Failure Analysis Associates

Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007

Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007

Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577

Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618

June 8, 2007

Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806

June 8, 2007

Contents
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii

Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope

3

Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background

SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806

2.7 3.1 5.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii SF36292.2.8.5 3.3 3.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.3 5.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks 5.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.4 5.8 4 First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions 8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56 Design-Related Risks 4.1 General Review 4.8.2 3.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions Construction-Related Risks 5.6 5.4 3.1 Design Background 4.2 5.5 5. 2007 3.June 8.6 3.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 .2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.9 6 Conclusions Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.8.3 4.1 Background 5.2.

4 9 Conclusions Scour-Related Risks 9.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.4 8 Conclusions Seismic-Related Risks 8.1 7.1 8.3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8. 2007 6.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7.3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks SF36292.3.1 10.3.June 8.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.3.3 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.1 9.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.4 6.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 8.3.2 10.2 9.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines 8.2 General Findings 57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95 6.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.3.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7.3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.1 Background 7.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions 10 Summary and Conclusions 10.3.3.003 A0F0 0607 0806 iv .3.2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks 7.

June 8.2 11.4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe SF36292.4 10.6 10. 2007 10.3 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806 v .1 11.5 10.7 11 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary 96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101 Recommendations 11.

red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began. 2006. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. 2006. 2006. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. 2006. Photographs taken on June 13.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vi . at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. Location of second spill incident. 15 Figure 6. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. at KP 8+850. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. General area of site of first spill incident. 2007 List of Figures Page Figure 1. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. General area of first spill incident. Bottom: View looking upstream. during stabilization work. at KP 8+850.June 8. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. during ROW stabilization work. 11 Figure 3. 16 Figure 7. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). Top: View downstream (looking downslope). MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. Figure 9. at KP 200+700. Photographs taken on June 14. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface. 2 Figure 2. at KP 222+500. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). during permanent pipeline repair work. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. 12 13 Figure 4. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. 19 20 Figure 8. Photographs taken on June 12. Photograph taken on September 11. Site of fourth spill incident. and September 19. looking downstream. 2006. General area of the third spill incident. Photographs taken on June 14. 2006. at KP 200+700. 23 SF36292. Figure 5. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru.

Change in risk from May to October 2006. Figure 18. Figure 16. Washington State University website). Risk by sectors for October 2006. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Figure 15. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Photographs taken on June 13. Risk assessment results for May 2006. 2007 Figure 10. Figure 14.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vii . General area of the fifth spill incident. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Figure 13. Figure 24. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. at KP 125+950. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. Figure 17. Risk assessment results for September 2006. Each zone is numbered. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. Risk assessment results for October 2006. Figure 19. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. Figure 22. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. Figure 27. Figure 20. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. Figure 12. 2006. Figure 23. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. Figure 25. White arrows identify the narrow.June 8. Figure 26. during stabilization work. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Risk by sectors for May 2006. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. Figure 21. Figure 11. 24 26 28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81 SF36292. at an amplification of 14×. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline.

Lima. 2007.003 A0F0 0607 0806 viii . 82 90 92 SF36292. and Tavera 2003). Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. Figure 30. 2007 Figure 28. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).June 8. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. Silva. Peru. Figure 29.

Table 2. Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62 SF36292. 2007 List of Tables Page Table 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 ix .June 8.

C.S.A.June 8. 2007 Acronyms and Abbreviations ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U. Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S. SF36292. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.A. 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc.003 A0F0 0607 0806 x .

using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. wholly or in part. or the condition of concealed construction. the findings of this report may be invalidated. and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties. Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user. ground stability. by changes that are beyond our control. Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas. Accordingly. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment. and engineering analysis.June 8. Exponent has no direct knowledge of. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review. SF36292. document review. such as rains and landslides or human activities. Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xi . which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions. limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections. In addition. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. 2007 Limitations At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. Accordingly. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction.

June 8. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. SF36292. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP. The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xii . at the southern edge of Lima. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents. commencing in April 2006. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. 2007 Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system). The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean. 1 True length of pipeline. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle.800 m. during the first 19 months of operation.A.1 Along this route. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long.

Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. pipeline design.June 8. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. 2007. and ongoing operation. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. 2007 and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. Specifically. The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiii . TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2. and one in the sierra sector. the mechanical design. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. Recently. pipeline maintenance. In contrast. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. primarily the NGL. As part of that study. and commercial operation began in August 2004. Construction of the pipelines started in 2002. pipeline construction. 2) evaluating the SF36292. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline.

construction specifications. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. Finally. and operational data. construction. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. and maintenance of the system. service providers. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. operators. SF36292. geotechnical and geological studies. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed.June 8. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. pipe material data.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiv . In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. seismic studies. hydrological studies. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. pipeline design drawings and calculations. river-crossing studies. These documents included engineering specifications. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. operation. 2 Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program. In some cases. or had been completed. operations. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. 2007 effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated. construction progress surveys. under construction. construction.

The second incident. In the incident at KP 8+850. The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk. and to consider the potential for systemic problems.3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent. In the incident at KP 125+950. In both cases. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding). SF36292. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW. Hence. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. located at KP 222+500.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xv . Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. At both of these locations. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. respectively. 2007 Spill Incidents Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. This is a rather deep crack.June 8. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed. 3 4 A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents.

current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality. 2007 the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. Again. located at KP 50+900. Finally. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. eliminate if appropriate. Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill. In this context.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvi . the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. For the fourth incident. The NG pipe at this location was not damaged. For purposes of this report. In this report. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk.June 8. Indeed. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. during our study. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding. we identified four SF36292. controlled. Risk Identification The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures. risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated. and/or monitored.

June 8. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend. Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline. Design-Related Risks The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Risk Evaluation The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow. Furthermore. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvii . However. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. seismic events. In summary. and river scouring.5 mechanical pipe integrity. 2007 primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. poor foundation (ground) conditions. and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. Due to their importance. and scour. SF36292. although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. 5 For the purposes of this report. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system. seismic events. to varying degrees. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock. Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline.6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. typically when saturated.

