You are on page 1of 7

In the Matter of the Voluntary Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Sps Carmen San Jose-Lacson, plaintiff-appellant vs.

Alfonso Lacson, defendant-
Bernas appellee
Appeal from a decision of CFI Zamboanga (1965) Alfonso Lacson, petitioner-appellee vs. Carmen San Jose-Lacson,
petitioner-appellant
FACTS: Appeal by certiorari fr. CA decision & resolution. 3 cases consolidated & decided on
In May 1962, petitioner-sps Jose Bermas, Sr. & Pilar Manuel Bermas executed an Aug. 30, 1968.
Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership & Sep of Property, after mutually
agreeing to dissolve such. It states that they are and have been legally married Facts:
since Dec 24, 1932, w/ 2children, both of age and married. During their marriage, • Feb. 14, 1953: Alfonso & Carmen were married. They had 4 children.
they acquired 12 parcels of land and 2 bldgs. The purpose of this Agreement is to • Jan. 9, 1963: Carmen left their conjugal home in Sta. Clara Subd., Bacolod to
prevent friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in the future, reside in Manila.
particulary because petitioner H Jose has 2 sets of children: 1 by former marriage, • March 12, 1963: Carmen filed w/Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (JDRC)
another by his present W. The result of this agreement/contract concerns the for custody of all children & demanded support for them & herself. Sps reached
income derived from rentals and quitclaim that any property acquired by any or an amicable settlement.
both of the parties shall pertain to him or her exclusively, or to both as co-owners,
as the case may be. • Apr. 27, 1963: CFI approved compromise judgment filed by sps in a joint
petition stipulating that they have separated & that they mutually agreed upon
The petition was filed in June stating the above mentioned facts and that this dissolution of CP subj to judicial approval pursuant to CC Art.191. Terms of the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage is allowed, mutual agreement are as follows:
under Art 191 of CC, subject to judicial approval. Moreover, the sps have no 1. Carmen waived any claims for share in prop held by Alfonso since they
outstanding debts/obligs and the sep of properties would not prejudice any creditor didn’t acquire prop of any consequence
or 3rd persons. Hearing was set in July and notice to that effect was published in a 2. After dissolution, they will own, dispose of, possess, administer & enjoy
newspaper of gen circulation in Zamboanga City once a wk, for 3 consecutive wks. separate estates & earnings from any profession, business or industry as
they may acquire w/o consent of the other.
However, after the hearing, the court denied the petition on the ground that under 3. Two elder kids, Enrique & Teresa, will stay w/dad while two younger,
CC Art 192, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once legal separation has Gerrard & Ramon, will stay w/Mom.
been ordered and exceptions, under Art 191, are civil interdiction, declaration of 4. Alfonso to provide Carmen w/monthly allowance of P300.00 for support of
absence or abandonment. And upon approval of the petition for dissolution, the kids in her custody.
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third 5. Sps will have reciprocal rts of visitation. Exchange custodies during
persons. summer vacation. Except that for 1963 summer, all 4 kids will stay w/Mom
& elder 2 will be returned to dad on June 15, 1963.
ISSUE: 6. They have no creditors.
WON conjugal partnership may be dissolved w/o notification of children of the • May 7, 1963: Carmen filed in JDRC motion stating that she entered into Joint
parties’ previous marriages Petition as only means to have immediate custody of minor children all below 7.
She prayed for relief fr agreement re custody & visitation. She likewise prayed
HELD: No, in a proceeding for dissolution of a conjugal partnership under Art 191 that her custody of children be confirmed pendente lite. Alfonso opposed &
CC, it is essential that children of previous marriages shall be personally notified of moved for dismissal of petition ongroudns of res judicata (thing/matter settled
said proceeding. by judgment) & lis pendens (pending suit). JDRC dismissed case sustaining
Alfonso’s grounds. Raised to CA w/c certified such to SC since only ques of law
In this case, the names and addresses of children by previous marriage of Jose is involved.
