Cases Consti 2 Morgan

ST.
MARY’S COLLEGEOF TAGUM

COLLEGE OF LAW
FELICIANA L. MORGAN Page 1

People v. Marti
G.R. No. 81561; 18 January 1991
FACTS:
On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a fiend in Zurich, Switzerland. When
asked if the packages could be examined and inspected, appellant refused, assuring that they were
simply gifts of books cigars, and gloves. The packages were then placed in a box and was sealed with
masking tape for shipment.
As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau
of Posts, the proprietor of the forwarding agency opened the box for final inspection. A peculiar odor
emitted there from and he found dried leaves inside. He brought samples to NBI, and informed them
that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Agents of the NBI went to his office and found the
shipment containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves, some of which were packed inside the gloves and
neatly stocked underneath tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an information was filed against the appellant
in violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which he was found guilty. Appellant assailed the
decision, claiming that the evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, and further, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally
searched and seized packages.
ISSUE:
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights be invoked
against the State?
REPORT THIS AD
HELD:
No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State in the absence of governmental interference. This constitutional right (against
unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government; and the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government
and its agents, not upon private individuals. In the present case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding
agency who made search/inspection of the packages and the contraband came into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and
seizure. The NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the alleged act of
the private individual in violation of a constitutional right cannot be invoked against the State.
NB:
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is
to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection

against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
REPORT THIS AD
Reference:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC
Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc.
10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit.
Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a
“refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of
Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the
Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Issue:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.
Held:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated
by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for
the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the
Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super
Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about
to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger
Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the
culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search
for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the
accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back
to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then
escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a
Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused
opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting the substance to be “shabu,” the security personnel immediately reported the
matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They
also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.
But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine
hydrochloride or “shabu” was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation
of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to
such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid
HELD: YES
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by
the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like
the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in
the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To overcome this
presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the
accused points to a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no
evidence to support his claim. No witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living,
breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused.
Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and
support the claim of the accused. Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case
at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will
take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its
owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.

PEOPLE v. BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, GR No. 130612, 1999-05-11
Facts:
the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at around 4 o'clock, when the body of six-year old Jennifer
Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The child's
body bore several stab wounds. Jennifer had been missing since... lunch time.
The medical examination conducted the following day by Dr. Ma. Fe Leticia Macaranas, the rural health
physician of Malasiqui, showed that Jennifer died of multiple organ failure and hypovolemic shock
secondary to 38 stab wounds at the back.
no lacerations or... signs of inflammation of the outer and inner labia and the vaginal walls of the
victim's genitalia, although the vaginal canal easily admitted the little finger with minimal resistance.
possible commission of acts of lasciviousness, Dr. Macaranas recommended an autopsy by... a
medico-legal expert of the NBI.
Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the victim's
grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime.
confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay.
disclosed that at... around 3:30 that afternoon, he had given the fatal weapon used, a bayonet, to Elsa
and Jorge Casingal, his aunt and uncle respectively, in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan.
took accused-appellant to
Bayambang and recovered the bayonet from a tricycle belonging to the Casingal spouses. The police
officers executed a receipt to evidence the confiscation of the weapon.
a criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Malasiqui.
Dr. Ronald Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI
The result of his examination of the victim's genitalia indicated that the child's hymen had been
completely lacerated on the right side.
amended the criminal complaint against accused-appellant to rape with homicide.
Edward Domantay testified that in the morning of October 17, 1996, accused-appellant and his two
brothers-in-law, Jaime Caballero and Daudencio Macasaeb, had a round of drinks in front of the latter's
house
Edward said he joined the group and sat between Daudencio Macasaeb and accused-appellant.[7]
Edward said that accused-appellant, who, apparently had one too many then, rolled up his shirt and
said:
("In Antipolo and Lipa, there were massacres; here in Guilig, there will also be a massacre. I will
massacre somebody here, and they will cry and cry").
tucked in the left side... of accused-appellant's waistline was a bayonet without a cover handle.[8] It was
not the first time that Edward had seen accused-appellant with the knife as the latter usually carried it
with him.

Jiezl Domantay, 10, likewise testified. She said that, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October 17,
1996, she and four other children were playing in front of their house
Jiezl saw accused-appellant and Jennifer Domantay walking towards... the bamboo grove of Amparo
Domantay where Jennifer's body was later found. Accused-appellant was about two meters ahead of
Jennifer.
Lorenzo Domantay, a relative of the victim, corroborated Jiezl's testimony that accused-appellant had
gone to Amparo Domantay's bamboo grove in the afternoon
Joselito Mejia, a tricycle driver, said that, in the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was about to take his
lunch at home in Alacan, a neighboring barangay about half a kilometer from Guilig, when accused-
appellant implored Mejia to take him to Malasiqui at... once.
In addition, the prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel who testified that, on
separate occasions, accused-appellant had confessed to the brutal killing of Jennifer Domantay.
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of station DWPR, an AM station based in
Dagupan City
On October 23, 1996, Manuel went to Malasiqui to interview accused-appellant who was then detained
in the municipal jail. He described what transpired during the interview
I also asked Junior Otot, what was his purpose, and he said, it was about the boundary dispute, and he
used that little girl in his revenge.
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview was conducted in the jail, about two to three
meters away from the police station.
Dr. Bandonill, the NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy of the victim on October 25, 1996,
testified that Jennifer Domantay died as a result of the numerous stab wounds she sustained on her
back,[21] the average depth of which was six... inches.[22] He opined that the wounds were probably
caused by a "pointed sharp-edged instrument."... contusions on the forehead, neck, and breast bone of
the victim.
Dr. Bandonill said he found that the laceration on the right side of the hymen was caused within 24
hours of her death. He added that the genital area showed signs of inflammation.
The defense then presented accused-appellant as its lone witness.
He said... that at around 1 o'clock in the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was bathing his pigs outside
the house of his brother-in-law
Accused-appellant claimed, however, that he did not join in the drinking and that it was Edward
Domantay, whom the prosecution had presented as witness, and a certain Jaime Caballero who joined
the party.
He denied Edward Domantay's claim that he (accused-appellant) had raised his shirt to show a...
bayonet tucked in his waistline and that he had said he would massacre someone in Guilig.
confirmed that, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, he went to Alacan passing on the trail beside the
bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay. But he said he did not know that Jennifer Domantay was following
him.

confirmed that in Alacan, he took a... tricycle to Malasiqui. The tricycle was driven by Joselito Mejia. He
said he alighted near the Mormon church, just outside of the town proper of Malasiqui to meet his
brother.
proceeded to town and reported for work.
He denied having owned to the killing of Jennifer Domantay to SPO1
Espinoza. He denied he had a grudge against the victim's parents because of a boundary dispute.
the trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged.
Issues:
Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel
are inadmissible in evidence because they had been obtained in violation of Art. III, §12(1) of the
Constitution and that, with these vital pieces of evidence... excluded, the remaining proof of his alleged
guilt, consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling:
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when the investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect."
R.A. No. 7438 has extended the... constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not
been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of
October 17, 1996,[37] he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer
Domantay.
already under... custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution
applied to him.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the
presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible.
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant's confession to the radio reporter,
Celso Manuel, is admissible.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was
"tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation.[42] We are
not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed while he... was inside his cell. The interviewer
stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant
could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed.
We do not think the presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure or... influence on
accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.

PEOPLE v. OCTAVIO MENDOZA Y LANDICHO, GR No. 109279-80, 1999-01-18
Facts:
On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death. The trial court
found her husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her death. However, the real victim of this
unfortunate occurrence is the spouses' only minor... child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the
care of her maternal grandparents.
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charge
with parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two Informations
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits
commenced, following which, a judgment of conviction was rendered
Accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho is further deprived of his civil and parental rights over his child
Charmaine Mendoza and he cannot inherit from her.
Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal
Issues:
The trial court erred in
I
. . . substantially and almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or inadmissible, unauthenticated,
questionable documents, in grave violation of accused's constitutional right to privacy of communication
and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and... seizure.
II
. . . almost substantially and wholly relying in the incredible coached and unreliable direct testimony of
the minor daughter of accused and victim, Charmaine Mendoza, despite the evident grave conflicts or
contradictions thereof to the facts clearly and decisively testified by... and/or findings of the police
investigators.
III
. . . not believing the decisively clear and straight forward testimony of the accused as corroborated by
his witness.
IV
. . . ultimately convicting accused for the separate offenses of parricide and Illegal Possession of
Firearms despite the police investigator's undisturbed findings of a shooting and stabbing incident, a
situation consistent with the decisively clear postulate of the... defense.
V
. . . not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of argument, but without conceding, that the
crime of parricide was committed, the law and doctrine that if a firearm is used in the commission of a
killing (Homicide, parricide, etc.) the same, as now mandated by Republic
Act No. 8294 (known as Revilla Law) must only be considered an aggravating circumstance. This is
consistent to the rule that Penal laws favorable to the accused shall have retroactive effects.
Ruling:

we find no reasons to disagree with the trial court and are convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant
Octavio Mendoza has been duly established.
Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt
During the trial of the case, it was duly established that... t the only persons residing at No. 2 Tramo
Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Piñas, were the Mendozas,... On... the night Cecilia
was shot to death, no one was there except these three persons. Accused-appellant struggled to
persuade the trial court of his innocence by denying that he killed his wife, insinuating that another
person is the killer.
The insinuation of accused-appellant that some convenient intruder perpetrated the killing is absolutely
without basis and unsubstantiated. It... is plainly an afterthought, a devised plot to escape just
punishment.
If indeed, Cecilia was shot and killed by... somebody else as claimed by accused-appellant, it would
surely have been but natural for him, as a husband to cooperate with police authorities for the speedy
apprehension of the gunman, by informing them immediately of the alleged intruder-killer. But he did
not and... instead... keep silent about the incident when the police conducted the investigation
Verily it was only on November 16, 1992, or 2 years after the incident that he came... out with the story
about the handy intruder. He kept silent for two long years.
Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001,
the fatal weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim.
But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of
the fatal weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw
on the night her mother was shot. And weeks earlier, she... said, it was the same gun which she saw
with his father. Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Piñas police investigators to
surrender the gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the
shooting incident.
But accused-appellant claims that these documents were... illegally procured in grave violation of his
constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable
search and seizure
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies.
the constitutional... protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
one's person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-
appellant's father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
Finally, contrary to accused-appellant's claim that he was licensed and authorized to carry a .45 caliber
pistol, the certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief, Records, Legal and Research Branch of

the Firearm and Explosive Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that... accused-appellant is not a
licensed firearm holder of any kind
While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by
accused-appellant, the established circumstances abovestated, however, constitute an unbroken chain,
consistent with each other and with the hypothesis that accused-appellant... is guilty, to the exclusion of
all other hypotheses that he is not.
And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances
corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by
the... accused

FILOTEO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (DIGEST)
September 16, 2019
G.R. No. 79543 (1996)
Panganiban, J.
Constitutional Interpretation
PARTIES:
Petitioners Jose Filoteo, Jr.
Sandiganbayan
Respondents
The People of the Philippines
SUMMARY:
The delivery van of the Bureau of Post was hijacked by armed men. The perpetrators took the van and
its contents which include treasury warrants, checks, mail matters, cash, etc. Through the investigation
of the SOG, petitioner Filoteo and nine others were apprehended. During custodial investigation, Filoteo
executed three sworn statements. In the third one, he swore that the investigators offered him
counsel from the CLAO-IBP, but he refused to avail of the privilege. The Sandiganbayan found him
and his companions guilty as co-principals for Highway Robbery under PD 532. Petitioner now filed this
petition with the Supreme Court raising as one of his arguments the invalidity his sworn statement
waiving his right to counsel. He claims that it is not in accordance with Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
constitution which mandates that waiver of the right to counsel must be made in the presence of the
accused’ counsel. The SC held that the 1987 Constitution does not apply in his case because he
executed the waiver in 1983, long before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
DOCTRINES:
It is a fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. Petitioner’s contention that Article III, Section
12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused,
cannot be sustained.
While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is being
construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is
obviously not a penal statute.
FACTS:
May 3, 1982 – Bureau of Post mail van No. MVD 02 left San Fernando, Pampanga to pick up and
deliver mail matters to and from Manila. On board the vehicle were:
• Nerito Miranda, the driver
• Bernardo Bautista, courier
• Eminiano Tagudar, courier

As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns of Bulacan, they took the MacArthur Highway on
the return trip to Pampanga. When they reached Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan at about 4:30 in the
afternoon, an old blue Mercedes Benz sedan overtook their van and cut across its path.
Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a handgun at driver Nerito Miranda as someone
uttered, “Are you not going to stop this truck?” Frightened, Miranda pulled over and stopped the van’s
engine. Alighting from the car, the armed group identified themselves as policemen.
They ordered the postal employees to disembark from the van and enter the car. The car seemed to
move around in circles. When it finally came to a stop, the captured men discovered that they were
along Kaimito Road in Kalookan City. They were made to remove their pants and shoes and then told
to run towards the shrubs with their heads lowered. Upon realizing that the hijackers had left, they put
on their pants and reported the incident to the Kalookan Police Station.
The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Posts recovered the postal van at the corner of
Malindang and Angelo Streets, La Loma, Quezon City.
The Special Operations Group of the Philippine Constabulary (SOG) received a tip from a civilian
informer that two persons were looking for buyers of stolen checks. With cash on hand, Capt. Ferrer
posed as the buyer. The informer introduced him to Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara.
After some negotiations, they agreed to proceed to Tondo. Then as they boarded a car, Capt. Ferrer
introduced himself and his companions as lawmen investigating the hijacking incident.
Frias thus volunteered to help crack the case and lead the SOG team to Ricardo Perez and Raul
Mendoza. Alcantara denied participation in the hijacking although he admitted living with Martin Mateo
who allegedly was in possession of several checks.
Walking atop a rice field dike to the house of Mateo, they noticed two men heading in their direction.
Perez identified them as Martin Mateo and Angel Liwanag. The latter threw something into the rice field
which, when retrieved, turned out to be bundles of checks wrapped in cellophane inside a plastic bag.
On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, Mateo and Liwanag admitted participation in the
postal hijacking.
At a confrontation with Perez and Mendoza, all four of them pointed to petitioner, Jose D. Filoteo, Jr., as
the mastermind of the crime.
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, an
old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. He was the recipient of several awards and
recognitions.The authorities confronted Filoteo about his participation in the hijacking, telling him that
Frias, Mendoza and Perez had earlier volunteered the information that petitioner furnished the Benz
used in the hijacking.
Thereupon, Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely,
Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be a discharged soldier), as
his confederates.
Petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before which details his whereabouts during the day
of robbery and the details of his participation therein.
Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day:

(1) One was a certification stating that he voluntarily surrendered “voluminous assorted US checks and
vouchers,”
(2) The other document was a sworn statement wherein petitioner attested to his waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the RPC and the following facts: (a) that he was apprised of his
constitutional rights under Section 20, Article IV of the (1973) Constitution, that he understood all his
rights thereunder, and that the investigators offered him counsel from the CLAO-IBP, but he refused to
avail of the privilege; (b) that he was arrested by SOG men in his house sa dahilang ako ay kasangkot
sa pagnanakaw x x x mula sa delivery van ng Philippine Mail (c) that the SOG men confiscated from
him numerous checks and a Mercedes Benz 200 colored sky-blue, and (d) that he was not hurt or
maltreated nor was anything taken from him which was not duly receipted for.
Municipal Court of Bulacan. SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a complaint for robbery-
in-band (hijacking) before the Municipal Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan against petitioner and ten (10)
others.
Sandiganbayan. The Information previously referred to and aforequoted was filed with the
Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8496. The Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment
finding accused and others as co-principals beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 2(e), in
relation to Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974.
Supreme Court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Thus, this alternative petition for certiorari under Rule 65 or Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45. The SC treated the petition as Rule 45.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the written statements, particularly the extrajudicial confession executed by the
accused without the presence of his lawyer, admissible in evidence against him? (YES. Only this issue
is relevant to the topic of constitutional interpretation, thus, the succeeding issues will not be
discussed in the ratio)
(2) Whether or not said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation and
therefore illegal and inadmissible? (NO)
(3) Whether or not petitioner’s warrantless arrest valid and proper? (YES)
(4) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt? (YES)
(5) Whether or not the petitioner was properly found guilty under PD 532. (NO, should only be
Robbery by Band under the RPC with lighter penalty)

RATIO:
The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution reads as follows:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
are, inter alia, as follows:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, the Court categorically held that the aforequoted
provisions of the 1973 Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be prospectively
applied.
By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an
accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of
counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made
prior to the effectivity of said Constitution.
Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible.
Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in
force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was
enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines
to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that the right
to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Petitioner’s contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive
effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained.
While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is
being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of
Rights which is obviously not a penal statute.
A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the
Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of
individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state.
Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense
committed against the state which the executive of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a
penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan is partially
reduced to that of robbery by band under the RPC and not Highway Robbery under PD 532.

SERRANO V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ISETANN DEPARTMENT
STORE
27 January 2000 | Mendoza | Special civil action in the SC, Certiorari
FACTS
Ruben Serrano was hired by Isetann Dept. Store as a security checker
1984 – Contractual; 1985 – Regular; 1988 – Head of Security Checkers
In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, Isetann decided to phase out the entire security
section and engage the services of an independent security agency.
Isetann sent a memo to Serrano on 11 Oct 1991, reiterating their verbal notice of termination effective
on the same day.
Serrano filed a complaint on 3 Dec 1991 for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labor practice,
underpayment of wages, nonpayment of salary and overtime pay
Labor Arbiter held that Serrano was illegally dismissed

 Failed to establish that the cause of retrenchment is to minimize losses
 Did not accord due process to Serrano
 Did not use reasonable standards in selecting employees to be terminated
 Did not show employees’ inefficiency so as to justify their replacement
 The day after Serrano’s dismissal, Isetann hired another person as a safety and security
supervisor
 Isetann ordered to pay backwages, reinstatement, unpaid wages, 13th month pay, attorney’s
fees
NLRC reversed Labor Arbiter’s decision upon Isetann’s appeal
 Phase-out of security section, hiring of agency is a legitimate business decision
 Labor Arbiter’s distinction between retrenchment and employment of cost-saving devices
insignificant
 Reasonable criteria does not apply because the entire Security Section was abolished
 No bad faith in appointing a supervisor because it was separate from Serrano’s position as
Security Checkers head
 Isetann ordered to give separation pay, unpaid salary, 13th month pay
 Serrano’s MfR denied
ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON the abolition of the Security Checkers section and the employment of an independent security
agency falls under any of the authorized causes for dismissal under Article 283 of the Labor Code
- YES, authorized cause is redundancy; Serrano should be given separation pay at the rate of one-
month pay for every year of service (Art. 283)
DISCUSSION
Art. 283 provides that one month before intended date, written notice must be served on
the workers and DOLE
Authorized causes under Art. 283 (Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel)

Installation of labor-saving Separation pay at the rate of at least one-month pay
devices or one-month pay for every year of
Redundancy service (whichever is higher)
Retrenchment to prevent Separation pay at the rate of at least one-month pay or
losses half-month pay for every year of service (whichever is
Closing or cessation of higher)
operations
Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with
the employer’s exercise of judgment.
That the phase-out constituted a legitimate business decision is a factual finding of NLRC.
History of policies
When there is just cause but no due process (requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard)
Before: Dismissal is illegal
The shift took place in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC
 Highly prejudicial to the employer’s interests to reinstate an employee who has been shown to
be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal
 Dismissal must be for just or authorized cause and after due process
Now: Dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the
requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process (Sebuguero v. NLRC)
 Fines imposed range from P1,000 to P10,000

Reexamining Wenphil doctrine
 J. Panganiban – Monetary sanctions are too insignificant, niggardly, late

 J. Puno – “Dismiss now, pay later” policy convenient for moneyed employers
 In their opinion, such dismissal is void and employee should be reinstated and paid
backwages
Remedy – pay full backwages from dismissal until determination that dismissal was for a just cause
BUT STILL, dismissal must be upheld
Why violation of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting
in the nullity of dismissal
Due process clause is a limitation on governmental powers and DOES NOT APPLY to the exercise
of private power
a. Only the state has authority to take life, liberty, property

b. Purpose of clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with civilized methods
Notice and hearing are required under the due process clause before the power of the organized
society is brought to bear upon the individual
a. This is NOT the case of termination of employee – no adversary system here (there is no charge
against the employee)
b. Purpose of 30-day written notice is to give employee time to prepare for the eventual job loss, and for
DOLE to determine WON economic causes exist to justify his termination

c. Even in cases of dismissal under Article 282[1], purpose of notice and hearing is NOT to comply with
the due process clause in the Constitution; Compliance with notice requirement does not foreclose right
of employee to question the legality of his dismissal
d. History of related laws
1. Art. 302 of Spanish Code of Commerce – employee/employer can terminate relationship by
giving one month notice; in lieu of notice, mesada (one month pay) could be given to employee
2. NCC 2270 – repealed Art. 302 of Spanish Code of Commerce
3. RA 1052 (Termination Pay Law) – revived mesada
4. RA 1787 – amended RA 1052 by providing for giving of advance notice or payment of
compensation (1/2 month per year of service)
5. Rules implementing BP 130, RA 6715 (amending NCC 277(b) – notice required even when the
dismissal was for cause
Employer CANNOT be expected to be an impartial judge of his own cause
Also the case for termination for a just cause under Article 282
J. Puno disputes this as he says that many cases have been won by employees before grievance
committees manned by impartial judges of the company
Grievance machinery is DIFFERENT – established by agreement of employer, employees and is
composed of representatives from both sides
If the violation of the notice requirement is not a denial of due process, what is it?
Mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment, which makes the termination
merely ineffectual
What makes a dismissal of an employee illegal?

