Failure Analysis Associates

Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007

Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007

Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577

Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618

June 8, 2007

Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806

June 8, 2007

Contents
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii

Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope

3

Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background

SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806

1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii SF36292.9 6 Conclusions Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions Construction-Related Risks 5.5 3.3 4.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.6 3.1 Background 5.1 5.4 5.8. 2007 3.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.1 Design Background 4.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.2.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks 5.7 3.2 5.2 3.8.1 General Review 4.2.8.2.4 3.6 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 .8 4 First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions 8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56 Design-Related Risks 4.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.June 8.5 5.3 5.3 3.

2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.2 10.4 8 Conclusions Seismic-Related Risks 8.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks SF36292.3. 2007 6.1 9.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7.003 A0F0 0607 0806 iv .3.2 9.3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8.3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.3.3.2 General Findings 57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95 6.1 Background 7.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines 8.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions 10 Summary and Conclusions 10.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks 7.3.June 8.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7.3.1 8.1 10.1 7.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 8.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.3.3.4 9 Conclusions Scour-Related Risks 9.3 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.4 6.

1 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806 v .4 10.4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe SF36292.3 11.6 10.5 10.June 8.2 11.7 11 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary 96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101 Recommendations 11. 2007 10.

Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. at KP 200+700. 2006. 2007 List of Figures Page Figure 1. 2 Figure 2. at KP 8+850. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. Photograph taken on September 11. 2006. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. General area of first spill incident. General area of the third spill incident. at KP 200+700. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. Photographs taken on June 13. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). General area of site of first spill incident. looking downstream. Photographs taken on June 14. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. 11 Figure 3. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. and September 19. Bottom: View looking upstream. Location of second spill incident. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vi . 2006. during ROW stabilization work. 2006. Figure 5. 12 13 Figure 4. 19 20 Figure 8. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Figure 9. 2006. Photographs taken on June 14. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface. at KP 222+500. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. Site of fourth spill incident. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. during permanent pipeline repair work. 16 Figure 7. 23 SF36292. 2006. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. 15 Figure 6.June 8. at KP 8+850. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. Photographs taken on June 12. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). during stabilization work.

with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. Figure 22. Figure 13.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vii . with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. Figure 11. Figure 14. Figure 12. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. Risk by sectors for October 2006. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Figure 27. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. Change in risk from May to October 2006. Figure 17. Figure 21. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. during stabilization work. 24 26 28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81 SF36292. Figure 19. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. Washington State University website). Risk assessment results for September 2006. Figure 26. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. Risk assessment results for October 2006. 2007 Figure 10. Figure 23. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. Figure 24. Figure 25. White arrows identify the narrow. 2006. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW.June 8. Figure 15. at KP 125+950. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Photographs taken on June 13. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Risk by sectors for May 2006. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Figure 18. Figure 16. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Risk assessment results for May 2006. at an amplification of 14×. General area of the fifth spill incident. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Figure 20. Each zone is numbered. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident.

June 8. Figure 30. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. Silva. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). Peru. Figure 29. and Tavera 2003). Lima. 82 90 92 SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 viii . 2007. 2007 Figure 28.

Table 2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 ix .June 8. 2007 List of Tables Page Table 1. Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62 SF36292.

June 8.S.003 A0F0 0607 0806 x . SF36292.A. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.A. 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc. Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No.C. 2007 Acronyms and Abbreviations ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U. Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S.

using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System. wholly or in part. 2007 Limitations At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. Exponent has no direct knowledge of. SF36292.June 8. by changes that are beyond our control. In addition. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. the findings of this report may be invalidated. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events. Accordingly. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xi . such as rains and landslides or human activities. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report. ground stability. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review. The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties. Accordingly. and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections. and engineering analysis. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment. Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas. or the condition of concealed construction. document review. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions.

the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xii . The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1. During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity. (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. 2007 Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system). climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. SF36292. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. commencing in April 2006. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long.1 Along this route. This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.June 8. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents. during the first 19 months of operation. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean.800 m. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. at the southern edge of Lima. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. 1 True length of pipeline.A.

pipeline design. As part of that study. 2007. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. 2) evaluating the SF36292. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. and ongoing operation. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiii . The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. Specifically. pipeline maintenance. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. and commercial operation began in August 2004. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. 2007 and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. the mechanical design. primarily the NGL. All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. pipeline construction. and one in the sierra sector. where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1.June 8. In contrast. TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. Recently. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. Construction of the pipelines started in 2002.

Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. construction. under construction. operations. service providers. hydrological studies. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. construction specifications. In some cases. construction. river-crossing studies. and operational data. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. pipe material data. SF36292. operation. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. construction progress surveys. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. 2 Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program. These documents included engineering specifications.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiv . and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated. 2007 effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. or had been completed. seismic studies.June 8. and maintenance of the system. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. Finally. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. pipeline design drawings and calculations. geotechnical and geological studies. In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. operators.

003 A0F0 0607 0806 xv . to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. In the incident at KP 8+850. At both of these locations. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures. 3 4 A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure. the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. In the incident at KP 125+950. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed. respectively. While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW. In both cases. SF36292. located at KP 222+500. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe. This is a rather deep crack. 2007 Spill Incidents Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding).3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. Hence. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed.June 8. The second incident.

Indeed.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvi . Again. In this report. Finally. the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. In this context. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk. For the fourth incident. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated. 2007 the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide.June 8. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding. and/or monitored. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality. Risk Identification The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures. located at KP 50+900. during our study. For purposes of this report. we identified four SF36292. Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify. risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. The NG pipe at this location was not damaged. controlled. eliminate if appropriate.

5 mechanical pipe integrity. on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline. Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline. 2007 primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. Furthermore. Due to their importance. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity. typically when saturated. 5 For the purposes of this report. seismic events. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline.June 8. Design-Related Risks The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). to varying degrees. whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvii . Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. SF36292. and river scouring. and scour. However. In summary. although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below.6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. poor foundation (ground) conditions. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system. seismic events. Risk Evaluation The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow.

