Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008) 1

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGESTS (Atty. Gwen De Vera) All by LOUDETTE CALPO (A 2008) 4. No, A writ cannot be issued by the court to the respondent. Although Congress gave the Court the right to issue a writ of mandamus to any court appointed, for any person holding office, ART.3 SEC. 2 of US Constitution clearly outlines the original and appellate jurisdictions of the Court. While a writ may be issued to the respondent the basis of which is not the office but the nature of the thing to be done, it cannot be issued by the SC following the Constitution. The jurisdiction to issue writs to public officers lies within the inferior courts. To do otherwise would be to give the legislative supreme power over the law, and any act contrary to the Constitution cannot be valid and given effect by the courts.

1. MARBURY v. MADISON Action: A petition for writ of mandamus for delivery of document Facts: On the December Term, 1801, petitioner, with Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsende Hooe and William Harper petitioned for a rule to compel respondent to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue. Petitioner is asking to be furnished with the commission as Justice of the Peace (JOP) of Washington, D.C. Witnesses Wagner (not all commissions signed, recorded; did not personally see commissions), Daniel Brent (almost certain of Marbury and Hooe’s appointment, signed and affixed with a seal but not recorded; Ramsay not included), Lincoln (Secretary of State during Adams, term) that no commissions were sent out. James Marshall (delivered commissions, returned some including Hooe’s and Harper’s), and Hazen Kimball (Marbury and Hooe commissions signed) attested to the existence of the commissions, duly signed and affixed with US seal. Petitioners were denied requests for the commission, and thus appeal to the Court for a writ of mandamus. On February 24, 1803, the Court rendered its decision.
Issues: 1. 2. 3. 4. Held: 1. WON applicant has right to commissions demanded. WON this right, if violated, has a remedy in law. WON writ of mandamus is the remedy, and if so, WON writ can be issued by the Court to respondent. YES, the applicants have the right to the commissions demanded. When the commission was signed by the President, and the seal affixed verifying the verity of the signature, the commission is complete. The office of the JOP is independent of the Office of the President; once signed, commission is irrevocable. The transmission or acceptance of the commission is a practice of convenience and not law, since the document is delivered to one ALREADY appointed. The petitioner thus has a vested right to the office of JOP. The violated right has a remedy in law. The Secretary of State has both a public ministerial duty to the US and an agency to the President. It is in this former capacity that he is accountable to the people. His executive or discretionary power ended with the signing of the President of the commission. Mandamus is the proper remedy. There is no other adequate specific legal remedy. Since a detinue involves an object or its value. Mandamus is the proper remedy since the office is not to be sold (no attendant value; all or nothing).

WHEREFORE, Court holds that the petitioner has a legal right to the office of JOP for five years, and the refusal to deliver the commission is a violation of that right. While mandamus is the proper remedy, jurisdiction to issue the writ lies with the inferior courts.



On September 17, 1935, petitioner was elected member of the national assembly for the first district of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers proclaimed him on November 15, 1935, NA passed Resolution no. 8 confirming all members whose election has not been contested. On December 9, 1935, respondent Ynsua filed a protest of petitioner’s election, with a prayer that he be declared winner or election declared null and void. He filed on the last day set by the electoral commission. On December 20, 1935 petitioner filed a motion to dismiss protest before the Electoral Commission on the following grounds: 1. Res. No. 8 valid exercise of legislative powers 2. Resolution has the object of limiting protest period 3. Protest filed outside prescribed period Ynsua argued that there exists no constitutional provision or statute prohibiting protest of election of a NA member after confirmation. On January 23, 1936, the EC denied the protest of which are the following grounds: 1. Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction to EC as regards electoral disputes under Sec 4 Art 6 2. This excludes the power to regulate proceedings of said election contests—reserved to NA 3. EC can only regulate if Na has not availed of the power to do so 4. Resolution no. 8 valid 5. SC has jurisdiction over question; involves Constitutionality under Par 13 Sec 1, ordinance appended to constitution and Sec 1 and 3 of PC The Solicitor General replied: 1. EC on independent instrument of NA, and its fixing of the deadline is a valid exercise of its powers



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2. 3. Res. No. 8 should and can not deprive EC of this jurisdiction EC invested with quasi-judicial powers created by PC- it is not an inferior tribunal minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate under Sec. 2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator Tañada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ET are reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation not only of Tañada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is without cause of action since Tañada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion. Issues: 1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter 2. WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee on Rules for the Senate Held: 1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. The case at bar is not an action against the Senate compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as members of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate elects its members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or nominate, but the validity of the manner by which power was exercised (constitutionality). The Court is concerned with the existence and extent of said discretionary powers. 2. No. Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6 Senate members in the ET must be followed, this cannot be done without violating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide against partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the law (modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted; although they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The contention that petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the power to waive is inexistent. Tañada never led Primicias to believe that his nominations on behalf of the CP are valid.

Respondent Ynsua argued: 1. No law prescribing protest period was in effect at the time EC set the deadline 2. He filed within the set deadline 3. EC has no jurisdiction, not reviewable by a writ of prohibition 4. No law requires confirmation of NA members 5. EC renders independent, final, and unappealable decisions 6. EC not inferior tribunal but empowered by Sec 226 and 516 of Code of Civil Procedure 7. The Tydings-Mcduffie Law as invoked by petitioner is not applicable to case at bar. Issue: 1. 2. Held: 1. The SC has jurisdiction. There is a need to determine the scope, characteristics, and extent of the Consti grant to EC under Sec 4 Art 6. No. The deliberation of the Constitutional Commissioners show that the purpose in creating the EC was to transfer all power related to judgment on electoral dispute from NA to independent tribunal. Absent a Consti provision stating otherwise, all powers to promulgate its judgment of election contests lies with EC. The argument of abuse is not relevant as everything can be actually met. Confirmation of elected officials is not necessary. The Constitution abrogated the Jones Law and Sec 478 of Act 3387, which gave NA the power to fix the time period within which protests can be filed. WON SC has jurisdiction over EC case at bar WON EC acted in excess of its jurisdiction, given the resolution passed by NA


Wherefore, petition is denied, with costs to petitioner. Also, Abad-Santos concurring: • The power of EC to judge electoral contests judicial in nature • The power to regulate time to protest legislative in nature



On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for

WHEREFORE, The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by the proper party, nor can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of the staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion of the Chairman.

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Paras, dissenting: The procedure or manner of nomination cannot affect Consti mandate that the Senate is entitled to 6 seats in the ET. The number of seats (9) must be held fixed, since the Consti must have consistent application. There is no rule against the minority party nominating a majority party member to the ET. Furthermore, the Senate, and not the parties, elect on the ET members, brushing aside partisan concerns. Labrador, dissenting: The petition itself is unconstitutional under Art. 6 Sec. 2 because: 1. 2. 3. 4. 9-member ET mandate violated right to elect of Senate held in abeyance by refusal of minority party to nominate process of nomination effectively superior to power to elect (party v. Senate power) SC arrogation of power in determining Con Con’s proviso of <9 ET members under certain circumstances 5. OSMEÑA v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the Constitution: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. PC mandate that local & nat’l elections be held on the second Monday of May, beginning 1992 par. 2, Sec. 3 of RA 7056, by providing that provincial, city & municipal officials hold over beyond June 30, 1992 violates Sec. 2, Art. 18 of PC Par. 2 Sec. 3 of RA 7056 shortens the term of certain officials to be elected on the second Monday of November 1992 – a violation of Sec. 8, Art. 10 of PC Sec. 8 of RA 7056, by fixing campaign periods (Pres. & VP – 130, Senators – 45 days before elections) violates Sec. 9 Art. 9 of PC Problems stated as reasons for desynchronization are not valid. Petitioners argue that as public officials and taxpayers, they have the duty to uphold the PC.

The refusal of Tañada to nominate must be considered a waiver of privilege based on constitutionality and reason, in order to reconcile two applications of Art. 6, Sec. 2.

Respondents argue that the questioned provision is a valid exercise of legislative power, and that the amending process in the Consti does not apply to transitory provisions. Furthermore, it is a political question, and the petitioners have no standing. Pending judgment, a temporary restraining order on RA 7056 was issued on June 27, 1991. Issues: 1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter 2. WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional 3. WON amending process applies to Transitory Provisions Held: 1. The Issue is a justiciable controversy. The act in question is not discretionary in nature. The question is the legality and not wisdom of RA 7056. Furthermore, the SC now has expanded jurisdiction over matters involving political questions, so long as Constitutionality is an issue, as evident in Sec. 1, Art. 8 of PC. Transcendental importance of cases to the public can merit brushing aside of procedure – which is why procedural flaws (standing, etc.) of petitioners can be brushed aside. The Statute is unconstitutional. The Constitution specifically provides for the synchronization of elections, as seen from the discussion of its framers. The provisions of RA 7056 assailed by petitioners are violative of the Constitution. Transitory Provisions are Constitutional. The Transitory Provisions were not created to be “applied as soon as practicable,” but on a specific date: 2nd Monday of May, 1992. The Solicitor General merely focused on the



Petitioner is campaigning to be delegate to the Constitutional Convention and was prohibited by respondent from using a taped jungle for campaign purposes. Respondent justifies prohibition as being pursuant to RA 6132 (Constitutional Convention Act), which makes it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request, or distribute various forms of electoral propaganda. On October 29, 1970, petitioner filed a civil action for prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction. Though prayer was denied, the Court granted by minute resolution a writ of prohibition on November 3, 1970, agreeing with petitioner that prohibition is a violation of Sec. 4, Art. 3 of the Philippine Constitution (free speech). Issue: WON COMELEC has the authority to prohibit petitioner’s self-expression Held, Ratio NO, the Court believes that the COMELEC does not have a statutory authority through RA 6132. Its interpretation of the statute infringes upon the right to free speech. Statutes should always be consonant with the Constitution, which is the highest law of the land. COMELEC’s prohibiton, in effect, amounted to censorship. WHEREFORE, petition granted. Injunction issued on COMELEC order.



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procedural issues and the legislative power of Congress, but failed to address the Constitutional questions. Moreover, the absence of a provision prohibiting separate elections does not preclude synchronization. WHEREFORE, RA 7056 is unconstitutional & therefore null & void. The TRO is made permanent. tendency to slow Philippine progress, their civilization is necessary to protect the interests of their more fortunate brothers. 4. No slavery/involuntary servitude imposed. The Mangyan are not being asked to work for anyone other than themselves. The prohibition against their leaving is necessary to ensure the interests of others (practice of caingin, etc.). There remains to the plaintiff the avenue of redress. Challenging the validity of the law without showing specific instance of oppression will only hamper the government from achieving its goals. This is consistent with the government policy in the Philippines being effective in bringing about the civilization of inhabitants.

6. RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO Action: For Habeas Corpus Facts: Plaintiff alleges that he and other Mangyans are being illegally detained by provincial officials in a reservation in Tigbao, Mindoro. Plaintiff further alleges that Doroteo Dabalos is being held in custody in Calapan by the provincial sheriff for escaping from the reservation.
Sec. 2145 (power to delegate tribes to lands) delegating power to the provincial governor, and Sec. 2759 of Act No. 2711 (detainment for violation) are alleged to be in violation of the August 29, 1916 Act of Congress, Sec. 3 of which guarantees equal protection under the laws. Defendant contends that the exercise of police power was valid and promulgated for the interest of the nation: the Mangyans need to be civilized Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711 are invalid by virtue of: 1. Illegal delegation of power from legislative to provincial officials (legislative avoided full responsibility) 2. Discrimination based on religious belief 3. Denying plaintiff of right to equal protection of the laws 4. Illegal detention is tantamount to involuntary servitude *Act 547 expressly for Mangyans Held: 1. There is no illegal delegation of power. The legislative only conferred discretionary authority to the provincial governor considering his familiarity with the best places for relocation. Such delegation of power is necessary for the execution of the law. 2. No discrimination based on religious belief. Legal practice and legislative intent clearly show that the term “Non-Christian” does not discriminate on the basis of religion, or even geographical location. The term is used to indicate whether or not a particular community has been civilized. No denial of right to equal protection. While the law is universal in its application, liberty must be understood to mean liberty restrained by reasonable regulations to assure public safety. Thus, given the Mangyan’s

WHEREFORE, Writ denied. Habeas corpus cannot issue if plaintiff is not unlawfully restrained of liberty. CARLSON, concurring: The power to provide for the issuance of Sec. 2145 and 2759 is akin to orders governing children and persons of unsound mind. It is for their own good. MOIR, dissenting: The Mangyans are legal citizens of the Philippines, unlike American Indian tribes who have treatises with the government. The reasons of caingin practice and their subsequent burden to the State is not justification for incarceration. The arbitrary and unrestrained power to do harm (by provincial governor) must be measure of law’s validity rather than the potential to do harm. 7. Facts: ROXAS & CO.,INC v. CA


Petitioner is the registered owner of HAACIENDAS PALICA, BANILAD, and CAYLAWAY, all located in NASUGBU, BATANGAS. On June 15, 1999, RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) took effect. Petitioner has tendered a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway to DAR, and haciendas Palico & Banilad were later put under compulsory acquisition. On May 4, 19993, petitioner applied for the conversion of his lands from agricultural to non-agricultural, citing the SANGGUNIAN NG BAYAN NG NASUGBU’s reclassification of the land; petitioner was denied. On August 24,1993, petitioner filed a case before the DARAB with a prayer to cancel the CLOAS issued in the name of several persons. Petitioner contended that the land was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. DARAB remarked that the determination of the land’s suitability for agriculture should be determined by DAR, and remanded the case to SDAR. The petition citing a lack of due process in the acquisition of lands was denied by the CA on April 28, 1994. Petitioner submitted the following assignment of errors: 1. CA’s determination of a premature cause of action. (did not exhaust administrative remedies given patent illegality of DAR acts) 2. CA’s ruling that land is subject to CARL. 3. DAR acquisition of land void for lack of due process. (no notice and identification of land)

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4. Issues: 1. 2. 3. Held: 1. 2. Yes. Petitioner had recourse to SC because he had been denied a speedy, adequate remedy by DARAB. No. The acquisition of DAR of the land violated due process rights of petitioner. He did not receive compensation, was not informed which part of the land was to be taken, an uninformed of proceedings. Under the law, compensation must be made in cash or LBP bonds; the conversion of trust fund accounts to cash & bonds did not remove the procedural lapse. Moreover, JAIME PIMENTEL is not sufficiently integrated with the company to know what he should have done with the correspondence. Neither was he authorized. The petitioner likewise had no chance to exercise his right of retention given that DAR had not clearly shown the part of the land it placed under compulsory acquisition. No. The lack of due process does not give the court justification to decide whether the lands in question are agricultural or non-agricultural. Neither are the CLOAs nullified at the expense of the land owners who have tilled it for the last few years. DAR must be given time to correct its procedural lapses. WON SC can take cognizance of petition. WON acquisition on proceeding valid in accordance with law. WON SC has power to rule on the reclassification of land. Lack of compensation even after petitioner was stripped of landholding. 2. 3. 4. subject of Act not expressed in Title violates International & Treaty obligations of RP provisions against hereditary succession & capital requirements violate sec1 & sec5 Art 13 and sec8 of Art 14 of PC

Respondents argue that the Act was a valid exercise of Legislative Power, that there was only one subject in the title, that there was no infringement of any international treaty, and that in the case of hereditary succession, only the form and not the value of property was impaired. Moreover, the institution of inheritance is of statutory origin. Issue: WON exclusion of aliens from retail trade is unreasonable under sec1 Art 3 of PC. Held: No. It is a valid exercise of power. Police power is said to be the most positive & active of all governmental processes, and as such is essential, insistent & illimitable. The Constitution does not define the scope of police power, but only imposes limits in the form of due process & equal protection of the laws. Equal protection of the laws does not demand absolute equality among residents so long as there is like treatment under like circumstances. If it applies to all members of the same class, there is no infringement so long as the distinction is reasonable. Moreover, courts can only inquire into the legality & not the wisdom of the law. Alien domination is a fact proven by official statistics and felt by all Filipinos across industries. The alien group is a well organized and powerful group dominating the economic sphere and perpetrating abuses. Alienage is a reasonable distinction given that aliens are here for gain & profit. They have no real contribution to national economy & wealth (don’t invest). The abuses done are against Filipinos goes against petitioners argument that retail trade is only a continuance of nationalistic protective policy laid down as law in the primary objective of the Constitution. Wherefore, Petition DENIED. 9. PEOPLE v. FERRER Facts: On May 5, 1970 a criminal complaint was filed against respondent FELICIANO CO charging him as a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, in violation of RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law). On May 25, 1970 a criminal case against NILO TAYAG and others was filed for subversion – respondent was a member of the Kabataang Makabayan, a subversive group, and tried to invite others to revolt against the government. On July 21, 1970, TAYAG moved to quash, arguing that RA 1700 is: 1. a bill of attainder; 2. vague; 3. with more than one subject expressed in title;


WHEREFORE, The petition is granted in part. Acquisition proceedings are nullified because of lack of due process. The case is remanded to DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of application of conversion. YNARES-SANTIAGO, dissenting: The remanding of the case should not be done, given how DAR has already sat on the petition for seven years. Fruits of wrongful acts must be nullified & the CLOAs revoked. The DAR acceptance of Presidential Proclamation 1520 which identified Nasugbu as a tourist zone implies recognizance that the land is non-agricultural. Vote to grant certiorari, declare lands non-agricultural and outside the scope of RA 6657. 8. ICHONG, ET AL v. HERNANDEZ & SARMIENTO Action: Petition for mandamus & injunction Facts: Petitioner alleges that RA1180, by limiting the participation of aliens in retail trade, is unconstitutional because: 1. denies alien residents equal protection & due process

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4. a denial of equal protection of laws. Fernando, dissenting: RA 1700 must be appraised in light of meaning prescribed to increasing complexity of subversive movements in the country. A taint of invalidity is seen even in the title of the Act, which state the specific name of an organization and create presumption of guilt. The right to dissent is constitutionally protected, even if it contains a subversive tinge. Dissent is not disloyalty. A line is drawn when words amount to incitement to sedition or rebellion. Other means could have been taken to stem the issue and spread of the CPP. 10. US v. POMPEYA Facts: On June 1, 1914 a petition against appellee was filed by the Prosecuting Atty of Iloilo. The complaint charged appellee with a violation of sec 40(m) of the municipal code, which required able-bodied men of specific characteristics to render patrol and/or police duty to the community, given a certain situation. He was sentenced by the Justice of Peace to pay P2 and court costs, whereupon he contended before the CFI that the said ordinance violated the liberty of citizens under the Philippine Bill. On August 22, 1914 a decision in favor of the appellee was rendered. Upon appeal, appellee contended that the facts of the case are not sufficient for cause of action. Issues: 1. WON sec 40(m) of the municipal code is constitutional (liberty assured by the Organic Act of the Philippines) 2. WON complaint is enough to sustain a cause of action Held:

On September 15, 1970, the statute was declared void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder, vague, and overbroad. Issues: 1. 2. Held: 1. WON RA 1700 is a bill of attainder WON RA 17700 is overbroad and vague (due process)

No, it is not a bill of attainder. The act does not specify which CPP members are to be punished. The focus is not on individuals but on conduct relating to subversive purposes. The guilt of CPP members must first be established, as well as their cognizance as shown by overt acts. Even if acts specified individuals, instead of activities, it shall not be a bill of attainder – not unless specific individuals were named. The court has consistently upheld the CPP’s activities as inimical to public safety and welfare. A bill of attainder must also reach past conduct and applied retroactively; Section 4 of RA 1700 expressly states that the act will be applied prospectively to give members time to renounce their affiliations. The legislature is with reasonable relation to public health, morals, and safety – and the government is with right to protect itself against subversion. No, the statute is not overbroad and vague. The respondents’ assertion that the term “overthrow” is overbroad is likewise untenable, since it could be achieved by peaceful means. Respondents disregarded the terms “knowingly, willingly, and by overt acts,” overthrow is understood to be by violent means. Whatever interest in free speech/associations that is infringed is not enough to outweigh considerations of national security and preservation of democracy. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue of its contents – it is valid if it is indicative in broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and consequences of proposed law and operation.



Guidelines Set Forth by the Supreme Court: 1. In the case of any subversive group a. establish purposes to overthrow and establish totalitarian regime under foreign domination; b. accused joined organization; c. knowledge, will and overt action. 2. in CPP case a. pursuit of objectives decried by the government; b. accused joined organization; c. knowledge, will, and overt action. WHEREFORE, Resolution set aside, cases remanded to court a quo for trial on merits.

Yes, Sec 40(m) of the Municipal Code requires all able-bodied men of specific characteristics to render service, and all householders to furnish relevant information in cases the community is infested by ladrones. This statute recognizes the common law right of the state to exercise police power. The powers of the country or posse comitatus, vests those with authority to maintain good order the power to call upon all able-bodied men to assist in maintaining the security of the community. Generally speaking, the Philippine Legislature can adopt laws on matters not expressly given to Congress, whereas the latter can only legislate on matters expressly granted to them by the Constitution. Police power is inherent on this power of the state and cannot be limited in the interest of presuming public order and preventing conflict of rights. Police power is so extensive that the courts have not been able to define it, such that each case is decided on its merits. Thus Act 1309 is a legitimate exercise of police power.

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2. No. While Act 1309 applies only to special individuals under special circumstances, the complaint must show that the appellee falls within the scope of that class. The complaint did not show appellee was part of the class, or that special circumstance existed

Held: 1.

Wherefore, Judgment affirmed and petition dismissed. Pertinent Provisions of Sec 40(m) of Act 1309 • empowers municipal government, if province is overrun by ladrones and outlaws to: 1. require able-bodied males between 18-50(55) to assist for not more than 5 days per month in the apprehension of outlaws; patrol duty for not more than once a wee. 2. Exact a fine or issue penalty for failure to comply ( not more than P100; not more than 3 months) or both at the discretion of the courts 3. Docs not extend to US officers/employees 4. officers/employees of common carriers (sea and land), priests, ministers, physicians, druggists, physicians engaged in business, and lawyers when in court Purpose of Act 1309 1. amendment of Municipal Code for organization of municipal governor 2. amendment to create sec 40 (m) 3. enunciation of municipal council powers 4. empowerment on additional areas to the council

Yes. Respondents assert that LOI 229 is backed by factual data & statistics, whereas petitioner’s conjectural assertions are without merit. The statute is a valid exercise of police power in so far as it promotes public safety, and petitioner failed to present factual evidence to rebut the presumed validity of the statute. Early warning devices have a clear emergency meaning, whereas blinking lights are equivocal and would increase accidents. The petitioner’s contention that the devices’ manufacturers may be abusive does not invalidate the law. Petitioner’s objection is based on a negative view of the statute’s wisdom-something the court can’t decide on. No. The authority delegated in the implementation is not legislative in nature. Respondent Edu was merely enforcing the law forms part of Philippine law. PD 207 ratified the Vienna Convention’s recommendation of enacting road safety signs and devices. Respondents are merely enforcing this law. Moreover, the equal protection under the laws contention was not elaborated upon.