Only the absence of a just cause for termination as provided in Article 279
Authorized
Basis Notice Reinstate Kind of pay
cause
Art.
P Î Î Separation pay, backwages
283
Art.
Î Î P Backwages
283
Art. Backwages from termination until it is
P Î Î
282 determined that there is just cause
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petition granted. NLRC resolution modified. Isetann is ordered to:
 Pay separation pay equivalent to one month pay per year of service
 Unpaid salary
 Proportionate 13th month pay
 Full backwages from termination until this decision becomes final
Case remanded to Labor Arbiter to determine computation of monetary awards to Serrano.
OPINIONS [2]
Separate Opinion – Bellosillo

 Prefers to call indemnity or penalty as disturbance compensation

 Proposes that amount of the award be uniform and rational and not arbitrary
Dissenting Opinion – Puno
 Wenphil did not change ruling that violation of the pre-dismissal notice requirement is an
infringement of due process
 Submits a return to the pre-Wenphil rule where a reasonless violation of the notice requirement
makes the dismissal illegal and results in the employee’s reinstatement
 One undesirable effect of Wenphil is to compel employees to seek relief against illegal
dismissals with DOLE (whereas before, a remedy can be sought before the employer) and oftentimes,
they do not know why they were dismissed in the first place
 Dilution of the rule has been abused by employers who followed the “dismiss now, pay later”
strategy
 An employee under Article 283 has a stronger claim to the right to a pre-dismissal notice and
hearing (rather than post facto dismissal hearing)
 Disagrees with majority opinion that due process requirement does not apply to the exercise of
private power; private due process is a settled norm in administrative law
Separate Opinion – Vitug
 A just or authorized cause and a written notice are required concurrently but not equipollent in
their consequence in terminating an employer-employee relationship
 Where there is no just or authorized cause, reinstatement and payment of backwages would be
proper. Damages might also be awarded if dismissal is attended by bad faith of employer. Separation
pay can substitute for reinstatement if such reinstatement is not feasible.
 Employer must be made to pay corresponding damages for failure to comply with notice
requirement
Separate Opinion – Panganiban
 Notice requirement finds basis not only in the Labor Code but also in the due process clause of
the Constitution
 When the employee is dismissed without due process, he is illegally dismissed. He is entitled to
backwages and reinstatement.
 The Labor Code grants the dismissed employee the right to be notified as well as the right to be
heard.
[1] Causes under Article 282 are (1) serious misconduct or willful disobedience, (2) gross and habitual
neglect of duties, (3) fraud or breach of trust, (4) commission of crime against employer or immediate
family member or authorized representatives, and (5) other analogous causes.
[2] For this part, I will only take note of discussions different from what has been presented in the
majority opinion.

Duncan vs. Glaxo Case Digest
Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc.
G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004
FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment
signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company
rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such
relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of
Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to
another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the
company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area
and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before
getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but
marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest.
Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective
positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-
Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to
Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid...
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company is valid
RULING:
On Equal Protection
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US
Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the
policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due
regard for the lot of the employee.
On Constructive Dismissal
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued

employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or
diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case.
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G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal
weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until
November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until
such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report
every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check
would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not
report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those
similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total
of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.”
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job
of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since
his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he
repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination
was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would
thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease.
That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight
down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from
the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts
it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect,
a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article
282(a), (c), and (d).”
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national
origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short,
the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid
“provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the
cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as
imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or
based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of
his moral character.

EN BANC
[ GR No. 188920, Feb 16, 2010 ]
JOSE L. ATIENZA v. COMELEC +
DECISION
626 Phil. 654
ABAD, J.:
This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a leadership
dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners question their expulsion from that party and
assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by the respondents.
Statement of the Facts and the Case
For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding events is in order.
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP),
announced his party's withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members
denounced Drilon's move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party.
On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy
and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LP's
ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon
immediately filed a petition [1] with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He
claimed that it was illegal considering that the party's electing bodies, the National Executive Council
(NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also
claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, [2] party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term
that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.
On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP's NECO and NAPOLCO
attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to
"people power," wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as president by direct action.
Atienza also said that the amendments[3] to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution,
giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of
Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, [4] partially granting respondent Drilon's
petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election under
COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid
since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since
the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilon's term may be
deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new
officers were elected.
Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a

divided Court issued a resolution,[5] granting respondent Drilon's petition and denying that of petitioner
Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party
leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a
consequence, respondent Drilon's term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilon's term
expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified to vote attended.
Before the election, however, several persons associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their
membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting
installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo E.
Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and
Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction [6] before the COMELEC
against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et
al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly
which elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that
the NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the party's 60th Anniversary
Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and
it showed that the NECO had 103 members.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited
to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the status of
"guests" during the meeting. Atienza's allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon
arbitrarily thumbed them down and "railroaded" the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and
moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienza's allies.
On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas' election as LP president faithfully
complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The party's 60 th Anniversary Souvenir
Program could not be used for determining the NECO members because supervening events changed
the body's number and composition. Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone
on leave after accepting positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run
in the May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got
elected to public office also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became
NECO members upon respondent Drilon's nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the
amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it changed
due to supervening circumstances.
Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and
Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006. This was
pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile,
certain NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party
membership when they ran under other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were
dropped from the roster of LP members.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.'s
petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the composition of the NECO since
the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of
Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. That some lost or won these positions
in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO
which elected Roxas as LP president was not properly convened.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.'s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed
that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The
COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al. filed
this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The Issues Presented
Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:
1.Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party; and
2.Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite legal standing to
question Roxas' election.
Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:
3.Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership
that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;
4.Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the
validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al.
from the party; and
5.Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.'s constitutional right to
due process by the latter's expulsion from the party.
The Court's Ruling
One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for failure of
petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party. Roxas, et al. point out that, since
the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the NECO, the controversy
could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to the case. [7]
But petitioners Atienza, et al.'s causes of action in this case consist in respondents Roxas, et al.'s
disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the election of party leaders and in the illegal election of
Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly excluded from the elections by a series of
"despotic acts" of Roxas, et al., who controlled the proceedings. Among these acts are Atienza, et al.'s
expulsion from the party, their exclusion from the NECO, and respondent Drilon's "railroading" of
election proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al.
Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought from it, the LP
is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.'s prayer for the undoing of respondents
Roxas, et al.'s acts and the reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.
Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal standing to
question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no longer LP members, having been
validly expelled from the party or having joined other political parties. [8] As non-members, they have no
stake in the outcome of the action.
But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[9] legal standing in suits is governed by the "real
parties-in-interest" rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states that "every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest." And "real party-in-interest" is
one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. In other words, the plaintiff's standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising
petitioners Atienza, et al.'s lack of standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have
the Court hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations in the petition.
Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.'s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al. deprived them
of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing them to
take part in the election of its officers and that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of
NECO members. If Atienza, et al.'s allegations were correct, they would have been irregularly expelled
from the party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition as
members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers using the correct list of
NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to take part in another election
would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Court's decision in this case. Consequently, they have
legal standing to pursue this petition.
Three. In assailing respondent Roxas' election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the
NECO members allowed to take part in that election should have been limited to those in the list of
NECO members appearing in the party's 60 th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al. allege that
respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted that list in the earlier cases before the COMELEC
and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Court's decision in the earlier cases, said
Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect defied the
Court's ruling when they removed Atienza as party chairman and changed the NECO's composition. [10]
But the list of NECO members appearing in the party's 60 th Anniversary Souvenir Program was drawn
before the May 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections, changes in the NECO membership had to be
redrawn to comply with what the amended LP Constitution required. Respondent Drilon adopted the
souvenir program as common exhibit in the earlier cases only to prove that the NECO, which
supposedly elected Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006, had been improperly convened. It
cannot be regarded as an immutable list, given the nature and character of the NECO membership.
Nothing in the Court's resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership should be
pegged to the party's 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been no basis for such a
position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO membership to be permanent. Its
Section 27[11] provides that the NECO shall include all incumbent senators, members of the House of
Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP members in good standing for at least six
months. It follows from this that with the national and local elections taking place in May 2007, the
number and composition of the NECO would have to yield to changes brought about by the elections.
Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership had to be dropped.
Newly elected ones who gained the privilege because of their offices had to come in. Furthermore,
former NECO members who passed away, resigned from the party, or went on leave could not be
expected to remain part of the NECO that convened and held elections on November 26, 2007. In
addition, Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the party president to
nominate "persons of national stature" to the NECO. Thus, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly
object to the admission of 12 NECO members nominated by respondent Drilon when he was LP
president. Even if this move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.'s way of ensuring their
election as party officers, there was certainly nothing irregular about the act under the amended LP
Constitution.
The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Respondents
Roxas, et al. explained in details how they arrived at the NECO composition for the purpose of electing
the party leaders.[12] The explanation is logical and consistent with party rules. Consequently, the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the NECO that
elected Roxas as LP president.
Petitioner Atienza claims that the Court's resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right as party
chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that would last up to November 30, 2007 and that,
therefore, his ouster from that position violated the Court's resolution. But the Court's resolution in the
earlier cases did not preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under Sections 29 [13] and 46[14] of the
amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any officer for cause as it saw fit.
Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it
ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their expulsion from the
party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the case. The
previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
intra-party leadership disputes.[15]
But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of the expulsion
of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected
respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELEC's finding as upheld by this Court that the
membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the resolution of the issue of
whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO
held.
While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to their faction, they did
not specify who these members were and how their numbers could possibly affect the composition of
the NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to assail the
individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present
proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et
al. were totally unsupported by evidence.
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts on the
party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that it was indispensable
for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of
Atienza, et al.'s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an
internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

What is more, some of petitioner Atienza's allies raised objections before the NECO assembly
regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the election,
implying that its membership, whose composition has been upheld, voted out those objections.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to
resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct
their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to
a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court.
The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections[16] that the COMELEC's powers and functions
under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political
party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in another case [17] that
the COMELEC's power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons
who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a
proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas' election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had
to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of
nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can
authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. [18] In
simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to the
benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political parties that
have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is thus particularly
significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections. [19]
Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party
membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of
law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing
before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party
discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings [20] and are, therefore, covered by the due
process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.[21]
But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political
parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the
state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative
agency or instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power
for the performance of a state function." [22] The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the
exercise of the state's powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.
The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state's powers are found in Article III of the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property,
or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the state's powers in relation
to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against
arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter
case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process
guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and
cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties. [23]
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between
the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of
members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of
the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to
prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation
to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among
themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights
under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those
rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership
and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs,
pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula,[24] the Court said
that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the political
processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a
free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people. [25]
To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas' election as LP
president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.'s expulsion from the party. While the
question of party leadership has implications on the COMELEC's performance of its functions under
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et
al.'s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and
discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political
parties.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on

Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.
SO ORDERED.

People vs. Lauga Case Digest
Extrajudicial confession before a bantay bayan taken without counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
Facts:
Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the witnesses
for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his
assistance was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear. He
invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he
raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to control himself. Lauga contested the admissibility in evidence
of his alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a
“bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there
was no valid waiver of such requirement.
Issue:
Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a lawyer admissible in
evidence?
Held:
No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in
their community. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the
“bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of
peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy
Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial
confession of appellant taken without counsel was inadmissible in evidence. [People vs Antonio Lauga, G.R. No.
186228, March 15, 2010]

G.R. No. 185125 January 30, 2012
Ruben Del Castillo

vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at
the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del
Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a
small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and
his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence
of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men
returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where
the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and
was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in
possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
REPORT THIS AD
REPORT THIS AD
Issue:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 by mere
presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over the place where the shabu was found?
Held:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns
the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as
well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical
materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the
drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s
failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting
perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the
charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence.

B.2
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning
bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior
to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the
bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the
matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.
If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and
the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of
the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid
of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy
the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds
as may be necessary for the purpose.

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"

are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not
the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody
equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who
is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a
compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards
this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization
of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral
process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-
note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis
of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence,
to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus
more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the
Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of
the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day
of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief

One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it
is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights
in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough
as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as
not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title
of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing
upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such
statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature
must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in
the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization”
and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and
those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The
RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation
but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The
RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way
for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions
of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after
these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s
dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any
one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the
spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution.
Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-
of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and
may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the
State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their
youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement
(rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in

developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several
terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states
that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH
Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational

institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not
allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe
for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a
duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction,
is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on
the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a
reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.

Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still,
the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on
locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters
or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects
and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the
well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed.
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in
the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which
bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as
to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to
the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group
to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious
beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

B4.
CASE DIGEST : Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967 ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE
HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-
appellee.
Facts:
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following
provisions questioned for its violation of due process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in
the lobby in open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is
enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. .As such a limitation
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable
nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to
which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. Taxation
may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is
dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and
Court of Industrial Relations (1973)
Facts –
Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) were dismissed for allegedly violating the
no strike-no lockout provision of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass
demonstration at Malacañang.
PBMEO was set to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 against abuses of
the Pasig police, where employees on the first, regular, and third shifts will participate. PBMEO
informed company two days before the said demonstration and asked to excuse all the workers
participating.
But a day before the demonstration, PBM said the rally should not prejudice normal office operations,
thus employees without prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to report for the first and regular shifts
on March 4 shall be dismissed for violating their CBA.
However, union officers said there was no violation because the demonstration was against the Pasig
police and not the company. They added that the rally was an exercise of their freedom of speech.
In a decision penned by Judge Joaquin Salvador of the Court of Industrial Relations, eight of the
Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization (PBMEO) officers were found guilty of bargaining in
bad faith and were thus removed as employees of PBM.
PBMEO filed a motion for reconsideration, which CIR dismissed the motion for passing two days late
from the 10-day deadline the court allowed.
Issue –
Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc. violated PBMEO’s freedom of expression and assembly on the
grounds that PBM Co. illegally dismissed its employees for participating in a mass demonstration.
Held–
VIOLATED. The rally was not against the company and therefore there is no violation of the “no strike-
no lockout” provision of their CBA. To charge PBMEO of bargaining in bad faith extends the jurisdiction
of the CBA and inhibits freedom of speech. The company failed to protect its employees from the Pasig
police’s abuse of power, went to the extent of dismissing their employees, and instead prioritized
material losses. Moreover, CIR could have easily accepted the motion for reconsideration. Procedural
rules do not supersede the Constitution and may be overruled in a bid to achieve justice, especially in
cases of free speech.

Concepts and Terminologies
CBA – collective bargaining agreement; a contract between a company and its employees that lays out
work hours, wages, and other terms and conditions of employment
Strike – right of employees to refuse to go to work; cessation of work
Lockout – right of employers to suspend work and to refuse to hire workers

Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr
., February 13,2008, Corona, J.
The Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration filed by the Department of Energy and oil
giants Chevron, Petron, and Shell; and reiterated its March 7, 2007 decisionordering the Manila City
mayor to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 directing the removal of theterminals from Pandacan by the said
oil companies. The said Ordinance reclassified portionsof the Manila districts of Pandacan and Sta. Ana
from industrial to commercial and directedcertain business owners and operators, including the three oil
giants to cease and desistfrom operating their businesses there.
Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila City Council on November 28, 2001 and effective December
28, 2001, reclassifies portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directs the
owners and operators of businesses to cease and desist from operating their businesses within 6
months from the ordinance’s effectivity. Among the businesses in the area are the so-called Pandacan
Terminals of Chevron, Petron, and Shell.
Chevron, Petron and Shell, questioned the validity of the said ordinance. They argued that they are
fighting for their right to property alleging that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate.
Are the contentions of the oil companies tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure enacted pursuant to the delegated police
power of local government units “to promote the order, safety, and health, morals, and general welfare
of the society.” It explained that “based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to
life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is
not.
When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’
right to property, the former should prevail.” (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza,
Jr., February 13, 2008)
Ordinance No. 8027 visit fellester.blogspot.com was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the
rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City.
The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation
that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why
such a protective measure should be delayed.

NOTES:
In 2007, the SC ruled that the Local Government Code imposes upon Mayor Atienza, to “enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. (GR No. 156052, Social
Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., March 7, 2007)
In 2008, The Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration filed by Chevron, Petron, and
Shell, and instead reiterated its March 7, 2007 decision. (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al.
v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)
In 2009, the SC recently denied with finality the second motion for reconsideration of the three big oil
players. The Court stressed that the second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
pursuant to sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. It said that it already passed upon the basic issues in
its February 13, 2008 resolution and noted that the arguments of the oil firms were a mere rehash of
their arguments raised in the first motion for reconsideration. (Min. Res., GR No. 156052, Social Justice
Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., April 28, 2009)

Canlas et. al., vs NAPICO Homeowners Association
GR No 182795 June 5, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land. Their dwellings have been demolished or is about to
be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They filed a petition for writ of amparo to summon some
unprincipled Land Officials as they allege to answer their participation in the issuance of fraudulent titles
to NAPICO.
Issue:
Whether or not writ of amparo is proper in this case.
Ruling:
No, writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity.
The threatened demolition is not included among the enumeration of rights protected by the writ. Their
claim to their dwelling does not constitute right to life, liberty, and security.

CASE DIGEST : BPI vs BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER
G.R. No. 164301 August 10, 2010 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, vs. BPI
EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK, Respondent.
FACTS:
On March 23, 2000, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed on
January 20, 2000 by and between BPI, herein petitioner, and FEBTC.[ This Article and Plan of Merger
was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 2000.Pursuant to the Article and
Plan of Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the
surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the country,
were hired by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and
benefits maintained. Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter - Federation of Unions in BPI
Unibank is the exclusive bargaining agent of BPI’s rank and file employees in Davao City. The former
FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did not belong to any labor union at the time of the
merger. Prior to the effectivity of the merger, or on March 31, 2000, respondent Union invited said
FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause of the existing CBA between
petitioner BPI and respondent Union After the meeting called by the Union, some of the former FEBTC
employees joined the Union, while others refused. Later, however, some of those who initially joined
retracted their membership. Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees who
refused to join, as well as those who retracted their membership, and called them to a hearing
regarding the matter. When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the
president of the Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate
their employment pursuant thereto. After two months of management inaction on the request,
respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the
Union Shop Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee. However, the issue remained unresolved
at this level and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed by petitioner upon the merger
between FEBTC and BPI should be covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the existing CBA
between petitioner and respondent Union.
HELD:
All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management
are subject to its terms. However, under law and jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are
exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes effect
are bona fide members of a religious organization which prohibits its members from joining labor unions
on religious grounds; employees already in the service and already members of a union other than the
majority at the time the union shop agreement took effect; confidential employees who are excluded
from the rank and file bargaining unit; and employees excluded from the union shop by express terms
of the agreement.

II. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A. ART. III. SECTION 1.
A.1
SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), v JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD 40 PHIL 136
Facts:
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in
the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year
for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application (Certificate of
Philippine Regitry) was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of
Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of
Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands under Act No.
2761 which provides:
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and
of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with
the owner.
SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of Philippine

register shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that
it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such
ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.
Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws
because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of corporations
based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the
corporation of its properly without due process of law because by the passage of the law company was
automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat
it could not use.
Issue: Whether the legislature through Act no. 2761 can deny registry of vessel with foreign stockholders.
Ruling: Yes. We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien
stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of the
laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in
denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines
coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be
condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power,
and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.
The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights,
are universal in their application to all person within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of
race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within
the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. Classification with the end in view of

providing diversity of treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based upon some
reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection.
A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause the inevitable
deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a corporation, some of whole members
are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws.
To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain a certificate of
Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the
United States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under some one of the
exceptions.
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence is, broad and
comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the State,
sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education,
and good order of the people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources
and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character,
having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts. This is the same police power which the
United States Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring
out of them the greatest welfare in of its people." For quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine
Organic Law could could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting
through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign
police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-
alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building.