Construction-Related Risks The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW. and ASME B31. such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard. all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion. SF36292.e. each of which is up to 12 meters long. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. using more than 100.June 8. where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation. 2007 Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. Brazil.. government mandated corridor. hydraulic risk). and Buenos Aires. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains.000 individual pipes. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide. Subsequently. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba. Argentina.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xviii . SP.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system. Therefore. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had 6 7 ASME B31. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines.

the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road. The more then 100. Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. and the work was inspected by outside consultants. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers. To minimize environmental impact. Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain. where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. SF36292. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xix . would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice. Next.June 8. 2007 to be granted by the Peruvian government. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines. and potential damage to the pipe exterior.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and 8 Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays. at river crossings. and along rivers and drainages. the pipe was strung out. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section. Overall.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later. trench conditions. The ROW was cleared and cut. Within the 3-km-wide corridor. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes.

external damage during construction in two cases. long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case. The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours. initiating the subsequent spill incident. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure. 2007 detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. During the hydrostatic testing. Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. This situation arose with the second spill incident. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. especially considering the challenging terrain.June 8. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). In this program. where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard. which may be similar to other pipelines in the world.250 km of pipeline is a low number. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). Overall. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. Despite the above-described actions.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xx . in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test. eight leaks were identified. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing SF36292. All these failures were subsequently repaired. This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. Next. Eight failures in more than 1.000 girth welds. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk. a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases.

and data on movement characteristics. addressed. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. 2007 geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques. the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard. To date. and engineering experience.. Further. some on both occasions. piezometer. Exponent observed over 50 sites. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented. strain gauge.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxi . This system was validated using information from our field inspections. Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust. As early as April 2006. and controlled in this ongoing process. Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. At the end of 2006.g. slope inclinometer. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline. During the second phase of our project. representing SF36292. observations. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced. While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area. instrumentation (e. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure. Based on our review. As a result of these efforts. survey control. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure. In more critical areas. to permit more expeditious.June 8. reliable repairs. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability.

In this regard. and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk. between KP 0 and KP 220. The core of this program involves regular visual inspections. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas. with solely the site at KP 108. the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW. adjacent to the second pump station. including during the rainy season. SF36292. 2007 locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement. reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. Thus. The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time. Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. We expect that the continuous. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment.” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites. Therefore. It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007.June 8. being now ranked as “very high. while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW).003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxii .

which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. it is susceptible to this external failure mode. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. per requirements by API 1160 xxiii SF36292. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement. Second. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk. and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. 2007 decision process.June 8. weld quality. while sufficient for internal pressures. As discussed above.003 A0F0 0607 0806 . will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further. Thus. during construction. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. and manner of execution. First. all the welds were x-rayed. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. To mitigate the residual risk. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects. At this time. reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies.

Results of the MFL inspection tool. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. In addition. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxiv . which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. SF36292. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. In this regard. 2007 and DOT9 195.June 8. if required. even though the technology to do so appears to be available. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features. However. have shown that. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project. currently.10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool. At present. Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the 9 Department of Transportation of the United States of America. Overall in 2006. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program. TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools.

and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. For cracks with a smaller crack opening. landslides. TgP will evaluate potential options. the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e. liquefaction. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva.g. Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities. and pressure reducing stations. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. 10 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. slope instability. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector. sierra.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxv . 2007 relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads.. Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system. Additionally. SF36292. Seismic-Related Risks The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty.June 8. pressure control stations. as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks.

poor foundation (soil) conditions. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer. However. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18). In addition. HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law. the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings. Despite not being required. Future Activities Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. and mechanical pipe integrity. pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical. considered to be the most significant. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvi . seismic events. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk. 2007 Scour-Related Risks Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. However. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks.June 8. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. Therefore. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline. In addition to the mentioned studies. in the opinion of SF36292. with little warning and serious consequences. and river scouring as secondary risks.

June 8. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and. in particular wave propagation. However. 2007 Exponent. permanent ground deformations. 3) reconsideration of seismic risk. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. resulting from strong ground shaking. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. In this context. based on the results. excluding fault rupture. #4. and thus. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvii . SF36292. and #5. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues.

which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. follows a 3-km–wide. 11 True length of pipeline. and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches.11 Along this route. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0.219 and 0. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. on the coast of Peru south of Lima.469 inch. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer.A. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002.800 m. (TgP). Within this 3-km-wide corridor.1 Description of the System The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0. SF36292. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast. and the 200-km-long costa sector. at the southern edge of Lima. the ~300-km-long sierra sector. 2007 1 Introduction 1..June 8. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. The alignment of the ROW. with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. which is shown on Figure 1. Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004.003 A0F0 0607 0806 1 . traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. government-mandated corridor. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline.406 and 1 inch.

June 8. The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco.003 A0F0 0607 0806 2 . Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required. 2007 The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves. Figure 1. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains. mostly at major river crossings. SF36292. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. On the west side of the Andes Mountains.

and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP. in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe. In this regard.2 Operational History Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. 2007 The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. seismic risk. and pipe-related risks of this system. The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld.003 A0F0 0607 0806 3 . The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system. SF36292. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident. 1. A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide. scour risk.June 8. located at KP 222+500. the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1). appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood.3 Report Organization This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components. our work focused on the NGL pipeline. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar. The second incident. 1. The fourth incident. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. located at a river crossing at KP 50+900.

and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5. pipe integrity risks. Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks.June 8. and scour risks at river crossings. SF36292. Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process. Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period.003 A0F0 0607 0806 4 . seismic risks. 2007 The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3. pipe manufacture. Issues related to pipe material.

Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking.June 8. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation. commencing in April 2006. 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards. 2007 2 Exponent’s Investigation 2. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents.2 Phases of Work Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations. During this investigation. 2. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program.003 A0F0 0607 0806 5 . geologic and SF36292. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. pipeline design. primarily the NGL. 4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards. 2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents. pipeline construction.1 Objective Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines.

