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CRUZ v. PARAS If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
123 SCRA 569 (1983) ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth,
this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
Nature: Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review decision of purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of
Bulacan CFI the State.
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
Petitioners had been previously issued licenses for their night clubs by the could qualify under the term reasonable as objective of fostering public morals can
Municipal Mayor of Bocaue Bulacan. be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field such as
reasonable restrictions as opposed to absolute prohibition.
Then Ordinance no. 84, Series of 1975 [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] took
effect in Bocaue, Bulacan which provided that no operator of night clubs, cabarets Furthermore, this case refers to R.A. 938 which was originally entitled: “an act
or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the granting municipal or city boards and councils the power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any establishment, maintenance and operation of certain places of amusement within
professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in any their respective territorial jurisdictions.”
of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition also included prohibition in
the renewal thereof. (Sec. 3)
This act gives the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of
It further provided for the revocation of permits and licenses upon the expiration of
night clubs, cabarets, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial
the 30-day period and that the operation of such establishments within the
jurisdiction. Then the 1st section was amended to include not merely "the power to
jurisdiction of the municipality shall then on be illegal (Sec. 4)
regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... "
Petitioners thus filed in the Bulacan CFI for prohibition with preliminary injunction
The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. The power
on the grounds that:
granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the
oOrdinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit
view advanced by petitioners that to construe RA 938 as allowing the prohibition of
a lawful business, occupation or calling.
the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question.
oOrdinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the
The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall
equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in be expressed in the title thereof. " (Art. VIII, Sec. 19, par. 1).
effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting,
oThat under P.D. No. 189, as amended, by P.D. No. 259, the power to license and it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of
regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.
to the Department of Tourism. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of
Lower court upheld constitutionality and validity of Ordinance 84 and dismissed the recently-enacted Local Government Code whose general welfare clause clearly
case. provides that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
Issue: WON a municipal corporation (Bocaue, Bulacan as represented by Municipal Respondents cited Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v.
Mayor Matias Ramirez and Municipal Vice-Mayor Mario Mendoza) can prohibit the City Mayor of Manila. However, in that case, it imposed a regulatory measure.
exercise of a lawful trade, operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may
conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices which could
NO. The reliance on the police power of the lower court is insufficient to justify the encourage vice and immorality.
enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
Police power is granted to municipal corporations by Sec. 2238, Revised Admin Held: writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court reversed, set
Code (practically a reproduction of the former Sec. 39 of Municipal Code) aside, and nulled. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is
U.S. v. Abendan, Moreland as ponente: An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof is declared void and unconstitutional.
valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act
of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, MBARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the
power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details Facts:
of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as
be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid. Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute reads:
U.S. v. Salaveria, Malcolm as ponente: (applying present Admin Code provision) It
is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the “SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-
general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan,
purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
State. Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
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Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to
Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig. notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality subject thereof.
shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for
local officials. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes
the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, deliberations the entire text of the bill.
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are
parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in In order to ascertain whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. constitutional requirement, the following, may be taken as guidelines:
"The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, while technical accuracy is not essential, arid the subject need not be
1967, indicating that pursuant to R.A. 4790, twelve barrios - in two stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set
municipalities in the province of Cotabato - are transferred to the province forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would
of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
provinces. contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act,
through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the is bad. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, requirement, of giving, notice to all persons interested, should be kept in
declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional mind by the court.”
by 'the Supreme Court."
The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Sur" 8 - projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected
Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this
unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"
20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified. read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive.
For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in
Issues: one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
1. WON Republic Act 4790 is null and void for embracing more than one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
subject in a bill. and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities, in Cotabato, a province different from
2. WON Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine Lanao del Sur.
barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with
the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive.
barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of
Cotabato. the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
3. WON petitioner has substantial interest affected by the implementation of Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is
RA 4790. being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns
Ratio/Holding: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. Respondent Commission is and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures
prohibited from implementing the same for electoral purposes. which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

1. Yes. Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting
in "the substantial diminution of the territorial limits" of Cotabato province is
Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that " [n]o bill "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the
which in ay be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in
expressed in the title of the bill. It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in-the title of the law." This
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posture - we must say - but emphasizes the error of constitutional
dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to
portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in
reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelvve barrios in the towns of
increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a Buldon and Parang, Cotabato, were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must
municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact. be in the negative.

