Failure Analysis Associates
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577
Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618
June 8, 2007
Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii
Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
5 3.8 4
First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions
8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56
Design-Related Risks 184.108.40.206 6 Conclusions
Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks
5.6 3.4 5.3 4.1 Design Background
4.5 5.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii
SF36292.2.7 3.6 5.8.1 Background 5.4 3.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions
Construction-Related Risks 5.June 8.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.1 General Review 4.3 3.2 5.1 5.2.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4. 2007
3.2 3.8.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.3 5.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.
3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
SF36292.3.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions
Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7. 2007
6.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions
Summary and Conclusions 10.3.4 9 Conclusions
Scour-Related Risks 9.1 9.3.1 8.1 10.3.4 6.3.2 9.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines
8.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 8.1 7.3.3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.2 10.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.June 8.2
57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95
6.4 8 Conclusions
Seismic-Related Risks 8.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7.3.1 Background 7.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8.3 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.3.2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks
Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary
96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101
Recommendations 11.4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe
SF36292.1 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.5 10. 2007
10.4 10.6 10.2 11.June 8.3 11.
at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. General area of the third spill incident. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. 2006. at KP 200+700. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). during ROW stabilization work. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. Photographs taken on June 14.
Figure 2.June 8.
Figure 4. 2006. Photograph taken on September 11. and September 19. Figure 5. General area of site of first spill incident. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. at KP 200+700. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Photographs taken on June 12. Bottom: View looking upstream. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas.
Figure 7. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850.
SF36292. Location of second spill incident. Photographs taken on June 14. red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began. at KP 8+850. at KP 8+850. during stabilization work. during permanent pipeline repair work.
Figure 6. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident.
Figure 3. at KP 222+500.
Figure 8. 2007
List of Figures
Page Figure 1. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. 2006. General area of first spill incident. 2006. Figure 9. 2006. looking downstream. Site of fourth spill incident. Photographs taken on June 13.
Washington State University website). Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. Figure 14. Photographs taken on June 13. Risk by sectors for October 2006. White arrows identify the narrow. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Figure 17. 2006. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. General area of the fifth spill incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. Figure 23. Figure 21. Risk assessment results for May 2006. Each zone is numbered. Risk assessment results for September 2006. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. Figure 22. at an amplification of 14×. 2007
Figure 10. during stabilization work. at KP 125+950. Risk assessment results for October 2006. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Risk by sectors for May 2006. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. Figure 20. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Change in risk from May to October 2006. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Figure 18. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. Figure 11. Figure 24. Figure 27. with the graph origin being in Malvinas.June 8. Figure 13. Figure 16. Figure 19. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. Figure 25. Figure 12. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline.
28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81
SF36292. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Figure 15. Figure 26.
and Tavera 2003). Peru. Lima. Figure 30.June 8. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).
SF36292. Silva. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. 2007
Figure 28. 2007. Figure 29.
June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62
List of Tables
Page Table 1. Table 2.
C. Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S.
SF36292. Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.June 8. 2007
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U.A.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc.A.S.
Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. wholly or in part. Exponent has no direct knowledge of. limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections. which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System. such as rains and landslides or human activities. and engineering analysis.June 8. 2007
At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties. Accordingly. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions. the findings of this report may be invalidated. This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment. or the condition of concealed construction.
SF36292. In addition. by changes that are beyond our control.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user. ground stability. Accordingly. using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report. document review. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review.
800 m.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean. This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. commencing in April 2006.
SF36292. (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. 2007
Background and Scope of Work
Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system). The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1. During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity. at the southern edge of Lima. during the first 19 months of operation. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents.1 Along this route.June 8.
True length of pipeline. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches.A. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.
2007. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. Recently. All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. Construction of the pipelines started in 2002. pipeline maintenance. the mechanical design. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary. and ongoing operation. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. primarily the NGL. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2. 2007
and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches.June 8. 2) evaluating the
SF36292. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. pipeline design. pipeline construction. The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1. Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and one in the sierra sector. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. As part of that study. In contrast. and commercial operation began in August 2004. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. Specifically.
and operational data. In some cases. operation. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System.June 8. construction. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. Finally.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. seismic studies. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. river-crossing studies. and maintenance of the system. pipe material data. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. service providers. operators. operations. construction specifications. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. construction progress surveys. or had been completed. In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. hydrological studies. geotechnical and geological studies. pipeline design drawings and calculations. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. These documents included engineering specifications.
SF36292. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. construction. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. under construction. 2007
effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines.
Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program.
The second incident. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed. ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed. At both of these locations. It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding).
A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe. In the incident at KP 125+950. respectively. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. 2007
Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and to consider the potential for systemic problems.June 8. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. Hence. the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent. In the incident at KP 8+850. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950.3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk. The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents.
SF36292. Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. located at KP 222+500. In both cases. This is a rather deep crack. to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures.
Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. In this report.
The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures. Indeed. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality. For the fourth incident. Again. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk. eliminate if appropriate. we identified four
SF36292. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. In this context. controlled. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding. located at KP 50+900. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify. 2007
the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. For purposes of this report. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. and/or monitored. Finally. during our study. The NG pipe at this location was not damaged.
Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. seismic events. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement. although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below. and scour. poor foundation (ground) conditions.
For the purposes of this report. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. typically when saturated.6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. Due to their importance. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend. Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. Furthermore. and river scouring.
The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow.
