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Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007
Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577
Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618
June 8, 2007
Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
June 8, 2007
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii
Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope
Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806
8.1 Background 5.2.9 6 Conclusions Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.8.6 5.7 3.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.1 5.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions Construction-Related Risks 5.6 3.1 Design Background 4.8 4 First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions 8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56 Design-Related Risks 4.4 3.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.2.June 8.2 3.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks 5.5 3.3 5.3 3.5 220.127.116.11 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.4 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 .2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4. 2007 3.3 4.2 5.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii SF36292.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.1 General Review 4.
4 6.3.2 9.3 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.4 9 Conclusions Scour-Related Risks 9.1 Background 7. 2007 6.June 8.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.4 8 Conclusions Seismic-Related Risks 8.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.1 9.3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8.3.2 10.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7.2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks 7.1 10.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.1 8.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7.3.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines 8.3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks SF36292.3.1 7.2 General Findings 57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95 6.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 18.104.22.168 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions 10 Summary and Conclusions 10.3.003 A0F0 0607 0806 iv .3.
4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe SF36292.3 11.6 10.7 11 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary 96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101 Recommendations 11. 2007 10.1 11.4 10.003 A0F0 0607 0806 v .2 11.5 10.June 8.
2006. Photographs taken on June 12. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). at KP 8+850. and September 19. during stabilization work. during ROW stabilization work. at KP 200+700. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. 23 SF36292.June 8. Site of fourth spill incident. 2 Figure 2. at KP 222+500. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). at KP 8+850. 2006. General area of the third spill incident. Photographs taken on June 13. Location of second spill incident. Bottom: View looking upstream. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface. 2006. General area of first spill incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vi . Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. during permanent pipeline repair work. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. 19 20 Figure 8. General area of site of first spill incident. 15 Figure 6. red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began. 2007 List of Figures Page Figure 1. Photographs taken on June 14. 12 13 Figure 4. Figure 9. Photograph taken on September 11. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. Figure 5. 2006. Photographs taken on June 14. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. looking downstream. 2006. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). 11 Figure 3. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. 2006. at KP 200+700. 16 Figure 7.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 vii . Risk assessment results for May 2006. Figure 22. 2006. Figure 16. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Risk by sectors for October 2006. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. during stabilization work. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. Risk assessment results for September 2006. Change in risk from May to October 2006. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. Figure 21. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. Figure 11. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Figure 23. Figure 13. 24 26 28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81 SF36292. Figure 18. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. Risk by sectors for May 2006. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. Figure 20. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. at KP 125+950. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. Figure 24. White arrows identify the narrow. Figure 19. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. Figure 25. Figure 26. Photographs taken on June 13.June 8. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. 2007 Figure 10. Figure 14. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. at an amplification of 14×. Washington State University website). Risk assessment results for October 2006. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Figure 27. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. Figure 17. Figure 15. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. General area of the fifth spill incident. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. Figure 12. Each zone is numbered.
Figure 29. Silva. and Tavera 2003). Figure 30. 82 90 92 SF36292. Lima. 2007.003 A0F0 0607 0806 viii . Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).June 8. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. 2007 Figure 28. Peru.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 ix . Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62 SF36292.June 8. Table 2. 2007 List of Tables Page Table 1.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 x .A. 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc. SF36292.A. Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No.C. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.S. 2007 Acronyms and Abbreviations ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U.June 8. Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S.
The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report. SF36292. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xi . Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas. such as rains and landslides or human activities. Accordingly. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events. limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections. which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. ground stability. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review. Accordingly. the findings of this report may be invalidated. Exponent has no direct knowledge of. document review. In addition. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. and engineering analysis. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment.June 8. Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System. and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. or the condition of concealed construction. 2007 Limitations At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. by changes that are beyond our control. wholly or in part.
2007 Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system). climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. at the southern edge of Lima.A. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. commencing in April 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xii . the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system.1 Along this route. During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity. This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent.800 m.June 8. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP. 1 True length of pipeline. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. during the first 19 months of operation. SF36292. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean.
TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. In contrast. 2007 and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). pipeline design. 2) evaluating the SF36292. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. pipeline construction. the mechanical design. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. and commercial operation began in August 2004. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. pipeline maintenance. Recently. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. and ongoing operation. Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. primarily the NGL. Specifically. Construction of the pipelines started in 2002. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors.June 8. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiii . Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary. 2007. As part of that study. and one in the sierra sector.
hydrological studies. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. Finally.June 8. construction specifications. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. In some cases. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. construction. 2 Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program. river-crossing studies. These documents included engineering specifications. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. and maintenance of the system. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. operation. operations. under construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiv . and operational data. geotechnical and geological studies. pipeline design drawings and calculations. seismic studies. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. construction progress surveys. operators. 2007 effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. service providers. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. or had been completed. construction. pipe material data. SF36292.
It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding). located at KP 222+500. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. SF36292. the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent.3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. At both of these locations. 3 4 A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure.June 8. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe. ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. respectively. This is a rather deep crack. The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk. Hence. to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. In the incident at KP 125+950. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed. In the incident at KP 8+850. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. 2007 Spill Incidents Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xv . In both cases. The second incident.
Again. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. and/or monitored. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. In this context. Risk Identification The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvi . The NG pipe at this location was not damaged. located at KP 50+900. 2007 the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality. Finally. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify.June 8. For purposes of this report. Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill. risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. we identified four SF36292. controlled. during our study. the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated. eliminate if appropriate. In this report. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding. For the fourth incident. Indeed. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk.