Bermas, Sr. have not been given and it appears that they have not been notified • May 15, 1963: Carmen filed MFR re compromise judgment invoking same
personally of the filing of the petition and of the date of its hearing even though the grounds as May 7 petition. Alfonso opposed & filed a motion for execution of
danger of substantial injury to their rights would seem to be remote. At any rate, compromise judgment & charge for contempt. CFI denied Carmen’s MFR &
the rights of the children by the 1st marriage are still affected in the event that when granted motion for execution and that Carmen may be held for contempt if she
there is doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between diff conjugal fails to deliver 2 elder children to Alfonso. Raised to CA w/c again certified case
partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property belonging to to SC.
the respective sps. • Carmen instituted certiorari proceeding before CA claiming that judge who
decided May 15 petition committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
Decision appealed set aside. Case remanded to lower court for further proceedings. execution of compromise judgment in effect depriving her rt to appeal. She
prayed for:
Alfonso LACSON, petitioner vs. Carmen SAN JOSE-LACSON & CA, 1. writ of prelim injunction to enjoin enforcement by contempt proceedings &
respondents other means, the writ of execution.
2. setting aside of compromise judgment after hearing.
3. awarding custody of 2 elder kids to her. rely on compromise judgment in determining fitness of each parent to be
custodian of children. Besides, Enrique (11), since he’s now over 10, should be
CA granted prayer #1. Alfonso filed an urgent motion for dissolution of prelim given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with (Sec. 6, Rule 99, Rules of
injunction. Denied. After hearing, CA granted petition for certiorari & declared Court).
null & void the compromise judgment re custody & rt of visitation & writ of • If any child will be finally awarded to mom, P150 monthly support is insufficient
execution. MFR of Alfonso, denied. Alfonso appealed to SC. considering that prices of commodities & services have increased & kids are
now of school age. CFI may increase such amount accdg to need of each child.
Issue & Ratio:
WON compromise agreement is in accordance w/law. Held: Decision remanded to CFI for further proceedings.
YES with respect to sep of prop & dissolution of conjugal partnership.
• Sep of prop (CC Art. 190) & dissolution of CP (CC Art. 191) are allowed YAPTINCHAY v. TORRES
provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Sps conformed w/such & they 28 SCRA 489 (1969)
don’t appear to have creditors either. They’ve been separated-in-fact for at
least 5 yrs & it’s but proper to sever their financial & proprietary interests. Facts: Teresita Yaptinchay (petitioner) asked the Pasay City, Rizal, CFI to appoint
Court can’t force them to live w/each other & render conjugal rts to the other her, first, as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate
(Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo). of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965 alleging that:
• But in approving sep of prop & dissolution of CP, does not mean that Court o Isidro had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife
recognizes nor legalizes de facto sep. It’s abnormal & fraught w/grave danger for 19 yrs (‘46-64—Taft Ave., Pasay City, and ’64-’65—Russel Ave., Pasay City)
to all concerned (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo). H & W are obliged to live o Isidro died without a will and left an estate in Philippines, HK and other places
together, observe mutual respect & fidelity & render mutual help & support (CC with estimated value of about P500K;
Art. 109). There’s virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married couples o Isidro left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary and Asuncion
to abandon each other merely due to whims & caprices. Gen. happiness of o On July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences
married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they aforesaid personal properties belonging to Isidro together with others
must live together, they become good h & w from necessity of remaining such. exclusively owned by Teresita.
Necessity is a powerful master in teaching duties w/c it imposes. (Arroyo vs. CFI granted such appointment while Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate
Vasquez de Arroyo). wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased opposed saying
NO with respect to custody & support of children. that Teresita, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the
• All children, including the Enrique & Teresa, were below 7 then. proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure
• CC Art. 353 specifically commands that no mom shall be separated fr her child appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with
under 7 yrs of age unless court finds compelling reasons for such measure. the deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as
• Ratio for Art 353: avoid tragedy where mom has seen her baby torn away fr administratrix for want of integrity. Also, oppositors counter-petitioned for the
her. Compelling reasons must be rare if mom’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If appointment of Virginia, as special administratrix and of Josefina, as regular
mom has erred such as in adultery, imprisonment & divorce will be sufficient administratrix.
punishment. Her moral deriliction won’t affect the baby who has yet to
understand situation (Report of Code Commission). After the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-petitioners' prayer
• Provision is mandatory and the compromise judgment by separating 2 elder and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix who subsequently submitted
children who were below 7 fr their mom was null & void for violating the a preliminary inventory of the assets of the estate of the deceased which included a
provision. house in North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal.