SF36292. seismic events.5 mechanical pipe integrity. However. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline.
The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). to varying degrees. In summary. 2007
primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline.
where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation. Brazil. Subsequently.
The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW. 2007
Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i.
SF36292.e.. all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba. such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill. The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites. hydraulic risk). each of which is up to 12 meters long. using more than 100. Therefore. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. and ASME B31. government mandated corridor. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.000 individual pipes. Argentina. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had
ASME B31. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. SP. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide. and Buenos Aires. external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system.
and along rivers and drainages.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. at river crossings. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. The ROW was cleared and cut. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later. where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds.
SF36292. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. To minimize environmental impact. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain.June 8. would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. 2007
to be granted by the Peruvian government.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and
Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays. The more then 100. and potential damage to the pipe exterior. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers. trench conditions. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task. and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road. and the work was inspected by outside consultants. Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. Overall. Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred. Within the 3-km-wide corridor. the pipe was strung out. the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice. Next.
where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard.000 girth welds. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. During the hydrostatic testing. especially considering the challenging terrain. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case.250 km of pipeline is a low number. This situation arose with the second spill incident. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. Overall. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure. eight leaks were identified. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing
SF36292. All these failures were subsequently repaired. the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours. The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. which may be similar to other pipelines in the world. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested. Next. external damage during construction in two cases.June 8. Eight failures in more than 1. In this program. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases. 2007
detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired. Despite the above-described actions. initiating the subsequent spill incident.
piezometer. Exponent observed over 50 sites. Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. survey control. instrumentation (e. observations. the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. to permit more expeditious. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented. At the end of 2006. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard. This system was validated using information from our field inspections. addressed.June 8. representing
SF36292. Based on our review. and data on movement characteristics. As early as April 2006. slope inclinometer. reliable repairs. and engineering experience.. some on both occasions. 2007
geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques. As a result of these efforts. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective.g. While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure. Further. strain gauge. In more critical areas. and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. To date. Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. and controlled in this ongoing process. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. During the second phase of our project.
and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below.June 8. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment. reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas. the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW. between KP 0 and KP 220. adjacent to the second pump station. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. including during the rainy season. while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW).003 A0F0 0607 0806
. It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. with solely the site at KP 108. Thus. In this regard. The core of this program involves regular visual inspections. The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time. We expect that the continuous. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk. 2007
locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk.
SF36292. Therefore. Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions.” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites. being now ranked as “very high.
and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. First. As discussed above. Thus. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. per requirements by API 1160 xxiii
SF36292. Second. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. during construction. which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. 2007
decision process.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. weld quality. will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further.
Pipe Integrity–Related Risks
Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above. reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. it is susceptible to this external failure mode. To mitigate the residual risk. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. while sufficient for internal pressures. and manner of execution. At this time. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects.June 8. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies. all the welds were x-rayed. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline.
SF36292. have shown that. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. In this regard. TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools.10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks. Overall in 2006. no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. In addition. However. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions. which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the
Department of Transportation of the United States of America. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP. if required.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. At present. even though the technology to do so appears to be available. currently. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program. The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features. Results of the MFL inspection tool. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks.June 8. 2007
and DOT9 195.
Additionally. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva.
SF36292. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%..June 8. Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system. For cracks with a smaller crack opening. as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks.g. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements.003 A0F0 0607 0806
relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. the probability of detection decreases rapidly.
The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. sierra. slope instability. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information.
The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector. and pressure reducing stations. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. pressure control stations. liquefaction. TgP will evaluate potential options. the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process. Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities. landslides. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e.
pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. and river scouring as secondary risks. Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk. However. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. In addition to the mentioned studies. considered to be the most significant. HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks.June 8. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector.
Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. Therefore. in the opinion of
SF36292. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18). Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. with little warning and serious consequences. additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. 2007
Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. and mechanical pipe integrity. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer. However. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. In addition. poor foundation (soil) conditions. seismic events. Despite not being required.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour.
future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. based on the results. resulting from strong ground shaking. In this context. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions.003 A0F0 0607 0806
SF36292. permanent ground deformations. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and. in particular wave propagation. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. excluding fault rupture.June 8. and thus. and #5. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. 2007
Exponent. 3) reconsideration of seismic risk. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007. #4. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks. However.
and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0. government-mandated corridor. 2007
1. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters. traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline.
SF36292. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco.1
Description of the System
The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. The alignment of the ROW. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer.406 and 1 inch.
True length of pipeline.. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. (TgP).469 inch.11 Along this route. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. and the 200-km-long costa sector. follows a 3-km–wide.800 m. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. which is shown on Figure 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long.June 8. at the southern edge of Lima. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004.A. the ~300-km-long sierra sector.219 and 0.
and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast. a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas.
Figure 1. and a NG distribution point in Lurin.
Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru.
SF36292. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves. The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events. mostly at major river crossings. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture. The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required. 2007
The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. On the west side of the Andes Mountains. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains.
and pipe-related risks of this system. located at a river crossing at KP 50+900. The fourth incident.
1. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld.June 8. The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding. appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood. located at KP 222+500. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. The second incident. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident. the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1). scour risk. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP.
1. in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe. The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components.
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. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide.2
Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. our work focused on the NGL pipeline. and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. 2007
The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. In this regard.3
This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. seismic risk. The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar.
June 8. Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks. and scour risks at river crossings.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. seismic risks. Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process. pipe integrity risks.