In addition to these activities. Specifically. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. and ongoing operation. hydrological studies. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. operation. seismic studies. pipeline maintenance. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. and design of river crossings (scour analysis). Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. As part of that study. pipe material data. In some cases. geotechnical and geological studies. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100.000 girth weld radiographs. construction. pipeline design drawings and calculations. These inspections SF36292. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006.3 Scope In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis.. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. These documents included engineering specifications. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. construction progress surveys.June 8. 2. 2007 geotechnical hazard mitigation. river-crossing studies.003 A0F0 0607 0806 6 . mechanical design. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. and operational data. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. construction specifications.

These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents.June 8. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. were under construction. and maintenance of the system. 2007 occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. operation. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents. or had been completed.003 A0F0 0607 0806 7 . construction. service providers. where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. operators. SF36292. Finally.

This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004. GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system. and one in the sierra sector. with a slope profile of approximately 15%. 2004. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. 3. 2007 3 Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. and 12 13 14 15 Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. In contrast. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 8 . 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.1 Background Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline.2 First Incident The first incident occurred on December 22. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m). Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP). in the jungle sector near KP 8+850. In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags. At the point of rupture. the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline. A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below.25 inch along this section of the system.June 8. The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents.

cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil.003 A0F0 0607 0806 9 . Exponent visited this site again on September 11.17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction. repairs. when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete. the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work. Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. but based on available information. 2006. visit. At the time of our June 12. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m. A substantial amount of overburden soil had been 16 17 Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil.June 8. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed. addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. 2007 revegetation with grass.” SF36292. Seven minutes after noting the anomaly. and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW. and by the ninth minute. 2006. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006). They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. Exponent inspected this site on June 12. and stabilization measures. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. 2006. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. During their site investigation. The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline.

Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features. whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline.18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW. inclinometers to detect soil movement. 2007 removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope.0 to 1.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 10 . 18 Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff. and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11. 2006. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level.5 m. SF36292. looking downstream. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement.

during ROW stabilization work. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). 2007 Figure 2. at KP 8+850. SF36292. 2006. General area of site of first spill incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806 11 .June 8. Photographs taken on June 12.

At the request of TgP. Photograph taken on September 11. at KP 8+850. General area of first spill incident. with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock. 2007 Figure 3. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced. The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock. with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps.003 A0F0 0607 0806 12 . Inc. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4).19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. 2006. with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface. as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces. Metallurgical Consultants Inc. as shown in Figure 4. Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically.June 8. 19 20 Metallurgical Consultants. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long). after stabilization work conducted in 2006. until the crack became critical. SF36292. is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory. looking downstream.

and MCI.June 8.3 Second Incident The second incident was discovered on August 29. occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500. 3. As shown in Figure 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 13 . Analyses done by GIE (GIE S.A. The incident. 2005.). 2007 Figure 4. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline. This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3. MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified. IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA). the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San 21 Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. approximately nine months after the first incident. SF36292. referred to as the Pacobamba failure. as well as our own investigation.950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley. Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured.

MCI analyzed. and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed. with initial participation of Exponent. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location. the pipeline was shut down.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0.219 inch. NGL pipeline excavation. MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline. TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline. the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site. At this location. On June 14.003 A0F0 0607 0806 14 . 2006. MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5. 2007 Antonio-Pacobamba Road. the removed fractured pipe section. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2. the field investigation. Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture. and at 20:04. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m. On September 1.to 2. Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock. a slope profile of approximately 15%. At the time of our visit. 2005. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate). at 15:00. Twenty minutes later. just upstream of PS #4. A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline.3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. SF36292.June 8.

Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. at KP 222+500. 2007 Road Ridge Figure 5. during permanent pipeline repair work. Photographs taken on June 14. Location of second spill incident.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 15 . SF36292. 2006. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline.

June 8, 2007

MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.

Figure 6.

MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.

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3.4

Third Incident

The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of

22

23

24

A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.

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the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.

25

Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.

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and September 19. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 19 . SF36292. Photographs taken on June 14. at KP 200+700. 2006. during stabilization work. General area of the third spill incident.June 8. 2007 Landslide Walls Figure 7. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope.

and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes. Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure. MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes. Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section. SF36292. hardness. 2007 MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident. MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. at KP 200+700.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 20 . MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. In summary. Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW. Figure 8.

According to TGP procedures. a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline. but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient. An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline.5 Fourth Incident The fourth incident was detected on November 24. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3. the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes. 26 27 28 The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108). In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline.0 to 2. At 05:00. SF36292. 2007 3. the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak. At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed.26 At this location. The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture. which can rise 1. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. which is standard construction practice. including this river crossing section. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water. pumping was stopped by TgP. at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900). 2005. After installation of the pipelines.1 m below the stream bottom. Furthermore. The river is less than 10 m wide. 2005. Consequently. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing. Both pipelines were originally buried about 2. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture.June 8.0 to 3.1 m for the NGL pipeline.27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain.219 inch.0 m during the rainy season.003 A0F0 0607 0806 21 . A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1.

No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture. Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis. Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics. and is nearly vertical above the groove. Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9. A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture. SF36292. Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove. TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow.003 A0F0 0607 0806 22 .5-inch-long rupture. 29 Inter-American Development Bank (2006). Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion. Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site.June 8. Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. 2006. 2007 On June 13. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006. The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9). a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline. MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7.

June 8. Photographs taken on June 13. Bottom: View looking upstream. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. SF36292. Site of fourth spill incident. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). 2006. 2007 Approximate Location of Rupture Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture Figure 9.003 A0F0 0607 0806 23 .

with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left.June 8. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 24 . 2007 Figure 10. Indeed. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. In summary. the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe.