5 mechanical pipe integrity. seismic events.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvii . on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline.June 8. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement.6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. and scour. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline. whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock. and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. Due to their importance. However. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity. to varying degrees. poor foundation (ground) conditions. Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below. seismic events. 5 For the purposes of this report. SF36292. 2007 primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. Furthermore. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend. and river scouring. Design-Related Risks The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). In summary. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. typically when saturated. although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. Risk Evaluation The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography.
hydraulic risk). 2007 Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation. government mandated corridor. each of which is up to 12 meters long. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard. such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. SP. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion. and ASME B31. The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites. Argentina.e.. and Buenos Aires.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xviii . using more than 100. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.000 individual pipes. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had 6 7 ASME B31. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system. Subsequently.June 8. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide. Construction-Related Risks The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW. Therefore.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. SF36292. Brazil.
they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain. Next. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges. and the work was inspected by outside consultants.June 8. the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xix . Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred. trench conditions. and along rivers and drainages. and potential damage to the pipe exterior. the pipe was strung out. Within the 3-km-wide corridor. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers. Overall. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines. The more then 100.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and 8 Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays. The ROW was cleared and cut.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later. and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road. at river crossings. SF36292. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains. To minimize environmental impact. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes. 2007 to be granted by the Peruvian government. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section. would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing. where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds.
which may be similar to other pipelines in the world. a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases.250 km of pipeline is a low number. Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. eight leaks were identified. and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. initiating the subsequent spill incident. long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested. Despite the above-described actions. in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test. especially considering the challenging terrain.June 8. 2007 detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired. This situation arose with the second spill incident. Overall. Next. In this program. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). Eight failures in more than 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xx . This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. During the hydrostatic testing. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk. the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours.000 girth welds. where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard. All these failures were subsequently repaired. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing SF36292. external damage during construction in two cases. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure.
some on both occasions. This system was validated using information from our field inspections. Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review. 2007 geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques. In more critical areas. strain gauge.June 8. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure. Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust. At the end of 2006. and engineering experience. slope inclinometer.g. Exponent observed over 50 sites. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. observations. and controlled in this ongoing process. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard.. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. instrumentation (e. As early as April 2006. piezometer. addressed. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective. While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. During the second phase of our project. to permit more expeditious. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxi . reliable repairs. the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced. As a result of these efforts. Based on our review. and data on movement characteristics. survey control. and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure. Further. representing SF36292. To date.
The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time. and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below. the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW).003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxii . adjacent to the second pump station. The core of this program involves regular visual inspections. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement. In this regard. It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007. reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. including during the rainy season. Therefore. between KP 0 and KP 220. with solely the site at KP 108. Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. SF36292. This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions. We expect that the continuous. 2007 locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. being now ranked as “very high. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. Thus. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW.June 8. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment.” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites.
These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects. it is susceptible to this external failure mode. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies. 2007 decision process. Thus. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. per requirements by API 1160 xxiii SF36292. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. during construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 .June 8. and manner of execution. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. First. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. At this time. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement. and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. As discussed above. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. Second. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. weld quality. all the welds were x-rayed. while sufficient for internal pressures. To mitigate the residual risk.
The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project. have shown that. TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. Results of the MFL inspection tool. currently. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks. 2007 and DOT9 195. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP. if required. Overall in 2006. even though the technology to do so appears to be available. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features. Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the 9 Department of Transportation of the United States of America.10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. However. SF36292.June 8. In addition. which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. At present.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxiv . no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. In this regard.
SF36292. 10 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process. TgP will evaluate potential options. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e. Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva. as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks. pressure control stations. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. Seismic-Related Risks The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements. For cracks with a smaller crack opening. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard.g.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxv . Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations..June 8. landslides. Additionally. sierra. 2007 relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. and pressure reducing stations. slope instability. liquefaction. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector.
pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. Despite not being required. Therefore. However. the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings. considered to be the most significant. seismic events. in the opinion of SF36292. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour. 2007 Scour-Related Risks Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk. HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvi . and river scouring as secondary risks. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline. poor foundation (soil) conditions. Future Activities Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. with little warning and serious consequences. In addition. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18). However. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. and mechanical pipe integrity. In addition to the mentioned studies.June 8. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer.
3) reconsideration of seismic risk. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. resulting from strong ground shaking. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. based on the results. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. SF36292. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. and #5. #4. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB. In this context. However. permanent ground deformations. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and. and thus. 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvii .June 8. 2007 Exponent. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. excluding fault rupture. Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007. in particular wave propagation.
11 Along this route.A. and the 200-km-long costa sector.. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters. Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004. SF36292. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002.800 m. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches.1 Description of the System The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. (TgP). with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. government-mandated corridor.June 8. The alignment of the ROW.406 and 1 inch. 11 True length of pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 1 . and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. follows a 3-km–wide. and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. at the southern edge of Lima. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer. which is shown on Figure 1. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. 2007 1 Introduction 1.219 and 0. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. the ~300-km-long sierra sector. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0.469 inch. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast.
a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas. Figure 1. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas.003 A0F0 0607 0806 2 . The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required. SF36292. 2007 The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. mostly at major river crossings. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves. On the west side of the Andes Mountains.June 8. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture. The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains. and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast.
2007 The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. located at a river crossing at KP 50+900. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. our work focused on the NGL pipeline. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. The second incident. 1. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident.3 Report Organization This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar. the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1). In this regard. in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld. The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release. seismic risk. SF36292.2 Operational History Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood.June 8. scour risk. located at KP 222+500. and pipe-related risks of this system. The fourth incident. 1. and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system. A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report.003 A0F0 0607 0806 3 . The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components.
Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks. and scour risks at river crossings. pipe integrity risks. Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period.003 A0F0 0607 0806 4 . Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities. pipe manufacture. SF36292. and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5. Issues related to pipe material. seismic risks. 2007 The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process.June 8.