SF36292. pipe manufacture. and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5. Issues related to pipe material. Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period. 2007
The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3.
Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. primarily the NGL. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program.
2. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system.June 8.1
Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System. 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. pipeline construction. commencing in April 2006. 2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings. geologic and
Phases of Work
Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation. 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents. During this investigation. pipeline design. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. 4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards. 2007
The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. These inspections
geotechnical hazard mitigation.
2. and operational data. construction progress surveys. In addition to these activities. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. and ongoing operation. construction specifications. seismic studies. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100. construction. and design of river crossings (scour analysis). These documents included engineering specifications.000 girth weld radiographs. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. In some cases. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. pipeline maintenance. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. mechanical design. geotechnical and geological studies. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. operation. Specifically. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures.3
In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis.. pipe material data.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. As part of that study. hydrological studies. river-crossing studies. pipeline design drawings and calculations.June 8.
where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest. operators. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. service providers. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. 2007
occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW. were under construction.June 8. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP.
SF36292. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Finally. operation. construction. or had been completed. and maintenance of the system.
A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below.
The first incident occurred on December 22. 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. with a slope profile of approximately 15%.
3. the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream.June 8. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors.1
Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. 2004. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline. GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m).12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004.25 inch along this section of the system. Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP). In contrast. At the point of rupture. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. 2007
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents
3. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. and one in the sierra sector. in the jungle sector near KP 8+850. and
Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline.
Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. 2007
revegetation with grass. visit. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released. Exponent visited this site again on September 11. A substantial amount of overburden soil had been
Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2. repairs. GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed.”
SF36292. and by the ninth minute. the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. but based on available information. 2006. and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline.17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. 2006. “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project. During their site investigation. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006). when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work. At the time of our June 12. Seven minutes after noting the anomaly. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction. 2006. Exponent inspected this site on June 12. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed. and stabilization measures. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW.
and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level.
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. Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement. 2006. inclinometers to detect soil movement.
Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff.18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW. 2007
removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope.0 to 1. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11. whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline.June 8. looking downstream.5 m.
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Figure 2. Photographs taken on June 12.
General area of site of first spill incident. during ROW stabilization work. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). at KP 8+850. Top: View downstream (looking downslope).June 8.
at KP 8+850. looking downstream. with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface.
Metallurgical Consultants. Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. Photograph taken on September 11. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced. Metallurgical Consultants Inc.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 2006. with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps.19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. as shown in Figure 4.
At the request of TgP.
General area of first spill incident. 2007
Figure 3. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4). The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock. as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces.June 8. is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory.
SF36292. Inc. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long). with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock. until the crack became critical.
as well as our own investigation. 2005. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline. 2007
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified.). The incident.
3. and MCI.June 8. referred to as the Pacobamba failure. the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San
Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench. occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500.
Analyses done by GIE (GIE S.A.3
The second incident was discovered on August 29. Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured.
SF36292. IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA).950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley. approximately nine months after the first incident. This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3. As shown in Figure 5.
At the time of our visit. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate). at 15:00. 2006.June 8. On September 1.
SF36292. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2.3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0.219 inch. with initial participation of Exponent. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed. At this location. A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline. the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site. MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1. just upstream of PS #4.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline. and at 20:04. and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair. On June 14. MCI analyzed. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location. Twenty minutes later. a slope profile of approximately 15%. TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline. MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. the field investigation. the removed fractured pipe section.to 2. 2005. Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture. NGL pipeline excavation. 2007
Antonio-Pacobamba Road. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m. Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock. the pipeline was shut down.
during permanent pipeline repair work. Photographs taken on June 14.
Figure 5. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. 2006. at KP 222+500.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Location of second spill incident.June 8. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs.
June 8, 2007
MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.
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June 8, 2007
The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of
A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8. and September 19. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. during stabilization work.
SF36292. 2006. 2007
Figure 7.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. 2006.
General area of the third spill incident. Photographs taken on June 14. at KP 200+700.
Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section. Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure. In summary. 2007
MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident. Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW.June 8.
MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. hardness.
SF36292. and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes. MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes. MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. at KP 200+700.
27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water.0 m during the rainy season. After installation of the pipelines. but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient. Furthermore. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river. 2005. Both pipelines were originally buried about 2.26 At this location. A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1. at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900). a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline. 2007
3. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed.
26 27 28
The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2. At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.0 to 3. pumping was stopped by TgP.1 m for the NGL pipeline. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing. the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes. 2005. The river is less than 10 m wide. At 05:00. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain. including this river crossing section.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3.5
The fourth incident was detected on November 24.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. According to TGP procedures. The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture.
SF36292. Consequently. which is standard construction practice. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage.0 to 2.June 8.219 inch. the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak. which can rise 1.1 m below the stream bottom. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108). In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline.
Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9. 2007
On June 13. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow. Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion. Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006. MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7. Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline.June 8. TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation. The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9). No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture. Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.5-inch-long rupture. Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006). Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics. A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. 2006. and is nearly vertical above the groove. a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline.
Bottom: View looking upstream. 2006. Photographs taken on June 13. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline.
SF36292. Top: View looking downstream (uphill).June 8. 2007
Approximate Location of Rupture
Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture
Site of fourth spill incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806
003 A0F0 0607 0806
Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity.
In summary. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture.
