Failure Analysis Associates
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577
Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618
June 8, 2007
Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii
Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background
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3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks
5.1 Background 5.8.2.June 8.3 3.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.2.5 5.8.6 3.2.2 3.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.9 6 Conclusions
Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.1 General Review 4. 2007
3.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii
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.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions
Construction-Related Risks 5.1 5.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4.6 5.1 Design Background
4.5 3.7 3.3 4.4 3.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.8 4
First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions
8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56
Design-Related Risks 4.8.3 5.4 5.2 5.
4 8 Conclusions
Seismic-Related Risks 8.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.1 Background 7.3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.1 8.3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines
8.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks
7.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions
Summary and Conclusions 10.3.4 6.1 7.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.2 9. 2007
6.3.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 8.1 10.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.3.2 10.3.3.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
SF36292.3.1 9.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions
Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7.4 9 Conclusions
Scour-Related Risks 9.June 8.3 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7.3.3.003 A0F0 0607 0806
57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95
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.2 11.7 11
Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary
96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101
Recommendations 11.6 10.June 8.4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe
SF36292.3 11. 2007
10.1 11.4 10.5 10.
Site of fourth spill incident.
Figure 3. General area of site of first spill incident.
Figure 6. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. 2006. General area of first spill incident. during stabilization work.June 8. during ROW stabilization work. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). 2006. at KP 8+850. at KP 200+700. Photograph taken on September 11. Photographs taken on June 12.
Figure 7. 2006. at KP 222+500.
Figure 2. Photographs taken on June 13. and September 19. Figure 9. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline.
Figure 8. 2006. 2007
List of Figures
Page Figure 1.
SF36292. red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Photographs taken on June 14. at KP 200+700. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. looking downstream.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). after stabilization work conducted in 2006. General area of the third spill incident. Photographs taken on June 14. Figure 5. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. Bottom: View looking upstream.
Figure 4. during permanent pipeline repair work. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface. at KP 8+850. 2006. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. 2006. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. Location of second spill incident. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope).
Each zone is numbered. Figure 27. at KP 125+950. Figure 17. Risk assessment results for October 2006. Figure 25. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Figure 20. Photographs taken on June 13. Risk assessment results for September 2006. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. Washington State University website). with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107.
28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81
SF36292. Figure 19.June 8. 2007
Figure 10. at an amplification of 14×. Risk assessment results for May 2006. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. Figure 12. Figure 15. during stabilization work. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. 2006. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Figure 23. Figure 24. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Figure 16. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Figure 13. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Figure 21. Risk by sectors for May 2006. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. Change in risk from May to October 2006. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. Figure 18. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. General area of the fifth spill incident. Figure 26. Figure 14. Risk by sectors for October 2006. Figure 22. White arrows identify the narrow. Figure 11.
June 8. Silva. 2007
Figure 28. 2007. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).
SF36292. Peru. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Figure 29. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. Lima. Figure 30. and Tavera 2003).
Table 2. 2007
List of Tables
Page Table 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62
Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc.C.
SF36292. Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S.June 8. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.S.A. 2007
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U.A.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8. This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. Accordingly. In addition.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report. which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. Accordingly. such as rains and landslides or human activities. the findings of this report may be invalidated. The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review. Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events.
SF36292. ground stability. 2007
At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment. or the condition of concealed construction. Exponent has no direct knowledge of. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. and engineering analysis. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions. limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections. wholly or in part. Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas. by changes that are beyond our control. Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. document review. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user.
during the first 19 months of operation. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity.1 Along this route. at the southern edge of Lima. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge.
SF36292.June 8. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. commencing in April 2006. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco.
True length of pipeline. The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1. This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. 2007
Background and Scope of Work
Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system).003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline.800 m. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean. (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents.A.
The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. As part of that study. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. pipeline maintenance. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. Recently. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. and one in the sierra sector. pipeline design. the mechanical design. Construction of the pipelines started in 2002. primarily the NGL. pipeline construction. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary.June 8. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. Specifically. and ongoing operation. Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. In contrast. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. and commercial operation began in August 2004. The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. 2007.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 2) evaluating the
SF36292. All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. 2007
and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches.
a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. or had been completed. In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. In some cases. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis.June 8. These documents included engineering specifications. construction progress surveys. hydrological studies. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. seismic studies. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. river-crossing studies. operation.
SF36292. and maintenance of the system. construction specifications.
Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program. construction. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. geotechnical and geological studies. operations. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. and operational data. pipe material data. pipeline design drawings and calculations. construction. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. 2007
effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. Finally. operators. service providers. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated. under construction.
This is a rather deep crack. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed. respectively.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent.
A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure. ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. In both cases. Hence. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk. In the incident at KP 8+850.June 8. It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding). to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure.3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure.
SF36292. At both of these locations. In the incident at KP 125+950. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures. The second incident. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. 2007
Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. located at KP 222+500.
the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality. we identified four
The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures. In this context. The NG pipe at this location was not damaged. during our study. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding. controlled. 2007
the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. For the fourth incident. and/or monitored. Again. risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. located at KP 50+900. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. Indeed. In this report.June 8. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify. Finally. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill. eliminate if appropriate. For purposes of this report.003 A0F0 0607 0806
and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector.
The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). seismic events. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline. and river scouring. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Due to their importance. whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock.
For the purposes of this report. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity. and scour.5 mechanical pipe integrity. poor foundation (ground) conditions.