• No compelling reason was given for taking away 2 children fr Carmen. CFI
decision on MFR re compromise judgment only presented a mere hint. Courts This time, Teresita filed in another branch (Pasig Branch) of the Rizal, CFI an action
can’t proceed on mere insinuations. for replevin and preliminary injunction for liquidation of the partnership
• Enrique & Maria are now above 7, thus issue re awarding their custody to mom supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro and for
has become moot & academic. But, Court should still uphold their agreement re damages. Respondent judge Torres ordered issued a temporary restraining order
custody. Art. 356 of CC provides that every child is entitled to: that Virginia et. al. and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in
1. parental care the complaint and from interfering with Teresita’s rights to, and possession over the
2. receive at least elementary education house now standing at North Forbes Park.
3. moral & civic training by parents/guardians
4. rt to live in atmosphere conducive to his phys, moral & intellectual dev’t. Virginia et al opposed, on the grounds that:
o exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased was
Child’s welfare should not be subject to parents’ say-so or mutual agreement already vested in the Pasay City, CFI Branch
alone. Court should ascertain in whose custody the child can better be assured o the present liquidation case was filed to oust said probate court of jurisdiction
the rts granted by law. Evidence should be presented & court should not merely over the properties enumerated in this 2nd case
o Teresita was not entitled to the remedy of injunction prayed for, her their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
alleged right sought to be protected thereby being doubtful and still in dispute. co-ownership." But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil
Virginia et. al thus prayed the Teresita and all others in her behalf be made to cease relationship envisaged in Art. 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of
and desist from disturbing Virginia’s possession of the North Forbes Park house and which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to
to order removal from the house of the employees employed by Teresita, to keep accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner
Teresita et. al. from entering the house and any other real property registered in had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property
Isidro’s name and from interfering with or from disturbing the exercise by of involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests
Virginia’s rights and powers of administration over the assets registered in the name in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that
of Isidro and/or in the latter's possession at the time of his death. would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the
existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting.
The Court granted Virginia’s prayers considering the Forbes Park property is really Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to
under the responsibility of Virginia as the appointed Special Administratrix of the enforce an abstract right.
estate of the deceased Isidro. This was amended adding that Virginia et. al are
enjoined from selling, disposing or otherwise encumbering said property in any Juaniza vs. Jose [March 30, 1979]
manner whatsoever pending the termination of this case, considering that present Appeal from the decision of the COFI
case treats principally with the liquidation of an alleged partnership between the
Teresita and the deceased. Teresita’s MFR was denied hence this petition Facts:
Issues: WON preliminary injunction may be granted (in relation to Teresita’s  Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney
prayers) that was involved in an accident with a freight train. Jose is legally married to
Held: NO. Petition dismissed and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dissolved Socorro Ramos but for the past 16 years he has been cohabitating with Rosalia
and set aside. Arroyo.
 Injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of  COFI ordered Jose and Arroyo to jointly and severally pay Juaniza (plaintiff)
possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title 1,500 plus interest
thereto has not been clearly established. In the verified petition before this  A motion for reconsideration was filed by Arroyo praying that she should not be
Court, Teresita avers that construction of said North Forbes Park property was liable to pay for damages since the decision was based on the erroneous theory
undertaken jointly by her and deceased, Teresita even contributing her own that she was living together with Jose as husband and wife without the benefit
exclusive funds therefor. But in her amended complaint she had said that she of marriage , are co-owners of the jeepney. The motion was denied. The court
acquired through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as based their decision on Article 144 of the CC which provides that when a man
North Forbes Park house. Virginia et. al. dispute Teresita’s claim of complete or and a woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
even partial ownership of the house. Maintaining that construction of that house their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
was undertaken by the deceased without Teresita's intervention and with his both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
own personal funds. Note that it was only after hearing and considering the governed by the rules on co-ownership
evidence adduced and the fact that after the death of Isidro the Forbes Park
house was among the properties of the deceased placed under Virginia’s Issues:
administration that respondent judge issued the injunction order. Thus, 1. WON Article 144 of the CC is applicable where one of the parties in a common-
petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for below. law relationship is incapacitated to marry.
 Furthermore, grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound discretion of 2. WON Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held liable for
the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a damages with the registered owner.
clear case of abuse. Although Teresita’s presented loans that she had
contracted during the period when said house was under construction as proof Ratio
of ownership, evidence was wanting which would correlate such loans to the 1. No
construction work—the evidence, on the contrary were indicative that the loans  Co-ownership that is contemplated in Article 144 of the CC requires that a
she obtained from the bank were for purposes other than the construction of man and the woman living together must not be in any way incapacitated to
the home. Thus, the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is contract marriage.
petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima facie  Jose was legally married to Socorro and as such he was incapacitated to
presumption that house, having been constructed on Isidro’s lot (or of the contract marriage with Arroyo.
conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during his marriage with Josefina, is  Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney because it belongs to the
part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix. conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife.