. and ASME B31. all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide. SF36292. Construction-Related Risks The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains. The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. Therefore. SP. Argentina. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. Subsequently. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had 6 7 ASME B31.June 8. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill. Brazil. government mandated corridor.000 individual pipes. using more than 100. each of which is up to 12 meters long. where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation. 2007 Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. hydraulic risk).003 A0F0 0607 0806 xviii .e. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. and Buenos Aires.

trench conditions. The more then 100. the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice. To minimize environmental impact. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. the pipe was strung out. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers. 2007 to be granted by the Peruvian government. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing. and along rivers and drainages. Next. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later. would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. and the work was inspected by outside consultants. Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. and potential damage to the pipe exterior. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and 8 Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines. The ROW was cleared and cut. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. Overall. at river crossings. and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xix . Within the 3-km-wide corridor. where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. SF36292. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task. Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred.June 8.

003 A0F0 0607 0806 xx .June 8. in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing SF36292. and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. external damage during construction in two cases. a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases. In this program. Eight failures in more than 1.000 girth welds. especially considering the challenging terrain. This situation arose with the second spill incident. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). Next. Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. which may be similar to other pipelines in the world. long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested. This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. All these failures were subsequently repaired. Overall.250 km of pipeline is a low number. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk. eight leaks were identified. 2007 detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. Despite the above-described actions. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. During the hydrostatic testing. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). initiating the subsequent spill incident. the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected.

representing SF36292. While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area.June 8. and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. During the second phase of our project.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxi .g. reliable repairs. This system was validated using information from our field inspections. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective. 2007 geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques. to permit more expeditious. slope inclinometer. Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review. Exponent observed over 50 sites. instrumentation (e. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline. and data on movement characteristics. and controlled in this ongoing process. Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust. the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure. Based on our review. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. survey control. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented. As early as April 2006. piezometer. and engineering experience.. strain gauge. observations. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. At the end of 2006. some on both occasions. As a result of these efforts. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure. In more critical areas. To date. addressed. Further. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced.

The core of this program involves regular visual inspections. Therefore. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxii . Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. 2007 locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. In this regard. adjacent to the second pump station. including during the rainy season. SF36292. It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007. between KP 0 and KP 220. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk. being now ranked as “very high. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW. reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time. We expect that the continuous. Thus.June 8. while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW).” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites. with solely the site at KP 108. This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk.

per requirements by API 1160 xxiii SF36292. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. it is susceptible to this external failure mode. Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. At this time. Thus. and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. all the welds were x-rayed. These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. Second. during construction. 2007 decision process. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. weld quality. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above. As discussed above.June 8. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length.003 A0F0 0607 0806 . and manner of execution. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk. while sufficient for internal pressures. First. To mitigate the residual risk.

In this regard. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. However. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions. currently. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the 9 Department of Transportation of the United States of America. Results of the MFL inspection tool. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program.10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool. 2007 and DOT9 195. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. In addition. At present. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxiv . TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools.June 8. SF36292. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP. Overall in 2006. have shown that. The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features. no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. even though the technology to do so appears to be available. which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. if required.

as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks. Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements. For cracks with a smaller crack opening. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector. TgP will evaluate potential options. slope instability. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard. landslides. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. and pressure reducing stations. SF36292.g. pressure control stations. the probability of detection decreases rapidly.June 8. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxv .. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e. Seismic-Related Risks The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. Additionally. the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. 2007 relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. 10 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. sierra. liquefaction.

and mechanical pipe integrity. seismic events. Despite not being required. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings. Therefore. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour. However. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law. Future Activities Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector.June 8. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. However. pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. with little warning and serious consequences. 2007 Scour-Related Risks Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. and river scouring as secondary risks. Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18). naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvi . In addition to the mentioned studies. in the opinion of SF36292. the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer. poor foundation (soil) conditions. In addition. considered to be the most significant. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline.

Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks. 3) reconsideration of seismic risk. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. SF36292. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. based on the results. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. permanent ground deformations. #4.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvii . in particular wave propagation. 2007 Exponent. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated.June 8. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007. However. In this context. excluding fault rupture. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. resulting from strong ground shaking. and thus. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and. and #5.

which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. which is shown on Figure 1. The alignment of the ROW. Within this 3-km-wide corridor.800 m. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches.A. (TgP). which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco.469 inch. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline.406 and 1 inch. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle.219 and 0. and the 200-km-long costa sector. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. at the southern edge of Lima. the ~300-km-long sierra sector.. Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer. with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters.June 8. 2007 1 Introduction 1. and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. SF36292.11 Along this route.1 Description of the System The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast. government-mandated corridor. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002. 11 True length of pipeline. follows a 3-km–wide.003 A0F0 0607 0806 1 .

SF36292. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves. The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events. The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required.June 8. On the west side of the Andes Mountains. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. 2007 The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains. mostly at major river crossings. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains. Figure 1. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture. a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas.003 A0F0 0607 0806 2 .

SF36292. our work focused on the NGL pipeline. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld. 2007 The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 3 . The fourth incident. The second incident.June 8. located at KP 222+500. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP. In this regard.2 Operational History Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components. in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe. the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1). and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident. The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system. A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding. 1. 1. scour risk. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. located at a river crossing at KP 50+900. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide. seismic risk. The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release.3 Report Organization This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood. and pipe-related risks of this system.

pipe manufacture. Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period. and scour risks at river crossings.June 8. seismic risks. and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5. Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks. Issues related to pipe material. pipe integrity risks.003 A0F0 0607 0806 4 . SF36292. Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities. 2007 The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process.

