Hunter College DL (Diana Li) Cases found here: http://wiki.debatecoaches.

org/2010-2011+² +Hunter+College+%28NY%29+²+Diana+Li AC The affirmative should not be held to defend disarmament because the resolution asks if a state of affairs is desirable y Run fairness/aff fiat bad theory y In the international arena, we have to consider consequences and make contingency plans V: Morality Util FW Gary Woller (Professor of Public Management, Brigham Young University). ³A Forum on the Role of Environmental Ethics in Restructuring Environmental Policy and Law for the Next Century.´ Policy Currents 7.2 (June 1997): p. 10-11. Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's ex- pense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such justification cannot simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also of- ten fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their polices are somehow to the overall advantage of society. At the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public af- fairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regula- tory unreasonableness while failing to adequately ad- dress the problem or actually making it worse. For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environ- ment by no means implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any policy that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of poli- cies might work, and others, although seemingly con- sistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That deontological principles are an inadequate basis for en- vironmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of deontologically based envi- ronmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner by street-level enforcement officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant in- centive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at cross purposes to environmental preservation. (There exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse out- comes of regulatory policy. See, for example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins, 1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I be- lieve, be troubled by this outcome. The above points are

and 100. There is enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the world to build more than 100. Rogue individuals are selling technology on the black market . Ex CIA agent Valerine Plame Wilson says we need to make it real´. this requires the means-end language and methodology of utilitarian ethics.sured that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem. But the alternative is continued proliferation and. though perhaps at times a necessary. and moral piety are an insufficient.Q. NY daily news. Terrorists don't have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons or material themselves .000 shipping containers come into the United States every day. they could not be prevented from smuggling it into a targeted city. basis for public policy in a democracy. the broad categories which must be employed and above all. A hundred pounds of HEU could fit in a shoebox . so if they are basically saying public policy can¶t be determined by any kind of moral mandate.they need to buy or steal them. Valerine. then they contradict themselves because util is a moral theory. saying that we can¶t prioritize some rights over others because prioritizing and weighing rights contradicts their definitional inviolability y See part of the card highlighted blue. so why do they even bother? Theft is relatively easy Wilson. and the public must be reasonably as. It therefore follows that in a democracy. prioritize life y Run the categorical imperative against this. This will take years of painstaking work. ³We know that terrorist groups« ensure that terrorists do not get the bomb. 12). p. The number of values typically involved in public policy decisions. There have been at least 25 incidents of lost or stolen nuclear explosive material. Eliminating all nuclear weapons and locking down all nuclear material is the only way to ensure that terrorists do not get the bomb. Khan of Pakistan did it for years before my group at the CIA exposed him in 2003.perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman. ³A world without nuclear weapons. the scope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so conclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy.Osama Bin Laden met with some just before 9/11. It is seldom the case that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest (1958. Good intentions. building a bomb and exploding it. The only way to eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism is to drain the swamp. If terrorists get hold of HEU. build or steal a bomb and that top nuclear scientists have offered to help them . Radiation sensors at the docks stand almost no chance of detecting such a cache. lofty rhetoric. run against this that they are looking at morality for a value. VC: Max HR.´ We know that terrorist groups are trying to buy.000 weapons. . specializing in nuclear counter proliferation.A. policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the problems they address. former CIA agent. an act of nuclear terrorism. sooner or later.

the 24 hour cumulative dose would be high enough to kill another 200. The size and shape of the fallout footprint were calculated from the most probable prevailing wind direction and speed at that time of the year. It also assumed that people with exposures in the range of 50 to 449 cGy would develop radiation sickness. I know it says at the top of the case that you don¶t have to provide a ml#ixzz10IWFez3o 1. we assumed an attack in September. which extends out to 2. To calculate the effects of local fallout beyond the zone of firestorm and direct radiation exposure. In addition to this direct radiation from the explosion. Results A 12.000 would suffer radiation sickness and more than 10. the authors have calculated the numbers of dead and wounded to be expected from a 12. Definitely run fiat bad theory in the NC/1NR. Another 238. For purposes of this study.5 kiloton nuclear explosion at ground level in New York City. To calculate the effects of direct radiation exposure from the explosion. but this specifically says that we ³drain the swamp.5 kiloton nuclear explosion in New York Harbor produce casualties more than one order of magnitude greater than those inflicted at the World Trade Center.000 and cause several hundred thousand cases of radiation sickness.000 of these would receive lethal doses. Using the CATS (Consequences Assessment Tool Set) software created by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). . Blast and thermal effects would kill 52. In addition there would be many thousands of people with mechanical and thermal injuries. fallout would expose another million and a half people. the explosion was placed in New York Harbor between lower Manhattan and Brooklyn to reflect concerns that a nuclear device could most easily enter a US city smuggled in a cargo container on board a commercial ship. We made it to 2010 and we¶re still The casualty model used assumed a cloudless day and a 100% fatality rate for people in the firestorm area. This provides no mechanism for disarming. and the model examined a fallout footprint extending 113 km (70 mi) to the East from the explosion. For this group. The model used residential demographic data and thus predicted casualties for an attack at night.´ but there is absolutely no reason why we would be able to do that.4 km (1. and a 50% fatality rate for people exposed to 450 to 599 cGy. it assumed a 100% fatality rate for people beyond the firestorm who are exposed to > 600 cGY. 2.5 mi) for a blast of this size.000 would be exposed to direct radiation from the blast. An attack during the day when large numbers of people come into Manhattan from outlying areas would produce substantially higher casualty figures. and of these 44. The impacts that this card cites would have probably already occurred because it talks about these issues as pressing in the first few years of the decade.Read more: http://www.000 people immediately.

