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Dianne Rosales

Brinas vs. People of the Philippines

Mallari vs. Court of Appeals

Sea-Land Service vs. IAC

H.E. Heacock Co. vs. Macondray & Co.

Citadel Lines vs. Court of Appeals

Fabre vs. Court of Appeals

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Ms. Dianne Rosales

Brinas vs. People of the Philippines

On or about January 6, 1957, in the Municipality of Tiaong, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the said accused Victor
Milan, Clemente Briñas and Hermogenes Buencamino, being then persons in charge
of passenger Train No. 522-6 of the Manila Railroad Company, then running from
Tagkawayan to San Pablo City, as engine driver, conductor and assistant conductor,
respectively, wilfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent,
careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to existing laws, regulations
and ordinances, that although there were passengers on board the passenger
coach, they failed to provide lamps or lights therein, and failed to take the
necessary precautions for the safety of passengers and to prevent accident to
persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and
imprudence, that when said passenger Train No. 522-6 was passing the railroad
tracks in the Municipality of Tiaong, Quezon, two of its passengers, Martina Bool, an
old woman, and Emelita Gesmundo, a child about three years of age, fell from the
passenger coach of the said train, as a result of which, they were over run, causing
their instantaneous death. "

Whether or not there is negligence on the part of the conductor?

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like
trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the
conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common
experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually
stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes
to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the
train resumes its run before they are able to disembark, there is no way to stop it as
a bus may be stopped. It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the
next flag stop when said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. As the respondent
Court of Appeals correctly observed, "the appellant's announcement was premature
and erroneous.
That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact that
immediately after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to full speed.
Petitioner-appellant failed to show any reason why the train suddenly resumed its
regular speed. The announcement was made while the train was still in Barrio
Lagalag. The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and
erroneous announcement of petitioner' appelant Briñas. This announcement
prompted the victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said
announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats
when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature

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Ms. Dianne Rosales
and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims
is direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.

Mallari vs. Court of Appeals

On 14 October 1987, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, the passenger jeepney
driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari
Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin along the National Highway
in Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Petitioner Mallari Jr. testified that he
went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the
right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of respondent BULLETIN
coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The sketch
of the accident showed that the collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera
while negotiating a curve in the highway. The points of collision were the and the
left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van
of BULLETIN. The tworight wheels of the delivery van were on the right shoulder of
the road and pieces of debris from the accident were found scattered along the
shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger
jeepney. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side
resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually
died due to the gravity of his injuries. On 16 December 1987 Claudia G. Reyes, the
widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City against Alfredo Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also
against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance
Company. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of
Israel Reyes was caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers of the
passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van. The complaint also prayed
that the defendants be ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff P1,006,777.40
in compensatory damages, P40,000.00 for hospital and medical expenses,
P18,270.00 for burial expenses plus such amounts as may be fixed by the trial court
for exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Whether or not the driver observed extraordinary diligence?

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding
against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger

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Ms. Dianne Rosales
jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in an action based
on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment
of damages sought by the passenger. Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for
all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death
or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence.
Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its
employees. Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by
Mallari Sr. assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is
right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.
Sea-Land Service vs. IAC

Sea-Land received from Starborne Trading Company a shipment consigned to Sen
Hiap Hing. The shipper not having declared the value of the shipment was indicated
in the bill of lading. The shipment was discharged in Manila, and while awaiting
transshipment to Cebu the cargo was stolen and never recovered. The trial court
sentenced Sea-Land to pay Cue P186,048 representing the Philippine currency
value of the lost cargo, P55,814 for unrealized profit and P25,00 for attorney’s fees.
The CA affirmed the trial court.

Whether or not it is just and fair that Sea-Land's dollar obligation be convertible at
the same

The private respondent admits that as early as on April 22, 1981, Sea-Land had
offered to settle his claim for US$4,000.00, the limit of said carrier's liability for loss
of the shipment under the bill of lading. This Court having reached the conclusion
that said sum is all that is justly due said respondent, it does not appear just or
equitable that Sea-Land, which offered that amount in good faith as early as six
years ago, should, by being made to pay at the current conversion rate of the dollar
to the peso, bear for its own account all of the increase in said rate since the time of
the offer of settlement. The decision of the Regional Trial Court awarding the private
respondent P186,048.00 as the peso value of the lost shipment is clearly based on a
conversion rate of P8.00 to US$1.00, said respondent having claimed a dollar value
of $23,256.00 for said shipment. All circumstances considered, it is just and fair that

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Ms. Dianne Rosales
Sea-Land's dollar obligation be convertible at the same rate. The stipulation in the
questioned bill of lading limiting Sea-Land's liability for loss of or damage to the
shipment covered by said bill to US$500.00 per package is held valid and binding on
private respondent. There being no question of the fact that said shipment
consisted of eight cartons or packages, for the loss of which Sea-Land is therefore
liable in the aggregate amount of US$4,000.00, it is the judgment of the Court that
said petitioner discharge that obligation by paying private respondent the sum of
P32,000.00, the equivalent in Philippine currency of US$4,000.00 at the conversion
rate of P8.00 to $1.00. Costs against private respondent.