2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents. pipeline design. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. 2007 2 Exponent’s Investigation 2. During this investigation.June 8. pipeline construction. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program. commencing in April 2006. 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. geologic and SF36292. Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006.1 Objective Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. 2. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations.003 A0F0 0607 0806 5 . 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system. primarily the NGL. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards. 4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards.2 Phases of Work Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases.
pipe material data. Specifically. and operational data. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. seismic studies. construction. 2007 geotechnical hazard mitigation. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. construction progress surveys. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. In some cases. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. These documents included engineering specifications.003 A0F0 0607 0806 6 . and ongoing operation. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. pipeline maintenance.June 8. geotechnical and geological studies. hydrological studies. mechanical design.3 Scope In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. river-crossing studies. operation. These inspections SF36292. In addition to these activities. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. and design of river crossings (scour analysis). and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program.. 2. pipeline design drawings and calculations. As part of that study.000 girth weld radiographs. construction specifications. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006.
operation. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. service providers. and maintenance of the system. where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest. were under construction. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. 2007 occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 7 . and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents. operators. or had been completed. construction. SF36292. Finally. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents.
June 8. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags. 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.25 inch along this section of the system. In contrast. The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. 2004. and 12 13 14 15 Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. At the point of rupture. and to consider the potential for systemic problems. Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP).12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline.1 Background Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m). The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. 3. the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream. in the jungle sector near KP 8+850. with a slope profile of approximately 15%. SF36292. and one in the sierra sector. A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below.003 A0F0 0607 0806 8 .2 First Incident The first incident occurred on December 22. This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004. 2007 3 Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3. GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system.
and by the ninth minute. 2006. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released. 2006. but based on available information. GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil.003 A0F0 0607 0806 9 . and stabilization measures. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline.June 8. and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture.” SF36292. repairs. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction.17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2. 2006. the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m. addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. visit. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work. A substantial amount of overburden soil had been 16 17 Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. Exponent visited this site again on September 11. Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. During their site investigation. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006). 2007 revegetation with grass. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed. “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed. when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete. Exponent inspected this site on June 12. At the time of our June 12. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. Seven minutes after noting the anomaly.
5 m.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 10 . 2006. 2007 removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope.18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW. inclinometers to detect soil movement. SF36292.0 to 1. looking downstream. Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features. and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1. 18 Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11. whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level.
Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). at KP 8+850. 2006. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. during ROW stabilization work. SF36292.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 11 . Photographs taken on June 12. General area of site of first spill incident. 2007 Figure 2.
as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces. At the request of TgP. General area of first spill incident. Metallurgical Consultants Inc. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4). Inc. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long).June 8. with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps. Photograph taken on September 11.19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. SF36292. The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock.003 A0F0 0607 0806 12 . as shown in Figure 4. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. 2006. is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory. with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface. with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock. until the crack became critical. 2007 Figure 3. Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically. looking downstream. at KP 8+850. 19 20 Metallurgical Consultants. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced.
003 A0F0 0607 0806 13 . 2005. referred to as the Pacobamba failure.June 8. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. as well as our own investigation. 3. Analyses done by GIE (GIE S. SF36292. and MCI.A. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline. As shown in Figure 5. occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500. The incident. IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA). Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured. This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3. approximately nine months after the first incident.950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley.3 Second Incident The second incident was discovered on August 29. 2007 Figure 4.). the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San 21 Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench. MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified.
the pipeline was shut down.219 inch. At this location. the removed fractured pipe section. the field investigation. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate). NGL pipeline excavation. MCI analyzed. and at 20:04. A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline.3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location. 2007 Antonio-Pacobamba Road. Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock. with initial participation of Exponent. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0. SF36292. Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture. the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site.June 8. 2006. a slope profile of approximately 15%. On June 14.003 A0F0 0607 0806 14 . TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline. MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1. Twenty minutes later. On September 1. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m. and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair. 2005. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2. MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline.to 2. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5. just upstream of PS #4. at 15:00.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed. At the time of our visit.
SF36292. 2006. Location of second spill incident. during permanent pipeline repair work. Photographs taken on June 14. at KP 222+500.June 8. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. 2007 Road Ridge Figure 5. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 15 .
June 8, 2007
MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.
MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.
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The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of
A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.
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the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.
Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.
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and September 19. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 19 . General area of the third spill incident. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope.June 8. 2006. at KP 200+700. during stabilization work. Photographs taken on June 14. 2007 Landslide Walls Figure 7. SF36292. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW.
and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes. Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure. MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. 2007 MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident. Figure 8. MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld.June 8. at KP 200+700. Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW. hardness.003 A0F0 0607 0806 20 . SF36292. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes. In summary. Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section.
The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water. SF36292. An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed.5 Fourth Incident The fourth incident was detected on November 24.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3. At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24.219 inch. After installation of the pipelines.27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe. 26 27 28 The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2.1 m for the NGL pipeline. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing.0 to 3. The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture. but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient. which is standard construction practice. Both pipelines were originally buried about 2. At 05:00. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture.0 m during the rainy season. 2007 3.1 m below the stream bottom. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river. the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage. a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline. In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline. A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1. The river is less than 10 m wide.26 At this location.003 A0F0 0607 0806 21 . 2005.June 8. According to TGP procedures.0 to 2. pumping was stopped by TgP. including this river crossing section.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108). which can rise 1. the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes. 2005. at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900). Furthermore. Consequently.
Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site. TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation. No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture. Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion.003 A0F0 0607 0806 22 . “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9). Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9. Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline.5-inch-long rupture. 2006. a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline. 2007 On June 13. MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow.June 8. Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics. Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove. 29 Inter-American Development Bank (2006). Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006. SF36292. A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture. and is nearly vertical above the groove.
2007 Approximate Location of Rupture Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture Figure 9. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 23 . Site of fourth spill incident. Bottom: View looking upstream.June 8. SF36292. Photographs taken on June 13. Top: View looking downstream (uphill).
June 8. the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity. SF36292. Indeed. In summary. 2007 Figure 10. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak.003 A0F0 0607 0806 24 .