SF36292. although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. Furthermore. Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline. 2007
primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system. In summary. seismic events. Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below. typically when saturated. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement.June 8. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. to varying degrees. on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline.
The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow. However.6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design.
The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW. Argentina. SP. and Buenos Aires. all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion. using more than 100. external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had
ASME B31. and ASME B31. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation. The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites.000 individual pipes. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. 2007
Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i.. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003.e.
SF36292. Brazil. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. Therefore. government mandated corridor. Subsequently. each of which is up to 12 meters long. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data.June 8. hydraulic risk). such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill.
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. The more then 100.June 8. trench conditions.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later. Within the 3-km-wide corridor. To minimize environmental impact. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain.
SF36292. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and
Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays. would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. at river crossings. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section. and the work was inspected by outside consultants. Next. and potential damage to the pipe exterior. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing. Overall. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers. Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred. 2007
to be granted by the Peruvian government. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes. The ROW was cleared and cut. and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road. where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds. the pipe was strung out. and along rivers and drainages.
Overall. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5).250 km of pipeline is a low number. This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. Despite the above-described actions. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk. a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing
SF36292. The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. initiating the subsequent spill incident.000 girth welds. 2007
detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired.June 8. long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested.
Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. Next.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. All these failures were subsequently repaired. especially considering the challenging terrain. eight leaks were identified. external damage during construction in two cases. and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). During the hydrostatic testing. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. In this program. in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test. where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard. Eight failures in more than 1. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. which may be similar to other pipelines in the world. This situation arose with the second spill incident. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure. the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours.
the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. and data on movement characteristics. observations.June 8. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure. Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review. and controlled in this ongoing process. piezometer. 2007
geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. As early as April 2006. and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability. To date. At the end of 2006. During the second phase of our project.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. some on both occasions.. Exponent observed over 50 sites. As a result of these efforts. This system was validated using information from our field inspections. addressed. survey control. instrumentation (e. reliable repairs. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented. While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced. In more critical areas. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline. representing
SF36292.g. slope inclinometer. Further. and engineering experience. strain gauge. Based on our review. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective. to permit more expeditious. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure.
while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW). This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment. between KP 0 and KP 220. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk. The core of this program involves regular visual inspections. Therefore. reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. being now ranked as “very high. Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly.
SF36292. with solely the site at KP 108. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. adjacent to the second pump station. 2007
locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time. Thus. In this regard.” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. We expect that the continuous. the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW. including during the rainy season. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement. It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas.
TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. To mitigate the residual risk. As discussed above. while sufficient for internal pressures. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies. Second. and manner of execution. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested.003 A0F0 0607 0806
decision process. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons.June 8. First. all the welds were x-rayed. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. during construction. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. it is susceptible to this external failure mode. which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. Thus. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement.
Pipe Integrity–Related Risks
Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. weld quality. per requirements by API 1160 xxiii
SF36292. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further. reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. At this time. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk.
TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks. Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the
Department of Transportation of the United States of America. even though the technology to do so appears to be available. The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. currently. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features.
SF36292. have shown that.10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool. Results of the MFL inspection tool. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. In this regard. no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. In addition. At present. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions. Overall in 2006. which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. However.June 8. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. 2007
and DOT9 195. if required.
The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks..003 A0F0 0607 0806
.g. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations.June 8. pressure control stations. the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process.
SF36292. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard. TgP will evaluate potential options. slope instability. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector.
The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes. Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities. For cracks with a smaller crack opening. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty. and pressure reducing stations. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system. sierra. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. landslides. Additionally. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva. 2007
relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. liquefaction.
in the opinion of
SF36292. However. additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. and river scouring as secondary risks. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour. Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. considered to be the most significant. poor foundation (soil) conditions. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. with little warning and serious consequences. pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. In addition to the mentioned studies. seismic events. 2007
Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline. Therefore.
Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. However. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18). Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law.June 8. the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings. In addition. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer. Despite not being required. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. and mechanical pipe integrity.
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.June 8. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. and thus. #4. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007. excluding fault rupture. 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1.
SF36292. 3) reconsideration of seismic risk. 2007
Exponent. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. and #5. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB. In this context. based on the results. permanent ground deformations. Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. However. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. in particular wave propagation. resulting from strong ground shaking.
the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. at the southern edge of Lima. follows a 3-km–wide. government-mandated corridor. Within this 3-km-wide corridor.A. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0.
True length of pipeline. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches.11 Along this route. traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. 2007
1.800 m. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0. The alignment of the ROW. (TgP). the ~300-km-long sierra sector.June 8. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast..469 inch. and the 200-km-long costa sector. Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco.1
Description of the System
The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. which is shown on Figure 1.406 and 1 inch. Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government.219 and 0.
SF36292. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long.
Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast. mostly at major river crossings. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events. On the west side of the Andes Mountains. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture. 2007
The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Figure 1. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves. a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas.June 8. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas.
The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding.2
Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1). The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar. In this regard. The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld. The fourth incident. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP.003 A0F0 0607 0806
1. located at KP 222+500. The second incident. and pipe-related risks of this system.
The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. seismic risk. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide.June 8. appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe.3
This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. our work focused on the NGL pipeline.
1. scour risk. and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system. A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report. located at a river crossing at KP 50+900. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident.
seismic risks.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period. Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks.
SF36292. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process. Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities. pipe integrity risks. Issues related to pipe material. pipe manufacture. and scour risks at river crossings. and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5. 2007
The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3.