The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion.6 Fifth Incident The fifth incident occurred on March 4. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. as shown in Figure 11. Inter-American Development Bank (2006). The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole.003 A0F0 0607 0806 25 . 2007 3. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point. SF36292. 2006. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline. but two injuries. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. A few seconds later. At the point of rupture. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%. At this location. No fatalities. were reported. The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines.June 8.375 inch. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high.32 30 31 32 A swale is a small valley. A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline. and an elevation of approximately 1. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato. generally on a hillside. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected. the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon.30 below a saddle. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12. but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage.” with medium potential for mudflows. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m. in the jungle sector at KP 125+950. Site soils are described as wet.000 m.

2007 New Stabilization Measures Figure 11. Photographs taken on June 13. 2006. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. General area of the fifth spill incident. during stabilization work. at KP 125+950. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil.003 A0F0 0607 0806 26 .June 8. SF36292.

after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0.003 A0F0 0607 0806 27 . strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes. 2007 On June 13 and September 20. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area. and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference.01 inch per load step. The crack then became critical. it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall. with rapid incremental tearing. interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11. As with the preceding four failures. Subsequent loading propagated this crack. MCI determined that the ductility. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. lowest. MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950. construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld.055 inch (see Figure 12). to form a flat fracture that followed a 10. SF36292. the second was at the point of failure. excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. was upslope along the ROW. and the third. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). The first.5-inch-long arc. 2006. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated.June 8. uppermost. hardness.

Each zone is numbered.June 8. indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. Recent geotechnical studies by IGL. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. 2007 Figure 12. larger landslide. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture. to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff.33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site. and this shallow slide overlies an older. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location. We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. SF36292. White arrows identify the narrow. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. at an amplification of 14×. in part. likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding.003 A0F0 0607 0806 28 . 33 Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas.

To date.003 A0F0 0607 0806 29 . SF36292. The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1.” April 16th. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent. Typically. at KP 125+500. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500.3 m3)34 of NGL was released. external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced. 2007. Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds. 2007 3.7 Sixth Incident Recently. TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2. however. 2007. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG. Figure 13. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program.June 8. 34 Coga. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0.

which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness.003 A0F0 0607 0806 30 . progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline.June 8. at KP 125+950. In the case of the first incident. respectively. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. at KP 222+500. are relatively small. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not 35 This is a rather deep crack. 2007 3. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. In both cases. The pressure fluctuations at this location. though frequent. Hence. In both cases. For the fourth incident. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. at KP 50+900. The second incident. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe. SF36292. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. in the fifth incident. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. at KP 8+850. the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction.8 Summary and Conclusions Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents.

the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. SF36292. 2007 caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream.June 8. Indeed. The sixth incident is still under investigation.003 A0F0 0607 0806 31 . and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date.

Specifically. SF36292. However. and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis. but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components. whether usual or unusual. Title 49.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Part 192. a pipe stress analysis. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. where the sizing of pumps.003 A0F0 0607 0806 32 . valves. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist.June 8. these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases. In this section. construction.4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids).1 Design Background Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code. wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe. and pipes is performed. Rather. respectively. inspection. 2007 4 Design-Related Risks 4. testing. we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses. Commonly. the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. operation and maintenance of pipeline systems. but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States. that the designer may encounter. This information is carried over to the next step.

1 General Review Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 33 .2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4. SF36292. The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW.June 8. 2007 4. indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route. This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. The profiles show good agreement. Using this information. Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition. Figure 14.2.

SF36292. 1.2 0. at KP 0. 108.000 BPD (barrels per day). For the NGL pipeline. 209.4.8 0.7 0. with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations.9 0.3 0.1 #1 PS PS #2 PS #3 PS #4 Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP 1 0.003 A0F0 0607 0806 34 .6 0. the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31.5 0. 2007 4. a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis.2 1.June 8. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Distance (Km) Figure 15. Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline. Based on this internal pressure.2. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline.4 0.000 to 70. and 226.

4. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg. 2007 In addition to this static analysis. Based on this internal pressure. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day). a minimum allowable wall 36 Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems. The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed. SF36292. flow rates.2. the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice. an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure. because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP. The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108.June 8. Accordingly. a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements. pump shutdown and pump startup. the actual internal pressure.4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops. and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis. or any combination of these events. 4.1 times the allowable MAOP. pumping capacity. The requirements of ASME B31. and are in compliance with ASME B31. In addition. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. Furthermore. and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg. In summary.003 A0F0 0607 0806 35 . This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1.

8 0. SF36292.1 1 Max. 2007 thickness was determined per ASME B31. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure 0.9 0. at all times. In summary.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km) Figure 16. The requirements of ASME B31. The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis. Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is. The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline.7 0.003 A0F0 0607 0806 36 . larger than the largest expected operating pressure. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met. 1. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice.8.June 8.

Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards. SF36292. 2007 4. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment.June 8. hillside erosion.” February 2002.3 Geotechnical Design Risks ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions. topographic information. be considered during the design process. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. which include external loads. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. Dario Verastegui. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance. 37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images. Sierra and Costa Sections. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3. 2003. satellite images. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads.003 A0F0 0607 0806 37 . particularly in the selva sector. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements. and geologic maps. MR Associates. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads. and conducted field inspections along the proposed 37 38 39 40 Golder Associates. Route of Camisea Pipeline. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards. Orlando Felix Salvador. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route. rock falls.” March 2002. and flooding/river erosion. debris flows. In addition. Prior to construction. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance.” December 2001.” March 21.

003 A0F0 0607 0806 38 .e. 4. hydraulic risk).4 Conclusions The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements.June 8. identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes. MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep.41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical SF36292. 2007 pipe route. The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment. Therefore. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. debris flows. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains.. Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. or scour. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion. and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections. external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system.

41 ASME B31. SF36292. 2007 stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 39 . and ASME B31.June 8.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.

