Failure Analysis Associates

Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007

Integrity Analysis of the Camisea Transportation System, Peru, S.A., June 2007

Prepared for Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue N.W. Washington, DC 20577

Prepared by Exponent 320 Goddard, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618

June 8, 2007

Doc. No. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806

June 8, 2007

Contents
Page List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms and Abbreviations Limitations Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Spill Incidents Risk Identification Risk Evaluation Design-Related Risks Construction-Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Future Activities 1 Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 Description of the System Operational History Report Organization vi ix x xi xii xii xv xvi xvii xvii xviii xx xxiii xxv xxvi xxvi 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 6 8 8 ii

Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 2.2 2.3 Objective Phases of Work Scope

3

Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3.1 Background

SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806

9 6 Conclusions Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6.June 8.1 5.4 5 Geotechnical Design Risks Conclusions Construction-Related Risks 5.2 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks 5.5 3.2.1 Background 5.3 4.2.1 General Review 4.8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 .8.7 3.5 5.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline 4.3 5.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System 5.2 5.7 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Geotechnical Construction Characteristics Clearing Related Risks Trenching-Related Risks Pipe Material–Related Risks Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks 5.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions iii SF36292.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5. 2007 3.1 Design Background 4.8 4 First Incident Second Incident Third Incident Fourth Incident Fifth Incident Sixth Incident Summary and Conclusions 8 13 17 21 25 29 30 32 32 33 33 34 35 37 38 40 40 45 46 47 48 50 51 51 51 52 53 54 56 56 Design-Related Risks 4.2.6 5.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline 4.4 5.8.

3 Wave Propagation Hazards 8.4 9 Conclusions Scour-Related Risks 9.3 Inline Pipe Inspection 7.1 Background 7.2 9.2 10.3 River Crossings and Scour Risks at Buried River Crossings Conclusions 10 Summary and Conclusions 10.2 Description of Potential Risks and Controls Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks 7.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8.3.1 9.3.4 6.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method 6.003 A0F0 0607 0806 iv .3 Circumferential Crack Detection 7.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand 8.3.1 10.4 8 Conclusions Seismic-Related Risks 8.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6.3.3.2 Tectonic Overview Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines 8.3.1 Risk Assessment Methodology 6.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards 8.3 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks SF36292.1 7.2 General Findings 57 60 60 62 69 70 73 73 74 75 75 76 77 78 80 80 82 84 84 85 86 87 88 88 89 93 94 94 94 95 6.June 8.1 8.5 7 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Conclusions Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks 7.3.3.2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results 7. 2007 6.

4 Geotechnical and Geologic Seismic Scour Pipe SF36292.5 10.7 11 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Seismic-Related Risks Scour-Related Risks Summary 96 96 97 97 98 98 101 101 101 Recommendations 11.3 11. 2007 10.6 10.2 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806 v .4 10.June 8.1 11.

Photographs taken on June 14. Top: View looking downstream (uphill).June 8. Photographs taken on June 13. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. 16 Figure 7. 12 13 Figure 4.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vi . General area of first spill incident. during permanent pipeline repair work. at KP 222+500. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru. Bottom: View looking upstream. during stabilization work. 2006. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. 2006. 15 Figure 6. at KP 200+700. red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. during ROW stabilization work. 2 Figure 2. 23 SF36292. Photograph taken on September 11. Location of second spill incident. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. Photographs taken on June 14. Figure 9. 2007 List of Figures Page Figure 1. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. Photographs taken on June 12. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). and September 19. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. 2006. at KP 8+850. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. at KP 8+850. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. looking downstream. Figure 5. 19 20 Figure 8. 2006. 11 Figure 3. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface. and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe. 2006. Site of fourth spill incident. 2006. Top: View downstream (looking downslope). General area of the third spill incident. at KP 200+700. General area of site of first spill incident. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850.

Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. Figure 16. Change in risk from May to October 2006. General area of the fifth spill incident. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Figure 12. Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. Figure 24. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92.003 A0F0 0607 0806 vii . Figure 27. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. Figure 19. Figure 11. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover. 2007 Figure 10. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. Risk by sectors for October 2006. Photographs taken on June 13. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW. Figure 18. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident.June 8. Each zone is numbered. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. Figure 14. Figure 22. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Figure 20. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. Figure 15. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Figure 17. at KP 125+950. 2006. Figure 26. Washington State University website). with the graph origin being in Malvinas. Figure 23. Risk assessment results for October 2006. during stabilization work. Figure 25. Risk assessment results for May 2006. at an amplification of 14×. Figure 21. Figure 13. 24 26 28 29 33 34 36 42 42 43 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 81 SF36292. White arrows identify the narrow. Risk assessment results for September 2006. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. Risk by sectors for May 2006.

2007. Peru. 2007 Figure 28.June 8. Lima. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18). Figure 30. and Tavera 2003). West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. Silva. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. Figure 29. 82 90 92 SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 viii .

June 8. Table 2. Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Risk category assessment chart 49 62 SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 ix . 2007 List of Tables Page Table 1.

C.A. SF36292. Department of Transportation extraction and production Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates Flux Arc Welding Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No.June 8.A.003 A0F0 0607 0806 x . 18 Golder Associates heat-affected zone high-density polyethylene hydrogen-induced cracking Inter-American Development Bank Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA Likelihood Levels maximum allowable operating pressure Metallurgical Consultants Inc.S. 2007 Acronyms and Abbreviations ABSC API ASME BPD CFR COGA DOT E&P Exponent FCAW FHWA HEC-18 Golder HAZ HDPE HIC IDB IGL LL MAOP MCI MFL MMSCFD MOP MRA NG NGL PCS PGD PRS PS QWP RMP ROW SCADA SEM SL SMAW SR TgP the system TPS Vector ABS Consulting American Petroleum Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers barrels per day Code of Federal Regulations Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas U. Camisea Transportation System Tuboscope Pipeline Services Vector Peru S. Magnetic Flux Leakage million standard cubic feet per day maximum operating pressure MR Associates natural gas natural gas liquid pressure control station permanent ground deformation pressure reduction station pump station Qualified Welding Procedures Risk Management Plan right-of-way supervisory control and data acquisition scanning electron microscopy Severity Levels Shielded Metal Arc Welding Safety Ratio Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.

and are derived in accordance with current standards of professional practice. and engineering analysis. such as rains and landslides or human activities. based on engineering and geological experience and judgment. Changes in the conditions of the right-of-way may occur with time due to natural processes or events. 2007 Limitations At the request of the Inter-American Development Bank. This report also provides a site-specific technical evaluation of the geotechnical and mechanical aspects of each incident. Exponent has used and relied upon certain information provided by sources that it believes to be reliable for the purpose of this report. or the condition of concealed construction. and a sixth spill incident in April 2007. Accordingly. limited visual inspection of some failed pipe sections. Accordingly. and any reuse of this report or the findings or conclusions presented herein is at the sole risk of the user. by changes that are beyond our control. wholly or in part.June 8. beyond what was specifically revealed during the site visits and our document review. interviews of key personnel involved in the design and construction. SF36292. The scope of services performed during this investigation may not adequately address the needs of other interested parties.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xi . Exponent prepared this report to summarize our evaluation of the integrity of the pipeline components in the Camisea Transportation System. In addition. ground stability. and offers no warranty regarding subsurface conditions. Comments regarding concealed construction or subsurface conditions are our professional opinion. which experienced five spill incidents between December 2004 and March of 2006. document review. the findings of this report may be invalidated. Exponent has no direct knowledge of. using the currently available information to identify the most probable contributing factors. Our investigation included visual inspection of the pipeline right-of-way and adjacent areas.

TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. During our investigation of causal factors in the five incidents and assessment of pipeline integrity.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xii . The alignment of the ROW is shown on Figure 1. (TgP) in order to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system. This report summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. during the first 19 months of operation. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline. climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of approximately 4. and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean. TgP has implemented many of these interim recommendations and has undertaken other additional activities based on its experience and knowledge. 2007 Executive Summary Background and Scope of Work Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity analysis of the Camisea Transportation System (the system). which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. commencing in April 2006. on the coast of Peru south of Lima. The Camisea Transportation System is owned and operated by TgP. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. SF36292.800 m. 1 True length of pipeline.June 8. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. Exponent’s retention followed the occurrence of five spill incidents. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. The intent of our investigation was to develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the incidents.1 Along this route. at the southern edge of Lima. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long.A. Exponent made recommendations to Transportadora de Gas del Peru S. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline.

As part of that study. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. The locations and dates of the first five spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline or on either pipeline in the costa sector. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation. one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. and ongoing operation. The location of this spill incident is also shown on Figure 1. pipeline maintenance. In contrast. All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline—four of the spills occurred in the selva sector. Specifics of the first five individual spill incidents are presented later in this summary. TgP identified2 a sixth incident on April 2. Construction of the pipelines started in 2002. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiii . The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a hybrid risk-based system to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. and the design of river crossings (scour analysis). and commercial operation began in August 2004. primarily the NGL. Specifically. Recently.June 8. 2007. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. pipeline design. 2) evaluating the SF36292. 2007 and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches. the mechanical design. geologic and geotechnical hazard mitigation. and one in the sierra sector. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. where a small amount of NGL was reported to have been released. pipeline construction. Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. TgP subsequently repaired the NGL pipeline and is currently investigating the root cause of this incident. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006.

and maintenance of the system. and operational data. geotechnical and geological studies. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. operators. SF36292. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. hydrological studies. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. These documents included engineering specifications. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. 2 Exponent was informed that TgP detected this minor leak during planned activities of its pipeline integrity program. 2007 effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. construction specifications. In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis.June 8. operations.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xiv . pipe material data. In some cases. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System. seismic studies. under construction. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. construction. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. river-crossing studies. operation. construction progress surveys. or had been completed. These inspections occurred at more than 50 sites along the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. pipeline design drawings and calculations. construction. Finally. In addition to the document review and engineering analysis activities. service providers. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the five spill incidents that we investigated.

hydrogen-induced crack in the weld.June 8. In the incident at KP 8+850. Hence. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. SF36292. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. The NG pipeline was not damaged at either location. to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure. located at KP 222+500. even though the crack had extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness4 by the time the hydrostatic test was performed. the crack resulted in complete severance of the NGL pipe. This is a rather deep crack. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent incubation time associated with hydrogeninduced crack initiation. a sizable landslide ultimately overwhelmed these measures. the crack resulted in a throughwall leak of about 10 inches in extent. 2007 Spill Incidents Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. At both of these locations. 3 4 A root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure. In the incident at KP 125+950. progressive soil loading likely propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the hydrogen crack to be further destabilized. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. appears to have been primarily the result of a timedelayed. In both cases. Exponent identified unstable geotechnical conditions as a significant contributor to the rupture of the pipe. and to consider the potential for systemic problems.3 Our evaluation identified similarities in fracture surfaces in the NGL pipe from the first and fifth incidents. While some measures were taken during construction to mitigate this geologic risk. It is currently Exponent’s opinion that the high toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing (performed five months after the welding). respectively.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xv . ultimately rupturing the pipe and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate. The second incident. both undermining and overtopping the ROW and the road next to the ROW.

The NG pipe at this location was not damaged. 2007 the rupture of the NGL pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. For purposes of this report. In this context. controlled. Indeed. during our study. we define risk as the likelihood that a given chain of events will occur and result in a consequence that has a defined severity. and then prioritize the remaining sources of risk so they can be mitigated.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvi . For the fourth incident. This triggering loading event could have been associated with riverbed scouring caused by the flash flooding. and/or monitored. Again. Finally. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. The objective of risk management as part of a pipeline integrity management program is to identify. the NG pipe at this location was not damaged. Risk Identification The pipeline integrity analysis evaluated the risk categories that influence the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline failures. The aggregate of the likelihood of failure and the severity of failure is risk. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. Analysis performed to date indicates that the dent was not made by a boulder washed downstream during the flash flooding that immediately preceded the spill. located at KP 50+900. it is important to note that the metallurgical testing confirmed that none of the five spill incidents were related to pipe material quality. we identified four SF36292.June 8. eliminate if appropriate. risk was ranked to be minimal if the risk is currently not a concern and effectively consistent with other pipelines. In this report.

whereas geological hazards are defined as movement in rock. we also recognize that the four risk categories identified above depend. we first provide a brief summary of our investigation into potential systemic risks resulting from the design and construction of the system. Design-Related Risks The system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). and river scouring. SF36292. Risk Evaluation The four primary categories of risk identified above are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow. and scour. typically when saturated. we found that the risk associated with geotechnical and geological conditions is currently more significant than risks associated with pipe integrity. to varying degrees. In summary. Furthermore. Due to their importance. Each of these areas of integrity risk is discussed separately below.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xvii . and abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. seismic events. 5 For the purposes of this report. 2007 primary categories of risk affecting the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical and geological. our communication with TgP to date indicates that they are committed to continue identifying and reducing the geotechnical risks to the pipeline. although pipe integrity–related risks typically increase with the age of the pipeline. Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement. geotechnical and geological hazards are defined as external pressures resulting from ground movement. poor foundation (ground) conditions.June 8. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography.6 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. seismic events. on decisions made during the design and construction of the pipeline. However.5 mechanical pipe integrity. Exponent’s review determined that TgP implemented various actions in 2006 to substantially reduce the risk of future incidents to the pipeline.

The pipes were transported to the individual construction sites. SP. SF36292. These electric-resistance-welded tubular pipes are manufactured per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 5L standard. government mandated corridor.e.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and up the mountains. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines. Subsequently. The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. Argentina. and Buenos Aires. 2007 Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i. Brazil. hydraulic risk). We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. and ASME B31.000 individual pipes. Construction-Related Risks The system was constructed simultaneously at several so-called “mini-spreads” along the ROW. each of which is up to 12 meters long. This ROW had to be contained in a 3-km-wide. where the ROW itself was commonly the only available route for transportation.. Therefore. Our design review revealed that the pipeline designers assumed that external soil loading would be entirely mitigated by geotechnical mitigation measures implemented during construction at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. external loads were an important element for the design and construction of the system. The pipe manufacturer’s records indicate that these mills are located in Pindamonhangaba. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had 6 7 ASME B31.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xviii .8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline.June 8. A review of the pipe book7 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the pipe material used was purpose built for the system at two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. such that steel plates are rolled and longitudinally welded at the mill. all pipes were coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect them from external corrosion. using more than 100.

the construction methods are consistent with general pipeline construction practice. The more then 100. Geotechnical engineers also supervised the geotechnical mitigation measures to control surface water runoff and stabilize the ROW following installation of the pipelines.000 girth welds of both pipelines were to be welded per approved procedures and to be x-rayed 24 hours later. This standard construction methodology was replaced by special construction methods in very steep terrain. and along rivers and drainages. grading along the ROW consisted of cutting into the hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side of the clearing.June 8. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. trench conditions. and potential damage to the pipe exterior. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters. and at locations where the pipeline was laid along an existing road. and some mitigation measures were constructed at that time. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. Within the 3-km-wide corridor. and girth welds were used to join individual pipes. Overall. the pipe was strung out. Due to limitations imposed by the narrow lane of clearing. To minimize environmental impact.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xix . would have likely resulted in substantially more construction-related damage to the environment. 2007 to be granted by the Peruvian government. Next. SF36292. at river crossings. the constructor decided to preferentially build the pipeline along mountain ridges. and the work was inspected by outside consultants.8 This process was generally effective at minimizing and 8 Exponent’s scope of work did not include reviewing these x-rays. where potential risks to pipeline integrity arise primarily from the girth welds. The ground conditions encountered during installation of the pipe were reportedly assessed by geotechnical engineers. it is our understanding the government of Peru– commissioned pipeline audit is performing this task. in that placing the ROW near the base of the mountains. The ROW was cleared and cut. Exponent’s review indicates that this approach was appropriate and preferred. A completed pipe section that may be several hundred meters long was then lowered into the trench and welded together to form an even longer pipe section.

The causes of the leaks were determined to be a faulty girth weld in three cases. initiating the subsequent spill incident. a faulty longitudinal weld in two other cases.June 8.000 girth welds. Despite the above-described actions. Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined level that exceeds the maximum operating pressure. During the hydrostatic testing. more than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and mitigated in 2006 by implementing SF36292. long individual sections of the pipeline were hydrostatically tested. especially considering the challenging terrain. This situation arose with the second spill incident. Eight failures in more than 1. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline and one in the NG pipeline. eight leaks were identified. Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. where weld quality was to be evaluated per the American Petroleum Institute’s API 1104 standard. external damage during construction in two cases.250 km of pipeline is a low number. This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. This incident is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. some minimal risk exists because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. Overall. 2007 detecting weld defects that needed to be repaired. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). In this program. Next. To further reduce the likelihood of failure. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). the water-tightness of the pipeline was verified by maintaining a constant water pressure for at least 24 hours. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the Camisea Transportation System reduced the level of risk. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. All these failures were subsequently repaired. which may be similar to other pipelines in the world. in which a hydrogeninduced crack survived the hydrostatic test.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xx . and a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate used to manufacture a pipe in one case.

While the route of the system traverses a challenging and dynamic area. As a result of these efforts. to permit more expeditious. To date. Based on our review.June 8.g. observations. instrumentation (e. In more critical areas. Exponent observed over 50 sites. Exponent concluded that geotechnical stabilization measures constructed during 2006 are generally reliable and robust.. we concluded that geotechnical and geologic conditions initially posed a substantial risk to the pipeline. TgP and COGA had begun to implement a system of identifying those sites with the highest priority for mitigation based on the perceived likelihood of failure and the potential consequence of failure. As early as April 2006. strain gauge. some on both occasions. and controlled in this ongoing process. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a hybrid risk matrix to adequately assess the likelihood of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions. survey control. representing SF36292. piezometer. During the second phase of our project. At the end of 2006. Further. reliable repairs. TgP believed that geotechnical hazards due to soil movement were more effectively documented.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxi . we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. and rainfall monitoring) is being used or is recommended to provide additional interpretation and warning of ground instability. following extraordinary efforts to stabilize geotechnical and geologic conditions along the ROW. Based on our second round of inspections in September 2006 and subsequent documentation review. the sites identified are listed in the hybrid risk matrix. Construction of geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 significantly reduced this risk by improving the geotechnical and geological stability at specific sites of greatest hazard. This system was validated using information from our field inspections. and engineering experience. TgP and COGA had also contracted additional external geotechnical and geological specialists to help assess the hazards and evaluate the likelihood of failure. the risk of future failure of the system from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced. our initial inspection in June 2006 indicated that some of the original stabilization measures implemented during construction were not completely effective. 2007 geotechnical mitigation measures using more robust construction techniques. slope inclinometer. addressed. and data on movement characteristics.

The risk at each station was then evaluated at three different points in time. we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW. with solely the site at KP 108. while we initially ranked 45 of 94 sites as having “high” to “very high” risk (along the initial 455 km of the ROW). We expect that the continuous. adjacent to the second pump station. It is our understanding that TgP is updating the hybrid risk matrix and is committed to implementing additional geotechnical measures in 2007. reflecting the risk prior to and after construction of the new geotechnical mitigation measures. This program appears to be comprehensive and is integral to reducing the risk of future failure resulting from geotechnical conditions.June 8. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP and COGA have made substantial progress in reducing the overall risk. In this regard. 2007 locations that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability. This program allows for the early detection and correction of potential problem areas.” TgP has stated that construction of new geotechnical stabilization measures is ongoing or completed at these sites. The core of this program involves regular visual inspections. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. Thus. TgP has committed to implementing the recommended Risk Management Plan (RMP) that should govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions. Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. being now ranked as “very high. Therefore. and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs discussed below. The multi-disciplinary team of inspectors is trained by COGA’s technical consultants and is intimately familiar with the project and conditions along the alignment. between KP 0 and KP 220. the construction of the geotechnical mitigation measures in 2006 reduced this number to 12 sites. including during the rainy season. SF36292. and the vast majority of these stations are located in the selva sector. The addition of monitoring provided a further reduction to 5 sites having a “high” to “very high” risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxii . ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current hybrid risk matrix due to the absence of surface manifestations of ground movement.

which is consistent with four of the first five spill incidents. Soil movement imposes lateral loading upon the pipe. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. Exponent’s analysis of this loading condition has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. and the quality of protection the pipe is afforded against environmental conditions. while sufficient for internal pressures. Pipe Integrity–Related Risks Pipe integrity–related hazards are associated with pipe material. At this time. during construction. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential anomalies. 2007 decision process. all the welds were x-rayed. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. will identify additional sites and reduce the geotechnical-related risks further. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. Second. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. These axial stresses are known to affect the girth welds in the pipe. Thus.June 8. Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce this risk. the residual risk is now mostly confined to areas that may become geologically unstable and that may contain potential weld anomalies. reducing the potential number of potential weld-related and pipeline material defects. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement. Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above. and manner of execution. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. First. As discussed above. it is susceptible to this external failure mode. which can induce axial pipe stresses in addition to those induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. the most significant risks to the system arise from external loading caused by soil movement. To mitigate the residual risk. per requirements by API 1160 xxiii SF36292. and the geometric tool measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. weld quality.003 A0F0 0607 0806 . and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested.

Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. Results of the MFL inspection tool.June 8. In addition. SF36292. Overall in 2006. The MFL inspection tool has proven to be an excellent tool to detect internal and external corrosion damage to the pipe in this project. At present. However. if required. no severe external or internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. Specific resources have been committed in 2007 to further improve TgP’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. have shown that. In this regard. 2007 and DOT9 195. Despite the fact that the use of in-line inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the 9 Department of Transportation of the United States of America. even though the technology to do so appears to be available. In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect crack-like features. it is Exponent’s opinion that some sections of the NGL pipeline may be subject to a potential longterm risk that will need to be addressed in the long-term planning stages of TgP’s pipeline integrity program. TgP has voluntarily identified additional sites to further quantify the accuracy of the inline inspection tools. A root cause analysis of spill incidents 1 and 5 and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks will be performed by TgP.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxiv .10 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable with high certainty by the currently employed MFL inspection tool. no pipeline inspection company is readily able to provide a commercially available inspection tool to detect potential circumferential cracks. currently. which will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to reduce the risk profile under technically and logistically difficult conditions.

and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. and pressure reducing stations. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements (e.June 8. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. TgP will evaluate potential options. the pipeline fabricator commissioned several seismic hazard studies during the design process.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxv . Although several seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the design of the system. The earthquake hazard appears to be the greatest in the costa sector and least near the selva sector. and lateral spread) should be evaluated more comprehensively to reduce uncertainty. to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered.g. Recognizing the potential seismic hazard. 2007 relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. 10 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. slope instability.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. Additional studies consisted of evaluating the potential for wave propagation damage for straight sections of buried pipe and 12 surface facilities. SF36292. pressure control stations. landslides.. sierra. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review. Additionally. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. as part of the pipeline integrity management plan of seismic risks. Another investigation identified active fault crossings along the pipeline and evaluated the pipeline’s capacity for predicted fault displacements. liquefaction. The first study characterized the regional seismic hazard for each of the three sectors (selva. Seismic-Related Risks The system lies within regions that have the potential for very large and frequent earthquakes. For cracks with a smaller crack opening.

Given the potential uncertainty and the objective to minimize this risk. considered to be the most significant. Therefore. naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its floodplain may affect the stability of the buried pipeline crossings. which is considered the industry standard to evaluate stream scour. as described in the Federal Highway Administration’s Hydraulic Engineering Circular 18 (HEC-18). HEC18 is not a design standard required under Peruvian law. The analysis identified four primary categories of risk to the integrity of the pipeline: geotechnical. These design studies included field investigations of stream crossings.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvi . additional scour studies and investigation of potential scour mitigation measures are warranted and are currently being evaluated by TgP. and river scouring as secondary risks. The higher risk level associated with geotechnical hazards is a direct consequence of the steep topography. In addition. seismic events. the HEC-18 scour design approach was partially utilized. Exponent recommends evaluation of additional potential scour processes. Despite not being required. Exponent’s review of the scour analyses performed during the design of the project indicates that some assessments were performed to determine the minimal depth at which to bury the pipeline. and the abundance of water along the pipeline ROW in the selva sector.June 8. However. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. in the opinion of SF36292. Flood-induced scour can occur over short periods of time. poor foundation (soil) conditions. and mechanical pipe integrity. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. with little warning and serious consequences. In addition to the mentioned studies. pipeline crossings should be designed and constructed to withstand floods of relatively extreme magnitude. Future Activities Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. 2007 Scour-Related Risks Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. along with other procedures that were deemed to be appropriate by the designer. However.

If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues.June 8. based on the results. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity actions. additional actions are still recommended to continue the minimization of any existing pipeline integrity risks. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. #4. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. However. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. excluding fault rupture. In this context. and #5. 2007 Exponent. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. This plan includes: 1) implementation of geotechnical mitigation and monitoring actions in 2007.003 A0F0 0607 0806 xxvii . and thus. implementation of actions to reduce such risks. 5) spill root cause analysis of spill incidents #1. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. 4) experimental evaluation of potential circumferential cracks and their impact on pipe integrity. SF36292. in particular wave propagation. 3) reconsideration of seismic risk. Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. a technical action plan has been established with TgP and the IDB. permanent ground deformations. along with continued geotechnical risk assessment. Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB related to the Camisea Transportation System. resulting from strong ground shaking. 2) re-evaluation of potential scour risk at river crossings and.

Commercial operation of the system began in August 2004.800 m. and 2) a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 1 . on the coast of Peru south of Lima. at the southern edge of Lima. The NGL pipeline is approximately 561 km long. with heavier wall thickness typically used for sections with larger diameter. The two pipelines share a common right-of-way (ROW) that traverses the Peruvian jungle. traversing the roughly 200-km-long selva sector. and the NG pipeline is approximately 734 km long. Within this 3-km-wide corridor. which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas to a terminal station at Lurin. and the 200-km-long costa sector. Both pipelines are constructed of tubular high-strength steel in conformance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) 5L standard and sleeved in a protective plastic layer. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to a width of 25 meters. which is shown on Figure 1.. The system consists of two buried pipelines: 1) a natural gas (NG) pipeline. and descends steeply toward the Pacific coast. The wall thickness of the NGL pipeline ranges between 0.469 inch. climbs over the Andes Mountains at a peak elevation of approximately 4. the NGL pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 14 to 10¾ inches. government-mandated corridor.1 Description of the System The Camisea Transportation System (the system) is owned by Transportadora de Gas del Peru S.219 and 0.A.406 and 1 inch. Deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government.11 Along this route. 11 True length of pipeline. The alignment of the ROW. and the larger NG pipeline telescopes from a nominal pipe diameter of 32 to 24 to 18 inches.June 8. Construction of the system was performed by Techint beginning in 2002. (TgP). the ~300-km-long sierra sector. which transports the liquid condensates from Malvinas to a fractionation plant near Pisco. 2007 1 Introduction 1. SF36292. TgP contracted with Compania Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA) for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline. and the wall thickness of the larger NG pipelines ranges between 0. follows a 3-km–wide.

and the pressure reduction stations reduce the pressure as the liquid hydrocarbons flow downhill to the fractionation plant located along the Peruvian coast. mostly at major river crossings. a NGL fractionation plant in Pisco. and a NG distribution point in Lurin. The NGL pipeline is also equipped with nineteen block valves and ten check valves. Figure 1. On the west side of the Andes Mountains. a pressure control station (PCS) reduces the pressure of the natural gas. to minimize the amount of potential spillage. SF36292. The NG pipeline receives the processed gas products from Pluspetrol’s exploration and processing facility in Malvinas at a sufficiently high pressure such that no further compression is currently required. with the extraction and production (E&P) centered in Malvinas. The PCS is equipped with several redundant safety features and a venting capability to protect the pipeline from over-pressurization events. The pump stations propel the liquid hydrocarbons up the Andes Mountains. 2007 The NGL pipeline is equipped with four pump stations (PS) on the east side of the Andes Mountains and three pressure reduction stations (PRS) on the west side of the Andes Mountains. Right-of-way of the Camisea Transportation System in Peru.003 A0F0 0607 0806 2 .June 8. All block valves are connected to an automatic leak detection system to quickly shut down the NGL pipeline in case of a pipe rupture.

the NGL pipeline has experienced six incidents involving a release of NGL (see Figure 1). in that external soil loading is currently considered to have been a significant contributor to the subcritical crack growth in the pipe. and pipe-related risks of this system. seismic risk. our work focused on the NGL pipeline. The first (KP 8+850) and fifth (KP 125+950) incidents were similar. In this regard. 2007 The system is centrally operated from Lurin using a state-of-the-art supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system.003 A0F0 0607 0806 3 . The second incident. located at KP 222+500. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. hydrogen-induced crack in a girth weld. The rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a landslide. SF36292. and 3) the identification and evaluation of the geotechnical and geologic risk. The system communicates primarily via its own fiber optic cable that is installed along the pipelines and has two technologically different and independent backup systems: a satellite and a radio frequency–based system. An explosion occurred as a consequence of the fifth incident. 2) our review of the design and construction methods and their risk assessment. A more detailed description of each incident is given in Section 3 of this report. The NG pipeline has not experienced a known gas release. located at a river crossing at KP 50+900. scour risk. The sixth incident occurred upstream of the fifth incident in April 2007 and is currently under investigation by TgP.3 Report Organization This report is structured in three main parts: 1) the review of the six spill incidents of the NGL pipeline. appears to have been induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline and been triggered by riverbed scouring caused by a flash flood. 1. The fourth incident.June 8. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and known to be an area of high risk of landsliding.2 Operational History Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into service in August 2004. The SCADA system gathers all operational data and allows direct remote control of all components. 1.

Section 10 presents our overall conclusions and recommendations for future activities. pipe manufacture. pipe integrity risks. SF36292.June 8. Issues related to pipe material.003 A0F0 0607 0806 4 . Section 5 addresses construction and issues related to the geotechnical mitigation measures that were constructed during this period. Section 4 describes the system’s mechanical and geotechnical design and evaluates whether any systematic risks were introduced during the design process. and pipeline fabrication are also discussed in Section 5. and scour risks at river crossings. Sections 6 through 9 describe both the hazards and means that were and will be used to mitigate pipelinerelated risks in the following four areas: geotechnical and geological risks. 2007 The spill incidents and their probable cause are reviewed in Section 3. seismic risks.

The following components were included in our evaluation of risk in the first phase: pipe material. Exponent made recommendations to TgP intended to improve future pipeline integrity by mitigating and controlling identified risks to the system.June 8. 2. commencing in April 2006. 7) identify and evaluate seismic hazards. Exponent’s retention in April 2006 followed the occurrence of five spill incidents during the first 19 months of operation. The primary objectives of our investigation were to: 1) develop a risk profile for the two component pipelines and identify the factors that contributed to the spill incidents.2 Phases of Work Exponent’s pipeline integrity analysis was conducted in two integrated phases. overall assessment of the integrity of the pipelines. 4) develop and assist TgP in implementing a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate geotechnical and geological hazards. 6) evaluate the pipe inspection program. and 8) explore possible contributions of scour to the risk of future pipeline failure at stream and river crossings.003 A0F0 0607 0806 5 . geologic and SF36292. Although TgP had undertaken a substantial program to provide stabilization measures along the ROW beginning in April 2006. each of which resulted in the release of hydrocarbons. primarily the NGL. During this investigation. 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the geotechnical measures constructed in 2006 to stabilize the ROW. This report also summarizes these efforts and provides a risk-based evaluation of the system that incorporates extensive sources of information and field investigations by Exponent. The objective of the first phase was to provide a forward-looking. pipeline construction. pipeline design. TgP also implemented our interim recommendations. 2007 2 Exponent’s Investigation 2.1 Objective Exponent® Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent) was retained by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to perform a pipeline integrity study of the Camisea Transportation System. 2) investigate the causal factors of the first five spill incidents. 3) review key information on the design and construction of the system.

and design of river crossings (scour analysis). These documents included engineering specifications. construction progress surveys. The first phase included an evaluation of the suitability of the seismic design. The objectives of the second phase were to further evaluate key risks and to evaluate the progress made by TgP and COGA in reducing risks to the pipeline. 2) evaluating the effectiveness of the geotechnical stabilization measures constructed in 2006 to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipelines. and operational data. seismic studies. river-crossing studies. pipeline design drawings and calculations. Exponent prioritized the identified hazards and evaluated the efficacy of currently used mitigation and control measures. In addition to these activities. Specifically. pipeline maintenance. Exponent reviewed more than 400 sets of documents related to the design. geotechnical and geological studies. 2.June 8. a multi-disciplinary team of Exponent engineers and scientists performed inspections along the pipeline ROW in June and September 2006. we established a baseline risk level for the system and performed a technical review of the five spill incidents that occurred in the system between December 2004 and March 2006. various internal and external pipeline inspection reports. Exponent did examine the radiographs of the spill incidents and some additional of the more than 100. and 3) evaluating the efficacy of the current pipe integrity program. As part of that study. In some cases. Exponent performed its own engineering analysis to quantify certain risks to the integrity of the pipeline. The risk was evaluated following the implementation of various mitigation measures constructed in 2006. and maintenance of the Camisea Transportation System.000 girth weld radiographs. construction specifications. These inspections SF36292. and ongoing operation. pipe material data. which was compared to the baseline risk established during the first phase of our investigation.3 Scope In order to accomplish the pipeline integrity analysis. construction. hydrological studies.003 A0F0 0607 0806 6 .. 2007 geotechnical hazard mitigation. operation. mechanical design. the second phase included: 1) developing and assisting in the implementation of a qualitative risk assessment method to evaluate potential geotechnical and geologic hazards to the pipeline system.

SF36292. were under construction. or had been completed. Exponent participated in the metallurgical investigation of samples of pipe that were involved in two of the incidents. Finally. service providers.003 A0F0 0607 0806 7 .June 8. 2007 occurred at more than 50 sites along the first 450 km of the ROW where geotechnical stabilization measures were proposed. where all spill incidents have occurred and geotechnical as well as geologic risks are considered to be highest. Special attention was given to the first 220 km of the ROW. construction. and maintenance of the system. operators. and independent consultants hired during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline by TgP. Exponent personnel also interviewed key personnel involved with design. These interviews were supplemented with numerous teleconference calls that included the designers. and reviewed the metallurgical examination reports and evidence from the first five spill incidents. operation.

2004. GEOTEC was the geotechnical engineering firm that supervised the implementation of geotechnical stabilization measures during construction of the pipeline system. 13 The NGL pipe has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. 3. At the point of rupture. the pipe was on an intermediate bench14 and near a small stream. The hills contain gentle to moderately steep slopes bisected by short ravines that rise above the Urubamba River. Exponent was not retained to perform a root-cause analysis of any of the spill incidents. and 12 13 14 15 Root cause analysis is the integrated evaluation of all facts pertaining to the investigated failure to uniquely identify the cause or causes of failure.25 inch along this section of the system. a total of six spill incidents have occurred along the NGL pipeline. with a slope profile of approximately 15%.2 First Incident The first incident occurred on December 22.003 A0F0 0607 0806 8 . one in the transition zone between the selva and the sierra sectors. In-place geotechnical mitigation measures consisted of surface drainage channels constructed of soil-cement bags.12 All of the spill incidents occurred in the first 222 km of the NGL pipeline— four of the spills occurred in the selva sector.June 8. The topography at this site is characterized by undulating hills at a low elevation (~400 m). SF36292. in the jungle sector near KP 8+850. The locations and dates of these six spill incidents are shown on Figure 1. no leaks have occurred on the larger diameter NG pipeline. A relatively level strip of land bounded by steeper slopes above and below. and to consider the potential for systemic problems.1 Background Since the Camisea Transportation System was placed into commercial service in August 2004. and one in the sierra sector. Exponent reviewed information related to the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents as a means of evaluating risk. 2007 3 Review of NGL Pipeline Incidents 3. In contrast. Distance along the pipeline as measured from Malvinas and marked along the ROW at every kilometer point (KP). This location had been inspected by GEOTEC15 in September 2004.

The hydrodynamic forces of the escaping NGL had formed a sinkhole above the pipeline. The pipeline rupture was detected in TgP’s control room in Lurin as an anomaly in the pressure characteristics of the pipeline between PS #1 and PS #2. Cracks in the soil and displacement of some of the drainage channels were interpreted as evidence of soil settlement. During their site investigation. 2006. visit.June 8. addition of ditch breakers to control subsurface seepage along the pipeline. and by the ninth minute. Both pipelines were originally buried at a depth of up to 7 m. the 14-inch NGL line was exposed. Stone and Webster Management Consultants (April 2006). A substantial amount of overburden soil had been 16 17 Circumferential weld joining two pipe sections. 2006. TgP stopped pumping hydrocarbons at PS #1. and construction of retaining walls to mitigate lateral earth movement in the ROW. and additional stabilization measures were being constructed to stabilize a shallow landslide that had occurred in the vicinity of the rupture. “Analysis of Incident Report: Camisea Pipeline Project. repairs. 2007 revegetation with grass. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. when additional geotechnical stabilization measures were nearly complete. and stabilization measures.17 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the spillage. Exponent inspected this site on June 12. Exponent visited this site again on September 11. GEOTEC recognized that the cracks provided a route for rainfall runoff to infiltrate the soil. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 2. and interviewed TgP personnel who were knowledgeable about the history of construction. 2006. the rupture site was isolated between the block valve at the outlet of PS #1 and the block valve on the east bank of the Urubamba River at KP 12. Seven minutes after noting the anomaly. At the time of our June 12.003 A0F0 0607 0806 9 . but based on available information. They recommended sealing of cracks and repairing channels and current breakers. TgP estimated that 260 m3 of hydrocarbons were released. TgP discovered that the pipe was circumferentially cracked in the vicinity of a girth weld16 but was not completely severed.” SF36292. they believed that there was no need for significant remedial geotechnical stabilization work. Remediation and geotechnical stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline.

whereas ditchbreakers were constructed to control subsurface water flow along the pipeline. 2007 removed from the ROW to improve the stability of the slope. Stabilization measures included the construction of surface and subsurface drainage features. and the depth of the NGL pipeline at that time was reported to be about 1. The extensive monitoring program being implemented for the site consists of strain gauges to detect pipe movement.0 to 1.18 as well as retaining walls and piles to stabilize the slope and prevent lateral earth movement along the ROW. 2006. and piezometers to monitor the groundwater level. looking downstream.June 8.5 m. SF36292. Figure 3 provides an overview of the newly constructed geotechnical stabilization measures at the site on September 11.003 A0F0 0607 0806 10 . inclinometers to detect soil movement. 18 Current breakers and surface channels were installed to control surface runoff.

Photographs taken on June 12. 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 11 . 2007 Figure 2. SF36292. Bottom: View upstream (looking upslope). Top: View downstream (looking downslope). at KP 8+850. during ROW stabilization work.June 8. General area of site of first spill incident. Plastic sheeting covers 14-inch NGL pipeline.

The circumferential position on a pipe is referenced to a clock. Photograph taken on September 11. 2006. At the request of TgP. MCI stated that this initial crack formed when offset fatigue cracks coalesced. at KP 8+850. MCI concluded that the fracture occurred between the 4 and 7 o’clock positions20 (about 10 inches long). SF36292. with rapid incremental tearing in a few load steps. Metallurgical Consultants Inc. as evidenced by the presence of ratchet marks on the fracture surfaces.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 12 . until the crack became critical.19 (MCI) performed a metallurgical investigation of the ruptured pipe section. Inc. 2007 Figure 3. Subsequent loading propagated this crack subcritically. after stabilization work conducted in 2006. is a Houston-based metallurgical laboratory. as shown in Figure 4. looking downstream. 19 20 Metallurgical Consultants. General area of first spill incident. and the wall of the pipe was breached (see Figure 4). with the crack beginning at the pipe’s outer surface. with the 12 o’clock position being straight up and the viewer looking downstream at the clock.