4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards. 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system. pipeline design.1
Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons.June 8. Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material.
2. 2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents. commencing in April 2006. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program. During this investigation.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. primarily the NGL. geologic and
2. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings. pipeline construction.2
Phases of Work
Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases.
2. operation. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. Specifically.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. hydrological studies. pipe material data. and ongoing operation. seismic studies. construction. and design of river crossings (scour analysis).3
In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. pipeline design drawings and calculations.June 8. These documents included engineering specifications. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100. In addition to these activities. 2007
geotechnical hazard mitigation. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation.. construction progress surveys. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. and operational data. mechanical design. pipeline maintenance. geotechnical and geological studies. construction specifications. In some cases.000 girth weld radiographs. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. As part of that study. river-crossing studies. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design.
construction. operators. or had been completed.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest.
SF36292. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents. were under construction. Finally. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. 2007
occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. service providers. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. operation. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW. and maintenance of the system.June 8.
and one in the sierra sector. At the point of rupture. with a slope profile of approximately 15%. This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m). GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system.June 8. in the jungle sector near KP 8+850.1
Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags. The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP). 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline.
SF36292. 2004. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline. In contrast. 2007
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents
3. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents.25 inch along this section of the system. The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River.
3. the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream. A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below.12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector.2
The first incident occurred on December 22.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk.
but based on available information. visit. addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. Exponent inspected this site on June 12. 2007
revegetation with grass. A substantial amount of overburden soil had been
Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. 2006. and by the ninth minute. and stabilization measures. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. At the time of our June 12. “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006). and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture. when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW.”
SF36292. During their site investigation. the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. 2006. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. Seven minutes after noting the anomaly. Exponent visited this site again on September 11. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed.17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work. The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released.June 8. repairs. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2. They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m.
0 to 1. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement. and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1.
Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff. inclinometers to detect soil movement.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 2006.18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW.5 m. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level. 2007
removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope. Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features. whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline. looking downstream.
SF36292. Top: View downstream (looking downslope).June 8. 2007
Figure 2. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). during ROW stabilization work. 2006.
General area of site of first spill incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. at KP 8+850. Photographs taken on June 12.
June 8. The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock. is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory.
General area of first spill incident. Inc.
Metallurgical Consultants. as shown in Figure 4. as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4). Photograph taken on September 11. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long). Metallurgical Consultants Inc. with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock. until the crack became critical.
SF36292. Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically. 2007
At the request of TgP. looking downstream. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. at KP 8+850. with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps.19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. 2006.
IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA). referred to as the Pacobamba failure.
Analyses done by GIE (GIE S. MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified. The incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3. and MCI.A. the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San
Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench.June 8.
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. 2007
Figure 4. As shown in Figure 5. Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured.3
The second incident was discovered on August 29. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline. approximately nine months after the first incident. 2005. as well as our own investigation.950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley. occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500.
MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. At this location. MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1. NGL pipeline excavation. and at 20:04. the removed fractured pipe section. and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair. Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site.219 inch. 2005. at 15:00. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location. A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline.3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. 2006. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate).
SF36292. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m. with initial participation of Exponent. Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock. the field investigation. At the time of our visit. On September 1. On June 14. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2. MCI analyzed. a slope profile of approximately 15%. just upstream of PS #4. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5. Twenty minutes later. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline. the pipeline was shut down. 2007
Antonio-Pacobamba Road.June 8. TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline.to 2.
June 8. 2007
Figure 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Photographs taken on June 14.
Location of second spill incident. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. during permanent pipeline repair work.
SF36292. at KP 222+500. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. 2006.
June 8, 2007
MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of
A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. at KP 200+700. 2006.June 8. Photographs taken on June 14. and September 19. during stabilization work. 2007
General area of the third spill incident.
at KP 200+700. Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section. MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes.003 A0F0 0607 0806
SF36292.June 8. MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure. In summary. and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes. hardness.
MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. 2007
MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident. Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW. MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld.
According to TGP procedures. 2007
3. 2005.0 to 2. 2005.219 inch.1 m below the stream bottom. Consequently. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108).
26 27 28
The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. including this river crossing section. At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24.27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe. At 05:00.0 to 3.June 8. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water. Furthermore. but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient.
SF36292. In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline.1 m for the NGL pipeline. the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes. An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline. The river is less than 10 m wide. at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900). After installation of the pipelines. a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline. which can rise 1. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion. Both pipelines were originally buried about 2. A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1.26 At this location. pumping was stopped by TgP. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture. which is standard construction practice.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3. the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.0 m during the rainy season.5
The fourth incident was detected on November 24.
Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006). TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation. Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics. No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture. Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site. Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006.June 8. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow. Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove. Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion. 2007
On June 13.
SF36292. and is nearly vertical above the groove. A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture. a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline. The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9). Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis.5-inch-long rupture. MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Photographs taken on June 13. 2007
Approximate Location of Rupture
Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture
Figure 9. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. Top: View looking downstream (uphill).
Site of fourth spill incident.June 8. 2006. Bottom: View looking upstream.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Figure 10.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. Indeed.
SF36292. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak.June 8. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity.
Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe.
375 inch. the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12.6
The fifth incident occurred on March 4. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion. The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12. were reported. The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole. The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines. 2006. generally on a hillside. in the jungle sector at KP 125+950. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%.June 8. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.” with medium potential for mudflows. A few seconds later. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato. At this location. but two injuries. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high.30 below a saddle. At the point of rupture. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. as shown in Figure 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Inter-American Development Bank (2006). A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline.000 m. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point. and an elevation of approximately 1.