Felwa vs. Salas is not a case in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended
4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all,
and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that
that the provisions of the law (Section 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials congressional will. Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable, and it is
of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there accordingly null and void in its totality.
ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces
must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" - 3. Here, the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the
which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title.
title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial
lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the
statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a
new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries' of the two provinces different provincial hegemony. The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of
may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so
versa. created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the
Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.
In Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to
Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon.The statute, Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections His right to
however, goes beyond the restriction and its title was therefore described as vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. Since by
“erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading." Similar statutes aimed at constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the
changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby, it stands to reason to
expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional. 10 say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of
that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the
2. No. constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

We are not unmindful of the rule, that where a portion of a statute is rendered Guingona vs. Carague
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the
constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus: PETITIONERS: Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., members of the
" . . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and Senate
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations RESPONDENTS: Guillermo Carague, Secretary of Dept. of Budget and
for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as Management; Rozalina Cajucom, National Treasurer; and
a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature Commission on Audit
would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional,
or connected, must fall with them." In substantially similar language, the FACTS:
same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:  The 1990 budget totals P233.5B
"The general rule is that where part of the statute is void, as repugnant to  It consists of
the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable 1. P155.3B appropriated by Congress under RA6831 (General
from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the Appropriations Act of 1990 or GAA 1990), of which 27B will go to
valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair DECS, the highest among all departments; and
to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had 2. P98.4B in automatic appropriations (P86B for debt servicing)
supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . . Enough
pursuant to:
must remain to make a complete. intelligible, and valid statute, which
carries out the legislative intent. . . , The language used in the invalid part a. PD81 (which amends RA4860, Foreign Borrowing Act),
of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever,
and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the
void part, since the court has no power to legislate ... “
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b. PD1177 (entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order  The Constitution mandates the assignment of highest budgetary priority to
to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New education in order to insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful
Society), and share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment
c. PD1967 (“An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Rep. of the Phil. On Its  However, this does not mean that Congress is so hamstrung that it is
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and deprived of the power to respond to the imperatives of national interest
Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds for the and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Purpose”)  Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation that can reasonably service our
 Petitioners, are seeking: enormous debt
1. the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree Nos. 81,  It is a matter of:
1177 (Section 31) and 1967; and 1. honor
2. the restraining of the disbursement for the debt service under the 1990 2. protecting our credit standing
budget under said decrees (i.e. the P86B automatic appropriations). 3. the very survival of our economy

 They are basing their petition on 3 grounds: II. W/N PD81, PD1177 and PD1967 are still operative under the Constitution.
1. By appropriating more funds for debt servicing (P86B) than for education
(P27B), such appropriations are violative of Section 5, Article 14 of the YES. Section 3, Article 18 of the Constitution recognizes that all existing
Constitution. decrees not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative
2. PDs 81, 1177 and 1967 are no longer operative under the present under amended, repealed or revoked. Implied repeal and revocation is
Constitution (1987) frowned upon.
3. Such PDs violate Section 29(1), Article 6 of the Constitution, which states
that “no money shall be paid out of the National Treasury except in  PD 81 amends RA 4860, which authorizes the president to obtain foreign
pursuance to an appropriation made by law.” loans and credits and appropriates the necessary funds therefore, by
providing that funds are hereby appropriated from the National
Treasury to cover any deficiency for debt servicing
PROCEDURAL ISSUES:  PD1177 provides for the automatic appropriations for expenditures
1. Locus Standi – as Senators, they may raise the issue of unconstitutionality for, inter alia, principal and interests on public debt
− as taxpayers, they have personal interest in restraining  PD1967 provides that “there is hereby appropriated, out of any funds
unlawful expenditure of public funds in the National Treasury, such amounts as may be necessary to
2. Justiciability – in Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., which involves the constitutionality effect payments on foreign or domestic loans
of the presidential veto of certain provisions of GAA 1990, the Court held that  Their purpose is to enable the government to make prompt payment
the political doctrine interposes no obstacle to the judicial determination of rival and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of
claims under the Constitution. the country
− With the Senate maintaining that the President’s veto is
unconstitutional, and that the charge being controverted,  Petitioners allege that said decrees became functus officio when Pres.
there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the
Marcos was ousted because, with the expiration of the one-man legislature,
Upper House of Congress and the Executive that may be
the legislative power was restored to Congress and that new legislation for
taken cognizance of by the SC
automatic appropriations must come from Congress.
