OF THE AREA UNQUOTE. HE RECOGNISED,
HOWEVER, THAT I F HE DROPPED H I S MIDDLE EAST M I S S I O N , QUESTIONS
WOULD INEVITABLY BE R A I S E D AT HOME AND ABROAD ABOUT THE
A D M I N I S T R A T I O N ' S COMMITMENT TO A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. THAT
REMAINED A FACTOR I N H I S RELUCTANCE TO TAKE A FIRM D E C I S I O N NOW.
HJ»* 154.0^ OKI
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FM WASHINGTON 302335Z OCT 79

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3447 OF 30 OCTOBER
>
1

INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,

UKMIS NEW YORK, HMCG JERUSALEM.

CAIRO TELNO 801 (NOT TO ALL)i STRAUSS/KHALIL/BURG TALKS IN

LONDON

1. WALKER (STRAUSS' OFFICE) HAS NOW BRIEFED US. HE PREFACED HIS
ACCOUNT BY STRESSING HOW GRATEFUL STRAUSS WAS FOR ALL THE
COOPERATION AND HELP WITH ARRANGEMENTS WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN
GIVEN BY THE U K AUTHORITIES IN SETTING UP THIS MEETING, ,
5. WALKER SAID THAT THE FORMULA HAD WORKED WELL. MOST OF THE

DISCUSSION HAD BEEN BETWEEN THE THREE PRINCIPALS ALONE AND THERE

HAD NEVER BEEN A FORMAL PLENARY SESSION. THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN

EXCELLENT BOTH DURING AND OUTSIDE THE MEETINGS (THE DINNER STRAUSS

HAD GIVEN HAD BEEN AN OCCASION FOR "SONGS AND JOKES"). WALKER

BELIEVED THAT THE COMBINATION OF STRAUSS' PUBLIC PRE-MEETING

PESSIMISM AND DAYAN'S RESIGNATION REMARKS HAD PUT PRESSURE ON BOTH

SIDES TO PRODUCE SOME SIGNS OF PROGRESS.

3. BOTH SIDES HAD MADE CONCESSIONS. BURG (NOT WITHOUT MANY
TELEPHONE CALLS TO JERUSALEM) HAD AGREED THAT THE ELECTIONS SHOULD
BE SUPERVISED BY ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN CIVILAINS, THOUGH HE HAD
NOT BEEN WILLING TO SPELL OUT IN THE COMMUNIQUE THAT THE MILITARY
WOULD BE SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED: AND HE HAD OPENED THE DOOR FOR
#

INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. THE EGYPTIANS, THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT
ADMIT IT, HAD CLIMBED DOWN FROM THEIR REFUSAL TO DISCUSS
DETAILS BEFORE ESTABLISHING AGREED PRINCIPLES. THE PROCEDURAL RESULT
WAS THAT THE ISRAEL i 3 ARE, WITHIN TV/O WEEKS, TO SUBMIT TO THE
EGYPT I AM 3 AND AMERICANS A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH
THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS INVOLVED IN THE DAY-TO-DAY
RUNNING OF ALL ASPECTS'OF WEST BANK ADMINISTRATION. THEY ARE TO
INDICATE WHICH SECTORS CAN IN THEIR VIEW BE HANDED OVER IN THEIR
ENTIRETY TO THE AUTONOMOUS REGIME AND WHICH WILL CAUSE THEM PROBLEMS
(THE EGYPTIANS STUCK TO THEIR POSITION THAT EVERYTHING EXCEPT
SECURITY - SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED BY THE TREATY - SHOULD BE HANDED
OVER FULLY.) THE EXISTING WORKING GROUPS WILL THEN DISCUSS THESE
ISSUES IN DETAIL, POSSIBLY BY BREAKING UP INTO FURTHER
SUBCOMMITTEES.
4. WALKER MADE NO CLAIM THAT THE PROSPECTS WERE 3RIGHT AND READILY
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS SUCCESSFUL LONDON FORMULA COULD NOT BE
REPEATED EITHER SOON OR OFTEN. HE WAS PARTICULARLY GLOOMY ABOUT THE
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ABILITY OF THE WEAKENED ISRAELI CABINET TO TAKE ANY DECISION
SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO BREAK THE REALLY DIFFICULT ISSUES. BUT ON
BALANCE THE MEETING HAD HELPED AND WALKER THOUGHT THAT MUCH
CREDIT SHOULD GO BURG WHO HAD HAD A DIFFICULT HAND TO PLAY.
AGREEMENT ON ELECTION MODALITIES HAD BEEN BROUGHT CLOSER AND KHALIL'S
IDEA OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE EAST JERUSALEM ARABS BY A WEST
GERMAN TYPE OF ARRANGEMENT WAS INTERESTING.
5. WALKER MENTIONED THAT KHALIL, WITHOUT APPEARING TO HAVE THOUGHT
THE MATTER THROUGH, HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF A NEW SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. IT WAS NOT CLEAR
WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS ARE THINKING OF INITIATING THIS THEMSELVES OR
SIMPLY PREPARING THEMSELVES BF.TTcR THAN IN AUGUST IN CASE SOMEONE *
ELSE DID. THE AMERICANS ARE UNDECIDED ON WHAT THEIR OWN ATTITUDE
SHOULD BE. THE EASIEST WAY OUT MIGHT BE TO TAKE A HARD LINE FROM
THE BEGINNING IN THE HOPE THAT A SUFFICIENTLY EXTREME DRAFT WOULD
EMERGE TO MAKE A VETO REASONABLE. THERE WERE PEOPLE IN STATE
DEPARTMENT WHO SAW ADVANTAGE IN SUCH A RESOLUTION FOR THE SAME
REASONS AS IN AUGUST, PLUS THE FACT THAT IT MIGHT THIS TIME HAVE
EGYPTIAN SUPPORT. THE SUFFERER WOULD BE CAMP DAVID AND THEREFORE THE
PRESIDENT, SINCE AFTER ALL THE RHETORIC OF AUGUST IT WOULD BE HARD
TO DENY THAT TO GO ALONG WITH A NEW RESOLUTION WAS TANTAMOUNT TO
ADMITTING THAT CAMP DAVID HAD FAILED. WALKER SAID THAT U K VIEWS AND
IDEAS ON THE ADVISABILITY AMD TIMING (EVEN IF IT IS OUTSIDE WESTERN
CONTROL) OF A NEW RESOLUTION WOULD BE WELCOME.
6. STRAUSS WILL ATTEND THE ST CATHERINE MONASTERY CEREMONIES BUT HAS
TAKEN NO DECISION YET ON WHETHER TO GO TO THE DECEMBER
MINISTERIAL MEETING.
7. WALKER SAID, INCIDENTALLY, THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HAD NO HAND IN
SADAT'S DECISION ON THE OIL PRICE QUESTION (CAIRO TELNO 8 0 3 ) .
HuN-DEA-ScrJ *
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CABINET OFFICE C O N F I D E N T I A L •
CONFIDENTIAL

ABILITY OF THE WEAKENED ISRAELI CABINET TO TAKE ANY DECISION
SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO BREAK THE REALLY DIFFICULT ISSUES. BUT ON
BALANCE THE MEETING HAD HELPED AND WALKER THOUGHT THAT MUCH
CREDIT SHOULD GO BURG WHO HAD HAD A DIFFICULT HAND TO PLAY.
AGREEMENT ON ELECTION MODALITIES HAD BEEN BROUGHT CLOSER AND KHALIL'S
IDEA OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE EAST JERUSALEM ARABS BY A WEST
GERMAN TYPE OF ARRANGEMENT WAS INTERESTING.
5. WALKER MENTIONED THAT KHALIL, WITHOUT APPEARING TO HAVE THOUGHT
THE MATTER THROUGH, HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF A NEW SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. IT WAS NOT CLEAR
WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS ARE THINKING OF INITIATING THIS THEMSELVES OR
SIMPLY PREPARING THEMSELVES BETTER THAN IN AUGUST IN CASE SOMEONE *
aSE DID. THE AMERICANS ARE UNDECIDED ON WHAT THEIR OWN ATTITUDE
SHOULD BE. THE EASIEST WAY OUT MIGHT BE TO TAKE A HARD LINE FROM
THE BEGINNING IN THE HOPE THAT A SUFFICIENTLY EXTREME DRAFT WOULD
EMERGE TO MAKE A VETO REASONABLE. THERE WERE PEOPLE IN STATE
DEPARTMENT WHO SAW ADVANTAGE IN SUCH A RESOLUTION FOR THE SAME
REASONS AS IN AUGUST, PLUS THE FACT THAT IT MIGHT THIS TIME HAVE
EGYPTIAN SUPPORT. THE SUFFERER WOULD BE CAMP DAVID AND THEREFORE THE
PRESIDENT, SINCE AFTER ALL THE RHETORIC OF AUGUST IT WOULD BE HARD
TO DENY THAT TO GO ALONG WITH A NEW RESOLUTION WAS TANTAMOUNT TO
ADMITTING THAT CAMP DAVID HAD FA JLED. WALKER SAID THAT U K VIEWS AND
IDEAS ON THE ADVISABILITY AND TIMING (EVEN IF IT IS OUTSIDE WESTERN

CONTROL) OF A NEW RESOLUTION WOULD BE WELCOME.

6. STRAUSS WILL ATTEND THE ST CATHERINE MONASTERY CEREMONIES BUT HAS
TAKEN NO DECISION YET ON WHETHER TO GO TO THE DECEMBER
MINISTERIAL MEETING.
7. WALKER SAID, INCIDENTALLY, THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HAD NO HAND IN
SADAT'S DECISION ON THE OIL PRICE QUESTION (CAIRO TELNO 803) .

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AUNCLASSIFIED / n
FM OTTAWA 3 0 2 1 1 0 Z OCT 79 p>Wi /Aw\/c.
TO P R I O R I T Y F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 5 3 0 O F 3 0 OCTOBER
INFO R O U T I N E T E L A V I V
P R O P O S E D MOVE O F C A N A D I A N EMBASSY TO J E R U S A L E M
1 THE PRIME MINISTER T O L D T H E COMMONS LAST NIGHT THAT
THE G O V E R N M E N T A C C E P T E D MR S T A N F I E L D ' S R E C O M M E N D A T I O N
QUOTE T H A T NO A C T I O N B E T A K E N ON T H E L O C A T I O N O F T H E
CANADIAN EMBASSY UNTIL T H E STATUS O F JERUSALEM IS CLARIFIED
WITHIN A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS
ARAB NEIGHBOURS UNQUOTE.
2. T H EANTICIPATED REVERSAL O F T H E GOVERNMENT'S
B1BARRASSING ELECTION PLEDGE HAS OCCURRED S O O N E R THAN
EXPECTED. MR S T A N F I E L D ' S R E C O M M E N D A T I O N WAS C O N T A I N E D
IN AN - I N T E R I M REPORT WHICH T H E DEA T E L L U S WAS P R O D U C E D
ON H I S OWN I N I T I A T I V E . MR S T A N F I E L D ' S U N E Q U I V O C A L REJECTION
OF T H E P R O P O S E D EMBASSY MOVE S U G G E S T S T H A T H E WAS A N X I O U S
TO R E V E R S E T H E DAMAGE C A U S E D B Y T H E P R O P O S A L WITHOUT
FURTHER DELAY. T H E GOVERNMENT E V I D E N T L Y S H A R E D H I S CONCERN.
RECENTLY MR M I C H A E L WILSON, THE MINISTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ADMITTED ORDERS WORTH DOLLARS FOUR AND A Q U A R T E R MILLION
HAD B E E N C A N C E L L E D B Y ARAB C O U N T R I E S B E C A U S E O F T H E J E R U S A L E M

PLAN.
%—MR S T A N F I E L D I S E X P E C T E D TO SUBMIT A FINAL REPORT
IN T H E NEW Y E A R CONTAINING RECOMMENDATIONS ON C A N A D A ' S
BROAD M I D D L E EASTERN POLICY INCLUDING T H E QUESTION O F
PEACE-KEEPING.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

LED

N AMD

UND

EESD • *

ELD

WED

LIAED

ES & SD

FRD
BOON DEPT

CONS DEPT

CONS EK UNIT

CABINET OFFICE

lO DOWNING STREET
T H E PRIME MINISTER
26 O c t o b e r 1979

(7L J\-
Thank you s o much f o r y o u r l e t t e r o f

25 O c t o b e r and f o r t h e k i n d r e m a r k s i t

contained. I v e r y much hope t h a t t h e t a l k s

i n w h i c h you a r e p a r t i c i p a t i n g w i l l soon

make p r o g r e s s . The E g y p t i a n P r i m e M i n i s t e r

spoke warmly t o me l a s t n i g h t about your

contribution.

Mr. R o b e r t S . S t r a u s s

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SWIA 2AH
25 October 1979

Message to the Prime M i n i s t e r from Mr S t r a u s s

I enclose a l e t t e r to the Prime M i n i s t e r
from Mr Robert S t r a u s s , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s
S p e c i a l Representative and Leader of the
American delegation i n the Middle East
negotiations. Mr S t r a u s s i s c a l l i n g on
Lord Carrington tomorrow morning.

Paul Lever

M O'D B Alexander

10 Downing S t r e e t

THE WHITE HOUSE
WA S H I N G TO N

October 25, 1979

The Right Honourable Margaret T h a t c h e r , M.P.

Prime M i n i s t e r

10, Downing S t r e e t

Dear Prime M i n i s t e r :

I want to express my thanks f o r the wonderful

cooperation we are r e c e i v i n g here i n London. I am very

much looking forward to meeting w i t h Lord C a r r i n g t o n

tomorrow morning to b r i e f him on the Middle E a s t s i t u a t i o n .

I haven't had the p l e a s u r e of seeing you s i n c e

the dinner a t Henry K i s s i n g e r ' s during your l a s t v i s i t .

But I look forward to seeing you during your forthcoming

v i s i t , should your schedule permit.

I follow w i t h admiration your s t e a d f a s t

determination and p r o g r e s s .

Personal R e p r e s e n t a t i v e

of the P r e s i d e n t

M I D D L E EAST: ADVANCE C O P I E S X - & I'
NO 1 0 DOV/ITLKG STREEOV-^
P S / S I R I GILMOUR CABINET OFFICE SIR J HUNT
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS CABINET OFFICE DIO
MR J C MOBERLY

HD/^ENAD
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A D V A N C E COPY

GPS 2 2 3

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 252340Z OCT 7 9
TO PRIORITY F.C.O.
T E L E G R A M NUMBER 3 3 7 2 O F 2 5 OCTOBER.
INFO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, U K M I S NEW YORK,
HMCG J E R U S A L E M .

FROM ROBINSON
MY T E L E G R A M NO 3 3 3 9 1 ARAB/ISRAEL.

1. T H E R E HAVE BEEN INCREASING SIGNS IN T H E LAST WEEK T H A T STRAUSS
FEELS H I S MIDDLE E A S T TASK IS HOPELESS AND T H A T H E SHOULD NOT PRESS
MATTERS TO A CRISIS SINCE THIS WOULD DAMAGE CARTER'S ELECTION
CAMPAIGN. T H E R E HAVE ALSO BEEN CONTINUING INDICATIONS THAT STRAUSS
IS R E S I S T I N G FIRMLY E F F O R T S BY T H E STATE DEPARTMENT TO STEER THE
ADMINISTRATION INTO A MORE F O R C E F U L ROLE IN T H E NEGOTIATIONS.

2. IN L A S T NIGHT'S WASHINGTON STAR, B A S E D ON AN INTERVIEW WITH
STRAUSS L A S T WEEK ( I E BEFORE DAY A N ' S RESIGNATION), HENRY BRANDON
V R 4 T E S THAT B E G I N S E E M S TO 3 E OBLIVIOUS TO THE FACT THAT THE STRENGTH
CF H I S NEGOTIATING POSITION WILL BE DECLINING AS ISRAEL HANDS CVER
^ I T O T H A T - § E € W S ' T O BE OBLIVIOUS'TO THT FACT THAT T H E STRENGTH
CF H I S NEGOTIATING POSITION WILL BE DECLINING AS I S R A E L HAN»SGJJN R R

THE O I L S E L L S ON 2 5 N OVEMBER AND LAND TO THE EL ARISH/RAS MUHAHMED
LINE ON ? 5 JANUARY. SADAT 18 THEN L I K E L Y TO B E C O M E MORE OUTSPOKEN
IN P R E S S I N G THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. UNLESS BEGIN IS WILLING TO OFFER
THE P A L E S T I N I A N S MORE THAN TOKEN AUTONOMY, THE TALKS ARE BOUND TO
COLLAPSE AND ISRAEL'S BUDDING R E L A T I O N S WITH EGYPT ARE L I K E L Y TO
DETERIORATE AT T H E VERY MOMENT THAT AMBASSADORS ARE EXCHANGED FOR
THE FIRST TIME. BRANDON QUOTES S T R A U S S AS ADMITTING WITH OBVIOUS
DESPAIR THAT H I S JOB I S R E D U C E D TO "KEEPING ALIVE" AND THAT H E
DOES NOT E X P E C T ANY RESULTS FROM H I S T A L K S IN LONDON T H I S WEEK.

3. BRANDON T O L D ME TODAY IN CONFIDENCE THATT
( I ) H E HAD NEVER SEEN STRAUSS, NORMALLY VERY RESILIENT, SO

PESSIMISTIC!

( I I ) S T R A U S S HAD BEEN A GOOD DEAL PLAINER ABOUT H I S B E L I E F THAT THE
NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT B E MOVED FORWARD AS LONG AS B E G I N REMAINED:
( I I I ) STRAUSS DID NOT DISGUISE HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE REPERCUSSIONS OF
PRESSING THE ARAB/ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS FOR CARTER'S RE-ELECTION
CAMPAIGN! (THOUGH HE D I D NOT SAY THAT CARTER SHARED H I S C O N C E R N ) :
(IV) S T R A U S S GAVE A STRONG H I N T T H A T HE DID NOT E X P E C T TO REMAIN IN
CHARGE O F T H E M I D D L E E A S T NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL NEXT MAY, AND THAT HIS
DEPARTURE MIGHT IN FACT BE A GOOD DEAL EARLIER.

HENDERSON

NNNN

\

\

t
RECORD O F A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER^ANDi T H E * ^
PRIME MINISTER OF EGYPT, MR. MUSTAFA K H A L I L , A T 10 DOWNING S T R E E T
ON 2 5 O C T O B E R 1 9 7 9 A T 1 7 3 0 v»«xmi

P r e s e n t j

Prime M i n i s t e r Mr. M. Khalil

Mr. M.S. Weir H.E. Mr. M.S. Anwar

Mr. M.O'D.B. A l e x a n d e r

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Autonomy T a l k s

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a s k e d about p r o g r e s s i n t h e autonomy talks.

Mr. K h a l i l s a i d t h a t t h e t a l k s were g o i n g v e r y slowly. The v i e w ­

p o i n t s of the I s r a e l i and E g y p t i a n Governments were q u i t e different,

e.g. over the question of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of a self-governing

authority. I n the Egyptians* view a l l c i v i l i a n responsibilities

s h o u l d be t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e new authority. Only military

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s h o u l d be r e t a i n e d by the Israeli Government. The

Israelis on t h e o t h e r hand wanted t h e m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s to

r e t a i n e x t e n s i v e powers. Mr. K h a l i l q u o t e d as an example t h e fact

that the I s r a e l i s wanted to r e t a i n c o n t r o l of education i n order

t o e n s u r e t h a t s c h o o l b o o k s d i d not c o n t a i n c r i t i c i s m of them.

The Egyptians w a n t e d t h e s e l f - g o v e r n i n g a u t h o r '.ty, w h i c h would be

e l e c t e d , to have l e g i s l a t i v e as w e l l as j u d i c i a l and administrative

p o w e r s . The I s r a e l i s wished to l i m i t the e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s as f a r

directly elected

as p o s s i b l e : t h e y had i n mind a /eleven-rnan c o u n c i l . The E g y p t i a n s

wanted a c o n t e s t e d election in constituencies. The Israelis claimed

t h a t t h i s w o u l d mean p a r t y p o l i t i c s and would b r i n g t h e PLO t o power.

When t h e E g y p t i a n s had attempted to r e s o l v e t h i s l a s t point by

making i t a c o n d i t i o n f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n by any party i n the election

t h a t t h a t p a r t y s h o u l d have to accept the existence of Israel*

the I s r a e l i s had shelved the q u e s t i o n . I n d e e d one of t h e problems

of dealing with the I s r a e l i s was t h a t t h e i r n e g o t i a t o r s had no

powers o f d e c i s i o n ; e v e r y t h i n g was r e f e r r e d back to Mr. Begin.

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a s k e d w h e t h e r Mr. K h a l i l had any specific
o b j e c t i v e f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g day. Mr. K h a l i l s a i d t h a t whole
negotiations c o u l d be f i n i s h e d i n s i x months if the principles
- 2 ­

could be agreed. But s i n c e at present e v e r y t h i n g was d i s a g r e e d ,

l i t t l e progress could be made. Mr. S t r a u s s was t r y i n g very hard

to f i n d a way through. Mr. K h a l i l s a i d that he agreed with

Mr. S t r a u s s that t h i s was not a time to t r y to put too much

p r e s s u r e on the I s r a e l i s . They would r e s i s t US pressure and

in any case Mr. C a r t e r was u n l i k e l y to be prepared to e x e r t i t

in a pre-election period. I n s h o r t , t h e t a l k s on t h e f o l l o w i n g

day were u n l i k e l y to get very f a r . The I s r a e l i s were s a i d to

have brought some new ideas with them but i t was not easy to

see what these might be.

Mr. Weir asked whether Mr. K h a l i l had a timetable i n mind.

Mr. K h a l i l s a i d that he planned to e s c a l a t e the p r e s s u r e on

I s r a e l when Egyptian t e r r i t o r y up to the E l Arish/Ras Mohammed

l i n e had been r e t u r n e d , i . e . a f t e r January. I t was an e s s e n t i a l

p a r t o f Egyptian t h i n k i n g on t h i s that the I s r a e l i Defence

M i n i s t e r , Mr. Weizman, should not r e s i g n u n t i l the E l A r i s h /

Ras Mohammed l i n e had been s e c u r e d . Mr. Weizman, whom Mr. K h a l i l

claimed as a good f r i e n d , had an e x c e l l e n t understanding with t h e

Egyptian Defence M i n i s t e r . I f he were to go, and s t i l l more

i f Mr. Begin's Government was to f a l l , there might w e l l be a

prolonged period of p a r a l y s i s . The s i t u a t i o n would be7unfavourable

i f Mr. Weizman was succeeded by Mr. Sharon.

The Prime M i n i s t e r asked about the c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f the Camp

David process and o f the ideas that King Hussein had been

advocating. Mr. K h a l i l s a i d that Kin? Hussein's opinion was t h a t

the Camp David t a l k s would get no f u r t h e r and that t h e Camp David

procedure was i t s e l f wrong. Mr. K h a l i l ' s own view was that i t

would be b e t t e r f o r t h e Camp David process to continue. He had

an a d d i t i o n a l proposal to put forward which he b e l i e v e d would make

i t p o s s i b l e f o r King Hussein's ideas to be pursued i n p a r a l l e l and

on a complementary b a s i s with the Camp David p r o c e s s .

I t was c l e a r that the PLO could not advance t h e i r cause

without a c c e p t i n g t h e r i g h t of I s r a e l to e x i s t . I t was e q u a l l y

c l e a r that the P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l would not take this

Government's proposal was that before the

Arab Summit a t the end o f November, the leading Arab s t a t e s should

/agree

I 5 j
- 3 ­

t o t h e a d o p t i n g o f a s u i t a b l e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n on t h e

b a s i s t h a t once i t was p a s s e d , t h e PLO would make a s t a t e m e n t

accepting I s r a e l ' s right to e x i s t . The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n

would be a b a l a n c e d one w h i c h would i n c l u d e r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e

r i g h t o f I s r a e l t o e x i s t and t o t h e r i g h t o f 'the P a l e s t i n i a n

p e o p l e t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n but would c o n t a i n no r e f e r e n c e t o a

Palestinian state. I t would o f c o u r s e be e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e PLO

to agree before t h e r e s o l u t i o n was put t o t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l

t h a t i f i t were p a s s e d t h e y would a c c e p t i t .

Mr. K h a l i l went on t o a r g u e t h a t once t h e r e s o l u t i o n had been

p a s s e d and had been a c c e p t e d by t h e PLO, t e r r o r i s t activity,

particularly along t h e I s r a e l / L e b a n o n b o r d e r , would cease.

T h i s i n t u r n would make i t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e PLO and I s r a e l to

w i t h d r a w from t h e d i s p u t e d a r e a i n S o u t h e r n Lebanon and f o r t h e

PLO t o be p a r t l y but not c o m p l e t e l y d i s a r m e d ( t h e y might f o r

instance surrender their m i s s i l e s while r e t a i n i n g small arms).

If t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s were t h e n p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t L e b a n e s e

sovereignty i n the a r e a s they a t p r e s e n t c o n t r o l l e d , the S y r i a n s

c o u l d p u l l b a c k and a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e Lebanon

m i g h t become p o s s i b l e . T h i s would c l e a r t h e way f o r the entry

o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s i n t o t h e autonomy t a l k s and f o r an a l i g n m e n t

o f t h e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e PLO and of t h e E g y p t i a n Government.