Wherefore: Petition is dismissed. Judgment immediately executory. Teehankee, dissenting: The rules and regulations outlined by the LTO Commission does not reflect the real intent of LOI229. 1. Effectivity and utility of statute not yet demonstrated. 2. public necessity for LOI not yet shown 3. big financial burden on motorists 4. no real effort shown to illustrate less burdensome alternative to early warning device 5. imperative need to impose blanket requirement on all vehicles -people still drive dilapidated vehicle -need for sustained education campaign to instill safe driving The exercise of police power affecting the life , liberty, and property of any person is till subject to judicial inquiry.

11. AGUSTIN v. EDU Action: Action for prohibition Facts: Petitioner assails Letter of Instruction No. 229 which provides for the mandatory use of early warning devices for all motor vehicles. Petitioner owns a Volkswagen Beetle equipped with blinking lights that could well serve as an early warning device. He alleges that the statute: 1. violates the provision against delegation of police power 2. immoral – will only enrich the manufacturer of the devices at the car owner’s expense 3. prevents car owners from finding alternatives Petitioner prays for a declaration of nullity and a restraining order in the meantime. On the other hand, respondents’ answers are based on case law and other authoritative decisions of the tribunal issues.
Issues: 1. WON LOI 229 is constitutional (due process) 2. WON LOI 229 is an invalid delegation of legislative power, as far as implementation is concerned



On July 17, 1913 a complaint was filed before the COFI MANILA charging defendant with practicing medicine without a license 1. Contrary to SEC. 8 ACT 310 of the PC. Defendant contends that: 1. Complaint was not in the form required by law 2. Facts stated do not constitute a crime 3. Complaint’s allegations are justifications to legally exempt the accused.

Defendant found guilty of violating the OPIUM LAW

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3. The demurrer was overruled and COFI found the defendant guilty of charges filed against him. Defendant presented the following errors on appeal: 1. The provisions of SEC 8 ACT 310is contradictory to the PHILIPPINE BILL 2. Powers vested in BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINER to revoke licenses of physicians convicted of unprofessional conduct should not be valid (basis of defendant’s license’s revoke) 3. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINER’s decision should not be taken as final pending the appeal to the BOARD OF HEALTH (later withdrawn by defendant) 4. Objection to defense evidence that the practice is worth more than P600 was sustained 5. Lower court took HOTEL QUIRUGILO as a cloak to aid defendant’s contravention of the law 6. Sentence of fine and subsidiary imprisonment invalid Defendant further alleged that SEC 8 of ACT 310 is void because of: 1. It violates PAR 1 SEC 5 of ACT OF CONGRESS (no deprivation of life, liberty, property without due process) 2. Power to revoke licenses only with COFI & SC 3. Power of BOME to revoke licenses repealed by SEC 88 of the PHILIPPINE BILL. Issues: 1. WON state can require certain standards of morality/scholarship in the practice of certain professions 2. WON the state has the right to revoke licenses 3. WON State can punish those who practice medicine without a license Held: 1. Yes. The state has the general power to enact laws in relation to persons and property to promote public health, morals, safety and welfare. Thus, police power cannot be deprived from the state – to deprive it from the state would be to destroy the purpose of the state. The deprivation of rights of certain people cannot curtail police power. Private interests must be subservient to the general interest of the community. Police power is so extensive and pervasive that the courts do not give it exact definition. There is no arbitrary deprivation of rights if the exercise is nor permitted by virtue of the detriment to society. Yes. Reliance is placed on the medical license issued by competent authority by people who invoke the aid of physicians. State police power to regulate/monitor/revoke licenses extends to all areas affecting public interest and welfare Yes. The law is not necessarily invalid if it provides a remedy to those affected simply because it does not provide for appeal to the courts. Due process of law is not judicial process. Once revoked the right to appeal the issuance of one’s license is only a statutory right not an inherent right.

WHEREFORE, Judgment affirmed



Petitioner alleges that RA 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT PRACTEICES ACT) by requiring periodic ruling of the SAL of public officers is an unlawful exercise of police power and is unconstitutional because: 1. It violates the right to privacy 2. Violates ban against unreasonable search and seizure and the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner and granted the petition for injunction. Appellant contends that RA 3019 is a valid exercise of public power to safeguard public morals. Appellee contends the statute’s presumption of guilt is an affront to dignify tax law & tax census law already require documents relevant to RA 3019’s purposes. Issues: 1. WON case exhibits evidence to rebut presumption of constitutional validity 2. WON statute violates the right to privacy, self incrimination & unreasonable search & seizure (valid exercise of police power?) Held: 1. The evidence is not enough to rebut the presumption of its constitutionality. There is no factual basis for the allegation, and the validity of the statute must be upheld. It has been said that when freedom is impelled by law, freedom must be respected, but if property is curtailed, the legislator’s judgment must be respected. There is no violation of any right to privacy, self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. 3019 (Sec 7) was drafted in order to address the rampant corruption in politics. Restriction of liberty is done for the greater good, and is allowable so long as due process is observed. Public servants are protected in so far as they cannot be removed from office without just cause. RA 3019 is thus not arbitrary exercise of police power. There is no unconstitutional intrusion to the public servant’s privacy nor an unreasonable search & seizure. The statute is with reference to a determinate provision and a procedure that must be followed. Invoking the violation of the self-incrimination clause will have to wait until charges have been filed. Arguing that the statute is an affiant to dignity is likewise untenable. The court can only decide in the legality & not the wisdom of the statutes.



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WHEREFORE, Judgment is affirmed.




On July 5, 1963 petitioner filed for a writ of prohibition against respondent, challenging the Municipal Board of Manila from enacting Ordinance No. 4760. Petitioner alleged that said ordinance was unconstitutional, unreasonable, oppressive, arbitrary, denies rights to privacy and self-incrimination, and void since the respondent was without authority to regulate motels (not expressly granted by law or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The petition was granted by the lower court and the statute declared null and void. Respondent, in appealing to the Supreme Court, contended that: 1. petitioner was without cause of action; 2. ordinance had a reasonable relation to a public purpose (curb immorality); 3. ordinance a valid exercise of police power; 4. only guests/customers can argue for abridgement of right to privacy and self-incrimination; 5. preliminary injunction issued is contrary to law, and the petition should be dismissed. Issues: 1. WON case at bar has shown that the ordinance is unconstitutional; 2. WON ordinance violates due process rights; 3. WON ordinance is vague or uncertain. Held: 1. The case at bar has not shown that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The presumption of a statute’s constitutionality is presumed and the burden to prove otherwise rests with the petitioner. The absence of evidence does not impair the statute’s validity. Police power, being the most essential, insistent and least limitable of powers aims to safeguard public morals, and must be respected until clearly shown to violate constitutional rights. The ordinance did not violate due process. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It is the standard to which governmental action must conform in order that life, liberty or property deprivation is valid. The test of an ordinance is its responsiveness to reason and the dictates of justice. Much wider discretion is afforded to the state in terms of licensing non-useful corporations, and the state generally does not interfere with such discretion. The fact that some may lose their jobs does not curtail police power, which is exercised in the interest of the community. Liberty is not absolute and is regulated by law. When the liberty curtailed by statutes affects property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wide.

The ordinance is not vague. The petition seems to indicate that the problem with the statute is that it is too detailed rather than vague. It concerns (such as whether it is the owner or operator who determines profits) such as those raised by the petitioner are not enough to invalidate the ordinance. As Justice Holmes said, there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.

WHEREFORE: Judgment is reversed; order prohibiting statute enforcement is set aside.




Plaintiff is a feeble minded woman, daughter of a feeble-minded woman committed to the same institution. She is likewise the mother of a feeble minded, illegitimate child. The petition is to review the decision of SCA Virginia upholding the order of salpingectomy issued by the Circuit Court of Amherst City. Plaintiff alleges that such order, under the act of assembly; is unconstitutional as it violates plaintiff’s right to bodily integrity, and is repugnant to the due process provision of the 14th Amendment. In Mann vs. Illinois the Court ruled that the inhibition against deprivation extends to all limbs and faculties through which life is enjoyed, and of what God has given everyone with life. While the statute provides for a hearing before the operation, and may be in a court of law in case of appeal, it does not meet the constitutional requirement of due process of law (form of procedure cannot convert process to due process if constitutional rights are denied). The test of due process of law must show that proceedings are legal & preserves liberty of citizens. Furthermore, the statute denies institutionalized individuals equal protection of the law as the classification is not enough to justify the statute. Such classification must be on reasonable grounds considering the legislative purpose; it cannot be arbitrary. The statute’s objective of preventing the reproduction of mentally defective people would give the state legislature, as they are the ones who determine the standards for mental capacity. Tyranny of medical professionals & its system of judicature would be established. For its part the defense contends that the statute does not constitute cruel & unusual punishment, which necessarily involves torture. In State vs. Felin it was held that the asexualization process is not a cruel punishment. The statute is a valid exercise of police power, as provided for in Sec 159 of the Virginia Constitution (police power never to be abridged). The state’s confinement of the feeble minded precludes their procreation, and is a deprivation of liberty that was never questioned. Compulsory vaccinations are similar ways to protect the individual & society. Issues: 1. WON Virginia statute is a constitutional deprivation of liberty 2. WON classification is reasonable 3. WON plaintiff has been denied due process of law

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Defendant argues said period ha not expired, the COFI ruled that the obligations were not yet demandable pursuant to the Moratorium Law. A motion for reconsideration assailing the constitutionality of the moratorium was likewise dismissed. Issues: 1. WON Sec 2 of RA 342 is unconstitutional (impairs the obligations of contract; prohibited under Sec 1 Art 3) 2. WON RA 342 is a valid exercise of police power Held: 1. No, it is constitutional. A moratorium in essence an application of sovereign power, adopted during the times of national emergency. It is considered constitutional as long as the determination of the suspension of remedies is definite and reasonable. The policy of protecting contractual obligations presupposes the maintenance of a government with adequate authority to secure the peace and order of society, without which contracts are unenforceable in the first place. The statute is constitutional insofar as it protects national economic interests. The assumption is that all contracts are subject to the implied reservation of the state’s protective power. 2. Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. RA 342 is a valid exercise of police power given the emergency situation and need for action.

Held: 1.

Yes, the Virginia statute is constitutional. The Virginia statute has for its purpose the protection of individual & and societal health by the sterilization of mental defectives, who may be safely discharged by virtue of sterilization. The plaintiff contends that the statute is patently unjustifiable. Yet public welfare can call upon some citizens to sacrifice their lives – it is reasonable to call upon those who already burden the state to make lesser sacrifices. It is better for the world to execute degenerates for crime now, and prevent imbeciles from starving. It is a reasonable desire to prevent the manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle sustaining compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover salpingectomy. Given the policy, the law has done all that is needed by striving to bring all similarly situated within the scope of the policy. Yes, the classification is reasonable. The statue is based on a reasonable classification. In Virginia, marriage with feeble minded is prohibited, and consummation is heavily penalized. In Peterson vs. Widule, the Court upheld the necessity of requiring males applying for marriage to present a physician’s certificate attesting in their freedom from disease. No. The statute’s strict guidelines on the procedure to be followed in the case at bar illustrates the protection the state affords to the feeble minded. The power of the state superintendent must be preceded by strict compliance to procedure. In the case at bar, every step taken was in keeping with the procedural requirements.



WHEREFORE, judgment affirmed.