 The SC held that it could not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to require all existing laws to pass through Congress again
ISSUES:
 The requirement of Sections 24 and 27, which requires appropriations and
I. W/N the P86B debt servicing appropriation is violative of Section 5, Article 14 of
bills to originate from the House of Representatives and be approved by
the Constitution and, therefore, invalid.
the President, applies only to bills that are still to be passed by Congress
 This is all the more true because of the “political wisdom” of automatic
NO. The fact the DECS appropriation is the highest budgetary appropriation
appropriations, which is to provide flexibility to the government for
among all department budgets is a clear and sufficient compliance with
effective execution of debt management policies.
the constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.
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III. W/N they are unconstitutional by violating Sections 24 and 29(1), Article 6 of Although it is a valid exercise of the power vested in the Sec by virtue of Act 3846,
the Constitution petitioners still question the purpose of the dept’s investigation. It is assailed that
or although the Sec may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station
W/N under the said PDs there is undue delegation of legislative power or operator license, the said investigation has no legal basis because the dept’s
purpose for doing so was not in connection w/ the application for renewal of license.
NO. If the delegation of the authority to execute the legislative intent satisfies The dept stated its purpose for the investigation was in relation only to the late
the test of completeness, then there is a valid delegation. The filing1 of the applications for renewal. However, the dept itself, through a circular,
legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job condoned such act if the named radio and tv stations took the necessary steps to
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. correct their practices. Therefore, the issue being resolved, the violation ceased to
exist and hence, there is no more reason nor need for the present investigation.
 In Edu vs. Ericta, the SC said that “to avoid the taint of unlawful
Next issue raised by the petitioners is WON there was abandonment or
delegation, there must be a standard that implies, at the very least, that
renunciation by petitioner CBN of its right to operate on Channel 9. It was
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
admitted that indeed there was no express agreement to this effect. What was
fundamental policy… the standard may be either express or implied from
agreed upon was that CBN would transfer to Channel 10 once the Baguio station
the policy and purpose.”
starts to operate. However, the statement “Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel
 The SC found that, in this case, the questioned laws are complete in all 9” did not mean abandonment by the station of its right to operate and broadcast
their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated on the existing Channel 9 in Quezon City. Such transfer was merely to avoid
therein. interference of its broadcast w/ that of another station, Channel 8, operated by the
Clark Air Force Base. Therefore, CBN still had the right to operate therein.
 Although the decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated
by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts
Consequently, because there was no express agreement made between CBN and
nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the
PBS for the exchange of use of Channel 9 and 10, the last issue raised that WON
decrees
PBS can legally operate Channel 9 and claim for damages for CBN’s refusal to give
 The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be
up operations thereof must be resolved against PBS. No right belonging to PBS was
disbursed
violated by CBN’s refusal to give up its present operation of Channel 9. Moreover,
 The mandate is only to pay the principal, interest, taxes, and other normal the President vetoed the appropriation for the operation of the PBS fund that no
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness… No uncertainty portion of the appropriation shall be used for the operation of tv stations in Luzon or
arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts any part of the Phils where there are tv stations.
as shown by the books of the Treasury
 Section 29(1), Article 6 merely states that appropriation should be made Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or
by law items of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation
 It does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious bill affects one or more items of the same, the Pres cannot veto the
recitals in which authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, provision w/o at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to w/c
except that it be done “by law” it relates2 (Art VI Sec 20).
 This is precisely what the decrees did, it made appropriations by law
Hence, any expenditure made by intervenor PBS for the purpose of installing or
operating a tv station in Manila, where there are already tv stations in operation,
Tolentino vs. Sec. Of Finance would be in violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation
and consequently, was null and void. Therefore, PBS is not entitled to
Bolinao Electronics Corp v. Valencia (1964) reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.
Original Petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction w/ preliminary injunction
Writ granted. Writ of preliminary injunction made permanent.
