This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577
Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618
June 8, 2007
Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii
Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
6 3.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions Construction-Related Risks 5.8.June 8.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.1 General Review 4.1 5.8.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.6 5.3 4.2 3.7 3.3 5.4 5.2. 2007 3.2 5.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii SF36292.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4.9 6 Conclusions Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.8 4 First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions 8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56 Design-Related Risks 4.4 3.003 A0F0 0607 0806 .1 Background 5.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.5 3.3 3.2.5 5.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks 188.8.131.52 Design Background 4.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.
2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks 7.1 7. 2007 6.1 184.108.40.206 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.4 9 Conclusions Scour-Related Risks 9.1 8.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.3.3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.4 8 Conclusions Seismic-Related Risks 8.3.June 8.3.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines 8.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7.2 10.3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions 10 Summary and Conclusions 10.1 Background 7.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 8.3.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7.2 General Findings 57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95 6.3.2 9.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.4 6.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 iv .3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks SF36292.3.1 10.
5 10.6 10.June 8.7 11 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary 96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101 Recommendations 11.4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 v .4 10.3 11. 2007 10.2 11.1 11.
Figure 9. Photographs taken on June 13. Photographs taken on June 12. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). 2006. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). 12 13 Figure 4. 16 Figure 7. Photographs taken on June 14. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). during stabilization work. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. General area of first spill incident. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. Figure 5. Bottom: View looking upstream. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. at KP 222+500. 23 SF36292. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. 2006. General area of the third spill incident. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. 2006. and September 19. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. 11 Figure 3.June 8. Photograph taken on September 11. during ROW stabilization work. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. Location of second spill incident. General area of site of first spill incident. 2007 List of Figures Page Figure 1. 15 Figure 6. at KP 8+850.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vi . 2 Figure 2. 2006. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. looking downstream. at KP 200+700. during permanent pipeline repair work. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. at KP 200+700. Photographs taken on June 14. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. 2006. 19 20 Figure 8. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began. at KP 8+850. 2006. Site of fourth spill incident. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface.
Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Change in risk from May to October 2006. Figure 26. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. at KP 125+950. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. Figure 22. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. 2006. Figure 27. Figure 11. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. Figure 21. at an amplification of 14×. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Risk assessment results for October 2006. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil.June 8. Figure 25. Figure 24. Figure 20. Figure 23. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. Figure 12. General area of the fifth spill incident. Photographs taken on June 13. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Each zone is numbered. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. Risk by sectors for October 2006. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. White arrows identify the narrow.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vii . 2007 Figure 10. Figure 16. Figure 17. Figure 15. Risk by sectors for May 2006. Figure 13. 24 26 28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81 SF36292. Figure 19. Risk assessment results for September 2006. Figure 18. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. during stabilization work. Figure 14. Washington State University website). Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Risk assessment results for May 2006.
Silva. 2007 Figure 28.003 A0F0 0607 0806 viii . Peru. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). Figure 29. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25.June 8. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. Lima. 82 90 92 SF36292. 2007. and Tavera 2003). Figure 30.
2007 List of Tables Page Table 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 ix .June 8. Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62 SF36292. Table 2.
C.A.003 A0F0 0607 0806 x . Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S.June 8.A. 2007 Acronyms and Abbreviations ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U. SF36292. Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.S.
ground stability. using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events. Accordingly. the findings of this report may be invalidated. wholly or in part. by changes that are beyond our control. This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. 2007 Limitations At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions. Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xi . limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review. and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report. In addition. SF36292. Exponent has no direct knowledge of.June 8. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment. or the condition of concealed construction. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. Accordingly. such as rains and landslides or human activities. and engineering analysis. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction. which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. document review.
on the coast of Peru south of Lima.1 Along this route. This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. commencing in April 2006. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents.800 m. The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge. SF36292. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. 1 True length of pipeline. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xii . (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. 2007 Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system). and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. at the southern edge of Lima. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin.A. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP. climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. during the first 19 months of operation. During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline.June 8.
Construction of the pipelines started in 2002. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector. and one in the sierra sector. pipeline maintenance. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. and ongoing operation. In contrast. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1. 2) evaluating the SF36292. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. primarily the NGL. 2007 and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2. the mechanical design. pipeline construction. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. Recently. All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. 2007. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). Specifically. and commercial operation began in August 2004. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. As part of that study.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiii . where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. pipeline design.June 8. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006.
These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiv . In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. construction specifications. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. operation. pipe material data. geotechnical and geological studies. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis.June 8. or had been completed. hydrological studies. seismic studies. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated. service providers. and maintenance of the system. operators. construction. These documents included engineering specifications. 2 Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program. SF36292. and operational data. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. construction. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. construction progress surveys. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. 2007 effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. In some cases. operations. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. Finally. under construction. pipeline design drawings and calculations. river-crossing studies. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006.
The second incident. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding).003 A0F0 0607 0806 xv . In both cases. In the incident at KP 125+950. In the incident at KP 8+850. 3 4 A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. located at KP 222+500. Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. Hence.June 8. 2007 Spill Incidents Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent. This is a rather deep crack. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW. SF36292. The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed. respectively. While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk.3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. At both of these locations. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate.