The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines.000 m. Site soils are described as wet. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench. but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage. SF36292. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high. At the point of rupture.June 8. generally on a hillside. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale.” with medium potential for mudflows. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m.375 inch.003 A0F0 0607 0806 25 . A few seconds later. 2007 3. and an elevation of approximately 1. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected. The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline.30 below a saddle. in the jungle sector at KP 125+950. as shown in Figure 11.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. No fatalities. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point.32 30 31 32 A swale is a small valley. The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12. were reported. At this location.6 Fifth Incident The fifth incident occurred on March 4. The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole. A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected. The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion. 2006. but two injuries. Inter-American Development Bank (2006).
General area of the fifth spill incident. SF36292. during stabilization work. 2006. Photographs taken on June 13. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW.June 8. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. 2007 New Stabilization Measures Figure 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806 26 . at KP 125+950.
2006. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld. MCI determined that the ductility. Subsequent loading propagated this crack.5-inch-long arc. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time. lowest. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex. As with the preceding four failures. and the third. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM).June 8. uppermost. strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0.003 A0F0 0607 0806 27 . hardness. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW. to form a flat fracture that followed a 10. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11. The first. and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference. excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW. after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0. The crack then became critical. construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline. it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall.055 inch (see Figure 12).01 inch per load step. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. the second was at the point of failure. with rapid incremental tearing. SF36292. was upslope along the ROW. MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950. 2007 On June 13 and September 20.
larger landslide. Recent geotechnical studies by IGL.June 8. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. and this shallow slide overlies an older. The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff. SF36292. indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. White arrows identify the narrow. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location.33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture. at an amplification of 14×. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. 2007 Figure 12. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding. 33 Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident.003 A0F0 0607 0806 28 . We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. in part. Each zone is numbered.
TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. 2007. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. at KP 125+500.3 m3)34 of NGL was released. Figure 13. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG.” April 16th. The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500. Typically. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent. 34 Coga. 2007 3.June 8. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007. 2007. To date. Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds.003 A0F0 0607 0806 29 . external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation. SF36292. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0. however. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2.7 Sixth Incident Recently.
though frequent. 2007 3. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not 35 This is a rather deep crack. in the fifth incident. at KP 125+950.003 A0F0 0607 0806 30 . appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. In both cases. In the case of the first incident. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. Hence. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail.June 8. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. respectively. The second incident.8 Summary and Conclusions Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction. at KP 8+850. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. at KP 222+500. For the fourth incident. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. at KP 50+900. are relatively small. The pressure fluctuations at this location. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. SF36292. which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness. the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking. In both cases.
and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date. SF36292. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area.June 8. 2007 caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream.003 A0F0 0607 0806 31 . The sixth incident is still under investigation. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. Indeed.
4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids). In this section. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses.003 A0F0 0607 0806 32 . wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe. Title 49. inspection. SF36292. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. 2007 4 Design-Related Risks 4. construction. Part 192. testing. a pipe stress analysis. that the designer may encounter. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States. we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. respectively. Specifically. and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. Commonly. and pipes is performed. but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation.1 Design Background Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. Rather. valves. Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline. operation and maintenance of pipeline systems. However. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist. these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. whether usual or unusual. This information is carried over to the next step.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code. the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis.June 8. the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases. where the sizing of pumps.
indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. The profiles show good agreement. with the graph origin being in Malvinas. This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure.1 General Review Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system. Figure 14.2. SF36292. Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition. Using this information. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route.003 A0F0 0607 0806 33 .June 8.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4. 2007 4. The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline.
For the NGL pipeline.5 0. with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations.7 0. 1.June 8. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times. Based on this internal pressure.3 0.2 1.000 BPD (barrels per day).4. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31.9 0.2. 2007 4.000 to 70.003 A0F0 0607 0806 34 .4 0.2 0. 209.1 #1 PS PS #2 PS #3 PS #4 Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP 1 0.6 0. 108. the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10. Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline. a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined. SF36292.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Distance (Km) Figure 15.8 0. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis. at KP 0. and 226.
Based on this internal pressure. an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate.4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met. 4. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops.1 times the allowable MAOP.003 A0F0 0607 0806 35 . The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures. pump shutdown and pump startup. or any combination of these events. because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP. flow rates. and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg.2. a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software. This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW. a minimum allowable wall 36 Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1. The requirements of ASME B31. In summary. Furthermore. the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice. pumping capacity.4. SF36292. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure. and are in compliance with ASME B31.June 8. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. the actual internal pressure. 2007 In addition to this static analysis. Accordingly. and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis. The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed. In addition. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day).
The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate. SF36292.7 0.1 1 Max. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1. The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened.June 8. at all times.8 0.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km) Figure 16. 2007 thickness was determined per ASME B31.8.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met. Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. In summary.003 A0F0 0607 0806 36 . larger than the largest expected operating pressure. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure 0. The requirements of ASME B31. 1.9 0.
with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. satellite images. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance.003 A0F0 0607 0806 37 . Dario Verastegui.” March 21. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads. 2003. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads. hillside erosion. SF36292. In addition.” February 2002. which include external loads. 2007 4. topographic information. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3. Route of Camisea Pipeline. be considered during the design process. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards. to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards. particularly in the selva sector. Orlando Felix Salvador. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides. Sierra and Costa Sections. rock falls. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements. MR Associates. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea. and conducted field inspections along the proposed 37 38 39 40 Golder Associates.” December 2001. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines. debris flows. and flooding/river erosion. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. Prior to construction.3 Geotechnical Design Risks ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions.” March 2002. and geologic maps. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route.June 8. 37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images.
external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system.e. The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment. and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified. MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep. and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections. identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes.003 A0F0 0607 0806 38 .. debris flows.4 Conclusions The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements. 2007 pipe route.June 8. Therefore. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies. 4. Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical SF36292. or scour. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement.41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. hydraulic risk).
4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 39 . 2007 stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. SF36292. and ASME B31.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. 41 ASME B31.June 8.
