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JAVIER v OSMENA → April 1960: Judgment rendered ordering petitioner to pay the sum w/ interest

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atty’s fees and costs.
Florentino Collantes was married to Petrona Javier who inherited from her parents 2 → June 1960:Appeal to CA by Perez & Subong dismissed for it was filed beyond
parcels of land. To perfect her ownership, she acquiored from her father’s second the reglementary pd.
wife the usufructuary right on properties for 3thou. → Aug 1961: Writ of execution was issued after the case was remanded to the
court of origin.
Florentino, who succeeded Petrona’s father as a commission merchant in their
family business in Manila, acquired the debt of Petrona’s father and became → 1st notice: Sept 1961, respondent Sheriff of Mla scheduled auction sale of levied
indebted to Tomas Osmena (one of the chief clients) in sum of four or five thou. 3,573 shares of common stock registered in the name of Damaso Perez w/
Unable to pay, judgement was rendered in favor of debtor Osmena. The sheriff Republic Bank. Judge suspended such sale on the ground that it was highly
despite the protests of Petrona sold off the two parcels (separate property of excessive & unjust, debt was only PhP17,309.44 while value of shares was
Petrona) of land at an auction where Osmena was the successful bidder. PhP357,300.
→ 2nd notice: Oct 1961, cancelled by CA pending hearing of Perez’ motion for
Petrona sought to have the sale annulled and to recover her property. The
mandamus & certiorari w/ prelim injunction
defendant Osmena contended that even though land was separate property of
Petrona, the usurfructuary right belonhgs to the CP since it was purchased using CP → 3rd notice: Jan 1963, sale was lowered to 210 shares of stock. But was later
dunds. Defendant prayed that the revenues from both properties, being CP, should enjoined by the ff complaint.
be made liable for the debt. → New twist: in the same month, Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, W of Damaso, filed
a complaint against respondents wherein she contended that the levied shares
WON debts should be paid out of fruits and revenue of the parcels of land which are conjugal assets w/c are not answerable for the judgment debt of her H, it
belong to Wife exclusively being a personal nature of obligation and contracted not for the benefit/
interest of their conjugal partnership. Case was later dismissed upon the motion
Yes. of W herself.