2 Phases of Work Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases.1 Objective Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System.003 A0F0 0607 0806 5 . commencing in April 2006. Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards. primarily the NGL. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations. 4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards. pipeline construction. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. 2007 2 Exponent’s Investigation 2. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents. 2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents. geologic and SF36292. 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system. pipeline design.June 8. During this investigation. 2. 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW.

and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. In some cases. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. pipe material data. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006.. Specifically. seismic studies. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline.000 girth weld radiographs. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. and design of river crossings (scour analysis). mechanical design. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline.3 Scope In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. and operational data. As part of that study. hydrological studies. In addition to these activities.003 A0F0 0607 0806 6 . pipeline design drawings and calculations. operation. geotechnical and geological studies. construction progress surveys. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. construction specifications. 2. These inspections SF36292. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program.June 8. These documents included engineering specifications. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. and ongoing operation. construction. pipeline maintenance. river-crossing studies. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. 2007 geotechnical hazard mitigation.

Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. and maintenance of the system. construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 7 . service providers. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. operation. Finally. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW. or had been completed. SF36292. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. 2007 occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest. were under construction. operators.June 8. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents.

no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline. SF36292. The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1.12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP). 3.25 inch along this section of the system. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system. 2004.003 A0F0 0607 0806 8 .1 Background Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream. At the point of rupture. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m).2 First Incident The first incident occurred on December 22. and one in the sierra sector. A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below. 2007 3 Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. with a slope profile of approximately 15%. This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River. in the jungle sector near KP 8+850. 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. and 12 13 14 15 Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags. In contrast. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline.June 8.

The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline. “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project.003 A0F0 0607 0806 9 .June 8. visit. They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. At the time of our June 12. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released. Exponent visited this site again on September 11. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006). Seven minutes after noting the anomaly. repairs. 2006. 2006. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed. and stabilization measures. A substantial amount of overburden soil had been 16 17 Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. 2007 revegetation with grass. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. but based on available information. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work.” SF36292. GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed. when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete.17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. During their site investigation. 2006. and by the ninth minute. Exponent inspected this site on June 12.

June 8.18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW. and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1. 2007 removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope. 2006. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement. whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline. SF36292. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level.0 to 1. inclinometers to detect soil movement. Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features.5 m. 18 Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff.003 A0F0 0607 0806 10 . looking downstream.

SF36292. Photographs taken on June 12. at KP 8+850.003 A0F0 0607 0806 11 .June 8. General area of site of first spill incident. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). 2006. during ROW stabilization work. 2007 Figure 2.

The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock. 2006. 2007 Figure 3.19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory. with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface. at KP 8+850.June 8. Metallurgical Consultants Inc. Photograph taken on September 11. looking downstream. until the crack became critical. with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps.003 A0F0 0607 0806 12 . 19 20 Metallurgical Consultants. General area of first spill incident. SF36292. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4). At the request of TgP. as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced. Inc. Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long). as shown in Figure 4. with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock.

Analyses done by GIE (GIE S. As shown in Figure 5. This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3. the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San 21 Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench.3 Second Incident The second incident was discovered on August 29. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline. Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured. 3.A. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850.). approximately nine months after the first incident. 2007 Figure 4. MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified. 2005. The incident. IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA). and MCI. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 13 . as well as our own investigation.950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley. referred to as the Pacobamba failure.June 8. occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500.

a slope profile of approximately 15%.219 inch. the pipeline was shut down. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m. SF36292. MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1. at 15:00. NGL pipeline excavation. the field investigation. A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline. the removed fractured pipe section. Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0. At this location. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 14 . Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. 2007 Antonio-Pacobamba Road. At the time of our visit. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate). MCI analyzed. and at 20:04. TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline. just upstream of PS #4. the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed. with initial participation of Exponent.3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline. Twenty minutes later. 2006. On June 14. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location.to 2. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline.June 8. 2005. On September 1. and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair.

Location of second spill incident. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. 2007 Road Ridge Figure 5. during permanent pipeline repair work. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 15 . Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. at KP 222+500.June 8. SF36292. Photographs taken on June 14.

June 8, 2007

MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.

Figure 6.

MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.

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3.4

Third Incident

The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of

22

23

24

A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.

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the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.

25

Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.

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003 A0F0 0607 0806 19 . and September 19.June 8. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. at KP 200+700. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. 2006. 2007 Landslide Walls Figure 7. Photographs taken on June 14. General area of the third spill incident. 2006. during stabilization work. SF36292.

MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld. MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes.June 8. and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes. Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW. SF36292. Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure. at KP 200+700. Figure 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 20 . In summary. hardness. MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. 2007 MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident. Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident.

0 m during the rainy season. which is standard construction practice.0 to 2. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.5 Fourth Incident The fourth incident was detected on November 24. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108). at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900). The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture. In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed. SF36292. the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes. After installation of the pipelines. According to TGP procedures. the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak. 2005. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain. An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline. including this river crossing section. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water. 2005.003 A0F0 0607 0806 21 . a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline. At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24. At 05:00.1 m below the stream bottom.219 inch.0 to 3. The river is less than 10 m wide.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3. 26 27 28 The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2. but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient. Furthermore. pumping was stopped by TgP.26 At this location. A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1.June 8.1 m for the NGL pipeline. Consequently. 2007 3. Both pipelines were originally buried about 2. which can rise 1.27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing.

and is nearly vertical above the groove. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis. Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site. a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline. Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion. 2006. TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation. Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline. The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9).5-inch-long rupture.003 A0F0 0607 0806 22 . A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture. 2007 On June 13. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006.June 8. No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture. 29 Inter-American Development Bank (2006). Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9. SF36292. Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics. Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove. MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7.

2006. Photographs taken on June 13.003 A0F0 0607 0806 23 . Site of fourth spill incident. Bottom: View looking upstream. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. SF36292. 2007 Approximate Location of Rupture Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture Figure 9.June 8. Top: View looking downstream (uphill).

June 8. SF36292. Indeed. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe. In summary. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture. the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left.003 A0F0 0607 0806 24 . 2007 Figure 10.