Police power is limited by: 1. impairment (only remedy, never the substantive right) – determinate and reasonable suspension 2. justified by emergency situation, temporary and reasonable conditions The statute protects war sufferers from debtors, and gives them the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. However, creditors in effect will have to wait for 12 years before they can collect under RA 342, which is an unreasonable amount of time given the local situation of progress due to American aid and local spirit. Thus while RA 342 has a reasonable relation to public welfare, the rime of the moratorium is impossible. Wherefore, Act 342 unreasonable and oppressive, declared null and void. EO 25 and 32 are likewise lifted, given it has no limitations and can only be lifted once declared null and void. Decision reversed. Notes: Sec 2 RA 342 All debts and monetary obligations incurred before December 8, 1941 are due and demandable after 8 years after settlement of war damages claims before the Philippine War Damage Commission. Sec 3 RA 342



On Aug. 20, 1941 appellant sold to appellee two parcels of land in Manila for P9,600 ( P4,800 up front, P2,400 on August 7, 1942 and 1943, at 7% interest). A mortgage to secure the first payment was taken in the name of the plaintiff, whereupon a deed of sale in favor of defendant was executed. On August 2, 1949, plaintiff filed a petition before the COFI to recover the unpaid balance and accrued interest, as well as attorney’s fees. There was also a prayer for the sale of the properties pursuant to law should the plaintiff fail to collect. Defendant contended that he is protected by: 1. Moratorium clause in RA 342 2. He is a war sufferer with a claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for losses 3. The liability was incurred as a pre-war obligation 4. Sec 2 of RA 342 suspend the payment of obligations until after 8 years from the settlement of claims

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If Sec 2 is nullified, provision of EO 25 as amended by EO 32 shall take no effect. The nullification of the Act revives the former moratorium by the President. and the measures necessary for their protection. The justifications of police power exercise are (1) the interests of the public (versus a specific class) require interference and (2) must be through reasonable means, and not oppressive. The determination of proper exercise of police power is subject to the court’s supervision. Wherefore, Judgment affirmed. Notes: The statute was drafted after a virus attacked the carabao population. Lands were not tilled and need to import rice arise. Cattle rustling increased. Thus, exercise of police power is justified. There is a necessity and a right of selfprotection. Act 1147, sec 30: Requirement of approval from the municipal treasurer whenever large cattle are slaughtered. Sec 31: Permit to slaughter does not extend to animals still fit for agricultural or draft purposes. Sec 33: Slaughter must be in municipal slaughterhouses for food or human consumption. 18. JM TUASON & CO. vs. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION Action: An Appeal from CFI. Facts: Feb 18, 1970- Court rendered judgment reversing the lower court’s decision that RA 2616 is unconstitutional. March 30, 1970 – motion for reconsideration was filed by appellee invoking his rights to due process & equal protection of laws May 27, 1970 – detailed opposition to the reconsideration was filed by SG Felix Antonio June 15, 1970 - a rejoinder of petition was filed. Petitioner contends that the expropriation of Tatalon Estate in Quezon City is unconstitutional (by virtue of its denial of due process for landowners) pursuant to RA 2616 sec 4. *the statute prohibits suit for ejectment proceedings & continuance of proceedings after expropriation proceedings have been initiated. Issues: 1. WON sec4 RA2616 is unconstitutional by virtue of its denial of due process & equal protection 2. WON procedural mistakes invalidate the statute Held: 1. No, the statute is constitutional. The statute is held to be constitutional given the opportunity and protection it affords to land owners in recognizing their right to evict subject to expropriation proceedings and just compensation. RA 3453 amended sec4 of RA 2616 in order to



Evidence shows that appellant slaughtered a carabao for human consumption without a permit from the municipal treasurer pursuant to sec. 30 and 33 of Act 1147, regarding the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Appellant contends that since there are no municipal slaughter house in Carmen, Bohol, the provision of Act 1147 do not apply, since the wording of the statute limits the prohibition and slaughtering in a municipal slaughterhouse. The defendant’s previous application for a permit to slaughter was denied because the animal was not found to be unfit for agricultural or draft purposes. He further alleges that penalizing those who slaughter animals without a permit is unconstitutional by violating sec 5 of the Phillippine Bill (due process). The prohibition unjustly limits defendant’s enjoyment of his property. Issues: 1. WON provision of ACT 1147 apply despite an absence of a municipal slaughterhouse. 2. WON Act 1147 is unconstitutional for violating due process rights of defendant. Held:


Yes, provisions apply. Sec 30 and 33 of Act 1147 must be taken in the context of the legislator’s intent. Given that the purpose of the bill is to protect large cattle theft and facilitate the return of the cows/cattle to owners, the interpretation of the Act must be consistent with the intent. The court holds that in general, the Act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle anywhere, and in particular, the slaughter of large cattle in municipal slaughterhouses (both without permits). When a statute’s language is susceptible to 2 or more constructions, interpretation should be according to the intent of the legislator. No. It is not clear whether the defendant assailed the statue for being (1) unlawful taking of property by right of eminent domain (without compensation) or (2) an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.


All property acquired and held under the condition that it is not used to injure the equal rights of others, or impair public rights. While the statute detracts from the enjoyment of property by owners, it does not constitute a “taking” of property. Act 1147 is not an exercise of the right to eminent domain, but a reasonable limitation of the law of rights of property in keeping with the police power for public welfare. The state can interfere whenever public interests so demand. A large discretion is vested in the legislative to determine public interests

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address this precise problem (sec4 of RA 3453 previously held to be unconstitutional.) The amendment was drafted in light of Cuatico vs. Court of Appeals where the landowner’s right to due process was impaired by tenants’ invocation of as-yet-to-be instituted expropriation proceedings. 2. The procedural mistakes do not invalidate the statute. Inaccuracies committed by Congress in determining who owns the land does not invalidate the statute. Dominical rights cannot be conferred on those obviously not entitled to them. Appellee’s fears are without legal basis. The government will only compensate rightful owners. 3. 19. US vs. CAUSBY Facts: Respondents are owners of 2.8-acre farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Said property was close to the municipal airport leased by the government. The Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) designated the safe path to glide to one of the airport runways over the property of appellees. They contend that the noise and glare from airplaines landing and taking off constituted a taking of property under the FIFTH AMENDMENT. The Court of Claims found the facts of the case to constitute a taking of property and rewarded appellees with $2,000 as value of the easement. Issues: 1. WON appellee’s property was taken as provided for the Fifth Amendment 2. WON awarding of damages is reasonable 3. WON Court of Claims is with jurisdiction Held, Ratio: 1. Yes, US Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (as amended by Civil Aeronautics Act of 1930), which outlines that the US had complete and exclusive national sovereignty in air space. The Act deemed navigable air space as that above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by the CAA. While appellant contend that the flight is well within the minimum safe altitude (take-off and landing), and that there was no physical invasion or taking of property, the Court ruled that rendering lands unusable for purposes of a chicken farm entitles petitioners to compensation under the Fifth Amendment, despite the Court’s unfavorable view of the application of the common law doctrine. The measure of value is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The path of glide as defined by the appellant is not within the meaning of minimum safe altitude of flight in the statute. Land owners are entitled to at least as much space above ground as he can occupy in connection with his use of the land. The damages sustained were a product of a direct invasion of respondent’s domain. It is the character of invasion, and not the amount of damage resulting, that determines WON property was taken. Furthermore, the definition of “property” under the Fifth Amendment contains a meaning supplied by local law – as in the case of North Carolina Law. No, the value of the land was not completely destroyed; it can still be used for other purposes. Thus, appellees are only entitled to a lower value given the limited utility of the land. However, there is no precise description of the nature of the easement taken, whether temporary or permanent. These deficiencies in evidentiary findings are not rectified by a statement of opinion. The finding of facts on every material matter is a statutory requirement. The Court of Claims’ finding of permanence is more conjectural than factual; more is needed to determine US liability. Thus, the amount stated as damages is not proper. Yes, the Court of Claims has clear jurisdiction over the matter. The question of WON there has been a taking property is a claim within the constitutionally-granted jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.


Wherefore, Judgment AFFIRMED.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is reversed. Case remanded to the Court of Claims for evidentiary hearing. Justice Black, dissenting: The Court’s opinion seems to be that it is the noise and glare of planes, rather than the flying of the planes themselves, which constitutes taking. The appellee’s claims are at best an action in tort (nuisance, statute violation, negligence). The Government cannot be sued in the Court of Claims unless over matters of implied or express contracts. There is no contract involved in the case at bar. The concept of “taking” has been given a sweeping meaning. The old concept of land ownership must be made compatible with the new field of air regulation. The damages should not be elevated to the level of the Constitution, as it would be an obstacle to a better-adapted, vital system of national progress. 20. US v. CALTEX Facts: At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, oil companies had terminal facilities in Pandacan. The US army restricted the distribution of products for civilian use requisitioning most of the supplies for the war effort. On December 26, 1941, the order for the demolition of all unused products and terminals was issued to prevent the approaching enemy from using the supplies. On December 31, 1941, demolition was completed just as the enemy entered Manila. Following liberation, appellees are demanding compensation for the property the US Army used and destroyed. While the US Government paid for the petroleum stocks, transportation equipment used and destroyed, they refused to compensate appellees for the Pandacan terminals. The appellees concede that the US army had the right to destroy such installations, but argue that they are entitled to compensation just the same. Appellees cite Mitchell v. Harmony and US v. Russel as legal basis for their claim.

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Issue: Whether or not appellees are entitled to compensation for properties demolished for public welfare. Held: No they are not. The appellee’s use of Harmony and Russel is untenable. In neither case was the US Army bound by the sole purpose of destroying strategic property to prevent the use by the enemy. On the other hand, US v. Pacific R. Company governs the case at bar. It was held that the losses and injury to private property are borne by the sufferer alone as a consequence of war. The order of demolition by the Commander General is justified by war necessities. The safety of the state takes precedence over personal loss. Common law likewise holds that the sovereign is immune from liability when he destroys public property in the interest of society. Wherefore, Judgment reversed. Justice Douglas, dissenting: The Army may have authority to destroy, but the 5th amendment requires compensation for taking of property. Whenever government appropriates private property for public use, the public purse should bear the loss. The petitioner’s view or the state’s right of eminent domain is restrictive and based on a misconception of fundamentals. “Tourism” is a specific term that may not be found in the constitution, which is phrased in general terms of objectives that are archived by varying programs. The provisions for agrarian reform do not preclude the exercise of eminent domain for tourism / development projects. 2. Yes, but the issue is moot. Petitioners claim that the certificate of land transfer and Emancipation Patents issued to them as proof that the land has been expropriated under PD 2 (Agrarian Reform Law), and thus can no longer be expropriated for tourism purposes. Yet the petitioners failed to show that the land is indeed a land reform area to which they are entitled. The area to be expropriated is hilly and unproductive, and few of the petitioners have the necessary document anyway. Thus, there is no real need to determine the superiority of one public interest over another. Even contracts have never impaired state right to expropriate. No, the taking was not premature. PD 42 as amended by PD 1533 empowers the government to take immediate possession of land provided 10% of the property value has been deposited with the proper agencies. This is supported by Art 8 Sec Par 2 of PC, which gives Presidential Decrees the character of law. Given the fidelity of the PTA in following procedure, the writs of possession issued are not premature. The ejectment of the tenants is constitutional. Petitioners claim that PD 583 prohibits the implementation of orders contrary to the Land Reform Law. However, the law refers to tenant farmers forcing emancipation rights, and does not apply to the expropriation of the state. The land in question is not even a tenanted area.




Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of PD 564 (Revised Charter of PTA) and proclamation No. 2052 (declaring certain Cebu towns and municipalities as tourist zones). They contend that expropriation cannot continue because: 1. To do so would be uconstitutional (no specific constitutional provisions for tourism expropriation, and that expropriation under PP 1533 does not offer unjust compensation) 2. Land in question is part of the Land Reform Program (jurisdiction under Court of Agrarian Relations, and tourism concerns cannot be superior to land reform concerns) 3. Expropriation proceedings / Writ of possession issued premature (necessity of taking unestablished) 4. Forcible ejectment of tenants criminal under PD 583 (prohibits orders contrary to the Land Reform Act) Issues: 1. WON expropriation for tourism purposes is unconstitutional. 2. WON land meant for land reform can be expropriated for tourism purposes. 3. WON the taking was premature 4. WON ejectment of tenants is unconstitutional Held: 1. Expropriation for tourism purposes is constitutional. The taking of the land for tourism purposes is supported by the constitution. Sec 2 Art 4 provides for taking with just compensation. Sec 6 Art 14 empowers congress to expropriation of private lands with just compensation.