A. 2
Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015
FACTS:
 Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia who was supposed to be the salutatorian of his batch, receive
the Philippines Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an
ensign of the Philippine Navy. Cadel 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014
of the PMA, the country’s premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in
Baguio City. He belonged to the “A” Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class.
 On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1CL cadets had a
lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C.
Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the Headquarters
Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was from 1:30- 3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H),
while the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).
 Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5 th period class issued a
Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1CL Cudia because he was “[l]ate for two (2) minutes
in his Eng 412 class x x x.” Cadets 1CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and
Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.
 On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1CL cadets had a
lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C.
Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the Headquarters
Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was from 1:30- 3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H),
while the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).
 Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5 th period class issued a
Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1CL Cudia because he was “[l]ate for two (2)
minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x.” Cadets 1CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz,
Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.
 In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL Cudia reasoned out that: “I
came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir.”
 December 19, 2013, Major Hindang gave Cudia a penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
He was punished because of the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who said that

she never dismissed her class late.
 Cudia wrote an appeal to seek reconsideration of the punishment. He addressed his Request
for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin Leander, Senior Tactical Officer
and asserted: “I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4 th
period class ended 1500H and our 5 th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also.
Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class without any intention of being
late Sir.”
 Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the request of Cadet 1CL
Cudia and to indicate if there were other cadets belonging to the same section who were also
late.
 On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that,
based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj.
Leander sustained the penalty imposed. Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet
1CL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for violation of the
Honor Code. The Honor Report stated: Lying that is giving

statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his 4th period class
ended at 1500H that made him late in the succeeding class.
 On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation on

the reported honor violation of Cadet 1CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the
investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets
1CL Mogol, 1CL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as
members. Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending
that the case be formalized.
 The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted until early
morning the next day. Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed of the charge against him, as to which
he pleaded “Not Guilty.” Among those who testified were Cadet 1CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and
Cadets 1CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the hearing held on January 21,
2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia again appeared and was called to the witness stand along with Cadets
Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under oath via phone on a loudspeaker.
Deliberation among the HC voting members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were
distributed. The members cast their votes through secret balloting and submitted their
accomplished ballot sheets together with their written justification. The result was 8-1 in favor
of a guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet 1CL Lagura) was the lone
dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order of HC Chairman Cadet 1CL Mogol, the Presiding
Officer and voting members went inside a chamber adjoining the court room for further
deliberation. After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer announced
the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring hours, was
then informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He
was immediately placed in the PMA Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal.
 Cudia filed an appeal. Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day,
January 24, as it found no reason to conduct a re-trial based on the arguments and evidence
presented.
 On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets,
affirmed the HC findings and recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA
Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet 1CL Cudia for violation of the First
Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008).
 On the same date, Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet
1CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances effective February 10,
2014 pending approval of his separation by the AFP-GHQ, barring him from future
appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance
requirements to the PMA.
 Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1CL
Cudia.
 Cudia filed an appeal. But the Headquarters resolved to deny Cudia’s appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing cadet first class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from
the academy in utter disregard of his right to due process. [NO]

2. Whether the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that cadet first class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia lied,
thereby violating the Honor Code. [NO]
3. Whether the result of the fact-finding investigation independently conducted by the CHR is of
such great weight and persuasive nature that the Court may honor, uphold, and respect. [NO]
RULE
 Section 31, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act")
o Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has
the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no
authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It
also does not empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for
recommending the cadet’s dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, it is claimed that
the PMA blindly followed the HC’s finding of guilt in terminating his military service.
 Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by
mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only “to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”
 Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 (as amended by
E.O. No. 1005), AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor
System, military professionalism, and, in general, military culture.
 Art. XIV, Sec 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning."
 As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance with Section 30,
Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O.
No. 292, the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2),
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
APPLICATION
 In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence that the findings of the
investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable
errors were committed; or that a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest.
 With respect to the core issue of whether lying is present in this case, all investigating and

reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact
lied.
 Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet
from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation
(CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency
which merits a recommendation for a cadet’s dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The
same is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook.
 Cadet 1CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that the Honor Code does not accommodate
a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no difference between a little lie and a huge
falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has always been considered as an
absolute yardstick against which cadets have measured

themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek to
assure that only those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and honor
are produced by the PMA.
 As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally permissible for the military “to set and
enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics.” Thus, in violating the
Honor Code, Cadet 1CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
 Respondents contend that the CHR’s allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious
bad faith and that he failed to discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when
he “paved the road to [Cadet 1CL Cudia’s] sham trial by the Honor Committee” is an
unfounded accusation.
 As to the CHR’s finding that Cadet 1CL Mogol was likewise “in bad faith and
determined to destroy [Cadet 1CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own” because the
former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in November 2013,
respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there is failure
to note that Cadet 1CL Mogol was a non-voting member of the HC. Further, he
cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is the HC
Chairman and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the
representatives of the HC are elected from each company, while the HC Chairman is
elected by secret ballot from the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet
1CL Cudia believed that there was bias against him, he should have resorted to the
procedure for the removal of HC members provided for in the Honor Code
Handbook.
 Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the
PMA to prevent Cadet 1CL Cudia from graduating because the Academy does not
stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic
standing, the separation militates against PMA’s mission to produce outstanding,
honorable, and exceptional cadets.
 CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED

CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.
 THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO

IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND
CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.
 CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

 The Court differs with petitioners.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P.
Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
CLT Realty Development Corp. v. Hi-Grade Feeds Corp.
G.R. No. 160684, September 2, 2015
Topic: Mandatory Judicial Notice

Doctrine:
The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be taken judicial
notice of.
Facts:
The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious Maysilo Estate left by
Gonzalo Tuason, the vastness of which measures 1,660.26 hectares, stretching across
Caloocan City, Valenzuela, and Malabon, covered by five (5) mother titles or Original
Certificate of Title (OCT). One of the mother titles is OCT No. 994, the mother title in dispute.
Later on, smaller lots forming part of the Maysilo Estate were sold to different persons.
Several subsequent subdivisions, consolidations, and one expropriation of the Estate,
spawned numerous legal disputes, living-up to the name "Land of Caveat Emptor." One of
these disputed lots was Lot 26, the property subject of this litigation. The conflict arose due to
an overlapping of the properties of CLT and Hi-Grade, which prompted CLT to file a case for
Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession, and Damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 121, docketed as Civil Case No. C-
15463 against Hi-Grade.
The Ruling of the RTC:

After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of CLT. According to the RTC, Hi-Grade's title, the older
title, cannot prevail over CLT's title because it suffers from patent defects and infirmities.
Although Hi-Grade paid realty taxes on the subject properties, it is not considered as a
conclusive proof of ownership.
Hi-Grade filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence and serious and patent errors in the court's appreciation of evidence and
factual findings based on the decision of the court in Civil Case No. C-15491, entitled " CLT v.
Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association."
The RTC denied the motion for utter lack of merit. According to the RTC, the ruling in
favor of Hi-Grade in Sto. Niño is not a newly-discovered evidence, as Hi-Grade could not
have failed to produce such evidence if it exercised reasonable diligence. Hi-Grade's reliance

in the aforesaid case is already moot and academic as the court in Sto. Niño already
reconsidered its decision and upheld the validity of CLT's title.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

During the pendency of the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to Admit and Take Judicial
Notice of Committee Report on Senate Inquiry into Maysilo Estate Submitted by the
Committees on Justice and Human Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and
Resettlement (Senate Report) on 1 July 1998. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in a
Resolution. Included in the Resolution, however, is a statement that although the Court of
Appeals takes judicial notice of the Senate Report, the Court of Appeals is not bound by the
findings and conclusions therein. S
Departing from the trial court's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals ruled as baseless the
trial court's reliance on the testimonies of CLT's witnesses, Vasquez and Bustalino, on the
alleged patent infirmities and defects in TCT No. 4211. According to the Court of Appeals,
Vasquez and Bustalino never testified that the issuance of TCT No. 4211 failed to conform to
the registration procedures in 1917, the year it was issued. Also, Vasquez and Bustalino are
incompetent to testify on the customary practices in land registration at that time. Reversing
the Decision of the RTC, the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
Issue(s):
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
took judicial notice of the Senate Report.
Ruling:
Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit of the law. Section 1 of
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions. (1a) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act
on without proof because these facts are already known to them; it is the duty of the court to
assume something as a matter of fact without need of further evidentiary support. Otherwise
stated, by the taking of judicial notice, the court dispenses with the traditional form of
presentation of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of evidence and court proceedings such as
cross-examination.

The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be taken
judicial notice of.
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings
made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as
evidence, though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the
initiative of the parties. . . . The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn
judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on
the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact
that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade
the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in
the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the
courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them. cHA
Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but will be examined
and evaluated based on its probative value. The Court of Appeals explained quite pointedly
why the taking of judicial notice of the Senate Report does not violate the republican principle.
Thus:
However, the question of the binding effect of that Report upon this Court is
altogether a different matter. Certainly, a determination by any branch of government on a
justiciable matter which is properly before this Court for adjudication does not bind the
latter. The finding of the Senate committees may be the appropriate basis for remedial
legislation but when the issue of the validity of a Torrens title is submitted to a court for
resolution, only the latter has the competence to make such a determination and once
final, the same binds not only the parties but all agencies of government.
That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was conceded by the
Court of Appeals. It did not allow the Senate Report to determine the decision on the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53770, entitled "CLT Realty Development Corporation v. Hi-
Grade Feeds Corporation, Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III," dated 18 June
2003 and 28 October 2003, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

A. 3


 RUBI vs PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
 39 Phil 660
 Sufficiency of Standards
 Delegation of Legislative Powers to Local Governments

 FACTS: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being
illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

 The Philippine Legislature has, by the enactment of Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.

 ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in question is an unlawful delegation of legislative
power

 RULING: No. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments
of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts,
final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence
to the "necessity" of the case.

 In the case at bar, the Legislature merely conferred upon the Provincial Governor, with
the approval of the Provincial Board and the Department Head, discretionary authority
as to the execution of law. Who, but the provincial governor and the provincial board,
as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such
as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order." As officials charged
with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but
they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

 RATIO: Delegation of Legislative Powers to Local Governments. An exception to the
general rule against the delegation of legislative power sanctioned by immemorial
practice permits the central legislative body to make such delegation to local
authorities.

 "Necessary in the interest of law and order" is a standard held sufficient.

 ---



Pedro vs Provincial Board of Rizal
G. R. No. 34163, September 18, 1931
Facts:
Gregorio Pedro argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on
December 29, 1928, by the temporary councillors appointed by the provincial governor of
Rizal, Eligio Naval, on the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired rights of said appellant; (2)
it was enacted on account of prejudice, because it was intended for a special and not a
general purpose, namely to prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation
of the cockpit of the said petitioner-appellant; and (3) it provides for special committee
composed of persons who are not members of the council, vested them with powers which of
their very nature, cannot be delegated by said council to that committee.
He further contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain, exploit, and open to
the public the cockpit in question, having paid the license fee and fulfilled all the
requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, he has acquired a right which
cannot be taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, which was
subsequently approved.
Issue:
Whether a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit falls under property
rights which a person may not be deprived of without due process of law
Held: No.
The court held: (1) That a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is
not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere
privilege which may be revoked when the public interests so require; (2) that the work
entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a study of the
sanitary effects upon the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in
character, but only informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance, approved
by a municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of another which had
been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.

G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL

MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO
CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-
Davao), respondents.
FACTS:
T he instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest Reserve known as the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.” Located at Mt. Diwata in
the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land has been embroiled in
controversy since the mid-80’s due to the scramble over gold deposits found within its
bowels.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted

Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the
hotly-contested Diwalwal area.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076, or the
People’s Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a People’s Small-Scale Mining
Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary’s direct supervision and control. The
statute also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale mining areas subject
to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale miners under
certain conditions.
On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department

Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-
forest land open to small-scale mining The issuance was made pursuant to the powers
vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-
Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.

On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which
directs the DENR to study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of
the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not
be limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements
or operating agreements, or both, with the appropriate government instrumentalities or private
entities, or both, in carrying out the declared policy of rationalizing the mining operations in
the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing
between the state and the said parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale
miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities, among
others. The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for Legal and
Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and Geo-sciences
Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such studies.
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal
Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the
nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the “direct
state utilization” espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not
abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the same was merely a
directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the government for solving the
Diwalwal conflict.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum
order did not adopt the “direct state utilization scheme” in resolving the Diwalwal dispute.
Held:
No, We agree with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not
conclusively adopt “direct state utilization” as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The
terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a
study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for
that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to
determine its feasibility.

Republic v. Rosemoor Mining
FACTS:
Four respondents were granted permission to look for marble deposits in the mountains of
Biak-na-Bato. When they discovered marble deposits in Mount Mabio, they applied for license
to exploit said marble deposits and they were issued such license. However, in a letter,
Ernest o Maceda (newly-appointed Minister of the Department of Energy and Natural
Resources) cancelled their license.Prclamation No. 84 was then issued, confirming the
cancellation of the license.
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT:
The privilege granted under respondents’ license already became a property right, which is
protected unde the due process clause. License cancellation, without notice and hearing was
unjust. Moreover, the proclamation, which confirmed the cancellation of the license was an ex
post facto law.
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
It adds that the Constitution provides for the non-impairment of obligations and contracts,
which implies that the license of the respondents must be respected.
ISSUES:
1. WON the license was valid.
Petitioners: License was issued in violation of PD 463 –a quarry license should cover
not more than 100 hectares in any given province. The license was issued to
Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation and covered a 330-hectare land.
Respondents: The license was embraced by 4 separate applications, each for an

aread of 81 hectares. Also, the issue has been mooted because PD 463 has already
been repealed by RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
2. WON Proclamation No. 84 – which confirmed the cancellation of the license, is valid.
Petitioners: The license was validly declared a nullity and terminated. Maceda’sletter did not
cancel or revoke the license, but merely declared its nullity. Also, the respondents waived
their right to notice and hearing in their license application.
Respondents: Their right to due process was violated because there was no notice and
hearing. Proclamation No. 84 is not valid because it violates the clause on non-impairment of

contracts, it is an ex post facto law and/or a bill of attainder, and it was issued by the
President after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
Tbe Petition is GRANTED.
SC set aside the decision of the CA and TC.
1. THE LICENSE IS NOT VALID.
The issue has not been mooted because while RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of
mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it respects previously issued valid and existing
licenses.
When the license was issued, the governing law was PD 463. Thus, it was subject to the
terms and conditions of PD 463, including the part where it says that the quarry license shall
cover an area of not more than 100 hectares in any one province and not more than 1000
hectares in the entire Philippines. The license in question was issued in the name of
Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation and not the 4 individual stockholders. It clearly
violates PD 463 because the license covered an area of 330-hectares.
2. PROCLAMATION NO. 84, CONFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE LICENSE,

IS VALID.
Respondents’ license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national
interest so requires because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the
due process clause of the Constitution. The license itself provides such condition. The license
can also be validly revoked by the State in the exercise of police power, in accordance with
the Regalian doctrine.
Also, since the license is not a contract, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Even
if it were, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The proclamation cannot also be said to be a bill-of-attainder, which is a legislative act which
inflicts punishment without judicial trial. The proclamation only declares the nullity of the
license. It does not declare guilt or impose punishment.
The proclamation can also be said to be an ex post facto law because it does not fall under
any of the six recognized instances when a law is considered as such. It is not even criminal
or penal in nature.
Lastly, when President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84, she was still validly exercising
legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986.

COLLADO v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of land (120 hectares in Antipolo,
Rizal) with the land registration court. She attached a technical description of the Lot, signed
by Robert Pangyarihan1, stating “this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.” About a
year later, Collado amended the application to include additional co-applicants and more
applicants joined (“petitioners”).
The Republic through the SG, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through the Municipal Attorney
and Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application.
ISSUES:
1. WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
Petitioners: They have occupied the Lot for a long time and their possession has been
open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name
of one of their predecessors-in-interest 2 as early as 1902. There have been 9 transfers of
rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest. Also, they have declared the Lot for
taxation and paid all the real estate taxes.
The land is not covered by any form of title or any public land application. It is also not
within any government reservation.
Private rights were vested on Leyva before the issuance of EO 33 (establishing the
Marikina Watershed Reservation). Since EO 33 contains a saving clause that the
reservations are subject to existing private rights, the Lot is excluded from such
reservation.
Assuming no private rights attached prior to the issuance of EO 33, the President had
subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and
disposable through Proclamation No. 1283. They say that the proclamation expressly
excluded an area of 3780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-
BosoTownsite Reservation. They contend that the Lot in question is part of the excluded
town site are and that under CA 141, town sites are considered alienable and disposable.
2. WON the petition for annulment of judgment should have been given due course.
1 Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands

2SesinandoLeyva

Petitioners: The petition for annulment of judgment was filed long after the decision of the
land registration court had become final and executor and is no longer available because
of res judicata. The land registration court had jurisdiction over the case, which involves
private land. The Republic is stopped from questioning the court’s jurisdiction because the
Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.
Solicitor General: The decision of the land registration court was null and void because the
land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case. The land in question was not
alienable and disposable.
3. WON the petition-in-intervention is proper. (more on procedural)
Petitioners presented sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot.
CA annulled the decision of the Trial Court. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of public
domain belong to the State. An applicant for registration of a parcel of land has the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. The petitioners failed to present evidence that the Lot has been segregated from the
public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable.
The technical description which the petitioners attached to their application said that the
survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed. This has been confirmed by the Administrator of
the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report.
Petition is DENIED.
1. PETITIONERS HAVE NO REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE LOT.
Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession under CA 141 3 (Public Land
Act) or under the amendment by RA 1942 4 and PD 10735 (the law prevailing at the time
the petitioners applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva had been in
possession of the Lot for only 2 years. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO
3Possession and occupation of lands of public domain since July 26, 1894.
4A simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.
5 Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure.

33,the petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed, acquisitive
prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the State.
Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the issuance of EO 33, EO 33
reserved the Lot as a watershed. Thus, ever since, the land has become non-disposable
and inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 could no
longer be counted because the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. CA 141 only applies to alienable and disposable public
agricultural land and not to forest lands, including watershed reservations. Possession of
forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1283 has been amended by Proclamation No. 1637, revising the area
and location of proposed townsite. The new proclamation excluded the Lot in question and
reverted it to MWR coverage.
The certification presented by the petitioners that says that the Lot is covered by the
reclassification is contradicted by the several documents submitted by the Solicitor
General. In a Report, the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration confirmed that the Lot forms part of MWR and re commended the dismissal
of the application for registration. Also, in a Letter, the Deputy Land Inspector of the
DENR, confirmed that it is within the MWR. Lastly, Collado’s application attached a
technical description stating that the Lot is inside the Mariquina Watershed. Once a parcel
of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive
Proclamation, there is the presumption that the land continues to be part of such
Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.
2. ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT INVOLVING THE LOT

ARE NULL AND VOID.
The Lot is proven to be not alienable and disposable public land. The Land Registration
court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties.
The doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental ights. Estoppel or laches does not validate an act that
contravenes law or public policy. Res judicata must be disregarded if its application would
sacrifice justice to technicality. Also, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of
public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private
acquisition does not prescribe.
TORRES v. GARCHITORENA
FACTS:

Susana Realty, Incorporated (SRI) is the registered owner of 2 parcels of land in Noveleta,
Cavite. Such parcels of land are adjacent to the sea and over time, portions thereof were
submerged by sea water. Domingo Fernandez was assigned by SRI to be the caretaker.
Mayor Dionisio Torres of Noveleta, caused the leveling and reclamation of the submerged
portion to relocate displaced squatters from Tirona, Cavite. The caretaker protested but
the mayor ignored him and continued with the leveling and reclamation of the property.SRI
formally protested and demanded that the leveling and reclamation be stopped.
ZARATE v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS:
Petittioner Francisco Zarate applied for registration of title of 3 parcels of land in Tangalan,
Aklan. He claims that he bought the land from Josefino Tirol, who inherited the same from
Ignacio Tirol. There were different oppositors to his application.
ISSUE:
WON subject parcels of land are registrable under petitioner’s name.
Petitioner: Geodetic Engineer’s testimony and certification show that the subject property
is alienable and disposable.
Respondent Preciosa Tirol Davila: She is the daughter of Ignacio Tirol. She opposed
saying that the land was not donated by his father to Josefino.
Respondent DBP: The lots are owned by spouses Molo and was mortgaged to them.
When the mortgage was foreclosed, the land became the bank’s property.
Respondents Toriaga: They owned the land.
Oppositor Republic of the Philippines: Subject land was timberland or unclassified forest.
Application for registration of title by Zarate and the claims of private oppositors is
dismissed.
CA affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court.
The petition is DENIED. Ruling of the CA and Trial Court is affirmed.

Subject lands were released as alienable and disposable only in 1973. The application for
registration was filed in 1976. Thus, the applicant and/or private oppositors possessed the
land for only 3 years prior to the filing of application and the 30-year requirement imposed
by CA 141 (Public Land Act) was not met.
The applicant (and oppositors) failed to show evidence that they have complied with the
requisites provided by law – 1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable. 2) the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely for 30 years immediately preceding the filing of
application. More than 1/2 of the total area applied for are not in the possession of the
applicant and thus, he cannot claim exclusive and notorious possession under the claim of
ownership, nor can he support his claim of title through acquisitive prescription.
A positive act of government is needed to convert forest land into alienable or disposable
land. Possession of forest lands, which are incapable of private appropriation, no matter
how long cannot ripen into private ownership.
REPUBLIC v. NAGUIAT
FACTS:
RespodentCelestinaNaguiat applied for registration of title to 4 parcels of land in Botolan,

Zambales. She alleges that she owns the land, having acquired them by purchase from
LID Corporation and that their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
land for more than 30 years.
The Republic opposed the application because neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands and that the parcels applied for are part of the
public domain and not subject to private appropriation.
ISSUE:
WON the parcels of land could be registered under respondent’s name.
The parcels of land could be registered in her name.
CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
THE LAND IS NOT REGISTRABLE.

CA assumed that the land was already alienable and disposable but in truth, it was still
questionable.
Respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government
agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and
disposable. Land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; it requires proof.
The documents she presented are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Declassification of forest and
mineral lands, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express
and positive act from the government.
The issue of WON respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, and continuous possession of the parcels of land does not matter. Unclassified
land, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession and occupation cannot
ripen into private ownership./

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan
to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer
Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer
Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes
male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male
and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case,
the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The
Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that
private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor
that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2)
how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a

matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.

YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION VS TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
GR NO. 207942 - JANUARY 12, 2015
SUMMARY
Rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing
prior to November 15, 1935 are vested rights that cannot be impaired.
ANTECEDENTS
 Philippine Iron Mines Inc(PIMI) owned several mining claims in Barrio Larap,
Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
 After financial losses, in 1975 PIMI sold these claims toManila Banking
Corporation(MBC) and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank(PCHB, later
BDO).
 Government opened area for exploration after the submission of a feasibility study.
 Trans-Asiafiled an application in 1997, for the approval ofMineral Production
Sharing Agreement(MPSH) over the area in the Regional Office of DENR, which was
amended in 1999 and granted on July 28, 2007.
 August 31, 2007 – Yinlu Bicol Mining Operation(Yinlu) informed DENR that it
acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way ofdeed of absolute
sale and that the areas covered by those patents were within the areas of Trans-Asia’s
MPSA.
o DENR secretary, Jose L. Atienza, Jr: Patents from PIMI were validly
transferred to and were now owned by Yinlu. He ordered the amendment of
Trans-Asia’s MPSH by excluding therefrom the mineral lands covered by Yinlu’s
mining patents.
o Trans-Asia moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the DENR
secretary on the grounds that it only rehashed matters already decided.
 Trans-Asia appealed to the Office of the President (OP):PIMI had a vested right to
the mining patents and the appellee as the beneficial owner has superior rights
over the claims of the appellant.Trans-Asia filed for motion for reconsideration
twice.The OP denied it twice.
o Trans-Asia received first resolution onJuly 14, 2010denying. Grounds::
 It only rehashed previously resolved arguments
 Only one motion for reconsideration can be allowed except for especially
meritorious cases.
 Trans-Asia appealed by certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA) which granted their
petition on the grounds that while Yinlu held mining patents over the disputed
mining areas, they were required to register the patents under Presidential
Decree No. 463 in order for these patents to be recognized. Since they did not do so,
the patents have lapsed and have no effect.

o Yinlu sought reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the CA on
June 27, 2013.
ISSUES
Procedural: W/N Trans-Asia’s petition for certiorari filed before the CA was filed
beyond the reglementary period.
 YES
 The appeal to the CA must be taken within 15 days “from notice of the award,
judgement, final order or resolution, or from date of its last publication…” (Sec 4, Rule
43, Rules of Court)
 Yinlu contended:
o that the CA should have dismissed Trans-Asia’s appeal since it was made
beyond the required period for appealing
o Trans-Asia’s filing of the 2 nd motion for reconsideration was improper since it did
not cite any exceptional circumstance.
 OP’s declaration:
o Declaration on the 2nd motion for reconsideration as “clearly unmeritorious”
(March 31, 2011), it did not stop the running of the appeal period that
started on July 14, 2010 when Trans-Asia received the OP resolution denying
the 1st motion for reconsideration.
o OP decision became final and immutable on July 29, 2010, last day of the
reglementary period.
 CA(granted) gravely erred in taking cognizance of Trans-Asia’s appeal despite its
tardiness.
 Importance of reglementary period:
o To allow Trans-Asia to transgress law would be to set naught procedural rules
that are inviolable.
 Because appeal is not a consti right nor part of due process, but a mere
statutory privilege enjoyed by litigants who comply. Failure to comply
with rules lead to loss of privilege.
o Limits are to avoid needless delays and to orderly and speedily discharge
judicial business.
o Failure to perfect appeal within the 15 day period is to preclude the appellate
court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case in order to review and revise the
judgment, that meanwhile became final and immutable operation of law.
Substantive: W/N Yinlu’s mining patents constituted vested rights that could not be
disregarded (OP).
 YES
 Decision of OP (denied) was unassailable in point of law and history.

o Spanish Mining Lawof 1867 observed Regalian doctrine– effect was that
minerals belonged to the State wherever it could be found.
o During the American Occupation, fundamental law in mining was incorporated
in the Philippine Bill of 1902. Sec 21 declared that all valuable deposits in
public lands are free for the citizens of the United States and the PH to
explore, occupy, use and purchase mineral lands.
 After exploration and claim of mineral land, the owner of claim and
mineral parents was entitled to all minerals founds in the area (Sec 27,
PH Bill of 1902)
 A person holding a mere mineral claim is entitled already to all minerals
found in such area.
 Enjoyed exclusive privilege in exploiting minerals within the patent.
 Entitled also to exclusive possession of land covered by claim
 Mining patents are property rights that Gov should not meddle with.
 Registered mineral patents, as valid and existing, cannot be defeated by
adverse, open and notorious possession and prescription.
 substantive rights over mineral claims perfected under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 subsisted despite the changes of the Philippine Constitution;
Constitution could not impair vested rights
o PD No. 463 protects vested rights also.
 Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 would impair its vested rights
under its mineral patents if said provisions were applied to it
 Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly prohibited the application of Section
100 and Section 101 to vested rights
o However,once a mining claim was made, it became private property and
the claimant became the owner of both surface and minerals found
underneath.
 Presidential Decree No. 463(Mineral Resources Development Decree) provides that
its provisions would not apply if it will impair vested rightsunder other mining
laws:
o Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired Substantive Rights.
Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Decree
which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with other mining laws previously in force shall have no retroactive effect.
Provided, That the provisions of this Decree which are procedural in nature shall
prevail.
 Re. mining patents terms:
o The term mining claimconnotes a parcel of land containing a precious metal
in its soil or rock;
 It is usually used in mining jargon as synonymous with the term location,
which means the act of appropriating a mining claim on the public
domain according to the established law or rules.
o A mining patentpertains to a title granted by the government for the said
mining claim.

WON petitioner Yinlu’s Titles based on “patents” were mining patents or some other
patent.
 Trans-Asia: patents were homestead patents.

 Yinlu: mining patents.
o TCTs from which it derived its own TCTs were issued pursuant to Patents 15,
16, 17 and 18
o under the Philippine Bill of 1902, there was no mineral patent separate from the
original certificate of title issued pursuant thereto
o that the mineral patent applied for under the procedure outlined in the Philippine
Bill of 1902 resulted to an original certificate of title issued under Act No. 496
WON petitioner Yinlu’s purchase pf its titles included purchase of the minerals found
therein.
 Yinlu’s mining patents

o were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902and
o Subsisted prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. This gave Yinlu
and its predecessors vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could
not and should not be impairedeven in light of their past failure to
complywith registration requirements and annual work obligation.
 beginning statements mentioned in Yinlu’stitle stated “pursuant to
PatentNo._____,________Placer Claim
o mineral patents were part of its actual titles
 Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 allowed the titling of the land and the
exploration of both the surface and the minerals beneath the surface
o During the American Occupation, fundamental law in mining was incorporated
in the Philippine Bill of 1902. Sec 21 declared that all valuable deposits in
public lands are free for the citizens of the United States and the PH to
explore, occupy, use and purchase mineral lands.
 After exploration and claim of mineral land, the owner of claim and
mineral parents was entitled to all minerals founds in the area (Sec 27,
PH Bill of 1902)
 A person holding a mere mineral claim is entitled already to all minerals
found in such area.
 Enjoyed exclusive privilege in exploiting minerals within the patent.
 Entitled also to exclusive possession of land covered by claim
 Mining patents are property rights that Gov should not meddle with.
 Registered mineral patents, as valid and existing, cannot be defeated by
adverse, open and notorious possession and prescription.
 substantive rights over mineral claims perfected under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 subsisted despite the changes of the Philippine Constitution;
Constitution could not impair vested rights

TCTs were already inclusive of the minerals located in the properties by

virtue ofPhilippine Bill of 1902, and thus could not be separately sold or
mortgaged from each other.
o PD No. 463 protects vested rights also.
 Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 would impair its vested rights
under its mineral patents if said provisions were applied to it
 Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly prohibited the application of Section
100 and Section 101 to vested rights
WON the CA disregarded the constitutional rights of petitioner Yinlu that its private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
WON the principle of laches apply to titles property.
WON the share of the republic of the PH in its natural resources was affected by the
mining patents of petitioner Yinlu.
RULING
Reverse and set aside decision by the Court of Appeals. Reinstate decision and resolution by
the Office of the President. Direct the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

B.DUE PROCESS( ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS)
Nelson Lai Y Bilbao v People

G.R. No. 175999, July 1, 2015
Bersamin, J:
Nelson Lai Y Bilbao was convicted of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, for allegedly killing Enrico Villanueva Jr. during a benefit dance that was being
held in PurokAzucena, Barangay 6, Bacolod City. Judge Fernando Elumbra heard and
decided on the case.
However, on Motion for Reconsideration, the defense argued that Elumbra should be
disqualified from hearing and deciding on the case, because he had prosecuted the same
case prior to his appointment as Judge. The Motion for Reconsideration having been denied,
the issue, among others, was raised before the Court of Appeals.
CA affirmed the judgement of the RTC, and ruled against the disqualification case on the
ground that 1) Judge Elumbra was only assigned as public prosecutor after the prosecution
has already rested its case, and 2) a petition to disqualify a judge should have been filed
before the rendition of judgement. The accused asks for relief before the Supreme Court,
arguing that his right to due process has been violated because the case was not decided by
an impartial judge.
Issue:
Is a decision rendered by a trial court judge who previously prosecuted the same invalid for
violating the due process clause of the Constitution?
Held:
Yes, a judge cannot claim impartiality when he, regardless of extent of participation, had
previously prosecuted the case. “To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the
public prosecutor was passive, or that he entered his appearance as the public prosecutor
long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the petitioner did not really matter.”
Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
requires judges who had served as counsel in a case to inhibit themselves. “As such, the
mere appearance of his name as the public prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No.
17446 sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting on and deciding the case.” The
Constitutional right to due process assures parties a decision of a cold, neutral judge. Such is
absent in the case at bar.
Furthermore, the rule that a petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before rendition of
judgement applies only when the supposed disqualification of the judge is premised on bias
as perceived by a party. It does not apply in cases where there is a mandatory basis for
disqualification, such as what happened in the case at bar.
The decision must be set aside and is remanded to the lower court

St. Raphael Montessori v BPI 773 S 419
Facts:
Spouses Rolando and Josefina Andaya (Sps. Andaya) are the President and Vice-
President, respectively, of St. Raphael Montessori, Inc. (St. Raphael). From 1994 to 1998, the
Spouses Andaya obtained a loan for themselves and on behalf of St. Raphael, from the Far
East Bank and Trust company, now Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). As security for the loan,
they executed real estate mortgages over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-45006.[4] They, however, defaulted on their obligation and thus, BPI
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and the title was issued in its name when
the mortgagors failed to redeem the subject property. On March 15, 2005, upon petition by
BPI, the court a quo issued a Writ of Possessionordering the sheriff to place the subject
property and all its improvements thereon, in possession of the same.
The Spouses Andaya asked for deferment of the implementation of the writ of
possession and executed for themselves and on behalf of St. Raphael an Undertaking
wherein they: (i) acknowledged BPI's ownership of the property; (ii) promised to vacate the
premises and remove all movables from the same on or before September 23, 2005; (iii)
promised to voluntarily and peacefully surrender the property in favor of the rightful owner BPI
without the necessity of any demand on or before September 23, 2005; and (iv) pledged not
to take advantage of the accommodation extended to them to secure any remedy from the
courts. BPI, thus, deferred the implementation of the writ to September 23, 2005 and upon
the lapse thereof even extended for another 60 days or until November 23, 2005 the
implementation of the writ.
The Spouses Andaya, however, failed to vacate the subject property. Despite BPI's
reminder of their commitment to surrender possession of the property without further need of
demand, the Spouses Andaya refused to turn over its possession and contended that BPI no
longer had the right to possess the property because the writ of possession had already been
implemented.
St. Raphael filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Possession and claimed that the school
building, while standing on the subject property, was not included in the real estate
mortgages. The Motion to Quash Writ of Possession was granted by the court a quo.
Aggrieved, BPI filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals wherein the CA
reversed the decision and the motion to quash writ of possession was denied and the writ is
declared valid and enforceable, thus entitling BPI to possession of the subject property,
including the building occupied by St. Raphael. Thus, the instant petition.
Issue:

Whether a writ of possession that was issued ex-parte as a result of the foreclosure of
the mortgages executed by Sps. Andaya on the subject property can be enforced and utilized
by BPI to oust St. Raphael from the physical possession of its school buildings built on the
same subject property.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The Court recognized that the writ of possession was warranted not merely on the
basis of the law, but ultimately on the right to possess as an incident of ownership. The right
to possess a property merely follows the right of ownership, and it would be illogical to hold
that a person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession.
Precisely, the basis for the grant of the writ of possession in this case is respondent's
ownership of the property by virtue of a tax delinquency sale in her favor, and by virtue of her
absolute right of ownership arising from the expiration of the period within which to redeem
the property.
The real estate mortgage agreement entered into by BPI and the Spouses Andaya is
the law between them. Suffice it to say that in all of the real mortgage agreements executed
by BPI and the Spouses Andaya in favor of St. Raphael, it was clearly and commonly
stipulated that the parties intend to include the improvements or buildings erected or to be
erected in the subject lot.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of a contract that if its terms are clear and leave
no doubt on the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall
control. In the absence of proof that the parties intended otherwise, the Court will not delve to
interpret the terms of the contract which are unequivocal as to the intention of the parties.

Cherith Bucal v. Manny Bucal, GR. No. 206957 (2015)
FACTS:
Cherith A. Bucal (Cherith) and Manny were married on July 29, 2005 and have a
daughter named Francheska A. Bucal (Francheska). Sometimes in 2010 Cherish filed against
Manny a Petition for the Issuance of a Protection Order base on VAWC Law. Cherith
specifically prayed that the RTC prohibit Manny from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with her, directly or indirectly and order Manny to
absolutely desist and refrain from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty and from
taking from her custody or charge of Francheska, and direct Manny and/or any of his family
members to stay away from her and any of her designated family or household members
under the limitations set by the court. Defendant Manny, in his pleading never prayed for
visitation rights. While Manny was present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and
PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking
for such relief.After due proceedings, the RTC issued a TPO granting the above-mentioned
reliefs. However, Manny was given visitation rights every Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00.
Cherith filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order, seeking the reversal of the grant of
visitation rights. Manny filed an Omnibus Motion praying among others that Cherith be cited
for contempt for failure to abide by the visitation rights granted to him. Cherith opposed
Manny’s Omnibus Motion, alleging that after she filed her petition, Manny personally
appeared before the court but did not file any pleading, nor oppose the prayer in her RTC
Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may grant a relief which was not prayed for in the pleading?
RULING:
NO. It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or
in excess of what is being sought by a party to a case.The rationale for the rule was explained
in Development Bank of thePhilippines v. Teston,viz: “Due process considerations justify this
requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the
pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of
a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.”
The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was present
during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any
pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for such relief.
For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the grant of visitation rights by the RTC
in favor of Manny, as contained in the PPO, and reiterated in its assailed Orders, being both

unexplained and not prayed for, is an act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction which deserves correction through the prerogative writ of certiorari.

Republic vs Mupas, 769 SCRA 384
Facts:
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government

– through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) – for the construction and development of the NAIA-IPT
III under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement.
On the other hand, Paircargo Consortium – composed of People’s Air Cargo and
Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Philippine Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS), and
Security Bank Corporation (Security Bank) – submitted its competitive proposal to the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).Paircargo Consortium offered to pay
the Government a total of P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment for 27 years while AEDC
offered to pay the Government a total of P135 million for the same period. Hence, DOTC
awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium (that later organized itself as PIATCO).
A Concession Agreement with PIATCO for the construction, development, and operation of
the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-transfer scheme was made to authorized PIATCO to
build, operate, and maintain the NAIA-IPT III during the concession period of twenty-five (25)
years.
On March 31, 2000, PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka andAsahikosan to aid in

constructing the project. However, PIATCO defaulted on its obligation to pay Takenaka and
Asahikosan pursuant to their respective contracts. Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer
PIATCO’s payments until June 2003. In 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in
her speech that the Government would not honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same day,
Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO that they were suspending the construction of the
NAIA-IPT III for PIATCO’s failure to provide adequate security. September 17, 2002,
petitioners Demosthenes Agan, et al., asked the Court to nullify the PIATCO contracts, and to
prohibit the DOTC and the MIAA from implementing these contracts for being contrary to law.
The case, entitled Agan v. PIATCO, was docketed as G.R. No. 15500.
May 5, 2003, the Court nullified the PIATCO contracts after finding that Paircargo Consortium
(that later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a duly pre-qualified bidder for failure to meet
the minimum equity requirements for the NAIA-IPT III project.
Security Bank (member of the Paircargo Consortium) invested its entire net worth in a single
undertaking or enterprise in gross violation of Section 21-B of the General Banking Act (which
limits a commercial bank’s equity investment, whether allied or non-allied, to fifteen percent
(15%) of its net worth).

PIATCO contracts contained provisions that substantially departed from the draft Concession
Agreement
December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III
before the RTC of Pasay, Branch 11
RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the Government. Citing City of Manila v.

Serrano,23 the RTC held that that it had the ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession upon:
(1) the filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and (2) the
Government’s deposit of the amount equivalent to the property’s assessed value, pursuant to
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
January 4, 2005, the RTC modified its December 21, 2004 order and directed: (1) the Land
Bank to immediately release to PIATCO the amount of US$62,343,175.77 25cralawred that
would be deducted from the just compensation; (2) the Government to submit to the RTC a
Certificate of Availability of Funds for the payment of just compensation; and (3) the
Government to maintain and preserve the NAIA-IPT III pending the expropriation proceedings
and the full payment of just compensation. The RTC likewise prohibited the Government from
performing acts of ownership over the NAIA-IPT III such as awarding concessions or leasing
any part of the NAIA-IPT III to other parties
RTC appointed three Commissioners 28 to determine just compensation without consulting the
Government and PIATCO
Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429
Government, et al., filed a petition for certiorari with the Court assailing the validity of
the January 4, 7, and 10, 2005 orders of the RTC in the expropriation case
, the Court did not recognize the London awards in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan. Under
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a foreign judgment would not bind Philippine courts
unless the judgment is recognized and enforced in this jurisdiction. Philippine courts may
annul a foreign judgment for lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
clear mistake of law or fact, or when the foreign judgment is contrary to public policy
PIATCO, as builder of the NAIA-IPT III, must first receive just compensation in accordance
with law and equity before the Government may take over the NAIA-IPT
Government should not pay for the portions of the NAIA-IPT III that were defective – as per
rtc
 (a) failed structural elements in the NAIA-IPT III;

(b) inferior quality of material works;
(c) constructed areas that are unnecessary to the use of an international airport

terminal;
(d) cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements;
(e) cost of completing the items listed in the JAC project status summary report of
February 28, 2003; and
(f) cost of seismic and gravity load structural retrofits for the failed elements in the
elevated roadway structures.
RTC stated that just compensation is limited to the value of the improvement at the time of
the filing of the expropriation complaint. The payment of just compensation does not include
the right to be compensated of the franchise to operate the airport, and the increased value of
improvements due to inflation rate.
PIATCO, Takenaka, and Asahikosan sought to nullify the RTC decision for alleged violation
of their right to due process. They complained that they were only furnished copies of the
BOC Final Report only after the promulgation of the May 23, 2011 decision. 103 They averred
that the RTC violated Sections 7 and 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court which provide that the
clerk of court shall serve copies of the commissioners’ report on all interested parties, with
notice that they be allowed ten days within which to file objections to the findings of the report,
if they so desire
the offer to pay through an escrow account is not equivalent to direct payment. PIATCO
further denied the Government’s allegations that there were several claimants on the just
compensation
RTC ruled that it has residual jurisdiction to adjudicate the Government’s Manifestation and
Motion considering that the motion was filed prior to the parties’ filing of the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC opined that the Manifestation and Motion was akin to a motion for execution
pending appeal. The Manifestation and Motion showed the Government’s intent to voluntarily
comply with the May 23, 2011 decision which was pending appeal before the CA. Under
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the RTC has the residual power to issue orders for
the protection and preservation of the parties’ rights, and to order the execution of a decision
pending appeal. Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court provides that courts
have incidental power to issue orders that are necessary to effectuate their judgments.
The CA Rulings

CA upheld the validity of the RTC’s May 23, 2011 decision. The CA ruled that the parties did
not need to be furnished the BOC Final Report since RA 8974 is silent on the appointment of
the BOC, as held in Gingoyon.
However, the CA modified the RTC rulings and arrived at its own formula of the NAIA-IPT III’s
replacement cost
The CA likewise observed that PIATCO’s summarized computation of attendant costs was
self-serving and unsubstantiated by relevant evidence.
CA further ordered Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the expenses of the BOC. Since
Takenaka and Asahikosan’s inputs on the construction costs of the NAIA-IPT III were heard
by the RTC, they should share in the expenses of the BOC.
Upon finality of judgment, interest on the sum due by then shall be at 6% per annum until fully
paid pursuant to BSP Circular No. 799, series of 2013 which took effect on 01 July 2013, and
which effectively modified the interest rate rulings in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals. Eastern Shipping was the basis of the Court’s earlier imposition of a 12% interest
from finality of judgment.
The Action to Enforce the London Awards, Civil Case No. 06-171
In a decision dated September 6, 2010, the RTC recognized the validity of the London
awards in Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 and declared these awards as enforceable
in the Philippine jurisdiction. The RTC thus ordered PIATCO to pay Takenaka and
Asahikosan the sum of $85.7 million.124cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209917 is the Government’s petition for review on certiorari128 to partially reverse the
CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision129 and its October 29, 2013 Resolution130 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 98029.
G.R. No. 209696 is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Takenaka and Asahikosan to
partially reverse the CA’s August 22, 2013 Amended Decision and its October 29, 2013
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 98029. 131cralawrednad
G.R. No. 209731 is PIATCO’s petition for review on certiorari to reverse the CA’s August 22,
2013 Amended Decision, and October 29, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
98029.132cralawrednad
G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696 & 209731 originally arose from the Government’s complaint for

expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III filed with the RTC of Pasay, Branch 117 in Civil Case
No. 04-0876. The main issue before the Court in these petitions is the valuation of the just
compensation due for the Government’s expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III.
G.R. No. 181892 is the Government’s petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order,133 assailing the May 3, 2007, May 18, 2008; and January 7, 2008
orders of the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 117 in Civil Case No. 04-0876. 134cralawrednad
This petition likewise arose from the Government’s complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-
IPT III. The main issue in this petition is the propriety of the appointment of DG Jones and
Partners as an independent appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III.
G.R. No. 202166 is PIATCO’s petition for review on certiorari135 to assail the CA’s March 13,
2012 decision136 and May 31, 2012 Resolution137 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96502. The petition
arose from Takenaka and Asahikosan’s action to enforce the London awards before the RTC
of Makati, Branch 143 in Civil Case No. 06-171. As previously mentioned, this case was not
consolidated with the four (4) cases above and shall thus be separately ruled upon by the
Court.
The Government’s Position (G.R. Nos. 209917, 209731, and 209696)
partially reverse the CA rulings and to deduct from the replacement cost of
US$300,206,693.00 the following items: (a) depreciation in the amount of US$36,814,612.00;
and (b) PIATCO’s non-compliance with contract specifications in the amount of
US$113,944,044.0
Whether the Government may take property for public purpose or public use upon the
issuance and the effectivity of the writ of possession
Held:
The parties were afforded procedural

due process despite their non-receipt
of the BOC Final Report prior to
the promulgation of the RTC’s
May 23, 2011 Decision.
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that the clerk of court shall serve copies of the
commissioners’ final report on all interested parties upon the filing of the report. Each party
shall have ten days within which to file their objections to the report’s findings

Upon the expiration of the ten-day period or after all the parties have filed their objections and
after hearing, the trial court may: (a) accept the report and render judgment in accordance
therewith; (b) for cause shown, recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of
facts; (c) set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; (d) partially accept the report;
and (e) make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation; and to the defendant, the just
compensation for the property so taken.
We rule that the parties’ failure to receive the Final Report did not render the May 23, 2011
Decision null and void.
The essence of procedural due process is the right to be heard.172 The procedural due
process requirements in an eminent domain case are satisfied if the parties are given the
opportunity to present their evidence before the commissioners whose findings (together with
the pleadings, evidence of the parties, and the entire record of the case) are reviewed and
considered by the expropriation court. It is the parties’ total failure to present evidence on just
compensation that renders the trial court’s ruling void. The opportunity to present evidence
during the trial remains to be the vital requirement in the observance of due process
The mere failure of the RTC’s clerk of court to send the parties copies of the BOC Final
Report is not substantial enough under the attendant circumstances to affect and nullify the
whole proceedings. Litigation is not a game of technicalities
The power of eminent domain is

a fundamental state power that is
inseparable from sovereignty.Eminent domain is a fundamental state power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private
property within its territorial sovereignty to promote public welfare. The exercise of this power
is based on the State’s primary duty to serve the common need and advance the general
welfare.174 It is an inherent power and is not conferred by the Constitution. 175 It is inalienable
and no legislative act or agreement can serve to abrogate the power of eminent domain when
public necessity and convenience require its exercise. 176cralawrednad
The decision to exercise the power of eminent domain rests with the legislature which has the
exclusive power to prescribe how and by whom the power of eminent domain is to be
exercised. Thus, the Executive Department cannot condemn properties for its own use
without direct authority from the Congress.
Just compensation is the full and

fair equivalent of the property taken from the
owner by the condemnor.

