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Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577
Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618
June 8, 2007
Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii
Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
3 5.2 5.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4.5 5.8.6 5.1 General Review 4.5 3.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.1 Background 5.2.4 3.2 3.6 3.2.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.7 3.3 4.June 8.4 5.3 3.9 6 Conclusions Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 .8 4 First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions 8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56 Design-Related Risks 4.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions Construction-Related Risks 5.1 Design Background 4.8. 2007 3.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.2.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii SF36292.8.1 5.
3 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7.4 6.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.1 8.3.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 8.4 8 Conclusions Seismic-Related Risks 8.3. 2007 6.June 8.3.2 10.3.2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks 7.003 A0F0 0607 0806 iv .3.2 General Findings 57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95 6.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions 10 Summary and Conclusions 10.1 9.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines 8.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8.3.4 9 Conclusions Scour-Related Risks 9.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks SF36292.1 Background 7.3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.2 9.3.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7.3.1 7.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.1 10.
2007 10.003 A0F0 0607 0806 v .4 10.June 8.3 11.7 11 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary 96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101 Recommendations 11.2 11.5 10.6 10.1 11.4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe SF36292.
2007 List of Figures Page Figure 1. at KP 200+700. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. 12 13 Figure 4. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. 11 Figure 3. Photographs taken on June 14. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. 2 Figure 2. Figure 9. at KP 222+500. Photographs taken on June 13. General area of site of first spill incident. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface. 2006. 2006. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs.June 8. during ROW stabilization work. looking downstream. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. during stabilization work. Photographs taken on June 14.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vi . Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. 16 Figure 7. 2006. Photograph taken on September 11. 2006. during permanent pipeline repair work. Figure 5. at KP 8+850. Site of fourth spill incident. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. Bottom: View looking upstream. 19 20 Figure 8. Photographs taken on June 12. 23 SF36292. 15 Figure 6. at KP 200+700. General area of the third spill incident. at KP 8+850. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. 2006. and September 19. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. General area of first spill incident. 2006. Location of second spill incident. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). and a NG distribution point in Lurin.
Figure 18. Figure 21. Figure 24. 2007 Figure 10. Figure 13. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. 2006. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. Figure 16. Risk assessment results for September 2006. during stabilization work.June 8. Figure 14. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. at KP 125+950. Figure 22. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. General area of the fifth spill incident. Figure 20. Figure 19. Change in risk from May to October 2006. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Risk by sectors for October 2006. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. Figure 15. Figure 23. Figure 27. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Figure 17. Risk by sectors for May 2006. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. Risk assessment results for May 2006. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. White arrows identify the narrow. Each zone is numbered. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Figure 25. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vii . MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. Washington State University website). Figure 11. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Photographs taken on June 13. 24 26 28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81 SF36292. Figure 12. at an amplification of 14×. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Risk assessment results for October 2006. Figure 26.
Silva. Peru. 2007 Figure 28. Figure 30.June 8. Lima. and Tavera 2003). Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. 2007.003 A0F0 0607 0806 viii . Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. 82 90 92 SF36292. Figure 29.
2007 List of Tables Page Table 1.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 ix . Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62 SF36292. Table 2.
SF36292. Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S.S.003 A0F0 0607 0806 x .A.C.A. 2007 Acronyms and Abbreviations ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U.June 8. Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc.
This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. Accordingly. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment. 2007 Limitations At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. by changes that are beyond our control. SF36292. The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction. using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review. document review. and engineering analysis. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report.June 8. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events. such as rains and landslides or human activities. ground stability. In addition. Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas. limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections. wholly or in part. Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xi . which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. the findings of this report may be invalidated. Exponent has no direct knowledge of. Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. or the condition of concealed construction. and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user. Accordingly.
The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. at the southern edge of Lima. climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. 1 True length of pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xii . During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. 2007 Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system). each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean. The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. SF36292. commencing in April 2006. This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. during the first 19 months of operation. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents.1 Along this route.800 m. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline.A. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline.June 8.
The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1. and one in the sierra sector. All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2. Recently. In contrast. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. 2007 and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiii . where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. pipeline construction. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. pipeline design. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. 2) evaluating the SF36292. Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. primarily the NGL. the mechanical design. 2007. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector. Construction of the pipelines started in 2002. pipeline maintenance. Specifically. As part of that study. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. and ongoing operation. and commercial operation began in August 2004.
June 8. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. pipe material data. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated. and operational data. construction progress surveys. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiv . These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. or had been completed. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. construction. construction. operators. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. 2 Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. and maintenance of the system. operations. Finally. In some cases. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. service providers. In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. river-crossing studies. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. geotechnical and geological studies. hydrological studies. under construction. operation. 2007 effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. pipeline design drawings and calculations. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. seismic studies. construction specifications. These documents included engineering specifications.
the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe. located at KP 222+500. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed.June 8. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. This is a rather deep crack. ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. In the incident at KP 125+950. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. 3 4 A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. respectively. SF36292. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. The second incident. to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. Hence. 2007 Spill Incidents Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xv . In the incident at KP 8+850. The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding). In both cases. At both of these locations. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld.3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950.
eliminate if appropriate. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. In this report. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated. the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. The NG pipe at this location was not damaged. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk.June 8. during our study. controlled. Finally. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify. and/or monitored. Risk Identification The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures. risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. Indeed. 2007 the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. we identified four SF36292. Again. For purposes of this report. In this context. located at KP 50+900. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding. Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. For the fourth incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvi .
Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below. 5 For the purposes of this report. However. SF36292.6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. typically when saturated. although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline. Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline. and scour. whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock. and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvii . Risk Evaluation The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend. seismic events. seismic events. Design-Related Risks The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). and river scouring. 2007 primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. Furthermore. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. In summary. Due to their importance.June 8. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement. to varying degrees.5 mechanical pipe integrity. poor foundation (ground) conditions. on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline.
all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system.. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba. SF36292. The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites. Subsequently. 2007 Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. government mandated corridor. Construction-Related Risks The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard.000 individual pipes. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had 6 7 ASME B31. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. SP. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xviii . Argentina. Brazil.e. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide.June 8. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. and ASME B31. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains. hydraulic risk). and Buenos Aires. using more than 100. Therefore. such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill. each of which is up to 12 meters long. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines.
where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds. To minimize environmental impact. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and 8 Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays. and the work was inspected by outside consultants. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xix . The more then 100. Overall. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task. Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. trench conditions. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines. and potential damage to the pipe exterior. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. Next. 2007 to be granted by the Peruvian government. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section. and along rivers and drainages. the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges. at river crossings. the pipe was strung out.June 8. The ROW was cleared and cut.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing. Within the 3-km-wide corridor. would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred. SF36292. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches.
especially considering the challenging terrain. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case. This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. 2007 detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3).000 girth welds. where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing SF36292. Despite the above-described actions. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure. In this program. a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases. which may be similar to other pipelines in the world. Eight failures in more than 1. long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested. All these failures were subsequently repaired. Next.250 km of pipeline is a low number.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xx . and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. This situation arose with the second spill incident. in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. initiating the subsequent spill incident. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. During the hydrostatic testing. Overall. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). external damage during construction in two cases. eight leaks were identified. the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours.
As a result of these efforts. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure. During the second phase of our project. the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. piezometer. observations. In more critical areas. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. slope inclinometer.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxi . and data on movement characteristics. survey control. and engineering experience. to permit more expeditious. At the end of 2006. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust. representing SF36292.. 2007 geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques. Exponent observed over 50 sites. Further.June 8. Based on our review. and controlled in this ongoing process.g. reliable repairs. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented. Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review. While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline. To date. some on both occasions. As early as April 2006. and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability. instrumentation (e. addressed. This system was validated using information from our field inspections. strain gauge. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure.
Thus. This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk. 2007 locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time. the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas. including during the rainy season. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW). It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007. Therefore. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions.June 8. with solely the site at KP 108.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxii . being now ranked as “very high. Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. In this regard. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk. between KP 0 and KP 220. The core of this program involves regular visual inspections. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW.” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites. adjacent to the second pump station. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement. We expect that the continuous. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment. SF36292.
As discussed above. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies. 2007 decision process. First. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement. will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further. which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects. during construction. These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. weld quality. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. Thus. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. it is susceptible to this external failure mode. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. all the welds were x-rayed. reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. Second. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. per requirements by API 1160 xxiii SF36292. At this time. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading.June 8. and manner of execution. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. To mitigate the residual risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806 . while sufficient for internal pressures.
In addition. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features. which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project. 2007 and DOT9 195. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP. TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools. Results of the MFL inspection tool. Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the 9 Department of Transportation of the United States of America. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks. have shown that. currently. if required. no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. Overall in 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxiv . even though the technology to do so appears to be available. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program.June 8. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool.10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool. However. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. SF36292. At present. In this regard.
and pressure reducing stations. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements. slope instability. 10 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. liquefaction. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations.g. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e. sierra. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva.. as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxv . Seismic-Related Risks The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes. SF36292. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard. Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities. For cracks with a smaller crack opening. 2007 relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads.June 8. pressure control stations. Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system. landslides. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty. Additionally. TgP will evaluate potential options.
TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. with little warning and serious consequences. Therefore. 2007 Scour-Related Risks Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline. HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18). naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings. Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. However. Future Activities Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. and mechanical pipe integrity.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvi . the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized.June 8. In addition. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. in the opinion of SF36292. seismic events. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer. considered to be the most significant. In addition to the mentioned studies. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. However. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical. Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk. poor foundation (soil) conditions. Despite not being required. pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. and river scouring as secondary risks.
in particular wave propagation. Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB. and thus. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. based on the results. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvii . 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1.June 8. However. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. resulting from strong ground shaking. 3) reconsideration of seismic risk. In this context. and #5. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks. permanent ground deformations. #4. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. SF36292. 2007 Exponent. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. excluding fault rupture. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions.
the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer. and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters. The alignment of the ROW.469 inch. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0.800 m. at the southern edge of Lima.11 Along this route.. follows a 3-km–wide. government-mandated corridor. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. 2007 1 Introduction 1. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. SF36292.June 8.219 and 0. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002.1 Description of the System The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. and the 200-km-long costa sector.406 and 1 inch. Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. the ~300-km-long sierra sector. which is shown on Figure 1. 11 True length of pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 1 . TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline.A. and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. (TgP). which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin.
SF36292. a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas. 2007 The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture. The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains. mostly at major river crossings. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves.003 A0F0 0607 0806 2 . and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast. On the west side of the Andes Mountains. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. Figure 1. The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events.June 8. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru.
A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report. located at KP 222+500. scour risk. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar. In this regard.3 Report Organization This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe. appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. The second incident. The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release. The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system. and pipe-related risks of this system. and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident. The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components. 1. 1.2 Operational History Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. 2007 The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The fourth incident. our work focused on the NGL pipeline.June 8. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 3 . the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1). located at a river crossing at KP 50+900. seismic risk. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed.
SF36292. Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities.June 8. Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks. 2007 The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3. Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period.003 A0F0 0607 0806 4 . pipe manufacture. and scour risks at river crossings. Issues related to pipe material. seismic risks. pipe integrity risks. and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process.
geologic and SF36292. During this investigation. pipeline construction. 2007 2 Exponent’s Investigation 2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 5 . 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW. 2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents.June 8. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines.1 Objective Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006. pipeline design. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation. commencing in April 2006. 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. primarily the NGL. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents. 4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards.2 Phases of Work Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. 2. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program.