Wherefore, Petition dismissed for lack of merit Makasiar, dissenting: The rights to land under the Land Reform Law is greater than the states right to develop land for tourism. But since petitioners are not tenants of the land, petition must be dismissed.



Petitioner is with judgment against defendant in an ejectment suit dated August 14, 1959, the land in question being in Sampaloc, Manila and of 20,500 square meters. Writs of ejectment and demolition were issued despite appeals of defendants. On August 5, 1963 the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) filed for the expropriation of the land for subdivision and sale to its tenants. Respondent argues that the condemnation is in keeping with Sec. 2 of RA 1400, since the land was

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formerly part of Hacienda Tuazon and, thus, in keeping with Sec. 4, Art. 13 of the Philippine Constitution (PC). Issue: WON land is expropriable under Sec. 4, Art. 13 of PC Held, Ratio: NO, the condemnation proposed by respondents is inadmissible as illustrated in RP vs. Manotok Realty. While the government has the right to expropriate lands/estates relative to small urban lands (5 hectares or so), it does not mean that land can be expropriated once more years after it has been partitioned. Land cannot be expropriated on the argument that it was once landed estate. Landed estates are determined by area or extension, not the number of tenants. WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari is granted, COFI order of August 6, 1963 set aside and therein petition dismissed. 23. GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESS Facts: Petitioners filed for a Writ of Prohibition to prevent the expropriation of her land in Maypajo, Rizal. Petitioner contends that: 1. Respondent is without authority to negotiate for a bank loan used as partial payment for her property. 2. Land in question is in part commercial, making it exempt from Act 359 (expropriation of private lands) 3. Expropriation will impair the obligation of contracts 4. Value set by lower court is erroneous Issue: Whether or not the land is expropriable under sec 4 of Art13 of PC. Torres, concurring – Art 13 sec4 was not intended to be applicable in all cases. Not judging on the merits of individual cases may give rise to socialism. 24. REPUBLIC v. JUAN Facts: On September 28, 1964 the lower court to expropriate appellants land to be used as La Union Regional argricultural school, with compensation set at P190,000 given pre-expropriation correspondence with appellants. On april 15, 1963, the government had taken immediate possession of the land after depositing P90,000 with the provincial treasurer of La Union, defendants had petitioned to lift the writ of possession, arguing that: 1. value of land higher than the value set by the provincial appraisal committee in resolution 13, series of 1962 2. expropriation must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 3. provisional value should be at P300,000 4. writ of possession set aside until jurisdiction is determined or provisional value deposited The defendant, after the trial court had found in favor of apellee and ordered deposit of P100,000. appealed for the reconsideration of value and dismissal of expropriation, they present the following errors: 1. manner of expropriation objectionable (no valid negotiation prior to taking in violation of EO 132 series of 1937) 2. value of property determined contrary to legal requirements (value far less than that determined by provincial agriculturists) Issues: 1. WON defendant was denied due process 2. WON value of compensation was just Held: 1. No, the defendant was not denied due process. Negotiations were evident even before expropriation proceedings began, given correspondence with defendants. The appellee is excercising its right of eminent domain, and EO 132 being an administrative requirement, does not impair the exercise of the plaintiffs right. Defendants withdrawal of the money precludes any objection to the expropriation proceedings. Yes, the value of the compensation was just. The valuation of the lots must be fair not only to owners but to taxpayers as well. The value must reflect only that which owner has been deprived of. The defendants last valuation of P500,000 is binding and admissible sec. 22 rule 130 of RROC, given that there was no indication of a factual error. The price to be considered is the value of the property at the beginning of the expropriation, and nor inclusive of the improvements the government has made since occupation. Given that the defendants invested only P90,000,

Held: No, the land is not. Various laws support the legitimacy of expropriation of private lands (Commonwealth Act 539, sec1 provides for expropriation/ purchase of private lands & expropriation for subdivision of small lots, sec2 provides for the designation of authority to any agency to carry out expropriation, and sec4 art13 PC empowers CONGRESS to expropriate private lands). Whether or not private lands can be expropriated regardless of location, area or nature is reflected in the purpose for the Constitutional provision, which is to break up large estates for the benefit of small landowners. The constitution does not seek to undermine property rights, and sec 4 art 13 allows only for expropriation for public benefit of a few families does not constitute public benefit. There is no line to determine when public use can be used as basis for expropriation; decisions must be made on a case-to-case basis. Deciding in favor of the respondents may only give rise for more oppressive cases of expropriation. Wherefore, Petition GRANTED


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to require taxpayers to pay P616,000 is unjust. Sec. 2 rule 67 RROC provides that when the landowner himself fixes the price it becomes binding. The discrepancy between peso values in 1963 and 1979 is not enough reason to increase the land value drastically, since the government will pay interests anyway. Wherefore, Judgment modified, plaintiff must pay P200,000 with 6% interest. Wherefore, Judgment affirmed. Teehankee, concurring: Defendants; valuation binding, given that there is no factual error. Antonio, dissenting: defendant only referred to a P300,000 provisional value valuation not bindng if unjust valuation affected by land residential potential Provincial Agriculturist appraisal objective and authoritative, just and realistic devaluation of peso justifies doubling of price of land. 25. COMISSIONER v. BOTELHO SHIPPING CORP. Facts: Appellants (Gov’t) seek to reverse the judgment of the court of Tax Appeals holding respondents exempt from compensating taxes on vessels M/S Maria Rosello and M/S General Lim. The reparation committee of the Philippines had sold the ships to respondents on Aug 30, 1960 and Sept. 19, 1960 under RA 1789. Respondents were denied due process for the vessels’ registration until the compensating tax was paid. While their case was pending before the lower court, RA 3079 amended RA 1789 insofar as the following provisions are relevant: 1. buyers of reparation goods no longer required to pay compensation tax 2. Sec 20 of RA 3079 provided for the renovation of previous contracts to avail of the amendatory act’s benefits on the condition that the end users voluntarily assumes all new obligations. Respondents applied for and were granted renovation, whereupon they filed a petition for review before the Tax Court, which ruled in their favor. Appellants contend that the court erred in finding for respondents because: 1. no clear intent of retroactivity is seen in RA 3079 2. Congress could not have intended retroactivity as it would be prejudicial to the government 3. benefits alluded to in Sec 20 of Ra 3079 does not include tax exemptions Issue: Whether or not retroactivity was intended by Congress in RA 3079 Held: Yes. The appellants contentions are untenable. Tax exemptions, by nature, are prejudicial to the government as it is a waiver of a right to collect what would be due to the gov’t. The tax exemption, which is given for a public benefit greater than monetary loss, is clear and explicit in RA 3079. The statute is with a valuable consideration for the retroactivity: the voluntary assumption of all new obligations under the act. Sec 14 of the law on reparations exempt not particular persons but members of a particular class. There is no constitutional prohibition against granting tax exemptions to specific people anyway so long as a denial of equal protection does not arise through unreasonable discrimination. Moreover, RA 3079 does not explicitly declare the exemption of parties to contracts prior the amendment because those parties still have to apply for renovation of their contracts. Sec 20 of RA 3079 does not seek to discriminate but to abolish discrimination (Phil Ace Lines Inc. vs Commission on Internal Revenue)

26. LUTZ v. ARANETA Facts: Appellant contests the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567 (Sugar Adjustment Act) alleging that the tax is unconstitutional as it is only for the benefit of the sugar industry and not the public. Appellant seeks to recover P14, 666.40 in taxes.
Issue: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 567 is unconstitutional on the grounds that no benefit directly accrue to the public. Held: No, the appellant’s assumption that CA No. 567 is a pure exercise of taxing power is untenable. Sec 6 of CA No. 567 indicates that the tax is for a regulatory purpose and to rehabilitate and stabilize the threatened sugar industry. The protection and advancement of sugar industry affects the public welfare greatly as the industry is the biggest contributor to GDP. The authority of the legislature to enact laws for the promotion of the industry is subject only to the test of reasonableness. As such, taxation can be made the implement of the State’s police power. It is inherent in the power to tax that the state be free to select the subjects of taxation. The inequalities that may arise from the choice of who to tax or to exempt are not unconstitutional. Even if other industries may be in like danger, the protection of the sugar industry is not wrong. Wherefore, Judgment affirmed. Notes on CA No. 567 (introduction): 1. Sec 1- state of emergency due to the Tydings-McDuffie Act, and the imposition of export taxes and corresponding loss of preferential position in US markets. There is a need to stabilize the industry. 2. Sec 2- an increase in the tax of sugar manufacturers on a graduated basis. 3. Sec 3- owners/controllers of sugar land ceded to sugar manufacturers to pay taxes equal to the difference between rent and 12% of the land tax. 4. Sec 6- all tax collections for the Sugar Adjustment & Stabilization fund is to be used for achieving the objectives set by law. CA 567 Objectives 1. to place sugar industry in a competitive position despite increasing competition

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2. 3. 4. readjust industry benefits for all involved to encourage continued profitable engagement limit sugar production to more economically suitable areas afford improved living wage to laborers subject to certain conditions, purposes, and through particular means of the facility resulted in a loss, the experience is still a gain to the entire industry. Sec 2 (A) of RA 632 and its objectives can only be achieved through the actual operation of a refinery.

2. No. There is no need for benefits to accrue to the taxpayer in the
collection of special assessments. Lutz vs. Araneta illustrated that the protection of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern. Legislature is with power to do what is necessary for the industry’s protection and promotion, subject to the test of reasonableness. The exercise of special taxation is thus an exercise of sovereign power no private citizen can lawfully resist, because of another sovereign power, which is police power. Wherefore, judgment affirmed. NOTES ON RA 632 Sec 2. Objectives of Philsugin: a. Conduct research for the sugar industry in all its phases (agricultural/industrial) to reduce cost and improve efficiency b. improve methods of sugar cane raising and sugar manufacture c. ensure stable permanent and sufficient production of sugar for local and international consumption d. maintain balance between production and consumption, and stabilize prices with a reasonable profit e. improve sugar merchandising in markets to ensure economic security f. improve living and economic situation of sugar laborers by correcting inequalities. Sec 15. Ways to achieve objectives Capitalization – annual sugar production tax of 10 centavos per picul of sugar fro 5 years from 1951-1952 for funds for Act implementation; borne by sugarcane planters/centrals in proportion of milling share. Sec 16. Special Fund Levy for the Sugar Research and Stabilization Fund for Philsugin Sec 3. Powers of Philsugin a. acquire/establish/operate central experiment stations to research on sugar cane culture and manufacture, related subjects b. purchase equipment for experiment c. expand local and foreign market d. buy/own/manage materials for production of sugar-related subjects e. enter into or make contracts to attain purposes f. grant loans to laborers g. do all such things to attain objectives h. execute all corporation powers under the corporation law.