2007 the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. For the fourth incident. For purposes of this report. Again. the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding. In this context. In this report. eliminate if appropriate. and/or monitored. controlled. The NG pipe at this location was not damaged. Risk Identification The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures. we identified four SF36292. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify. during our study. Indeed. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. Finally. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality.June 8. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvi . risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. located at KP 50+900. Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill.
and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. 2007 primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. 5 For the purposes of this report. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend.6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. In summary. to varying degrees. on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline. Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline. Design-Related Risks The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). However. Due to their importance. seismic events. seismic events. poor foundation (ground) conditions. whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvii . Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline.June 8. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity. Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below. and river scouring. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil.5 mechanical pipe integrity. Risk Evaluation The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system. Furthermore. SF36292. and scour. typically when saturated. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement.
and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had 6 7 ASME B31. Construction-Related Risks The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW. all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion.e. and Buenos Aires. using more than 100. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba. 2007 Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. Therefore. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains. government mandated corridor. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.000 individual pipes.June 8. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation. such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill. hydraulic risk). external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system. The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites. and ASME B31. each of which is up to 12 meters long. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard. SP. Argentina. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xviii . any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.. Brazil. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. Subsequently. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003.
and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road. Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. To minimize environmental impact. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and 8 Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays. would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. and potential damage to the pipe exterior. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers. at river crossings. the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xix . Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred.June 8. and the work was inspected by outside consultants. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task. and along rivers and drainages. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain. where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. SF36292. trench conditions. The ROW was cleared and cut. the pipe was strung out. The more then 100. Within the 3-km-wide corridor. 2007 to be granted by the Peruvian government. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains. Next. Overall.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later.
initiating the subsequent spill incident. Eight failures in more than 1. which may be similar to other pipelines in the world. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure. long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard. a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases. During the hydrostatic testing. 2007 detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired. and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case. eight leaks were identified.June 8. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. external damage during construction in two cases. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. Next.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xx . This situation arose with the second spill incident. Overall. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk.000 girth welds. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. In this program. Despite the above-described actions. All these failures were subsequently repaired. the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. especially considering the challenging terrain. This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing SF36292. in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test.250 km of pipeline is a low number.
Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure. This system was validated using information from our field inspections. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. representing SF36292. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective. At the end of 2006. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. observations.g. some on both occasions. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced. to permit more expeditious. As early as April 2006. slope inclinometer. Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review. Further. As a result of these efforts. and data on movement characteristics. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented. strain gauge.June 8. piezometer. While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area. During the second phase of our project. Exponent observed over 50 sites. and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability. the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. Based on our review. addressed.. reliable repairs. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard. To date.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxi . 2007 geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques. and engineering experience. instrumentation (e. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. and controlled in this ongoing process. survey control. In more critical areas.
reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment. 2007 locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. Therefore. with solely the site at KP 108. adjacent to the second pump station.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxii .” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk. SF36292. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. being now ranked as “very high. We expect that the continuous. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time. while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW). In this regard. It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk.June 8. between KP 0 and KP 220. The core of this program involves regular visual inspections. and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below. including during the rainy season. Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas. This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions. Thus.
will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. during construction. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806 . reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. First. per requirements by API 1160 xxiii SF36292. all the welds were x-rayed. while sufficient for internal pressures. and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. At this time. These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. 2007 decision process. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. and manner of execution. it is susceptible to this external failure mode. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons.June 8. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects. To mitigate the residual risk. weld quality. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies. Thus. As discussed above. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. Second. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement.
TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. Results of the MFL inspection tool.10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool. Overall in 2006. However. if required. SF36292. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features. At present. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP.June 8. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program. no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxiv . Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the 9 Department of Transportation of the United States of America. which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. In this regard. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. currently. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. In addition. even though the technology to do so appears to be available. have shown that. 2007 and DOT9 195. TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools.
June 8. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements.. SF36292. sierra. as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva. liquefaction.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxv . the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process. For cracks with a smaller crack opening. TgP will evaluate potential options. 2007 relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. and pressure reducing stations.g. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty. pressure control stations. Seismic-Related Risks The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes. slope instability. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard. landslides. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector. 10 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. Additionally.
seismic events. 2007 Scour-Related Risks Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical. poor foundation (soil) conditions. additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized. pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. In addition. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour. Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. in the opinion of SF36292. with little warning and serious consequences. Despite not being required. Therefore. and mechanical pipe integrity. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18).June 8. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings. However. However. considered to be the most significant. In addition to the mentioned studies. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvi . Future Activities Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings. Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. and river scouring as secondary risks.
and #5. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. 2007 Exponent.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvii . However. In this context. resulting from strong ground shaking. based on the results. Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. SF36292. #4. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB.June 8. in particular wave propagation. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. and thus. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. permanent ground deformations. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. excluding fault rupture. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. 3) reconsideration of seismic risk. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks. 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007.
2007 1 Introduction 1. and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches.800 m. on the coast of Peru south of Lima.406 and 1 inch. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0. and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0.469 inch. The alignment of the ROW. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline.11 Along this route. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 1 . traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. follows a 3-km–wide. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. which is shown on Figure 1. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle.. and the 200-km-long costa sector. 11 True length of pipeline. Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004.1 Description of the System The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. SF36292.June 8. with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. at the southern edge of Lima. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast. government-mandated corridor. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters. (TgP). which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. the ~300-km-long sierra sector.219 and 0.A.
a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. 2007 The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains. Figure 1. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. mostly at major river crossings. and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains. and a NG distribution point in Lurin.003 A0F0 0607 0806 2 . On the west side of the Andes Mountains. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas. SF36292. The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture.June 8. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves. The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events.
SF36292. The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident. 1. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding. in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe. The fourth incident. 2007 The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. In this regard. The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide. and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. scour risk.3 Report Organization This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. seismic risk. our work focused on the NGL pipeline.2 Operational History Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed.003 A0F0 0607 0806 3 . The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system.June 8. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar. A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report. and pipe-related risks of this system. located at KP 222+500. the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1). 1. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP. The second incident. located at a river crossing at KP 50+900. appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood.
Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks. seismic risks. and scour risks at river crossings. Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period. and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5. 2007 The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process. pipe integrity risks.June 8. Issues related to pipe material. pipe manufacture. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 4 . Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities.
2 Phases of Work Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation.June 8. 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system. 2. 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW. primarily the NGL. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. commencing in April 2006. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. 4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings. 2007 2 Exponent’s Investigation 2. During this investigation.1 Objective Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards. 2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. pipeline construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 5 . The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations. geologic and SF36292. pipeline design.
Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. These documents included engineering specifications. 2007 geotechnical hazard mitigation. and ongoing operation. In some cases. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. river-crossing studies. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. These inspections SF36292. operation. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. construction. Specifically. construction progress surveys. hydrological studies. and operational data. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. seismic studies. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. construction specifications. pipeline design drawings and calculations. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100. As part of that study. geotechnical and geological studies. and design of river crossings (scour analysis). which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. In addition to these activities.June 8. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. pipeline maintenance. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806 6 .000 girth weld radiographs. 2. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. mechanical design. pipe material data.3 Scope In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis..
were under construction. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. Finally. service providers. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. and maintenance of the system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 7 .June 8. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. operators. 2007 occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest. or had been completed. SF36292. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. operation. construction. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents.
June 8.12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. and 12 13 14 15 Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline. SF36292. in the jungle sector near KP 8+850. The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1.25 inch along this section of the system. At the point of rupture. 3. with a slope profile of approximately 15%.2 First Incident The first incident occurred on December 22.1 Background Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline. Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP). The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River. In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. In contrast. A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004. and one in the sierra sector. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system. 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.003 A0F0 0607 0806 8 . the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream. 2007 3 Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m). 2004.
Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006). visit. 2006. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil.June 8. 2006. and by the ninth minute. At the time of our June 12. but based on available information. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released. Seven minutes after noting the anomaly. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2. and stabilization measures. GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed.003 A0F0 0607 0806 9 . “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project. A substantial amount of overburden soil had been 16 17 Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. repairs. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m.17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work.” SF36292. Exponent visited this site again on September 11. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed. when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete. They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. Exponent inspected this site on June 12. During their site investigation. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture. 2007 revegetation with grass. addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. 2006. The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline.
2007 removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope. looking downstream. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11. Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement. SF36292. and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1.June 8. whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline.18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 10 .5 m. 18 Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level.0 to 1. inclinometers to detect soil movement.
during ROW stabilization work. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 11 .June 8. Photographs taken on June 12. 2006. 2007 Figure 2. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). General area of site of first spill incident. at KP 8+850. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope).
Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long). with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. General area of first spill incident. At the request of TgP.19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory. at KP 8+850. as shown in Figure 4. 2007 Figure 3. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4). 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 12 .June 8. with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock. until the crack became critical. Inc. as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces. Metallurgical Consultants Inc. 19 20 Metallurgical Consultants. Photograph taken on September 11. SF36292. looking downstream. with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface. The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock.
referred to as the Pacobamba failure. SF36292. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline. MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified. 2007 Figure 4. Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured. approximately nine months after the first incident. 2005. 3.June 8. and MCI.).3 Second Incident The second incident was discovered on August 29.A. IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA). This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3. the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San 21 Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench. Analyses done by GIE (GIE S. occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500.003 A0F0 0607 0806 13 . The incident. as well as our own investigation. As shown in Figure 5. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850.950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley.
Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture. and at 20:04. the pipeline was shut down. SF36292. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate). 2005. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. MCI analyzed. NGL pipeline excavation.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline. A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5. Twenty minutes later.June 8. at 15:00. On June 14. 2007 Antonio-Pacobamba Road. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed.3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair. On September 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 14 . MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1. the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location. just upstream of PS #4. TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline.to 2. MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline. At the time of our visit. the field investigation. a slope profile of approximately 15%. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0. with initial participation of Exponent. the removed fractured pipe section. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2. At this location. 2006.219 inch. Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock.
2007 Road Ridge Figure 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 15 . Photographs taken on June 14. at KP 222+500. Location of second spill incident. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline.June 8. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. SF36292. 2006. during permanent pipeline repair work.
June 8, 2007
MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of
A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. and September 19. SF36292. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 19 . Photographs taken on June 14. 2006. 2007 Landslide Walls Figure 7.June 8. General area of the third spill incident. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. during stabilization work. at KP 200+700.
Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section. In summary.003 A0F0 0607 0806 20 . MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure. Figure 8.June 8. SF36292. MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld. hardness. 2007 MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident. MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW. at KP 200+700. and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes.
but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient. including this river crossing section.27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe.26 At this location. which is standard construction practice.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain. 2007 3. 26 27 28 The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108). pumping was stopped by TgP. According to TGP procedures. At 05:00. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water. at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900).1 m below the stream bottom. SF36292. A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1. the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak. An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline. In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline.0 to 2. a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline. The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture. At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24. which can rise 1. The river is less than 10 m wide. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage.003 A0F0 0607 0806 21 . the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes.1 m for the NGL pipeline. Consequently.June 8. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. 2005. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing. Both pipelines were originally buried about 2. 2005. Furthermore. After installation of the pipelines.219 inch.5 Fourth Incident The fourth incident was detected on November 24.0 to 3.0 m during the rainy season.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river.
Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 22 . MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7. a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline.5-inch-long rupture. A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture. Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove. Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site.June 8. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006. SF36292. 29 Inter-American Development Bank (2006). Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics. and is nearly vertical above the groove. Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion. Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006. 2006. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture. Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9. The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9). TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation. 2007 On June 13. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis.
2006.June 8. SF36292. Photographs taken on June 13. Bottom: View looking upstream. 2007 Approximate Location of Rupture Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture Figure 9. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. Top: View looking downstream (uphill).003 A0F0 0607 0806 23 . Site of fourth spill incident.
it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left.003 A0F0 0607 0806 24 . Indeed. 2007 Figure 10. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover.June 8. In summary. the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. SF36292. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe.