June 8. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors.e. Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager. and loading docks) in 2001. government-mandated corridor. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor.1 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i. The first step was to clear and grade the ROW. Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva. and costa sectors. SF36292. access roads. 42 The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April. Techint employed up to 10. During construction. sierra. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. fuel depots.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment. who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers. camps. Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season. In order to minimize the impact on the environment.000 people on 12 spreads. 2007 5 Construction-Related Risks 5.. with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. pipe staging sites.003 A0F0 0607 0806 40 . and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less. and mitigation measures were constructed at that time.

The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags. every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom.June 8. resting each pipe on two blocks. upon which the pipeline would initially rest. SF36292. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. because it was the only available route for transportation. as depicted in Figure 18. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld. Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used.” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW. The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. 2007 The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself. and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges. Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding.003 A0F0 0607 0806 41 . the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. or socalled pillows. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%. Afterward. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material. trenching may have occurred first. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. If the terrain was flat. Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. In some instances.

003 A0F0 0607 0806 42 . 2007 Figure 17. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. SF36292. Figure 18. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391.June 8.

2007 Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching. Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads. SF36292. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day.June 8. When possible. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench. Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045. a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position. The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline. Once the trench was dug.003 A0F0 0607 0806 43 . rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches. Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. Figure 19. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment. In locations where the pipeline followed a road.

the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes). Figure 20. blasting was required to trench.003 A0F0 0607 0806 44 .June 8. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures. 2007 Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching. Typically. SF36292. In some cases. Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench. Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. As discussed below.

GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. rockfalls. and the environment.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration. and recommend measures to prevent. 2007 5.June 8. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for SF36292. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure.2 Geotechnical Construction Characteristics During construction of the pipelines. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004. GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction. people. Additionally. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts. reduce.003 A0F0 0607 0806 45 . TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW. In October 2004. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90. landslides. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector. and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. two months after the system was put into operation. and river erosion. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation. whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate.

no date. During our site inspections. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW. Exponent 43 Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales. where possible. In many of these locations. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section. October 2004. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN. cracking. Proyecto Camisea.June 8. SF36292. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline.3 Clearing Related Risks As mentioned previously in Section 5. conservative values were assumed. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. The route selection along mountain ridges. 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 46 . 2002. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts. 45 “Camisea Project. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks.44. necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures. Field Reconnaissance on July 17. When only limited detailed data were available. and shallow landsliding. 45 In our opinion. no date. coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters. soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles. Pacobamba Route Sector. At some narrow ridges. Based on our field inspections. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. 44 Camisea Project. Variant Pisco.1. not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction. 2007 maintenance. During our inspections.

The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings).June 8. unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized.4 Trenching-Related Risks Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel. Figures 17 to 20). Therefore. 2007 observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor. During our field inspection. which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. The conditions in the selva sector. SF36292. on the other hand.. Dry sand. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods.003 A0F0 0607 0806 47 . Except in special circumstances. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6. specifically in natural drainages. and the material type and wetness of the backfill. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions. Clods of clay. will not flow. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe. The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe. we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above. 5. would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles. Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e. This is generally not a recommended practice. for example.g. but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment. the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW. potentially creating a large.

All three pipes SF36292. The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba. Argentina. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion.906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49.003 A0F0 0607 0806 48 .000 individual pipe segments. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures. 2007 Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”). Available data (i. each approximately 12 m in length. and two were defective longitudinal welds. Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003.193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects.. hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59. These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment. Brazil. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005.June 8.e. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe. Adherence to DIN 30670. SP. is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating. Specifically. Additionally. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes. 5. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”).5 Pipe Material–Related Risks The system was constructed using more than 100. and Buenos Aires.

overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection. 2003 7 8 NGL NG KP 210 KP 388 January 9. a sleeve is placed.8. 2004 March 23. see leaks 3.June 8. rather. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. It needs to be recognized that. 4. ID 1 2 Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8. The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate.003 A0F0 0607 0806 49 . 2007 were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. at each circumferential pipe joint. 2004 October 4. Table 1. risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld Pipeline NGL NGL 3 4 5 6 NGL NGL NGL NGL KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170 October 4. however. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion. 2003 July 27. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low. 2003 External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion. as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s 46 The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. 2003 February 16. 2004 September 16. This level of defect removal is not atypical. and 5 in Table 1. For details on these three leaks. SF36292.

These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines. and 2794-L-SP-00031. API 1104 and ASME B31. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents. geotechnical loading conditions.3. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104.8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes. and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold.6 Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104. This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds.June 8. whereas for the NG pipeline. In addition. 2007 long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss. and not weld quality. 5. IX. The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method. automated methods were used. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing. In this regard. a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. 2794-L-SP00016.003 A0F0 0607 0806 50 . in 2006. TgP operates a cathodic protection system and. 2794-L-SP-00017. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and SF36292.4 (liquid) and ASME B31.

The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104. Likewise. it was to be radiographed. A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5. page 10. Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired.3.003 A0F0 0607 0806 51 . there is a very small possibility.June 8. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”.1 Background Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks. 1973. 2007 easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5. Ewing. 12th World Gas Conference.8. 5. 5. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that 47 G.8.7 Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld.H. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes. due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system. as with all pipelines. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects. there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken. SF36292. Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack. that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph.

Per this criterion.48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together. such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines. the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours. two by external damage that had occurred during construction.June 8. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP). and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate. However.003 A0F0 0607 0806 52 . In the case of the NGL pipeline.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested.250 km of pipeline is a low number. especially considering the challenging terrain. induced stresses were not uniform. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1. All of these failures were subsequently repaired.8.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength.8. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31. SF36292. Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of 48 TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long. two by faulty longitudinal welds. 5. After the test. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing. during hydrostatic testing. eight leaks were identified. our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes. For example. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds.25 times the internal design pressure. Next. 2007 exceeds the maximum operating pressure.

where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test.424 miles of pipe.003 A0F0 0607 0806 53 .3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels.8. This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline. This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500. some minimal risk may exist. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds. this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing. in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing.” 1973. 10 were plate defects. As in any pipeline.H. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. Despite these actions. the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking. if it results in a leak. SF36292. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world. however.49 Of these 129 defects. The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further 49 G. 2007 3. page 10. this type of potential defect. This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ). Ewing.June 8. 12th World Gas Conference. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator. 5. but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld. During the time the hydrogen is present. Typically. 16 were defects in the girth welds. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents.

5. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures. and when it does occur. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month. However.003 A0F0 0607 0806 54 . (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors SF36292. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low.000 girth welds. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. 2007 propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. Overall. our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW.9 Conclusions Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. On the other hand. but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack. the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW.June 8. Overall. We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome. because absent soil movement. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. risks are not as high as for a rupture situation. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air. The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements.

2007 were in compliance with API 1104. SF36292.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 55 . and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes.

typically when saturated. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. 2007 6 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines. but still pose significant risk to the pipelines. low resistance to weathering. Specifically. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. hard rock. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement. relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils. geology. wedge landslides. high groundwater levels. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock. low strength. particularly when devoid of vegetation. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings. rockfalls. The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain.003 A0F0 0607 0806 56 . but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur 50 For purposes of this report. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. rock slides. over the Andes Mountains. SF36292. The conditions include very steep and high slopes. freezing temperatures. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability. and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline.June 8. and along the Pacific coast. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. and ridge instability.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. narrow ridges. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. amounts of precipitation. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. and high-gradient streams.

crib walls. These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants. predominantly granular soils and gravel. slope armoring. wedge landslides. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard. and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. and gravity walls. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system. 2007 intermittently. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. five months after the system was placed into operation. and broad river crossings. GEOTEC presented a plan of action. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities. this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. In January 2005.003 A0F0 0607 0806 57 . and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. and reinforced shotcrete. The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works. surface surveying. rockslides. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems. gabion walls. including GEOTEC. reinforced concrete walls. For a challenging alignment such as this system. SF36292. and rockfalls.June 8. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers. rock bolts. 6.2 General Findings As described previously in Chapter 4. and slope inclinometers. metal or concrete piles. very little rainfall.

GEOTEC made several other recommendations. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. As described in Chapter 4. or immediately following. The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock SF36292. Verastegui. More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously.June 8. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route. including implementation of subsurface exploration. Based on this study. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization. some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. and made preliminary recommendations. and Stepanek). 2007 Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. identified critical zones in the selva sector. topographic surveys. which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections.003 A0F0 0607 0806 58 . Following our June 2006 inspections. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. For example. we observed evidence of substantial ground movement. The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete. In some instances. In addition. TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006.

and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions.g. rain gauges. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. 2007 below the landslide plane. As a result of these efforts. in September 2006. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2. Based on our second set of site inspections.. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. in September 2006. depths. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline. (5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes. We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches. slope inclinometers. Hence. lined ditch to a main surface collector system. where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide. SF36292. Based on our observations at PS #2. with the exception of one site at PS #2. piezometers. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements. strain gauges. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible. Further.003 A0F0 0607 0806 59 . Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. (2) in some limited cases. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled.June 8.

(2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters.3.1 Risk Assessment Methodology Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW. complex.. SF36292. dynamic. deforestation. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e.June 8.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.003 A0F0 0607 0806 60 . In this method. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters. development. This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse. 6. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur. The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk. and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure. risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes.g. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk. and remediation) causes. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below. In our opinion. In late 2006. and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. 2007 directions. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability.

marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site.. including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 61 . The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. property. 2007 Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental. the greater the susceptibility. more severe. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. and safety. The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode. and (d) ridge instability. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels.June 8. consequences. SF36292. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site. The higher the Likelihood Level. health. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures 51 The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement. The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide. (b) wedge landslide. (c) translational landslide.g.

67 are in the selva sector.3. 4. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix. considering all four failure modes.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary.June 8. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. Risk category assessment chart Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5 6.003 A0F0 0607 0806 62 . SF36292. 2007 Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures. 28 are in the sierra sector. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2. Table 2. 52 Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA. and none are in the costa sector. The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW.

For example. some on both occasions. The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited. For each time period. Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. respectively. surface depression. The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006). Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix. soil movement. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23. along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May SF36292. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix. Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006).g. pipe movement. However. September. even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector.003 A0F0 0607 0806 63 . The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006). In addition. because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006. sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e. in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk. The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites. tension cracks. there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. In this regard. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue.. the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented. slope bulging. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk. 2007 In general. Finally. The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA.June 8. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23).

and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006.” As mentioned before. SF36292.June 8. 2007 2006. 94 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 3 2 0 4 17 2 0 1 13 9 0 7 24 12 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006 1 2 3 4 5 35% 23% 0% 29% 13% Figure 21. the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006. TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk. By October 2006. only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high.003 A0F0 0607 0806 64 . Risk assessment results for May 2006. Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk. By comparison.

Risk assessment results for September 2006. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 9 3 0 5 22 16 0 6 20 4 0 2 6 2 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 40% 47% 0% 11% 2% Figure 22.003 A0F0 0607 0806 65 .June 8. SF36292.

003 A0F0 0607 0806 66 . Risk assessment results for October 2006. SF36292.June 8. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 16 9 0 8 33 14 0 4 6 1 0 0 3 1 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 74% 21% 0% 4% 1% Figure 23.

e. and monitoring. 2007 The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels.. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures. because Severity Levels were likely unchanged.e.003 A0F0 0607 0806 67 . Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i. The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program. which began in earnest in April 2006. whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites. surface drainage control. groundwater depth.June 8. and presence of gabion walls). The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. 3 1 Reduction in Risk 2 21 9 1 21 9 1 0 27 1 3 1 2 3 4 5 May 2006 Risk Category Figure 24. the Risk Category as of May 2006). inspections.. SF36292. slope inclination. The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i. Change in risk from May to October 2006. Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4).

to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. However. the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006. recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. In contrast. the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector.June 8. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector. Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. representation across the three sectors was not possible. Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. However. Risk by sectors for May 2006. 50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category Figure 25. engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method.003 A0F0 0607 0806 68 . The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5. Hence. respectively. 2007 The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2. Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006) 4 5 SF36292. comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector.