003 A0F0 0607 0806 25 . Site soils are described as wet. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. No fatalities. as shown in Figure 11.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato. SF36292. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m. The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. 2007 3. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. were reported. the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench. but two injuries. The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected.375 inch. A few seconds later. The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines.32 30 31 32 A swale is a small valley. generally on a hillside. The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point. in the jungle sector at KP 125+950. 2006. The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole.000 m. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%. A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon. Inter-American Development Bank (2006).30 below a saddle.6 Fifth Incident The fifth incident occurred on March 4. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected. and an elevation of approximately 1. At this location. but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage.June 8. At the point of rupture.” with medium potential for mudflows.

during stabilization work.003 A0F0 0607 0806 26 . 2007 New Stabilization Measures Figure 11. 2006. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. General area of the fifth spill incident. at KP 125+950. Photographs taken on June 13.June 8. SF36292. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW.

interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950.June 8. lowest. to form a flat fracture that followed a 10. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0. uppermost. with rapid incremental tearing. hardness. and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW. The first.01 inch per load step. was upslope along the ROW.055 inch (see Figure 12). Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld. 2007 On June 13 and September 20.5-inch-long arc. 2006. SF36292. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex. The crack then became critical. As with the preceding four failures. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0. strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated.003 A0F0 0607 0806 27 . it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11. excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. and the third. the second was at the point of failure. Subsequent loading propagated this crack. MCI determined that the ductility.

White arrows identify the narrow. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. larger landslide. Recent geotechnical studies by IGL. indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. 33 Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture. We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. SF36292. in part.003 A0F0 0607 0806 28 . at an amplification of 14×. and this shallow slide overlies an older.June 8.33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site. Each zone is numbered. 2007 Figure 12.

The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. however. To date. 2007 3. 34 Coga. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500. at KP 125+500. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG. SF36292. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident.” April 16th. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent.June 8. Figure 13. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007. external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program.3 m3)34 of NGL was released. 2007.003 A0F0 0607 0806 29 .7 Sixth Incident Recently. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2. 2007. Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds. TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0. Typically.

For the fourth incident. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline.June 8. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent. which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. The pressure fluctuations at this location. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. 2007 3. at KP 125+950. Hence. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe. in the fifth incident. SF36292. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. at KP 8+850. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking. In both cases. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not 35 This is a rather deep crack. the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. at KP 222+500. In the case of the first incident. respectively. The second incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806 30 .8 Summary and Conclusions Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents. at KP 50+900. are relatively small. though frequent. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness. In both cases.

The sixth incident is still under investigation. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. Indeed. and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date. 2007 caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream. SF36292.June 8. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area.003 A0F0 0607 0806 31 .

However. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids). the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases. wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe. Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 32 . but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States. SF36292. construction. that the designer may encounter. these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. Specifically. the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. This information is carried over to the next step. In this section. we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase. testing. Rather. valves. whether usual or unusual. and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. a pipe stress analysis. where the sizing of pumps. Part 192. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist. the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design. 2007 4 Design-Related Risks 4. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. respectively. and pipes is performed. Commonly. operation and maintenance of pipeline systems.1 Design Background Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. inspection. but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components.June 8. Title 49.

2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4. This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 33 . SF36292. Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Figure 14.June 8. The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline.1 General Review Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system. 2007 4. The profiles show good agreement.2. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route. indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment. Using this information. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW.

the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10.6 0.000 to 70. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31.2 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 34 . a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined.5 0.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis.2. For the NGL pipeline.7 0.4 0.4. 2007 4.9 0. Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline. 108. SF36292. 209.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Distance (Km) Figure 15.3 0. 1. Based on this internal pressure.June 8.2 0. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times.8 0. at KP 0. with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations.000 BPD (barrels per day). Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. and 226.1 #1 PS PS #2 PS #3 PS #4 Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP 1 0.

an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate. Accordingly. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements. 4.June 8. or any combination of these events.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures. pumping capacity. a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. Based on this internal pressure. This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW. Furthermore. The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed. because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops.4. and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg.003 A0F0 0607 0806 35 . and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis.2. 2007 In addition to this static analysis. SF36292. In summary. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day). pump shutdown and pump startup. the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1. the actual internal pressure. a minimum allowable wall 36 Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems.1 times the allowable MAOP. The requirements of ASME B31. In addition. flow rates. The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108. and are in compliance with ASME B31.4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met.

7 0. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure 0. The requirements of ASME B31. Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is.8 0. The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km) Figure 16. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate. at all times. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met. larger than the largest expected operating pressure. The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1.8.1 1 Max. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice.003 A0F0 0607 0806 36 . 1.9 0. In summary. 2007 thickness was determined per ASME B31. SF36292.June 8.

Orlando Felix Salvador.” February 2002. topographic information.” December 2001. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment.” March 2002.3 Geotechnical Design Risks ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions.June 8. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. Sierra and Costa Sections. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements. satellite images.” March 21. Prior to construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 37 . and geologic maps. particularly in the selva sector. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. debris flows. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3. SF36292. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards. to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. MR Associates. Dario Verastegui. and flooding/river erosion. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads. be considered during the design process. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea. which include external loads. 2007 4. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route. In addition. and conducted field inspections along the proposed 37 38 39 40 Golder Associates. rock falls. 37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images. Route of Camisea Pipeline. Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides. 2003. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. hillside erosion.

2007 pipe route. hydraulic risk). Therefore.. identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes. The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains.e. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. 4. external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system. debris flows.June 8. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion. Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical SF36292.4 Conclusions The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements. Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections. MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep.41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design.003 A0F0 0607 0806 38 . or scour. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies.

SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 39 .June 8.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. and ASME B31. 2007 stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. 41 ASME B31.

access roads.000 people on 12 spreads. During construction. Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment. camps. 2007 5 Construction-Related Risks 5. who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers.003 A0F0 0607 0806 40 . and costa sectors. Techint employed up to 10. SF36292.e. sierra. At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season. fuel depots.1 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i.June 8. Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager. pipe staging sites. In order to minimize the impact on the environment. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor. and loading docks) in 2001. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. and mitigation measures were constructed at that time. with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines. Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. 42 The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April.. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less. The first step was to clear and grade the ROW. government-mandated corridor. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing.

” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW. upon which the pipeline would initially rest. trenching may have occurred first. Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 41 . the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. If the terrain was flat. The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material. resting each pipe on two blocks. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain. because it was the only available route for transportation. Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions. or socalled pillows. Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used. Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding. In some instances. SF36292. as depicted in Figure 18.June 8. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld. 2007 The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself. The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. Afterward.

Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107.June 8. 2007 Figure 17.003 A0F0 0607 0806 42 . Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. SF36292. Figure 18.

The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 43 . In locations where the pipeline followed a road. rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain. When possible. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches. Figure 19. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day. Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045. a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position. Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill.June 8. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. Once the trench was dug. Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads. 2007 Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching.

2007 Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching. SF36292. As discussed below. Typically. Figure 20. blasting was required to trench. Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures. The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench. In some cases. the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes).003 A0F0 0607 0806 44 . Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92.June 8.

and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system. landslides. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation. GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement. and river erosion.2 Geotechnical Construction Characteristics During construction of the pipelines. rockfalls. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. In October 2004. reduce. whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate. Additionally.June 8. and recommend measures to prevent. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004. but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for SF36292. two months after the system was put into operation. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation.003 A0F0 0607 0806 45 . TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW. and the environment. people. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector. GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction. 2007 5. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90.

coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW. 2002. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. Based on our field inspections. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement. October 2004. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section. During our site inspections. 44 Camisea Project. During our inspections. In many of these locations. cracking. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas.003 A0F0 0607 0806 46 . 2007 maintenance. conservative values were assumed. soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles. Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. 45 In our opinion. 5. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6. where possible. necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures. no date. Field Reconnaissance on July 17. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN. When only limited detailed data were available. Proyecto Camisea.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek.June 8. no date. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks. At some narrow ridges. SF36292. and shallow landsliding.44. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline.3 Clearing Related Risks As mentioned previously in Section 5. 45 “Camisea Project. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges. Exponent 43 Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales. not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction. Variant Pisco. Pacobamba Route Sector.1. The route selection along mountain ridges.

4 Trenching-Related Risks Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel. will not flow. Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e. The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe. the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW. for example. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor. 5. The conditions in the selva sector. This is generally not a recommended practice.June 8. Except in special circumstances. Dry sand.. specifically in natural drainages. 2007 observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW. would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe. potentially creating a large. which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings).g. During our field inspection. and the material type and wetness of the backfill. but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods. Clods of clay. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6. SF36292. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe.003 A0F0 0607 0806 47 . Figures 17 to 20). unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized. soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. Therefore. on the other hand. we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above.

each approximately 12 m in length. is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005.193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion. Argentina. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”). All three pipes SF36292. 2007 Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”).5 Pipe Material–Related Risks The system was constructed using more than 100. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material.003 A0F0 0607 0806 48 . API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment. Available data (i. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures. Specifically. Additionally. Adherence to DIN 30670. Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe. The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba. 5. SP. and Buenos Aires. hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. Brazil.e.906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49.June 8..000 individual pipe segments. and two were defective longitudinal welds. These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard.

risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes. 2003 External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible. 2007 were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. however. The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate. at each circumferential pipe joint. overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection. 2003 7 8 NGL NG KP 210 KP 388 January 9. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld Pipeline NGL NGL 3 4 5 6 NGL NGL NGL NGL KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170 October 4.8. 4. and 5 in Table 1. see leaks 3. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low. 2003 February 16. 2004 October 4. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s 46 The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. This level of defect removal is not atypical. as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. a sleeve is placed. rather. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion. Table 1. 2003 July 27. SF36292.June 8. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects. ID 1 2 Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8. For details on these three leaks.003 A0F0 0607 0806 49 . 2004 September 16. It needs to be recognized that. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion. 2004 March 23.

TgP operates a cathodic protection system and.3. and not weld quality. 2007 long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools.003 A0F0 0607 0806 50 . in 2006.8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds. In addition. 2794-L-SP00016.6 Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104. geotechnical loading conditions.4 (liquid) and ASME B31. These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and SF36292. The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method. 2794-L-SP-00017. This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk. automated methods were used. 5. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7. API 1104 and ASME B31. a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. In this regard. IX. and 2794-L-SP-00031. whereas for the NG pipeline. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing. and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents.June 8.

5. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”. Ewing.June 8. 12th World Gas Conference.3. due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack. as with all pipelines.8. 2007 easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested.7 Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld. page 10. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that 47 G. there is a very small possibility. Likewise. The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104.H.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5. Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired.1 Background Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks. SF36292. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system. Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations.8. it was to be radiographed. 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 51 . A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level. there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken. that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph. 1973.

All of these failures were subsequently repaired. such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines.48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds. the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours. 5.June 8. the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together.25 times the internal design pressure. induced stresses were not uniform.003 A0F0 0607 0806 52 . For example. After the test. Per this criterion. especially considering the challenging terrain. In the case of the NGL pipeline.8. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of 48 TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1. during hydrostatic testing. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP). of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system. Next. 2007 exceeds the maximum operating pressure. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1. and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate.250 km of pipeline is a low number. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak. two by external damage that had occurred during construction. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength. However. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31. two by faulty longitudinal welds. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding.8. our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. SF36292. eight leaks were identified.

Despite these actions. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States. SF36292. if it results in a leak. 10 were plate defects.H. This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ). Typically. 5. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test.8.424 miles of pipe. however. 16 were defects in the girth welds.003 A0F0 0607 0806 53 . As in any pipeline.” 1973. Ewing. In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds. this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. this type of potential defect. 2007 3. 12th World Gas Conference. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons.49 Of these 129 defects. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding. During the time the hydrogen is present. page 10. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator. the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking. but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld. in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing. some minimal risk may exist. The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further 49 G.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels.June 8. This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing. where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph. This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline.

5. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006. However. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice. Overall. the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW.000 girth welds. Overall. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. because absent soil movement. On the other hand. risks are not as high as for a rupture situation. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. 2007 propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air. The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test. but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack.003 A0F0 0607 0806 54 . our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. and when it does occur. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures.9 Conclusions Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures.June 8. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome. (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors SF36292.

2007 were in compliance with API 1104.003 A0F0 0607 0806 55 . SF36292.June 8. and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes.

narrow ridges. over the Andes Mountains. and ridge instability. high groundwater levels. rockfalls. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines.June 8. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement. and along the Pacific coast. Specifically.003 A0F0 0607 0806 56 . but still pose significant risk to the pipelines. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. and high-gradient streams. but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur 50 For purposes of this report. wedge landslides. rock slides. particularly when devoid of vegetation. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. typically when saturated. hard rock. SF36292. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain. freezing temperatures. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. amounts of precipitation. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. The conditions include very steep and high slopes. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils. geology. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. low strength. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability. low resistance to weathering. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion. The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. 2007 6 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings.

rockslides. metal or concrete piles. and slope inclinometers. very little rainfall. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard. gabion walls. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW. 6. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley. this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. five months after the system was placed into operation. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers. and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. crib walls. reinforced concrete walls.003 A0F0 0607 0806 57 . and broad river crossings. 2007 intermittently. and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. rock bolts. wedge landslides. and reinforced shotcrete. and gravity walls. surface surveying. In January 2005. predominantly granular soils and gravel. slope armoring.June 8. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities. including GEOTEC. SF36292. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works. GEOTEC presented a plan of action. These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows.2 General Findings As described previously in Chapter 4. For a challenging alignment such as this system. and rockfalls. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems.

In addition. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route. and made preliminary recommendations. The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting. Based on this study. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete. TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. we observed evidence of substantial ground movement. including implementation of subsurface exploration. 2007 Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. In some instances. some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. For example. which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections. The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock SF36292. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 58 . or immediately following. As described in Chapter 4. GEOTEC made several other recommendations.June 8. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. and Stepanek). More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously. Verastegui. identified critical zones in the selva sector. topographic surveys. Following our June 2006 inspections.

and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e. As a result of these efforts. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner.g. (5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes. rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW. rain gauges. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006. strain gauges. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline. in September 2006. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2. lined ditch to a main surface collector system. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide.June 8. Further. because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements. with the exception of one site at PS #2. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. in September 2006. Hence. piezometers. depths. Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary. SF36292. Based on our second set of site inspections. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible. (2) in some limited cases. 2007 below the landslide plane. slope inclinometers..003 A0F0 0607 0806 59 . where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide. Based on our observations at PS #2. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches. We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations.

development. In our opinion. 6. and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure. risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes. complex. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. (2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters. deforestation. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure. In this method.3. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk. The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. dynamic. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below.1 Risk Assessment Methodology Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW. This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts. and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. 2007 directions.g. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur. and remediation) causes. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis. SF36292. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 60 .3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6. In late 2006.. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk.

g. the greater the susceptibility. consequences. more severe. The higher the Likelihood Level. The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental. The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode.003 A0F0 0607 0806 61 .June 8. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. SF36292. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide. 2007 Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e. health. and (d) ridge instability. marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site. The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis. (c) translational landslide.. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW. property. (b) wedge landslide. The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures 51 The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement. and safety. including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels.

The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. considering all four failure modes.003 A0F0 0607 0806 62 . 28 are in the sierra sector. Table 2. SF36292. 67 are in the selva sector. 2007 Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures. 52 Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA. and none are in the costa sector. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level. 4.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. Risk category assessment chart Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5 6.3.June 8. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2. Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix. and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary.

g. along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May SF36292. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23). Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. Finally. and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. For example.June 8.. In addition. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk. slope bulging.003 A0F0 0607 0806 63 . tension cracks. some on both occasions. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006). 2007 In general. surface depression. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May. The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23. sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e. The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006). However. in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk. respectively. The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites. For each time period. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix. Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. soil movement. pipe movement. In this regard. the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures. Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix. the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006). because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue. there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector. September.

Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk. only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high. TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk. By October 2006.” As mentioned before. Risk assessment results for May 2006. 2007 2006. and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006. 94 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 3 2 0 4 17 2 0 1 13 9 0 7 24 12 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006 1 2 3 4 5 35% 23% 0% 29% 13% Figure 21.June 8. the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 64 . By comparison.

Risk assessment results for September 2006.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 65 . 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 9 3 0 5 22 16 0 6 20 4 0 2 6 2 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 40% 47% 0% 11% 2% Figure 22. SF36292.

which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 16 9 0 8 33 14 0 4 6 1 0 0 3 1 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 74% 21% 0% 4% 1% Figure 23. Risk assessment results for October 2006.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 66 . SF36292.

e. and presence of gabion walls).003 A0F0 0607 0806 67 . inspections. Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i. whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites.. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures. 3 1 Reduction in Risk 2 21 9 1 21 9 1 0 27 1 3 1 2 3 4 5 May 2006 Risk Category Figure 24. which began in earnest in April 2006. Change in risk from May to October 2006. The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i.e. because Severity Levels were likely unchanged. The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program. Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4). surface drainage control. SF36292.June 8. and monitoring. The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. slope inclination.. groundwater depth. the Risk Category as of May 2006). 2007 The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels.

2007 The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006) 4 5 SF36292. Hence. However. to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006. Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector. recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method. respectively. The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5. the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector. representation across the three sectors was not possible. However. While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector.June 8. Risk by sectors for May 2006. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2. 50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category Figure 25.003 A0F0 0607 0806 68 . wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3. In contrast.