The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. 2. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. construction specifications. mechanical design. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. In addition to these activities. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. pipe material data. and ongoing operation. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100.June 8. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation.3 Scope In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. geotechnical and geological studies. seismic studies. pipeline maintenance. construction. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006.. These inspections SF36292. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. These documents included engineering specifications. and design of river crossings (scour analysis). and operational data.003 A0F0 0607 0806 6 . Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. 2007 geotechnical hazard mitigation. In some cases. As part of that study. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program.000 girth weld radiographs. operation. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. construction progress surveys. Specifically. pipeline design drawings and calculations. river-crossing studies. hydrological studies.
or had been completed. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW. operators. 2007 occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. were under construction. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents.003 A0F0 0607 0806 7 . Finally. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. operation. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. SF36292.June 8. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. construction. where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest. and maintenance of the system. service providers.
In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags.June 8.25 inch along this section of the system. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m).2 First Incident The first incident occurred on December 22. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system. in the jungle sector near KP 8+850. SF36292. At the point of rupture.1 Background Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. 2004. A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below. 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. with a slope profile of approximately 15%. and 12 13 14 15 Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 8 . 3. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP). The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. 2007 3 Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. In contrast.12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline. This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004. and one in the sierra sector. the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline.
” SF36292. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project. 2006. repairs. but based on available information. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed. Exponent visited this site again on September 11. A substantial amount of overburden soil had been 16 17 Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. Seven minutes after noting the anomaly. visit. 2006. and stabilization measures. addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006).17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed. During their site investigation. They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction. 2007 revegetation with grass. At the time of our June 12. and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture. 2006. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. and by the ninth minute.003 A0F0 0607 0806 9 . GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. Exponent inspected this site on June 12. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2.June 8. when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete.
0 to 1. inclinometers to detect soil movement.18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11. 2006. whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement. SF36292. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level.June 8. 2007 removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope. Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features. looking downstream. and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1.5 m.003 A0F0 0607 0806 10 . 18 Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 11 .June 8. at KP 8+850. during ROW stabilization work. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). 2007 Figure 2. General area of site of first spill incident. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). SF36292. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Photographs taken on June 12. 2006.
General area of first spill incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806 12 . is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory. as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces. At the request of TgP. Photograph taken on September 11. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced. The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock. SF36292. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4). Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically. 2006. with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps. 2007 Figure 3. at KP 8+850. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. until the crack became critical. Metallurgical Consultants Inc.19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long). with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface.June 8. as shown in Figure 4. with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock. looking downstream. Inc. 19 20 Metallurgical Consultants.
MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified.June 8. 2007 Figure 4. Analyses done by GIE (GIE S. As shown in Figure 5. IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA).3 Second Incident The second incident was discovered on August 29. referred to as the Pacobamba failure. Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured. 3.A.003 A0F0 0607 0806 13 . MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San 21 Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench. SF36292. 2005. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline.). occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500. and MCI. approximately nine months after the first incident.950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley. as well as our own investigation. The incident. This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3.
219 inch. On June 14. the removed fractured pipe section. Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock. and at 20:04. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed. the field investigation. At the time of our visit. 2007 Antonio-Pacobamba Road. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate). SF36292. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5.to 2. the pipeline was shut down. with initial participation of Exponent. just upstream of PS #4. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location. 2005. Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture. A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline. TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline. Twenty minutes later. MCI analyzed. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0.June 8. and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair. at 15:00. At this location. the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site. a slope profile of approximately 15%. MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m. On September 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 14 . 2006.3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. NGL pipeline excavation. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2. MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline.
2006. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. Photographs taken on June 14.June 8. 2007 Road Ridge Figure 5. SF36292. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 15 . at KP 222+500. Location of second spill incident. during permanent pipeline repair work.
June 8, 2007
MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.
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The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of
A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.
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the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.
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2007 Landslide Walls Figure 7. SF36292. 2006. General area of the third spill incident. at KP 200+700. during stabilization work.003 A0F0 0607 0806 19 .June 8. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. 2006. and September 19. Photographs taken on June 14.
MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes. Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section. hardness.003 A0F0 0607 0806 20 . Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW. and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. at KP 200+700. Figure 8.June 8. In summary. MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. 2007 MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident. SF36292. MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld. Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure.
Both pipelines were originally buried about 2.0 to 3. a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline. After installation of the pipelines.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3.27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe. the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes. Furthermore.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion. SF36292. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. According to TGP procedures.June 8. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water. which is standard construction practice. At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. pumping was stopped by TgP. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108). Consequently. but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain. An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline. 2007 3. The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture. at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900). 26 27 28 The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2. The river is less than 10 m wide. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river. At 05:00.0 to 2.5 Fourth Incident The fourth incident was detected on November 24.1 m for the NGL pipeline.0 m during the rainy season.003 A0F0 0607 0806 21 . which can rise 1. 2005. 2005. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed.219 inch. A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1. including this river crossing section. the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak.26 At this location.1 m below the stream bottom. In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline.
Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 22 . 29 Inter-American Development Bank (2006). Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site. Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion. and is nearly vertical above the groove. No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture. Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline. MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7. Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006.5-inch-long rupture. 2006. SF36292. a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. 2007 On June 13. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis. TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation. The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9). Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove. Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9. A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006.
SF36292. 2007 Approximate Location of Rupture Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture Figure 9. Bottom: View looking upstream. Top: View looking downstream (uphill).June 8. Photographs taken on June 13.003 A0F0 0607 0806 23 . at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. Site of fourth spill incident. 2006.
June 8. the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity. SF36292. 2007 Figure 10. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. In summary. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak.003 A0F0 0607 0806 24 . Indeed. it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe.