3. Site soils are described as wet. No fatalities.32
30 31 32
A swale is a small valley. The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline. but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage.
June 8. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil.003 A0F0 0607 0806
SF36292. during stabilization work. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Photographs taken on June 13. at KP 125+950. 2007
New Stabilization Measures
Figure 11. 2006.
General area of the fifth spill incident.
the second was at the point of failure. and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated.
SF36292. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW. lowest. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0. MCI determined that the ductility. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11.June 8. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW. and the third. Subsequent loading propagated this crack. was upslope along the ROW. uppermost. hardness. construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline. 2007
On June 13 and September 20. interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time.055 inch (see Figure 12). cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0. The crack then became critical.5-inch-long arc.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex.01 inch per load step. The first. 2006. to form a flat fracture that followed a 10. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld. As with the preceding four failures. with rapid incremental tearing.
slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation.June 8. at an amplification of 14×.
MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. larger landslide. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones.
Recent geotechnical studies by IGL.33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site. indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. 2007
Figure 12. The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. and this shallow slide overlies an older. White arrows identify the narrow. Each zone is numbered. in part.
Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas. likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding.
3 m3)34 of NGL was released. 2007. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program.June 8. Typically. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent.
SF36292. TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. at KP 125+500. 2007
3.” April 16th. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500. To date.
Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2.
Figure 13. external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced. The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1. Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds. 2007.
Coga. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007.7
Recently. however.003 A0F0 0607 0806
which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness.8
Summary and Conclusions
Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents. Hence. progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. In both cases. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures. the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. in the fifth incident. The second incident. though frequent. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. are relatively small. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. respectively. While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction. at KP 8+850. which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe. The pressure fluctuations at this location. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. In both cases. at KP 222+500.June 8. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. at KP 50+900. For the fourth incident. at KP 125+950.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not
This is a rather deep crack. 2007
3. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. In the case of the first incident. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking.
The sixth incident is still under investigation. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area. and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Indeed.June 8. 2007
caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream.
and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31.
SF36292. the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. respectively. a pipe stress analysis. where the sizing of pumps. valves. Specifically. Title 49. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist. Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline. Commonly. 2007
4. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase.4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids). inspection. This information is carried over to the next step. testing. but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation. operation and maintenance of pipeline systems. whether usual or unusual. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses. construction.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). that the designer may encounter. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code.June 8. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States. the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis. Part 192.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Rather. wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe. However.1
Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components. these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. In this section. and pipes is performed.
Figure 14. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition. indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment.1
Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system. Using this information.
SF36292. The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline.June 8.
Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW.2. The profiles show good agreement. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route.2
Hydraulic Design Risks
4.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure. 2007
with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.000 BPD (barrels per day).4. the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10. For the NGL pipeline. 209. 2007
4. 108.2 0.000 to 70.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Figure 15.8 0. and 226.4 0.June 8.
Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline.2.2
Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline
The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis.7 0. at KP 0.1 #1 PS
Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP
1 0.2 1.
1. a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined.
SF36292. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31.9 0.3 0.5 0.6 0. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times. Based on this internal pressure. Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline.
because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP. The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed. The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108.4. and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg. and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day). the actual internal pressure. Based on this internal pressure.3
Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline
Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures. the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice. an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate.4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met.June 8.
SF36292. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1. or any combination of these events.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software. The requirements of ASME B31. a minimum allowable wall
Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems. pump shutdown and pump startup. In addition.2. Furthermore. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops. In summary. and are in compliance with ASME B31. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure. 2007
In addition to this static analysis.1 times the allowable MAOP.
4. Accordingly. flow rates. pumping capacity. This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg.
The requirements of ASME B31. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km)
In summary. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate.
SF36292. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure
0. larger than the largest expected operating pressure.
1. The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis.003 A0F0 0607 0806
0. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced.7
Max. The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened.8
0.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met.8.June 8. Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is. at all times. 2007
thickness was determined per ASME B31. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice.
Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline.
Prior to construction. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards. rock falls. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. Orlando Felix Salvador.3
Geotechnical Design Risks
ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions. debris flows. In addition.” December 2001. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. topographic information. to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. be considered during the design process. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance. and geologic maps. Route of Camisea Pipeline. 2007
4.” March 2002. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. Sierra and Costa Sections. satellite images. and flooding/river erosion. hillside erosion. and conducted field inspections along the proposed
Golder Associates.” February 2002. Dario Verastegui. 2003. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea. Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector. which include external loads. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads.” March 21. 37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides.June 8. MR Associates. particularly in the selva sector.
SF36292. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route.
identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes. and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified.June 8. debris flows. or scour.
pipe route. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion..41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design.e. Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment. external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system. Therefore. MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines.4
The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies. hydraulic risk).003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections. Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical
SF36292. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains.
8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.
SF36292. and ASME B31.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. 2007
stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.
pipe staging sites. fuel depots. both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. sierra. grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing.e.000 people on 12 spreads. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager.
The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April. and loading docks) in 2001. with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines. In order to minimize the impact on the environment. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less. access roads. During construction. The first step was to clear and grade the ROW..June 8. and mitigation measures were constructed at that time. camps. At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season. Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction. Techint employed up to 10. 2007
5. government-mandated corridor. who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Pipeline Construction Characteristics
Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). and costa sectors. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government.
