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Eduardo, Hermogena and Vicente FELIPE, petitioners vs.

HEIRS OF MAXIMO Not invalid because it’s imprecise considering CC terms re contracts. It can
ALDON (namely Gimena Almosara, Sofia & Salvador Aldon) and the either be:
Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents 1. rescissible (art. 1380) – when all essential elements are untainted
Petition for review of CA decision [Feb. 16, 1983] (Gimena’s consent was tainted)
2. voidable (art. 1390)
Facts: 3. unenforceable (art. 1403)
• 1936: Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara 4. void/inexistent (art. 1409)
• 1948 – 1950: they bought several pieces of land • Deed of sale is a voidable contract – where one of parties is incapable of giving
• 1960 – 1962: said lands were divided into 3 lots, 1370, 1371 & 1415 of San consent to the contract (art.1390 par. 1). Gimena was incapacitated to give
Jacinto Public Land Subdivision, San Jacinto, Masbate consent. Consent of both spouses is needed. Supported by CC Art. 173, w/c
• 1951: Gimena sold lots to sps Eduardo & Hermogena Felipe w/o Maximo’s provides that contracts entered by husband w/o wife’s consent when such is
consent. Gimena & Hermogenes are close relatives. required, are annullable at her instance during marriage & w/in 10yrs from
• Maximo died. questioned transaction.
• April 26, 1976: heirs of Maximo (private respondents) filed complaint in CFI
Masbate vs the Felipes alleging that they are the rightful owners of properties 2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for annulment of contract
sold to the sps. They claim that they orally mortgaged lands to sps & an offer to • GIMENA - It’s only subj to annulment of husband during marriage because he
redeem (given by priv respondents) mortgage had been refused by sps. was the victim who had interest in contract whereas Gimena was party
• Defendants claim: they acquired lots by purchase & it was subsequently responsible for defect. Gimena is barred from doing this during and even after
delivered to them. the marriage.
• Trial Court: decided in favor of Felipes. They were declared as lawful owners. • CHILDREN – While marriage was still subsisting, they could NOT seek for its
Complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. annulment since their rt to the lands was merely inchoate/expectant. But upon
• CA: Reversed & set aside trial court decision. Felipes ordered to surrender lots death of dad, they acquired rt to question defective contract in so far as it
deprived them of their hereditary rts in dad’s share in lands. Dad’s share is ½ &
& muniments (?) of title to Aldons. They were also ordered to make acctg of
they’re entitled to 2/3 of such, remaining 1/3 belongs to mom.
produce derived from lands including expenses incurred since 1951 & to
solidarily turn over to Aldons the net monetary value of profits after deducting
3. WON petitioners have acquired land by acquisitive prescription. - NO
P1,800.00 (most probably this is the amount paid by Felipes when they
They bought lands in bad faith proven by ff instances:
purchased the land or amount loaned to Aldons?)
a. Vicente, son of sps Felipe, attempted to have Gimena sign a ready-made
• CA ratio:
document purporting to sell disputed lands to Felipes in Dec. 1970. They knew
1. if transfer was thru an oral contract of mortgage: redemption allowed
land didn’t belong to them.
anytime upon repayment of P1,800.00
b. Said document was for purpose of obtaining Gimena’s consent to construction
2. if it was done thru sale: redemption is improper
irrigation pump on lands. If they were the owners, why did they have to get her
3. what really transpired: Deed of Purchase & Sale executed by Gimena in
consent?
favor of Hermogenes
c. Improvements were only being made in 1970 when sale was in 1951.
4. sale not forged but invalid since deed was executed w/o needed consent of
d. Declaration of prop made only in 1974.
Maximo, lots being conjugal (presumed as such because these were
e. No attempt to obtain Maximo’s signature despite fact that Gimena &
purchased during marriage). This was properly raised in the pleading
Hermogena were close relatives.
considering the fact that complaint alleges that lands were purchased from
Given that they did possess the lands, possession in bad faith is covered by
Gimena & husband Maximo.
extraordinary prescription w/c lapses in 30 yrs. Sale was in 1951 & case filed in
• Felipes claim: since deed is not a forgery, it authenticity & due execution is
1976, 30 yrs has not yet lapsed.
beyond question. This is a ques of fact that SC can’t consider. They’re only
concerned w/ques of law.