Appellants are sister companies under one controlling management. The lower court found them liable for special assessments under Sec. 15 of RA 632 (Charter of Philippine Sugar Institute or Philsugin). Appellants contend that they are exempt/ not liable for said tax given Philsugin’s unlawful acquisition and disastrous management of Insular Sugar Refinery. They allege that: 1. RA 632 does not authorize the purchase of sugar mills. 2. There is only an obligation to pay the special tax as long as benefits accrue to the taxpayers, since RA 632 is not an act for revenue generation. The lower court decided in favor of the plaintiff because: 1. Sec 3 of RA 632 authorizes Philsugin to acquire sugar refineries. 2. Claim of fund misappropriation and lack of benefits to appellants untenable; Philsugin board is composed of members recommended by National Federation of Sugar Cane Planters and Philippine Sugar Association, of which appellants are members. 3. All financial transactions by Philsugin audited by a variety of agencies. 4. Wrongness of petition: anyone can then refuse to pay taxes if he suspects fund misappropriation. To which the appellants rejoined: 1. Safeguards do not ensure legality of actions 2. Philsugin without authority to acquire sugar refineries given the difference between central experiment stations and sugar refineries (Collector vs. Ledesma, Commonwealth Act No. 470) 3. Refusal to pay under RA 632 is a refusal to pay a special tax. Refusal to pay ordinary tax would impede government functions. 4. Norwood vs. Baer indicates the imposition of special benefits without accruing benefits as a denial of due process. Issues: 1. WON Philsugin is authorized to acquire sugar refineries under RA 632 2. WON special assessments are justified by benefits accruing to taxpayers. Held: 1. YES. The acquisition of a sugar refinery is authorized by Sec 2 (A) of RA 632, which provides for the conduction of research work for the improvement of the sugar industry in all its phases. Even if the operation

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Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunction with a prayer for a TRO & preliminary injunction against the implementation of the Contract of Lease between PCSO & PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners are suing in their capacity as members of Congress and as taxpayers. On DECEMBER 17, 1993 the Contract of Lease was executed and approved by the president on DECEMBER 20, 1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount to a lack of authority by entering into the contract, because: 1. Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibits the PCSO from conducting lotteries in cooperation with any entity 2. RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresional franchise before a telecom system (public utility) can be established 3. Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution prohibits companies with less than 60% Filipino Ownership from operating a public system 4. PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA 7042 (Foreign Investment Act) to install an online Lotto system a. The contract shows that PGMC is the actual operatior while it is a 75% foreign-owned company. RA 7042 puts all forms of gambling on the negative list Respondents answered the allegations by contending: 1. PGMC is only an independent contractor. There is no shared franchise 2. PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecom system is an indispensable requirement of an online lottery system. Petitioner interpretation of Section 1 of RA 1169 too narrow. 3. There are no violations of laws 4. The issue of morality is a political one and should not be resolved in a legal forum 5. Petitioners are without legal standing, as illustrated in Valmonte vs. PCSO a. The PCSO is a corporate entity and can enter into all kinds of contracts to achieve objectives. Arguing that PCSO will operate a public utility, it is still exempted under Section of Act 3846, where legislative franchisees are not necessary for radio stations Issues: 1. Whether or not petitioners have standing 2. Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 of RA 1169 Held: 1. Yes, petitioners have standing. Standing is only a procedural technicality that can be set aside depending on the importance of an issue. As taxpayers and citizens to be affected by the reach of the lotto system, petitioners have standing. No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in the negative arguing that “whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld.” PCSO cannot share

the franchise in any way. The contract’s nature can be understood to form the intent of the parties as evident in the provisions of the contract. Article 1371 of the CC provides that the intent of contracting parties are determined in part through their acts. The only contribution PCSO will be giving is the authority to operate. All risks are to be taken by the lessor; operation will be taken by the PCSO only after 8 years. Further proof are: a. Payment of investment acts in the even of contract suspension / breach b. Rent not fixed at 4.9% and can be reduced given that all risks are borne by the lessor c. Prohibition against PGMC involvement in competitor games; strange if gaming is PGMC; business d. Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years, which is unreasonable for a lease contract. It indicates that PGMC is the operator and the condition an attempt to increase public benefit through public involvement. e. Escrow deposit may be used as performance bond. f. PGMC operation evident in personnel management, procedural and coordinating rules set by the lessor. g. PCSO authority to terminate contact upon PGMC insolvency The contract indicates that PCSO is the actual lessor of the authority to operate given the indivisible community between them. Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid and TRO made permanent Cruz, Concurring: The respondent was not able to prove the allegations that the contract was intentionally crafted to appear to be a lease. PCSO cannot operate without the collaboration of PGMC. The rental fee underscores the PGMC interest in the success of the venture, since their income depends on the degree of success. The transaction is immoral insofar as the activity is fixed by the foreigners on us with government approval. Feliciano concurring: Locus standi reflects an important constitutional principle: the separation of powers. The rules is that those assailing statute must show the adverse effect of its implementation has on them. But it is not a rigid rule. It is not enough that the court invoke public mistrust or national concern in brushing aside the requirement, as it would mean standing is dependent on a majority and is far from being intellectually satisfying. While no principle has been set for determining standing, the guidelines are: 1. character of funds involved (is it public in nature?  in this case, the funds are from the general populace); taxpayer with right to see taxes used properly. 2. clear disregard of a law prohibiting certain actions of a public agency – the judicial conclusion on case merits interact with the notion of locus standi


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3. 4. lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest. In this case, no other government agency filed suit. wide impact or implementation; in this case, nationwide. Art. 8. In FLAST VS. COHEN standing was shown to focus on the party and not the issue. Standing cannot be granted simply because others cannot come to court. The taxpayer suit is without legal basis as the PCSO is a quasi-public corporation where taxpayer derivative suits cannot be recognized. The majority struck down the contract on the basis of a statute, but invoked National Importance for overlooking standing. There are no Constitutionally-based arguments. Power unused would be better than power misused. Petition denied. Vitug, Separate Opinion: Tax Payer suits are recognized only insofar as public funds from taxation are misused. Locus standi is not merely a procedural rule but the essence of jurisdiction. The petition strikes at factual issues and requires evidence. The petitioner’s claim that lottery being a game of chance is a crime against morals in the REVISED PENAL CODE is misplaced. The Court has not power to ignore legal mandates. RA 1169 Section 1 authorizes PCSO to conduct lotteries. Petition dismissed. Kapunan, dissenting: There is a need to comply with standards before petition can be recognized. The judiciary has power to decide on cases only when litigants with real interests at stake file complaints in accordance with law. The funds in questions are generated from sources other than taxation / public funds. The Court must respect the other branches of government; national interest is not enough reason to encroach on their powers. The judicial power is to check, not to supplant those powers of elected representatives. There is no constitutional issue involved; the question of the contract’s validity should have been brough before the lower courts. Petition denied.

Padilla, concurring: Gambling is immoral. Petitioner must show a clear, personal or legal right violated by the assailed law, but the requirement must be relaxed in the face of paramount national interest. The PCSO-PGMC contract is clearly a joint venture as each party contributes its share in the enterprise or project – PCSO contributes the market. Melo, dissenting: The petition must be dismissed for lack of standing. Petitioners are without a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy; to invoke public interest is too broad and indeterminate. Their capacity as taxpayers does not give them standing; a taxpayer suit can arise only w\hen public funds derived from taxation are improperly disbursed. PCSO is not a revenue-collecting fund and as such no public funds are involved. The funds in question are corporate in nature and will not fo into the National Treasury. If the petition is entertained, it may give rise to nuisance suits. Puno, dissenting: The requirement of standing to sue inheres from the definition of judicial power. It is not merely a technical rule. Section 1, Article 8 of Consti outlines the requirements to be satisfied / complied with before coming to court: a) actual case / controversy b) question of constitutionality raised by the proper party with actual or potential injury c) question raised ASAP d) judicial decision on question raised necessarily to determine the case. Even a relaxation of the requirement of standing does not mean all cases should be heard. Petitioner has no standing because: a) not part of the contract b) petitioners are not personally injured; they won’t even play c) no ordinary tax is involved or tax money used, given that PGMC assumes all risk d) an action on behalf of other parties must exhibit personal injury and a need to prevent the erosion of a third party right The invocation of constitutional rights and the allegation of vioalation are untenable. Section 1 Article 13(enhance right to dignity and equality through property regulation) is a mere policy direction for the legislative, reminding them to prioritize certain concerns. Section 11, Aticle 12 (60% Filipino ownership) violations cannot be determined by the Court as PGMC has not been proven to be foreign-owned or controlled. The rulings in DE GUIA VS. COMELEC the Court treated standing as a procedural rule when in fact it is a constitutional requirement under Sec 1,

29. 30.



31. UNTAL v. CHIEF OF STAFF Action: Resolution on motion for reconsideration Facts: Petitioner is a first class private of the 212 th Military Police Company of AFP, stationed in Manicani, Guiuan, Samar, which was stationed for the sole purpose of guarding surplus supplies in the area.
On November 4, 1947, petitioner killed Sgt. Francisco Estrada with a rifle and charged with a violation of 93rd Article of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408). Petitioner pleaded not guilty, contending that the offense occurred in time of peace, and thus the General Court Martial is without jurisdiction. The defense alleges that WW II was terminated by the Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945 in Tokyo

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Bay, reinstating the judicial branch. Thus, petitioner is not triable not only under the original 94th Article of War, but also under the amended one, as well as the 93 rd Article of War. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is triable under Articles of War. Held: Yes, he is. Petitioner is triable under the Articles of War given that the treaty of peace had not been signed and officially announced US Jurisprudence indicate that a state of war ceases only upon the declaration or signing of a treaty of peace. Raquiza v. Bradford illustrates how detainment of POWs is constitutional even after hostilities have ended, if peace has not been declared in the official legal sense. Petitioner is not triable under the original 94th Article of War, as the crime was committed outside of a military reservation. Neither can he be tried under the new law, as amended by RA 242, as it was passed on June 12, 1948 – after the crime was committed. Thus, petitioner is found to have violated the 93rd Article of War. WHEREFORE, Petition is denied. NOTES ON ARTICLES OF WAR Original 94th Article of War – Any person subject to military rule committing a penal offense on Philippine Army Reservation during a time of war is punishable by Court Martial. 94th Article of War, amended by RA 242 – Offender punishable by Court Martial outside military reservation, if offended party is subject to military law. Article 93 – Any subject under military law committing murder punishable by death/life imprisonment by Court martial directive, if committed in time of war (lifted from US 92nd Article of War) FERIA, dissenting on ratio: The petitioner is triable under the 94th Article of War as amended, even if outside reservation. The amendment was after the offense, but before the prosecution and trial began. RP is no longer at war since the US withdrawal on July 4, 1946 gave us sovereignty. Before then, we could not enter into war or a treaty of peace as we were not independent. The country has never been at war with the Axis powers. 38. ALMARIO v. ALBA (by Diane Sayo) Facts: Held: NO. The petitioners failed to show sufficient cause for postponement of the plebiscite. No one should deny to the voters their right to decide whether or not they agree to such amendments. The issue here whether the voter are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, and the danger of an abuse that may come about with Res. 105 and 113. Though the “grant” as a form of acquiring land may either mean just the same as “homestead” or “free patents” or just plain giving away of land, the petitioners failed to show the voter’s lack of discretion. Also, the Filipino people have long been aware of urban land reform and social housing, anyway.  The wisdom of the proposed amendment, that is, the meaning that it holds, is beyond the power of the court to adjudicate. The Comelec, along with civic organizations including the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, has been giving effort in information dissemination, such that the petitioner’s request for 67 days (for Res. 105) and 42 days (for Res. 113) before ratification is too much, given that the 1935 consti was ratified only after 36 days upon approval of Act No. 4200. Wherefore, Petition DISMISSED. Fernando, CJ, concurs: No question need arise under the standard of proper submission, referring to CJ Conceptions’ decision in Gonzales vs. Comelec Separate Opinions: Planas, J, concurs: The amendments proposed by questions No. 3 and 4 are already inherent in the consti!!! What is the point then of the amendments? The plebiscite is just a waste of effort, time, and money!!! But given that the plebiscites will still push through, there is no need for two separate plebiscites. Teehankee, J., dissents: Questions 3 and 4 do present a problem. They are unnecessary and redundant to the consti, since these are already encompassed in the “social justice and equity” responsibility of the

• •

Question No. 3 – vote for approval of amendments proposed by BP No. 105, which provides that grant shall be an additional mode for the acquisition of lands, as part of Sec 11 Art XIV of consti.