4 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation We expect that the continuous.. we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present. Initially. decision processes and means of execution. Risk by sectors for October 2006. In addition.003 A0F0 0607 0806 69 . This RMP should state at least the following: SF36292. requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e. this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites.g. Therefore. 6. 2007 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006) Frequency 4 5 Risk Category Figure 26. strain gauges and inclinometers).June 8.

Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. 6. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical SF36292. Furthermore. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. • Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided. complex. caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures.5 Conclusions The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. observations. This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner. The observed performance of the pipeline system. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway. with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station.June 8. and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed. Based on Exponent’s review. and engineering experience. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities. be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. During our inspections in 2006. and sensitive.003 A0F0 0607 0806 70 . Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. 2007 • • • All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. dynamic.

June 8, 2007

sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In

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this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.

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7

Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks

7.1

Description of Potential Risks and Controls

In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,

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such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the 53 54 The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison. axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure. while sufficient for internal pressures. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes.2 Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further. 2007 and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 74 . Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. 7. Therefore.53 In particular. SF36292. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading. This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents. where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents. for the first and fifth spill incidents. TgP’s outside consultant.June 8.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82. MCI.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures. This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength. Thus.

3.3 7. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture. Our review indicates that this set of 55 The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short. potentially leading to pipe failure. However.452. and dents. SF36292. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load. Furthermore. metal loss. Under normal operating pressures.452. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies.003 A0F0 0607 0806 75 . DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195. 2007 overload failure of the NGL pipeline. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies. ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195. 7. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness. pipe gauge. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline.1 Inline Pipe Inspection Background TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline. These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis.55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks. However. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions.June 8.

. Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications. patching.452. By the end of March. Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts. re-weld.). 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed. which includes excavation. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e. we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195. etc. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i. external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld. a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i. ultrasound wall thickness measurement. The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk.188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement.3. and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld.452. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation). micro hardness measurement). implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e. potential anomalies). In this regard. radiographic examination of girth weld. 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss. and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing.. 2007 regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection. as well as external excavations.. Among the 30 locations. As of March 2007. numerous sites have SF36292. visual inspection. and based on the results.e. First.June 8. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld.g. 14 were related to metal loss.003 A0F0 0607 0806 76 . 7.e. The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site. the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce. 13 to dents. In all cases.g.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection.. the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents.

Specifically. A verification of other sites is ongoing. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%. the probability of detection decreases rapidly.June 8. 2007 been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect.56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable 56 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0.3. the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195.3 Circumferential Crack Detection In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks. currently. In addition.. with a depth of 49%. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. Therefore. SF36292. For cracks with a smaller opening. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector.e. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure). per DOT 49 CFR 195. However. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. Overall. All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. 7.452. Based on these findings.452. TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%.003 A0F0 0607 0806 77 . and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. Specifically. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep.

in bending. whereas. 7. Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline. in pure axial loading. the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption. In this regard. but it was caused by a specific site condition. the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger. based on this study.June 8.4 Conclusions The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions. Specifically. the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. Unfortunately. Clearly. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. Therefore. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads. even though the technology appears to be readily available. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending. TgP has committed to evaluating potential options. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks. Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline. at present. the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 78 . 2007 with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool.

June 8, 2007

significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.

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8

Seismic-Related Risks

8.1

Tectonic Overview

Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.

57

58 59

60

Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.

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Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.

Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.

As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.

Figure 27.

Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).

61 62

A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.

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in turn. and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking.003 A0F0 0607 0806 82 . lead to pipeline damage. and Tavera 2003). Excessive movement associated with ground failure can. Silva.June 8. Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. 2007 Figure 28. SF36292. 8.2 Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1.

69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline. for similar levels of earthquake motion.” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures.e.67 lateral spread. 2. Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting.66 slope instability liquefaction. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD. When these transient strains become sufficiently large.g. Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid. 1392-1426. SF36292. This phenomenon generally occurs in loose. 2007 2. EERI. toward an open face such as a stream channel. 1167-1183. as opposed to body waves. 75. “Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves. compression or shear) or surface waves (e. Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface. typically with little to no perceptible slope. Therefore.. damage to buried pipelines may result. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction. O’Rourke (1998). unstable slopes. faults. cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i..June 8. Rayleigh or Love).g. it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components.. Reston.e. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves. PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e. or poorly compacted fills).68 and seismic compression..65 landslides.e. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i. ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil. Lateral movement of ground. VA.003 A0F0 0607 0806 83 . resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone.64 However.70 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 Transient strain is short-term deformation.. liquefiable soils. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking. Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking.” Earthquake Spectra. Vol. earthquakes). Vol. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004). Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials. “An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering. 20(4).

Consequently.” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking. Specifically. with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i.June 8. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval. “Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.C. (2001). Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity. Therefore. 2007 8.0g. 0. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector. Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions. additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand.A.5g represents half the acceleration of gravity.7g73 for the extreme event and 0. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking. and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity.5g for the design event. SF36292.e.003 A0F0 0607 0806 84 . and pressure reducing stations. 71 72 73 Vector Peru S. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard.3.A. These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW.C.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8. (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes. pressure control stations. sierra.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand Vector Peru S. inter-slab versus in-slab events). which is 1. For a subduction-zone earthquake..

Seismically induced slope instability poses a 74 ABS Consulting (2002).g. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline. Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault.3. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault. “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline. at the intended alignment.e.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system. They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e. and silts with high fines and clay content. Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake. and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i. sands.003 A0F0 0607 0806 85 . Peru. For the sierra and selva sectors. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction.” SF36292.June 8. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0. and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. 2007 8.. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements.52 m. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent. However. particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction.e. liquefaction. it appears that other modes of PGD (i. landsliding.. rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels. which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes.. APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault. slope instability. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines. sand dunes). ABSC identified only one active fault crossing. lateral spread. characterizing potential fault displacements.