4. WON rt of action of Sofia & Salvador Aldon is barred by statute of
limitations - NO
Issues & Ratio:
Their rt of action accrued from death of dad in 1959 & they are given 30 yrs to
1. WON sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid. - NO
institute it (CC Art. 1141). Action filed in 1976, thus still w/in allowed time.
• Note the ff. elementary rules:
1. CC Art. 165: husband is administrator of CP Held: CA modified. Sofia & Salvador awarded their shares of lands. Felipes as
2. CC Art. 166: subj to certain exceptions, husband can’t alienate/encumber possessors in bad faith ordered to make an acctg of fruits corresponding to
any real prop of the CP w/o wife’s consent children’s shares from 1959 & solidarily pay value to them.
3. CC Art. 172: wife can’t bind CP w/o husband’s consent except in cases
provided by law Tintigan v. Tintigan
• Thus, since wife sold lands belonging to CP w/o husband’s consent & such sale
is not covered by instances “except in cases provided by law”, sale is defective. Guiang vs. Court of Appeals [June 26, 1998]
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
Facts: which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
 Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz were married on December 24, 1968. They implementing such decision.
have 3 children Junie, Harriet and Jodie or Joji. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
 February 14, 1983 – they bought a piece of land from Manuel Callejo with Gilda in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
Corpuz as the vendee. The consideration was payable in instalment and with sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
the right of cancellation in favour of the vendor should the vendee fail to pay encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
for 3 successive instalments spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
 April 22, 1988 – the spouses sold ½ of their Lot 9 Block 8 to the defendant encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
 June 1989 – Gilda Corpuz went to Manila (with the consent of the husband) to may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
look for employment in the Middle East but she became a victim of an spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
unscrupulous illegal recruiter. both offerors. (165a)
 January 1990 – Harriet (daughter) informed her mother that her father  Disposition or encumbrance is void. The court compared the civil code with the
intended to sell the remaining ½ portion of the land including their house to the family code. Under Art. 166 of the civil code the husband cannot generally
Guiangs. Gilda Corpuz objected to the sale. Harriet did not inform her father alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
but instead she gave the letter of her mother to the Guiangs. wife’s consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made without the consent
 Judie Corpuz pushed through with the sale of the remaining ½ portion and a of the wife. Art 173 provided that the wife is 10 years during the marriage to
deed of transfer of rights was executed. annul the alienation or encumbrance. This provision was not carried to the
 March 1 (or15), 1990 – to cure whatever defect in defendant Judie Corpuz’s Family Code and as such any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband
title over the lot transferred, Luzviminda Guiang executed another agreement after August 3, 1988 without the consent of the wife would be considered as
over lot 9 block 8 with Manuela Callejo (widow of the original owner) {Manuel null and void.
and Manuela}  Fraud and intimidation was only present during the execution of the amicable
 March 11, 1990 – Gilda Corpuz returned home and together with her children settlement and not during the Deed of Transfer of Right.
they stayed at their home. At this time her husband is already living with  When is a contract null and void? Absence of any of the elements:
another woman already. i. Cause
 The Guiangs charged Gilda in the barangay for trespassing. March 16, 1990 ii. Object
the parties signed a document known as amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz iii. Consent
asked for the annulment of the settlement.
 Court of Appeals ruled that the sale was void because it was done without the 2. No
consent of the wife. The amicable settlement did not ratify the sale because  The Deed of Transfer of Right cannot be ratified because an amicable
Art. 1409 expressly bars the ratification of the contracts of those prohibited or settlement cannot validate an invalid act.
declared void by law.  Art. 1422 provides that: A contract which is the direct result of a previous
illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.
Issues:
1. WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed Imelda Relucio, pet v Angelina Lopez, res
2. WON the CA erred in not declaring as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the
Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified Relucio seeks to have the CoA decision set aside, which denied a petition for
thru the execution of the amicable settlement by the contending parties. certiorari assailing the RTC’s order (that then denied her motion to dismiss the case
against her inclusion as party defendant).
Ratio
1. No, it is a void Contract Angelina Lopez is legally married to Alberto Lopez. In 1968, Alberto abandoned her
 Petitioners contend that it is a valid contract and that Deed of Transfer of Rights and their four legitimate children. He also abrogated unto himself full and exclusive
was validly executed and that the absence of the consent of Mrs. Corpuz merely control and administration of their CP. He spent and used the CP for his sole gain
made the Deed voidable and under Art. 1390 provides that it is susceptible of and benefit to the total exclusion of Angelina and their four children.
ratification.
 Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there Since 1976, he also maintained an illicit relationship and cohabitated with Imelda
may have been no damage to the contracting parties (2) Those where the Relucio. Since then, they amassed quite a fortune consisting mainly of
consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residential…jewelry, etc.
This article refers to contracts visited by vices of consent (consent was vitiated These properties are in the names of (in CoA case, the defendant) Alberto and
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud) The consent Imelda or jointly, or their dummies. They have been acquired mostly byactual
of Mrs. Corpuz was totally inexistent or absent. contribution and industry of Alberto. He also, with intention to escape his obligations
 Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall as a father and husband, placed some properties in the name of Relucio and even
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision stashed away some. He has also alienated various properties that belong to the CP,
spending the proceeds thereof for his benefit, Imelda’s and their two illegitimate → After negotiation, Edilberto (only) and petitioner agreed upon the purchase
children. price of PhP1.5M for Taytay property & PhP2.1M for Mkt property. Agreement
was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. Purchase was on
WON Angelina’s petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the CP against installment basis and downpayment through checks was made by petitioner.
her H established a cause of action against petitioner → Ff day, Norma, the sps and the real estate broker met to incorporate notations
and revise contracts to sell
NO. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party (the defendant) in → At yet another mtg, petitioner was surprised to learn that sps were backing out
violation of the of the agreement because they needed “spot cash” for the purchase price.
legal right of the other. There are three elements: Norma Camaisa refused to sign contract to sell.
1. right in favor of plaintiff
2. obligation on part of defendant to respect that right ISSUES:
3. act or omission on part of defendant in violation of that right 1) WON sale of real properties of the sps have already been perfected
2) WON H may validly dispose of a conjugal property w/o the W’s written consent
Complaint of Angelina is that of an aggrieved wife against her husband. It 3) WON Court may intervene to authorize transaction
doesn’t seek relief from Imelda. References to her iare merely incidental to
set forth facts and circumstances that prove cause of action against HELD: Petition of buyer denied.
Alberto. All of Angelina’s causes of action were against her husband: RATIO:
1& 2) No, acdg to Art 124 FC, the law requires that the disposition of a conjugal
1. as to judicial appointment as administratrix of the CP or ACP arising property by the H as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent
from her marriage to Alberto…Imelda is a stranger to such cause of of the W. Otherwise, the disposition is void. Even though W Norma was aware of
action since A128 of FC refers only to sps with regards to compliance and participated in the negotiations for the sale, mere awareness of a transaction is
with marital obligations, petitions for judicial separation or property or not consent and her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
for appointment as administratrix 3) No, because acdg to the same law, court authorization is only resorted to in
2. as to accounting, which is an incident of marriage cases where the sp who does not give consent is incapacitated. Petitioner failed to
3. as to forfeiture of Alberto’s share in co-owned property acquired during allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to
illicit relationship with Imelda…the issue is whether there is basis in the contracts. In the absence of such, court authorization cannot be sought.
law for forfeiture of Alberto’s share
4. as to seeking support, which can’t be sought from stranger Princesita, Federico and Willie SANTERO, petitioners vs. CFI OF CAVITE,
5. as to moral damages Anselma Diaz, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, Miguel all surnamed Santero &
Reynaldo Evaristo, in his capacity as administrator of the Intestate Estate
WON Imelda’s inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for of Pablo Santero, respondents
complete adjudication of the controversy Petition for certiorari to review CFI Cavite judgment [Sept. 14, 1987]

NO. she isn’t a real party-in-interest; there can be a final determination of Facts:
action even without her inclusion. A judgement in favor of Angelina would • Pablo Santero – only legitimate son of Pascual Santero (died 1970) & Simona
be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto. Moreover, complete Pamuti vda de Santero (died 1976). He died in 1973.
relief will be granted to Angelina even without the inclusion of Imelda. See • Petitioners are children of late Pablo & Felixberta Pacursa.
page 584. • Priv respondents (Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina & Miguel) are 4 of 7 children of
Pablo & Anselma Diaz.
HMPH! Dapat concubinage kasi kinaso niya. • Pablo married neither Felixberta nor Anselma.
• Priv respondents filed a Motion for Allowance before CFI. CFI decided in their
Thelma Jader-Manalo v. sps Norma & Edilberto Camaisa (2002) favor granting such motion.