42 The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers.1 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i. pipe staging sites. In order to minimize the impact on the environment. sierra. Techint employed up to 10. both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors.e. and costa sectors. government-mandated corridor. The first step was to clear and grade the ROW. grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less. camps.003 A0F0 0607 0806 40 . 2007 5 Construction-Related Risks 5. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment. and loading docks) in 2001. SF36292.. access roads.June 8. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. During construction. with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. fuel depots. Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction. and mitigation measures were constructed at that time.000 people on 12 spreads. Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva. At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season.
SF36292. In some instances. Afterward. or socalled pillows. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. upon which the pipeline would initially rest. Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material. as depicted in Figure 18. The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used. resting each pipe on two blocks. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline. The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags. trenching may have occurred first. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain. the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. because it was the only available route for transportation. If the terrain was flat.003 A0F0 0607 0806 41 .June 8. and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges. Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom. Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions.” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding. 2007 The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself.
Figure 18. SF36292.June 8. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. 2007 Figure 17. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107.003 A0F0 0607 0806 42 .
003 A0F0 0607 0806 43 . a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position.June 8. Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench. The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline. Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads. Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. 2007 Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches. When possible. In locations where the pipeline followed a road. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment. Once the trench was dug. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain. Figure 19. SF36292.
blasting was required to trench.003 A0F0 0607 0806 44 . Typically. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures. In some cases. As discussed below. SF36292. Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing. Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Figure 20. the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes).June 8. The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench. 2007 Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92.
two months after the system was put into operation. GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation. and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. landslides. 2007 5. TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW. but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration.2 Geotechnical Construction Characteristics During construction of the pipelines. GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. and recommend measures to prevent. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation. and river erosion. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector. rockfalls. Additionally.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts. and the environment. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for SF36292. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement.June 8. people.003 A0F0 0607 0806 45 . In October 2004. reduce. GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction.
In many of these locations. where possible. Field Reconnaissance on July 17. 45 In our opinion. no date. Proyecto Camisea. and shallow landsliding. During our inspections. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges.June 8. conservative values were assumed. SF36292.1. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6. When only limited detailed data were available. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. Variant Pisco. During our site inspections. 45 “Camisea Project.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN. Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts. 2007 maintenance. Based on our field inspections. cracking. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks. 44 Camisea Project. no date. not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction. coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters. October 2004. The route selection along mountain ridges. At some narrow ridges. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW. 5. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas. Pacobamba Route Sector. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. 2002. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section.3 Clearing Related Risks As mentioned previously in Section 5. necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures. Exponent 43 Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales.003 A0F0 0607 0806 46 . soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles.44.
potentially creating a large. This is generally not a recommended practice.4 Trenching-Related Risks Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel. on the other hand. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor. Clods of clay. unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized. 2007 observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW.. Dry sand. the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW. and the material type and wetness of the backfill. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods. will not flow. for example. Except in special circumstances. specifically in natural drainages. During our field inspection. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions. Figures 17 to 20).June 8. SF36292. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings). we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above. The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe. The conditions in the selva sector. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles. Therefore. which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 47 . soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e. would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe. The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6. but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe.g.
is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures. hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion.000 individual pipe segments. and two were defective longitudinal welds.193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects. 5. Specifically.e. SP. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material. each approximately 12 m in length.003 A0F0 0607 0806 48 . These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”).906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. 2007 Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”). Argentina. Brazil. Available data (i. Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba.5 Pipe Material–Related Risks The system was constructed using more than 100.. Additionally. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005. API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. Adherence to DIN 30670. and Buenos Aires. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe.June 8. All three pipes SF36292.
The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate. rather. overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s 46 The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. Table 1. 2003 February 16.003 A0F0 0607 0806 49 . and 5 in Table 1. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion. 2003 July 27. at each circumferential pipe joint. ID 1 2 Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8. 2003 External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible. see leaks 3. however. risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes. 2004 March 23. 2003 7 8 NGL NG KP 210 KP 388 January 9. 4. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low. SF36292. 2004 October 4. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld Pipeline NGL NGL 3 4 5 6 NGL NGL NGL NGL KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170 October 4. It needs to be recognized that. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects.June 8. a sleeve is placed.8. 2007 were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. 2004 September 16. as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. This level of defect removal is not atypical. For details on these three leaks.
In this regard. a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. whereas for the NG pipeline. automated methods were used. These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing.3.6 Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104.June 8. 2794-L-SP-00017. geotechnical loading conditions. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and SF36292. 5. This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7. and not weld quality. API 1104 and ASME B31. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss.4 (liquid) and ASME B31. 2794-L-SP00016. in 2006. In addition.003 A0F0 0607 0806 50 . and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012. 2007 long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools. and 2794-L-SP-00031. TgP operates a cathodic protection system and. The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds.8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes. IX. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104.
“The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”. page 10.003 A0F0 0607 0806 51 .8. Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired. that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph. Likewise.June 8.H.3. Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that 47 G. 12th World Gas Conference. there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken. 2007 easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested. 5. it was to be radiographed. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack. A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5.7 Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5. 1973. due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes. as with all pipelines. 5. SF36292. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld. Ewing.1 Background Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks.8. The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects. there is a very small possibility. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level.
eight leaks were identified. 5. such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31. especially considering the challenging terrain. two by external damage that had occurred during construction.8. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP). two by faulty longitudinal welds.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of 48 TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline.8.25 times the internal design pressure. induced stresses were not uniform. However. during hydrostatic testing. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak. After the test. In the case of the NGL pipeline. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1.250 km of pipeline is a low number. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. All of these failures were subsequently repaired. and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate. For example. the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system.48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system.June 8. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 52 . Next. Per this criterion. 2007 exceeds the maximum operating pressure. our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes. the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing.