RELEVANT PART: Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the 2. No
provisions of Art. 144, CC be decisive. Art. 144 says that: "When man and a woman Arroyo is not the registered owner of the jeepney cannot be liable for damages.
live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is Only the legal owner of a public service is responsible for damages that may arise
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through from consequences incident to its operation or maybe caused to any of the
passengers therein.
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila (1949)
Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS
Jose Consuegra contracted two marriages in his lifetime. FACTS:
Ist M with Rosario Diaz – two children: Jr. and Pedro (both predeceased their father) Cirila Layson de Tamboan and Emiliano Tambaoan have been married since Nov
2nd M with Basilia Berdin – seven children 1909. In 1941, H Emiliano left the conjugal dwelling and went to live w/ mistress,
now defendant, Mercedes by whom he begot 2 children. They lived together until
As a member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) the proceeds of Dec 1946.
his life insurance went to petitioner Berdin and their children as he had named them
his beneficiaries in the policy. He failed to designate who would receive his Cause of conflict: In May 1941, the rights of one Laureano Ferrer, as purchaser on
retirement insurance benefits though. As a result, his first W Rosario filed a claim monthly installment of lot No 6, Blk No 49 in Sta Mesa Heights Subdv. were
with GSIS asking that such should be paid to her as the only legal heir of transferred to Mercedes. In the Deed of Transfer, Emiliano signed for the transferee
Consuegra. Berdin and her children also asserted that being the beneficiaries named Mercedes. Later on, they built a residential hse on the lot w/ contractor Franscisco
in the life insurance policy, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement del Rosario. After the payment of the last installment, Deed of Sale was executed
insurance benefits. by Gregorio Araneta, Inc in favor of “Mercedes Oliquino, married to Emiliano
Tambaoan.”
GSIS resolved the conflict by ruling that the legal heir was his widow, Rosario Diaz,
who is entitled to ½ of the retirement benefits. One the other hand, his second wife In Dec 1946, Emiliano having become paralytic and unable to support his mistress,
Basilia as his widow should be entitled to the remaining ½. the latter separated from him. She filed a petition w/ CFI to change the status in
the above title from “married to Emiliano Tambaoan” to “single.” Emiliano opposed
Basilia Berdin, filed an action in the CFI as she was unsatisfied with the GSIS ruling. claiming to be the owner of the H&lot covered by the title. Court granted her
CFI ruled that when two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in petition.
holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of out wedlock will
be regarded as legitimate children and each family shall be entitled to ½ of the An action was instituted by legal W Cirila Layson v. mistress Mercedes and Emiliano
estate (LAO vs DEE TIM). CFI ruled the same way GSIS did. seeking that the properties (i.e. H&lot) be adjudged conjugal property of her and H,
and that defendant Mercedes be ordered to reconvey the same to the conjugal
Basillia and her children appeal. partnership. Lower court ruled in her favor. Defendant Mercedes brought this
appeal.
WON retirement insurance benefits should be awarded to the 1st or 2nd W.
ISSUES:
Half should be awarded to each of the spouses since the 2nd M was contracted in 1. WON subject property is owned by Mercedes or by Emiliano
good faith and since the 1st M’s conjugal partnership (since M wasn’t dissolved or 2. If owned by Emiliano, WON alienation as gift/present to Mercedes is legal
declared void) has not ceased or the 1st W lost her status as putative heir of her H.
Thus they are both entitled to a share in his estate upon their H’s death. Moreover, HELD:
with respect to the 2nd W, inasmuch as the CP formed by the 2nd M was dissolved Mercedes claims that it was through her and her sisters’ earnings as dressmakers
before judicial declaration of its nullity, the only just and equitable solution in this that they were able to buy a laundry business. And it is w/ this busi’s income of
case would be to recognize the right of the 2 nd W to her share of ½ in the property PhP50/mo that she was able to purchase the H&lot. The document of sale for the
acquired by her and her H and consider the other half as pertaining to the 1st CP. lot in question was stolen. She offers testimonies of her sister, Prima Oliquino, and
one Pedro Guerrero, who paid the fees of the contractor and carpenter.