SF36292. Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva.
The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. resting each pipe on two blocks. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used.” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW.
SF36292. or socalled pillows. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline. Afterward. trenching may have occurred first. In some instances. If the terrain was flat. every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom. upon which the pipeline would initially rest. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%. Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. 2007
The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself. and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges. The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. as depicted in Figure 18. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. because it was the only available route for transportation. Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding.June 8. the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions.
003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. 2007
Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107.
Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391.
Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day. Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment. The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. Once the trench was dug. When possible.June 8.
SF36292. rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width. Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads.
Figure 19. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches. 2007
Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching. In locations where the pipeline followed a road.
Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Typically. As discussed below.
Figure 20. the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes).
Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. 2007
Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching.
SF36292. Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures. blasting was required to trench.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. In some cases. Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench.June 8.
reduce. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation. whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate. rockfalls. landslides. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts.June 8.2
Geotechnical Construction Characteristics
During construction of the pipelines. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. Additionally. people. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004. GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. two months after the system was put into operation. and recommend measures to prevent.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and river erosion. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion. TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW. In October 2004. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for
SF36292. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90. and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation. GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement. 2007
5. and the environment. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW. but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure.
and shallow landsliding. 2007
maintenance.1. no date. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes.3
Clearing Related Risks
As mentioned previously in Section 5.44. In many of these locations. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW. necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. Pacobamba Route Sector. no date. 45 “Camisea Project.June 8. 44 Camisea Project. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6. Based on our field inspections. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement.
SF36292. coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters. 2002. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks. cracking. Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts. During our site inspections. During our inspections. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges. conservative values were assumed. The route selection along mountain ridges. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales.
5. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas. Variant Pisco. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN. where possible. October 2004. At some narrow ridges. soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles. When only limited detailed data were available. not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction. 45 In our opinion.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. Proyecto Camisea. Field Reconnaissance on July 17.
soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment. which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe. potentially creating a large. Figures 17 to 20). The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. This is generally not a recommended practice. specifically in natural drainages. The conditions in the selva sector.g. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods. Therefore.
5. for example. the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings). Dry sand. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6.June 8. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles. During our field inspection. Except in special circumstances. will not flow. 2007
observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW. Clods of clay. we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above. unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles. and the material type and wetness of the backfill.
SF36292. Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e. on the other hand.4
Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor. The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe..
Brazil.000 individual pipe segments. Additionally. each approximately 12 m in length. Available data (i. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion. Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements.. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”).
5. All three pipes
SF36292. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe. and two were defective longitudinal welds. and Buenos Aires.e. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures. API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. Specifically. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”). These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment. SP. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment.5
Pipe Material–Related Risks
The system was constructed using more than 100.906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49. The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba.193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes. Adherence to DIN 30670. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005. is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating. Argentina.June 8. hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59.
ID 1 2
Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline
Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8. For details on these three leaks. a sleeve is placed.8. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld
Pipeline NGL NGL
3 4 5 6
NGL NGL NGL NGL
KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170
October 4. risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes. 2004 September 16. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion.
Table 1. The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion.June 8. 2007
were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. It needs to be recognized that. 2003 July 27. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects. 2003 February 16. at each circumferential pipe joint. rather. This level of defect removal is not atypical. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low. and 5 in Table 1. as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. 2004 March 23. 2003
KP 210 KP 388
January 9. 2003
External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld
Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible. overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s
The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. see leaks 3. 2004 October 4. 4. however.
The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method. 2794-L-SP00016. IX. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss. a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. 2007
long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools.June 8. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds. In addition. and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold. API 1104 and ASME B31. whereas for the NG pipeline. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing. TgP operates a cathodic protection system and.8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012.
5. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and
SF36292. These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.3. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed. in 2006. and not weld quality. and 2794-L-SP-00031. In this regard. geotechnical loading conditions. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents.6
Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks
The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104. automated methods were used. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7. This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104. 2794-L-SP-00017.4 (liquid) and ASME B31.
due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack.H.
5. 12th World Gas Conference. as with all pipelines.1
Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks.
SF36292. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system.June 8. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that
G. page 10. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level. 2007
easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested.
5. there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken.7
Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks
Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld. Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes.8. A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5.8
Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks
5.3.8. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects. The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104. Ewing. there is a very small possibility. it was to be radiographed. Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired. Likewise. that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph. 1973.003 A0F0 0607 0806
All of these failures were subsequently repaired. eight leaks were identified. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline. For example. such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines.25 times the internal design pressure. the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults.250 km of pipeline is a low number.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
SF36292.8. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31. the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours.
5.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested. After the test. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing. especially considering the challenging terrain. our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes. 2007
exceeds the maximum operating pressure. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak. two by external damage that had occurred during construction. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding.48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate. In the case of the NGL pipeline.2
Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System
During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength. However. induced stresses were not uniform.8. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1. Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of
TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long. Next. Per this criterion. two by faulty longitudinal welds. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP). and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. during hydrostatic testing.
the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. Ewing.8.