SF36292. the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area.June 8. Indeed. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. 2007
Figure 10. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe.
in the jungle sector at KP 125+950. 2007
3. The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion. generally on a hillside. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m. The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12.000 m. The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole.June 8. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected. No fatalities. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. Inter-American Development Bank (2006). but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%.32
30 31 32
A swale is a small valley. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected.” with medium potential for mudflows. were reported. The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines. 2006. the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon.30 below a saddle. The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline. but two injuries. At the point of rupture. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point.375 inch. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale. and an elevation of approximately 1.
The fifth incident occurred on March 4. At this location. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12. A few seconds later. as shown in Figure 11. A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato. Site soils are described as wet.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8. 2006. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW.
General area of the fifth spill incident. at KP 125+950. Photographs taken on June 13.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. 2007
New Stabilization Measures
Figure 11. during stabilization work.
MCI determined that the ductility. interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0. and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference. MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. and the third. construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline. 2006. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. to form a flat fracture that followed a 10. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex. The crack then became critical. it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall. the second was at the point of failure. Subsequent loading propagated this crack.
SF36292. excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW. lowest. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. uppermost. hardness. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes.5-inch-long arc.01 inch per load step. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11. The first.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. As with the preceding four failures. with rapid incremental tearing. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area.June 8.055 inch (see Figure 12). Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0. 2007
On June 13 and September 20. was upslope along the ROW.
likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding. larger landslide.33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site.June 8. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. 2007
Figure 12. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture. White arrows identify the narrow. at an amplification of 14×.
Recent geotechnical studies by IGL.
Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas. indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. and this shallow slide overlies an older. The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph.
MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. in part. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location.
SF36292. Each zone is numbered.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Figure 13. 2007
3. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Coga. 2007. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation. however. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG.
Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Typically. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced.3 m3)34 of NGL was released.” April 16th. TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident.
SF36292. To date. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500. at KP 125+500. 2007. The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1. Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0.7
While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction. which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. respectively.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. in the fifth incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. In the case of the first incident. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. though frequent. the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide.8
Summary and Conclusions
Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents. at KP 125+950. at KP 222+500. are relatively small. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness. 2007
3. In both cases. The second incident. In both cases. at KP 50+900. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures.June 8. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent. The pressure fluctuations at this location. Hence.
SF36292. For the fourth incident. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking. at KP 8+850. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not
This is a rather deep crack.
The sixth incident is still under investigation.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date. 2007
caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area.
SF36292.June 8. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. Indeed.
operation and maintenance of pipeline systems. Specifically. 2007
4. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code. construction. and pipes is performed. inspection. Part 192. whether usual or unusual. valves. Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline. Title 49. respectively. where the sizing of pumps. However.June 8. a pipe stress analysis. but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids).1
Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design. This information is carried over to the next step. testing. these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. that the designer may encounter. the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist. but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation. Rather. and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. In this section. Commonly. the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase.
SF36292. the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe.
The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline. Using this information.1
Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system.
Figure 14. with the graph origin being in Malvinas.June 8.
Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. The profiles show good agreement. 2007
Hydraulic Design Risks
SF36292. This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure. Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.2. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route. indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment.
Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline
The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis.2 0.3 0. 209.7 0. 108.
Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline.6 0.June 8.000 to 70.
SF36292. Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline. the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10.2 1.8 0. For the NGL pipeline. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600
1.1 #1 PS
Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP
1 0. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times. and 226.2.9 0. with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations. 2007
4.000 BPD (barrels per day). Based on this internal pressure. a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. at KP 0.
and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis.4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1.3
Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline
Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures. In addition. 2007
In addition to this static analysis. The requirements of ASME B31. and are in compliance with ASME B31. pump shutdown and pump startup. because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP. flow rates. an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate. or any combination of these events. a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements. This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure. the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice.
SF36292. a minimum allowable wall
Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems. The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg. pumping capacity.2. Accordingly.4.June 8. In summary. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108. Furthermore.1 times the allowable MAOP. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day).
4. the actual internal pressure. Based on this internal pressure.
The requirements of ASME B31. The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis.
1.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure
0.June 8.8. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1. 2007
thickness was determined per ASME B31. The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened.9
0. at all times. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate. larger than the largest expected operating pressure.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km)
0. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline.1
0. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is.
Route of Camisea Pipeline. Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector.” March 21. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. particularly in the selva sector.3
Geotechnical Design Risks
ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions. rock falls. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. 37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance. Dario Verastegui. and conducted field inspections along the proposed
Golder Associates. In addition. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. which include external loads. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3.” March 2002. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards. 2003. to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. Prior to construction. debris flows. topographic information. 2007
4. and geologic maps.
SF36292. Sierra and Costa Sections. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads. MR Associates. and flooding/river erosion. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance.June 8. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. be considered during the design process. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea.” February 2002.” December 2001. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines. hillside erosion. Orlando Felix Salvador. satellite images.
Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical
SF36292.e. and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. Therefore.
4. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines.. or scour. identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes. Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i.4
The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements. debris flows. external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system. hydraulic risk). MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep.June 8. 2007
pipe route. and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified.41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion.
003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.
stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. and ASME B31.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.
the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less. pipe staging sites.
SF36292. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva. with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines. grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season. sierra. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. During construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. access roads. and mitigation measures were constructed at that time. In order to minimize the impact on the environment.