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA 1. Priv respondents claim that allowance is support for educational expenses,
clothing & medical necessities. Anselma Diaz, guardian-movant of children,
FACTS: claimed that similar motion was granted last year.
→ April 1992: Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo came across respondent sps’ ad in 2. Petitioners/oppositors: Wards are no longer schooling & they have reached
Bulletin Today selling their 10-door apartment in Mkt and another property in age of majority. Also, they claim that administrator doesn’t have sufficient
Taytay, Rizal. funds to cover said allowance because current funds are held in trust for
→ Interested in both properties, petitioner negotiated for its purchase through the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of Kawit prop fr w/c
sps’ real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno. administrator derives income of Pablo’s intestate estate.
→ After a visual inspection of the lots, petitioner met w/ both the sps and made a 3. Anselma: some of her children are not in school precisely because they
don’t have funds to finance such. They’ll e enrolled as soon as they get the
definite offer to buy the properties. allowance. She cited:
a. CC Art. 290: Support is for substance, dwelling, clothing & medical
attendance accdg to social position of family. It also includes education Garcia vs. Manzano
until person entitled to support completes education/training even
beyond age of majority.
b. Sec. 3, Rule 83, Rules of Court: Widow & minor or incapacitated Partosa-Jo vs Court of Appeals [December 18, 1992]
children of deceased are entitled to allowances upon settlement of Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
estate as may be determined by court.
CFI further ruled that Pablo’s estate is quite big & allowances would be Facts:
insignificant & can be easily replaced fr gen funds. Children are granted P2k  Jose Jo cohabitated with three women and he fathered 15 children. The
allowance each for tuition, clothing materials & subsistence. Petitioner in thus case claims to be the legal wife (Prima) and they a daughter
• March 25, 1985: another Motion for Allowance was filed by priv respondents for named Monina Jo.
inclusion of Juanita, Estelita, & Pedrito Santero (remaining 3 children of Pablo &  Prima claims that when she left Dumaguete City it was their agreement that
Anselma) in grant of allowance. CFI granted such. Anselma explained that 3, she was temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
even if they’re of age already, are still entitled to receive allowance as advance pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support her.
payment of their shares in inheritance of Pablo under Art. 188 of New CC1.  1980 – Prima filed an action for judicial separation of conjugal property and this
• Petitioners opposed motion. CFI ordered estate administrator to get back was consolidated with her earlier petition for support.
allowance of 3 additional children based on petitioners’ Urgent Motion to Direct  In the disposition of the trial court it was held that Prima was legally married to
Administrator to Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to Movants. Jose Jo and therefore entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife and Jose
• Among petitioners’ contentions: children have attained majority, 2 are gainfully Jo was ordered to give a monthly support of 500. There was no definite
employed, 1 married thus no longer covered under Sec. 3, Rule 83, Rules of disposition as to the judicial separation of conjugal property.
Court. They also claim that wards are no longer under guardianship &  The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Trial Court but the complaint
respondents misrepresented part re school materials & fees. Issue of for the judicial separation of conjugal properties was dismissed for lack of cause
insufficient funds was also raised. of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Art.
178 of the CC.
Issues & Ratio:  The penultimate paragraph of the decision provides: It is, therefore, hereby
1. WON priv respondents are entitled to the allowance. - YES ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the
• Pursuant to CC Arts. 188 & 290 and not Rules of Court, Rule 83, Sec. 3. CC is a defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Art. 178, third
substantive law that can’t be impaired by a procedural rule like the Rules of paragraph of the CC, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated
Court. herein.
• CC Art. 188 makes no distinction w/regards minor or incapacitated children
unlike Rules of Court. Thus, fact that some children have already reached Issue: WON the conjugal properties of Prima and Jose can be judicial separation of
majority or married is immaterial. their conjugal properties is allowed under Art. 175, 178 and 191 of the CC.