The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high. and an elevation of approximately 1.000 m. The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion. Inter-American Development Bank (2006). The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole.6 Fifth Incident The fifth incident occurred on March 4. At this location. At the point of rupture. 2006. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point.30 below a saddle. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12. but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage. A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline. The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12. generally on a hillside.32 30 31 32 A swale is a small valley. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m. as shown in Figure 11.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato.375 inch. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon.003 A0F0 0607 0806 25 . the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench.” with medium potential for mudflows. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected. No fatalities. but two injuries.June 8. were reported. 2007 3. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. A few seconds later. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. in the jungle sector at KP 125+950. SF36292. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale. Site soils are described as wet. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.
at KP 125+950.June 8. Photographs taken on June 13. SF36292. during stabilization work.003 A0F0 0607 0806 26 . Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. General area of the fifth spill incident. 2007 New Stabilization Measures Figure 11. 2006.
excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW. Subsequent loading propagated this crack. construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline. was upslope along the ROW. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. 2006. SF36292. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area. MCI determined that the ductility. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW. with rapid incremental tearing. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated. 2007 On June 13 and September 20. uppermost. and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference. hardness. interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time. MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950. The crack then became critical. The first. to form a flat fracture that followed a 10.June 8. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM).5-inch-long arc. As with the preceding four failures. lowest. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. and the third.003 A0F0 0607 0806 27 .055 inch (see Figure 12).01 inch per load step. the second was at the point of failure. it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall. after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0.
33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site. to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff. likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding. We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. larger landslide. The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones.003 A0F0 0607 0806 28 . at an amplification of 14×. and this shallow slide overlies an older. 2007 Figure 12. White arrows identify the narrow.June 8. SF36292. 33 Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture. Recent geotechnical studies by IGL. in part. Each zone is numbered. indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident.
2007. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500. Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds. external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced. SF36292. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking.3 m3)34 of NGL was released.7 Sixth Incident Recently. The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1. Figure 13.003 A0F0 0607 0806 29 . TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident.” April 16th.June 8. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2. To date. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG. 2007 3. 2007. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation. however. at KP 125+500. Typically. 34 Coga. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent.
the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. at KP 222+500. respectively. In both cases. at KP 50+900. In the case of the first incident. For the fourth incident.June 8. in the fifth incident. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures. at KP 125+950. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. are relatively small. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. SF36292. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure.8 Summary and Conclusions Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents. even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not 35 This is a rather deep crack. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 30 . at KP 8+850. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. In both cases. Hence. progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. though frequent. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking. The pressure fluctuations at this location. 2007 3. The second incident. While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction.
and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date. Indeed. 2007 caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak.003 A0F0 0607 0806 31 . SF36292. The sixth incident is still under investigation.June 8. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area.
whether usual or unusual. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. valves. that the designer may encounter. Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). operation and maintenance of pipeline systems. wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe.4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids). inspection. Rather. Specifically. and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. testing. where the sizing of pumps. In this section.1 Design Background Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code. Commonly. Part 192. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses. and pipes is performed. This information is carried over to the next step. but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation. respectively. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design. but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist. the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases. SF36292. the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. a pipe stress analysis. the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis. we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase. However. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 32 . 2007 4 Design-Related Risks 4. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States.June 8. Title 49.
2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 33 . with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Using this information. The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline. The profiles show good agreement. indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment. Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition. Figure 14. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. SF36292.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4. This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure.1 General Review Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system. 2007 4.June 8.
a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined. 2007 4.5 0.000 to 70. For the NGL pipeline.2 0.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Distance (Km) Figure 15.4.2 1.June 8. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31. Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline. 1. 209.7 0. SF36292.8 0.003 A0F0 0607 0806 34 . the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10.2. and 226.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis.6 0.000 BPD (barrels per day). Based on this internal pressure. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 #1 PS PS #2 PS #3 PS #4 Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP 1 0. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times. at KP 0. 108. with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations.
and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops. and are in compliance with ASME B31.June 8. pump shutdown and pump startup.4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure. flow rates. an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate. This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW. The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108. 2007 In addition to this static analysis.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg. and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis. In summary.2. The requirements of ASME B31. Furthermore. 4. or any combination of these events. the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice. pumping capacity.4. Based on this internal pressure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 35 . and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. a minimum allowable wall 36 Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day). a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software. because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP. Accordingly. SF36292. In addition. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements.1 times the allowable MAOP. The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed. the actual internal pressure.
2007 thickness was determined per ASME B31.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km) Figure 16. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure 0. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced.8. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice. The requirements of ASME B31. The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1. SF36292.9 0. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate. In summary. The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline.June 8. Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is.7 0. 1.8 0.1 1 Max. larger than the largest expected operating pressure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 36 . at all times.
37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards. to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. Sierra and Costa Sections. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards. debris flows. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3.” March 2002. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors.” February 2002. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines. MR Associates. Dario Verastegui. Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector. and geologic maps. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route. and flooding/river erosion.” December 2001.” March 21.003 A0F0 0607 0806 37 . particularly in the selva sector. 2003. and conducted field inspections along the proposed 37 38 39 40 Golder Associates. topographic information. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads. 2007 4. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. Orlando Felix Salvador. Route of Camisea Pipeline. In addition.June 8. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads. satellite images. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. rock falls.3 Geotechnical Design Risks ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions. Prior to construction. SF36292. which include external loads. be considered during the design process. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea. hillside erosion.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 38 . The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment. Therefore. MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep.41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i.. identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes. 4. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies.June 8. external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system. and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified. or scour. 2007 pipe route. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion. Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical SF36292.4 Conclusions The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. debris flows. and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement.e. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. hydraulic risk).
003 A0F0 0607 0806 39 . SF36292.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.June 8. and ASME B31. 41 ASME B31. 2007 stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.
The first step was to clear and grade the ROW. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing.. SF36292. camps. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less. fuel depots. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. sierra. 42 The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April. and costa sectors. government-mandated corridor. pipe staging sites. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction.e.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment. Techint employed up to 10. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor. 2007 5 Construction-Related Risks 5. access roads. who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers. Within this 3-km-wide corridor.1 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i. During construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 40 . and mitigation measures were constructed at that time. Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager. Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva. At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season. with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines.June 8.000 people on 12 spreads. In order to minimize the impact on the environment. both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. and loading docks) in 2001.
and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges.June 8. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. because it was the only available route for transportation. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used. or socalled pillows. as depicted in Figure 18. 2007 The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself. every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom. Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding. The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags. Afterward.003 A0F0 0607 0806 41 . Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. resting each pipe on two blocks. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld. In some instances. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline. The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. SF36292. upon which the pipeline would initially rest. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material. If the terrain was flat. trenching may have occurred first.” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions.
Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391.003 A0F0 0607 0806 42 . SF36292. 2007 Figure 17. Figure 18. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107.June 8.
rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain. Once the trench was dug. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench.003 A0F0 0607 0806 43 . Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads. Figure 19. In locations where the pipeline followed a road. The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. When possible. a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position. SF36292. Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width. Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches.June 8. 2007 Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching.
SF36292. the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes). In some cases. As discussed below. Figure 20. 2007 Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching.003 A0F0 0607 0806 44 . Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures. Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92.June 8. Typically. The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench. blasting was required to trench.
2007 5. landslides. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for SF36292. people.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. reduce. In October 2004. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector. and recommend measures to prevent. whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate. Additionally. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90.003 A0F0 0607 0806 45 . rockfalls. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts. and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure. and the environment. but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation. two months after the system was put into operation. TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement. and river erosion.2 Geotechnical Construction Characteristics During construction of the pipelines.June 8. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation.
Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts. Based on our field inspections.1. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. Field Reconnaissance on July 17. 2002. and shallow landsliding. At some narrow ridges.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement. 44 Camisea Project. 2007 maintenance. When only limited detailed data were available. The route selection along mountain ridges. During our inspections. 45 In our opinion.3 Clearing Related Risks As mentioned previously in Section 5.44. cracking. Pacobamba Route Sector. Exponent 43 Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales. During our site inspections. conservative values were assumed. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW. no date. Variant Pisco. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges. In many of these locations. necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures. SF36292. October 2004. Proyecto Camisea. soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles. not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN.003 A0F0 0607 0806 46 . where possible. 45 “Camisea Project. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas.June 8. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section. coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. 5. no date.
SF36292. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6.. the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW. on the other hand. During our field inspection. and the material type and wetness of the backfill. but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions.003 A0F0 0607 0806 47 . which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. Dry sand. potentially creating a large. Except in special circumstances. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles. The conditions in the selva sector.June 8. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings). would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe. specifically in natural drainages. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor. will not flow. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe. This is generally not a recommended practice. unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized. we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. 5. Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e.4 Trenching-Related Risks Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel. The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. Therefore. Clods of clay. 2007 observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW.g. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles. soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment. for example. Figures 17 to 20). The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods.
2007 Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”). Additionally. These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard.e. Brazil. each approximately 12 m in length. API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. 5. and Buenos Aires. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment.000 individual pipe segments. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe.5 Pipe Material–Related Risks The system was constructed using more than 100. The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba. is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating. Available data (i. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005.June 8. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures. All three pipes SF36292.. SP.906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material. and two were defective longitudinal welds. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”).193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects. Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. Adherence to DIN 30670.003 A0F0 0607 0806 48 . Specifically. Argentina. hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59.
as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. 4.8. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion. SF36292. 2007 were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low. overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection.003 A0F0 0607 0806 49 . and 5 in Table 1. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld Pipeline NGL NGL 3 4 5 6 NGL NGL NGL NGL KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170 October 4. Table 1. at each circumferential pipe joint. ID 1 2 Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8. 2003 July 27. 2003 February 16. 2004 October 4. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s 46 The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. 2003 7 8 NGL NG KP 210 KP 388 January 9. however. 2003 External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible. risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes. 2004 September 16. It needs to be recognized that. see leaks 3.June 8. 2004 March 23. a sleeve is placed. rather. This level of defect removal is not atypical. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. For details on these three leaks.
IX. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss. API 1104 and ASME B31.June 8. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds. and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and SF36292. whereas for the NG pipeline. 2794-L-SP-00017. geotechnical loading conditions.003 A0F0 0607 0806 50 . This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk. 2794-L-SP00016.6 Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7. and 2794-L-SP-00031. and not weld quality.4 (liquid) and ASME B31. in 2006. TgP operates a cathodic protection system and. automated methods were used. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents. 2007 long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools. a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. In this regard.3. In addition. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed.8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes. These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines. 5. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012. The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method.
Ewing. 5. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”.June 8. page 10.3. Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that 47 G.1 Background Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks. The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104. there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken. there is a very small possibility. SF36292. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack. 5.8. it was to be radiographed. as with all pipelines. due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack. 1973.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.H. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system. 12th World Gas Conference. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects. 2007 easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested.8. A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5. Likewise. that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph.7 Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made.003 A0F0 0607 0806 51 . Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired.
induced stresses were not uniform. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding.June 8. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. 2007 exceeds the maximum operating pressure. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1.48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. two by faulty longitudinal welds. For example.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system. Next. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together.003 A0F0 0607 0806 52 . the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours. Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of 48 TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long. All of these failures were subsequently repaired. Per this criterion. However.8.8. eight leaks were identified. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested. especially considering the challenging terrain. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5. our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes. such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines. SF36292. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1.25 times the internal design pressure. In the case of the NGL pipeline. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing. and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate. during hydrostatic testing. two by external damage that had occurred during construction. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP). 5. After the test.250 km of pipeline is a low number.
This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline. but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. if it results in a leak. some minimal risk may exist. 16 were defects in the girth welds. where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator. however. Ewing. Typically. in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing.June 8. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 53 . This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ). 12th World Gas Conference. this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world.H.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents.49 Of these 129 defects. 2007 3. this type of potential defect.8. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding.” 1973. The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further 49 G. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons. During the time the hydrogen is present. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States. 5.424 miles of pipe. 10 were plate defects. As in any pipeline. page 10. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds. Despite these actions. This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500. the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking.