5. 10 were plate defects.H.” 1973. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test. This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500.49 Of these 129 defects. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator.June 8. This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ). In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world. this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing. The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further
G. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents. page 10. 2007
3. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons. if it results in a leak. 12th World Gas Conference. As in any pipeline. where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph. in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing.3
Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks
Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing. During the time the hydrogen is present. some minimal risk may exist. Typically. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds.424 miles of pipe. Despite these actions. this type of potential defect. 16 were defects in the girth welds. however.
the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month.000 girth welds. and when it does occur. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low. but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack. We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Overall. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack. However. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air. 2007
propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. because absent soil movement. On the other hand. The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test.9
Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures.June 8. (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors
SF36292. Overall. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. risks are not as high as for a rupture situation.
003 A0F0 0607 0806
SF36292.June 8. and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes. 2007
were in compliance with API 1104.
June 8. and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline. 2007
Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
6. low strength. low resistance to weathering. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. rockfalls. freezing temperatures. over the Andes Mountains. and along the Pacific coast. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils. relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils. amounts of precipitation. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. but still pose significant risk to the pipelines. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. and ridge instability. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur
For purposes of this report. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain. typically when saturated. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. wedge landslides. narrow ridges. The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock. particularly when devoid of vegetation. The conditions include very steep and high slopes. hard rock. geology.
SF36292. Specifically. and high-gradient streams. rock slides. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines. high groundwater levels.1
Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions
The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement.
The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows. In January 2005. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system. and reinforced shotcrete. and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. rockslides. this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. and gravity walls. 2007
intermittently. five months after the system was placed into operation. rock bolts.2
As described previously in Chapter 4. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities. gabion walls.June 8. surface surveying. including GEOTEC. GEOTEC presented a plan of action. These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants. crib walls. For a challenging alignment such as this system. and slope inclinometers. slope armoring. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley. predominantly granular soils and gravel.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers. very little rainfall. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. and broad river crossings. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems. and rockfalls.
6. reinforced concrete walls.
SF36292. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. metal or concrete piles. wedge landslides.
we observed evidence of substantial ground movement.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route. or immediately following. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting. TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. 2007
Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. topographic surveys. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. Based on this study. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. and Stepanek). some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. Verastegui. Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. and made preliminary recommendations. The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock
SF36292. Following our June 2006 inspections. The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization.June 8. More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously. As described in Chapter 4. GEOTEC made several other recommendations. which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections. In addition. including implementation of subsurface exploration. In some instances. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006. For example. identified critical zones in the selva sector.
lined ditch to a main surface collector system. As a result of these efforts. in September 2006.g. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible. piezometers. Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary. rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations. Hence. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches. depths. (2) in some limited cases. in September 2006. Based on our second set of site inspections. with the exception of one site at PS #2. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements. and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled. (5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes.June 8. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel. rain gauges. Based on our observations at PS #2. 2007
below the landslide plane.. Further. where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline.
SF36292. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide. strain gauges. slope inclinometers. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006. including soil sampling in borings and test pits.
6.g. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below. and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis.3. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk.3
Geotechnical Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment Methodology
Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW. deforestation. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure. In this method. and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure. This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse. (2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters. complex. risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk. 2007
directions.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e. and remediation) causes. In our opinion. development. dynamic. In late 2006.
marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels. property. and safety.g. 2007
Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures. The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis. (b) wedge landslide. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. The higher the Likelihood Level. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site.June 8. The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. health. and (d) ridge instability. (c) translational landslide.
SF36292. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures
The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement.. The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental. consequences. more severe. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW. the greater the susceptibility.
Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA.
Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures. and none are in the costa sector.
Table 2. The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. Risk category assessment chart
Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5
6. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2. 28 are in the sierra sector. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. 67 are in the selva sector. 4.2
Application of the Risk Assessment Method
The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level. Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix. considering all four failure modes.
even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix. tension cracks.. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May. In this regard. some on both occasions.June 8. For each time period. sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e. along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May
SF36292. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue. Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. 2007
In general. in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk. pipe movement. The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites. respectively. the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006).003 A0F0 0607 0806
. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23). The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006). The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures. The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA. September. surface depression. For example. However. In addition. because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006. slope bulging. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. Finally. soil movement. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented.g. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk. and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited. Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix. Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006).
the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006.
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 3 2
0 4 17 2
0 1 13 9
0 7 24 12
2 3 4
DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006
1 2 3 4 5
0% 29% 13%
Figure 21.” As mentioned before. By comparison. only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. By October 2006. Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk.
Risk assessment results for May 2006. TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk. 2007
2006. and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006.
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 9 3
0 5 22 16
0 6 20 4
0 2 6 2
2 3 4
DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006
1 2 3 4 5
47% 0% 11%
Figure 22.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Risk assessment results for September 2006.
which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results.June 8. 2007
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 16 9
0 8 33 14
0 4 6 1
0 0 3 1
2 3 4
DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006
1 2 3 4 5
74% 21% 0% 4% 1%
Figure 23.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Risk assessment results for October 2006.
surface drainage control. slope inclination.e.. Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i. whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites.June 8. Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4).. The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. and presence of gabion walls). and monitoring.e. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures. because Severity Levels were likely unchanged. the Risk Category as of May 2006).
Change in risk from May to October 2006. The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i.
Reduction in Risk
May 2006 Risk Category
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. which began in earnest in April 2006. 2007
The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels. groundwater depth. The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program.
50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category
Figure 25. engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method. Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. However. respectively. In contrast. wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3. to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2. recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. representation across the three sectors was not possible. Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW.
Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006)
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. the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector. Risk by sectors for May 2006.June 8. 2007
The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5. comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector. Hence. However. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector.