In cases where the fair market value of the property is difficult to ascertain, the court may use
other just and equitable market methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair market value
of a property
The Court cannot consider

the additional evidence submitted by Takenaka
and Asahikosan before the Court of Appeals
At the outset, we rule that we cannot consider Takenaka and Asahikosan’s attachments in
their (1) Motion for Submission of Additional Documents dated July 30, 2013; 260 (2)
Supplemental Motion for Submission of Additional Documents dated October 3, 2012; 261 and
(3) Second Supplemental Motion for Submission of Additional Documents dated April 11,
2013 in CA G.R. No. CV-98029. 262 These attachments sought to refute the Government’s
position that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from massive structural defects.
Takenaka and Asahikosan posit that they could have submitted reports before the trial court
to show that the design of the NAIA-IPT III was structurally sound if the RTC had only
furnished the parties copies of the BOC Final Report and afforded them the opportunity to file
a Comment on the Final Report.
Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules of the CA, the CA may receive evidence in the
following cases:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) In actions falling within its original jurisdiction, such as (1) certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, (2) annulment of judgment or final order, (3) quo warranto, (4) habeas corpus, (5)
amparo, (6) habeas data, (7) anti-money laundering, and (8) application for judicial
authorization under the Human Security Act of 2007;
(b) In appeals in civil cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court;
(c) In appeals in criminal cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 124 of the rules of Court; and
(d) In appeals involving claims for damages arising from provisional remedies. (Emphasis
supplied)
This provision qualifies the CA’s power to receive evidence in the exercise of its original and
appellate jurisdiction under Section 9 of BP 129, as amended:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x xxx

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence, and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct
new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief
Justice.
Since Takenaka and Asahikosan filed an ordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 41 in relation to
Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the CA could only have admitted newly discovered
evidence. Contrary to Takenaka and Asahikosan’s claim, the attachments to the motions are
not newly discovered evidence. Newly discovered evidence is evidence that could not, with
reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial, and which, if
presented, would probably alter the result. 263cralawrednad
We find it hard to believe that Takenaka and Asahikosan could only have possibly secured
the attachments after the trial court had rendered its decision. With the exercise of reasonable
diligence, Takenaka and Asahikosan could have produced these documents before the BOC
since they were fully aware that the Government presented evidence on the alleged structural
defects of the NAIA-IPT III.
Equiponderance of evidence on

the alleged structural defects of the NAIA-IPT
III favors PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan.
Nonetheless, even without considering and/or giving probative value to the additional
evidence presented by Takenaka and Asahikosan before the CA, this Court finds that the
Government failed to establish by preponderance of evidence that the NAIA-IPT III suffered
from structural defects.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a person is innocent of
wrong;265 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; 266that private transactions have
been fair and regular;267 and that the ordinary course of business has been
followed.268cralawrednad
Based on these presumptions, we presume that Takenaka and Asahikosan built the NAIA-
IPT III in accordance with the specifications required under the Onshore Construction
Contract and Offshore Procurement Contract. We also presume that the NAIA-IPT III is
structurally sound and compliant with the applicable building codes and other laws at the time
it was designed and built.

However, these presumptions are merely disputable presumptions and may be overcome by
contradicting evidence. The burden of proof lies with the Government to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from structural defects.
“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of
evidence” or “greater weight of credible evidence.” 269cralawrednad
In determining where the preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence on the

issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
witness’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of
their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility in so far as
the same may legitimately appear during trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, although preponderance does not necessarily lie with the greater
number.270cralawrednad
The Government’s burden of proof to show that the NAIA-IPT III is indeed defective does not
shift to its adverse parties. The burden of proof remains throughout the trial with the party
upon whom it is imposed.
It is the burden of evidence that shifts from party to party during trial. 271 This means that the
burden of going forward with the evidence is met by the countervailing evidence of PIATCO,
Takenaka and Asahikosan which, in turn, balances the evidence introduced by the
Government. Thereafter, the burden of evidence shifts back to the Government.
In the present case, the experts and consultants of the Government, PIATCO, Takenaka and
Asahikosa arrived at conflicting findings regarding the structural integrity of the NAIA-IPT III.
The Government’s experts detailed with particularity the alleged defects of the NAIA-IPT III,
which allegations the experts of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan refuted with particularity.
Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when the scale of justice shall stand on
equipoise and nothing in the evidence inclines a conclusion to one side or the other, the court
will find for the defendant. 272cralawrednad
If the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the allegations of the plaintiff and the other consistent with the defense of the
defendant, the evidence does not fulfill the requirement of preponderance of evidence. When
the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the
preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof fails. 273cralawrednad

The reason for this rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not
on the weakness of the defendant's claim. Thus, even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be
stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side when
this evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. 274cralawrednad
In the present case, PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan, met the Government’s allegations
regarding the structural integrity of the NAIA-IPT III.
A reading of the reports of the parties’ respective experts shows that each party presented an
equally persuasive case regarding the structural soundness or defect of the NAIA-IPT III. The
Government’s case on the alleged structural defect of the NAIA-IPT III has been met by
equally persuasive refutations by the experts of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan.
As a matter of law and evidence, the Government’s case regarding this matter must fail.
Since PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan presented equally relevant and sufficient
countervailing evidence on the structural soundness of the NAIA-IPT III, the scales of justice
tilt in their favor. Neither party successfully established a case by preponderance of evidence
in its favor; neither side was able to establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence
it had. As a consequence, we can only leave them as they are. 275cralawrednad
PIATCO’s attendant costs
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving
the terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
The best evidence rule ensures that the exact contents of a document are brought before the
court. In deeds, wills, and contracts, a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in
the rights and obligations of the parties. A substantial hazard of inaccuracy exists in the
human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting. Moreover, with respect to oral
testimony purporting to give the terms of a document from memory, a special risk of error is
present, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations
generally.286cralawrednad
The best evidence rule likewise acts as an insurance against fraud. If a party is in the
possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in
its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent
purposes that its production would expose and defeat. The rule likewise protects against
misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected
portions of a larger set of writings. 287cralawrednad
As exceptions to the best evidence rule, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides

that non-original documents may be produced in court in the following
cases:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
) faith on the part of the offeror;
(b When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom the evidence
) is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c)When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
) public office. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory that the original
cannot be produced by the party who offers the evidence within a reasonable time by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. 288cralawrednad
PIATCO argues that its non-submission of original documents before the trial court is justified
under Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It points out that a party need not submit
the original when it consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole. PIATCO insists that the lower courts erred in not giving
probative value to the report prepared by Reyes Tacandong& Co., an auditing firm, validating
PIATCO’s computation of attendant costs. Significantly, Reyes Tacandong& Co. failed to
state that it examined the original documents in validating PIATCO’s computation of attendant
costs.
We agree with PIATCO that it need not submit numerous and voluminous invoices, official
receipts, and other relevant documents before the trial court to prove the attendant costs that
it incurred in the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. The trial court may admit a summary of
voluminous original documents, in lieu of original documents, if the party has shown that the
underlying writings are numerous and that an in-court examination of these documents would
be inconvenient. In other words, Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does away with
the item-by-item court identification and authentication of voluminous exhibits which would
only be burdensome and tedious for the parties and the court.
However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary of numerous

documents, the proponent must lay a proper foundation for the admission of the original
documents on which the summary is based. The proponent must prove that the source
documents being summarized are also admissible if presented in court. 289cralawrednad
In concrete terms, the source documents must be shown to be original, and not secondary.
Furthermore, the source documents must likewise be accessible to the opposing party so that
the correctness of the summary of the voluminous records may be tested on cross-
examination and/or may be refuted in pleadings. In ordinary trial-type proceedings, a proper
foundation for the introduction of a summary may be established through the “testimony of the
person who is responsible for the summary's preparation, or the person who supervised the

preparation of the summary.”290cralawrednad
The primary reason for these procedural foundations is that the summary of numerous
documents is, in strict terms, hearsay evidence. The trial court should not haphazardly allow a
party to present a summary of numerous documents and immediately admit and give
probative value to such summary without sufficiently laying these foundations. If the source
documents of the summary are non-original, the trial court would commit a grave error in
admitting and/or giving probative value to the summary of non-original documents; the
evidence admitted would be double hearsay.291cralawrednad
Furthermore, when a party invokes Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he does not
similarly invoke Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He does not
likewise claim that the original documents have been lost or destroyed. The party merely
asserts that the numerous documents cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and that the fact sought to be established from these documents is only the general result of
the whole.
Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best evidence rule pursuant to Section 3 (c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he asks permission from the trial court to produce a summary
of numerous documents, whose originals are available to the adverse party for inspection. He
does not ask permission from the trial court to present in evidence the numerous non-original
documents. Otherwise, the very purpose of Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
would be defeated. In that case, every exhibit of non-original documents would be identified,
authenticated, and cross-examined, leading to a tedious and protracted litigation.
Thus, if a party desires to present photocopies of the original documents, he must first

establish that the presentation of photocopies is justified under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He must establish the presence of all the elements under
these provisions.
In the case of lost or destroyed documents, the offeror of non-original documents must first
prove the following elements before secondary evidence is admitted before the court: (a) the
existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the
reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the
offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. To conclude otherwise is to
allow the party to circumvent the best evidence rule and the requirements under Section 3
(a), (b), and (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court by merely invoking Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
In the present case, PIATCO attached to its Compliance dated December 14, 2010,

the photocopies of numerous documents, and the validation of PIATCO’s computation of
attendant costs prepared by Reyes Tacandong& Co., among others. PIATCO justifies the
non-presentment of original documents pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
We affirm the lower courts’ uniform findings that PIATCO failed to establish its attendant

costs. PIATCO failed to establish that the photocopied documents fall under Section 3 (a),
(b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These photocopied documents are hearsay
evidence. They are mere scraps of paper and have no weight as basis for the attendant costs
of the NAIA-IPT III.
We likewise cannot give weight to the summary prepared by Reyes Tacandong& Co. for
being double hearsay. Reyes Tacandong& Co., whose letter was addressed to PIATCO and
not to the trial court, did not state in its report that it examined the original documents
allegedly proving attendant costs. Moreover, in a letter dated December 14, 2010, Reyes
Tacandong& Co stated it does not “express any assurance on the attendant costs:”
We have performed the procedures agreed with Philippine International Air Terminals, Co.,
(“the Company”) with respect to the Company’s attendant costs incurred in building NAIA
Terminal 3 from 1997 to 2004. Our engagement was undertaken in accordance with the
Philippine Standard on Related Services applicable to agreed-upon procedures
engagements.
x xxx
The sufficiency of the procedures is solely the responsibility of the specified users of the
report. Consequently, we make no representation regarding the sufficiency of the procedures
either for the purpose for which this report has been requested or for any other purpose.
Because the procedures do not constitute either an audit or a review of financial statements
made in accordance with Philippine Standards on Auditing, we do not express any assurance
on the attendant costs. (Emphasis supplied)

SECURITIES and EXCHANGE COMMISSION, vs. UNIVERSAL RIGHTFIELD PROPERTY
HOLDINGS, INC.,
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Respondent is Universal
Rightfield Property Holdings, Inc. (URPHI). URPHI is a corporation duly registered and
existing under Philippine Law which is engaged in the business of providing residential and
leisure-related needs and wants market.
SEC issued an Order revoking URPHI's Registration of SEC for failure to timely file its Year
2001 Annual Report and Year 2002, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Quarterly Reports which required
pursuant to Section 17 of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC). On October 16, 2003,
URPHI Filed a motion to set aside the revocation order and reinstate registration after
complying with its reportorial requirements. On October 24, 2003, SEC granted the motion to
lift the revocation order. However, URPHI failed again to comply with the same reportorial
requirements.
On June 24, 2004, in a NOTICE OF HEARING, SEC directed URPHI to show cause why its
registration of Securities and Certificate of Permit to Sell securities to the Public should not be
suspended for failure to submit said requirements in violation of SRC Rule 17. On July 6,
2004, the scheduled hearing, URPHI through its Chief accountant, informed SEC why it failed
to submit the reportorial requirement, viz:
(1) it was constrained to reduce its accounting staff due to cost-cutting measures; thus, some
of the audit requirements were not completed within the original timetable;
(2) its audited financial statements for the period ending December 31, 2003 could not be
finalized by reason of the delay in the completion of some of its audit requirements.
On July 27, 2004, SEC suspended URPHI's registration of Securities and Permit to Sell
Securities to the public for failure to submit the reportorial requirements DESPITE THE
LAPSO OF THE EXTENTION PERION, and due to lack of sufficient justification.
On August 23, 2004, SEC informed URPHI that it failed to submit its 2004 2nd Quarter Report
in violation of the amended IRR of the SRC Rule 17.a (1)(A)(ii). It directed URPHI to file the
said report and show cause why it should not be held in violation for the said rule.
On September 23, 2004, URPHI requested for a final extension or until November 15, 2004.

On December 1, 2004, URPHI filed with SEC its 2003 Annual Report. On December 8, 2004,
SEC revoked URPHI's Registration of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to the Public for
its failure to submits its reportorial requirements within the final extension period.
On December 9, 10 and 14, 2004, URPHI finally submitted to the SEC its Quarterly Reports.
URPHI appealed the SEC Order of Revocation dated December 8, 2004 by filing a Notice of
Appeal and a Memorandum both dated January 3, 2005.
On December 15, 2005, SEC denied URPHI's appeal through a resolution.
Aggrieved, URPHI filed a petition for review with the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the URPHI was accorded all the opportunity to be heard and comply
with all the reportorial requirements before the Order of Revocation was issued by SEC.
Held: YES. SC granted the petition as meritorious stating that there is no dispute that the
violation of reportorial requirements under Sec 17.1 of the Amended IRR of the SRC is a
ground for suspension or revocation of the registration of securities pursuant to Sec 13.1 and
54.1 of the SRC to wit:
13.1. The Commission may reject a registration statement and refuse registration of the
security thereunder, or revoke the effectivity of a registration statement and the registration of
the security thereunder after due notice and hearing by issuing an order to such effect, setting
forth its findings in respect thereto, if it finds that:
a) The issuer:
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) Has violated any of the provisions of this Code, the rules promulgated pursuant thereto, or
any order of the
Commission of which the issuer has notice in connection with the offering for which a
registration statement has been filed;
54.1. If, after due notice and hearing, the Commission finds that: (a) There is a violation of
this Code, its rules, or its orders; (b) Any registered broker or dealer, associated person
thereof has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations, another
person subject to supervision who commits any such violation;
(c) Any registrant or other person has, in a registration statement or in other reports,
applications, accounts, records or documents required by law or rules to be filed with the
Commission, made any

untrue statement of a material fact, or omitted to state any material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading; or, in
the case of an underwriter, has failed to conduct an inquiry with reasonable diligence
to insure that a registration statement is accurate and complete in all material
respects;
or (d) Any person has refused to permit any lawful examinations into its affairs, it
shall, in its discretion, and subject only to the limitations hereinafter prescribed,
impose any or all of the following sanctions as may be appropriate in light of the
facts and circumstances:
(i) Suspension, or revocation of any registration for the offering of securities;
SC further held that the essence of due process is simply giving an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute
absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.
The due notice of revocation given to URPHI through the SEC Order dated July 27,
2004, wherein the SEC expressly warned that such registration would be revoked
should it persistently fail to comply with the said requirements. Still, URPHI
continuously failed to submit the required reports. Due notice simply means the
information must be given or made to a particular person or to the public within a
legally mandated period of time so that its recipient will have the opportunity to
respond to a situation or to allegations that affect the individual's or public's legal
rights or duties.
Furthermore, the SC notes that SEC has both regulatory and adjudicative functions.
The revocation of registration of securities and permit to sell them to the public is not
an exercise of the SEC's quasi-judicial power, but of its regulatory power.
The case used by URPHI which is the Globe Telecom ruling is different from the
case at hand. The SC in Globe Case ruled that the fined imposed by the NTC
without notice and hearing was null and void due to the denial of petitioner's right to
due process. The revocation of URPHI's registration of securities and permit to sell
them to the public cannot be considered a penalty but a withdrawal of a privilege,
which regulatory power the SEC validly exercised after giving it due notice and
opportunity to be heard.
Thus, petition is granted and the decision of CA is reversed. The requirements of

due notice and hearing under Section 13.1 and 54.1 of the SRC were substantially
complied with.

ACAMPADO V. SPS. COSMILLA
G.R. No. 198531, September 25, 2015
FACTS:
The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of
Document filed by respondents against petitioners before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan,
Branch 6. In their Amended Complaint6 docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 6644,
respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the sale of their share on the subject
property was effected thru a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and is therefore
null and void. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 31 March
2005 dismissing the complaint of the respondents for failure to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the SPA were
forged.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 on 6 May 2005 seeking

for the reversal of the earlier RTC Decision. For failure of the respondents, however,
to comply with the requirement of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus12 with prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and TRO seeking to annul and set aside the RTC Order
dated 16 May 2005. For lack of merit, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
filed by the respondents.
On Motion for Reconsideration by Respondents, however, the Court of Appeals

reversed its earlier Resolution and allowed the relaxation of the procedural in a
Resolution16 dated 28 June 2007. Hence, the appellate court vacated the 16 May
2005 Order of the RTC directed the court a quo to thresh out the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the respondents on the merits.
In a Resolution17 dated 19 August 2011, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have complied with the requirement of notice of
hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
RULING:
PETITIONERS. Rule 15 Secs 4-6The foregoing requirements — that the notice

shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the
hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the
motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not comply with the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper
which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority

to act upon.21 The logic for such requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains
a prayer which the movant makes to the court which is usually in the interest of the
adverse party to oppose.
The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process; it
gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of
the movant. In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which
does not afford the adverse party a chance to oppose should simply be
disregarded.24 Principles of natural justice demand that a right of a party should not
be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, the three-day
requirement is not a hard and fast rule.31 Where a party has been given an
opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is
compliance with the rule.32 The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard,
as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert
the grounds upon which it is based. Considering that the running of the period
towards the finality of the judgment was not stopped, the RTC Decision dated 31
March 2005 became final and executory. Every litigation must come to an end once
a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable.
It is important, however, to note that these doctrines refer exclusively to a motion,

since a motion invariably contains a prayer, which the movant makes to the court,
which is to repeat usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose and in the
observance of due process, the other party must be given the opportunity to oppose
the motion.[27] In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion
which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply
be disregarded.[28] Failure to comply with the required notice and hearing is a
fatal defect that is deleterious to respondents cause. [29]
In New Japan Motors, Inc. v. Perucho,[30] the Court dismissed the motion for
reconsideration that was unaccompanied by a notice of hearing as a piece of paper
unworthy of judicial cognizance:
"Under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, x xx a motion is required

to be accompanied by a notice of hearing which must be served by the applicant on
all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof. Section 6 of
the same rule commands that '(n)o motion shall be acted upon by the Court, without
proof of service of the notice thereof x xx.' It is therefore patent that the motion for
reconsideration in question is fatally defective for it did not contain any notice
of hearing. We have already consistently held in a number of cases that the
requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are
mandatory and that failure to comply with the same is fatal to movant's cause."
(Emphasis supplied)