The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion. Consequently. or with major curves or bends. the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility.June 8. sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread. Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31.003 A0F0 0607 0806 86 .” SF36292. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect. However. Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations.3 Wave Propagation Hazards ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system. we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake. segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities. Furthermore.4.3. an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid 75 ABS Consulting (2002). 8. However. ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties. “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II. may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage. 2007 substantial risk in the costa sector.

seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered.4 Conclusions The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. SF36292.June 8. 76 Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another.003 A0F0 0607 0806 87 . Consequently. However. 8. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further. 2007 connections. which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline. Additionally. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan.

Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events. intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches). and characteristics of the bed and bank materials. Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour.003 A0F0 0607 0806 88 . and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above. SF36292. Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined. 2007 9 Scour-Related Risks 9.1 River Crossings and Scour Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. Once exposed or undermined. and (3) local scour. Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream. General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings. Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions. pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe.June 8. Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round). To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe. (2) general scour. all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. location of the pipe crossing. characteristics of the flood.

which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis. 81 77 Hydroconsult (2003).” – date unknown. Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths.June 8. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa. 2007 9. and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures. “Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea. “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18. which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. FHWA HEC-18. Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor.2 Risks at Buried River Crossings A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29. “Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system. 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing.” 81 Golder Associates (2003). Furthermore. the FHWA documents are guidance documents and. and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 89 .A. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. -20. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.77. in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing. Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW.79. Ingenieros Consultores. is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23. 80. to our knowledge. they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally. 79 Golder Associates (2002).” 78 GMI S. HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream. However. Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing.” 80 Golder Associates (2002). 18 (FHWA HEC-18). Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW.3 and 479. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law.” SF36292. Techint.

The design return period was 200 years (0. Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth.June 8. The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline. the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth.003 A0F0 0607 0806 90 . Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).5% chance of occurrence SF36292. including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings. 2007 Figure 29. As seen in Figure 30.

SF36292. 2007 during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0. • Scour countermeasures.S. and energy dissipators. it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing. a stochastic stream flow generation program. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings. • Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing. it was increased to 1 meter. but in some cases. If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters.2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical. The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. such as reinforcement of the riverbed. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U. • The river crossing locations were surveyed.003 A0F0 0607 0806 91 . were designed and built in selected locations. • At each river crossing. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study. providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders. the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. • If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model. stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated.June 8.

when combined. Lima. All of the above-listed factors. However. 2007 Figure 30. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. Peru.003 A0F0 0607 0806 92 . Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. SF36292. result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth. 2007. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system.June 8. our general practice and experience in scour prediction.

such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. -20.June 8. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 93 . SF36292. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. 9. During our field inspections in 2006. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary. 2007 Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation. To mitigate this potential residual risk. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events.3 Conclusions The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk. and -23.

the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline. 2007 10 Summary and Conclusions Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary. (5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME SF36292. Second. 10.June 8. First.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. (4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Overall. related to the Camisea Transportation System. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline. the review showed that (1) the more than 100. and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system. (3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. Overall. Furthermore. 10.003 A0F0 0607 0806 94 . TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis.

This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. SF36292. Based on Exponent’s review. complex. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above. observations.June 8. We expect that the continuous. and engineering experience. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006. During our inspections in 2006. Ultimately. will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. and sensitive. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). 10.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 95 .4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. 82 ASME B31. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline. 2007 codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected. and ASME B31.3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). However. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces. dynamic.

this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. 10. Second. Consequently.003 A0F0 0607 0806 96 . TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks. However. during construction. it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions.452.June 8.5 Seismic-Related Risks The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. Overall. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11). Therefore. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. currently. all the welds were x-rayed. First. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required. 2007 10. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites. to determine whether SF36292. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further.

If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events. To mitigate this potential residual risk. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required.003 A0F0 0607 0806 97 . However. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007.7 Summary TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. 10.6 Scour-Related Risks The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. However. 2007 these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. SF36292. 10. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions. we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. and thus.June 8.

June 8. based on the results and conclusions of this investigation. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection. 2007 11 Recommendations Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. 11. and river scouring as secondary risks. 2. the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented. TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline. Overall. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management.1 Geotechnical and Geologic The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 98 . including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. with mechanical pipe integrity. At a minimum. construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006. Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk. SF36292. performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis. are described in the following sections. seismic events. These recommendations. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. which TgP has committed to implement.

In addition to the above general recommendations. We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni. 7. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis.003 A0F0 0607 0806 99 . TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations. Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. Prior to our site inspections. 6. Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable. piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2. During the past site inspections. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization. 5.5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using SF36292. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations. The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location. 4. At most of the locations.June 8. 2007 3.

Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings.003 A0F0 0607 0806 100 . 9. Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. b. Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. and qualified personnel to install. 2007 simple hand drive hammers. Following completion of this work. as discussed with TgP. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. as necessary. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site. monitor. especially noting new occurrences. c. This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement. presence of discoloration. It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study. 11. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a. to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. analyze. including soil sampling in borings and test pits.June 8. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. as discussed with TgP. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. and other such observations. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes. and construction of remedial measures is currently underway. Detailed geotechnical investigations. and interpret results. 10. SF36292.

and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends. fourth. e. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i. Later. appropriate remedial measures. such as long-term degradation. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements. Formation of erosion gullies. Based on the analysis. or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds.June 8. This information shall be used to update. This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active.. if necessary.003 A0F0 0607 0806 101 . TgP should implement. 11. 2007 d.4 Pipe To reduce pipe integrity–related risks. 11.2 Seismic TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system. TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first.3 Scour TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing. lateral shifting of the stream banks. Alignment of the gabion walls at each location. and fifth spill incidents. design ground motions. damage to check dams. SF36292. the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades.e. retreat of stream banks. if necessary. soil movement). 11. TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude.

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