Question No. 4 – vote for the approval of amendments proposed by BP No. 113, which provides that a paragraph will be included in Section 12 Article XIV of the Consti. The additional paragraph shall provide that the state will undertake an urban land reform and social housing program wherein reasonable opportunities to acquire land and decent housing will be made available, consistent with Section 2 Art IV of consti. Petitioners deem that there has been no fair and proper submission to the people prior the plebiscite. The petitioners are asking for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Res. No. 105 and 113. Issue: WON there are enough grounds for cause for postponement of the plebiscite.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 643 – provides for a plebiscite on 27 January 1984 to either approve or reject the amendments to the Constitution proposed by BP Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 1120, 112, and 113. There are four separate questions answerable by YES or NO.

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government as provided by the consti. Also, there has been no ample time for the dissemination of information on the implications of Q # 3; this is proven by the fact that even the judiciary is doubting its significance and consider it as unnecessary. Abad Santos, J. separate opinion: populace is not yet fully prepared to decide on Q 3 and 4. it is best that the plebiscite for these questions be held on a separate date. Melencio-Herrera, J. separate opinion: the number of days to which a proposed consti amendment is to be submitted in a plebiscite is within the power of the Batasan, and will depend on the date of publication of the Batas Pambansa on the Official Gazette. Relova, J. separate opinion: The people, especially those from the provinces, are not yet fully informed of the implications of Q 3 and 4!!! In fact, the proposed amendments have been translated only in Tagalog and Cebuano! The voter needs ample basis for an intelligent appraisal on the matter. (note: the decision was given only two days before the plebiscite!) 39. MABANAG v. LOPEZ VITO (by Chesa Baltazar) Petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction (March 5, 1947) Facts: Petitioners pray to prevent the enforcement of a joint resolution (through R.A. No.73) proposing an amendment to the Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (note: this is the controversial Parity Rights Amendment). Among them are 8 Senators who have been suspended and 17 representatives who have not been allowed to sit in the House shortly after the opening of the 1 st session on account of alleged election irregularities. They thus did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor were they included in the computation of the ¾ vote requirement for the passage of a resolution proposing amendments. Petitioners also include presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. Issue: WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case. Held: No, the Supreme Court ruled that it did not. 1. This is a political question, and is thus outside of the province of the judiciary. The term “political question” is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in harmony as to the scope of its restrictions. In Coleman v. Miller, it was said that since ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to it must also be a political question. There is no logic attaching political character to ratification and withholding that character from proposal. Said case was a petition for mandamus by members of the Senate to compel the Sec of State to erase an indorsement on the resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amendment to the effect that it has been adopted and to indorse thereon the words “as not passed.” The issue was the power of the Lt Governor to cast his vote in the event of a tie in the Senate, and the “loss of vitality” of the proposed amendment due to the failure of ratification within a reasonable time of 3 years. The Kansas SC held that it had jurisdiction in so far as petitioners’ standing went, but dismissed the petition on its merits. It concluded that the substantive issue was a political question and was not subject to review of the court. The justices themselves were at odds and were “equally divided” into 3 groups, and the case was treated as “interesting” and “amusing” by an article in the Yale Law Journal in so far as it was labeled, “Sawing a Justice in Half.” Nonetheless, this SC bases its decision on the concurring opinions of four justices in the Coleman case. 2. The enrolled bill rule should be followed, as it conforms to the policy of the lawmaking body (sec 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act 2210), and as it is required by the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government and is also one of convenience in so far as courts need not look beyond the legislative journals and instead, just rely on prima facie evidence. In our jurisdiction, there are two methods of proving legislative proceedings: by the journals, or by a duly authenticated copy. Both are conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and due enactment thereof. The SC found no irregularity in the journals in the passage of RA 73. Decision: Petition dismissed. It is unnecessary to decide on the issue regarding computation. Bengzon, concurring: On the principle of separation of powers: It is a time-honored rule that courts may not go behind legislative journals to contradict the veracity of enrolled bills and resolutions. Journal entries are binding on the judiciary and they may question neither their veracity nor the computation of votes for approval because this matter is entirely left to the discretion of the legislature: Hilado, concurring and dissenting: Suspension of members of the Congress is their business and thus is a political question which may not be interfered with by the Court. Suspension should thus be taken for granted, preventing any justification or reason for even including the suspended members in the determination of the ¾ vote. Furthermore, there is also no way of determining how they would have voted.

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Perfecto, dissenting (his right brain took over ): On the issue of computation: Respondents maintain that on the date of the passage of the joint resolution, there were only 21 senators and 90 representatives. However, the stipulation of facts belies this and in fact shows that there were 24 senators and 90 reps. Based on this, the votes obtained to approve the resolution fall short of the ¾ requirement. On the issue of political questions: This “doctrine” should not be accepted at its face value as it is not even a doctrine but a general proposition despite the majority’s claim that it is “wellestablished.” Doctrines should be expressed in simple and self-evident terms. A doctrine such as this in which one of the nuclear terms is the subject of endless debate is a misnomer and a paradox. He thus refuses to accept it. On the Coleman case: This invoked authority has no relevance at all to the matters of controversy in the present case. In the Coleman case, no controversy of violation of specific Constitutional provisions was raised. The major premise of the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black was that the Constitution granted Congress exclusive control over submission of amendment. While this may be applicable to the US, no such unlimited power is granted to our own Congress. Submission is expressly provided by law. On the enrolled bill theory: This theory is absurd and should not be accepted. Though it prevails in England, we are “not Simians trained in the art of imitation” so as to be incapable of thinking independently. The invoked section 313 is now obsolete, and has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court. On the respect due to a coequal branch and convenience: We should not sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of social courtesy and convenience. On the Constitutional numerical rules: The Constitutional Conventional put them there for a purpose (affecting matters of momentos importance) and we abide by the wise teachings of experience. The ¾ rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities, otherwise it would be the deathknell of constitutionalism in our country. On the Jalandoni case: lessons learned: The SC has the duty of giving redress in clear cases of violation of the fundamental law, and must not bury their heads in the sand as ostriches tend to do. It is also necessary in the effective administration of justice that some of the existing wrong attitudes (particularly those used as premises for the majority opinion in this case) should be discarded and replaced with more progressive ones in consonance with truth and reason. 40. OCCENA v. COMELEC (by Chesa Baltazar) Action: Petition for Prohibition (April 2, 1981) Facts: Petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assail the validity of Resolution Nos. 28, 104 and 106 (1981) of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) on the premise that the 1973 is not the fundamental law (so basically, all their arguments attack certain provisions of that Consti). SC here has to dismiss their petition precisely because  they are bound to defend that Constitution which they have held to be valid in the Javellana case. Issues: 1. WON the force and applicability of the 1973 Consti may be denied. Held: No, it may not. It is too late to assail it. In Javellana, CS, by a majority vote (6-4), pronounced the validity of the 1973 Constitution. The function of judicial review has both a positive and negative effect: it can sustain the validity as well as nullify the acts of coordinate branches. The SC already sustained the 1973 Consti’s validity, thus resolving all doubts against it. 2. WON assailed resolutions are invalid based on: a. The questioned existence of the power of the IBP to propose amendments.

Held: No, The 1976 amendments gave it the same functions, responsibilities, rights, and privileges as the Interim National Assembly and regular National Assembly, one such power being the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by majority vote. Thus, IBP could and did propose the amendments embodied in the assailed resolutions. b. The proposed amendments are so extensive in character that they actually revise, and not merely amend, and thus go beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the IBP.

Held: No. The Constitutional Convention has the discretion to either propose amendments only or entirely overhaul the Consti and then submit it to the people for ratification. “Amendment” includes “revision” or total overhaul. The fact that only a majority vote and not the ¾ vote is required to convene as the agency proposing amendments. NO. Ratio: The Consti specifically requires only a majority vote. Besides, “extraordinary” majority was in fact obtained when the IBP exercised its constituent power to propose amendments. c.

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The length of the time necessary for submission. NO. Ratio: The Consti indicates the way the matter should be resolved. Article XVI, Section 2 states only that the plebiscite should be held not later than 3 months after approval of the amendment/revision (there is no minimum requirement). The people have been adequately informed. Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Teehankee, dissenting: 1. Consistently with his dissenting opinion in Sanidad on the invalidity of the 1976 amendments for not having been proposed/adopted in accordance wit mandatory provisions, which require that they must come from the Interim National Assembly and not from the executive power as vested in the President (PM) from whom such constituent power has been withheld. 2. Proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the IBP as the fruit of the invalid 1976 amendments must also suffer from the same inherent infirmity. 3. Length of time for submission was inadequate. What the Consti directs is that the government shouled exert all effort to enlighten the people so that there will be fair submission, and intelligent consent/ rejection. “A good Consti should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice/passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people, not to the whim of the people…” (Judge Cooley). 41. GONZALES v. COMELEC (by Diane Sayo) Facts: d. Petitioner Philconsa asks for a review by certiorari of the resolution of Comelec dismissing their prior petition, similar to that of L-28196. Issue: Held: WON RA 4913 is unconstitutional. NO. It is not unconstitutional. Several reasons are enumerated: 1. The votes cast in Congress in favor of the proposed amendment satisfy the three-fourths vote requirement as stated in the Consti. The issue raised in the case is not a political question, hence the court decided upon such in the same way as in Tanada vs. Cuenco and Avelino vs. Cuenco. 2. Though it is the people who has the inherent power to amend the fundamental law, the Congress acts as a constituent assembly in proposing amendments or calling a convention for such purpose; Congress does not have the final say. (In light of the spirit of the law, the “or” here may mean “and”.) 3. Legality of the congress: Sec 5 Art VI of the consti provides that Congress may make an approportionment of the their representation within three years. This should not be read as three years after the ratification of the 1935 consti but applied in every subsequent election. In fact, there has not been any valid approportionment since 1935! This does not repeal the Election Law regarding the election of members of Congress (failure to make an approportionment within three years after the census of 1960). The then members of Congress are not just de facto officers. 4. Power of Congress, as provided for in the consti, to approve resolutions, should not be denied!!! Their reasons for approving resolutions is an issue political in nature, and not subject to review by the court. And besides, the determination of the conditions under which amendments shall be submitted to the people is a matter that falls under the legislative sphere. 5. Date of the elections: there is nothing in the provision indicated that the plebiscite will be held as a “special election” and not as part of a “general election”. (note: all three previous plebiscites to amend the consti are held as special elections. This is the first time that it will be part of a general election.) 6. Public knowledge of proposed amendments: copies of the amendments are posted in public places and polling stations, and even at the back of the ballots.

• • • •

Republic Act No. 4913 – provides that the amendments on the Constitution proposed by Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections on 14 November 1967. Resolution for Both Houses (RBH) No. 1 – proposing that Section 5 Article VI of the Constitution be amended so as the membership of the House of Representatives be increased from 120 to a maximum of 180. RBH 2 – calling a convention to proposed amendments to Constitution RBH 3 – proposing that Section 16 Article VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates of the constitutional convention without forfeiting their slots in the Congress.

Wherefore, Petitions DISMISSED. Separate Concurring Opinions: Makalintal, J.: (1) The means of informing people is enough.  (2) (2) RA 4913 constitutional. To declare unconstitutionality, there should proven an irreconcilable conflict between it and the consti.

Petitioner Gonzales prays for judgment to restrain (1) Comelec from enforcing RA 4913 or to hold any plebiscite, (2) Director of Printing from printing the ballots, and (3) auditor general from disbursing any funds related to RA 4913. He deems the Act as unconstitutional and void.