FACTS:
The Sec of Public Works & Communications and the Acting Chief of the Radio NOTES: As a general rule, if the Pres disapproves a bill approved by Congress, he
Control Division have instigated an investigation against petitioners who are the should veto the entire bill. He is not allowed to veto separate items of a bill. It is
owners and operators of radio and tv stations namely: (1) Bolinao Electronics Corp, only in the case of appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills that he is authorized to
(2) Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. and (3) Monserrat Broadcasting System, exercise item-veto ( Comments of Fr Bernas on the 1987 Consti).
Inc. RP, as operator of the Phil Broadcasting Service (PBS), later intervened in the
1
case having been granted a construction permit to install and operate a tv station in First issue: late filing of the application was resolved and therefore investigation lost its raison d’etre.
2
Mla. Compare w/ 1987 Consti Art VI Sec 27 (2): The Pres shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to w/c he
does not object.
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♥ Demetria vs Alba: Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of
Gonzales vs. Macaraig Jr. [Nov. 19, 1990] its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what
Petition for prohibition/madamus assailing constitutionality of Pres’l veto of Sec.55 other branches of the gov’t had assumed to do as void.
♥ Imperative need for a definitive ruling on the matter in order to avoid
Facts: recurrences in the future.
♥ Congress passed HB No. 19186 or the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for the ♥ Taxpayers (Sanidad vs. COMELEC) & members of Senate (Tolentino vs.
Fiscal Year (FY) 1989. It eliminated/decreased certain items included in the COMELEC) have the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of issues
proposed budget submitted by the Pres. GAB signed into law (RA No. 6688) by raised.
the Pres who vetoed 7 special provisions & Sec. 55, a general provision. Senate ♥ This is pursuant to the court’s power of judicial review.
then, thru Senate Resolution No. 381 declared the veto as unconstitutional & ♥ Court took cognizance of cases involving the constitutionality of a Presidential
void & upheld validity of Sec. 55. Petition filed assailing the constitutionality of veto such as Bengson vs Sec. of Justice & Bolinao Electronics vs. Valencia.
the veto & sought to enjoin implementation of RA No. 6688. Senate authorized 2. WON the President has the power to veto “provisions” of the GAB? - YES
this petition by the members of the Senate Committee on Finance who filed this ♥ Sec. 27, Art. VI of the Consti provides for the veto pow of the Pres. Par. 1 refers
case in their capacity as committee members & as taxpayers. Respondents are to the gen veto power w/c results to the veto of the entire bill whereas Par. 2
Cabinet members tasked to implement the GAA of 1989 & 1990 all sued in their refers to the item-veto or line-veto power allowing exercise of veto over
official capacities. particular item/s in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. This power does not
♥ A supplemental petition was filed this time questioning the president’s veto of grant the authority on the Pres to veto a part of an item & to approve the
certain provisions, Sec. 16 of HB 26934 (GAB for FY 1990) in particular. remaining portion of the same item.
♥ Sec. 55 of GAA of FY 1989 (Prohibition against the restoration or increase of ♥ Item: particulars, the details, the distinct & severable parts of the bill. It’s an
recommended appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by Congress): indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It’s a specific
Appropriations items recommended by the Pres in Budget submitted to appropriation of money & not some general provision of law w/c happens to be
Congress w/c has been reduced/disapproved shall not be restored/increased put into an appropriation bill.
using appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. A ♥ Petitioners urge a restrictive interpretation of the provision. It disregards the
recommendation is deemed disapproved if Congress did not provide for a fact that distinct & severable parts of a bill may be the subj of a separate veto
corresponding appropriation for that purpose. & thus eliminating the need of vetoing the entire bill (Sec. 25.2, Art. VI). It
♥ Reason for Presidential Veto: Violative of sec. 25 (5) of Art. VI of the Consti in likewise overlooks the Constitutional mandate w/c provides that a provision in
effect disallowing Pres, Sen. Pres., Speaker of the House, SC CJ, head of an appropriations bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation
Constitutional commissions to augment items in the GAA for their offices from to w/c it relates & it does not relate to the entire bill.
savings in other items even in cases of calamity or when there is an urgent ♥ Petitioners erroneously claim that the veto pow of the Pres is legislative &
need to accelerate implementation of essential pub service/infrastructure. should be strictly construed. In Bengzon, the Court said that the Consti is a
♥ Sec. 16 of GAA of FY 1990 (Use of Savings): Allowed augmentation but 1989’s limitation upon the legislative pow & a grant of pow to the executive and that
Sec. 55 was attached as a condition/restriction. Same reason was given for the the courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a
veto along with the fact that a case was already pending in the SC concerning veto as it will presume the constitutionality of a legislative act.
