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Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577
Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618
June 8, 2007
Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii
Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
6 3.8 4 First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions 8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56 Design-Related Risks 4.3 4.8.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4.4 3.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.7 220.127.116.11 5.1 Background 5.4 5.5 5.8.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.6 5.1 Design Background 4.June 8.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii SF36292.3 5.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions Construction-Related Risks 5.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks 5.5 3.003 A0F0 0607 0806 .3 3.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5. 2007 3.2 18.104.22.168 6 Conclusions Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.1 General Review 4.1 5.
3.4 9 Conclusions Scour-Related Risks 9.1 7.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.2 General Findings 57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95 6.1 10.June 22.214.171.124.1 9.1 Background 7.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.3.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines 8.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions 10 Summary and Conclusions 10.4 8 Conclusions Seismic-Related Risks 8.3.3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8.2 10.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.4 6. 2007 6.003 A0F0 0607 0806 iv .1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 8.3 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.3.2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks 7.1 8.3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks SF36292.3.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7.2 9.
2007 10.7 11 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary 96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101 Recommendations 11.1 11.6 10.2 11.3 11.5 10.003 A0F0 0607 0806 v .June 8.4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe SF36292.4 10.
at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. Site of fourth spill incident. at KP 222+500. 2006. 2 Figure 2. General area of site of first spill incident. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). 23 SF36292. Figure 5. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). General area of first spill incident.June 8. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. during ROW stabilization work. 12 13 Figure 4. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. 2006. and September 19. Photographs taken on June 14. Location of second spill incident. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). at KP 200+700. 19 20 Figure 8. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. Photographs taken on June 13. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. during permanent pipeline repair work. Photograph taken on September 11. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vi . at KP 8+850. 2006. at KP 200+700. Bottom: View looking upstream. at KP 8+850. General area of the third spill incident. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. 2006. 16 Figure 7. 2007 List of Figures Page Figure 1. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. Photographs taken on June 14. Photographs taken on June 12. Figure 9. looking downstream. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began. 2006. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. 15 Figure 6. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. during stabilization work. 11 Figure 3. 2006.
Figure 17. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. Figure 23. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. Figure 22. Figure 21. White arrows identify the narrow. Figure 25. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Risk assessment results for October 2006. at an amplification of 14×. Figure 12. Figure 13. Figure 24. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. 24 26 28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81 SF36292. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Risk assessment results for May 2006. 2007 Figure 10. at KP 125+950. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. Figure 16. Figure 20. Figure 15. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. General area of the fifth spill incident. Risk by sectors for October 2006. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Figure 27. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. 2006.June 8. Each zone is numbered.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vii . Figure 11. during stabilization work. Figure 14. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. Figure 18. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. Figure 26. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. Figure 19. Change in risk from May to October 2006. Risk assessment results for September 2006. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. Washington State University website). Risk by sectors for May 2006. Photographs taken on June 13.
and Tavera 2003). 82 90 92 SF36292. 2007 Figure 28. Lima.June 8. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. Peru. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey.003 A0F0 0607 0806 viii . Figure 29. Silva. 2007. Figure 30.
Table 2.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 ix . 2007 List of Tables Page Table 1. Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62 SF36292.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 x .A. SF36292.June 8. 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc.A. Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S.S. 2007 Acronyms and Abbreviations ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U.C. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No.
using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. and engineering analysis. Accordingly. and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. by changes that are beyond our control. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user.June 8. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. Exponent has no direct knowledge of. ground stability. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review. which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions. SF36292. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events. This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report. wholly or in part. Accordingly. or the condition of concealed construction. Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System. document review. 2007 Limitations At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction. In addition. Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xi . the findings of this report may be invalidated. limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections. such as rains and landslides or human activities.
A. climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP.800 m. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents.1 Along this route.June 8. at the southern edge of Lima. 2007 Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system). 1 True length of pipeline. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xii . (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. commencing in April 2006. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. SF36292. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. during the first 19 months of operation. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge.
pipeline construction. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. 2) evaluating the SF36292. and one in the sierra sector. The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1. Specifically. In contrast. 2007 and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. Construction of the pipelines started in 2002. As part of that study. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. pipeline maintenance.June 8. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiii . Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. pipeline design. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. Recently. 2007. the mechanical design. and ongoing operation. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. primarily the NGL. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. and commercial operation began in August 2004. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures.
2 Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. construction progress surveys. geotechnical and geological studies. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated. or had been completed. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. seismic studies. These documents included engineering specifications. SF36292. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. pipeline design drawings and calculations. construction. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. hydrological studies. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiv . In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. 2007 effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. operation. river-crossing studies. pipe material data.June 8. under construction. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. service providers. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. construction specifications. construction. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. operators. Finally. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. and maintenance of the system. In some cases. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. and operational data. operations.
and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. In the incident at KP 125+950. In both cases. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed. ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding). the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent. In the incident at KP 8+850. This is a rather deep crack. to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe.June 8. At both of these locations. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. Hence. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures. The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW. 2007 Spill Incidents Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. SF36292. located at KP 222+500. 3 4 A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xv .3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. respectively. While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. The second incident. and to consider the potential for systemic problems.
2007 the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. we identified four SF36292. The NG pipe at this location was not damaged. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk. during our study. Indeed. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. Finally. controlled. and/or monitored. In this report. In this context. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated. Again.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvi . For the fourth incident. Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill. located at KP 50+900.June 8. Risk Identification The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures. For purposes of this report. the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. eliminate if appropriate. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding.
However. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline. Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below. SF36292. to varying degrees. 2007 primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. and scour. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement.June 8. although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. Design-Related Risks The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. Risk Evaluation The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow. and river scouring.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvii . whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock. Due to their importance. In summary. seismic events.6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline. Furthermore.5 mechanical pipe integrity. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend. and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. seismic events. 5 For the purposes of this report. poor foundation (ground) conditions. typically when saturated. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system.
e. government mandated corridor. Brazil.000 individual pipes..4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. SP. Therefore. each of which is up to 12 meters long. Argentina. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had 6 7 ASME B31. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains. and Buenos Aires. SF36292. all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. Subsequently. Construction-Related Risks The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xviii . such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba. The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. 2007 Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. using more than 100. hydraulic risk). where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation. and ASME B31.June 8.
Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. and the work was inspected by outside consultants. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines. Overall. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges. and along rivers and drainages. The ROW was cleared and cut. and potential damage to the pipe exterior. The more then 100. To minimize environmental impact.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road. Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. at river crossings. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section. 2007 to be granted by the Peruvian government. the pipe was strung out. trench conditions. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes.June 8.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and 8 Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays. SF36292. would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds. Next. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes. the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain. Within the 3-km-wide corridor.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xix .
Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). especially considering the challenging terrain.June 8. long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases.000 girth welds. This situation arose with the second spill incident.250 km of pipeline is a low number. Eight failures in more than 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xx . the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours. The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard. Despite the above-described actions. eight leaks were identified. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure. Next. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). In this program. This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. external damage during construction in two cases. Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing SF36292. During the hydrostatic testing. in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test. All these failures were subsequently repaired. Overall. initiating the subsequent spill incident. 2007 detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. which may be similar to other pipelines in the world.
Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review.g. observations. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective. As a result of these efforts. some on both occasions. 2007 geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques. As early as April 2006. piezometer. Exponent observed over 50 sites. Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. addressed. and engineering experience. the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. slope inclinometer. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced. Further. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure. strain gauge. instrumentation (e. To date. and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxi . This system was validated using information from our field inspections. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline. representing SF36292.June 8. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. survey control. and data on movement characteristics. to permit more expeditious. Based on our review. reliable repairs. During the second phase of our project. At the end of 2006. In more critical areas.. While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area. and controlled in this ongoing process.
while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW). The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas. 2007 locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below. Thus. The core of this program involves regular visual inspections. the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. between KP 0 and KP 220. We expect that the continuous. SF36292.” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites. This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions. reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. being now ranked as “very high. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW. including during the rainy season. Therefore.June 8. In this regard.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxii . Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment. with solely the site at KP 108. adjacent to the second pump station.
it is susceptible to this external failure mode. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. weld quality. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk. will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further.June 8. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. and manner of execution. Thus. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. First. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. Second. 2007 decision process. which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested.003 A0F0 0607 0806 . and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. As discussed above. all the welds were x-rayed. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement. reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects. during construction. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies. To mitigate the residual risk. while sufficient for internal pressures. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above. At this time. per requirements by API 1160 xxiii SF36292. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading.
Results of the MFL inspection tool. The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks. Overall in 2006. even though the technology to do so appears to be available. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. if required. SF36292. 2007 and DOT9 195. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP. have shown that. currently. At present. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the 9 Department of Transportation of the United States of America. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program. In this regard. In addition. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxiv . TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools.10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity.June 8. no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However.
landslides. pressure control stations.June 8. Additionally.g. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva. sierra.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. TgP will evaluate potential options. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector. SF36292. as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks.. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxv . Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system. the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process. Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities. slope instability. 10 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. liquefaction. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e. 2007 relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. For cracks with a smaller crack opening. and pressure reducing stations. Seismic-Related Risks The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard.
with little warning and serious consequences. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline. 2007 Scour-Related Risks Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. and river scouring as secondary risks. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings. and mechanical pipe integrity. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. However. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour. pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18). considered to be the most significant.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvi . In addition to the mentioned studies. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer. seismic events. In addition. the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation.June 8. Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk. Despite not being required. However. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical. in the opinion of SF36292. Future Activities Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law. poor foundation (soil) conditions. Therefore.
SF36292. 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1. #4. Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. and thus. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. 3) reconsideration of seismic risk. permanent ground deformations. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB. 2007 Exponent. In this context.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvii . future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. However. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. excluding fault rupture. in particular wave propagation. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. and #5.June 8. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and. based on the results. resulting from strong ground shaking. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system.
the ~300-km-long sierra sector.11 Along this route. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. which is shown on Figure 1. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters.June 8.A. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. SF36292. Within this 3-km-wide corridor.800 m. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. government-mandated corridor. and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast.1 Description of the System The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002. with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0..406 and 1 inch. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. and the 200-km-long costa sector. and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. The alignment of the ROW. at the southern edge of Lima. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco.003 A0F0 0607 0806 1 . (TgP). follows a 3-km–wide. Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. 2007 1 Introduction 1. Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. 11 True length of pipeline.219 and 0.469 inch.
Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru.003 A0F0 0607 0806 2 . The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events. Figure 1. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas.June 8. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. mostly at major river crossings. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast. On the west side of the Andes Mountains. 2007 The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains. SF36292. The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves.
the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1). in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. 2007 The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system.3 Report Organization This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release. and pipe-related risks of this system. and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. located at a river crossing at KP 50+900. appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood. 1. 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 3 . SF36292. seismic risk. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed.2 Operational History Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident. our work focused on the NGL pipeline. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding.June 8. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar. The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system. scour risk. located at KP 222+500. In this regard. A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report. The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld. The second incident. The fourth incident.
and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5.June 8. Issues related to pipe material. pipe integrity risks. seismic risks. 2007 The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3.003 A0F0 0607 0806 4 . pipe manufacture. Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks. and scour risks at river crossings. Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process. Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities. SF36292.
overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings. 2007 2 Exponent’s Investigation 2. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations. pipeline design. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents. Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006.2 Phases of Work Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. primarily the NGL.003 A0F0 0607 0806 5 .1 Objective Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System.June 8. 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW. 2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. During this investigation. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards. 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system. 4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. 2. commencing in April 2006. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program. geologic and SF36292. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation. pipeline construction.
The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. construction. pipe material data. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. operation. pipeline maintenance.000 girth weld radiographs. 2. 2007 geotechnical hazard mitigation.June 8. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. and operational data. and design of river crossings (scour analysis). and ongoing operation. river-crossing studies. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. hydrological studies. mechanical design. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. geotechnical and geological studies. In some cases. Specifically. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. These inspections SF36292. seismic studies.003 A0F0 0607 0806 6 .3 Scope In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. construction progress surveys. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. In addition to these activities. These documents included engineering specifications. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. construction specifications. pipeline design drawings and calculations. As part of that study. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006.. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design.
construction. SF36292. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. 2007 occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents.003 A0F0 0607 0806 7 . where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. or had been completed. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW. and maintenance of the system.June 8. were under construction. operators. Finally. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. service providers. operation.
in the jungle sector near KP 8+850.12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. In contrast. 2004. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline. with a slope profile of approximately 15%. At the point of rupture. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below. This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004. and 12 13 14 15 Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk.25 inch along this section of the system.1 Background Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m). one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream. SF36292. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline. Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP).003 A0F0 0607 0806 8 .June 8.2 First Incident The first incident occurred on December 22. GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system. and one in the sierra sector. 3. 2007 3 Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3. The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River.
but based on available information.June 8. Exponent visited this site again on September 11. and stabilization measures. “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed. Exponent inspected this site on June 12. Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2. and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture. At the time of our June 12. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work. They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. repairs. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed.” SF36292. GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil. During their site investigation. 2006. 2006. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. 2006. visit. and by the ninth minute. A substantial amount of overburden soil had been 16 17 Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. Seven minutes after noting the anomaly. when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW.003 A0F0 0607 0806 9 . the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline.17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006). 2007 revegetation with grass.
2007 removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope.5 m.18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW. 18 Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement.0 to 1. and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11. inclinometers to detect soil movement. SF36292.June 8. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level.003 A0F0 0607 0806 10 . Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features. looking downstream. 2006. whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline.
Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. 2007 Figure 2. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). at KP 8+850. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). Photographs taken on June 12.003 A0F0 0607 0806 11 . General area of site of first spill incident. SF36292. during ROW stabilization work.June 8. 2006.
with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps. as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces. with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock. is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4). Photograph taken on September 11. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long). 2006. General area of first spill incident. The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock. with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface. 2007 Figure 3.19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically. 19 20 Metallurgical Consultants.June 8. At the request of TgP. until the crack became critical. Inc. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced. as shown in Figure 4. at KP 8+850. looking downstream.003 A0F0 0607 0806 12 . Metallurgical Consultants Inc. SF36292.
SF36292. Analyses done by GIE (GIE S. the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San 21 Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench.). This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3. occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500.003 A0F0 0607 0806 13 . referred to as the Pacobamba failure. As shown in Figure 5.A. IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA).950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley. 2007 Figure 4. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline. MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified. The incident. 2005. 3.June 8. approximately nine months after the first incident. and MCI. Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured.3 Second Incident The second incident was discovered on August 29. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. as well as our own investigation.
at 15:00. MCI analyzed. Twenty minutes later. the field investigation. 2007 Antonio-Pacobamba Road. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0. and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair. just upstream of PS #4. NGL pipeline excavation. A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline. On June 14. Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location. Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1. At the time of our visit. the removed fractured pipe section. a slope profile of approximately 15%. and at 20:04.to 2. the pipeline was shut down.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline. with initial participation of Exponent. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m. On September 1. TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline. 2006.3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline.June 8. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate).219 inch.003 A0F0 0607 0806 14 . the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site. 2005. At this location. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5. SF36292.
Location of second spill incident. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. 2007 Road Ridge Figure 5. 2006. SF36292. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. at KP 222+500. Photographs taken on June 14. during permanent pipeline repair work.003 A0F0 0607 0806 15 .June 8.
June 8, 2007
MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.
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The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of
A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.
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the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.
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June 8. 2006. during stabilization work. 2007 Landslide Walls Figure 7. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. and September 19. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. at KP 200+700. General area of the third spill incident. Photographs taken on June 14.003 A0F0 0607 0806 19 . SF36292. 2006.
In summary. Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section. hardness. Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW. and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes. MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld.003 A0F0 0607 0806 20 . 2007 MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident.June 8. at KP 200+700. MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure. MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes. SF36292. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. Figure 8.
pumping was stopped by TgP.0 to 3.26 At this location. Furthermore.27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe. a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline. but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing. 2005. Both pipelines were originally buried about 2. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. After installation of the pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806 21 . In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline.June 8.5 Fourth Incident The fourth incident was detected on November 24. The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river. The river is less than 10 m wide. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water.0 to 2. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108). which can rise 1. which is standard construction practice.219 inch. SF36292. 26 27 28 The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion.1 m below the stream bottom. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain. at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900). Consequently.1 m for the NGL pipeline.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3.0 m during the rainy season. At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24. 2005. An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline. At 05:00. including this river crossing section. According to TGP procedures. the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes. A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1. the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak. 2007 3.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 22 . 2007 On June 13. Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion. MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7. Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006.5-inch-long rupture. Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove. Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006. Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline. A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture. The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9). a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline. Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis.June 8. 29 Inter-American Development Bank (2006). TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site. and is nearly vertical above the groove. No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture. SF36292. 2006.
Photographs taken on June 13.June 8. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). Site of fourth spill incident. Bottom: View looking upstream. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 23 . 2006. 2007 Approximate Location of Rupture Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture Figure 9.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 24 . the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe. 2007 Figure 10. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe.June 8. Indeed. SF36292. In summary. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover.
At the point of rupture. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale. 2006. The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion. The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline. the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench.375 inch. Inter-American Development Bank (2006). as shown in Figure 11. The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines. and an elevation of approximately 1. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected. No fatalities. SF36292. At this location. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point.000 m. The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high. in the jungle sector at KP 125+950. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.6 Fifth Incident The fifth incident occurred on March 4. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected. but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage. The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole.30 below a saddle. generally on a hillside. A few seconds later. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. 2007 3.003 A0F0 0607 0806 25 . but two injuries. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12. A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline.” with medium potential for mudflows. were reported.June 8. Site soils are described as wet. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.32 30 31 32 A swale is a small valley.
2006. General area of the fifth spill incident. at KP 125+950. Photographs taken on June 13. during stabilization work.003 A0F0 0607 0806 26 . 2007 New Stabilization Measures Figure 11.June 8. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. SF36292.
2006. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11.June 8. and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex. As with the preceding four failures. and the third. Subsequent loading propagated this crack. The crack then became critical. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW. was upslope along the ROW. uppermost. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes. hardness. SF36292. construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline.01 inch per load step. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall. the second was at the point of failure. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW.5-inch-long arc. MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950. lowest. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). with rapid incremental tearing.055 inch (see Figure 12). 2007 On June 13 and September 20. after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld. MCI determined that the ductility.003 A0F0 0607 0806 27 . The first. interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. to form a flat fracture that followed a 10.
June 8. SF36292. The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location.003 A0F0 0607 0806 28 . Recent geotechnical studies by IGL. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. at an amplification of 14×. 2007 Figure 12. and this shallow slide overlies an older. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. White arrows identify the narrow. 33 Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas.33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site. likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding. in part. We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. larger landslide. to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Each zone is numbered. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph.
June 8. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG. 2007 3. Figure 13. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. at KP 125+500.3 m3)34 of NGL was released. SF36292. external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced.7 Sixth Incident Recently. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0.003 A0F0 0607 0806 29 . Typically. Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation. 34 Coga. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program. 2007.” April 16th. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent. To date. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500. The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1. 2007. TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. however.
in the fifth incident. The second incident. The pressure fluctuations at this location. In both cases. are relatively small.June 8. 2007 3.8 Summary and Conclusions Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents. at KP 125+950. Hence. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not 35 This is a rather deep crack. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness. In the case of the first incident. which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. at KP 8+850. While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. In both cases. respectively. at KP 222+500. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. though frequent.003 A0F0 0607 0806 30 . SF36292. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. For the fourth incident. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe. at KP 50+900. progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline.
Indeed. and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date.June 8. SF36292. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. 2007 caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area. The sixth incident is still under investigation.003 A0F0 0607 0806 31 .
the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis. respectively. However. testing. This information is carried over to the next step.003 A0F0 0607 0806 32 .1 Design Background Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. operation and maintenance of pipeline systems. but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components. the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States. Rather. these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code. valves. that the designer may encounter. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. and pipes is performed.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Specifically. but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation. a pipe stress analysis. Commonly. Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline. SF36292. 2007 4 Design-Related Risks 4. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses. Title 49. Part 192.June 8. and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design.4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids). the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase. construction. whether usual or unusual. In this section. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist. inspection. where the sizing of pumps. wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe.
Using this information. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route. The profiles show good agreement. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Figure 14.1 General Review Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system. indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment.June 8.2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 33 . Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition. 2007 4. SF36292. This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4. The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW.
4 0. with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations. SF36292. For the NGL pipeline.000 BPD (barrels per day). 1. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Distance (Km) Figure 15. at KP 0. 2007 4. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. 209. Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline.1 #1 PS PS #2 PS #3 PS #4 Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP 1 0.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis. the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10. a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined.3 0.9 0.003 A0F0 0607 0806 34 .5 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.2 1. 108.2 0. and 226.2.000 to 70.4. Based on this internal pressure. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31.June 8.
the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice.003 A0F0 0607 0806 35 . flow rates. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg. Accordingly. SF36292. The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed.4. and are in compliance with ASME B31. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops. a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software. In addition. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1. an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate.2. 4. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day). and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. a minimum allowable wall 36 Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems. The requirements of ASME B31. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure. The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108. and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg. In summary. or any combination of these events. because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP. Furthermore. 2007 In addition to this static analysis. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements.4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met. and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures.1 times the allowable MAOP. Based on this internal pressure. pump shutdown and pump startup. the actual internal pressure.June 8. pumping capacity. This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW.
Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is. 2007 thickness was determined per ASME B31.8 0.9 0. 1.June 8. The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis.8. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure 0. at all times. In summary. larger than the largest expected operating pressure.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km) Figure 16. SF36292. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. The requirements of ASME B31.1 1 Max. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate. The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened.7 0. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice.003 A0F0 0607 0806 36 .
” February 2002.3 Geotechnical Design Risks ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards. Route of Camisea Pipeline. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards.” March 21. rock falls. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads. 2007 4.” December 2001. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. and conducted field inspections along the proposed 37 38 39 40 Golder Associates. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route. and flooding/river erosion.” March 2002. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea. satellite images. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. particularly in the selva sector. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. SF36292. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment.003 A0F0 0607 0806 37 . Dario Verastegui. to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. which include external loads. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance. In addition. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements.June 8. 2003. topographic information. Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector. Prior to construction. Orlando Felix Salvador. be considered during the design process. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines. 37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images. hillside erosion. MR Associates. debris flows. Sierra and Costa Sections. and geologic maps.
identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes. 4. or scour. Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical SF36292. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified. Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies. Therefore. external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system.e..June 8. 2007 pipe route. hydraulic risk). and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections.003 A0F0 0607 0806 38 .41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. debris flows.4 Conclusions The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines.
June 8.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 39 . and ASME B31. 41 ASME B31. 2007 stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.
June 8. During construction.000 people on 12 spreads. Techint employed up to 10. The first step was to clear and grade the ROW. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less.003 A0F0 0607 0806 40 . and loading docks) in 2001. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction. 2007 5 Construction-Related Risks 5. Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva.. with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines.1 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i. both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors. At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. SF36292. government-mandated corridor. and costa sectors.e. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers. pipe staging sites. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment. In order to minimize the impact on the environment. grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing. 42 The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April. Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager. and mitigation measures were constructed at that time. access roads. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. fuel depots. sierra. camps.
In some instances. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material. every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain. as depicted in Figure 18. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions. Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%.003 A0F0 0607 0806 41 .June 8. upon which the pipeline would initially rest. The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags. or socalled pillows. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used. Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding.” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW. because it was the only available route for transportation. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld. resting each pipe on two blocks. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. Afterward. SF36292. and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. trenching may have occurred first. Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. 2007 The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself. If the terrain was flat.
Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. SF36292. 2007 Figure 17.003 A0F0 0607 0806 42 . Figure 18.June 8. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107.
When possible. Once the trench was dug. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. In locations where the pipeline followed a road. Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045. SF36292. rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain. Figure 19. Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position.003 A0F0 0607 0806 43 . The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline.June 8. 2007 Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width. Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench.
As discussed below. The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench. 2007 Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching.003 A0F0 0607 0806 44 . Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. blasting was required to trench.June 8. the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes). Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing. SF36292. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures. Figure 20. Typically. In some cases.
landslides. GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction. whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate. rockfalls. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for SF36292.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation. In October 2004. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts. two months after the system was put into operation.003 A0F0 0607 0806 45 . GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system.June 8. and river erosion. but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration. reduce. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure. Additionally. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation. and recommend measures to prevent.2 Geotechnical Construction Characteristics During construction of the pipelines. GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement. people. TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW. and the environment. 2007 5.
soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles. 2002. 2007 maintenance. 44 Camisea Project. When only limited detailed data were available. Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW. conservative values were assumed.003 A0F0 0607 0806 46 . necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures. During our inspections. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges. Variant Pisco.1. Pacobamba Route Sector. In many of these locations. and shallow landsliding.June 8. no date. The route selection along mountain ridges. coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement. SF36292. no date. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN. Proyecto Camisea. Field Reconnaissance on July 17. 45 In our opinion. Based on our field inspections. not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks. 45 “Camisea Project. where possible. 5. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas. At some narrow ridges. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline. October 2004. Exponent 43 Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales.44.3 Clearing Related Risks As mentioned previously in Section 5. During our site inspections. cracking.
on the other hand. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles. The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. potentially creating a large. Except in special circumstances. Figures 17 to 20).June 8. 2007 observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW.003 A0F0 0607 0806 47 . soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment. and the material type and wetness of the backfill. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor. would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe. unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized. will not flow..g.4 Trenching-Related Risks Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel. 5. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe. The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe. Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e. Clods of clay. Therefore. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods. specifically in natural drainages. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. During our field inspection. Dry sand. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions. we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6. for example. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles. This is generally not a recommended practice. The conditions in the selva sector. SF36292. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings). but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW.
2007 Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”). Additionally. The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment. Available data (i.e.5 Pipe Material–Related Risks The system was constructed using more than 100. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment. 5. Brazil.000 individual pipe segments. These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard. API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59.. and Buenos Aires. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes. and two were defective longitudinal welds. SP. each approximately 12 m in length. Argentina. All three pipes SF36292. is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material.June 8. Specifically.003 A0F0 0607 0806 48 .193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects.906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49. Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. Adherence to DIN 30670. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”).
2003 July 27. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low. 2004 March 23. rather.003 A0F0 0607 0806 49 . at each circumferential pipe joint. 2003 7 8 NGL NG KP 210 KP 388 January 9. as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld Pipeline NGL NGL 3 4 5 6 NGL NGL NGL NGL KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170 October 4. ID 1 2 Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. For details on these three leaks. The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate. however. This level of defect removal is not atypical. a sleeve is placed. 2004 October 4. and 5 in Table 1. risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes. overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection. 2003 External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s 46 The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects.8. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion. Table 1. 4. 2007 were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. 2003 February 16.June 8. SF36292. It needs to be recognized that. 2004 September 16. see leaks 3.
2007 long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents. whereas for the NG pipeline. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104. IX.3. 2794-L-SP-00017.003 A0F0 0607 0806 50 . In this regard. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss. and 2794-L-SP-00031. a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. 5. These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines.June 8. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing. In addition. TgP operates a cathodic protection system and. and not weld quality. The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method.8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes. in 2006. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and SF36292. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed. automated methods were used. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7. and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold. API 1104 and ASME B31. This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk. geotechnical loading conditions. 2794-L-SP00016.6 Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104.4 (liquid) and ASME B31.
as with all pipelines. 2007 easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested. there is a very small possibility. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld.1 Background Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5. 12th World Gas Conference. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack.3. Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations.8. Ewing.June 8.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system. Likewise. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes. 1973. page 10. SF36292.7 Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made. The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”. it was to be radiographed.8. there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken. due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level.003 A0F0 0607 0806 51 . that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph. 5. Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired.H. A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5. 5. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that 47 G.
25 times the internal design pressure. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP). Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of 48 TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1. during hydrostatic testing. especially considering the challenging terrain. two by external damage that had occurred during construction. and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate.June 8. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak. However. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. induced stresses were not uniform.8. such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline. the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours. 2007 exceeds the maximum operating pressure. Per this criterion. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing. For example.8. two by faulty longitudinal welds. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds.003 A0F0 0607 0806 52 . our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes. SF36292. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding. After the test. the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31. eight leaks were identified. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1. 5. All of these failures were subsequently repaired.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested.250 km of pipeline is a low number. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5. Next. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength.48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. In the case of the NGL pipeline.
This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents. 16 were defects in the girth welds. in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing. Ewing. 2007 3. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test. this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing. 10 were plate defects.49 Of these 129 defects.8. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing. SF36292. This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ). Typically. however. this type of potential defect. the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds. where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph. This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States. page 10. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. 5. but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld.” 1973. if it results in a leak. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator.H. During the time the hydrogen is present. some minimal risk may exist. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons. Despite these actions.June 8. As in any pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 53 .424 miles of pipe. The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further 49 G. 12th World Gas Conference. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world.
2007 propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome.003 A0F0 0607 0806 54 .9 Conclusions Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors SF36292. because absent soil movement. our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures.June 8. Overall. the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW. 5. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. On the other hand. Overall. but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack. and when it does occur. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air. risks are not as high as for a rupture situation. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test. However.000 girth welds. We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice.
and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes.003 A0F0 0607 0806 55 . SF36292.June 8. 2007 were in compliance with API 1104.
The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows.June 8. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. typically when saturated. The conditions include very steep and high slopes. Specifically.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. rockfalls. and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline. but still pose significant risk to the pipelines. hard rock. rock slides. narrow ridges. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability. 2007 6 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur 50 For purposes of this report. low resistance to weathering. geology. over the Andes Mountains. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings. wedge landslides. particularly when devoid of vegetation. freezing temperatures. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock. high groundwater levels. low strength.003 A0F0 0607 0806 56 . relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils. amounts of precipitation. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement. and along the Pacific coast. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. and ridge instability. SF36292. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. and high-gradient streams.
and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. and gravity walls. very little rainfall. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley. gabion walls. 6. rockslides. and rockfalls. 2007 intermittently. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works. and reinforced shotcrete. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW. including GEOTEC. and broad river crossings. These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants. five months after the system was placed into operation. The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows. wedge landslides. rock bolts. metal or concrete piles. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 57 . GEOTEC presented a plan of action. surface surveying. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities. crib walls.June 8. and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems.2 General Findings As described previously in Chapter 4. and slope inclinometers. slope armoring. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. For a challenging alignment such as this system. In January 2005. this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. reinforced concrete walls. predominantly granular soils and gravel. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers.
The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization. In some instances. Following our June 2006 inspections. Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. 2007 Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. identified critical zones in the selva sector. Based on this study. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. GEOTEC made several other recommendations.June 8. which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections. For example. More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. we observed evidence of substantial ground movement. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. Verastegui. The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock SF36292. or immediately following. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting. including implementation of subsurface exploration. The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. topographic surveys. As described in Chapter 4. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 58 . and Stepanek). and made preliminary recommendations. In addition.
rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW. depths. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2. and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide. in September 2006. Further. 2007 below the landslide plane. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. including soil sampling in borings and test pits.June 8. (5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006.g. Hence. strain gauges. slope inclinometers. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled. Based on our second set of site inspections. Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary. where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible. with the exception of one site at PS #2. Based on our observations at PS #2. We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations. piezometers. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. As a result of these efforts. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 59 . in September 2006. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e.. (2) in some limited cases. lined ditch to a main surface collector system. rain gauges. because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements.
June 8.. and remediation) causes. development. In this method. complex. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk. (2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters. SF36292. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters. In late 2006. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis. 6. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur. and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure. and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk. dynamic. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below. risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes. In our opinion. deforestation. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure.3. This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.003 A0F0 0607 0806 60 . 2007 directions.1 Risk Assessment Methodology Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW.g.
The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis.. 2007 Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels. The higher the Likelihood Level. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. health. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide. (b) wedge landslide. The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental. and safety. the greater the susceptibility. (c) translational landslide. consequences.g.003 A0F0 0607 0806 61 . The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode. property. The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site. including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures 51 The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement. The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2. and (d) ridge instability.June 8. more severe. SF36292.
Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. 52 Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. 4. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. and none are in the costa sector. considering all four failure modes. The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2. and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary. Table 2. 2007 Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures.003 A0F0 0607 0806 62 . 28 are in the sierra sector. SF36292. 67 are in the selva sector. Risk category assessment chart Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5 6.June 8.3.
The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA. sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e. For example. However. September. soil movement. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May. The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006). the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006).June 8. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23). in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk. and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited. along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May SF36292. because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures.. In this regard. tension cracks. Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix. the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented. The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006). even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector. surface depression. The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites. 2007 In general. pipe movement. during our field inspections in June and September 2006.g. slope bulging. there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806 63 . The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. Finally. For each time period. Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23. In addition. Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix. respectively. some on both occasions.
2007 2006. Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk. only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high. SF36292. 94 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 3 2 0 4 17 2 0 1 13 9 0 7 24 12 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006 1 2 3 4 5 35% 23% 0% 29% 13% Figure 21. By October 2006. Risk assessment results for May 2006. the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006. TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk.June 8. By comparison.” As mentioned before. and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 64 .
June 8. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 65 . 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 9 3 0 5 22 16 0 6 20 4 0 2 6 2 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 40% 47% 0% 11% 2% Figure 22. Risk assessment results for September 2006.
Risk assessment results for October 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 66 . which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. SF36292. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 16 9 0 8 33 14 0 4 6 1 0 0 3 1 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 74% 21% 0% 4% 1% Figure 23.June 8.
The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program. groundwater depth. whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites. which began in earnest in April 2006. the Risk Category as of May 2006). SF36292. Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4). slope inclination. Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i. 2007 The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels. surface drainage control. Change in risk from May to October 2006.. The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. inspections. and presence of gabion walls). because Severity Levels were likely unchanged.003 A0F0 0607 0806 67 . 3 1 Reduction in Risk 2 21 9 1 21 9 1 0 27 1 3 1 2 3 4 5 May 2006 Risk Category Figure 24. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures.e. The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i.June 8. and monitoring.e..
003 A0F0 0607 0806 68 . Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. However. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector. the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector. representation across the three sectors was not possible. wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3. Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006) 4 5 SF36292. While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector. 50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category Figure 25. 2007 The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5.June 8. Risk by sectors for May 2006. Hence. Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. However. the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006. respectively. In contrast. engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2.
Risk by sectors for October 2006. Initially.4 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation We expect that the continuous.003 A0F0 0607 0806 69 . this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites. we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present. 2007 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006) Frequency 4 5 Risk Category Figure 26.June 8. 6. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk.g. This RMP should state at least the following: SF36292. requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard. strain gauges and inclinometers). ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e. decision processes and means of execution. In addition. Therefore.. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions.
and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed. and engineering experience.5 Conclusions The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. Furthermore. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station. and sensitive. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities.June 8. The observed performance of the pipeline system. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical SF36292. caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures. Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. observations. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. During our inspections in 2006. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. dynamic. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites. • Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided. Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned. 2007 • • • All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection. complex. This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner.003 A0F0 0607 0806 70 . 6. Based on Exponent’s review. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway. be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible.
June 8, 2007
sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In
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this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.
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Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Description of Potential Risks and Controls
In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,
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where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents. tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents. TgP’s outside consultant. Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. while sufficient for internal pressures. 2007 and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading. Thus. for the first and fifth spill incidents. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe. axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the 53 54 The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads.June 8. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further.003 A0F0 0607 0806 74 .53 In particular. Therefore. an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed.2 Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L. This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. MCI. SF36292. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience. 7. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures.
55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length.003 A0F0 0607 0806 75 .3.1 Inline Pipe Inspection Background TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline. Furthermore. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test. SF36292.June 8. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions. repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk. potentially leading to pipe failure. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location. any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture. However. ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline. However.452. 7.3 7. and dents. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules. Our review indicates that this set of 55 The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short. These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis. DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195. metal loss. pipe gauge.452. Under normal operating pressures. 2007 overload failure of the NGL pipeline. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies.
14 were related to metal loss. implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e. etc..). The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation). and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry. radiographic examination of girth weld.e. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk.g. As of March 2007. 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed. which includes excavation. 13 to dents.. 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss.452..June 8. Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications. micro hardness measurement).g. In this regard..003 A0F0 0607 0806 76 . Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing. numerous sites have SF36292.3. ultrasound wall thickness measurement. By the end of March. the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i. The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48. as well as external excavations. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e. visual inspection. First. and based on the results.e. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment. we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195. 7. 2007 regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld. patching. and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld. a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i. re-weld. external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld. the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents. Among the 30 locations.452. In all cases.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection. potential anomalies).
the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program.. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool.e. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%. Based on these findings. For cracks with a smaller opening. with a depth of 49%. 7. Overall.56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable 56 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector.3. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep.June 8.452.3 Circumferential Crack Detection In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks. Specifically. Specifically. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that. 2007 been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect. per DOT 49 CFR 195. currently. However.003 A0F0 0607 0806 77 . this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. A verification of other sites is ongoing. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. In addition. SF36292. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep. TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure).452. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i.
the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption. the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger. Therefore. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow. even though the technology appears to be readily available. the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads. based on this study. Unfortunately. Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline. but it was caused by a specific site condition. per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. in bending. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws. the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. Clearly. whereas. 2007 with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool.003 A0F0 0607 0806 78 . TgP has committed to evaluating potential options. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of SF36292. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. in pure axial loading. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks. 7. Specifically. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline.June 8. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads.4 Conclusions The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions. Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. at present. In this regard.
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significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.
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Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.
Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.
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Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.
Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.
As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.
Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).
A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.
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2 Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1. 2007 Figure 28. Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms. and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking. in turn. Silva. 8.June 8. and Tavera 2003). West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey.003 A0F0 0607 0806 82 . Excessive movement associated with ground failure can. lead to pipeline damage. SF36292.
“An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering. When these transient strains become sufficiently large.” Earthquake Spectra..67 lateral spread. “Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe. Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i. liquefiable soils.68 and seismic compression. compression or shear) or surface waves (e. Rayleigh or Love). VA. toward an open face such as a stream channel.g. O’Rourke (1998). cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i.64 However. for similar levels of earthquake motion. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction. This phenomenon generally occurs in loose. Therefore... Lateral movement of ground. ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil. Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials.e. damage to buried pipelines may result. 2.65 landslides. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i. SF36292. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures. 1392-1426. Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting.June 8. earthquakes).. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking. unstable slopes. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves. typically with little to no perceptible slope. Vol. 75. Vol.” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No.003 A0F0 0607 0806 83 .e. Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface. Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking.e.69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline. as opposed to body waves.. PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004). EERI.70 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 Transient strain is short-term deformation. 2007 2. it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components. 1167-1183.66 slope instability liquefaction. resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone.g. Reston. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves. faults. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD. or poorly compacted fills). 20(4).
additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8. For a subduction-zone earthquake. Consequently.3.June 8.7g73 for the extreme event and 0. and pressure reducing stations. 71 72 73 Vector Peru S. These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW. inter-slab versus in-slab events). “Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Therefore. and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity.e. Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions. Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand Vector Peru S.5g represents half the acceleration of gravity.” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking.C.A.C. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking.003 A0F0 0607 0806 84 . (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva. 0..5g for the design event. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations.A. Specifically. pressure control stations. which is 1. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector. sierra. SF36292. 2007 8.0g. there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i. with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes. (2001).
particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions. They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system. For the sierra and selva sectors. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 85 .. 2007 8.52 m..June 8. which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes. it appears that other modes of PGD (i. APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements. lateral spread. rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels.3. landsliding.g. However. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault. and silts with high fines and clay content. slope instability. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes. characterizing potential fault displacements. sand dunes). “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline.. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction. and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides. and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. liquefaction. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines. Seismically induced slope instability poses a 74 ABS Consulting (2002). at the intended alignment. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline.e. Peru.e. Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault. sands. ABSC identified only one active fault crossing. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0. Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake.” SF36292.
Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect.3 Wave Propagation Hazards ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid 75 ABS Consulting (2002). sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread.4. However. or with major curves or bends.” SF36292. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II. ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties. we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake. The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion. Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31. may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage.June 8. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program. However.3. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake. 2007 substantial risk in the costa sector. “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines. Furthermore. Consequently. segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations. 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 86 .
4 Conclusions The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes.003 A0F0 0607 0806 87 . to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further. 8. 76 Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another. 2007 connections. SF36292. However. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. Consequently. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk. which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast.June 8. Additionally.
General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. location of the pipe crossing.1 River Crossings and Scour Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. (2) general scour. all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 88 . 2007 9 Scour-Related Risks 9. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe. Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream. Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined. Once exposed or undermined. Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events. and characteristics of the bed and bank materials. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above. Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour. and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour. intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches). To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline. pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe. SF36292. Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round). characteristics of the flood. Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions. Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes. and (3) local scour.
HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream. and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures. -20. Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor. the FHWA documents are guidance documents and.2 Risks at Buried River Crossings A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. “Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa. which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. 2007 9. Ingenieros Consultores. This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18. 79 Golder Associates (2002). Techint. and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. to our knowledge. Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW. 18 (FHWA HEC-18).” SF36292.79. “Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477. FHWA HEC-18. However.June 8. 80.” 78 GMI S.” 81 Golder Associates (2003). “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing. Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system. 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing. in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing.A. they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally. 81 77 Hydroconsult (2003).77. Furthermore. is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law.003 A0F0 0607 0806 89 .” – date unknown.” 80 Golder Associates (2002).3 and 479. which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis. Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths.
the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth. The design return period was 200 years (0. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 90 . including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings.5% chance of occurrence SF36292. As seen in Figure 30. 2007 Figure 29. Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth. The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline.
• Scour countermeasures.003 A0F0 0607 0806 91 . • Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. were designed and built in selected locations.2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover. it was increased to 1 meter. it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing. a stochastic stream flow generation program. providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model.S.June 8.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings. SF36292. and energy dissipators. but in some cases. The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. such as reinforcement of the riverbed. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U. • At each river crossing. If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters. • The river crossing locations were surveyed. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study. the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time. stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated. 2007 during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0. • If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations.
result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth.June 8. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. SF36292. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system. All of the above-listed factors. 2007 Figure 30. 2007. However. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25.003 A0F0 0607 0806 92 . our general practice and experience in scour prediction. when combined. Peru. Lima. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows.
and -23. SF36292. TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk.3 Conclusions The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures.003 A0F0 0607 0806 93 . Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. To mitigate this potential residual risk. These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure. During our field inspections in 2006.June 8. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty. 9. 2007 Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. -20.
First. related to the Camisea Transportation System.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. 2007 10 Summary and Conclusions Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB. such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline. TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Overall. Second. Overall. (4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104. the review showed that (1) the more than 100. and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system. (5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME SF36292. Furthermore.June 8. 10. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary. 10.003 A0F0 0607 0806 94 . our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. (3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline.
Ultimately. SF36292. will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system. observations. complex. dynamic. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline. This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. During our inspections in 2006. However. 82 ASME B31. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006.June 8.3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. and ASME B31. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected. and engineering experience. and sensitive. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006. 10.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). Based on Exponent’s review. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. 2007 codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806 95 . We expect that the continuous. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above.
452. to determine whether SF36292. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11). it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. currently.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks. However. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further. Overall.003 A0F0 0607 0806 96 . 10. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. Consequently. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design.June 8. our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required.5 Seismic-Related Risks The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. all the welds were x-rayed. during construction. Therefore. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects. First. 2007 10. Second.
June 8. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. However. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. However.6 Scour-Related Risks The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter. and thus. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. To mitigate this potential residual risk. SF36292. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues.7 Summary TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806 97 . such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events. 10. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. 10. 2007 these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures.
construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006. and river scouring as secondary risks. 2. These recommendations. with mechanical pipe integrity. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection. which TgP has committed to implement. the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management. Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk. TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 98 .June 8.1 Geotechnical and Geologic The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures. are described in the following sections. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. 11. seismic events. SF36292. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. Overall. based on the results and conclusions of this investigation. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis. At a minimum. 2007 11 Recommendations Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System.
7. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations.5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using SF36292. At most of the locations. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project. 4. Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures. TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations. 6. During the past site inspections. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls. In addition to the above general recommendations. Prior to our site inspections. 5. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6. piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable. The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location.003 A0F0 0607 0806 99 . We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni. Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis. 2007 3.June 8.
It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study. to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels. Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. as discussed with TgP. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites. as necessary. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. SF36292. and construction of remedial measures is currently underway. and interpret results. presence of discoloration. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. Following completion of this work. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. and other such observations. 2007 simple hand drive hammers. Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings. b. especially noting new occurrences. 10. as discussed with TgP. including soil sampling in borings and test pits.003 A0F0 0607 0806 100 .June 8. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site. Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. monitor. 11. analyze. Detailed geotechnical investigations. and qualified personnel to install. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a. c. 9. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes.
11. soil movement). if necessary.e. 11.. TgP should implement. damage to check dams. such as long-term degradation. the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements. Based on the analysis. This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active. retreat of stream banks.3 Scour TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing.June 8. if necessary. and fifth spill incidents. Alignment of the gabion walls at each location. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude. 11. or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds. Formation of erosion gullies. This information shall be used to update. design ground motions. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i.4 Pipe To reduce pipe integrity–related risks. e.2 Seismic TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system. appropriate remedial measures. SF36292. fourth. Later. TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection. 2007 d.003 A0F0 0607 0806 101 . TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first. lateral shifting of the stream banks. and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends.
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