The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April. camps..1
Pipeline Construction Characteristics
Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i.June 8. and costa sectors. and loading docks) in 2001.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment. Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction. Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager. government-mandated corridor. 2007
5.e. The first step was to clear and grade the ROW.000 people on 12 spreads. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor. fuel depots. Techint employed up to 10. who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers.
003 A0F0 0607 0806
. If the terrain was flat. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. resting each pipe on two blocks. Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges. trenching may have occurred first. Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. upon which the pipeline would initially rest. Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions. as depicted in Figure 18.June 8. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline. In some instances. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used. every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom. The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags. the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. or socalled pillows. because it was the only available route for transportation. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. 2007
The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld. Afterward.” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW. Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding.
SF36292. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material.
Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391.
Figure 18.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. 2007
Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width.
Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench. In locations where the pipeline followed a road. rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. 2007
Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches. When possible. Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline.June 8. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day. Once the trench was dug.
SF36292. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment. a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position.
Figure 20. As discussed below. In some cases.
SF36292.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92.
Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Typically. blasting was required to trench. the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes). 2007
Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching. The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench. Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures.
GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction. GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts. 2007
5. Additionally. TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW. whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate. people.2
Geotechnical Construction Characteristics
During construction of the pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure. reduce. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for
SF36292. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. two months after the system was put into operation. and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90. but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration. and the environment. In October 2004. rockfalls. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion. and recommend measures to prevent. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW. GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. landslides. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. and river erosion. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement.
During our inspections.
5.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. 45 “Camisea Project. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement.3
Clearing Related Risks
As mentioned previously in Section 5.June 8. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline. coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters.44. 2007
Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales. no date. cracking. 45 In our opinion. no date. The route selection along mountain ridges. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section. soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks. 44 Camisea Project. October 2004. Pacobamba Route Sector. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN. where possible. Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts. During our site inspections. At some narrow ridges. Variant Pisco. Field Reconnaissance on July 17. In many of these locations. and shallow landsliding. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. conservative values were assumed.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6.
SF36292. necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures. not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction. Proyecto Camisea. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas. When only limited detailed data were available. 2002. Based on our field inspections. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW.1.
Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e. The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods. specifically in natural drainages.003 A0F0 0607 0806
observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW. would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe. The conditions in the selva sector. unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized.g. the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW. which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles. potentially creating a large. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions.
5. Dry sand. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings). The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe.
SF36292. During our field inspection. Except in special circumstances.June 8. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor. Figures 17 to 20). and the material type and wetness of the backfill. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles. for example. Clods of clay. will not flow. This is generally not a recommended practice. soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment..4
Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel. but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above. on the other hand. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe. Therefore.
each approximately 12 m in length.. Argentina. hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59. and Buenos Aires. Specifically.5
Pipe Material–Related Risks
The system was constructed using more than 100. Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material. These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard.
5. Brazil.June 8. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”). is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe. All three pipes
SF36292.000 individual pipe segments.e. 2007
Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”).193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion. The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures. Additionally. SP. and two were defective longitudinal welds. Available data (i. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005. Adherence to DIN 30670. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment. API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003.
This level of defect removal is not atypical. For details on these three leaks. a sleeve is placed. 2004 October 4. 2004 March 23. 2003
KP 210 KP 388
January 9. as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. rather.003 A0F0 0607 0806
were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. 2003
External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld
Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible. 2003 July 27. at each circumferential pipe joint.
SF36292. 2003 February 16. 2004 September 16. overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection.
ID 1 2
Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline
Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8.8. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion. The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate. 4. It needs to be recognized that. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects. and 5 in Table 1. risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld
Pipeline NGL NGL
3 4 5 6
NGL NGL NGL NGL
KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170
Table 1. see leaks 3. however. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low.June 8. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s
The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion.
geotechnical loading conditions. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and
SF36292. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds. automated methods were used. The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method. In this regard.8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes. and not weld quality. These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines. 2794-L-SP-00017.June 8. IX. TgP operates a cathodic protection system and. 2794-L-SP00016.3. in 2006. a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold. and 2794-L-SP-00031. whereas for the NG pipeline. This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk. In addition. 2007
long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools. API 1104 and ASME B31.4 (liquid) and ASME B31.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed.
Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks
The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104.
Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack. there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken. A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5.H. 12th World Gas Conference.3.
5. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects.1
Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”.8
Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks
5. Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired. The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104. that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph.
SF36292. it was to be radiographed.8. Ewing. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes. as with all pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that
G.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system.7
Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks
Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made. due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack. there is a very small possibility.8. Likewise. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld. 2007
easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested. 1973. page 10.
All of these failures were subsequently repaired. such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines. during hydrostatic testing. In the case of the NGL pipeline. Next. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline. the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours.June 8. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. Per this criterion. eight leaks were identified. induced stresses were not uniform.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested. Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of
TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long.2
Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System
During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system.
5. However. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak. After the test. and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate.250 km of pipeline is a low number. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults.25 times the internal design pressure. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5. 2007
exceeds the maximum operating pressure. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP). especially considering the challenging terrain. For example.8.
SF36292.48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. two by external damage that had occurred during construction. the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together. two by faulty longitudinal welds. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1. our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes.8.
SF36292. but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld. if it results in a leak.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world. The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further
G. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing. where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. page 10. the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding. Despite these actions. this type of potential defect. This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500. This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline. 10 were plate defects. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test. some minimal risk may exist. 12th World Gas Conference. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds. in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing.H.3
Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks
Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. however. During the time the hydrogen is present.