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(3) (3) Ratification need not be in a special election or plebiscite. Bengzon, J.: (1) The manner or procedure of proposing amendments (ie. the 3-4ths vote of the Congress) should not be questioned! In fact, the three-fourths vote for RA 4913 is not even required since the Act merely provides the manner and date the amendments will be voted upon, and not the contents of the amendments themselves! (2) Again, special election is not required! (3) Due process clause: The means of informing the people on the amendments (publications, posted on public areas and on polling areas) are not infringements of due process. Fair and reasonable opportunity to be informed is given. Fernando, J.: Certain aspects of the amending process may be considered political but then the judicial inquiry in this case is still the best means to assure compliance of constitutional requirements. Dissenting Opinions: Sanchez, J.: “Submission” is not the same as “ratification”: The changes that the two amendments will bring about will certainly affect the people as a whole. The word “submitted” can only mean that the government should strain every effort in to inform every citizen of both the provisions to be amended and the proposed amendments (not just the latter, as planned). People should be enlightened; there must be fair submission. (a) The procedure for dissemination of information is defective: not everyone has access to the Official Gazette, not everyone goes to public places such as municipal hall, much less for the reason of reading such amendments, etc. (b) date of plebiscite: has always been separate from general elections Reyes, JBL, J.: The intention of the framers of the consti is that the people will give importance and undivided attention for amendments. That is why these are submitted and approved in special elections exclusively devoted to the issue. ANNOTATION by Atty. Domingo Lucenario Political Question refers to those questions which under the consti are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to the delegated authority to the legislative and executive. Political questions involve political rights, that is, the right to participate in the establishment or management of the government. On the other hand, justiceable questions are those that affect civil, personal, or property rights accorded to all. The judiciary cannot revise or even question the acts of the executive and the legislative branches that are within the power granted to them by the constitution. The judiciary is merely empowered to determine limitations which the law places upon official actions. Hence in determining the jurisdiction of the courts in such cases is the issue involved, and not the law or provision to be applied. Several particular questions are held to be political (total of 14!!!). Among the examples given are: 1. 2. 3. inquiry regarding the wisdom, justice, or advisability of particular law – this is a question for the legislature, who makes these laws, to determine. Refer to Angara vs. Electoral Commission issues affecting exercise of executive power to appoint and withdraw appointments. – the Commission on Appointments serves as the check-and-balance. Whether lawless violence, invasion, etc., and war exists – refer to Untal vs. Chief of Staff (the articles of war case)

Several particular questions held to be justiceable (there are 6). Among the examples given are: 1. validity of proceedings in Senate Electoral Tribunal (SEL) – refer to Tanada vs. Cuenco; the constitution sets limitations on the choice of members of SEL. 2. determination of number of votes essential to constitute a quorum – refer to Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito and Avelino vs. Cuenco. 45. PLANAS v. COMELEC (by Diane Sayo) Facts:

• •

Proclamation No. 1081 – Issued on Sept. 21, 1972. – Placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. Presidential Decree No. 73 – Issued on November 30, 1972. – Submitting the proposed constitution to the people for ratification or rejection, appropriating funds therefore, and setting the plebiscite on January 15, 1973. PD 86 – Organizing Citizens Assemblies to be consulted on certain public questions General Order No. 20 – issued by the president on January 7, 1973. – Directing the postponement of the scheduled plebiscite on January 15, 1973, until further notice, and temporarily suspending the effects of Proc. No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed constitution Proclamation No. 1102 – issued on January 15, 1973. – Announcing the ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

• •

The instant petitions were filed after the issuance of PD 73 seeking to nullify it, on the grounds that the powers exercised therein are lodged exclusively in Congress, and that there was no proper submission of the proposed constitution to the people for lack of time and lack of freedom of speech, press and assembly. The petitions enjoin the Comelec from fulfilling its duties regarding the plebiscite referred in PD 73. The president already issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proc. No. 81 on December 17, 1972, and announced the postponement of plebiscite on December 23, though these were only formalized through GO 20.

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Issues: 1. WON the Court has the authority to pass upon the validity of PD 73. If yes, WON PD 73 is valid. 2. WON the 1971 Constitutional Convention has the authority to pass the proposed constitution through Citizen Assemblies. 3. WON Proc. No. 1102 is valid. Held: 1. (a) Yes. The issue on the validity of PD 73 is justiciable in nature. Sectoin 2 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution as well as precedent cases provides the authority of the Court to review cases involving statutes. (b) The issue was deemed moot and academic precisely because the plebiscite in question will not be held at any definite time yet 2. YES. The convention is free to postulate any amendment it may deem fit to proposes because the Convention exercised sovereign powers delegated to them by the people, insofar as formulating and determining proposals is concerned. As for the approval of the proposed amendments or of a new constitution, the proposal is submitted to the people who shall approve or otherwise, through votes cast on elections, as provided in Sec 1 Art XV of 1935 Constitution. This issue was not raised properly in the Court, hence the Court should not pass upon such question. PD 1102 did not comply with Sec 1 Article XV of the 1935 Constitution which provides that Congress in joint session may propose amendments for or call a convention to amend, the constitution. This amendment is done through casting of votes. The voting held in barangays did not contemplate on this provision. Hence PD violates the constitution. Even though the result of the “plebiscite” was a “will of the people”, the Court may not allow the will of the majority to prevail because the requirements of the law were not complied with. (example: the case of the disqualified mayor winner) Petitions GRANTED. Teehankee, J. separate opinion.: It is premature for the Court to decide on the validity of PD 1102 because it had not been properly raised in the Courts, and that the plebiscite did not happen, anyway. Barredo, J concurring and dissenting opinion.: I vote to dismiss the petitions even if these are justiciable, because the grounds thereof are either untenable or have become premature, at least while the plebiscite had not been rescheduled, or if it will take place at all. The Convention’s task is not limited to proposing specific amendments; it is free to make any proposals, whether or not consonant with 1935 constitution. Also, it is judicially improper to pass upon an issue the factual setting of which may still be altered, hence a decision on PD 1102 is premature. Article XV of 1935 constitution was not complied with! The establishment of citizens’ assemblies as a mode of plebiscite is not within the provision of Art XV; is must be observed that the Comelec should have been in charge of the plebiscite, as in any election. But still, the people have spoken; they have decided on their future with this new constitution. The Court does not have the right to go against the people’s will!!! Otherwise it is tantamount to defying the very sovereign people by whom and for whom the constitution has been ordained.  On the contention that citizens less that 21 years of age (15 and above) participated in the Citizens’ Assembly, should not be questioned. The constitution provides that those 21 and older has the right to suffrage but that does not deny the legislature to include others it believes should enjoy those rights as well. Antonio, J., concurs: Implicit in the power of the Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution in its authority to order an election at which such amendments are to be submitted. Also, martial rule per se does not warrant the presumption that the result of the plebiscite is not genuine and free expressions of the people; thinking so would demean the integrity of the Filipino people.  Esguerra, J. concurs in the result: I vote to deny the petitions. Reasons: 1. The cases are moot and academic because of the postponement.


Wherefore, Petitions DISMISSED. Separate Opinions: (Each justice was required to share their own views from which the final decision, based on the votes cast on the points in issue, was derived. A recapitulation of the opinions, arranged by issue/points raised, is in the latter part of the syllabi. This one is arranged per justice ) Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concurs: The issues on the validity of PD 1102, that is WON the president has the power to call a plebiscite, is moot and academic because the plebiscite in question did not take place, anyway. Its postponement of some indefinite date rendered the petitions immature. The contention that the 1972 Draft was unfit for proper submission is also moot because the ratification has already taken place. Petitions DISMISSED. Zaldivar, J. dissenting opinion: The issues are not moot and academic because there remains substantial rights and issues that are controverted which are not yet settled. The Court should not indulge too much on technicalities! Even though Zaldivar views PD 1102 as merely a proclamation, he contends that the Court must not ignore it.

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2. There is nothing to restrain or prohibit as the acts sought to be stopped have been fully accomplished. He does not attempt to assail with the validity of PD 1102 because that was not formally filed in the Court. 46. UNIDO v. COMELEC (by Chesa Baltazar) Facts: On March 5, 1981, the Comelec issued 3 resolutions (Nos. 1467, 1468, 1469) providing for rules and regulations governing the upcoming 1981 plebiscite, as regards equal opportunity on public discussions and debates, equal time on the use of broadcast media, and equal space on the use of printed media for political parties and groups campaigning for both the “Yes” and “No” votes. On March 10, 1981, petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), a political organization campaigning for the “No” votes, sent a letter to the Comelec demanding that it also be given the same privileges accorded to President Marcos, in light of his scheduled “Pulong-pulong sa Pangulo” radio-TV program wherein Marcos led the campaign for the “Yes” votes, carried live by 26 TV and 248 radio stations for a 2-hour period on March 12, 1981. Petitioners stated that their own public meeting be given the same amount of coverage. Comelec denied their demands, saying in so many words that it was in his capacity as the President/PM that Marcos held the pulong, especially since it was under his leadership that the amendments were proposed. He is the one responsible for the program of government, thus, he should be able to inform and enlighten the people of the rationale behind his initiatives without the same privilege being given to the opposition. Comelec also said that the pulong is not a political vehicle but an “innovative system of participatory democracy,” and that they cannot direct the media to grant the free use of their facilities, although petitioners may avail of them with their own resources if they so choose. Unido then sumbmitted a motion for reconsideration stating the ff. reasons for the granting of their demand: 1. The subject matter of the pulong was in fact a campaign for the “yes” votes. 2. The radio and TV facilities were used by Marcos in his capacity as political leader of the KBL, not as president/PM. 3. When the proposed amendments were passed by the Batasan under his leadership, his function as President/PM was complete. 4. Nature of the pulong is not determined by its name but the subject matter. 5. Marcos campaigning for the “Yes” votes did not enter into appropriate contracts with stations, but was given free use. 6. Comelec has the constitutional right and power to have its resolutions respected and obeyed by all, otherwise, they will only be in form without any substance. Motion was also denied; hence, this appeal. Issue: WON Unido is entitled to the same amount of mileage accorded to Marcos in light of the Comelec Resolutions supposedly regulating fair elections. Held: NO. In the interest of the importance of properly enlightening the people regarding proposed amendments, it would seem plausible that petitions be granted. However, the Court recognized certain norms that they cannot disregard, such as their incapacity to mandate the Comelec (an independent Constitutional body) to act in a certain way. It is also beyond their power to take any action with regard to the media entities, as petitioners have not shown that they have previously requested any media station to grant them coverage, and have been denied. As regards the capacity of Marcos, it is undeniable and natural that the head of the state be accorded privileges not equally available to his opponents. No Office/government entity is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities by which its contrary views may be aired. While these opponents are free to avail of their own resources to accomplish their purpose, “it is not for the administration to hand them on a silver platter the weapon they need.” It was also in his capacity as President/PM that Marcos appeared at the pulong, not to promote the interests of his party, but to “improve the quality of government.” Wherefore, Petition dismissed. Fernando, concurring: A President, by virtue of the position he holds, is necessarily in a more advantageous position. Respondent Comelec did not abuse its discretion in denying the request of the petitioners, and can in fact take pride in the fact that “it has not been recreant to the trust imposed on it” by virtue of the provisions ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. Teehankee, dissenting: Petition should be given due course, as Comelec is fully authorized to issue all reasonable measures to the media, even those that are governmentowned, to grant petitioners as much time and space as it is feasible, although understandable less than that accorded to the President. This is especially important in light of the fact that only two days remain before the plebiscite, and up to now, even lawyers have a difficult time grasping the practical applications of the proposed amendments.

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