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a s k e d how Mr. K h a l i l intended to pursue

h i s i d e a and how much s u p p o r t he e x p e c t e d t o g a i n f o r i t .

Mr. K h a l i l s a i d t h a t t h e n e x t t h r e e o r f o u r weeks would be

crucial. The E g y p t i a n Government was not i n d i r e c t t o u c h with

the other Arab Governments but Mr. S t r a u s s , who was aware o f and

a p p r o v e d t h e p l a n , would convey i t t o P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r . I t would

t h e n be f o r t h e A m e r i c a n s t o s e l l i t to the other Arab G o v e r n m e n t s .

Mr. K h a l i l h i m s e l f had d i s c u s s e d t h e p l a n w i t h C h a n c e l l o r Kreisky,

who was i n f a v o u r , and w i t h t h e PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n V i e n n a ,

Mr. S i r t a w i . Mr. S i r t a w i had u n d e r t a k e n t o convey t h e p l a n t o

Y a s s e r A r a f a t . He was c o n f i d e n t t h a t A r a f a t would a c c e p t i t .

As r e g a r d s t h e a t t i t u d e o f o t h e r Arab s t a t e s , Mr. K h a l i l expected

that only I r a q , L i b y a and South Yemen would r e j e c t i t .

/Mr. Weir

- A -

Mr Weir commented t h a t Mr K h a l i l ' s p l a n was very s i m i l a r to

the a b o r t i v e American i n i t i a t i v e i n August about w h i c h E g y p t had

had reservations. Mr. Khalil s a i d t h a t h i s p l a n was essentially

t h e same. However, h i s Government had considered t h a t the timing

of the e a r l i e r i n i t i a t i v e had been q u i t e wrong. The p l a n had no

chance of acceptance i n the summer but t h e s i t u a t i o n was now more

favourable. The only r e s u l t of p u r s u i n g t h e p l a n on the earlier

t i m i n g would have been t h a t t h e I s r a e l i s would have p u l l e d out of

the n e g o t i a t i o n s . Now e v e r y o n e , i n c l u d i n g I s r a e l , would accept

t h e a p p r o a c h he was suggesting. The r e s o l u t i o n might b e s t be

presented to the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l in January.

The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d i t would be e s s e n t i a l to avoid another

failure l i k e t h a t o f t h e summer. I f the i d e a was t o be pursued

t h e n e v e r y t h i n g would have t o be arranged before the r e s o l u t i o n

was put to the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . Mr. K h a l i l repeated that he

was confident t h a t h i s p l a n would be accepted. He r e f e r r e d to

a list o f 14 q u e s t i o n s w h i c h K i n g H u s s e i n had put to President

C a r t e r i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e Camp D a v i d t a l k s and to which

P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r had given w r i t t e n answers. Those a n s w e r s had

c o v e r e d e v e r y p o i n t on w h i c h E g y p t was now seeking satisfaction.

Mr. K h a l i l s a i d t h a t h i s Government a s k e d f o r n o t h i n g more. As

regards t h e PLO, i f t h e y d i d not accept the present opening they

w o u l d l o s e t h e i r c h a n c e of i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e p e a c e p r o c e s s for

a considerable time. He d i d not u n d e r e s t i m a t e the difficulties

w i t h t h e PLO. C h a n c e l l o r K r e i s k y had come c l o s e t o r e s i g n a t i o n

e a r l i e r t h i s y e a r a f t e r he had been l e t down by h i s PLO contacts.

He had wanted t o p r e s e n t a peace p r i z e j o i n t l y to a d i s t i n g u i s h e d

Israeli and t o Mr. S i r t a w i , t h e PLO representative in Austria.

Y a s s e r A r a f a t had a g r e e d t h a t Mr. S i r t a w i might a c c e p t the peace

p r i z e and t h e n , a f t e r knowledge o f C h a n c e l l o r K r e i s k y ' s p l a n had

become p u b l i c , Y a r s e r A r a f a t under p r e s s u r e from t h e Palestinian

National C o u n c i l had changed h i s mind. I t was only the w i l l i n g n e s s

o f Mr. S i r t a w i t o d e f y Y a s s e r A r a f a t and accept t h e award ( a t

possible risk t o h i s own l i f e ) t h a t had saved the situation.

This episode, according to

/Mr. Khalil

- 5 -

Mr. K h a l i l , showed t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f d e a l i n g w i t h t h e PLO and

of g e t t i n g the P a l e s t i n i a n National Council to take a r e s p o n s i b l e

l i n e on t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f I s r a e l ' s r i g h t t o e x i s t . However,

Y a s s e r A r a f a t would have t o s h o u l d e r his responsibilities.

Mr. K h a l i l was c o n f i d e n t t h a t i f t h e o t h e r Arab s t a t e s b r o u g h t

sufficient pressure t o b e a r i n t h e p e r i o d between now and

25 November, he c o u l d be b r o u g h t t o do s o .

The d i s c u s s i o n ended a t 1815.

26 O c t o b e r 1979

M I D D L E EAST:' ADVANCE COPIES X ­ 18

NO 10 DOWITXNG STREET
PS
P S / S I R I GILMOUR CABINET OPPICE S I R J HUNT
PSA1R EURD CABINET OPPICE DIO
PS/PUS
MR J C MOBERLY

HDAJENAU
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/OID (2)
ED/IPD

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PUSD (2)
NEWS D

CONFIDENTIAL
PM T E L A V I V 2 4 1 0 2 5 Z OCT 7 9
TO P R I O R I T Y FCO
srt &u£f kUK,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 7 9 O F 24 OCTOBER
INFO C A I R O AMMAN DAMASCUS 3EIRUT U K M I S NEW YORK ERUSALEMA?
2r. <o

WASHINGTON TEL3 NOS 3314 AND 3315: AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

1. THERE IS CERTAINLY NO EVIDENCE-YET AVAILABLE HERE TO SUPPORT
THE VIE'./ ATTRIBUTED BY GWERTZMAN OF THE NEW YORK TIMES TO THE
STATE DEPARTMENT'S MIDDLE EAST EXPERTS (PARAGRAPH 2 Q 1ST TU"?), r

THAT MR DAYAN'S RESIGNATION WILL "QUICKEN THE PACE" OF THE
QUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.

2. ON THE CONTRARY, AS STERNER ARGUES (PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECOND TUR),
THE ISRAELI CABINET WITHOUT R DAYAN IS LIKELY TO BE LESS RATHER
f,

THAN MORE FLEXIBLE ON THIS ISSUE. THIS WILL BE PARTICULARLY^T-'E
CASE" IF PROFESSOR YADIN SUCCEEDS MR DAY AN SINCE HE SEEN.S VERY
LIKELY TO BE PREPARED TO TAi'E HIS ORDERS UNDILUTED FROM MR 3EGIN
AND THE HARD MEN IN THE CA3INET.

3. AND I F AS IS NOW BEING SUGGESTED, DR BURG DECIDES TO DIO? HIS
t

REPORTED EARLIER RESERVATION'S (PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELNO 4 7 6 ) IN
01DER TO BECOME FOREIGN MINISTER, THE PROSPECTS OF A 0RE M

aEXIBLE APPROACH SEE EVEN SLIM"ER. BURG'S ATTITUDE, NOT ? L Y
M , ;

a! THE JERUSALEM ASPECT CF THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ON THE AUTON""Y
QUEST ITN AS A WHOLE, 13 PERHAPS BEST PORTRAYED IN ONE SENOITI .'ELY
ON THE JERUSALEM ASPECT OP TKL KE50TfITTIOMS, 3UT ON- THE AUTONOMY'
:

QUE ST ITN AS A WHOLE, IS PERHAPS 3EST PORTRAYED IN ONE SENSITIVELY
PHRASED COMMENT TO THE ISRAEL/AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE l £ ? E
CN 19 OCT03ER, WHEN - SPEAK I NO OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT DR KHALIL
MIGHT WISH TO PRESS HIM TOMORROW IN LONDON ON THE POSSIBILITY OF
THE ARABS CF EAST JERUSALEM PARTICIPATING IN A FUTURE AUTONOMOUS
REGIME ON THE WEST BANK - HE IS QUOTED AS SAYING: " I SHALL
EXPLAIN TO HIM (KHALIL) THAT JERUSALEM IS MENTIONED IN THE BIBLE
NEARLY 730 TIMES BUT IS NOT ONCE MENTIONED IN THE KORAN. THIS
WOULD SEEM TO ME TO SETTLE THE ISSUE".

4. IT I S , Or COURSE, CONCEIVABLE (STERNER'S "IMPLAUSIBLE
SCENARIO") THAT MR BEGIN, SHAKEN 3Y THE WORLD REACTION TO MR
DAYAN'S RESIGNATION, MIGHT IN SO'E MOODS BE TEMPTED TO MAKE A
BID FOR SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A WAY OF RESTORING HIS OWN
PRESTIGE. BUT AMY PA*ER-HA\'CINC IN WHICH THE CABINET MIGHT, AT
HIS URGING, INDULGE TO PRESENT THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW FLEXIBILITY
COULD ONLY DISGUISE THE REALITY TEMPORARILY, CONTINUED ATTACHMENT
TO THEIR OWN NARROW AND RIGID VERSION OF WHAT AUTONOMY SHOULD MEAN.

PIKE

NNNN
lO DOWNING STREET

T H E PRIME MINISTER 24 O c t o b e r , 1 9 7 9 .

Dear J u l i a n ,

Thank you f o r y o u r l e t t e r o f 22 O c t o b e r .

I was f a s c i n a t e d t o r e a d t h e summary o f y o u r

d i s c u s s i o n s and I l o o k f o r w a r d t o t h e f u l l e r

version.

Yours ever,

(SGD) MT

T h e R t . Hon. " J u l i a n Amery, M P .
UNCLASSIFIED
H TEL A71V 2313002 OCT
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELNO 477 OF 23 OCT
INFO WASHINGTON, CAHO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS/ BEIRUT
MoiMSA

MYTEL 471 (PARAGRAPH TWO) s MR DAYAK'S FAREWELL. A^vf^ ff
Zi~- (o

1. MR DAYAN HELD A FAREWELL MEETING WITH FOREIGN HEADS OF
MISSION AT THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS MORNING.
HE LOOKED SPRUCE AND CHEERFUL IN A NATTY BROWN "LEISURE
SUIT" AND (AMAZINGLY) A T I E . THE MEETING WAS SHORT - TWENTY
MINUTES: MR DAYAN HAD TO GO ON TO A FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE
IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS.

2. MR DAYAN LED OFF BY CONFESSING THAT HE HAD LITTLE NEW TO SAY
ABOUT THE REASONS BEHIND HIS RESIGNATION. HE HAD ALREADY
EXPLAINED THESE IN PUBLIC. HID DECISION TO LEAVE WAS NOT
MERELY RELATED TO THc MFA'S "DEALINGS". IT CENTRED ROUND
. • • , -.'. " : • ­. HE \
SURE THAT EVERYONE IN THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT, AND, IN PARTICULAR,
MR BEGIN, WANTED AN AGREEMENT AS MUCH AS HE DID.BUT
THE QUESTION OF HOW THIS SHOULD DE NEGOTIATED WAS "VERY
COMPLICATED" ESPECIALLY SINCE THE PALESTINIANS AND JORDANIANS
WERE NOT TAKING PART IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. WITHOUT
PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION THE POINT WOULD BE REACHED AT WHICH
IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO "MATERIALISE" AH AGREEMENT. ME­
DIO NOT, ON THE OTHER HAND, ACCEPT THAT,' AS THE EGYPTIANS WERE
NfGING, AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE "BOUGHT": OR THAT r * ALL
KINDS OF CONCESSIONS" SHOULD BE MADE-TO THE PALESTINIANS
IN ORDER TO BRING THEM INTO THE TALKS, SUCH A3 A DECISION TO
HALT ISRALE I SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AND DESPITE
ALL THE PROBLEMS, HE STILL FELT STRONGLY THAT THERE WAS A
CHANCE OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD NOT "CONTRADICT"
THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK. THIS jSjiSHl BE SLOW TO ACHIEVE AND
DIFFERENT METHODS MIGHT T.* REQUIRED. BUT IT COULD BE MANAGED.
3. MR DAYAN REITCRATED THT HE HAD NOT COMPLAINED WHEN THE
PRIME MINISTER HAD REFUSED TO P U T HIM IN CHARGE OF THE AUTONOMY
NEGOTATSONS. HE HAD BEEN OFFERED THE JOB INITIALLY. BUT BOTH
HE AND MR BEGIN KNEW THAT A "GUIDELINE" WAS HEEDED IF THE ..>.
NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO B E CARRIED OUT EFFECTIVELY. UNFORTUNATELY,
THE U R ? AND LIKKUD VIEWS (ON THE CONDUCT OF, AND OBJECTIVES
IN, THE NEGOTIATIONS: MY PARENTHESIS) DID NOT "EXACTLY
CORRESPOND WITH MINE". HE HAD THEREFORE FELT THAT COULD NOT •
TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEADING T H E ISRAELI SIDE IN THE TALKS.
A.
FROM THE CAMP D A V I D FRAl'E'.'ORK, MR DAVAN MADE WHAT HE
DESCRIBED AS A MEtPOtHT ( O N E WHICH ME WOULD ALSO MAKE I M M I S
SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE), ''MANY OF YOU OVER ESTIMATE V #
CAPACITY OF THE P L 0 TO P E R M I T , OR MOT TO PER*.IT, THE P A L E S T I N I A N
ARABS TO TAKE PART I N THE T A L K S ' ' . WHY WAS T H I S S 0 3 3 MR DAYAN
RECALLED THAT WHEN HE HAD CREATED ISRAEL'S "OPEN BORDERS''
AFTER THE 1967 WAR, THE P L O HAD DOME EVERYTHING P O S S I B L E TO
PREVENT ARABS FROM COM IMG TO WORK IN I S R A E L . BUT THEY HAD F A I L E D .
THIS F A I L U R E DEMONSTRATED TO H I S KIND THAT I F AND WHEN T H E
P A L E S T I N I A N ARAB INHABITANTS L I V I N G "HERE" ( S I C ) DECIDED NOT
TO L I S T E N TO THE P L 0 , THEY WOULD F I N D I T P O S S I B L E TO DO SO.

5. IF THE ARABS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA EVENTUALLY DECIDED TO

TAKE PART I N THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS THE P L O WOULD F I N D I T

" " H i T TO n; • , ; iSTION WAS
LOCAL ARAB A T T I T U D E S : THE P L C ' S P O S I T I O N WOULD NOT I N R E A L I T Y
PROVE A MAJOR 0 3 3 T A C L E . T H E PLO WOULD EITHER AUTHORISE PALESTINIAN
PARTICIPATION ( I M T H E AUTONOMY N E G O T I A T I O N S : MY PARENTHESIS) OR
WOULD BE IGNORED. UNFORTUNATELY, AS LONG AS THE P A L E S T I N I A N S I N
THE OCCUPIED T E R R I T O R I E S WANTED TO HOLD BACK, THEY COULD SHELTER
BEHIND THE ARGUMENT THAT THE P L O WERE PREVENTING THEM FROM
PARTICIPATING..
6. AFTER THE DEAN-.OF T H E D I P L O M A T I C CORPS, SPEAKING ON B E H A L F
OF HIS COLLEAGUES, HAD EXPRESSED HIS REGRET Q1 MR DAYAN'8
DEPARTURE, THE U S AMBASSADOR/ SAMUEL L E W I S , BROKE I N TO SAY
CHAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS A " L W T T L E OUT OF O R D E R " HE COULD NOT
REFRAIN FRBM APPLAUDING THE ''EXTRAORDINARY CONTRIBUT ION WHICH
THE FOREIGN M I N I S T E R MAD MADE TO THE SUPREME GOAL OF ANY FOREIGN
MINISTER , MAKING PEACE." HE HAD BEEN FORTUNATE TO OBSERVE THE
i

"TRIALS MR DAY AN HAD ENDURED Sl\'C£ THE
AND D I F F I C U L T I E S WHICH
s ; c : ; ^ C OF THE CAMP D A V I D AGREEMENT. HE HAD BEEN DEDICATED
THROUGHOUT : 0 ONE P R O P O S I T I O N : THAT I S R A E L ABOVE A L L ELSE NEEDED
PEACE AMD HAD TR11?.• ~ FIND T H E WAY TO O B T A I N THIS. H I S T O R I A N S
WOULD DESCRIBE THE EGYPT! SR'AEL! -PEACE TREATY, " A MONUMENT
TO PEr\CE - MAKING I M T H I S CENTUK/**. AS A "MONUMENT ALSO TO
M08HE DAY A M " .
PIKE

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NENAD • MAED ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
MED X'JQ & SD
N AM D FRD
UND BOON D
EESD CONS D
EID CONS EM UNIT
V/ED CABINET O F F I C E
CG.MRDEN i IAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 2 2 2 2 4 0 Z OCT 7 9 j »
TO P R I O R I T Y FCO
TELNO 3 3 1 5 OF 2 2 OCTOBER 7 9
INFO P R I O R I T Y TEL AVIV ROUTINE TO CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS B E I R U T
UKMIS NEW YORK AND JERUSALEM
MIPT: MR DAYAN
1. STERNER (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS
CONFIRMED TO US THAT DAY AN " S RESIGNATION HAS COME AS A SURPRISE
TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THEY KNEW THAT HE HAD BEEN UNHAPPY FOR
SOME T I M E BUT D I D NOT EXPECT A R E S I G N A T I O N AT T H I S MOMENT AND
ARE PUZZLED THAT HE SHOULD HAVE C I T E D H I S EXCLUSION FROM THE
AUTONOMY TALKS S I N C E HE HAD BEEN L I V I N G WITH THAT FCR SOME MONTHS.
2. STERNER S A I D THAT NO A N A L Y S I S CONDUCTED I N THE STATE DEPARTMENT
TALLIED WITH GWERTZMAN*S ACCOUNT THAT I N I T I A L REACTIONS HERE WERE
THAT DAYAN'S RESIGNATION COULD SPEED THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.
ON THE CONTRARY, STERNER B E L I E V E D THAT AN ISRAELI CABINET FURTHER
WEAKENED BY DAYAN'S DEPARTURE WAS L I K E L Y TO BE LESS RATHER THAN
MOPE F L E X I B L E . THE ONLY REASONING THAT COULD P O I N T THE OTHER
WAY WOULD REQUIRE B E G I N TO FEEL A NEED TO ENHANCE H I S PRESTIGE BY
MAKING A B I D FOR SUCCESS I N THE NEGOTIATIONS - BUT, SINCE THIS
WOULD REQUIRE CONCESSIONS, I T LOOKED AN IMPLAUSIBLE SCENARIO.
3. STERNER EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WHICH
HAVE ARISEN OVER I S R A E L I O I L S U P P L I E S (WASHINGTON TELNO 3 2 5 0 ) . .
HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE ARE MEMBERS CF THE I S R A E L I CABINET CALLING
STRONGLY FOR ISRAEL TO REFUSE TO EVACUATE THE O I L F I E L D S UNLESS
THEY ARE G I V E N S A T I S F A C T I O N ON T H E P R I C E AT WHICH EGYPT W I L L SELL
THEM O I L . SADAT, WHO I S UNDER NO O B L I G A T I O N FLOWING FROM THE
ISRAEL-EGYPT TREATY TO DO OTHERWISE, I S SO FAR S T I C K I N G FIRMLY TO
THE P O S I T I O N THAT EGYPTIAN O I L W I L L BE SOL" m T H f I S P A F I I S AT
THE SAME P R I C E AS TO ALL OTHER CUSTOMERS (DLRS32.50 PER B A R R E L ) .

IP THE ISRAELIS F A I L TC BUDGE H I M (STERNER COMMENTED THAT SADAT HAD

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

.4

NOT PROVED GOOD AT CALLING ISRAELI BLUFFS SO FAR EG. OVER THE
PLO/UN ISSUE) AND CONSEQUENTLY REFUSE TO VITHDRAW, THIS WOULD
CONSTITUTE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE TREATY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
STERNER BELIEVES THAT SADAT WOULD NOT HESITATE TO DENOUNCE ISRAEL,
LEADING TO AN UNRAVELLING OF THE PEACE PROCESS. AS PART OF THEIR
CONCERN ABOUT OIL SUPPLIES THE ISRAELIS ARE ALSO PRESSING THE
AMERICANS TO LOWER THE THRESHHOLD WHICH WILL TRIGGER THE US STEPPING
INTO THE BREACH. IN THIS CONTEXT TOO THE ISRAELIS ARE PRESSING
FOR A BARGAIN PRICE FOR OIL PURCHASED FROM THE UNITED STATES, WHICH
THE AMERICANS WOULD FIND POLITICALLY EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

ROBINSON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NENAD •• ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
KED *
N AM D
UND
EESD . •
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Y7ED
LIAED * . * '
ES & SD ' . .
FRD :
BOON DSPT
c c : ; s DEPT
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CABINET OFFICE 2 •

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C ;.f-1 Dc"TI AL

DESKBY 2208002

FN TEL AVI V 211635Z OCT 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 468 OF 21 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO WASHINGTON AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS UKMIS
NEW YORi; PRIORITY JERUSALEM

MIPT: RESIGNATION OF MR DAYAN

1 . RUMOURS OF KR DAYAN'S POSSIBLE RESIGNATION HAVE SEEN CURRENT
HERE FOR SOME WEEKS. THESE HAVE FED ON ASSERTIONS THAT - DESPITE
MR |AVAN'S 01:'} PROTESTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY - HIS- HEALTH HAS SEEN
STEADILY DECLINING SINCE HIS OPERATION IN THE SUMMER. IT HAS ALSO
BEEN SUGGESTED THAT HIS WIFE, INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT THE
CONTINUED STRAIN OF OFFICE ON HIS HEALTH, HAS BEEN PLEADING WITH
•!. TO EIZE THE FIRST PLAUSIBLE EXCUSE FOR RESIGNATION.

2. HOWEVER THIS MAY BE - AND WE HAVE NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN
EITHER OF THESE STORIES - THERE HAS BEEN NO DOUBT AiOUT MR DAYAN'S
f

GROWING DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES, OR LACK OF
THEM* DESPITE OCCASIONAL HALF-HEARTED ATTEMPTS, SUCH AS THAT AT THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE EARLIER THIS MONTH, TO PUT THE BEST FACE ON
THINGS, HE HAS MADE NO SECRET PUBLICLY, AND EVEN LESS SO PRIVATELY,
OF HIS CONVICTION THAT MR BEGIN AND HIS CABINET HAVE BEEN LEADING -
IF THAT IS THE CORRECT DESCRIPTION - ISRAEL DOWN A SERIES OF BLIND
ALLEYS, TO THE DETRIMENT CF HER OWN BEST INTERESTS AND TO THE
MANIFEST DISMAY OF HER BEST FRIENDS.
**

3. QUITE APART FROM 'THE MAJOR REASON, QUOTED BY NAOR (PARAGRAPH
2 OF MIPT) FOR HIS RESIGNATION - MR BEGIN'S EVIDENT DETERMINATION,
AT LEAST UNTIL VERY RECENTLY, TO EXCLUDE HIM, AND THE ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FRCM ANY SERIOUS SAY IN THE HANDLING
AND DIRECTION, OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS, HAS CLEARLY RANKLED
DEEPLY - MR DAYAN, I; ! SHARP CONTRAST WITH MOST OF THE REST C THE
c

CABINET - AND AS HIS STATEMENT QUOTED BY, ISRAEL RADIO MAKES CLEAR
- HAS FELT THAT ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO OFFER EVEN A HINT OF COMPROMISE,
AND HER BLATANTLY PR0CA3TINATCRY TACTICS, IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE
BECOME INCREASINGLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.
C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. MR DAYAN HAS ALSO BEEN ALONE WITHIN THE CABINET IN ARGUING*
AS YET IN CIRCUMLOCUTORY AND OPAQUE TERMS RUT WITH STEADILY
HARDENING CONVICTION - THAT ISRAEL WILL SOONER OR LATER HAVE TO
ENTER INTO SOME KIND CF DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IN WAYS THAT CANNOT
YET DE DEFINED. HIS UNHAPPINE3S ABOUT ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICIES
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND HIS INABILITY TO D? MORE THAN
FIGHT A GALLANT REARGUARD ACTION IN THE FACE OF MR SHARON'S BULL­
DOZER, HAVE INTENSIFIED HIS POLITICAL ISOLATION.

5. A FINAL, PEHAPS DECISIVE FACTOR, IN.HIS DECISION TO RESIGN WAS
PROBARLY HIS JUDGEMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT NOW HAD VERY LITTLE TIME
TO LIVE AND THAT IT WOULD DE WISE TO LEAVE IT BEFORE IT DREW ITS
LAST BREATH, WITH HIS OWN PRESTIGE STILL RELATIVELY UNIMPAIRED.
AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE SURPRISE IS NOT PERHAPS THAT MR DAYAN
HAS RESIGNED BUT THAT IT HAS TAKEN HIM SO LONG TO COME TO THE P O I N T
CF ACTUALLY DOING SO.