Initially. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.June 8..g. this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites. This RMP should state at least the following: SF36292. 6. In addition. we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present. Risk by sectors for October 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 69 . Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. 2007 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006) Frequency 4 5 Risk Category Figure 26.4 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation We expect that the continuous. decision processes and means of execution. strain gauges and inclinometers). requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk. Therefore.

This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner. and engineering experience.June 8. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical SF36292. caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway. be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station. and sensitive. and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites. Furthermore. • Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection. complex. 6. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. dynamic. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. The observed performance of the pipeline system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 70 . Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. observations. 2007 • • • All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. Based on Exponent’s review.5 Conclusions The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. During our inspections in 2006.

June 8, 2007

sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In

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this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.

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7

Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks

7.1

Description of Potential Risks and Controls

In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,

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an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed.June 8. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing. where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents. MCI. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the 53 54 The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience.003 A0F0 0607 0806 74 . Therefore. 2007 and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline. axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes. This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending.2 Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L. TgP’s outside consultant. while sufficient for internal pressures. 7. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82. tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents.53 In particular. This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. SF36292. for the first and fifth spill incidents. Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively. Thus. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading.

ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195. potentially leading to pipe failure.452. Under normal operating pressures. These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis. However. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids. 2007 overload failure of the NGL pipeline. repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk. and dents.003 A0F0 0607 0806 75 . Our review indicates that this set of 55 The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short. Furthermore. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. metal loss.452. 7. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test. any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location.55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions. DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195.3. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load.June 8. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness. However. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. SF36292. pipe gauge.1 Inline Pipe Inspection Background TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline.3 7. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies.

external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld.. Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications. 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed. 14 were related to metal loss. In this regard. By the end of March.g. 13 to dents. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e.. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation). a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i.3. Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts.June 8. ultrasound wall thickness measurement. implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e. re-weld. In all cases. 2007 regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection. The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site.188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement. radiographic examination of girth weld.. and based on the results. we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195. as well as external excavations. potential anomalies).003 A0F0 0607 0806 76 .e. numerous sites have SF36292. patching. and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry..g.).452. The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48. the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents. and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld. the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce.452. First.e. 7. 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i. Among the 30 locations. micro hardness measurement). etc. visual inspection. which includes excavation. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing. As of March 2007.

All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195.. In addition. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. SF36292. 2007 been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect. Overall. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%.3 Circumferential Crack Detection In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks.452.3. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that. Based on these findings. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%. currently. the probability of detection decreases rapidly.e. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations. the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness. with a depth of 49%. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure). per DOT 49 CFR 195.452.56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable 56 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore.June 8. TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%. Specifically. 7. However. A verification of other sites is ongoing. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector. For cracks with a smaller opening.003 A0F0 0607 0806 77 . Specifically. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks.

in bending. the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption. the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. 2007 with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool. Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. TgP has committed to evaluating potential options. Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline.4 Conclusions The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline. per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. even though the technology appears to be readily available. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow. but it was caused by a specific site condition. Unfortunately. the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads. at present. Therefore. whereas.June 8. In this regard. Clearly. based on this study. 7. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending. Specifically. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of SF36292. in pure axial loading. the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws.003 A0F0 0607 0806 78 .

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significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.

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8

Seismic-Related Risks

8.1

Tectonic Overview

Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.

57

58 59

60

Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.

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Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.

Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.

As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.

Figure 27.

Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).

61 62

A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.

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8. 2007 Figure 28. and Tavera 2003). Excessive movement associated with ground failure can. in turn. Silva. Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms. and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking. lead to pipeline damage.003 A0F0 0607 0806 82 . West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey.June 8. SF36292.2 Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1.

This phenomenon generally occurs in loose.” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No.65 landslides.67 lateral spread. SF36292. damage to buried pipelines may result. Lateral movement of ground. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD. O’Rourke (1998). Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface.66 slope instability liquefaction.g. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking. earthquakes).e. 2007 2. unstable slopes. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures.e.68 and seismic compression. PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e. as opposed to body waves.e. Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking. Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i. 1167-1183. When these transient strains become sufficiently large. “Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe. 1392-1426. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction. liquefiable soils. typically with little to no perceptible slope. faults. 75.June 8. Reston.70 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 Transient strain is short-term deformation. or poorly compacted fills). ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil.003 A0F0 0607 0806 83 . cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i.69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline..64 However. Therefore. Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves. for similar levels of earthquake motion. Rayleigh or Love). Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid. it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components.. compression or shear) or surface waves (e. 2.. resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone.. 20(4). Vol. EERI. toward an open face such as a stream channel. Vol.” Earthquake Spectra. “An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering.. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004). VA. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i.g.

“Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i. Therefore.A..3. For a subduction-zone earthquake.June 8. inter-slab versus in-slab events).5g represents half the acceleration of gravity.A. 71 72 73 Vector Peru S. Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity. sierra. SF36292. (2001).C. which is 1. Specifically. Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector. pressure control stations. and pressure reducing stations. Consequently. additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand.0g.7g73 for the extreme event and 0.e. 0. with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval. (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva. These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand Vector Peru S. and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity.003 A0F0 0607 0806 84 .” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard.C.5g for the design event.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8. 2007 8. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes.

Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake. and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides.52 m. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. However. at the intended alignment. and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i. landsliding. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline.e. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements.e. it appears that other modes of PGD (i. Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault.. characterizing potential fault displacements. ABSC identified only one active fault crossing.June 8. particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline.. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault. “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline. liquefaction. which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system.g. rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels.3. Peru.. sands. and silts with high fines and clay content. lateral spread. sand dunes). slope instability. For the sierra and selva sectors. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines.” SF36292. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 85 . 2007 8. APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction. Seismically induced slope instability poses a 74 ABS Consulting (2002). They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0.

Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31. However.4. an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid 75 ABS Consulting (2002). ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties. 2007 substantial risk in the costa sector. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility.3. sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread. we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect. However. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II. Consequently. or with major curves or bends.3 Wave Propagation Hazards ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system.” SF36292. Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations.003 A0F0 0607 0806 86 . “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines. Furthermore. 8. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program. The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion. the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake.June 8. segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities.

2007 connections. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline. SF36292. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk.4 Conclusions The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. Consequently. which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast. 8. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. 76 Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information.June 8. Additionally. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. However. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks.003 A0F0 0607 0806 87 .

naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe. Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined.1 River Crossings and Scour Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour. location of the pipe crossing. characteristics of the flood. and characteristics of the bed and bank materials. all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches). Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round). Once exposed or undermined. Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions. and (3) local scour. General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. (2) general scour. Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour. pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe. 2007 9 Scour-Related Risks 9. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above. To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline. Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream.003 A0F0 0607 0806 88 . Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes. SF36292.June 8. Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events.

Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor. However. Ingenieros Consultores. Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths. the FHWA documents are guidance documents and. 80. FHWA HEC-18. “Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea. and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline.” SF36292.” 81 Golder Associates (2003).77. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.” 80 Golder Associates (2002). 81 77 Hydroconsult (2003). HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream. is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23.” 78 GMI S. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system. and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures. which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No.” – date unknown. “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law.3 and 479. Furthermore. 79 Golder Associates (2002). they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally. 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing. -20.79. in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing. which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis. This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18. to our knowledge. “Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477.A. Techint. 18 (FHWA HEC-18). 2007 9.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 89 . Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing.2 Risks at Buried River Crossings A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29. Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa.

5% chance of occurrence SF36292. 2007 Figure 29. including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings. Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth.June 8. The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline. As seen in Figure 30. the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).003 A0F0 0607 0806 90 . The design return period was 200 years (0.

• If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter. a stochastic stream flow generation program. stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters.June 8. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover. • The river crossing locations were surveyed. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5. • Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing. 2007 during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U. Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated. but in some cases.2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model. it was increased to 1 meter. the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time. SF36292. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. and energy dissipators. it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing. such as reinforcement of the riverbed.S.003 A0F0 0607 0806 91 . The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. • At each river crossing. were designed and built in selected locations. providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders. • Scour countermeasures.

Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system. Lima. our general practice and experience in scour prediction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 92 . 2007 Figure 30. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows. 2007. However. SF36292. Peru. when combined.June 8. All of the above-listed factors.

primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation. These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18. -20. To mitigate this potential residual risk. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events.3 Conclusions The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk. and -23.003 A0F0 0607 0806 93 . 2007 Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty. Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. 9. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary.June 8. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. SF36292. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure. During our field inspections in 2006. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above.

Overall. related to the Camisea Transportation System. such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. Second. (5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME SF36292.June 8.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Overall. TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. 10. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary. (3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104. the review showed that (1) the more than 100. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline. and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system. First. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 94 . (4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment. 2007 10 Summary and Conclusions Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB. Furthermore. the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. 10.

10. 2007 codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines. observations. complex. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above. Based on Exponent’s review. We expect that the continuous.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. During our inspections in 2006. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). Ultimately.003 A0F0 0607 0806 95 .8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system.June 8. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline. 82 ASME B31. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3).3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas. dynamic. and sensitive. SF36292. and ASME B31. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces. and engineering experience. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected. However.

during construction. 10. our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites. 2007 10. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11). results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that. all the welds were x-rayed. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks.003 A0F0 0607 0806 96 . strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. currently. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. Second. Consequently. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects. to determine whether SF36292. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term.452. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement.5 Seismic-Related Risks The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. First. it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. Overall. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further. Therefore. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195.June 8. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. However.

and thus. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions. SF36292. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter. To mitigate this potential residual risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806 97 . such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. However. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues.6 Scour-Related Risks The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. 2007 these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events. 10. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. However. 10. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions.7 Summary TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11.June 8.

Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk. with mechanical pipe integrity. SF36292. 2007 11 Recommendations Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System.003 A0F0 0607 0806 98 . based on the results and conclusions of this investigation. are described in the following sections. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. These recommendations. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management. 2. seismic events. which TgP has committed to implement. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. and river scouring as secondary risks. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures. Overall.1 Geotechnical and Geologic The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection. At a minimum.June 8. TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline. the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented. 11. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis.

4. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls.June 8. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization.003 A0F0 0607 0806 99 . Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. 7. 5. During the past site inspections. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. 2007 3. Prior to our site inspections. At most of the locations. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable. TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations. In addition to the above general recommendations. The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location. piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2. 6. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations.5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using SF36292. Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures. We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni.

to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels. 10. 2007 simple hand drive hammers. as necessary. c. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites. analyze. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. 9. and construction of remedial measures is currently underway. as discussed with TgP. and qualified personnel to install. This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement.003 A0F0 0607 0806 100 . b. It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. Detailed geotechnical investigations. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings. and interpret results. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site. Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. Following completion of this work. especially noting new occurrences. and other such observations. as discussed with TgP. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. 11.June 8. monitor. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. SF36292. presence of discoloration.

Based on the analysis. appropriate remedial measures. This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active. lateral shifting of the stream banks. soil movement). TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection. TgP should implement. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements.June 8.. SF36292. This information shall be used to update. design ground motions.003 A0F0 0607 0806 101 . the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i. if necessary. or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude. 11. damage to check dams. fourth. if necessary. Formation of erosion gullies. 2007 d. retreat of stream banks. such as long-term degradation. and fifth spill incidents.2 Seismic TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system.4 Pipe To reduce pipe integrity–related risks. e. and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends. 11. Alignment of the gabion walls at each location. TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first.3 Scour TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing. 11.e. Later.

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