Zarate v Aquino III
Petitioners aver that they are members of various progressive party-lists that have
been wrongfully tagged by the military and the police as "communist front
organizations. As alleged in the petition, sometime in March 2014, the Government
commenced intensified military offensives in Talaingod, Davao del Norte under the
rubric of counterinsurgency. About 1,300 Manobos allegedly evacuated to Davao
City to escape the effects of said military operationsevacuees.
Beginning January 2015, however, some of the Manobos started going back
to Davao City. By July 2015, approximately 700 Manobos were at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) Haran. Petitioners claimed that these Manobos
sought refuge at UCCP Haran due to the persisting militarization of their
communities and their forcible recruitment to the paramilitary group, Alamara
Certain Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that they were deceived into
going to Davao City; that, upon reaching UCCP Haran, they were deprived of their
freedom of locomotion and were held there against their will from 3 February 2015
to 25 February 2015; that during said period they were forced to listen to lectures
and join rallies; until a fellow tribe member was found dead, hanging lifeless on a
tree, inside the UCCP Haran compound; and that it was only then that they were
allowed to go home with the body of the deceased. Filed a complaint for
(Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention), and Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003).
To determine who would be charged in the complaint, the complainants were

shown "lists" from which they purportedly identified the defendants. Petitioners now
aver that the inclusion of their names and photographs in the "lists" indicates that
they are and have been the subject of State surveillance. incriminate them in
fabricated criminal charges, and insinuations of their links with the New People's
Army. petitioners argue that their inclusion in the "lists" are threats to their life,
liberty, and security warranting the protection of the writ of amparo. Additionally,
petitioners claim that as there is absolutely no basis for the inclusion of their names
and photographs in the "lists," then respondents should be compelled via the writ of
habeas data to disclose and to provide petitioners with copies of all information and
evidence pertaining to them which respondents have in their files or records, and for
such information to be destroyed.
Held: Dismissed. Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence. "only
actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the
case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. Mere membership in organizations or sectors historically involved in EJKs
cannot equate to an actual threat that would warrant the issuance of a writ of
amparo. We note, however, that the matter of petitioner Zarate's supposed inclusion
in the military's OB has already been addressed by the Court in the consolidated

cases of In re: Petition for the Issuance ofa Writ ofAmparo in favor of Lilibeth 0.
Ladaga, et al. As for the pending cases against petitioner Zarate, suffice it to say
that the complaints were duly supported by affidavits,20 police blotters,21 medical
records,22 and reports of social workers
Petitioners Mariano and Casino, on the other hand, cite their previous charge
of rebellion,24 and their earlier implication in a kidnapping with murder case. The
filing of cases, however, cannot be characterized as an unlawful act or omission in
the context of the Amparo Rule. Of all the petitioners, it is only petitioner
Balabapersonalwhoalleged circumstances claiming threatened violations of her right
to life, liberty and security. However, The instances cited by petitioner Balaba fail to
demonstrate an actual threat to her life, liberty, and security.
The writ of habeas data is a "remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The extraordinary writ of
habeas data "provides a judicial remedy to protect a person's right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Rule on
the Writ ofHabeas Data) provides that the petition should aver "the manner the
right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party." The Habeas Data Rule likewise requires
substantial evidence. In the present petition, petitioners fail to show how their right
to privacy is violated given that the information contained in the "lists" are only their
names, their positions in their respective organizations, and their photographs. All
these data are of public knowledge and are readily accessible even to civilians.
Although the petition for a writ of habeas data may be filed by family
member, or even relatives, on behalf of the aggrieved party,35 the Habeas Data
Rule presupposes that the aggrieved party is still alive

G.R. NO. L-46496 FEBRUARY 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND
PROPIETOR, AND
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative
Bodies
Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies
the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of
a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off
were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers
Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated
union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB
won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The
Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD:
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained
by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so
inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence
in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are
of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained
records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the
requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be
complied with by observing the following:
 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but
the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Posted by Glasses_Guy at 2:11 AM

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Anzaldo vs Clave GR L-54597 15 December 1982
Facts: The Science Research Supervisor II position was vacant and both Dr

Felicidad Anzaldo and Dr Eulalia Venzon were next-in-rank for the said position.
Venzon was recommended for the position to w/c Anzaldo protested. The position
was not filled up until NIST OIC appointed Anzaldo to that position. The same was
approved by Civil Service Commission. Venzon contested this and appealed to the
Office of the President. This protest was sent to Civil Service Commission and was
decided in favour of Venzon by Chairman Jacobo Clave. Anzaldo’s motion for
reconsideration was denied and she appealed to Office of the President to w/c Clave
is concurrently Presidential Executive Assistant. Appeal was revoked and ruled as
“as recommended by the Civil Service Commission.”
Issue: Whether or not Clave denied due process to Anzaldo on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion?
Decision: Decision of respondent set aside and Anzaldo’s appointment declared
valid. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own
recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to w/c doctor
should be appointed for the position, should be adopted by the President of the
Philippines. Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil
Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should
be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would
decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)Rivera vs. CSC, Land Bank of the
Philippines (January 4, 1995)
Facts:
Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and was charged with
dishonesty, receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the
course of official duties, committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft Laws, and
pursuit of private business vocation or profession without permission required by
CSC. Rivera allegedly toldPerez that he would facilitate the processing, approval
and release of his loan if he would be given 10% commission. Riverawas further
charged having served and acted, without prior authority required by CSC, as the
personal consultant of Lao andconsultant in various companies where Lao had
investments. LBP held Rivers guilty of grave misconduct and actsprejudicial to the
best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank. The
penalty of forcedresignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was
thereupon imposed on Rivera.
Issue:
Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the capital
penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions
Ruling:
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved
Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving
Rivera’s appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence to a
fundamentalaspect of due process.CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and the case is
remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans the participation of CSCCommissioner
Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus appealed

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY vs THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
G.R. No. L-26803
October 14, 1975
Facts :
ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office concerning the use of trade
mark and trade name. ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised
Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases” as
amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said
office to hear “inter partes” proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that “all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly
prepared by the Director and signed by him.” These proceedings refer to the hearing
of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding
instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use
of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a
trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. Petitioners filed their
objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the
amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must
personally hear and decide inter partes case. Said objections were overruled by the
Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel the
Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing
officers.
Issue :
Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers are within due process.
Held :
The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative
agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made.
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and
discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the
basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does
due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking
of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As
long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the
record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are
fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer
concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is,
however, required that to “give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose
of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations
must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.”

ARNOLD P. MOLLANEDA
vs. LEONIDA C. UMACOB
G.R. No. 140128
June 6, 2001
FACTS:
Sometime Sept 7, 1994, Leonida Umacob, a public school, teacher went to the office
of Mr. Rolando P. Suase to follow up her request for transfer to a different district.
Therein, Arnold Mollaneda, school Division Superintendent, after entertaining her
request hugged her, embraced her, kissed her nose and lip in a torrid manner, and
mashed her breast. Mollaneda did these acts for several times then warned Umacob
not to tell the incident to anybody.
Umacob reported the incident to the police station and filed a complaint for acts of
lasciviousness before the Municipal Trial Court. She also filed an administrative
complaint as well with the Civil Service Commission - Regional Office XI, Davao City
(CSC-RO XI). She furnished the Department of Education, Culture and Sports -
Regional Office XI, Davao City (DECS-RO XI) a copy of her affidavit-complaint.
A DECS investigating committee was formed, which later recommended to the

DECS Regional Director "the dropping of the case" for lack of merit. Meanwhile, the
case before the CSC was heard before Atty. Anacleto Buena, which hearing was
attended by both parties and their counsel. CSC found Mollaneda guilty, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus Mollaneda elevated the case to the SC.
Mollaneda alleges that 1) Umacob was guilty of forum shopping, 2) He was denied
due process, and 3) witnesses' testimonies were hearsay. Pending the SC case, the
Municipal Trial Court dismissed the case of acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Umacob was guilty of forum shopping;
2) Whether or not court erred in giving weight to witnesses' testimonies; and
3) Whether or not dismissal of the case in the MTC merits dismissal of the CSC.
HELD:

1) No. With regard to the DECS and CSC, DECS was just furnished a copy of
the complaint - it was not filed before the DECS. The resolution of DECS was just a
recommendatory resolution. With regard to the filing of the case both in the CSC and
the court, the case filed before the CSC is an administrative case while that before
the court is a criminal case, thus it does not constitute forum shopping.
2) No. The witnesses' testimonies were offered not to prove its truth, but merely
to prove that Umacob told the witnesses what transpired in the office. What was
given more credence was the testimony of Umacob which was straight and replete
with details consistent with human nature.
3) No. Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a

criminal case against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not foreclose the administrative
proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In dismissing
the case, the MTC is simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the
guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution
guarantees an accused. However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of
proof required is only substantial evidence, which the court finds in this case.

FABELLA VS CA
FACTS:
Secretary Carino of DECS charged the teachers of Mandaluyong High School who
had participated in walkouts and strikes. DECS committee then rendered a decision
declaring the teachers guilty as charged and ordered for their dismissal. Teachers
argued that the composition of the committee was illegal for failure to comply with
the procedures prescribed in R.A. 4670, otherwise known as “Magna Carta for
Teachers” and that their dismissal was ordered without any formal investigation –
therefore, they are denied of due process. The secretary defended that the said law
was already repealed by P.D. 807.
ISSUE:
Whether the teachers were denied of due process?
RULING:
Yes. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private respondents did not include “a representative
of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. It was also not repealed by the
PD for being a special law.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction.

Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not
provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The
inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would
have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Therefore, there is no
formal investigation and they were denied of due process.
Contention: Waiver of Right of be Heard
Committee considered that the teachers waived their right to be heard because they
walked out during the proceedings.
Ruling - not tenable because the walk out was staged in protest against the
procedures of the committee and its refusal to give the teachers’ counsel a copy of
the guidelines. The committee concluded its investigation and ordered the dismissal
of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full access of the evidence
against them and the opportunity to defend themselves.
RE: Hearing presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal

Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the other hand,
presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal. The right to be heard and,
ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in the absence of an
independent, competent and impartial tribunal.
Re: Administrative Due Process
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the

following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondent’s legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to

present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a

person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence

submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made
known to the parties affected
RE: Right to Strike
While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize,

they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
Exceptions:
If not prejudicial to the public, or they did it during their break time, weekends, or
holidays.

Sps. Romualdez v. COMELEC
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ,

petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation
of the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false
information as to their residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen,
Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation
be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.
Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte
since 1989. On May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5
years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.
Issue: WON due process was violated.
Held: No.
First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is

couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the
charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic
Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the
election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different
from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the
COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the
charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the
RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged
violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations
directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact,
filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the
evidence presented by the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that
the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble
of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have

been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
Complaint or Information.
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due
process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s
Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are
based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the
Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are
the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or
submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the
RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the
opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2
April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-
Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They
similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was
not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the
stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably
apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears
stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were
given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these
stages, petitioners actively participated.

G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises.

During the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein
petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire
of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables.
Such conversation was recorded and was played during the house of
representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was
filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally seized
communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also
such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be prevented
from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was
no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such
investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower
the senate to further proceed with their investigation?
Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes publication
is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take
effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and
does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.

8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as
the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could

not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of

legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot

proceed for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly
published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if
allowed without observance of the required publication will put a person’s life,
liberty and property at stake without due process of law. Also, the further
assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their
web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was
only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme
with what the constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the
senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign
Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury
Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said
extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the
technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found
having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of
all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample
time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds:
He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation.
At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures
and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and
treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information
in the documents.
The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with
an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of
treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding
Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of

the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition
is now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be
done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable
and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts.
The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by
a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source
of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO
BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing
petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested

the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant
of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court
allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Ruling/s:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
“conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because
he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under
its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had
that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Quisumbing vs MERALCO
TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO
CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house
located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3,
1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to
conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and
observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by
the plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been
tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the
information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be
brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was
indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of
the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the
laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01
representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The
plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done
without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings, social and
business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for
damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the
billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and
exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be recovered
when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without
due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are
imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of
MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done
in strict observance of the rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric
Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of
alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”. During the inspection, no
government official or ERB representative was present.

Petitioner’s claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and
was premised only upon Lorna’s testimony. These are compensation for an injury
that will put the injure position where it was before it was injured.

Lim vs Court of Appeals GR 111397 12 August 2002
Facts: Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with
prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Mayor
Alfredo Lim. Policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s
license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused
the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant operations. Lim also
refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the work
permit applications of Bistro’s staff. Court granted preliminary injunction. However
Lim issued closure of Bistro operations and filed motion to dissolve the injunction
order.
Issue: Whether or not Lim violated due process on the ground of failing to give
Bistro the opportunity to be heard?
Decision: Petition denied. Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or
any business establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take
refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government
Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor
authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and
hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause
of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut
the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits. The
regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law.

ROLANDO PLACIDO and EDGARDO CARAGAY, Vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 180888, September 18, 2009
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Rolando Placido (Placido) and Edgardo Caragay (Caragay) had
been employed since January 22, 1981 and June 1, 1983, respectively, both as
cable splicers by respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
Incorporated (PLDT).

It appears that since August 2000, PLDT had been receiving reports of theft
and destruction of its cables. On March 13, 2001, PLDT Duty Inspector Ricardo
Mojica (Mojica) and PLDT Security Guard/Driver Mark Anthony Cruto (Cruto),
responding to a report that cables were being stripped and burned in one of the
residences along Alley 2 Street, Project 6, Quezon City, proceeded to the said area
where they saw petitioners’ service vehicle parked infront of the house at No. 162.
They likewise saw petitioners stripping and burning cables inside the compound of
the house which turned out to belong to Caragay’s mother. With the assistance of
police and barangay officials, PLDT recovered the cables bearing the “PLDT”
marking.

The incident spawned the filing, on complaint of PLDT, of an Information for
Qualified Theft against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 99467.

In a related move, PLDT required petitioners to explain within 72 hours why no
severe disciplinary action should be taken against them for Serious Misconduct and
Dishonesty. After several requests for extension to submit their explanations,
petitioners submitted a joint explanation on June 11, 2001 denying the charges
against them. By their claim, they were on their way back from the house of one
Jabenz Quezada (Quezada) from whom they were inquiring about a vehicle when
they were detained by Mojica.


On petitioners’ request, a formal hearing was scheduled. Their request for a
copy of the Security Investigation was denied, however, on the ground that they are
only entitled to “be informed of the charges, and they cannot demand for the report
as it is still on the confidential stage.”

During the June 25, 2001 formal hearing scheduled by PLDT, representatives
from petitioners’ union Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) were
present. As petitioners’ counsel could not attend the hearing due to a previously
scheduled hearing at the RTC Makati, petitioners requested for another setting but it
was denied. Petitioners were, however, given a non-extendible period of three days
to submit their evidence.

Mojica testified during the hearing that when petitioners saw him as they were
stripping and burning the cables, they fled but surfaced thirty minutes later from Alley
6 Street wearing different clothes; and that according to Rodolfo R. Anor, PLDT Work
Order Supervisor, the cables could be dead cables that were not recovered by
contractors.

Petitioners’ counsel later reiterated the request for a setting of a hearing and
an audiotape of the June 25, 2001 hearing, but the same was denied. A third time
request for another hearing was likewise denied.

On May 17, 2002, PLDT sent notices of termination to petitioners, prompting
them to file on May 24, 2002 a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter.

By Decision of January 12, 2004, Labor Arbiter Catalino R. Laderas held that
petitioners were illegally dismissed, there being no provision in PLDT’s rules and
regulations that stripping and burning of PLDT cables and wires constitute Serious
Misconduct and Dishonesty; that PLDT’s seeming lack of urgency in taking any
disciplinary action against petitioners negates the charges; and that dismissal is too
harsh, given petitioners’ years of service and lack of previous derogatory record.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by Decision
dated February 28, 2005, reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and dismissed
petitioners’ complaint for lack of merit, it holding that they were validly dismissed for
just cause ─ “theft of company property.”


In brushing aside petitioners’ disclaimer of the acts attributed to them, the
NLRC noted that, inter alia, they failed to present any affidavit of Quezada to prove
that they were indeed at his house inquiring about a vehicle.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In the meantime or on February 15, 2007, Branch 104 of the Quezon City RTC
acquitted petitioners in Criminal Case No. 99467 on the ground of reasonable doubt,
it holding that the prosecution failed to prove that the cables were in fact stolen from
PLDT.

By Decision of September 28, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC
Decision, it holding that since the cables bore the “PLDT” marking, they were
presumed to be owned by PLDT, hence, the burden of evidence shifted on
petitioners to prove that they were no longer owned by PLDT, but they failed.

Ruling out petitioners’ claim that they were denied due process, the appellate
court held that they were given ample opportunity to defend themselves during the
administrative hearing during which they were furnished with written invitations for
their appearance before the investigating unit on several dates, but they refused to
submit themselves to the investigation. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having
been denied by Resolution of December 17, 2007, the present petition was filed.

Petitioners insist that the presence of the “PLDT” marking on the cables does
not prove that PLDT owned them at the time. They aver that PLDT disposes of used
and unserviceable materials, including cables and telephone wires which had been
declared junked and classified as scrap --- a substantial amount of which remains
insulated ---, and once disposed of, these cables, although still bearing the “PLDT”
marking, are no longer its property .

In fine, petitioners contend that PLDT’s ownership of cables or wires bearing
the “PLDT” marking on the insulation cannot be presumed, hence, a person’s
possession thereof does not give rise to the presumption that he obtained or stole
them from PLDT.

Additionally, petitioners aver that they were denied due process when PLDT
refused to furnish them a copy of the Investigation Report and grant them a formal
hearing in which they could be represented by counsel of their choice.


The petition is bereft of merit.
As did the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, the Court finds that as the cables
bore the “PLDT” marking, the presumption is that PLDT owned them. The burden of
evidence thus lay on petitioners to prove that they acquired the cables lawfully. This
they failed to discharge.

And as also did the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, the Court finds that
petitioners were not denied due process.

Article 277 of the Labor Code provides:

xxxx

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure
and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just or
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the workers
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford
the latter ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with
company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the guidelines
set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken
by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with
the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The
burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause shall rest on the employer. (Emphasis supplied)
And the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code require a hearing and
conference during which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to
respond to the charge, and present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him. Thus Rule I, Section 2(d), provides:

Section 2. Security of Tenure. —

xxxx


(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined
in Article 282 of the Labor Code:

(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the
ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires, is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the
evidence presented against him.

(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee,
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his termination. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The abovequoted provision of Section 2(d) should not be taken to mean,
however, that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non for
compliance with the due process requirement in case of termination of employment. For
the test for the fair procedure guaranteed under the above-quoted Article 277(b) of the
Labor Code is not whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation
between the employer and the employee. The “ample opportunity to be heard” standard
is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the employee’s right to
be heard to a solitary form narrows down that right.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is
absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of
due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or
trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the
requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.

In the present case, petitioners were, among other things, given several written
invitations to submit themselves to PLDT’s Investigation Unit to explain their side, but
they failed to heed them. A hearing, which petitioners attended along with their union
MKP representatives, was conducted on June 25, 2001 during which the principal

witnesses to the incident were presented. Petitioners were thus afforded the opportunity
to confront those witnesses and present evidence in their behalf, but they failed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 28, 2007 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


Mendoza vs Comelec, GR 188308, October 15, 2009
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent Roberto M. Pagdangananvied for
the position of Governor of the Province of Bulacan in the May 14,
2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the
office of Governor.

The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the
COMELEC. Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested
precincts soon followed. The revision was conducted at the COMELEC’s office in
Intramuros. The COMELEC later transferred the some ballot boxes, including those
involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET). Because of this, petitioner moved to suspend further proceedings but was
denied by the COMELEC, ruling that the COMELEC has plenary powers to find
alternative methods to facilitate the resolution of the election protest; thus, it
concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper coordination with the
SET. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for certiorari asserting that the
COMELEC, exercising judicial power, conducted proceedings in the election contest
within SET premises for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Bulacan,
between him and the respondent Pagdanganan, without due regard to his
fundamental due process rights of notice and participation.
The COMELEC, claims that its decision-making deliberations are internal,

confidential and do not require notice to and the participation of the contending
parties.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.
Held: No. Judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional

body, other than a court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the
course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a
judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions,
determine the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these
decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the exercise of
discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election
contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is
not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its
adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and
enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a
constitutional administrative agency and its powers are essentially executive in

nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to exercise
original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and
quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the
promulgation of its rules of procedure).
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADIMINSTRATOR VS. INDAR
Claim
:
This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon
City to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of
decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued
by Judge Indar. To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA
conducted a judicial audit in RTC Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, where the Audit
Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of
Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received,
pending or disposed by RTC Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment
decisions did not exist in the records of RTC Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team
further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil
Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket
books of either RTC Shariff Aguak or RTC Cotabato
.In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage
cases which do not exist in the records of RTC Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is
nothing to show that
(1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases;

(2) docket fees had been paid;
(3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared;
(4) hearings
had been conducted; or
(5) the cases were submitted for decision.
As found by the Audit Team, the list of

case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not
found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak,
nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the
law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any
showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and
jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes
gross misconduct.

The Court condemns Judge Indar’s reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that
voided marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such
malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life changing
consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due
process. Not only that, Judge Indar’s gross misconduct greatly undermines the
people’s faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and confidence in the courts.
Judge Indar’s utter lack of moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar
deserves nothing less than dismissal from the service.
Issue:
The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and
dishonesty.
Ruling:
We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice. Judge Indar cannot feign
ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside from the fact
that the Court’s Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive
suspension was reported in major national newspapers.
Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to his known
addresses. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges
against him. However, Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation and
appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the investigation
proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any
other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the
Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. As
the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge
should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect
and confidence of the people.
Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards.

JAMSANI-RODRIQUEZ VS.ONG
FACTS:
The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice
Ong, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth
Division of the Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a
Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on
their failing to hear cases as a collegial body during the scheduled sessions of the
Fourth Division held in Davao City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing
cases by himself and Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other
cases together; and on their having unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when
she objected to the procedure); (b) falsification of public documents (grounded on
their issuance of orders relative to the hearings in Davao City, signed by all three of
them, that made it appear as if all of them had been present during the particular
hearing acting as a collegial body, when in truth they were not); (c) improprieties in
the hearing of cases that amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave
misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez’s making the following
intemperate and discriminatory utterances during the hearings of their Division in
Cebu City sometime in September 2006)
ISSUE:
Respondents’ Violation of the Provisions of PD 1606 and Revised Internal Rules of

the Sandiganbayan, Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez,
and Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality.
RULING:
Finding the arguments of the complainant to be matters that the Court fully dealt with
and discussed in the Decision, and there being no other substantial matters raised
by her, we deny her Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision
Dated 1 September).
We deny the plea of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez for complete exoneration,
considering what we held in the Decision.
As to the argument of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez against this Court’s
finding of unbecoming conduct on their part, the matter has been fully addressed in
the Decision of August 24, 2010.
The variance in the responsibilities of respondent Justices as Members of their

Division compel the differentiation of their individual liabilities. Justice Ong, as the
Chairperson, was the head of the Division under the Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, being the most senior Member, and, as such, he possessed and

wielded powers of supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of the
proceedings of the Division.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision
Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of complainant Assistant Special
Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez; and the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong

and Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez are denied for lack of merit

G.R. No. 203302 : April 11, 2013
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

AND HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of
Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging that
there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the
revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's
motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount
the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards.
Thus, it issued an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary
to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it
issued another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the
duly elected Mayor.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right
to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He
argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary
evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the
paper ballots had not been preserved.
The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to
the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to
him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings
conducted by the First Division.
The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the same. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the
ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot
images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the
same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence;
and that the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been

tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading
discovered during the revision.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a
clear violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law considering
that decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of the ballots were
done inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of the COMELEC First Division
sans any notice to the petitioner and for the first time on appeal.
HELD: The decision of the court a quo is granted.
POLITICAL LAW notice to parties
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v.