3. Analyses done by GIE (GIE S.3 Second Incident The second incident was discovered on August 29. SF36292. As shown in Figure 5.June 8. and MCI. identified soil movement and the possible loss of pipe bedding21 due to water infiltration as a significant contributor to the rupture of the NGL pipeline.003 A0F0 0607 0806 13 .). 2005. MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the first rupture at KP 8+850. This spill incident occurred at an elevation of approximately 3.A. approximately nine months after the first incident. MCI’s metallurgical investigation of the failed pipe confirmed that the pipe material and weld were in compliance with applicable codes but minor allowable anomalies per API 1104 were identified.950 m on a fairly broad topographic ridge crest at the head of a long valley. 2007 Figure 4. occurred in the mountain sector near KP 222+500. Our current understanding is that the circumferential crack grew subcritically as soil loading bent the pipe until it ruptured. referred to as the Pacobamba failure. as well as our own investigation. IGL (Ingenieria y Geotecnia LTDA). The incident. the pipeline ascends an east-facing slope and is approximately 30 m away from the unimproved San 21 Soil placed beneath the pipe in the trench.

the removed fractured pipe section. At this location. Exponent staff inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel familiar with the rupture. On September 1. at 15:00.to 2. NGL pipeline excavation. just upstream of PS #4.003 A0F0 0607 0806 14 . and a bypass pipe was being installed to enable removal of the fractured pipe section with the slip-on sleeve and installation of a permanent repair. the pipeline was shut down. MCI analyzed. the block valves upstream and downstream were closed to isolate the rupture site. 2005. the NGL line was exposed in a series of three trenches. MCI identified the leaking weld as being part of a tie-in section approximately 1. with initial participation of Exponent. TgP’s control room received this information at 19:34 hours and commenced a leak investigation of the NGL pipeline. It is noteworthy that the normal operating pressure is very low at this elevated location.5-inch-long) circumferential crack along a girth weld of the NGL pipeline.219 inch. which verified the existence of a small (approximately 2.June 8. which contributed to the low leakage rate (significantly less than a fraction of 1% of the NGL pipeline’s product flow rate).3 m long that connected two much longer sections of piping. Remediation and stabilization work completed before the inspection included temporary repair of the pipeline and cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil and rock. and a burial depth of 1 to 1½ m. 2007 Antonio-Pacobamba Road. the 14-inch NGL pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 0. and temporary repair of the NGL pipeline using a slip-on sleeve were completed. A local resident discovered a small hydrocarbon surface stain caused by a minor leak in the NGL pipeline. On June 14. the field investigation. and at 20:04. 2006. Twenty minutes later. MCI also performed a detailed investigation of the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline. SF36292. a slope profile of approximately 15%. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 5. At the time of our visit.

003 A0F0 0607 0806 15 . 2007 Road Ridge Figure 5. 2006.June 8. Location of second spill incident. SF36292. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across trenches opened for repairs. Top: View upstream (downslope) along excavated trench along NGL pipeline. during permanent pipeline repair work. at KP 222+500. Photographs taken on June 14.

June 8, 2007

MCI’s investigation indicates that the leakage began as a time-delayed, hydrogen-induced crack on the inside surface of the pipe and extended radially to a crack depth of more than 90% of the wall thickness (see Figure 6). Mild steels used in pipeline construction are known to be susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). Because hydrogen can be introduced temporarily during welding, welded regions of the pipe are particularly susceptible. Typically, these cracks can take between several hours and several days to develop after welding. While the hydrogen-induced crack was evident in the post-failure radiograph, it was not visible in the post-weld radiograph that was performed according to TgP one day after welding. This 90% deep hydrogen-induced crack, though close to critical, was able to pass the subsequent hydrostatic test, performed approximately 5 months after welding. Pressure cycling during hydrostatic testing and the subsequent pressure fluctuations during operation of the pipeline further destabilized the crack, which ultimately caused—at a much later time during normal operation of the NGL pipeline—the formation of a tight through-wall crack from which the NGL escaped very slowly. Exponent’s current understanding is that the hydrogen-induced crack originated in the weld, and that the low normal operating pressure at this location likely delayed the rupture of the weakened NGL pipeline.

Figure 6.

MCI photograph showing frontal view of fracture surface of the pipe from the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline at KP 222+500. White arrows indicate the weld’s root pass in the background to the fracture surface; red arrows indicate the inner surface of the pipe where the hydrogen-induced crack began; and yellow arrows indicate the narrow remaining ligament at the outer surface of the pipe.

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3.4

Third Incident

The third incident, referred to as the Toccate failure, occurred on September 16, 2005. This failure occurred in the upper jungle sector near KP 200+700 on the Pacobamba variant, a portion of the ROW that was rerouted before construction, primarily for environmental reasons. This rupture was caused by a fairly substantial landslide that extended across the ROW and severed a girth weld that joined a bend (wall thickness of 0.344 inch) to a straight pipe (wall thickness of 0.219 inch). This section of the ROW is on a tall, steep, west-facing valley wall and follows a long, unimproved road between San Antonio and Toccate. The third incident occurred approximately 1 km northeast of the town of Toccate at an elevation of approximately 2,350 m. Various studies conducted prior to construction had identified this area as having many unstable geologic zones that would require special engineering and construction methods. The location was described as having a very high physical risk due to the potential for shallow landslides,22 rockslides,23 and debris flows.24 Based on these findings, some geotechnical mitigation measures were installed to stabilize the slope and protect the pipeline. Mitigation measures implemented during construction included the establishment of a narrower ROW to minimize the heights of cut slopes, and carefully controlled blasting to minimize vibrations that could loosen rock masses above and below the roadway. GEOTEC’s October 2004 report, two months after the system was placed into operation, describes the area as the most unstable site that they evaluated along the ROW, and the area of greatest risk for the stability of the pipelines in case of ground movement. Evidence of ground movement in the form of cracks and distorted retaining walls was noted in two zones, one above the pipelines and one below. The upper zone of movement was adjacent to a slope failure that occurred after the installation of the pipelines and forced their relocation. GEOTEC recommended long-term monitoring and geotechnical stabilization measures. Exponent’s site visits along this section of

22

23

24

A mass of soil and/or detached bedrock that slides downslope. The moving mass is generally thinner than about 3 to 6 m. Movement can be slow or rapid – measured in meters per month to meters per second. A mass of detached bedrock that slides downslope. The mass can be less than a meter to many tens of meters thick. Movement is generally rapid – measured in meters per day to meters per second. A mass of mud and rocks that flows downslope, generally during or shortly after heavy rainfall. The mass is usually no more than a few meters thick. Movement is rapid – measured in meters per second.

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the ROW slopes showed evidence of incoherent, highly fractured rock and locally thick soil along very steep slopes that extend a long distance above and below the road. The rupture was detected in the control room due to a pressure drop at PS #3 on September 16, 2005. At 00:15 hours, the operating system reported normal operating conditions. A drop in pressure and flow rate was registered at 00:16, which automatically activated the upstream and downstream block valves to isolate the rupture site. One minute later, the pipe operator stopped pumping NGL. The total amount of released NGL was estimated to be approximately 1,102 m3, of which approximately 410 m3 remained after evaporation.25 No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. TgP’s technical report on this rupture identifies several measures that were deployed to capture the NGL liquid downslope of the rupture site, as well as along the possible flow path of the Chunchubamba River, a tributary to the larger Apurimac River. Exponent inspected this site on June 14 and September 19, 2006. Selected photographs of the area from the first visit are shown in Figure 7. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our June 2006 visit included construction of a bypass pipeline beneath the roadway, and completion of various interim geotechnical works along approximately 500 m of the ROW. As a result of ongoing stability problems at the site, a bypass tunnel, approximately 730 m long, was under construction from Rio Corimayo northeast of the site to the next ravine southwest of the site. Remediation works completed by September 19, 2006, just prior to completion of the tunnel, included widening the road by cutting back the base of the upper slope, removing about 60,000 m3 of unstable material above the road, benching the slope above the road, building a new retaining wall and subdrain at the base of the road cut, improving surface drainage, and planting trees. Although the pipeline was to be rerouted through the tunnel, away from the unstable area, stabilization work was performed to allow continued use of the San Antonio– Toccate Road through the failure area.

25

Inter-American Development Bank (2006), “Camisea Project: Incident Report”.

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General area of the third spill incident. 2006. during stabilization work. and September 19.June 8. Top: View upstream showing large landslide above and below ROW. 2006. Photographs taken on June 14.003 A0F0 0607 0806 19 . at KP 200+700. 2007 Landslide Walls Figure 7. Bottom: View downstream along ROW showing alignment of temporary bypass pipeline (beneath stacked sacks) and new retaining wall at base of cut slope. SF36292.

Figure 8 shows the ruptured NGL pipe section that was completely severed by the landslide in a ductile overload tension failure. hardness. SF36292. at KP 200+700. 2007 MCI performed the metallurgical investigation of the pipe from this incident. In summary.003 A0F0 0607 0806 20 .June 8. Exponent reviewed MCI’s investigation and visually inspected the failed pipe section. MCI photograph of pipe from the third spill incident. Exponent concludes that the most significant contributing factor to the failure of the pipe was external geotechnical forces induced by a large landslide that extended across the ROW. MCI confirmed that the weld was in compliance with the applicable codes. MCI determined that the fracture had no distinct fracture origin and occurred in the base metal and heat-affected zone next to the circumferential weld. MCI conducted various tests to quantify the material’s strength. Figure 8. and ductility and determined that it showed satisfactory properties and compliance with the applicable codes.

but the fast flow and the presence of large boulders (approaching 3 m in maximum dimension) suggest a steep gradient.219 inch.0 to 3. the operational flow rate decreased by approximately 20% over a period of 5 minutes. At approximately 04:55 in the morning of November 24.26 At this location.1 m for the NGL pipeline. A protective rockfill layer of boulders 1. at the crossing of the Paratori River (KP 50+900). the first action to perform after indication of a leak is to stop the pumping and start an operating analysis to identify the segment of pipe involved in the leak. both the NGL and NG pipelines were covered with a reinforced concrete layer at the river crossing.1 m below the stream bottom. At 05:00. The pipelines approach the river on relatively flat terrain. After installation of the pipelines. 2005. the hydrostatic test of this section was performed and did not indicate any leakage. 2005.27 TgP has indicated to Exponent that the sizing plates did not identify any significant deformation to the pipe. and ascend a steep slope on the opposite side of the river. 2007 3.June 8. TgP operations personnel in Lurin identified this rupture by detecting a reduction in flow downstream at PS #2 (KP 108). An inline pipe tool to clean the pipeline. The river is less than 10 m wide. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.28 Estimates29 of total NGL volume leaked indicate a loss of approximately 736 m3. pumping was stopped by TgP. According to TGP procedures. SF36292. a cleaning pig with plates was passed through the entire pipeline. In addition to the protective polyethylene cover that sheaths each pipeline. Consequently. operations personnel closed the block valves 55 minutes after pumping stopped and the leak analysis was completed.5 Fourth Incident The fourth incident was detected on November 24. which can rise 1. The pressure reduction was not sufficiently large to activate the automatic rupture detection mechanism of the block valves upstream and downstream of the rupture. No fires or explosions occurred as a consequence of the rupture. Furthermore.0 m in diameter had been installed along the river banks to protect the pipeline from lateral erosion.0 to 2.0 m during the rainy season. 26 27 28 The “as-built” drawing at this specific location identifies a minimum burring depth of 2. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes the river as carrying a high flow of water. including this river crossing section.003 A0F0 0607 0806 21 . which is standard construction practice. Both pipelines were originally buried about 2.

June 8. SF36292. and is nearly vertical above the groove. a steel truss bridge was installed to support an aerial bypass pipeline. MCI’s external examination of this pipe section revealed a deep dent and an external groove that bisected the approximately 7. Selected photographs of the area from this site visit are shown in Figure 9.5-inch-long rupture. Exponent participated in the initial metallurgical laboratory investigation of this rupture in July 2006. The groove itself is inclined at an angle of 55 degrees with respect to the pipe axis. Figure 10 shows that the rupture is inclined 50 degrees to the pipe axis below the groove. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. Subsequent to the failure of the NGL pipeline. The maximum water level was reported to be on the order of 2 to 3 m above the stream level observed during our site visit (see Figure 9). 2006. A flash flood reportedly preceded the rupture. 2007 On June 13. No girth welds were present in the vicinity of the rupture. Exponent made observations and interviewed TgP personnel who were familiar with the construction and stabilization measures at this site. The original NGL pipeline section that crossed the river was excavated in late May 2006. Testing of the pipe material from this location revealed satisfactory material characteristics.003 A0F0 0607 0806 22 . 29 Inter-American Development Bank (2006). Excavation revealed that the concrete coating of the NGL pipeline was missing over a length of a few meters and that the slightly-higher-positioned NG pipeline’s concrete coating showed some signs of erosion. The groove was more likely caused by a gradual application of pressure due to construction equipment than by the scraping movement of rocks carried by streamflow. TgP removed the section of the NGL pipeline containing the rupture and sent it to MCI for metallurgical evaluation.

2006. 2007 Approximate Location of Rupture Approximate High Water Mark at Rupture Figure 9. Site of fourth spill incident. SF36292.June 8. at KP 50+900 showing river crossing and new steel truss bridge carrying the NGL bypass pipeline. Top: View looking downstream (uphill). Photographs taken on June 13. Bottom: View looking upstream.003 A0F0 0607 0806 23 .

it was not sufficient to breach the wall of the pipe. with the pipe being horizontally aligned and NGL product flow being from the right to the left. In summary. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. It is currently believed that the damage sustained to both the NGL pipeline’s concrete coating and to the pipe itself was most likely associated with external mechanical damage caused by human activity.003 A0F0 0607 0806 24 . Indeed. although the initial mechanical damage that caused the dent and groove initiated the subsequent rupture.June 8. SF36292. the pipe wall at this location apparently was capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload at the damaged area. Observed groove (white arrows) and rupture (red arrows) on the outer surface of the pipe. 2007 Figure 10. Black material is the damaged protective polyethylene cover.

The downstream block valve was closed at 15:32:12. At the point of rupture. A saddle is a low point on a ridgeline. generally on a hillside. The NGL pipeline at the rupture location has a slope of about 15% to 20%. in the jungle sector at KP 125+950. At this location. Osinerg filings indicate that 661 m3 of NGL was released during this rupture. the pipe was near the base of a slope above an intermediate bench. TgP’s control-room personnel in Lurin detected this rupture following a pressure-drop warning from an upstream block valve at 15:27:00 in the afternoon. 2007 3. The NG pipeline was buried at a slope and depth similar to the NGL pipeline. 2006. the NGL pipeline has a diameter of 14 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0. Pumping at the upstream pump station (PS #2) was reported to have ceased 20 seconds after the pressure drop was detected.003 A0F0 0607 0806 25 . The slopes at the site are gentle to moderate and are bisected in some places by shallow ravines.6 Fifth Incident The fifth incident occurred on March 4. The resulting hydrodynamic force of the escaping NGL formed a sinkhole. “Camisea Project: Incident Report”. Inter-American Development Bank (2006). No fatalities. Site soils are described as wet. Subsequent site inspection revealed that the NGL pipeline was completely severed at the rupture point.32 30 31 32 A swale is a small valley. SF36292. The geological and geotechnical reports of this sector indicate the potential for slope instability to be “high” to “very high.30 below a saddle.000 m. This section of the pipeline is in a broad topographic swale. but two injuries. The rupture of the NGL pipeline resulted in an explosion. and an elevation of approximately 1. but with good surface drainage and moderately good subsurface drainage. this block valve automatically started to close and was verified to be closed at 15:28:12.” with medium potential for mudflows. a burial depth of approximately 1 to 2 m. were reported. approximately 5 minutes after the pressure drop was detected. A few seconds later.375 inch.31 on a ridge about 2 km southwest of Rio Cumpirusiato. which was apparently ignited by a source in a farm dwelling located downhill from the rupture. as shown in Figure 11.June 8.

during stabilization work. Bottom: View downstream (upslope) across excavation made to remove unstable soil. at KP 125+950.003 A0F0 0607 0806 26 . 2007 New Stabilization Measures Figure 11. General area of the fifth spill incident. SF36292. 2006.June 8. Photographs taken on June 13. Top: View upstream (downslope) along the ROW.

As with the preceding four failures. 2007 On June 13 and September 20. strength of the pipe materials and weld materials were in compliance with the required codes. The first.055 inch (see Figure 12). and the pipe wall was breached and severed around its complete circumference. MCI concluded that crack nucleation occurred at the bottom portion of the pipe in the heat-affected zone of the weld. excavation of unstable soil to the left of the point of rupture and extending left of the ROW.01 inch per load step. and the third. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). 2006. Exponent inspected this site and interviewed TgP personnel who are familiar with the construction and stabilization measures. construction of the foundation and first above-ground layer of a retaining wall in the excavated area. the second was at the point of failure. and construction of most of the length of a concrete-lined channel along the right edge of the ROW to replace the original berm-type drainage channel lined with sacks of soil cement. MCI was retained to perform the metallurgical investigation of this rupture at KP 125+950. interconnected soil movement of at least three landslides that occurred at about the same time. Remediation and stabilization work completed before our visit included repair of the pipeline. MCI performed a detailed investigation of both the fracture surface of the NGL pipeline and the material properties of the pipe. Selected photographs of the area from that visit are shown in Figure 11. The rupture was believed to have been caused by a shallow landslide that was part of a complex. SF36292. after which its rate of growth increased to approximately 0. cleanup of hydrocarbon-containing soil. hardness. installation of subdrains along and across the ROW. was upslope along the ROW. landslide was located in the area that has since been excavated. MCI determined that the ductility. it was determined that the nucleated crack grew through about half the thickness of the pipe wall. with rapid incremental tearing.5-inch-long arc.003 A0F0 0607 0806 27 . uppermost. lowest. to form a flat fracture that followed a 10. construction of a buried retaining wall parallel to and to the left of the NGL pipeline with stabilizing ties to the pipeline. Subsequent loading propagated this crack.June 8. This nucleation zone was characterized by mostly ductile narrow slant fractures that joined to form a single large crack with a depth of approximately 0. The crack then became critical.

to the truncation of a natural drainage crossing the ROW and direct precipitation and surface runoff. We also believe that the geotechnical stabilization measures implemented after the rupture have significantly reduced the future risk of landslides at this location. likely preceded or accompanied by washout of the pipeline’s bedding. We therefore conclude that external forces produced by ground movement. and this shallow slide overlies an older. at an amplification of 14×. 33 Ingeneria y Geotecnia LTDA is a geotechnical firm in Columbia that has extensive experience in jungle areas. slanted fracture associated with crack nucleation. Blue arrows demarcate three distinct fracture zones. The cause of movement of the shallow landslide was likely the infiltration of surface water into the ground due. indicate that both pipelines pass through a shallow active landslide at this location. Each zone is numbered. with the outer surface of the pipe being the top portion of the photograph.33 as well as Exponent’s field inspection of the rupture site. larger landslide. SF36292. Recent geotechnical studies by IGL. White arrows identify the narrow. in part.June 8. MCI photograph showing fracture surface of NGL pipeline at the fifth spill incident. We also understand that a local inhabitant had altered some of the surface drainage in this area prior to the rupture. were likely a substantial factor in the rupture of the NGL pipeline at this location. 2007 Figure 12.003 A0F0 0607 0806 28 .

2007. and this analysis is based on the material submitted by TgP to Exponent. and this leak was discovered during planned activities of TgP’s pipeline integrity management program. external loading is responsible for the formation of such wrinkles if no thermal stresses are induced. Excavated NGL pipe section from the sixth spill incident. Typically. 2007. Exponent has not conducted a complete investigation. TgP is currently investigating the root cause of this incident.” April 16th. with protected wrinkle from which NGL was reported to have been leaking. 34 Coga.003 A0F0 0607 0806 29 . Figure 13 depicts the excavated pipe section with the localized wrinkle away from the girth welds. at KP 125+500. however. Figure 13. TgP informed us that the NGL pipeline was repaired by mid-April 2007. To date.3 m3)34 of NGL was released. SF36292. including the reports TgP submitted to OSINERG. 2007 3. TgP reported that only a small amount (approximately 0. “Estamacion Del Volumen De Perdida De NGL En KP 125+500.7 Sixth Incident Recently. The location of this spill incident is shown on Figure 1.June 8. TgP identified as part of its pipeline integrity analysis a sixth incident of the 14-inchdiameter NGL pipeline on April 2.