H.E. Heacock Co. vs. Macondray & Co.

The plaintiff shipped Edmonton clocks from New York to Manila on board a
vessel of the defendant. It was agreed in the bill of lading that the value of
goods receipted do not exceed US$500 per freight on or in proportion for any
part of a ton, unless the value be expressly stated in the bill and freight paid.
It was also agreed that in the event of claims for shortage or damage the
carrier shall not be liable for more than the net invoice price plus freight and
insurance less charges, and any loss or damage for which the carrier may be
liable shall be adjusted pro rata on said basis. The clocks were not delivered
despite demands. Plaintiff claimed P420.00, the market value of the clocks,
while defendant tendered only P76.36, the proportionate freight ton value.
Trial court decided for the plaintiff for P226.02, the invoice value plus freight
and insurance. Both parties appealed.


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Ms. Dianne Rosales
Whether or not clause 1 or clause 9 of the bill of lading here in question is to
be adopted as the measure of defendant's liability?

Clause 1 provides as follows: it is mutually agreed that the value of the
goods receipted for above does not exceed $500 per freight ton, or, in
proportion for any part of a ton, unless the value be expressly stated herein
and ad valorem freight paid thereon. Clause 9 provides: also, that in the
even of claims for short delivery of, or damage to, cargo being made, the
carrier shall not be liable for more than the net invoice price plus freight and
insurance less all charges saved, and any loss or damage for which the
carrier may be liable shall be adjusted pro rata on the said basis. The
defendant-appellant contends that these two clauses, if construed together,
mean that the shipper and the carrier stipulate and agree that the value of
the goods receipted for does not exceed $500 per freight ton, but should the
invoice value of the goods be less than $500 per freight ton, then the invoice
value governs; that since in this case the invoice value is more than $500
per freight ton, the latter valuation should be adopted and that according to
that valuation, the proportionate value of the clocks in question is only
P76.36 which the defendant is ready and willing to pay to the plaintiff.

Citadel Lines vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner Citadel Line, Inc. is the general agent of vessel “Cardigan Bay/
Strait Enterprise,” while respondent Manila Wine Merchant Inc. is the
importer of the subject shipment of Dunhill cigarettes from England where
90 cases of which were missing.

Whether or not the loss occurred while the cargo in question was in the
custody of E. Razon, Inc. or of Citadel Lines, Inc?

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Ms. Dianne Rosales
The Court of Appeals declared in no uncertain terms that, on the basis of the
evidence presented, the subject cargo which was placed in a container van,
padlocked and sealed by the representative of the carrier was still in its
possession and control when the loss occurred, there having been no formal
turnover of the cargo to the Arrastre. Besides, there is the categorical
admission made by two witnesses, namely, Atty. Lope M. Velasco and Ruben
Ignacio, Claims Manager and Head Checker, respectively, of the carrier, that
for lack of space the containers were not turned over to and as the
responsibility of E. Razon Inc. The carrier is now estopped from claiming
otherwise. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case. If the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extra ordinary diligence as required in Article 1733 of the Civil Code. The
duty of the consignee is to prove merely that the goods were lost.
Thereafter, the burden is shifted to the carrier to prove that it has exercised
the extraordinary diligence required by law. And, its extraordinary
responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same
are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to
the person who has the right to receive them. Considering, therefore, that
the subject shipment was lost while it was still in the custody of herein
petitioner carrier, and considering further that it failed to prove that the loss
was occasioned by an excepted cause, the inescapable conclusion is that the
carrier was negligent and should be held liable therefor. The cases cited by
petitioner in support of its allegations to the contrary do not find proper
application in the case at bar simply because those cases involve a situation
wherein the shipment was turned over to the custody and possession of the
arrastre operator. We, however, find the award of damages in the amount of
P312,800.00 for the value of the goods lost, based on the alleged market
value thereof, to be erroneous.

Fabre vs. Court of Appeals


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Ms. Dianne Rosales
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda
minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school.
The couple had a driver, Cabil, whom they hired in 1981. His job was to take school
children to and from the St. Scholastica's College. Private respondent Word for the
World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the
transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union
and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount
of P3,000.00. On their way to La Union, they met an accident at a sharp curve, since
the driver was unfamiliar with the roads, it was raining, and it was a sharp curve.
The passengers were injured, one of them seriously who was paralyzed.

Are petitioners liable?

Held: Yes
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who
owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on
record. These factual findings of the two courts we regard as final and conclusive,
supported as they are by the evidence. Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres,
were themselves negligent in the selection and supervisions of their employee. Due
diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant
possessed a professional driver's license. The employer should also examine the
applicant for his qualifications, experience and record of service. Due diligence in
supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and issuance of proper instructions as well as actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. A person
who hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to the place to
which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no other control over the conduct of
the driver, is not responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from
recovering for injuries suffered from a collision between the automobile and a train,
caused by the negligence or the automobile driver.As already stated, this case
actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be
engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code
on common carriers to apply to them.The above article makes no distinction
between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity, as "a sideline".
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general
public,", and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained
from making such distinctions.

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