5. Ewing. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons. 2007
3. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States.424 miles of pipe. As in any pipeline. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. Typically.” 1973. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents.8.June 8. 16 were defects in the girth welds.49 Of these 129 defects. This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ). this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing.
because absent soil movement. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air. the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures. risks are not as high as for a rupture situation. (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors
SF36292. We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice. Overall. Overall.9
Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures.June 8. However.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low. The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test.
5.000 girth welds. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome. On the other hand. 2007
propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. and when it does occur. our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW. but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
were in compliance with API 1104. and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes.
and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings. freezing temperatures. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. low resistance to weathering. relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability. 2007
Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
6. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows. but still pose significant risk to the pipelines. and high-gradient streams. particularly when devoid of vegetation. geology. over the Andes Mountains. hard rock. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. wedge landslides. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement. rockfalls. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. typically when saturated. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines.1
Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions
The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. amounts of precipitation. narrow ridges. but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur
For purposes of this report. Specifically.
SF36292. and ridge instability. low strength. high groundwater levels. and along the Pacific coast.June 8. The conditions include very steep and high slopes. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. rock slides.
rock bolts. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. and broad river crossings. wedge landslides. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers.June 8. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems. 2007
intermittently. including GEOTEC. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system. These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants. and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. and gravity walls.
SF36292. predominantly granular soils and gravel.2
As described previously in Chapter 4. surface surveying. and slope inclinometers. The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows. five months after the system was placed into operation. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works. this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. crib walls. reinforced concrete walls. rockslides. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities. gabion walls. In January 2005. metal or concrete piles. For a challenging alignment such as this system. and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. very little rainfall.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and reinforced shotcrete. and rockfalls. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW. GEOTEC presented a plan of action.
6. slope armoring.
The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete. TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. In some instances. we observed evidence of substantial ground movement. GEOTEC made several other recommendations. some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. 2007
Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting. Based on this study. including implementation of subsurface exploration. Verastegui. For example. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization. The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock
SF36292. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. and made preliminary recommendations. and Stepanek). In addition.June 8. or immediately following. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006. which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections. Following our June 2006 inspections.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. topographic surveys. As described in Chapter 4. identified critical zones in the selva sector. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route.
We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations. rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006. Hence. in September 2006. 2007
below the landslide plane.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline. in September 2006. Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary.
SF36292. rain gauges.g. and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions. strain gauges. slope inclinometers. depths. Based on our observations at PS #2. lined ditch to a main surface collector system. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide. As a result of these efforts. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. with the exception of one site at PS #2. (2) in some limited cases. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible. where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches.June 8. Further.. Based on our second set of site inspections. piezometers. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled. (5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes.
and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure. risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes. (2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. 2007
directions. In late 2006. development. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters.
SF36292. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk.3
Geotechnical Risk Assessment
6.June 8..3. deforestation.
6. and remediation) causes. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e. complex. This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse.1
Risk Assessment Methodology
Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW. and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. dynamic. In this method. In our opinion. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis.g. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure.
g. marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and (d) ridge instability.
SF36292. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. (c) translational landslide. The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis. The higher the Likelihood Level. The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental. 2007
Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e.June 8. health. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures. The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site. The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. property.. consequences. (b) wedge landslide. and safety. The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2. more severe. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures
The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement. the greater the susceptibility. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW.
4. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2. The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW.2
Application of the Risk Assessment Method
The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level. 2007
Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures.
Table 2.June 8. Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix. considering all four failure modes. 67 are in the selva sector. and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary.
SF36292. Risk category assessment chart
Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5
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Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA. and none are in the costa sector. 28 are in the sierra sector.3.
along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May
SF36292. Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23. the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented. respectively. the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006). In addition. even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector. 2007
In general. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. In this regard. However. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23). Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. September. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue.g. The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006). The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites.June 8. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk. tension cracks. The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. For example.. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. some on both occasions. For each time period. surface depression. soil movement. sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e. there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix. because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix. The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006). Finally. slope bulging. pipe movement.
TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk.June 8.” As mentioned before.
SF36292. By October 2006.
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 3 2
0 4 17 2
0 1 13 9
0 7 24 12
2 3 4
DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006
1 2 3 4 5
0% 29% 13%
Figure 21. By comparison. the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006. Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk. and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Risk assessment results for May 2006. only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high. 2007
Risk assessment results for September 2006. 2007
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 9 3
0 5 22 16
0 6 20 4
0 2 6 2
2 3 4
DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006
1 2 3 4 5
47% 0% 11%
Figure 22.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806
which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results.
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.June 8. 2007
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 16 9
0 8 33 14
0 4 6 1
0 0 3 1
2 3 4
DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006
1 2 3 4 5
74% 21% 0% 4% 1%
Risk assessment results for October 2006.
SF36292. the Risk Category as of May 2006). whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites. 2007
The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels. groundwater depth. and presence of gabion walls). surface drainage control.. which began in earnest in April 2006.
Change in risk from May to October 2006. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures.e. inspections. The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i. Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4). slope inclination.. and monitoring.
Reduction in Risk
May 2006 Risk Category
Figure 24. because Severity Levels were likely unchanged. The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i.e.003 A0F0 0607 0806
.June 8. The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program.