June 8. Hence. 2007 3.003 A0F0 0607 0806 30 . at KP 50+900. The hydrogen crack escaped detection by the post-welding radiography because of the inherent time delay of hydrogen cracking. Exponent’s investigation identified unstable geologic conditions as a significant contributor to the ruptures. even though the crack extended to approximately 90% of the wall thickness. and subsequent crack growth due to normal operational pressure fluctuations need be only minimal to reach a critical crack depth that causes the remaining ligament ahead of the crack to fail. at KP 222+500. For the fourth incident. The toughness of the pipe material allowed the pipe to pass subsequent hydrostatic testing. a sizable landslide ultimately overcame these measures and both undermined and overtopped the road and ROW. at KP 125+950. respectively. In both cases. though frequent. The pressure fluctuations at this location. the crack resulted in complete severance of the pipe. which occurred at KP 8+850 and KP 125+950. The second incident.8 Summary and Conclusions Exponent’s review of the first five NGL pipeline spill incidents identified similarities in the fracture surfaces of the first and fifth incidents. progressive soil loading is the likely driver that propagated an initial crack and induced the rupture of the NGL pipeline. SF36292. In both cases. In the case of the first incident. appears to have been primarily the result of a time-delayed. at KP 8+850. in the fifth incident. hydrogen-induced crack in the weld. Analysis performed to date indicates that this dent was not 35 This is a rather deep crack. the crack resulted in a through-wall leak of about 10 inches in extent.35 Our current understanding is that the combination of hydrostatic load cycles and subsequent operational pressure fluctuations caused the initial hydrogen-induced crack to be further destabilized. The third incident occurred in an area that was well studied from a geologic perspective and was known to be an area of very high risk of ground failure. the rupture of the pipe at this location is attributed to overload caused by a substantial landslide. which helped delay the propagation of the crack through the remaining wall thickness. current information suggests that the rupture of the NGL pipe was induced by mechanical damage to the exterior concrete coating and a dent in the exterior wall of the NGL pipeline. are relatively small. While some measures to mitigate this geologic risk were taken during construction. ultimately perforating the pipe wall and releasing the NGL at a very slow rate.

June 8. This triggering loading event could have been associated with the flash floods that immediately preceded detection of the leak. The sixth incident is still under investigation. 2007 caused by contact with a boulder being washed downstream. and no final conclusions concerning its origin and relation to the other incidents have been reached to date. the pipe wall at this location was apparently capable of containing the NGL fluid until some unknown external loading event caused the already-weakened pipe wall to fail in ductile overload in the damaged area. SF36292. Indeed.003 A0F0 0607 0806 31 .

but reliable input is sought from geotechnical engineers and geologists to evaluate the manner in which the pipe will interact with soils and other environmental components. inspection. where the sizing of pumps. This information is carried over to the next step. wherein the designer considers load cases other than the internal design pressure in the pipe. Title 49.1 Design Background Several different engineering disciplines are involved in designing pipelines. respectively. Seismic hazards and scour at river crossings are evaluated in Sections 8 and 9. valves. In this section. Specifically. that the designer may encounter. The mechanical engineer is ultimately responsible for the overall pipeline design. the first step in the mechanical design process is the hydraulic analysis. but are fundamentally intended to ensure pipeline integrity and safe operation. with guidance from the geotechnical engineer or geologist.8 (Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems) as well as the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). whether usual or unusual. operation and maintenance of pipeline systems. This typically leads to an iterative design process between the engineers performing the hydraulic and the pipe stress analyses. and the NG pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. SF36292. Commonly. Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline. These design load requirements vary slightly from code to code. Part 192.4 (Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids). However. Rather. these codes do not provide requirements for all conditions. and pipes is performed. 2007 4 Design-Related Risks 4. we review the hydraulic analysis and the geotechnical design considerations for the system during the design phase.003 A0F0 0607 0806 32 . a pipe stress analysis. the designer needs to exercise due care and consideration for all reasonable and expected load cases.June 8. the NGL pipeline was required to conform to ASME B31. construction. testing. The primary purpose of these codes is to establish requirements for design. The Camisea Transportation System was designed to the requirements of standards issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) that are national standards of the United States.

with the graph origin being in Malvinas.1 General Review Exponent reviewed the design hydraulic analysis and operational data from TgP’s SCADA system. Figure 14 provides a comparison of the elevation profile of the pipeline for the first 550 km between the initial design and the as-built condition. This internal pressure is then used to compute a minimum allowable pipe wall thickness that adheres to the code design requirements for the internal pressure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 33 . indicating that only minor deviations should be expected between the design calculations and the as-built alignment. the hydraulic analysis determines the internal pressures along the pipeline route.June 8.2 Hydraulic Design Risks 4. Figure 14. Comparison of the pipeline elevation profile along the ROW. 2007 4. The profiles show good agreement. SF36292. Using this information. The hydraulic modeling of the system requires as input a well-defined pipeline profile and the hydraulic performance requirements of the pipeline.2.

Our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the internal pressures along the NGL pipeline. 209. For the NGL pipeline. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure to the MAOP along the ROW of the NGL pipeline.2 Hydraulic Design of NGL Pipeline The hydraulic analysis can be divided into two parts: the steady-state analysis and the transient analysis.8 0.June 8.2 0.1 #1 PS PS #2 PS #3 PS #4 Maximum Operating Pressure/MAOP 1 0.4 0.1 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Distance (Km) Figure 15.3 0. at KP 0.2 1. a minimum allowable wall thickness was determined.4. 2007 4.7 0. Figure 15 provides a graphical depiction of the ratio of the maximum internal operating pressure to the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) per ASME B31.000 BPD (barrels per day). 1. where this ratio is to be smaller than 1 at all times.9 0. SF36292. with the smallest margins typically existing downstream of the four pump stations.000 to 70.2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 34 . the steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates of 10.5 0.6 0. 108. Based on this internal pressure. and 226.

The maximum operating pressure is the blocked-in pressure if the block valve at the end of the pipeline were to be closed. pump shutdown and pump startup.3 Hydraulic Design of NG Pipeline Techint’s hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline included a steady-state analysis and a blocked-in load condition providing the largest pressures. our review indicates that the hydraulic analysis of the NGL pipeline has been properly executed in conformance with code requirements. because the hydraulic analysis shows that the Camisea NGL pipeline does not exceed either the static or transient MAOP.4. In addition. flow rates. The hydraulic analysis relied on typical modeling techniques to compute the pipe friction coefficient and associated pressure drops. or any combination of these events. The largest transient operating pressures are found along the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline and downstream of PS #2 at KP 108. Based on this internal pressure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 35 .4 concerning the internal pressure design have been met.June 8. The requirements of ASME B31. This static analysis determines the internal operating pressures along the ROW. 2007 In addition to this static analysis. This analysis determined transient pressures along the NGL pipeline due to valve closure. The steady-state analysis was carried out for flow rates ranging from 205 to 215 MMSCFD (million standard cubic feet per day). and are in compliance with ASME B31. and the minimum specified delivery pressure at Lurin is 40 barg.1 times the allowable MAOP. In summary. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced. pumping capacity. a minimum allowable wall 36 Stoner Pipeline Simulator (SPS) is widely used for the transient flow simulation of natural gas and liquid transmission systems. the mechanical design was carried out in compliance with applicable codes and engineering practice. and pipeline control in the operating pipeline appear to be consistent with the hydraulic analysis. Furthermore.2. the actual internal pressure. an analysis was performed that included a compressor station at KP 208 to increase the flow rate. Our review indicates that the considered transient events are at all times smaller than 1. The maximum delivery pressure of the NG pipeline at Malvinas is approximately 147 barg. a transient study was performed using the Stoner36 pipe simulation software. SF36292. Accordingly. 4.

1. Operating Pressure/Design Pressure 0.8 0. at all times. The requirements of ASME B31.8 concerning the internal pressure design appear to have been met. 2007 thickness was determined per ASME B31. SF36292.9 0. The operational internal pressure and flow rates appear to be consistent with the results of the hydraulic analysis.8. The mechanical design was carried out in compliance with codes and general engineering practice. Figure 16 clearly illustrates that the design pressure is.003 A0F0 0607 0806 36 . The largest margins are typically found at river crossings where the pipe has been thickened. the hydraulic analysis of the NG pipeline is adequate.6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 Distance (km) Figure 16.June 8. Ratio of the maximum operating pressure divided by the design pressure along the ROW of the NG pipeline. larger than the largest expected operating pressure. In summary.1 1 Max.7 0. since the ratio of them is at all times smaller than 1. and no undue hydraulic risks were introduced.

Route of Camisea Pipeline. topographic information. and flooding/river erosion. hillside erosion. be considered during the design process. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechncial Reconnaissance. The Golder study identified the five main geotechnical and geologic hazards in the selva sector as being landslides. debris flows. Golder Associates (Golder) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the selva sector. Natural Gas and Liquid Natural Gas Pipelines.” February 2002. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. imposed by soil pressures or ground movements. MRA reviewed aerial photographs. MR Associates40 (MRA) conducted a preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigation in the sierra and costa sectors. Both the Felix and Verastegui reports recommended further geological and geotechnical studies during construction. Prior to construction. In addition. “Geotechnical Inspection of Route – Camisea Pipeline – Sector Selva. particularly in the selva sector. Dario Verastegui. Orlando Felix Salvador. satellite images. Route in Sector Selva – Project Camisea.” December 2001. or adequately mitigating the geotechnical hazards. SF36292. Orlando Felix38 and Dario Verastegui39 performed more detailed geologic and geotechnical evaluation at thirteen critical sites in the selva sector and made preliminary recommendations to mitigate hazards.” March 2002.003 A0F0 0607 0806 37 . to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. Golder developed an algorithm to evaluate the risk at sites along the route and identify zones of concern. with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. MR Associates.June 8. Sierra and Costa Sections. and conducted field inspections along the proposed pipe route. 2003. “Final Report – Geologic and Geotechnical Reconnaissance. 2007 4. Given the challenging geotechnical conditions and diverse terrain present along the pipeline. rock falls.” March 21. the system designers opted to construct geotechnical stabilization measures to mitigate potential external soil loads. and conducted field inspections along the proposed 37 38 39 40 Golder Associates. and geologic maps. which include external loads. “Pipeline –Sector Selva – Geologic Inspection of the Route – Critical Zones and Pumping Stations 2 and 3. External soil loads can be addressed by either designing the pipeline to withstand external soil loads. 37 Golder reviewed aerial photographs and satellite images.3 Geotechnical Design Risks ASME codes require the designer to demonstrate that all reasonable foreseeable load conditions.

and evaluation of alternative route alignments where active slides or marshy lands were identified. as evidenced by the geotechnical and geologic studies. Given the demanding route of these pipelines through the jungle and over the mountains. debris flows. Therefore.e. The preliminary geotechnical and geologic reports and more specific geotechnical studies performed during the design phase indicated that the geotechnical and geologic conditions would be complex and challenging along the alignment. 4.003 A0F0 0607 0806 38 . Our review revealed that the pipeline was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical SF36292. increasing the depth of pipe embedment at sites susceptible to erosion.4 Conclusions The system was designed to comply with ASME engineering code requirements. external loads were expected to be an important consideration in designing and constructing the system. MRA recommended implementing surface and subsurface drainage facilities to prevent erosion and soil creep. hydraulic risk). Foreseeable load conditions apply to internal pressures and to external loads imposed by soil pressures or ground movement.June 8.. and recommending corrosion prevention near the costa sections. or scour. 2007 pipe route. We have independently verified that the computed design pressures are code compliant and in good agreement with the measured operational pressures along the whole length of both pipelines. identifying locations where excavation cuts would reduce the stability of the slopes near the pipes. any risks associated with the internal pressure aspects of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines.41 Code compliance is established if the designer demonstrates that all specific code requirements and all reasonably foreseeable load conditions are addressed by the design. Our review indicates that the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline (i.

and ASME B31.003 A0F0 0607 0806 39 .8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. SF36292. 41 ASME B31.June 8. 2007 stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline.

who informed us that the ground conditions encountered during grading and installation of the pipe were assessed by geotechnical engineers. 2007 5 Construction-Related Risks 5.June 8. Due to limitations imposed by the topography of the ridges and the narrow lane of clearing (25 meters). and costa sectors. Responsibility for constructing the system was divided into the selva. government-mandated corridor. camps.42 Techint finalized the pipeline alignment. 42 The rainy season is a time period of elevated precipitation from late October until April. Techint employed up to 10. SF36292. Exponent interviewed key individuals involved in the construction.e. During construction. and loading docks) in 2001. The pipeline was constructed simultaneously along the ROW between 2002 and early 2004. and deviations from this pre-approved corridor had to be granted by the Peruvian government. fuel depots. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges of the government-mandated 3-km-wide corridor.1 Pipeline Construction Characteristics Techint commenced construction of support infrastructure (i..000 people on 12 spreads. At the end of the 2001–2002 rainy season. the cleared section of the ROW was typically restricted to 25 meters or less. Each sector was supervised by a Project Manager and a Construction Manager. and mitigation measures were constructed at that time. The first step was to clear and grade the ROW. access roads. Within this 3-km-wide corridor.003 A0F0 0607 0806 40 . with each spread constructing an assigned section of both pipelines. grading along the ROW typically consisted of cutting into the ridge or hillside and placing the excavated material as “side-cast” or “spill” fill on the downhill side(s) of the clearing. In order to minimize the impact on the environment. The pipe route had to be contained within the 3-kmwide. pipe staging sites. sierra. both of whom were ultimately responsible for construction of the pipeline in their respective sectors.

upon which the pipeline would initially rest. The excavated material was placed next to the trench. because it was the only available route for transportation. every 3 to 5 meters on the trench bottom. the pipes were welded together into a continuous section measuring several hundred meters in length. The “special installation” method was reserved for very steep terrain with a grade more than 35%. If the terrain was flat. 2007 The pipes typically were transported to the individual construction sites along the ROW itself. In some instances.” The “standard installation” method was used in flat to hilly terrain along the majority of the pipeline ROW. The pipe trench was then dug and prepared for the pipeline by placing several sand bags. The welded pipe sections were lowered into the trench. the side-booms moved continuously forward with roller-equipped slings. resting each pipe on two blocks. Figure 17 shows an example of the standard construction method in hilly terrain. depending on the terrain: “standard” and “special. trenching may have occurred first. The engineer responsible for laying the pipe determined the spacing and number of side-booms and other auxiliary equipment to be used. Techint’s standard installation method appears to have been flexible and adaptable to specific site conditions. as depicted in Figure 18. or socalled pillows. Techint used two general types of construction methods to install the pipes. Techint preferred to string out the pipe prior to welding. and protective measures were reportedly taken to prevent the soaking of the excavated material.003 A0F0 0607 0806 41 . Another “special installation” method was also employed at river crossings. SF36292. Each weld was x-rayed 24 hours after completion of the weld. if the ROW was sufficiently wide. Afterward.June 8. and sites located along roads and narrow mountain ridges. and later joined to the already-laid pipeline.

June 8. Trenching and stockpiling of cuttings at KP 391. Standard installation of NGL pipeline at KP 107. SF36292.003 A0F0 0607 0806 42 . Figure 18. 2007 Figure 17.

003 A0F0 0607 0806 43 . The pipe was clamped and welded to the pipeline. Figure 19.June 8. where the NG and NGL pipeline share a single narrow trench that may be stepped to further reduce the trench width. Another specialized construction variation arose at ridges and roads. rather than in long strings as was done in more gently sloping terrain. 2007 Techint’s special installation procedure for steep hills started with trenching. In locations where the pipeline followed a road. thereby constructing the pipeline segment by segment. concrete plates were placed on top of the backfill to minimize vehicle loads acting on the pipes. which provided for the use of selected backfill to contain stones of sizes up to 1½ by 1½ inches. the machine depicted in Figure 19 was used to backfill a portion of the trench. Backfilling was finalized by forming a crown on top of the filled trench and driving an approximately 4-ton vehicle over the trench to achieve some degree of compaction. When possible. This construction method allowed advancement of only approximately two pipe segments per day. a backhoe carrying the pipe was winched from the top of the hill to the end of the pipeline to place the pipe in position. SF36292. Backfilling of the trench had to satisfy Techint’s construction specification 2794-L-SP-0045. Placement of selected fill as bedding at KP 358 using a machine that separates larger stones from the remaining fill. Once the trench was dug.

SF36292. Typically. As discussed below. Laying of pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. Figure 20.003 A0F0 0607 0806 44 . Micro-tunneling was used solely at the Urubamba River crossing. 2007 Techint used two types of techniques to construct river crossings: micro-tunneling and trenching. Figure 20 shows the laying of the pipe over the Manugali River at KP 92. the pipe was coated with a thick concrete layer to provide ballast and protection (Construction Specification 2794-L-SP-0043: Concrete Casing of Pipes). In some cases. The most commonly used technique relied on trenching the riverbed and laying the pipe into the trench. blasting was required to trench. the construction methods employed standard engineering procedures.June 8.

reduce. GEOTEC cautioned that maintenance in the selva sector would be required for at least the first 5 years of operation. and river erosion. In October 2004. but other sites already showed signs of increased deterioration. and control potential damages from natural phenomena to the system. Sections of the pipelines constructed along roadways were identified as being at higher risk of failure. rockfalls. people. and recommend measures to prevent. Supervision of construction required an evaluation of future risks of erosion.2 Geotechnical Construction Characteristics During construction of the pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806 45 . and the environment. as well as areas of successful geotechnical stabilization efforts. GEOTEC documented numerous manifestations of instability in the selva sector. Additionally.43 The report concentrated on critical areas of the selva sector and included descriptions of specific stations along the ROW. a consortium of geotechnical consultants named GEOTEC was retained by TgP to develop and supervise the implementation of the geotechnical protection work from KP 0 to KP 520. landslides. detailing examples of areas of erosion and ground movement. GEOTEC was also responsible for evaluating the geotechnical and geologic risks after installation of the system and commencement of system operation in August 2004. 2007 5. They pointed out that other sites not described in the report could also have stability problems in the future due to the dynamic nature of the terrain and significant precipitation. GEOTEC concluded that geotechnical stabilization works had improved some of the sites during construction. GEOTEC concluded that most of the slope failures evaluated in the sierra sector had occurred during construction and were believed to have reached equilibrium but to be at risk of reactivation if subjected to an earthquake or a harsh winter. TgP requested that GEOTEC complete an extensive risk study to characterize the postconstruction stability conditions of the ROW. and between about KP 175 and KP 197. whereas cut-slope failures were judged to pose the greatest threat when the cut is in colluvium because of its origin as a landslide deposit that could reactivate. The report pointed out that the results were intended to prioritize areas for SF36292.June 8. The report also noted the potential long-term risk to the pipelines arising from failures in side-cast fill downslope of the ROW. GEOTEC believed that the landslide risk was highest between about KP 50 and KP 90. two months after the system was put into operation. and to a lesser extent in the sierra sector.

not all of these side-cast fills were adequately stabilized during construction.003 A0F0 0607 0806 46 . During our inspections. 45 “Camisea Project.3 Clearing Related Risks As mentioned previously in Section 5. no date. and discussions with Techint employees who were directly involved in the construction of the pipeline. coupled with the government mandate to limit the cleared section of the ROW to 25 meters. During our site inspections.June 8. excavated soil and rock materials had washed or slid down the steep ridge flanks. conservative values were assumed. 2002. no date.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. but TgP is currently addressing this issue through the stabilization measures discussed in Section 6. Field Reconnaissance on July 17. Exponent noted sites being stabilized where the geotechnical stabilization measures originally installed during or immediately after pipeline construction were not adequate to stabilize the ROW. where possible. The route selection along mountain ridges. The October 2004 GEOTEC report describes numerous sites at which thick fill stockpiles had experienced ground movement in the form of settlement. At some narrow ridges. Based on our field inspections. 45 In our opinion. they ultimately became a source of concern related to the potential to exert external soil pressures on the pipes. In many of these locations.” memo to Lucio Costarrosa from Milos Stepanek. October 2004. soil saturation is mentioned as a key factor in the instability of stockpiles. necessitating geotechnical mitigation measures. 5. Lineas de Conduccion de GN y LGN. Variant Pisco. Exponent 43 Estudio de Riesgos por Fenomenos Naturales. SF36292.44. Pacobamba Route Sector. Proyecto Camisea. When only limited detailed data were available. necessitated the creation of side-cast fills in some particular areas where there was a limitation of the cleared ROW section.1. Exponent generally concludes that this approach was appropriate for pipeline integrity purposes and helped reduce environmental impacts. Although these side-cast fills were generally placed outside the limits of the pipe trenches. and shallow landsliding. 2007 maintenance. TgP decided to preferentially build the pipeline along or near topographic ridges. Detailed stability analyses were performed for critical areas. 44 Camisea Project. cracking.

but rather will fall and stack on the sides of the pipe. During our field inspection. the trench was backfilled using material processed from excavated material stockpiled along the ROW. the material surrounding the pipe was dumped via a mechanized conveyor. SF36292. 2007 observed a few instances where this excessive material was apparently used to widen the ROW. Figures 17 to 20). potentially creating a large. will not flow. Exponent reviewed representative photographs taken during construction of the project in the three sectors and at river crossings (e. likely represent some of the worst conditions for producing material in a suitable form for backfilling the pipe. This is generally not a recommended practice. on the other hand. The backfill around the pipe reportedly was lightly to moderately compacted. continuous void beneath the pipe and interspersed voids among the clods. A detailed description of the stabilization measures undertaken by TgP in 2006 is given in Section 6. The materials used for the pipe bedding and embedment were derived from excavated native materials. Dry sand. Except in special circumstances. Clods of clay. which were known to vary substantially along the alignment. we noted that TgP constructed many geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006 to address the issues described above. The ability of material dumped into the trench to flow around and beneath the pipe is dependent on the size of the gap on the sides and beneath the pipe. using the tracks and/or wheels of the construction vehicles. which provide a glimpse of the range of ground conditions that existed during construction of the pipe zones and possible current conditions. 5. The conditions in the selva sector. unless the slope is sufficiently stabilized. specifically in natural drainages. Therefore. soil conditions in the trench are expected to have varied significantly along the alignment.. would likely flow freely around and beneath the pipe.June 8. The moisture conditions in the ground varied from dry (in the coastal sector) to wet (in the jungle sector) to saturated (at river crossings).4 Trenching-Related Risks Based on our discussions with Techint construction personnel.g. and the material type and wetness of the backfill. primarily because of the wet ground conditions and heavy precipitation that wets the stockpiles. for example.003 A0F0 0607 0806 47 .