Consuegra became part of the GSIS system around 1943. When Consuegra
designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance he could not have intended those Emiliano, for his part, claims that he purchased the lot directly from Laureano Ferrer
beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of his retirement who is his witness. He said that at that time, he was employed in the Hawaiian &
insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under the GSIS came Phils Assoc, a sugar corp, earning PhP1k/mo. He also had a transpo busi w/c he
about only when Com Act 186 was amended by RA 660 on 1951. derived another PhP1k/mo. Contractor Del Rosario, as his witness, further states
that indeed it was Emiliano who paid him the contract price and told him that he
Life insurance and retirement insurance are two distinct benefits separately and was buying the lot for his “querida.”
distinctly offered by GSIS. Retirement is primarily intended for the benefit of the ⇒ As between the 2 opposing versions supplied by oral evidence, the trial court
employee for his old age, incapacity, after rendering service in the govt for a gave more credence to Emiliano’s version for it is more consistent and natural.
required number of years. In cases like the one at bar, retirement benefits will It was given by witnesses Ferrer & Del Rosario who have no motives to distort
accrue to the estate of the employer and will be given to his legal heirs in the truth and who were directly involved in the purchase and construction. It
accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiaries are named. was not strange for a man like Emiliano, who had the meansfor it, to buy a lot
and construct a house for his mistress w/ whom he was living under the same
roof and by whom he begot 2 children.
Cirila Layson de Tamboan v. Mercedes Oliquino & Emiliano Tambaoan
⇒ Mercedes and her sisters have no sufficient income and it is doubtful that
Emiliano would let the appellant take the little earnings of her siblings to buy Issues & Ratio:
the H&lot where they would live. 1. WON marriage in military fashion is legal. – NO.
⇒ Hence, the H&lot are conjugal property. It is evident that it was granted by • Act No. 3613 w/c recognized military fashion marriages as legal was approved
way of a gift or present. However, such alienation, being in violation of CC and only on Dec. 4, 1929 & took effect 6 mos later, thus it can’t apply to a marriage
in fraud of the W, is illegal and shall not prejudice her and her heirs. that took place in 1903.
⇒ The gift is held invalid insofar as it prejudices the W. Pursuant to Art 1412 & • In 1903, Gen. Order No. 70 was the applicable law. It did not recognize
1419 CC, its nullity cannot be determined until after liquidation of CP and it is marriages in military fashion.
found to encroach upon the W’s portion in the partnership. • CFI & CA findings that marriage took place in 1919 will not be disturbed
⇒ This alienation should be declared illegal and noted/recorded in the register & in 2. WON properties in dispute are exclusive prop of Melbourne. – NO.
the cert of title of the defendant and appellant. Judgment modified. • Petitioners: even if acquired before marriage, prop are still conjugal because
they were acquired thru joint efforts & industry of sps. They suggest that
Maxey vs. CA [May 11, 1984] mom’s effort in performing her role as mother to them & wife to their dad were
Petition for certiorari to review CA decision more than sufficient contribution to constitute parcels of land in ques as
common prop acquired thru joint efforts. (True!)
Petitioners: Margaret Maxey asstd by Santiago Magbanua; Florence Maxey asstd by • CA: CC Art. 144 not applicable since codal provisions are non-retroactive where
Ofrecinio Santos; and Lucille Maxey vested rts may be prejudiced/impaired. The prop were not acquired thru joint
Respondents: Hon. CA & Sps Beato Macayra & Alacopue Monday. efforts. Joint efforts=monetary contribution (huh!). It further stated that
woman’s lifetime dedication to the mgt of the household goes unremunerated &
Facts: has no monetary value (grr..). It accepted respondents’ view that it was
• 1903: Melbourne Maxey, a mem of 1899 US occupation forces & later on held unlikely for Regina to contribute in acquisition of prop since she was jobless &
high pos in prov’l gov’t & in Phil pub school sys, lived together w/Regina she had no prop of her own unlike Melbourne who held pos of teacher, deputy
Morales (both deceased) in Davao. They lived as H & W & they had 6 kids gov, district supervisor & superintendent of schools.
among them are 3 petitioners. Kids claim they were married in a military • Code Commission comment re retroactivity: No retroactivity if vested rts will be
fashion in 1903. Such claim rejected by trial & appellate courts. impaired. Vested/acquired rts should be determined by courts as each
• 1911 & 1912: Melbourne acquired parcels of land, now in dispute particular issue is submitted by applying transitional provisions. In case of
• 1919: church marriage of Melbourne & Regina. Regina died subsequently. He doubt, Art. 9 governing silence/obscurity of law should be observed.