• Allowance will be considered as advances fr their shares in inheritance from
dad. Held: yes
• Note that spouse contemplated in Art. 188 is only the legitimate spouse & not
common-law spouses who are mom of children here. (Anselma not entitled to Ratio:
support)  The dispositive portion of the decision was incomplete insofar as it carried no
ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property although it
2. WON priv respondents are entitled to allowance from intestate estates was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.
of Pablo’s parents - NO  The penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial court ruling should have
They’re only entitled to estate of their dad, Pablo. New CC Art. 992 states that been embodied in the dispositive portion.
illegitimate child has no rt to inherit ab intestato fr legit children & relatives of  The ruling of the CA that an agreement to live separately without just cause
dad/mom & vice-versa. Settled in Diaz vs. Felisa Pamuti-Jardin. was void under Art. 221 of the CC and could not sustain any claim of
abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. The only remedy available was that of
3. WON motion was granted by CFI w/o hearing - NO legal separation.
Notice of Hearing was issued & there’s even proof that petitioners’ lawyers received  Petitioner contends that it was never their agreement to live separate
such. Lawyer even filed an opposition. Besides, allowances have been granted for 8 permanently.
yrs now.  1942 – Prima returned to Dumaguete City but she was not accepted by her
husband.
Held: Petition dismissed. CFI decision affirmed.  Art. 178 of the CC provides that: The separation in fact between the husband
and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership,
1
Art. 188, New CC – Support shall be given to surviving spouse & children from common mass of prop except that: (3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for
upon liquidation of inventoried prop & until what belongs to him is delivered; but from this shall be at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or
deducted amt received for support w/c exceeds fruits/rents pertaining to them.
administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or separation of Abandonment contemplated by the law must be of physical estrangement,
property. moral and FINANCIAL desertion. Reading from how word abandonment was
 This provision was superseded by Art. 128 of the Family Code which states used in A178 as well as Gay v State, for a desertion of one sps to
that: If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with constutute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital
his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court relations and duties and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To
for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the abandon is to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such giving up absolutely and with intent never again to resume or claim one’s
precautionary conditions as the court may impose. rights or interests.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to
marital, parental or property relations. Not only has the H been supporting the education of their children, he has
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the been sending her financial allowance of at least P500 (actually, they get
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the 1200-1500 from him, as testified to by H’s general manager) so she could
conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same play mahjong.
period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling Since separation in fact between H and W do not affect the CP except if the
 In the FC the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation: H abandoned his wife without just cause, (A178, CC)..claims of the W of
o Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause concubinage on part of H must be regarded as efforts at bolstering her
o Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family claim of abandonment which shall justify, under the law, a judicial
without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse. separation of C assets. There is no strong corroborated evidence that
 Abandonment – departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to demonstrates the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and
return, followed by a prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the defendant.
meantime providing in the least for one’s family although able to do so.
 Physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by Jose to give He also hasn’t been mismanaging funds. Au contraire, he has increased the
support sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial value of their assets by over a million pesos.
separation of their conjugal property.
 The FC allows sjudicial separation of property when the spouses have been 2WON H’s failure and/or refusal to inform W of the satate of their business is an
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. abuse of his powers of admin’n of the CP as to warrant a division of
matrimonial assets
Estrella dla Crz, plaintiff-appellee v Severino dla Crz, defendant-appellant NO. for abuse to exist, there must be an act willfully performed and with
utter disregard by one sps that would be prejudicial to W.
Estrella and Sev are married w/ six children. They acquired seven parcels of land at
Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels at Silay Cadastre. These are all registered in COURT says they’re not condoning the husband’s separation from his W. What
their names. They are also engaged in various business ventures. they’re saying is that there is an insufficiency or absence of cause of action.
Remedies of A167 and 178 are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must exercise
Petitioner’s claims: restraint since they’re trying to preserve union of sps: a judgement ordering a
In 1949, W already suspected that H was sleeping around. It was only confirmed by separation of assets where there’s no real abandonment may eradicate the
a note she found in his shirt in 1951. She had confronted him about it and he possibility of reconciliation.
promised her to forsake his mistress. Well, he didn’t. Since 1955, he hasn’t slept in Alimony increased from 2000 to 3000. Attorney’s fees must also be born by
conjugal dwelling. He has been luiving in Mnla but has returned to Bacolod defendant since he left the conjugal abode and has given casue for plaintiff to seek
occasionally. After 1955 until the time of thr trial, he had never visited the conjugal redress in courts.
abode and denied W communication with himself. He lived with Nenita Hernandez,
his concubine in Mnla.

She prays for separation of property, monthly support and payment of attorney’s
fees but doesn’t ask for legal separation. Hahaahah

RTC ordered separatn and divisn of C assets (valued at 500, 000), directing the H to
pay to W 20, 000 as attorney’s fees, with legal interest form date of original
complaint (July 22, 1958) until fully paid plus costs.

WON separation of H from W constitute abandonment in law that would justify
the separation of CPP
NO.