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. This RMP should state at least the following:
SF36292. Therefore. In addition.4
Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation
We expect that the continuous. Initially.June 8. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions.g. we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.
6. this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites.. Risk by sectors for October 2006. requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk. 2007
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3
Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006)
Figure 26. strain gauges and inclinometers). decision processes and means of execution.
The observed performance of the pipeline system. including soil sampling in borings and test pits.5
The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed. Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical
SF36292. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. dynamic. and sensitive. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately. During our inspections in 2006. and engineering experience. Based on Exponent’s review.
6. be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. observations. 2007
• • •
All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. complex. This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities. Furthermore. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites. with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection. caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned.June 8. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation.
Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system.
June 8, 2007
sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In
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June 8, 2007
this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.
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June 8, 2007
Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Description of Potential Risks and Controls
In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,
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MCI. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading. tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents. This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes. while sufficient for internal pressures. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength.
SF36292.53 In particular. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively. This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed. 2007
and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing. Thus. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures.
7. axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure. for the first and fifth spill incidents.June 8. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience. where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents. Therefore. Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the
The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison. TgP’s outside consultant. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe.2
Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks
The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L.
Inline Pipe Inspection
TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline.452. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load. any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture. and dents. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules. potentially leading to pipe failure. ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes.
7. repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk. Under normal operating pressures. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location. 2007
overload failure of the NGL pipeline. DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test.55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks.3. pipe gauge. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. However. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline. These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis. Furthermore. metal loss.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions. Our review indicates that this set of
The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short.June 8.3
SF36292. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness.452.
as well as external excavations. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i.). First. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld.. numerous sites have
regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.3.. etc. potential anomalies). micro hardness measurement). 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed.. and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry. and based on the results. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation). The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e. and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld. ultrasound wall thickness measurement. 13 to dents.2
Inline Pipe Inspection Results
TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection.452.g. we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk.g. implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e.452. By the end of March. Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications. As of March 2007. Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts. The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site. the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents. radiographic examination of girth weld. the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. In this regard. re-weld. patching. 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment.e.June 8.188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing.. which includes excavation. a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i. Among the 30 locations.e. 14 were related to metal loss. In all cases.
7. visual inspection. external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld.
results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that. A verification of other sites is ongoing. currently. the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness. Overall.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool.3.
SF36292. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations.June 8.56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable
The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program.e. However. per DOT 49 CFR 195. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector. Specifically. TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%. Therefore. with a depth of 49%. For cracks with a smaller opening. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term.
7. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure). All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Specifically.452. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%.452. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep. Based on these findings.3
Circumferential Crack Detection
In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. 2007
been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i. In addition.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195..
in bending. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. Specifically. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending. in pure axial loading. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of
SF36292. Therefore. TgP has committed to evaluating potential options. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads. the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger.4
The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions. but it was caused by a specific site condition.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. based on this study. even though the technology appears to be readily available. per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline. 2007
with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool. Clearly. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks.June 8. at present.
7. Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline. the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads. the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. In this regard. Unfortunately. whereas. the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption.
June 8, 2007
significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.
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Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.
Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.
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Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.
Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.
As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.
Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).
A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.
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Excessive movement associated with ground failure can. and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking. 2007
SF36292. and Tavera 2003).003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Silva. in turn.June 8. lead to pipeline damage. Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms.2
Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines
Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1.
West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey.
“Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe.70
Transient strain is short-term deformation.e. faults.. Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid.68 and seismic compression. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking. O’Rourke (1998). cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i. Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i. Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking. PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e.66 slope instability liquefaction. 2. VA.65 landslides.64 However. as opposed to body waves. damage to buried pipelines may result. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures.” Earthquake Spectra. it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components. Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction. 1167-1183. toward an open face such as a stream channel.e. 75. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004). Vol. earthquakes).. This phenomenon generally occurs in loose. typically with little to no perceptible slope.June 8. liquefiable soils. Reston. for similar levels of earthquake motion. Therefore.e. Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface.g. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves. compression or shear) or surface waves (e.. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD.” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves. Vol.69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline. 1392-1426. When these transient strains become sufficiently large. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i. Rayleigh or Love). 20(4). Lateral movement of ground.g. or poorly compacted fills). unstable slopes..003 A0F0 0607 0806
.67 lateral spread. ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil. 2007
SF36292. EERI. “An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering.. resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone.
003 A0F0 0607 0806
. there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i. which is 1. Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity.5g for the design event.7g73 for the extreme event and 0. “Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard. For a subduction-zone earthquake. and pressure reducing stations. Specifically.3.. and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity.C. Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions.3
Seismic Risk Evaluation
8. Therefore. 2007
8. 0. (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva.
Vector Peru S. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking.e.A. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes. additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand.June 8.5g represents half the acceleration of gravity. inter-slab versus in-slab events). and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations.C. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector.A.0g. Consequently.
SF36292. (2001). pressure control stations. with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0.1
Characterization of Seismic Demand
Vector Peru S. These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW. sierra.” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking.
Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards
ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines.”
SF36292. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline. ABSC identified only one active fault crossing. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline.e.June 8. Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. sand dunes). rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels. which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction.e. sands. However. liquefaction. characterizing potential fault displacements. Seismically induced slope instability poses a
ABS Consulting (2002). and silts with high fines and clay content. Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault.. particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions. “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction.52 m. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault.g. 2007
8.3. APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault. and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes.. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent. Peru. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0. at the intended alignment. slope instability. lateral spread. and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. For the sierra and selva sectors. it appears that other modes of PGD (i. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i. They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e. landsliding.