6. SOME OPPOSITION MEMBERS OF THE KNESSET ARE ALREADY BEING QUOTED
AS SAYING THAT MR DAYAN'S RESIGNATION IS A CLEAR SIGN' THAT THE
GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES ARE BANKRUPT* TIME HAS NOW COME FOR THEM TO
RESIGN. THE OPPOSITION AS A WHOLE WILL NO DOUBT JOIN IN THE CHORUS
DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS (ALTHOUGH IT IS BY MO MEANS CLEAR THAT .
MR
. PERES WOULD IN FACT WELCOME THE GOVERNMENT'S RESIGNATION AT THIS
MOMENT! HE NEEDS A GOOD DEAL MORE TIME TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION
AS LEADER OF THE LA30UR PARTY),

7, YET HOWEVER LOUDLY THE OPPOSITION MAY PRESS THE GOVERNMENT TO
RESIGN, MR BEGIN PROBARLY HAS A GOOD DEAL OF FI OUT STILL LEFT IN
HIM. HE HAS EVIDENTLY B E E N DOING HIS BEST TO PERSUADE MR DAYAN
NOT TO LEAVE SINCE ? OCTOBE'R AND THE LATTER'S DECISION TO GO,
DESPITE HIS PLEAS, WILL MOT BE WELCOME TO HIM. BUT IT DOES, AT
LEAST IN THEORY, OPEN'UP THE FIELD FOR THE CABINET RESHUFFLE WHICH
HAS SEEMED INCREASINGLY INEVITABLE SINCE MID-SUMMER AND COULD COMPEL
MR BEGIN, NOLENS VCLENS, TO SOLVE THE "ERHLICH PROBLEM" |N A WAY
ACCEPTABLE TO HIS REMAINING CABINET COLLEAGUES AMD THE COALITION
PARTIES. A NEW CABINET COULD EVENTUALLY EMERGE WHICH, WITH MR
DAYAN GONE AND PROFESSOR YADIN AND MR WE IZMAN THE ONLY REMAINING
"MODERATES'', MIGHT APPEAR SOME'.'HAT MORE EFFECTIVE AND UNITED
THAN THE PRESENT VERSION (ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT THAT THE APPEARANCES
WOULD BE SUPERFICIAL AND THE REAL DEGREE OF COHESION SMALL).

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8. ' MEANWHI LE, WE ARE PROBABLY IN FOR A PERIOD OF COMPLEX BARGAIN-
IMG If4 THE ITALIAN STYLE AS MR BEGIN STRIVES TO HOLD HIS GOVERNMENT
TO -ETHER AND EMBARKS ON A RESHUFFLE. VARIOUS NAMES - MR TAMJR,
THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, AND MR SUOSTAK, THE MINISTER OF HEALTH -
ARE ALREADY BEING TOUTED IN THE DAYAN SUCCESSION STAKES. BUT IT
WOULD BE UNWISE AT THIS STAGE TO PLACE BETS. MR BEGIN MAY PREFER
TO CONTINUE TO ACT AS HIS OWN FOREIGN MINISTER FOR A TIME WHILE
NEGOTIATIONS GO ON ABOUT THE SHAPE CF THE NEXT LIKUD CABINET.

9. WHATEVER THE PRECISE OUTCOME OF THESE ASSUMING, CF COURSE,
THAT MR BEGIN'$ OWN HEALTH HOLDS UP SUFFICIENTLY FOR HIM TO CARRY
611, A FACTOR A30UT WHICH THERE MUST 3E SOME DOUBT - THE NEXT
CA3INET, WITHOUT MR DAYAN, SEEMS LIKELY TO TAKE AN EVEN HARDER
LINE, IF THAT IS POSSIBLE, IN THE AUTONO'Y NEGOTIATIONS: WILL
CONTINUE TO BE VULNERABLE TO PRESSURE FROM MR SHARON AND HIS
GUSH EMUMIN ALLIES ON SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:
AND WILL GO ON SAYING "NEVER" TO THE IDEA OF AN EVENTUAL DIALOGUE
WITH THE PLO.

P I K E

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

NENAD .
MED
N AM D
UND
EESD . •
EID
WED
IIAED
ES & S D
FRD
BOOH DEPT
CONS DEPT
CONS EH U N I T
CABINET O F F I C E

CONFIDENTIAL

SO

PRIME

PERSOisfAL M JO DOWNING STREET
SERIAL T.a^e/^r
Tin- PRIMB M I N I S T E R
18 October, 1979.

Your Excellency,

Thank y o u v e r y much f o r y o u r l e t t e r o f 23 S e p t e m b e r with

its full a c c o u n t o f y o u r d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Mr. B e g i n a t H a i f a

and y o u r i n t e n t i o n s f o r the future.

I t a k e t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n f i r m my f i r m s u p p o r t f o r

your e f f o r t s aimed a t a c h i e v i n g a comprehensive Middle East

peace. I v e r y much a g r e e w i t h y o u r v i e w o f t h e n e e d to find a

f o r m u l a w h i c h w i l l meet t h e l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s o f t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s ,

and p r o v i d e f o r c o - e x i s t e n c e b e t w e e n the P a l e s t i n i a n and Israeli

peoples. I wish the continuing negotiations w e l l . I am c o n v i n c e d

that i f some g e n u i n e automony f o r t h e West Bank a n d G a z a c a n be

achieved as a t r a n s i t i o n a l arrangement, t h i s would be a v a l u a b l e

b a s i s on w h i c h t o b u i l d t o w a r d l a s t i n g p e a c e i n t h e a r e a .

With a l l good w i s h e s .

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) M T

H i s E x c e l l e n c y Mr. Muhammed Anwar S a d a t .

4
MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES X - 18

PS
NO 1 0 DOWNING STREET
PS/SIR I GILMOUR CABINET OFFICE S I R J BUNT

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS CABINET OFFICE DIO

MR J C MOBERLY

HD/NENAD

HD/MED

HD/UND
HD/OID
(2)
HD/IPD

••• ••• •••
... ••• ••• •••

PUSD (2)
NEWS D

CONFIDENT! AL
FN CAIRO 1511^0/ OCT

TO IMMEDIATE : C0
r

TELNO 751 OF 15 O e f

|»F0 IM'EDIAT^CD

MIFTt MEETING WITH PRESIDENT tADATl 31 LATERAL AFFAIRS

1. A^TER PRESIDENT SADAT'S LUNCH ON 13 OCTOBER FOR MR AND •-'RS
CALLAGHAN I MANAGED TO HAVE A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH HIM
ABOUT BILATERAL TOPICS*

I BEGAN BY COMPLIMENTING HIM CN T H E 6 OCTOBER MILITARY
PARADE AND FLY-PAST, SADAT COMMENTED T H A T ALTHOUGH H E NO
LONGER HAD ANY REASON T O MAINTAIN A H I G H LEVEL OF FORCES AND
ARMAMENTS V I S - A - V I S -ISRAEL HE WAS UNFORTUNATELY OBLIGED TO DO S O
BY THE THREAT FRO"' OTHER NEIGHBOURS, NOTABLY CADDHAp|, THANKS
PRIMARILY TO THE G E N E R O U S HELP O F THE U N I T E D S T A T E S HE WAS A B L E
TO KEEP HIS FORCES AND E Q U I P M E N T UP TO DATE. I REMINDED T H E
PRESIDE'.T T H A T BRITAIN HAD B E E N S'jrPLYING EGYPT WITH D E F E N C E
EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING ON A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE FOR SOf'E YE4RS

BEFORE THE US ENTERED THE F I E L D . T H E R E WAS NO* A P R O B L E M OVER

THE AOI BUT 3 R I T I S H FIRMS R E M A I N E D ANXIOUS T O CONTINUE W I T H

C O O P E R A T I V E V E N T U R E S AND WERE KEEN TO DISCUSS T H E M O D A L I T I E S *

COOPER ATI VC VENTURES AND WERE KEEN TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES.
I CANNOT CLAIM THAT SADAT HOISTED THIS IM, FOR HE R E V E R T E D TO ^
HIS THE'-'E OF THE MfGALOMANIC GADDHAFI WHOSE AMBITION WAS TO
EMULATE ISRAEL IN POWER AND IN RATIO O ARMAMENTS TO POPULATION
r

(IN VAI> , FOR THE HUMAN MATERIAL WAS HOMELESS, DESPITE T F 7 I R
!

ALGERIAN, SOUTH YEMENI, CUBAN, NORTH KOREAN ETC MERCENARIES).

3. SADAT REACTED MORE POSITIVELY WHEN I REFERRED TO OTHER
PROJECTS IN WHICH BRITISH F|R"S WERE INVOLVED IN EGYPT, IN
PARTICULAR THE ROLLS-ROYCE RE-ENCINING 0=" MIG'S. HE EXPRESSED
HIS GRATITUDE FOR THIS C"!TR I BUT I ON, AND REMARKED THAT NO FEVER
n

THAN 5?. OF THE RE-ENGINE3 M|G»S HAD TAKEN PART IN THE C OCTOOER
FLY-PAST. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS A LOT MORE CF SUCH OVERHAUL
WORK TO BE DONE, AND THAT BRITISH FIR"S HOPED TO CONTINUE TO PLAY
A PART.

A. HCSMI MU3ARAK WAS LISTENING FOR THE LETTER PART OF THE
CONVERSATION!
A\D IT MAY HELP ROLLS-ROYCE AT LEAST TO HAVE

;

REGISTERED WITH THE TWO TCP PEOPLE THEIR CLAIM TO FURTHER WORK.
BUT I WOULD NOT EXPECT SUCH REPRESENTATIONS TO WEIGHT" VERY HEAVILY
IN THE BALANCE IF AS WE FEAR THE EGYPTIANS ARE NOW CONSIDERING
AMERICAN PROPOSALS TO GET INTO THE 3USI NESS OF LOCAL MANUFACTURE
OR ASSEMBLY. I HOPE TO FIND OUT MORS ON THIS WHEN I SEE THE US
AMBASSADOR TOMORROW*

WEIR

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PSA1R HURD
CABINET OPPICE SIR J HUNT

PS/PUS CABINET OPPICE DIO

MR J C MOBERLY

HD/NENAD

ED/MED

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CCNF}DENTIAL

FM CAIRO 151930Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 760 OF 15 OCT
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVI V JEDDA AMMAN WASHINGTON LHMIS NEW YORK
VISIT OF MR CALLAQHAN

U MR AND MRS CALLAGHAN LEFT CAIRO FOR TEL AVIV ON 1 3 OCTOBER
BY EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE MYSTERf AFTER A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL THREE-
DAY VISIT. MR CALL AG?-! AN HAD LONG TALKS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT
AND /ICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK (OVER LUNCH AT THE BARRAGE, WITH
WIVES), THE PRIME MINISTER, MUSTAFA KHALIL, AND OTHER MINISTERS,
AND ATTENDED A SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BOTH IN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE HE EXPRESSED FILL SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT SADAT'S
PEACE POLICIES, AND AT THEIR JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE SADAT PAID
A FULSOME TRIBUTE TO THE CONTRIBUTION HE HAD MADE TOWARDS
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES ?EFORE AND AFTER CAMP DAVID.
(THIS WAS A DEPARTURE FROM SADAT'S NORMAL PRACTICE AT JOINT
PRESS CONFERENCES, WHICH IS TO LET THE GUEST DO MOST OF THE TALKING).
INEVITABLY, THE PRESS HAS PLAYED UP THE VISIT AS AN EXERCISE IN
MEDIATION, IN EGYPT'S FAVOUR, WITH MR BEGIN AND KING HUSSEIN.
MR CALLA6HAN PUBLICLY DENIED ANY SUCH INTENTION, BUT HE DID GET
ROM SADAT A GENERAL MESSAGE FOR EACH. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN
INEVITABLY, THE PRESS HAS PLAYElTUP THE VISIT AS AN EXERCISE IN
MEDIATION, IN EGYPT'S FAVOUR, WITH MR B E G I N AMD KING HUSSETN . "~"
MR CALLACHAN PUBLICLY DENIED ANY SUCH INTENTION, BUT HE DID GET
FROM SADAT A GENERAL MESSAGE FOR EACH. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN ||
POINTS OF INTEREST FROM THE TALKS, ALL Or WHICH I ATTENDED. .

2. MUSTAFA KHALIL GAVE HIS USUAL LUCID AMD RATIONAL EXPOSITION
OF EGYPTIAN POLICY. HE CRITICISED THE ISRAELIS FOR CONSTANTLY
RAISING DIFFICULTIES, IN PARTICULAR FOR ATTEMPTING TO DISTORT
THE LANGUAGE OF THE TREATY EG IN CLAIMING THAT AUTONOMY APPLIED
ONLY TO T-IE INHABITANTS AND NOT TO THE LAND. HE ALSO CRITICISED
THE 1 FOR TRYING TO EXPLOIT SADAT'S UNWITTING (HE IMPLIED)
CONCESSIONS AT HAIFA TO INSERT ISRAELI UNITS INTO THE SUPERVISION
OF EGYPTIAN FORCE LEVELS AND TO EXCLUDE THE UM ALTOGETHER* AND
HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WDULD FAVOUR TOUGHER TACTICS AFTER
JiNUARY IF THERE HAD DEEM NO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY
TALKS* HE MlMTIOMEt) HIS PROPOSED MEETING WITH STRAiSS IN LONDON;
RUT AS IF IT WERE A PURELY US/EGY^TIAN CONSULTATION ON HOW TO
SPEED UP NEGOTIATIONS IN THE I MEDIATE FUTURE*

3. SADAT WAS CHARACTER I STICALLY CONFIDENT, NOT TO SAY COMPLACENT.
QtfOrt TO TELL YOU FRANKLY, I CONSIDER THE WHOLE THING SETTLED
ALREADY UNQUOTE. THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES, BUT THEY WOULD BE
RESOLVED IN TIME THANKS TO THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP HE HAD ESTABL­
ISHED WITH 3 E G I A T PRESENT DEGIN WAS I N DIFFICULTY OVER THE
ECONOMIC SITUATION, AMD HIS HEALTH WAS POCR, 3 T N0-0MS ELSE
COULD HAVE ACHIEVED './HAT HE HAD. SADAT SAID HE COULD NOT OF COURSE
WAIT FOR EVER, AND PRESSURE TACTICS WERE NOT COMPLETELY EXCLUDED,
BUT HE RECKONED THIT SIX MORE MONTHS AT MOST WOULD PRODUCE A
PACKAGE SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE THE PALESTINIANS TO TAKE PART IN *
THE ELECTIONS AND SU3SE0UENT NEGOTIATIONS. AT VARIOUS POINTS

SADAT STRESSED HIS TOTAL CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S WILL

AND ABILITY TO SEE THE AUTONOMY T A LK S THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL

CONCLUSION, AND ALSO' INCIDENTALLY I N HIS PROSPECTS OF REELECTION.

t, ASKED HOW HE COULD OVERCOME BEGIN'S RESISTANCE ON JERUSALEM,
SETTLEMENTS, RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAND, WATER ETC, SADAT SAID HE
WAS SURE HE COULD CONVINCE H I M . I T WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT HE HAD
ALREADY BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK OF H I S IDEAS ON JERUSALEM I N ISRAEL
WITHOUT AROUSING A STORM, AND HE HAD TOLD BEGIN THAT AM INDEPENDENT
^ A L F S T I N I A N STATE WAS INEVITABLE A D THAT THE SETTLEMENTS POLICY
WAS I LOST CAUSE. IF NECESSARY TH^ SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY
SHOULD RE ESTABLISHED AS A FIRST STAGE IN GAZA, SADAT REPEATED
HI S OF^ER TO P |PE NILE WATER TO THE NEGE'7 THROUGH THE NEW SUEZ.
TUNNEL, AT A RATE OF 1 MILL I OH C M . A DAY. Ml 8 MESSAGE FOR "EG IN
WAS THAT SADAT UNDERSTOOD HIS PROBLEMS, REMAINED FAITHFUL TO THE
SHOULD BE E S T A Q L I S H E D AS A FIRST STAGE IN GAZA, SADAT REPEATED
TO D|PE N I L E WATER TO T H E NEGEV THROUGH THE MEW SUEZ
HIS O F F E R
TUNNEL, AT A RATE 0^ l M I L L I O N C . M . A DAY, H I S MESSAGE FOR BEGIN
# WAS THAT SADAT UNDERSTOOD H I S P R O D L E S , M
REMAINED F A I T H F U L TO T H E
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS IN L E T T E R AMD S P I R I T , AND WAS READY TO MEET
HIM AT ANY T I M E TO AGREE ON T H E NECESSARY D I R E C T I V E S TO THEIR
NEGOTIATORS.

5. FOP KING H U S S E I N T H E MESSAGE WAS THAT HE SHOULD STAY OUT OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL T H E AUTONOMY PACKAGE WAS AGREED, BUT
THEREAFTER WAS WELCOME TO J O I N IM. HE KNEW THAT H U S S E I N WAS
EAGER TO RECOVER T H E WEST HANK, BUT HE SHOULD NOT E X P E C T TO DO SO
WITHOUT A P L E B I S C I T E . SADAT ADDED H I S B E L I E F THAT H U S S E I N WOULD
JOIN T H E NEGOTIATIONS TOMORROW I F HE COULD DO SO WITHOUT L O S I N G
H I S DOLLARS 3 0 0 M I L L I O N SAUDI SU:S!DY. INDEED THE S A U D I S WERE
INI KEV TO THE P O S I T I O N OF T H E OTHER M.'DERATES, AND HE COULD NOT
UNDERSTAND WHY THEY SHOULD PLAY THE I RAO I GAME. HE ALSO THOUGHT
THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN WRONG TO MOUNT T H E I R MISCONCEIVED INITIAT­
ION ON A NEW S E C U R I T Y COUNCIL R E S O L U T I O N IM ORDER TO CURRY FAVOUR
IN R I Y A D H . MR C A L L <OHAN URGED SADAT IN T H E I N T E R E S T S O F ARAB UNITY
KOT TO ALLOW H I M S E L F TO BE PROVOKED BY H I S C R I T I C S , AND SADAT
INDICATED ASSENT. AT ONE P O I N T HE S A I D HE WOULD EVEN B E PREPARED
TO DO A R E P E A T O F H I S JERUSALEM V I S I T TO SAUDI ARABIA IF I T WOULD
HELP. (HOWEVER MUBARAK'S W I F E TOLD "I ME THAT THEY WERE ALL •
CONSTANTLY URGING SADAT TO COOL IT, HE WOULD AGREE AT T H E T I M E
BUT COULD NEVER R E S I S T T H E TEMPTATION WHEN ON H I S FEET).

6. T H E R E WAS ALSO SO E D I S C U S S I O N OF REGIONAL SECURITY. SADAT
SAID H E E X P E C T E D A L E F T - W I N G TAKE-OVER IM IRAN WITHIN A FEW .
:THS AND T H E COUNTRY V/OULD BECO"E A SOVIET S '.TELL I T E . OUT T H E
• REAL THREAT TO THE G'JL" S T A T E S WAS MOT FRO" IRAN' BUT FROM <RAO.
IF I T CAM TO A C H O I C E HE WOULD SOONER SEE A SOVIET OCCU ATION
FJ

OF T H E G U L F , IRAQI I N F L U E N C E WOULD B E PURELY D E S T R U C T I V E . OMAN
WAS T H E ONLY S T A B L E STATE IM T H E A 7 E A , AND C L O U S ' S S E C U R I T Y PLAN
!
HAD DESERVED A 3 E T T E R R £ 0 £ P T | 0 * , THE WEST SHOULD ALSO MAKE A
CHEATER CONTRIBUTION 1
TO GULF SECURITY, THOUGH HE AGREED WI TH
THE S \ U D I S THAT AMERICAN WARSHIPS WERE MOT T H E ANSWER. HE WAS
READY TO OFFER A I R B A S E S ON E G Y P T ' S RED SEA COAST, ONLY AN HOUR
OR 8 0 F L Y I N I T I ME AWAY, FINALLY SADAT VOICED H I S CONCERN V3CUT .
THE. SUDAN, THREATENED BY ECONOMIC C R I S E S WITHIN AND BY SAUDI
AND L I B Y A N I N T R I G U E FRO*-! WITHOUT.

7. ALTHOUGH THERE IS LITTLE NEW IM ALL T H I S , I T WAS INTERESTING
TO HEAR IT AT F I R S T HAND AND TO OBSERVE T H E SEREME Q'-'ALITY OF .
SADAT'S OPTIMIS". IT STRUCT ME AS ALMOST A MIRROR |fAC£ O F
BEGIN'S S E L F - R I G H T E O U S N E S S , BUT I F B E G I N I S AM IMMOVEABLE C D J E C T
7. ALTHOUGH THERE IS LITTLE NEW IN ALL THIS, IT WAS INTERESTING
TO HEAR IT AT FIRST HAND AND TO OBSERVE THE SERENE QUALITY OF
SADAT'S OPTIMIS". IT STRUCT ME AS ALMOST A MIRROR |MAGl OF •
BEG IN'S SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS, 3 U T IF BEGIN IS AN IMMOVEABLE OBJECT
IT IS HARD TO SEE SADAT, WITH HIS BELIEF IN THE POWER CF GENER­
OSITY AND HIS DISTASTE FOR DETAILED NEGOTIATION, AS AN IRRESISTI3LE
FORCE. THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO PRC/IDE A LOT OF STIFFENING.

B. I HAD A SEPARATE TALK WITH PRESIDENT SADAT ABOUT BI LATERAL
TOPICS, FOR WHICH SEE MY TWO I F T 8 (NOT TO ALL).

• IR

NNNN

f l M MEDIATE
C O N f l D E N TI!I A1
AL

GRS 177?

CONFl BENT I AL

FM AMMAN 1309152 OCT 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
P• L^

TELNO 3?3 OF 12 OCT 79

SAVING TO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKM>
NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AMD C G JERUSALEM.

MINISTER OF STATE'S VISIT TO JORDAN: 9-11 OCTOBER*

L ALTHOUGH MR HURD'3 VISIT WAS VERY BRIEF, ALLOWfNO HIM ONLY ON
FULL DAY AND PART OF THE FOLLOW!NO MORNING HERE, HE WAS ABLE TO
HAVE WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSIONS WITH ALL THOSE WHO AT PRESENT PLAY
A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE DIRECTION OF JORDANi AN AFFAIRS: V I NO
HUSSEIN, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HEAD OF
THE ROYAL COURT, THE COMMANDER IN.CHIEF AND KEY MINISTERS IN THE
JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION
(HIS FORMAL HOST, WHO ATTENDED MR HURD ALMOST THROUGHOUT HIS
VISIT),, AND THE MINISTER 0 - INDUSTRY AND
TRADE. HE ALSO y £ T OVER LUNCH THE HEADS OF A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT
JORDANIAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENTERPRISES: THE GOVERNOR OF THE
CENTRAL BANK, THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMMAN UN IVERGITY AND THE
•CHAIRMEN Or THE POTASH COMPANY AND THE ROYAL JORDAN I AN AIRLINE.
IN ADDITION MR HURD SIOM'iD AN INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENT
WITH THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRY, VISITED A REFUGEE CAMP WITH THE
UNRWA REPRESE.NTATI /E, ATTENDED A CEREMONY AT WHICH THE CRCW.N
PRI-'CE LAIN THE FOUNDATION STONE OF THE KStf INTERNATIONAL
C 0 N 1 U N I T Y SCHOOL AND MET AD OUT 20 RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF
BRITISH FIRftS OVER.DRINKS AT MY HOUSE* I N THE COURSE OF HIS
VISIT HE ALOO ^ET THE LEADER OF THE TEAM NEGOTIATING THE SALE
OF BRITISH TANKS TO .JORDAN, THE DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE OFFICE A^D TWO MEMBERS OF ECCD, ALL OF WHOM HAPPENED •
TO BE IN JORDAN' AT THE SAJ-E TIME AS HIMSELF.

2. UNFORTUNATELY THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TINE IN AM ALREADY
VERY CROWDED PROGRAMME TO VISI T ANY OF THE IMPORTANT PROJECTS
BEING CARRIED OUT BY BRITISH FIRMS IN THE VICINITY OF AMMAN OR
FURTHER AFIELD, EG THE FIR ST' STAGE OF THE LARGE POTASH PROJECT

GdNFfDENIlAl

C O N F I D E N T I A L ­ ­ m

BEING UNDERTAKEN BY WIMPEYS ON THE DEAD SEA, THE EXPANSION %
Of AQABA PORT, THE PHOSPHATE MINE AT E L HASA AND THE NEW QUEEN
ALIA AIRPORT. HOWEVER THE V I S I T COULD HARDLY HAVE COME AT A 0
MORE OPPORTUNE MOMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, WITH THE
EAOfl MILLION TANK DEAL, THE PURCHASE OF NEW AIRCRAFT FCR ALIA
(IN WHICH ROLLS ROYCE ENGINES TRISTAN AND THE AIRBUS ARE IN
COMPETITION WITH BOEING) AND THE SECOND STAGE OF THE POTASH PROJECT

LL UNDER NEGOTIATION AND A S I Z E A B L E CONTRACT FOR THE EQUIPMENT
OF THE NEW ALIA AIRPORT JUST SIG'ED BY CABLE W I R E L E S S . AS I S
HIS WONT, THE MINISTER OM INDUSTRY URGED THAT MORE JOINT
BR ITISH/JORDANI AN VENTURES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN JORDAN TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE Of- T H E P O S S I B I L I T I E S OF THE LOCAL AND NEIGHBOUR ING
ARAB MARKETS. DR DAJANI CLAM ED THAT NEITHER -'CMEY NOR
MANPOWER WERE LACKING: WHAT WAS NEEDED WERE FOREIGN ENTREPRENEURS
PREPARED TO USfl JORDAN AS A BASE FOR PENETRATING OTHER ARAB
M

AR.<ETS, THUS ENABLING JORDAN TO ACT AS A CONDUIT FOR

"ESTER TECHNOLOGY TO THE ARAB WORLD. HE CLAIM-ED THAT JORDAN

VAS TAKING OVER, IN PART AT L E A S T , THE BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL

ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PREVIOUSLY PLAYED BY LEBANON AND IRAN AMD

r

MED THAT RlTISH FIRMS WOULD S E I Z E THE OPPORTUNITIES CF£N TO

THE".