30 below a saddle. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. were reported.000 m. but two injuries. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12. Inter-American Development Bank (2006). The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole. 2007 3.32 30 31 32 A swale is a small valley. At this location. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m.375 inch. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. At the point of rupture. The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline. 2006. A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point. No fatalities. the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato. SF36292. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected. The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12. The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale.” with medium potential for mudflows. as shown in Figure 11. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high. A few seconds later. but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage.003 A0F0 0607 0806 25 . Site soils are described as wet.June 8. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%. in the jungle sector at KP 125+950.6 Fifth Incident The fifth incident occurred on March 4. and an elevation of approximately 1. generally on a hillside. The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion.
2006. SF36292. Photographs taken on June 13. at KP 125+950.003 A0F0 0607 0806 26 . during stabilization work.June 8. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. 2007 New Stabilization Measures Figure 11. General area of the fifth spill incident. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW.
2006. MCI determined that the ductility. lowest. construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline. hardness.5-inch-long arc. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. As with the preceding four failures. 2007 On June 13 and September 20. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 27 . after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0. to form a flat fracture that followed a 10. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11. it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall. and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference. and the third. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld. MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. uppermost.01 inch per load step. The crack then became critical. The first. SF36292. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0.055 inch (see Figure 12). Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes. with rapid incremental tearing. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. the second was at the point of failure. Subsequent loading propagated this crack. was upslope along the ROW. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW. interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex. excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area.
indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation.June 8. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture. 2007 Figure 12. White arrows identify the narrow. in part. at an amplification of 14×. SF36292. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Recent geotechnical studies by IGL. 33 Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas.003 A0F0 0607 0806 28 . The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph.33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site. Each zone is numbered. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location. and this shallow slide overlies an older. larger landslide.
SF36292. 2007 3. 2007.7 Sixth Incident Recently. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent.003 A0F0 0607 0806 29 .” April 16th. Typically. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2. The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1. To date.June 8. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0.3 m3)34 of NGL was released. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG. 2007. however. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program. TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500. at KP 125+500. 34 Coga. Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds. Figure 13. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced.
The second incident. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 30 . In both cases. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. Hence. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe. at KP 125+950. at KP 50+900. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. are relatively small.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. The pressure fluctuations at this location. at KP 222+500. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking. though frequent. In both cases. which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. For the fourth incident. While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction. at KP 8+850. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. In the case of the first incident. 2007 3. SF36292. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not 35 This is a rather deep crack. the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. in the fifth incident. progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. respectively.8 Summary and Conclusions Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents. even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness.
2007 caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. SF36292. and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area.003 A0F0 0607 0806 31 . The sixth incident is still under investigation.June 8. Indeed.
wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe. the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis. This information is carried over to the next step.003 A0F0 0607 0806 32 . these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. Specifically. SF36292. inspection. the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design. and pipes is performed. However. a pipe stress analysis.4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids).June 8. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses. Part 192. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States. Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline. and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. operation and maintenance of pipeline systems. In this section. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist. but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). where the sizing of pumps. Commonly. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code. but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation. valves. we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase. testing. whether usual or unusual. Title 49. Rather. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. respectively. that the designer may encounter. construction. 2007 4 Design-Related Risks 4.1 Design Background Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31.
The profiles show good agreement.2. Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4. SF36292. Figure 14. indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment.1 General Review Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 33 . This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure. Using this information.June 8. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline. 2007 4.
Based on this internal pressure.8 0.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Distance (Km) Figure 15.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline.4.2 1. Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline.000 BPD (barrels per day). 1. SF36292. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times. and 226. with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 34 . 209.000 to 70. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31.4 0. For the NGL pipeline.5 0.2 0. at KP 0.3 0. 2007 4. the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10. a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined.2.7 0.6 0. 108.9 0.1 #1 PS PS #2 PS #3 PS #4 Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP 1 0.
flow rates. In addition.June 8. Based on this internal pressure. because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced.2. the actual internal pressure. a minimum allowable wall 36 Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day). a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software. The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops. the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1.4. 2007 In addition to this static analysis. Furthermore. an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate. and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg. In summary. 4. pumping capacity. The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed. The requirements of ASME B31. pump shutdown and pump startup. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures. and are in compliance with ASME B31.003 A0F0 0607 0806 35 . or any combination of these events. This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW. SF36292. and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis. Accordingly.4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met.1 times the allowable MAOP. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements.
June 8. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure 0.9 0.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met. 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 36 . Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate. The requirements of ASME B31. In summary. SF36292.7 0. at all times. The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened.8.1 1 Max. larger than the largest expected operating pressure. The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km) Figure 16. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice.8 0. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. 2007 thickness was determined per ASME B31.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 37 .3 Geotechnical Design Risks ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines. and conducted field inspections along the proposed 37 38 39 40 Golder Associates.” March 21. Sierra and Costa Sections. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance. rock falls. particularly in the selva sector. Dario Verastegui. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea. topographic information. to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. hillside erosion. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements. Orlando Felix Salvador. and flooding/river erosion. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. which include external loads. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector. 2007 4. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides. SF36292. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. and geologic maps. MR Associates. Prior to construction. debris flows. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards.June 8. Route of Camisea Pipeline. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3. be considered during the design process. 2003. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads. 37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images.” March 2002. In addition. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment.” February 2002. satellite images.” December 2001.
Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. 2007 pipe route. identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes. Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical SF36292. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion.. Therefore. and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified. MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement.41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains. external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 38 .4 Conclusions The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements. or scour.e. 4. hydraulic risk). The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment.June 8. debris flows. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections.
41 ASME B31.June 8.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. 2007 stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 39 . and ASME B31.
Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva. who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers. and mitigation measures were constructed at that time. and loading docks) in 2001.003 A0F0 0607 0806 40 . At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment. grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing.1 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i.June 8. SF36292. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. In order to minimize the impact on the environment. access roads. both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors. pipe staging sites.e. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. During construction. 42 The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April.. Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction. 2007 5 Construction-Related Risks 5. camps.000 people on 12 spreads. sierra. and costa sectors. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor. fuel depots. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. Techint employed up to 10. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). The first step was to clear and grade the ROW. with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines. government-mandated corridor.
every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom.June 8. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. because it was the only available route for transportation. In some instances. Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions. Afterward. resting each pipe on two blocks. trenching may have occurred first.” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW. Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material. as depicted in Figure 18. The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags. Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain. and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges. The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. or socalled pillows. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. 2007 The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%. If the terrain was flat. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. SF36292. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld.003 A0F0 0607 0806 41 . Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding. upon which the pipeline would initially rest.
2007 Figure 17.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 42 . Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. SF36292. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Figure 18.
2007 Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching. Figure 19. The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline. rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment.003 A0F0 0607 0806 43 . Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045. Once the trench was dug. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches. When possible. Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench.June 8. In locations where the pipeline followed a road. a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width. Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. SF36292.
Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures. As discussed below.003 A0F0 0607 0806 44 . The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench. Figure 20. In some cases. SF36292. Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing. 2007 Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching. the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes). blasting was required to trench. Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Typically.June 8.
but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration. GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. In October 2004. whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate.003 A0F0 0607 0806 45 . rockfalls. and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system.June 8. and the environment. people. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion. TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure. GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW. and recommend measures to prevent. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for SF36292.2 Geotechnical Construction Characteristics During construction of the pipelines. 2007 5. and river erosion. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation. Additionally. reduce. two months after the system was put into operation. GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation. landslides.
Variant Pisco. Proyecto Camisea. cracking. At some narrow ridges. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6. October 2004. When only limited detailed data were available. Field Reconnaissance on July 17. 2002. 45 In our opinion. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. SF36292. During our inspections. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN. Exponent 43 Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales. no date.44. Pacobamba Route Sector. coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters.003 A0F0 0607 0806 46 .3 Clearing Related Risks As mentioned previously in Section 5. Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts. and shallow landsliding. During our site inspections. where possible. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW. not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction. necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures. conservative values were assumed. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas.1. 45 “Camisea Project. 5. 2007 maintenance. soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles. The route selection along mountain ridges. no date. In many of these locations. Based on our field inspections. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches.June 8. 44 Camisea Project.
4 Trenching-Related Risks Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel. the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. specifically in natural drainages. The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment. SF36292. we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above. potentially creating a large. During our field inspection. Therefore. and the material type and wetness of the backfill. unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized. would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe. Except in special circumstances. The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe. Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e.. 2007 observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles. Clods of clay. 5. The conditions in the selva sector. on the other hand. which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings). Dry sand. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor.g. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods.003 A0F0 0607 0806 47 . for example. Figures 17 to 20). but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles.June 8. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions. will not flow. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe. This is generally not a recommended practice.
5.5 Pipe Material–Related Risks The system was constructed using more than 100. Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements.. SP. each approximately 12 m in length. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment. The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”).000 individual pipe segments.June 8. Adherence to DIN 30670. hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59.e.906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49. and Buenos Aires. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. and two were defective longitudinal welds. Available data (i. Additionally. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment. API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating.193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects. These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard. 2007 Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”). Argentina. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe. Brazil. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material.003 A0F0 0607 0806 48 . All three pipes SF36292. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion. Specifically. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures.
rather. 2003 February 16. however. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion. For details on these three leaks.June 8. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s 46 The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion. The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate. 2003 External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible. risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes.003 A0F0 0607 0806 49 . 2004 March 23. overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection. 2004 September 16. 2003 7 8 NGL NG KP 210 KP 388 January 9. as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. at each circumferential pipe joint. 2003 July 27. 2004 October 4. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld Pipeline NGL NGL 3 4 5 6 NGL NGL NGL NGL KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170 October 4. 2007 were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. and 5 in Table 1. 4. Table 1. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects.8. This level of defect removal is not atypical. a sleeve is placed. It needs to be recognized that. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. ID 1 2 Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8. SF36292. see leaks 3.
and 2794-L-SP-00031. In addition. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104. geotechnical loading conditions. 2007 long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools. whereas for the NG pipeline. These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss. automated methods were used. The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method. This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk. API 1104 and ASME B31. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds. in 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 50 .8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing. 2794-L-SP-00017.3. and not weld quality. a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents.4 (liquid) and ASME B31. 5. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and SF36292. In this regard.June 8.6 Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104. and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold. IX. 2794-L-SP00016. TgP operates a cathodic protection system and.
8. page 10. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level.June 8. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack.H. it was to be radiographed. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that 47 G. The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104.3. 2007 easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld.7 Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes. Ewing. Likewise. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”. due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack. there is a very small possibility.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system. 5. there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5. 12th World Gas Conference.003 A0F0 0607 0806 51 . Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects.8. A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5. 1973.1 Background Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks. Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations. that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph. as with all pipelines. 5. SF36292.
In the case of the NGL pipeline. For example. However. 5. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31. our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes. All of these failures were subsequently repaired. eight leaks were identified. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding. After the test. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing.25 times the internal design pressure.48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. 2007 exceeds the maximum operating pressure.8. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength. during hydrostatic testing. Next. and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate. the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours.June 8. Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of 48 TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP). of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline.8. Per this criterion.250 km of pipeline is a low number. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines. induced stresses were not uniform. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds. SF36292. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5. two by faulty longitudinal welds. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1. especially considering the challenging terrain.003 A0F0 0607 0806 52 . the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak. two by external damage that had occurred during construction.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 53 . 10 were plate defects. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing. 5.June 8. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. Typically. this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing. but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld. This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline. Ewing. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding.49 Of these 129 defects. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator.8. This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500. The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further 49 G.424 miles of pipe. some minimal risk may exist. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test. In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. 2007 3. As in any pipeline. however. During the time the hydrogen is present.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels. in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing. page 10. if it results in a leak.” 1973. SF36292. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons. this type of potential defect. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. Despite these actions. the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States. 16 were defects in the girth welds.H. where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph. This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ). 12th World Gas Conference.
but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome.003 A0F0 0607 0806 54 . (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors SF36292. However. We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue. 2007 propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack.June 8. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. risks are not as high as for a rupture situation. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month. The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test. the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW.000 girth welds. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air. On the other hand. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack. and when it does occur. Overall. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. Overall. our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW. 5. because absent soil movement.9 Conclusions Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures.