3. may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program.
8. ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties. sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread. “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines.3
Wave Propagation Hazards
ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system. or with major curves or bends. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect.”
SF36292.4. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities. Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations. Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility. Consequently. 2007
substantial risk in the costa sector. Furthermore. Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31. However. The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion. However. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake. the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid
ABS Consulting (2002).003 A0F0 0607 0806
. we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake.June 8. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II.
Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks.
SF36292. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk. which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline. 2007
connections. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations.003 A0F0 0607 0806
The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. However.
8. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information.June 8. Consequently. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan.
Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. Additionally.
and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour. 2007
9. location of the pipe crossing. Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events. Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes. Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round). and (3) local scour.June 8. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe. Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions. pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe. (2) general scour. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings. Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream. General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. and characteristics of the bed and bank materials.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. characteristics of the flood. To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline. Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined.
SF36292. Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour. intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches).1
River Crossings and Scour
Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above. Once exposed or undermined.
“Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477. 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing.77.”
SF36292. which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. to our knowledge. HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream. However. Techint. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system. -20.79. Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor. Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW.2
Risks at Buried River Crossings
A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. 79 Golder Associates (2002). Furthermore. is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23. in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Ingenieros Consultores. “Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea. and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline.” 80 Golder Associates (2002). Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths.” 81 Golder Associates (2003).” 78 GMI S. the FHWA documents are guidance documents and. 81
Hydroconsult (2003). FHWA HEC-18. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa. they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally.June 8. Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW. This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18.A. 18 (FHWA HEC-18). which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis. Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing. “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.” – date unknown. 2007
9. 80.3 and 479.
Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). As seen in Figure 30.5% chance of occurrence
SF36292. The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline.
Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth. the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Figure 29.June 8. including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings. The design return period was 200 years (0.
2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical. Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated. • If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter. such as reinforcement of the riverbed. a stochastic stream flow generation program. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model. • The river crossing locations were surveyed. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5. The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing. the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time. were designed and built in selected locations.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and energy dissipators. • At each river crossing. it was increased to 1 meter. 2007
during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0. stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover.
SF36292. providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders. • Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing.S. • Scour countermeasures. If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters.June 8.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U. but in some cases. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study.
when combined. result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth. Lima.
Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows.
All of the above-listed factors. our general practice and experience in scour prediction. Peru.
Figure 30.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. However. 2007.
to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above.3
The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk.
SF36292. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. and -23. These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18.June 8. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events. During our field inspections in 2006. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007.
9. To mitigate this potential residual risk. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty. -20. 2007
Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure.003 A0F0 0607 0806
(4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104. 2007
Summary and Conclusions
Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB. TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis. such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. related to the Camisea Transportation System.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. (3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104. First. Furthermore. the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. Overall. the review showed that (1) the more than 100. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary. (5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME
10.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Second. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline.
10.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks
Overall. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks
Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82.
and sensitive. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above. complex. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces. and engineering experience.3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006.
ASME B31. This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas. will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline.
10.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5).003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Based on Exponent’s review. Ultimately. and ASME B31. We expect that the continuous. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system.
SF36292. observations. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. During our inspections in 2006.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. dynamic. 2007
codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). However.June 8. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006.
Overall. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required. Consequently.
10. during construction. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. currently. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11). Therefore. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline.5 Seismic-Related Risks
The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks. it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk.452. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. Second. However. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. to determine whether
10. our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites. all the welds were x-rayed. First.
these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered.6 Scour-Related Risks
The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. However. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures.June 8.
10. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions.7 Summary
TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter. and thus. However. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. To mitigate this potential residual risk. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process.
10. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system.
seismic events. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. with mechanical pipe integrity. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis.1 Geotechnical and Geologic
The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. Overall. 2. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. 2007
Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management. At a minimum.
11. and river scouring as secondary risks. TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline. which TgP has committed to implement. the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented. These recommendations. based on the results and conclusions of this investigation. Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk. are described in the following sections. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006.June 8. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection.
Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. At most of the locations. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6. During the past site inspections.5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using
SF36292. 7.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 6. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis.June 8. 2007
3. piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2. Prior to our site inspections. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization. Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures. 4. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project. We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations. 5. The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location. In addition to the above general recommendations.
It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. Following completion of this work. monitor. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes. 2007
simple hand drive hammers. to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels. Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings. b. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site. as necessary. c. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. and construction of remedial measures is currently underway. as discussed with TgP. analyze.
SF36292. Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. presence of discoloration. especially noting new occurrences. Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a. 9. 10. as discussed with TgP. including soil sampling in borings and test pits.June 8. and other such observations. Detailed geotechnical investigations. and qualified personnel to install. 11. and interpret results.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement.
Formation of erosion gullies.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds. if necessary.
SF36292. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements.2 Seismic
TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system. appropriate remedial measures. retreat of stream banks.
11. soil movement). TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection. fourth. This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active. Alignment of the gabion walls at each location. 2007
d. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i.. Based on the analysis. damage to check dams.4 Pipe
To reduce pipe integrity–related risks. if necessary. such as long-term degradation. TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first. and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude. and fifth spill incidents. design ground motions. This information shall be used to update.
11. e. Later.3 Scour
TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing. lateral shifting of the stream banks. TgP should implement.e. the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades.