Failure Analysis Associates
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577
Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618
June 8, 2007
Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii
Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
1 Design Background
4.9 6 Conclusions
Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.4 3.8 4
First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions
8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56
Design-Related Risks 4.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4.8.5 3.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii
SF36292.7 3.3 4.3 3. 2007
3.1 Background 5.2.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.6 3.June 8.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions
Construction-Related Risks 5.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks
5.2.1 General Review 4.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.6 5.2 5.8.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.5 5.1 5.4 5.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.2 3.2.3 5.
3.June 8. 2007
6.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.1 8.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.3 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.3.3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
SF36292.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.1 10.2 10.1 Background 7.2 9.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions
Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions
Summary and Conclusions 10.3.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 8.4 6.2
57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95
6.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.3.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.4 9 Conclusions
Scour-Related Risks 9.1 9.3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks
7.3.1 22.214.171.124 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines
8.3.4 8 Conclusions
Seismic-Related Risks 8.
5 10. 2007
10.4 10.3 11.June 8.2 11.1 11.6 10.7 11
Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary
96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101
Recommendations 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe
Location of second spill incident. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface.
SF36292. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope).
Figure 4. looking downstream. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs.
Figure 2. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. at KP 200+700. 2007
List of Figures
Page Figure 1. Photograph taken on September 11. Photographs taken on June 14. Photographs taken on June 14. at KP 8+850. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. General area of the third spill incident. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850.June 8. Photographs taken on June 12. red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began. at KP 200+700. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. General area of first spill incident. 2006. 2006. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. 2006. 2006.
Figure 3. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. at KP 8+850.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and September 19. 2006.
Figure 8. Figure 5.
Figure 7. Photographs taken on June 13. Figure 9. during permanent pipeline repair work. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Site of fourth spill incident. 2006. during ROW stabilization work.
Figure 6. Bottom: View looking upstream. General area of site of first spill incident. during stabilization work. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). at KP 222+500.
June 8. Figure 17. Risk assessment results for May 2006. Figure 25. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. Risk assessment results for October 2006. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Risk by sectors for May 2006.
28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81
SF36292. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Figure 23. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Risk by sectors for October 2006. White arrows identify the narrow. Change in risk from May to October 2006. at KP 125+950. 2006. Figure 15. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. Each zone is numbered. Figure 18. Figure 14. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Figure 20. General area of the fifth spill incident. Figure 16. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. during stabilization work. Figure 21. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. Figure 26. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. Photographs taken on June 13. Figure 27. at an amplification of 14×. Washington State University website). Figure 24. Figure 22. 2007
Figure 10. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Risk assessment results for September 2006. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Figure 12. Figure 13. Figure 19. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Figure 11.
Silva. Figure 30.
Figure 28. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 2007. Peru.June 8. Figure 29. Lima. and Tavera 2003). Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey.
List of Tables
Page Table 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. Table 2. Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U. 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.C.June 8. Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S.
and engineering analysis. which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. document review. such as rains and landslides or human activities. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment. using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties.
SF36292. Exponent has no direct knowledge of. or the condition of concealed construction. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. by changes that are beyond our control.June 8. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user. wholly or in part. 2007
At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. In addition. This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. Accordingly. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction. Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. the findings of this report may be invalidated. Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas. and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System. Accordingly. ground stability.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections.
This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean. (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco.June 8. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP. During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity. during the first 19 months of operation. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons.
SF36292.A. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge.
True length of pipeline. 2007
Background and Scope of Work
Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system). The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long.1 Along this route. climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. commencing in April 2006. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.800 m. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. at the southern edge of Lima. The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1.
no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector. pipeline maintenance. 2007. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. 2) evaluating the
SF36292. pipeline construction. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. primarily the NGL.June 8. All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). Recently. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. the mechanical design. Specifically. and commercial operation began in August 2004. 2007
and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. and ongoing operation. Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. pipeline design. TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. Construction of the pipelines started in 2002. In contrast.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1. and one in the sierra sector. As part of that study. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006.
In some cases. In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. construction specifications. pipe material data. operators. and maintenance of the system. construction progress surveys. hydrological studies. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. operation. construction. operations. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. construction. or had been completed. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. Finally. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. service providers. pipeline design drawings and calculations. and operational data. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated. seismic studies.June 8. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents.
Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program. These documents included engineering specifications. river-crossing studies.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline.
SF36292. under construction. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. geotechnical and geological studies. 2007
effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines.
While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. The second incident. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures. respectively. In the incident at KP 125+950. At both of these locations. Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed.3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW. 2007
Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. Hence. In both cases.
A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure. In the incident at KP 8+850. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. located at KP 222+500. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent.June 8. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding). The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. This is a rather deep crack. to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure.
SF36292. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate.
For the fourth incident. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify. the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. Finally. we identified four
SF36292. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality. during our study. located at KP 50+900. and/or monitored. For purposes of this report. Indeed.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. In this context. The NG pipe at this location was not damaged. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding. controlled. Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill. Again.June 8. risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated. In this report. 2007
the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide.
The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures. eliminate if appropriate.
6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement. 2007
primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system. Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline. However. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. seismic events. whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock. typically when saturated. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement.
For the purposes of this report. on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline. and scour. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline. In summary. Due to their importance. Furthermore.June 8.
The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow.
SF36292. poor foundation (ground) conditions. and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography.5 mechanical pipe integrity. to varying degrees. and river scouring. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend.
The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. seismic events.
SF36292. Therefore. 2007
Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites. Subsequently.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba. such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill. each of which is up to 12 meters long. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had
The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains. where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system. hydraulic risk).June 8. all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion. and ASME B31.000 individual pipes.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. and Buenos Aires. SP. Brazil. using more than 100. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. Argentina. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide.e. government mandated corridor. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard..
The ROW was cleared and cut. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers.
SF36292. Within the 3-km-wide corridor. Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. and the work was inspected by outside consultants. and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and
Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays.June 8. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing. 2007
to be granted by the Peruvian government. The more then 100. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines. the pipe was strung out. where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds. Next. the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains. would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. trench conditions. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain. Overall. and along rivers and drainages. and potential damage to the pipe exterior. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes. at river crossings. To minimize environmental impact.
June 8. This situation arose with the second spill incident.
Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. In this program. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5).250 km of pipeline is a low number. especially considering the challenging terrain. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. eight leaks were identified. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. Overall. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). All these failures were subsequently repaired. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure. Next. long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested. external damage during construction in two cases. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. which may be similar to other pipelines in the world. initiating the subsequent spill incident. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard. and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk. Eight failures in more than 1. a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases. Despite the above-described actions. the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. 2007
detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired.000 girth welds. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing
SF36292. This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test. The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. During the hydrostatic testing.
and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline. and data on movement characteristics. representing
SF36292. To date. slope inclinometer. Based on our review. As early as April 2006. Further.. some on both occasions. During the second phase of our project. the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust.g. and controlled in this ongoing process. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. addressed. piezometer. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure. and engineering experience. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced. survey control. As a result of these efforts. While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. strain gauge. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective. At the end of 2006. observations. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. This system was validated using information from our field inspections. In more critical areas. Exponent observed over 50 sites.June 8. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure. to permit more expeditious. reliable repairs. instrumentation (e. Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review. 2007
geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques.
Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. being now ranked as “very high. The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. including during the rainy season. and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk. In this regard. adjacent to the second pump station. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment. It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions.” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites. The core of this program involves regular visual inspections.June 8. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk. 2007
locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas. Thus. between KP 0 and KP 220. Therefore. while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW). the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW. We expect that the continuous. reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. with solely the site at KP 108.
such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. and manner of execution. it is susceptible to this external failure mode. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. weld quality. during construction.
Pipe Integrity–Related Risks
Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. 2007
decision process.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. First. reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. Thus. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. all the welds were x-rayed. As discussed above. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above.June 8. These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. while sufficient for internal pressures. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further. At this time. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies. Second. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement. To mitigate the residual risk. per requirements by API 1160 xxiii
The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program. currently. Results of the MFL inspection tool. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. if required.10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the
Department of Transportation of the United States of America. Overall in 2006. At present. 2007
and DOT9 195. have shown that. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks.June 8. In this regard. which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks. However. In addition.
SF36292. even though the technology to do so appears to be available. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features.
1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. For cracks with a smaller crack opening.
SF36292. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty. landslides.June 8. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. and pressure reducing stations. slope instability. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard. 2007
relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. liquefaction.
The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes. sierra.g. as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered.. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva. Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. TgP will evaluate potential options. Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities. Additionally.
The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector. pressure control stations.
naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings. In addition to the mentioned studies. Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. In addition. 2007
Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer. Despite not being required. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings. additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized.
Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour. and mechanical pipe integrity. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. However. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18). pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. However. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. seismic events. and river scouring as secondary risks. poor foundation (soil) conditions. in the opinion of
SF36292. Therefore. considered to be the most significant. HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law.June 8. with little warning and serious consequences. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline.
permanent ground deformations. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. in particular wave propagation. However.June 8. 3) reconsideration of seismic risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806
SF36292. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. #4. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. resulting from strong ground shaking. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and. 2007
Exponent. In this context. Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. excluding fault rupture. and #5. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. and thus. 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. based on the results.
Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. government-mandated corridor. (TgP). and the 200-km-long costa sector.1
Description of the System
The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. which is shown on Figure 1. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002.A. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters. the ~300-km-long sierra sector. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. 2007
1. with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long.June 8.219 and 0.406 and 1 inch.469 inch.
SF36292. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches.. follows a 3-km–wide. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer.11 Along this route. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. The alignment of the ROW. and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0.
True length of pipeline. at the southern edge of Lima. traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004.800 m. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0.
mostly at major river crossings. and a NG distribution point in Lurin.June 8. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains. a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast. On the west side of the Andes Mountains. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas.
Figure 1. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves.
Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. 2007
The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains.
SF36292. The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required.
In this regard.2
Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP. The fourth incident. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report.
SF36292. located at a river crossing at KP 50+900.
1. the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1).3
This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe. The second incident. The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system. 2007
The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood. The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release. and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld.
1. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding.June 8. located at KP 222+500. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar. and pipe-related risks of this system. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components. seismic risk. our work focused on the NGL pipeline. scour risk.
pipe integrity risks.
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. seismic risks. Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period. 2007
The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process. Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities. and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5. pipe manufacture. and scour risks at river crossings.June 8. Issues related to pipe material. Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks.
The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents. pipeline construction. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations. pipeline design. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. 2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents. commencing in April 2006. geologic and
2. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards.
2.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW. During this investigation. 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. primarily the NGL. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program. 4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards.June 8. Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006.2
Phases of Work
Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases.
river-crossing studies. and design of river crossings (scour analysis).000 girth weld radiographs. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. 2007
geotechnical hazard mitigation. pipeline maintenance. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. These documents included engineering specifications. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. construction specifications. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System.3
In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. operation. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100. construction.. and operational data. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. In addition to these activities. and ongoing operation. mechanical design. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. These inspections
SF36292.June 8. pipe material data. construction progress surveys. pipeline design drawings and calculations. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design.
2. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. hydrological studies.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. As part of that study. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. geotechnical and geological studies. seismic studies. Specifically. In some cases.
Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and maintenance of the system. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW.
occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. operators. where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. operation. were under construction.June 8. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. service providers. construction. or had been completed. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. Finally.
SF36292. At the point of rupture. This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004.1
Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below. in the jungle sector near KP 8+850. The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. 2007
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents
3. 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents.
3. Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP). one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. with a slope profile of approximately 15%. and
Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. and one in the sierra sector. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline. the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream. GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline. In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags. The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River.2
The first incident occurred on December 22. and to consider the potential for systemic problems.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m). 2004.25 inch along this section of the system. In contrast.
but based on available information. The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline. A substantial amount of overburden soil had been
Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. and stabilization measures. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed. Seven minutes after noting the anomaly. GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed.June 8. Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW. and by the ninth minute. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006). addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. 2006. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work. Exponent visited this site again on September 11. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m. At the time of our June 12.17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. 2007
revegetation with grass. 2006. They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. Exponent inspected this site on June 12.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture. repairs. the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. 2006. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2. “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project. During their site investigation.”
18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW.June 8.0 to 1. and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement.
Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff. inclinometers to detect soil movement. looking downstream. Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11. whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline.5 m. 2006. 2007
removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). during ROW stabilization work. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). 2007
Figure 2. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Photographs taken on June 12.June 8.
General area of site of first spill incident. at KP 8+850.
as shown in Figure 4.
Metallurgical Consultants. with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps.
At the request of TgP. with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock. as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces. until the crack became critical. 2007
Figure 3.June 8. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4). Metallurgical Consultants Inc. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced. Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically. 2006. is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory.
General area of first spill incident. with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface. at KP 8+850. Inc. looking downstream. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long). Photograph taken on September 11.
2005. This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3.
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. referred to as the Pacobamba failure.3
The second incident was discovered on August 29. IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA). the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San
Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench.A.950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley.
3. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline.June 8. As shown in Figure 5. as well as our own investigation. approximately nine months after the first incident.).
Analyses done by GIE (GIE S. The incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500. MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified. Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured. and MCI.
A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed. On September 1.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline. and at 20:04. Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture.3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. 2006. Twenty minutes later. the pipeline was shut down. 2005. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. at 15:00. the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location. the removed fractured pipe section. NGL pipeline excavation. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5. the field investigation. MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1.
SF36292. MCI analyzed. just upstream of PS #4. Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock. and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair. At the time of our visit. with initial participation of Exponent. 2007
Antonio-Pacobamba Road. a slope profile of approximately 15%. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m.219 inch. On June 14.to 2. At this location. TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline. MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate).003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2.
SF36292. during permanent pipeline repair work.
Location of second spill incident. at KP 222+500. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. 2007
Figure 5.June 8. Photographs taken on June 14.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 2006. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline.
June 8, 2007
MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.
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June 8, 2007
The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of
A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.
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June 8, 2007
the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.
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during stabilization work.
General area of the third spill incident. Photographs taken on June 14. 2006. 2006.June 8. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. and September 19.003 A0F0 0607 0806
SF36292. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. 2007
Figure 7. at KP 200+700.
and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes. MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld. MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes.June 8. 2007
MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident.
Figure 8. Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW. Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section. In summary.
MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. at KP 200+700.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. hardness. Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure.
At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water. but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108).27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe. The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture.0 to 2.0 m during the rainy season. 2007
3. the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture.June 8. which is standard construction practice. at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900). the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3. Both pipelines were originally buried about 2. Furthermore.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion.1 m below the stream bottom. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river. In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline.
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. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed. Consequently. a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline.
26 27 28
The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2. At 05:00. 2005. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage.5
The fourth incident was detected on November 24. including this river crossing section. pumping was stopped by TgP. According to TGP procedures.1 m for the NGL pipeline.26 At this location. The river is less than 10 m wide. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing.0 to 3. the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak. A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1. An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline.219 inch. which can rise 1. 2005. After installation of the pipelines. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain.
The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9). Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion. Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics.June 8. Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow. 2007
On June 13. a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline.
SF36292. 2006. MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7.5-inch-long rupture. and is nearly vertical above the groove. Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation. No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006). Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006. Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site. A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture.
Site of fourth spill incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). 2006. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. Photographs taken on June 13. 2007
Approximate Location of Rupture
Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture
SF36292.June 8. Bottom: View looking upstream.
the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. Indeed.
Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. 2007
Figure 10.003 A0F0 0607 0806
SF36292. it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture.
In summary. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak.June 8.
000 m. No fatalities. The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale. A few seconds later. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected.6
The fifth incident occurred on March 4. The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected.” with medium potential for mudflows. as shown in Figure 11. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. and an elevation of approximately 1. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high. 2007
3. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. Inter-American Development Bank (2006).June 8.30 below a saddle.
SF36292. in the jungle sector at KP 125+950. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. generally on a hillside. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole. but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage. were reported. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. At this location. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato.32
30 31 32
A swale is a small valley. The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines. At the point of rupture. A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline.375 inch. Site soils are described as wet. The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion. 2006. the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12. but two injuries. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon.
at KP 125+950.June 8. 2006. 2007
New Stabilization Measures
Figure 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Photographs taken on June 13.
General area of the fifth spill incident.
SF36292. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. during stabilization work.
it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall. and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference. construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex. with rapid incremental tearing. strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes. excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. Subsequent loading propagated this crack. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW. MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950. interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time. hardness. and the third.01 inch per load step. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld.June 8. 2007
On June 13 and September 20. As with the preceding four failures. to form a flat fracture that followed a 10. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline.055 inch (see Figure 12). The first. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area.
SF36292. lowest.5-inch-long arc. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). uppermost. MCI determined that the ductility. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0. The crack then became critical. was upslope along the ROW. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11. the second was at the point of failure.
SF36292.33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding. indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Each zone is numbered. White arrows identify the narrow. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture.
Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas. and this shallow slide overlies an older.
MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. in part.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. at an amplification of 14×. 2007
Figure 12. larger landslide. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation.
Recent geotechnical studies by IGL.June 8. We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location.
Recently. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program. external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced. 2007. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2. Typically.
SF36292. however. at KP 125+500.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1. 2007
3. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation.
Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds. To date.3 m3)34 of NGL was released. 2007. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007.
Figure 13.” April 16th. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent.June 8.
even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not
This is a rather deep crack. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. In both cases. 2007
3. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction. Hence. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. at KP 222+500. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe.8
Summary and Conclusions
Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents. though frequent. at KP 8+850. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. In the case of the first incident. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide.
SF36292. at KP 50+900. For the fourth incident. at KP 125+950. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. are relatively small. in the fifth incident. The second incident. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness. progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. The pressure fluctuations at this location. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. In both cases. respectively.
June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak.
SF36292. The sixth incident is still under investigation. 2007
caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream. Indeed.
we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase. but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation. the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. In this section.
4. Part 192. construction. and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. inspection. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design. wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States. valves. respectively. where the sizing of pumps. Commonly. Rather. Title 49.4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids). these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. whether usual or unusual. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. a pipe stress analysis. and pipes is performed. that the designer may encounter. This information is carried over to the next step. operation and maintenance of pipeline systems. but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline.1
Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. Specifically. testing. However. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses. the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis. the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31.June 8. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist.
Using this information. The profiles show good agreement. The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline.1
Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system. indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment.
Hydraulic Design Risks
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.2. Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition. with the graph origin being in Malvinas.June 8. This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route.
Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW.
3 0.000 BPD (barrels per day). a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined.6 0.4 0.
SF36292. the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10.1 #1 PS
Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP
Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. 209.2
Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline
The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis. at KP 0.2 1.2 0.
1.June 8. Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline. 2007
4.000 to 70.5 0.7 0. with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations.8 0. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times. For the NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Based on this internal pressure. 108. and 226.4.9 0.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600
flow rates. The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108. Furthermore. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day). or any combination of these events. a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software.4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met.
4. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg. because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops. The requirements of ASME B31. In addition.4. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements.June 8. Accordingly.2. and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg. pumping capacity.3
Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline
Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures. Based on this internal pressure. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure. a minimum allowable wall
Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems.1 times the allowable MAOP. In summary. 2007
In addition to this static analysis. This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW. pump shutdown and pump startup. the actual internal pressure. an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate. and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis.
SF36292. and are in compliance with ASME B31. The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed. the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced.
thickness was determined per ASME B31.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km)
0.003 A0F0 0607 0806
In summary. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure
1.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met. The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate. The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis.8. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice.7
0. at all times.
Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1.June 8. The requirements of ASME B31. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. larger than the largest expected operating pressure.8
0. Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is.
Dario Verastegui. MR Associates.” March 21. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment.3
Geotechnical Design Risks
ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions. Prior to construction. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors. hillside erosion. Sierra and Costa Sections. 2003. Orlando Felix Salvador. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads. particularly in the selva sector. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures.” December 2001. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. be considered during the design process. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea. and geologic maps. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3. In addition.” March 2002. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance. 37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images. 2007
4. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides. rock falls. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines.” February 2002. which include external loads. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads. and flooding/river erosion.June 8. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. debris flows. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards. topographic information. satellite images. and conducted field inspections along the proposed
Golder Associates. Route of Camisea Pipeline.
SF36292. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route.
e. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion.June 8.. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. Therefore. 2007
pipe route. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes. MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep. and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified. Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement.003 A0F0 0607 0806
4. Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical
SF36292. external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system.41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment.4
The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements. hydraulic risk). or scour. and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections. debris flows.
stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. and ASME B31.
ASME B31.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.
pipe staging sites. grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing. Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors. Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva.000 people on 12 spreads. camps.
SF36292. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government.e.. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. Techint employed up to 10. who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers.
The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor. with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Pipeline Construction Characteristics
Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i. government-mandated corridor. 2007
5.June 8. Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction. sierra. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season. and mitigation measures were constructed at that time. fuel depots. During construction. The first step was to clear and grade the ROW. and costa sectors. and loading docks) in 2001. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less. In order to minimize the impact on the environment. access roads.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment.
Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions. 2007
The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself. resting each pipe on two blocks.June 8. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. If the terrain was flat. as depicted in Figure 18.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom. Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding.” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW. Afterward. Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges. upon which the pipeline would initially rest. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used. the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material. or socalled pillows. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. trenching may have occurred first. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. because it was the only available route for transportation. In some instances. The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags.
SF36292. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain.
Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391.
Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Figure 18.June 8.
Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width. The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline. Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045. a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches.
SF36292. rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain.June 8. When possible. Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads. Once the trench was dug. In locations where the pipeline followed a road. 2007
Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench.
Figure 19. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment.
In some cases.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. Typically. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures. As discussed below. 2007
Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching.
SF36292. the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes). blasting was required to trench. The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench.
Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing.
Figure 20. Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92.
whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate. people. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation. landslides. In October 2004. GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement. TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW.2
Geotechnical Construction Characteristics
During construction of the pipelines. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90. 2007
5. and recommend measures to prevent. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure. Additionally. and the environment. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for
SF36292. GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004. and river erosion. rockfalls. reduce. and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. two months after the system was put into operation. GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW.June 8.
Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. and shallow landsliding. necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. October 2004. When only limited detailed data were available. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section. 44 Camisea Project. 45 “Camisea Project. no date. Pacobamba Route Sector. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas. Field Reconnaissance on July 17. Exponent
Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales. During our site inspections. 2002. soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles. 45 In our opinion. coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters.
SF36292. Variant Pisco.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek.3
Clearing Related Risks
As mentioned previously in Section 5. not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline.44. Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts. During our inspections. Proyecto Camisea.
5. In many of these locations. Based on our field inspections. where possible. cracking. The route selection along mountain ridges.June 8. At some narrow ridges. no date.1. 2007
maintenance. conservative values were assumed. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement.
which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. 2007
observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW. we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above. Therefore. will not flow. The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor. During our field inspection.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings). This is generally not a recommended practice. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions.g. The conditions in the selva sector. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles.. Except in special circumstances. and the material type and wetness of the backfill. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6.4
Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods. would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe. but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized. specifically in natural drainages. Clods of clay.
5. Figures 17 to 20). the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW. for example. soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe. The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e. potentially creating a large. on the other hand.June 8. Dry sand.
The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba. Brazil. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes.
5. each approximately 12 m in length.193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects. All three pipes
SF36292.000 individual pipe segments. and Buenos Aires. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures. Adherence to DIN 30670.June 8.e. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material.906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49. These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005. Specifically. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”). Argentina. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Available data (i.5
Pipe Material–Related Risks
The system was constructed using more than 100.. SP. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion. and two were defective longitudinal welds. API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe. 2007
Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”). hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59. Additionally.
The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate. 2004 October 4. 2004 September 16. This level of defect removal is not atypical.
ID 1 2
Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline
Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. 4. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld
Pipeline NGL NGL
3 4 5 6
NGL NGL NGL NGL
KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170
October 4. risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects. It needs to be recognized that. 2003
KP 210 KP 388
January 9.June 8.8.
Table 1. 2004 March 23. a sleeve is placed. see leaks 3. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low. 2003 February 16. however. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion. rather. overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection. For details on these three leaks. 2007
were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. at each circumferential pipe joint. 2003
External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld
Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s
The pipe book lists relevant pipe data.
SF36292. and 5 in Table 1. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion. 2003 July 27.
003 A0F0 0607 0806
. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and
SF36292. 2794-L-SP00016. TgP operates a cathodic protection system and.
Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks
The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104. whereas for the NG pipeline. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012. IX. In this regard. and 2794-L-SP-00031.4 (liquid) and ASME B31. In addition. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104. a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing. in 2006. The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method.June 8. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss. API 1104 and ASME B31. automated methods were used. geotechnical loading conditions. 2794-L-SP-00017. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents. and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold. and not weld quality. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7.8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes.3. 2007
long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools. This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk.
there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken.
SF36292. Ewing. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”. it was to be radiographed. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects. page 10. Likewise. 2007
easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.8. that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that
5. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system.7
Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks
Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made. 12th World Gas Conference.H. there is a very small possibility. 1973.8. The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level. as with all pipelines.1
Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks.3.June 8. A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes. Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired. due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld. Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations.8
Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks
June 8.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested. For example.8. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak. and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate. Per this criterion. our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes. two by external damage that had occurred during construction. the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. In the case of the NGL pipeline.48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds.250 km of pipeline is a low number. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. After the test. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding. two by faulty longitudinal welds. such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines. during hydrostatic testing. eight leaks were identified. All of these failures were subsequently repaired. induced stresses were not uniform. Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of
TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP). 2007
exceeds the maximum operating pressure. especially considering the challenging terrain.2
Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System
During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system.8. the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together. Next. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1.
5.25 times the internal design pressure. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31. However.
SF36292. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults.
but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further
Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks
Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing. Typically. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding. Ewing. the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator. 2007
3.8. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing.
5. where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph. however. if it results in a leak. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected.
SF36292. As in any pipeline. 10 were plate defects.H. This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500. During the time the hydrogen is present. some minimal risk may exist. page 10. 16 were defects in the girth welds. 12th World Gas Conference.” 1973.49 Of these 129 defects.June 8. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds. In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world. This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline. this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test. this type of potential defect. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States. This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ).424 miles of pipe. Despite these actions.
the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low. risks are not as high as for a rupture situation. The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test. (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors
SF36292. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures. We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month. Overall. our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100.
5. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. However. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. Overall. but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack. 2007
propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. because absent soil movement. and when it does occur. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006.June 8. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack. the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW.000 girth welds.9
Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome. On the other hand.
were in compliance with API 1104. and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
narrow ridges. and ridge instability. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils. over the Andes Mountains. particularly when devoid of vegetation. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
6. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. amounts of precipitation. hard rock. typically when saturated. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines. and high-gradient streams. high groundwater levels.1
Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions
The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. low strength. wedge landslides. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement. Specifically. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. and along the Pacific coast. but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur
For purposes of this report. freezing temperatures. and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline.June 8. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils. The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows. The conditions include very steep and high slopes. geology. rockfalls. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. rock slides. but still pose significant risk to the pipelines.
SF36292. low resistance to weathering. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion.
intermittently. GEOTEC presented a plan of action. and rockfalls. slope armoring.2
As described previously in Chapter 4. very little rainfall. five months after the system was placed into operation.
6. and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers. The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley. metal or concrete piles. reinforced concrete walls. and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. wedge landslides. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system. In January 2005. and reinforced shotcrete. and slope inclinometers.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. surface surveying. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. rock bolts. crib walls. predominantly granular soils and gravel. including GEOTEC. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works. and broad river crossings. These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants. For a challenging alignment such as this system. and gravity walls. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities.June 8. gabion walls. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard.
Following our June 2006 inspections. For example. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. and Stepanek).June 8. TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. GEOTEC made several other recommendations. As described in Chapter 4.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete. and made preliminary recommendations. identified critical zones in the selva sector. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006. 2007
Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. topographic surveys. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock
SF36292. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. we observed evidence of substantial ground movement. The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization. Verastegui. In some instances. including implementation of subsurface exploration. Based on this study. More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously. In addition. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route. which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. or immediately following.
we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions. rain gauges. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e. 2007
below the landslide plane. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. As a result of these efforts. Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. depths. in September 2006. Hence. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2. slope inclinometers. in September 2006. (2) in some limited cases.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel.g. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline. Based on our second set of site inspections. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide.
SF36292. piezometers. with the exception of one site at PS #2. because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements. lined ditch to a main surface collector system. Further. (5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes. rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW. Based on our observations at PS #2.June 8. strain gauges.. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled. We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches. where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006.
and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. In this method. (2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk.1
Risk Assessment Methodology
Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806
6. and remediation) causes. dynamic. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts.g.3
Geotechnical Risk Assessment
SF36292. The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure. complex. risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below. development. and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure.. 2007
directions. deforestation. This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse.3. In late 2006. In our opinion.
The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. (b) wedge landslide.g. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW. the greater the susceptibility. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide.. The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. more severe. The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis. The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode. (c) translational landslide. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures
The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement. including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures. and (d) ridge instability. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels. consequences. property. and safety. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site.
SF36292. The higher the Likelihood Level. 2007
Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e.June 8. The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. health.
Application of the Risk Assessment Method
The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. 67 are in the selva sector. considering all four failure modes. and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary. and none are in the costa sector. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level.
Table 2. The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. Risk category assessment chart
Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5
6. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2. 2007
Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 28 are in the sierra sector.3. 4.June 8.
Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA.
SF36292. Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix.
there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. September. The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites. respectively. For each time period. Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. surface depression.. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures. In this regard. Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector. However. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23. In addition. Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix. along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May
SF36292. The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006).g. 2007
In general. sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e. soil movement. the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006). The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006).June 8. Finally. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited. The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA. For example. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue. pipe movement. some on both occasions. slope bulging. because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006. in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23). the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented. during our field inspections in June and September 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. tension cracks. The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May.
only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high. Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk.
SF36292. TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk. By October 2006. By comparison. and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006.June 8.” As mentioned before.
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 3 2
0 4 17 2
0 1 13 9
0 7 24 12
2 3 4
DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006
1 2 3 4 5
0% 29% 13%
Figure 21. 2007
2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Risk assessment results for May 2006. the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006.
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Risk assessment results for September 2006. 2007
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 9 3
0 5 22 16
0 6 20 4
0 2 6 2
2 3 4
DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006
1 2 3 4 5
47% 0% 11%
Figure 22.June 8.
which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results.
Risk assessment results for October 2006. 2007
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 16 9
0 8 33 14
0 4 6 1
0 0 3 1
2 3 4
DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006
1 2 3 4 5
74% 21% 0% 4% 1%
Figure 23.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels.
Reduction in Risk
May 2006 Risk Category
Figure 24. The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i. The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites.
SF36292.e. the Risk Category as of May 2006). slope inclination. and monitoring. Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4).June 8.. inspections. The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program.
Change in risk from May to October 2006. surface drainage control.. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures. Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.e. groundwater depth. which began in earnest in April 2006. because Severity Levels were likely unchanged. and presence of gabion walls).
the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector. wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3.June 8. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2. In contrast. Hence. While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006)
SF36292. The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5. the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006. respectively. representation across the three sectors was not possible. Risk by sectors for May 2006. to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector.
50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category
Figure 25. 2007
The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector. Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. However. However. Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW.
ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g. This RMP should state at least the following:
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3
Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006)
6. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk. this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites. Risk by sectors for October 2006. strain gauges and inclinometers). requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard.June 8. In addition. we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present.4
Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation
We expect that the continuous.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Initially. Therefore.. decision processes and means of execution. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions.
and sensitive. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection. complex. with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station. and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical
SF36292. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. During our inspections in 2006. The observed performance of the pipeline system. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately.
6. Furthermore. Based on Exponent’s review. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. dynamic. This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner. caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. observations. and engineering experience. 2007
• • •
All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned. be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites.5
The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse.
Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided.
June 8, 2007
sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In
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this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.
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Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Description of Potential Risks and Controls
In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,
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and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline. This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. MCI. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively.
SF36292. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures. This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience. Therefore. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further.
7. where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading. an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed. tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the
The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison. axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure.2
Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks
The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L.June 8. TgP’s outside consultant.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength. while sufficient for internal pressures. for the first and fifth spill incidents.53 In particular. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes.
Under normal operating pressures. any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture. metal loss. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test. Furthermore. DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195.3. ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length.1
Inline Pipe Inspection
TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline.3
overload failure of the NGL pipeline. These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules. However. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location.452. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies. and dents.452. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load.55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks. potentially leading to pipe failure. Our review indicates that this set of
The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short. repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk.June 8. pipe gauge. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids.
SF36292. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool.
7. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions. However.003 A0F0 0607 0806
micro hardness measurement).452. First. and based on the results..452. and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry. 13 to dents. The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e.e.2
Inline Pipe Inspection Results
TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection.. ultrasound wall thickness measurement. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld. as well as external excavations. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing. In this regard. As of March 2007. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation). Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts. and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld.e. etc. re-weld. the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce. 14 were related to metal loss. which includes excavation. 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed.June 8. radiographic examination of girth weld. implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment. 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss.g. In all cases.. Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195. visual inspection.3. Among the 30 locations. external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld. potential anomalies).003 A0F0 0607 0806
. numerous sites have
SF36292. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i. we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195. By the end of March. The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site. 2007
regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection. a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i.
7. the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk..188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement.).g. patching.
with a depth of 49%.
7. Based on these findings. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i.
SF36292.452. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%. All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep.452. 2007
been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect.3
Circumferential Crack Detection
In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks. A verification of other sites is ongoing. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%.e. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations. per DOT 49 CFR 195. TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%.56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable
The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. Therefore. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks.3.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.. Specifically. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep. Specifically. currently. In addition. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. For cracks with a smaller opening. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool.June 8. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure). the probability of detection decreases rapidly. However. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Overall. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program.
even though the technology appears to be readily available. per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. TgP has committed to evaluating potential options. based on this study. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks.
7. Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline. 2007
with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool. but it was caused by a specific site condition. at present. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow. the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger. in pure axial loading. Specifically.4
The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions. the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws. in bending. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of
SF36292. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending. Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline. In this regard. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads. Therefore. the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads.June 8. Clearly. whereas. Unfortunately.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.
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Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.
Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.
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Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.
Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.
As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.
Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).
A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.
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SF36292. lead to pipeline damage. and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking. and Tavera 2003).
West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. Silva.June 8. 2007
Figure 28. in turn.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines
Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1. Excessive movement associated with ground failure can. Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms.
e. Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting. Reston. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i. 75. as opposed to body waves.e.. Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials.g.e.” Earthquake Spectra. or poorly compacted fills).65 landslides.70
Transient strain is short-term deformation. liquefiable soils.
SF36292. EERI.June 8. earthquakes). for similar levels of earthquake motion. 1392-1426. unstable slopes.. “Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe. 2007
2. PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction.” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No.. Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid. toward an open face such as a stream channel..68 and seismic compression. compression or shear) or surface waves (e.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves.. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD. Therefore. Vol. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking.67 lateral spread. damage to buried pipelines may result. faults. Lateral movement of ground. Rayleigh or Love). it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking. “An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering. 1167-1183. VA. resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone. typically with little to no perceptible slope.66 slope instability liquefaction. Vol. cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves. 2. 20(4). Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i. ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil.69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline. This phenomenon generally occurs in loose. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004). When these transient strains become sufficiently large. O’Rourke (1998).64 However.g.
inter-slab versus in-slab events).C. For a subduction-zone earthquake. there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval. (2001). (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva. sierra.June 8. Therefore. 2007
8. with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0. pressure control stations. additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand. These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW.e.0g. Specifically.3
Seismic Risk Evaluation
8. which is 1. and pressure reducing stations. Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. “Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.A.C.5g for the design event.. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes.5g represents half the acceleration of gravity.7g73 for the extreme event and 0.3. and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity.” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking. Consequently. Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard. 0.
Vector Peru S.1
Characterization of Seismic Demand
Vector Peru S.A. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations.
SF36292. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector.
. rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels.. slope instability. at the intended alignment.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction. characterizing potential fault displacements. and silts with high fines and clay content. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes. landsliding.e.2
Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards
ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system. ABSC identified only one active fault crossing. and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides.e. sands. However. Seismically induced slope instability poses a
ABS Consulting (2002). Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline. liquefaction. For the sierra and selva sectors. lateral spread.”
SF36292. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault.June 8. and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline. Peru.g. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent.52 m. which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes. it appears that other modes of PGD (i. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines.. Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault. They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements. sand dunes). APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault. “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0.3. 2007
8. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i.
or with major curves or bends. Consequently. may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage.”
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. the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect. Furthermore.
substantial risk in the costa sector. sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread. However. “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines. segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities.3. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program. ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties. an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid
ABS Consulting (2002).June 8. we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake.4. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake.3
Wave Propagation Hazards
ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. However. Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility. Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II. Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations. The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion.
Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast.
SF36292. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk.
Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan.4
The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. Consequently. However. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information.
8. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks.003 A0F0 0607 0806
connections. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered.June 8. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further. Additionally.
characteristics of the flood. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe. and (3) local scour. all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. 2007
9. Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above.003 A0F0 0607 0806
River Crossings and Scour
Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour.June 8. and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour. General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe. location of the pipe crossing. Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined. (2) general scour. Once exposed or undermined. intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches). Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream. Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round). Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions.
SF36292. To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline. Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes. and characteristics of the bed and bank materials. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings.
“Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea.A. they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally. which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis. Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths. HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream.June 8. Ingenieros Consultores. “Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW. Techint.”
SF36292. “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. 80. Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW. -20.3 and 479.” 78 GMI S.77. in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing. and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. 2007
9.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Furthermore. FHWA HEC-18. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law.79. and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline. 81
Hydroconsult (2003). to our knowledge. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system.” 81 Golder Associates (2003). 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing. This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18. Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing. the FHWA documents are guidance documents and. which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. 79 Golder Associates (2002).” – date unknown.” 80 Golder Associates (2002).2
Risks at Buried River Crossings
A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29. 18 (FHWA HEC-18). However. is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23. Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor.
As seen in Figure 30.5% chance of occurrence
SF36292. the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The design return period was 200 years (0. including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings. The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline. 2007
Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).
Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth.
providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders. a stochastic stream flow generation program. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover. Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated.
SF36292. • Scour countermeasures. • If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings. it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing. • At each river crossing. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model. and energy dissipators.2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U. If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters.S. • Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing. 2007
during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5. such as reinforcement of the riverbed. the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time. • The river crossing locations were surveyed. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. were designed and built in selected locations. stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations. but in some cases. it was increased to 1 meter.June 8.
However. our general practice and experience in scour prediction.
All of the above-listed factors. Peru. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows. 2007
Figure 30. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system. result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth. 2007. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. Lima. when combined.June 8.
Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. To mitigate this potential residual risk.
Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. and -23. These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure. During our field inspections in 2006. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. -20.3
The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007.June 8. The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation.
Summary and Conclusions
Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system. (3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104. (5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME
SF36292. TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis. related to the Camisea Transportation System. Overall. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline. the review showed that (1) the more than 100. (4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary.
10. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline. Furthermore.
10.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks
Overall. First.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks
Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82.June 8. such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment.
However. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. 2007
codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces. complex.June 8. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected. Based on Exponent’s review. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). Ultimately. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. dynamic. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). and engineering experience. This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline. observations. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures.
SF36292. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006.3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. and ASME B31. We expect that the continuous. During our inspections in 2006.
10.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.
ASME B31. and sensitive.
as part of their pipeline integrity management plan.452. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further. Second. First. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. during construction. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195. However. 2007
10. Consequently. to determine whether
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. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11). currently.5 Seismic-Related Risks
The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested.June 8. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required.
10.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks. Therefore. all the welds were x-rayed. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that. Overall.
6 Scour-Related Risks
The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound.June 8. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. However. 2007
these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. and thus. To mitigate this potential residual risk. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events.
10. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures.
TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. However. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007.
SF36292. Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk. At a minimum. the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management. construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006. with mechanical pipe integrity. TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline. based on the results and conclusions of this investigation. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection. 2007
Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. are described in the following sections.
11.1 Geotechnical and Geologic
The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1. seismic events. performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. and river scouring as secondary risks. Overall. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures. These recommendations. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. which TgP has committed to implement. 2.
The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location. 5. 4. We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls. 6. In addition to the above general recommendations. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable.5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using
SF36292. Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations. At most of the locations. During the past site inspections.June 8. 7. Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. 2007
3. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project. Prior to our site inspections. piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2.
This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement.
SF36292. analyze. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. 9. as discussed with TgP. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes. Detailed geotechnical investigations. 10. c. b. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site. 2007
simple hand drive hammers. monitor. presence of discoloration. especially noting new occurrences. Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. as necessary. and construction of remedial measures is currently underway. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a. It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study. as discussed with TgP. 11. and other such observations.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. and qualified personnel to install. Following completion of this work. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. and interpret results. Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels.
This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active.e. fourth. Formation of erosion gullies. TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first. if necessary. Alignment of the gabion walls at each location.
11. Based on the analysis. if necessary.June 8.
d. or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds. damage to check dams. the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades. retreat of stream banks.
TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system.4 Pipe
To reduce pipe integrity–related risks.
SF36292. Later. TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection. and fifth spill incidents. e. soil movement). appropriate remedial measures.003 A0F0 0607 0806
TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing. This information shall be used to update. such as long-term degradation. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i. lateral shifting of the stream banks. TgP should implement.. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude. and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends. design ground motions.