remarried, Julia Pamatluan Maxey. Determining in what cases the old CC should apply & in what cases new one
• 1953: Julia using a pow of attorney sold properties in favor of sps Beato & should be binding is left w/Court’s discretion. It’s likewise provided that newly
Alacopue who took possession of land continuously up to present. created rts will be applied retroactively since it’s the exercise of sovereign pow
• Jan. 26, 1962: petitioners instituted action for annulment of sale & for recovery of legislation. Such is called for by considerations of justice & pub policy. As
of possession claiming that properties were common prop of their parents long of course as it does not impair vested rts.
acquired during their lifetime thru joint effort & capital. They likewise claimed • Vested rts were not prejudiced in this case. Prior to CC effectivity on Aug. 30,
that sale was w/o their knowledge & consent. 1950, court has recognized rt to equal share in prop acquired during
• Respondents claim that they purchased land in good faith w/reasonable belief cohabitation thru joint efforts & industry of man & woman not legally married
that Melbourne was the real & exclusive owner. (Aznar v Garcia, Marata v Dionio, etc.) CC Art. 144 codified this law established
• RTC: declared sale as null & void and ordered respondents to return prop to by jud’l precedent w/modification that rules on co-ownership shall govern such
petitioners + rent since 1953. Decision was based on CC Art. 144 w/c provides properties, providing that prop acquired by either or both thru work/industry
that when a man & woman live together as h & w w/o marriage or if such is even if only man works shall be shared equally. This recognizes that it would be
void ab initio, properties acquired by either/both of them thru their work, unjust & abnormal if woman who’s a wife in all aspects of relationship except
industry or wages & salaries shall be governed by rules on co-ownership. It for req’t of valid marriage must abandon home & kids and neglect traditional
further stated that justice demands that wife be entitled to share of prop & not duties to earn a living or engage in business before rules on co-ownership
be considered as mere adornment/only for man’s comfort & passion (eww). would apply.
• CA reversed. Declared prop as Melbourne’s exclusively thus sale was valid & • CC provisions premised on traditional, existing, normal & customary gender
respondents are absolute owners. No proof that these were acquired thru their roles of Filipino men & women. Woman is the administrator & in-charge of
joint efforts & taking notice of fact that Melbourne was in a pos to purchase running of household. Lack marriage does not change nature of respective
prop by his own efforts, earnings w/o help of Regina. Gave credence to roles. It’s woman who traditionally holds family purse even if she doesn’t
testimony of Regina’s sis-in-law w/c stated that Regina had no prop of her own contribute to filling such w/funds.
& no source of income since she was unemployed. They demanded clear proof • Wife holds purse, husband hands over paychecks & gets allowance in return &
that Regina contributed to acquisition. Cited Aznar vs. Garcia. Evidence of both wife manages affairs of household. Best man is a woman as articulated by Gov
parties show that Melbourne acquired prop thru his own efforts & Regina had no Gen Leonard Wood. – Dean Irene Cortes Women’s Rts Under the New Consti,
means at all to contribute. Woman & the Law
• Yaptinchay vs. Torres: real contribution does not only include earnings from Held:
wife’s profession, occupation or business but also her contribution to family’s  No. Trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
material & spiritual goods thru caring for kids, administering household, cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
husbanding scarce resources, freeing husband from household tasks & cohabitation is governed either by the provisions of Art. 147 (a remake of Art.
performing traditional duties of housewife. (True! True!) 144, CC) or Art. 148, FC.
3. WON Art. 144 CC is applicable. – YES.  The particular kind of co-ownership in Art. 147 applies when a man and a
• No showing that vested rts would be impaired/prejudiced. woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
• Vested rt: prop w/c has become fixed & established & is no longer open to together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
doubt/controversy. It’s an immediately fixed rt of present/future enjoyment as marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision refers to the legal capacity of
distinguished fr expectant/contingent rt (Bright Consolidated Mining Co. vs. a party to contract marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by
Pineda). both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
• Alleged exclusive rt of Melbourne is not vested since it stood against concurrent equal co-ownership.