49 Of these 129 defects. this type of potential defect. this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing. In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world. This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ). The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further 49 G. This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500. some minimal risk may exist. 10 were plate defects. page 10.8. During the time the hydrogen is present.H. This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline. the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking. 2007 3. if it results in a leak. As in any pipeline. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test. Typically. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing. Despite these actions. where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph.424 miles of pipe.” 1973.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels.003 A0F0 0607 0806 53 . 12th World Gas Conference. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding. in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds. Ewing. 16 were defects in the girth welds. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator.June 8. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. however. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States. but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld. SF36292. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. 5. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents.
our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW. Overall. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice. 5.000 girth welds. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome. and when it does occur. Overall. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack.003 A0F0 0607 0806 54 . The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low. the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW.June 8. because absent soil movement. but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. 2007 propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air.9 Conclusions Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue. (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors SF36292. risks are not as high as for a rupture situation. On the other hand. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month. However.
June 8. and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes. 2007 were in compliance with API 1104.003 A0F0 0607 0806 55 . SF36292.
rock slides. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock. and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline. amounts of precipitation. and along the Pacific coast. low resistance to weathering.June 8. but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur 50 For purposes of this report. and ridge instability. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. rockfalls. but still pose significant risk to the pipelines. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. hard rock. high groundwater levels. and high-gradient streams. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain. geology. low strength. narrow ridges. wedge landslides. freezing temperatures. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. particularly when devoid of vegetation. The conditions include very steep and high slopes. 2007 6 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6. The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability.003 A0F0 0607 0806 56 . Specifically.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. over the Andes Mountains. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines. typically when saturated. SF36292. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion. relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils.
rockslides. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. and gravity walls. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works. wedge landslides. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard. crib walls. For a challenging alignment such as this system. and reinforced shotcrete. slope armoring. and broad river crossings.003 A0F0 0607 0806 57 . including GEOTEC. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers. five months after the system was placed into operation. The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems. These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants. and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley. gabion walls. and slope inclinometers. rock bolts. this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. metal or concrete piles. GEOTEC presented a plan of action. SF36292. very little rainfall. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities. and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. and rockfalls.June 8. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW.2 General Findings As described previously in Chapter 4. predominantly granular soils and gravel. In January 2005. 2007 intermittently. 6. reinforced concrete walls. surface surveying.
including implementation of subsurface exploration. and Stepanek). Verastegui. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. GEOTEC made several other recommendations. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting. topographic surveys. As described in Chapter 4. 2007 Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. or immediately following. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete.June 8. we observed evidence of substantial ground movement. In some instances. Following our June 2006 inspections.003 A0F0 0607 0806 58 . Based on this study. TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. identified critical zones in the selva sector. More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously. The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock SF36292. For example. In addition. and made preliminary recommendations. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route. Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization.
(5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled. Based on our second set of site inspections. with the exception of one site at PS #2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 59 . As a result of these efforts. rain gauges. We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline. Further.. depths. Hence. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e. in September 2006. lined ditch to a main surface collector system.g. (2) in some limited cases. because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements. SF36292. strain gauges. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches.June 8. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide. in September 2006. piezometers. and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide. slope inclinometers. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. 2007 below the landslide plane. Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary. Based on our observations at PS #2.
In our opinion. In late 2006. SF36292. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e. and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk. In this method. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. deforestation. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur.. The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. (2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters. This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse.3. and remediation) causes. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below.g. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure.1 Risk Assessment Methodology Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW. 2007 directions. development. dynamic. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters. complex.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 60 . risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes. 6. and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk.
The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode. and (d) ridge instability. 2007 Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e.003 A0F0 0607 0806 61 . (b) wedge landslide. health. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures 51 The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement. (c) translational landslide. The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. The higher the Likelihood Level. SF36292. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. property. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures.June 8. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. the greater the susceptibility. The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental.. more severe. marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site. consequences.g. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW. and safety. The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis. The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide.
2007 Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures. 52 Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. considering all four failure modes. The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW.3. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. SF36292.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary. 67 are in the selva sector. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level. Table 2. 4. 28 are in the sierra sector.June 8. Risk category assessment chart Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5 6. and none are in the costa sector.003 A0F0 0607 0806 62 . Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix.
The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23. The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006). 2007 In general. Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix. the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006).003 A0F0 0607 0806 63 . For each time period. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23). The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA. some on both occasions. Finally. pipe movement. and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk. Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. In addition. even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector. In this regard. However. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. September. the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented. there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006.June 8. in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk. soil movement. sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e. tension cracks.g. respectively. The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue. For example. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006).. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites. surface depression. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures. along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May SF36292. slope bulging.
94 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 3 2 0 4 17 2 0 1 13 9 0 7 24 12 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006 1 2 3 4 5 35% 23% 0% 29% 13% Figure 21. By October 2006. only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high. SF36292. Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk. the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 64 .” As mentioned before. 2007 2006. By comparison. and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006. Risk assessment results for May 2006. TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk.
Risk assessment results for September 2006. SF36292. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 9 3 0 5 22 16 0 6 20 4 0 2 6 2 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 40% 47% 0% 11% 2% Figure 22.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 65 .
June 8. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 16 9 0 8 33 14 0 4 6 1 0 0 3 1 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 74% 21% 0% 4% 1% Figure 23. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 66 . which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. Risk assessment results for October 2006.
June 8.e. which began in earnest in April 2006. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures. slope inclination. surface drainage control.003 A0F0 0607 0806 67 .e. inspections. the Risk Category as of May 2006). Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4). Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i. 3 1 Reduction in Risk 2 21 9 1 21 9 1 0 27 1 3 1 2 3 4 5 May 2006 Risk Category Figure 24. and presence of gabion walls). and monitoring. whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites. SF36292.. The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. because Severity Levels were likely unchanged. groundwater depth. The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program. 2007 The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels.. Change in risk from May to October 2006. The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i.
recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. 50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category Figure 25. However. respectively. Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2. the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006. comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector. The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5. 2007 The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3. the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector. Hence.003 A0F0 0607 0806 68 . engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method. to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. In contrast. Risk by sectors for May 2006. While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. However. Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. representation across the three sectors was not possible.June 8. Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006) 4 5 SF36292.