the validity of the 1989 veto. 3. WON the provisions are inappropriate - YES
♥ Petitioners’ contentions: These are not provisions in the budgetary sense. Sec. 25.2, Art. VI of the Consti
1. Pres can only veto item/s & not provision/s such as Secs 16 & 55. provides that all provisions/enactments shall relate specifically to some particular
2. When Pres vetoes a provision, she should likewise veto the entire bill. appropriation & their operation shall be limited to the appropriation to w/c they
3. Item-veto power does not allow Pres to veto conditions/restrictions. relate to. But these provisions apply generally to all items disapproved/reduced by
4. Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of Consti has to be provided for by law & Congress has Congress & not to a particular/distinctive appropriation. The disapproved/reduced
power to impose restrictions on exercise of that pow. items are not found on the Bill either. One would still need to resort to the
♥ Respondents’ contentions: President’s original recommendation to discover w/c items have been
1. It’s a political question. disapproved/reduced. These provisions are more of an expression of Congressional
2. Petitioners had a political remedy – override the veto. policy re: augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. These
3. Sec. 55 is a rider since it’s unrelated to the Appropriations Act. are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the
4. Budget Law (PD 1177, Secs. 44-45) allows the Pres to augment items in President’s veto power (Henry vs Edwards).
the appropriations for the exec dept. 4. WON conditions/restrictions are inappropriate - YES
5. Consti allows pres to veto provisions or other distinct & severable parts of ♥ Inherent in the pow of appropriation is the pow to specify how money shall be
an Appropriations Bill. spent. Exec is not allowed to veto a condition/proviso while allowing the
Issues & Ratio: appropriation itself to stand. But restrictions should be such in the real sense of
1. WON SC has jurisdiction. - YES the term, not some matters w/c are more properly dealt w/in a separate
legislation. It must exhibit a connection w/money items in a budgetary sense in
the schedule of expenditures.
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♥ Although the provisions were made to appear as conditions/limitations, they • PD 644 (Jan 25, 1975) repealed Sec 3-A of RA 1797 & RA 3595 & PD 578
were actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive & • PD 1638: the automatic readjustment of pensions of AFP members who
separate legislation. Neither of the provisions show the necessary connection retired before Sept ’79
w/a schedule of expenditures. • WHILE ADJUSTMENT OF RETIREMENT PENSIONS OF AFP WAS RESTORED,
♥ Bolinao case is inapplicable. The veto there was held invalid because it carried THAT OF THE RETIRED JUSTICES WAS NOT.
w/it the approval of the condition attached to it whereas in this case, no • Thus, Congress approved in 1990 HB 16297, a bill for the reenactment of
condition in the budgetary sense, attached to an appropriation/item in the the repealed provisions of RA 1797 & RA 3595
appropriation bill w/c was struck out. What we have here is a gen provision of • In July 11, 1990, Pres Awuino VETOED HB 16297 to strictly enforce the
law w/c happens to be put in an appropriation bill. standardization of compensation (RA 6758) & bec the govt should not
5. WON the veto is valid - YES grant distinct privileges to select grp of officials whose retirement benefits
♥ Provisions are indeed violative of Art. VI, Sec. 25(5) as president argued in his under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the
veto. In Demetria vs. Alba, the Court held that heads of different branches of others.
the gov’t should be afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds & • Prior to instant petition, retired CA justices filed a letter/petition (Apr 22,
resources. They should be allowed to transfer funds for purpose of augmenting 1991), which is treated as an ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER (A.M.) Petitioners
an item fr savings in another item in the appropriation of the gov’t therein asked Court for readjustment of their monthly pensions in
branch/constitutional body concerned. Such was affirmed in the 73 Consti and accordance w/ RA 1797. They said that PD 644 repealing RA 1797 didn’t
in PD 1177, Sec. 44-45. Even the 1989 (Sec. 12) and 1990 (Sec. 16) GAA become law as there was no valid publication pursuant to Tanada v.
allow such. Tuvera)
♥ The doctrine of separation of powers is not endangered because the transfer is
• PD 644 promulgated on Jan 24, 1975 appeared for the 1st time only in the
made only w/in a dept. Likewise, it does not vest in the exec the power to
supplemental issue of OG, dated Apr 4, 1977, published only Sept 5, 1983.
rewrite the entire budget since transfers are limited w/in the dept/branch
• A.M. RESOLUTION: above request granted. The monthly pensions were
concerned.
authorized to be adjusted & paid on the basis of RA 1797.