9 Conclusions Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low. risks are not as high as for a rupture situation. the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month. We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors SF36292. However. 5. and when it does occur. Overall. but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack.003 A0F0 0607 0806 54 .June 8. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. 2007 propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006.000 girth welds. our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW. Overall. On the other hand. The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test. because absent soil movement.
June 8. and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes. SF36292. 2007 were in compliance with API 1104.003 A0F0 0607 0806 55 .
and ridge instability. and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline. geology. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings.003 A0F0 0607 0806 56 . The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows. rockfalls. wedge landslides. SF36292. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability. rock slides. and along the Pacific coast. narrow ridges. over the Andes Mountains. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain. but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur 50 For purposes of this report. hard rock. relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils. and high-gradient streams. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. typically when saturated. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock. high groundwater levels. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. Specifically. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. but still pose significant risk to the pipelines.June 8. amounts of precipitation. low strength. particularly when devoid of vegetation. low resistance to weathering. 2007 6 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6. freezing temperatures. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. The conditions include very steep and high slopes.
and rockfalls. predominantly granular soils and gravel. GEOTEC presented a plan of action. five months after the system was placed into operation. rock bolts. 2007 intermittently. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley. wedge landslides. For a challenging alignment such as this system. metal or concrete piles. These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers.June 8.2 General Findings As described previously in Chapter 4. including GEOTEC. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities. slope armoring. and slope inclinometers. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW. In January 2005.003 A0F0 0607 0806 57 . and reinforced shotcrete. this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. very little rainfall. crib walls. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works. 6. SF36292. gabion walls. surface surveying. and gravity walls. reinforced concrete walls. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems. and broad river crossings. rockslides. and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system.
Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. or immediately following. 2007 Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously. topographic surveys. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route. Verastegui. and made preliminary recommendations. The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock SF36292. Following our June 2006 inspections. In some instances. The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization. which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections. The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete. In addition. TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. identified critical zones in the selva sector. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. and Stepanek).003 A0F0 0607 0806 58 . Based on this study. we observed evidence of substantial ground movement. including implementation of subsurface exploration. For example. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. GEOTEC made several other recommendations. some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. As described in Chapter 4.June 8.
Hence. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2. where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide.003 A0F0 0607 0806 59 . rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW.. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. depths. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. rain gauges. Based on our second set of site inspections. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled. slope inclinometers. As a result of these efforts. in September 2006. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline. strain gauges. Further. and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions. piezometers.g. in September 2006. SF36292. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006. lined ditch to a main surface collector system. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. (5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel.June 8. Based on our observations at PS #2. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide. 2007 below the landslide plane. because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches. with the exception of one site at PS #2. We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations. Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary. (2) in some limited cases. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible.
This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse. 6.003 A0F0 0607 0806 60 .3. risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters. In late 2006.g. deforestation. 2007 directions. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure.June 8. (2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. complex.1 Risk Assessment Methodology Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW. In our opinion.. dynamic. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below. In this method. development. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur. The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. SF36292. and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure. and remediation) causes.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.
including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures. SF36292. consequences. 2007 Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e.June 8.. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures 51 The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement. the greater the susceptibility.003 A0F0 0607 0806 61 . The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site. and safety. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW. The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2. marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site.g. and (d) ridge instability. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. health. The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis. (c) translational landslide. property. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide. The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels. more severe. The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. (b) wedge landslide. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. The higher the Likelihood Level.
and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. 28 are in the sierra sector.June 8. 67 are in the selva sector.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. considering all four failure modes. Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix. Risk category assessment chart Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5 6. The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. and none are in the costa sector. 52 Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA. SF36292. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level.003 A0F0 0607 0806 62 .3. Table 2. 2007 Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures. 4.
the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented. pipe movement. In this regard. the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006). Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix.g. Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. Finally. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector. tension cracks. some on both occasions. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures. surface depression. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May. along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May SF36292.. slope bulging. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23). The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk. However. respectively. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23. The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites. sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e. The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA. soil movement. For example. The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006). The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006). during our field inspections in June and September 2006. September. and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited.June 8. 2007 In general. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix. In addition. because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006. in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk. For each time period. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue.003 A0F0 0607 0806 63 .
and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006.” As mentioned before. TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk. Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk. By October 2006. the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006. only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high.June 8. SF36292. By comparison. Risk assessment results for May 2006. 2007 2006. 94 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 3 2 0 4 17 2 0 1 13 9 0 7 24 12 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006 1 2 3 4 5 35% 23% 0% 29% 13% Figure 21.003 A0F0 0607 0806 64 .
SF36292. Risk assessment results for September 2006.June 8. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 9 3 0 5 22 16 0 6 20 4 0 2 6 2 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 40% 47% 0% 11% 2% Figure 22.003 A0F0 0607 0806 65 .
2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 16 9 0 8 33 14 0 4 6 1 0 0 3 1 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 74% 21% 0% 4% 1% Figure 23.003 A0F0 0607 0806 66 . SF36292.June 8. Risk assessment results for October 2006. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results.
Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4).003 A0F0 0607 0806 67 . and presence of gabion walls). and monitoring. The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i. SF36292. The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program. because Severity Levels were likely unchanged.. whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites. 3 1 Reduction in Risk 2 21 9 1 21 9 1 0 27 1 3 1 2 3 4 5 May 2006 Risk Category Figure 24. inspections. The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. the Risk Category as of May 2006). Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i. surface drainage control.e. 2007 The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures.. Change in risk from May to October 2006.e.June 8. slope inclination. which began in earnest in April 2006. groundwater depth.
the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006. engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method. While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2. to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. representation across the three sectors was not possible. However. However. respectively.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 68 . Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. 2007 The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. Risk by sectors for May 2006. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector. Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006) 4 5 SF36292. wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3. 50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category Figure 25. The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5. the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector. Hence. In contrast. recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector.
we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present.4 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation We expect that the continuous. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e. Therefore. 6. decision processes and means of execution.June 8. In addition. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. This RMP should state at least the following: SF36292. Risk by sectors for October 2006. strain gauges and inclinometers).g. requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard. Initially. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk.. 2007 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006) Frequency 4 5 Risk Category Figure 26.003 A0F0 0607 0806 69 . this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites.
we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. observations. be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. Based on Exponent’s review. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately. • Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided. and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical SF36292. Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. and sensitive. Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned.5 Conclusions The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. 2007 • • • All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. dynamic. Furthermore. 6. and engineering experience. The observed performance of the pipeline system. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection.003 A0F0 0607 0806 70 . caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures. with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station. During our inspections in 2006. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites.June 8. complex.
June 8, 2007
sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In
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this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.
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Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Description of Potential Risks and Controls
In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,
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This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. for the first and fifth spill incidents. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes. an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength. while sufficient for internal pressures. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the 53 54 The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively. Therefore.June 8. 2007 and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline. Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline.2 Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L. This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending. axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents.53 In particular. Thus. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures. TgP’s outside consultant.003 A0F0 0607 0806 74 . where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents. MCI. 7. SF36292.
The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids. SF36292. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline.452. Our review indicates that this set of 55 The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short. Under normal operating pressures. pipe gauge. DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195. metal loss. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool.June 8. any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture. However.55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes. ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline.3.1 Inline Pipe Inspection Background TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline. Furthermore. potentially leading to pipe failure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 75 . These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness.3 7. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test. However. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location. 7. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies.452. repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules. 2007 overload failure of the NGL pipeline. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions. and dents.
The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site.452.. and based on the results. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195. Among the 30 locations.. 2007 regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection. patching. In this regard.. visual inspection. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk. external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld.g.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection. the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce. we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment.). 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss. re-weld. ultrasound wall thickness measurement. and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld. First.e. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e. a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i. etc.188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement. As of March 2007. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation).June 8. and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry. micro hardness measurement). 14 were related to metal loss.452. numerous sites have SF36292. Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts. potential anomalies). implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e.3. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i. the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents. By the end of March. as well as external excavations. 13 to dents. radiographic examination of girth weld.003 A0F0 0607 0806 76 .e. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing. 7.g. which includes excavation. In all cases. Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications.. 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed. The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48.
However. Specifically.56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable 56 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. 7.452. Overall. Therefore. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations.June 8. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector. For cracks with a smaller opening. with a depth of 49%.. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%. per DOT 49 CFR 195. SF36292. TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%.452. All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. A verification of other sites is ongoing. currently. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that.003 A0F0 0607 0806 77 . Based on these findings.e. In addition. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep. 2007 been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program.3. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%. the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness. Specifically.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure). no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195.3 Circumferential Crack Detection In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks. the probability of detection decreases rapidly.
Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline. Therefore. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of SF36292. at present. 7. in bending. the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. Unfortunately. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow. Specifically. even though the technology appears to be readily available. in pure axial loading. Clearly. TgP has committed to evaluating potential options.4 Conclusions The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions.June 8. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads. 2007 with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool. whereas. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks. but it was caused by a specific site condition. the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption. the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws.003 A0F0 0607 0806 78 . per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. based on this study. In this regard.
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significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.
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Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.
Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.
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Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.
Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.
As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.
Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).
A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.
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SF36292. 8.June 8. in turn. 2007 Figure 28. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey.2 Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 82 . lead to pipeline damage. Silva. and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking. Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms. Excessive movement associated with ground failure can. and Tavera 2003).
70 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 Transient strain is short-term deformation.66 slope instability liquefaction. for similar levels of earthquake motion.67 lateral spread.g. Rayleigh or Love). it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components.. PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e. 2. “Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe. resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone. Vol. Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting. Lateral movement of ground.” Earthquake Spectra. Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface. damage to buried pipelines may result. toward an open face such as a stream channel. When these transient strains become sufficiently large. “An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering.65 landslides.e. ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil. Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials. Therefore. 1167-1183. O’Rourke (1998). Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i.003 A0F0 0607 0806 83 . 2007 2. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves. faults.. VA. unstable slopes.g.e. compression or shear) or surface waves (e.. 75.64 However. SF36292. typically with little to no perceptible slope. Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid. 20(4). EERI.e.68 and seismic compression. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction. This phenomenon generally occurs in loose. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i.. liquefiable soils. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004).June 8. Reston. cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i.69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline. 1392-1426. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking. earthquakes). Vol. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures. or poorly compacted fills)..” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. as opposed to body waves.
3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.e.7g73 for the extreme event and 0.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand Vector Peru S. sierra. SF36292..June 8.3. 2007 8. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval.C. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking.A. and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity. pressure control stations.5g for the design event.A. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. “Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes.C. (2001). inter-slab versus in-slab events). Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions. there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i. Therefore.” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking. Specifically.003 A0F0 0607 0806 84 .5g represents half the acceleration of gravity. with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector. For a subduction-zone earthquake.0g. 71 72 73 Vector Peru S. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard. Consequently. 0. which is 1. Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity. and pressure reducing stations. These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW. additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand.
sands.e. However. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent. Peru. rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels.June 8.. 2007 8. ABSC identified only one active fault crossing. which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes. “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system.” SF36292. Seismically induced slope instability poses a 74 ABS Consulting (2002). APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault.e.003 A0F0 0607 0806 85 . and silts with high fines and clay content. particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault. and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines.g. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. sand dunes). Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake.. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline. Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction. at the intended alignment.3. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes.52 m. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0. it appears that other modes of PGD (i. They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e. liquefaction. and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides.. slope instability. characterizing potential fault displacements. lateral spread. landsliding. For the sierra and selva sectors. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i.
3. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect. However.June 8. 8. sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread.003 A0F0 0607 0806 86 . “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines. However. 2007 substantial risk in the costa sector. Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31.4. Furthermore. may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake. or with major curves or bends. the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. Consequently.3 Wave Propagation Hazards ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system. Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program.” SF36292. ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II. an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid 75 ABS Consulting (2002). Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities. we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake. The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion.
which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks. 8. Consequently. SF36292. 2007 connections. Additionally. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further.4 Conclusions The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline.June 8. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. However. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information.003 A0F0 0607 0806 87 . 76 Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another.
June 8. Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions. Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events. Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream. Once exposed or undermined. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe. Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes. and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour. Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings. and characteristics of the bed and bank materials. location of the pipe crossing. (2) general scour. characteristics of the flood.1 River Crossings and Scour Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches). Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined. 2007 9 Scour-Related Risks 9. To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline. Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round).003 A0F0 0607 0806 88 . and (3) local scour. all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe. SF36292. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above.
This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa.77. Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system. in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing. 2007 9. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law. they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally. Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths. HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream. is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23. 18 (FHWA HEC-18).” SF36292.” – date unknown. Ingenieros Consultores.2 Risks at Buried River Crossings A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29. “Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea.June 8. Techint. However.A. “Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477.3 and 479. “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. -20. Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor. and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline. the FHWA documents are guidance documents and.” 81 Golder Associates (2003).” 80 Golder Associates (2002). 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing. which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis. 80.003 A0F0 0607 0806 89 . and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.” 78 GMI S. 81 77 Hydroconsult (2003). Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW. to our knowledge. FHWA HEC-18.79. Furthermore. which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing. 79 Golder Associates (2002).
003 A0F0 0607 0806 90 . The design return period was 200 years (0. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline.June 8. 2007 Figure 29. As seen in Figure 30.5% chance of occurrence SF36292. Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth. including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings. the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth.
it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing. If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters. such as reinforcement of the riverbed.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model. stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. it was increased to 1 meter. were designed and built in selected locations. • Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing.003 A0F0 0607 0806 91 . the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time. Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated. 2007 during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0. • At each river crossing. SF36292. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. • The river crossing locations were surveyed. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations. The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. but in some cases.2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover.June 8. a stochastic stream flow generation program.S. providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders. • Scour countermeasures. • If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter. and energy dissipators.
2007 Figure 30. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows. However. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system. 2007. Peru. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. All of the above-listed factors. when combined. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth.003 A0F0 0607 0806 92 . SF36292.June 8. Lima. our general practice and experience in scour prediction.
During our field inspections in 2006. The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. 9. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. SF36292.3 Conclusions The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18.003 A0F0 0607 0806 93 . TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events. and -23. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty.June 8. 2007 Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. To mitigate this potential residual risk. Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. -20.
such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment. (5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME SF36292. Overall. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. the review showed that (1) the more than 100.003 A0F0 0607 0806 94 . First. (4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104. (3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104. 2007 10 Summary and Conclusions Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB. Furthermore. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline. related to the Camisea Transportation System. TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis. 10. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82. the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. Second.June 8.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Overall. 10.
will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system. and ASME B31. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). However. 10. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. Based on Exponent’s review. and sensitive. We expect that the continuous.June 8. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline. dynamic. and engineering experience. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected. 82 ASME B31.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. Ultimately. During our inspections in 2006. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007.3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse.003 A0F0 0607 0806 95 . Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces. observations. SF36292. 2007 codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines. complex.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above.
to determine whether SF36292. Consequently. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions. 2007 10. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations.5 Seismic-Related Risks The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. Therefore.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks. during construction.452. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. all the welds were x-rayed. First.June 8. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. 10. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11). as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required. Overall. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. currently.003 A0F0 0607 0806 96 . results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195. Second. However. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites.
and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions. 10. To mitigate this potential residual risk. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process.6 Scour-Related Risks The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. 10. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter. 2007 these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required.003 A0F0 0607 0806 97 . Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. and thus. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. However. we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. However. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues.June 8. SF36292.7 Summary TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data.
TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures. Overall. based on the results and conclusions of this investigation. which TgP has committed to implement. 2. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection.June 8. At a minimum. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. 2007 11 Recommendations Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. SF36292.1 Geotechnical and Geologic The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1. Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk. seismic events. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. These recommendations. are described in the following sections. construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation.003 A0F0 0607 0806 98 . 11. performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis. with mechanical pipe integrity. and river scouring as secondary risks. the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented.
Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures. 2007 3. 5. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable.5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using SF36292. Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. 7. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2. During the past site inspections. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project. The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location. Prior to our site inspections. We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization. At most of the locations. 4.003 A0F0 0607 0806 99 . In addition to the above general recommendations. TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6.June 8. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations. 6. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls.
to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels. Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement. 2007 simple hand drive hammers. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. Following completion of this work. analyze. as discussed with TgP. SF36292. and construction of remedial measures is currently underway. c. Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study. 10. monitor. as discussed with TgP.June 8. especially noting new occurrences. and other such observations. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site. Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings. Detailed geotechnical investigations. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. 11. and interpret results.003 A0F0 0607 0806 100 . Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. presence of discoloration. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. as necessary. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. 9. and qualified personnel to install. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. b. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites.
This information shall be used to update. SF36292. TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first. and fifth spill incidents. retreat of stream banks. 11. the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades. TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection. Alignment of the gabion walls at each location. appropriate remedial measures. Formation of erosion gullies. Based on the analysis.4 Pipe To reduce pipe integrity–related risks. 11. lateral shifting of the stream banks. or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds. e. fourth.. TgP should implement. if necessary.2 Seismic TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system. and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends.003 A0F0 0607 0806 101 . Later. damage to check dams.e. such as long-term degradation. soil movement). This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active. 11. design ground motions. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i.3 Scour TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude. if necessary.June 8. 2007 d.
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