June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 69 . requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e. 6. Therefore. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk.. this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites. 2007 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006) Frequency 4 5 Risk Category Figure 26. In addition. This RMP should state at least the following: SF36292. strain gauges and inclinometers). Risk by sectors for October 2006. Initially. we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present. decision processes and means of execution.4 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation We expect that the continuous.g. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions.
complex. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites. and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 70 . This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner. be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately. Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection. observations. The observed performance of the pipeline system. 2007 • • • All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. dynamic. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical SF36292. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities. Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. and sensitive. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures. Based on Exponent’s review. and engineering experience.5 Conclusions The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. During our inspections in 2006. • Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided. 6. Furthermore.
June 8, 2007
sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In
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this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.
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Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks
Description of Potential Risks and Controls
In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,
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Therefore. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the 53 54 The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison. TgP’s outside consultant. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience. Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further. while sufficient for internal pressures. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that.53 In particular. tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents. where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. 7. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength. Thus.003 A0F0 0607 0806 74 .2 Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82.June 8. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing. SF36292. This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. 2007 and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline. This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading. MCI. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively. an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed. for the first and fifth spill incidents.
repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load. metal loss. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. pipe gauge.003 A0F0 0607 0806 75 . SF36292. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies.3.1 Inline Pipe Inspection Background TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline. DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test.3 7. any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture. and dents.June 8. potentially leading to pipe failure. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules.452. 7. However. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool.452. ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195. 2007 overload failure of the NGL pipeline. Furthermore. However. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids. Our review indicates that this set of 55 The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies. Under normal operating pressures. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline. These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis.55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks.
Among the 30 locations.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection. 2007 regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection..452. external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld.e. re-weld. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i. a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i. 13 to dents. In all cases. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195. By the end of March. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk. which includes excavation. numerous sites have SF36292. and based on the results. the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce. 14 were related to metal loss. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment. radiographic examination of girth weld.June 8. Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts. In this regard.g. micro hardness measurement). patching. visual inspection.188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement.g. implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e.003 A0F0 0607 0806 76 . we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing. and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry. The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48. etc. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e. The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site. and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld.. 7. potential anomalies). the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents. as well as external excavations. As of March 2007. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld.). ultrasound wall thickness measurement. First.. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation)..3. 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed.452. 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss.e. Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications.
56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable 56 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. In addition.452. Based on these findings. Specifically.. Therefore. For cracks with a smaller opening. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. A verification of other sites is ongoing. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. 2007 been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector.452. SF36292. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that. Specifically. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195. TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%. However.e. currently.3. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i. All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep. Overall. the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness.June 8. with a depth of 49%. per DOT 49 CFR 195. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure).3 Circumferential Crack Detection In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations.003 A0F0 0607 0806 77 . 7.
per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. Specifically. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow.June 8. at present. even though the technology appears to be readily available. in bending. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending. but it was caused by a specific site condition. Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline. 7. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws. Clearly. In this regard. Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads. whereas. Unfortunately. in pure axial loading. TgP has committed to evaluating potential options. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks. 2007 with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool.4 Conclusions The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions. based on this study. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 78 . the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads. Therefore. the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption. the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of SF36292. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks.
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significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.
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Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.
Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.
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Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.
Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.
As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.
Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).
A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.
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West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. Silva.003 A0F0 0607 0806 82 . and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking. in turn.2 Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1. 8. SF36292. and Tavera 2003). 2007 Figure 28. lead to pipeline damage.June 8. Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms. Excessive movement associated with ground failure can.
g. When these transient strains become sufficiently large. ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves. 2.e. as opposed to body waves. Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD. “Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004).67 lateral spread.. unstable slopes. cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i. toward an open face such as a stream channel.. VA. Rayleigh or Love). or poorly compacted fills). PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e.g.65 landslides. Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials. “An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering. faults.. Lateral movement of ground. EERI.. damage to buried pipelines may result. compression or shear) or surface waves (e. SF36292. This phenomenon generally occurs in loose. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking. Vol. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures. Therefore. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves.” Earthquake Spectra.70 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 Transient strain is short-term deformation. typically with little to no perceptible slope.” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. 2007 2.e.69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i. 20(4).64 However. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking. Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid. Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface.June 8. liquefiable soils.e. Vol. Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i. O’Rourke (1998). 1392-1426.003 A0F0 0607 0806 83 . for similar levels of earthquake motion. earthquakes). 75.. 1167-1183.68 and seismic compression.66 slope instability liquefaction. Reston. resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone. it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components.
and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity.C. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval. These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard.0g. Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes. (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva.3. 0.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8. Specifically. pressure control stations. “Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Consequently. there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i.. additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand. inter-slab versus in-slab events). with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0.A.7g73 for the extreme event and 0. (2001).5g for the design event.June 8.5g represents half the acceleration of gravity.C. Therefore. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking. which is 1. 71 72 73 Vector Peru S. sierra. and pressure reducing stations.e. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector. 2007 8. Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions.” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking.003 A0F0 0607 0806 84 . SF36292.A. For a subduction-zone earthquake.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand Vector Peru S.
Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault. lateral spread.003 A0F0 0607 0806 85 . which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i. APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent.. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements. it appears that other modes of PGD (i. at the intended alignment.e. landsliding. 2007 8. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines. However. liquefaction. sands. sand dunes). characterizing potential fault displacements. and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline.” SF36292. Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake..52 m. They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e. slope instability. Peru. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline.3.. For the sierra and selva sectors. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes. ABSC identified only one active fault crossing. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0.June 8. and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction.g. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. and silts with high fines and clay content. particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions.e. Seismically induced slope instability poses a 74 ABS Consulting (2002). rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction.