Kim Jong Il. but you can never call someone a truly irrational actor. Finally: Morton Mintz. if . Nobody wants to die for nothing and not get anything from dying. Run deterrence empirically good against this. Also. by rote. meaning that nobody is truly irrational.1. and North Korea. 1. Ask what the methodology is here 2. Launch crews--on duty every second of every day--are under orders to send the messages on receipt of a single computer-delivered command. that the impacts in here are irrelevant. It was also written DURING THE COLD WAR IN 1985. this is alarming. Everybody wants something. Next up is Sagan. with new concerns about central asia. ³The bitter disputes over national« a nuclear war by checklist. These missiles would launch on receipt of three computer-delivered messages.´ The bitter disputes over national missile defense (NMD) have obscured a related but dramatically more urgent issue of national security: the 4. The nuclear arena has changed so much since then. February 2001. but he wants a basketball. Two Minutes to Launch. CONTENTION 3: Accidents The first evidence is by a man named Berkowitz. The blame may fall on people like the CIA for not getting intelligence into the motivations of people.800 nuclear warheads--weapons with a combined destructive power nearly 100. run accients unlikely. is a crazy man.000 times greater than the atomic bomb that leveled Hiroshima--currently on "hair-trigger" alert. Two thousand or so of these warheads are on the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted by Russia at the United States. Iran. but rather get close and avert disaster.800 are on the ICBMs targeted by the United States at Russia. for example. The deterrence file is in the dropbox. But it also seems to make the point that we will EMPIRICALLY NEVER have an accident. True. No link to the impact here«it talks about a shoebox full of uranium but there is no reason to believe that we could get a cargo ship with bombs on it into New York CONTENTION 2: Irrational Leaders Answer this analytically like we went over in class.000 are on the submarine-based missiles targeted by the two nations at each other. The American Prospect. Hair-trigger alert means this: The missiles carrying those warheads are armed and fueled at all times. but if the negative shows good reasons to keep nukes around. Card #2 is tagged ³Emprical Examples of Almost-Accidents´ Yes. It talks about warning errors. a hypothetical maybe almost-accident is not an impact the aff can win on. you can crossapply from the card above this one. and approximately 1. In no more than two minutes. It may be better not to come close.

THIS ONE IS EVEN HARDER TO FIND THAN THE FIRST. No. 3. Russia or the United States could launch missiles at predetermined targets: Washington or New York. p. a nuclear war by checklist. by rote." explains Bruce Blair.´ by Barry Levy and Victor Sidel 2007 ³The Uppsala Conflict Data Project« may exceed 500. causing the intended--or accidental--enemy to mount retaliatory strikes. "Within a half-hour. pp. Kenneth. the size of a nuclear arsenal begins to have diminishing returns ON THE NEGATIVE V: Morality VC: Preventing War y nukes or not«we can still have war. ³The catastrophe promised by nuclear war« disappears in a nuclear one. 84. IF I FIND IT I WILL ADD. big nuclear arsenals = MAD deterrence b. basically. 24 ³War and Public Health. 731-745. Remember that« a. there could be a nuclear war that would extinguish all of us. AGAIN. Moscow or St. BUT I KNOW I¶VE SEEN IT. Nuclear Myths and Political Realities The American Political Science Review. Vol." This card is basically saying that the US and Russia have huge huge huge nuclear arsenals.´ Richard Garfield ³The Epidemiology of War´.´ UNFORTUNATELY. Waltz. September 1990.all went according to plan. so it does lose some credibility that way. this also goes away and their impact is link turned harder back on them CAN¶T FIND THIS EVIDENCE. Petersburg. y Do keep in mind facing this that it was written before the fall of the USSR. The early-warning systems on which the launch crews rely would detect the other side's missiles within tens of seconds.000 per year.´ y Generally against this cause I would say o Run deterrence bad o Author/date indicts to show it is non-unique o Battle with your framework because this case is most likely utilitarian . "It would be. If you win deterrence bad. I WILL ADD IF I CAN FIND IT Richard Garfield ³The Epidemiology of War.

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