SP. One of these three defects was related to the rolled plate material. hydrostatic testing revealed that none of the 59. the hydrostatic testing and the metallurgical analysis of the five spill incidents) indicate that the pipe material was in compliance with the required codes. Adherence to DIN 30670. as described in Specification 2794-P-SP-00005.5 Pipe Material–Related Risks The system was constructed using more than 100.. and Buenos Aires. is intended to ensure the integrity of the outer HDPE coating. Additionally.193 installed pipes of the NGL pipelines had pipe material defects. 5. the loss of backfill from erosion could result in external soil pressures acting on the pipe.906 installed pipes of the NG pipeline and only three of the 49. API 5L provides provisions to minimize potential risks to pipe integrity that can arise from the fabrication of the steel plate and the longitudinal electric-resistance weld by requiring minimum material performance. Argentina. as well as material sampling and quality assurance procedures. Specifically. A review of the pipe book46 and the pipe manufacturing and coating records indicates that the entire stock of pipe segments used for this system was fabricated at one of two pipe mills during 2002 and 2003. We understand that TgP is in the process of installing piezometers in the ROW and inspecting the performance of the subterranean drainage systems as a means to assess the potential for internal soil erosion.000 individual pipe segments. each approximately 12 m in length.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 48 . and two were defective longitudinal welds. Brazil.e. Without proper use of flow barriers to reduce the flow of water traveling through the backfill (“ditch breakers”). Documents and evidence reviewed showed that the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. flat steel plates were rolled into a tubular cross-section and longitudinally welded into a pipe segment. Each segment was then coated with an outer highdensity polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the pipe’s exterior from the environment. The pipe manufacturers’ records indicate that these two pipe manufacturers are located in Pindamonhangaba. 2007 Potential geotechnical risks from trench conditions relate primarily to internal soil erosion (“piping”). Available data (i. All three pipes SF36292. These electric-resistance welded tubular products were manufactured per API 5L standard.

see leaks 3. risks to the integrity of the HDPE coating arise during the various stages of moving and handling the coated pipes. It needs to be recognized that. ID 1 2 Leaks identified during hydrostatic testing of the pipeline Location KP 9+906 KP 1+726 Date August 8. however. at each circumferential pipe joint. Pipeline integrity– related risks associated with the manufacture of the coating are typically low. 2003 7 8 NGL NG KP 210 KP 388 January 9. as can be seen from the more comprehensive discussion of the hydrostatic testing given in Section 5. 2003 February 16. 2003 External damage Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Exponent currently considers the residual risk of future pipeline failures caused by pipe manufacturing-related risks to be negligible. 2003 July 27. This level of defect removal is not atypical. For details on these three leaks. 2004 March 23.8.June 8. a sleeve is placed. 2004 October 4. they demonstrate that the hydrostatic testing was successful in removing these defects before the pipeline was placed into operation. because hydrostatic testing provided an effective means of identifying longitudinal welding defects. and 5 in Table 1. SF36292. overlapping the adjacent pipe to provide continuous surface protection. 2007 were replaced and successfully passed a subsequent hydrostatic test. The prevention of surface damage to the protective outer layer is an important step in enhancing the protection against external corrosion. 2003 Failure Type Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Longitudinal fracture Partial circumferential rupture Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Short longitudinal fracture along the longitudinal weld Partial circumferential rupture of girth weld Failure Cause Description Incorrect assembly of weld joint during construction External mechanical deformation and gauges Localized material defect of manufactured steel plate used for pipe manufacture Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Localized defect along the factory manufactured longitudinal weld Failure of a repair girth weld External damage of pipe due to unauthorized use of construction equipment near pipeline Failure of a repair girth weld Pipeline NGL NGL 3 4 5 6 NGL NGL NGL NGL KP 171 KP 31+494 KP 48+830 KP 170 October 4. 2004 September 16. 4. The HDPE coating system is designed to mitigate external pipe corrosion. Table 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 49 . The three pipe material–related failures do not indicate that the manufacturing process was inadequate. A failure of this protective coating system is significant to the pipeline’s 46 The pipe book lists relevant pipe data. rather.

a review of the welding records indicates that the issued welder certificates were consistent with the requirements of API 1104 and ASME Sec. performed an inline pipe inspection of the NGL pipeline to detect any external as well as internal material loss. In this regard. These standards are used throughout the world for the construction of pipelines. The other incident was caused by a hydrogen-induced crack in the girth weld that both escaped radiographic detection and passed hydrostatic testing. automated methods were used. geotechnical loading conditions.3. and 2794-L-SP-00031.6 Pipeline Field Welding–Related Risks The individual pipes are circumferentially joined in the field using the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) and Flux Arc Welding (FCAW) method in compliance with API 1104. The NGL pipeline was fabricated using the manual SMAW method. and not weld quality. 2007 long-term integrity and mitigated by operation of a cathodic protection system and detection of material loss by inline inspection tools. TgP operates a cathodic protection system and. 2794-L-SP00016. Qualified Welding Procedures (QWP) for girth welds and their field repair are given in Construction Specifications 2794-L-SP-00012. It is not unusual for a small number of preexisting line defects to cause small leaks that are detectible and SF36292. Although four of the six incidents occurred at girth welds. and because the pipe material toughness exceeded the minimum required so that the crack was just below the failure threshold. were the significant contributing factors in three of these four incidents. API 1104 and ASME B31.June 8. in 2006. In addition. This hydrogen crack does not necessarily represent an unacceptable level of risk. The crack missed detection by both of these weld quality tests because the crack appears to have developed after the weld was x-rayed. whereas for the NG pipeline. A more detailed description of the inline inspection’s results and a discussion of our observations can be found in Section 7.003 A0F0 0607 0806 50 . 2794-L-SP-00017. IX.8 (gas) standards establish the framework for the many girth welds that join the individual pipes. 5. Exponent reviewed these welding specifications and found them to be acceptable and in conformance with API 1104.4 (liquid) and ASME B31.

Likewise.8. due to the time-delayed nature of a hydrogen crack.003 A0F0 0607 0806 51 . Hydrostatic testing involves filling each pipe section with water and pressurizing the water to a predefined proof pressure that 47 G.7 Pipeline X-ray–Related Risks Techint specified that 24 hours after a weld was made. 1973. Because defects such as an undercut are more easily identified than a very tight hydrogen crack.8.H. 5.47 It only becomes a significant risk if such cracking is pervasive throughout the system.1 Background Hydrostatic testing of pipelines is an important tool to verify integrity and identify any leaks. Any defects determined not to be acceptable per API 1104 were to be removed and the weld repaired. SF36292. page 10.8 Hydrostatic Testing–Related Risks 5.3. there is a very small possibility. and the radiograph evaluated per API 1104 for any potential welding-induced defects. A review of the certification records confirmed that the contracted inspection personnel were certified to the required level. Ewing. 12th World Gas Conference. A more detailed discussion of the risks associated with hydrogen-induced cracking of girth welds can be found in Section 5. 2007 easily repaired for a line that has been hydrostatically tested. Radiography is particularly effective in finding weld defects such as undercuts in the weld. as with all pipelines. Exponent reviewed a limited number of radiographs and associated reports that did not show any API 1104 code deviations. that a tight hydrogen crack could escape detection by the radiograph. there is also a finite risk that a hydrogen crack could develop just after the radiograph is taken. it was to be radiographed. 5. The inspectors who conducted and interpreted these radiographs were to be certified to Level II per API 1104. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States”. Hydrostatic testing of the system is mandated by the ASME codes.June 8.

such that the effectiveness to detect defects varied along the length of the pipelines.8. Table 1 lists the specific information for each leak.2 Hydrostatic Testing Results for the Camisea System During the hydrostatic testing of the Camisea system. especially considering the challenging terrain. which is the expected maximum operating pressure (MOP).48 This hydrostatic test was performed for both pipelines along the entire length of the system. These welds are then radiographed 24 hours after the welding. All of these failures were subsequently repaired. induced stresses were not uniform. For example. Hydrostatic testing removed 129 defects over a span of 48 TgP’s water tightness test was conservatively extended to be 24 hours long. two by faulty longitudinal welds. 5. After the test. However. the pipe is repaired and hydrostatic testing is performed again to verify the pipe’s water tightness and strength. the individual tested sections of the pipeline are welded back together using either pipe tie-in pieces or welding the adjoining pipe sections together. Per this criterion.June 8. of which seven occurred in the NGL pipeline. two by external damage that had occurred during construction. The test results are more an indication of the test’s ability to detect preexisting faults. If a leak is detected during hydrostatic testing. Three leaks were caused by faulty girth welds.250 km of pipeline is a low number. and the pipeline section was successfully re-tested. our review indicates that the hydrostatic tests were executed in conformance with the ASME Codes.8.25 times the internal design pressure. Eight failures during hydrostatic testing in more than 1. eight leaks were identified.000 miles of transmission pipelines that have been hydrostatically tested. SF36292. 2007 exceeds the maximum operating pressure. during hydrostatic testing. the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation has in service over 5. A similar criterion applies to the NG pipeline and is defined per ASME B31. In the case of the NGL pipeline. the water-tightness of the pipeline is verified by maintaining a slightly smaller constant water pressure for at least 4 hours. Next. and one by a foreign object being introduced during rolling of the steel plate. the specific code requirements are that the hydrostatic test’s proof pressure is 1.003 A0F0 0607 0806 52 .

As in any pipeline. This temporarily trapped hydrogen embrittles the weld material and heat-affected zone (HAZ). in which the tough pipe material of the system did not rupture during hydrostatic testing. if it results in a leak. 12th World Gas Conference.” 1973.June 8. This situation arose with the second spill incident at KP 222+500. it needs to be recognized that these risks cannot be fully eliminated but need to be managed by the pipeline operator. This situation arose with the second spill incident of the NGL pipeline. some minimal risk may exist. however. Hydrostatic testing plays an important role in detecting flaws and cracks in pipelines in order to reduce operational risks and the likelihood of subsequent pipeline incidents. Despite these actions.8. this hazard was mitigated during construction by radiographic inspection of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing.003 A0F0 0607 0806 53 . SF36292. 2007 3. where a hydrogen-induced crack was not detected by the radiograph.3 Hydrogen-Induced Crack–Related Risks Hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) is a well-known phenomenon that affects welds in which hydrogen can be temporarily introduced during welding of mild steels. Typically.H. because defects may be aligned or sized such that the hydrostatic test would not rupture the pipe and the defect could go undetected. this type of potential defect.49 Of these 129 defects. 10 were plate defects. a potential residual risk is that partial penetration cracks can survive the hydrostatic test. “The Development and Results of High Stress Hydrostatic Testing of Gas Transmission Lines in the United States.424 miles of pipe. During the time the hydrogen is present. but will not leave any trace of its presence after it diffuses out of the weld. In the absence of significant external pipe loading. 5. page 10. despite the precautions taken by hydrostatic testing. the weld material and HAZ is susceptible to hydrogen-induced cracking. and the subsequent hydrostatic test and initiated the subsequent spill incident. these cracks are formed several hours to several days after welding. Ewing. In the Camisea system and consistent with general pipeline engineering practice throughout the world. would typically release only small amounts of gas or liquid hydrocarbons. and the remainder were defects at the longitudinal welds. 16 were defects in the girth welds. The multiple hydrostatic test cycles and subsequent operational pressure cycles of the transported hydrocarbons further 49 G.

risks are not as high as for a rupture situation. The reviewed test results showed no indication of a leak for the final hydrostatic test. Overall. The five repetitions of this hydrostatic test were necessitated by the pipe’s inability to hold pressure in the initial test.003 A0F0 0607 0806 54 . We currently believe that hydrogen-induced cracking is not a systemic issue.9 Conclusions Construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. On the other hand. the review showed that (1) the pipe was specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. GEOTEC recognized this risk and recommended additional geotechnical stabilization measures. a failure with a slow leak rate should be the more likely outcome. Exponent’s review and analysis currently indicates that the most likely cause for the failure of the initial hydrostatic tests was entrapped air. However.June 8. the radiography of all girth welds and hydrostatic testing of the system provides a level of risk mitigation consistent with general pipeline engineering practice. 5. the constructed geotechnical stabilization measures proved to be insufficiently robust that soil stability was initially problematic along the ROW. (2) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors SF36292. The incident at KP 222+500 is currently not considered to be indicative of any systemic problems for the more than 100. 2007 propagated this initial hydrogen-induced crack. ultimately breaching the wall and causing a slow leak in the NGL line at KP 222+500. and when it does occur. The occurrence of this type of failure should be very low. The severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 locations in 2006. Overall. but the post-failure radiograph clearly showed a hydrogen-induced crack. The hydrostatic test of this section was performed five months after the fabrication of this joint and lasted for approximately a month.000 girth welds. which are discussed in more detail in Section 6. Exponent’s investigation currently indicates that the post-weld radiograph at KP 222+500 showed no signs of a hydrogen-induced crack. because absent soil movement. our inspections in 2006 showed that a significant portion of these measures were not sufficiently effective and robust to stabilize the ROW.

2007 were in compliance with API 1104. and (3) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME codes.003 A0F0 0607 0806 55 .June 8. SF36292.

freezing temperatures. The jungle (selva) sector is characterized as having geotechnical and geologic conditions that pose the highest risk to the integrity of the pipelines. deep rotational landslides in colluvial deposits. over the Andes Mountains.003 A0F0 0607 0806 56 . and ridge instability. and high-gradient streams. amounts of precipitation. but the water table can rise during periods of intense rainfall that occur 50 For purposes of this report. The conditions include very steep and high slopes. all of which are a direct consequence of the steep topography and heavy precipitation. typically when saturated. The mountain (sierra) sector is characterized by natural conditions that are somewhat better than those in the selva sector. whereas geologic hazards are defined as movement in rock. and heavy precipitation leading to underground seepage and numerous water crossings. wedge landslides. geotechnical and geologic hazards are external ground pressures resulting from ground instability or movement. the conditions include very steep and high slopes. SF36292. Geotechnical hazards are defined as movement in soil. The rocks and soils in the selva sector are generally characterized as materials with low durability. particularly when devoid of vegetation. and moderate to high susceptibility to erosion. high groundwater levels. rockfalls. Specifically. 2007 6 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks 6. and along the Pacific coast.1 Geotechnical and Geologic Conditions The Camisea Transportation System carries natural gas products through the jungle. and other conditions that pose a myriad of geotechnical and geologic hazards50 and challenge the integrity and reliable operation of the pipeline. isolated regions with infrequent occurrence of high intensity rainfall. relatively thick deposits of moderate to high-plasticity residual soils. The salient geotechnical and geologic hazards for the selva sector include debris flows. low strength. geology. low resistance to weathering.June 8. Groundwater typically does not exist within the pipe zone. rock slides. hard rock. isolated areas of flatter slopes with high-plasticity weathered soils. narrow ridges. Each of these geographic regions possesses distinctive terrain. but still pose significant risk to the pipelines.

and stabilization systems such as buttress fills. and also a hydro-meteorological (rainfall and river-stage) alert network. 2007 intermittently. For a challenging alignment such as this system. In January 2005. SF36292. with recommendations for remedial actions that included surface and subsurface drainage systems. predominantly granular soils and gravel. metal or concrete piles. five months after the system was placed into operation.June 8. reinforced concrete walls. rockslides. slope armoring. The costa sector is characterized by regions with low topographic relief. particularly reconstruction of surface drainage works.2 General Findings As described previously in Chapter 4.003 A0F0 0607 0806 57 . this design approach requires the construction of effective stabilization measures. These geotechnical and geologic conditions were known and evaluated by several geotechnical and geologic consultants. rock bolts. GEOTEC presented a plan of action. and broad river crossings. surface surveying. very little rainfall. crib walls. wedge landslides. This report also recommended the following types of instrumentation: observation wells or piezometers. and rockfalls. and slope inclinometers. The principal geotechnical and geologic hazards in the sierra sector include debris flows. the pipeline was designed such that external soil loading would be mitigated by stabilization measures constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geologic hazard. The coastal (costa) sector generally has the most favorable natural conditions with respect to the static stability of soil and rock along the ROW. including GEOTEC. gabion walls. These recommended measures were to be used in conjunction with regular maintenance activities. the consortium hired to provide engineering services during and immediately after construction of the system. 6. The primary non-seismic geotechnical hazards are mudflows and flash floods in ravines during infrequent downpours. and gravity walls. and reinforced shotcrete. and lateral erosion of river terraces in the Pisco River Valley.

identified critical zones in the selva sector. we observed gabion walls that had displaced laterally with significant tilting. Following our June 2006 inspections.003 A0F0 0607 0806 58 . which indicated that the stabilization measures were not adequately mitigating geotechnical or geologic hazards at the time of our inspections. 2007 Also described in Chapter 4 are the preliminary geologic and geotechnical investigations that were conducted by Golder and MRA for design of the system with the stated objective of determining the geologic and geotechnical feasibility of the proposed alignment. and routine annual geotechnical maintenance. The most comprehensive study of geotechnical risks was performed by GEOTEC after installation of the pipeline was complete. The spill incidents and the observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical stabilization program that began in earnest in April 2006. More than 100 sites along the ROW were evaluated and remediated by implementing geotechnical stabilization measures using designs and construction techniques that were more robust than those used previously.June 8. and Stepanek). TgP developed a master plan to address geotechnical and geologic recommendations. These preliminary studies recommended further geologic and geotechnical studies during construction to identify additional unstable zones and recommend stabilization measures. Verastegui. These preliminary studies evaluated the geologic (and geotechnical) risk along the proposed route. GEOTEC made several other recommendations. For example. Based on this study. topographic surveys. and displaced or disrupted drainage facilities. construction were not completely effective in mitigating external soil loads acting on the pipes. some site-specific evaluations of geotechnical and geologic hazards were performed prior to or during construction by various consultants (Felix. we observed evidence of substantial ground movement. The primary components of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization measures included: (1) gabion walls that were typically founded in weathered rock SF36292. As described in Chapter 4. or immediately following. including implementation of subsurface exploration. In some instances. and made preliminary recommendations. Exponent concluded that some of the stabilization measures implemented during. In addition. The geotechnical risk assessment requested by TgP from GEOTEC identified areas (slopes and ravine/river crossings) that required additional geotechnical stabilization.

piezometers. As a result of these efforts. with the exception of one site at PS #2. in September 2006. rain gauges. Exponent also noted that effective and continuous monitoring of the performance of surface and subsurface drainage systems is necessary. and a significant portion of the stabilization measures have been completed at PS #2.003 A0F0 0607 0806 59 . We understand that TgP has followed our recommendations. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. Further. strain gauges. rows of small-diameter pipe or timber “pin” piles that were placed parallel to the ROW.June 8. SF36292. Based on our second set of site inspections. we believe that the risk of future failure of the system resulting from external geotechnical forces has been substantially reduced at locations where stabilization measures were implemented in 2006. (6) surface “current breakers” to collect runoff water and convey it in a controlled. be performed at PS #2 and that appropriate geotechnical stabilization measures be implemented as soon as possible.g. 2007 below the landslide plane. and subsequent review of documentation of individual site stabilization design approaches. Exponent concluded that the remedial geotechnical stabilization measures at most sites are sufficiently robust and appear to represent a reasonable and practical approach to reduce the risk of failure to the pipeline. and (7) lined drainage channels to collect water from current breakers and ditch breaker drains. depths. slope inclinometers. where evidence of soil movement was observed above the gabion wall installed at the toe of the landslide. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. lined ditch to a main surface collector system. This instrumentation will provide earlier warnings of ground instability and additional data on ground movement locations. in September 2006. (5) subsurface “ditch breakers” to collect water flowing through trench backfill in steep terrain and route it to underground drain pipes. Hence. Based on our observations at PS #2. (2) in some limited cases.. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment (e. (3) reduction in thickness of soil overburden above the unstable ground or landslide. we determined that these measures were being applied in a consistent and effective manner. and survey control) at sites with the greatest residual risk to assess surface and subsurface conditions. because high groundwater conditions have been a major factor in the initiation of slope movements. (4) subsurface drains (“filters”) consisting of perforated PVC pipe wrapped in geo-fabric and connected to solid pipe discharging into a lined drainage channel.