8. the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect.” SF36292. sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread. However.003 A0F0 0607 0806 86 . an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid 75 ABS Consulting (2002). segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities. 2007 substantial risk in the costa sector. Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31.3 Wave Propagation Hazards ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system. The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion. may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage. Furthermore. Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations. ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties. Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake.3. Consequently.4.June 8. However. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake. or with major curves or bends. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program.
seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations.003 A0F0 0607 0806 87 . Consequently. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline.4 Conclusions The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. 2007 connections. Additionally. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. 8. which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast. 76 Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks. SF36292. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further.June 8. However.
Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined.003 A0F0 0607 0806 88 . Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour. and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour. (2) general scour. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe.1 River Crossings and Scour Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes. and characteristics of the bed and bank materials.June 8. Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions. intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches). characteristics of the flood. Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round). and (3) local scour. Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream. Once exposed or undermined. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above. all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline. General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. SF36292. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings. location of the pipe crossing. pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe. 2007 9 Scour-Related Risks 9. Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events.
“Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Ingenieros Consultores.” SF36292. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.79. and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline. the FHWA documents are guidance documents and. which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis. Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW. This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18.” – date unknown.3 and 479.” 80 Golder Associates (2002). Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing. 18 (FHWA HEC-18).June 8. Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor. “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. 81 77 Hydroconsult (2003). Furthermore. 80.” 81 Golder Associates (2003). Techint.A. to our knowledge. Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW. 79 Golder Associates (2002). is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23.” 78 GMI S. HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 89 . which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa. However. FHWA HEC-18. “Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477. 2007 9. in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing. Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths. 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law.77. -20. and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures. “Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea. they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally.2 Risks at Buried River Crossings A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29.
As seen in Figure 30. the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth. The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth. including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings.June 8. The design return period was 200 years (0.003 A0F0 0607 0806 90 .5% chance of occurrence SF36292. 2007 Figure 29.
Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated. • Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing.003 A0F0 0607 0806 91 .2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical. a stochastic stream flow generation program. it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover. If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters. • At each river crossing. • If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations. but in some cases. providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders. it was increased to 1 meter. The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U. and energy dissipators. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model. were designed and built in selected locations. the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time. such as reinforcement of the riverbed.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings.June 8. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study. 2007 during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0.S. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. • Scour countermeasures. SF36292. • The river crossing locations were surveyed.
SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 92 . our general practice and experience in scour prediction. when combined. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. All of the above-listed factors. 2007. result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth. However. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows. Peru.June 8. Lima. 2007 Figure 30.
SF36292. 9. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. To mitigate this potential residual risk. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary. and -23. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007.003 A0F0 0607 0806 93 . Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events.3 Conclusions The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18.June 8. TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events. During our field inspections in 2006. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty. The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above. 2007 Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events. -20.
TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Overall.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline. 10.003 A0F0 0607 0806 94 .June 8. and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system. First. Furthermore. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment. such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. the review showed that (1) the more than 100. (4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104. 10. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. Second. the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. Overall. (3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. 2007 10 Summary and Conclusions Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB. (5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME SF36292. related to the Camisea Transportation System.
However.3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. observations. SF36292. 82 ASME B31. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces.June 8. and engineering experience. dynamic. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected. and ASME B31. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. complex. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3).4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system. Based on Exponent’s review. 10. This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas.003 A0F0 0607 0806 95 .8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. During our inspections in 2006. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006. 2007 codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines. Ultimately. We expect that the continuous. and sensitive. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5).
TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. during construction. 2007 10. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. to determine whether SF36292. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that. our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites. Second. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. However.June 8. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions. Therefore. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. currently. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further.5 Seismic-Related Risks The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. all the welds were x-rayed.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks.003 A0F0 0607 0806 96 . Overall. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11). and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195. First. 10.452. Consequently.
10. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data.003 A0F0 0607 0806 97 . such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. To mitigate this potential residual risk. and thus. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events. SF36292.6 Scour-Related Risks The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. However. However. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. 2007 these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered.7 Summary TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11. 10. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions.June 8. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated.
Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures.1 Geotechnical and Geologic The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1. the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection. These recommendations. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline. 2007 11 Recommendations Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006. with mechanical pipe integrity. At a minimum.003 A0F0 0607 0806 98 . 11. seismic events. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis. based on the results and conclusions of this investigation.June 8. Overall. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. and river scouring as secondary risks. SF36292. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. 2. Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk. which TgP has committed to implement. are described in the following sections.
4. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project.003 A0F0 0607 0806 99 . Prior to our site inspections. 7. During the past site inspections. The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location. In addition to the above general recommendations. TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable. Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. 5. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis. 6. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations. 2007 3. Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures.June 8.5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using SF36292. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni. piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2. At most of the locations.
and construction of remedial measures is currently underway. Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. Detailed geotechnical investigations. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study. and qualified personnel to install. as discussed with TgP. especially noting new occurrences. Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. Following completion of this work. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a.003 A0F0 0607 0806 100 . as necessary.June 8. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings. c. This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement. 2007 simple hand drive hammers. to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels. analyze. monitor. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites. and interpret results. 9. Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. 10. 11. SF36292. presence of discoloration. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. b. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes. as discussed with TgP. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site. and other such observations.
Formation of erosion gullies.003 A0F0 0607 0806 101 . appropriate remedial measures. 11.2 Seismic TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system.e.. and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends. TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first. fourth. retreat of stream banks. Later. 2007 d. This information shall be used to update. if necessary. TgP should implement.4 Pipe To reduce pipe integrity–related risks. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude. the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades. TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection. This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active. such as long-term degradation. damage to check dams.June 8. design ground motions. e. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i. and fifth spill incidents. or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds. SF36292. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements. if necessary. Based on the analysis.3 Scour TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing. lateral shifting of the stream banks. 11. soil movement). Alignment of the gabion walls at each location. 11.
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