There is a natural presumption of fact that whatever Collanted contributed towards
→ 4th notice: Oct 1963, auction sale of 220 shares of stock scheduled by Sheriff
defrayment of the family expenses was contributed by him out of what he earned by but was suspended due to Mrs Cobb-Perez filing a 3 rd party claim over the
commission paid him for services rendered to his clients as commission merchant. shares of stocks.
Thus, the debts also incurred will be presumed conjugal. It is conclusive that the → 5th notice: Nov ’63 but was later suspended by Mr Perez’s offer of his alleged
debt must be paid out of CP since it is contracted by H during M and in exercise of cash dividends in same bank worth PhP19,985. His motion/offer denied.
the industry or profession by which, moreover, he contributes towards the support
of his family. These debts are not personal or private debts at all. → 6th notice: Jan ’65: auction sale of 240 shares of stock. Sheriff enjoined for
petitioners posted a bond of PhP10,000 for writ of preliminary injunction prayed
A1409 of CC: CP should be made liable for debts and obliges (no.1) contracted
during M by H and (no.5) for the support of family. ISSUE:
1) WON judgment debt is H’s exclusive & private debt
To be more clear, the fruits of the exclusive property belong to CP, right? As such,
they are liable for the apyment of M expenses. Thus, it only follows that the creditor HELD: Petition dismissed. Preliminary injunction dissolved.
of the H may bring suit against the fruits and revenues of the private property of W. RATIO:
1) No, debts contracted by H, as head of the family and administrator of the
As to whether the defendant’s prayer for an appointment of a receiver is to be conjugal partnership, in the exercise of an industry or profession by w/c he
granted, A1984 says that the W has the right to manage her paraphernal property contributes to the support of the family cannot be his exclusive debts. The said
and (A1412) says that H is the administrator of the CCP. Therefore, appointment of debt was contracted in the purchase of leather used in the shoe manufacturing
a receiver shall deprove W and H of these rights. No need! business of the H and said business is an ordinary commercial enterprise for
gain, in the pursuit of w/c Damaso Perez had the right to embark the
Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso Perez v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, partnership.
Ricardo Hermoso & City Sheriff of Manila (1968) Moreover, the presumption that all property of the marriage belong to the
Original Petition in the SC. Ceriorari w/ preliminary injunction. conjugal partnership under Art 160 CC must be accompanied by proof of
acquisition of property. Since there is no evidence as to when the shares of
FACTS: stock were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the H
→ Feb 1959: respondent Hermoso filed civil case against petitioner Damaso Perez alone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to him.
& one Gregorio Subong for recovery of principal sum PhP17,309.44 as unpaid
purchases of leather materials used in the shoe manufacturing business of NOTES:
Perez.
In the case, the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain motion to quash the writ
of execution for none of the ff grounds were present. It can only do so when: (1) CUATICO v. MORELOS
writ has been improvidently issued, (2) it has been issued against the wrong party, 61 OG 869 (1964)
(3) it is defective in substance, (4) judgment debt has been paid, (5) writ has been
issued w/o authority, (6) there has been a change in the situation of the parties w/c Facts: Romeo Morelos secured a loan from the plaintiff Lorenzo Cuatico by a
makes execution inequitable, or (7) controversy has never been submitted to court promissory note. Romeo was unable to pay so Lorenzo instituted a complaint
and therefore no judgment has been rendered. against Romeo and his wife Amada for the collection of the sum of P5K plus interest.
The Manila CFI declared Romeo default (and Amada who was also impleaded was
relieved as she did not sign the promissory note) and ordered the garnishment of
DBP vs. Adil Romeo’s salary from the Mapua Institute of Technology where Romeo worked.
Petition for Certiorari to Review CFI Iloilo decision Romeo moved for the dissolution of the garnishment but was denied. Hence this
petition.
Facts:
• Feb. 10, 1940 – sps Patricio Confesor & Jovita Villafuerte obtained agricultural Issues:
loan from Agricultural & Industrial Bank (AIB w/c is now DBP). Amount is P2k 1. WON his salary is exempt from execution
evidenced by a promissory note payable in 10 equal yearly amortizations NO. Romeo was obviously misleading the court as to his testimonies regarding
• After 10 years (literal! Hehe), they were still not able to pay his salaries and expenditures. The truth was his total monthly expenses amount
to P507.82 and his monthly income totals P680.80 and thus the earnings exceed
• April 11, 1961 – Confesor, now a member of Congress, issued a 2nd promissory
the sum necessary for the support of the family by P172.98. Consequently, he is
note acknowledging the loan & promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961. He not exempt.
further agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage if & when he fails to pay.
Another stipulation is that if he secures certificate of indebtedness from gov’t 2. WON the lower court acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