The core of this program involves regular ROW visual inspections within the selva and sierra sectors by multi-disciplinary teams trained by COGA’s technical consultants. This method was developed to assess geotechnical and geologic risk in a project setting that is diverse.g. The geotechnical risk assessment method formulated by Exponent and TgP consists of the following four major steps: (1) evaluation of geo-integrity parameters. (3) characterization of the severity of failure should one occur. dynamic.3. and (4) qualitative evaluation of the overall risk of failure. and rates of movement will be available to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. and sensitive as a result of both natural and man-made (e.. Exponent also reviewed a proposed inspection program (marcha vigilante) initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. In this method. 6. In our opinion. with a separate evaluation of the likelihood of failure versus the severity of failure. complex. (2) evaluation of the likelihood of failure using a screening analysis and the geo-integrity parameters. and remediation) causes.3 Geotechnical Risk Assessment 6. The marcha vigilante inspection teams document relevant geotechnical conditions at each site on a weekly basis.1 Risk Assessment Methodology Exponent and TgP collaboratively developed a qualitative method to assess the likelihood and severity of future failure resulting from geotechnical and geologic conditions at a given site along the ROW. and develops the most effective means to reduce risk and to prioritize remedial and monitoring efforts. 2007 directions. providing a stronger basis to make fundamental decisions on acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk. deforestation. development. risk is assessed using traditional geotechnical failure modes. and this information is used to update the geotechnical risk assessment method described below. this approach enhances the characterization of overall risk.June 8. SF36292. In late 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 60 .

The higher the Likelihood Level. the greater the susceptibility. The initial step in the likelihood evaluation involves computing a Safety Ratio (SR) for the site using geo-integrity parameters for each failure mode. marcha vigilante) to characterize the likelihood of a potential pipeline failure using readily available or measurable information from a given site. and a slope is at the point of marginal stability or imminent failure. and safety.003 A0F0 0607 0806 61 . The Severity Level considers the following four different consequence categories: environmental. including geologic and geotechnical conditions that likely led to three of the first five pipeline ruptures. The Safety Ratio relationships developed for this method are intended to be an interim surrogate measure of safety factors51 in the absence of more rigorous engineering analysis. Severity Levels (SL) are characterized using four rating levels. The Risk Categories are: Risk Category 1 – Low risk Risk Category 2 – Moderately low risk that is acceptable Risk Category 3 – Medium risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures 51 The ratio between the forces resisting ground movement and the forces driving ground movement.g. health. more severe.June 8. property. SF36292. The following geotechnical failure modes are currently considered in this risk method and capture most of the observed landslides for the system: (a) deep rotational landslide. and (d) ridge instability.. with higher numerical levels also corresponding to greater. 2007 Geo-integrity parameters are typically evaluated during the inspection program (e. consequences. The computed Safety Ratios are then used to assign Likelihood Levels (LL) for each failure mode. A safety factor of 1 indicates that the forces are equal. These parameters were chosen based on our experience and knowledge of the conditions along the ROW. Likelihood Levels consist of four numerical categories that correspond to our interpretation of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode at that site. (b) wedge landslide. (c) translational landslide. The final step in the risk assessment method involves assigning the final Risk Category for each site by combining the computed Likelihood and Severity Levels as shown in Table 2.

3. SF36292.June 8. Exponent has recommended to TgP that all sites in Risk Categories 3. 67 are in the selva sector. Risk category assessment chart Likelihood 1 1 2 Severity 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 5 6. considering all four failure modes.003 A0F0 0607 0806 62 . Table 2. The sites were selected by COGA based on their interpretation of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. 28 are in the sierra sector. and Severity Level as shown in Table 2. 2007 Risk Category 4 – High risk that should be evaluated for mitigation measures with high priority Risk Category 5 – Very high risk that requires immediate evaluation of the need for mitigation measures. Of the 95 sites in the risk matrix. the geo-integrity parameters necessary to apply the geotechnical risk assessment method were characterized for only 95 sites as of October 2006. 4. and 5 be subjected to a formal engineering stability analysis to determine whether mitigation measures are necessary. The final Risk Category is evaluated using the most critical combination of the Likelihood Level.2 Application of the Risk Assessment Method The geotechnical risk assessment method was applied to 95 different sites52 along the system to create a risk matrix. and none are in the costa sector. 52 Although more than 100 sites were mitigated as part of the 2006 geotechnical stabilization program conducted by TgP and COGA.

in order to provide a baseline assessment of risk.June 8. In this regard. soil movement. 2007 In general. because there were no known manifestations of ground movement in these same sections as of 2006. during our field inspections in June and September 2006. surface depression. In addition. The risk at each site was then re-evaluated following the completion of the stabilization measures (September 2006). some on both occasions. the risk matrix does not necessarily include all potential risk sites along the entire pipeline alignment. Exponent did not independently evaluate the geo-integrity parameters for the remaining 61 sites but did collaborate with COGA in their evaluation. there currently are no sites in the matrix involving this potential hazard. The overall risk at each site was first evaluated assuming conditions that existed prior to the construction of the new geotechnical stabilization measures (May 2006). However. the maximum combination of likelihoodseverity pairings of each individual site is presented. September.. sites are entered into the risk matrix if manifestations of earth instability (e. respectively. For example. it is our understanding that TgP will transition in 2007 toward a proactive implementation to address this potential geotechnical risk. slope bulging. The risk matrix is based on the geotechnical expert evaluation of the first 450 km of the ROW. Finally. The risk matrix initially ranked 48% of the sites (45 sites. excessive fiber optic attenuation) are observed. and ridge instability is included in the risk matrix.003 A0F0 0607 0806 63 . The geointegrity parameters for these 35 sites were evaluated initially by COGA. pipe movement. and October 2006 are presented in Figures 21 to 23. tension cracks. The 35 sites in the risk matrix that were inspected by Exponent are shown in blue. along the initial 455 km of the ROW) as having “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Categories 4 and 5) in May SF36292. and subsequently by Exponent for the sites that we visited. For each time period. Exponent inspected more than 50 sites. Thirty-five of these sites were in the COGA risk matrix. The results of the geotechnical risk assessment and our field observations indicate that TgP made substantial progress in 2006 to diminish the overall risk of future failure resulting from external soil or rock pressures. the risk was re-evaluated to incorporate the implementation of the marcha vigilante inspection program (October 2006). The results of the geotechnical risk assessment for May.g. the results were compiled in pie charts to summarize the overall risk level of the 95 sites in the COGA risk matrix (Figures 21 to 23). even though narrow ridge instability is a substantial hazard on some sections of the ROW in the selva sector.

SF36292. Risk assessment results for May 2006. the percentage of sites ranked “high” to “very high” risk was 13% (12 sites) in September 2006. By October 2006. 2007 2006. only one site adjacent to the second pump station was ranked as “very high.” As mentioned before. Further reductions to the risk level were observed in the October 2006 risk matrix results wherein only 5% of the sites (5 sites) were characterized as having a “high” to “very high” risk.003 A0F0 0607 0806 64 . and 74% of sites were ranked as having “moderately low” risk (Risk Category 2) by October 2006. TgP has recently been implementing stabilization works at this location to reduce the geotechnical risk. 94 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 3 2 0 4 17 2 0 1 13 9 0 7 24 12 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for MAY 2006 1 2 3 4 5 35% 23% 0% 29% 13% Figure 21. By comparison.June 8.

June 8. 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 9 3 0 5 22 16 0 6 20 4 0 2 6 2 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for SEPTEMBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 40% 47% 0% 11% 2% Figure 22. Risk assessment results for September 2006.003 A0F0 0607 0806 65 . SF36292.

003 A0F0 0607 0806 66 . 2007 95 Likelihood 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 16 9 0 8 33 14 0 4 6 1 0 0 3 1 Severity 2 3 4 DISTRIBUTION for OCTOBER 2006 1 2 3 4 5 74% 21% 0% 4% 1% Figure 23. which includes the monitoring program for the September 2006 results. Risk assessment results for October 2006. SF36292.June 8.

e.June 8. 3 1 Reduction in Risk 2 21 9 1 21 9 1 0 27 1 3 1 2 3 4 5 May 2006 Risk Category Figure 24. which began in earnest in April 2006. Figure 24 summarizes the computed reduction in Risk Category versus the baseline risk (i. SF36292. Change in risk from May to October 2006. groundwater depth. Figure 24 shows that the most significant reductions in risk were achieved at sites possessing “high” to “very high” risk (Risk Category ≥ 4). whereas marginal effects were observed at “moderately low” to “medium” risk sites. The rankings in the May and October risk matrices were compared to evaluate the total progress made as of October 2006 in mitigating geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW through geotechnical stabilization. surface drainage control. The further reduction of Likelihood Levels in the October risk matrix corresponds to TgP’s commencement of its comprehensive inspection program. 2007 The substantial reduction in overall risk from May to October 2006 is directly attributable to changes in Likelihood Levels. The change in Likelihood Levels from May to September coincides with COGA’s progress in completing robust geotechnical stabilization measures. because Severity Levels were likely unchanged.e. and presence of gabion walls). slope inclination. inspections... The construction of geotechnical stabilization measures is reflected in the risk matrix through re-evaluation of geointegrity parameters used to characterize various site conditions (i. the Risk Category as of May 2006).003 A0F0 0607 0806 67 . and monitoring.

While TgP had been using a risk assessment method for some time. respectively. Risk by sectors for May 2006. representation across the three sectors was not possible. 50 45 40 Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Risk Category Figure 25. 2007 The results of the risk assessment for the 95 sites were separated by sector. However. comparison of Figures 25 and 26 suggests that the majority of the geotechnical stabilization works and monitoring programs are appropriately focused on the selva sector. wherein most of the selva sites fall into Risk Categories 2 and 3. In contrast. However. The May 2006 rankings show that the majority of the selva sector sites evaluated fall into Risk Categories 4 and 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 68 . Results of this method appear to work reasonably well in providing a qualitative assessment of the geotechnical and geologic hazards present along the ROW. the October 2006 results show a substantial reduction in the risk for the selva sector. to geographically delineate variations in the potential for geotechnical risk along the system. because 67 of the 95 sites are located in the selva sector—the location of the vast majority of sites that have exhibited manifestations of ground instability—and the remaining sites are in the sierra sector.June 8. recognizing the qualitative nature of the approach. whereas the majority of the sierra sector sites fall into Risk Category 2. Figures 25 and 26 show the risk by sectors for the May and October risk matrix rankings. Selva (May 2006) Sierra (May 2006) 4 5 SF36292. engineering judgment should be exercised at all times when applying the risk assessment method. Hence. the current geotechnical risk assessment method was developed in 2006.

we recommend that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical and geologic hazards along the ROW where manifestations of instability are not present.. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP) that governs the use of all geotechnical risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions.4 Ongoing Geotechnical Risk Mitigation We expect that the continuous. 6. requiring immediate measures to sufficiently mitigate the hazard.g. Some of these potential new sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk. This RMP should state at least the following: SF36292. strain gauges and inclinometers). 2007 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 Selva (October 2006) Sierra (October 2006) Frequency 4 5 Risk Category Figure 26. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e. Risk by sectors for October 2006. Initially.003 A0F0 0607 0806 69 . In addition. Therefore.June 8. decision processes and means of execution. this approach will likely require an assessment of geologic and topographic maps to identify the most susceptible sites.

be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. Based on Exponent’s review. including soil sampling in borings and test pits.003 A0F0 0607 0806 70 . we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved insufficient to mitigate external soil pressures acting on the pipes. complex. caused TgP to implement aggressive geotechnical stabilization measures.5 Conclusions The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. Exponent recommended that a detailed geotechnical investigation. Exponent visited more than 50 sites during our September 2006 inspection. when stabilization measures were completed or significantly underway. with the exception of a site adjacent to the second pump station. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. and TgP has communicated that such efforts have been substantially completed. 2007 • • • All sites with a risk ranking 4 and 5 should be mitigated immediately. Furthermore. and concluded that the geotechnical risk has been reduced substantially at the remediated sites.June 8. observations. During our inspections in 2006. and engineering experience. Exponent recommended the deployment of instrumentation and monitoring equipment at critical SF36292. All sites with a likelihood ranking of 4 should be mitigated immediately. wherein three of the spill incidents were attributed to geotechnical and geologic instabilities. 6. • Mandated actions ranging from authorizing investigations to shutting down the pipeline need to be provided. Extraordinary efforts were made to complete the geotechnical stabilization measures along the ROW before the start of the 2006–2007 rainy season. The observed performance of the pipeline system. and sensitive. This remedial program began in earnest in April 2006 and employed robust construction techniques that were applied in a consistent and effective manner. Clear organizational structures and the level of responsibility and authority need to be assigned. dynamic.

June 8, 2007

sites to provide earlier warnings of ground instability, and to provide additional data on ground movement locations, depths, directions, and rates to permit more expeditious and reliable repairs. Exponent also reviewed the inspection program initiated by TgP to help reduce the risk of future failure from external geotechnical forces by detecting and quantifying early signs of slope instability. This program, which involves weekly visual inspections of critical sections of the system during the rainy season, appears to be comprehensive and aggressive. During the second phase of our project, Exponent worked collaboratively with TgP to develop a geotechnical risk assessment method to evaluate the occurrence of geotechnical hazards along the ROW that could ultimately affect the stability of the system. This risk assessment method was validated using information from our field inspections and applied to 95 sites along the system to create a risk matrix. The risk at each site was evaluated at three different points in time, reflecting the risk prior to construction of the new geotechnical remedial measures (May 2006), after the construction of those measures (September 2006), and after implementation of the additional monitoring programs (October 2006). In general, the results of the geotechnical risk assessment are consistent with our field observations that TgP has made substantial progress in diminishing the overall risk. The reduction in risk in 2006 was achieved primarily through the construction of geotechnical stabilization measures and implementation of monitoring programs to decrease the likelihood of future failures. Furthermore, the results suggest that the geotechnical stabilization measures and monitoring programs have appropriately targeted sites that formerly had high to very high risk, which are located primarily in the selva sector. We expect that the continuous, ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process will identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected using the installed instrumentation (e.g., strain gauges and inclinometers). Some of these sites may even be ranked with a high to very high risk and will need to be mitigated quickly. Therefore, we recommended that TgP adopt a proactive approach of continually assessing geotechnical hazards along the ROW, such that sites possessing higher risk profiles that have not exhibited instability manifestations will be included in the risk matrix. In

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this regard, TgP has committed to implementing a RMP, recommended by Exponent, that will govern the use of all risk assessment methods and guide TgP’s actions, decision process, and manner of execution. At this time, Exponent believes that a successful implementation of the above, and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007, will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system.

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7

Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks

7.1

Description of Potential Risks and Controls

In any operating pipeline, pipe integrity–related risks are associated with pipe loading conditions, pipe material, weld quality, and the quality of protection the pipeline is afforded against environmental conditions. Pipe material and pipe manufacture–related risks have been discussed in prior sections and been deemed to be at a typical and acceptable level for pipelines. Risk mitigation during the construction of the pipeline relied foremost on hydrostatic testing and radiography of girth welds, which is in compliance with the requirements of the applicable codes. During operation, inline inspections and external pipe inspections are the most effective means of controlling long-term hazards to pipeline integrity, most commonly manifested as internal and external corrosion. As with the Camisea system, cathodic protection and the exterior HDPE coating are common methods of protecting the pipeline from external environmental attack. Inline inspection tools, particularly the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool, in conjunction with pipe excavation at areas identified as problematic, are common means of identifying internal metal loss and other potential anomalies. These inspections are typically conducted in compliance with API 1160 and federal regulations by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 195.452. In this regard, TgP has implemented an inline inspection program in compliance with these requirements. This section summarizes the results of these pipe inspections performed by TgP in 2006 on the NGL pipeline and discusses the key findings and future needs to mitigate potential residual risks. In the dynamic landscape of the Camisea selva sector, soil movement has been identified to be the most significant hazard to the system, because soil movement imposes a lateral loading upon the pipe. Lateral loading from external soil pressures can induce axial stresses in the pipe, in addition to the stresses induced by the internal pressure of the transported hydrocarbons. These axial stresses affect the girth welds in the pipe, by growing circumferential defects if they exist,

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MCI. the pipeline is less able to resist external soil loads. where soil movement was identified to be a significant contributor in three of the five spill incidents. axial loading due to internal pressure alone cannot account for the observed fast54 crack growth rates and final overload failure. Elimination of potential defects in the pipe or weld reduces the potential risk even further.53 In particular. SF36292. Identification of these sites and construction of effective geotechnical measures mitigates this risk most effectively. The results of Exponent’s analysis are consistent with the operational experience. Thus. This standard requires minimum yield strength of 70. Exponent’s analysis of the system’s ability to withstand lateral soil movement has shown that the as-designed NG pipeline has a significantly larger external load capacity and flaw tolerance than the NGL pipeline. We refer to fast crack growth in the context of geologic time scales and not dynamic fast fracture due to impact loading. Therefore. TgP’s outside consultant. Load capacity estimates for the NGL pipeline show that. these external soil loads should be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures. an increased residual risk due to subcritical crack propagation may exist at sites where geotechnical mitigation measures have not been constructed.June 8. These tests independently substantiated the adequacy of pipe strength. while sufficient for internal pressures. In addition to the material testing required by API 5L during pipe manufacturing. Significant progressive lateral soil loading is the likely force that propagated these cracks and induced the 53 54 The sixth spill incident is currently being investigated and is not included in this comparison.003 A0F0 0607 0806 74 . tested samples of pipe from the first five spill incidents.000 psi and a minimum ultimate strength of 82. 7. This basic residual strength advantage of the NG pipeline versus the NGL pipeline is approximately a factor of two in tension and a factor of six in bending. for the first and fifth spill incidents. 2007 and this could also significantly affect the integrity of a pipeline.2 Pipe Material and Damage Tolerance–Related Risks The tubular pipe material used for the system was required to conform to API 5L. such that the NG pipeline generally has a low risk of failure from external loads. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner walls than the NG pipeline per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME codes.000 psi for an X70 grade pipe.