June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 55 . and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes. SF36292. 2007 were in compliance with API 1104.
2007 6 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6. The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock. and along the Pacific coast. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines. and ridge instability. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. particularly when devoid of vegetation. SF36292.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils. and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. low strength.003 A0F0 0607 0806 56 . narrow ridges. amounts of precipitation. low resistance to weathering. but still pose significant risk to the pipelines. but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur 50 For purposes of this report. high groundwater levels. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain. freezing temperatures. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. The conditions include very steep and high slopes. typically when saturated.June 8. rockfalls. geology. and high-gradient streams. hard rock. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. Specifically. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability. relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings. wedge landslides. over the Andes Mountains. rock slides.
For a challenging alignment such as this system. and broad river crossings.June 8. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. SF36292. GEOTEC presented a plan of action. slope armoring. wedge landslides. 6. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works. and reinforced shotcrete. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities. crib walls. and slope inclinometers. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard. gabion walls. surface surveying. this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. five months after the system was placed into operation. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW. and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. including GEOTEC. and rockfalls. very little rainfall. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. metal or concrete piles. reinforced concrete walls. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems. rock bolts. 2007 intermittently. predominantly granular soils and gravel. In January 2005. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley. and gravity walls. The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows. rockslides.2 General Findings As described previously in Chapter 4.003 A0F0 0607 0806 57 . These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants.
or immediately following. GEOTEC made several other recommendations. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. topographic surveys. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting.June 8. As described in Chapter 4. some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization. More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously. Verastegui. Based on this study. including implementation of subsurface exploration. In addition. Following our June 2006 inspections. identified critical zones in the selva sector. The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete. we observed evidence of substantial ground movement. For example. and made preliminary recommendations. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. In some instances. 2007 Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. and Stepanek). The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 58 . Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route. TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006.
Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e. piezometers. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006. with the exception of one site at PS #2. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches.g. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. rain gauges.June 8. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel. strain gauges. We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations. Hence. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline. and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. (2) in some limited cases. where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled. Further. lined ditch to a main surface collector system. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. in September 2006. SF36292.. slope inclinometers. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide. rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW. Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary. (5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes. Based on our second set of site inspections. depths. in September 2006. As a result of these efforts. Based on our observations at PS #2. 2007 below the landslide plane.003 A0F0 0607 0806 59 . because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements.
In late 2006. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur. This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse. The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. 6. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure. development..June 8. dynamic. In our opinion. risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes. SF36292.g. (2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters. and remediation) causes. and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure.3. In this method. complex. deforestation.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis.003 A0F0 0607 0806 60 . and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e.1 Risk Assessment Methodology Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk. 2007 directions.
SF36292. The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. and safety.003 A0F0 0607 0806 61 . marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site. 2007 Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site. the greater the susceptibility. (b) wedge landslide. consequences. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures. more severe.g. The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental. The higher the Likelihood Level. (c) translational landslide. The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis. and (d) ridge instability. health.June 8.. The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures 51 The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide. property.
Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. and none are in the costa sector. and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary.3. considering all four failure modes. Table 2. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. 2007 Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures. 4. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level. 52 Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA. SF36292.June 8. Risk category assessment chart Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5 6. 28 are in the sierra sector. The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. 67 are in the selva sector.003 A0F0 0607 0806 62 .2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2.
and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue. For example. Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix. In this regard. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix. some on both occasions.. 2007 In general. in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk. pipe movement. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk. In addition. However. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May. tension cracks. even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector. there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. respectively. Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. September. the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006). Finally. surface depression. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23).003 A0F0 0607 0806 63 . For each time period. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006). sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e.g. because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006. The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May SF36292. slope bulging. The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23.June 8. the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented. The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures. soil movement. The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006).
only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high. Risk assessment results for May 2006. By October 2006. Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk.” As mentioned before. the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006. 2007 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 64 . and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006. SF36292. By comparison. TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk. 94 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 3 2 0 4 17 2 0 1 13 9 0 7 24 12 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006 1 2 3 4 5 35% 23% 0% 29% 13% Figure 21.June 8.
SF36292.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 65 . Risk assessment results for September 2006. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 9 3 0 5 22 16 0 6 20 4 0 2 6 2 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 40% 47% 0% 11% 2% Figure 22.
which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 66 . Risk assessment results for October 2006.June 8. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 16 9 0 8 33 14 0 4 6 1 0 0 3 1 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 74% 21% 0% 4% 1% Figure 23.
Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4). The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program.e. 2007 The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels.e.003 A0F0 0607 0806 67 . inspections. 3 1 Reduction in Risk 2 21 9 1 21 9 1 0 27 1 3 1 2 3 4 5 May 2006 Risk Category Figure 24. SF36292.June 8. and presence of gabion walls). surface drainage control... which began in earnest in April 2006. slope inclination. and monitoring. The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures. because Severity Levels were likely unchanged. Change in risk from May to October 2006. The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i. whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites. groundwater depth. the Risk Category as of May 2006).
Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. 2007 The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. representation across the three sectors was not possible. the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006. In contrast. 50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category Figure 25. Hence. Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006) 4 5 SF36292. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector. engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method.June 8. The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5. However. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2. the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector. While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. respectively. Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW.003 A0F0 0607 0806 68 . comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector. However. wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3. Risk by sectors for May 2006.