rt of Regina or her heirs to a share thereof. Prop were sold in 1953 when CC  Art. 147 has clarified Art. 144, CC and now expressly provides that:
was in effect. o Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in
• Buyers don’t have vested rts either since ½ of prop was still open to co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of
controversy on acct of legitimate claim of Regina to her share. cohabitation; and
Held: Petition granted. CA decision reversed & set aside insofar as ½ of prop is o In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her
concerned. Respondents ordered to return ½ of prop to heirs of Regina. Return of ½ share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default
of purchase price & payment of rents will be ruled out due to equitable thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share
considerations. shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default
thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
VALDES v. RTC termination of the cohabitation (Art. 147) or declaration of nullity of the
260 SCRA 221 (1998) marriage (Arts 43, 50, 51, FC).

Facts:  When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
 Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on Jan. 5, 1971 when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only
 In 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage in the Quezon the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
City RTC, pursuant to Art. 36, FC (mutual psychological incapacity to comply money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
with their essential marital obligations) which the trial court granted. their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
 Ex-spouses were directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is
common properties as defined by Art. 147, FC, and to comply with the married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
provisions of Art. 50-52, FC, within 30 days from notice of this decision. partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the
 Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the direction of compliance with Arts. party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
50-52 asserting that the FC contained no provisions on the procedure for the share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."  The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or
 Trial court thus clarified that considering that Art. 147 explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and
the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, ex-spouses law spouses.
will own their family home and all their properties for that matter in equal  In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
shares. coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
 In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the ex- voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-
spouses, the provisions on ownership found in the CC shall apply. And on the law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case,
issue of disposing the family dwelling, considering that this Court has already the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code
declared the marriage as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
ownership and provisions of Arts. 102 and 129 of the FC finds no application. spouses.
Petitioner’s MFR was denied and in his recourse to the SC, he submits that Art. Note: Might wanna check out difference bet. Art. 147 and 144, p. 228.
50-52 should be controlling
Carino vs. Carino [February 2, 2001]
Issue: WON provisions Arr. 50-52 are controlling Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
 SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted two marriages the first was on June 20 1969 marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
with Susan Nicdao with whom he had two children. The second was on certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.
November 10, 1992 with Susan Yee.  Presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao was sufficiently overcome
 November 23, 1992 – he passed away under the care of Susan Yee. She paid
for medical and burial expense.
 Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be
a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
 Yee and Nicdao both filed claims for monetary benefits and financial. Nicdao
before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCIU, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and
marriage would also be void. The nullity of the marriage of Nicdao with the
Pag-ibig. Yee was able to collect P21,000 from GSIS Life, GSIS burial, SSS
deceased does not validate the marriage of Yee because their marriage was
burial
solemnized without a judicial decree declaring the 1st marriage void.
 December 14, 1993 – Yee filed a case for collection of sum of money against  Two marriages are void and as such the applicable property regime is
Nicdao praying that the latter be ordered to return to her at least one-half of governed by provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
denominated as “death benefits”  Article 148 of the Family Code refers to the property regime of bigamous
 Nicdao failed to file her answer and the trial court declared her in default. marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
 Yee admitted that relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons,
i. her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and multiple alliances of the same married man – Only the properties acquired by
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
between petitioner and the deceased or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
ii. She claims that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that respective contributions
she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met  Actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Contributions
iii. She contends that the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void an in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
initio because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. inspiration, are excluded in this regime
The marriage certificate bears no marriage license number and she  Marriage of Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage and as such article
presented a certification dated Marc 9, 1994 from the Local Civil Registrar 148 of the FC is applicable.
that states that no record of marriage license of the deceased and Nicdao.  The P146,000 are renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental
 Trial court ruled in favor of Yee agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. It could not be said that
 Nicdao filed an appeal with the CoA but the decision of the trial court was Yee contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the
affirmed. monetary benefits
 Intestate succession the death benefits shall pass to his legal heirs.
Issues: 2.
1. WON article 148 is applicable to the marriage of the deceased with Yee. YES  Article 147 of the Family Code governs unions of parties who are legally
2. WON article 147 is applicable to the marriage of the deceased with Nicdao. YES capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a
Ratio: marriage license
1.  Under Article 147 wages and salaries earned by either party during the
 Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the
declaring such previous marriage void. other did not contribute thereto.
 For purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare  Wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
a marriage an absolute nullity. owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between
them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
 Under the CC valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
contribute thereto
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio.
 The marriage of Nicdao and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such