SF36292. Furthermore. metal loss. providing guidance to the pipeline industry in maintaining the integrity of pipelines that transport hazardous liquids. The goal of the pipe inspections is to identify pipe wall anomalies. However. using the MFL inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool. However. because the pipe material is sufficiently tough to pass the hydrostatic test. ANSI B31G is a manual that is used and referenced in DOT 49 CFR 195.3 7. pipe gauge. API 1160 is a standard that is used to implement these rules.452. to determine the remaining strength of corroded pipes. Our analysis indicates that this crack was at the limit of detection for the hydrostatic test performed at this location.452. geologic hazards pose a risk to the NGL pipeline. DOT regulates inspections per 49 CFR 195. especially if circumferential cracks are deeper than 40% of the wall thickness.1 Inline Pipe Inspection Background TgP contracted Tuboscope Pipeline Services (TPS) in 2006 to perform an inline inspection of the entire NGL pipeline. Our review indicates that this set of 55 The hydrogen-induced crack that imitated the second spill incident was significantly deeper but relatively short. The MFL inspection tool has the capability to detect metal loss and other potential pipe wall anomalies.55 because soil movement can induce the growth of such cracks. repeated hydrostatic testing will not reduce this risk. These tools are inserted at a launch point at each pump station and record data from their sensors for later analysis. potentially leading to pipe failure. which lays out the classification and reporting of these conditions. 7. this soil loading is mostly load controlled and therefore is more detrimental to the NGL pipeline than the NG pipeline. 2007 overload failure of the NGL pipeline. since the NG pipeline has a larger diameter such that smaller stresses are induced by the same soil load.3.003 A0F0 0607 0806 75 . any potential defects that may have survived the hydrostatic test are unlikely to cause rupture. and dents.June 8. This failure evolution occurred with very few load cycles until the crack reached critical length. The geometric tool continuously measures the pipe’s geometry along its length. Under normal operating pressures.

Among the 30 locations. re-weld. In all cases. which includes excavation. visual inspection. The approach for each of these sites is to do a field investigation at each site.. The investigation of the remaining 18 anomalies is ongoing.452. 7. micro hardness measurement).2 Inline Pipe Inspection Results TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection.. 2 to girth welds and 1 to dent and metal loss. First. external magnetic particle inspection of girth weld. Beyond what is required by applicable norms (i. In this regard.. ultrasound wall thickness measurement. potential anomalies). and it was not necessary to replace the pipe or repair a girth weld. 2007 regulations and standards are being used by TgP to conduct their pipeline integrity review of the recently performed inline pipe inspection. 14 were related to metal loss. in terms of required follow-up action/investigation). Good correlation was found between the inline inspection results and the field verifications. patching. and the more sophisticated MFL inspection tool is used to identify other reportable wall thinning conditions encountered in the pipeline industry.g. a series of detailed non-destructive testing (i. implementation of any necessary remedial actions (e.3. to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195. etc. Then we discuss the MFL inspection tool’s ability to detect potential circumferential cracks and its impact on the NGL pipeline’s risk. 12 sites have been investigated and necessary repair actions completed. radiographic examination of girth weld.188 pipes) only identified 30 locations with reportable conditions per the requirement.). the existing pipe was in sufficient condition to reinforce. and based on the results. numerous sites have SF36292. TGP is also investigating additional locations where the internal inspection tool reported some indications (e. Our discussion of the results of the inline inspection is divided into two parts. the geometric inspection tool is typically used to identify dents..e. As of March 2007. as well as external excavations.003 A0F0 0607 0806 76 .g. measure of pipe diameter and axial pipe misalignment. By the end of March.452. 13 to dents. external ultrasound inspection of girth weld. we discuss the results of the inline inspection with regard to the requirements of 49 CFR 195.e.June 8. The inline inspection results of the entire NGL pipeline (48.

However.452.452. per DOT 49 CFR 195.3 Circumferential Crack Detection In an effort to quantify the MFL tool’s ability to detect circumferential cracks. Specifically. more than 95% of these were deviations in diameter of less than 6%. This inspection identified a total of 90 locations along the first 452 km of inspected NGL pipeline with deviations. TgP employed the geometric inspection tool to identify dents with a depth of more than 2%.3. currently. 2007 been verified in the field without having encountered any significant defect. the burst pressure of the pipeline is at all times larger than the maximum operating pressure).56 Our analysis indicates that a potential circumferential crack would need to be subjected to a significant external load to be detectable 56 The service provider of the currently used MFL inspection tool has determined that only circumferential cracks with a crack mouth opening of more than 0. In addition. Overall. SF36292. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. with a depth of 49%. For cracks with a smaller opening.1 mm can be detected with a probability of better than 90%. it also appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. The deepest metal loss was reported to have occurred in the selva sector. A verification of other sites is ongoing.. Therefore. Based on these findings.e. and nearly 80% of the detected damage is less than 10% deep. All other metal loss reported in the selva sector is less than 25% deep. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline (i. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that. Specifically. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program.June 8. the probability of detection decreases rapidly. TgP and its contractors conducted a research program to quantify the crack detection limit of the MFL tool. the data showed that the vast majority of metal loss occurrences had depths of less than 15% with respect to the pipe’s wall thickness. Exponent performed a pipeline integrity study to determine the MFL inspection tool’s utility in detecting circumferential cracks. TgP requested that TPS use a more stringent criterion of identifying any diametrical change larger than 2%. which is still less than the mitigation threshold of 80% as required per DOT 49 CFR 195. 7.003 A0F0 0607 0806 77 .

the NG pipeline’s strength advantage is even larger. the NG pipeline is deemed to be of SF36292. the NG pipeline with a nearly 60% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength that will surpass that of a perfectly good NGL pipeline. in pure axial loading. even though the technology appears to be readily available. only a 40% deep circumferential crack will typically have a residual strength greater than the NGL pipeline with no flaws. Under bending loads that are typically induced by external soil loads. the most effective means at this time to contain this potential risk is to identify sites with geologic and geotechnical instability and construct the geotechnical mitigation measures needed to eliminate any potential external soil loadings that could cause these circumferential cracks to grow.003 A0F0 0607 0806 78 . Despite the fact that the use of inline inspection tools to detect small circumferential cracks is currently not a common practice among pipeline operators due to the relatively low risk to pipeline integrity posed by circumferential cracks under normal operating loads. because the NGL pipeline only requires a smaller diameter and thus thinner wall than the NG pipeline. 2007 with a high degree of certainty using the currently employed MFL inspection tool. no pipeline inspection company is able to provide a commercially viable inspection tool that can detect potential circumferential cracks. In this regard. Unfortunately. but it was caused by a specific site condition. 7. Specifically. the loading condition that commonly results from external soil loads. the third failure where tension loads were larger was an exception to this loading assumption.4 Conclusions The NG pipeline is at least twice as strong as the NGL pipeline under a variety of loading conditions. Exponent expects that the most commonly encountered geologic and geotechnical hazards will induce bending moments that may be accompanied by tension loading. Our fracture mechanics study showed that the flaw tolerance of the NG pipeline is significantly better than that of the NGL pipeline. in bending. at present. per the hydraulic design considerations of the ASME code. TgP has also committed resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. Therefore. TgP has committed to evaluating potential options. based on this study. whereas.June 8. Clearly. This is especially true if the pipe is loaded in bending.

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significantly lower risk than the NGL pipeline. Geological and geotechnical hazards are the most significant hazards for the NGL pipeline, and are even more of a concern when circumferential cracks deeper than 40% preexist. Specific data from the fifth failure suggest that rapid crack growth due to soil movement is possible, and only a few cycles were required to propagate the crack to a critical length. TgP used the combined data from the MFL inspection and geometric inspection, as well as external excavations, to determine which conditions were reportable per DOT 49 CFR 195.452. This review only identified 30 reportable locations in the entire NGL pipeline per this requirement. These 30 locations are being investigated and repaired as needed. Overall, results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G has shown that, currently, no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline. However, it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Therefore, this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term, and we recommend that this be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program. The in-line inspections and external excavations performed at many sites have shown that the MFL inspection tool is an excellent tool to detect internal and external metal loss in this system. However, its ability to identify circumferential cracks is dependent on external loading conditions, which reduces the probability of detecting potential circumferential cracks within an actionable time frame. In addition, hydrostatic testing will also not likely identify potential circumferential cracks, because identifiable critical crack sizes need to be at least 60% deep and very long, given that the pipe material has such good toughness properties. We understand that TgP has committed specific resources in 2007 to further assess the ability to detect potential circumferential cracks. A root-cause analysis of the first and fifth spill incidents and the origin and nucleation of the potential circumferential cracks, to be performed by TgP in 2007, will assist in assessing the implications of this concern related to pipeline integrity. Overall, in 2006, TgP significantly reduced pipe integrity–related risks and is currently engaged in additional efforts to further reduce the risk profile.

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8

Seismic-Related Risks

8.1

Tectonic Overview

Peru represents one of the most seismically active regions in the world. This distinction is the consequence of its location along a segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt where the continental block of South America is drifting westward, overriding and forcing down the denser Pacific Ocean (Nazca) plate along a major offshore fault zone known as a subduction zone. This deformation of the earth’s crust causes elastic strain energy57 to accumulate until a breaking point is reached—an earthquake. At least nine large-magnitude earthquakes58 have been recorded in or near Peru during the last 60 years. The intensity of ground shaking and significant effects of a particular earthquake depend largely on the magnitude, faulting mechanism, distance to the origin of rupture, and local site and subsoil conditions. The Nazca and South American plates are “slipping” at a rate of 78 to 84 mm per year.59 By comparison, the famous San Andreas fault between the Pacific and North American plates is slipping at a rate of approximately 50 mm per year. Because of the position and orientation of the subduction zone, earthquakes in Peru generally occur at increasingly greater depths toward the east, as illustrated in Figure 27. Earthquakes affecting Peru have three distinct mechanisms:60 • Shallow, offshore inter-slab thrust events wherein failure occurs at the boundary of the subducting Nazca and overriding South American plates.

57

58 59

60

Elastic strain energy is potential energy stored in a volume of the earth’s crust that has been deformed but not yet ruptured. A large-magnitude earthquake is defined as having a magnitude of 7 or greater. DeMets, C., Gordon, R.G., Stein, S. and Argus, D.F. (1990). “Current plate motions,” Geophysical Journal International, 101, pp. 425-478. Yeats, R.S., Sieh, K. and Allen, C.R. (1997). “The Geology of Earthquakes,” Oxford University Press, New York.

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Shallow continental in-slab events where some of the relative motion of the Nazca and South American plates is accompanied by deformation within the overriding South American plate.

Finally, deep onshore in-slab events caused by internal deformation of the subducting Nazca slab at depths of 40 to 700 km.

As shown in Figure 28, the Peru-Chile segment of the circum-Pacific-seismic belt has experienced two great61 earthquake events in historical time. Recent notable earthquakes (e.g., the 2001 southern Peru event) have significantly reduced the elastic strain energy along a 300-km-long segment of the circum-Pacific seismic belt. However, the approximately 700-kmlong plate interface between Chala and Limahas has been quiescent since the great earthquakes of 1868 and 1877, and thus has been accumulating elastic strain energy since the late 19th century.62 Consequently, elastic strain energy with the potential to produce large-magnitude earthquakes in the upcoming decades exists along the part of the plate boundary closest to the Camisea ROW.

Figure 27.

Cross-sectional view of the Peru-Chile Trench (after Worthey, Washington State University website).

61 62

A “great” earthquake has an approximate Richter magnitude of at least 8.0. Dewey, Silva, and Tavera (2003). “Seismicity and Tectonics” in Southern Peru Earthquake 23 June 2001 Reconnaissance Report, EERI Supplement A to Volume 19.

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in turn. 8.June 8. lead to pipeline damage. Excessive movement associated with ground failure can. West coast of Peru showing source regions of great events of 1868 and 1877 and epicenters of notable 20th century earthquakes (after Dewey. SF36292. Permanent ground deformation: Strong ground shaking during earthquakes can induce permanent ground deformations (PGD) in regions where underlying soil materials or bedrock are susceptible to ground failure mechanisms. and Tavera 2003).003 A0F0 0607 0806 82 . Silva. and this mechanism is considered an indirect consequence of earthquake ground shaking.2 Seismic Hazards to Buried Pipelines Incidents of seismically induced pipeline damage are typically characterized as arising from one of two earthquake effects: 1. 2007 Figure 28.

67 lateral spread. The mechanism of lateral spread requires the occurrence of soil liquefaction.70 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 Transient strain is short-term deformation.g. Reston. it follows that wave propagation tends to affect weaker pipeline components. Therefore.” ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. Landsliding occurs during earthquakes when inertial forces introduced during strong shaking cause shear stresses to exceed the shear strength of the slope materials. Seismic compression refers to the settlement of unsaturated soils due to strong earthquake shaking. Wave propagation: Seismic waves traveling through the earth (i. toward an open face such as a stream channel. When these transient strains become sufficiently large. Lateral movement of ground. Wave propagation damage can occur due to the propagation of body waves (i.e. for similar levels of earthquake motion. O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004). Ground failure mechanisms capable of inducing PGD damage to pipelines include surface faulting. liquefiable soils. faults. or poorly compacted fills).. Liquefaction refers to a phenomenon wherein saturated soils temporarily lose their strength and behave like a viscous fluid. Vol. “Seismic damage to segmented buried pipe. resulting in breaks throughout the entire portion or large portions of the pipeline system within the PGD zone.June 8.. SF36292.e. Vol. 2.” Earthquake Spectra.e. cohesionless soils subjected to rapid loadings (i. Wave propagation–induced damage can be thought of as a direct consequence of earthquake ground shaking. Rayleigh or Love).. This phenomenon generally occurs in loose.68 and seismic compression. earthquakes). compression or shear) or surface waves (e. VA. 1167-1183. PGDinduced damage is typically confined to a local geographic area susceptible to ground failure (e. as opposed to body waves.69 Wave propagation typically induces smaller strains in the pipe than PGD but covers a much longer extent of the pipeline. typically with little to no perceptible slope.g. O’Rourke (1998).. 75..65 landslides. ground shaking) induce transient strains63 in buried pipelines and the surrounding soil. damage to buried pipelines may result. 2007 2.66 slope instability liquefaction. EERI. unstable slopes. Studies of the performance of pipelines during past earthquakes clearly indicate that the most serious pipeline damage during earthquakes is caused by PGD. Surface faulting is the rupture and displacement of the ground where the earthquake fault intersects the ground surface. “An overview of geotechnical and lifeline earthquake engineering. 1392-1426. which cause the development of excess pore-water pressures. 20(4).003 A0F0 0607 0806 83 .64 However. Recent studies have shown that pipes are typically more susceptible to wave propagation damage when subjected to surface waves. Earthquakes generate different types of seismic waves.

0.5g represents half the acceleration of gravity.3 Seismic Risk Evaluation 8. with estimated peak ground accelerations of 0. For a subduction-zone earthquake..0g. Specifically. pressure control stations. and (ii) a “design” event based on a probabilistic assessment assuming an event with a 475-year recurrence interval. They also identified the potential for continental seismic activity occurring along the Razuwilcas fault system near Ayacucho in the sierra sector. (Vector)71 characterized the regional seismic demand72 for each of the three sectors (selva.003 A0F0 0607 0806 84 .A.3. (2001). there are substantial differences in the ground motion characteristics between the various faulting mechanisms (i. Ground acceleration is measured as a percent of the acceleration of gravity.A. Therefore. Several studies have significantly advanced the scientific understanding of ground motions generated by subductionzone earthquakes. “Estudio de Peligro Sismico Traza de los Ductors de Gas Y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. Vector evaluated the earthquake loading for two different scenario earthquake events: (i) an “extreme” event based on a deterministic assessment corresponding to the greatest earthquake that a seismogenic zone can produce under well-defined tectonic conditions. Consequently.C.C.1 Characterization of Seismic Demand Vector Peru S. sierra.7g73 for the extreme event and 0.” Seismic demand is the earthquake loading imposed on the system as a result of strong ground shaking. which is 1. and costa) and provided more specific evaluations of ground motions for the pump stations. SF36292. Exponent reviewed the Vector study and concluded that engineering models used to evaluate the seismic demand may under-predict the actual ground-shaking hazard.5g for the design event. inter-slab versus in-slab events). These findings may have important implications as to which earthquake scenarios may affect the hazard along various segments of the Camisea ROW. 2007 8. Vector concluded that the costa sector would experience the strongest shaking.June 8. additional studies may be warranted to re-evaluate the seismic demand. and is typically expressed in acceleration and/or velocity. and pressure reducing stations. 71 72 73 Vector Peru S.e.

Based on our understanding of the regional geology and descriptions of ground failures during the 2001 Southern Peru Earthquake.. Based on our review of documents provided to Exponent. landsliding.e.3. referred to as the Los Libertadores fault. ABSC also reviewed aerial photographs to identify regions susceptible to liquefaction. rapid uplift and erosion) creates poorly sorted gravels. APA Consulting was subsequently subcontracted by ABSC to evaluate the pipe performance for such fault displacements and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes are expected to withstand the design displacements at the Los Libertadores fault.003 A0F0 0607 0806 85 . and silts with high fines and clay content. sand dunes). and seismic compression) should be evaluated on a site-specific basis outside limited areas that have been improved with geotechnical stabilization measures. “Seismic hazard investigations of active faults for the Camisea Pipeline. For the sierra and selva sectors.. They also concluded that large sections of the costa sector are covered by windblown deposits (e.June 8. lateral spread.52 m. characterizing potential fault displacements. ABSC identified only one active fault crossing.. because the depositional environment in the Andes (i. which could mask any evidence of past liquefaction episodes. sands. with expected mean horizontal displacements of 0. slope instability. 2007 8. seismically induced landslides pose a substantial risk to the pipeline. Seismically induced slope instability poses a 74 ABS Consulting (2002). it appears that other modes of PGD (i.e.g. The Los Libertadores fault was characterized as a predominately left-lateral strike-slip fault. and did not observe surface evidence of any past liquefaction episodes. Their investigation consisted of identifying active faults that cross the pipelines. Peru. and evaluating the pipeline’s capacity for such displacements. and mountainous areas exhibiting recent or ancient deep-seated landslides. However. ABSC postulated that soil deposits are less susceptible to liquefaction. particularly for slopes in the selva and sierra sectors that are marginally stable under non-seismic conditions. we conclude that PGD hazards arising from fault rupture pose a low risk to the pipeline.” SF36292.2 Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) Hazards ABS Consulting74 (ABSC) was retained by Techint to investigate surface fault rupture hazards posed by active faults along the system. liquefaction. Empirical correlations were used to develop design displacements for the fault. at the intended alignment.