2007 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006) Frequency 4 5 Risk Category Figure 26.. Initially.003 A0F0 0607 0806 69 . In addition. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk. Risk by sectors for October 2006. This RMP should state at least the following: SF36292. 6. this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites.4 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation We expect that the continuous. Therefore. decision processes and means of execution. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.June 8.g. we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present. strain gauges and inclinometers).
003 A0F0 0607 0806 70 . and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures. and sensitive. During our inspections in 2006. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites. Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned.June 8. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. 2007 • • • All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station. and engineering experience. be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection. The observed performance of the pipeline system. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical SF36292. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner. Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. complex. 6. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. Furthermore. observations.5 Conclusions The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities. • Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided. dynamic. Based on Exponent’s review. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway.
June 8, 2007
sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Description of Potential Risks and Controls
In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure. an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience. while sufficient for internal pressures. TgP’s outside consultant. 2007 and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading. MCI. where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength.2 Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L.003 A0F0 0607 0806 74 . This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending. This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing.June 8. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the 53 54 The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison. 7. SF36292. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. Thus. Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline.53 In particular. Therefore.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe. for the first and fifth spill incidents.
However. any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture.452.3 7. 7. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids. SF36292. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness.1 Inline Pipe Inspection Background TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline. Our review indicates that this set of 55 The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short. Under normal operating pressures. Furthermore. ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195. pipe gauge. These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195. repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk. metal loss. 2007 overload failure of the NGL pipeline. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes. and dents. However. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline.June 8. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions.003 A0F0 0607 0806 75 .3. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test.452.55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks. potentially leading to pipe failure. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies.
the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents. By the end of March. Among the 30 locations.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection. and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld. re-weld..g.g.. 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation).. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk. implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e.452.188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement. Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts. and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing. 13 to dents. radiographic examination of girth weld. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i. potential anomalies).). The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment. In all cases. numerous sites have SF36292. ultrasound wall thickness measurement. which includes excavation. micro hardness measurement). 7. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e. The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site. 14 were related to metal loss.452. In this regard. and based on the results. As of March 2007. as well as external excavations..e. we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195. a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i. visual inspection. 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed. patching.e. First.003 A0F0 0607 0806 76 . 2007 regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld. the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce. external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld.3. etc. Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications.June 8.
Overall.. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. Therefore. A verification of other sites is ongoing.3 Circumferential Crack Detection In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks. For cracks with a smaller opening. with a depth of 49%.56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable 56 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep. the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%. per DOT 49 CFR 195.3. currently.June 8. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure).e.452. In addition.003 A0F0 0607 0806 77 . Specifically. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. 7. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195. However. Specifically. All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep. TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. SF36292. 2007 been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect. the probability of detection decreases rapidly.452. Based on these findings. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 78 . the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. but it was caused by a specific site condition.June 8. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline. the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption. TgP has committed to evaluating potential options. per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads. Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline. whereas. Therefore.4 Conclusions The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions. at present. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending. in pure axial loading. even though the technology appears to be readily available. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws. based on this study. the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads. In this regard. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. Unfortunately. Clearly. the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger. 2007 with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of SF36292. Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. Specifically. 7. in bending.
June 8, 2007
significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.
Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.
Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.
As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.
Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).
A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
2007 Figure 28. Excessive movement associated with ground failure can. 8.2 Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1. in turn. and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking. Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms. Silva. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey.003 A0F0 0607 0806 82 .June 8. SF36292. and Tavera 2003). lead to pipeline damage.
.69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline. cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i.g. toward an open face such as a stream channel.g. VA. faults.68 and seismic compression. O’Rourke (1998).. unstable slopes. Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid. EERI. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction.June 8. 75.” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. 2. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD.. for similar levels of earthquake motion. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004). 2007 2. Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting. it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components.” Earthquake Spectra.65 landslides.64 However. as opposed to body waves. damage to buried pipelines may result.e.67 lateral spread. or poorly compacted fills). Vol. earthquakes). “An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering. Lateral movement of ground. ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures. PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e. Rayleigh or Love). “Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe.e. Vol. resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone. 20(4). Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i. Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i.e. Therefore. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking.003 A0F0 0607 0806 83 . This phenomenon generally occurs in loose...66 slope instability liquefaction. 1167-1183. 1392-1426.70 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 Transient strain is short-term deformation. typically with little to no perceptible slope. Reston. Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface. compression or shear) or surface waves (e. SF36292. liquefiable soils. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves. When these transient strains become sufficiently large.
pressure control stations. Consequently.0g. (2001). additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand. 2007 8.June 8. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes. Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity. 71 72 73 Vector Peru S.e.” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking. sierra.. “Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity.C. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard. For a subduction-zone earthquake. Specifically. with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval.C.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.5g represents half the acceleration of gravity. which is 1. inter-slab versus in-slab events). (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva.A. there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i. Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand Vector Peru S.A.3. Therefore. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. 0. These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW.003 A0F0 0607 0806 84 .7g73 for the extreme event and 0. SF36292. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector. and pressure reducing stations.5g for the design event.
g. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline.. it appears that other modes of PGD (i. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline. sands. and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. sand dunes). Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake. However. which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction. Peru. and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides. For the sierra and selva sectors. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements. Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault.June 8. rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels. lateral spread. at the intended alignment. characterizing potential fault displacements. slope instability. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction. particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions.e. and silts with high fines and clay content. APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault. landsliding. 2007 8..e. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i. They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e. Seismically induced slope instability poses a 74 ABS Consulting (2002). ABSC identified only one active fault crossing..52 m.3. liquefaction.” SF36292. “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 85 .