2* MR HURD IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED AN EASY AND FRIENDLY
RELATIONSHIP WITH KING HUSSEIN AND ALL THE OTHER LEADING
JORDAN IAMS HE MET, THE P O L I T I C A L DISCUSSIONS RANGED WIDELY,
WERE CONDUCTED WITH GREAT FRANKNESS AND COVERED A NUMBER OF BROAD
TiEMES. KING H U S S E I N , WHO HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FRO-' NEW YORK,
SAID HE WAS I"TENDING TO V I S I T SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES, STARTING

WITH SYR I A, TO PREPARE FOR AM ARAN SUMMIT MEETING LATER IN

THE YEAR AND CREATE THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR AN ARAB INITIATIVE.

NEITHER THE KING NOR MIS IMMEDIATE ADVISERS SHOVED ANY

DISPOSITION TO UNDERRATE THE D I F F I C U L T I E S OF THE TASK THEY HAD

SET THEMSELVES. 3 U T THEY WERE WELL S A T I S F I E D WITH THE
L"'ROVE E'.T IN JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE PLO AND THE GREATER

REALISM WHICH THEY F E L T NOW CHARACTERISED FLO THINKING. THEY

EXPRESSED ACUTE CONCERN O'ER THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SYRIA,- AND,

SOME UNEASINESS L E S T THE RENEWED QUARREL BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ
MIGHT GET IN THE WAY Or A NEW ARAB I N I T I A T I V E . THEY WERE . •
ALSO VERY WORRIED OVER THE SITUATION IN THE LEBANON AMD

THOUGHT THAT A SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON'S PROBLEMS COULD ONLY BE

ACHIEVED BY WORDING CLOSELY WITH THE SYRIANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. H I S JORDANIAN INTERLOCUTORS R E A D I L Y AGREED WITH MR HURD
WHEN H E S T R E S S E D T H E IMPORTANCE OF G E T T I N G THE T I M I N G R I G H T IN
LAUNCHING ANY NEW INITIATIVE AND THAT T H E I R PURPOSE SHOULD BE
TO SUPPLEMENT RATHER THAN A T T E M P T TO R E P L A C E R E S O L U T I O N 2 4 2 ,
THEY F E L T THAT NOT 0 ' L Y WAS P R A C T I C A L CO-OPERATION WITH T H E P L O NOW
POSSIBLE I N , FOR EXAMPLE, A D M I N I S T E R I N G FUNDS CONTRIBUTED BY
OTHER ARAB C O U N T R I E S TO A S S I S T THE WEST BANK, BUT THAT T H I S MIGHT
PREPARE T H E WAY FOR WIDER C0-0PER ATI ON IN THE F U T U R E . THEY
-ADLY SHARED MR HURD'S VIEWS ON THE NEED TO WEAN THE D
L0
AWAY FRO'' T E R R O R I S M , P O I N T I N G OUT THAT' JORDAN HAD ALWAYS ~EEM
OPPOSED TO THE USE OF SUCH METHODS, ALTHOUGH THE P R I M E MINISTER
REMARKED THAT THERE WAS L I T T L E TO CHOSE BETWEEN T H E
P A L E S T I N I A N S AND I S R A E L I S WITH REGARD TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM. THEY ALSO THOUGHT THAT A CRAFUAL CHANGE WAS COMING
ABOUT IN ARA3 VIEWS, AND THAT EVEN COUNTRIES HITHERTO
THOUGHT OF AS RADiCAL WERE MODIFYING THEIR POSITIONS.

5. DEVELOP• E TS CN THE WEST 3ANK AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE
ISRAELIS WERE SUCCEEDING IN CHANGING THE FACTS THERE .'ERE A
PRINCIPAL THE' £ IN THE T A L K S . THE CROWN P R I N C E ' S WORKING .
v

...EA-FAST FOR MR HURD INCLUDED A S L I D E PRESENTATION WITH APS
AND DIAGRAMS TO SHOW DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND THE DIVERS! Of4 OF
WEST BANK RES URGES; PARTICULARLY WATER, FOR USE IN ISRAEL
ITSELF. THE CROWN PRINCE EMPHASIZED THAT ALMOST 88# OF THE
LAND ON THE WEST BANK HAD BEEN EXPROPRIATED BY THE ISRAELI
f E T I L E R S FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE SETTLE'-ENTS AND THAT, EVEN I F
THE ISRAELI S E T L L E R 3 NOW NUMBERED.ON I F , 0 2 3 , THE INTENTION OF
BOTH THE MAIN P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S ' IN ISRAEL WAS TO INCREASE THEIR
NUMBER WHILE FORCING OUT THF PRESENT INHABITANTS AND MAINTAINING
THE './EST BANK AS A C A P T I V E ECONOMIC MARKET FOR ISRAEL.

6. BOTH K[NG HUSSEIN AND ABDUL HAMID SHARAF IN DISCUSSING THEIR
RECENT V I S I T TO NEW YORK SPOKE W.JTH SOME B I T T E R N E S S ABOUT
JORDANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE US. SHARAF THOUOHT THE KING'S
TALK WITH MR V MICE HAD BEEN USEFUL. IN PARTICULAR MR VANCE
HAD NOT PRECLUDED A PARALLEL EFFORT TO CAMP DAVID, AMD ):OTH HE
AND MR SAUNDERS HAD SEEMED TO WELCOME THE KING'S IDEA FOR A NEW •
ARAB I N I T I A T I V E WITH EUROPEAN SUPPORT. THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS HO.EVER A D I F F E R E N T MATTER AND THEY HAD BEEN DISTURBED TO HEAR
CONFIDENTIAL -

REPORTS './HILE IN NEW YORK (MOST OF THE ' MISLEADING, ACCORDING
TO ' Y US COLLEAGUE) OF A PROPOSED NEW US I N I T I A T I V E ON LEBANON, A
WHICH WOULD INVOLVE ALL P A R T I E S TO THE CONFLICT INCLUDING MAJOR
HADDAD AND THE ISRAELIS, THE KING WAS PARTICULARLY C R I T I C A L OF
ATTEMPTS TO FORCE HI ' TO S E E MR STRAUSS, WHICH HE CLAIMED COULD
ONLY HAVE EMBARRASSED HIM WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES AT A TIME
WHEN JORDAN'S O P P O S I T I O N TO THE CANip DAVID PROCESS WAS WELL
KNOWN, AND TO MAKE A.MEETING './ITH MR STRAUSS A CONDITION FOR
A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. WHEREVER
THE TRUTH L I E S IN ALL T H I S , I T WAS CLEAR THAT THE K|NG HAD
RETURNED EVEN MORE UNEASY ABOUT THE AMERICAN ROLE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST THAN PRIOR TO H I S US VISIT.

7, P R E D I C T A B L Y , MR NURD'S JORDANIAN INTERLOCUTORS PLACED GREAT

0

STRESS Of! THE ROLE WHICH THEY HOPED EUROPE, AND BRITAIN AND
FRANCE IN PARTICULAR, MIGHT PLAY IN HELPING THE ARABS TO FIND A
WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE. THEY SAID THEY HAD WATCHED
CLOSELY THE GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN POSITION ON THE
MIDDLE EAST, F E L T THAT WE AND OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS HAD MOVED
IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AMD THAT EUROPE COULD NOW PLAY A MORE
P O S I T I V E ROLE WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE AMERICANS AMD WEED
NOT EMBARRASS THE!. THEY READILY UNDERSTOOD MR KURD'S EMPHASIS
CN THE IMPORTANCE DOING NOTHING WHICH MIGHT PUT AT RISK
US INVOLVEMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT
AND ALSO THE EUROPEAN WISH MOT TO ADD TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S
PRESENT TROUBLES. BUT THEY F E L T STRONGLY THAT AN INCREASED
EUROPEAN ROLE WOULD ACTUALLY HELPFUL TO THE AMERICANS IM
EXTRICATING THEM FROM THE D I F F I C U L T I E S INTO WHICH THEY HAD BEEN LED
THROUGH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.­

8. THE JORDANIANS-WERE, I THINK, L E S S R E C E P T I V E ' T O MR HURD'S
SUGGESTION THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS OUGHT TO BE GIVEN A CHANCE
AND COULD LEAD TO B E N E F I T S FOR THE P A L E S T I N I A N S WHICH THEY COULD
LATER E X P L O I T TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. THEY SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE
THAT MR EDAM'S P U B L I C L Y EXPRESSED FRARS ON T H I S SCORE ARE
GENUINE, AMD THEY REMAIN FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL WILL NEVER
VOLUNTARILY RENOUNCE HER CLAIM TO THE '..'EST DANK. THEY THEREFORE
PIN NO FAITH ON THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THEY DELI EVE THE
EGYPTIANS ARE IN ANY CASE ILL-EO'HPpED TO CONDUCT BECAUSE OF
THEIR IGNORANCE OF .EST BANK A F F A I R S . NOR DID MR HURD'S
RGUMENTS IN FAVOUR CF KEEPING JORDAN'S L I N E S OPEN TO EGYPT

# C O N F I D E N T I A L
EVOKE A POSITIVE RESPONSE. THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE
41 IN PARTICULAR SPELT OUT VERY CLEARLY THE WAY IN WHICH JORDAN WAS

CARRYING OUT TO THE LETTER THE BAGHDAD RESOLUTIONS TO CUT OFF

JORDANIAN COMMERCIAL DEALINGS WITH EGYPT.

9. IT IS SCARCELY POSSIBLE IN A FEW °ARAGRAPHS TO DO JUSTICE
TO THE RANGE AND DEPTH OF MR HURD'S DISSCUSSIONS HERE: I ASSUME
RECORDS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO INTERESTED POSTS. HIS VISIT
WAS, IF I MAY SAY SO, AN OUTSTANDING PERSONAL SUCCESS AND THE HEAD
OF THE ROYAL COURT HAS SINCE TOLD ME HOW MUCH THE JORDAN IANS
HAD VALUED THEIR TALKS WITH HIM. FOR THEIR PART, THE
JORDANIANS WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO DE'-'OMSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE
THEY ATTACHED TO HIS VISIT IN BOTH LARGE AND SMALL'WAYS, GRANTING
HIM THE TREATMENT USUALLY RESERVED FOR FOREIGN M11 MISTERS AND
HEADS OF STATE. HIS VISIT RECEIVED VERY WIDE PUBLICITY ON
TELEVISION AND IN THE PRESS (AS MUCH OR MORE THAN THAT ACCORDED
TO MR GENSCHER ON HIS RECENT VISIT HERE).
•1
10. I HOPE THAT , IN ANY USE MADE OF THIS TELEGRAM WITH
OTHER GOVERNMENTS, CARE WILL BE TAKEN NOT TO REVEAL ANYTHING
CONCERNING DEFENCE AND OTHER CONTRACTS FOR WHICH WE ARE
COMPETING AND ALSO THAT THE KING'S CONFIDENCE REGARDING HIS
FUTURE INTENTIONS AND HIS RELATIONS WITH THE US (PARAGRAPH 3 AND 6)
WILL BE RESPECTED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSES.

URWICK

ADMioUAt-. J>ISTW .

UNJ>

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IlIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES X - \t<

PS 110 1 0 DOV/NING STREET < ^
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 1123062 OCT 79
TO ROUTINE FOREIGN AND CCMMEMVEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3126 OF 11 OCTOBER 1979
INFO JEDDA, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, SANA'A,
ADEN, RABAT, ALGIERS

INFO SAVING MOSCOW, BAHRAIN AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

US/SAUDI RELATIONS.
1, STRAUSS, SAUNDERS AND VANCE CALLED ON PRINCE SAUD WHILE HE
WAS IN NEW YORK ON 2,3 AND 5 OCTOBER RESPECTIVELY.

?. AT THE MEETING WltM VANCE, SAUD WAS HANDED A LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT CARTER THANKING THE SAUDIS FOR THEIR DECISION TO MAINTAIN
NCREASED OIL PRODUCTION TO THE END OF THE YEAR AND STRESSING THE
IMPORTANCE CF MAINTAINING PRODUCTION AT THAT LEVEL. THEY THEN
DISCUSSED LEBANON, THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, REGIONAL SECURITY.
MO THE WESTERN SAHARA.

LEBANON
? . SAUNDERS HAD EARLIER BRIEFED SAUD CN THE IDEAS UNDERLYING THE
AMERICAN QUOTE INITIATIVE UNCUOTE. VANCE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT
PREDICT THE OUTCOME BUT THE US HAD FELT THAT SOME ACTION WAS
ESSENTIAL. VANCE AND SAUD AGREL'D THAT THE LEAD SHOULD BE TAKEN BY
THE LEBANESE. SAUD STRESSED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO SUGGEST
IN AT ISRAELI INTERVENTION IN THE LEBANON WAS ACCEPTABLE. WHILE THE
SAUD STRES ED THAT NO f
THAT ISRAELI INTERVENTION IN THE LEBANON WAS ACCEPTABLE. WHILE T:l?
PLO MIGHT AGREE IN NEGOTIATION TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE IT WAS UNREAL­
ISTIC TO EXPECT THEM TO DO SO AS A PRECONDITION TO NEGOTIATIONS.
THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CONSENSUS WITHIN
LEBANON THAT ALL INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE SHOULD CEASE. HE DOUBTED
WETHER THE ISRAELIS REALLY WANTED A SOLUTION TO THE LEBANESE
PROBLEMi THEY SEEMED TO CAUSE IT TO FLARE UP WHENEVER THEY CAME UNDER
RESSURE ON PALESTINIAN ISSUES. VANCE STRESSED THAT THE US ENVISAGED
A QUIET FCLLOW-UP AND THAT THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A FORMAL
CONFERENCE.

THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
k. VANCE GAVE SAUD AN ACCOUNT OF KING HUSSEIN'S IDEAS AS EXPLAINED
TO HIM IN NEW YORK. HUSSEIN APPEARED TO HAVE A LONG RANGE PLAN FOR
THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BUT HAD GIVEN NO DETAILS .
THERE WAS NO REASON WHY HIS IDEAS SHOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE
CURRENT PEACE PROCESS. PERHAPS SCME CLEARER IDEAS WOULD SURFACE
AT AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING BY THE END OF THE YEAR. SAUD AGREED THAT
HJSSEIN WAS WORKING FOR AN ARAB CONSENSUS AND A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT. AS FOR THE CURRENT PROCESS, STRAUSS HAD MENTIONED TO
HIM AT THEIR ? OCTOBER MEETING HOW GOOD THE BEGIN/SADAT RELATION­
SHIP HOW WAS BUT HE , SA'JD, DID NOT FIND THIS SURPRISING SINCE
SAJAT WAS GETTING BACK HIS TERPJTONY"AND WAS AVOIDING THE DIFFICULT
. ' - j N i f i r ' - s . SAUD FEARE1 LAT SADAT AND 1
DING THE CARDS U VE AGAINST • '. TlNlA . ; : :
I I 'L. THE SAUDIS LlEVED IN USG
TO PALESTINIAN StLF-DtTERMINATION AND WERE PLC THE APPARENT
SHIFT OF U S PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ISSUE QUOTE IF WE HAVE SHOWED
FRUSTRATION, IT IS BECAUSE WE WANT THE US TO SUCCEED IN THIS
COMMITMENT UNCUOTE. VANCE REPLIED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT DID NOT
UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES BUT NOTED THAT CERTAIN ISRAELI
LEADERS HAD RECENTLY BEEN MAKING STATEMENTS, WITHOUT INCUSING REBUKE
FROM THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE .
SIX MONTHS AGO. THE US HAD NEVER WAIVERED FROM THEIR POSITION THAT
THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. SAUD
SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRINGING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE
PROCESS WOULD REMOVE A GREAT NUMBER OF OBSTACLES.

REGIONAL SECURITY :
5. VANCE REFERRED -TO PRESIDENT CA IR 8 1 OCTOBER STATEMENT ABOUT THE
:

US STRENGTHENING ITS NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN-OCEAN. THIS MEANT
JHeiiWJTION CF 2 - 3 SHIPS AND THE US WOULD BE CONSIDERING FURTHER
F I P THAT H E B E L I E V E D THAT BRINGING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE
'FLOCESS WOULD REMOVE A G R E A T NUMBER C F O B S T A C L E S .

REGTONAL S E C U R I T Y
5. V A N C E ' R E F E R R E D TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S 1 OCTOBCT S T A T E M E N T ABOUT THE
US STRENGTHENING ITS NAVAL FORCES IM T H E INDIAN OCEAN. THIS MEANT
THE ADDITION OF 2-3 SHIPS AMD THE US WOULD BE CONSIDERING FURTHER
STEPS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE US QUICK REACTION FORCE WAS NOT
INTENDED SPECIFICALLY FOR T H E P E R S I A N G U L F B U T HAD A WORLD-WIDE R O L E .
QCH U S F O R C E S HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE SINCE THE EARLY 63S. NEWS
S T O R I E S THAT THE A M E R I C A N S WERE C O N S I D E R I N G P R E P O S I T I O N I N G OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT WERE QUOTE ABSOLUTE BALONEY UNQUOTE. SAUD
R E P L I E D THAT IT WOULD BE MOST H E L P F U L I F THE A M E R I C A N S WOULD SAY SO
PUBLICLY. DUE TO HENRY KISSINGER'S REMARKS WHEN H E WAS SECRETARY CF
STATE ABOUT P R O T E C T I N G T H E OIL FIELDS, ANY PUBLIC REFERENCE TO A
QUICK REACTION FORCE WAS BOUND TO PRODUCE ADVERSE POLITICAL
REACTIONS IN T H E M I D D L E EAST AND DAMAGE US INTERESTS. THE SAUDIS
R E M A I N E D D I S T U R B E D BY SOVIET ACTION IN THE REGION FROM AFGHANISTAN
TO SOUTH YEMEN, AND F E A R E D T H A T AN ABSENCE OF A US RESPONSE
INCREASED THE SOVIET DANGER. B U T H E T O L D VANCE FRANKLY THAT SOUTH

ARABIA WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO CQMKfNT PUBLICLY ON THIS ISSUE.

WESTERN SAHARA
6. SAUD D E S C R I B E D THE SITUATION AS VERY CRITICAL FOR THE MORROCCANS

m HAD T O L D THE SAUDI'S OF T H E I R CONCERN ABOUT THE US POSITION.

THE SAUDIS HAD HAD C O N T I N U O U S TALKS WITH THE P A R T I E S INVOLVED

INCLUDING THE A L G E R I A N S WHO WERE C O N V I N C E D THAT HASSAN WOULD

ULTIMATELY FAIL IN THE S A H A R A . THEY HAD BEEN G U I L T Y C F HAVING

W I L L F U L L Y C R E A T E D AND F I N A N C E D THE PCLlSARlO. T H E R E S U L T WAS THAT

MOROCCO WAS I S O L A T E D P O L I T I C A L L Y AND WEAKENED M I L I T A R Y . THIS H E L P E D

THE SOVIET UNION WHO WANTED TO REMOVE MOROCCAN I N F L U E N C E FROM

AFRICA. , ,

FCO PASS SAVING MOSCOW AND BAHRAIN

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENT!
GR 300
FM WASHINGTON 112103Z

TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NO. 3119 OF 11 OCTOBER
INFO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MYTEL 2881 (NOT TO ALL) : U.S. INITIATIVE ON LE3AN0N.

1. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR OF 9 OCTOBER CARRIES AN ARTICLE
DATELINED NEW YORK WHICH HAS EXCITED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SINCE
!TS DETAIL GIVES THE IMPRESSION CF WELL INFORMED BRIEFING. THE
GIST OF THE ARTICLE IS THAT THE U.S. INITIATIVE ENVISAGES THAT
NEGOTIATIONS TO CONVERT THE LEBANESE CEASEFIRE INTO A PERMANENT
ARMISTICE SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT TWO SEPARATE NEGOTIATING TABLES :
ONE IN BEIRUT INVOLVING REPRESENTATIVES CF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT,
THE PLO, SYRIA, LEFTIST LEBANESE PARTIES WITH FORCES IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTORS TO
UN IF IL : THE SECOND PRESUMABLY IN JERUSALEM WOULD GROUP THE
AMERICANS, THE ISRAELIS AND HADDAD. THESE TWO QUOTE CONSULTATIVE
BODIES UNQUOTE WOULD BE PUT UNDER A U.N. UMBRELLA. IVOR RICHARD
WOULD BE APPOINTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
AND SHUTTLE BETWEEN THE TWO TABLES. IF SUCCESSFUL IN RESTORING
PEACE IN LEBANON THE FORMULA WOULD BE EXTENDED TO DEAL WITH THE
REMAINING ARAB/ISRAEL ISSUES AMD TO SEEK A COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT (WITH JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA NOW JOINING THE PROCESS).

2. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT ALTHOUGH AMERICAN IDEAS

HAVE NOW EVOLVED TO THE POINT THAT THEY HAVE HAD PRELIMINARY

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE AND WILL BE DOING

SO WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WHEN AMBASSADOR DEAN RETURNS TO

EEIRUT ON 14 OCTOBER THE PAPER ON LEBANON NOW AWAITING

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY PROPOSALS RESEMBLING

THE TWO TABLE APPROACH DESCRIBED IN THE CSM ARTICLE.

HENDERSON
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GRS 463
R E S T R I C T E D
F!' U K D E L S T R A S B O U R G 1110302 OCT 79 V A
TC PRIORITY FCC '^u^. I Ifa^l^
TELEGRAM NUMBER 66 OF l l OCTOBER
AND TO CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN
SAVING BAGHDAD BEIRUT DAMASCUS WASHINGTON

EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI F O R E I G N MINI STEWS 3EF0RE THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

U, MR B G U T R C 3 - G H A L I AND MR DAYAN YESTERDAY ADDRESSED THE
CONSULTATIVE A S S E M B L Y OF THE COUNCIL CF E U R O P E Oil THE C^M? OAVID
AGREEMENTS AND THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE. THEN AFTER GIVING A JOINT
PRESS CONFERENCE LASTING ONE AND A HALF HOURS, THEY SPENT ANOTHER
THREE HOURS SITTING SIDE BY SIDE ANSWERING SOME S I X T Y WRITTEN
viUESHONS FROM THE PAK'L IAMENTAR I A N S .

D.. IN HIS INTERVIEW THE EGYPTIAN MINISTER STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT
SADAT HAD ALWAYS WANTED M U L T I L A T E R A L RATHER THAN BILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS. HE C R I T I C I S E D ISRAEL AS W E L L AS T H E REJECTIONIST
STATES FOR SEEKING TO SPLIT EGYPT FROM HER ARAB BROTHERS. EUROPE
B.HOULD HELP THE PALESTINIANS TO MAINTAIN T H E I R IDENTITY IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, PRESS ISRAEL AND THE USA TO DIALOGUE WITH
THE P L C AND SEEK TO B R I N G TOGETHER EGYPT AND THE R E J E C T I ON I S T S .
MR DAYAN BITTERLY CRITICISED THE IRISH STATEMENT ON B E H A L F OF THE
NINE AT THE UN FOR BLAMING ISRAEL FOR DEFENDING ITSELF WHILE
0-1 I T T I N G TO CRITICISE ARAB TERRORISM. CANP DAVID INCLUDED PROVISION
FOR T H E PALESTINIANS BUT ISRAEL COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO
WHICH WAS DEDICATED TO ITS DESTRUCTION. THEY COULD NOT REGAIN AN
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY GUARANTEE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO DEFENSIBLE
FRONTIERS. HE A P P E A L E D TO EUROPE NOT TC CRITICISE THE CAMP DAVID
AGREEMENTS, NOT TO COMPLICATE MATTERS BY PRODUCING NEW IDEAS AND
TO HELP PEACE-MAKING 3Y ASSISTANCE TO MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ON T H E LINES OF THE MARSHALL PLAN.