Each pipeline model encompassed the respective surface facility and several hundred meters of buried pipeline upstream and downstream of the facility. and hence does not capture the wave-propagation effect. They performed the analysis for a straight section of buried pipe using the earthquake loadings for the 475-year return period design event developed by Vector. Techint evaluated the effects of ground shaking on 12 surface facilities using CAESAR II. or with major curves or bends.” SF36292. 8. Furthermore. Based on Exponent’s review of wave propagation studies. an analysis should be performed to evaluate the performance of above-ground pipe sections with rigid 75 ABS Consulting (2002). the directional dependency of the seismic loading should be investigated in more detail. we conclude that straight sections of buried pipe are unlikely to be damaged by seismic wave passage during a major earthquake. and concluded that both the NG and NGL pipes can adequately resist the passage of seismic waves during the design earthquake. ABSC evaluated the strain levels associated with these ground motions using conservative soil properties. 2007 substantial risk in the costa sector. “Seismic Verification of Camisea Pipelines.June 8. Based on the results of the seismic stress analysis using earthquake loadings per Vector’s recommendations. Consequently.3. sections of the pipeline near river deposits and in low coastal regions may be susceptible to liquefaction and lateral spread. The seismic stress analysis performed by Techint assumed that all supports move in unison with the defined ground motion.3 Wave Propagation Hazards ABSC75 evaluated the potential for wave propagation damage to occur along the system. Techint found that the surface facilities were code compliant per ASME B31. segments of above-ground pipe with rigid connections to surface facilities. a numerical pipe stress analysis software program.003 A0F0 0607 0806 86 . may be vulnerable to wave propagation damage. However.4. However.

to determine whether these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions with up-to-date scientific information. Exponent currently understands that TgP is engaged in a review of seismic risks. our review suggests that the potential for permanent ground displacements should be evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites to reduce the uncertainty in the risk.4 Conclusions The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. However. 76 Impedance contrast provides a measure of the stiffness of one material relative to another. which are most susceptible to wave propagation damage due to the high impedance76 contrast. 2007 connections. The seismic hazards arising from fault rupture and wave propagation along straight sections of the buried pipeline are considered to pose a low risk to the pipeline. Additionally. Consequently. the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be evaluated further. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design.June 8. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. as part of their pipeline integrity management plan.003 A0F0 0607 0806 87 . 8. SF36292.

all stream crossings should have burial depths designed and constructed according to site-specific conditions. and ephemeral (flowing only after rainfall) can become exposed or undermined as a result of scour.003 A0F0 0607 0806 88 . pipelines can fail or be damaged due to debris impact or from the spanned weight of the pipe. (2) general scour. Once a pipeline is exposed or undermined. Once exposed or undermined.1 River Crossings and Scour Scour is defined as the erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water. Erosion of the streambed is considered to have three principal components: (1) long-term scour. characteristics of the flood. it can potentially become a source of further erosion as water accelerates around the pipe. Local scour is the removal of material due to acceleration of flow around submerged obstructions. Long-term scour refers to aggradation and degradation of the streambed due to natural or anthropogenic causes. 2007 9 Scour-Related Risks 9. and (3) local scour. Factors that affect lateral stream migration are the geomorphology of the stream. SF36292. To prevent breakage and subsequent accidental contamination of runoff during the lifetime of the pipeline. Lateral migration of a streambed can occur gradually over decadal time periods or episodically during very large flood events.June 8. location of the pipe crossing. and characteristics of the bed and bank materials. Pipelines buried in streams that are perennial (year-round). General scour is the lowering of a streambed due to the passing of a flood. intermittent (flowing reaches interspersed with dry reaches). naturally occurring lateral migration of the mainstream channel within its flood plain may affect the stability of buried crossings. In addition to the types of scour mentioned above.

79 Golder Associates (2002). the FHWA documents are guidance documents and. 2007 9.3 and 479.” 81 Golder Associates (2003). Techint then used Golder’s studies and design recommendations to construct each river crossing.” 78 GMI S.June 8. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Selva y Sierra Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea. HEC-20 provides guidance on the evaluation of the long-term stability and geomorphology of the stream. “Cruce De Ríos Sectores Costa. This methodology outlined in FHWA HEC-18. Techint.” 80 Golder Associates (2002). 78 This hydrologic information was used by Golder to aid in their calculations of the burial depth of the NG and NGL pipeline at each river crossing. 80. which is taken from the Federal Highway Administration Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. they are widely used for various types of scour studies internationally. and -23 considers the factors likely to play a role in the scour behavior during the lifetime of a pipeline. Although these documents were developed in the United States to estimate bridge scour depths. to our knowledge. -20.” SF36292. 18 (FHWA HEC-18).2 Risks at Buried River Crossings A rigorous and robust scour analysis of buried river crossings is outlined in Figure 29. “Cruce De Ríos Sector Costa Poliducto de Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.” – date unknown. Exponent’s review indicates that specialist firms were retained to support the general contractor.77.003 A0F0 0607 0806 89 . and HEC-23 provides guidance on the design and construction of scour countermeasures. Techint retained Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers to complete hydrology and hydraulic studies on separate areas of the pipeline ROW. “Camisea Project Peru Rio Pisco Preliminary Report on Instream Allignments at Prog 477. Furthermore. Exponent reviewed documentation and interviewed the parties involved in the design of the 62 identified river crossings along the ROW. in determining the pipelines’ design burial depth at each river crossing. do not constitute design standards required by Peruvian law. Sierra Y Selva Poliducto De Gas y Condensados Proyecto Camisea.A. FHWA HEC-18. aspects of the FHWA approach were utilized in the original design of the Camisea system.79. Ingenieros Consultores. “Estudio Hidrologico General Gasoducto Camisea. However. which provides guidance on the hydrologic and hydraulic aspects of a scour analysis. 81 77 Hydroconsult (2003). is symbiotic with FHWA HEC-20 and -23.

including: • Hydroconsult and GMI Consulting Engineers completed hydrology and hydraulic studies for the river crossings. As seen in Figure 30. 2007 Figure 29. Flow chart for conducting scour analysis (from FHWA HEC-18).003 A0F0 0607 0806 90 .June 8.5% chance of occurrence SF36292. The main objective of these studies was to quantify the magnitude of the floods in the rivers crossed by the pipeline. the design team incorporated the following elements of the FHWA methodology in their recommended burial depth. The design return period was 200 years (0. Exponent’s review of the scour studies indicates that a portion of the guidance in the FHWA publications was used by Techint to establish the design burial depth.

the data were incomplete or had been recorded only for short periods of time. stabilization of embankment with gabion walls. • The river crossing locations were surveyed. The details of the other evaluated methodologies were not given in the Scour Analysis Summary Reports published by Golder in 2002 and 2003. and energy dissipators. were designed and built in selected locations. • Scour countermeasures. Army Corps of Engineers’ HEC-4 model. SF36292. The clear-water contraction scour equation (FHWA HEC-18 equation 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 91 . If the calculated scour depth for unconsolidated alluvium was less than 2 meters. 2007 during any year) for most crossings and was 500 years (0. and site-specific conditions were documented during field investigations. Incomplete or short records were supplemented using the U. it was increased to 2 meters at each crossing. it was increased to 1 meter. This provides an additional safety factor above the adopted equations. the system is reinforced with a concrete cover. • Data from 19 rain gauges and 5 stream gauges were relied upon for the GMI hydrologic study.2% chance of occurrence during any year) for crossings deemed critical. such as reinforcement of the riverbed.4) was deemed the most conservative and was used for many of the crossings. providing a certain amount of protection against abrasion and impact from small boulders.S. Different methodologies for calculating the potential scour depth were evaluated. • If the calculated scour depth for rock material was less than 1 meter. • Data from the hydrology and hydraulic study and the field investigations were used to calculate the potential scour depth at each river crossing. a stochastic stream flow generation program. • At each river crossing. but in some cases.June 8.

However.003 A0F0 0607 0806 92 . SF36292. Peru. 2007. result in a reasonable overall design basis for pipeline burial depth. and our review of the design process shown in Figure 30 and the documentation provided to us. Lima. All of the above-listed factors. our general practice and experience in scour prediction. indicate that certain phenomena could play an important role in the prediction of scour risk for the Camisea system. These include: • • • • Stream classification and evaluation of long-term stream stability Evaluation of stream bank migration Identification of possible headcutting or knickpoint migration Evaluation of the potential effects of debris flows. 2007 Figure 30.June 8. Methodology utilized by Golder Associates for the scour analysis of the Camisea Pipeline (taken from “EVALUACIÓN DE CRUCES Y QUEBRADAS PROYECTO CAMISEA ‘RIVER CROSSING’” – presentation by Golder Associates January 24 and 25. when combined.

SF36292. The more comprehensive identification of potential scour risks in 2007 will be helpful to better identify potential hazards and reduce the current uncertainty. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data and the use of the clear-water contraction scour equation. Given the uncertainty and recognizing that the objective of all parties involved is to minimize risk. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. which are widely used in the design of scour protection for key infrastructure.003 A0F0 0607 0806 93 . To mitigate this potential residual risk. 2007 Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events.June 8. TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. TgP fortified several river crossings and smaller streams to mitigate scour risk. The primary sources of uncertainty arise from sparse hydrologic data and the additional phenomena mentioned above. and -23. 9. During our field inspections in 2006. -20. These methodologies are incorporated into the design procedure set forth in FHWA HEC-18. and to design and construct additional mitigation measures where necessary. These measures would help to mitigate potential risks from large-scale flood events. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. TgP has committed resources in 2007 to investigate the risk of scour damage at each river crossing. Our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is protected from scour over the long term and during extreme flood events.3 Conclusions The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound.

(3) the issued welder certificates and qualifications of the inspectors were in compliance with API 1104. the pipe wall thickness is sufficient to contain the internal pressures of the transported hydrocarbon products along the entire length of the pipeline. and that TgP has taken actions in 2006 to significantly reduce these risks to the system.000 individual pipe segments were specifically built for this system and consistent with API 5L requirements. Furthermore. 10. (5) hydrostatic testing of the system was in compliance with the required ASME SF36292.June 8. First. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. 10.1 Pipeline Design–Related Risks Our review indicates that the system was designed to comply with the engineering code requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)82. Overall. (4) radiography of all girth welds was performed per API 1104. 2007 10 Summary and Conclusions Exponent was retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB.2 Pipeline Construction–Related Risks Overall. As these efforts identify risks to the integrity of the pipeline. risk management actions above and beyond those underway and completed to date may be necessary. the review showed that (1) the more than 100. Second. TgP continues to address pipeline integrity and risk issues on an ongoing basis. the system was designed such that external soil loads would be mitigated by geotechnical stabilization measures to be constructed at sites deemed to pose a geotechnical or geological hazard. related to the Camisea Transportation System. (2) all pipe segments were subsequently coated with an outer high-density polyethylene (HDPE) layer to protect the exterior from the environment. such that hydraulic risks of the design are minimal and consistent with other pipelines.003 A0F0 0607 0806 94 .

complex. Based on Exponent’s review. This program allows for the early detection and subsequent correction of potential problem areas. and ASME B31. and the construction of additional geotechnical mitigation measures in 2007. ongoing implementation of the risk matrix process and monitoring program may identify additional sites that are not included in the current risk matrix as new manifestations of ground movement are observed or detected. Exponent believes that the successful implementation of the above. We expect that the continuous.3 Geotechnical and Geology-Related Risks The geotechnical and geologic conditions along the pipe alignment are diverse. Geotechnical instability caused or substantially contributed to two of the five spill incidents (#1 and #5). 2007 codes and performed along the entire length of both pipelines. and sensitive. we conclude that geotechnical and geologic conditions posed the most significant risk to the integrity and reliable operation of the system. Exponent also reviewed a monitoring program initiated by TgP and COGA to help reduce the risk of future failure resulting from external geotechnical forces. and engineering experience.8 [Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems] is the applicable code for the larger NG pipeline. will further reduce the geotechnical-related risks to the pipeline system. observations. Ultimately. 10. and (6) construction of the pipeline used methods that employed standard engineering procedures. 82 ASME B31. we observed evidence that some geotechnical stabilization measures implemented during or immediately following construction proved to be insufficient to adequately mitigate external soil pressures acting on portions of the NGL pipeline. However. The spill incidents and observed performance of the system as of early 2006 caused TgP to set into motion an aggressive geotechnical remediation program that began in earnest in April 2006. the severity and challenges of the dynamic terrain led to the construction of additional robust geotechnical remedial measures at more than 100 sites in 2006. SF36292. dynamic.4 [Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids] is the applicable Code for the NGL pipeline. and geologic instability caused one of the five spill incidents (#3). During our inspections in 2006.June 8.003 A0F0 0607 0806 95 .

currently. 2007 10. Therefore.June 8.4 Pipeline Integrity–Related Risks Several approaches have been adopted by TgP to reduce pipeline integrity-related risks. and the entire pipeline was hydrostatically tested. strong ground shaking generated by large earthquakes poses a substantial risk of damaging the pipeline and disrupting operations. It is our understanding that TgP is currently engaged in a review of seismic risks. and TgP’s ongoing and prior geotechnical construction program reduces the likelihood of soil movement.5 Seismic-Related Risks The Camisea system lies within regions that are prone to very large and frequent earthquakes. all the welds were x-rayed. However. First. and (3) the effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends should be re-evaluated further. Removal of the loading is a good way to further mitigate the risk. it appears that there is a relatively elevated frequency of metal loss occurrences within the first 50 km of the NGL pipeline. Overall. no severe external and internal corrosion damage exists along the NGL pipeline.452. this portion of the NGL pipeline may be subject to this potential risk over the long term. TgP performed an inline inspection of the NGL pipeline in 2006 using the Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) inspection tool and a geometric inline inspection tool.003 A0F0 0607 0806 96 . as part of their pipeline integrity management plan. Although seismic hazard studies were performed as part of the system design. reducing the potential number of weld-related and pipeline material defects. any growth of such defects that would lead to the rupture of the pipe requires the presence of external loading. Consequently. TgP has reported that the inspection of the NGL pipeline identified 30 reportable defects per requirements of DOT 49 CFR 195. and we recommend that this should be evaluated as part of TgP’s ongoing pipeline integrity program (see Section 11). our review suggests that (1) the potential for permanent ground displacements should be re-evaluated more comprehensively at the most susceptible sites. (2) seismic risk management would benefit from an update of the design ground motions. during construction. to determine whether SF36292. results of the MFL inspection tool and evaluation of metal loss per ASME B31G have shown that. TgP is currently excavating these sites to perform a more detailed evaluation and initiate the appropriate repair measures if required. Second. 10.

Based on available information obtained during Exponent’s investigation and the proposed actions. 2007 these potential seismic risks are acceptable for this system or whether mitigation measures should be considered. If and when ongoing pipeline integrity management efforts identify additional issues. future information and risks need to be continually and properly evaluated. and thus. However.003 A0F0 0607 0806 97 .June 8. our review of the overall scour design concludes that there is some uncertainty as to whether each stream crossing is fully protected from scour over the long term during extreme flood events. such as the construction of additional fortifications and flow control measures. To mitigate this potential residual risk. Exponent also notes that pipeline integrity management is a continuous process. SF36292. we recommended and TgP has committed to study all river crossings in 2007. risk management actions above and beyond those currently being taken may be required. to identify which crossings may require further risk mitigation measures. it appears to Exponent at this time that TgP is performing adequate pipeline integrity management actions. However.7 Summary TgP has agreed with the IDB to implement the recommendations listed in Section 11. which includes review of these actions and additional site visits in 2007. and that these actions have significantly reduced the risk to the system. 10. and Exponent has been retained to provide continued technical assistance to the IDB on this matter.6 Scour-Related Risks The design team’s approach of utilizing their local knowledge and site-specific investigations in their scour analysis appears to be sound. primarily due to the limitations of the available hydrologic data. 10.

which TgP has committed to implement. with mechanical pipe integrity. Exponent has recently made several recommendations to further reduce the risk. Overall. TgP has implemented various actions to help reduce these risks. These recommendations. seismic events. performance of rigorous site-specific stability analysis. from which TgP and the IDB have developed a technical action plan for 2007. our investigation indicates that the primary risks to the pipeline are geological and geotechnical. Exponent recommends that TgP develop a comprehensive risk management plan (RMP) that establishes a framework for pipeline integrity risk management. and will identify means and responsibilities for execution of such remedial measures. 2007 11 Recommendations Exponent performed a pipeline integrity analysis of the pipeline components of the Camisea Transportation System. and installation of monitoring equipment at specific sites. 11.1 Geotechnical and Geologic The following are geotechnical and geological recommendations that apply to the pipeline alignment: 1. SF36292. are described in the following sections. such as the excavation of specific sites to verify data from the inline MFL inspection.June 8. the plan should clearly define the framework and approach for making management decisions in terms of what geotechnical remedial measures should be implemented. including various interim recommendations made by Exponent during our investigation. 2. construction of additional geotechnical stabilization measures in 2006. At a minimum. and river scouring as secondary risks. based on the results and conclusions of this investigation.003 A0F0 0607 0806 98 . TgP should continue to apply the risk assessment method as described herein in a proactive manner to other sections of the pipeline.

6. 7. Exponent recommends that the project purchase a small drilling and sampling rig that is portable using helicopters. At most of the locations.June 8. should the data indicate that stabilization is either necessary or desirable. Prior to our site inspections. Exponent recommends that attention and care be given to proper soil conditioning and compaction of backfill behind and in front of retaining walls and other remedial structures. The strain gauge program should provide the type of data that will allow TgP to evaluate movement in the pipelines and should allow a preemptive remedial program to be implemented at a specific location. We understand that some equipment has been purchased since then and is being used at the COGA office at Kiteni. TgP installed strain gauges on the pipelines at seven locations. TgP should continue the implementation of the ROW inspection program as described in Section 6. 5.003 A0F0 0607 0806 99 . piezometers can be constructed by hand by driving 2.5-cm-diameter perforated metal pipe into the ground using SF36292. 2007 3. Exponent recommended some basic geotechnical testing equipment to perform index property testing of soil samples taken from the borings made on the project. We recommend that the results and findings from this analysis be transmitted from engineers at Lurin to the COGA field personnel on a regular and frequent basis. Exponent recommends that the following geotechnical technologies be employed at specific sites as appropriate: 8. 4. Piezometers to monitor water levels at nearly all sites of geotechnical stabilization. The reduction of potential ground cracks will simplify the geotechnical investigation at these locations. During the past site inspections. In addition to the above general recommendations. Proper compaction will reduce forces acting on the walls and reduce potential ground cracks that could form in poorly compacted fill behind walls.

Nature and amount of the occurrence of surface water flows. b. c. Following completion of this work. especially noting new occurrences. 9. and interpret results. as discussed with TgP. Pipe should be relatively heavy (schedule 80) pipe with threaded couplings. It is our understanding that TgP has performed this geotechnical study.June 8. and other such observations. as discussed with TgP. 10. Detailed geotechnical investigations. analyze. increases or decreases in the rate of flow. 11. and qualified personnel to install. as necessary. and to perform conventional stability analyses of existing slopes at the site. to be performed at PS #2 as soon as possible. SF36292. 2007 simple hand drive hammers. to evaluate soil strength and groundwater levels. Examples of observations and measurements are as follows: a. Installation of these will require the use of portable drilling equipment. and construction of remedial measures is currently underway. Specific observations and physical measurements to be made at individual sites. monitor. Alignment of concrete-lined surface water channels and soil-cement bag current breakers and lined channels. Nature and size of ground cracking or other indications of displacement in the slopes.003 A0F0 0607 0806 100 . Slope inclinometers to monitor subsurface movements in soil and rock. This work will require the use of the portable drilling and sampling equipment. This may involve placement of simple staking to assist in making precise quantitative measurements of movement. including soil sampling in borings and test pits. Exponent recommends that a detailed geotechnical analysis be performed to identify subsurface conditions and construct cross sections for this site. presence of discoloration.

if necessary. e.003 A0F0 0607 0806 101 . the seismic risk management plan and perform any required upgrades. 11. and fifth spill incidents. TgP will investigate the feasibility of identifying circumferential cracks along the system and will continue with its external excavation program to make further advances in the interpretation of the recently performed MFL inline inspection. SF36292. TgP should implement. or shifting of rock protection on the floors of streambeds. appropriate remedial measures. Later. and possible floods of relatively extreme magnitude. specifically related to the potential for permanent ground displacements.. soil movement). TgP has committed to perform a root-cause analysis of the first. if necessary. and effects of wave propagation on the pipeline at rigid connections and major curves and bends. retreat of stream banks. Alignment of the gabion walls at each location. 11. This information shall be used to update. 11.3 Scour TgP should evaluate the scour potential and existing countermeasures at each river crossing and should perform a scour risk analysis that classifies the scour risk at each river crossing. design ground motions. lateral shifting of the stream banks. fourth. such as long-term degradation.e.June 8. including an experimental evaluation of the nucleation of circumferential cracks at pipe girth welds that are loaded externally (i. Formation of erosion gullies.4 Pipe To reduce pipe integrity–related risks. damage to check dams.2 Seismic TgP should perform a complete and comprehensive upgrade to the seismic hazard assessment for the system. Based on the analysis. 2007 d. This study shall consider factors that are very likely to play a part in some of the stream crossings where more complex processes are active.

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