June 8. recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector. However. The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5. In contrast. respectively. However. While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006. Risk by sectors for May 2006. Hence. engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method. 2007
The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. representation across the three sectors was not possible. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3. Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW.
50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category
Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006)
SF36292. the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector.
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3
Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006)
Figure 26.June 8. this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites. Risk by sectors for October 2006. decision processes and means of execution. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e. In addition.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk. strain gauges and inclinometers)..
Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation
We expect that the continuous.g. Initially. requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard. we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. Therefore. This RMP should state at least the following:
with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station.
Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation.
6. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately.June 8. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites. The observed performance of the pipeline system. caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. dynamic. and engineering experience. 2007
• • •
All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection.5
The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. and sensitive. and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed. During our inspections in 2006. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical
SF36292. Based on Exponent’s review. observations. Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities. Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned. be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. Furthermore. complex. This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner.
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sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In
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this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.
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Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Description of Potential Risks and Controls
In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,
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axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure. Therefore.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82. This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. 2007
and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline. This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively. Thus. TgP’s outside consultant. for the first and fifth spill incidents.2
Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks
The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L. Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline.
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.53 In particular. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength.June 8. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the
The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed.
7. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading. tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents. while sufficient for internal pressures. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. MCI. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents.
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. pipe gauge. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load. any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. However. Under normal operating pressures.1
Inline Pipe Inspection
TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline.
overload failure of the NGL pipeline. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness. DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195. ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test. However.452. These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis. Furthermore. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline. Our review indicates that this set of
The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short. potentially leading to pipe failure. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids.3
7. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline. metal loss.55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks.452.June 8.
SF36292. repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions. and dents.3. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location.
and based on the results. 14 were related to metal loss. and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld. In all cases.3. As of March 2007. micro hardness measurement). potential anomalies).. re-weld. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i..g. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation). the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment. which includes excavation.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195.. etc. 13 to dents. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e. numerous sites have
Inline Pipe Inspection Results
TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection.452.). 2007
regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection. Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications..e.188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement. radiographic examination of girth weld. First. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk. The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48. a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i. visual inspection. the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce.g.e. as well as external excavations. ultrasound wall thickness measurement. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing. patching. implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e.June 8. Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts. and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry. In this regard. The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site. By the end of March. external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld. Among the 30 locations. 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed. 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss.
7. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld.452.
56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable
The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0.3
Circumferential Crack Detection
In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks. the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations. Therefore. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure). TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%. 2007
been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect..1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%.3.452. A verification of other sites is ongoing. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%.
7.June 8. Based on these findings. All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep.
SF36292. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. Specifically.e. Specifically. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that. In addition. per DOT 49 CFR 195. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector. However. with a depth of 49%. For cracks with a smaller opening. Overall.452. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%. currently.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term.
Unfortunately. TgP has committed to evaluating potential options. Clearly. whereas. the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption.
7. the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. even though the technology appears to be readily available. at present. in bending. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow. but it was caused by a specific site condition. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws. in pure axial loading. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending. Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline. the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger. per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks. Specifically.June 8.4
The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of
with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool. based on this study.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. Therefore. the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. In this regard.
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significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.
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Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.
Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.
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Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.
Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.
As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.
Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).
A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.
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Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms.
West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. Silva. in turn. Excessive movement associated with ground failure can.June 8. lead to pipeline damage. and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking.
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8. and Tavera 2003).2
Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines
Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1. 2007
SF36292. liquefiable soils.. Rayleigh or Love). Lateral movement of ground. 2. for similar levels of earthquake motion. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking. or poorly compacted fills). as opposed to body waves. VA. 20(4).70
Transient strain is short-term deformation.” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components. 1167-1183. Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD. resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone.e. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures. “Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe. Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting. When these transient strains become sufficiently large.69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline. 2007
2. compression or shear) or surface waves (e. toward an open face such as a stream channel. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004).e.64 However. damage to buried pipelines may result.. earthquakes). PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e. “An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering.” Earthquake Spectra.. This phenomenon generally occurs in loose. Therefore.68 and seismic compression.g. unstable slopes. Vol.66 slope instability liquefaction.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking. typically with little to no perceptible slope. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves. Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials. O’Rourke (1998). cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i. EERI. Vol.67 lateral spread. Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid. Reston.June 8.e.g.65 landslides. faults. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction. 1392-1426. Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i.. 75..
which is 1.A.7g73 for the extreme event and 0. Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions. additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand. These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking.0g.June 8.C.1
Characterization of Seismic Demand
Vector Peru S.. Therefore. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard. For a subduction-zone earthquake. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva.
SF36292. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval. 2007
8. pressure control stations. inter-slab versus in-slab events). and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity. there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i. “Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking.C. 0.3.5g represents half the acceleration of gravity.A.e. Specifically. and pressure reducing stations.
Vector Peru S. with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0. sierra. Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity. (2001).003 A0F0 0607 0806
Seismic Risk Evaluation
8. Consequently. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector.5g for the design event.
52 m. They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e.3.June 8. characterizing potential fault displacements.”
SF36292.. Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault. rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels. liquefaction. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines.g.e. APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault. slope instability. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent. Seismically induced slope instability poses a
ABS Consulting (2002). ABSC identified only one active fault crossing... However. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements. and silts with high fines and clay content. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes. and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline. sand dunes). and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides. lateral spread. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0. at the intended alignment. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault. Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake.e. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. 2007
8. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i. For the sierra and selva sectors. sands. which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes. “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline. it appears that other modes of PGD (i. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806
Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards
ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system. Peru.
ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties.
8. However. may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage. Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31.3. sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread. “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines.3
Wave Propagation Hazards
ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system. However. 2007
substantial risk in the costa sector. we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake.June 8. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake. segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations. Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility. Furthermore.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect. The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion.”
SF36292. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program. or with major curves or bends. an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid
ABS Consulting (2002). Consequently.4. the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II.
our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk. 2007
SF36292. which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further. Additionally. Consequently. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations.
Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806
The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. However. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered.
all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. location of the pipe crossing. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe. Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined. (2) general scour. characteristics of the flood. Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Once exposed or undermined. Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour. 2007
9. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above.June 8. and (3) local scour. Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions. pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings. General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events. intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches). and characteristics of the bed and bank materials. Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round). Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream. and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour.1
River Crossings and Scour
Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline.
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. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law.” 78 GMI S. Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW. which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis. Ingenieros Consultores.77. the FHWA documents are guidance documents and. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths. 79 Golder Associates (2002). Techint. 18 (FHWA HEC-18). HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream. Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor.A. 2007
Risks at Buried River Crossings
A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29. However. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system. Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW. Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing. they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally.79. FHWA HEC-18. “Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. “Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477.” – date unknown.” 81 Golder Associates (2003). Furthermore. -20. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa.”
SF36292.” 80 Golder Associates (2002). 80. to our knowledge. in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing.June 8. 81
Hydroconsult (2003). and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline. This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18. and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures. 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing. is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23.3 and 479. “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.
Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).5% chance of occurrence
Figure 29. The design return period was 200 years (0. including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings. The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline. As seen in Figure 30.June 8. the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth.
Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth.003 A0F0 0607 0806
• Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing. and energy dissipators. were designed and built in selected locations. such as reinforcement of the riverbed. • If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter. the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. a stochastic stream flow generation program. The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. • Scour countermeasures.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings. it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study. If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. 2007
during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0.2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical. • At each river crossing. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5. Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated.S. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover. but in some cases. • The river crossing locations were surveyed. providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders.
SF36292. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model.June 8. stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. it was increased to 1 meter. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U.
Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25.
All of the above-listed factors. However. 2007
Figure 30. 2007. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows. our general practice and experience in scour prediction. result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system.
SF36292.June 8. Peru. Lima.
The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. During our field inspections in 2006.
9. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation. TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk.June 8. These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18.
SF36292. Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. -20. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events. 2007
Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. To mitigate this potential residual risk.3
The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. and -23. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007.
(5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME
SF36292. TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline. 2007
Summary and Conclusions
Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB. and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks
Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82. the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment. Second. First.
10.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. (4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104. Furthermore.
10. the review showed that (1) the more than 100. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline.June 8. Overall.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. (3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks
Overall. related to the Camisea Transportation System.
we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected.
SF36292. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). and ASME B31. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.
10.3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks
The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. and sensitive. and engineering experience. complex.
ASME B31. dynamic. observations. Ultimately. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). We expect that the continuous. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces.June 8. 2007
codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. During our inspections in 2006. Based on Exponent’s review. However. This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006.
all the welds were x-rayed. our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11). as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further. Consequently. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. currently.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195. to determine whether
SF36292. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool.452. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. Second.5 Seismic-Related Risks
The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline.June 8. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks. Overall. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects. First. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that. during construction.
10. Therefore. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. However. it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline.
To mitigate this potential residual risk. and thus.7 Summary
TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11.
SF36292. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. 2007
these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. However. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required.
10. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions.June 8. However.6 Scour-Related Risks
The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter.
10. we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures.
seismic events. based on the results and conclusions of this investigation. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. with mechanical pipe integrity. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. and river scouring as secondary risks. These recommendations. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection. At a minimum. Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk.
Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System.1 Geotechnical and Geologic
The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures.June 8. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical.
11. Overall. TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline. the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. are described in the following sections. which TgP has committed to implement. performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis. 2.
piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2. Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. During the past site inspections. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. 5. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project. Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures. Prior to our site inspections. TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis. 4. In addition to the above general recommendations. The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location. 2007
3.June 8. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable. We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni.5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using
SF36292. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. 7. At most of the locations. 6. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations.
9. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. as discussed with TgP. It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study. monitor. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites. as discussed with TgP. 10. This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement. and interpret results.
SF36292. Following completion of this work. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site.June 8. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. and construction of remedial measures is currently underway. as necessary. and qualified personnel to install. Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. presence of discoloration. 11. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. analyze. Detailed geotechnical investigations. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels. b. and other such observations. 2007
simple hand drive hammers. c. especially noting new occurrences. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings.003 A0F0 0607 0806
retreat of stream banks.003 A0F0 0607 0806
. Later. Alignment of the gabion walls at each location. lateral shifting of the stream banks.2 Seismic
TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system. fourth. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements.e. damage to check dams.3 Scour
TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing. Formation of erosion gullies. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude.4 Pipe
To reduce pipe integrity–related risks. and fifth spill incidents. Based on the analysis.
11. TgP should implement. This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active. or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds. and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends. soil movement). This information shall be used to update.June 8. TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first.. if necessary. appropriate remedial measures. such as long-term degradation.
SF36292. the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades. TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection. 2007
d. e. design ground motions. if necessary.