3.. THE LONG AND TOUGH DEBATE STARTED OFF AMICABLY BUT BECAME
SOMEWHAT T E N S E TOWARDS THE END. BOUTRCS-GHALI, IN A PERFORMANCE
WHICH WAS GENERALLY A G R E E D TO BE B R I L L I A N T , APPEARED TO BE TALKING

RESTRICTED / MUCH
RESTRICTED

MUCH CF THE TIME OVER THE HEADS OF THE ASSEMBLY TO HIS FELLOW
ARABS. IN CONTRAST| MR DAYAN APPEARED A SICK AND TIRED MAN. FROM
TIKE TO TT E HE READ OUT EXTRACTS FROM THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT
AND REMINDED HIS COLLEAGUE THAT IT HAD BEEN SIGNED BY PRESIDENT
SADAT. HIS CLOSING REMARKS WERE BITTE^ AND A MEMBER OF MY STAFF
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THAT HE HAD EXPECTED THE MEETING TO PROVIDE
THE OCCASION FOR A CONCERTED DEFENCE OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT
BUT THAT IT HAD IN FACT TURNED INTO SOMETHING OF A CONFRONTAT 1 0 i .
ThE OCCASION PROVIDED A FASCINATING SPECTACLE FOR THE PARLIAMENT,
PUBLIC AND TV CAMERAS IN THE PACKED HEMICYCLE. BUT MOST THINKING
OBSERVERS QUERIED WHETHER THE PUBLIC AIRING CF THE MINISTERS'
DIFFERENCES WOULD ASSIST THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS.

4.. THE ASSEMBLY IS PLANNING NECT TO DESPATCH ITS RELEVANT
SUB-COMMITTEE (INCLUDING BRITISH MPS KERSHAW AND URW|»j TO VISIT
THE OTHER ARAB STATES AND TO INVITE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
REACTIONISTS TO ADDRESS THE ASSEMBLY'S JANUARY SESSION.

5.. COPIES CF THE SPEECH, QUESTIONS AND RECORD OF ANSWERS FOLLOW.

FCO PASS SAVING TO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON.

CREPEATED AS REQUESTED]
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GR 1200~
CONFIDENTIAL
PM TEL AVIV 1 1 0 8 0 9 Z OCT 7 9
TO P R I O R I T Y FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 5 8 OF 1 1 OCTOBER
INFO P R I O R I T Y AMMAN CAIRO ROUTINE WASHINGTON U K M I S NEW YORK

JERUSALEM DAMASCUS B E I R U T

THE MOOD I N ISRAEL

1. THE JEWISH H I G H HOLY DAYS, & U R ,
NG WHICH F 0 R
THREE WEEKS ISRAEL
WORKS AT H A L F SPEED, ARE COMING TO AN END. AT T H I S T I M E LACT YEAR
(MY TEL NO 4 6 0 OF 2 0 OCTOBER 1978) I REPORTED THAT THE HOLDY DAYS
HAD SEEN THE EROSION OF THE ELATION AROUSED 3 Y THE RECENT CAMP
DAVID AGREEMENTS INTO FOREBODING THAT THE U N I T E D STATES AND EGYPT
MIGHT HAVE SOLD ISRAEL DOWN T H E R I V E R . T H E B E L I E F AT THAT TIME
THAT A PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE SIGNED BY
THE END OF T H E YEAR PROVED TO BE M I S T A K E N .

2. THIS YEAR THE MOOD I S RATHER ONE OF APATHY. THE AUNTONOMY
TALKS HAVE DISAPPEARED BELOW THE LEVEL OF P U B L I C CONSCIOUSNESS*
NOBODY EXPECTS ANYTHING TO EMERGE FROM THEM BEFORE THE TURN OF
THE YEAR, I F THEN. MANY OF THOSE WHO L A S T YEAR WERE PROTESTING
VEHEMENTLY ABOUT NEW SETTLEMENTS NOW SEEM TO HAVE GIVEN U P , OR
BEEN E F F E C T I V E L Y STIFLED, UNFORTUNATELY, WHILE T H E ECONOMY
CONTINUES TO HOLD THE H E A D L I N E S , NOBODY CARES MUCH, AND CERTAINLY
F ; Q
T EFFECTIVELY, ABOUT WHAT I S HAPPENING, WHILE T H E GOVERNMENT
BEEN EFFECTIVELY STIFLED. UNFORTUNATELY, WHILE THE ECONOMY
CONTINUES TO HOLD THE HEADLINES, NOBODY CARES MUCH, AND CERTAINLY
NOT EFFECTIVELY, ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT {
HAS FOR THE MOMENT ABDICATED ANY CONTROL WHICH IT HAD. THE MAIN
ISRAELI BANK, BANK LEUMI, WITH 47# OF ISRAELI DEPOSITS, WITH SOME
JUSTIFICATION LOCKED OUT ITS STRIKING EMPLOYEES ON 4 OCTOBER, AND
REMAINS CLOSED, WITH SEVERE CONSEQUENT DISRUPTION TO BUSINESS AND
INDUSTRIAL LIFE. A TOTAL, AND I MEAN TOTAL, ELECTRICAL BLACKOUT
OF ISRAEL FOR SEVERAL HOURS ON 9 OCTOBER, CAUSED BY A TECHNICIAN'S
MISTAKE, SEEMED IN CHARACTER WITH THE COUNTRY'S MOOD. (HOWEVER,
THE JORDAN I AN-OWN ED EAST JERUSALEM ELECTRIC COMPANY KEPT ITS PART
OF THE CITY SUPPLIED EXCLAM).

3. THE PREVAILING APATHY CAN BE ASCRIBED VARIOUSLY TO: HOLIDAYS
AFTER A LONG HOT SUMMER: THE FEELING THAT THERE IS NO DANGER OF
WAR ON THE HORIZON: AND PERHAPS THE FACT THAT THIS COUNTRY ANYHOW
LIVES IN TROUGHS AND PEAKS. IN THE TROUGHS THE ISRAELIS EXPECT
THEIR GOVERNMENTS, OF WHICH THEY TRADITIONALLY HAVE A POOR OPINION,
TO OPERATE FLABBILY AND INEFFECTIVELY: AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES,
WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT, TO INDULGE IN BACKBITING
BOTH AMONGST AND BETWEEN THEMSELVES. THEY HAVE GOT BOTH IN FULL
MEASURE AT THE MOMENT. BUT IT DOES NOT SEEM A CAUSE FOR MUCH ALARM.

4 . HOWEVER, THE PRESENT FAILURE CF LEADERSHIP FROM THE TOP IS MORE
MARKED THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE I HAVE BEEN HERE, AND IS CERTAINLY
CONTRIBUTING TO THE PRESENT MOOD. THE PRIME CAUSES ARE MR BEGIN'S
INABILITY, OR DISINCLINATION, TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER HIS CABINET,
AND THE FACT THAT THE FINANCE MINISTER, MR EH RLI CM, HAS BEEN MADE .
THE SCAPEGOAT FOR THE DETERIORATING STATE OF THE ECONOMY. THIS IS
UNFAIR TO HIM. HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
DOWNWARDS, HAVE SHOWN NO INCLINATION TO PROVIDE HIM WITH THE SUPPORT
WHICH HE NEEDED FOR HARSH ECONOMIC MEASURES, CHIEFLY BECAUSE THEY
DEEMED THEM POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE ECONOMY
STILL SEEMS TO RUB ALONG PROSPEROUSLY ENOUGH, EVEN AS THE INFLATION
RATE CLIMBS UP TWARDS 120%- IN PARTICULAR, MR EHRL1 CM IS BEING MADE
THE SCAPEGOAT WITHIN HIS OWN LIBERAL PARTY, WHO, TOGETHER WITH
OTHER PARTIES IN THE COALITION, ARE SEEKING HIS RESIGNATION. NOBODY,
HOWEVER, EXCEPT MR MODAI, THE ENERGY MINISTER, SEEMS ANXIOUS TO
SUCCEED HIM, AND MR MODAI'S BELIEF THAT HE COULD DO THE JOB BETTER
THAN MR EHRLICH IS SHARED BY NO ONE ELSE IN ISRAEL. MR BEGIN IS
THOUGHT TO BE DEEPLY RELUCTANT TO LET MR EHRLICH GO, AND THE LATTER
HAS SAID THAT HE WILL ONLY GO I F THE PRIME MINISTER SO REQUESTS,
HE IS CURRENTLY DEALING WITH HIS PROBLEMS BY SPENDING MUCH TIME OUT
CF THE COUNTRY.
;'JRRE?<TLY D E A L I N G WITH H I S PRO EL EMS B Y S P E N D I N G MUCH T I M E GUT~

THE COUNTRY.

0 T H E R E HAS BEEN TALK FOR MANY WEEKS O F A REDISTRIBUTION OF PORT­
FOLIOS, WHICH IS NOW BEING FORECAST BEFORE THE END O F T H E MONTH.
EUT I ' B E L I E V E T H A T MR B E G I N WILL MOVE V E R Y C A U T I O U S L Y * NOT SURPRI­
SINGLY, EVERY INDIVIDUAL, AND EVERY PARTY, IN HIS CABINET LOOKS TO
A REORGANISATION TO IMPROVE HISAHEIR POSITION, AND T H E Y CANNOT ALL
BE SATISFIED. TOO MUCH D I S S A T I S F A C T I O N IN ANY O N E Q U A R T E R MIGHT
DESTROY T H E P R E S E N T D E L I C A T E BALANCE OF INTERESTS. AND L I T E R A L L Y
NO MEMBER O F T H E C A B I N E T IS WILLING TO CEDE POSITION "IN THE
NATIONAL INTEREST".

6. T H E LABOUR P A R T Y , FOR T H E I R PART, ARE ENGAGED IN A SERIES OF
MILD IDEOLOGICAL AND P O L I C Y DISPUTES. B U T MR P E R E S NOW S E E M S FIRMLY
IN T H E S A D D L E AS L E A D E R . MR RABIN, WHO V I O L E N T L Y A T T A C K E D MR PERES
IN HIS R E C E N T BOOK, HAS L O S T T H E C O N T E S T , AND NO O T H E R CANDIDATES
ARE C R E D I B L Y IN SIGHT THIS TIME ROUND. T H E P A R T Y HAS A 20* LEAD

IN THE P U B L I C OPINION P O L L S , BUT T H I S I S MORE A FUNCTION OF D I S S A T ­

ISFACTION WITH T H E GOVERNMENT THAN S A T I S F A C T I O N WITH T H E OPPOSITION.

MR P E R E S HAS T O L D ME T H A T H E WOULD B E H A P P Y TO FIGHT AN ELECTION

TOMORROW, BUT I AM IN NO DOUBT T H A T H E WOULD MUCH P O E F E R TO WAIT

A GOOD W H I L E LONGER.

7. I S R A E L WILL NOT CONTINUE IN T H E P R E S E N T TROUGH INDEFINITELY.

T H E P R E S E N T GOVERNMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT A R E S H U F F L E , MIGHT RETURN

TO A MORE EVEN K E E L , BUT T H I S IS IN MY V I E W UNLIKELY. I AM NOW

BEGINNING TO G I V E THEM UP AS A BAD J O B . THIS NOT TO SAY THAT THEY

WILL NOT L I N G E R O N , UNTIL THEY FALL APART ON T H E I R OWN, OR UNTIL

EVENTS FORCE A CHANGE. THE LATTER I S P E R H A P S T H E MORE P R O V A B L E ^

GIVEN THE CABINET'S TENACITY IN MAINTAINING ITSELF IN OFFICE.

8. MOREOVER, I S R A E L GOVERNMENTS HAVE T R A D I T I O N A L L Y CHANGED SHAPE
AS T H E R E S U L T O F SOME E X T R A N E O U S O C C U R E N C E . FOR T H E L A S T GOVERNMENT
THE A P P A R E N T L Y MINOR SUCH EVENTHAPPENED WHEN SOME MEMBERS O F THE
CABINET ACCIDENTALLY BROKE SHAB3AT TO G R E E T T H E F I R S T D E L I V E R Y O F
US F 1 5 S IN DECEMBER 1 9 7 6 . SOME SUCH F U T U R E EVENT, INTERNAL (E.G.
THOUGH ONE HOPES NOT, SOME R E L I G I O U S E X C E S S ) , OR E X T E R N A L (E.G.
SOME C O N C I L I A T O R Y MOVE FROM T H E P L O ) MIGHT G A L V A N I S E P O L I T I C A L LIFE,
L E A D I N G TO A MORE E F F E C T I V E R E S H U F F L E THAN I NOW P R E D I C T , EITHER
TO A GOVERNMENT O F NATIONAL UNITY, OR TO NEW E L E C T I O N S . THE ONLY
AT ALL F O R E S E E A B L E , BUT UNDATEABLE, E V E N T WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY
DO T H I S WOULD B E MR B E G I N ' S . R E S I G N A T I O N THROUGH PHYSICAL INCAPACITY
OR, LESS LIKELY, A FAILURE OF WILL. BUT ANOTHER F15-TYPE INCIDENT,
SOKE CONCILIATORY MOVE FROM THE FLO) MIGHT GAL VAN I St r u n u v
LEADING TO A MORE EFFECTIVE RESHUFFLE THAN I NOW PREDICT, EITHER
TO A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, OR TO NEW ELECTIONS. THE ONLY
AT ALL FORESEEABLE, EUT UNDATE ABLE, EVENT WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY f
DO THIS WOULD BE MR BEGIN'S RESIGNATION THROUGH PHYSICAL INCAPACITY
OR, LESS LIKELY, A FAILURE OF WILL. BUT ANOTHER F15-TYPE INCIDENT,
COMING OUT OF THE BLUE, COULD ALSO DO THE TRICK. WHATEVER HAPPENS,
ON PAST FORM THE PRESENT LULL SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED UPON TO LAST.

MASON
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 O c t o b e r 1979

L e t t e r from P r e s i d e n t Sadat t o t h e Prime M i n i s t e r
A p e r s o n a l l e t t e r from P r e s i d e n t S a d a t t o t h e P r i m e

M i n i s t e r was handed t o HM Ambassador a t C a i r o on 27 September.

I e n c l o s e t h e o r i g i n a l , w h i c h a r r i v e d by bag on 3 O c t o b e r .

I t i s one o f a s e r i e s w h i c h P r e s i d e n t S a d a t has a d d r e s s e d

a t i n t e r v a l s t o Heads o f Government on h i s p e a c e e f f o r t s , and

a l e t t e r i n s i m i l a r terms has gone to o t h e r l e a d e r s . This

may a c c o u n t f o r the l e t t e r ' s r e f e r e n c e t o an e a r l i e r l e t t e r

to the Prime M i n i s t e r . Lord Carrington b e l i e v e s that a

l e n g t h y r e p l y i s not r e q u i r e d but t h a t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y s h o u l d

be t a k e n t o r e a s s u r e P r e s i d e n t Sadat of our s u p p o r t i n g e n e r a l

terms. I enclose a draft.

On the s u b s t a n c e o f t h e l e t t e r , P r e s i d e n t S a d a t ' s a c c o u n t

c o n f i r m s what we know of t h e H a i f a e x c h a n g e s from o t h e r r e p o r t s .

The P r e s i d e n t d i d not p r e s s Mr B e g i n v e r y h a r d on the autonomy

a r r a n g e m e n t s and h a s been c r i t i c i s e d on t h a t s c o r e . But he

hopes t o i n d u c e t h e I s r a e l i s t o be c o - o p e r a t i v e o v e r t h e

P a l e s t i n i a n s i n t h e l o n g e r term by b u i l d i n g a fund o f g o o d w i l l

and u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h Mr B e g i n a t t h i s e a r l y s t a g e . This

t a c t i c has s o m e t h i n g t o commend i t but L o r d C a r r i n g t o n n o t e s

t h a t P r e s i d e n t S a d a t ' s r e s t r a i n t p l a c e s t h e A m e r i c a n s , who

have been more h a r s h l y c r i t i c a l o f I s r a e l i p o l i c y i n s u c h a r e a s

as South Lebanon and o v e r s e t t l e m e n t s , i n a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n .

I t a l s o makes our own s u p p o r t o f t h e Camp D a v i d p r o c e s s as

a means toward a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e t t l e m e n t l e s s c o n v i n c i n g t o

t h e o t h e r A r a b s , who note P r e s i d e n t S a d a t ' s a p p a r e n t l a c k o f

u r g e n c y on the P a l e s t i n i a n q u e s t i o n . But L o r d C a r r i n g t o n

r e c a l l s t h a t P r e s i d e n t S a d a t has shown h i m s e l f an a d r o i t

t a c t i c i a n i n the p a s t ; we a r e under no immediate p r e s s u r e from

t h e Arab s i d e who r e a c t e d f a v o u r a b l y t o L o r d C a r r i n g t o n ' s

s p e e c h a t t h e G e n e r a l Assembly; and t h e r e i s e v e r y r e a s o n t o

g i v e P r e s i d e n t S a d a t t h e r e a s s u r a n c e he s e e k s .

M O'D B A l e x a n d e r E s q

10 Downing S t r e e t

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11

Rqgistry^^^

No. DRAFT Letter
Type 1 +
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
From
._ HE Mohammed Anwar el-Sadat
Top Secret,
To
P r e s i d e n t of the Arab Republic
Prim
Primee Minister
Secret.
of Egypt

Confidential.

T e l e p h o n e N o . E x t .

Restricted.

Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING Department

In C o n f i d e n c e

Thank you very much f o r your l e t t e r of 23 September

with i t s f u l l account of your d i s c u s s i o n s with Mr Begin at

H a i f a and your i n t e n t i o n s f o r the f u t u r e .

•Majf I take t h i s opportunity to confirm my f i r m support

for your e f f o r t s aimed at a c h i e v i n g a comprehensive

*cvci»

Middle E a s t peace, and t o say how muoh I^agree with your

view of the need to f i n d a formula which w i l l meet the

l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s of the P a l e s t i n i a n s , and provide f o r

ijtijlin'f,!)^ co-existence between the P a l e s t i n i a n and Israeli

peoples. I wish the continuing n e g o t i a t i o n s w e l l . I am

convinced that i f some genuine autonomy f o r the West Bank

and Gaza can be achieved as a t r a n s i t i o n a l arrangement, t h i s

w i l l be a valuable b a s i s on which to b u i l d toward l a s t i n g

peace i n the a r e a .

Dd 0532000 800M 5/78 HMSO Bracknell
P S TO P K NC 10 DOWNING ST

GR 120

UNCLASSIFIED ^
4
FM WASHINGTON 101717Z OCT 79 /S^Jo
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3077 OF 10 OCTOBER

INFO BEIRUT AMMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV AND HMCG JERUSALEM

U.S. /PLO
1. ASKED AT HIS TELEVISED PRESS CONFERENCE ON 9 OCTOBER WHETHER
THE TIME HAD NOT COME FOR THE U.S. TO OPEN UP A DIALOGUE WITH THE
PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO, THE PRESIDENT REPLIED* QUOTE NO, I DO
NOT. WE WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO. WE WILL NOT RECOGNISE
THE PLO UNTIL AFTER THE PLO RECOGNISES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST
AND ENDORSES UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 2^2 AS A BASIS FOR MIDDLE
EAST PEACE UNQUOTE.
HENDERSON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NENAD EID ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
MED WED
MAED
ES & SD
FRD
B AM D ECON D
UND CONS D
EESD CONS EM UNIT
CABINET O F F I C E
GRS 245 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CONFIDENTIAL
FM AMMAN 08?955Z OCT
TO PRIORITY FCO P S TO P M NO 1 0 DOWNING ST

TELNO 390 OF 8 OCT 79
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT
ROUTINE CAIRO DAMASCUS TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON
AND CG JERUSALEM.

MY TELELETTER TO MOBERLY OF 27 SEPTEM3ERI fl^K

JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST '

1. KING HUSSEIN'S RETURN HERE ON 6 OCTOBER FROM HIS TRIP
TO SWITZERLAND, THE UK (WHERE HE SPENT A FEW DAYS BOTH ON THE
WAY OUT AND ON THE RETURN JOURNEY) AND NEW YORK TO ADDRESS
THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS MADE THE OCCASION FOR A CAREFULLY
STAGED HERO'S WELCOME, INCLUDING A MOTORCADE THROUGH TOWN
WITH THE POPULATION (HALF A MILLION, ACCORDING TO THE PRESS)
LINING THE STREETS, MILITARY BANDS AND EVEN THE RITUAL SLAUGHTER
OF CAMELS. SUCH A RECEPTION IS AN EXCEPTIONAL OCCURRENCE HERE
AND REFLECTS THE REG I ME'S WISH TO PRESENT THE KING'S SPEECH TO
THE UNITED NATIONS AS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT AND AN ASSERTION OF
JORDAN'S NEW ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

2. THE KING AND HIS PARTY SEEMED VERY './ELL SATISFIED WITH THE
RESULTS OF THEIR TRIP. ABDUL HAM ID SHARAF (HEAD OF THE ROYAL
COURT) CLAIMED THAT NOT A SINGLE ARAB STATE HAD RAISED OBJECTION
TO ANY PART OF THE KING'S SPEECH. THE. KING IIIMSELF ASKED ME TO
CONVEY TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND HER COLLEAGUES HIS VERY WARM
APPRECIATION AND THANKS FOR HIS RECEPTION IN LONDON AMD FOR THE
VERY USEFUL DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD WHILE THERE. I LEARNED
FROM THE COMMANDER IN.CHIEF THAT THE FIRST THING THE KING HAD
ASKED HIM ON ARRIVAL WAS HOW THE NEGOTIATION'S WITH US ON THE
SALE OF TANKS WERE PROGRESSING.

"M

tYJS&lTTOrtAL. TjiSTfJ
^4TJ A&aaj iSMEt- disport

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L
6)
CONFIDENTIAL f/y^
FM TEL AVIV 0807152 OCT 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 452 OF 8 OCTOBER
m6 PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK ROUTINE AMMAN BAHRAIN CAIRO DAMASCUS
JEDDA AND WASHINGTON

UVMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM MO 1196: ARAB/lSRAELl

SHEIKH MUHAMMAD BIN MUBARAK

U IF I MAY SO SO, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, I MUCH APPLAUD SIR A
PARSONS REPLY TO SHEIKH MUHAMMAD'S DEMARCHE (PARA 4 OF TUR).
THE EXCEPTION IS THAT I WOULD HAVE BEEN INCLINED TO TAKE HIM
UP RATHER MORE ON HIS POINT ABOUT ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION, WHERE
I BELIEVE HIM TO BE UNDER AN ILLUSION.

2. IN MY VIEW ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION, BOTH BY INCLINATION AND
FROM INDOCTRINATION FROM ABOVE, TENDS TO BELIEVE THAT WESTERN
EUROPE SHOULD FULLY SUPPORT ISRAEL, FOR MORAL AHD HISTORICAL
SEASONS, *A3 WELL AS FOR SELF INTEREST (STEMMING THE ADVANCE OF
COMMUNISM, ETC). T H E Y REGARD WESTERN EUROPEAN SIGNS OF APPROVAL,
AS COWARDLY MUNICH STYLE APPEASEMENT, IN WHICH WE SET SHORT TERM
MATERIAL ADVANTAGE AGAINST BOTH P R I N C I P L E AND OUR OWN LONG TERM
INTEREST.

3. IF ANYTHING, WESTERN EUROPEAN /IEWS AND STATEMENTS HAVE MORE
CHANCE OF INFLUENCING THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT THAN ISRAELI ..
PUBLIC OPINION, THOUGH THE CHANCES HERE ARE ALSO NOT GOOD. I
HAVE COE ACCROSS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT MAYNE3' STATEMENT TO
SIR A PARSONS (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 1173), THAT MR DAYAN
AND THROUGH HIM, THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT, WERE SHAKEN 3Y RECENT
EUROPEAN CRITICISMS OF ISRAELI POLICIES AND ACTIONS, THEY MAY
HAVE BEEN SLIGHTLY STIRRED, BUT NO MORE.

4. SU3JECT TO WASHINGTON'S VIEWS, I AOREE ON THE OTHER HAND,
THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE TAKING SERIOUSLY THE SUSTAINED US PRESSURE
ON THEM A OUT SOUTH LEBANON, I AM SURE BOTH MR DAYAN AND MR*
n

WEIZMAN WERE TAKEN ABACK 3Y THEIR RECEPTION IN CONGRESS AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL,

ELSEWHERE I N THE U N I T E D STATES RECENTLY, AS HAVE BEEN OTHER
RECENT ISRAELI VISITORS TO THE U N I T E D STATES. E'EN SO, LEAVING
ASIDE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE, I DEL I EVE THE RECENT ISRAELI
INACTIVITY I N SOUTH LEBANON, FOR EXAMPLE, TO HAVE BEEN DUE MORE
TO OTHER FACTORS THAN TO THE PRESSURE OF OUTSIDE O P I N I O N . SO
LO;:G AS THEY M A I N T A I N T H E I R P R I N C I P A L OBJECTIVE OF STRATEGIC
CONTROL OVER LEBANON SOUTH O F THE L I TAN I , THE I S R E L I S I N FACT
PREFER NOT TO S T I R UP TROU3LE THERE. SO LONG AS THE PALEST­
INIANS ARE RES0NA3LY Q U I E T , AND THERE ARE NO B I G TERRORIST ATTACKS
WITHIN ISRAEL, WHICH MIGHT FORCE THEM TO A R E P R I S A L , NEITHER THE
I S R A E L I S NOR MAJOR HADDAD ARE R A I N G TO GO, PARTICULARLY NOW
THAT THE F I R S T R A I N S OF WINTER HAVE BEGUN. I B E L I E 'E, MOREOVER *
THAT ISRAELI AGRES3IVENESS HAS BEEN TEMPERED BY T H E I R GENUINE
ANGER AT THEMSELVES OVER THE DISASTROUS A I R S T R I K E ON 22 JULY,
HEN, AS WE HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY, THEIR PILOTS GROSSLY
ML S I D E N T I F I ED T H E I R ASS I"NED TARGETS.