Commission on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will
ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to
all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right
to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed,
or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be
thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc
should not have upheld the First Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in
the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the
parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic
requirements of due process.
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the
equivalents of the original official ballots themselves.In Vinzons-Chato v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013the Court
held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS,
are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by
the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof
are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus,
may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered
"original documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative
weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as
weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the
Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture
images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the
parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the
printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their
respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best
evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be
used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has
been compromised.

BROWN MADONNA PRESS INC., THADDEUS ANTHONY A. CABANGON,
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (now Fortune General Insurance
Corporation) and/or ANTONIO CABANGON CHUA,
vs.
MARIA ROSARIO M. CASAS,
FACTS:
In 1984, Casas was hired as an accounting clerk at Fortune General Insurance. She
eventually rose from the ranks; she was transferred to BMPI, another ALC member
company, as its Vice President for Finance and Administration.
Casas met with BMPI’s company president, and the Vice President for the Central
Human Resource Department of the ALC Group of Companies. During the meeting,
Casas was allegedly told not to report to work anymore starting January 8, 2007,
upon the instructions of Cabangon-Chua, ALC’s Chairman Emeritus. Casas claims
that the reason for her abrupt dismissal was not disclosed to her, but she was
promised a separation pay. She thus packed her things and left.
BMPI, on the other hand, asserts that it was Casas who requested a graceful exit
from the company. The meeting was supposedly held to confront Casas about
certain complaints against her, and about the growing rift between her and another
company officer. BMPI asserts that Casas opted to leave the company to avoid an
administrative investigation against her and to give her the chance to jumpstart her
career outside the company. She succeeded in convincing Cabangon to grant her
some form of financial assistance as they were friends. 4
Casas no longer reported for work and BMPI, for its part, started the processing of
her clearance. Casas sent Cabangon-Chua a letter asking for the reconsideration of
his decision to terminate her employment. Cabangon-Chua did not act on this letter.
Casas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for payment of separation pay,
backwages, retirement benefits and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: WON Casas had been illegally dismissed.
(Did she voluntarily resign from, or abandon her work at, BMPI, or was she
summarily dismissed by Cabangon?)
HELD: YES, Casas had been illegally dismissed.

The CA did not err in affirming the
NLRC’s factual finding that Casas
had been dismissed from work
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the
employee’s dismissal was legal.1âwphi1However, to discharge this burden, the
employee must first prove, by substantial evidence, that he had been dismissed from
employment.
The CA, in affirming the NLRC’s conclusion that Casas had been dismissed, gave
emphasis to the existence of two documents on record: first, the unsigned clearance
and quitclaim document unilaterally prepared by BMPI, and second, the letter Casas
sent to Cabangon-Chua, asking the latter to reconsider her termination.
These pieces of evidence sufficiently establish Casas’ dismissal from the company.
The Clearance and Quitclaim document discloses that Casas would "cease to be
connected with the company at the close of office on January 16, 2007." The
document, which was even introduced as evidence by the petitioners, was prepared
unilaterally at Cabangon’s instructions. It shows the company’s intent to sever its
employment relationship with Casas. Considered together with the letter Casas sent
Cabangon-Chua asking for her reinstatement on May 17, 2007, these documents

back Casas’sr assertion that she was compelled to leave her job on January 5,
2007.
As their main defense, BMPI and Cabangon claim that they never dismissed Casas
from work, and that she instead requested a graceful exit from the company.
Jurisprudence has established that employers interposing their employee’s
resignation as a defense from illegal dismissal cases have the burden of proving that
the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. 33 Resignation — the formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office — is the voluntary act of an
employee compelled by personal reason(s) to disassociate himself from
employment.34 It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by
the act manifesting this intent.35
In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas asked for a graceful exit from
the company to avoid an administrative investigation against her. They claim that
Casas had grossly failed to manage and take control of BMPI’s ex-deal assets,
which caused the company serious losses. When Casas was confronted about
these reports of mismanagement, she voluntarily resigned from office in exchange
for separation pay.
NLRC and CA correctly disregarded these allegations in concluding that Casas had
been terminated from office.
First, the pieces of evidence that the petitioners submitted are insufficient to
establish their claim. To prove that Casas voluntarily abandoned her work, the
petitioners submitted affidavits from their employees, Domingo Almoninia, Jr. and
Victoria C. Nava, who both testified to the events leading to a private conversation
between Casas and Cabangon.
Domingo Almoninia, Jr., BMPI’s former Chief Audit Executive, Testified 36 that he had
informed Cabangon of reports regarding Casas’s mismanagement of BMPI’s ex-deal
assets on January 5, 2007. Casas, together with Vice President for Human
Resources Victoria Nava, were then summoned to Cabangon’s room. According to
Almoninia, he witnessed Cabangon confront Casas regarding reports about her
mismanagement and certain unauthorized transactions. In the course of the
discussion, Cabangon allegedly told Casas that the reports against her would have
to be investigated, and instructed her to settle her differences with a certain Mr.
Tayag. Casas asked Cabangon if she was being dismissed, to which the latter
answered in the negative. Both Almoninia and Nava were then asked to leave the
room.
Nava, on the other hand, corroborated Almoninia’s narration, and added insinuations
that Casas had been having problems in the company. 37
In considering their affidavits, we emphasize that neither Almoninia nor Nava were
present in the private conversation that ensued between Cabangon and Casas, after
the confrontation that they witnessed. This leaves Cabangon’s claim that Casas
asked for a graceful exit from the company uncorroborated; what stands is Casas’
statement contradicting the claim that she had not been dismissed from her job.
Second, Cabangon failed to provide any documentary evidence supporting Casas’
voluntary resignation. BMPI failed to show any resignation letter from Casas. The
Clearance and Quitclaim document, which shows Casas’ severance from the
company, does not contain her signature. 38 Neither was Casas given any return to
work order, notice of infraction, or notice of termination, all of which could have
supported BMPI’s theory that Casas was never prevented from going back to work.
Third, Cabangon, Almoninia and Nava’s testimonies show that Casas could have
entertained the motive to resign from her work, but does not prove her intent to leave

her office. Intent to relinquish one’s office is determined from the acts of an
employee before and after the alleged resignation. Casas’ acts after allegedly
resigning from work negate this intent: she wrote a letter asking Cabangon-Chua to
reconsider her termination from office; she refused to sign the Clearance and
Quitclaim document; and she filed an illegal dismissal case against her employers.
The CA did not err in affirming the
NLRC’s conclusion that Casas’
dismissal violated the procedural
requirements of the Labor Code
The sudden termination from office was without just cause and violated procedural
due process.
According to the NLRC, despite the serious allegations that the BMPI lodged against
Casas, it never asked her to explain her acts, and instead opted to sever its
employment relations with her. On this basis alone, the NLRC concluded that Casas’
dismissal had been illegal and non-compliant with procedural due process.
Casas had been dismissed prior to any probe on her reported violation of company
rules and regulations.
In determining whether an employee’s dismissal had been legal, the inquiry focuses
on whether the dismissal violated his right to substantial and procedural due
process. An employee’s right not to be dismissed without just or authorized cause as
provided by law, is covered by his right to substantial due process. Compliance with
procedure provided in the Labor Code, on the other hand, constitutes the procedural
due process right of an employee.
The violation of either the substantial due process right or the procedural due
process right of an employee produces different results. Termination without a just or
authorized cause renders the dismissal invalid, and entitles the employee to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement.
An employee’s removal for just or authorized cause but without complying with the
proper procedure, on the other hand, does not invalidate the dismissal. It obligates
the erring employer to pay nominal damages to the employee, as penalty for not
complying with the procedural requirements of due process.
Thus, two separate inquiries must be made in resolving illegal dismissal cases: first,
whether the dismissal had been made in accordance with the procedure set in the
Labor Code; and second, whether the dismissal had been for just or authorized
cause.
There can be no doubt that the procedural requirements had not been complied with
in the present case: shortly after a private conversation between Cabangon and
Casas, Casas took her belongings from the office and left the building. As explained
earlier, Casas’s acts after this private conversation reveal that she had been
summarily dismissed: Casas gave no resignation letter, refused to sign the
Clearance and Quitclaim document that the company issued, and sent a letter
asking for her reinstatement.
Notably, the private conversation that led to Casas’s summary dismissal did not
conform, in any way, to the procedural due process requirements embodied in Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, viz:
RULE XIV Termination of Employment
SECTION 1. Security of tenure and due process. — No workers shall be dismissed
except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process.

SECTION 2. Notice of dismissal.— Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker
shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting
the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be
served at the worker's last known address.
xxx
SECTION 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations stated
against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such
notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
SECTION 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker
in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Cabangon failed to show any written notice provided to Casas informing her of the
charges against her, and neither had she been informed in writing of her dismissal
and the reasons behind it.
Even assuming arguendo that Casas had indeed voluntarily abandoned her work –
an uncorroborated claim by Cabangon – Cabangon had the duty to give Casas a
written notice of the grounds leading to her dismissal.
Thus, Cabangon failed to comply with the two-notice requirement under the law,
resulting in a violation of Casas’s right to procedural due process.
The CA did not err in finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC’s decision to hold that Casas
had been dismissed without just
cause
Casas’s dismissal had not been for just cause, because at the time she was
dismissed, not one of the charges against her had been proven. Casas was, at the
time of her dismissal, presumed innocent until proven guilty; thus, there existed no
just cause to terminate her employment at the time she was summarily dismissed.
In reaching this conclusion, the CA reviewed whether the NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in holding that Casas’s dismissal had no just cause. The NLRC,
in its decision, held that Casas’s dismissal had not been for just cause because she
was not even allowed to explain the supposed acts that had been inimical to BMPI’s
interests.
In affirming the NLRC’s decision, the CA clarified the application of procedural and
substantial due process in the present case: Casas had not been given the two-
notice requirement in the law, and hence, her procedural due process rights had
been violated. And because not one of the allegations against her had been proven
at the time she was summarily dismissed, there existed no cause to terminate her
services.
We have, in the past, affirmed the NLRC in ruling that an employee’s act not proven
at the time he had been dismissed does not constitute just cause for his dismissal. In
other words, for an act to justify an employee’s dismissal, it should have been
proven, with substantial evidence, at the time he was dismissed. Otherwise, the
dismissal would not be for just cause.
This conclusion finds support in cases emphasizing that an unsubstantiated
accusation will not ripen into a holding that there is just cause for dismissal. 47 A mere
accusation of wrongdoing is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an
employee. The facts for which a dismissal is based should be backed by substantial
evidence at the time the employee is dismissed, and not at the time his dismissal is
being questioned before the courts.

In the present case, the petitioners allege that Casas had committed various
infractions that would have warranted disciplinary action against her. At the time that
Casas was dismissed, however, these alleged infractions were mere speculations.
The present petition for review on certiorari admits this reality in two instances: first,
in the body of the petition itself stating that at the time of the January 5, 2007
meeting, disciplinary proceedings had yet to be initiated against Casas and that the
reports against her would still have to be verified; 48 and second, through its annexes,
which provided that the result of the investigation in the ex-deal assets that Casas
allegedly mismanaged was produced only on February 17, 2007, or a full month
after Casas’ dismissal.
Thus, at the time Cabangon asked Casas to leave her employment, all he had as
basis for Casas’s dismissal were speculations. Worse, Cabangon’s summary
dismissal of Casas left her with little opportunity to adequately defend herself from
the allegations against her.
In these lights, we support the CA in holding that Casas’ summary dismissal had not
been for just cause.
Just cause must be proven with
substantial evidence at the time of
dismissal
At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to liberty that cannot be
taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid causes provided in the law.
The concepts of procedural and substantive due process had been carried over and
applied to illegal dismissal cases, although notably, employers are not governmental
bodies to which these rights usually refer. Agabon v. NLRC 51 described the due
process required in dismissing employees as statutory – requirements that the law
imposes on employers to comply with, in contrast to constitutional due process rights
that guarantee against overreach from the government.
Although statutory in nature, the procedural and substantive due process
requirements in illegal dismissal cases stem from the protection that the Constitution
provides labor – the Constitution has tasked the State to promote the workers’
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. These guarantees,
as well as a host of other rights and responsibilities, find implementation through the
Labor Code, which fleshed out the concept of security of tenure 54 as the continuance
of regular employment until an employee's services are terminated because of just
or authorized causes enumerated in the law.
Thus, despite the differences in origin and application between constitutional due
process rights and the statutory requirements in the Labor Code, we have applied
concepts implementing constitutional due process rights to the statutory due process
requirements of the Labor Code. We did this in the present case, when we
emphasized the need for substantial evidence to support the just cause for the
employee's dismissal at the time her services were terminated. In the same way that
the crime charged against an accused must first be proven before his or her right to
liberty is taken away, or that a government employee's infraction must first be proven
before the accused is deprived of the right to continue !o hold office, so too, must
just cause against an employee be proven before he or she may be deprived of a
means of livelihood. Otherwise, the employee's right to substantive due process
would be violated.
In these lights, and in order to give full effect to the embodiment of substantive due
process in illegal dismissal cases, it is necessary to rule, that an employee, in this

present case Casas, cannot be terminated from service without sufficient substantial
evidence of the just cause that would merit her dismissal.

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST v. COMMISSION ELECTIONS, GR No. 221318, 2015-
12-16
Facts:
f... petitioners Kabataan Party-List... assailing the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. (RA) 10367, entitled "An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics
Voter Registration,"
President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367,... mandates the
COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new
voters... in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of
voters through the adoption of biometric... technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that "[r]egistered voters whose biometrics have not been
captured shall submit themselves for validation."
"Voters who fail to submit for validation... shall be deactivated
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721... which serves as the implementing rules
and regulations of RA 10367,... prescribing the procedure for validation,...
deactivation,... and... reactivation of voters' registration records (VRRs).
Resolution provides that: (a) "[t]he registration records of voters without biometrics
data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of...
applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections shall be deactivated
(b) "[t]he following registered... voters shall have their biometrics data validated: [(1)]
Those who do not have BIOMETRICS data appearing in the Voter['s] Registration
System (VRS); and [(2)] Those who have incomplete BIOMETRICS data appearing
in the VRS";... and (d) "[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the requirements on
posting, ERB hearing and service of individual notices to the deactivated voters."...
petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the
constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367,...
They contend that: (a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional,
substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation;
Ultimately, petitioners pray that this Court declare RA 10367,... unconstitutional and
that the COMELEC be commanded to desist from... deactivating registered voters
without biometric information,... the Court

They submit that the statutory requirement of biometric validation is no different from
the unconstitutional requirement of... literacy and property because mere non-
validation already absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage through
deactivation.[65] Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the
disqualification by law contemplated as a valid... limitation to the exerci
Issues:
whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013, all related thereto, are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
petition is bereft of merit.
Court may except a particular case from the operations of its rules when the
demands of justice so require.
rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Accordingly,... technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand
in the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the
rules of procedure.
contestation is untenable.
[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
privilege granted by the State to such... persons or classes as are most likely to
exercise it for the public good.
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for
the exercise of suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at... least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications,
with the restriction, however,... as per the second sentence of the... provision, a
"literacy, property or other substantive requirement."

But the law can step in as far as certain procedural requirements are concerned like
requiring registration, and also step in as far as these classifications are...
concerned.
A 8189 primarily governs the process of registration.
As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order "to systematize the
present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent
and updated list of... voters."
To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern technology
It built on the policy considerations behind RA 8189 as it institutionalized biometrics

validation as part of the registration... process... this requirement is not a
"qualification" to the exercise of the right... of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was
institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere
complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
Court's pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it was held that:
Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right

to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then
enact laws to safeguard and... regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate
purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy,
property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the
Constitution - that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is
bereft of any rational basis... to a person's ability to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good - the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional
Principles:
A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such

as fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a
position or office, or to perform a public duty or function."
Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse

on suffrage is concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of "registration",
which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a person's
qualifications to vote is... determined. In Yra v. Abaño... it was stated that "[t]he act

of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that
makes the citizen a qualified voter [and]... one may be a qualified voter without
exercising the right to vote."
In said case, this Court definitively characterized registration as a form of regulation

and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage:
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of

an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other

LAO GI V. CA
FACTS:
Felomino Chia Sr.’s (Lao Gi) citizenship has been revoked making his children’s
citizenship also revoked due to alleged fraud and misrepresentation.
The Commission on Immigration and Deportation filed a deportation case against

the Chia family.
The original charge was amended alleging that the Chia’s refused to register as
aliens and that his son Manuel Chia also committed undesirability.
The Chia’s filed a motion to dismiss the charges against them by the CID alleging
that the CID has no authority to reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No. 191
(law granting them citizenship), series of 1958.
The CID special prosecutor also filed an opposition on the ground that the

citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion may demand and that due process
was accorded to respondents.
Remember earlier that Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public
documents in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila in Criminal Case No. 60172
for alleging that he was a Filipino citizen in the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale
of certain real property. He was acquitted by the trial court in an order dated May 5,
1982, on the ground that Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice
may be equated as res judicata and that revocation thereof by Opinion No. 147,
series of 1980 cannot be considered just, fair and reasonable.
Respondents (CID) filed for MR but was denied.
The CID set the deportation case against respondents for hearing and Acting
Commissioner Victor G. Nituda. While the deportation case is pending, the Chia’s
took further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was denied by the CFI of
Manila. They also lost their appeal in the CA.
Hence, herein petition for certiorari filed by petitioners wherein they seek to set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask that a new one be rendered
setting aside the order of the CID dated September 28, 1982, and directing it to
proceed with the reception of the evidence in support of the charges against the
petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON the CID special prosecutor is allowed to intervene in a criminal case.
HELD:
NO. In deportation cases, the Court cannot conceive of any justification for a private
party to have any right to intervene. Even if such party can establish any damages

due him arising from the deportation charge against the alien, such relief cannot be
afforded him in the deportation proceeding. His recourse if at all is in the ordinary
courts. Thus the Court rules that the intervention of a private prosecutor should not
be allowed in deportation cases. The possibility of oppression, harassment and
persecution cannot be discounted. The deportation of an alien is the sole concern of
the State. This is the reason why there are special prosecutors and fiscals tasked to
prosecute such cases.
The respondent CID was directed to continue hearing the deportation case against
petitioners and thereafter, based on the evidence before it, to resolve the issue of
citizenship of petitioners, and if found to be aliens, to determine whether or not the
petitioners should be deported and/or otherwise ordered to register as aliens.
Hence, petition granted.