for his back pay, he’ll be allowed to pay amount out of it. garnishee (Mapua) to deduct from Romeo’s monthly salary to pay his
• They were still not able to pay on the assigned date. debt.
• Sept. 11, 1970 – DBP filed complaint against sps. City Court decided in favor of NO. The relevant provision in such a case is Rule 39(38) of the ROC which
DBP & thus ordered sps to pay debt + interests. provides that if, upon investigation of his current income and expenses, it
• CFI Iloilo reversed the decision & dismissed complaint against sps. MFR denied. appears that the earning of the judgment debtor are more than what is
necessary for the support of his family, the judge may order him to pay the
Issues & Ratio: judgment debt in fixed monthly installments, as how the judge in the CFI had
1. WON rt of prescription may be waived or renounced. - YES ordered.
a. CC Art. 1112 – Rt to prescription may be tacitly renounced resulting from
acts w/c imply abandonment of such rt. 3. RELEVANT ISSUE: WON the garnishment on Romeo’s salary was
b.True that prescription has set in as to the 1 promissory note. However, 2
st nd proper, considering that the salaries of the spouses are conjugal
promissory note, acknowledged such debt & even promised to pay the partnership property, and further that the conjugal partnership
same thereby, rt to prescription was effectively & expressly renounced. property cannot be made liable for the personal obligations of one of
c. Villaroel vs. Estrada – Debt barred by prescription can’t be enforced by the spouses.
creditor. But a new contract recognizing & assuming prescribed debt would NO. Indeed, art. 153(2) of the new CC provides that those which is obtained by
be valid & enforceable. the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them shall be
d. Remember, prescription only bars the remedy, that is the payment of the conjugal partnership property. Thus, Romeo’s earnings in the form of salaries
debt, but not the debt itself. The new promise made by Confesor constitute part of the conjugal partnership property which may answer only for
constitutes a new cause of action. the liabilities enumerated in art. 161. And from a reading of this article, it is
2. WON 2nd promissory note is binding on the conjugal partnership. - YES found that the personal liability of the spouses cannot bind the conjugal
a. CFI claims it’s not binding pursuant to new CC Art. 166: unless wife is partnership unless it was incurred for the benefit of the family. In the case
spendthrift, serving civ interdiction or confined in leprosarium, husband at bar, it appears that the promissory note was executed and signed by Romeo
can’t alienate/encumber real prop of CP w/o her consent. Court may alone. Furthermore, the promissory note does not in any way divulge whether or
compel her to give such if she refuses to do so. not the loan secured by the promissory note was for the benefit of the family.
Since Romeo has not proved that the loan was for the benefit of said conjugal
b. But CC Art. 165 provides that husband is administrator of CP & thus, all partnership, the inevitable conclusion is that the loan was the exclusive personal
debts & oblig he contracts for the benefit of the CP are chargeable to the indebtedness of the husband for which the conjugal partnership cannot be held
CP. He signed 2nd promissory note for the benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable.
liable for obligation. On the contention that since the indebtedness was contracted during the
marriage with his present wide, the law presumed that the loan was contracted
Held: CFI decision reversed & set aside. City Court decision reinstated. for the benefit of his family. It will not be sustained, however, given the ruling in
De la Cruz v. De Gula that before granting a loan to the husband, one should (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
first make inquiry and satisfy himself that the loan applied for will be for the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose,
benefit of the conjugal partnership and if such purpose is not stated in detail in in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
the document of loan which should be signed preferably by both husband and
wife, the loan may be a personal obligation of the husband, for which the (2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a
conjugal property is not answerable, except in case it redounded to the benefit charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;
of the family.
On another contention that at least one half of the conjugal partnership (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the
belongs to the husband, and therefore, could be validly levied upon to satisfy separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be
the money judgment against the husband it must be remembered that only charged to the partnership;
when the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated, and there is a net
remainder, may the same be divided equally between the spouses. In the (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
meantime, the interest of each in the conjugal partnership is inchoate and a
mere expectancy. Thus, any levy on the conjugal partnership property to satisfy (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both
such money judgment against the husband is null and void. husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;