♥ An appropriations bill makes appropriation of money from the public treasury
• Pursuant to A.M. Resolution, Congress included in Gen Appropriation Bill for
whereas the power of augmentation from savings cannot be considered a
FY 1992 the appropriation for the Judiciary for payment of the adjusted
specific appropriation of money. It’s a non-appropriation item w/c has no place
pension rates due the retired SC justices (HB 34925)
in an appropriation measure. They are more of substantive expressions of a
• HB 34925 basically authorizes the CJ to augment, among others, the
legislative obj. They are matters of gen law & more properly the subj of a
separate legislation that will embody, define & delimit the scope of the special payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto
pow of augmentation fr savings. If, as Congress claims, these provisions were pursuant to A.M. Resolution. Payment from its savings.
included to repeal PD 1177, then all the more that it should be provided in a • In Jan 15, 1992, Aquino vetoed the underlined portions of HB 34925 (p.
separate enactment since implied repeals are not favored. 141), for the reason that the A.M. Resolution nullified the veto of HB
♥ Besides, as the respondents contend, Consti has laid down a remedy for the 16297. Aquino reiterated the same reasons for the prior veto of HB 16297.
petitioners. They could have overridden the veto by 2/3 votes of its members. • PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS: 1) subject veto is not an item veto; 2) veto by
But they did not do so. executive violates separation of powers; 3) veto deprives retired justices of
their rights to the pensions due them; 4) veto impairs fiscal autonomy
Held: Veto upheld. Petition dismissed. guaranteed by Consti

BENGZON V. DRILON ISSUES:
Basic issue: Constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provision in the
Petitioners: Retired SC justices
GAA for FY 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices
Respondents: Drilon (Exec Sec); Carague (DBM Sec); Cajucan (Nat’l Treasurer)
of the SC & CA.
1. WON subject veto is an item veto – NO
FACTS:
2. WON PD 644 became law - NO
• June 10, 1953: RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of
3. WON subject veto violates separation of powers - YES
SC & CA justices
4. WON veto deprives retired justices of their rights to pensions due them -
• June 21, 1957: RA 910 was amended by RA 1797 w/c says that should the
YES
salary of the justices increase/ decrease, such increase/decreased salary 5. WON veto impairs fiscal autonomy - YES
shall be deemed to be the salary or retirement pension of retired SC justice
(Sec 3-A) RATIO
• RA 1568 (amended by RA 3595) provided identical retirement benefits to 1. Subject veto is not an item veto
members of the Const’l Commission • On Appropriation, revenue, & tariff bills: Exec can’t veto entire bill even if it
• PD 578: provided similar benefits to AFP members, along with automatic may contain objectionable features. Thus, Consti provides for “item veto
readjustment features.
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power” to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable statutory prerequisites for retirement w/ pay, his right to retire & draw
appropriation or revenue measure salary becomes vested & may not thereafter be revoked or impaired.
• Only a particular item/s may be vetoed. • In RP, retirement laws have been enacted to entice competent men &
• Power to disapprove any item/s in an appropriate bill DOES NOT GRANT women to enter the govt service & permit them to retire therefrom w/
the authority to veto a part of an item & to approve the remaining portion relative security.
of the same item (Gonzales v. Macaraig) • The rationale behind the veto w/c implies that Justices & constitutional
• ITEM: refers to the particulars, details, the distinct & severable parts; it’s officers are unduly favored is misimpression.
an indivisible sum of money, not some general provision of law w/c • The provisions regarding retirement pensions of Justices arise from the
happens to be put into an appropriation bill. package of protections given by the Consti to guarantee & preserve the
• The general fund adjustment is an ITEM w/c appropriates P500M to enable independence of the judiciary.
the govt to meet certain unavoidable obligations w/c may have been • Any argument w/c seeks to remove special privileges given by law to
inadequately funded by the specific items for the diff branches, depts., former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct
bureaus, agencies, & offices of govt. THE PRES DIDN’T VETO THIS ITEM. privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores the Const’l
• WHAT WERE VETOED WERE METHODS OR SYSTMS placed by the Congress provisions (Art VIII & Sec 30, Art VI) that the Judiciary is not only
to ensure that permanent & continuing obligations to certain officials would independent, but also co-equal & coordinate.
be paid when they fell due.
• Portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed & unvetoed parts. 5. Veto infringed on fiscal autonomy in Sec 3, Art VIII
Less than all of an item has been vetoed. • Fiscal autonomy is a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate & utilize their
• THE VETOED PORTIONS ARE NOT ITEMS BUT PROVISIONS. resources w/ the wisdom & dispatch that their needs require. It means
freedom from outside control.
• The augmentation from savings is a PROVISION and NOT AN ITEM. It gives
• The imposition of restrictions & constraints on the manner the independent
the CJ the power to transfer funds from one item to another. No specific
const’l offices allocate & utilize the funds appropriated for their operations
appropriation of money was involved.
is anathema to fiscal autonomy & violative not only the express mandate of
the Consti but especially as regards the SC, of the independence & sep of
2. PD 644 never became law
powers upon w/c the entire fabric of our const’l system is based.
• Simply because it was not properly published. (PD 644 is among those
declared w/o force & effect in Tanada v. Tuvera) • In the case at bar, the veto of specific provisions of GAA 1992 is
• Thus, RA 1797 was never repealed. HB 16297 was superfluous as it tried to tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized,
restore benefits w/c were never taken away validly by PD 644. The veto of w/c is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the CJ to make
HB 16297 in 1990 also did not produce effect. Both were based on adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the
erroneous & non-existent premises. expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any
• When the Pres vetoed certain provisions of the GAA 1992, SHE WAS particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary
ACTUALLY VETOING RA 1797 w/c is beyond her power to accomplish. is withheld.
• Art VI, Sec. 25: …CJ…may…augment any item in the gen appropriations law
3. Subject veto violated separation of powers for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
• EXECUTIVE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO SETA SIDE & OVERRULE A DECISION appropriations.”
OF SC • The vetoed provisions w/c relate to the use of savings for augmenting
• Congress included in the GAA 1992 provisions identifying funds & savings items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are
used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the SC Resolution. As long clearly in consonance w/ the abovestated pronouncements of the Court.
as retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing The veto impairs the power of the CJ to augment other items in the
obligation on the part of the govt to pay the adjusted pension rate Judiciary’s appropriation, in contravention of the const’l provision on fiscal
pursuant to RA 1797 & the A.M. Resolution autonomy.
• NEITHER MAY THE VETO POWER BE EXERCISED AS A MEANS OF
REPEALING RA 1797. Miller vs. Mardo [July 31, 1961]
• Pres has no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her Appeals from the decisions of different Courts of First Instance.
predecessors much less to repeal existing laws.
Facts:
 The Supreme Court consolidated here 5 cases which assails the validity of
4. The attempt to use the veto power deprives retirees of benefits given them
the Reorganization Plan 20-A
by RA 1797
• The right to a public pension is of statutory origin. This is founded on  Reorganization Plan 20-A confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the
Department Labor to decide cases other than those falling under the
services rendered to the state. Where a judge has complied w/ the
Workmen’s Compensation Law. Reorganization Plan 20-A was created
under the authority of RA 997 as amended by RA 1241.
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 Section 6 of RA 997 authorizes a law to be passed by mere inaction of
Congress.
 On February 14, 1956 Reorganization Plan No. 20-A which was submitted
by the Reorganization Commission to the president was forwarded to
Congress. Congress adjourned its session without passing a resolution
disapproving or adopting the reorganization plan.
 It is contended that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is not merely the
creation of the Reorganization Commission but it is a regular statute
directly and duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
powers.

Issue: WON the Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is unconstitutional. YES

Ratio:
 Approval of a bill cannot be made by Congress by mere silence,
adjournment or concurrent resolution. The constitution requires the two
houses to hold separate sessions for deliberations, and to submit the
determination of one to the separate determination of the other, unless a
joint session is provided for.
 The method of passing the law amounts to an abdication by Congress of its
legislative prerogative to the executive.
 Congress cannot deem a draft submitted by an executive agency passed as
law by mere inaction within a certain period. It must go through the 3
readings and the submission of the bill to the president.

Tanada vs. Tuvera (see Crim notes)