MASON

ADDITIONAL D I S T R I B U T I O N

DEPARTMENTAL D I S T R I B U T I O N

ARAB/ISRAEL D I S P U T E

HEHAD EESD

MED

EID

WED

CABINET O;
X
8 October 1979

Dear J u l i a n

Thank y o u f o r y o u r l e t t e r of g October

e n c l o s i n g a copy o f P r e s i d e n t Ceauceacu'ii

r e m a r k s on t h e 2!iddle East and y o u r general

cocneutii. 1 was f a s c i n a t e d t o s e e t h e n .

Yours sincerely

MT

The R t . Jioii. J u l i a n Aaery, i i . P .

jfh

X - 18

0<*)

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

PS* NO 1 0 DOV^ONG STREET
PS/SIR I GILMOUR CABINET OFFICE SLR J HUNT

FS/MR HURD

PS/PUS CABINET OFFICE DIO
NK «I Q MOBERIrX

HD/NENAD

ED/MED
HD/UND

HD/OID (2)
HD/IPD

ADVANCE Coer
•• •• •
/
PUSD (2)
NEWS D

•^3tDENT-.CI.EFff

(/Uo

Gfi 650
CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YOnK 051918Z OCT

TO PRIORITY FCO ~
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1196 OF 5 OCTOBER
INFO CAIRO AMMAN TEL AVIV BAHRAIN JEDDA DAMASCUS WASHINGTON

ARAB ISRAEL

1. I HAVE HAD A SERIES OF SESSIONS DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS WITH
S«A|KH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK AL KHALlFAH, THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF
BAHRAIN, WHO IS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF MINE. I WILL BE REPORTING
SEPARATELY SOME INTERESTING THINGS HE HAD TO SAY ABOUT GULF
SECURITY, IRAN ETC. SHAIKH MOHAMMED MADE A PASSIONATE PLEA TO
WESTERN EUROPE ON ARAB/ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD
E F F E C T I V E L Y ELIMINATED THEMSELVES FROM THE P A L F . S T I N E PROBLEM FOR
THE TIME BEING BY GOING DOWN THE CAMP DAVID TRACK WITH PRESIDENT
WDAT AND MR BEGIN. HE DID NOT IN THE LEAST BLAMc. PRESIDENT SADAT
FOR WHAT HE HAD DONE AMD HE DID NOT BLAME THE AMERICANS. BUT THE
NET EFFECT HAD EEEN TO BRING THE SMALL AND MODERATE GULF STATES
W DEI INTOLERABLE PRESSURE FROM A RAB_F. YTREM ISTS SUCH AS IRAQ
AND S^RJ_A> THIS HAD BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE SITUATION IN IRAN.
THE IMPOTENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT STOP KHOMEINI AND CO
FROM TRYING TO STIR UP TROUBLE AMONGST THE SHIA POPULACE IN THE
CUL R
AND T H E I R A N I A N GOVERNMENT HAD C O M B I N E D WITH THE AYATOLLAHS

IN STRIKING A HIGHLY MILITANT ATTITUDE ON P A L E S T I N E WHICH WAS
ADDING TO THE PRESSURES ON THE GULF STATES ALREADY COMING FROM ^
IPAQ AND S Y R I A .

2. SHAIKH MOHAMMED S A I D THAT A L L THE REGIMES I N THE GULF WERE
VULNERABLE. SOONER OR LATER ONE O F THEM WOULD FALL TO THIS
PRESSURE AND A C H A I N REACTION WOULD SET I N . THE ONLY WAY I N WHICH TlE
RESSURE COULD EE RELIEVED WAS TO GET PROGRESS OVER PAiESTjNE, WITH
TIE AMERICANS IN FAULK WESTERN EUROPE WAS THE ONLY AREA
WHICH COULD H E L P . HE DID NOT EXPECT U S TO PRODUCE MIRACLES BUT A
CLEAR STAND BY U S COULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON I S R A E L I PUBLIC OPINION
AND EVENTUALLY ON THE I S R A E L I GOVERNMENT , AS WELL AS G I V I N G THE
ARABS SOME HOPE. T H I S WOULD MAKE IT MUCH E A S I E R FOR THE MODERATE
ARAB STATES TO CONTINUE TO CO-OPERATE WITH U S .

3. SHAIKH MOHAMMED WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE SHOULD NOT LOOK AT THE
PROELEM IN TERMS O F PRO-ARAB OR POYBHPFE
WOEVWNFW WE SHOULD T H I N K IN
J<0 DIMENSIONS - F I R S T TO CHECK THE SOVIET ADVANCE AND SECONDLY
TO DEPLOY I N A POSITIVE MANNER THE GREAT W£_A_LTH__QF THE GULF
SJAjis'NOT JUST TO THE WEST BUT TO THE REGION AND TO THE
POORER STATES IN A F R I C A AND A S I A . IN SHORT, WE SHOULD T H I N K OF
OUrt P O L I C Y IN TERMS O F WESTERN INTERESTS WORLD WIDE RATHER THAN /
IN TERMS O F T A K I N G S I D E S IN A REGIONAL QUARREL. '

4. I S A I D THAT I FULLY UNDERSTOOD H I S MESSAGE. HOWEVER, I THOUGHT

HE WAS S E L L I N G U S AND THE COMMUNITY A L I T T L E SHORT. HAD HE

READ THE PASSAGE ON THE M I D D L E EAST IN THE COMMUNITY STATEMENT TO

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE RELEVANT PASSAGE IM YOUR STATEMENT?

I THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD H N D A PRETTY CLEAR POSITION I N THESE
STATEMENTS. THE I S R A E L I S COULD BE IN NO DOUBT AS TO WHAT WE FELT
ABOUT EG THE SETTLEMENTS, THEIR POLICY I N LEBANON, THE MEED
FOR WITHDRAWAL AND SO OM. I T WAS TRUE THAT VE HAD PROBLEMS OVER THE
tO. BUT HE MUST UNDERSTAND T H A T , SO LONG AS THE PLO WAS
iT£frrmEn WITH j g ^ o a i S M - AND HE SHOULD MOT FORGET THAT WE
HAD A TERRORIST PROBLEM OF CUR OWN - AND D I D NOT ACCEPT THE
EXISTENCE 0 ^ ISRAEL, THESE PROBLEMS WOULD NOT CO A WAY. OBVIOUSLY
THE UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLO O F RESOLUTION 2 4 2 I E OF
ISRAEL'S RIGHTS TO E X I S T W I T H I N THE BOUNDARIES FORESHADOWED IN

RESOLUTION 2 4 2 WOULD MAKE A GREAT D I F F E R E N C E . EQUALLY, HE SHOULD

NOT OVER ESTIMATE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE I S R A E L I S ALTHOUGH I

TOOK H I S P O I N T ABOUT I N F L U E N C I N G I S R A E L I PUBLIC O P I N I O N .

5. I ONLY REPORT T E AEOVE AT LENGTH BECAUSE SHAIKH MOHAMMED
U

HAS, I THINK, 80ME STANDING A'-'ON GST ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS AFTER
EIGHT YEARS IN THE POST. HE IS ALSO AN INTELLIGENT AND SENSIBLE MAN
AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN A GOOD FrtlEND TO BRITAIN.

PARSONS

LOOK AT THE
PROBLEM IN TERMS OF PRO-ARAB AQR
»

LOOK AT THE PROBLEM
PROELE M IN TERMS OF PRO-ARAB OR PRO-ISRAELI. W SHOULD THINK IN
TWO

ETC
p 8 TO T M HO 1 0 DOWNING ST

GRS 9tf

UNCLASS|F/£^fc

FM CAIRO 0210802 OCT
/LA
TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM MR 733 OF 02 OCT 79

INFO JEDDA DAMASCUS AMMAN TEL AVI V WASHKN6T0M AMD UKMIS MEWYORK

'y TELNO 716: ARAB/iSftfl£_L
1. IN TWO SEPARATE SPEECHES YESTERDAY (TO UNIVERSITY
TEACHERS AND TO THE SCH 00 LT E A CH ERG* UNION) PRESIDENT SADAT
AGAIN ATTACKED THE OIL RICH ARABS AND STRESSED THAT HE WOULD
NOT ALLOW THEIR ATTEMPTS TO STARVE EGYPT TO DIVERT HIM FROM
HIS POLICIES, HE ALSO PRAISED PRESIDENT CARTER AND US MIDDLE
EAST POLICY FULSOMELY, THE FIRST OCCASION HE HAS DONE SO
PUBLICLY FOR SOME TIME,

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD EID
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

MED WED

MAED

E S & SD

PRD

N .AM D ECON D

UND CONS D

EESD CONS EM UNIT

CABINET O P P I C E

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES
X - 18

HO 10 DOWNING STREET

j?S

PS/SIR I GILMOUR CABINET OFFICE S I R J HUNT

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS
CABINET OFFICE DIO

MR J C MOBERLI

HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UHD
HD/OID (2)
HD/IPD

••• •••
• •• •• •
PUSD (2)

NEWS D

GRS 600

CONFIDENT!AL

FN DAMASCUS 2709302 SEP 79

70 IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

INFO PR | OR I TV TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, MODUK (DI'O, ' CAIRO, WASHINGTON,

U'MIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, BAGHDAD.

! IAEL-SYRIA i AIR CLASH*

> ,

i . THE CLASH ON 2h SEPTEMBER HAS DEEM PROMINENTLY FEATURED IN THE
PRESS IN THE LAST TWO DAYS, THOUGH GI YEN LOWER BILLING THAN ASAD'S
DISCUSSIONS ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS (SEPARATE REPORT).

THE PRESS ON 25 SEPTEMBER PUBLISHED PICTURES OF WHAT WERE
ALLEGED TO BE REMAINS CF AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT, AND ON 2$ SEPTEMBER
PICTURES AMD AN INTERVIEW WITH THREE UNNAMED PILOTS SAID TO HAVE
TAKEN PART IN THE RAID. IT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FOUR SYRIAN MIG CT'S
WERE BROUGHT DOWN BUT CLAIMED THAT ALL THE PILOTS SURVIVED. IT ALSO
CLAIMED THAT TWO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AN F-15 AND A '-'IRAGE, WERE BROUGHT
DOWN, BY ROCKET FIRE AND THAT THE ISRAELI PILOTS WERE SEEN
PARACHUTING TO SAFETY, THE PILOTS SAID THE MIRAGE CRASHED SOUTH EAST
OF DAMOUR AND THE F15 OVER JARASH. MUCH IS MADE OF SYRIA'S HEROIC
DEFENCE OF LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS AND HER INDOMITABLE
WILL TO RESIST ISRAEL, AND THROUGH ISRAEL THE UNITED STATES, BOTH
THE OFFICIAL RADIO AND TISHRIN NEWSPAPER, SOMETIMES REGARDED AS THE
PRESIDENT'S !THP I F~£ HA'E SAID THAT THIS CLASH *'»'A3 NOT THE FIRS
1 !
PRESIDENT'S M-UTi^'i::. L , MA'-'E SAID » ' • • • » - •
I T 18 NSW ESTASU­
,.•3 v/lLL NOT BE THE LAST.'" IMF P^ESS ZLfttf< TH
MED SY i *»;' "OL I CYTD l*TO*C€PT E^ERY l ^ ' F U AIR RAID ON La ^UON.

3. PRIVATE REACTIONS HAVE ."EE ! AG UG'JAL AvATiiETIC AND FATALISTIC.
1

T!ERE IS MO SIGN THAT THE •'CPULAriO) g-pECTS THE CLASH TO Bg
::: E^TE:) SOON OR T-- ESCALATE INTO ANYTHING ORSE. THERE IS NO PANIC
;

FOOD BUYING, A ST AND ARB INDEX OF PC*ULjM EXPECTATIONS*) THE <?•£"£•? AL
VIE'/ AMONG DIPtOM-ATS, INCLUDING THE 00 VI FT E"­7 A COY, IS T"AT (AS THE

-

PILOTS INTERVIEWED EXPtlCITT CLAIMED) THE CLASH TOO". PLACE A3 A
DELIBERATE SYRIAN INITIATIVE. NO-ONE HERE TAKES SERIOUSLY THE BBC
SUGGESTION FROM BE I RUT THAT IT WAS MEANT TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE
RUSSIANS IN ADVANCE OF ASAD'S VISIT TO MOSCOW TO SUPPLY SETTER
WEAPONS 3Y DEMONSTRATING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THOSE THE SYRIANS
ALREADY HAVF. THE SYRIANS WELL Kll&i THAT THEIR MIG O-'S WERE NO
MATCH FOR THE OPPOSITION LAST MONDAY? AMD WE STILL HAVE NO
EXPLANATION FOR THE DECISION NOT TO USE KI/3 83'S,

4. THE REASONING BEHIND ASAD'S DECISION SEEN HERE AS "OUT PLAUSIBLE
IS THAT PRESSURES GENERATED BY THE RECENT INTERNAL TROUBLES, THE
RIFT WITH IRAQ, FEARS THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS MIGHT BE 36COMING
I RE SEOUCTI -E FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND JORDAN, ALL LE':T ATTRACTION
a

TfTX DIVERSIONARY OPERATION. AS AO v-AY NATURALLY HAVE HOPED THAT IT
WOULD ACHIEVE SOME LIMITED SUCCESS, BUT EVEN A HEROIC FAILURE IS OF
SOME PROPAGANDA VALUE AND THE PRESS ARE DULY DRAWING ALL THE OBVIOUS
MORALS, AND CALLING FOR NATIONAL UNITY. IT IS ALSO OSSICLE THAT
THE AIR FORCE ASKED TO CF ALLOWED TO HAVE A GO AND THAT ASAD, UNDER
PRESSURE FROM OTHER DIRECTIONS, FELT OBLIGED TO LET THE"'.

5. AS FOR THE CHANCES OF FUTURE INCIDENTS, ASAD HAS SHOWN 'AN ABILITY
IRKA3LE IN A MILITARY LEADER TO ACCE'-'T OH A" IMG PPM" EATS AND

PRACTISE SELF-RESTRAINT. BUT HE IS ALSO TENACIOUS, AND AS LONG AS

THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE THEIR PRESENT POLICY OF SENDING REGULAR

PATROLS OVER A NEIGHBOURING ARAB CO "TRY TO WHICH SYRIA FEELS SO

CLOSE AND WERE 50 MANY SYRIAN TROOPS ARE STATIONED TIC RISK OF

FURTHER CLASHES WILL CONTINUE GREAT. IT IS LESSENED DY SYRIAN

INFERIORITY BOTH IN EQUIPMENT AND THE ABILITY TO USE IT. BUT IF THE
ISRAELIS COURT A CLASH IT WILL DE HARD FOR ASAD TO AVOID WHAT ME HAS
SO OFTEN SAID HE WISHES TO AVOID t A FIGHT AT A TIME AND PLACE NOT OF
HIS CHOOSING.

OR A
LONG
lO DOWNING STREET
From the Private Secretary 26 September 1979

Middle E a s t : P o l i c y towards t h e

Palestinians

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a s s e e n y o u r l e t t e r

t o me o f 23 September on t h i s s u b j e c t . She

has made no comment.

I am s e n d i n g a copy o f t h i s l e t t e r to

Martin V i l e (Cabinet O f f i c e ) .

M. O'D. B. A L E X A N D E R

G.G.H. Walden, E s q . ,

F o r e i g n and Commonwealth O f f i c e .

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE C O P I E S

KO 10 DOWNING S/xREST

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CABINET O P P I C E S L R J HUNT

P S / S I R I GILMOUR

PS/MR HURD CABINET O F F I C E DIO

PS/PUS

MR J C MOBERLY

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NEWS D

15 yf>*
con

GR 1,1CF
UNCLASSIFIED
FM IflCMtS NEW YORK 261250Z SETT 79
TO PLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1123 O r SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, T t L AVI V, .AMMAN, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT,
PRIORITY TUNIS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, ALGIERS, PAB'<T,
TRIPOLI, ALL EEC POSTS,

3'*TH GEKEftH ASSEMBLY* GENERAL DEBATE•
r i S M FOREIGN MINISTER'S SPEECH|

FOLLOVlNG IS MIDDLE LAST SECTICf, C F 0'KENNEDY'S (P3ESI DENCY) S P E E C H :

MIDDLE uACT
°D. T«--E '. T E CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT IT ILL BE POSSIBLE TO AiCHlEVc
IN T « t MIDDLE EAST THE J U T , LASTING AN* COMPK EHEITSI¥6 SUTTLt
TO ••.MICH THIS ASSEMBLY IS OVER'-VEU-lf-GLY COMMITTED. TK£Y EEL I ^ YE
THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT MUSf BE CASED CM SiCU<ttTY COUNCIL RESO'LL-TICNS
fA? AND 3 3 0 , *Pfl.|£D IN ALL THETA PA=(T5 AfiO OK ALL \0'iTS. IT ' LT
c 1

At ?f> *P ,BAftKr; fiM Tu-r PSIMCI »>! E S ?cT OUT BY THE *.}|*•£ |f| T «TI.•» .^T.A" —
,J
•••Li-"' ; E BASEL ON THE PRMCI PLtS SET OUT BY THE NINE 111 T!*c|R STATET
MCNT ON 29 JUNE 1977 AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SUBSEQUENTLY, £

2 6 , THESE PRINCIPLES ARE AS FOLLOWS | —
( I ) THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY
FORCE i
( I I ) THE MEED FOR ISRAEL TO END T « £ TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION WHICH
I T HAS MA I fiTA J NED SINCE THE CONFLICT OF 1967t
( I I I ) RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEP­
ENDENCE OF EVERY STATE |N THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN
PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES!
(IV) RECOGNITION THAT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING
PEACE ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE
PALESTINIANS,

27, THE NINE EMPHASISE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL PARTIES TO
THE NEGOTIATION OF A SETTLEMENT ACCEPT THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES
IN THE AREA TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES WITH
ADEQUATE GUARANTEES. EQUALLY, Or COURSE, IT 18 ESSENTIAL THAT
THERE BE RESPECT TOR THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS Or THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE, THESE INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO A HOMELAND AND THE .RIGHT, THROUGH
ITS REPRESENTATIVES, TO PLAY ITS FULL PART IN THE NEGOTIATION O^
A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

2 8 , SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ?4P AND 330, TOGETHER WITH THE
PRINCIPLES I HAVE MENTIONED, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, SET THE ESSENTIAL
PRAMEWORK rOn A PEACE SETTLEMENT, IN THE VIEW OF THE NINE IT IS
NECESSARY THAT ThEY EE ACCEPTED BY ALL THOSE INVOLVED - INCLUDING
THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION - A S THE BASIS FO^ NEGOTIAT­
ION OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN WHICH ALL THE PARTIES WILL PLAY
THEIR FULL FART.

r
0 . SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD WIN THE INDORSEMENT AND SUPPQiti" OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUKITYi AND I T WOULD MEET THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS
AND l : T E -ESTS 0 ^ ALL PARTIES. TH I i INCLUDES ISRAEL, WHICH IS
ENTITLED TO SVIST AT eEACL W I T H I N SECURE BOUNDARIES^ ACCEPTED AND
ADEQUATELY < $ * « A « T S £ D I AND TME PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, WHO ARE ENTITLED',
WITHIN TME PRAvEvORK SET BY A PEACE SETTLEMENT, TO EXERCISE THE I S
RIGHT TO DETERMINE T^'EIO OWN F « T u ; E AS A PEOPLE.

30. THE NINE RECOGNISE OF COU-.CE THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT 15 NOT
EASY TO ACHIEVE. I-UT THEY PEL I EVE IT I UST !E THE CONTINUING A tr*
OF T • !\TE- NATIO'-AL CO!*fl UNITY. TO F' >'0T£ I T . THEY A*Na CO ""INC EN
THAT SiCH A COMPREHENSIVE OETTL^'ENT VOIIN B • I NO PEACE AT LAST TO
MOVES WHICH CLAIM TO CHANGE THE STATUS OP THE CITY.

3 5 . THE PROBLEM OF THE LEBANON IS CLEARLY HELATED TO T«E LARGER
PROBLEM O F THE MIDDLE EAST AS A''WHOLE. THE NINE HAVE FREQUENTLY
REAFFIRMtD THEIR SUPPORT FOR ITS INTEPENDtNCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THEY D I D SO MOST RECENTLY IN A STATEMENT
ISSUED BY THE NINE FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THEIR MEETING IN DUBLIN
ON 1 1 SEPTEMBER. THIS STATEMENT ALSO RECOGNISED THE COURAGEOUS
EFFORTS MADE BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO PROMOTE THE SECURITY
OF ITS PEOPLE AND THE RESTORATION OF ITS AUTHORITY OVEr. THE WHOLE
OF ITS TERRITORY.

36. VIOLENCE HAS NEVEH THELESS CONTINUED IN SEVERAL PARTS O F
LEBANON. THE NINE RECOGNISE THAT TriEI.E HAS BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENT
IN THE SITUATION PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY SINCE
THE RECENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTED BY ThE GOVERN­
MENT O F THE LEBANON. THEY ARE CONCERNED HOWEVER ABOUT THE CONSTANT
HAiiASSvEMT Or UNI Fl L OF W»ICH CERTAIN "EMBERS OF THE NINE FORM PART,
AND ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE BEEN PLACED IN ITS WAY AS
IT ATTEMPTS TO FULFILL ITS MANDATE. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY DISTRUBED
ABOUT THE MILITARY AND FINANCIAL AID PROVIDED FROM OUTSIDE LEBANON
TO THOSE WHO HAVE MADE I T DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE TO-
CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE. THEY CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO GIVE FUU SUPPORT
TO UNIFIL AND TO ASPECT THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PARSONS

NNNN
THAT SUCH A CQMFt&WEHSIVE SETTLEMENT VOL-ID; B R I N G PEACE AT LAST T ^
THE REGIONi AND T H E Y R E C A L L THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED THEIR
P E A D I NESS TO CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN GUARANTEES IN T H E FRAME WO IK
OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

31. THE PAST YEAR WAS SEEN SOME MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS TO WHICH
THE NINE, IN V I E W OF THEIR CLOSE CONNECTIONS WITH T H E REGION, ARE
PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE. ONE OF THESE WAS T H E SIGNATURE LAST MARCH
OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IN T H E I R DECLARATION OF
2 6 T H MARCH L A S T , THE NINE STATED THEIR POSITION ON T H E S E AGREEMENTS.

3?. SINCE THE SIGNATURE O F THESE AGREEMENTS, WHICH THE NINE SEE AS A
CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION PA2 AS FAR AS
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ARE C O N C E R N E D , T H E RE HAS BEEN PROGRESS
RELATIONS
TOWARDS IMPROVED R E L A T I O N S BETWEEN E G Y P T AND I S R A E L AND T H E R E HAVE
B E E N WITHDRAWALS OF I S R A E L I F O R C E S III S I N A I . T H E N I N E NOTE T H E S E
R E C E N T DEVELOPMENTS AND R E C A L L THAT ONE O F T H E B A S I C R E Q U I R E M E N T S
O F A COMPREHENSIVE S E T T L E M E N T IS AN E N D T C T H E T E R R I T O R I A L OCCUPATION
W I C H I S R A E L H A S MAINTAINED S I N C E T H E C O N F L I C T I N 1967. T H E NINE M I L
C O N T I N U E TO FOLLOW THE SITUATION CLOSELY AND W I L L SEEK IN E V E R Y
WAY THEY CAN TO ADVANCE T H E A|M OF A C O M P R E H E N S I V E AND L A S T I N G PEACE
SETTLEMENT I N V O L V I N G ALL P A R T I E S AND M E E T I N G ALL THE FUNDAMENTAL
ISSUES I HAVE MENTIONED,

33. IT FOLLOWS THAT T H E NINE MUST VIEW WITH T H E GREATEST REGRET
ANY A C T I O ! ] OR STATEMENT ' H I G H AGGRAVATES THE PRESENT SITUATION
OR P L A C E S AN O B S T A C L E IN THE WAV A PEACE SETTLEMENT. ACCORDINGLY,
THEY STRONGLY DEPLORE CONTINUED ACTS OF V I O L E N C E DY A N Y O F THOSE
I N V O L V E D . T H E NINE A R E O P P O S E D TO THE I S R A E L I GOVERNMENT'S P O L I C Y
OF ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS IN O C C U P I E D T E R R I T O R I E S IN CONTRAVENTION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAWi AND T-lEY CANNOT A C C E P T CLAU'3 £ Y I S R A E L TO
SOVEREIGNTY O V E R O C C U P I E D TERRITORIES, S I N C E T H I S WOULD BE I N C O M P A T ­
I B L E WITH RESOLUTION ^ p . THE S E C U R I T Y O F ISRAEL, WHICH THE N I N E

CONSIDER E S S E N T I A L , CAN E GUARANTEED, AND THE L E G I T I M A T E RIGHTS

R

OF THE P A L E S T I N I A N S GIVE". E F F E C T , W I T H I N T H E FRAMJEWORK O F A C N ' P -

REHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

3*. THE NINE A E • F U L L Y A WARE, TOO, OF T E U
IMPORTANCE OF TH£ QtESTION
OF JERUSALEM TC A L L P A R T I E S . T-dv KNOW T « * T AM A C C E P T A B L E SOLUTION
TO THIS PROBLEM W I L L BE V I T A L To AN O V E R A L L S E T T L E M E N T ON THE : -510
I '-AVE INDICATED, T H E Y CONSIDER, IN PARTICULAR, THAT A N Y AGREE' NT
c:; T E
, ;
nrri.RE STATUS O? J E R U S A L E M SHOULD GUARANTEE F--EE ACCESS : Y
ALL TO THE HOLY PL-C^S: AND THuY DO NOT ACCEPT ANY L>NlL*TERAt
SOLUTIONS. IN THIS WAY WE CAN ALL CCNTRIBUTL JAP[£

PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. OTHERWISE THE FUTURE PROMl r c r
S

ONLY V I O L E N C E AND MISERY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA

^ATEVER THEIR RACE. L
'

MIDDLE EAST
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT GREATLY WELCOME WHAT

HAS SO FAR EE EN ACHIEVED THROUGH THE PROCESS BEGUN AT CAMP DAVID.

IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES TO EXPLORE FULLY THE OPENING

CREATED THERE. WE HOPPE THAT THESE CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS WILL

LEAD TO TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS W H I C H WILL LIGHTEN THE BURDEN
OF OCCUPATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND HELP TO CREATE A CLIMATE
OF CONFIDENCE AND CO-OPERATION IN PRACTICAL MATTERS. BUT THE ULTIMATE
GOAL MUST REMAIN A COMPREHENSIVE SETTELEMENT, BASED ON THE EFFECTIVE
APPLICATION OF RESOLUTION 21+2 IN ALL ITS PARTS. THIS INVOLVES
THE ACCEPTANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE
WITH HER NEIGHBOURS WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BORDERS.
ArD, EPUALLY , IT REQUIRES THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM TERRITORIES
OCCUPIED IN 1967-
THERE IS ONE ARE IN WHICH A BROAD INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS HAS

RECOGNISED THAT RESOLUTION 21+2 IS INCOMPLETE: TfMtfflS IN THE

HANDLING OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. THE RESOLUTION TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF

THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS WHICH GO WELL

BEYOND THEIR STATUS AS REFUGEES. NOR DOES IT TAKE ANY ACCOUNT

OF THE PALESTINIANS' BELIEF THAT THEY AREA SEPARATE PEOPLE WITH

A RIGHT TO THEIR HOMELAND. THIS, I. BELIEVE, IS AN AR EA IN WHICH

RESOLUTION 21+2 MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED: NOT, I EMPHASIZE, REPLACED,

AMENDED OR DISTORTED, BUT SUPPLEMENTED TO MEET THIS POINT.

MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT A SETTELEMENT WHICH DOES NOT COMMAND THE

BROAD ASSENT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE CANNOT LAST. BUT IF THE

PALESTINIANS ARE TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN

FUTURE AS A PEOPLE, THIS MUST BE IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATED

PEACE SETELEMENT WHICH GUARANTEES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO A PEACEFUL AND

PERMANENT EXISTENCE WITHIN SECURE BORDERS. ONLY IF BOTH

PARTIES RECOGNISE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF EACH OTHER WILL IT BE

POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE DURABLE PEACE WHICH ALL TH"E PARTIES OF

THE MIDDLE EAST SO DESPERATELY NEED.

IN THE MEANTIME IT IS OUR EARNEST HOPE THAT ALL PARTIES WlLL
AVOID DOING OR SAYING ANYTHING TO MAKE IT HARDER TO ESTABLISH THE
MINIMUM TRUST WITHOUT WHICH SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE. WE CALL AGAIN ON THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT TO CEASE THEIR
POLICY OF SETTLEMENT IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEIR PRESENT
POLICY REJUDICES THE CHANCES OF PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND
ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.
WE DEPLORE THEIR RECENT DECISION TO ALLOW ISRAELI CITIZENS TO
BUY LAND IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MOREOVER, WHILE WE UNDERSTAND
THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S PREOCCUPATION WITH SECURITY, WE URGE THEM
TO REFRAIN FRO THEIR PRESENT POLICIES IN SOUTH LEBANON. THESE
UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND FRUSTRATE
THE EFFORTS OF UNIFIL TO FULFIL ITS MANDATE. IN THAT CONTEXT I
SHOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE DEDICATION AND COURAGE WITH WHICH
THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF UNIFIL ARE CARRYING OUT THEIR DANGEROUS
AND DIFFICULT TASK.

INDO-CHINA

ANOTHER AREA OF DANGEROUS TENSIONS IS INDO-CHINA, WHERE SUFFERING
DUE TO NATURAL CAUSES HAS BEEN MADE WORSE BY THE REGIMES
WHICH TOOK POWER IN 1975. I REFER FIRST TO THE VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT WHICH, AS I SAID AT THE MEETING IN GENEVA ON 2 0
Witntite compliments of
THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2 A H
\

S E C f i E

OR 4 5 *
SECRET
UK C0MM8 ONLY
FM TEL AVIV 25?"15Z SEP 7 9
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 4 7 O F 2 5 S E P T E M B E R
INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS B E I R U T MODUK (DI4) PRIORITY CAIRO
WASHINGTON U K M I S NEW YORK

ISRAEL/SYRIA AIR CLASH

1. THE ISRAELI MEDIA OF YESTERDAY EVENING, 2 4 SEPTEMBER, AND
THIS MORNING, PROMINENTLY REPORT YESTERDAY'S AIR CLASH OVER
BEIRUT, IN WHICH THEY ALLEGE THAT ISRAELI F15S SHOT DOWN FOUR
SYRIAN MIG 2 1 S W I T H O U T L O S S . THIS FOLLOWS UPON THEIR REPORTING
LAST WEEK OF T H E INCIDENT ON 1 9 S E P T E M D E R WHEN SO'-E S Y R I A N MIG 2 3 S
FIRED MISSILES AT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ON R E C O N N A I S S A N C E OVER LEBANON,
WITHOUT HOWEVER SCORING H I T S , OR ATTRACTING RETALIATION.

2. TAKEN TOGETHER, T H E S E TWO INCIDENTS GIVE RISE TO A NUMBER O F .
QUESTIONS. WHY DID THE S Y R I A N S CHOOSE L A S T WEDNESDAY TO SEND INTO
ACTION, FOR AS FAR AS WE KNOW H E R E T H E FIRST TIME, THEIR MI023S
AGAINST ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WHICH WE B E L I E V E TO HAVE .
B E E N PHANTOMS? WHY DID THEY MISS THEM? WHY DID THE ISRAELI FIGHTER
COVER, IF UP, NOT INTERVENE AGAINST THE MIS 2 3 5 ? .. HY,
:
ON 2 4 SEPT­
EMBER, DID THE S Y R I A N S NOT AGAIN S E N D UP M I G 2 3 S ? I F THEY PLEFFERED
NOT TO HAZARD T H E M , WHY DID THEY S E N D UP MLG 2 1 S , WHEN T H E Y MUST
SURELY HAVE KNO'/N T H A T THE ISRAELIS ON T H I S OCCASION WOULD B E
WAITING FOR THEN?

3. T H E ONLY OUESTICN ON WHICH T H E ISRAELI MEDIA CONCENTRATE IS
WHY T H E SYRIANS SENT UP MIG 2 1 S Y E S T E R D A Y , WHEN T H E Y KNEW THEY
WOULD DE O U T - F O U G H T . THE SPECULATIVE ANSWER I S THAT IT WAS IN
ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE RUSSIANS, IN ADVANCE OF A VISIT 3Y
PRESIDENT ASAD T O MOSCOW, HOW B A D L Y THE SYRIANS N E E D MORE MODERN
AIRCRAFT AND OTHER ARMS.

S E C R E T A. DURING
S E C R E T

4. DURING A BR IEF FRIVATE CONVERSATION YESTERDAY EVENING, I t>UT
THE GUEST IONS TO THE ISRAEL MINISTER OF DEFENCE. HE DID NOT KNOW
l.HY THE SYRIANS HAD PUT UP THEIR NIG 23$ ON 19 SEPTEMBER. HE SAID
THEY HAD MISSED BECAUSE THEY HAD FIRED FROM MILES OUT OF RANGE,
INFORMATION WHICH CAN NO DOUBT BE CHECKED FROM OUR OWN SOURCES.
HE ID NOT KNOW WHY THE SYRIANS HAD NOT PUT UP THEIR MlG 23S ON
24 SEPTEMBER, CUT SAID THAT OF COURSE THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN HOPING
VERY ''UCH THAT THEY-WOULD, SO THAT THEY COULD MATCH THEIR F15S
AGAINST THE . WHEN, IN THE HOPE OF DISCOVERING WHO HAD FIRED FIRST,
V

ON 24 SEPTEM3ER, I ASKED MR WEIZMAN WHETHER THE IAF HAD HEARD THE
SYRIAN MlG 21S ORDERED TO ARM THEIR MISSILES, HE PROTESTED THAT HE
WAS NOT IN THE DEBRIEFING ROOM. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY THE PHANTOMS
ON 19 SEPTEMBER HAD BEEN LEFT UNPROTECTED TO GET OUT OF THEIR
PREDICAMENT AS BEST THEY COULD.

5. WHILE THE INCIDENT ON 19 SEPTEMBER THEREFORE REGAINS NOT FULLY*
EXPLAINED, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT ON 24 SEPTEMBER THE ISRAELIS
DELIBERATELY SOUGHT TO PROVOKE THE SYRIANS AGAIN, WERE SUCCESSFUL,
AND EMERGED VICTORIOUS AND ONLY DISAPPOINTED THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN
ABLE TO ENTICE THE MIG 23S INTO BATTLE. THE STORY KAY BECOME
CLEARER AS FURTHER INFORMATION FROM OUR OWN SOURCES COMES JN.

MASON
DEPART^D?NTAL DX^RTRUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
SENA D MAED ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
KED ES & S D
N AM D FRD
EE? D ECON D
CSD CONS D
EESD CONS EM UNIT
EID CABINET O F F I C E
WED

2

S E C R E T
CONFIDENTIAL /TN

^ S
545 P S TO P M NO 10 DOWNING ST

amF,DE
" TiAL
; 't&'&kk.
FM WASH INGTON 2M752Z SEP 79
TO ROUTINE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2820 OF 24 SEPTEMBER.
INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, %
UKMIS NEW YORK, HMCG JERUSALEM. • m

CAIRO TELNO 7 1 0 : ARAB/ISRAEL

1. ROBINSON ASKED SAUNDERS ON 21 SEPTEMBER HOW HE SAW THE PEACE
PROCESS EVOLVING AFTER THE DEMISE OF THE PLO UNITED NATIONS
INITIATIVE

2. SAUNDERS SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE IMPORTANT LANDMARKS ON THE
HORIZON« THE END OF THE YEAR WHEN THE INTERIM WITHDRAWAL FROM SlNAl
WOULD BE COMPLETED: FEBRUARY 1980 WHEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WERE DUE
TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS: AND MARCH 1980 WHEN THE ONE YEAR PERIOD
SET FOR THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE UP. KHALIL HAD EXPLAINED
TO THE AMERICANS THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO ROCK THE
BILATERAL EGYPT/ISRAEL BOAT WHILE THE INTERIM WITHDRAWAL WAS STILL
GOING ON. PUT IN ITS CRUDEST TERMS THIS MEANT THAT THE EGYPTIANS
WANTED SINAI BACK AT ANY COST, THOUGH KHALIL'S MORE ELEGANT
FORMULATION WAS THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE TO
THE ARAB WORLD THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CAPABLE OF STICK lilG TO AN
AGREEMENT AND THAT NFGOTlATING-WITH THEM DlD PRODUCE THE GOODS. IN
TALKING TO THE AMERICANS KHALIL HAD NOT PLACED SO MUCH EMPHASIS ON
BEG IN'S HEALTH AS HE HAD WITH MICHAEL WE IR IN CAIRO TUR, THOUGH
THERE'WAS AN ELEMENT CF SADAT MOT WANTING TO ASK TOO MUCH OF BEGIN
AT A TIME WHEN HE RECOGNISED THAT THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER HAD
DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS. AS FOR THE PALESTINIANS DURING THIS
PERIOD, KHALIL HAS TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT HE SENT THE PLO A MESSAGE
THAT THEIR BEST STRATEGY WOULD BE TO SPEND THE REST OF THIS YEAR
IMPROVING THEIR IMAGE AND DEMONSTRATING THEIR CAPACITY FOR MODERATION
IN THIS CONTEXT SAUNDERS MENTIONED THAT CURRENT U.S. EFFORTS TO
TURN THE LEBANON CEASEFIRE INTO A MORE PERMANENT TRUCE, IF
SUCCESSFUL, COULD FORTUITOUSLY HELP THE PROCESS.

CONFIDENTIAL . / 3. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

3. THE AMERICANS CAN LIVE WITH THIS TIMETABLE (WHICH IS MUCH IN LfllE
WITH WHAT STRAUSS TOLD ME - MY TIL 2797) AND SAUNDERS BELIEVES THE
EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS CAN USEFULLY SPEND THE TIME BETWEEN
IOW AND THE END OF THE YEAR ON DETAILED WORK AND ON IDENTIFYING
THE -ISSUES WH-ICH NEED RESOLUTION AT POLITICAL LEVEL. BUT THAT MEANT
THAT TIE BEGINNING OF 1980 WCULD BE AN IMPORTANT PERIOD AND THERE
WOULD NEED TO BE MORE TO SHOW FOR THE PEACE PROCESS THAN JUST
ISRAELI INTERIM WITHDRAWAL BEFORE tHE FEBRUARY EXCHANG OF AMBASSA­
r

DORS. AT THIS POINT SAUNDERS SAID RATHER WEARILY THAT EVEN THAT
COULD PERHAPS RE ACHIEVED IF THERE WERE NO EXTRANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS
SUCH AS OIL "AND THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY".

4. SAUNDERS CONFESSED TO BEING WORRIED ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE
COST OF PEACE WAS BUILDING UP. C O N S R E S 8 HAD AGREED THE DOLLARS 4 . 8
BILLION (OVER 3 YEARS) IN MARCH AFTER THE SIGNATURE OF THE
EGYPT/ISRAEL TREATY BUT EVEN IN THOSE EUPHORIC DAYS THERE HAD BEEN
PLENTY OF QUESTIONS ASKED. IN THE PRESENT MORE SOBER ATMOSPHERE THE
ISRAELI DOLLARS 3.45 BILLION BID FOR FY 1931, TOGETHER WITH WHAT
COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE EGYPTIANS,WOULD NOT BE EASY TO EXPLAIN
- THERE WAS A LIMIT TO HOW OFTEN YCU COULD TELL CONGRESS THAT PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS SO VITAL A U.S. INTEREST THAT IT IS WORTH
ANY COST.

5. ROBINSON ASKED V.HY MU3ARRAK HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON. SAUNDERS
ADMITTED TO SOME PUZZLEMENT HIMSELF BUT ATTRIBUTED MUBARRAK'S. WISH
TD COME (OUITE APART FROM MEDICAL ATTENTION HE NEEDED HERE) TO
EGYPTIAN UNEASE ABOUT TH? U.". CC'-'M IT.'"NT. THEY HAD DISCOVERED HOW
FFfr ARMS DOLLARS 1.5 BILLION COULD BUY (OLD DESTROYERS, INSTEAD
OF NEW, FOR EXAMPLE) AMD, LIKE THE ISRAELIS IF LESS SPECIFICALLY,
WANTED TO PUT DOWN SOME MARKERS ABOUT FUTURE A ID NEEDS.

HENDERSON . * '.

DEPARTMENTAL D I S T N . ADDITIONAL
NENAD MAED
MED E S & SD ARAB/ISRAEL
N AM D FRD
UND TCOCTT D
EESD CONS D
EID CONS EM UNIT
WED CABINET'OFFICE ' 2
CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE C O P I E S
X - 18

10 DOWNING STREET
PS

P S / S I R I GILMOUR CABINET O F F I C E S I R J HUNT

PS/MR HURD
CABINET O F F I C E DIO

PS/PUS

\
MR J C MOBERLY

HD/NENAD

HD/MED

HD/UND

(2)
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•• • •••

•• •
PUSD
(2)
NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL,
FN UKMIS NEW YORK ?A2??1Z SEPT 79
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1096 OF ?k SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO TEL AVI V WASHINGTON AMMAN DAMASCUS
BAGHDAD

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY,

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CALL ON PR, WALDHE IM s MIDDLE EAST,

1. DR WALDHElM SAID THAT HIS RECENT SUGGESTION FOR AN INTER­
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST DID NOT AMOUNT TO A
FORMAL PROPOSAL. PUT HE WAS INCREASINGLY SCEPTICAL ApQUT THE
PROSPECTS OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. STRAUSS HIMSELF HAD SPOKEN
VERY FRANKLY TO HIM RECENTLY, STRAUSS CLEARLY DID NOT EXPECT
THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS TO WORK, AND THOUGHT THERE VOULD BE
A BREAKDOWN BY THE BEGINNING OF NEXT YEAR. THAT WOULD BE THE
TIME TO FORMALISE THE PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CONFERENCE. DR WALDHElM
DID NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO UNDERMINE CAMP DAVID BY MOVING TOO
CUICKLY, HE HAD SPOKEN TO KING HUSSEIN AND ASSAD IN HAVANA AND
THOUGHT HE WOULD WAVE THEIR SUPPORT, THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT
WANT ANOTHER GENEVA CON'^RENCE , OR ANYTHING WHICH WOULD APPEAR
TO ACCEPT CAMP DAVID, BUT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND VOULD DO NEITHER.

PARSONS
MIDDLE EAST:

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TELNO 716 OF 24 SEP '

INFO KHARTOUM TRIPOLI JEDDA ADU DMAD I BAHREAIN KU/AIT

BAGDAD DAMASCUS AMMAN TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

ARAB/13"; A EL

1. ON 23 SEPTEMBER IN THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS

IN OCTOBER MAGAZINE PRESIDENT SADAT CONTJ1IUED-ATTACKS

ON HIS AN AD CPPJM^EJjTS, AFTER BAITING THE SYRIANS AND THE

IRAQIJL IN FA'-'ILIAR, THOUGH PARTICULARLY SAVAGE TERMS, HE

ACCUSED THE SAUDIS OF TRYING TO BUY LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB

w :UD. IN PASSING HE DESCRIBED THE CROW* PRI OE OF BAHRAIN,

M

THE l.'AlTI PRIME-MINISTER AND SHEIKH ZA|D CF THE UAE AS

"SAUDI CLIENTS",

2. PRESIDENT SADAT ALSO SPOKE-OF A JNAHIVSAggAM AXIS AND
CLAIMED, WITHOUT CIVING DETAILS, THAT SAUDI ARABIA, LIBYA AND
PAD HAD BEEN PLOTTING AGAINST SUDAN AS A FIRST STEP IN A
CONSPIRACY AGAINST EOYPT. (HE PRESUMABLY HAD IN MIND REPDRT3
OF IRA. I INVOLVEMENT IN THE RECEMT DISTURBANCES IN SUDAN, AMD/
OR RU OURS OF SAUDI PRESSURE CM PRESIDENT NIMEIRI TO DISTANCE
HIMSELF F R O M EGYPT. IT MAY NOT "E COINCIDENTAL THAT ON THE DAY
BEFORE THE "OCTODFR" INTERVIEW WAS PUBLISHED, VICE PRESIDENT
f\J BARAK PAID A SURPRISE M S IT TO "• 11 El 0.1 IN KHARTOUM),

2. THOUGH THE PRESIDENT ATTACKED HIS ARAB ODDMENTS U N M E R C I F U L
IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THERE WAS NO C R I T I C I S M OF ISRAEL AND MR - E
CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 307
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 24112'IZ SEP 79 fCk
TO FLASH WASHINGTON ' ' * /I A

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1260 OF 24 SEPTEMBER _J
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 2813: US/JORDAN

IN DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 20 SEPTEMBER KING HUSSEIN

TOOK THE GENERAL L I N E THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS HAD REACHED

THE L I M I T S OF I T S P O S S I B I L I T I E S , AND THAT THE PRESTIGE OF THE UNITED

STATES HAD SUFFERED. A DIFFERENT APPROACH WAS REOUIRBD, INVOLV­

ING OTHER NATIONS AND THE PALESTINIANS. THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT

WAS IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH THE PLO AND HOPED TO FIND A MEANS BY

WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT COULD BE HELPED TO FIND A MEW APPROACH:

T H I S WOULD RECUIRE QUOTE BINDING COMMITMENTS UNOUOTE FROM THE

US ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242.

2. KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN SURPRISED PY THE INCREASED MATURITY' OF
THE PLC'S ATTITUDE AND BY THEIR INTEREST IN TALKING NOW ABOUT THE
FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PALESTINIAN STATE AND JORDAN. HE
WOULD RESUME DISCUSSION WITH ARAFAT WHEN HE RETURNED FROM THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY. ON FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN A PALESTINIAN STATE
AMD JORDAN HE SAID THAT WHILE A FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP WOULD POSE
PROBLEMS FOR JORDAN THE JORDANIANS WOULD ACCEPT WHATEVER THE

PALESTINIAN PEOPLE DECIDED FOR THEMSELVES.

3. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE WAS TRYING TO FORMULATE A NEW

POSITION WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS BUT MADE NO REFERENCE TO ANY '

WIDER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. HE INTENDED TO PUT FORWARD THE

OUTLINE OF A NEW RESOLUTION IN NEW YORK. HE HAD BEEN URGING THE

PLO TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH THE US AND A POSSIBLE US VETO

OF AM ARAB RESOLUTION.

t. PLEASE INFORM SAUNDERS OF THE GENERAL SUBSTANCE OF KING

HUSSEIN'S REMARKS: HE WILL UNDERSTAND THE MEED TO ENSURE THAT KING

HUSSEIN DOES NOT R E A L I S E THAT THE US HAVE HAD AM ACCOUNT CF HIS

MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER .

CARRINGTON I" C O P I E S SENT TO NO 10 I/OWNING S T R E E T ]

P I L E S

NENAD PS/MR RURD

NED PS/PUS

N AM D S I R A DUFF

PS MR J C MOBERLY

PS/LPS

CONFIDENTIAL

/LA

Such a s e t t l e m e n t would win t h e endorsement and

s u p p o r t o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community: and i t

would meet t h e l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s and interests

of a l l parties. T h i s i n c l u d e s I s r a e l , which i s

e n t i t l e d to e x i s t a t peace w i t h i n s e c u r e b o u n d a r i e s

a c c e p t e d and a d e q u a t e l y g u a r a n t e e d : and the

P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e , who are e n t i t l e d , within the

framework s e t by a p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t , t o e x e r c i s e

t h e i r r i g h t to determine t h e i r own f u t u r e as a

people and t o d e c i d e f o r t h e m s e l v e s on the

p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s under which they
wish to live.

PRIME MINISTER'S

23, September ,7979.

Peat Utt. Thatcher,

Pursuant to my last letter to you on the. efforts exerted

to solve the Middle East problem, 7 would tike, to put you fully In

the picture wit', respect to the talks 7 held with Israeli Prime Minister

Begin In Haifa on the fourth and the fifth of this month. Vou know

that we aKe committed to work incessantly unlit we reach a comprehensive

settlement tc the dispute on the basis of the "Framework for Peace in

the Middle East" signed at Camp Vavid a yean ago. Having signed the

Peace Treaty and the letter on the establishment of a s el fa governing

authority in the West Bank and Gaza, we are currently concentrating

on negotiating the modalities fan. electing this government and defining

Us powers and responsibilities.

My visit to Haifa was Intended to give impetus to these

negotiations and persuade the Israeli Government to adopt the attitude

wliich would be conducive to making progress. Of course 7 did not

expect, any concrete steps to emerge faom this round ol talks.

The Palestinian Issue is too complex and sensitive to lend itself to

simple solutions. However, a determined and firm approach would

definitely yield favorable results In due course. In my conveAsatlons

with Prime Minister Begin, 7 dwelt In length on the necessity far

adopting a broader concept of the jurisdiction of the self-governing

Wis. MARGARET THATCHER
The British Prime Minister.
- 2 ­

authority. That government, which is to exercise full autonomy in

accordance with the. provisions of the. Camp David framework, should

have real authority in order to attract the Palestinians to the peace

process.

I emphasized the necessity for making progress on the issue

of Jerusalem at this stage. Hundreds of millions of, muslims and

Christians and many others do not accept the prolongation of, the

present situation. It is not impossible to agree on a formula that

would allow the return of Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem while

maintaining the unity of the city for all practical purposes.

Services and utilities would be administered by one board, freedom

of movement for persons and goods throughout the City would be

safeguarded. Freedom of worship would be guaranteed. I urged

Mr. Begin to cooperate with us and accept our idea of allowing the

Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem to participate in the

election of the self-governing authority. This would be a first

step that would reassure the Palestinian people without prejudging

the issue. Short of this, no progress can be achieved.