Held: Romeo’s liability is his personal responsibility and the conjugal partnership (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other
cannot therefore be held liable. Consequently, the garnishment on his salary is null course. (1408a)
and void.

Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. De Garcia [October 31, 1969]  The husband is the administrator of the conjugal property however, only
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the
conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career,
Facts: profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the
 Ladislao Chavez (principal) and petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc. executed benefit of the family
a surety bond in favour of PNB to guaranty a crop loan granted to Ladislao  Acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement is not
Chavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia, Ladislao Chavez and Ramon an act that would benefit the conjugal partnership
B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they  Argument of Luzon Surety that acting as a guarantor and making good of
hound themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon Surety Co., his guaranty, Mr. Garcia acquires the capacity of being trusted, add to his
Inc. against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, reputation or esteem, enhances his standing as a citizen in the community
charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which it may incur. in which he lives, and earns the confidence of the business community. He
 April 27, 1956 PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon can thus secure money with which to carry on the purposes of their
Surety to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in interest, attorney’s fees, conjugal partnership. This argument is too remote and fanciful
and costs of the suit.  To make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain
 August 8, 1957 – third party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Rmon to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted by Luzon Surety. new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being
 July 30, 1960 a writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the family as a unit.
of the claim of petitioner in the sum of P8,839.97. August 9, 1960 a wit of
garnishment was issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Ayala Investment v Ching
Garcias.
 The Garcias filed a suit for injuction and the trial court ruled in their favour. PBM onbtained a loan of 50, 300, 000 from Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (AIDC). Ching, the Executive Vice-Pres of PBM signed a surety to the
Issue: WON the CPG, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be loan. Upon PBM’s failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum of
held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a money from PBM and Ching.
3rd party in favour of a surety agreement.
The writ of execution covered 3 of the C properties of Ching and his wife so Ching
Held: No, said agreement did not benefit the family so the CPG is not liable asked that the auction sale upon said properties be enjoined because such are part
of the CPG and couldn’t be held liable to answer for a loan that didn’t redound to
Ratio: the benefit of his family.
 Article 161 of the civil code provides:
Auction still took place and AIDC being the only bidder acquired the properties. As
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: such, Ching instituted an action in the court to declare the sale null and void. The LC
and CoA ruled in his favor, giving the sale no legal effect since the loan they → W admitted securing a loan together w/ H but claimed that loan was payable on
properties were being made to pay didn’t benefit the CP. a staggered basis. H claimed that sum was not a loan but his share of income
on contracts in reviving the petitioner’s construction business
WON the CPG is liable for obligation entered into by the H as a surety in a loan → RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Carlos
extended to corporation? → CA reversed decision and dismissed the complain for insufficiency of evidence
SubWON Did obligation redound to benefit of CPG
SubWON Was act of H, in securing the loan, part of his industry, ISSUES:
business or career from which he supports his family 1) WON USD25K or its equivalent PhP625K was in the nature of a loan
2) If so, WON loan is liability of both sps
HELD CPG is not liable.
HELD: Petition granted, judgment modified.
SubWON1 Inasmuch as loan contracted by Ching was a corporate loan, it
was not made for the benefit of the CPG. RATIO:
1) Yes, for petitioner was able to prove it as a loan by a preponderance of
A161(1), CC and A121 (2) FC are clear in requiring that the loan evidence in providing the check he issued, the acknowledgement of the W of
obtained should be for the benefit of the partnership or should their accountability, and the petitioner’s demand letter sent and received by
redound to the benefit of the CP in order for the CPG to be held respondent.
liable. H’s claim that it is his rightful share as income, profit or salary is untenable
because there is no showing that he is a stockholder, an employee or an agent
Burden of proof of showing that it does lies in creditor-party of the corporation.
litigant and the AIDC presented no such proof. 2) Yes, because acknowledgement of the loan made by the defendant-W binds the
conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family
Moreover, actual benefits must redound to CPG and it’s not because it was used to purchase the h&lot w/c became their conjugal home.
enough that the transaction be one that would normally produce Pursuant to Art 121 No. 2&3, even w/ the alleged lack of consent of
benefit for the partnership. It must do so, in fact where such respondent-H, defendant-H & W are jointly and severally liable in the payment
benefits directly result from the loan; such are what is of the loan.
contemplated by the law.

SubWON2 Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an industry or profession
of Ching. Neither it is an embarking in a business or an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.

Honorario Carlos v. Manuel Abelardo (2002)
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA

FACTS:
→ Oct 1989: resp & his W Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and
requested him to advance USD 25K for the purchase of h&lot in Parañaque.
→ Petitioner issued a check in the said full amount to the seller of the property to
enable and assist the sps conduct their married life independently and on their
own
→ July 1991: petitioner inquired about the status of the loan. The sps
acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet ready to
settle it. Respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s inquiries by
making various threats against the petitioner.
→ Aug ’94: formal demand was made by Carlos but sps failed yet again to comply
→ Oct ’94: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the sum & damages against
sps in RTC of Valenzuela
→ Sps, having been separated in fact for more than a yr prior to filing of
complaint, submitted separate answers.