Consequently. “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines. Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility. 8. or with major curves or bends.” SF36292. an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid 75 ABS Consulting (2002). we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake. Furthermore.3 Wave Propagation Hazards ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect. However. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II.3.4. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program. ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. 2007 substantial risk in the costa sector.003 A0F0 0607 0806 86 . sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread. may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage. However. The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion. Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31.June 8. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations. the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities.
our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. SF36292. which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks. Consequently.4 Conclusions The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. Additionally. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered.003 A0F0 0607 0806 87 . 2007 connections. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline.June 8. 76 Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another. However. 8. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further.
naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings. and characteristics of the bed and bank materials. Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe. and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour. Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour.003 A0F0 0607 0806 88 . characteristics of the flood. (2) general scour. all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. location of the pipe crossing. Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round). intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches). 2007 9 Scour-Related Risks 9. Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream.June 8. To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline. Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes. SF36292. Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined. Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions. pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe. and (3) local scour. General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above. Once exposed or undermined.1 River Crossings and Scour Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water.
” 81 Golder Associates (2003).2 Risks at Buried River Crossings A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29. -20. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa.” 78 GMI S. which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. Furthermore. 2007 9. Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW.79. “Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477. to our knowledge. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.” SF36292. and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures. Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths. 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law. “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. However.A.” – date unknown. 81 77 Hydroconsult (2003). 79 Golder Associates (2002). HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream. This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18. 80. and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline. is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23. Techint. “Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea.June 8.” 80 Golder Associates (2002). in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing.003 A0F0 0607 0806 89 . the FHWA documents are guidance documents and. 18 (FHWA HEC-18). Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing. Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor. they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally. FHWA HEC-18. Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW. Ingenieros Consultores. which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis.77. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.3 and 479.
including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings.003 A0F0 0607 0806 90 . As seen in Figure 30.5% chance of occurrence SF36292. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth. 2007 Figure 29. The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline.June 8. the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth. The design return period was 200 years (0.
stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. such as reinforcement of the riverbed. • Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing. and energy dissipators. SF36292. • Scour countermeasures. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover. were designed and built in selected locations. • The river crossing locations were surveyed. 2007 during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0.June 8. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations. If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters. it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings. • At each river crossing. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5. it was increased to 1 meter. Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated. but in some cases. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model.2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical.003 A0F0 0607 0806 91 . • If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter.S. providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders. The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. a stochastic stream flow generation program.
Peru. result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth.June 8. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system. SF36292. 2007 Figure 30. our general practice and experience in scour prediction. when combined.003 A0F0 0607 0806 92 . However. 2007. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. All of the above-listed factors. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows. Lima.
primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure. 9. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary. Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty. To mitigate this potential residual risk. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. 2007 Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events.003 A0F0 0607 0806 93 . These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18. SF36292. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. and -23. -20.3 Conclusions The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. During our field inspections in 2006.June 8. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events. The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above. TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk.
Furthermore. Second. the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary. such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment.003 A0F0 0607 0806 94 . and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system. 10. Overall.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Overall. (5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME SF36292. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline. the review showed that (1) the more than 100. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. First. 10.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements.June 8. related to the Camisea Transportation System. 2007 10 Summary and Conclusions Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB. TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis. (3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82. (4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104.
82 ASME B31. 2007 codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines. However. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). Ultimately. Based on Exponent’s review. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. and ASME B31. This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above. observations. During our inspections in 2006. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. and sensitive.June 8. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006. complex. and engineering experience. SF36292. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures.003 A0F0 0607 0806 95 .4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3).8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. We expect that the continuous. dynamic. will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. 10. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline.
any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. currently. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195. all the welds were x-rayed. Consequently.5 Seismic-Related Risks The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. However. Therefore. 10. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions. First. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. during construction. to determine whether SF36292. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11).June 8. Second.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. Overall. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. 2007 10. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects.003 A0F0 0607 0806 96 .452. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that. our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan.
we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data. To mitigate this potential residual risk. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. However. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. 10.7 Summary TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process.June 8. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events.003 A0F0 0607 0806 97 .6 Scour-Related Risks The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. and thus. SF36292. However. 10. 2007 these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system.
performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. Overall. 11. which TgP has committed to implement. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management. and river scouring as secondary risks. SF36292. 2007 11 Recommendations Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. seismic events. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. with mechanical pipe integrity. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures.003 A0F0 0607 0806 98 . the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented. construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006.1 Geotechnical and Geologic The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1.June 8. are described in the following sections. based on the results and conclusions of this investigation. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection. Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk. These recommendations. At a minimum. TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline. 2.
At most of the locations. 2007 3.June 8. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. 5. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization. During the past site inspections. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable. We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni. In addition to the above general recommendations. piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 99 .5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using SF36292. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6. Prior to our site inspections. 4. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations. The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location. Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures. 6. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls. 7. TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations.
Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. analyze. Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings. b. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. and other such observations. 9. presence of discoloration. c. Following completion of this work. SF36292. and qualified personnel to install. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site. to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a. as discussed with TgP. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites. and interpret results. 10. It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. monitor.June 8. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. as necessary. Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. 11. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. 2007 simple hand drive hammers. Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes. as discussed with TgP. Detailed geotechnical investigations. This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement.003 A0F0 0607 0806 100 . especially noting new occurrences. and construction of remedial measures is currently underway.
TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection.4 Pipe To reduce pipe integrity–related risks. 11. 11. 11. and fifth spill incidents. Based on the analysis.3 Scour TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing. e. such as long-term degradation. This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active. if necessary. Formation of erosion gullies. design ground motions. fourth. and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends. if necessary. the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades. soil movement). TgP should implement.June 8. SF36292. damage to check dams. Later. 2007 d. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude.e. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i. retreat of stream banks.. lateral shifting of the stream banks.2 Seismic TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system. appropriate remedial measures. Alignment of the gabion walls at each location.003 A0F0 0607 0806 101 . or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds. This information shall be used to update. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements. TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first.