Our position on the settlements issue remains as it

is : they are illegal and they constitute an obstacle to peace,

furthermore the latest decision by the Israeli government to allow

its nationals to purchase land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

constitutes further impeachment to the peace process.
- 3 ­

ks I did in my talks with. the Israeli Prime Minister, I

emphasized to the Israeli public in my speeches the fact that the

realization of the legitimate night* of, the Palestinian people doe*

not jeopardize Israeli security oh. other interests in any way.

Israelis 6 ho laid cease thinking that their interests are diametrically

opposed to those of the Palestinians. It is an absolute must to find

a formula fa A coexistence between the two peoples, otherwise the

situation would Aemain explosive and unstable. By and laAge, I noticed

that theAe was a greater degree oh receptivity far such argument than

befaAe.

The Prime Minister was giving alt these ideas deep

thought, k t certain points, he reiterated his well-known opinions,

while on others, he was wilting to consider. Jherefare, I decided to

leave the points I made with him so that the Israeli. Cabinet may stuby

them in the spirit of peace and fraternity. I made it crystal clear to

Begin, Peres and other Israeli leaders that much will depend on theiA

cooperation on the Palestinian question. I also indicated that it is

vital to make meaningful progress be fare the end of this year if we

remain faithful to the peace ideal.

I was impressed and touched by the spirit of the inhabitants

of Haifa. Especially heartwarming was the positive and hopeful
MM*

- 4­

attitude of the Arab Israelis who constitute a good part of the

population in Haifa and the neighboring areas in the Galilee.

They support the peace process wholeheartedly as the only way

to assure a happy and secure future for everyone in the region.

I n the course of my conversations with the Israeli

Prime Minister, settled a few points related t o the

implementation of the Peace Treaty, such as the sale of Egyptian

oil to Israel and moving forward the date withdrawal from

mount Sinai . It was also agreed that officials of both sides

would meet in Washington next week to consider the question of

the Peace-keeping force. We agreed tentatively on an interim

arrangement that would allow a small number of representatives

of both Parties to perform some supervisory functions on the

ground on a limited scale.

My idea is to confront the Israelis in the weeks

and months ahead with the necessity for making the decisions

that are required for settling the Palestinian question. Every

Israeli, knows that this is part of the peace package reached

with Egypt. This remains an unwavering Egyptian commitment.

You might have noticed that Prime Minister Begin, himself

stated in public more than once during the visit that Israel

is committed to work for a comprehensive settlement. I

intend to apply the right measure of pressure and persuasion.

I am employing every new step taken in the dealing between
Egypt and Israel to promote a mono. cooperative I s r a e l i attitude,

with respect to the. P a l e s t i n i a n * .

This i s why I told Prime Mini*ten. Begin t h a t next yeax

a^ter pumping the. Hile water thfiough a tunnel beneath the Suez Canal

to irrigate ?.<nai, I may be prepared to Supply the Hegev with &ome

voaten.. I alludzd to t h i s i d e a , i n general term*, a6 an expression

OfJ good neighbourhood p o l i c y .

Vexui Friend,

I want to t e l l you that the Egyptian people i u l l y

appreciate your support ion their principled stand on t h i s and

other i s s u e s . We. count on youA continuous understanding and

coopeAation. This attitude would ceAtainly be neglected i n

^uAtheA enhancing ouA friendly r e l a t i o n s .

With Best Wishes and regards,

Uohammed Anwar El-Sadat

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2 A H

23 September 1979

/
M O'D B A l e x a n d e r E s q ' >>W, * (LXMAIA^
10 Downing S t r e e t
/fit ^

MIDDLE EAST: P O L I C Y TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS

Thank y o u f o r y o u r l e t t e r o f 1 4 Se|ftember. I n view
of t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s comments t h e F o r e i g n and Commonwealth
S e c r e t a r y d o e s n o t w i s h t o p r o c e e d w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n i n OD a t
this stage.
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a s k e d when HMG became committed t o t h e
i n c l u s i o n o f t h e r i g h t t o a homeland among t h e P a l e s t i n i a n
r i g h t s t o be t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . P e r h a p s I c o u l d r e c a l l some
of t h e h i s t o r y . S e c u r i t y Council Resolution 242 t r e a t e d the
P a l e s t i n i a n problem a s e s s e n t i a l l y a r e f u g e e q u e s t i o n . Since
t h e n t h e a t t i t u d e o f s u c c e s s i v e B r i t i s h Governments h a s d e v e l o p e d
a s a r e s u l t o f B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s a n d , s i n c e we j o i n e d
t h e Community, t h r o u g h t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t h i n k i n g i n t h e N i n e .
The C o n s e r v a t i v e Government o f t h e d a y made a d e l i b e r a t e s t e p
f o r w a r d i n S i r A l e c D o u g l a s Home's s p e e c h t o t h e Y o r k s h i r e A r e a
C o u n c i l o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y a t H a r r o g a t e on 31 O c t o b e r 1970,
when he s a i d "we must n o t i g n o r e t h e p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s o f t h e
P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs and t h e i r d e s i r e t o be g i v e n a means o f s e l f ­
expression. We c a n n o t s u p p o r t any p o l i t i c a l programme w h i c h
would i n v o l v e t h e d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e s t a t e o f I s r a e l ; this
i s what t h e P a l e s t i n i a n r e s i s t a n c e o r g a n i s a t i o n s a t p r e s e n t
demand. B u t we must work f o r a s e t t l e m e n t w h i c h w i l l a t t r a c t
t h e agreement o f a l l t h e p e o p l e s o f t h e a r e a , i n c l u d i n g t h e
P a l e s t i n i a n s , and w h i c h t a k e s a c c o u n t o f t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e
aspirations". A l t h o u g h t h e s e a s p i r a t i o n s were n o t s p e l l e d

out b y S i r A l e c D o u g l a s Home, t h e y h a v e o f c o u r s e l o n g i n c l u d e d

the establishment of a P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e . I n t h i s and o t h e r

r e s p e c t s t h e H a r r o g a t e s p e e c h remained t h e b a s i s o f B r i t i s h

p o l i c y u n t i l t h e G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n o f 1974.

The B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n d e v e l o p e d f u r t h e r d u r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g

5 y e a r s when L a b o u r was i n p o w e r . At t h e United Nations G e n e r a l

A s s e m b l y on 5 O c t o b e r 1976 Mr C r o s l a n d s a i d t h a t "one e s s e n t i a l

element i n a s e t t l e m e n t w i l l be a land f o r t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s , n o t

/ necessarily

n e c e s s a r i l y a s o v e r e i g n s t a t e b u t a p l a c e where t h e y w i l l be
f r e e t o l o o k a f t e r t h e i r own a f f a i r s " . The most i m p o r t a n t
of t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e m e n t s by t h e N i n e was t h e London
d e c l a r a t i o n of 29 June 1977 where t h e Heads of Government a g r e e d
as f o l l o w s . "The N i n e have a f f i r m e d t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t a
s o l u t i o n t o t h e c o n f l i c t i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t w i l l be p o s s i b l e
o n l y i f t h e l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e t o g i v e
e f f e c t i v e e x p r e s s i o n to i t s n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y , i s t r a n s l a t e d
i n t o f a c t , w h i c n would t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e l e e d f o r a homeland
f o r the P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e " . On 26 March t h i s y e a r t h e N i n e put
out a n o t h e r s t a t e m e n t e m p h a s i s i n g t h e need f o r any s e t t l e m e n t " t o
t r a n s l a t e i n t o f a c t t h e r i g h t of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e t o a
homeland".

The c o n c e p t of a P a l e s t i n i a n r i g h t t o a homeland t h u s h a s

i t s r o o t s a l o n g way b a c k . S i n c e t h e n t h e LPS h a s s a i d i n t h e

House of Commons " t h e Government's o b j e c t i v e i s a j u s t , l a s t i n g

and c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e t t l e m e n t b a s e d on S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . R e s o l u t i o n s

242 and 338 and t h e need f o r a l a n d of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e " .

S i r I a n G i l m o u r a v o i d e d t h e word "homeland" b e c a u s e i t may f o r

some h a v e e c h o e s of what t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n Government have been

doing.

Some of t h e N i n e have of c o u r s e gone f u r t h e r t h a n t h i s

b o t h on t h e q u e s t i o n of a homeland and on o t h e r a s p e c t s of

Palestinian rights. P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r , f o r h i s p a r t , has

r e f e r r e d t o t h e need f o r "the P a l e s t i n i a n s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n

t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e i r own f u t u r e " and h a s s a i d t h a t " t h e r e

h a s t o be a homeland p r o v i d e d f o r t h e P a l e s t i n i a n r e f u g e e s who

have s u f f e r e d f o r many many y e a r s " .

On t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r s u c h a homeland s h o u l d be -an

i n d e p e n d e n t s o v e r e i g n s t a t e o r s h o u l d be l i n k e d i n some way

w i t h J o r d a n , we have g e n e r a l l y remained n e u t r a l , though Mr

Callaghan, l i k e P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r , expressed a personal preference

f o r some f e d e r a l o r o t h e r s o l u t i o n f a l l i n g s h o r t of i n d e p e n d e n c e .

As t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r w i l l r e c a l l from h e r d i s c u s s i o n w i t h K i n g

H u s s e i n i n J u n e , t h e J o r d a n i a n s a r e i n f a v o u r of P a l e s t i n i a n s e l f ­
d e t e r m i n a t i o n and c l e a r l y a c c e p t t h a t t h i s might but need n o t

n e c e s s a r i l y mean f u l l i n d e p e n d e n c e . L o r d C a r r i n g t o n had n o t e d

t h a t a t t h a t t i m e ( i n B r y a n C a r t l e d g e ' s l e t t e r o f 18 June t o

P a u l L e v e r ) t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r had s a i d t h a t she would be p r e p a r e d

t o a s k P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r t o e x e r t p r e s s u r e on Mr B e g i n t o a c c e p t

t h e p r i n c i p l e of P a l e s t i n i a n s o v e r e i g n t y f o r t h e West Bank T
and

had t a k e n a c c o u n t of t h i s i n p r o p o s i n g the s u b j e c t f o r d i s c u s s i o n '

by OD.

The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a l s o a s k s w h e t h e r a s o l u t i o n b a s e d on

P a l e s t i n i a n s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n would be v i a b l e . A good d e a l

of w o r k , a l b e i t r a t h e r h y p o t h e t i c a l , h a s been done on t h e s u b j e c t ,

/ and

and I w i l l send you an a c c o u n t o f t h i s s e p a r a t e l y . We

b e l i e v e t h a t a s e p a r a t e P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e would a t t r a c t

c o n s i d e r a b l e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t from t h e A r a b w o r l d , e x p a t r i a t e

P a l e s t i n i a n s and o t h e r f o r e i g n d o n o r s . Given the high l e v e l

of e d u c a t i o n and a b i l i t y of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s , i t s economy need

n o t p r e s e n t i n s u p e r a b l e p r o b l e m s , t h o u g h , l i k e I s r a e l and J o r d a n ,

i t would need t o r e l y upon c o n s i d e r a b l e o u t s i d e a s s i s t a n c e ,

perhaps i n d e f i n i t e l y . But t h e p r o b l e m s would be f o r m i d a b l e ,

a s was r e c o g n i s e d i n o t h e r PCO p a p e r s w h i c h t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r

has s e e n . F o r example, the c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which a

P a l e s t i n i a n homeland might be n e g o t i a t e d would a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y

be s u c h t h a t i t would l a c k some i m p o r t a n t a t t r i b u t e s of most

states: i t would have t o be d e m i l i t a r i s e d ; i t s borders with

I s r a e l would p r o b a b l y be sub.ject t o a s p e c i a l regime l i m i t i n g

i t s economic freedom of a c t i o n ; and t h e freedom of i t s c i t i z e n s

t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r homeland would i n p r a c t i c e be l i m i t e d .

The F o r e i g n and Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y h a s a l s o s e e n L o r d
H a i l s h a m ' s comments i n A r n o l d ' s l e t t e r t o Lever of 12 S e p t e m b e r .
On t h e s p e c i f i c p o i n t of I s r a e l ' s s e c u r i t y and R e s o l u t i o n 24-2
L o r d C a r r i n g t o n i s aware t h a t t h e s e a r e t h e t e r m s i n w h i c h t h e
problem i s s e e n by many I s r a e l i s . The I s r a e l i Government h a s
argued f o r many y e a r s t h a t t h e 1967 b o r d e r s a r e u n a c c e p t a b l e
b e c a u s e t h e y would be d i f f i c u l t f o r I s r a e l t o d e f e n d , and a l s o
t h a t t h e e x p r e s s i o n " s e c u r e and r e c o g n i s e d b o r d e r s " i n R e s o l u t i o n
24-2 s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean, so f a r a s I s r a e l i s c o n c e r n e d ,
t h a t t h e s e b o r d e r s must be d e f e n s i b l e i n m i l i t a r y t e r m s . Our
own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y been d i f f e r e n t . The
H a r r o g a t e s p e e c h of O c t o b e r 1970 s a i d t h a t a d e f i n i t i v e a g r e e ­
ment on t e r r i t o r i a l q u e s t i o n s would be t h e a n s w e r b o t h t o
I s r a e l ' s f e a r f o r h e r e x i s t e n c e a n d , a t t h e same t i m e , t o
Arab f e a r of I s r a e l i e x p a n s i o n i s m . I t added t h a t between
I s r a e l and J o r d a n , R e s o l u t i o n 24-2 i m p l i e d t h a t " s e c u r e and
r e c o g n i s e d b o u n d a r i e s s h o u l d be b a s e d on t h e a r m i s t i c e l i n e s
w h i c h e x i s t e d b e f o r e t h e war of 1967, s u b j e c t t o minor changes
w h i c h might be a g r e e d between t h e two c o u n t r i e s " .

I am s e n d i n g a copy of t h i s l e t t e r t o M a r t i n V i l e (Cabinet

Office).

G Walden

CON FI DENT I AL
w n r I U C R I I M .
*
CONFIDENTIAL
^ ' (l^^U^
FM WASHINGTON 212O02Z SEP
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2797 OF 21 SEP 7 9 . - f f t ^
INFORMATION ROUTINE TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JEDDA,
TEL AVIV, UK MIS NEW YORK AND HMCG JERUSALEM. ,

ARAB/ISRAEL.

1. f CALLED ON AMBASSADOR STRAUSS TH Is MORNING. HE WAS MORE REALISTIC
IN PRIVATE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR HIS MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS THAN
HIS RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAD CONVEYED.

2. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE "AHEAD OF SCHEDULE" IN

THE SENSE THAT MORE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED BY SEPTEMBER THAN HE HAD

EXPECTED. THAT MIGHT CONTINUE TO BE TRUE THROUGH OCTOBER AND

NOVEMBER TOO: 3UT THERE WAS A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING AHEAD

OF SCHEDULE NOW AND BEING CONFIDENT OF A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION |N

MARCH 1980 - YOU COULD BE IN THE LEAD AT ONE STAGE OF THE RACE

WITHOUT WINNING IT. HE FORESAW A DIFFICULT PERIOD AHEAD FROM THE

BEGINNING OF NEXT YEAR. HE AGREED THAT SC FAR THE EGYPTIANS HAD

MADE MOST OF THE CONCESSIONS AND FORESAW THAT BY THE END OF THE

YEAR SADAT WOULD HAVE COME 40 PERCENT OF THE WAY TO MEET BEGIN

WHEREAS BEGIN WOULD HAVE ONLY COME 15-00 PERCENT ON HIS SIDE..

THAT WOULD LEAVE A BIG GAP AND HOW TO BRIDGE IT WOULD BE THE

MAJOR PROELEM. THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY

SHOULD TRY TO "RAM THROUGH" AN AGREEMENT. FOR HIS PART, SADAT

MIGHT WISH TO THROW THE PROBLEM BACK TO THE UNITED NATIONS (WHICH

STRAUSS CONCEEDED WOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS).

THE MOST POSITIVE FEATURE FOR THE MOMENT WAS THE RELATIONSHIP CF

GENUINE AFFECTION WHICH HAD BUILT UP BETWEEN SADAT AND BEGIN.

BUT EVEN THAT HAD ITS DRAWBACKS SINCE THE TWO OF THEM WERE SO

CAREFUL OF EACH OTHER'S FEELINGS THAT THEY AVOIDED CONFRONTING THE
hcUES WHICH MIGHT DAMAGE THEIR RELATIONSHIP. STRAUSS HESITATED TO
PNEDlCT HOW THE RELATIONSHIP WOULD WITHSTAND A MAJOR CONFRONTATION.

CONFIDENTIAL / 3. STRAUSS

CONFIDENTIAL

3. STRAUSS RATHER DESPAIRED CP SADAT'S RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER
ARABS, PARTICULARLY T H E SAUDIS. PRICE FAHD WAS PERSONALLY DEEPLY
EMBITTERED AGAINST SADAT. IT WENT BACK TO SADAT'S ORIGINAL
JERUSALEM TRIP. ON THE STRENGTH OF AN ASSURANCE FROM SADAT GIVEN
6 DAYS BEFORE HE WENT TO JERUSALEM, FAHD HAD TOLD HIS FELLOW SAUDIS
AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS THAT SADAT WOULD MOT GO DOWN THAT ROAD.
THE NEXT THING i!£ KNEW WAS TO LEARN ON fHE*RADlO THAT SADAT WAS
ON HIS WAY. THE PUBLIC EXCHANGE OF RECRIMINATIONS SINCE THEN HAD
SIMPLY EXACERBATED THINGS. STRAUSS SAID THAT H E HAD TRIED WITHOUT
SUCCESS TO G E T SADAT TO DO MORE TO MEND HIS FENCES WITH THE SAUDIS,
BUT HAD ALWAYS COME UP AGAINST SADAT'S OVERRIDING CONTEMPT FOR THEM
AND FOR HUSSEIN. HIS OWN RELATIONS WITH THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP WFRET"
GOOD AND H E WAS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH HIS JUNE ACHIEVEMENT IN GETTIN
THE EXTRA 1 MILLION BARRELS A DAY (THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT IT HAD
BADLY UNDERMINED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S ENERGY PROGRA­
' . . . . ) . THAT COMMTTHW FROM THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN FOR 6 MONTHS.
(STRAUSS WAS QUITE EXPLICIT THAT THE SAUD! COMMITMENT WAS FOR
61X MONTHS.) ALTHOUGH NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID BY THE SAUDIS
ABOUT TURNING DOWN THE TAP IF NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BY DECEM­
BER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT COULD NOT BE RULED OUT.
FOR THE MOMENT HE SAW NO PROSPECT OF THE SAUDIS, WHO WERE SCARED

• • , . . i r~! ~~"
R —
TTHAT H
TO BE WORRIED THAT T ^ j j .'
.iTHOUT HIS PES DE I F IT.

k. STRAUSS BELIEVES THAT, THE ISRAELIS ARE BADLY LOSING THE WAR OF
THE AMERICAN TV SCREEN ("WHERE WE LOST VIETNAM"), BUT THAT THEY
H .- T ! IMPORTANT ASSETS WHICH EVEN BEGIN'S DISASTROUS PUBLIC
RELATIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO ERODE* ARAFAT'S FACE AND AM EP­
IC AN RESENTMENT AT Ft -LING HOSTAGE TO A LOT OF OIL PRODUCING M I L L -
l'AlRF SHEIKHS. THUS A SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF 6A SOL IRE OR HEATING
OIL THIS WINTER, WHILE IT UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT
CN ISRAEL'S SUPPORT IN THIS COUNTRY, WOULD NOT CAUSE IT TC NOSE­
DIVE COMPLETELY. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE MAKING
A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN NOT OFFERING THE PLC A TRUCE. IT WAS CLEAR
THAT ARAFAT COULD NOT DELIVER EVEN IF HE ACCEPTED AND THAT
WOULD DO MUCH TO COUNTER ISRAEL'S OBSTINATE IMAGE ON THE PLO
- 2 -
QUESTION. CONFIDENTIAL / 5. PERHAPS
CONFIDENTIAL

%

5. PERHAPS THE MOST INTERESTING INSIGHT STRAUSS OFFERED WAS TV!AT
BOTH HE AND SADAT BELIEVED THAT THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM COULD BE TAC­
KLED EARLIER THAN CONVENTIONAL WISDOM BELIEVED ( ' 'NOBODY ELSE AGR­
EES WITH U S " ) . IT WAS AFTER ALL NOT A SECURITY ISSUE, AND MOVEMENT
ON JERUSALEM WOULD MAKE A USEFUL IMPRESS ION ON THE SAUDIS AND
HUSSEIN. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW THE IDEA
HAD NOT EVEN BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET AND THAT BEGIN'S
EMOTIONALISM ON THE SUBJECT MADE IT AN UNLIKELY STARTER WITH HIM -
BUT STRAUSS WAS NOT CONVINCED THAT WEIZMAN CR PERES WOULD RULE
IT OUT.

6. FINALLY, I MENTIONED TO STRAUSS THAT THE NEXT TIME HE WAS IN
LONDON HE MIGHT LIKE TO SEE A MINISTER. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD
WELCOME THAT, ADDING THAT HE HAD NEARLY ASKED ME TO ARRANGE THIS
CN HIS LAST TRIP BUT HAD DECIDED THAT, SINCE HE WAS STOPPING
OVER CN A SATURDAY NIGHT, IT WAS HARDLY FAIR TO DISTURB ANYONE'S
WEEKEND. WHEN HE DOES COME I THINK THAT, GIVEN STRAUSS' VERY SENIOR
AND INFLUENTIAL POSITION IN THE CABINET HERE, YOU WOULD WISH TO
SEE HIM. ACCORDING TO HIS PRESENT TRAVELL PLANS, THIS MAY NOT BE UN­
TIL NOVEMBER, BUT I CO NOT THINK THAT MATTERS SINCE WE ARE LIKELY TO
EE IN FOR A PAUSE IN US MIDDLE EAST ACTIVITY AND, WITH SOMEONE LIKE
STRAUrO, THE LEVEL AT WHICH HE IS RECEIVED WILL BE IMPORTANT.
UNLESS, THEREFORE, HE PARTICULARLY WANTS TO VISIT WASHINGTON,IN
OCTOBER, MR HURD MAY PREFER TO LET MINISTERIAL CONTACT WITH STRAUSS
1 WAIT UNTIL NOVEMBER.,

HEN DER SON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NENAD EID ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE
MED WED
MAED
ES & SD
PRD
N AM D ECON D
UND CONS D
EESD CONS EM UNIT*
CABINET O F F I C E - 5 -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
F i TEL AVIV SEP 1"!
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 440 OF 0 1 SEPTEMBER
UFO WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM

MR BECIN'S HEALTH

1. CAIRO TELEGRAM MO 710 TO YOU LEADS ME TO REVERT TO THE .
SUBJECT OF MR BEGIN'S HEALTH. (T^

2. I HAVE MOT PERSONALLY SEEN MR 3EG IN SINCE MY TELEGRAM NO
433 OF 14 SEPTEMBER, BUT HE RECEIVED THE RODS VISITORS LAST •
WEEK AND THEY FOUND HIM IN VERY GOOD FORM. HE LIKEWISE PERFORMED
EFFECTIVELY DURING HIS (JEWISH) NEW YEAR MESSAGE OM TELEVISION
LAST EVENING.

3. SOMETHING OF A FURORE WAS CAUSED HERE BY A TIME MAGAZINE
PIECE ALLEGING THAT FOREIGN DOCTORS HAD EXAMINED MR BEGIN AND
ADVISED HIM TO WORK ONLY THREE HOURS A DAY. THE AUTHOR OF THIS
PIECE, HALE'/1, SUBSEQUENTLY SUBSTANTIATED III S STORY OM TELEVISION.
THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS ADVISER HAS NO'./ CONVINCED ME THAT THE
STORY WAS A FABRICATION, MADE UP EITHER BY MALEVI OR FOISTED UPON
HIM, IN EITHER CASE IN ORDER TO WEAKEN THE 0OVERNMEN1*.

4. NEVERTHELESS, WHATEVER THE ACTUAL STATE OF MR DEC IN' S HEALTH,
I AGREE THAT IT HAS ONCE AGAIN BECOME AM IMPORTANT FACTOR, HOT
OMLY TO THE EGYPT IANS, BUT ALSO DOMESTICALLY HERE, WHERE WE HEAR
INCREASING TALK OF THE MEED FOR A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY,
EITHER •''EFOflE OR AFTER ELECT I Of,'S? BUT IMPLICITLY AFTER MR BEGIN'3
DISAPPEARANCE FROM THE SCENE. THIS SS PERHAPS NO MORE THAN AN
EX'RE SSI ON OF GENERAL UNEASE, WHICH CAM LEAD NOT ONLY IN ISRAEL
1

TO WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT GOVERNMENTS OF NATIONAL UNITY*

'A n s o r v j
DEP;JCTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
HENAD EID ARAB/ISRAE L D I S P U T E
NED WED
MAED
ES & SD
FRD
H AM D ECON D
UND CONS D
EESD CONS EM U N I T
CABINE T O F F I C E
• P A R T L ends:-

P A R T 5 begins:­