GR No. L-68288 | Guzman Vs NU
FACTS:
Students Diosadado Guzman, Ulyses Urbiztondo, and Ariel Ramacula seeks relief
from what they describe as their school’s ” continued and persistent refusal to allow
them to enrol”
BACKGROUND:
August 7, 1984 Students prayed for preliminary mandatory injunction for the refusal
of the National Universty to let them enrol.
September 24, 1984 University president replied that the petitioners failure to enrol
for the first semester of SY 84-85 is due to their own fault because the enrollment
was already closed and that DeGuzman and Ramacula’s academic showing was
“poor” and they have failures in their records and are not of good scholastic
standing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a school or university have the right to deny acceptance of students
without due process.
HELD:
The 3 students were allowed by the court to enrol. The court declared illegal the
University’s act of imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.
RULING:
Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, have the right among others “to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course up to graduation except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of
disciplinary regulations.”
Petitioners were being denied this right , or being disciplined without due process, in
violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that ” no
penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the
Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after
due investigation shall have been conducted.”
NOTES:

Minimun standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process:
The Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusations against them.
They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired.
They shall be informed of the evidence against them.
They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf.
The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Ateneo de Manila University vs. Hon. Judge Ignacio Capulong
[222 SCRA 644; GR. 99327; 27 May 1993]
Facts:
On February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the
Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites for students interested in joining its
ranks. As a result in such initiation rites, Leonardo “Lennie” H. Villa, a first year
student of said university, died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese
General Hospital on February 10, 1991. Acting upon the incident, petitioner
Dean Cynthia del Castillio created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report
within three days on the circumstances surrounding the death of Villa. The said
notice also required the respondent students to submit written statements
within two days from receipt. Although the said students received a copy of the
notice, they failed to file a reply which prompted petitioner school to hold them
in preventive suspension. After receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses, the Joint

Administration-Faculty- Student Investigating Committee found a prima facie
case against respondent students for violating Rule 3 of the
Law School Catalogue entitled “Discipline” which prohibits participation in any

hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Boad left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr.
Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students.
Respondent students then filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati citing their current status as enrolled
students of the university. The TRO was granted along with another TRO
enjoining Petitioner University from dismissing the respondent students Albas
and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and
argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the
srcinal petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and
reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue:

Whether or not there was a denial of due process against the respondent
students
Held:
No. There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due
process. The Deal of the Ateneo Law School notified and required
respondent students to submit their written statements of the incident.
Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel,
copies of the

charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners’ notices. The elements of notice and hearing were present in the case
at bar. Although the respondent students argue that petitioners were not in a
position to fine the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to
file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, effectively bypassing
the latter and the Court of Appeals, it is of accepted legal doctrine that an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a
question of law, as in the case at bar where the issue is whether or not the
respondent students have been afforded procedural due process before being
dismissed from the university.
Moreover, minimum standards are set in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions

in academic institutions as observed in the case at bench. Such standards do
not follow the stricter rules observed in courts of law. Thus, such requirements
may suffice the proper administrative proceedings:
(1)The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2)That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of cousin, if desired;
(3)They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4)They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5)The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or

official designation by the school authorities to head and decide the case.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 168
G.R. No. 127980
December 19, 2007
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE

DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES
YUHICO and JAMES YAP, petitioners
And
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION
ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND
SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE
and ROBERTO VALDES, JR.,
Facts of the case
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard

Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who
were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)
Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing
injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux
Fraternity. March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s
Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently
angry at Domino Lux. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the
remarks to his two other brods. The three, together with four other persons went back to
Manang’s and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of
respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then. After this
incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an
apology. But no apology was made.
On March 29,1995, before James Yap’s class at 6:00 pm he went out of the
campus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was
about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys
were running towards him. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with
something heavy in his hands which he assumed to be knuckles. Respondents
Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and
Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of
attackers left. Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who
attacked him. Three other students who are members of Domino Lux Fraternity was
also assaulted by the same group. The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity
war.
The next day, James Yap filed a complaint with the Disciplinary Board of DLSU
charging private respondents with Direct Assault. The other members who were
assaulted filed a similar complaint. The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent
separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and
Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private
respondents filed their respective answers. During the proceedings before the Board on
April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. No
full-blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-examine the
witnesses against them.
Issue
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 169
Whether or not private respondents were accorded due process by the reason
that there was no full blown hearing that was conducted nor were they allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses against them?
Held
Private respondents were accorded due process of law. The Due Process
Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on
moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The
constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law is solemn and inflexible.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school
discipline, there are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process and these are:
a. that the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
b. that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the
assistance if counsel, if desired;
c. that they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. that they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. that the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but
failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said
that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where the
opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by
the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their
respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them
as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents
were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the
Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties
before rendering its resolution. Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied
due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them.
The Supreme Court once held that “x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due
process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross
examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.”
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 170
Sps. Eugene C. Go and Angelita Go, and Minor Emerson Chester Kim B. Go vs.
Colegio De San Juan De Letran, et al.
Facts:
In October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of Letran’s Auxiliary Services
Department, received information that certain fraternities were recruiting new
members among Letran’s high school students, together with the list of allegedly
involved students.
The school conducted medical examinations on the students involved and on

November 20, 2002, Dr. Emmanuel Asuncion, the school physician, reported that
six (6) students bore injurieson the posterior portions of their thighs. Mr. Rosarda,
the Assistant Prefect for Discipline, conferred with the students and asked for their
explanations in writing.
Four (4) students, admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau Gamma Fraternity
and were present in a hazing rite held in Tondo, Manila. They also identified the
senior members of the fraternity present at their hazing. These included Kim, then
a fourth year high school student.
In the meantime, the school’s security officer, prepared an incident report that the
Tau Gamma Fraternity has been recruiting members from Letran’s high school
department. He had spoken to one of the fraternity neophytes and obtained a list
of eighteen (18) members of the fraternity currently enrolled at the high school
department. Kim’s name was also in the list.
Mr. Rosarda has informed Kim’s mother, Mrs. Go, that her son is a fraternity
member whereas she expressed her disbelief stating that her son has always
been in constant supervision.
Mr. Rosarda thereafter spoke to Kim and asked him to explain his side. Kim
responded through a written statement dated December 19, 2001; he denied that
he was a fraternity member.
In time, the respondents found that twenty-nine (29) of their students, including
Kim, were fraternity members. The respondents found substantial basis in the
neophytes’ statements that Kim was a senior fraternity member. Based on their
disciplinary rules, the Father Prefect for Discipline (respondent Rev. Fr. Jose
Rhommel Hernandez) recommended the fraternity members’ dismissal from the
high school department rolls
On January, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of
Caloocan City claiming that the respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim. They
refused to accept the respondents’ finding that Kim was a fraternity member. They
likewise insisted that due process had not been observed. Mr. and Mrs. Go also
sought compensation for the “business opportunity losses” they suffered while
personally attending to Kim’s disciplinary case.
In ruling for the petitioners, the RTC ruled that Kim was dismissed without due
process, his membership in the fraternity was not duly proven, and the the school
had no authority to dismiss KIM from school.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the RTC and reversed the decision, thereby
prompting the petitioners to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 171
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA had erred in setting aside the decision of the RTC in Civil
Case No. C-19938, whereas petitioners claim that respondents had unlawfully
dismissed Kim from the high school department rolls
RULING
the RTC’s statement that Letran, a private school, possesses no authority to

impose a dismissal, or any disciplinary action for that matter, on students who
violate its policy against fraternity membership must be corrected. The RTC
reasoned out that Order No. 20, series of 1991, of the then Department of
respondents cite as legal basis for Letran’s policy, only covered public high
schools and not private high schools such as Letran.
However, in ascertaining the meaning of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, the entire
order must be read in whole, not in isolated parts, but with reference to every other
part and every word and phrase in connection with its context.
The order’s title may also serve as an aid for construction, which states,
“Prohibition of Fraternities and Sororities in Elementary and Secondary Schools.”
This serves to clarify whatever ambiguity in the fourth paragraph. It directs the
prohibition to elementary and secondary schools in general, and does not
distinguish between private and public schools.
Incidentally, the penalty for non-compliance with DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, is
expulsion, a severe form of disciplinary penalty consisting of excluding a student
from admission to any public or private school in the country. In contrast, the
penalty prescribed by the rules of Letran for fraternity membership among their
high school students is dismissal, which is limited to the exclusion of an erring
student from the rolls of the school.
Private schools have the authority to promulgate and enforce a similar prohibition
pursuant to their right to establish disciplinary rules and regulations. This right has
been recognized in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which has the
character of law.
DECISION
The Supreme Court finds no reversible error in the assailed CA decision, and
accordingly, deny the present decision. The Supreme Court hereby affirms the decision
dated May 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80349.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 172
CASE DIGEST : PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner,
and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Facts:
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications.

Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein
respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications
Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to
Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was
issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of
the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC
Issue:
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held:
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said
that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt
contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said
order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since
the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore,
temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a
temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-
fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has
no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the
order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing
nor it did give any notice to the petitioner
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 173
DIONA, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MARCELINA DIONA v.
BALANGUE, ET AL.
[G.R. No. 173559, January 07, 2013]
The grant of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given nor
supported by the evidence presented violates the opposing party's right to due process
and may be declared void ab initio in a proper proceeding.
FACTS:
 This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Resolution of (CA) issued which
granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the respondents seeking
to nullify that portion of the Decision of the (RTC), Valenzuela City awarding
petitioner 5% monthly interest rate for the principal amount of the loan
respondents obtained from her.
 On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45K from petitioner payable
in 6 months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-sqm property
located in Valenzuela and covered by TCT.‚When the debt became due,
respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, petitioner filed with the
RTC a Complaint on September 17, 1999.
 Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue.
On October 15, 1999, with the assistance of (Atty. Coroza) of the PAO, they filed
a Motion to Extend Period to Answer but respondents failed to file any. RTC
declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte.
RTC granted petitioner's Complaint.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution alleging that respondents did not interpose
a timely appeal. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a
Motion to Set Aside Judgment dated January 26, 2001, claiming that not all of
them were duly served with summons. They had no knowledge of the case
because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them.
 But on March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to
implement its October 17, 2000 Decision. However, since the writ could not be
satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of the mortgaged property,
which the RTC granted. In an auction sale conducted on November 7, 2001,
petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P420k. Thus, a Certificate of
Sale was issued and accordingly annotated.
 Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside
Execution Sale, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of
interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her
Complaint. RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum). Their
indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest ballooned to P652,000.00. RTC
granted respondents' motion and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded
to 12% per annum. Then respondents filed a Motion for Leave To
Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation in the total amount of P126,650.00.
 Displeased with the RTC's May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to
the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CA
rendered a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding
the 5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12% per
annum. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated: Indeed, We are convinced that the
Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5% monthly interest instead
of the 12% per annum prayed for in the complaint. However, the proper remedy
is not to amend the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity.
ISSUES:
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 174
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS' PETITION
FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE
REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND

SERIOUS ERROR AND MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS
WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE RTC, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
SAID DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL AND ALREADY EXECUTED
CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT. 30Ï‚rÎ½l1
HELD:
The petition must fail.
We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their
right to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47;

an exception to the final judgment rule;
grounds therefor.
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part,
has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute
for a remedy which was lost due to the party's own neglect in promptly availing of the
same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments
goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice
that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be
laid to rest.
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.
In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals , this Court declared that a final and executory judgment
may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for
having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond

the 12% per annum interest sought in the
Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in
excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief
without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the
pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Teston, this Court expounded that: Due process considerations justify this requirement.
It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the
pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard
with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 175
allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise
to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a
defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For
instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the
parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in
default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits
the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the
Complaint. It provides: (d) Extent of relief to be awarded. - A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that
prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
The raison d' Etre in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be
presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared
in default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or
different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind
Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant's right to due
process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of
this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies "the sporting idea of
fair play and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the
opportunity to be heard thereon.
In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the
allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage
executed by the parties does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner
filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from her
"the sum of P45, 000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum‚ and sought
payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest.
Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC's award of
5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process.
It violated the due process requirement because respondents were not informed
of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived
of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were
made to believe that the complainant [petitioner] was seeking for what she merely
stated in her Complaint.
Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by

petitioner's general prayer for "[o]ther reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the
premises x x x. To repeat, the court's grant of relief is limited only to what has been
prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by
the party's cause of action. Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or
60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during trial, the same remains
unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in accordance with
applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma, this Court held: In the case of Ruiz
v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, Spouses Bautista v. Pilar Development Corporation and the recent case
of Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, this Court considered the 3% interest per month or
36% interest per annum as excessive and unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the
said case, equitably reduced the rate of interest to 1% interest per month or 12%
interest per annum.
It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged
in their Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid
obligation. Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as
waiver to contest patently erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due
process, as well as applicable jurisprudence.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 176
Respondents' former counsel was grossly
negligent in handling the case of his clients;
respondents did not lose ordinary remedies
of new trial, petition for relief, etc. through
their own fault.
Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client.
This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his
general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception
to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain
their client's cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their client's property
without due process of law. In which case, the courts must step in and accord
relief to a client who suffered thereby. ½l½l1
"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in
accordance with the law. Judging from how respondents' former counsel handled the
cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly negligent in protecting their
rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their property without due process of law.
In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and
other remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence
of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We
cannot also blame respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients
have reasonable expectations that their lawyer would amply protect their interest during
the trial of the case. Here, "[r]espondents are plain and ordinary people x x x who are
totally ignorant of the intricacies and technicalities of law and legal procedures. Being
so, they completely relied upon and trusted their former counsel to appropriately act as
their interest may lawfully warrant and require.
As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents' principal obligation was only
P45,000.00. Due to their former counsel's gross negligence in handling their cause,
coupled with the RTC's erroneous, baseless, and illegal award of 5% monthly interest,
they now stand to lose their property and still owe petitioner a large amount of money.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 177
PEOPLE V. NAZARIOAug. 30, 1988
EusebioNazario – charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the

municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon province.
Accdg to the information filed by the provincial Fiscal:
- Nazario, then being the owner and operator of a fishpond in Pagbilao, refused and
failed to pay municipal taxesin the years 1964, 1965, and 1966
- unpaid taxes: worth P362 required of him as a fishpond operator as provided for
under Ordinance No. 4, as amended by Ordinances No. 15 and 12
- taxes remained unpaid despite repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal
Treasurer
Nazario testified:
- that he didn’t live in Pagbilao, but that indeed he was a lessee of a fishpond located
there, with a lease agreement that was still existing and enforceable
- that he received letters of demandfor the payment of taxes on his leased fishpond
- that in reply, he requested an inspection of his fishpond to determine its condition as
it was not then in operation for having been destroyed by the typhoon
- that he received 2 other demand letters
- that he did not pay because of the ff:
1. he did not know whether he was covered by the tax ordinance or not
2. under the Administrative Code, taxes lapse if not paid, and the treasurer was
collecting on a lapsed ordinance
3. under the Tax Code, fishermen are exempted frompercentage and privilege taxes
4. no law empowering the municipality to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators
>defense tried to show that as a lessee of forest land that was converted into a
fishpond, he is not covered by the municipal ordinances
5. the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain
TRIAL COURT: found Nazario guilty of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance
APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS: Nazario argued that the municipal

ordinances are void for being ambiguous and uncertain!
ORDINANCE NO. 4:
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits
of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per
hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum.
ORDINANCE NO. 15:
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 178
Sec. 1(a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of
fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of
municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years
startingfrom the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries.
ORDINANCE NO. 12
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits
of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any
fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964.
RE: Nazario’s argument that the ordinances are
“ambiguous and uncertain”
“owner and manager”
The petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not
covered since the said ordinances speak of “owner or manager.”
vague as to the date of payment
He likewise maintains that they are vague regarding the establishment of the
date of payment:
- Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment

“after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is
approved by the Bureau of Fisheries,”
- Ordinance No. 12statesthat liability for the tax accrues “beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before
the year 1964.”
Supreme Court HELD:
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it...
- lacks comprehensible standards

- thatmen of common intelligence
- mustnecessarily guess at its meaning
- anddiffer as to its application.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 179
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) itviolates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, meaning, it cannot be clarified either...
- by a saving clause, or
- by construction
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
that had made it illegal for “three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and
there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.” Clearly, the
ordinance imposed no standard at all “because one may never know in advance what
‘annoys some people but does not annoy others.’
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a “perfectly vague” act whose
obscurity is evident on its face.
HOWEVER, it is to be distinguished from...
1. legislation couched in impreciselanguage—but which nonetheless specifies a

standard though defectively phrased—in which case, it may be“saved” by proper
construction
2. legislationapparentlyambiguous yet fairlyapplicable to certain types of
activities—in that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed
against such activities.
In Parker v. Levy, a prosecution originally under a US military court (prohibiting,
specifically, “conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman”), the defendant, an army
officer was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that
accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and
consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.
It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, a divided Court sustained

an act of Congress (limiting the election campaign period, and prohibiting “partisan
political activities”), amid challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that
the law had included an “enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms
`election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’” that would supply the standards.
“As thus limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized,
if not totally set at rest.”
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 180
In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct sought to be
prohibited “is not clearly defined at all.” “As worded in R.A. 4880, prohibited discussion
could cover the entire spectrum of expression relating to candidates and political
parties.” He was unimpressed with the “restrictions” Fernando’s opinion had relied on: “
‘Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning the election’ and expression
of ‘views on current political problems or issues’ leave the reader conjecture, to
guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance
(‘simple expressions of opinion and thoughts’) or the subject of the utterance (‘current
political problems or issues’).”
The Court likewise had occasion to apply the “balancing-of-interests” test, insofar as
the statute’s ban on early nomination of candidates was concerned: “The rational
connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and
modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing
public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political activity,
lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does not
offend the Constitution.” In that case, Castro would have the balance achieved in favor
of State authority at the “expense” of individual liberties.
In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro’s separate opinion, the
balancing test finds a close kin, referred to as the “less restrictive alternative”
doctrine, under which the court searches for alternatives available to the Government
outside of statutory limits, or for “less drastic means” open to the State, that would
render the statute unnecessary.
In United States v. Robel, legislation was assailed, banning members of the

(American) Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired the right of association, and that in
any case, a screening process was available to the State thatwould have enabled it to
identify dangerous elements holding defense positions. In that event, the balance would
have been struck in favor of individual liberties.
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is
said, however, that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy
involves say, economic rights, or as in the Levy case, military affairs, in which less
precision in analysis is required and in which the competence of the legislature is
presumed.
SUPREME COURT RULING SUMMARY:
“owner and manager”
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 181
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness.
It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its
coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term “manager.”
He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced
fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. While it
appears that it is the National Government which owns them, the Government never
shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the
burden of tax under the said ordinances.
The SCagree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue
measures designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously,
it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing,
upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune from taxes and for another,
since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the
recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the
municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a
liability to make such ordinances vague.
vague as to the date of payment
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the
claim that “the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be
determined (three years after the ‘approval of the fishpond’ by the Bureau of Fisheries,
and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be
determined by an uncertain individual or individuals.”
Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable “after the lapse of three (3) years starting
from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries,”is unequivocal
about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability
there-under “beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964,”does not give rise to any ambiguity.
In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established.
The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates—as
far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned—presents a mere
problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 182
same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in
this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in
operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after
their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the
amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent
fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect
to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standardsthatclarify

imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof,
they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances.
Note.—Rule that if words and phrases of Statute are not obscure or are unambiguous,
meaning and intention of the legislature is determined from language employed. No
room for construction when there is absence of ambiguity in words of a Statute. (Aparri
vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 321.)
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 183
Summary Dismissal Board vs Torcita GR 130442 06 April 2000
Facts:
Major Lazaro Torcita was offduty , coming from a party was driving and was overtaken
by Mazda pick-up w/ afterwards pick up speed. Upon entering the compound of HDA
Aimee , Torcita was denied entry. They complained that Torcita confronted them and
that he was yelling and hurling incentives. They filed 12 complaints against him and was
consolidated for “conduct unbecoming of a police officer.” The board dismissed the
complaint but found him guilty of simple irregularity, suspending him for 20 days for
being having alcoholic drink during the incident. Torcita appealed and RTC / CA
reversed the dispositive portion. Petitioner contend that “Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer” is broad enough to include any act of an officer which tends to bring
dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization.
Issue:
Whether or not conviction is null on the ground of lack of procedural due process of
law?
Decision:
CA decision affirmed, dispositive portion of SDB decision annulled. It is glaringly

apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve administrative cases filed against
C/Insp. Torcita, earlier quoted, that none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made
reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. The
omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which
he was not notified nor charged. It is a requirement of due process that the parties be
informed of how the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 184
Jardeleza vs. Sereno
FACTS:
 In 2014, incumbent Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza was nominated to
replace retiring Associate Justice Roberto Abad.
 CJ Sereno manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-

0094 regarding a question on Jardeleza’s integrity over his handling of an
international arbitration case for the government.
 When Jardeleza appeared before the JBC, he was asked by CJ Sereno if he

wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He
answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be
observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that CJ Sereno and AJ Carpio
execute a sworn statement specifying their objections and that he be afforded the
right to cross-examine them in a public hearing. Finally, he requested the JBC to
defer its meeting considering that the Court En Banc would meet the next day to
act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.
 Later in the afternoon of the same day, and apparently denying Jardeleza’s
request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and
proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the short list. Thereafter,
the JBC released the subject short list of four (4) nominees which excluded
Jardeleza.
 Consequently, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus
with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, seeking to compel theJBC to include him
in the list of nominees.
ISSUE:
 Does the Supreme Court’s power of supervision over the JBC include the
remedies of certiorari and mandamus?
HELD:
 YES, on the availability of certiorari. NO, on the availability of mandamus.
 Article VIII, Section 1 providesthat the judicial power is vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
 In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes
in the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the “unanimity rule” on integrity in
violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but
by the Council’s own rules. For said reason, the Court is of the position that it can
exercise the expanded judicialpower of review vested upon it by the 1987
Constitution.
 It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 185
 In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the
Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impasse must be overcome.
 Mandamus, on the other hand, lies to compel the performance, when refused, of
a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.
Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public
officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It
is his judgment that is to beexercised and not that of the court. There is no
question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be
compelled to do something.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 186
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA v. JUDICIAL, GR No. 211833, 2015-04-07
Facts:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a
Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief[1] under
Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court,... respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to... second-level courts, on the ground that it
is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for
the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City;
Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter[2] dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for
the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through... electronic
mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants
and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter[3] dated
February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en
banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was...
upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to
second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their
current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for
more than a year, he... was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take
recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications
of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement
violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the
JBC's five-year... requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and
Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that
the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10[4] of Republic
Act (R.A.) No.
8557[5] should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further
alleged that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution
and by Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of...
practice of law.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 187
In compliance with the Court's Resolution[6] dated April 22, 2014, the JBC[7] and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)[8] separately submitted their Comments. Summing
up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG,... they essentially stated that the petition is
procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and
due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot
issue to prevent the JBC from performing its... principal function under the Constitution
to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will
not lie because the petitioner has no clear legal right... that needs to be protected; (3)
the equal protection clause is not violated because the classification of lower court
judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less than five
years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no... violation
of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.
Issues:
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-
level courts is constitutional.
Ruling:
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first
determine whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and
declaratory relief commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court
uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for...
certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65."[9] As discussed in the
case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et
al.,[10] this Court explained that:
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's
policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated
when he was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He
said that... his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him
direct injury.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief
should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation
or... an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the
parties' rights or duties thereunder."[16] "[T]he purpose of the action is to... secure an
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 188
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach."
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather,
the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be
included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year
requirement... policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right
under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions.
The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right... that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list
of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either.
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed
policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved.[18] The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under... the exclusive
jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19[19] of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691.[20]
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of
its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition.
But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant
petition should... still be dismissed.
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend

appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
judiciary. Thus, the JBC is... burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with
public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench.
While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary,
this does not preclude the JBC from having its... own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the
JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in
precise terms... the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants'
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
only to the minimum qualifications... required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing... its duties.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 189
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial
vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given
this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to
ascertain whether an... applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-
year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and
incidental to the function conferred by the
Constitution to the JBC.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 190
TANADA VS. TUVERA 146 S 446
Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval.
The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of
the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all
unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The
petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and
that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the
solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion
and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2
of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.
Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published
as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the content of the laws.
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 191
FEICIANA L. MORGAN
CONSTI 2 Page 192

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MARY’S COLLEGEOF TAGUM

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Petitioners Jose Filoteo, Jr.

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Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day:

(3) Whether or not petitioner’s warrantless arrest valid and proper? (YES)

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Labor Arbiter held that Serrano was illegally dismissed

ISSUE AND HOLDING

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 Fines imposed range from P1,000 to P10,000

 J. Panganiban – Monetary sanctions are too insignificant, niggardly, late

a. Only the state has authority to take life, liberty, property

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What makes a dismissal of an employee illegal?

Separate Opinion – Bellosillo

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Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued

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ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

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Statement of the Facts and the Case

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The Issues Presented

Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:

The Court's Ruling

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WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on

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Ruben Del Castillo

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Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

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By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in

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